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Pakistan’s Responses to the United States’ Demands in the War against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

Fida Muhammad Bazai

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Politics
School of Social and Political Sciences
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September 2016
Abstract

The key objective of this project is to determine to what degree Pakistan has cooperated with the United States and what factors are responsible for the variance in Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the war against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. To determine the responses of the Pakistani government especially of its army, which is the core decision making body on issues of national importance, this thesis disaggregates the United States’ demands against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. The main purpose of identifying the demands against the three different terrorist organisations of various importance to the national security of the United States was to determine its effect on the Pakistani cooperation with the United States.

This thesis provides an alternative explanation of the Pakistani cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, which is different from the traditional one focused on the Indian factor. It argues that the Pakistani cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is dependent on three variables; the perception of the Pakistani army of the United States’ commitment, the military capability of the Pakistani army and the domestic opposition in Pakistan to cooperation with the United States. These factors don’t only provide explanation to the variance in Pakistani cooperation against different groups but also across different times.
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Author’s Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature _______________________________
Printed name: Fida Muhammad Bazai
## Definitions/Abbreviations

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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCCs</td>
<td>Border Coordination Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCR</td>
<td>Federal Crimes Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Frontier Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPR</td>
<td>Inter-Service Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of the National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWA</td>
<td>North Waziristan Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODRP</td>
<td>Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Political Agent</td>
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<td>PATA</td>
<td>Provincially Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz Sharif</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROZs</td>
<td>Reconstruction Opportunity Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs.</td>
<td>Pakistani rupees</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>South Waziristan Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNSM</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammedi</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAVs</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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Chapter 1 Pakistan’s Responses to the United States’ Demands in the War Against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

1.1 Introduction

The United States and Pakistan relationship has been one of the most complicated ones in the contemporary studies of international relations. It has been marked by both: period of strategic partnerships and mutual antipathy. The terrorist attack of September 2001 changed the direction of bilateral relationship for a small period of time, but it did not transform the nature of transnational relationship. On September 11, 2001, when nineteen hijackers used three commercial jets of the United States as missiles that killed more than 3,000 people in New York, immediately altered the priorities of the President George W. Bush administration. Terrorism, already a source of concern for the US, became the top objective of the administration. The Bush administration instantly identified Al-Qaeda as the key perpetrator of the ferocious attack on the United States’ homeland and declared war against terrorism. President Bush said in his address to a joint session of the Congress, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush, 2001). When the Taliban government, who hosted Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the Bush administration decided to change the regime in Kabul.

Pakistan as “The God Father of the Taliban” again re-emerged at the United States’ strategic radar screen (Elias, 2012). Director General of Pakistan’s Premier Intelligence agency: Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Mehmood Ahmed, who happened to be in Washington at the time of attack, became the first source of contact between the military junta in Islamabad and the Bush administration in Washington. Pakistan did not only support the Taliban’s government in Afghanistan, but also use extremism as source of foreign policy against its arch-rival India. On the other hand, it was the only nuclear power, which had the tendency of failing or a rogue state (Hussain, 2005, p.1). It was also directly ruled by an army that is ideologically committed to install a satellite regime in Afghanistan in order to prevent Indian presence in its backyard. The Bush administration, which was already aware of the deeply entrenched links between the Pakistani Army and the militant organizations in Afghanistan, immediately delivered a ‘blunt ultimatum’ to Pakistani

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1 According to a cable sent to Washington from the US embassy in Islamabad on 6th February 1996; The U.S. Embassy confronts an unnamed Pakistani official on the unsettling triangle possibly developing between Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Both bin Laden and the HUA have been granted
President Pervez Musharraf that stated, “You are either with us or against us” *(Musharraf, 2006, p.201).* President Musharraf claims in his book, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* that the US deputy Secretary of State; Richard Armitage, told the DG ISI that if Pakistan decides to support terrorists, then ‘it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age’ *(Musharraf, 2006, p.201)*. According to President Musharraf and several other sources, the US made seven demands against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban at the beginning of the global war on terror *(Musharraf, 2006; Rashid, 2009; Abbas, 2004)*. These were: (1) the deployment of forces on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan to prevent the flow of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; (2) the blanket over-flight and landing rights to the United States forces for military and intelligence operations inside Pakistan; (3) territorial access to Pakistani ports, air bases and strategic border locations for military operations against Al-Qaeda and those who harbour support for the group; (4) immediate provision of intelligence, immigration and internal security information to the US to prevent future attacks; (5) condemnation of terrorist attacks; (6) cutting off of the shipments of fuel, recruits and resources to the Taliban in Afghanistan; and, (7) breaking up the diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.

There are different perceptions regarding Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ seven demands. Scholars including Seth Jones (2007), Ahmed Rashid (2013), Ashley Tellis (2008), Hussain Haqqani (2015) and Bruce Riedel (2012) accuse Pakistan of taking one step forward and two steps back in order to protect its own interests in Afghanistan (by supporting the Taliban) while receiving billions of dollars from the United States *(Jones, 2007, p18; Tellis, 2008, p8)*. These scholars believe that the Musharraf government initially accepted all the demands of the United States against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but later hesitated to implement them thoroughly *(Rashid, 2008, p.34)*. They are of the view that Musharraf’s hesitancy reflected the military establishment’s perception that compliance with such requests would jeopardize Pakistan’s national security interests in Afghanistan. Therefore, they accuse Pakistan of playing a ‘double game’ with the United States. On the other hand, there are scholars like Vali Nasr (2014), Daniel Markey (2007), Barnett Rubin (2007) and

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2 The list of the United States seven demands against Al-Qaeda is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

3 Richard Armitage denied the allegation that he used the language of ‘bombed to the stone age’. Shuja Nawaz supports the Armitage position in his book, ‘Cross Swords’. He said that he was told by the Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Dr. Maliha Lodhi that Armitage did not use the word ‘bombed to the stone age’.

4 Ahmed Rashid, Kamran khan and Shuja Nawaz who carried independent research on this subject also confirmed the list of seven US demands from Pakistan.
Craig Cohen (2007) who put the blame of US failure in Afghanistan on the Bush administration by shifting the military and economic resources to Iraq. According to Barnett Rubin, “Contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, who attention after September 11 attacks quickly wandered off to Iraq and grand vision of transforming the Middle East, the main center of terrorism of global reach is in Pakistan.” (2007, p.57). In order to clear this paradox, this thesis aims to explain why Pakistan cooperates with the United States against Al-Qaeda by accepting its seven demands but at the same time not against the Afghan Taliban. Put schematically, then, this thesis will answer two central questions:

*How did Pakistan respond to the United States’ demands in the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban?*

*And*

*Why did Pakistan accept and comply with some demands of the United States after 9/11, while declining and/or reneging on others?*

This thesis claims that counter-terrorism cooperation between two sovereign states is a complicated phenomenon, which needs a detailed investigation of each aspect to reach a plausible conclusion on the nature of the bilateral relationship. The bulk of existing literature on Pakistan’s cooperation with the US against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is focused on geo-strategic aspects of the issue. This thesis does not deny the importance of geo-strategic explanation for Pakistan’s behaviour vis-à-vis the demands made by the United States concerning the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Small states like Pakistan surrounded by hostile countries like India are primarily concerned with threats to their national security from such states. They tend to take decisions in consideration of ‘other’ states that may threaten their sovereignty or national security. These states provide a good example of neorealist states that are concerned with the power of other states and give preference to the relative gains over the absolute one. In the case of Pakistan, it is a plausible assumption that policies focusing on Afghanistan are driven by the Army’s obsession with India for two reasons. Firstly, the Pakistani Army, unlike the armies of other democratic or semi-democratic countries, has complete control on strategic issues of national importance. Secondly, being mindful of the ‘unholy alliance’ between the Pakistani Army and the militant organisations in Kashmir, Afghanistan and at home, since the 1980s, many scholars still analyse the issue from that historical perspective. However, there are significant gaps in the geo-strategic
explanation of Pakistani responses to the United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

This chapter consists of five succeeding sections. The second discusses the exiting literature on Pakistan’s responses to the demands of the United States. The third section critically engages the existing literature by highlighting their shortcomings. The fourth mentions the contribution of this thesis to existing literature. And the fifth section will highlight the research methods employed for this study and argues why this thesis has selected three case studies to analyse Pakistan’s behaviour vis-à-vis US’ demands. The key data collection tools were elite interviews, Wiki Leaks cables, and policy reports from research institutes. The last section of this chapter will cast light upon the rest of this thesis by outlining the chapters ahead

1.2 Literature Review

The literature on Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda can be divided into four categories: Pakistan as a security-seeking state, as an ideological state, as a rent-seeking state, and as a US sceptic state. There are scholars who analyse Pakistan’s behaviour from the neorealist perspective. They believe that Pakistan is a ‘security-seeking state’ It will not cooperate with the US on the issue of terrorism, especially on the matter of the Afghan Taliban, due to Indian influence in Afghanistan (Krasner, 2012; Jones, 2008; Tellis, 2008). They suggest that the United States should play a role to resolve the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan to end their rivalry in Afghanistan. The second group of analysts believe that Pakistan is an ‘ideological state’. They are of the view that the Pakistani Army skilfully projected India through mainstream media and educational institutions as a Hindu state that threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005; Fair, 2014). They believe that the Pakistani Army is the source of all problems, not only domestically by derailing democracy, but also internationally by supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and Mujahedeen in Kashmir (Haqqani, 2005). They further argue that as long as the army controls Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies, chances of cooperation between Washington and Islamabad on the issue of terrorism are weak. They are also of the opinion that the Islamic discourse of Pakistan’s national security does not allow it to effectively move against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The third group considers Pakistan as a ‘rent-seeking state’. They argue that Pakistan’s army cooperate with the United States as long as that serves its institutional interest internationally and domestically at the expense country economic and social developments (Shah, 2011; Grare,
Chapter 1

2007; Rashid, 2008). This thesis claims that Pakistan is a ‘US sceptic state’. It argues that Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States on every issue depends on two things: Pakistan Army’s perception of the United States’ commitment and credibility, and domestic constraints on Pakistan behaviour.

1.2.1 Pakistan as security seeking State

There is a group of experts on terrorism who see Pakistan as a security-seeking state (Karsner, 2012; Jones, 2008; Tellis, 2008). They believe that there is a rivalry between India and Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir since their partition in 1947. India as a major power in the region poses a security threat to Pakistan. In order to balance India’s conventional superiority, Pakistan has adopted a two-pronged strategy: first, acquire nuclear weapons at the highest level to avoid the threat of military invasion, and second, support militant groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan to counter Indian influence and hegemony in the region. They argue that Pakistan, especially the Pakistani Army, sees issues surrounding Afghanistan from the Indian perspective. They believe that Pakistan will not support any regime in Kabul that is friendlier to New Delhi than to Islamabad, because a hostile regime will pose a threat to Pakistan from its western border with assistance from India, which lies on its eastern border. This would force Pakistan to protect two borders at the same time, which would not be possible given Pakistan’s current military capabilities. Experts from this school of thought are of the view that the Pakistani Army will not cooperate with the United States against the Afghan Taliban and other terrorist groups unless the latter resolves the issue of Kashmir between the former and India. They recommend that the US should use its diplomatic leverage on India and Pakistan to stop seeing Afghanistan as a ‘zero-sum game’.

This group connected with the political theory of neorealism. Neorealism provides a scientific explanation for the international political system by urging upon the role of international system. One of the key questions neorealism asks is why different states, with different political systems and internal set-ups, produce the same result. Waltz argues that it can be explained by the constraints that are imposed by the structure of the international system on their behaviour. He says, “A system's structure is defined first by the principle by which it is organized, then by the differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across units” (Waltz, 1979, p.93). He maintains that the ordering principle in the international system is anarchy, which is the organising principle that tells us how international structure emerges. The units in the system are self-regarding states, operating in power maximising ways, who at least seek to survive mainly aim at hegemony.
Neo-realists recognise non-state actors, but consider nation-states as the only entities entitled to use force to look after themselves and have fighting capabilities, which makes them (the states) the primary actors in the international system. It further argues that all states are alike, but only differentiated by their capabilities. It ignores cultural, political and social differences among states because of the importance of the international system. Whether a state is democratic, liberal or despotic, it doesn’t matter when it comes to dealing with other states because of international constrains. Neorealism also believes that it does not matter who controls a state’s foreign policy, whether a civilian government or a military junta. “Realists treat the state as if they are black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.73). According to neorealism, the distribution of military, considered as systemic factors, is the key variable for explaining state behavior. It maintains that state leaders are prisoners of the international system; hey must do what international system dictates. Neorealists say, “If states are to be secure in an anarchic world, they need to pay heed to the structural constraints under which they operate. Simplistically stated, powerful states can and indeed should or must “do more” than less powerful states” (Jakobsen, 2013). The question of how much power is enough for a major power has further divided neo-realists into offensive and defensive camps.

John Mearsheimer, who is the premier of the offensive realism, suggested five assumptions regarding the nature of international system. First, the international system is anarchic, but that does not mean it is chaotic; second, every state has some offensive capability; third, it is dangerous to rely on the intentions of other states by ignoring their capabilities, because it is difficult to verify their intent; fourthly, the main goal of state is survival, which entails protecting its territorial integrity and the autonomy of its domestic order from outside interventions; and lastly, states are rational actors, which means that they are capable of coming up with sound strategies for maximising their prospects for survival (Measheimer, 2006, pp73-74). According to Mearsheimer, “When the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other” (Mearsheimer 2001, p.32). He argues that all states are in constant struggle to maximize their power, because it will maximize their security. This relentless struggle between states makes them vulnerable to attack. Mearsheimer believes that if a state has the opportunity to attack the other to change the distribution of power in its favour, it will do so, because that can increase its own security. This makes state particularly attentive to relative gains, because it will jeopardise their security in the long run.
The group that considers Pakistan as a ‘security-seeking state’ treats the state as a unitary actor and the Army as its representative. The prominent scholars who have adopted this perspective include Ashley Tellis, Stephen Krasner, and Seth Jones. They are of view that Pakistan’s cooperate with the United States against Al-Qaeda, but not against the Afghan Taliban, because it will need the former to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. According to Kronstadt and Katzman, “Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of “strategic encirclement” taking note of New Delhi’s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001 opening of several Indian consulates in Afghanistan” (2008, p.9). Similarly, Ashley Tellis said in his testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that Pakistan does not cooperate with the United States on the issue of Afghanistan, because their objectives are fundamentally at odds. He said regarding Pakistan’s objective in Afghanistan, “It desires an Afghanistan that would be at least deferential to, if not dependent on, Islamabad where Kabul’s critical strategic and foreign policy choices are concerned. (Tellis, 2011, p4). Seth Jones argues that Pakistan does not support the US in Afghanistan because of its rivalry with India. According to Jones, ‘Pakistan’s motives have largely been geostrategic. Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul-Haq once remarked to the head of the ISI, General Akhter Abdul Rehman that ‘the water [in Afghanistan] must boil at the right temperature (2007, p.17). According to Stephen Krasner:

Its policies are a fully regional response to the conception of the country’s national interest held by its leaders, especially those in the military. Pakistan’s fundamental goal is to defend itself against its rival, India. Islamabad deliberately uses nuclear proliferation and deterrence, terrorism and its prickly relationship with the United States to achieve this objective (2012, p.91).

They don’t consider domestic constraints as being important in Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands. They are exclusively focused on analysing the behaviour of the Pakistani state from a geo-strategic perspective.

1.2.2 Pakistan as an Ideological State

This group of scholars believe that Pakistan’s problems are ideological and conceptual rather than physical. They trace Pakistan’s present perception as an insecure state to its independence movement before partition with India in 1947, when Muslims demanded a separate homeland from Hindus (Ayub, 2016). They believe that Pakistan’s fear of India as a survival threat and the dispute over the issue of Kashmir became the fundamentals of its national security discourse, which were reinforced in its educational institutions. They claim
that Pakistan’s state institutions, especially its national security institutions such as the military and the intelligence services, have played a leading role in building the Pakistani national identity on the basis of religion and fear of India since Pakistan’s independence (Haqqani, 2005, p.10). They are of the view that Pakistan’s focus on its rivalry with India as an existential threat defined the relationship between the state and citizens and provided legitimacy to a new security state dominated by fear of India (Fair, 2011, p. 91). These scholars allege that Pakistani officials did not only use Islam to unify a multilingual and multi-ethnic society domestically, but also used it to reinforce Pakistan’s Islamic identity against India’s predominantly Hindu population (Mathews, 2005, p.2). According to them, the unnecessary conflict with India diverted meagre resources from socio-economic development at home to an arms race that further strengthened the exalted status of the Army on major issues. They think that Pakistan’s emphasize on Islam as an instrument of national policy empowered the religious organizations that strengthened the alliance between the Islamists and the security establishment against the secular and ethnic forces domestically, and against India and to an extent against Afghanistan regionally (Haqqani, 2005, p.91).

This group analyses Pakistan’s behaviour from constructivist’s perspective. Constructivism provides an alternative explanation of state behaviour to neorealism and neoliberalism that are two dominant theoretical frameworks in International Relations. It challenges the microeconomic disciplinary foundations of International Relations (Checkel, 1998, p. 333). Constructivism emphasises that the processes and dynamics of interactions between states is important, not the structure. It provides a sociological account of the world politics, where norms, ideas, culture and identities play a central role (Jackson & McDonald, 2009, p.16). Constructivism gives special importance to the role of institutions and norms in the international system. Norms have the same value for constructivists in explaining the behaviour of a state, as distribution of power for neorealist and distribution of preferences for neoliberalists. According to Checkel, “for constructivists norms are collective understandings that make behavioural claims on actors. Their effects reach deeper: they constitute actors’ identities and interests and don’t simply regulate behaviour” (1998, p. 328). The fundamental difference between rationalism and constructivism is over the nature of international system, particularly anarchy, and whether it is social or not. Anarchy is the core principle of neorealism and a key component of neoliberalism; therefore, it is at the centre of debate between rationalism and constructivism. According to constructivists, the definition of the ‘Self’ in respect to the ‘Other’ defines the nature of anarchy. If a state defines its security in ‘self-interested’ term, then it leads to competitive politics, self-help and security dilemmas, which are some of many kinds of anarchies. On the other hand, if it
defines its identity in communitarian terms then it will trigger politics of cooperation and collective security. It challenges two core principles of neorealism and neoliberalism: the understanding of the international system solely in material terms, and the effect of institutions and structure on the identities of states (Checkel, 1998, p. 333). It defies materialism and methodological individualism of rationalism (Katzenstein, 1996, pp.16-17).

Constructivism, unlike rationalism, does not take interest and identity as given, but rather argues that they are socially constructed and are the basis of states behaviours. According to Wendt, “Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have the ’portfolio’ of interest that they carry around independent of social context: instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situation” (1992, p.398). Constructivism considers identity and interest as key variables that determine a country’s foreign policy, not distribution of capabilities and anarchy (Wendt, 1992, p.397). Weldes argues, “The representation created by the state officials make clear not to those officials themselves and to others who and what ‘we’ are and who and what ‘our enemy’ are, in what ways ‘we’ are threatened by ‘them and how ‘we’ best deal with those ‘threats’ (1996, p. 283). According to constructivists, the emergence of any particular social institution in a situation depends on the identities and interests of actors. Once an institution is established after inter-subjective knowledge of understanding and expectation, it starts affecting the behaviours of the actors. Therefore, identities and institutions are mutually constitutive. Michael Barnett writes, “Identity is the understanding of oneself in relationship to others. They are fundamentally social and ideational and defined by the actor’s interaction with and relationship to others” (199, p.9). According to Jackson and McDonald, “Agents constitute structure through their beliefs, actions, and interactions, while structure constitutes agents by helping to shape their identities and interests” (2009, p.17). Checkel also claims that, “Constructivism emphasizes a process of interaction between agents and structure; the ontology is one of mutual constitution, where neither unit of analysis is reduced to the other and made ontologically primitive” (1998, p.326). One of the key criticisms of constructivism on rationalism is that the latter ignores the effect of the agent’s identity on the nature of structure, because it has taken the identity and interest of agent as a given (Wendt, 1987, p.340; Checkel, 1998, p. 326).

Prominent analysts like George Perkovich, Christine Fair, and Hussain Haqqani lead this group of scholars. Fair is of the view that Pakistan’s army instrumentalized Islam in order to strengthen its national identity by building an ideological state, and by pursuing ‘Islamization’ the state gradually made a “strategic commitment to Jihadi ideology” (2011, p 136). According to Fair, “The army believes that it is—and is believed by many Pakistanis
to be the only institution capable of protecting Pakistan. The army is able to sustain that claim principally by convincing Pakistanis that India, and to a lesser degree Afghanistan, pose existential threat” (2011, p97). Hussain Haqqani, a leading constructivist on Pakistan’s national security studies claims, “The emphasis on Islam as an element of national policy empowered the new country’s religious leaders. It also created a nexus between the ‘custodian of Islam’ and the country’s military establishment” (2005, p.29, r31). He is of the view that the belief of the security establishment that India represents an existential threat to Pakistan led the latter to maintain a large military, which resulted in its dependence on the United States. He claims Pakistani security establishment’s insecurity vis-a-vis India is psychological rather than physical, which could not be resolved even by acquiring nuclear weapons (Haqqani, 2005, p.230). He sees fewer chances that Pakistan’s security establishment will cooperate against the Afghan Taliban, unless it changes its mind set in respect to India, give up power domestically to democratic forces, and focuses on economic development at home. Otherwise, the religious rhetoric and rivalry with India will further push Pakistan towards a failed and dysfunctional state, which will increase its reliance on militant organizations like the Taliban in order to protect its interests in the region.

1.2.3 **Pakistan as rent-seeking state**

The third group of scholar belongs to neoliberalism and considers the domestic politics of a country crucial for the formation of that country’s foreign policy. “It rests on the assumptions that domestic actors or structures influence the foreign policy identity and interests of states as well as their actual behaviour in international relations” (Panke & Risse, 2007, p 90). Neoliberalism believes that when domestic actors share power over decision-making and their policy preferences differ, then treating the state as a unitary actor risks distorting our understanding of international relations. For understanding international relations, it is, therefore, essential to understand the ‘structure of domestic preferences’ of different actors. This structure refers to the relative positions of important domestic actors’ preferences on the issue at hand. The policy preferences of the actors in domestic politics are derived from their interests. It is assumed that actors have some fundamental interests. According to Milner, there are three domestic groups that influence a country’s foreign policy: the executive, the legislative, and the interest groups (1997, p35). The policy preferences of these three domestic groups and of foreign country are used to determine the structure of preferences. The relative position of these groups in respect to the foreign country determines the nature of that group’s preferences, whether they are hawkish or dovish (Milner, 1997, p37).
Groups within a state usually have different policy preferences because they are differently affected by government policies. Every policy change will have domestic distributional consequences that divide the society between proponents and opponents of the change. They pressurise governments to pursue policies that promote their particular interests. The differences in policy preferences among the actors who share power, called ‘structure of domestic preferences’ have significant effects on international cooperation. The structure of domestic preferences also differs on issue areas. On different issues the actors will have different preferences. “No single national structure of preferences exists; rather, this structure will change with the issue area” (Milner, 1997, p17). The structure of domestic preferences also affects the probability and terms of the international cooperation. Milner believes that when dovish actors hold power, cooperation is more likely and when hawkish actors are holding power, there are less chances of cooperation between two states (1997, p17). The structure regards domestic groups as strategic rational actors in foreign policy making and does not believe in the difference between domestic and foreign policy. It argues that when the interest of a societal actor is significantly affected by the action of a state at the international level, there are strong incentives for it to influence a state’s foreign policy through various ways. According to constructivists, advocacy groups, epistemic communities, and knowledge-brokers play critical roles as norm entrepreneurs (Haas, 1992; Checkel, 1999, p.548). Rationalists, on the hand, believe that societal actors can influence state policy through several ways, which basically depends on the nature of polity. For example, in the United States societal groups try to influence politicians through lobbying practices and bargaining.

This group of scholar includes Ahmed Rashid (2008), Ayesha Saddiqa (2011), Aqil Shah (2011), Frederic Grare (2007) and Bruce Riedel (2001). They are of the view that Musharraf regime cooperated with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for personal and institutional advantages. They think the one per cent of Pakistan’s military and civilian elites, whose interests have always been misaligned with those of general population in Pakistan and world community, have hijacked the political and economic system in Pakistan for their personal benefits (Saddiqa, 2011, p.149). According to Grare, At the core of the problem is the Pakistani military, which has dominated Pakistan’s politics since 1958 and has developed over the years nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur rather than on any rational analysis of the country’s national interest (2007, p. i).
They believe that Pakistan’s priorities show the specific institutional interests of its army, not the general welfare of its people (Shah, 2011). They are of the view that the army has always exploited the tendency in the United States policy to achieve short term objectives at the expense of long-term goals, whether it was during cold war or in the war on terror (Puri, 2011). Ahmed Rashid said that Pakistan’s Army cooperated against Al-Qaeda, because it perfectly matched with Army concept of national interest. He says, “Washington’s limited aims suited Pakistani army perfectly because they allowed for a new strategic alliance with the United States at minimum risk to the army’s concept of national security” (Rashid, 2008, p. 325). Rashid believes that the Army’s concept of national security rests on three pillars: resisting Indian hegemony in the region, protecting and developing the nuclear program, and promoting a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008, p. 325) They suggest that the United States should not trade off democratization for the country cooperation against Al-Qaeda (Grare, 2007, p.7). Bruce Riedel also presumes that there are very slim chances of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on the issue of Afghanistan as long as Pakistani Army controls it foreign policy, because its conception of Pakistan’s national interest is in conflict with the objectives of the United States in Afghanistan (2011). They argue that Pakistan accelerated its operation against Al-Qaeda only after its suicide attacks against General Musharraf and army officers.

1.3 Critical engagement of the exiting literature

This thesis claims that Pakistan’s rivalry with India defines the broad parameters of its security and foreign policy, but doesn’t determine its policy towards the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. This thesis challenges the assumptions that Pakistan cooperated with the United States against Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, because they were not useful strategically against India. This thesis also does not accept the constructivists’ explanation that Pakistan is an ideological state and that it perceives India in religious terms. This work also refutes neo-liberal claims that Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States was determined by the Army’s institutional interest and conception of national interest.

1.3.1 Security Seeking State perspective

Some of the prominent scholars like Ashley Tellis (2008), Stephen Krasner (2011) and Seth Jones (2008) presented Pakistan as security-seeking state that did not cooperate with the United States because of the Indian factor. It is true that Pakistan is concerned about the nature of regime in Afghanistan, because it is important to Pakistan’s security in more than
one ways. Many states are apprehensive about the nature of regime in their immediate neighbourhood, for example the US Monroe doctrine, Britain’s protection of English channel in nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, Turkey’s worries about Syria and Saudi Arabia concerns about instability in Yemen. Pakistan is similarly concerned about the influence of Iran and India in Afghanistan and instability in Kabul, but the key question is about Pakistan’s perception of the United States’ commitment to Afghanistan. Pakistan is willing to cooperate with the US if it perceives that Washington DC will go to any extent to bring stability in Afghanistan, even if it requires punishing Pakistan as it did post-9/11. Pakistan cooperated with the United States against the Afghan Taliban after 9/11, in spite of fears of Indian influence, because it knew that the Bush administration would punish Islamabad if it did not. Pakistan changed its policy towards the Afghan Taliban when it understood that the United States was not interested in nation-building in Afghanistan first by invading Iraq then transferring the responsibility of stability to NATO in 2005. The above-mentioned scholars have acknowledge this point that the diversion of resources to Iraq and the lack of investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan are the primary factors responsible for the revival of the Afghan Taliban—because Afghanistan did not remain the top priority of the Bush administration5. But, they ignore applying the same logic to the United States’ relationship with Pakistan in respect to the Afghan Taliban.

1.3.2 Ideological State perspective

As mentioned above, the renowned scholars who analyse Pakistan’s behaviour from the constructivist perspective are Hussain Haqqani, Christine Fair, Touqir Hussain and Muhammad Ayoob. They believe that the perceived security threat to Pakistan from India is psychological rather than physical. They claim that even nuclear weapons could not solve Pakistan’s security syndrome. It is true that there is a conservative group in Pakistan’s army who sees an ‘Indian hand’ in every problem Pakistan faces. They exaggerate India to salience opponents, to acquire personal and institutional benefits, and to keep Pakistan as a security state by disproportionately investing in the procurement of modern weapons. However, these developments do not mean that India does not pose a security threat to Pakistan. India has previously assisted the secessionist movement in East Pakistan in 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is on record saying that India

did not just train guerrillas for the civil war in East Pakistan, but also sent its Special Operation Forces to destabilise East Pakistan. This thesis does not claim that West Pakistan’s policies did not play a critical role, but the issue could have been settled on less than the independence of Bangladesh had India not intervened and declared war on Pakistan. It shows that India will not hesitate to replicate the Bangladesh module again if it gets the chance. Therefore, Pakistan’s security establishment has to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan to minimise New Delhi’s chances of interfering in Pakistan from across the Durand Line. The second hard reality that constructivists ignore is the Indian military’s capabilities, the nature of weapons system and strategy. India does not have a warm relationship with China and also shares longer border with Beijing than with Pakistan, but its force deployment posture is heavily biased towards Pakistan. The Indian Army consists of 13 Corps, 10 are defensive, while three are Strike Corps. The three Strike Corps consist of three Armored, four Infantry, five Mechanized and three Artillery Divisions. But the only country these merchandised components (3000-plus tanks and armored personnel carriers) could be deployed against is Pakistan, due to the mountainous nature of the terrain on the northeastern border (Sufyan, 2011). Similarly, Indian Navy is also primarily focused on Pakistan. These developments show that Pakistan has to keep a minimum deterrence in order to avoid a humiliating defeat against India.

1.3.3 Rent-seeking perspective

This perspective discusses several domestic issues that affect Pakistan’s war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These primarily include the social code in tribal areas, the military strategy of the Pakistani Army, the constitutional and legal status of FATA and the socio-economic condition of tribal areas. It is difficult to confront all he relevant points of this perspective. Pakistan did face these problems in implementing counter-insurgency in FATA, but the ambiguity about the future of Afghanistan, the Army’s policy of good Taliban versus bad Taliban, strategic differences between Washington DC and Islamabad, and the rivalry with India also complicated Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. For example, FATA did not constitute the top priority of the Pakistani Army. It did not want to deploy a large number of troops from its eastern border with India towards FATA. This was one of the primary factors responsible for the lack of success against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Secondly, there was a perception in the Pakistani Army that the United States will resort to a political solution in Afghanistan, which serves its interest in multiple ways. Therefore, it deliberately adopted the policy of good and bad Taliban that affected cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. There was higher level of cooperation
against Al-Qaeda, but not against the Afghan Taliban, because of the strategic differences between Islamabad and Washington DC on the end game in Afghanistan. This issue could not be resolved by political and legal reforms in tribal areas.

1.4 Contribution of this Research

As it was depicted in the previous section that neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism frameworks that have presented Pakistan as ‘security-seeking’, ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘ideological’ state respectively do not comprehensively cover Pakistani responses to the US' demands. This thesis applies neo-classical realism to analyse these responses. It will try to determine the effect of three things on Pakistan responses to the demands of the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: perception of the Pakistani elites regarding international pressure, domestic distributional consequences of cooperation with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and the military capability of the Pakistani Army in the presence of a threat from India. It will determine how Pakistan responded to the intensity of the United States’ demand against the Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani) and Al-Qaeda. It will also determine the effect of domestic constraints on Pakistan’s response to the United States. It will determine the influence of right-wing political parties and madrassah network on Pakistan’s behaviour. It will also assess how Pakistan’s military capability affected its calculation to cooperate or not with the United States.

1.4.1 Neo-Classical Realism

Neo-classical realism draws upon the theoretical insight of the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of Han Morgenthau, Henry Kissenger, and Arnold Wolfers (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p.4). Neo-classical locates causal properties at both structural and unit levels. It maintains the causal primacy of the structural variables (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p.23). It stresses upon the importance of decision-makers’ perception of the international system. According to neo-classical realism, the international system is anarchic, but it is neither Hobbesian nor benign, as offensive and defensive realism believe, but murky and difficult to read. It believes that world leaders are constrained by international and domestic politics.

Neo-classical realism argues that a country’s foreign policy is driven by the country’s relative material power, yet it claims that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through intervening
unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perception and state structure (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p.5). The calculation and perceptions of leaders can inhabit a timely and objectively efficient response or policy adaptation to shifts in the external environment. Foreign policy elites are sitting at the intersection of the international and domestic system. They can act internationally for domestic reasons or domestically for international ones. There is no perfect “transmission belt” linking the relative distribution of power and states’ foreign policy. Officials make policy choices based on their perceptions and calculations of relative power and other states’ intensions (Tailiaferro, 2009, p.213). International imperatives filtered through the medium of state structure and affected how top officials assessed likely threats, identified viable strategies in response to those threats, and ultimately extract societal resources necessary to implement and sustain those strategies (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, pp.3-4). Unit level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states to respond to systemic imperatives. Leaders face two-tiered games in devising and implementing grand strategy: on the one hand, they must respond to the external environment, but on the other, they must extract and mobile resources from domestic society, work through existing state institutions and maintain the support of key stake holders (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p.7). Neo-classical realism treats the state as an intervening variable. Foreign policy elites are solo foreign policy makers. They are responsible to protect and promote national interests. Societal leaders, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with narrower interests. Nationalists and internationalists societal leaders are always engaged in a political calculation on how threat assessments affect their relative domestic position and power.

Neo-classical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and the society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neo-realism about constrain of the international system (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p13). It recognises that many states do not function as unitary actors in international politics. Sometimes, there are internal divisions and disagreements among the foreign policy elites on the nature of threat to a given country. According to Tailiaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 

It seeks to explain why, how and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states- the extractive and mobilisation capacity of the politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from the society and the level of elite or societal cohesion- intervening between the leaders’ assessment of the international threats and opportunities and actual diplomatic, military and economic foreign policies those leaders pursue (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, P4)
Neo-classical realism claims that as there are competitions and struggles between states at the international level, similarly, there are competitions within states between various groups to capture a state’s institutions. It argues that the international system imposes certain generalizable pressures on all countries, but the foreign policy behaviour of a state can be explained only by unit level variables. “Neo-classical realists suggest that international systemic pressures are the most important cause behind the foreign policy behaviour of particular states, but only through the mediating effect of unit level variables such as elite perceptions and domestic political conditions” (Dueck, 2009, p 141).

Fareed Zakaria claims in his book From “Wealth to Power” that the United States did not expand rapidly from 1865 to 1899 instead of economic development, population growth and access to natural resources, because the state could not turn its national power into state power (1999, p.9). Whereas, on the other hand, when the state achieved a measure of strength vis-à-vis society from 1899 to 1908 due to cohesion in institutions, autonomy from society and ability to generate revenue, it rapidly expanded overseas by acquiring colonies in the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico (Zakaria, 1999, p. 9). Friedberg claims that Soviet Union, a second ranked great power, successfully acquired nuclear weapons, occupied eastern Europe and challenged the United States for four decades, simply due to the highly centralised nature of governance system that allowed the state to have complete control on state resources (1987, p.120). The ability of a state to extract resources from society is not simply function of institutions, but also depends on the political leaders (Taliaferro, 2009, 217). Leaders usually face the challenge of convincing people to sacrifice for the sake of a policy. For example, President Obama did not allow the Pentagon to extend the length of American forces in Afghanistan due to domestic pressure instead of positive reports from ground (Woodward, 2009, p 239). This goes to show that domestic constraints seriously affect policy of states.

Neo-classical realism as other variant of realism has a pessimistic view of human nature. It believes that human beings cannot survive as individuals; therefore, they have to form a larger group that commands their loyalty and provides some measure of security from external enemies. According to neo-classical realism, tribalism is an immutable fact of political and social life (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009, p14). It is of the view that politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups under a general scarcity of resources and opportunities. According to Gilpin, “The essence of social reality is the group. The building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life are not the individuals of liberal thought or the classes of Marxism conflict groups” (2009, p305). It believes that fear
is the fundamental cause of group formation, because physical security is the pre-requisite of pursuing other kinds of happiness. Therefore, neo-classical realism identifies the state as the most important actor in the international system, because its survival ensures the security of individuals from internal discriminations and external threats.

The starting point for neo-classical realist is Max Weber’s definition of a state: “[The] state is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within given territory” (1978, 904-05). It present a top-down conception of the state, where the national security executive represents the state and has the authority to define national interests, make foreign policy and extract domestic resources to implement a decision. National security executive is sitting at the juncture of international and domestic system, where it accurately assesses the international constraints and domestic conditions for the implementation of a strategy (Tailiaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2016, p.6). The national executive also has private information through state agencies and is better informed about intentions of other states. It has the final authority over the definition of ‘national interest’, but cannot ignore the influence of domestic groups. Therefore, it has to bargain with the domestic groups for the implementation of a strategy. Neo-classical realism views policy responses to shift in balance of power as product of state-society coordination or struggle (P27). According to Ripsman, less autonomous states must frequently build coalitions and make compromises to mobilise social and political actors in order to enact a policy as George H. W. Bush did in preparation for the 1991 Gulf war (Ripsman, 2002, p. 43).

1.4.2 Pakistan as US sceptic state

This thesis and Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer’s book on Pakistan’s negotiating style with the United States, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the roller coaster, are based on neo-classical realism. Both literatures consider Pakistan’s foreign policy elites’ perception of the United States’ commitment as the most important factor in changing Pakistan’s policy. This thesis deems Pakistan as a US sceptic state. Howard and Teresita Schaffer succinctly demonstrate in their study that Pakistan’s negotiating style is the product of its place in the international system, Pakistan’s national cultural characteristics and power-relationship within Pakistani government (Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011, p.2). They further elaborated each of the three factors influencing Pakistan’s negotiating style in three condense chapters. According to Schaffers, the most important factor is Pakistan’s geo-political identity that is the result of its foreign policy elites’ perception of the United States’ reliability, rivalry with India, fragile relationship with
Afghanistan, “All Weather friendship with China”, and diplomatically active role in the Muslim Ummah (global Muslim community, p.15). They are of the view that Pakistan’s national cultural, that gives more value to the rights and obligations of the group (contradictory to American culture), stresses hospitality and honour, provides the prism for Pakistani negotiators to express themselves (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011, p.29). The third important factor according to Schaffers, is the structure of the Pakistani government. This consists of the division between civilian and army and the prominent role of army on strategic issues (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011, p. 22). They claim that these three factors enable Pakistani negotiators to cultivate “the art of the guilt trip” in negotiations with the United States (Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011, p.3).

The book comprehensively illustrates how the institutional cultures of Pakistan's army, bureaucracy and politicians are further affecting Pakistan’s negotiation styles. They indicate how Pakistan’s army, that enjoys domestic supremacy, recall their institutional ethos to the negotiation table with the United States. They have eloquently analysed the institutional cultures of Pakistan’s army, bureaucracy and politicians in three brief chapters. The rare contribution of their book is the exploration of national and institutional cultures on Pakistan’s negotiating styles with the United States. Several critical scholars such as Hussain Haqqani (2005), Christine Fair (2014) and Muhammad Ayub (2011) have mentioned the influence of the army narrative and world view on Pakistan’s policy towards the United States, but they failed to highlight the importance of national and institutional cultures. Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer supported their argument by giving examples of Field Marshal Ayub khan, General Zia ul- Haq and General Pervez Musharraf’s periods of engagement with the United States in three case studies respectively. In the last chapter, they recommended that the United States’ interlocutors should avoid falling into the guilt trip, as well as understanding the cultural sensitive nature of their Pakistani counterparts to avoid the third divorce.

However, Howard and Teresita Schaffers did not provide satisfactory answers to three important points in their book. They claim that Pakistan cooperated with the United States after 9/11 due to the influence of India providing bases to the United States against Pakistan (Schaffer 7 Schaffer, 2011, p.22). However, in Musharraf’s autobiography, he states that Pakistan accepted the United States demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda due to threat of attack from the United States (2006, p202). This notion was also confirmed by several other authors at the time. This thesis does not only challenge Schaffers’ claims that Pakistan changed its policy against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda due to the Indian factor, but also argues
in the subsequent chapters that Pakistan accepted US demands due to high importance of the issue to the US national security. Secondly, they are of the view that some elements of the ISI continued its contacts with the Afghan Taliban after 9/11, which is called as the “rainy day policy” in order to negate Indian influence in Afghanistan when deemed necessary (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011, p.21). This thesis claims that Pakistan did not conduct similar level of counter-terrorism operations against the Afghan Taliban due to reduced focus of the United States in pursuing the Taliban after the removal of the Taliban’s regime in Kabul, when they were no longer considered as threat to the US national security. Therefore, Pakistan’s government avoided conducting any operation against the Taliban, for fear of creating domestic instability. Furthermore, even anti-Taliban war lords in Afghanistan stopped looking for the Taliban and wanted to arrest Al-Qaeda’s members to get bounty prizes from the CIA. Thirdly, they did not discuss the shift in Pakistan’s policy towards the Pakistani Taliban under the US pressure. This thesis claims that when the Pakistani Taliban expanded from tribal areas to Pakistan’s mainland, it elevated the level of threat to US national security due to nuclear weapons which precipitated pressure to change policy against the Pakistani Taliban.

This thesis will show how states respond to the importance of an issue to the national security of the other states rather than to power. It will try to investigate how the perception of Pakistan’s military establishment towards the United States’ commitment against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda plays a role in the decision to accept the United States demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The perception of the Pakistani military establishment of the United States’ commitment against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda depends on three elements: the level of threat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda pose to the United States’ national security, which determines the United States’ long term commitment to fight against the group; the political will of the United States to either punish or reward Pakistan substantially to force it to change its policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; and the support in the United States for the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.  

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6 This study is particularly important in the present context, when the threat of terrorism has been expanding from Afghanistan and Iraq to Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Kenya and Nigeria. When state A (a weak state) has different perceptions about the importance of an issue to the national security of the state B (a powerful super or major power), it (A) will not accept the demand of the state B. It shows that sheer accumulation of power is not the determining factor in influencing other state behaviour, but the will to use the power is the primary determining factor, which is only possible when an issue of strategic importance is at stake.
The second contribution of the thesis is a comprehensive survey of Pakistan’s military capability to carry out counter-insurgency operations in FATA and Balochistan in the presence of the threat from India. It is important to precisely determine the capability of Pakistan’s army against Al-Qaeda, and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban before forcing Pakistan’s political will. This thesis will disaggregate Pakistan responses to each demand of the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. It will provide a detailed map of Pakistan’s military capability that will enable readers to assess whether Pakistan does not cooperate with the United States due to lack of military capability or political will.

The third contribution of this thesis is the analyses of domestic constraints on Pakistan’s behaviour in respect to the US demands. It will examine the effect of two important factors: the opposition from the right-wing political parties and the resistance of madrassas’ network, on Pakistan’s responses the United States’ demands especially on military operation that involves massive use of kinetic means and the destruction of areas on a large scale. At the political level, the right-wing political parties like Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), Jumiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) have always opposed Pakistan’s alliance with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Khan, 2010, Rehman, 2012, Haq, 2013). They depicted Pakistan’s war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as the extension of the United States’ war in Afghanistan against the Afghan Taliban and urged the government to distance itself from the United States war on terror (Khan 2010). It will assess whether the right-wing political parties’ opposition to the demands of the United States against the militants plays a role in influencing the government decision or not. Secondly, it will also assess the role of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan, where hundreds of thousands of students are getting religious education and have a similar worldview to that of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In fact, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda recruit their foot soldiers and suicide bombers from these madrassas (Fair, 2008). The best example of the madrassas’ affiliation with and support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is the Lal Masjid.\footnote{Two months after the Lal Masjid siege, an 18-year boy blew himself up inside the high-security base of Zarrar Company, the elite commando unit of the Pakistan Army responsible for Operation Silence; 22 soldiers were killed. It was an inside job. Zahid Hussain writes: ’One of the officers identified was Captain Khurram Ashiq, who had been with Pakistan's Special Services Group and had also served in Zarrar Company’ (121). Captain Khurram Ashiq died in Helmand fighting on the side of Al-Qaeda.}
1.5 Research Methods

This thesis adopts a case study research methodology to analyse various internal and external factors responsible for Pakistani responses to the demands of the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This thesis has selected three case studies to comprehensively cover the important issues between Pakistan and the United States and illustrates a complete picture of the nature of the bilateral relationship since 9/11. Although there are several issues between Pakistan and the United States, like the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s relationship with India, the domestic militant organisations within Pakistan such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, this thesis will exclusively focus on counter-terrorism issues and analyse through rigorous empirical research Pakistan’s responses to the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. This thesis selected three case studies (Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban) for following reasons.

Firstly, these three terrorist organisations (Al-Qaeda, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban) were posing different levels of threat to the national security of the United States. Al-Qaeda was a terrorist organisation responsible for 9/11 and aimed to attack the United States’ again. Therefore, it was the top priority of the United States to defeat Al-Qaeda in order to protect its homeland from another spectacular attack. The Afghan Taliban were Al-Qaeda’s allies, who provided sanctuaries to Al-Qaeda before 9/11 and are currently at war with the United States in Afghanistan. They undermined the US’ interest in Kabul and killed American soldiers in Afghanistan, but were not involved in attacking the United States’ homeland. A group of US officials in the Obama administration, led by Vice President; John Biden, basically opposed sending extra troops to Afghanistan in 2009 on the same ground that the Afghan Taliban did not pose security threat to the United States. It shows that the Afghan Taliban were perceived as posing a lower level of threat to the US than Al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban were the local allies of Al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and are currently at war with the Pakistani government over its alliance with the United States. The Pakistani Taliban were not directly involved in fighting the United States’ forces, but their expansion from tribal areas to Pakistan’s mainland created concerns in Washington regarding safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. New York Times called safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons “Obama’s Worst Nightmare” (Sanger, 2009). According to Professor Graham Allison, “When you map W.M.D. and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan,” (Sanger, 2009). A detailed analysis of the Pakistani responses will
show how important the US priority factor is in changing Pakistan’s policy towards Al-Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Secondly, these three case studies were selected, because they had different consequences for Pakistan economically and militarily. For example, it was easier of the Pakistani government to meet the United States’ demands against Al-Qaeda; consisted of few hundred foreigners, than the Taliban; who were locals and had support of the disenchanted youth in FATA. It was also convenient for the government to identify Al-Qaeda member, but problematic to differentiate between tribes and the Taliban in North and South Waziristan. It needed greater amount of resources and large number of troops on ground to encounter the Taliban’s insurgency than arresting few hundreds Al-Qaeda members. These case studies will show how capabilities issues of Pakistan’s Army affected its responses to the United States’ demands against these terrorist organisations. It is also important to remember that the Pakistani government had to meet these challenges at a time when it did not enjoy cordial relationship with India.

Thirdly, the level of cooperation also varied regarding the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. For example, there was higher level of cooperation between Islamabad and Washington against Al-Qaeda than Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. On the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan eventually accepted the United States’ demand to change its policy from appeasement to containment, when they expanded from tribal areas to Swat and Buner, who are at the distance of 60 mile from Islamabad. On the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani government did not accept any demand of the United States instead of tremendous pressure from the Obama administration, especially at the time of surge in the US forces in Afghanistan. A detailed analysis will illustrate why Pakistan responded differently to the US demands against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. It will also highlight why there were greater levels of cooperation against some organisations, but not the other ones and what is necessary to increase the scale of bilateral coordination against terrorist groups between states.

For data collection, this thesis relies on different research strategies to ensure triangulation of sources (Danzin, 1970; Webb, 1966; Bryman, 2005). I used elite interviews, White papers, classified cables released in wiki-leaks, Congressional Research Services Reports, and various other research institutes findings. I have thoroughly studied various United States’ Embassy Cables sent to Washington from Islamabad. There are more than 9,000 cables released through wiki-leaks related to FATA. Wiki-leaks cables and newspaper reports especially of The Washington Post, The New York Times and The New Yorker were
profoundly useful in identifying the United States demands from Pakistan and the channel through which demands were communicated to Pakistan. For example, Wiki-leaks cable sent to Washington from the US embassy in Pakistan during early 2009 provides a clear picture of the US demands from the Pakistani army and the concerns in Washington on the nature of Pakistan’s military operations. It also illustrates how closely the United States officials were observing military developments in Pakistan.

The other key source of data collection was semi-structured interviews with the policy elites in Pakistan. It was one of the most significant sources of data collection. It would have been impossible to draw a concrete picture of the Pakistani government responses to the US demands without doing a series of semi-structured interviews. It was difficult getting access to Pakistani officials who were directly involved in the decision-making process. Usually, they did not allow me to do an audio-recording of their interviews, except six. I conducted semi-structured interviews with policy experts, which consisted of open ended questions and some specific questions on the Pakistani responses to various demands of the United States. One of the key findings was on the capability aspects of Pakistan’s responses. To assess Pakistan’s military capability against the Taliban in FATA, I conducted interviews with the army retired generals and field officers who were directly involved in the day to day fight with the Taliban. It was found during the fieldwork that Pakistan not only had problems at the policy making level, but also had a bigger problem at the implementation level.

During interviews in Pakistan, a deliberate effort was made to incorporate both the civil and military perspectives on the United States’ demands. In accordance with that pattern I was first developing a list of the United States’ demands from Pakistan with the help of wiki-leaks cables and other media reports especially from newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. It included the date on which the US official was visiting Pakistan, the name of the US official and his/her meeting with the Pakistani counter-parts. Later, I was making appointments with the relevant military officials, who were involved at the decision making level at that time. Then I was selecting a politician, who was in the corridors of power at that time to have a civilian view of the Pakistani responses. Following this, I was conducting an interview with an expert on the issues to know the factors responsible for Pakistani responses to the US demands. At the beginning, when I was starting my fieldwork in Pakistan, I had an impression that it would be difficult to arrange interviews with military and civil officials, than journalists and politicians, but contrary to my expectation, I had impressive cooperation from military officials and retired bureaucrats. Unfortunately, journalists were not very generous with their times. I made several attempts to arrange few
interviews journalists, who cover Pakistan’s tribal areas and have access to Afghan and Pakistani officials, but I could not get them except with a veteran BBC journalist Rahimullah Yosufzai.

I conducted three field trips in Pakistan. The first one was in May 2011 to August 2011. It was a pilot project to observe whether it was possible to conduct interviews with officials in Islamabad. I also wanted to know if it was allowed in Pakistan’s sensitive security situation to have frank discussion on Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. At that time the security situation in Pakistan was not good. There were suicide attacks on regular basis. The second one was from December 2013 to April 2014. The fieldwork was conducted in Islamabad and Peshawar. In the second trip to Pakistan, I conducted 20 interviews with different officials, academics, generals and bureaucrats. The third time I went back to Pakistan was in November 2014 to have a final round of interviews before concluding empirical chapters. In my third field trip, I conducted seven interviews in Islamabad with policy makers and experts. During third trip to Pakistan, I attended various conferences in Islamabad, which did not only help me to get access to high level officials easily, but also significantly enhanced my understanding of Pakistan’s responses to the US demands. For example, in a conference in Islamabad, the organiser invited military and civil officials to present their perspectives on how to ensure peace in Afghanistan. The former civil and military officials were very sceptic of the United States’ commitment to Afghanistan. They were frequently citing the differences in the Obama administration, decline in support in the United States for the US war in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq as evidences of the United States’ fickle commitment to Afghanistan.

It is important to mention some challenges during fieldwork in Pakistan. As I mentioned earlier that one of the key problems was getting access to relevant people for research. As a former student in Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, I used my former teachers’ contacts for getting appointment. I must recognise their invaluable cooperation and acknowledge the key role they played in arranging important appointment. Secondly, it was not easy asking sensitive or probing questions from high ranked officials. I had to ask important and sensitive questions from high officials without losing their confidence. I have absolute respect for them by participating in my research and giving their precious time, but key objective was to differentiate accurate information from propaganda. At the end of interviews, I had to offer a small box of apple as token of thanks and apologize to them for asking probing questions.
The second challenge was to ensure my neutrality to participants. The Pakistani foreign policy elites were as divided on the issue of cooperation with the United States as the society as whole. There was strong support for the position of security establishment among the foreign policy elites on the issue of Afghanistan, but they were equally supportive of democracy in Pakistan. For example, at one occasion, when I asked a participant why the United States’ counter-insurgency strategy did not displace as many people as Pakistan’s low intensity strategy in Swat and FATA, he replied that I accuse Pakistan’s Army without any evidence, whereas, my question was self-explanatory. I had to tone down the discussion and let him present his perspective on the issue. I had to apologise at the end to ensure that he continue his cooperation with researchers.

It was observed during interviews that high ranked officials were experiences in presenting Pakistan’s position succinctly, but for operational details interviews with middle ranked Army officers were invaluable. My interview with a major in Pakistan’s Army was exceptionally better than an interview with a retired general, who served in war in FATA and Swat. Middle ranked officers were involved in day to day management of insurgency and were at the forefront of counter-insurgency, therefore they had clearer picture of the situation than Army officers in military headquarter. It was also explored during fieldwork that Pakistan’s Army young officers were significantly contributing to Pakistan’s counter-insurgency doctrine by inputting invaluable ground experiences. For example, a Major in Pakistan’s army Aviation Division gave me a detailed interview how war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda exhausted Pakistan’s Army existing resources. He highlighted how over-use of limited helicopters increased incidents of air crash.

1.6 Timespan of this research

This research covers Pakistan’s responses to the United States demands from September 2001 till the end of President Obama first tenure. This timespan was selected for five reasons. Firstly, it covers two very important turning points in the United States policy towards Pakistan. The first turning point was after the event of 9/11 and the second one was when president Obama decided to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan border region instead of Iraq after winning election in 2008. Secondly, this period covers the responses of a military and a democratic government in Islamabad the demands of the US. It will demonstrate whether there are differences in policy responses of a military and a civilian government or not. Thirdly, as there were two governments in the span of 11 years in Pakistan from September 2001 to December 2012, there were also two army chiefs during this period. It will illustrate
if the change of guard in Pakistan’s top hierarchy change its response to the United States’ demands or not. Fourthly, there were two administrations from different political parties (republican and democrat) in the United States in this period of time that had different kinds of policies towards Pakistan. An analysis of Pakistani responses will show if change of political parties in the Washington or policies affect Pakistani responses or not. Last but not the least, this period was selected because of the field work. It was considered effective from the research point of view to determine an end point instead of covering every occurring incident. Therefore, the end of Obama’s first tenure was perceived as the appropriate end point, because the direction of the US policy towards Pakistan was already decided by then though series of interagency meetings.

1.7 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis consists of six following chapters that include three empirical case studies. The second chapter introduces the three terrorist organisations namely, Al-Qaeda, and the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. It provides a brief history of their origins, relationship with each other, links with Pakistan’s security establishments and threat to the United States national security. It starts with the origin of Al-Qaeda, its relationship with the Afghan Taliban, and the transfer of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The second section of the chapter discusses the rise of the Afghan Taliban, their relationship with Al-Qaeda and their revival in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. The third section of the chapter focused on FATA and system in tribal areas.

The third chapter discusses the Obama administration policy towards Pakistan to change its strategic perception towards Al-Qaeda, and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. This chapter consists of eight sections. The first part discusses Bruce Riedel committee policy recommendations on Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second section highlights the differences in the administration on US strategy towards the region. The third, fourth and fifth parts of the paper discuss perspectives of the CIA, the Pentagon and the State departments respectively on policy towards Pakistan. The sixth is about Congress position. The seventh section of the paper discusses the administration policy towards Pakistan, which contains of drone strikes, coalition support fund and economic assistance. The last part is conclusion of the chapter.

The fourth chapter discusses Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against Al-Qaeda. This chapter consists of four sections. The second section briefly discusses the United
States’ seven demands of Pakistan. The third section highlights Pakistan’s responses to the US demands. This is the main part of the chapter, which discusses Pakistan’s responses to each of the seven demands, including deployment of forces on the border to intercept Al-Qaeda, military operations in North and South Waziristan, permission to pursue counter-terrorism activities in Pakistan, blanket over flight and landing rights to the United States and sharing of intelligence and immigration information. The last section analyses the reasons for the type of response Pakistan made to the US demands against Al-Qaeda and their significance.

The fifth chapter of the thesis is focused on Pakistan’s responses to the United States demands against the Afghan Taliban. This chapter consists of four sections. The second section briefly discusses the United States’ seven demands of Pakistan. The third section highlights Pakistan’s responses to the US demands. This is the main part of the chapter, which discusses Pakistan’s responses to each of the seven demands, including deployment of forces on the border to intercept Al-Qaeda, military operations in North and South Waziristan, permission to pursue counter-terrorism activities in Pakistan, blanket over flight and landing rights to the United States and sharing of intelligence and immigration information. The last section analyses the reasons for the type of response Pakistan made to the US demands against Al-Qaeda and their significance.

The sixth chapter is on Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Pakistani Taliban. This chapter consists of four sections. The first part of the chapter discusses the United States’ three demands of Pakistan against the TTP, which were military operations in Swat and Malakand divisions, an expansion of the operation to FATA and the embedding of US troops with Pakistan’s army in Swat and South Waziristan. The second section illustrates Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands, and looks at whether Pakistan complied or not. The third part of the chapter analyses Pakistan’s response to the United States’ demands and the factors responsible for Pakistan’s behaviour. The final section makes some conclusions as to why Pakistan accepted all three demands of the United States against the Pakistani Taliban.

The seventh chapter is the conclusion. It will present the key findings of the three empirical chapters and show how Pakistan responded to the various demands of the United States against different terrorist groups. It will illustrate with strong evidences the key factors
behind Pakistan’s cooperation on some demands of the United States against some groups, but not against others. It will show whether the key determining factor in Pakistan’s cooperation or lack of cooperation was India as most of the literature argues or there were other important determinants as well. This chapter will also highlight how successful the United States was in changing some aspects of Pakistan’s policy towards some groups, but not against others. The key contribution of this thesis will be the depiction of a developing state behaviour under pressure from the United States to change its strategic threat perception from a conventional enemy to a non-state one. The result will show whether the United States succeeded in changing Pakistan’s threat perception completely, partially or not at all. The determination of Pakistani behaviour is also significant in the present situation, where the threat of terrorism is expanding to several other countries and changing the political and strategic landscape in the Middle-East—which has always been at the centre of world politics due to its oil resources.
Chapter 2 Background to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

2.1 Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to introduce three key non-state actors namely Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which are key target of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in the war against terrorism. These three terrorist organisations are the focus of United States’ demands from Pakistan in the war against terrorism and extremism since 9/11. This chapter explains five questions related with these organisation:

1. What is the history of these organisations?
2. How these terrorist groups are threatening the United States’ interest?
3. What is these groups relationship with the Pakistani army and the ISI?
4. What are the United States’ demands from Pakistan regarding these organisations?
5. How these organisations are related with each other’s particularly with Al-Qaeda?

2.2 Al-Qaeda

When the Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan, it encouraged the non-state actors involved in Afghanistan's theatre to replicate the same experience in other places against their own enemies. Three prominent individuals (Dr. Abdullah al-Azzam, head of the Jordanian branch of Brotherhood, an intellectual architect of the Jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; Umar Adb al-Rehman, the spiritual leader of radical Egyptian Islamist group Al-Jihad; and Osama bin-Laden; son of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin) created 'Maktab al-Khidamat', an organisational fore-runner of the Al-Qaeda organisation, in order to recruit people in the Arab world and to finance Afghanistan's jihad against the Soviet Union in 1984 (Katzman, 2005). In 1988, toward the end of the Afghani war, Azzam and Osama termed the Islamist volunteers network inherited from the Afghanistan's war, the “Al-Qaeda” (“the base” or “foundation”), but they had differences on the future use of Al-Qaeda (Elias-Sanborn, 2012). Azzam wanted it to be a “rapid reaction force” to help supressed Muslim across the world. Bin Laden, on the other hand, wanted to use it against the liberal and secular despotic regimes in Middle-East to restore the Islamic caliphate (Katzman, 2005). Bin Laden eventually became the undisputed leader of Al-Qaeda when Azzam was assassinated in Pakistan in 1989 (Hamilton & Lee, 2004). Al-Qaeda directed its mission against the United States to force it to withdraw its forces from Saudi
Arabia after the Gulf war in 1991. It became the core mission of Al-Qaeda and portrayed the US forces' stay in Saudi Arabia as the occupation of the holy land by crusade forces (Elias-Sanborn, 2012).

The relationship between Pakistan and Al-Qaeda became a major source of concern in the United States after the event of 9/11. Some documents show that Pakistan was in contact with Al-Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks (Elais, 2012). It is believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan had given sanctuary to Osama bin-Laden after the ISI's approval (Elais, 2012).

According to the United States’ National Security Archive,

Osama (Bin Ladin)'s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training centre for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 63-65) it is unlikely that Osama had returned to Afghanistan without Pakistan's approval and information. It further says that the ISI officers might have facilitated his travel and reportedly introduced Bin Laden to the Taliban’s leadership in Afghanistan (2004). Osama was running a training camp in the Khost province of Afghanistan that was also home to Kashmiri militants supported by Pakistan. Pakistan was constantly approached by the Clinton administration for help in the arrest of Bin Laden, but Pakistan didn't acknowledge its influence on the Taliban (9/11 Commission, 2004). After the US' Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001, when Taliban were quickly defeated without any major casualty, Al-Qaeda leaders succeeded in fleeing to Pakistan's tribal areas and urban centres.

After the US occupation of Afghanistan and toppling of the Taliban regime in Kabul, Al-Qaeda's leadership and members shifted to the other side of the border, where they are protected from the United States forces due to Pakistan's sovereignty. Many of al Qaeda’s rank-and-file took shelter with friendly tribes and militant organisations in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), while some of its senior leadership hid in Pakistan’s major cities. Many of those sheltering in urban centres were later captured with the assistance of Pakistani authorities; including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abu Zubaydah. By 2004, US officials believed they had captured or killed two-thirds of al Qaeda’s original senior leadership (Jan, 2011). President Bush said in his state of the union address to joint session of the Congress on 28th Jan, 2003,
To date we have arrested or otherwise dealt with many key commanders of Al Qaeda. They include a man who directed logistics and funding for the September 11th attacks, the chief of Al Qaeda operations in the Persian Gulf who planned the bombings of our embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole, an Al Qaeda operations chief from Southeast Asia, a former director of Al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan, a key Al Qaeda operative in Europe, a major Al Qaeda leader in Yemen. All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. And many others have met a different fate. Let's put it this way: They are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.

The United States and Pakistan succeeded in arresting or killing Al-Qaeda’s leaders in urban center, but tribal area emerged as the Headquarter of Al-Qaeda’s core leadership.

In 2007, there was a National Intelligence Estimate on Al-Qaeda, which said Al-Qaeda is neither on the run nor decimated, but rather functioning successfully in Pakistan’s tribal areas in different form and shape. It further revealed that Pakistan's tribal areas emerged as the operational headquarters of Al-Qaeda and epicentre of terrorism targeting the United States and other western nations (NIE, 2007). Two years later President Obama repeated the same message in his remarks on the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009, in the nearly eight years since 9/11, Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes this al-Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Aymen al-Zawahiri”. He further says,

They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with followers to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world (Obama, 2009).

Al-Qaeda used Pakistan's sanctuaries for four purposes. Firstly, it wanted to use sanctuaries to influence other terrorist groups in Pakistan's tribal areas. It did not only make them more lethal, but it also enhanced their objectives. Secondly, it wanted to use sanctuaries in Pakistan for training purposes. It trains individuals for suicide attacks not only inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also sent them to the United States and Europe. Thirdly, Al-Qaeda was targeting Pakistani in the diaspora (United States, the Gulf and European countries) for recruitment: they had the skills and background that would be desirable for an international enterprise such as Al-Qaeda. Finally, Al-Qaeda was trying to acquire weapon of mass destruction in Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda wanted to use Pakistan’s tribal areas for networking with other like-minded groups to enhance their skills and objectives in the war against United States and Pakistani army. Al Qaeda forces that fled Afghanistan with their Taliban supporters remain active in
Pakistan and reportedly had extensive, mutually supportive links with indigenous Pakistani and Afghani terrorists (Hussain, 2011). Although, Al-Qaeda's network suffered heavily (including the death of Osama bin Laden) since the United States declared a war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but it showed considerable resilience and continued to retain its survivability (Ignatius, 2011). Al-Qaeda's close collaboration with other terrorist and militant organisations made them more complex and lethal. Al-Qaeda had been selling its brand and technical know-how in exchange for protection and resources to orchestrate spectacular attacks in Europe and the United States (Jan, 2011).

The ideology of global jihad has been bought into by more and more militants, even guys who never thought much about the broader world. And that is disturbing, because it is a force multiplier for Al-Qaeda” (2010). Al-Qaeda's assistance to the Haqqani network did not only increase its international Jihadist credentials by helping it to orchestrate spectacular attacks in Afghanistan, but also increased its lethality and influence in Afghanistan (Dressler, 2012). According to Christine Fair, they are fighters in the same trench. Organizationally, they are not in the same network but they do things together because their cause is the same. [They] are different organizations, but [they] have the same mission. In the words of one senior Pakistani intelligence official ‘... Al Qaeda has subcontracted some operations … to these local groups.’ (2004, p496).

Secondly, Al-Qaeda had also imported the phenomenon of suicide attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan from Iraq, contrary to popular belief placing its origins in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda's Iraqi wing's increased interaction with the Afghan insurgents and their Pakistani counterparts introduced them to the use of suicide bombing. The US counter-terrorism strategy has reduced the strength of Al-Qaeda individually as an organisation, but as a phenomenon Al-Qaeda today is far more prolific than it was a decade ago.

Thirdly, safe sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas to Al-Qaeda provided it with an opportunity to revamp its strategic objective of attacking the United States and the west. Al-Qaeda was running training camps in North Waziristan and recruiting people to conduct suicide attacks against the west. At least 150 Westerners reportedly have attended these camps since 2008 (Rollins, 2011). In 2010, the flow of aspiring Western terrorist recruits continued, and the consensus view of analysts is that Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remains a crucial threat (Rollins, 2011, p10). National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland concluded in 2007 that Al-Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in [Pakistan’s FATA], operational lieutenants, and its top
leadership”(Rollins, 2011. p11). More than 38% of the major plot against the United States and Europe were either directed or planned in Pakistan (Jones, 2011).

The last but not least repercussion of Al-Qaeda's presence in Pakistan is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President Obama and Vice President John Biden said that their worst nightmare is Al-Qaeda access to biological and nuclear weapon (Woodward, 2011). Pakistan’s record of nuclear proliferation is an open secret; especially due to its nuclear bombs father Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan's (known as Dr. A.Q Khan) confession on live television that he had shared Pakistan’s nuclear weapon design with North Korea and Iran.

The possibility of Al-Qaeda’s sleeping cells either in Pakistan’s scientist community or in security establishment poses a serious threat to security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The suicide attacks on Pakistan’s major security installations and General Headquarter of Pakistan’s army, which would not have been possible without insider information, farther raised the possibility of Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban’s cells inside the security establishment. Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University says the potential for nuclear staff or soldiers with militant sympathies to collude in a Taliban or al-Qaeda attack was a cause for greater concern: “No screening programme will ever be able to weed out all Islamist sympathizers or anti-Westerners among Pakistan's military or civilians with nuclear weapons expertise” (Gregory, 2009). The United States has been taking some tangible steps to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, but the trust deficit between Islamabad and Washington is a major hindrance for any significant cooperation in the security and safety of nuclear weapons.

2.3 The Quetta Shura or the Afghan Taliban

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan descended into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups and warlords. Different groups and warlords occupied several regions, but no organisation succeeded in occupying large part of the country (Hussin, 2005). The Taliban – emerged from the Pakistani madrassas, Afghan civil war and refugee camps in Pakistan – captured Kandahar by exploiting differences between rival groups, co-optation, and backing of Pakistan’s ISI (Bajoria, 2011). The Taliban movement run by Mullah Mohammad Omar expanded throughout the country within two years and occupied Kabul in May 1996 (Rashid, 2008). One of the major factors in the speedy success of Taliban in Afghanistan was the support from Pakistan’s ISI. According to the US National Security Archive, “U.S. intelligence indicates that the ISI is supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food. The Pakistan Inter service Intelligence Directorate is using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban
forces" (Elias-Sanborn, 2012, Doc15). The Taliban-ruled Afghanistan soon became a sanctuary for other terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden was already present in Afghanistan before the Taliban occupied Kabul. According to The 9/11 Commission report (pp. 63-65), when bin Laden first returned to Afghanistan in May 1995 he maintained ties to Gulbadin Hekmetyar as well as other non-Taliban and anti-Taliban political entities. However, by September 1996 when Jalalabad and Kabul had both fallen to the Taliban, bin Laden had solidified his ties to the Taliban and was operating in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan (2004). The United States was consistently forcing the Taliban to shut down terrorist camps and oust Osama from Afghanistan (Elais, 2012). There were also other terrorist camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. An unnamed British journalist reported to the U.S. Embassy that her visit to two terrorist training camps in Paktia province, near the Afghan-Pakistan border on November 14th 1996 revealed that both camps appear occupied, and her “Taliban sources” advise that “one of the camps is occupied by Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) militants,” the Pakistan-based Kashmiri terrorist organization. The other camp was occupied by “assorted foreigners, including Chechens, Bosnian Muslims, as well as Sudanese and other Arabs (Elias-Sanborn, 2012). The Taliban were finally removed from Afghanistan in October 2001, when they refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States, who was responsible for the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, its leadership re-located to Pakistan's side of the Durand line (a border line separating Pakistan's Pashtuns from Afghanistan). They allegedly regrouped and gathered in the Pakistani town of Quetta (capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, sharing a border with southern Afghanistan); and are therefore generally referred to in literature as “The Quetta Shura of Taliban” or Quetta Consultative body. In March 2003, when the United States started attacking Iraq, a renowned Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai received a call from the Afghan Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah announcing a Jihad against the United States (Peters, 2009, p.18). This period is considered as the beginning of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. Three months later, Mullah Omar appointed a ten-man Shura (Ruling Council) to lead the resistance in Afghanistan (Peter, 2009). Jalal-ud-din Haqqani, known as the Haqqani Network, was named to control the south-eastern region (Khost, Paktika and Paktia), Mullah Dadullah was made commander of the south (Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Farah) and Gulbadin Hekmetyar was assigned the eastern flank (Nuristan and Kunar) (Peter, 2009, p.18).

The Taliban considers Mullah Mohammad Omar, who heads the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), as the “leader of the faithful”. The QST considers itself the legitimate government of Afghanistan in exile and called itself the government of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Although the Taliban are more of a network than a hierarchical organisation, the Quetta Shura Taliban represents the core group of the Taliban, which ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 (Rashid, 2008). Almost every other insurgent group has sworn its allegiance to the Quetta Shura Taliban led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, who was uncontested leader of the Taliban's movement in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2011). The Taliban's war rhetoric is as much based on Afghan nationalism as it is on Jihadism. The Quetta Shura did not only provide the ideological and intellectual foundation to the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan, but also regularly issues strategic guidance to the field commanders in Afghanistan (Dressler, 2012). It also played an important role in recruiting insurgents from a large pool of fighters from Madrassas and refugee camps in Pakistan. The QST, unlike Al-Qaeda, has made a strategic decision to not engage in Pakistani insurgency. They are exclusively focused on the Afghan theatre and are not involved in any kind of sabotage activities inside Pakistan. This decision of the Taliban to distance themselves from the Pakistani insurgency damaged them militarily but it helped them politically in Afghanistan. If the Afghan Taliban had the ownership of the Pakistani insurgency, they would have been having a larger chunk of men power from FATA at their disposal for Afghanistan. On the other hand, if the Afghan Taliban took the ownership of the Pakistani insurgency, it would have deprived them of the sanctuaries in Pakistan.

The Quetta Shura Taliban were actively involved in terrorist activities throughout Afghanistan, but their main objective was to secure the Kandahar and Helmand provinces, which were strategically significant and politically important for the Taliban. Kandahar is the spiritual home of the Taliban, as this was the movement’s birthplace; it has been very important in Afghanistan historically as well (Kandahar was the capital of the Taliban movement in 1990s until they occupied Kabul in 1996). The Quetta Shura Taliban is also sometimes called the “Kandahari Taliban”, because most of their leadership is from the Kandahar province (Dressler, 2012). It is a city of more than one million people, overwhelmingly dominated by Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan) who form most of the Taliban (Forsberg, 2009). The second important province was Helmand, which is also exclusively a Pashtun province and amenable to the Taliban (Jones, 2008). It was producing more than 40% of the opium in the world and was the financial hub of the Taliban's insurgency. The Afghan government and coalition forces were facing a dilemma in Helmand: when they were doing operations against the poppy cultivators, the farmers and traders in the opium industry were joining the Taliban. Taliban did not only provide them with protection against the government and coalition forces, but also facilitated their
smuggling to Pakistan. In return, the Taliban were collecting taxes on the poppy cultivation. Drug and criminal syndicates are the major financial sources of the Taliban's insurgency (Dressler, 2009). Kandahar and Helmand provinces were the main priority of the United States’ surge in troops in 2009. In February 2009, when the Obama administration ordered deployment of 21,000 troops in Afghanistan, one entire Marine Brigade consists of 10,000 troops, was deployed only in the Helmand province to counter the Taliban’s insurgency (Woodward, 2011). There were British and Canadian forces in Helmand before the United States’ Commander in Afghanistan deployed Marine in 2009. The surge was a blow to the Taliban in the south, but it was difficult to sustain. According to General Petraeus, “it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible” (2011). If the Afghan force succeeds to counter the Taliban in Helmand, it would be a strategic victory over the Afghan Taliban, because Helmand and Kandahar have always been the hubs of the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan.

The other significant aspect of the Taliban's insurgency is shadow governance structure (Dressler, 2009). According to Giustozzi,

The Taliban is estimated to have a total of 60,000-70,000 active members, with only a small portion mobilised for fighting, many of these individual Taliban are non-fighting members, such as informants and providers of food, supplies and accommodation. As early as 2003, the Taliban started to fortify its structure through the appointment of its own provincial governors’ (2010).

He also noted that, from 2006 onward, the Taliban began appointing its own, informal district governors, police chiefs and judges, who operated fully separate from GIRQA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) institutions. Gul Mohammad, a resident of a rural community in Kandahar province, told The Telegraph that the Taliban have their own police force and that they “have everything they used to have when they were in government” (Nijssen, 2011). The Taliban’s governors primary functions include coordinating the efforts of the commanders working in their provinces and administering and providing oversight of Taliban finances and judicial mechanisms (Nijssen, 2011). The Taliban were popular in rural areas of Afghanistan, as they provided quick justice and dispute resolution mechanisms – which are traditional and based on Islamic and Pashtun’s traditions (Dressler, 2009). The Taliban's justice system did not need any formal law training or an extensive judicial infrastructure network; neither did it require any prosecution or defence attorneys, judges or juries. A three-man Shura listens to both parties’ grievances and examines evidence, quizzes witnesses and renders a decision on the spot. It may seem
absurd, but this is a popular mechanism of resolving disputes between parties in Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2012). This millennia-old system, called Jirga, is valued in Afghanistan mostly because people are poor: they cannot afford expensive attorneys or long judicial processes, which may be taking several decades to resolve a civil dispute between parties. “One local farmer reported that the Taliban courts in Maiwand and Zhari ‘deal with a number of cases: land disputes, family disputes, loan disputes, robbery, killing, fighting... and the people are happy with them’” (Forsberg, 2009, p8). The Taliban’s provision and enforcement of justice became a key source for building legitimacy in Kandahar. According to Forsberg, “Anecdotal evidence suggests Taliban courts are more efficient and transparent than are government-funded courts, and that many locals prefer them, not only are local courts corrupt, but they are also inadequate for the size of Kandahar’s population” (Forsberg, 2009, p8). The ultimate objective of the Taliban’s shadow governance is to discredit the Afghan government backed by the international community and provides an effective alternative system to the people of Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s strategies were like other terrorist groups assassinating effective Afghan government officers, tribal chiefs, governors, and other high profile figures assisting the government (Jones, 2008, p.53). Their primary objective was to discredit the government’s institutions and kill all the people who are effective at either the district or provincial levels. The Taliban were particularly targeting law enforcement agencies’ personnel including the police and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). The NDS is a domestic intelligence agency, and a very functional one at that by Afghanistan standards (Jones, 2008, p.49). Along with that The Taliban boast dynamic propaganda machinery and were busy in successfully establishing the perception that they were winning the war; it has a tremendous effect on the population’s attitude toward the insurgents and the government (Ledwidge, 2011). A friendly population plays a critical role in an insurgency. The Taliban were focused on heavily populated cities in southern Afghanistan especially on Kandahar and Helmand. If they succeeded in alienating the population from the government and acquiring its active support, then they were more likely to win the war in southern Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Afghan government and the coalition forces failed to provide security to both key population centres and important tribal and government figures. The Taliban killed Ahmed Wali Karzai – a younger brother of Afghanistan’s former president who was also chairman of the Kandahar Provincial Council – and Barhan-ud-din Rabbani – an ex-president of Afghanistan and head of the Afghan Peace Council. It showed that they were successful in targeting many high profile figures in Afghanistan and succeeded in establishing an impression that the government had failed to provide even simple security to its top officials.
The primary target of the surge of the US troops in Afghanistan was to reverse the Taliban's momentum and win the people’s confidence in the Afghan and coalition forces. But according to International Crisis Group report on Afghanistan, the NATO surges failed to reduce the insurgency’s capacity, as Taliban attacks increased 75 per cent from 2008 to 2011 in Kandahar, including a major assassination campaign in Kandahar city. By one account, more than 500 pro-government figures were gunned down from 2002 to 2013. The most high profile, in 2011, was Ahmed Wali Karzai, whom Brigadier General Razik replaced as the preeminent strongman in the south’ (ICG, 2014).

(Insurgent Targets, 2002–2006)

The Afghan Taliban's sanctuaries in Pakistan were considered as the most important factor for the survival of insurgency and the failure of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (Jone, 2008). According to Jones,

[t]hose insurgencies that received support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from non-state actors and Diaspora groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time. Support from state actors and non-state actors, such as a diaspora population, criminal network, or terrorist network, clearly makes a difference” (2008, p 21).
Insurgencies usually enjoy two kinds of external support. The first one is a direct support, when a state or non-state actor has a declared policy of supporting an insurgency that includes providing training, recruiting insurgents, giving money, weapons and strategic guidance. During the Cold War, Pakistan and the United States were displaying a clear policy of supporting insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul; the CIA and ISI also collectively provided every possible support and successfully ousted the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 (Jones, 2008). Similarly, Pakistan openly supported Kashmir's insurgency against India during the 1990s and even risked a nuclear war during the Kargil crisis in 1999. The second kind of support is a passive one, when insurgents have freedom to use the territory of any state as a sanctuary. There could be several reasons for that: either the insurgents may have a tacit approval of the state or the state may be too weak to take effective actions against the insurgents, or both (Asia report, 2011, p.27). There were strong allegations on the Pakistan’s ISI from the American top Generals and politician that the ISI has been supporting the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan in attacking the US and Afghan forces (NYT, 2011). Zalmay Khalilzad, an ex-American ambassador to Afghanistan said on 18th June 2005,

Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders are in Pakistan. [Mullah Akhtar] Usmani, one of the Taliban leaders, spoke to Pakistan’s Geo TV at a time when the Pakistani intelligence services claimed that they did not know where [the Taliban leaders] were. If a TV company could find him, how is it that the intelligence service of a country which has nuclear bombs and a lot of security and military forces cannot find them?”
Pakistan had always denied that it had any relationship with the Afghan Taliban. However, it is very difficult to confirm Pakistani claim that it did not give a tacit approval to the Taliban’s activities inside Afghanistan for geo-strategic reasons.

There are different reports on the Afghan Taliban relationship with Al-Qaeda. Some scholars Christine Fair (2008), Antonio Giustozzi (2009), Bruce Riedel (2010) and Rahimullah Yousufzai (2011) believed that the Afghan Taliban had minimum contacts with Al-Qaeda. They are of the view that the Quetta Shura Taliban’s relationship with Al-Qaeda was less explicit and visible, whereas, Al-Qaeda relationship with the Haqqani network and Pakistani Taliban is warmer and deeper (Dressler, October 2010). One of the major reasons was due the locations where they operate. Al-Qaeda did not have as high level of freedom in Quetta as they enjoyed in North Waziristan, which was under the de facto control of the Haqqani network and the Pakistani Taliban. The Quetta Shura Taliban were living in southern Baluchistan before the start of their movement in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda members are usually foreigners, who could easily be recognised and arrested in Quetta. The Quetta Shura Taliban also wanted to increase their credentials as a responsible group that is acceptable to international community. It leaders Mullah Mohammad Umar said several times the Afghan Taliban are not interested in any other country affairs and respect the sovereignty of other countries. It might actually want to distance itself from Al-Qaeda to increase its legitimacy among the international community. According to the Washington Post,

In Washington, officials differentiate between the relatively young Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban, which have deep political roots in its country. “The Pakistani Taliban gets treated like Al Qaeda,” one senior official said. “We aim to destroy it. The Afghan Taliban is different. (2010).

It shows that the Afghan Taliban have projected an image that there are different from Al-Qaeda and have a stake in Afghanistan’s affairs. The debate in strategic review committee in the Obama administration on policy towards Afghanistan further illustrated that the Taliban were perceived differently from Al-Qaeda in Washington.

On other hand, there were scholars who argued that the Afghan Taliban would not distance themselves from Al-Qaeda as long as they are winning the war in Afghanistan. The US former ambassador to Pakistan Ann Peterson, General Petraeus, Robert Gate, Seth Jones, Frederick Kagan, John Nagl and former US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair believed that the Taliban were related with Al-Qaeda and would not desert them until they are not defeated militarily in Afghanistan (Woodward, 2011). They believed Al-Qaeda had been helping the Afghan Taliban at tactical, operational and strategic levels in Afghanistan's
insurgency (Jones, 2008). They were of the view that the Afghan Taliban became more lethal after their intense cooperation with the Al-Qaeda and Iraqi insurgent groups (Dressler, 2009). They were of the opinion that Al-Qaeda was also financially helping the Afghan Taliban, by collecting money from wealthy individuals in Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Dorronsoro, 2009). Although, it is difficult to establish a concrete opinion from the open sources on the Taliban’s association with Al-Qaeda, but there are some evidences that the Taliban are getting assistance from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but they unlike Pakistani Taliban did not claim responsibility for any attack or plot outside Afghanistan. It shows that the Taliban are ready to accept Al-Qaeda financial and technical assistance in Afghanistan, but they don’t agree with Al-Qaeda’s strategy of attacking the United States at home. Secondly, the Afghan Taliban association with the Pakistani security establishment might have prevented them from full-fledge alliance with Al-Qaeda. As Al-Qaeda is in war with the Pakistani state, therefore any association of the Afghan Taliban with Al-Qaeda will be perceived as alliance, which could trigger a military operation against them. On other hand, the Pakistani Taliban didn’t only openly support Al-Qaeda, but also took responsibility of the Time Square bomber in May 2010. The Pakistani Taliban have also attacked Pakistan’s naval base in Karachi, where they destroyed two multi-million dollar Pakistan’s navy premier anti-submarine and marine surveillance aircrafts- the US made P3C Orion (BBC, 23rd May, 2011). The spokesman of the Teherik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) Ehsanullah Ehsan said, “It was the revenge of martyrdom of the Osama Bin Laden. It was the proof that we are still united and powerful” (BBC, 2011)

2.4 The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network is a lethal enemy for the United States’ interests in Afghanistan. It has allegedly been involved in most of the spectacular and high profile attacks in Kabul. It is strategically located in Pakistan's tribal area of North Waziristan and operationally active in south-eastern Afghanistan. It enjoys a cordial relationship with the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani security establishment. It plays a politically important and strategically significant role in Pakistan's tribal areas and in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government’s resistance to launch a military operation against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan is a major source of discord between Islamabad and Washington. Ostensibly, the network’s leadership pledges allegiance to Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, but the Haqqanis are their own masters in many ways. Their ties with Al-Qaeda are stronger than any other insurgent groups and they command respect among the
international jihadists. The US Congress recently passed bills that urge the Secretary of State to designate the Haqqani network as a terrorist organisation.

Map 1: Zadran Arc in Afghanistan. It is Haqqanis’ traditional strong hold

The Haqqani network, also called the Central Front, has been at war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Map 2). It is a tribal-cum-religious organisation founded by a veteran of the Afghan war against Kabul’s communist regime: Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father of the current chief Sirajuddin Haqqani. He was more a tribal leader than a religious leader and had the support of the tribes in the three south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan: Khost, Paktia and Paktika, also called Loya Paktia or great Paktia (Map 3). He belongs to the Zadran tribe of the Pashtuns, known as one of the fiercest tribes and famous for resisting the foreign influence in south-eastern Afghanistan. The Zadran tribe also alienated themselves from the present government because of its false promises of development and jobs and doesn’t have any alternative to supporting the Haqqani network in order to oppose the Karzai regime (Townsend & Hayder, August 15, 2009). The Haqqani network also supports the Zadran tribe in its rivalries with other tribes which makes it popular in the Zadran Arc (Map 3). This area is the epicentre of the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan. The tribal fighters provide significant resources and effective operational bases to the Haqqani network. Jalaluddin Haqqani was one of the most effective and skilled fighter against the Soviet forces in south-eastern Afghanistan during the 1980s. He was one of the first warlords in Afghanistan who provided training and camping facilities to the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan's south-eastern provinces in 1980s (Gopal, June 1, 2009). “When al-Qaeda was formed in 1988, its newly built installations and infrastructure were supervised by
Chapter 2

Haqqani.” (Dressler, October 2010, p7). “Former U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson famously called Jalaluddin “goodness personified” and he received a disproportionate share of U.S. money. The Haqqanis have also been effective in attracting Arab donations due to their tactical efficiency and assisted by Jalaluddin marital and linguistic connection to the Gulf States” (Townsend & Hayder, August 15, 2009). He was leader of the Hizb-e-Islami-Khalis group, a radical anti-Soviet Jihadist group in 1980s and maintained strong relationships with Pakistani, American and Saudi intelligence agencies during the Afghan war (The New York Times, August 8, 2012). He joined the Taliban movement in 1995 and became a minister for tribal affairs and borders during the Taliban period (www.stanford.edu/group accessed at 15th July, 2012).

Map 2: FATA border with Afghanistan

North Waziristan as shown in the map is one of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The population belongs in majority to the Pashtuns ethnic group that lives across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Generally, the whole tribal area is under the influence of various Taliban factions, but North Waziristan in particular is under the control of the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which are pro-Pakistan terrorist organisations. North Waziristan’s capital Miram Shah is located just 10 miles south and 30 miles east of the Khost and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan (Dressler, October 2010, p11). During the anti-Soviet Jihad, North Waziristan and the surrounding areas served as a rear base of operations for the Mujahedeen. The militants use a series of leftover bunkers and compounds adjacent to the Afghan border to funnel men and material into the fight in
Chapter 2

Afghanistan's southeast. The Haqqani network maintains its main command and control, training and logistical facilities in Miram Shah. The Haqqanis runs a parallel shadow administration that includes courts, recruitment centres, tax offices and radical madrassas in Miram Shah. North Waziristan is a little Islamic emirate or a mini-state used by the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda against the US and the Afghan forces in Afghanistan. “Today, Miram Shah is the headquarters of the Haqqani network, which plays host to a myriad of Al-Qaeda and associated foreign terrorist groups that seek to attack the United States at home and abroad, and to target coalition forces and the government of Afghanistan.” (Dressler, October 10, 2012). North Waziristan also provides a financial backbone to the Haqqanis’ insurgency in Afghanistan. It runs their criminal enterprises such as the smuggling of chromites and timber from Afghanistan to Pakistan, kidnapping or extortion (Philp, January 7, 2010). North Waziristan is also a safe haven for notable Pakistani and Afghan criminals because there is no administrative system and the political agent mechanism is absolutely dead in greater Waziristan. The recent US drone strikes are mostly focused on this area. It has limited the movement of the Haqqanis’ and Al-Qaeda in Miram Shah. The most threatening aspect of North Waziristan is that it offers sanctuary to the Haqqanis, Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militants who have complete freedom to work in collaboration in Miram Shah. Foreign fighters under the Haqqani auspices include Arabs, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens and Turks. Foreign fighters are considered the integral part of the Haqqani network, “Regardless of nationality and affiliation, foreign fighters operate within the structure and organisation of the Haqqani network. Although al-Qaeda and other extremist organisations provide training, expertise, personnel and financial assistance, they are “outsiders” and could not operate in Loya-Paktia and the surrounding areas without the protection of the Haqqanis.” (Dressler, October 2010, p 14).

The Haqqani network’s resort to more sophisticated and deadly means of violence in Afghanistan's insurgency shows its close collaboration with the Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda doesn't serve only as force multiplier of the Haqqani network, but also as elite force by sharing its experiences and expertise acquired during the Iraq insurgency. It didn't only increase the lethality of the Haqqani network attacks, but also improved its position on ground against the international and Afghan forces. The Haqqani network embracing of new techniques of insurgency and incorporation of foreign fighters spectacularly increased its credential in international Jihad enterprise. “The Haqqanis pioneered the use of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, an import from al-Qaeda in Iraq. Haqqani attacks are more likely to use foreign bombers, whereas Afghan Taliban attacks tend to rely on locals. The suicide attacks are an innovation of Sirajuddin's, according to US intelligence officials” (Gopal, June 1, 2009). The
network chief Sirajuddin told to MSNBC in an interview in April 2009 that they mastered the modern technology and could use it for innovative method of making bombs and explosives, it includes TV bombs, IEDs (Improvised Explosive Device) and SVBIEDs (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device). The Haqqani network maintains several cells in its targeted areas for facilitation and detonation of the IEDs (Dressler, October 2010, p 23). It mainly targets district centres, government infrastructure, and police and army training centres. Al-Qaeda also helps the Haqqani network in staging well-orchestrated complex attacks around and in Kabul, which grab tremendous international media attention. The Haqqanis’ association with Al-Qaeda has made it a preferred choice for other terrorist groups. Pakistani sectarian and militant groups are also in close collaboration with the Haqqani network especially Lashkar-e-Taiba, which trademarks are found in several attacks on Indian installations inside Afghanistan including New-Delhi’s embassy. The Haqqani network’s close collaboration with the Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups ensures the flow of sophisticated weapons and human resources. It has made it more an outlet of Al-Qaeda than a junior partner of Taliban in Afghanistan. “Taliban leaders have also acknowledged al-Qaeda role as a force multiplier, providing as it does the Afghan insurgency with technical advice, training, weapons, propaganda and communications capabilities and funding. However, the relationship between the Haqqani network and the Al-Qaeda, as well as Pakistani al-Qaeda affiliates, is far closer than the links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda” (ICG report, 27 June, 2011). The Haqqani network is now only second to the Quetta Shura of the Afghan Taliban, which is the supreme Taliban’s leadership under the direct control of Mullah Omar.

The growing influence of the Haqqani network is also demonstrated by their intimidation and assassination strategy to discourage the entry of competent people into government offices. The Haqqani network has assassinated or tried to assassinate many tribal elders and high office bearers in Afghanistan. The killing of Paktia governor Hakim Taniwal; a Sociology professor in Australia before coming to Afghanistan and the many suicide attempts on Pacha khan, a tribal elder in Zadran tribe who opposes the Haqqani network are the prime examples of that strategy (Dressler, October 2010, p 15, 19, 21). It resulted in putting corrupt and incompetent people in the government machinery which further decreases the population’s trust in their government (Dressler, October 2010, p 25, 27, 28). When the government fails to provide justice and order to the people instantly, they are forced to look toward the Taliban for conflict resolutions. The Taliban speedy and brutal justice is well received in a traditional Afghan society which values tradition more than the
law of the land. Fida: this is all very vague. Your view may be correct but there is little evidence to sustain your claims.

Table 1: The High Profile Powerbroker killed by the Haqqani Network 2010-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 8, 2010</td>
<td>Engineer Mohammad Omar</td>
<td>Governor of Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moalim Mohammad Nazir</td>
<td>District Governor of Qala-i-Zal district, Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masood Jashan Pur</td>
<td>District Governor of Nahrin district, Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10, 2011</td>
<td>Gen Abdul Rahman Sayed Khili</td>
<td>Provincial police chief of Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Aqtaash</td>
<td>Deputy provincial police chief of Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 2011</td>
<td>Gen Daud Daud</td>
<td>Police commander “Northern Zone”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shah Jahan Noori</td>
<td>Provincial police chief of Takhar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 2011</td>
<td>Commander Yasin (Sangi Mohammad)</td>
<td>Powerbroker in Kunduz and Takhar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26, 2011</td>
<td>Abdul Mutaleb Baik</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Takhar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Failed Assassination Attempts 2010-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 10, 2011</td>
<td>Samiullah Qatara</td>
<td>Provincial police chief for Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14, 2011</td>
<td>Abdul Basir Salangi</td>
<td>Governor of Parwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sher Ahmad Maladani</td>
<td>Provincial Police Chief for Parwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 2011</td>
<td>Bismullah Khan</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2011</td>
<td>Bismullah Khan</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What about 2012-14: has it got worse or better?
The Haqqani network tries to expand its influence to other relatively stable provinces of central Afghanistan. Its new targets are the provinces that could facilitate their access to Kabul to project spectacular attacks, Wardak, Logar and Ghazni (ICG report, June 2011, p15). The Haqqani network doesn’t achieve the same level of support in central provinces due to the mixed population: Pashtuns live alongside other ethnic groups in these areas and the presence of the Afghan Taliban (Dressler, October 2010, p 28). The Afghan Taliban who is the senior partner in the insurgency doesn’t want to allow the Haqqani network to expand its influence beyond the south-eastern provinces, their traditional power base (ICG report, June 2011, p19). They are cooperating on some fronts and competing on other. Their competition becomes tough when it comes to the controlling of highways. The highways are a special source of income for the insurgents. They do not only have check-points for collecting taxes, but also take bribes from NATO contractors for safe passage to convey (Dressler, October 2010, p 25, 28). Therefore, the protection of the highways is one of the major objectives of the Afghan and coalition forces.
Number of U.S. Airstrikes in territories of various Taliban/Al-Qaeda Factions in Pakistan (2004-2012).

The Haqqani network got the focus of international media and attention of US policy makers when it successfully executed high-profile attacks in and around Kabul (Dressler, October 2010, p 15). Its suicide campaign and kinetic activities against the international and national targets in Afghanistan sharply increased in summer of 2008, when Islamabad made a peace agreement with the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan who are aiding the Haqqani network. The peace agreements multiplied their strength and focused their struggle against the United States, International and Afghan forces (Dressler, October 2010, p 24). The Haqqani network along with the Afghan Taliban and Hizb-Islami Hekmetyar group (HiG) established Kabul Attacks Network (KAN) to execute attacks against the strategic and opportunistic targets in Kabul (Dressler, October 2010, p 31). The Haqqani network is particularly interested in multi-staged attacks against the government installation. It detonated a SVBIED outside the Indian embassy in Kabul killing 40 people in July 2008. It is believed that the ISI was behind the attack to discourage Indian involvement in Afghanistan’s mega projects. Similarly, It attacked the luxury Serena Hotel in Kabul in
January 2008, reportedly targeting the Norwegian foreign minister. It was to pressurise Norway to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Several months later it attacked the parade ceremony of the 16th anniversary of overthrow the Soviet back government. President Karzai hardly escaped in that multi-pronged attacks carried by the Haqqani network. Similarly in 2009 the Haqqanis’ SVBIEDs targeted embassy entrances, a United Nations guesthouse, Bagram air base, Kabul International Airport and Camp Phoenix housing the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police training facilities (Dressler, October 2010, pp.31-32). It shows that the Al-Qaeda's training of the Haqqani network has enhanced its capabilities to strike sophisticated attacks against highly guarded places. The Haqqani network spectacular attacks continue throughout 2008 and 2009. It reduced slightly in 2010, 2011 and 2012 due to the United States extra troops in Afghanistan and effective drone attacks against them in North Waziristan (Dressler, October 2010, p.35). The Haqqani network will further test the strength of the Pakistan and United States alliance in the war on terror. Imp not sure you need all this detail. It looks like padding to me: you need to justify the discussion.

Pakistan's security establishment particularly the ISI links with the Haqqani network is a profound source of concern for the United States. There is a consensus in the Obama administration that Pakistan has been providing support to the Haqqani network at different levels, although the nature and intensity of support may vary across time and subject. “Today, the ISI admits that it maintains regular contact with the Haqqanis, but denies providing operational support. American and other Western officials, citing intelligence reports, say the ISI and the Haqqanis do more than just talk. Pakistani intelligence allows Haqqani operatives to run legitimate businesses in Pakistan, facilitates their travel to Persian Gulf states, and has continued to donate money. Senior Haqqani figures own houses in the capital, Islamabad, where their relatives live unmolested.” (The New York Times, August 1, 2012). Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen said in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011,

The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers. The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating U.S.-Pakistan relations.

The relationship between the Haqqanis' and Pakistan's government is subjected to close scrutiny. There are different opinions and positions regarding Pakistan's relationship with the Haqqanis. One school of thought dominated by the American scholars says that
Pakistan's government uses the Haqqani network as a strategic card in Afghanistan end game because it needs a proxy to extend its influence in Afghanistan after the Americans leave. They say that the interest of the Haqqanis' and Pakistan's are in line with each others in Afghanistan; therefore there is a mutual support (Shah & Gall October 31, 2011). They base their explanations on strategic factors like the Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's fear of Pashtun nationalism and Islamabad's desire to have a strategic depth in Afghanistan. This school of thought in White house became stronger after Admiral (retired) Mullen testified before the Congress that the Haqqanis act as the “veritable arm” of Pakistan's ISI. Pentagon also echoes the same concerns that Pakistan’s military has been in contact with the Haqqanis. The United States Congress, which increases its role in the US foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, has already been identified as hostile to Pakistan. The United States Congress had also set the tone of US sanctions against Pakistan whether it was in 1990s against its nuclear programme or after 1965 Indo-Pakistan's war. United States policy makers belong to this group stress the Obama administration that it should adopt a policy of containment toward Pakistan and press Islamabad to conduct a military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network. And what happened afterwards?

The second school of thought is identified as a cautious one. Many independent writers and scholars are proponent of cautious approach to Pakistan. It is believed that the US State department, particularly the Secretary of State is a major supporter of the engagement policy toward Pakistan. They are looking toward a political solution of Afghanistan, in which Pakistan's role is critically essential. “Speaking to a group of Pakistani journalists, Clinton said it was unrealistic to think Pakistan's intelligence service did not have connections with insurgents. “Every intelligence agency has contact with unsavoury characters, that is part of the job of being in an intelligence agency,” she said. “What we are saying is let’s use those contacts to try to bring these people to the table to see whether or not they are going to be cooperative.” (The Washington post, 2011). Hillary Clinton said “Pakistan has a critical role to play in supporting Afghan reconciliation and ending the conflict,” Clinton said. “We look to Pakistan to take strong steps to deny Afghan insurgents safe havens and to encourage the Taliban to enter negotiations in good faith.” (New York Time, 2011). This school of thought believes that Pakistan's has contact with insurgents including the Haqqani network, but it doesn't have command and control of them. It says that Pakistan may not be interested in launching a military operation without its clear role in the Afghan end game. They do not accuse Pakistan for supporting the Haqqani network, but blaming it for not doing enough against it. There is a difference between these two
approaches: supporting terrorists and not doing enough against them, the former means anti-US policy, whereas, the latter means pro-Pakistan policy. The engagement school of thought believes that Pakistan doesn't go after the Haqqani network, because it will also ensue instability and suicide attacks inside Pakistan. Whereas, the containment school of thought perceives that Pakistan has its own political objectives in Afghanistan; installing a pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul, resisting Indian influence in Afghanistan and Pashtuns’ nationalism for greater Afghanistan that has a claim on Pashtuns’ population of Pakistan.

So in the thinking of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment, the Haqqanis make sense. They are Pashtuns but not nationalists, and they are increasingly seen as being more reliable partners than even the Quetta Shura, the Afghan Taliban leadership council based in Pakistan. And they provide a hedge in Afghanistan against any encroachment by Pakistan’s chief rival, India (New York Times, 2001).

The reality lies somewhere in the middle of the above approaches. All three of them carry substantial evidences to support their cases against the others. It is true that Pakistan has been supporting proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir since 1980s. Its bankrupt policy using militants as foreign policy instrument backfired very badly. The biggest threat to Pakistan's survival today is not from either India or the US presence in Afghanistan, but it is stemming from the internal terrorist groups. On the basis of its historical relationship with terrorists’ organisations, it is not difficult to conclude that Pakistan has links with them today as well. But it is very important to know that Pakistan cannot afford to attack the US forces in Afghanistan through its proxies, the way it did with India in Kashmir. There is a realisation in Islamabad and Washington at the corridors of power that the US is only one attack away from the unilateral action against Pakistan either diplomatically or militarily. If the Haqqani network succeeds to kill more than 100 US soldiers in an attack or kill the US ambassador to Afghanistan, it will precipitate a massive US attack against inside Pakistan. It is hard to believe that the ISI advises the Haqqani network to attack the US embassy in Kabul. Pakistan gives it passive support, for examples, doesn’t arrest its family members, doesn't shut down its legal businesses and ignores its movement inside Pakistan, but it doesn't provide them operational and strategic guidance for attacking the US forces in Afghanistan. Any full-fledge military operation in North Waziristan is not in the interest of Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the United States drone strikes are used with the help of Pakistan’s intelligence support, it will produce a positive result in Afghanistan.
2.5 What is FATA?

There are seven districts called agencies (Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan) at Pakistan's border with Afghanistan with an estimated population of 3.5 million. Its size is approximately 10,500 square miles, roughly the same size as the state of Maryland in the United States (Markey, 2008, p.8). FATA shares a nearly three hundred miles long border with Afghanistan. All districts have their border with Afghanistan except Orakzai. It has one of the world's harshest landscapes that range from towering mountains, narrow valleys and desert plains to rocky barren wasteland (Johnson & Mason, 2008). FATA is the poorest and least developed part of Pakistan: the literacy rate is only 17% compared to the national average of 40%, (among women it is 3% to the national average of 32%) and the per capita income is roughly $250, as nearly 66% of households live beneath the poverty line (Nawaz, 7th January, 2009). The Pashtun ethnicity (or Pakhtun) overwhelmingly dominates the area: with more than 25 million members, they represent one of the largest tribal groups in the world. The Pashtuns are further divided into clans, khels and families; they identify themselves in terms of their familial ties and commitment (Johnson & Mason, 2008).

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is one of the least administered areas in Pakistan. The influence of the federal government in tribal areas is minimum; they are under the de-facto control of Al-Qaeda-allied Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). How did FATA become the basin of Al-Qaeda and TTP is a major question that has not only threatened the security of Pakistan, but also that of the United States, Europe and Afghanistan. To understand Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas it is necessary to comprehend the governance structure present in FATA which made it the safest place in the world for Al-Qaeda. FATA has a different status in Pakistan's constitution: it is a semi-autonomous region, governed through the office of a Political Agent reporting to the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, which is a geographically contagious province of Pakistan to FATA. The Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa represents Pakistan's President who is the head of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The chain of authority thus flows from the President of Pakistan to the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa to the Office of Political Agent, who is aided by assistant Political Agents, Tehsildar and naib-tehsildar. The office of Political Agent is one of the most prised positions in Pakistan's bureaucracy due to its absolute authority in the management of the affairs of tribal agencies: every agency has a sole Political Agent, who is the administrative head of the agency (Markey, 2008; Nawaz, 2009).
The Office of Political Agent exercises a mix of extensive executive, judicial and revenue power. It is the Political Agent's responsibility to maintain law and order, and suppress crimes in tribal areas. The Political Agent relies on the social and administrative powers of Maliks to maintain peace and harmony in tribal areas. Malik is a status granted to the head of a tribe by the Office of Political Agent with the consent of the Governor. This status carries some role and responsibilities: the Malik is supposed to resolve disputes between parties, maintain law and order in his area and remain loyal to the interest of state. The status of Malik makes person elite of his tribe; they get regular stipends from the government, and depending on their influence and role, have the luxury of meeting the Political Agent, the Governor and even sometimes the President to present their area's grievances (Asia Report No 125, 2006). The relationship between the Political Agent and the Malik is an important component of this system called Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR). It is more of a social relationship between two parties than a bureaucratic one. Tribes and Maliks are quite autonomous in running their affairs. The Malik can never be an alternative to a Police Officer to manage the affairs, who are trained professionals and obliged to serve the interests of the state. This administrative vacuum gave Al-Qaeda and the Taliban a great opportunity to exploit and fill it: if there was a proper police management system, even to the Pakistani standard, it would have created a lot of trouble for Al-Qaeda to settle in the tribal areas. It is important to remember that Pakistan's police force has a significant role in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Although they do not have quality training, sophisticated weapons and other proper counter-terrorism equipment they have played a profoundly important role against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's mainland. Additionally, Maliks do not work as a force, they are not disciplined and do not have intelligence information which made them vulnerable to assassination and terrorism attacks from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Maliks were assassinated one by one which eventually collapsed the entire system of law and order enforcement. On the contrary, the police institution acts as a force, has its own intelligence unit and an attack on one section prompts a response from all. So, it is very difficult to break its morale and occupy the areas. Pakistan's police force is on the forefront of the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in settled areas. If the United States had focused its attention and resources on Pakistan's police force rather than its army, it most likely would have produced splendid results in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Abbas, 2011).
2.5.1 Judicial System in FATA

The state of judiciary in Pakistan is everything except satisfactory, especially in Pakistan's lower courts. They are under tremendous pressure to resolve people's problems; hundreds of thousands of cases are filed in every court of law. It is amongst the most corrupt institutions in Pakistan, although its image has improved recently when Pakistan's current chief Justice Chaudary Mohammad Iftikhar refused to allow Musharraf to contest the election as a chief of army staff. He was deposed, later on installed after a country wide movement by political parties, lawyers and civil society. But it does not mean the judiciary is functioning well and dispensing justice. It is particularly hesitant to punish members of extremist and terrorist organisations due to fear for their personal security. The judicial system in FATA is even worse than the federal one. The FATA judicial system is enshrined in Frontier Crime Regulation (1901), a hybrid colonial era legal framework that mixes traditional costumes and norms with the executive discretion (Asia Report No 125, 2006). FCR concentrates discretionary police, judicial and executive power in the Political Agent's hands, and there are no courts at the lower level in FATA. Political Agents of every agency refer civil and criminal matters to the Jirga, a tribal mechanism of conflict resolutions and dispensation of justice. It is unlike Pakistan's lower courts where cases can potentially hang for decades as it resolves disputes quickly and without any fee. A large number of tribal people trust the Jirga system when it works in its natural flow without interference from the Political Agent office, According to International Crisis Group report,

Most FATA residents interviewed by Crisis Group supported the Jirga as an efficient source of dispensing justice. In cases where neither the government nor the Political Agent has a stake, the process can be quicker and offer disputants more opportunity to air their grievance and negotiate than an ordinary court trial (Asia Report 125, 2011).

There are four problems with the judicial system in FATA. They might not have contributed in providing sanctuaries to Al-Qaeda in tribal areas but they facilitated the collapse of government writ which eventually led to the raise of Al-Qaeda and its allies the Pakistani Taliban.

Firstly, there is a section in the FCR (1901, sections 21-24) that empowers the Political Agent to punish entire tribes for crimes committed on its territory by fines, arrests, property confiscation, and blockade. It is called doctrine of collective role and responsibility: “The Political Agent can order detention of all or any members of the tribe, seize their property or block their access to the settled districts if he has “good reason” to believe that a tribe or its
members are “acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner”, have “failed to render all assistance in their power” to help apprehend criminals, “connived at, or abetted in a crime” or “suppressed evidence” of an offence. Political Agents can even seize the property or businesses of tribesmen in settled districts who do not live in a FATA agency” (FCR 1901, sections 21-24). Not only does it violate the basic principles of modern justice system, individual liability before law, but it also defeats the fundamental pillar of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism doctrine: winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The surge in the United States' forces in Iraq and Afghanistan which costs its treasury billions of dollars was primarily guided by the principle of winning hearts and minds through protection of population from insurgent attacks. On the other hand, in Pakistan's tribal areas, when the US forced Islamabad to take action against Al-Qaeda in 2002 and 2003, it committed two major mistakes. First of all, it did not have any local police system in FATA, so Pakistan resorted to using its army for counter-terrorism purposes. Pakistan's army counter-terrorism operations without any prior intelligence and police system caused massive civilian casualties, which were exploited by Al-Qaeda (Asia Report No 125, 11th December, 2006 ). Secondly, the Political Agents used the principle of collective punishment against the tribal people when they failed to deliver Al-Qaeda's operative in tribal areas, without trying to understand whether it was a capability issue or a political one. Pakistan's army and political bureaucracy imposed a blockade on areas bordering Afghanistan especially North and South Waziristan for months. No human right organisation or media personnel were allowed to report on the situation from Pakistan's tribal areas during the economic blockade: “The authorities levied heavy fines and economic sanctions against tribesmen, seizing their property and impounding vehicles. After the March 2004 military operation in the capital, Wana, of south Waziristan, bulldozers tore down homes of wanted local militants, families suspected of hosting foreigners, and their relatives."My only crime was belonging to the Yargul Khel tribe," says Javed Khan, one of the victims of the collective punishment. "I do not support Al-Qaeda. I did not shelter anybody, but I was arrested, my shop was sealed."” (The CS Monitor, 27th October 2004). This policy eventually turned complete tribes into Al-Qaeda and Taliban sympathisers and converted Pakistan's tribal areas into the most dangerous place in the world for the US.

Secondly, the judicial system in tribal areas has two problems in its modus operandi; it does not follow a due process of law and there is no separation of power between executive and judiciary in tribal areas. The office of Political Agent exercises both powers, can order the arrest of a person and punish them without any right to legal representation: “There is no right to legal representation, to present material evidence or cross-examine witnesses” (Asia
Report No 125, 11th December, 2006). When a Political Agent punishes a person or a tribe (in case of collective punishment), his decision cannot be challenged in Pakistan's High Courts or Supreme Court as tribal areas do not fall into the orbit of any of the four High Courts or of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. According to Article 247 (7) of Pakistan's constitution: “neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless Majlis-e-Shura [parliament] by law otherwise provides”. Although the national parliament can technically extend the jurisdiction of the superior courts to FATA, no civilian or military government has seriously considered upsetting the status quo. The Political Agent's decision can only be reviewed by an FCR commissioner, appointed by the Governor of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa, who is usually a fellow bureaucrat of the Political Agent. Lawyers appearing before the FCR commissioners say that they usually protect state interests rather address the grievances of convicted parties. Although tribal people do not have a good opinion of Pakistan's High Courts and Supreme Court, they are still better than a tribunal that consists of bureaucrats acting as judges against the decision of their fellow bureaucrats: “In essence, convicted parties have no recourse to an impartial court of law and must rely on bureaucratic discretion. Since the FCR vests appellate authority in the executive, it violates the safeguard of an independent judiciary enshrined in Articles 2-A and 175 of the constitution” (Asia Report No 125, 11th December, 2006).

Thirdly, there is a clause in the FCR which gives the right to cause death of a person on suspicion of evading arrest by arms (the right to use force). It is a very dangerous clause, giving a 'license to kill' to Pakistan's army and to the Political Agents engaged in counter-terrorism in tribal areas. Pakistan's army has frequently used this clause to kill people who were suspected of supporting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. On 30th October 2006, there was a strike on a madressa (religious school) in the Bajour agency which killed more than 80 people including children on the suspicion that some Al-Qaeda operatives were hidden there. There was a demand from the Human Rights Watch to Pakistan's government to allow independent investigators to determine the legality and proportionality of the Bajour strikes (Human Rights Watch, 1st November 2006). That military strike was effectively used by the

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8 It was the second drone strike used by the Bush administration in tribal areas. Pakistani government covered it as its military missile. Eventually, when a report from the area Hayat Ullah visited the site found some pieces of drone missile made by the USA. He exposed the missile pieces to local and International media, which finally exposed the US drone program in Pakistan tribal areas. The reporter was kidnapped after few months and found brutally tortured and dead after six months. His family member accused Pakistan’s ISI personnel for killing Hayat-ul-lah.

9 There was information from the various intelligence sources that Al-Qaeda leader Al-Zawahri visited the madressa, which was attacked, but he left before the drone strikes.
Chapter 2

Taliban and Al-Qaeda as propaganda tools for the recruitment of suicide bombers. This incident along with the ‘Lal Masjid’ [Red Mosque in Islamabad] operation was the most cited cause of suicide bombing in Pakistan\(^\text{10}\) (Khan, Dawn, 9\(^\text{th}\) November 2006).

Last but not least, there are various problems within the Jirga system (Council of elders). There are two kinds of Jirga systems. The first is a social one, formed by mutual consent of two parties, consisting of people of good reputation, who are well respected in the locality or tribe because of their honesty and steadfastness. This Jirga system usually uses its good office to resolve conflicts, civil and criminal, by offering acceptable solutions to both parties (Shinwari, 2010). It does not have any administrative power and mainly relies on social forces. For example, if a party first gives its power of attorney to the Jirga and later decides to not accept its decision, that party could be boycotted in future transactions, not be invited to any occasions or would be forced in extreme cases to leave the area; it is more like a ‘name and shame’ tactic. This system has credibility in its favour, as Pashtuns usually resolve their disputes in tribal and settled areas outside courts through this mechanism. On the other hand, there is another Jirga system that is picked by the Political Agent of any agency to resolve disputes between parties, which is called FCR Jirga. The FCR Jirga has binding effects as it will be implemented by the Political Agent. Although the latter has the final say in the FCR decision, it is primarily functioning through his picked Maliks, who are usually considered government representatives. An analyst observed: “The Jirga lost its credibility among the tribesmen the day it became a tool in the hands of political authorities, who converted it into a state-manipulated gathering of blue-eyed people” (Asia Report 125). People consider it as a tool at the government's disposal to promote its interest and punish any party which does not see eye to eye with the Political Agent or his loyal Maliks. The Senate subcommittee report on the FCR pointed out: “In its present form, the Jirga under FCR though [loosely] based on Pashtun tribal customs and traditions is so designed to suit the convenience of the administration rather than meet the ends of justice” (Senate Committee on Human Rights, 31\(^\text{st}\) May, 2005).

\(^{10}\) The number of suicide attacks exponentially increased after 2007, when some militant organisations united under the umbrella organisation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP usually cited the incident Lal Mosque as an excuse for suicide attacks in Pakistan. They were particularly focused on Pakistan’s security forces, which were considered responsible for Lal Mosque operation.
Chapter 3 The Obama administration’s policy towards Pakistan

3.1 Introduction

One of the main objectives of the Obama foreign policy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s sanctuaries. According to the US National Security Strategy 2010 “[we] are fighting a war against a far-reaching network of hatred and violence. We will disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates through a comprehensive strategy” (p4). The safe havens available to Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas have given it plenty of opportunity to revamp its organisation and work on its strategic objectives without any significant security threat. Ted Gestaro, the principal author of a National Intelligence Estimate in 2007 said regarding FATA, “Al-Qaeda now has many of the operational and organisational advantages it once enjoyed across the border in Afghanistan before 9/11” (Warrick, 2008). The key to a strategic victory against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda lies with Pakistan’s army and deployment of ground forces in FATA to establish order (Riedel, 2012). There was a perception in the United States that as long as FATA did come under complete control of Pakistani government, it would not be possible to destroy Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries through counter-terrorism measures such as drone strikes and Special Forces operations. Pakistan did not have to only arrest or kill al-Qaeda’s member, but also had to establish its writ in FATA to win hearts and minds of the people through a proper comprehensive policy of counter-insurgency (Mullen, 2011).

The Bush administration was preoccupied with the war in Iraq until 2008 and did not have a delineated policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan11. According to Robert Gate, who was Defense Secretary during the last two years of the Bush administration, “prior to Obama’s inauguration, Joe Biden visited Afghanistan and Iraq, talking to US diplomats, commanders, and soldiers in Kabul. Biden found confusion at all levels about our strategy and objectives” (Gate, 2014, p.335). Similarly, Michele Flournoy, the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said after visiting Afghanistan in February 2009: “I saw little to convince me that we have a comprehensive interagency plan or concept of operation. I still believe that many competing and often conflicting campaigns are on-going in Afghanistan”. When President

11 There were reports that four months before President Bush left the Office, his top civilian and military aides conducted four major new reviews of the war strategy and overall mission in Afghanistan (Schmitt & Shanker, 22nd September 2008, The New York Times). He intended to execute the successful policy of Iraq in Afghanistan as well, which was based on the principles of surge in the US forces and building of Iraqi army. In December 2007, President Bush already set the direction of future course in Afghanistan, “The administration recently announced a series of changes, including plans to double the size of the Afghan Army, restructure the American military command there and put more intelligence analysts on the ground to help hunt down militants from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda” (Schmitt & Shanker, 22nd September 2008, The New York Times).
Obama took office in January 2009, he appointed a committee chaired by his campaign advisor for South Asia, Bruce Riedel\textsuperscript{12} and the United States’ Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke (Sanger, 2009). The main responsibility of the committee was to define the United States’ objective in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and recommend a strategy to achieve them. The Riedel committee took two months to produce a strategy with the assistance of General (retired) Douglas Lute\textsuperscript{13}, called “AfPak” (Afghanistan and Pakistan) (New York Times, 2009). According to various American sources, President Obama accepted the Riedel recommendations without passing the review through the interagency process of policy making (Woodward, 2011, Steve, 2011, Jones, 2011). President Obama, while announcing the United States’ strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on 27\textsuperscript{th} March in 2009 said: “So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future”. The key message of the Riedel Review was: ‘The Obama administration should treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries but one challenge, and therefore the policy was called “AfPak”’ (Riedel, 2011). Several experts criticised the strategy as being based more on Bruce Riedel’s ideas about the region rather than a product of a comprehensive interagency process (Woodward, 2011; Coll, 2011). Therefore, it was followed by another comprehensive interagency strategic review of the United States’ objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan within six months.

This chapter consists of eight sections. The first part discusses Bruce Riedel committee policy recommendations on Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second section highlights the differences in the administration on US strategy towards the region. The third, fourth and fifth parts of the paper discuss perspectives of the CIA, the Pentagon and the State departments respectively on policy towards Pakistan. The sixth is about Congress position. The seventh section of the paper discusses the administration policy towards Pakistan, which contains of drone strikes, coalition support fund and economic assistance. The last part is conclusion of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{12} Bruce Riedel was a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution, an expert on South Asia, Islam, extremism, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was Obama's South Asia team leader during the presidential campaign on 2007. In January 2009, President Obama asked him to lead a review committee on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He had 60 days to prepare a report on the situation there for the Obama administration (Woodward, 2011).

\textsuperscript{13} General (retired) Douglas Lute was President Bush war czar for Iraq and Afghanistan. He played a critical role in the Bush policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan in the last two years. When Barrack Obama became president, he retained Lute along with Robert Gate. General Lute immediately became the key person in the White House which provided some invaluable military advises to the White House political advisors to counter the Pentagon narrative of military victory in Afghanistan.
3.2 Bruce Riedel’s Committee

The Riedel review basically consisted of three major points regarding Pakistan: resourceful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan; a focus on Al-Qaeda in FATA; and the political resolution of conflict in Afghanistan. Firstly, he recommended that the United States should implement a resourceful counter-insurgency in Afghanistan to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, but for a short period of time. He advised President Obama:

“Given what President Bush and you have ordered- nearly 33,000 more troops this year- that will double the number there now...But you should have a measurement over the course of six to 12 months whether you are succeeding. If you don’t see progress, there are lovely words in the bureaucratic process. You can ‘off-ramp’ them, meaning that because of the months of delays between your approval and actual deployment, you can decide to not deploy them” (Woodward, 2011, p215).

Secondly, the committee recommended that the administration should focus its attention and resources on FATA rather than Afghanistan, because it is the hub of international terrorism (Riedel, 2011). According to Riedel: “The goal is to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, their support structure and their safe havens in Pakistan and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (Woodward, 2011, p201). According to Woodward, he said to President Obama, “Though my first recommendation is an integrated civilian-military counter-insurgency for Afghanistan, you, Mr. President, have to be focused on the real, central threat - Pakistan” (Woodward, 2011, p.211). He forewarned President Obama that Al-Qaeda was plotting attacks against the United States and Europe by using Pakistani immigrants in the UK and other European countries, who could easily escape the US screening system as they do not need a visa to visit the United States (Woodward, 2001, p.122). Therefore he recommended that the Obama administration should (a) pressurise Pakistan to carry out a military operation in FATA against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries, (b) approve more visas for United States’ officials, especially the CIA’s

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14 This would have been a better approach if the Obama administration had given at least one complete year to the forces, as recommended in the Riedel review, as it would have given an idea of whether the forces on ground could make any difference. If the US forces could not break the momentum of the Taliban, the resources could have been used for the diplomatic resolution of the problem. Alternatively, if the momentum of the Taliban was reversed with the existing number of troops in Afghanistan, the resources could have been used for the development of the Afghan national army, strengthening of the governance structure in Kabul and for the economic and military assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the Pentagon changed its position mid-operation and asked for extra troops within four months of the review. This later became the key factor in conflict between the White House and the Pentagon. That is, whether the Obama administration should approve extra troops in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban or disrupt the Taliban’s momentum with the existing number of troops.
employees and private security contractors, to collect intelligence on Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and (c) allow US armed drones in FATA and settled areas to target members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (NYT, 2010). Last but not least, Riedel recommended the political resolution of Pakistan’s conflicts with India over Kashmir and with Afghanistan on Durrand-line. His reasoning was that if the United States resolves the issue of Kashmir by using its intelligence, military and diplomatic channels between India and Pakistan, Islamabad would dismantle the jihadist infrastructure that supports global jihad against the United States (Riedel, 2012).

All the principle advisors and national security staff of President Obama supported the Riedel review except Joe Biden, who thought that a strategy of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan using significant resources would not be sustainable (Baker, 2009). According to Richard Hass (2009), “He (Biden) came to question some of the assumptions and began asking questions about whether there might be other approaches that might get you as good or better results at lower cost”. According to Bob Woodward “when Vice-President Joe Biden told him that it is not politically sustainable at home to keep a large number of forces in Afghanistan on the long term, Riedel retorted politics doesn't come into his orbit, therefore the President should take care of the political and budget factors” (Woodward, 2011, p. 125). Secretary Clinton was the strongest supporter of the Riedel review among the principal advisors, precisely because it recommended a highly-resourced counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. The Pentagon initially had a mixed reaction towards the Riedel review, because it did not put any cap on the number of the United States’ forces in Afghanistan. It urged the avoidance of an open commitment to Afghanistan and recommended a short-term response (Gate, 2014). The Pentagon supported the Afghan section of Riedel review, but was not satisfied with other recommendations for two reasons. Firstly, it recommended shifting the focus of the administration from Afghanistan to Pakistan to defeat the Taliban insurgency. The core message of the Riedel Review was “if Pakistan doesn’t cooperate with the United States against the Afghan Taliban, it will not be possible to defeat them militarily” (Riedel,

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15 According to Gate, ‘Riedel advised that the Obama administration should at the time give at least six to twelve months to the forces in Afghanistan: if they are making a substantial progress in Afghanistan, they should be given reinforcements; otherwise the US should show restraint to avoid an open commitment to Afghanistan (Gate, 2014). He further said, “I told my staff in early March that I was very disappointed in the Riedel review so far, which contained no new ideas. Among other things, his report called for significantly greater US civilian advisory capacity without offering any concrete proposals as where it could be found. Flournoy said that the draft report was all about what should be done but the how was missing” (Gate, 2014)
2010). Secondly, according to the United States Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, the review did not specify the exact number of troops needed in Afghanistan.

### 3.3 The split in the Obama administration

There were two groups in the Obama administration seeking to influence presidential policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. They had a different understanding of the problem in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first group was led by the Pentagon. This group had support of Hillary Clinton, Republicans in Congress and some hawkish Americans diplomats such as Ryan Crocker and Ann Paterson (the US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively) (Rashid, 2011). The key assumption of this group was that the United States should defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan even if it did not have the capacity or the intention to attack the US homeland. This was to use the response to the Taliban as an example to other extremists groups in the Greater Middle East, but would again provide Al-Qaeda safe havens as before 9/11. General Petraeus was of the opinion that it was not useful to discuss whether the Afghan Taliban would support Al-Qaeda after succeeding in Afghanistan. He said they were themselves becoming a new brand of terrorism, therefore should be defeated irrespective of their relationship with Al-Qaeda (Woodward, 2011). The first group was of the opinion that it would not be possible to develop the Afghan army for as long as the momentum was with the Taliban (McChrystal, 2010). It believed that when the Taliban’s middle level leadership was eliminated by robust counter-terrorism operations such as night raids and drones, the insurgency would die a natural death. Therefore, it urged the administration to approve 40,000 troops to defeat the Taliban militarily. It particularly stressed Afghanistan’s centric approach towards the defeat of the Taliban’s insurgency rather than Pakistan.

The other group was led by Vice President Joe Biden, who was a supporter of the Afghan war during the Bush administration. He had the support of the White House political advisors. This group was of the opinion that the United States had to redefine its goals and objectives in Afghanistan and focus on Al-Qaeda's core in Pakistan's tribal areas, Yemen and Somalia (Baker, 2012). Vice President John Biden said:

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16 His National Security Advisor Anthony Blinken, then-White House Chief of Staff Rahm Israel Emanuel, retired Army Lieutenant General Douglas Edward Lute (Special Assistant to President Obama and Senior Coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, now the United States Permanent Representative to NATO), John Owen Brennan (Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, now Director of the CIA), then-Deputy National Security Advisors Thomas Edward Donilon and Denis Richard McDonough.
“We cannot lose sight of Pakistan and stability there. The way I understand this, Afghanistan is a means to accomplish our top mission, which is to kill Al-Qaeda and secure Pakistan’s nukes. We must be making progress separately against Al-Qaeda and separately in Pakistan” (Woodward, 2010).

The group believed that the Afghan Taliban comprised Pashtun extremists who had no interest in blowing up skyscrapers in New York (Woodward, 2011). It was of the view that as long as Al-Qaeda's core was safe and protected in Pakistan's tribal areas, it would not return to Afghanistan where there were 68,000 US forces alongside the Joint Special Operation units and drone weapons (Nasr, 2013). Therefore the United States should take the war to Al-Qaeda’s core in FATA, where it had ideological and political support (Gate, 2014). The group further argued that even if the US wanted to defeat the Afghan Taliban, it is important to destroy its sanctuaries in FATA. This is where it trains young students from Madrassas for suicide bombing and sends them to Afghanistan to attack the United States and NATO forces; makes Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); recruits unemployed youth in the name of jihad; raises funds; holds hostages abducted for ransom; and virtually runs a parallel state in tribal areas right under the nose of Pakistan’s army (Coll, 2012). According to this group, the centre of gravity of Afghanistan’s insurgency is not the Afghan cities, but Pakistan’s tribal areas (Jones, 2011). This group presented an alternative to the Pentagon’s doctrine of counter-insurgency, called counter-terrorism plus. This group wanted President Obama to send 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan to speed up the building of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Joe Biden’s group opposed counter-insurgency in Afghanistan for three reasons. Firstly, it was of the view that Pakistan was increasingly turning into the epicentre of international terrorism and possessed nuclear weapons. Therefore, it should be the focus of US resources and concern rather than Afghanistan. It argued that if the United States did not succeed in Pakistan, its success in Afghanistan against the Afghan Taliban would be meaningless, because the objective was to destroy Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries. Secondly, the group believed that a change of situation in Pakistan was not only good for addressing the bigger threat of Al-Qaeda; it would also help in Afghanistan. It argued that once Pakistan and the United States were on the same page against the Taliban, Pakistan’s army would either remove the Taliban’s sanctuaries in FATA or force them into a political settlement in Afghanistan, which would give a safe exit to the United States (Ignatius, 2011). Thirdly, the group opposed it because it was not politically sustainable at home at a time of economic crisis. According to James Mann:
The American economy was in the most severe recession since the Great Depression. During the first three months of 2009, the economy contracted at an annual rate of 6.1 per cent after dropping 6.3 per cent in the last quarter of 2008. Unemployment was climbing month by month. The stock market kept dropping; having hit a high of 14,198 in 2007, the Dow Jones had fallen to 7,949 by the time Obama took office and it’s reached a low of 6,443 on March 2009. Chrysler slipped to bankruptcy, and General Motors followed a couple of months later. After less than four weeks in the White House, Obama won congressional approval of his $787 billion stimulus package, the largest in history” (2012, p.117).

In that situation, the Pentagon was asking for 40,000 more forces in Afghanistan, whereas the Obama administration had already approved 21,000 forces for Afghanistan in mid-February 2009.

The differences in the Situation Room between the President's political advisors in the White House and the Pentagon turned into a media campaign over the 'messaging to the American public'. The political advisors including the Vice-President wanted to give the Riedel review’s other areas of policy - economic, political and governance - sufficient time to influence the development on the ground in Afghanistan. They wanted to strike a semblance between the military and civilian components of the US policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, and review the situation after one complete year before deciding whether any extra troops were needed. The Pentagon, on the other hand, was under pressure in Afghanistan to show results on the ground and had the legacy of successful counter-insurgency in Iraq. It therefore forcefully argued for a rapid surge in Afghanistan17 (Armitage, 2013).

3.4 Role of the CIA in AfPak

The CIA was primarily responsible for chasing Al-Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to Vali Nasr, “[t]he CIA had one goal: protect America from another Al-Qaeda attack. Pakistan remained a big worry in that regard, especially after the failed, May 1, 2010, SUV-bomb plot to attack New York City's Time Square was traced back to the country”

17 On 4th September 2009, the Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson published an interview with Petraeus in which the General clearly stated that while there was no guarantee that more troops would lead to success in Afghanistan, “It won’t work out if we don’t send a lot more” (Gate, 2014). He completely supported the McChrystal approach to Afghanistan’s insurgency, which called for 40,000 more US troops. After that interview, the battle for more troops in Afghanistan was left for the Pentagon-friendly Republican Senators in the Senate Armed Services Committee to push the Obama administration and the Democrats in the Congress for more troops in Afghanistan. The Director of Strategic Communication in the National Security Council, Denis McDonough, officially conveyed the President’s irritation on the interview to Petraeus spokesman Colonel Erik Gunhus and advised him against any appearance on TV channels (Gate, 2014).
(Nasr, 2013, p.81). The CIA had been critical of Pakistan's cooperation and consistently urged the White House to adopt more unilateral measures such as drone strikes, the setting up of a parallel intelligence network and the use of private contractors (Nasr, 2013, 82). It had encouraged the administration to make terrorism-related issues the core objective of US policy towards Pakistan, rather than engaging Pakistan strategically, which required addressing other complicated security, political and economic issues. It also encouraged the administration to pressurise Pakistan to issue more visas to its employees, share information regarding Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and allow the operation of armed drone strikes in FATA. It wanted the White House to use negative tactics such as delaying the reimbursement of the coalition support fund, attaching more conditions to security and economic assistance, criticising Pakistan’s army and ISI in public, and leaking stories to media to pressurise Pakistan to accept its demands (Mazzetti, 2013).

The CIA uses five types of independent sources in Pakistan. Firstly, it shifted its own case officers to Pakistan from Iraq so they could gain first-hand ground experience to make concrete analyses of the data from other sources (Mazzetti, 2013). These officers could also verify whether Pakistan was cooperating or not. Secondly, the CIA uses private contractors to collect information on Pakistan's mainland and in tribal areas (Mazzetti, 2013). These are former Special Operation Force members and CIA analysts. They provide security to the United States' diplomatic missions and CIA case officers as well as collecting intelligence on terrorist organisations (Strata, 2011). The CIA agent who killed two people in Lahore, Raymond Davis, was working as a private contractor spying on the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Dawn, 2011). The third source of information is the US State and Defense department personnel, who are based in large numbers in Pakistan to monitor progress on US economic assistance and to train Pakistani forces to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Fourthly, the CIA uses a paramilitary force it developed after the invasion of Afghanistan to penetrate Taliban- and Al-Qaeda-controlled areas. According to the New York Times, “additionally, in recent years, Afghan militias backed by the C.I.A. have carried out a number of secret missions into Pakistan’s tribal areas (The New York Times, 2010). Finally, the CIA hires Pakistani citizens such as Shakeel Afridi to provide information on sensitive issues. Overall, these five sources of information helped the CIA to develop an independent parallel intelligence network in Pakistan, which not only identified Osama bin Laden, but also prevented several attacks on US forces in Afghanistan and the homeland. These successes have given the CIA a special role in influencing US policy towards Pakistan.
3.5 The role of the Pentagon

The second important role in the United States’ policy towards Pakistan is played by the Pentagon. The Pentagon was once a strong ally of Pakistan’s army, especially during the Cold War. It was the key institution that opposed the State department proposal in the 1990s to declare Pakistan as state sponsor of terrorism due to its support of Kashmir insurgents and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Nasr, 2013, p. 85). The Pentagon considered Pakistan's Army as an important asset in a troubled region because it had been an ally during the Cold War and in the early 1990s. According to Nasr:

After the Afghan war, the State Department thought of putting Pakistan on its list of state terror sponsors and sanctioning it for A.Q Khan's nuclear program. But the Pentagon intervened, arranging for Pakistani troops to lend a hand with UN peacekeeping in Somalia, where Pakistan's Frontier Regiment lost 24 men in a battle against local clan militias in June 1993 and helped rescue US troops in the Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu that October” (2013, p.93).

The relationship between the Pentagon and Pakistan's military deteriorated after 2007-08, when the Taliban insurgency gained momentum in Afghanistan and started inflicting high casualties on the US forces. Pakistan's military and the ISI were accused of supporting and sheltering those groups, particularly the Haqqani network. Admiral Mike Mullen said in his last testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2011 that the Haqqani network acts as “the veritable arm” of the ISI (Bumiller & Perlez, 2011). The US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, also said in the same testimony (2011):

“We’ve made clear that we are going to do everything we have to do to defend our forces, I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and what operational steps we may or may not take.” He added: “I think the first order of business right now is to, frankly, put as much pressure on Pakistan as we can to deal with this issue from their side.”

It urged the Obama administration to force Pakistan to stop the flow of Taliban from Pakistan to Afghanistan and to destroy the Haqqani network's safe havens (Gate, 2014, p.337). According to Vali Nasr, “America's relations with Pakistan between 2009 and 2011 ran on two tracks. On the first track, the CIA and the Pentagon were leaning hard on Pakistan to give the US more help against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban” (Nasr, 2013, p 82). When the Pentagon was disappointed with Pakistan's efforts, especially against the Haqqanis, it developed a plan to unilaterally intervene in Pakistan's tribal areas to remove the Taliban's sanctuaries. This involved the US Special Operation Forces in Afghanistan under McCrystal and General Petraeus (Mazzetti & Filkins 2010). The US Special Operation Forces were
particularly interested in cross-border operations to capture the leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Such arrests would bring a fresh wave of intelligence for US forces in Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda control and command centres in FATA (Mazzetti & Filkins 2010).

The Pentagon had control over the reimbursement of the coalition support fund (CSF), which is the most important instrument for influencing Pakistan’s behaviour. Pakistan is the largest recipient of the CSF. The Pentagon used this fund as a policy tool to force or reward Pakistani behaviour: when its relationship with Pakistan was good, it did not conduct a strict verification of Pakistani claims. Between 2004 and 2006, the average percentage of deferred claims was only 2%, when the Pentagon did not have any complaint about the Taliban kinetic activities on the border. On the other hand, from 2007 onwards the Pentagon issued a guidance to its representative in the US embassy in Islamabad to strictly verify Pakistan's claims, which increased the percentage of deferred claims to 22% instead of an army expansion of military operations from FATA to settled areas (GOA, 2010). The Pentagon uses this leverage to force Pakistan to start military operations against all militant groups based in FATA. It stressed that Pakistan should stop differentiating between “good” and “bad” Taliban.

The other major demand the Pentagon made of Pakistan's Army was permission for its Special Operation Forces to work alongside Pakistan's Army in the battle field in FATA and Swat. It wanted to train Pakistan's Army for counter-insurgency against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Pakistan's Army only partially accepted the Pentagon's demand by allowing its paramilitary force, the “Frontier Corps”, to be trained by the US Special Operation Forces. The Obama administration has made several funds conditional upon the presence of US Special Operation Forces in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas. According to the New York Times, “The Obama administration is suspending and, in some cases, cancelling hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to the Pakistani military, in a move to chasten Pakistan for expelling American military trainers and to press its Army to fight militants more effectively” (Schmit & Perlez, 2011). Pakistan on the other hand is only interested in the US equipment, not training, because of domestic politics. When Pakistan's Army expelled the US Special Forces after the Osama raid, the Pentagon suspended the shipment of some equipment essential for the counter-insurgency operations, including night vision goggles, radios and helicopter spare parts (Schmit & Perlez, 2011).
3.6 The role of the State department in AfPak

The State department did not play as important a role as the Pentagon and the CIA due to the nature of relationship between Pakistan and the United States. It was the only agency where Pakistan enjoyed a little support. According to the Washington Post, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is among a minority of administration officials still willing to express public sympathy for Pakistan’s weak civilian leaders as they face a growing threat from domestic terrorism and the politically powerful military’ (Deyoung, 2011). She supported Obama's policy towards Pakistan, but advocated a more cautious and strategic approach to Pakistan's problems in interagency meetings. The State department was of the view that the United States should engage Pakistan and offer substantial support to change its strategic threat perception. According to Nasr, “Holbrooke convinced Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that America had to offer a strategic partnership to Pakistan, built around a strategic dialogue - a type of bilateral forum that America holds with a number of countries, including China and India” (Nasr, 2013, p81). It stressed that a transnational relationship with Pakistan was not in the United States' long-term interest. It advocated a change of framework in the bilateral relationship from counter-terrorism to a strategic partnership. The State department placed particular stress upon a political solution for Afghanistan's problem and reluctantly supported Obama's surge policy (Woodward, 2011). The former Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the late Richard Holbrooke, believed that the United States would achieve maximum cooperation from Pakistan through a policy of substantial engagement.

3.7 The role of Congress in AfPak

The general mood in the United States was not good regarding Pakistan; only 15% of Americans had favourable view of Pakistan (Gullup, 2012). It had very few friends in the US Congress; therefore it was politically difficult to sell a policy of strategic engagement domestically in the United States regarding Pakistan. The last straw that 'broke the camel's back' was the Osama raid, when Navy SEAL Team 6 killed Bin Laden during Operation Neptune Spear in a compound right under the nose of Pakistan's Army in May 2011. The events after Bin Laden's death further strained the bilateral relationship when Pakistan arrested physician Doctor Shakeel Afridi who cooperated with the CIA to identify Bin Laden (Mazzetti, 2011).
The US Congress passed several resolutions asking the Obama administration to cut economic and military assistance to Pakistan. According to Time, “US Congressmen reacted angrily to Afridi’s imprisonment, voting to cut $33 million of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, one million for each year he’s serving in prison” (2012). It also urged the administration to conduct an investigation to find the support network of Bin Laden in Abotabad. According to New York Times (2011),

Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who is chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, acknowledged that she had no evidence that Pakistan’s government knew where Bin Laden was hiding, but said the government had much to answer for. ‘If they didn’t know, why didn’t they know? Why didn’t they pay more attention to it? Was it just benign indifference, or was it indifference with a motive,’ she said.

Gen. Douglas Lute (ret.), Deputy National Security Advisor, called on the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani, on 11th May 2011 after the Bin Laden episode and told him that countries had been designated as states sponsor of terrorism on less evidence than that available on Pakistan. He further warned: “Once the role of Pakistan was revealed [on Bin Laden's hideout], the US public and Congress would demand measures that may go well beyond the past pattern of only cutting of aid” (Dunya TV, 2013).

The United States’ policy towards Pakistan divided congress. The Senior members of the Congress from both parties, who held important positions in both chambers’ committees include Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA), Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member John McCain (R-AZ) and Senate Appropriation State and Foreign Ops ranking Republican Lindsey Graham (R-SC), both heads of the House Appropriation State and Foreign Ops subcommittees, Kay Granger (R-TX) and Nita Lowey (D-NY) stressed upon go slow approach (Rogin, 2012). They believed that it was too dangerous to break relationship with Pakistan at this point of time (Rogin, 1st December 2012). This group of lawmakers and the Obama administration came under tremendous pressure when Osama bin Laden was found in the town of Pakistani military training centre. Several resolutions were moved in the House and Senate to cut off aids to Pakistan completely. According to Rogin (2012), “The issue of how to deal with Pakistan divides both parties and both chambers. Traditional conservative/liberal distinctions do not apply, and law makers are bringing their long-held scepticism of Pakistani aid into debate.” There was a long list of resolutions recommending various kinds of sanctions and stringent actions against Pakistan in various committees of the United States Congress.
The Congress was also divided on the issues of which kind of aid serves the United States national security interest; economic or security aid. It again divided both houses of Congress and both parties whether the United States should continue granting economic aid to Pakistan's civilian government – which is more sympathetic to Washington, but is weak to influence Pakistan's relationship with the United States – or whether it should cut the security assistance, including the Coalition Support Fund, to Pakistan's military – who is the real partner of the US in war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but does not see eye-to-eye with the United States on Afghanistan, India and extremism in Pakistan. According to Cable (2012),

Top senators admit that the civilian government led by President Asif Ali Zardari has staked a lot of its credibility on its decision to stand by Washington. But many in Congress say that the United States needs the Pakistani military to help it fight the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, so they are more reluctant to cut this funding.

The Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, Carl Levin (D-MI) told The Cable,

It’s not a matter of which part of the government to support, it's the mission or activities that are in our interest. And the military pieces that we are supporting, which is reimbursement of their costs for supporting our efforts in Afghanistan plus training their military on the border, that’s clearly in our interest (2012).

He further says that supporting a stable democracy is in the United States interest, but that it is not the pressing issue at the moment. The list of members who called for review of the Kerry-Luggar-Berman bill (which is a non-military assistance of $1.5 billion annually for five years) included even its two authors Senator Lugar and Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) in the wake of the bin Laden killing (cable, 2012). On the other hand, there were some Senators like John Kerry, John McCain, Rep. Berman and House Foreign Affairs Chairperson Ilean Ros-Lehtinen, who stressed upon a long-term relationship and a bigger picture of the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States beyond the episode of the bin Laden killing. Rep. Ros-Lehtinen said, “They are an important partner. We should be jeopardizing our security if we cut off aid” (cable, 2012). Ranking member Berman had concerned about the security assistance to Pakistan, not the civilian one. He maintains that strengthening Pakistan's civilian government and democratic institutions remains one of the few ways to ensure a long-term, healthy relationship with that country (cable, 2012).
3.8 The Obama administration Policy towards Pakistan

Unlike the Bush administration that had a policy of engagement towards Pakistan, the Obama policy was aggressive and inclined towards unilateral actions against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. There were three prominent components of his policy towards Pakistan: the use of drone weapons, unilateral strikes and economic aid to Pakistan. The administration was more suspicious of Pakistan's security establishment's political will than of its capabilities against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to Bruce Riedel (2011),

The generals who run Pakistan have not abandoned their obsession with challenging India. They tolerate terrorists at home, seek a Taliban victory in Afghanistan and are building the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. They have side-lined and intimidated civilian leaders elected in 2008.

The Obama administration wanted to use the US military's assistance as a tool to influence Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The administration had narrowed its objective in Pakistan to target Al-Qaeda hard and destroy its capability to attack the United States’ homeland instead of developing strategic relationship of Pakistan. President Obama unlike his predecessor heavily relied on the use of drone technology to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s leadership, which did not require any special assistance from the Pakistani government.

3.8.1 The Use of drone strikes

The Obama administration had significantly increased the use of drone technology as a “target killing weapon”, against the alleged enemies who are suspected of posing an imminent threat to the security of the United States (Becker & Shane, 2012). The Obama administration inherited the drone programme from its predecessor, but it massively increased the use of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. When President Bush left the office in January 2009, the US had used 45 drone strikes in Pakistan, usually targeting high-profile terrorists with the help of Pakistan's government. On the other hand, President Obama carried five times more drone attacks in Pakistan during his first tenure (Bowden, 2013). The US' forceful execution of the drone attacks in Pakistan has succeeded in targeting many high-profile terrorists associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but it has increased differences with Pakistan and profoundly reduced the level of intelligence cooperation between Islamabad and Washington (Mckelvey, 2012).

The Obama administration used two types of drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan: “signature” strikes and “personality” strikes. Signature strikes are based on the “pattern of
life” analysis, targeting groups or people who bear certain characteristics associated with terrorist activities, but whose identities are not known (Becker & Shane, 2012). Personality strikes are targeting alleged high-profile leaders of terrorist organisations. President Bush was more focused on the personality strikes, whereas, the Obama administration did not only include more people to the list of high-value targets, but also exponentially increased signature strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas (Coll, 2014). In Afghanistan drones were used for surveillance and reconnaissance activities to help the US and NATO forces against the Taliban by the Pentagon. Whereas, the drone mission in Pakistan was under the auspices of the CIA. There was consensus in the Obama administration on the use of personality strikes in Pakistan, but signatures strikes were controversial. Sometimes, these strikes produce bonanza, as in June 2011, a signature strike killed Illyas Kashmir, a dangerous operatives of the Al-Qaeda. However, the State Department and the US embassy in Islamabad were not happy with the cost-benefit ratio of the signature strikes and wanted a veto over it (Ignatius, 2012).

There were differences in the administration between the CIA and State Department over the use of drone strikes in Pakistan, which eventually exposed publicly when the United States’ Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter resigned in May 2012 as a protest against excessive use of drone strikes in Pakistan (Mckelvey, 2012). He said, “Instead of diplomacy, Washington was increasingly employing brass-knuckle techniques, such as threatening to cut back on aid and calling me calls to 'Dial up the pain (Munter, 2012). Munter’s resignation invoked a bigger debate in the White House that who should have a final authority over the use of drone strikes in Pakistan. Hillary Clinton wanted the US ambassador should have the authority to block a drone strike if necessary, whereas the then-CIA Director Leon Panetta, a confidant of the President, was not ready to give up power over the use of drone strikes in Pakistan (Mckelvey, 2012). The State Department and particularly the US former envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the late Richard Holbrook, were in favour of diplomacy and engagement; whereas the White House and the CIA were resorting to the use of force and coercion. The State Department was stressing upon the judicious use of the drone attacks and putting high value on relationship with Pakistan. Cameroon Munter said “Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?” (Mckelvey, 2012). Whereas, the CIA wanted to treat Pakistan by “Moscow’s rules” (Nasr, 2014, p.73). The relation between the US ambassador and the CIA station chief further deteriorated when a private contractor working for the CIA; Raymond Davis, was arrested after killing two Pakistanis in Lahore (Nasr, 2014). The CIA wanted to play tough and was not ready to accept any resolution except free release of its agent, whereas, the US embassy in Islamabad preferred to settle the issue amiably (Ignatious,
Eventually, the embassy resolved the Raymond Davis case by paying “blood money” to the victims’ families (Ignatius, 2012). The increasing number of signature strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas during the first tenure of President shows that the CIA had more influence than the State Department on the US policy towards Pakistan.

One of the key reasons for massive increase in the use of drone strikes during the Obama administration was the Pakistani government refusal to launch a military operation in North Waziristan. In the absence of Pakistani forces in North Waziristan, the administration had to either deploy US forces in North Waziristan to stop militant activities or use drone strikes as conventional weapons to disrupt their operations in order to stop them from attacking the United States’ forces in Afghanistan. The use of drone strikes was the least bad in the available ones. It also did not have political repercussions domestically as it did not require deployment of US forces in one of the most dangerous places on earth (Ignatius, 2011). If there was any area more suitable for the best utilisation of drone strikes, it was North Waziristan due its militant landscape. It is true that excessive use of the drone strikes endangered the US relationship with Pakistan and it was not enough to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but it was a useful weapons to disrupt terrorists operations and monitor their activities until Pakistan establishes its writ in the area.

### 3.8.2 Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

Coalition Support Fund was created to reimburse the extra cost of coalition forces in support of the United States efforts against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (GAO, 2008). Pakistan has been a major recipient of CSF due to its commitment to support the United States and NATO forces in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Its geographical proximity, historical and cultural links to Afghanistan made Pakistan profoundly important for a successful operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Pakistan had opened its airspace to the US, provided access to its military bases, offered security protection in the bases used by the US forces, logistical support to operations and forces in Afghanistan, and deployed more than 100,000 on Pak-Afghan border to arrest and kill Al-Qaeda and Taliban members fleeing Afghanistan (Cohen, August 2007, p.3). There were two reasons of the Bush administration generous reimbursement policy towards Pakistan. Firstly, in the earlier period of the Bush administration, there was a greater level of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States especially against Al-Qaeda. The White House and the State Department were satisfied with President Musharraf counter-terrorism efforts. Pakistan apprehended close to 500 suspected Al-Qaeda’s operative (Kronstadt, 2003, p.21). Secondly, the Bush
administration and congress both were preoccupied with the invasion of Iraq. They did not notice the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and diverted all resources and attention to Iraq. At that time the US was dependent on the cooperation of Pakistan to arrest Al-Qaeda’s members and stop the Taliban from major operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Bush administration did not follow reimbursement guidelines and accommodated Pakistan’s inflated claims\(^\text{18}\) (GAO, 2008).

However, it is important to notice that there were differences between the Congress and the White House on the level of cooperation Pakistan had extended to the Bush Administration (Kronstadt, 2003, p.21). Congress believed that there were some key figures of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan’s border area with Afghanistan. According to Kronstadt,

Two senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee – Senator Lugar and Senator Biden – expressed a “deep concern” that “elements of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency might be helping members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate into Afghanistan.”(2003, p.2).

Along with cooperation in counter-terrorism, Congress was not happy with Musharraf government’s efforts towards democracy, Islamabad's nuclear proliferation activities and Pakistan’s link with the alleged terrorists attacking India. According to Congressional Research Service report,

Members of the 107th Congress introduced several Pakistan-related bills that were not voted upon, including […] one that would require Presidential certification of Pakistan’s successful efforts to halt cross-border terrorism into India, that the country’s national elections are conducted freely and fairly, and

\(^{18}\) A report was published by the United States Government Accountability Office in June 2008 says that the Bush Administration did not consistently apply the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) Comptroller guidance issued in 2003 (GAO, 2008). It is a list of guidance which sets criteria for the verification of reimbursement claims and distributes roles and responsibilities in validation of claims. Defense’s 2003 guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e. above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated (GAO, June 2008). The Defense Department says in its defence that the report ignored some important facts: Pakistan’s military contributions enabled by CSF, Defense's authority to decide and conclude the amount of reimbursement and the different accounting standard of Pakistan, which is a sovereign country. “Since December 2001, Pakistan has conducted 91 major and countless small operations in the FATA and other locations along the border with Afghanistan. The cost to Pakistan of these operations, in human terms, has been significant. Approximately 1400 Pakistani security forces members have lost their lives since 2001 in the GWOT; since July 2007, over 700 Pakistani have been killed by suicide bombings. CSF reimbursements to Pakistan have been a significant factor in Pakistan’s ability to assist U.S. operations in the GWOT.” (Shine, 16th June 2008). The Obama administration has increased the accountability of the reimbursement funds to Pakistan and Congress has also demanded a more detailed description of items to Pakistan in CSF.
that waivers on aid restrictions would facilitate both anti-terror efforts and transition to democratic rule in Pakistan (H.R. 5267)” (Kronstadt, 2003, p.2)

The White House was concerned that a greater emphasis on democratic reforms may bring Islamists in power and disrupts Pakistan and the US' cooperation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; it therefore did not press Pakistan hard on the issue of democratic reforms and transparent election. On the other issues the Bush Administration had received guarantees from the Pakistani government to stop every proliferation activity.

There were two differences between the Bush and Obama administrations in the reimbursement of the CSF to Pakistan. Firstly, Congress passed the Defence Appropriation Act for the Fiscal year 2002, which granted the Secretary of Defense the final and conclusive authority to make CSF payments to coalition partners (GAO, 2008). This act had given a complete flexibility to the Pentagon to use fund for political bargaining with Pakistan. The Bush Administration did not implement strict criteria for the payment of reimbursement as a favour to the Musharraf regime for his cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts and difficult decision of sending Pakistani forces to tribal areas, which were autonomous regions even during the British colonial period (DoD, 2008). On the other hand, the Obama Administration uses the reimbursement of CSF as a weapon to force Pakistan to take actions that would not have been taken otherwise. One of the best examples is the withholding of the CSF when Pakistani government refused to provide logistic support to the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan after a NATO unilateral strike on the Pakistani-Afghan border that killed 24 Pakistani military personnel including one officer (ET, 2012). According to Senator Lindsay, “funding for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund was reduced to just $50 million, and subjected it to the opening of supply lines”, said Senator Lindsay Graham” (2012).

Secondly, the Congress also increased its oversight and monitoring of the US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan. When the war in Afghanistan replaced the one is Iraq as the most expensive war, the US Congress also started a microscopic analysis of the progress and award of money and weapons to Pakistan (CRS, 2012). It demanded from the Secretary of Defense to provide a quarterly report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriation and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the use of CSF to Pakistan and other partners (Anon, 2008). The Obama administration did not have the flexibility to accommodate Pakistan’s inflated reimbursement claims. One of the major responsibilities of the Office of Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP) was to validate Pakistani claims and confirm payment only when all required documents are provided to the Office of
Defense Representative in Pakistan, the United States Central Command, the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, and the Secretary of Defense (Anon, 2008). When Congress questioned about the CSF oversight at a March 2011 House hearing, the Commander of US Central Command stated that he had “some very keenly attentive field grade officer in Islamabad” who track money “very, very carefully” (Petraeus, 2011).

3.8.3 Economic and Military Assistance

Foreign aid is one of the most important tools of the United States foreign policy to secure its national security and enhance its commercial interest. The United States foreign assistance to Pakistan increased dramatically after the enlistment of Islamabad as a pivotal ally in the global war of terrorism (Kronstadt, 2003). Not only did the Bush administration remove all the sanctions against Pakistan – which were imposed in the 1990s for possessing nuclear weapons and a military coup – but also gave substantial economic and security assistance to Pakistan. One of the major examples of the United States economic and military assistance to Pakistan is the Kerry-Luggar-Berman bill, passed in 2009, which increased economic assistance to $1.5 billion annually for the period 2010-2014. The Bush administration insisted more on the security assistance to Pakistan than on the economic and development ones. It secured Pakistan's support against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda through payment of reimbursement claims without any accountability and selling of sophisticated weapons that were least relevant to the war on terror. When the United States started focusing on Afghanistan, Pakistan and its tribal areas automatically became the centre of attention. The Congress, unlike in the previous administration, took more ownership of the US policy towards Pakistan by increasing its oversight of the programs and setting benchmarks for the administration in its relationship with Pakistan (CRS, 2008). The Congress took three important steps for realigning the US priorities in its relationship with Pakistan that included tripling economic and non-military assistance to Pakistan for five years, putting conditions on security assistance to Pakistan and restricting the new administration for quarterly reporting on the Pakistan’s cooperation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and nuclear non-proliferation (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2011).

3.9 Conclusion

The White House decided on a policy of coercion and confrontation to achieve its counter-terrorism objectives at the expense of the strategic ones. The Obama administration was convinced that nobody would blame it for the deterioration of the relationship with Pakistan, and every one would point at Islamabad's 'double game' for the breakup of the relationship;
it therefore was a politically safe option to force Pakistan for more cooperation. It had adopted “go slow approach” to foreign assistance for Pakistan. The biggest casualty of this approach was intelligence cooperation. The level of intelligence cooperation among the ISI, CIA and FBI was much stronger in the Bush period than Obama’s one (Kronstadt, 2003). However, the Obama administration compensated that by developing a parallel CIA network in Pakistan which succeeded in tracing Osama bin Laden in Abotabad. The United States policy of unilateral strikes in Pakistan on reliable information was an important part of the Obama policy towards Pakistan. Therefore, the Pakistani government did not only stop issuing visas to the US military trainers, but also refused to cooperate even with the civilian employees of the USAID, which affected the flow of funds to Pakistan. Two names of CIA station chiefs in Islamabad were deliberately leaked by Pakistan’s ISI to the media, which was a very unusual act and put the CIA members' lives at risk. It shows that the CIA was actively involved in a war with the ISI in Pakistan, which affected the relationship between Islamabad and Washington. The Obama administration uses the US aid as a coercive means rather than as a bargaining chip used by the Bush administration.
Chapter 4 Pakistan’s responses to the US demands Against Al-Qaeda

4.1 Introduction

During the events of 9/11, the Chief of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency the ISI happened to be in Washington, giving a briefing to the United States’ Congressmen on Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Musharraf, 2006, p. 230). The United States deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, met with him and categorically asked him that if Pakistan didn’t cooperate with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, their reprisal would completely destroy Pakistan’s infrastructure (Musharraf, 2006, p. 231). Armitage presented seven demands to the ISI chief and told him that they were non-negotiable. Before 9/11, Pakistan was under several United States’ economic and military sanctions due to the underground testing of nuclear weapons in May 1998 and military coup in October 1999 (Markey, 2013). The key objective of the United States’ re-engagement with Pakistan after 9/11 was to strategically defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, because Islamabad was one of the principle supporter of the Taliban regime in Kabul, who refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States. It demonstrates that Pakistan’s decision to support the Bush administration against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the face of tremendous domestic pressure was primarily due to a perception among the policy elites that if they did not cooperate, the United States would damage Pakistani strategic assets, military capabilities and economic infrastructure. This perception forced General Musharraf to cooperate with the United States even at the risk of his own life. The responses of Pakistan to these seven demands of the United States are the subject of investigation in this case study.

The existing literature on Pakistan’s responses to the United States demands against Al-Qaeda is divided into three groups. These analyses are in correspondence with constructivism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Constructivists argue that Pakistan accommodated the immediate demands against Al-Qaeda to establish a strategic relationship with the United States, which allowed the security establishment to sustain its rivalry with India and control power domestically. Neo-realists are of the opinion that Pakistan accepted the demands against Al-Qaeda due to continued threat from the United States that “you are either with us or against us”. Neo-liberals claim that Pakistan’s army leaders accepted the demands so that both themselves and the institute would benefit. Neo-liberals also argue that Pakistan’s army accelerated counter-terrorism operations after Al-Qaeda’s involvement in
domestic terrorism in Pakistan, especially after suicide attacks on President Musharraf and army officers in December 2003. This chapter demonstrates that Pakistan accepted the demands of the United States because there was a perception in the foreign policy elites that the United States would act like a “wounded bear” after 9/11 (Musharraf, 2006, p.201). It also illustrates that there were domestic constraints on Pakistani responses, which did not allow it to implement its policies successfully. This led to accusations of a double standard on the part of Washington. The analyses in this chapter are based on neo-classical realism.

The prominent constructivists’ scholars like Hussain Haqqani (2005) and Christine Fair (2014) have produced outstanding literature on Pakistan’s responses to the US demands. They believe that the United States may defeat Al-Qaeda with the help of Pakistan’s army, but cannot defeat terrorism as a whole in the region unless it changes the strategic direction of Pakistan. They are of the view that the US short term gains against Al-Qaeda will not help its broader struggle against terrorism without changing Pakistan’s army perception of its national interest, because Pakistan’s current foreign policy is inherently in conflict with the United States objectives in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Haqqani, 2005, p.167). They claim that Pakistan’s army has always accommodated the United States immediate demands in order to acquire economic and military assistance to counter Indian influence regionally, as well as strengthen its grip on power domestically with the help of Islamists (Fair, 2007, p.5). They recommend that the United States should discourage rivalry between India and Pakistan, changing the army’s perception of Pakistan’s national interest towards supporting civilian supremacy on issues of strategic importance (Cohen, 2004, p.78). They believe these changes will convert Pakistan into a natural partner in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Another group of scholars, including Ashely Tellis (2008), Daniel Markey (2007), Stephen Krasner (2011) and Seth Jones (2008) analyses Pakistan’s responses from neo-realists perspective. They are of view that Pakistan disproportionally contributed in the war against Al-Qaeda because of a very genuine threat from the United States to damage Pakistan’s economic infrastructure, strategic assets and military capability (Hussain, 2003, Tellis, 2008, p.13). They agree Pakistan was already on the verge of bankruptcy due to economic sanctions from the United States and their international reputation was suffering because of the country’s support for the Taliban and Kashmir insurgency (Zaidi, 2005). Pakistan was therefore vulnerable and a justifiable target for attack by the United States after 9/11 (Zaidi, 2005) if they did not cooperate against Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, an alliance between the United States and Pakistan against Al-Qaeda provided it with significant economic and
military advantages, which served to not only strengthen Pakistan’s fragile economy, but also equip its military with modern equipment (Kronstadt, 2004, p.6). They believe that Pakistan preferred a strategic relationship with the United States instead of protecting Al-Qaeda even at cost of domestic instability (Tellis, 2008, p.12).

The third branch of literature belongs to the neo-liberalists. They are of the view that the Musharraf regime cooperated with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for personal and institutional advantages. They believe Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda had tacitly provided international legitimacy to Musharraf’s dictatorship and equipped the army with modern weapons that were desperately needed to counter Indian technical superiority. They consider the one percent of Pakistan’s military and civilian elites, whose interests have always been misaligned with those of the general population in Pakistan and the world community, have hijacked the political and economic system in Pakistan for their personal benefits (Saddiq, 2011, p.149). They believe that Pakistan’s priorities show the specific institutional interests of its army, not the general welfare of its people (Shah, 2011). They are of the view that the army has always exploited the tendency amongst the United States policy makers to achieve short-term objectives at the expense of long-term goals, whether it was during the cold war or the war on terror (Puri, 2011). They suggest that the United States should not trade off Pakistan’s democratization for the country’s cooperation against Al-Qaeda (Grare, 2007, p.7). They argue that Pakistan accelerated its operation against Al-Qaeda only after its suicide attacks against General Musharraf and army officers.

This chapter consists of four sections. The second section briefly discusses the United States’ seven demands of Pakistan. The third section highlights Pakistan’s responses to the US demands. This is the main part of the chapter, which discusses Pakistan’s responses to each of the seven demands, including deployment of forces on the border to intercept Al-Qaeda, military operations in North and South Waziristan, permission to pursue counter-terrorism activities in Pakistan, blanket over flight and landing rights to the United States and sharing of intelligence and immigration information. The last section analyses the reasons for the type of response Pakistan made to the US demands against Al-Qaeda and their significance.

### 4.2 The United States’ demands of Pakistan

According to various sources (Rashid, 2008; Nawaz, 2008; Musharraf, 2006, p. 201; Abbas, 2004; 9/11 commission) the United States had made seven demands of Pakistan first by
Collin Powell in a telephone conversion on 12th September 2001, then by the US ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain on 13th September 2001 in her meeting with President Musharraf. It is important to mention here that the Chief of the ISI, General Mahmud Ahmed, had already informed President Musharraf regarding the Armitage threat (Hussain, 2003). President Musharraf says in his Memoir,

In what has to be the most undiplomatic statement ever made, Armitage added to what Colin Powell has said to me and told the director general not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age’ (2006, p201).

The United States made the following demands of Pakistan;

1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipping through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.
2. Provide the United States with blanket over flight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.
3. Provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence as needed and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbor them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on the border.
4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases, and internal security information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, its friends or its allies.
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other terrorist act against the US or its friends and allies, and curb all domestic expression of support [for terrorism] against the US, its friends and allies.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
7. Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and assist the United States in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.


Chapter 4

4.3 Pakistan’s responses to the US demands

Pakistan’s responses against Al-Qaeda were considered satisfactory. The White during the Bush administration was appreciative of the Pakistani government efforts against Al-Qaeda, but the situation changed during the Obama presidency that was more focused on success in Afghanistan than threat from Al-Qaeda to the US homeland security. The section will elaborate in detail Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands.

4.3.1 Deployment of forces on the AfPak Border

On 18th December 2001, General Tommy Franks, the US Commander of CENTCOM called General Pervaiz Musharraf, who was chief executive of Pakistan at that time, demanding deployment of forces on Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan to stop the flow of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Aziz, 2008, p.245). General Franks reminded Musharraf of Pakistan’s commitment to support the United States in the war against terrorism on 12th September 2011. Pakistan as per commitment sealed its border with Afghanistan by deploying 60,000 regular army and 55,000 paramilitary forces (CRS, 2003, p. 4; Musharraf, 2006. p.205). Pakistan also sent one division force consisting of around 25,000 personnel to tribal areas for the first time in the history of the country to arrest Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s members in these regions (Yusufzai, 2014). Tribal areas are constitutionally different from the rest of Pakistan, who enjoy greater level of autonomy in running their affairs. General Nadeem Taj, who supervised Pakistan’s military deployment on the border with Afghanistan before his retirement, told me in an interview during a conference at the Marriot Hotel Islamabad in December 2014 that Pakistan had established 9970 checkpoints on the border with Afghanistan (Taj, 2014). President Musharraf claims in his memoir regarding troop’s deployment,

In December 2001, when Operation Tora Bora caused many Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to flee to Pakistan, I established a net for apprehending them. Our regular forces and the paramilitary Frontier Corps were dropped in by helicopter, as the area is quite inaccessible from the ground. We even gathered mules from all parts of the country and formed them into animal transport battalions to sustain our troops in this extremely inhospitable area, most of which has no communication infrastructure at all” (2006, p.264).

He further says,

The Tora Bora net led to the capture of 240 Al-Qaeda operatives belonging to 26 different nationalities, the majority from Afghanistan and the Arab countries. It remains the largest catch in a single anti-terrorist operation conducted anywhere in the world since 9/11 (Musharraf, 2006, p.265).
According to Wikileaks cables sent to Washington from Islamabad on 8th November 2006, the Pakistani government also offered to mine and fence the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan to stop the flow of the Taliban, but the Afghan government opposed it, because of their refusal to recognize the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan as legitimate (06ISLAMABAD21879). During my fieldwork, when I further investigated this issue, Ijaz Haider, a specialist on Pakistan’s army, told me that Pakistan did not mine its border because of opposition from Canada and the Karzai government in Kabul. He said that Karzai did not accept the mining of the border, because it would divide the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan; whereas, the Canadian government is one of the key advocates of the anti-mining group, which discourages mining for any military purpose (Haider, 2014).

Pakistan’s efforts to arrest or kill Al-Qaeda fugitives were disrupted by developments on its eastern border with India. In December 2001, there was an attack on the Indian parliament, allegedly by Pakistan-based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jash-e-Muhammad. It fortunately did not succeed in entering the Parliament, which was in session, but the attack did result in the deaths of 9 security guards and 18 injured persons (CRS, 2004, p.18). This event precipitated one of the biggest deployments on the India-Pakistan border of almost 1 million soldiers (CRS, 2005, p.18). According to a CRS report on terrorism in South Asia,

An ensuing 10-month-long standoff in 2002 involved one million Indian and Pakistani soldiers and was viewed as the closest the two countries had come to full-scale war since 1971, causing the U.S. government to become “deeply concerned ... that a conventional war ... could escalate into a nuclear confrontation.” (2004, p.18).

This incident forced President Musharraf to redeploy Pakistan’s regular army from the Afghan to the Indian border. Pakistan left only 45,000 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel on the Afghan border to stop Al-Qaeda’s members (CRS, 2005, p.19). Frontier Corps were neither capable nor disciplined enough to counter Al-Qaeda fugitives on the border (Nawaz, 2009, p.17). This failure on the part of the FC was the due to the nonexistence of an intelligence wing, an aerial support system like a gunship helicopter or a disciplined command and

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19 The President said that, at his meeting with the Army Corps commanders later in the day, he intended to raise the prospect of mining areas along the border to interdict cross-border traffic by anti-Coalition militants. This is a sensitive issue, as it would interfere with traditional tribal easement rights, but one that the President indicated was necessary. Selective mining would help to channel cross-border traffic to lawful monitored crossing points. Both Assistant Secretary Boucher and Ambassador Crocker stressed the need to ensure that minefields were properly monitored to prevent resourceful enemy agents from digging up the mines and deploying them against Pakistani, Afghan and Coalition forces’ (06ISLAMABAD21879).
control system (Nawaz, 2009, p.17). Secondly, almost all FC personnel were recruited from the tribal areas. There were allegations that the FC personnel deployed on the border to stop Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s members were in fact facilitating them to escape from the US aerial bombing in Afghanistan, because of ethnic and religious affiliation, as well as widespread anti-Americanism endemic in tribal areas (Fair & Jones, 2009, pp. 174-181; Kilcullen, 2009, p.57). An officer in Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the ISI, told me in an interview that it was easy for President Musharraf to switch sides on a call from President Bush, because he understood the consequences of saying no to the United States, but soldiers in Frontier Corps and Pakistan’s army could not kill fellow Muslim brothers for the sake of the United States.

Meanwhile, when there was a standoff between India and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda re-organized and re-grouped itself in South Waziristan (Rashid, 2008, p. 121; Nawaz, 2008, p.15). There were reports that Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar were in Pakistan’s tribal areas (Krostantd, 2004, p.2). The Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, who protected themselves through guerilla warfare against the US forces in Afghanistan, started attacking the US forces at bordering towns with Pakistan at the end of 2002 (Rashid, 2008, p.148). According to Ahmed Rashid, ‘Angur Adda, in South Waziristan, became the first headquarters of al Qaeda’s reorganization. From here in 2002, fighters regularly attacked U.S. firebases at Shikin and Lawara, just inside Afghanistan, and then retreated into Waziristan” (Rahid. 2008, p.148). He further says,

U.S. military officers complained that paramilitary soldiers from the Frontier Corps (FC) were helping al Qaeda fighters cross the border or were providing covering fire to distract U.S. forces. At times al Qaeda fighters on Pakistani soil brazenly launched rockets on U.S. positions. American officers on the ground were at first confused, then frustrated, and finally very angry, and they pressured the U.S. commander, Lt.-Gen. Dan McNeill, to allow them to chase al Qaeda fighters into South Waziristan (Rashid, 2008, p. 440).

When I asked in an interview with Ayaz Wazir, a native of South Waziristan, about Al-Qaeda’s presence in Wana, he did not deny Ahmed Rashid’s claims about Al-Qaeda’s activities in South Waziristan (Wazir, 2014). Finally, the US Commander in Afghanistan Lt.-Gen McNeill threatened Pakistan that if it did not take adequate measures against Al-Qaeda, the US forces would unilaterally cross the border and attack Al-Qaeda’s training camps in South Waziristan (New York Times, 2003).
4.3.2 Military Operations in South Waziristan

The pressure from the US generals in Afghanistan on the Pentagon to coerce Pakistan for concrete steps against Al-Qaeda finally persuaded the White House to send an ultimatum of unilateral action in South Waziristan. The situation further escalated when the ‘Al-Jazeera’ news channel released a video of Osama bin Laden on the second anniversary of 9/11 (Rashid, 2008, p.452). President Bush sent US deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, to Islamabad in early October 2003 with a message of “do more” against Al-Qaeda (Dawn, 2003). Although, there were developments against Al-Qaeda on other fronts, for example a tripartite military commission was formed in June 2003 to monitor progress on the Pakistan-Afghan border against terrorism, the US Joint Special Operation Forces were covertly allowed to hunt for Al-Qaeda’s leaders in South Waziristan and many amongst the leadership of Al-Qaeda were arrested in Pakistan’s mainland with the assistance of the FBI; but the progress in South Waziristan was not satisfactory, and led to different voices in Washington, especially in the US Congress, pressuring President Musharraf to do more against Al-Qaeda in FATA (Kronstadt, 2005, p.7). Finally, Pakistan succumbed to US pressure and sent 25,000 troops to search for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban members in South Waziristan and provide an anvil to the US hammer in Eastern Afghanistan. According to a CRS report in February 2005, “In June 2003, in what may have been a response to increased U.S. pressure, Islamabad for the first time sent its armed forces into FATA in search of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who have eluded the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. By September 2003” (Kronstadt, 2005, p.6).

Sending Pakistani forces to South Waziristan was a difficult decision for General Musharraf due to three fundamental problems. First, the deployment of the Pakistani forces at the border and in North and South Waziristan broke a 60 year old Memorandum of Understanding between the tribes of the region and the Pakistani state (Wazir, 2014)20. The Pakistani government kept the same British-established FCR system in FATA for governance since 1947. When Pakistan’s army went into North and South Waziristan, it forced local people to cooperate with against Al-Qaeda. When they refused to cooperate or were unable to cooperate, Pakistan’s army imposed collective punishment on the entire tribe that included

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20 In 1947, when Pakistan became an independent country, it inherited tribal areas from British Empire. Unlike the rest of British India, the tribal areas were governed through a separate mechanism called Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). FCR was significantly different from the governance system in the rest of British India. According to Kirk Nilsson, “It (FCR) is based on the laws originally enforced by the British Raj in the tribal areas of Northwest British India, specially tailored to sidestep the Pashtun’s violent rejection of external rule. (Nilsson, 2009, p.13).
arresting tribal chiefs, economic sanctions, and destruction of their shops, which further increased tribal hostility towards the government and the United States in North and South Waziristan. Pakistan’s army demanded of tribes what the United States and Pakistan could not do together; to defeat Al-Qaeda.

Secondly, the tribes that live in FATA are fiercely independent, and do not accept any interference in their affairs including that of Pakistan’s army (Khattak, 2014). When Pakistan’s army went into North and South Waziristan against Al-Qaeda, it divided the population into pro-Al-Qaeda and pro-government camps. The pro-Al-Qaeda camp was not only stronger than the government one, but also more effective, because of its strong collective narrative based on religion and tribal values (Jahnson & Mason, 2008, p.16). The locals perceived Pakistan’s army as American mercenaries against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who were considered holy warriors (Wazir, 2014). It is important to remember that tribal areas are the poorest regions of Pakistan with the lowest literacy rate (Markey, 2008, p.13). The only prevalent source of education in tribal areas is Madrassa education. These areas were also used as a basin for the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet forces; therefore they already had close affinity with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Kirk, 2009). Even the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force recruited from tribal areas, deployed on the border, did not try to kill or arrest the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives, especially after the massive aerial bombing in Afghanistan in November and December 2001 (Aziz, 2006, p.242; Risen, 2006, p.181). The support for Al-Qaeda and Taliban was one of the key factors that restrained Pakistan’s army from military operations in Waziristans.

Thirdly, President Musharraf sent forces to one of the world’s most difficult mountainous terrains and hostile environments. Robert Baker, the CIA officer who led the CIA team in search of Saddam Hussain in Iraq said about Pakistan’s tribal areas, “There are no roads, and you can’t get armor up there. This is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didn’t even bother to go up there. Everybody’s got a gun. That area is worse than Iraq.” (NYT, 2003) The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 1,640 miles long,

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21 By 1932, British troops had been waging war of varying intensity with a group of intractable tribes along and beyond the north western frontier of India for nearly a century. That year, in summarizing a typical skirmish, one British veteran noted laconically, “Probably no sign till the burst of fire, and then the swift rush with knives, the stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of the infidels.” It was a savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side, and it was singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance. It still is (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p.41).

22 Robert Backer worked in South Waziristan in the 1980s, when the CIA and ISI were supporting the Mujahideen insurgency against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul.
much of its spanning terrain so remote and so mountainous that it is virtually inaccessible. Overlaid on a map of the United States, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border would run from New York City to Santa Fe, New Mexico’ (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p.42).

4.3.3 Blanket over-flight, landing and logistic rights

The third demand for assistance by the US in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was over-flight, logistic and landing rights to the United States’ forces in Afghanistan. According to a Wiki-leaks cable sent to various US embassies from Washington on 6th November 2007, ‘US forces in Afghanistan are 85% dependent on supplies moved through Pakistan’ (7state153352). They are passing through Pakistani ports, roads and borders called Ground Lines of Communications (GLoC). During a meeting between Peshawar Corps Commander General Massod Alam and the US’ Regional-Commander in East Afghanistan Major-General Scapparotti, on 14th October 2009, the former informed the latter that while the United States required extra troops in Afghanistan, it should also take into consideration the infrastructure necessary on the Pakistan side of the border to handle the increased traffic that the new troop levels would require (09peshawar2008). Pakistan only blocked the supply route in November 2011 for six months as a protest, when the US helicopters fired on a Pakistani check post on the border with Afghanistan which killed 24 soldiers and 2 officers at Salala (ET, 2012). Pakistan’s government demanded the US to publically apologize for killing Pakistani forces, but the Pentagon report said that it was a misunderstanding between the two forces; foregoing the need for the US to apologize (NYT, 2011). Six months later, when the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton apologized for the bombing on the Pakistani check post, the ground route to NATO supply was restored. It is important to mention here that Pakistan claims that it does not charge the US for using its ports and communication systems, but when the route was closed, the US Congress withheld $800 million of the coalition support fund. The coalition support fund was effectively created to accommodate the expenses of the allied forces in the war against terrorism, but a huge bulk of funds go to the Pakistani forces for military operations in FATA against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and deployment of troops on the Afghan border (Krosntadt, 2005, p.4). It seems that there is a direct, albeit unofficial, relationship between supplying the US forces in Afghanistan and release of the coalition support fund, and that it is one of the significant instruments of the United States, specifically the Congress, to influence Pakistan’s behaviour in the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Chapter 4

The third important support for US military operations in Afghanistan are Pakistani air and naval bases, although Musharraf claims in his memoir, “We allowed the US only two bases—Shamsi and Jacobabad – and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there’ (Musharraf, 2006, p.206). But information from Shuja Nawaz, Gen (retired) Shahid Aziz, and Wiki-leaks cables show that Pakistan bases were also used for military purposes (Nawaz, 2008, p. 258). Shuja says, “later evidence indicates that Pakistan has managed to provide the US with bases for more than ‘logistic and aircraft recovery’ (Nawaz, 2008, p.541). General Aziz claims ‘we knew in the same month (December 2001) that CIA’s drones had arrived to Shamsi airbase and would remain there’ (Aziz, 2008, p.242). Later on, a Democrat Congressman from Florida, Alan Grayson, also confirmed in an interview to the BBC on 30th October 2013 that the CIA had been using Shamsi airbase for drones and other intelligence purposes (BBC, 2013). General Aziz even claims that the US Marine Corps had used Pakistan’s Gawadar Deep Sea port for supplying weapons to the US forces in Afghanistan from 2004-2005; it was also confirmed to myself during fieldwork in Pakistan that the United States Marines had used Pasni port for large operations in Afghanistan. A Congressional Research Service report describes Pakistan’s assistance to the US against terrorism in the following terms;

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Pakistan is providing basing and over-flight permission for all United States and coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan. The airbase near Jacobabad has been vital to U.S. military operations in the region, and the airport of Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, is a key forward operational base. More than 57,000 U.S. military sorties have originated on Pakistani territory. U.S. military personnel reportedly have installed extensive radar facilities at three Pakistani airfields, allowing for coverage of the entire Pakistani airspace’ (Kronstadt, 2003, p.12).

According to the Pentagon website, the United States had made 2160 requests from Pakistan related to landing, logistic and over-flight. The Pakistani government has accepted 2008 of them, while 152 are still being processed. The Pentagon says that Pakistan has provided five airbases to meet the demands of the United States and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. It further says that emergency planes could land anywhere in Pakistan. On average 400,000 litres of fuel per day has been provided to US forces. In order to facilitate launching an air operation into Afghanistan, Pakistan provided 2/3 of its air space as an air corridor to US forces. Pakistan had rescheduled its own commercial flights to facilitate the US air operation in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Navy provided a landing facility to the US/Coalition ships at Pasni. At sea, Pakistan’s Navy operations/training were curtailed in order to accommodate and facilitate the operations of US/Coalition Naval Forces. According to the US Marine Corps Gazette of June 2002, the Coalition Naval Operations at Pasni were the largest
amphibious operations in size, duration and depth that the Marine Corps had conducted since the Korean War. In all, 8000 Marines, 330 vehicles and over 1350 tons of equipment/logistics were offloaded at the beach and later flown to Kandhar from Pasni (Pentagon, 2012).

4.3.4 Permission for counter-terrorism operations

The United States has been running four different kinds of counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan. The first was the FBI intelligence operations in assistance with the Pakistani law enforcement agencies in major cities like Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta (CRS, 2003, p.5; Los Angeles Times, 2002). President Musharraf claims that the FBI agents were just providing technical assistance to Pakistani law enforcement agencies, but other writers believe that the FBI not only helped in intelligence gathering, but participated in raids. According to a New York Times report, 'senior Pakistani officials say F.B.I. agents are taking part in raids with the local authorities. "They help us break down doors," a senior Pakistani law enforcement official said. "They go with Pakistani law enforcement when a raid is necessary, and they carry guns." (NYT, 2002). According to a former Interior Minister, Moin Haider, “Pakistan law enforcement agencies were doing 24 to 25 raids every night in Karachi in 2002 and 2003” (Dawn, 2002). Asad Munir, the Station Chief of the ISI in Peshawar after the 9/11 attack, said that the Americans have turned the US consulate in Peshawar into a spy station (Mazzetti, 2014). The number of FBI agents in Pakistan varied from two dozen into the hundreds (Rashid, 2008). According to Los Angeles Times,

Some Pakistani officials say privately that the number of FBI counter-terrorism specialists in Pakistan is in the low hundreds. An FBI official speaking on condition of anonymity confirmed that, ‘between several dozen and a hundred “FBI agents are in Pakistan at any one time, working closely with the local and federal police and intelligence officials”’ (2002)23.

According to the Abotabad Commission,

The Commission carried out a deliberate exercise by examining visa details from Pakistan’s embassy in Washington, and also interviewing ex-Ambassador Mr. Haqqani. It was revealed that prior to July 14, 2010, visa application of officials and diplomats in any part of the world were required to go through security clearance procedures by the Ministry of Interior (through ISI and IB). Due to pressure from the US Government, a waiver was granted only to the Embassy in

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23 Raymond Davis was a private contractor who shot two people in Lahore. When he was arrested the United States claimed that he was a diplomat, granting him diplomatic immunity under the Vienna convention. The CIA did not inform the ISI about his identity before the incident which created suspicion regarding the number of US private contractors in Pakistan.
Washington, wherein the Ambassador could issue visas up to one year without security clearance’ (2013, p.215)²⁴.

The Commission also claims that Pakistan’s embassy in Washington, which was granted special discretion to issue visas without security checks from the Ministry of the Interior, had issued 4422 visas to United States Officials and diplomats in 2010; whereas, in 2009, Pakistan had given visas to 3242 officials, which, according to the Commission, is a significant upward trend that possibly resulted in the alarming presence of the CIA agents who established foreign spy networks in Pakistan for the facilitation of the Abotabad raid (2013, p.217). Vali Nasr says, “Already in 2009, half the American diplomatic missions in Pakistan worked on intelligence and counter-terrorism rather than diplomacy or development. Our consulate in Peshawar was basically bricks shielding antennas”. He further says, “The CIA collected critical intelligence in Pakistan that made possible drone strikes on Al-Qaeda targets and on more than one occasion prevented a terror strike in the west” (Nasr, 2014, p.77). The Obama administration began carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan on an industrial scale, decimating Al-Qaeda’s command and control structure and crippling the organization. Even with all the Pakistani double dealing and foot dragging going on, there was still cooperation between the CIA and the ISI on Al-Qaeda and everything the administration claimed by way of success against Al-Qaeda depended on it (Nasr 2014, p.77).

According to the CENTCOM website, the FBI conducted 99 raids in Pakistan in 2003 along with the Pakistani law enforcement. They had arrested 420 people of foreign nationality, out of which 332 were handed over to the United States and 34 were extradited to countries other than the United States. Among this number included many high profile leaders of Al-Qaeda, including Abu-Zubeda, Ramzi bin Yousuf, and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. Abu-Zubeda and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad were considered as Al-Qaeda’s number 3 at that time (CRS, 2004, p.17).

The second kind of counter-intelligence activities conducted by the United States in Pakistan is the deployment of the Joint Special Operation Forces into Pakistan’s tribal areas under the auspices of the CIA (Mazzetti, 2014, p.276). The JSOF comes under the command of the Pentagon by default as a result. Whenever they are needed in any part of the world, the

²⁴ The Abotabad Commission was formed to investigate two issues which had been raised: how Osama bin Laden had been able to live in Abotabad under the nose of Pakistan’s military for six years and how had the United States managed to execute a hostile military mission without any response from Pakistani forces.
Pentagon attaches a unit of the JSOC to the regional Command of the US military for the duration of a specific operation. For example, if the United States needs a JSOC unit in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it operates under the authority of the Central Command (Schmidt & Erick, 2002). According to Mazzetti, “In 2004 Rumsfeld issued a secret directive that expanded the powers of special-operations troops to kill, capture, and spy in more than a dozen countries... It allowed them to go into Syria, Somalia, and Pakistan.” (Mazzetti, 2014, p.77). Pakistan’s former president, General Musharraf, permitted drone strikes in FATA and was relatively comfortable with the CIA arrangement of drone strikes in comparison to the number of US troops on the ground (Mazzetti, 2014, p.79). According to a New York Times reporter, in order to get special-operations troops inside Pakistan, they would simply be turned over to the CIA and operate under Title 50 covert-action authority. Special-operations troops would be “sheep-dipped”—the SEALs would become spies. Special-operations troops would be able to launch operations into Pakistan, and Musharraf would never be told. As one former CIA officer described the arrangement, the special-operations troops “basically became the CIA director’s armed platoon” (Mazzett, 2014, p.77).

A large unit of the JSOC is based in Tarbela to train the Frontier Corps, but they are also used in FATA for intelligence collection and counter-terrorism operations. They even participate in Pakistan’s ongoing military operations against the Pakistani Taliban. They are dressed in Pakistan’s army uniform to avoid any tribal backlash and domestic uprising from the presence of JSOC in tribal areas (Mazzetti, 2014, p.32; Cable, 2009). The US ambassador, Ann Paterson, described Pakistani behaviour of allowing the US JSOC to assist in military operations in Waziristans and Bajaur in a cable sent to Washington on 9th October 2009 in following terms, ‘The recent approval by GHQ — almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani — for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to Bajaur and Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking (Cable, 2009).

The third important component of the United States' secret war in Pakistan is the use of clandestine, private military organizations like Black water, the Clarridge network and other CIA counter-terrorism pursuit teams consisting of Afghan and Pakistani agents such as Dr. Shakeel Afridi. Although not used as excessively in Pakistan as in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are several examples of their low profile presence within Pakistan (Mazzetti, 2009, p.83). Raymond Allen Davis, a former United States Army soldier, was a private contractor working for the CIA in a Pakistani metropolitan city, Lahore. During a spying mission on Lashkar-e-Taiba, he killed two people; he was later arrested by the Pakistani police and remained in jail for one week in Lahore. This incident brought the Pakistan-United States
relationship under unprecedented strain. There were protests on Pakistan's streets in favor of Raymond Davis being punished, whereas the US government insisted on his diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention (Mazzetti, 2014, p.83). His presence was just the tip of the iceberg; there were many other discreet individuals working for the CIA and the JSOC in Pakistan. According to a New York Times report, “For many senior Pakistani spies, the man sitting in the jail cell represented solid proof of their suspicions that the CIA had sent a vast secret army to Pakistan, men who sowed chaos and violence as part of the covert American war in the country” (Mazzetti, 2013). Private contractor firms not only plan targeted assassination and collect intelligence for the US drone strikes, especially for the JSOC, but also provide security to the US bases, personnel and goods passing through Pakistan. According to Mazzetti,

Like Davis, many of the contractors were hired to fill out the CIA's Global Response Staff-bodyguards who travel to war zones to protect case officers, assess the security of potential meeting spots, even make initial contact with sources to ensure that case officers would not be walking into an ambush (August 2013).

None of the above counter-terrorism activities of the US received the same level of media or public attention as the use of drone strikes, which became an important issue in Pakistan’s domestic politics.

The United States drone policy towards Pakistan could be divided into three periods. The first phase of the drone strikes started with the killing of Al-Qaeda affiliated tribal leader Nek Muhammad, who badly defeated Pakistan forces in his first encounter with them in March 2004. The CIA drone strikes in early 2004 to mid 2006 were conducted with the consent of the ISI. They were taking approval for every military drone strike in North and South Waziristan from the Pakistani government and the ISI (Mazzetti, 2014; Coll, 2014; Aid, 2012). This period of the US drone strikes was not as successful as the other two and also resulted in more civilian casualties (Singer, 2015).

The second phase of the CIA drone strikes started after a terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7th July 2008, which killed 40 people including an India military attaché in Kabul (Coll, 2009). There were 10 drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to July 2008, but after the July approval, there were 36 drone strikes in 2008 before President Obama took charge in January 2009 (International Security, 2014). There were 341 drone strikes in Pakistan in the first term of the Obama administration. The acceleration in frequency of drone strikes in Pakistan in the second phase was the result of four developments. First, there was widespread support for the drone program in Washington across the Pakistan-Afghan
border. Both the Democrats and Republicans supported the drone program in Pakistan, because it did not include deployment of the US forces in dangerous zones (Coll, 2014). Drone strikes also had the support of different government agencies. Although there were some debates on the other aspects of drone program like its frequency, the veracity of the information relating to their use, the procedure of including people on the ‘kill list’ and the justification of ‘signature strikes’, nobody completely disagreed with the utility of the drone program, especially in the places least accessible to ground troops, like North and South Waziristan (Coll, 2014).

Secondly, the Bush administration had become frustrated with what it viewed as a lack of effort on the part of the Pakistani government to remove Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries in North and South Waziristan (NYT, 2009). According to the New York Times,

President Bush’s top counterterrorism advisers acknowledged on Tuesday that the strategy for fighting Osama bin Laden’s leadership of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan had failed, as the White House released a grim new intelligence assessment that has forced the administration to consider a major counterterrorism shift and take a new tack against Al-Qaeda. The administration expressed this frustration at Pakistan’s efforts after the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment on the growth of Al-Qaeda’s homeland capability. In July 2007, NIE, a sixteen agencies intelligence report, published its assessment about Al-Qaeda’s capability by concluding, “Al-Qaeda has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability by re-establishing a haven in Pakistan and reconstituting its top leadership” (NIE, 2007). The report also noted that Al-Qaeda has been able “to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for homeland attacks,” by associating itself with an Iraqi subsidiary” (The CSM, 2007). The NIE assessment and criticism from the democrats in the Congress forced the Bush administration to adopt an aggressive strategy against Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries in North and South Waziristan.

The Bush administration also accelerated the number of drone strikes in FATA due to a political crisis in Pakistan. President Musharraf who had assisted the US against Al-Qaeda had weakened politically by 2008 and no longer possessed the power to successfully move against Al-Qaeda. There were also other economic, political and judicial crises in Pakistan, which following the election of 2008 did not allow the weak civilian government to garner enough support for a decisive operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan. This situation forced the Bush administration to rely on drone strikes rather than the Pakistan army. The third and fourth factors were discussed earlier; the cultivation of an independent intelligence network in FATA and advancement in drone technology from...
Predator to Reaper. Drone strikes not only killed high value Al-Qaeda members, but also significantly damaged the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network infrastructure in North and South Waziristan.

### 4.3.5 Intelligence and immigration cooperation

The fifth demand of the United States from Pakistan against Al-Qaeda was to share intelligence, immigration and financial information about Pakistani citizens with the United States. The main objective of these demands was to intercept Al-Qaeda members who might be using Pakistani passports to travel to the United States or allied countries. The United States demanded the Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Advanced Passenger Information (API) for all airlines outbound from Pakistan to the United States and Canada. According to Wiki-leaks, on 3rd July 2009, Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) Janet Napolitano, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Ann Paterson and DHS Under Secretary Rand Beers, met with Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik. It reported that Secretary Napolitano asked Pakistan for access to PNR and API information on all passengers travelling to any part of the world from Pakistan. The United States already had access to PNR of all passengers flying on direct flights from Pakistan to the United States through Pakistan International Airline (PIA) and on flights from Lahore to Manchester to New York through PIA. In return, secretary Napolitano told Pakistan’s PM Gillani that the United States would provide technical assistance to help Pakistan secure its border with Afghanistan (09Islamabad1642).

The Pakistani team consisting of President Zardari, PM Gillani and interior Minister Malik offered the United States shared data on Pakistani citizens held by the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) which holds comprehensive information on all citizens, but requested legal assistance to avoid problems with third country airlines and privacy rights violation on the PNR and API issues (09Islamabad1642). According to a wiki cable, Zardari welcomed Secretary Napolitano's offer to work with the Government of Pakistan on border security, adding that Pakistan needed help responding to the people's demands not only for security, but also for electricity and jobs. He said that greater access to the U.S. market for Pakistani textiles would result in a net increase of only $500 million in textile exports to the United States, but would generate 50-80,000 urgently needed jobs in Pakistan where he said unemployment is running to 44% in some areas. Until Pakistan significantly raises citizens' per capita income (Note: Currently $1046. End Note), Zardari said that people will continue to be tempted into militancy’ (09Islamabad1642).
The Pakistani government was reluctant to accept the United States’ demands on sharing PNR and API information due to reactions from the Pakistani Supreme Court, which they believed, would stop Pakistan from any arrangement that violated individual privacy. The Interior Minister even asked Secretary Napolitano to provide Pakistan’s government any precedence of such an arrangement or any convention that allows sharing PNR and API information on all citizens going to any part of the world (09Islamabad1642).

### 4.4 Analysis of Pakistan’s behaviour against Al-Qaeda

Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against Al-Qaeda were result of its ruling elites perception of the US commitment against Al-Qaeda, the capability of the state to meet the US demands and lack of domestic opposition.

#### 4.4.1 Perception of international Pressure

Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands against Al-Qaeda were the result of perceptions of how to properly conduct themselves amongst foreign policy elites who were reacting to increasing domestic opposition in the face of overwhelming international pressure. The chief of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, who was in Washington at the time of 9/11, personally witnessed the anger and grief in the United States due to the scale, atrocity and intensity of attack. The United States deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, categorically asked the ISI chief if Pakistan was with the United States or with the terrorists. According to President Pervaiz Musharraf, he said to the ISI chief that if Pakistan was not with the United States, it should be prepared to be “bombed into the stone age” (2006, p.201). General Musharraf writes in his memoir that if Pakistan had not supported the United States, the reaction of the US would have been violent and angry (Musharraf, 2006, p201). He stated that Pakistan could not hope to contest the will of the United States due to their own military, economic and social weakness. He also writes that the United States would have destroyed Pakistan’s strategic assets, economic infrastructure and damaged its Kashmir cause (Musharraf, 2006, p.202). The United States would always be in the position to do the aforementioned damage to Pakistan’s economy and military so this was no idle threat. Herein lay the key feature of the US’ policy after 9/11, which forced Pakistan to accept the United States demands despite the inevitable strong domestic opposition in Pakistan and at cost of future interests in Afghanistan. The realization amongst Pakistan’s military elite that the United States would use its force to achieve its objective was swift and inevitable, because there was unequivocal US domestic support to punish Al-Qaeda and its perceived
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harbor. President Bush explicitly said in his speech following 9/11 that “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” (2001).

Despite 9/11 inflicting some significant damage to Pakistan’s geo-strategic position internationally, it provided an opportunity to salvage its image by how they conducted themselves in its aftermath and in doing so gain economic and military benefits from re-engagement with the United States. Before 9/11, Pakistan’s economy was profoundly affected by the US economic sanctions along with bad governance and law and order problems (CRS, 2005, p.4). The opening paragraph of Pakistan’s Economic Survey 1998-1999 declares that “the outgoing fiscal year 1998-99 has been the most difficult and challenging year for Pakistan's economy” (Economic Survey, 1998-99, p.vii). Similarly the State Bank of Pakistan report for December 1999 said, “The year 1998-99 was one of the most difficult years in the history of Pakistan” (State Bank of Pakistan’s report 1998-99). In fact, the economic growth rate for 1998-99 was only marginally lower than the average growth rate had been for the preceding eight years. By 1998-99, external debt was more than half the size of the GDP and with domestic debt equal to this value as well. In total, Pakistan's domestic and external debt was greater than the size of their GDP. While Pakistan was paying back around a third in export earnings in the form of debt servicing, it was still adding on to the stock of overall total external debt (Zaidi, 2005). In the 1990s the external and internal debts reached an unsustainable level as the economy was stagnant in terms of foreign investment, revenue generation and export growth. According to Akbar Zaidi, a renowned Pakistani economist, “The external debt and interest payments had reached such astronomical proportions that there was a real fear that Pakistan would default on its international commitments and be declared bankrupt, in addition to being called a rogue or pariah state” (Zaidi, 2005). With this economic condition, Pakistan could not afford to resist the United States’ pressure to comply with their demands.

On 22nd September, 2001, When President Bush lifted all nuclear test related economic sanctions against India and Pakistan by exercising the authority granted to him by the Defence Appropriation Act of 2000, it had a dramatic impact on improving the state of Pakistan’s floundering economy (CRS, 2001, p.4). The Bush administration exempted Pakistan from four kinds of economic sanctions: nuclear testing, falling in arrears on debt servicing, democracy related ones and proliferation of nuclear weapons (CRS, 2001, p.5). The Bush administration not only lifted economic sanctions on Pakistan, but also approved
significant financial aid for Pakistan. On 10th November 2001, when President Bush met General Musharraf in New York, he said,

Pakistan’s efforts against terror are benefiting the entire world and linking Pakistan more closely with the world. The United States wants to help build these linkages. I’ve authorized a lifting of sanctions, and over $1 billion in U.S. support. I will also back debt relief for Pakistan…. I’m pleased that the President is committed to restore democracy in Pakistan. Pakistan is a strong ally; President Musharraf is a strong leader, and the world is deeply appreciative for his leadership.
The removal of economic sanctions made Pakistan’s eligible to receive economic assistance from other countries and institutions. On 11th December 2001, the European Commission included Pakistan under the special Generalized System of Preferences program (GSP) for countries combating drugs for the period 2002–2004. Inclusion in the special GSP eliminates all existing duties on Pakistan’s textiles exports. The EU also increased Pakistan’s quota for textile and apparel exports by 15%. (International Trade Reporter, 18 October 2001). On 14th December 2001, the Paris Club of official creditors agreed to restructure Pakistan’s $12.5 billion sovereign debt by extending its maturity and granting a generous grace period of 35 years, during which no principal has to be repaid (Financial Times, 14th December 2001). The Bush administration also provided debt relief of $1 billion in FY 2003 and increased Pakistan’s market access for textile worth by $142 million. This fiscal rescheduling allowed for relief of between $1.2-1.5 billion annually for Pakistan in payments of debt servicing on external debt from 2001 onward. While Pakistan underwent a debt resuffling with some friendly countries which considerably improved things for them in the wake of 9/11, other countries went further by completely writing off their debt. In 1999-2000, Pakistan's total foreign exchange reserves were $2.77 billion, but rose to $7.07 billion at the end of fiscal year 2001-02, and by the next year in June 2003, were $11.48 billion. Moreover, in 2003-04, the Government of Pakistan was able to pay back $1 billion in debt voluntarily. There was a 120% increase in one year in Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves that had allowed its international credit rating to improve. Between 2001-02 and 2002-03 the State Bank of Pakistan's reserves rose from $4.33 billion to $9.52 billion due to (a) an increase in Pakistan's exports, which crossed $10 billion for the first time ever in 2002-03 due to the quota increase in US and access to European markets and (b) debt rescheduling that reduced payment of interest, which allowed the State Bank of Pakistan to hold and increase its reserves (Zaidi, 2005).
4.4.2 Domestic Constraints on the Musharraf regime

Pakistan’s government and especially its army are often accused of duplicity in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These allegations began to emerging at the start of the war on terror. There was a perception in the US congress that Pakistan did not counter all extremists and would differentiate between what they perceived as morally justified and immoral terrorists. According to Ahmed Rashid, “Today, U.S. officials express concern with Islamabad's behavior on three fronts: Pakistan's testy relations with neighbouring India, its protection of Afghan figures the U.S. considers terrorists, and Islamabad's alleged aid to North Korea” (Rashid, December 2001). Members of the 107th Congress of the US had introduced several bills to Pakistan that were not voted upon. It included, S. 1675 related to suspension of duties on textile, H.R 5150 related to restoration of democracy and H.R 5267 that was related to the halt on cross-border terrorism in India (CRS, 2003, p.2). The US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Khalilzad, stated in February 2003 that, “there are some key Taliban figures in Pakistan… some Al-Qaeda people in the border areas” and that the US government “will not accept” these individual finding refuge in Pakistan (CRS, 2003, p.22). In the same month the senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-Sen. Lugar and Sen. Biden expressed, “deep concerns” that “some elements of Pakistan’s powerful agency ISI might be helping members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate into Afghanistan (CRS, 28th March, 2003, p. 22). These allegations on Pakistan were primarily due to domestic constraints that it could meet the US demands against Al-Qaeda.

Pakistan’s alliance with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was soon followed by terrorist incidents inside Pakistan. The first high value casualty of domestic terrorism in Pakistan was Daniel Pearl; a Wall Street Journal reporter in Pakistan. He was kidnapped from Karachi on 23rd January 2003 after an interview with a prominent figure in the country’s Islamic movement (Wall Street Journal, 24th Feb, 2002). It was followed by a car bomb near the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, which killed 14 people including 11 French naval Engineers who had been working on submarine project for the Pakistani navy. In March 2002, five people were killed including a US diplomat and her daughter in a suicide attack on a church in Islamabad. In June 2002, a car bombing outside the US consulate in Karachi killed 12 Pakistani nationals. In August, there were two lethal suicide attacks on Christian Schools, which increased the US concerns about further incidents against perceived western targets in Pakistan. The terrorist incidents that started with Pakistan’s joining the US war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda continue to this day. Continual attacks
have killed hundreds of thousands of people including Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. There were also two devastating suicide attacks on President Musharraf in December 2003, both of which he survived. The frequency of attacks demonstrates the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s deep penetration into Pakistani society, law enforcement agencies and to the overall security of the Pakistani state and its society. These developments have been particularly devastating to law enforcement officers on ground, who are more vulnerable to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s attacks than the political elites. Combined terror attacks have killed thousands of law enforcement officials, army generals and intelligence directors, which seriously undermine the implementation of any security policy against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The second important domestic constraint on Pakistan’s responses to consider is the effect of widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Many across the spectrum of Pakistani society expressed anger at the US’ foreign policy towards Iraq and Palestine. In 2004 during testimony before a Senate Panel, Stephen Cohen said, “Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and westernized elites on the other side.” (Cohen, 2004, p.139). A Pew poll undertaken in 2005 found only 23% of Pakistani citizens held a favorable view of the United States, which increased to 46% after massive relief efforts by the United States during the 2005 earthquake. However drone strikes in FATA and a rise of violence in Pakistan in general again substantially reduced favorable views towards the US to 27% (CRS. 6th June 2007, p. 29). According to the Program on International Policy Attitudes survey released in April 2007, 67% Pakistanis had unfavorable view of the US government, 73% think dividing the Islamic world is a US goal, more than one-third think the US government were behind the 9/11 attacks while only 2% hold Al-Qaeda responsible for the attacks and 27% had positive feelings towards Osama Bin Laden (PIPA, April 2007). Anti-American sentiment was also credited to helping contribute to the success of the MMA (Muthahida Mujlas Amal; an alliance of six religious parties) in the 2002 general election in Pakistan. Some political experts like Hussain Haqqani (2005) and Ahmed Rashid (2008) are of the views that the 2002 general election was largely rigged by Pakistan’s security establishment to discourage Washington from pressurizing the Musharraf regime towards restoration of democracy. They argue that Pakistan’s security establishment wanted to demonstrate that if the US continued to force Musharraf for a free and fair democratic voting system, it would empower religious forces in Pakistan, who were not in favor of cooperation with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that religious parties had won this many seats in parliament, a total of 68 which was equal to one fifth of
the total, allowing them to form their governments in two provinces bordering Afghanistan. These religiously motivated members of parliament were such key supporters of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan that they would regularly offer protection and sanctuary to Al-Qaeda leaders who were often arrested within these ministers’ homes (CRS, 2004, p.16).

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed in detail three kinds of assistance Pakistan has been offering to the United States in the war against Al-Qaeda. This includes operational and logistic assistance for military operations in Afghanistan through the deployment of 115,000 troops on the border to stop the flow of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to Pakistan. Two bases for military and intelligence purposes in Baluchistan, and ground supply to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan. This kind of cooperation was essential for the successes of the United States’ mission in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda. The second method of support offered by Pakistan to the United States against Al-Qaeda has been proactive counter-terrorist operations. This assistance manifests through granting permission to the US Joint Special Operation Forces, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA personnel in Pakistan for raids and intelligence gathering. The US teams in conjunction with Pakistani law enforcement agencies succeeded in arresting key leaders of Al-Qaeda in urban areas, including one of the masterminds behind 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. Cooperative operations of this nature eventual led to missions such as those which resulted in the elimination of Osama bin Laden in Abotabad. In tribal areas, Pakistan and the United States not only engage in joint operations against Al-Qaeda, but also use drone strikes frequently, which has badly damaged Al-Qaeda’s network in North and South Waziristan. The final method of cooperation is a military initiative whereby Pakistan sent its forces to tribal areas for the first time in history at the behest of the United States to remove Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries. This strategy was less successful as it precipitated a fully-fledged tribal-cum-religious insurgency. Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, demanded by the United States not only strengthened Al-Qaeda’s affiliated groups, but also inflicted a massive cost on the Pakistani military, its society and economy.

Pakistan accepted the United States’ demands due to a perception amongst foreign policy elites that if they did not cooperate, the Bush administration would damage Pakistan’s strategic assets, military capability and economic infrastructure. Likewise the Pakistani Generals were aware that if they did not cooperate with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the United States would damage its core national interest. President Musharraf categorically
told his Corps Commanders before joining the global war on terror that the United States would behave like a wounded bear. There was no doubt in the minds of policy makers that the United States would be unwavering in their retaliation upon Pakistan if it didn’t cooperate with against Al-Qaeda. The credibility of the United States’ threat to damage Pakistan’s core interest persuaded General Pervaiz Musharraf to accept the United States’ demands without hesitation. To the credit of the United States, in return for Pakistan’s assistance in the war on terror, they promised to remove economic sanctions on Pakistan and help it both financially and militarily. Thus the United States policy of carrot and stick forced Pakistan to join the global war on terror against its established interest in Afghanistan, which until that point had been to support the Taliban, rather than endure the combined military, economic and political attacks by the US. Pakistan cooperated with the United States despite domestic opposition from right wing political parties, militant organizations and the Madrassas network. Though these domestic constraints on Pakistan’s policy didn’t stop it from supporting the US war on terror against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it did make future policy implementation profoundly difficult. The contradiction between international pressure and domestic constraints created doubts in Washington regarding Pakistan’s political will to help the United States against Al-Qaeda and undid the fostering of goodwill through accusations of duplicity.
Chapter 5 Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban

5.1 Introduction

When President Barack Obama came into power in January 2009, one of the main objectives of his administration was to focus on the war in Afghanistan. President Obama shifted the United States’ resources and personnel from Iraq to Afghanistan, because he considered the war in Afghanistan as the war of necessity and the one in Iraq as war of choice (Obama, 2009). The Obama administration called upon two strategic reviews of the United States’ objectives, goals and strategies in Afghanistan in 2009. When Bruce Riedel’s committee, which consisted of Richard Holbrooke and Michele Flournoy did not resolve some basic questions, President Obama himself chaired a second committee to devise a comprehensive strategy for the war in Afghanistan (Clinton, 2014, p.151). There were agreements in both strategic reviews on three principle points; the lack of US forces in Afghanistan, the governance problems in Kabul and the Taliban’s sanctuaries in Pakistan (Woodward, 2010, p.212; Gate, 2014, p.91; Clinton, 2014, p.151). To address the first problem, the Obama administration sent 55,000 US troops to Afghanistan for counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban, and decided to increase the number of Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel from 70,000 to 230,000 over six years to hold areas after the withdrawal of the US forces (Kronstadt, 2011, p.8). In order to resolve the second problem, which related to governance in Kabul, the administration put unprecedented pressure on the Karzai government to reduce corruption and increase the writ of state beyond Kabul in order to enhance government’s legitimacy. The third component of the United States’ policy was to remove the Taliban’s sanctuaries from Pakistan’s tribal areas adjoining Afghanistan, especially in FATA. According to the Pentagon, the existence of militant sanctuaries inside FATA represents “the greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan” (New York Times, 2008). Commander of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, said that Pakistan’s western tribal regions provided the main pool for recruitment insurgents who fight in Afghanistan, and that infiltration has caused a 30% increase in number of militant attacks in eastern Afghanistan over the past year (2008).

25 President Obama said in his address at the Veteran of Foreign Wars convention at 17th August, 2009, “we must never forget. This is not a war of choice,” he told the VFW crowd. "This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again.”
In order to remove the Taliban’s sanctuaries in FATA, the United States made two major demands from the Pakistani government. The first requirement was to establish the writ of state on North Waziristan, the epicentre of the Haqqani network: a key Taliban’s faction that has strong links with Al-Qaeda. The second condition of the United States was to allow the US drone fleet in Pakistan to target the highest and middle tier leaders of the Afghan Taliban in North Waziristan and Quetta. This thesis claims that Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands were dependent on three factors. The first was a perception in Pakistan’s security establishment that the United States would be unable to defeat the Afghan Taliban militarily and that predicted military action against them would create domestic problems for Pakistan. The second factor was the operational constraints on Pakistan’s military capability. Pakistan’s army could not afford simultaneous military operations against the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in the presence of continual security threat from India. The third factor arose from pressure from the right wing political parties and madrassas network. Political pressure of this type would ensure security problems for Pakistan. The findings of this chapter validate the claims of neoclassical realism that stresses upon the role of the perception of policy elites, domestic politics and capability of a state in determining its foreign policy.

Those currently generating literature concerning the response of Pakistan to the US’ demands against the Afghan Taliban can be categorised into three opinion groups. The first group, which perceives Pakistan as a rent-seeking state, argues that Pakistani Generals do not cooperate against the Afghan Taliban, because they consider the US policy towards Afghanistan in conflict with Pakistan’s strategic interest in Kabul. The second group that perceives Pakistan as an ideological state claims that Pakistan’s army did not accept the US demands against the Afghan Taliban, because it considered the Afghan Taliban as strategic partner blocking India’s influence in Afghanistan. The third group deems Pakistan to be a security-seeking state, whose authors share the view that Pakistan did not accept the United States’ demands due to geo-strategic factors. According to them, a New Delhi friendly regime in Kabul would not only reduce Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan, but also jeopardise its security interest. This thesis has established that Pakistan’s army did not cooperate against the Afghan Taliban, because of the combination of concerns that the United States’ presence in Afghanistan will last only as long as their immediate concerns require, capability constraints to accept the United States demands and domestic pressure.

Political analysts, who conceive Pakistan as being an ideological state, argue that Pakistan did not accept the United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban, because it considers
them as a strategic partner against Indian influence in Afghanistan. According to Hussain Haqqani,

Afghanistan’s initial reluctance to recognise Pakistan and Afghanistan’s claims on Pakistani territory inhabited by Pashtun tribes along their shared border added to the psychological insecurity of Pakistan’s leaders, who already believed that India sought to undo partition (2005, p.103).

He believes that Pakistan therefore emphasized its Islamic identity to counter the challenge of Pashtun nationalism through an alliance with Islamists groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005, p.103). Constructivists argue that it is not possible for Pakistan to change its policies towards the Afghan Taliban as long as its basic narrative towards India and using Islam as an instrument of foreign policy remains the same. Christine Fair says in her book, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War*, “How can the Pakistani state expect its citizens to sustain support for some notions of state-supported jihad while denouncing other self-proclaimed jihadi groups for committing what the state believes is terrorism?” (Fair, 2014, p.80) The constructivist view is that Pakistan’s u-turn in 2001 against the Afghan Taliban was a tactical move to cooperate with the United States in such a manner that would modernise its military and reinforce their economy in order to balance Indian influence, rather than a strategic choice to give up extremism as method of foreign policy in Afghanistan.

A second group of critics, who believe that Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands against the Afghan Taliban matched with the behavior of a rent-seeking state. This group consisted of Aqil Shah, Frederic Grare, Ahmed Rashid and Bruce Riedel. They perceive Pakistan’s Army as key spoiler of peace in Afghanistan, because it is the major beneficiary of uncertainty in Afghanistan. They claim that instability in Afghanistan not only increases the chances of the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan, who are Pakistan’s proxy, but also maintains a system whereby weapons and money provided by the United States guarantees Pakistan’s continued defense against India. According to Aqil Shah, “They (Pakistan’s Army) selectively cooperate with the United States, apprehending al-Qaeda militants and fighting the Pakistani Taliban insurgents while sheltering and supporting other extremist, such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, which spearhead the insurgency in Afghanistan” (2011). Frederick Grare also echoes the same opinion in his report that Pakistan’s priorities reflect the specific institutional interests of the military, which is fundamentally in conflict with the interest of the international community and Pakistan’s general population (2007, p.11). He recommends that the United States and international
community should stop trading off democracy for partial cooperation against Al-Qaeda (Grare, 2007, p.5). These critics believe that the military dictators in Pakistan have always been securing sizeable economic and military aid and political support for much less cooperation than required.

The third group consider Pakistan as a security-seeking state. This group includes Seth Jones, Alan Kronstadt, Shuja Nawaz, and Stephen Krasner. They believe Pakistan did not accept the United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban, because the Afghan Taliban provide Pakistan with a greater level of security against Indian threat. Stephen Krasner says, regarding Pakistan’s policy towards the Afghan Taliban, “It (Pakistan) policies are a fully rational response to the conception of the country’s national interest held by its leaders, especially those in the military” (Krasner, 2012, p. 91). He further argues that Pakistan not only managed to use extremism to humiliate India and engage its 500,000 troops in Kashmir, but also impressively played a double game with the United States in Afghanistan (Krasner, 2012, p. 92). Seth Jones also drew the same conclusion in his report that Pakistan’s motives for supporting the Afghan Taliban are geo-strategic (2007, p.17). He claims that the power struggle between India and Pakistan in South Asia did not allow Pakistan to cooperate with the United States against he Afghan Taliban, because the later protect the interest of former in Afghanistan (Jones, 2007, p.17. He theorised that in order to acquire Pakistan’s assistance against the Afghan Taliban, which was deemed essential for the US to succeed in its mission, Washington would also be forced to address Islamabad’s concern regarding Indian encroachment in Afghanistan (Jones, 2007, p.27).

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section briefly discusses the United States’ demands from Pakistan. The second section discusses Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban. The third section analyses Pakistan’s behaviour and demonstrates how perception of the Pakistani Army of the United States’ commitment, capability of the military and domestic politics constrain its policies. The last section concludes the chapter.

5.2 The United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban

There was a considerable level of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on issues of border management and initiation of political reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban, but this did not have a significant effect on the level of violence in Afghanistan,
which was the main concern of the Obama administration (Kronstadt, 2012, p.33). The United States demanded two critical steps from Pakistan in order to reduce violence in Afghanistan. The first demand of the Obama administration on the Pakistani government was to initiate a military operation against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan in the same manner as it did against the TTP in Swat and South Waziristan, because the Haqqanis were using North Waziristan as safe haven to attack the US forces in Afghanistan and orchestrate spectacular attacks in Kabul (Armitage, 2009). The US’ second demand on Pakistan was to allow the CIA to expand lethal drone strikes to other parts of FATA and Balochistan against the Taliban senior and mid-level leadership to break their communication with the field commanders in Afghanistan. According to a wiki-leaks cable sent to Washington on 24th March 2008, Admiral Mullen asked General Kayani for help in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA (08Islamabad1272).

5.2.1 The US demand of military operation in North Waziristan

In September 2011, there were attacks on the United States’ Embassy in Kabul and an outpost of the NATO by the Haqqani network that injured 77 US soldiers (Walsh, 2011). The White House sent a powerful delegation, consisted of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, director of the CIA, David Petraeus, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey to Pakistan to deliver a single and stern message to the Pakistani leadership to conduct military operations in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan (Walsh, 2011). Hillary Clinton said in her testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee regarding her visit to Pakistan and demands set to them on 27th October 2011,

In Islamabad last week, General Dempsey, Director Petraeus and I delivered a single, unified message – Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership must join us in squeezing the Haqqani Network from both sides of the border and in closing safe havens. We underscored to our Pakistani counterparts the urgency of the task at hand, and we had detailed and frank conversations about the concrete steps both sides need to take.

In that meeting, when the US delegation met with Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani, President Asif Zardari and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, they categorically asked Pakistan to cut off ties with the Haqqanis and remove their sanctuaries from North Waziristan (The Washington Post, 2011).
The demand of military action against the Haqqani’s infrastructure including its madrassas, training camps, recruitment centers, IEDs factories and control on North Waziristan was not made for the first time in October 2011. The US Commander in Afghanistan, Karl W. Ekinberry, openly criticized against the Haqqani terrorist activities and their safe havens in Pakistan back in 2006 (Rashid, 2008, p.578; Mazzetti, 2014, p.98). The United States pressure on Pakistan against the Haqqani network, specifically to conduct a military operation in North Waziristan, started from 1st May 2010, when Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American, tried to blow up his vehicle at Time Square in New York City (Woodward, 2010, p.414). Faisal Shahzad was arrested just prior to leaving from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on 3rd May 2010 onboard an Emirate Airline flight (The Guardian, 2010). Later, he confessed in the court proceeding that he received training in bomb making in North Waziristan (Los Angles Time, 2010). The failure of Pakistani and US intelligence to intercept Faisal Shahzad forced the Obama administration to further increase unilateral drone strikes in FATA and pressurized Islamabad to launch military operations in North Waziristan (Mazzetti, 2014, p.212; Coll, 2011). Finally, Admiral Mike Mullen was forced to publicly accuse Pakistan of negligence in order to increase pressure to comply on 22nd September 2011 by saying,

The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that [September 13] truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy. We also have credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.

However, the White House distanced itself from the Mullen statement, though Secretary Panetta fully supported Mullen’s statement and urged Congress to send a clear message to Pakistan on the Haqqani network (Kronstadat, 2012, p.31).

5.2.2 The United States’ demand to expand drone strikes

Drone strikes in Pakistan began in June 2004, when the CIA killed a tribal ally of Al-Qaeda, Nek Muhammad, in South Waziristan in a drone strike26. Nek Muhammad gained prominence in March 2004, when the Pakistani government asked him to hand over the Al-Qaeda and Uzbek terrorists to the government, who had taken refuge with him (Hussain, 2011). When Nek Muhammad refused to accept their demand, Pakistan launched a military
operation against him. He did not only successfully resist the Pakistani forces, but also inflicted high casualties upon them (Markey, 2008, p.11). It was at this time the CIA offered its assistance against Nek Muhammad but on the condition that it would also be allowed to fly drones over the North and South Waziristan (Mazzetti, 2014, p.67). According to Mark Mazzetti, a New York Times Pulitzer prize winning reporter, ‘The CIA’s station chief in Islamabad paid a visit to General Ehsan ul Haq, the ISI chief, and made an offer: if the CIA killed Nek Muhammad, would the ISI allow regular drone flights over the tribal areas?’ (Mazzetti, 2014, p.67). He claims in his book, ‘THE WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY AND A WAR AT THE ENDS OF THE EARTH’ that the ISI and Pakistan’s army had accepted the CIA offer to allow armed drone flights in exchange for killing of Nek Muhammad, because he was troublesome for Pakistani forces in South Waziristan (Mazzetti, 2014, p.67). According to various sources, the CIA was taking consent from the ISI until July 2008, when the Bush administration approved “Signature Strikes” after becoming frustrated with Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban (Coll, 2014; Woodward & Miller, 2013). The second phase of the CIA drone strikes started following a terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7th July 2008, which killed 40 people including India’s military attaché (Coll, 2009). In total there were 10 drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to June 2008, but after the July approval from the White House, the CIA increased this to 36 drone strikes in the last half of the 2008 (Coll, 2014). There were 341 drone strikes in Pakistan during Obama’s first term (Coll, 2014).

The second demand of the United States was to allow the CIA to expand its drone strikes to areas other than North Waziristan to Bajour and Quetta. According to a cable sent to Washington from the US embassy in Islamabad on 24th March 2008 regarding a meeting between General Kayani and Admiral Mike Mullen on 4th March 2008,

Admiral Mullen began by telling Kayani that a US SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) team had completed its initial assessment of Pakistan’s requirements and that they intend to propose options to assist them in developing a solution. Admiral Mullen then asked Kayani for his help in approving a third Restricted Operating Zone for the US aircraft over FATA” (081ISLAMABAD1272).

The airspace over FATA is divided into different zones with varying jurisdiction. Admiral Mullen was seeking to extend the US drones strikes from North Waziristan and Bajour agencies to South Waziristan, but was denied by General Kayani who refused to accept the US demand on the basis that Pakistani forces were already operating in South Waziristan in 2008 (Coll, 2014).
5.3 Pakistan’s Responses to the US demands against the Afghan Taliban

In comparison to Pakistan’s cooperation against Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, it did not cooperate with the United States as Washington had expected. Therefore, the US’ Congress and major think tanks simultaneously accused Pakistan of underhandedness with the United States. The level of cooperation on drone strikes was relatively better than meeting the demand of military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network.

5.3.1 Pakistan’s responses to the US demand of Military operation

According to various US and Pakistani sources, in May 2010, there was an agreement between General Kayani and US National security team consisted of Gen (retired) James Jones, Leon Panetta and Gen (retired) Douglas Lute, to conduct a military operation in North Waziristan in 2011 (Mazzetti, 2014; Mullen, 2011). Admiral Mullen also confirmed in an Interview to Fox news on 30th May 2010 that General Kayani had promised to launch an operation in North Waziristan (Dawn, 2010). Dawn newspaper, a reliable English-language paper in Pakistan, also made the claim from a diplomatic source that, ‘The meetings led to an understanding between the two sides that Islamabad will extend its military operations to North Waziristan and other similar areas as well,” (Dawn, 2010). During an interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, he confirmed to me that Pakistan did indeed prepare for military operations in North Waziristan in 2011 (Yusufzai, 2014). The final source, which substantiated the claim that Pakistan had decided to conduct military operations in North Waziristan in 2010, was the former DG (ISPR) General (retired) Athar Abbas. General Abbas said to BBC Urdu service on 1st July 2014 that Pakistan’s army decided to conduct military operations in North Waziristan in 2011 (BBC, 2014). According to Abbas it was decided that Pakistan would undergo a full year’s worth of preparation, from May 2010 to 2011 to build infrastructure, develop communication systems, and establish an intelligence network before starting their military operations in North Waziristan (Abbas, 2014). It was a significant and credible revelation from a former army spokesperson. This chapter claims that there were three fundamental factors that forced Pakistan to delay military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network instead of an unprecedented level of pressure from the United States; perception by Pakistan’s army of the US commitment to Afghanistan, the capability of the Pakistani army and domestic pressure from non-state actors.
5.3.2 Pakistan’s responses on drone strikes

During my field work in Pakistan in February 2014, I was told during two interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Imtiaz Gul that the government of Pakistan and the ISI allowed the US drone strikes under two conditions (2014). First, it wanted to have a veto power on the approval of every drone strike happening in Pakistan (Imtiaz, 2014). Secondly, the government was not prepared to allow the CIA to expand the use of drone strikes from FATA to settled areas. The government insisted that the CIA should share evidence gathered with the counter-terrorism unit of the ISI before the drone hit an individual or a place (Munir, 2014). There was significant cooperation between the CIA and the ISI against Al-Qaeda at that time, so the two countries had no problem reaching a consensus on the first condition as long as Al-Qaeda was concerned. It was during this same period that the ISI captured around 500 high valued Al-Qaeda’s members including its top leadership like Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. According to Congressional Research Service report,

The White House called Mohammed’s capture a “joint operation” between Pakistani and US authorities and President Bush expressed his “deep appreciation and gratitude to President Musharraf and to the government of Pakistan” for their “fine efforts” in combating terrorism (CRS, 2003, p.3).

Various sources claim that the CIA ceased requesting prior permission from Pakistan for drone strikes after 30th May 2006, when Michael Hayden became the director of the CIA and Micheal D’ Andrea (cover name Roger) was appointed the chief of the CIA counter-terrorism unit (Miller, 2012). According to a Washington Post report, ‘Under Hayden, the agency abandoned the practice of notifying the Pakistanis before launching strikes, and the trajectory began to change: from three strikes in 2006 to 35 in 2008’ (Miller, 2012). There were three other reasons which accounted for the shift in the US drone policy towards Pakistan.; the rise of violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy of appeasement towards the Taliban in Waziristan and the National Intelligence Estimate report on the status of Al-Qaeda in 2007.

5.4 Analysis of Pakistan’s behaviour

The analyses in this chapter are based on the core principles of neo-classical realism that stresses the importance of a decision-makers’ perception of the International system. According to neo-classical realism, the International system is anarchic, but it is neither Hobbesian nor benign as offensive and defensive realism believe, but murky and difficult to read. It believes that world leaders are constrained by international and domestic politics. It
claims that in order to understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, one must analyze how systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables such as decision makers’ perception and domestic state structure (Rose, 1998, p152). It argues that the key objective of a state’s foreign policy is to control and shape the external environment created by uncertainties of international anarchy. It believes that the ambition and magnitude of a state foreign policy is determined by its relative material power. If a state’s relative power rises that state will seek more influence abroad and if its falls its actions will be scaled back (Rose, 1998, 152). Neo-classical realists separate themselves from structural realists by introducing the perception of decision-makers as an intervening variable. They believe that the notion of a smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt is inaccurate and misleading. The international distribution of power can drive countries’ behavior only by influencing the decisions of ‘flesh and blood official’ (Rose, 1998, p158). The second important intervening variable of neo-classical realists is the state-society relationship. According to Fareed Zakaria,

Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government. Consequently, what matters is state power, not national power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends. (1999, p.9).

This research challenges Ahmed Rashid’s claim that the ISI was meticulously running the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan by providing funds, training and ammunition. To contest this, the questions of who provides training, funds and ammunition to the Pakistani Taliban, who have been running a lethal insurgency against the Pakistan’s army in FATA and Malakand division can be raised. Indeed, the lose nature of state-society relationship in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan forced the creation of a simultaneously black and undocumented economy that supported the Taliban’s insurgency. The Taliban do not need Pakistani money, because, according to state department reports, they were already taking protection money from drug traffickers, smugglers, construction companies and even NATO suppliers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban, in particular the Haqqani network, have been living in North Waziristan since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and have a significant support base in Pakistan’s tribal areas (Nawaz, 2008, p.12). The Haqqani not only enjoy tribal support in North Waziristan, but also command respect from the religious element in the area. According to Mason and Johnson, Pashtuns identifies themselves in term of familial ties and commitment and have fundamentally different way of looking at the world. They says, “they are surrounded by concentric rings consists of
family, extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and a major cultural-linguistic group” (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p.51). According Johnson and Mason “This segmentation is one reason why, historically, no foreign entity- whether Alexander, the British, the Soviet, the Afghan or the Pakistanis-has been able to reconcile the Pashtun to external rule” (Johnson and Mason, 2008, p.52). Johnson and Mason said that the Pakistani government were forced to broker peace with the Taliban in FATA, because of the heavy political and human cost of military actions. They say, “It was this failure of the Pakistani army to bring the FATA under military control that compelled Pervez Musharraf’s regime to change track and pursue several “peace deal” with cowed tribal leaders fronting for the Taliban leadership in Waziristan in 2004 and 2006” (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p.55-56). It establishes that the Afghan Taliban are not exclusively dependent on the ISI’s support for their survival in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani government officials informed me during the field work that while they have contacts with the Afghan Taliban, they don’t have control over them. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s security establishment have contacts through family members of the Taliban and religious scholars, especially within political parties.

This chapter claims that Pakistan’s rivalry with India plays a role in Pakistan’s policy towards the Afghan Taliban, but it is not the determining factor\(^{27}\). The key factor in Pakistan’s decision to resist the US pressure for military operations against the Afghan Taliban was the perception amongst Pakistan’s foreign policy elite that the United States could not defeat the Taliban militarily. This perception was drawn from the decline in the United States’ relative power after the insurgency in Iraq and economic crisis at home, which

\(^{27}\)Pakistan and India have always been archrivals of each other in the region. There is a territorial dispute between Islamabad and New Delhi on the issue of Kashmir since 1947. Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state of India, which also has a long border with Pakistan. In 1947 during the partition of British India, there were more than 360 princely states, which were not under the direct control of the British Empire, but ruled by Maharajas (Princes). All princely states later joined either Pakistan or India on the basis of two principles; religious majority and territorial contiguity (Cheema, 2005). Kashmir was the only princely state, which neither joined India nor Pakistan. There were two reasons for Kashmir’s resistance. First, it was the biggest princely state, it wanted to be recognized as a third independent state along with India and Pakistan. Secondly, its Maharaja was Hindu tilted towards India, but the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants were Muslims, who wanted to join Muslim Pakistan. The delay of Maharaja to join either of the two newly independent countries precipitated Pakistan’s occupation of Kashmir as other reluctant states, but the chief of Pakistan’s army at that time was a British officer, who refused to fight a war with the Indian army that was also consisted of its fellow British Officers. The Pakistani government then resorted to non-state actors to occupy Kashmir (Cohen, 2005). It indirectly encouraged tribes from FATA to liberate their fellow Muslim brothers from the occupation of Hindu Maharaja. When the tribes approached Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir by occupying 1/3 of Kashmir, Maharaja asked New Delhi for help, which made it conditional to accession to India. Stephen Cohen believes that Pakistan started using non-state actors as source of foreign policy since 1948 in Kashmir. Christine Fair also argues “In fact, Islamabad has relied on non-state actors to prosecute policy objectives in Kashmir since Pakistan's inception in 1947...By October 1947; Pakistan's first foray into asymmetric warfare had precipitated the first Indo-Pakistan conventional military crisis (1947-48) in the early months of the two states’ existence. The war ended on January 1, 1949, with the establishment of a ceasefire line (CFL) sponsored by the United Nations, which demarcated the areas under Pakistan and Indian control” (Fair, 2011, p.108).
Chapter 5

further reduced the significance of Afghanistan for US national security. The lack of support in the United States for a long term economic and military commitment to Afghanistan discouraged Pakistan to take any military action against the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s foreign policy elite believes that military action against the Taliban will not only create domestic problems, but will also reduce their influence on the Taliban, which could be used for the political settlement of conflict in Afghanistan. The second intervening variable which decreased the pressure from an International system was the lack of military capability to launch a comprehensive counter-insurgency operation in the presence of any threat from India. Pakistan’s military establishment was of the opinion that in the presence of a threat from India, current counter-insurgency operations in FATA and Balochistan, it lacked the sufficient military capability to start a military operation as per the United States’ demand. The third intervening variable was the domestic pressure from the right wing political parties in Pakistan and Madrassah network, who strongly opposed Pakistan’s military cooperation with the United States against the Afghan Taliban as long as the latter did not pose any threat to Pakistan’s domestic stability.

5.4.1 The Credibility of the United States’ Commitment to Afghanistan

Pakistan’s security establishment consists of its army and the ISI; which does not accept the United States demands of military operation against the Afghan Taliban for three reasons. Firstly, it believes that the United States doesn’t have the political will to punish Pakistan for its policy towards the Afghan Taliban due to its other important interests in the region. According to the methodology of the US Army War College for determining interest and levels of intensity, there are three degrees of intensity of interest; vital, important and peripheral. Vital-If unfulfilled, will have immediate consequence for critical national interests. Important-If unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect critical national interests. Peripheral-If unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect critical national interests (Barber & Varger, 1997). In the hierarchy of Pakistan’s interests, Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban are not of vital interest of Pakistan, but they are still and important one (Yasin, 2014). Pakistan’s decision to ally with the United States against the Taliban in October 2001 demonstrates that the Taliban are not chief amongst their concerns. When the Bush administration made it clear to Pakistan that if it did not cooperate with the United States, it would damage Pakistan’s vital national security interests, President Musharraf said in his address to the nation in September 2001, “Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say our critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse
situation for us” (Musharraf, 2001). He wrote in his book, ‘In the Line of Fire’ that the United States threatened to bomb Pakistan to “the stone age” if it did not cooperate on Afghanistan against the Taliban (Musharraf, 2006, p.201). This shows that for the United States’ to induce change in the national interest of Pakistan’s regarding Afghanistan, then it must threaten those interests of Pakistan whose level of intensity is higher. Presently however, the Pakistani security establishment believes that the situation has changed to the point that Afghanistan does not constitute the top priority of the United States due to changes in the international milieu and the domestic situation since 9/11.

Secondly, it assumes that the US will not reinforce its strike capability in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban militarily due to war wariness at home, the economic crisis in 2008 and lack of Afghanistan’s strategic interest to the United States. The United States’ lack of commitment to Afghanistan as the policy of the Bush administration can be demonstrated when compared to their handling of Iraq. The number of US troops in Iraq reached to 160,000 in 2007, but in Afghanistan there were only 23,000 US troops from 2001 to 2009. From 2002 to 2006, insurgency in Afghanistan was nonexistent, but the Bush administration failed to develop the Afghan army and police. The United States and international community only developed 60,000 Afghan troops from 2002 to 2010 (Rashid, 2008, p.520). From 2001 to 2005, the United States and NATO forces were operated only within Kabul leaving the rest of the country to be managed by the warlords in their respective spheres of influence (Rashid, 2008, p.896). These developments led the Pakistani security establishment to suspect that the United States would leave Afghanistan again as it did in 1989 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst the key observations drawn from the field work in Pakistan by conducting interviews with the political elite, attending conferences and discussing issues off the record with retired and serving army generals was that there was a strong perception in Pakistan’s policy elites that the United States would not succeed in Afghanistan. This perception was further strengthened after the announcement of the Obama administration in September 2009 to withdraw the US forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

The security establishment in Pakistan believes that there is a conflict between the United States’ other strategic interests and the situation in Afghanistan. During an interview with

28 There are reports that claim that When Pakistan realised the Taliban would be defeated in Afghanistan it deployed forces on borders without receiving any request from the United States to stop the flow of the Afghan and Al-Qaeda leadership into Pakistan’s tribal areas in 2001 (Keller, 2011).
Professor Rasool Bukhsh Rais\textsuperscript{29} in February 2014 he informed me that if the United States wants to establish a stable Afghanistan then it must commit itself to the construction and development of Afghanistan beyond 2014, which means it has to compromise other commitments which detract resources from this goal. For example, counter-terrorism operations in other parts of the world (especially in Middle East and North Africa) and modernization of its military and economic situation at home\textsuperscript{30} (Rais, 2014). According to Vali Nasr, an advisor to late Richard Holbrooke, in October 2010 Pakistan’s army Chief General Kayani visited the White House and gave a 13 page white paper, summarised as follows:

You are not going to win the war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you; it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans and let’s get practical, sit down, and discuss how you will leave and what is an end state we can both live with (Nasr, 2013, p.11).

General Kayani’s paper suggested a different solution based on reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban, rather than proceed down a route guaranteeing a military defeat that would consume more resources and time than the United States could afford due to domestic pressure and their other priorities. General Kayani stated in his paper that the United States’ strategy that emphasized a predominantly military-based solution to Afghanistan is not sustainable\textsuperscript{31}. The US should instead use military force as an instrument to serve a political strategy (their current strategy is the opposite) that aims to reconcile with the Taliban in whole or in part while keeping time and resources constraints into consideration along with the collective history, geography and culture of Afghanistan. General Kayani said in the white paper, “SUSTAINABILITY, both in short and long term, and in the context of political, military and economic cost ‘SHOULD BE THE KEY CONSIDERATION’. For this the political will of United States and Europe will be the most important assumption.” (White paper, 2010). General (retired) Yasin Malik and Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema also expressed the same opinion during interviews that the US policy in Afghanistan is not likely

\textsuperscript{29} Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad.

\textsuperscript{30} Pakistan’s army knows that there are two ghosts that act as counter-weight to the United States commitment to Afghanistan; the United States experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. These two experiences will not allow the United States to have open commitment to Afghanistan to turn it into a functional democracy.

\textsuperscript{31} Pakistan’s army was strong critic of the United States policy to train 352,000 Afghan National Security Force (ANSC) due to two reasons. Firstly it believed that it is not trained enough to counter the Taliban and resist ethnic fissures after the withdrawal of the United States forces from Afghanistan. There has been a civil war in Afghanistan, where they have been killing each others for 30 years on ethnic basis. Secondly, it believes that the United States Congress will not finance the Afghan army when the US withdraws its forces from Afghanistan.
to succeed primarily because of its lack of commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014 (Cheema, 2014; Malik, 2014).

From the Pakistani perspective, sustainability, cost and domestic support for the United States policy towards Afghanistan should be considered in context to Afghanistan’s history, culture and geography. This means that the Obama administration’s strategy, based on the use of force (surge) to defeat the Taliban militarily, develop 400,000 Afghan security forces (ASF) to hold the areas cleared of the Taliban, support the 400,000 ASF for the next ten years in a time of austerity, which per year expenses exceeds $9 billion are not sustainable, economical or acknowledge the history, culture and geography of Afghanistan. Vali Nasr said,

I cannot forget Kayani’s reaction when we enthusiastically explained our plan to build up Afghan forces to 400,000 by 2014. His answer was swift and unequivocal: Please don’t try to build that Afghan army. “You will fail,” he said. “Then you will leave and that half-trained army will break into militias that will be a problem for Pakistan.” We tried to stand our ground, but he would have none of it. He said, “I don’t believe that Congress is going to pay nine billion dollars a year for this four-hundred-thousand-man force.” (2013, p.11).

Similarly, in December 2013, 16 intelligence agencies of the United States unanimously issued a National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan that presented a pessimistic picture of Kabul in 2017. According to the Washington Post,

“A new American intelligence assessment on the Afghan war predicts that the gains the United States and its allies have made during the past three years are likely to have been significantly eroded by 2017, even if Washington leaves behind a few thousand troops and continues bankrolling the impoverished nation, according to officials familiar with the report” (2013).

However, the United States’ military commanders on the ground did not agree with the grim assessment of the situation for 2017. They believed that if the United States’ Congress

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32 President Obama announced his first Afghan strategy in March 2009, when he ordered a surge in the United States forces in Afghanistan and approved the 21,000 troops requested by the Pentagon. But when General Stanley McChrystal was appointed as new Commander of the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, he requested another 40,000 troops for Afghanistan, which forced Obama to again review the strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. He came with his second strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 2009, when he sent 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, but for 18 months only.

33 Richard Hass, President Council of Foreign Relation, says about the Afghan war, “What began as a narrow, modest war of necessity evolved into a broad, ambitious war of choice”. He further suggests, “What should we learn from this decade? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was on to something when he stated that any of his successors who advice the President to again send a big land army into Asia or the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined. It is not just that it promises to be too costly; it is also that the prospects for success are too small. Local realities matter. Nothing is more difficult than remaking another society. Except in the rarest cases, we should confine national building to here at home, where it is sorely needed.” (Haas, 2011).
supports the Afghan Army financially, they will successfully resist the Taliban’s occupation of big cities34 (Biddle, 2013). But, there is a perception in Islamabad that when the United States withdraws their forces from Afghanistan, the Afghan army situation would be no different from the one developed by the Soviet during the 1980s. General (retired) Asad Durrani, the former DG of the ISI told me at the Qazi Hussain Ahmed Memorial international conference in Islamabad on 29th January 2014 that the Afghan army developed by the Soviet Union was stronger and better disciplined than the one created by the United States (2014). He said that there was no chance that the Afghan army would face the brutal insurgency from the Afghan Taliban after the withdrawal of the US forces (Durrani, 2014, Lodhi, 2013). The recent break down of the Iraqi forces in the face of threats from Islamic State terrorists further strengthened the perception that the fate of the Afghan army will be reminiscent of the Iraqi one.

The second factor that caused doubt in Islamabad to the United States commitment to Afghanistan was the internal conflict in the Obama administration and war wariness throughout the American population (Lodi, 2014; Rais, 2014). According to Andrew Mack (1975, p.25),

Success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory on the ground; through military successes may have been a contributory cause, but rather from the progressive attrition of their opponents’ political capability to wage war. In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat.

The Obama administration’s policy towards Afghanistan was more the result of public opinion in the United States than the strategic realities in the region. Vali Nasr said that President Obama got high marks on foreign policy in cocoon, because the principle aim of his policies was not to make a successful strategic decision but to satisfy public opinion. He said Obama did more of the things that people want and fewer of the things we had to do that may be unpopular (Nasr, 2013, p.12). Similarly, Robert Gate said “Biden argued throughout the process, and would continue to argue, that the war was politically unsustainable at home’ (Gate, 2014). Although, Gate did not agree with Biden’s view, he said the President could sustain even an unpopular war as Bush did in Iraq. Gate makes the mistake however of refusing to acknowledge that George W. Bush and Barrack Obama were

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34 Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington Hussain Haqqani says, the United States should at least train one generation of the Afghan National Army to make them capable of fighting external and internal threat. He argues that it takes a cadet 25 years to go from training to the rank of General, so the United States at least should produce one complete generation of the Afghan national army to institutionalise the process.
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representatives of two different demographics in the United States. Support for the Afghan war was lower among the Democrats than amongst Republicans; therefore he should be concerned about his approval amongst this demographic while sending 60,000 extra troops and investing $500 billion in Afghanistan. It was domestic pressure, especially from the liberal Democrats, which pushed President Obama to put a deadline on the United States’ deployment of extra troops in Afghanistan. According to the Washington Post, “Overall, seven in 10 Democrats say the war has not been worth its costs, and fewer than one in five support an increase in troop levels” (The Washington Post, 2009).

The hesitation by the Obama administration to embrace the troops surge in Afghanistan was perceived in Pakistan as a lack of willingness by the US to commit to the war against the Taliban. Although United States officials tried to convince Pakistan’s army that they were committed to Afghanistan and would not leave before defeating the Taliban, it was not difficult to understand that the majority of Americans began to view the war in Afghanistan as not worth fighting while only a quarter of the population agreed that more US troops should be sent to the country (The Washington Post, 2009). The war wariness factor emerged before President Obama officially announced a deadline on the surge, when he ordered the complete withdrawal of the United States’ forces from Iraq. This act undermined the perception that the United States would fight until the end irrespective of the resistance from the insurgents on ground. Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan told me during an interview in his home on 17th March 2014 that when the United States withdrew its forces from oil rich and strategically important Iraq, Pakistan’s army understood that they would soon leave Afghanistan as well (Khan, 2014). The full effect of domestic pressure in the US on the perceived strategic importance of Afghanistan in the Obama administration’s policy not only increased Pakistan’s resistance to launch any military operation, but also emboldened the Afghan Taliban who refused to enter into a negotiation to end the conflict. The third factor that affected the United States credibility were demands from Pakistan. As previously stated in the third chapter, there were differences of opinion between the State

35 On 1st December 2009 President Obama announced his second Afghan policy within a year at the West Point military academy in New York. President said, “This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan” (Obama, 2009)

36 All principle advisors of the Obama and important figures in Congress like John McCain and Lindsay Graham opposed the public announcement of the deadline on the US forces without taking progress on ground into account, but President Obama had to keep strategic interest of the United States above the Afghan policy.
department, the Pentagon and the big six on the United States’ policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. These differences fed into conflicts in the United States’ demands from Pakistan. The United States requested Pakistan either conduct a military operation against the Haqqani network or deliver them for peace talks. As Hillary Clinton said “we believe that they can play either a constructive or a destructive role in helping to bring into talks those with whom the Afghans themselves must sit across the table and hammer out a negotiated settlement,” (ET, 2011). According to the New York Times,

Just a month after accusing Pakistan’s spy agency of secretly supporting the Haqqani terrorist network, which has mounted attacks on Americans, the Obama administration is now relying on the same intelligence service to help organize and kick-start reconciliation talks aimed at ending the war in Afghanistan (2011).

When the US House of Representative Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson asked Clinton, “So which is it, Madam Secretary? Crack down or negotiation with the Haqqani network or a little bit of both”. She said “It’s both (NYT, 2011). The demand for political talks had given a signal to Pakistan that the United States would finally accept a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, one which would be in the best interest of Pakistan rather than a continued military operation which would seriously damage Pakistan’s security and stability. Pakistan has been making the case to Washington to carefully think how to ‘sequence’ efforts aimed at a political settlement rather than follow a contradictory strategy. Pakistan’s preferred option is a political resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United States. Rahimullah Yusufzai explained in a telephone interview that if there were even a slight chance the United States could successfully make a political deal with the Taliban, Pakistan would abandon any plan for a military operation against them.

37 The first option presented by Richard Holbrooke, The US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, was to find a diplomatic solution of the Afghanistan’s problem and strike a deal with the Taliban. This option was not a popular politically at home. President Obama would have been considered soft on national security issues. It was not an easy option either. It would have brought the United States and Pakistan on the same page on Afghanistan. Pakistan’s army would have helped the United States in every possible way to find a political solution of the Afghanistan’s problem, because it is the worst sufferer of the conflict in Afghanistan. According to Hillary Clinton, Pakistan’s ISI has played a critical role in bring the Haqqani network people at the table at Doha for a political solution of the conflict, but lack of political backing from the White House to the diplomatic solution of the conflict did not allow the process to reach to a conclusion.

38 The second option was presented by the Pentagon, which naturally stresses upon the military solution of the Afghanistan’s problem. They believe that the United States cannot trust either the Afghan Taliban or Pakistan for peace in Afghanistan; therefore, it has to develop Afghan army to the level that become capable of countering the Taliban after the United States withdraw from Afghanistan. The Pentagon believes that the best strategy for this solution is to announce surge in the United States forces in Afghanistan and pressurize Pakistan for a military operation against the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura on their side of the border. It will divide the strength of the Afghan Taliban and break the connection between the sanctuary in Pakistan and insurgency in Afghanistan.
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(Yusufzai, 2014)39. He said the high cost and low return of the military operation against the Afghan Taliban and the high return and low cost of political negotiations between the United States and the Taliban would always restrain Pakistan from the former and push it towards the latter. As long as the possibility of negotiation between the Taliban and the United States exists, the likelihood of a military operation by Pakistan against the Taliban diminishes. Therefore, the United States has to either abandon the possibility of a political resolution to the Afghan conflict or it should take advantage of the existing Pakistani contact with the Haqqani network for a political deal with the Taliban.

5.4.2 Military capability of Pakistan’s army

Most of the literature assessing Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban is focused on the intentions of Pakistan’s army, the ISI and its government and overlooks the capability they have to deal with the problem the Taliban pose. Despite Pakistan’s army being a disciplined and professional force, complications and hindrances in effectiveness exist for even on the most capable military forces as far as counter-insurgency operations are concerned. For example, The United States’ experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the Indian experience in Kashmir, French failures in Algeria and Israel’s experience in the West Bank show those counter-insurgency operations are both complicated and costly. According to Daniel Byman,

Counterinsurgency is difficult for even the best militaries. It requires not only remarkable military skill but also a deft political touch. The soldiers on patrol must be a fighter, policeman, an intelligence officer, a diplomat, and an aid worker. Not surprisingly, even well-trained, well led, and well-funded militaries such as those of the United States, Britain, and Israel have foundered when facing insurgent movements’ (2006).

39 Pakistan’s army plays the same role in Afghanistan between the Afghan Taliban and the United States as the religious forces and right wing political parties play between the Pakistani Taliban and army. The right wing political parties also urge Pakistan’s army to find a political settlement of the conflict with the Pakistani Taliban, whereas, the military is interested in the surrender or defeat of the Pakistani Taliban. The United States wants Pakistan’s army to play similar role against the Afghan Taliban as it is playing against the Pakistani one. An independent Task force consists of various Congressmen and former officials of the Obama and Bush administrations headed by Richard Armitage, the former US Deputy Secretary of State from 2001 to 2004, recommended that Pakistan should treat the Afghan Taliban especially the Haqqani network the same way as it treats the Pakistani Taliban (Independent Task Force report no 65, 2010). But, they are two different cases. In case of Afghanistan, Afghan army is weak and the US forces will be leaving at the end of 2014, whereas, in Pakistan’s case the army is neither wwenk, nor it is leaving FATA in foreseeable future. The war against the Pakistani Taliban is a war of necessity for Pakistan, whereas, the one against the Afghan Taliban is a war of choice, therefore, Pakistan’s army is first focused on the Pakistani Taliban.
This section of the thesis argues that if Pakistan’s army had to abandon its strategic doctrine of “good and bad” Taliban and embraced the doctrine of counter-insurgency as the United States had been demanding then that would have seriously constrained the capabilities of the Pakistani army. There were three formidable challenges to Pakistan’s army for counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The first and foremost one is the number of troops required for successful counter-insurgency operations in line with the doctrine of counter-insurgency. According to the Quinlivan’s “Force requirement in Stability Operation” calculation for a successful military operation there must be at least 20-25 soldiers for every 1000 civilians (Quinlivan, 1995-96). The main objectives of such high number of deployed soldiers are, ‘the ability of the COIN forces to gather intelligence and to separate the populace from the insurgents, thus negating the insurgents’ two main advantages. Troop ratios are therefore calculated relative to the population the COIN force is attempting to control and protect, rather than the insurgents that they are trying to defeat. The ratio is relatively high because the best intelligence-gathering instruments in such a campaign remain the eyes and ears of COIN forces, despite advances in signal and imagery intelligence’ (Krause, 2007). If we consider this one aspect of counter-insurgency (the ratio of troops to population) combined with the threat from India while also combating factors like anti-Americanism in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan, the influence of religious forces, topography of the area, tribal cultural and highest number of guns per capita in FATA, which clearly favor the Taliban’s insurgency, the data shows that Pakistan’s army lacks the required number of troops for counter-insurgency in the Taliban-influenced areas.

There are two broad strategies to defeat an insurgency in any area; counter-insurgency doctrine and traditional low intensity conflict strategies such as divide and rule, crown the warlord, decapitation and extreme brutal repression. Counter-insurgency is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address the root causes” (FM 3-24, 2006). The main objective of the counter-insurgency doctrine is to win the support of the population. It is also called “population centric approach to the insurgency”. According to David Gulala; who is considered the father of modern counter-insurgency, the first principle of counter-insurgency is to win the support of the population,

“What is the crux of the problem for the counterinsurgent? It is not how to clean an area. We have seen that he (state) can always concentrate enough forces to do it, even if he has to take some risk in order to achieve the necessary

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40 There are differences on the number of forces required for a successful counter-insurgency. It success definitely depends on more factors than simply the number of forces deployed an area, but General Petreaus also quoted Quinlivan’s number for successful counter-insurgency operation.
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concentration. The problem is, how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces will be free to operate elsewhere” (1964, p55).

Therefore, the United States army considered winning the hearts and minds of the people a priority objective of its counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the population cease to cooperate with the insurgents or start cooperation with the security forces, even if this is by a minority, there will still be a positive gain on useful intelligence on insurgents’ whereabouts. This goal is achieved through avoidance of collateral damage to the civilian population by the counter-insurgency forces even at the expense of an enemy’s escape (McCrystal, 2012). The first principle to avoid collateral damage is the preference for ground engagement over air power (Kilcullen, 2009). In doing so the counter-insurgent army has to detach smaller commando units to villages and towns to protect the population from the insurgents. It increases the vulnerability of the forces to insurgent attacks, but has the benefit of acquiring ‘human intelligence from the local population to “clear” out insurgents, the use of patrols to “hold” cleared areas, and the enablement of civilian provided development assistance to build and win over the population’ (FM 3.24, 2006 p5-18; Lalwani, 2009, p.6).

The other approach to defeat insurgency is called low intensity conflict or small footprint approach. This is an enemy-centric approach, targeting each enemy without the same level of consideration to collateral damage as counter-terrorism forces are not supported by people on the ground to collect intelligence, clear areas from the insurgents, patrol streets to hold it or assist the civilian administration to build them. In this approach, the counter-terrorism army issues an ultimatum to the local civilian population of the areas to leave their houses and let the army move decisively against the insurgents in the area. After the area is cleared of civilians, the counter-terrorist force will commence under the assumption that anyone remaining is as potential insurgent (ISPR, 2014). The ground force occupation of the area is usually preceded by air strikes on the militants’ strong holds to soften the target (Dawn, 2014). This approach reduces the risk of army casualties but at the potential cost of civilians of the areas (McChrystal, 2012). Pakistan has been using low intensity conflict approach to the military operations in Swat, South Waziristan and Bajour which resulted in more than 3.5 million refugees from the areas (Rashid, 2012; Khattak, 2009; Fair & Jones, 2012). According to Lalwani, ‘In 2009, Pakistan employed conventional military methods, although instead of attempting to cordon and search, it tried to clear out the Taliban by calling on residents to flee, leaving behind vast fire zones where it could freely target militants. Of course, this angered the now refugee populace, many of whom subsequently were recruited by the Taliban instead of supplying intelligence to the Pakistani military’ (Lalwani, 2009,
David Kilcullen called them “The Accidental Guerrilla”. If Pakistan’s military utilises a similar type of operation against the Afghan Taliban, it will undoubtedly have little effect on defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan (Fair & Jones, 2012). As David Gulala said,

> If it is relatively easy to disperse and to expel the insurgent forces from a given area by purely military action, if it is possible to destroy the insurgent political organizations by intensive police action, it is impossible to prevent the return of the guerrilla units and the rebuilding of the political cells unless the population cooperates” (Gulala, 1964, p.55).

Pakistan’s army must now adopt the doctrine of counter-insurgency to win the hearts and minds of the people in areas bordering Afghanistan where the Afghan Taliban enjoys sanctuaries (Fair & Jones, 2012; Mallick, 2009; Rashid, 2009).

To examine the capability of Pakistan’s army to adopt a doctrine of counter-insurgency against the Taliban, it is necessary to determine the size of force required at the eastern border with India in the event of a crisis. Ambassador Aziz told me in an interview that it is almost impossible for Pakistan to ignore the threat from India especially at a time when terrorists have the potential means to precipitate a war between the two nuclear-armed countries by conducting spectacular attacks on the same style as that of Mumbai in 2008. Any deterrence, either through Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or the United States’ presence in the region will prove less effective if there is another major terrorist attack in India originating from Pakistan (Khan, 2014). Hillary Clinton said that when she visited India after the Mumbai terror attacks, she was “very struck” by how the then government said it was very difficult to exercise restraint. “I don’t think any government could say anything differently.” (Clinton, 2014). Therefore, one of the key objectives of Pakistan’s army is to protect its mainland, especially Punjab from the Indian invasion in case of any crisis between the two states. According to Lalwani,

> The unfortunate geography of Pakistan forces it to defend nearly every part of its territory, but its concerns about the Punjab’s vulnerability is acute because the region’s communication lines, industrial centres, and major cities all lie fairly close to border that has few major strategic impediments to an Indian tank invasion across the desert and plain” (2009, p.42).

There are no natural barriers like the Himalayan heights between Pakistan and New Delhi. So Pakistan’s army needs a minimum force of numbers to protect its interests at all times. General Malik told me that Pakistan will not reduce the minimum number of force required to counter an Indian invasion on its eastern border even if the United States offers a guarantee of security to it (Malik, 2014).
There are two mechanisms to measure the minimum number of forces on a border: face-to-face ratios and force to space ratio. The opinion of what value constitutes a minimum number of forces required in a face-to-face ratio differs though (Mearsheimer, 1982). Some scholars believe that 1:3 defense to offense ratio is enough to prevent the breakthrough in the line of defense, whereas others believes that even 1:1.5 ratio would be vulnerable to offensive breakthroughs (Epstein, 1988). Following the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, it brought the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war for the second time in two years, after the attack in Kargil in 1999. India deployed 700,000 troops on the border and demanded that Pakistan hand over the 20 suspects of the Parliament attack. Pakistan in turn deployed 300,000 troops on the border to counter an Indian invasion (GlobalSecurity.org). It seems that Pakistan would adopt 1:2.3 defense ratios in anticipation of a full scale clash between India and Pakistan (Lalwani, 2009). In the presence of nuclear weapons and good relationship with the United States, Pakistan could safely rely on the above mentioned ratios. It is important to mention here that the United States has a history in diffusing tension which may result in military action between India and Pakistan from the late 1990s to the Mumbai incident in 2008.

The total strength of Pakistan’s army is approximately 550,000 active-duty personnel and another 500,000 troops in reserve (Fair and Jones, 2011). It has nine corps and a Strategic Force Command that is responsible for the protection of nuclear weapons, sometimes called “tenth Corps” (Fair & Jones, 2011). Of the nine corps, six are deployed in Punjab to protect it from Indian invasion and the other three are deployed in the remaining three provinces; Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar Corps (Haider, 2013). The total number of Pakistani forces on the Indian border consist of 19 divisions of 58 brigades. Meanwhile, India has approximately 20 divisions on the same border and six divisions in its southern command that could be quickly moved to the border with Pakistan (Lalwani, 2009, p.44). One division consists of three brigades totalling 20,000 men (GlobalSecurity.org). Pakistan needs 21-29 brigades on its eastern border with India according to the 1:2.3 ratios, which is an extremely conservative estimate (Lalwani, 2009, p.44). This ratio does not permit Pakistan to adopt the ‘offensive defense’ strategy, but would still allow them to counter an Indian assault while releasing their army from other areas in a time of crisis41. This strategy would release around

41 Offensive-defense is Pakistan’s strategy to against Indian aggression. It is based on the philosophy of deploying three infantry divisions at the front to slow Indian aggression, while simultaneously attacking the Indian border at other point to occupy its territory, which will be traded at a later date for Pakistani territory occupied by India. It is important to remember that India’s defense budget and state of their equipment is much higher than that of Pakistan’s. The force number is just one aspect of the military
25 brigades or approximately 160,000 troops. However, Pakistan’s army has already deployed 55,000 troops in Malakand for a military operation in Swat in 2009 (Nawaz, 2009). Pakistan’s army is unable to draw any force from the Karachi and Quetta division, because in the event of a military operation against the Afghan Taliban, there is the likelihood that the Afghan Taliban will activate their sleeping cells in Quetta and Karachi for suicide bombing, stemming from the large number of Afghan refugees, militant madrassas network, religious militant organisations and the influence of Quetta Shura of the Taliban. It means Pakistan’s army has extra 105,000 troops to implement counter-insurgency in FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (KPK). There are different opinions on the ideal size of force required for a successful counter-insurgency. The United States’ Army and Marine Field Manual for Counter-insurgency considers 20-25 per 1000 people the ideal number to create a conducive environment for military operations to collect intelligence on the insurgents and separate them from the population (FM 3-24, 2006). General Petraeus says, “No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely. A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an area. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents are often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.” (Petraeus, December 2006).

Pakistan’s army has currently 150,000 troops in FATA and Malakand division against the Pakistani Taliban (The Military Balance, 2013). There are different estimates regarding the total population of the FATA which ranges from 3.5 million to 7 million. According to Shuja Nawaz, FATA is home to of 3.5 million Pashtun tribesman and 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan, which requires 100,000 troops for COIN operation (Nawaz, 2009, Lalwani, 2009). It shows that if Pakistan’s army embraces the standard doctrine of counter-insurgency (20-25 troops per 1000 people) against the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban then it has the capacity to counter the Taliban’s insurgency only in FATA, but the Taliban influence...
extends much beyond the tribal areas to settled areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa and Pashtun Belt of Balochistan as shown in the following map.

Map 3: This map shows the Taliban strong hold areas, Taliban presence and government controlled areas.

As the above map shows that the influence of the Afghan Taliban extends from FATA to KPK province which would add an influx of another 4.8 million people to the Taliban influenced areas (BBC, 2009). It is also important to remember that the key faction of the Afghan Taliban; the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar, is based in the Pashtun’s belt of Balochistan. So any counter-insurgency operation against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan would also unleash insurgency in the Pashtun’s belt of Balochistan. Pakistan’s army must take this into consideration as well. The current population of Quetta city is around 1.5 million excluding all other districts where the Taliban have greater influence (FAFEN, 2013). If Pakistan’s army deploys a minimum number of force, (10 troops per 1000 people) according to the doctrine of counter-insurgency, in Khyber Pashtunkhawa and FATA against the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban it will still fall short of the required 150,000 troops. Along with this, there are other constrains like rotation, training and forces allocated to counter other contingencies like earthquakes, floods or any other natural disaster. According to Pakistan’s Secret White Paper,
We have a 500,000 strong army. Total deployment on the Western Border (Afghanistan) is approximately 150,000 and an additional 80,000 is on the Eastern Border (India). Being the largest contributors in UN peacekeeping we have 10,000 troops in current UN missions. The deployment totals up to 230,000. Given the teeth to tail ratio, the need of rotation and training, only 30% of a force is normally deployable but we have more than 40% of the army deployed. Besides economic affordability, the army is stretched in deployment. To maintain the present, our soldier serves in the operational area for 30 months as compared to 6 months of most ISAF soldiers (2010).

In such a situation Pakistan has to rely either on police, frontier constabulary and Lashkar (local militia) or it has to reactivate its reserve force. It is essential here to acknowledge the magnitude of the United States demands from Pakistan before assessing its political will. This study is primarily focused on the implications of the security aspect of this problem. The Pakistani government also has to take the economic cost into consideration of such a massive military operation against the Afghan Taliban. According to the Economic survey 2014,

Losses sustained by the country due to the war on terrorism in the outgoing fiscal year stood at $6.7 billion losses – $3.3 billion or one-third less than the previous fiscal year, highlighting a gradual recovery…This year’s losses also pushed the total cost of the 13-year war above $102.5 billion, approximately two times more than the government’s proposed total budget of Rs3.9 trillion for fiscal year 2014-15” (ET, 2014).

The other two significant factors that influence Pakistan’s policy on how to effectively deploy forces on such large scale against the Taliban are the changing structure of the army and the average duration of counter-insurgency particularly in South Asia. For Pakistan’s army, it is not enough to simply deploy its regular 400,000 troops in FATA, KPK and Balochistan to counter the Taliban’s insurgency; it must also retrain its army on counter-insurgency tactics. A force trained for conventional war against a traditional enemy is not sufficient or recommended for counter-insurgency operations. Likewise, a force for COIN lacks the suitable training for conventional wars. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) experience against Hezbollah in 2006 has made other states more acutely aware of this problem (Lalwani, 2009, p.46). According to Matt M. Mathews,

prolonged counter-insurgency in occupied Palestinian territories left the once indomitable IDF ground forces tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense.(2008).

There will be stiff resistance from Pakistan’s army to change its structure to a counter-insurgency force while keeping the threat from India in perspective. Ijaz Haider told me in
an interview that Pakistan’s army has always been using the Indian factor to perpetuate domestic support and a larger share of the country’s economy (Haider, 2014). According to Gallup survey in 2014, “Despite this recent drop, the percentage of Pakistanis saying they have confidence in the military remains considerably higher than the percentage saying they have confidence in any other institution” (survey, 2013). If it has to change to a counter-insurgency force, deployed in FATA to patrol streets, it will significantly reduce its public esteem.

5.4.3 Domestic Constrains on Pakistan’s Behaviours

The third constraint on Pakistan’s army was the madrassah network and the influence of right-wing political parties. If Pakistan’s army is coerced into undertaking military action against the Afghan Taliban on the scale the United States has demanded, then it must also secure substantial public support as per mentioned in the counter-insurgency doctrine, especially in the Pashtun’s belt, which is the main theatre of war. In addition to its strategic significance as the hub of militant madrassas, the Pashtun’s belt is also the core constituency of the right wing political parties. General (retired) Athar Abbas, a former Director General of Directorate of Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) said in an interview to Dawn Newspaper that Pakistan’s army has, on principle, taken the decision of military operations in North Waziristan, but Chief of Army Staff General Kiyani did not approve it due to fear of backlash from right wing groups against him personally (Dawn, 2014).

One of the most important sources of support for the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt is the madrassa network. Madrasas are religious schools, which provide free education, boarding and lodging to children, especially to poor. The objective of madrassah is to introduce Muslim children to basic teachings of Islam to perform various religious activities. Reports vary about the number of madrassas and the strength of enrolled students. For example a report by International Crisis Group on madrassas in Pakistan claims that there are as many as one million to 1.7 million students attending madrassas. It further says it represents 33 per cent of all Pakistani children enrolled in schools. Another report by a group of scholars from Harvard says there are only 475,000 children in Pakistani madrassas, which represents only 1% of the total number of enrolled students. Similarly, the Washington Post estimated the number of students from 500,000 to 1.5 million in Pakistan. Each report was consistent in agreeing that the majority of madrassas are situated in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. The Harvard reports says, ‘what stands out is the very high Madrassa fraction along (and only along) the western border with Afghanistan. This is the
Chapter 5

Pashtun belt- the “Pashto” speaking population most directly influence by events in Afghanistan’. It further says,

Madressas are most popular in the Pashtun belt with the top ten districts in terms of fraction of enrolled children in madressas all bordering Afghanistan (where they still account for less than 2 per cent of all school-aged children)... It appears that this “Afghan” influence is related more to geographical proximity than to preferences for religious schooling among Afghan immigrants’ (Andrabi, Das, Khawaja, Zajonc, p.21).

Most of the Afghan Taliban, especially its leaders are trained in these madressas. The notorious Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban, which is led by Jalal ud-din Haqqani, was a student in Darul-Uloom Haqqania situated in the Khyber Pashtunkhawa province of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. This madrassah provided the bulk of the Taliban leadership to Afghanistan’s insurgency and has immense influence in the area (Khattak, 2014). They belong to the Deobandi school of Thought, which is one of the most radical and militant strand of Islam. These madressas, which are situated in Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan, are more focused on Jihadist training than providing religious education (ICG report, 2005).

If the government of Pakistan is forced to remove the Afghan Taliban’s sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal area and Baluchistan militarily, then it must first deal with these thousands of Madressas which predominantly exist in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan. The Musharraf government already tested this option by conducting a military operation against the “Red Mosque brothers who had closed links with Al-Qaeda. An investigative journalist Saleem Shahzad, who was allegedly killed by the ISI after revealing the links between Al-Qaeda and a number of officers in Pakistan’s navy, claimed in his book that Al-Qaeda strategically used the two brothers in the Red Mosque operation to pressurise the government to stop military operations in Swat and Waziristan, and to spread extremism in Pakistan (2010). The Red Mosque episode was followed by a wave of suicide bombings from a group formed after the Red Mosque operation to take revenge on the government and army, and created Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The popularity of the army plummeted after the Red Mosque operation, which was seized upon by Al-Qaeda as propaganda against the army. Army officers were instructed not to wear inform in public places to avoid attacks from terrorists (Hoodbhai, 2012). There were 1471 fatalities from terrorist violence in Pakistan in 2006 before the Red Mosque military operation, which increased to 3598 in 2007, 6715 in 2008 and 11705 in 2009 according to the South Asia Portal of Terrorism (SATP, 2014). If Pakistan is placed in the position where it must conducts a military operation against the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura, it will encounter thourands of Red Mosques, which in turn
may be followed by suicide bombings on much larger scale than that of Red Mosque. This is one of the primary constraints on Pakistan’s decision about whether to go against the Afghan Taliban militarily. Pakistan defense secretary General (retired) Asif Yasin Malik categorically said to the author in an interview that the army is concerned with growth of militant Madrassas in Pakistan’s twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. He said that most of the students in these Madrassas are not local students from Islamabad and Rawalpindi, but from Pashtun’s areas of Pakistan. It confirms the presence of Taliban sleeper cells in Pakistan’s urban cities. Therefore, Pakistan’s government has to seriously consider the backlash from Deobandi Madrassas in urban areas and particularly from the Pashtun belt before considering any military operation against the Afghan Taliban.

The second domestic constraint on Pakistan’s army policy towards the Afghan Taliban are right wing political parties. There are several right wing parties in Pakistan, but Jumiat-e-Islami (JI), Jumiat-e-Ulama-Islam (JUI) and Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) are the most prominent and outspoken in their opinion on the policy towards the Afghan Taliban, the war on terror and Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. PTI is a centre right political party, which is politically conservative and socially liberal, whereas, the other two parties are primarily religious and desire to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Since 1970, there has been an alliance between the Pakistani security establishment and the religious political parties. This phenomenon is discussed thoroughly in Hussain Haqqani and Stephen Cohen’s books, “The Alliance between Mullah and Military” and “The Idea of Pakistan” respectively. Pakistan’s security establishment has never been closer to the secular and liberal forces since its inception. The alliance between the religious political parties and military became stronger when General Zia-ul-Haq imposed emergency in Pakistan in 1977 on the demand of religious parties against a liberal party; Pakistan’s People Party. The alliance between religious parties and the army become militant when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 (Haqqani, 2005). Pakistan, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the United States, started supporting the religious parties in Afghanistan. The JI and JUI were the domestic allies of the army for running the Afghanistan’s project (Hussain, 2014).

42 General Zia-ul Haq was a military dictator, who imposed martial law in Pakistan in 1977 and ruled for 11 years. He was a religious fanatic, who islamised all institutions of Pakistan including the army and played a key role in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. It was during his tenure that an alliance visibly emerged between the military and militants and Pakistan started using extremism as an instrument of foreign policy.

43 The exact of opposite of what is happening today in Egypt. In Egypt people protested against the Muslim Brotherhood and their army imposed martial law while in Pakistan religious parties protested against the PPP: a secular party, and the army imposed martial law, imprisoned all liberal politicians and finally hanged former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on fake charges of a murder case.
These parties are particularly popular in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt. In the 2002 general election, they emerged as the largest political parties from Pakistan’s Pashtuns’ belt and made a government in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa and a coalition government in Balochistan; the two bordering provinces with Afghanistan populated by Pashtuns.

A military operation against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt will undoubtedly bring these political parties in direct conflict either with the militants or with the military. They are facing this dilemma even today in Pakistan’s war against the Pakistani Taliban. Currently, there is tough competition between the army and the militants on public discourse as both vie to dominate the public discourse, which has immense importance in counter-insurgency campaign. Khadim Hussain said in an interview to me that if the Taliban and Al-Qaeda lose the struggle to control public discourse, then it will be very difficult for them to draw support from madrassas, religious parties and society at large. As long as they have support from the people, it will be difficult for the government and army to move against them (Hussain, 2014). The key bone of contention between the army and the militants is the concept of Jihad. The party that convinces the people that they are the true jihadists, they will win the insurgency in Pakistan’s Pashtun’s areas according to the Counter-Insurgency doctrine. In this struggle between the army and militants on the entitlement of Jihad, religious political parties are immensely important. If the religious political parties are able to generate a strong public position that the war against the Afghan Taliban is not Islamic. Should anyone be killed in a fight with the Taliban, he will not be a “martyr” but a murderer; it will cause a serious problem for Pakistan’s army to motivate its rank and file to fight against the Taliban. The Red Mosque Imam in Islamabad already issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring military operation in Wana in 2004 a ‘rebellion against God and His Prophet’ and any loss of life on the part of soldiers should be considered as ‘not martyred’ (ET, 2014). The Fatwa (religious decree) asked the soldiers to refuse to obey the order to kill their fellow Muslims under the pressure from the United States. He said, “The military operations in Wana (Waziristan) are against Sharia law, therefore it is not permissible for the armed forces to participate in it, (Fatwa, 2004)”. This religious Fatwa created problems for Pakistan’s army at the beginning to motivate its soldiers against militants in FATA. If the religious scholars, who usually belong to one of the two parties, come to the consensus that fighting against the militants in FATA is not Jihad; it will have serious repercussions for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operations in North and South Waziristan. Professor Taj

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44 Currently in Pakistan parliament religious right wing parties are in majority. There are differences between Nawaz league; the ruling party and Imran PTI on other issues, but they both have similar stances on military operation. All liberal forces were defeated in the 2013 general election because of their poor performance the previous term and a spike in violence.
explained to me in an interview that one of the key reasons for the lack of decisive success of Pakistan’s army against Al-Qaeda in FATA is its failure to win the war of narrative from Al-Qaeda in FATA. Al-Qaeda and its allies succeeded in projecting the Pakistani army as a mercenary force of the United States, which is killing fellow Muslims and Pakistanis for sake of dollars (Taj, 2014). In this struggle between the military and militant on public discourse, religious parties are forced to side either with the military or militants. Should they side with the militants, they will officially become part of the insurgency against the state of Pakistan. On the other hand, if they cooperate with the army, then they will be in direct conflict with the militants, who could target them just as they have been targeting secular forces in Pakistan. As long as the Afghan Taliban refrain themselves from attacking the Pakistani forces and committing terrorist activities inside Pakistan, it will be very difficult for the religious parties to support a military operation against the Afghan Taliban (Sherani, 2014). Even if they support the government under the pressure from the army, the possibility exists that they will still not obey their leaders. As Muhammad Khan Sherani said, we as a party, Jumiate-e-Ulama Islam (JUI), don’t support the Taliban either in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but our workers don’t follow our instructions on this issue (Sherani, 2014). If Pakistan’s army undertakes a military operation against the Afghan Taliban under pressure from the United States, it will be difficult for the religious political parties to support the army. It is understandable why therefore the army shows resistance to accept the United States’ demands of military operation in light of maintaining public support, especially from the religious section of society. General Athar Abbas, the former DG ISPR45, said that one of the key reasons for delay of military operations in North Waziristan was the continued public statements from American officials that Pakistan must undergo military operations in North Waziristan. He said that they informed the Americans that public statements for military operation in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network would not help the Pakistani army, because it would project them as fighting a war to protect American interests instead of Pakistani ones (Abbas, 2014).

5.5 Conclusion

The consistent problem amongst scholars of International relations is their tendency to analyse problems from the realists or neo-realists perspective, which emphasizes on the International system without taking into account the domestic aspects of a particular

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45 ISPR is Directorate of Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan’s army, which issues policy statements on the behalf of Pakistan’s army.
problem. While analysing Pakistan’s behaviour towards the United States’ demands against the Afghan Taliban, many of these scholars reach a similar conclusion that Pakistan does not cooperate with the United States due to the Indian factor (Riedel, 2011, Jones, 2008, Haqqani, 2013, Tellis, 2008, and Fair, 2009). Unlike the traditional analyses, this chapter has highlighted three factors that illustrate the restrain amongst Pakistan’s army to accept the United States’ demands of military operations against the Afghan Taliban. The first restriction on Pakistan’s decision to perform a military operation against the Afghan Taliban is the perception amongst Pakistan’s army that the United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan. This perception has been developed due to three occurrences; conflict between the United States’ commitment to war and the ground situation in Afghanistan. If the United States commits itself to defeat the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan, it needs more time and resources, which will badly interfere with its other priorities at a time of economic crisis at home. Pakistan’s army believes that the United States commitment to the development of an effective Afghan army is not sustainable for the period of ten years and is contrarian to the culture, history and geography of Afghanistan. The second factor which has impacted the United States commitment to defeat the Taliban militarily was confusing demands from Pakistan through talk and fight strategy. The United States has consistently asked Pakistan to either openly combat the Afghan Taliban or convince them for peace talks to end the conflict in Afghanistan. The high cost of a military operation and the high return of peace talk between the Afghan Taliban and the United States restrain Pakistan to embrace for the first option. The third factor was the United States’ complete withdrawal from Iraq; an oil rich and strategically important country, which convinced Pakistan’s army that a full withdrawal from Afghanistan is also only a matter of time. These three factors convinced Pakistan’s powerful security establishment that the United States’ lacks both the will to either punish them for lack of cooperation or reinforce them in an effort to defeat the Taliban.

The failure of cooperation between the US and Pakistan against the Afghan Taliban can also be credited to the lack of capability of the Pakistani army. For Pakistan’s army to conduct any military operation against the Afghan Taliban and remove their sanctuaries in FATA and Balochistan under the doctrine of counter-insurgency, it has to deploy its forces in the heavily Taliban-influenced Pashtun’s belt of Pakistan. Keeping the threat from India in perspective and the weight of public opinion associated with it, it is not possible for Pakistan’s army to effectively deploy its forces throughout the entire Pashtun’s belt; therefore, it must orchestrate its operation first against the Pakistani than Afghan Taliban. Secondly, for a practical and effective counter-insurgency operation requires a restructuring of their military force and weapons system from a conventional army to counter-insurgency
one. This is not possible while the Indian threat exists; therefore, Pakistan has to develop a new counter-insurgency army from scratch. Thirdly, the average age of a successful counter-insurgency campaign is 14 years, whereas, the track record of south Asian forces lacks such an effective long term capability. These three operational constraints on Pakistan’s army capability played an important role in delaying the military operation in North Waziristan.

The final constraint on Pakistan’s behaviour is the influence of domestic political power groups. There is a strong network of madrassa system, religious forces, and right wing political parties, who oppose Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s army can only successfully conduct a military operation against the Afghan Taliban if it has public support. While the Afghan Taliban maintain their neutrality in the fight between the Pakistani Taliban and the army, it will be very difficult to justify a military operation on such a massive scale. These religious forces and political parties not only possess strength in provincial parliaments of the two provinces bordering Afghanistan, but also have substantial public support in Pashtun’s belt of Pakistan. A military operation without public support goes against the very first principle of counter-insurgency doctrine, which is aimed at encouraging support of the local population against the insurgents.

The drone programme of the United States in Pakistan initially started with the consent of the Pakistani government who placed two conditions on the operation of drones in Pakistan. Firstly, they wanted to control the US drone program in Pakistan and secondly they wanted the CIA to share its information with the ISI counter-terrorism unit and request prior permission from Pakistan before each drone attack. The United States made these requests for permission from Pakistan during the initial two years of drone strikes, but gradually became frustrated with the behaviour of the ISI against the Afghan Taliban and the exponential rise in violence in Afghanistan. The CIA not only increased the number of strikes in Pakistan, but also started conducting signature strikes, which did not require the presence high valued targets in North and South Waziristans. The second condition of Pakistan related to conducting drone strikes in specific zones was also flouted by the United States in FATA, though they restrained themselves from conducting drone strikes in Pakistan’s mainland due to fear of public outrage and the Pakistani government’s reaction to potentially block the supply route to NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Chapter 6 Pakistan’s responses to US demands against the Pakistani Taliban

6.1 14 Introduction

This chapter determines the Pakistani government’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Pakistani Taliban, called Teherik-e-Taliban Pakistani (TTP). TTP is an umbrella organisation consisting of more than 16 small groups, who operate in FATA and adjacent districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (KPK) such as Swat, Malakand, Banu and Buner. The key objective of the Pakistani Taliban is to implement Islamic Sharia law in Pakistan, but militarily it tries to establish a writ in FATA and adjacent areas to operate openly against the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2011). The Pakistani Taliban came into being after a series of failed military operations by the Pakistani government and subsequent political deals in North and South Waziristan against Al-Qaeda in 2004, 2005 and 2006 (ICG, 2009). The different groups of the Taliban officially created TTP in December 2007 after a military operation in July 2007 against the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad (Abbas, 2008). The Pakistani Taliban have taken responsibility for hundreds of suicide bombings in Pakistan as well as internationally since 2007, including the attack on Nobel laureate Malala Yusufzai on 9 October, 2012 and the attempted Time Square bombing in New York in May 2010.

The key factor responsible for the rise of the Pakistani Taliban in FATA and adjacent areas was the Pakistani government’s policy of ‘dialogue, development and deterrence’ (ICG, 2009). Pakistan had neither been using developments nor strong deterrence to force the Taliban to accept the state writ in FATA and Malakand division, therefore, had to rely on dialogue with the militants in FATA. In January 2009 the situation deteriorated so much that the Taliban expanded from Swat and Malakand divisions towards Buner and Hazara, which are less than two hours, or 90 miles from Islamabad (Abbas, 2008). The United States thus made three demands of Pakistan against the TTP: immediate military action against the Pakistani Taliban on an urgent basis in Swat and Malakand divisions; the expansion of military action against the Taliban from Swat to FATA, the Headquarters of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; and permission for the United States’ Special Operation Forces to train and equip the Frontier Corps, responsible for law and order in FATA. The response of Pakistan to these three demands of the United States against the Pakistani Taliban are the subject of investigation in this chapter.
The existing literature on the response of Pakistan to US demands against the Pakistani Taliban can be divided into three groups. A large amount of the literature (Shah, 2011), (Rashid, 2008), and (Grare, 2007), which perceives Pakistan as a rent-seeking state, argues that Pakistan’s army initiated military operations against the TTP after horrendous suicide attacks on military top brass, including General Pervaiz Musharraf. The second group that treats Pakistan as an ideological state claims that Pakistan’s army accepted US demands against the TTP because it went out of army control and were no longer serving its (army’s) interests. The third group deem Pakistan to be a security-seeking state, with authors of the view that Pakistan accepted demands by the US of military operations against the TTP due to a convergence of interest between Islamabad and Washington in the case of the Pakistani Taliban. In this group of literature it is argued that Pakistan’s army accepted US demands of military operations against the TTP because it started posing a higher threat level to US national security, as well as due to lack of domestic constraints because of shift in public opinion.

Political analysts, who conceive of Pakistan as an ideological state, argue that Pakistan has accepted the United States’ demands against the TTP due to strong pressure from the United States, but its cooperation was not effective due to inherent contradictions in policies from Islamabad’s government. They believe that, on the one hand Pakistan uses the ideology of Islam as a rallying cry for internal cohesion, and presents its contest with India in civilizational terms as the struggle between Hindu and Muslim. On the other hand, it opposes Islamic terrorism of the Pakistani Taliban. Christine Fair argues, “how can the Pakistani state expect its citizens to sustain support for some notions of state-supported jihad while denouncing other self-proclaimed jihadi groups for committing what the state believes is terrorism?” (2014, p.80). Hussain Haqqani says that the relationship between client and the patron is not always smooth. He believes that after 9/11 Islamists were not content with having secondary roles in national affairs, as their seizure of power had started gaining momentum. Therefore they started their own independent struggle from Pakistan’s security establishment in tribal areas, which put them in collusion with their former patron (Haqqani, 2005, p.197). Ayesha Saddiq is of the view that as long as the Pakistani army continue to differentiate among various groups on the basis of their tactical position, it will be very difficult to end terrorism in Pakistan. She believes Pakistan’s security establishment still considers them as splinter groups rather than a national security threat (Saddiq, 2011, p.157). According to an International Crisis Group report, the confusion at policy-making level in Pakistan’s army regarding the Pakistani Taliban led to an ambivalent approach alternating between excessive force and appeasement, which further strengthened the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda in tribal areas (ICG, 2006, p.i). According to constructivists, Pakistan’s ideological world view that is based on rivalry with India and use of Islam as rallying cry for domestic and strategic purposes doesn’t help it to fight effectively against the TTP, because it creates confusion regarding the status of TTP, whether they are splinter groups or security threat.

The second group of scholars perceives Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands against the TTP as that of a rent-seeking state. They claim that the army targeted only those militants who attacked military personnel. According to Aqil Shah, “When the Pakistani government requested that the military go into South Waziristan, for example, it dragged its feet for months and was spurred into actions only after militants carried out a deadly attack on its heavily guarded headquarters” (Shah, 2011, p74). Similarly, Ahmed Rashid claims that the Pakistan army considers the domestic jihadi threat as a tactical matter compared with the strategic depth in Afghanistan and maintaining the balance of power against India, which are the army’s top priorities. Therefore, Pakistan army has diverted US $8 billion to buy weapons for use against India instead of revamping Pakistan’s capacity for counter-insurgency (Rashid, 2009, p.6). They attribute Pakistan’s inconsistent policy of making peace deals and military operations against the TTP to the conceptualization of threat as a tactical one rather than strategic.

The third group of scholars who consider Pakistan as security-seeking state includes Seth Jones (2008), Alan Kronstadt (2012) and Haider Mullick (2009). They believe Pakistan didn’t accept the United States’ demands to initiate a counter-insurgency operation in FATA before 2009, because it didn’t perceive domestic terrorism as a threat to Pakistan’s national security. According to Seth Jones, Pakistan’s military operations were generally unsuccessful in holding ground against the Taliban in FATA because it military doctrine concentrated on conventional operations against India in response to India’s “Cold Start”, which involved the swift penetration of Pakistan to isolate, destroy or capture vital points such as nuclear stores and other installations (Jones, 2010, p.35). According to Haider Mullick, Pakistan only changed its threat perception and accepted the US demand of a counter-insurgency operation after the Taliban expanded to other districts and declared Pakistan’s political and judicial system un-Islamic (Mullick, 2010, p.8).

This chapter consists of four sections. The first part of the chapter discusses the United States’ three demands of Pakistan against the TTP, which were military operations in Swat and Malakand divisions, an expansion of the operation to FATA and the embedding of US
troops with Pakistan’s army in Swat and South Waziristan. The second section illustrates Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands, and looks at whether Pakistan complied or not. The third part of the chapter analyses Pakistan’s response to the United States’ demands and the factors responsible for Pakistan’s behaviour. The final section makes some conclusions as to why Pakistan accepted all three demands of the United States against the Pakistani Taliban.

6.2 The United States’ demands of Pakistan

The Pakistani government had a policy of appeasement towards the TTP during the Musharraf government. According to a report of International Crisis Group (ICG) regarding FATA, “The Musharraf government’s ambivalent approach and failure to take effective action is destabilising Pakistan and Afghanistan: The United States and NATO should apply greater pressure on it to clamp down on the pro-Taliban militants” (ICG, 2006, p. i). In essence, the United States made three kinds of demands from Pakistan against the TTP in 2009. It first wanted Pakistan to start a comprehensive military operation against the Taliban in Swat and Malakand division based on the doctrine of counter-insurgency, because Musharraf government policy of appeasement towards the Taliban was further strengthening them. Second, Washington forced Islamabad to expand its operations against the TTP to South Waziristan and Bajour agencies to disrupt and defeat the Taliban’s movement in FATA. The third demand by the United States was to allow deployment of its forces with Pakistan’s army in Swat and South Waziristan and increase the number of trainees for Frontier Corps and Special Service Group. The United States wanted to get first-hand information from the ground on successes of Pakistan’s military operations in FATA and Swat.

6.2.1 The demand of military operations in Swat and Malakand division

In February 2009, Pakistani government inked an agreement with the Taliban in Swat Valley and accepted to implement Sharia law in Swat and Malakand division. Officials from the Obama administration were very upset at the Pakistani government’s decision to sign a peace deal with the militants in Swat (Bukhari, 2009). US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in her testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 23 April, 2009, “the government in Islamabad is ceding territory and basically abdicating to the Taliban and the extremists in signing a deal that limits the government's involvement in the wartorn Swat Valley”. She added, “I think we cannot underscore [enough] the seriousness of the existential threat posed to the state of Pakistan by the continuing advances (of the Taliban)”.
that the nuclear-armed nation could also pose a “mortal threat” to the United States and other countries (Clinton, 23 April, 2009). She called on Pakistaniis and American Pakistanis to speak out forcefully against the government attitude towards the Taliban in Swat by saying, “I don't hear that kind of outrage or concern coming from enough people that would reverberate back within the highest echelons of the civilian and military leadership” (Clinton, 23 April, 2009). Clinton's concern was also echoed by House Committee Chairman, Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Valley Village), who said he was alarmed by predictions “that Pakistan could collapse in as little as six months” (2009). According to the Pentagon, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also expressed deep concern that events continue to move in the wrong direction in Pakistan and that the situation there may be approaching a tipping point” (2009). Similarly, Robert Gate said, “my hope is that there will be an increasing recognition on the part of the Pakistani government that the Taliban in Pakistan are in fact an existential threat to the democratic government of that country”. He further said that, “what happens in Pakistan directly affects Afghanistan” (2009).

On 22 February, 2009, the Chief of Pakistan’s army, General Kayani, and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qurishi went to the United States to give Pakistani feedback to the Riedel and Holbrooke committee on Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dawn, 2009). A cable was sent to Washington on 19 February, 2009 from the US Embassy in Islamabad urging officials in Washington that,

The government's anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue, deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fall-back has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants; a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger (09Islamabad0365).

It went on to say that

Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue that he does not have the forces to battle on multiple fronts, so he is picking his battles and negotiating to preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that it will be difficult for international donors to support a government that is not prepared to go all-out to defend its own territory (09Islamabad0365).

Similarly, on 23 April, 2009, Mike Mullen visited Pakistan and specifically discussed two issues with Pakistan’s army Chief General Kayani: the condition in Swat and the approval for US Special Forces to train Pakistani forces for counter-insurgency (WSJ, 2009). He said that General Kayani was very concerned about the Taliban activity in Swat and their
discussion was more focused on the Swat, where the Taliban were already breaking their deal with the Pakistani government (DoD, 2009). General Yasin Malik, who was Corps Commander of the Pakistani forces conducting operations in Swat also confirmed to me in an interview that there was tremendous pressure from the United States regarding military operations in Swat in 2009 (Malik, 2014).

6.2.2 The US demand to expand military operations to FATA

The Obama administration focused exclusively on Afghanistan and Pakistan by withdrawing American forces from Iraq in 2009. He took complete ownership of the Afghan conflict. There were two strategic reviews of the Afghan war in 2009. In April 2009, Bruce Riedel committee presented his recommendations to the Obama administration, which was soon followed by another review of US strategy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan in August 2009 when General McCrystal demanded extra troops to implement his strategy based on counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (Woodward, 2011). At the same time, the Obama administration kept consistent pressure on the Pakistani establishment to expand its operations against the Taliban in Swat and Malakand to North and South Waziristan. In July 2009, General Petraeus and Richard Holbrooke visited Pakistan and demanded the expansion of the military operation to North and South Waziristan. According to a Pakistani newspaper, The Nation, “the special American envoy will urge the Pakistani leaders to go for a full-fledged operation against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in Waziristan along with the on-going small-scale offensives in Swat, Buner and Dir” (2009). According to Reuters, “with U.S. troop strength growing in Afghanistan, Washington wants Pakistani forces in control of the area to prevent Taliban fighters from crossing the border unimpeded as they did during U.S. operations in Afghanistan in 2001” (2009). Although, the United States government was aware of the Pakistani limitations that it had to first restore order in Swat and settle 3 million Internally Displaced People (IDP), but there were concerns that Pakistan would lose momentum if it did not immediately expand military operations to FATA (Mullen, 2011).

6.2.3 Training and embedment with FC

In April 2008, the Pentagon and State Department requested US $750 million from the US Congress to train troops around the world engaged in counter-terrorism activities. Defense Secretary Robert Gate said that rapidly building up the armed forces of friendly nations to combat terrorism within their borders was “a vital and enduring military requirement” of the United States (CSM, 2008). Robert Gates said in his testimony to Congress in April 2008,
The current program has paid for parts and ammunition used by the Lebanese army against terrorist threats in a Palestinian refugee camp as well as for helicopter spares parts, night-vision devices and night-flight training for Pakistani Special Forces fighting suspected members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda along the Afghan border (Gates, 2008).

The Fund was requested from Congress, when the United States had decided to send extra trainers to Pakistan to train FC and SSG forces. According to the Christian Science Monitor report,

For several years, small teams of American Special Operations Forces have trained their Pakistani counterparts in counterinsurgency tactics. But the 40-page classified plan now under review at The United States Central Command to help train the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force of about 85,000 members recruited from ethnic groups on the border would significantly increase the size and scope of the American training role in the country (2008).

On 12 February, 2008, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Commander CENTCOM Admiral William Fallon met with Pakistan’s army Chairman Joint of Staff General Tariq Majid, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiayani, and President Pervaiz Musharraf. Admiral Mullen and Fallon both asked Pakistan’s army Generals to allow the US Special Operation Forces to train FC and SSG of Pakistan. According to a Wikileaks cable sent to Washington on 11 February, 2009:

Fallon offered a more permanent training team at the Special Services Group’s Tarbela camp to complement the current Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program...Fallon explained that the small Special Forces team he was proposing could assist in on-going training management, as well as doctrine, command and control issues, and other higher-level functions (08Islamabad609).

The importance of the FC and SSG training to the United States’ government’s objectives in Pakistan can be understood from a response of the US embassy in Pakistan when Congress decided to reduce the fund for Pakistan to US $50 million from the original US $75 million approved in April 2008. It said,

Since a better trained, better equipped Frontier Corps is the backbone of our counter-insurgency strategy in the tribal areas, this reduction in funding is a serious blow. Moreover, it comes at a time when the Frontier Corps is under new and far more promising leadership, both the Army and the Frontier Corps are engaged in serious combat with militants in both Swat and Bajaur, and, after a long delay, it appears as if Special Forces training for the Frontier Corps is back on track (08Islamabad3177).
SSG and FC are two different types of forces in Pakistan’s army. SSG and FC are basically counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency forces respectively (Taylor, 2010). SSG is the Pakistani version of the United States’ Green Beret and Navy SEALs. Frontier Corps (FC), on the other hand, is a paramilitary force that has been used in Pakistan’s mainland and in FATA for law and order purposes. It is legally under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, but operationally under the control of Pakistan’s army.

6.3 Pakistan’s responses to US demands

Pakistan’s responses to the US’ demands against the TTP depended on how Pakistan’s army perceived the United States’ commitment against the TTP, the capability of Pakistan’s army and the domestic support against the TTP. Pakistan didn’t only accept the traditional counter-terrorism demands of the Pentagon, but also changed its policy from appeasement to containment towards the TTP on the request of the United States. The primary objective of the appeasement strategy was to reduce violence in Pakistan’s mainland by signing a peace deal with the Taliban in FATA. The policy of containment, on the other hand, was based on the premise that it would not be possible to stop terrorism in Pakistan’s mainland as long as the Taliban were not defeated in tribal areas.

6.3.1 The Pakistani government’s response to the demand of military operations in Swat and Malakand

In February 2009 the Pakistani government signed a peace deal with militants in the Swat and Malakand regions in the North Western part of Pakistan. The key objective of the peace deal was apparently to restore order in Swat without any military operations. The peace deal was basically signed between the provincial government of the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Swat wing of the Pakistani Taliban. The ANP was a secular party that won with an overwhelming majority in the February 2008 election in the province of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. ANP was also coalition partner of the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP). Khadim Hussain, a member of the ANP, told me in an interview in February 2014 that ANP not only had the support of Pakistan’s army, but was also supported by the ISI to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban in Swat (Hussain, 2014). There was an agreement between the government and the Pakistani Taliban in Swat on two key points. The government agreed to introduce the Islamic judicial system, but demanded that the Taliban put down their arms. The Islamic judicial system introduced in Swat and Malakand division was called ‘Nizam Adal regulation’ (System of Justice). It is important to mention here that when the Islamic judicial system was introduced in Swat all political parties except Mothahida Qoumi
Movement (MQM) supported the peace deal (Dawn, 2009). President Zardari signed it instead of tremendous pressure from the United States and international community (Jang, 2009). It was a politically popular move, but very difficult to implement from the beginning. Scepticism on the government’s capability to implement the Islamic judicial system was best described in a cable sent to Washington from US Peshawar’s Consulate on 16 March, 2009:

While some of the amendments to the Sharia Regulation, such as expedited case adjudication sound good in theory, we are sceptical of the ability of the Pakistani court to meet these new requirements in part because it presumes a level of financial and personnel resources that are probably not available. There is also a troubling lack of clear understanding of the proposed new legal regime, particularly the potential power to declare existing law as not in conformance with Sharia or even agreement on the meaning of Sharia itself at a moment when expectations have been raised (09Peshawar51).

ANP was not only responsible for law and order in KPK, but was also the frontrunner in the coalition government on the issue of extremism and terrorism (Hussain, 2014). The ANP government in KPK accepted the Taliban’s demand to introduce the Islamic judicial system in Malakand division for three reasons. Firstly, they believed that there were real grievances of the people in Swat and Malakand against the existing judicial system. The Malakand division had its own independent governing system including the administration of justice before it joined the Pakistani state in 1969, and there was already demand for the Islamic judicial system in the 1990s, which was accepted at the time by Benazir’s government (Dawn, 2009). Secondly, the ANP leadership believed that the Taliban in Swat are different from the Taliban in Afghanistan and FATA. According to a Wikileaks cable, the head of ANP, Asfandyar Wali Khan told the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Richard A Boucher in Islamabad on 4 April, 2008:

When clarifying plans to negotiate with militant forces, Asfandyar said he perceived four different groups: (a) primarily foreign elements in al-Qaeda; (b) local militants like Baitullah Mehsud; (c) local Taliban and their tribal supporters; and (d) people in the settled regions bordering the Tribal Areas. Asfandyar explained that his party supports dialogue with people only in the third and fourth groups—i.e., those that provide assistance to local militants. Using Swat as an example, Asfandyar argued that he could effectively counter extremism if he could convince local people to deny militants transit routes and hospitality (08Islamabad1447).

Thirdly, the ANP wanted to use the Islamic judicial system to reduce the Taliban’s local support by showing that the Taliban were interested in power rather than Islam. One ANP leader told me in an interview that they knew the Taliban would not disarm after the implementation of the Islamic judicial system; therefore, they approved the Islamic judicial
system to show the wider public that the Taliban in Swat were not interested in Islam, but in power (Hussain, 2014).

Pakistan finally started military operation in Swat on 7 May, 2009 when Prime Minster Yousuf Raza Gillani said, “The government will not bow before the militants and terrorists but will face them to lay down their weapons and will not compromise with them” (Jang 2009). It is difficult to know precisely the exact number of soldiers deployed in the Swat operation because they kept changing due to the demand of forces on the ground. Shuja Nawaz claims that two complete divisions (37th and 19th), and four brigades of other divisions were deployed in Swat along with a brigade of the Special Service Group (SSG) and paramilitary troops called the Frontier Corps (2009). The two divisions were shifted from the Pakistani border with India on the demand of the United States, because the XI Corps of the Pakistani army that was responsible for security of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa and FATA was already deployed in FATA (Nawaz, 2009). During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I found different kinds of forces deployed in Swat. Basically, Pakistan’s army only deployed the 19th division in Swat, which is the largest division, consisting of three brigades, and two brigades from the 37th Mechanised division along with SSG for search operation and FC to hold grounds after the initial operation of Pakistan’s regular army (Salam, 2014). The entire 37th division was not deployed in Swat, because it is a mechanised division consisting of tanks and bulletproof vehicles, which are not suitable for a mountainous area like Swat. The key role in Swat operation was played by the American trained Frontier Corps, which had deep knowledge of the area, experience of the insurgency in Bajour and skills learned from being trained by the American Special Operation Forces (Rashid, 2009). Admiral Mike Mullen said he was heartened by the Pakistani military campaign and by the army’s decision to keep troops in the area to hold the gains and protect the residents. He said, “If what’s happened in Swat over the last six weeks or so is indicative, I’m optimistic. They’ve learned a good deal” (Schmitt, 2009).

Pakistan’s army was particularly concerned about the possibility of collateral damage. Counter-insurgency is a very difficult mission, which always involves killing innocent people (Haq, 2014). It is not easy to cleanly differentiate between civilians and the insurgents during a counter-insurgency operation. David Kilcullen, an Australian expert on counter-insurgency, who advises the US forces in Afghanistan, says that the United States is fighting 90 to 95 percent of people it should not be fighting, because they don’t hate America and they are not ideologically committed to kill the American people (2009). He says that they are the product of the American intervention in a conflict; either the United States has killed
their family members or destroyed their orchard during military action against the terrorists (Kilcullen, 2009). He calls them “The Accidental Guerrilla” (Kilcullen, 2009). Pakistani forces were aware of the danger that the excessive use of force would further alienate people from the government and make them more susceptible to the Taliban’s influence. Imran Khan, the head of PTI-opposed military operations in Swat and FATA on the same grounds. General Kayani ordered the army to make precise strikes against the militants in Swat and adjacent areas to ensure minimum damage even at the expense of taking risks (Dawn, 2009). The Pakistani strategy of de-populating the areas was effective in avoiding collateral damage and also did not require large numbers of troops, but it displaced around three million people to other areas from Swat, which was declared the biggest displacement of people within a country after Rwanda by the UN High Commission for refugees.

There are two strategies to conduct a counter-insurgency operation in an area. The government either deploy large numbers of troops in the insurgent-occupied areas and counter them in the street with the help of the local population (Rand, 2011). It is a very difficult operation and needs substantial cooperation from local people to identify insurgents. In this type of operation the army usually does not use air strikes, because there is the chance of collateral damage (Rand, 2011). The army cordon off a selected area then conduct search and arrest operations. This is called a people-centric counter-insurgency operation. The United States conducted people-centric counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan particularly during the period when General McChrystal was commander of the US forces in Afghanistan in 2009 (Fair, 2009). Therefore, the United States needed extra troops in Afghanistan to cordon off areas, collect intelligence and conduct raids on that information (Nagl, 2011). Ideally, there should be one soldier for every twenty-five to thirty people, but governments have never deployed the ideal number anywhere except the Indian deployment in Kashmir (Jones, 2008). The second type of operations is called low-intensity conflict operation (LIC). In LIC operations, the government usually forewarns the population of impending military action against the insurgents to give time to local people to migrate to other areas for the time being (Mallick, 2009). Once the locals migrate from the insurgent stronghold areas, the government uses air strikes to soften the targets and inflict maximum damage on the enemy. The last steps in such operations are the deployments of troops in the streets and cordonning off of the areas to do search and destroy operations (Rashid, 2009). The major problems with these kinds of actions are the large number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and the destruction of people’s property and houses. Pakistan’s army used low intensity conflict approach to counter-insurgency, which has inflicted tremendous pressure on the state infrastructure to sustain the burden of military action. For example, the
military operation in Swat and Malakand division displaced more than three million people in May 2009. The government, with the help of the international community, did well to accommodate the IDPs from Swat, but the critical role was played by the people of KPK province. According to a Crisis group report on the IDP crisis in Pakistan, 80 percent of the IDPs were accommodated by people in the surrounding areas, largely due to the fact they have the same language and culture as the people from Swat (Alam, 2009).

Pakistan’s military operation in Swat represents the best case of cooperation between Islamabad and Washington against the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan carried out two military operations prior to this, in Swat to defeat the Pakistani Taliban and in Malakand, but they failed in both cases. The United States had clearly demanded that it should not only conduct military operations, but also deploy enough troops to hold the ground until the civil administration was capable of restoring law and order. Pakistan’s army still had its 19th division to prevent the return of the Taliban. The US in return not only provided significant economic and military assistance to Pakistan, but shared its equipment with the Pakistani army to help it in military operations against the Taliban. The Swat operation was followed by the Kerry-Luggar bill, which had given US $7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years from 2009 to 2014 for economic development.

6.3.2 Pakistan’s responses to US training and embedding request

At the beginning of 2007, Pakistan’s army did not have a problem with training the SSG, but was not comfortable with training the FC or embedment of US Special Operation Forces with the Pakistani army in a war zone. The fundamental reason for Pakistan’s reluctance to approve the US Special Operation Forces training for the Frontier Corps was the fear of a political backlash. Pakistan’s army was already being accused of fighting the American’s war against its own citizens. They believed that if it was exposed that the US Special Operation Forces were training and fighting with the Pakistani forces against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it would seriously affect public confidence in the army and damage Pakistan’s narrative against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to a Wikileak cable sent to Washington from the US Embassy in Islamabad on 11 February, 2008,

Referring to the situation in Waziristan, Kayani asked if Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area. Fallon regretted that he did not have the assets to support this request, but offered Joint Tactical Aircraft Controller (JTAC) support for Pakistani aircraft. Kayani demurred, saying that having US JTACs on the ground would not be politically acceptable (08Islamabad609).
In another cable, US Ambassador Ann Paterson advised the State Department on the approval of the Special Operation Forces by Pakistan’s army in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Bajaur,

These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these development and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance (091Islamabad2449).

Pakistan’s army accepted US demands of training the FC and the embedding within Pakistan’s army in a war zone when it changed its policy from containment to military engagement towards the Pakistani Taliban. It not only asked for predator coverage of the areas where Pakistan’s army was doing military operations, but also approved the US Special Operation Forces deployment with FC for intelligence, surveillance and Reconnaissance activities in Maram Shah, Wana and Bajaur. According to a US embassy cable,

Pakistan army GHQ informed ODRS that it approved a request from the army’s 11th Corps Commander for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to Wana and Miram Shah in FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11th Corps’ 9th and 7th Divisions (09Islamabad2449).

It further says that

This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at Khar Fort, in Bajaur Agency in the FATA, Provided ISR for an FC operation. This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location (09Islamabad2449).

In a separate comments section the US ambassador called the change in Pakistani behaviour as a “sea change”. She says,

U.S. special operation elements has been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani for SOC (FWD)-PAK deployments to Bajaur and the Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking (091Islamabad2449).
Chapter 6

The last factor for approval of training and embedding was the US policy that if Pakistan was interested in US equipment then it had to allow the US trainers to train the FC and assist them in executing their operations in the field. The Wikileaks cables explicitly exposed the fact that Pakistani generals were more interested in the United States’ money and equipment than training. For example, according to a cable sent to Washington on 12 February, 2008, General Kayani told Admiral Fallon in a 10 February, 2008 meeting that the Pakistan military did not need training and asked Fallon to give priority to his equipment requests (08Islamabad609). During my fieldwork in Pakistan, when I asked Pakistan’s Defense Secretary, General (retired) Yasin Malik about the presence of more than one hundred US Special Operation Forces in Tarbela, FATA and Swat, he said that the United States told Pakistan that if it was interested in the US equipment like Cobra helicopters, night-vision goggles, helmets, armoured vehicles, bullet proof vest and mid-life up gradation of F-16 then it had to accept the US Special Operation Forces and give them a level of independence in running and managing the SSG and FC training in Tarbela and Warsak respectively (Malik, 2014). Pakistani Generals who were involved in fighting an insurgency in FATA and Swat, such as Inspector General Frontier Corps, General Tariq Khan, Director General of Military Operations, General Shuja Pasha, and Corps Commander Peshawar General Masood Alam also highly appreciated the value of US Special Operation Forces training for the FC and SSG, and asked them to include other law enforcement agencies such as the Police, Levies and Frontier Constabulary as well (08Islamabad664).

6.3.3 The Pakistani government’s response to the US demand for military operations in South Waziristan

Pakistan’s military finally started its ground operation against the TTP in South Waziristan on 17 October, 2009. The operation against the TTP in South Waziristan started in July 2009 when Richard Holbrooke and David Petraeus visited Pakistan (Ratnayake, 2009). In July 2009, Pakistan’s army imposed an economic blockade on the Mehsud areas in South Waziristan by controlling entry and exit lines to the agency. The key objective of the economic blockade was to exhaust the Taliban’s arms and financial resources to weaken their resistance to impending military operation. The economic blockade was followed by use of heavy artillery against the TTP stronghold in Srarogha, Makeen and Ladha. The use of heavy artillery and air strikes played a crucial role in weakening the Taliban’s position in South Waziristan. Before 2009, Pakistan conducted three military operations in South Waziristan that had failed to dislodge the Taliban from the agency.
Pakistan’s army didn’t have any information about the developments in South Waziristan before 2009. It was under the complete control of the Taliban; therefore, General Kayani called it an “intelligence black hole” and asked the United States to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance through the use of drone video feeds (Yusufzai, 2009). According to a Wikileaks cable sent to Washington on 11 February, 2008,

In response to Fallon's questions regarding military assistance, Kayani first focused on the need for surveillance assets. Emphasizing the urgent need for tactical SIGINT capability for Pakistan's military aircraft, Kayani said he understood the U.S. was working on this issue and would have an assessment team in Pakistan shortly. Kayani said he was not interested in acquiring Predators, but was interested in tactical level Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). He noted these were expensive and asked if the U.S. could grant or loan them to Pakistan (08Islamabad 609).

The United States did not only give drone surveillance facilities to Pakistan’s army, but also significantly increased the capacity of the Frontier Corps, which enabled it to use artillery precisely against an enemy target. The United State also provided night-vision goggles, helicopter spare parts and other equipment to Pakistan’s army that profoundly enhanced its capacity to counter the Taliban guerilla attacks after military operation.

Pakistan’s army mobilised 45,000 army and 15,000 paramilitary troops against the TTP in South Waziristan (Yusuzai, 2009). It was the biggest military operation since 2001. The army called it battle for the survival of Pakistan. The Pakistani military operation in South Waziristan in 2009 was different from those executed in 2004, 2005 and 2008. In 2009, the military operation was based on a doctrine of counter-insurgency that entailed clear, hold, build and transfer stages. Its objective was to clear three key towns of the Taliban in South Waziristan that were considered the capital of the Taliban and headquarters of Al-Qaeda: Srarogha, Makeen and Lodha. The Taliban were using these three towns as training camps to conduct terrorist activities inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The military targeted Srarogha from its divisional headquarters in Jandola, moved towards Lodha from Wana and occupied Makeen from its garrison town Razmak in North Waziristan (Yusufzai, 2009). On the 3 and 4 November, 2009, Pakistan’s army cleared all three targeted areas without major resistance from the TTP. There were some criticisms of the Pakistani strategy that it allowed the Taliban to disperse to other agencies instead of eliminating them. Pakistan’s army claimed that it killed 589 militants and seventy-nine soldiers lost their lives. It is important to note that the Taliban strength at that time was ten thousand. The Pakistan army still holds South Waziristan and has not transferred it to a civil administration that is considered the successful completion of a counter-insurgency operation.
6.4 Analysis of Pakistan’s responses

The United States eventually succeeded in changing Pakistan’s policy from appeasement to containment towards the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan’s government did not sign any peace deal with the Taliban after an unsuccessful attempt in February 2009. Pakistan’s responses to the US demands against the Pakistani Taliban was the result of its military’s perception of the US commitment against the Pakistani Taliban and lack of domestic constraints due to significant increase in hostility towards the Taliban due to violence and suicide attacks in Pakistan’s mainland.

6.4.1 Perception of Pakistan’s army of the US commitment

There were tremendous international pressures on Pakistan after signing a peace deals with the Taliban in Swat, because TTP started expanding into neighbouring districts. The Swat agreement expanded the Taliban’s influence to Islamabad’s adjoining areas, home to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. At the same time, when the Taliban were expanding from Swat towards Islamabad, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), released satellite images of two newly built nuclear plants in Khushab. Pakistan built these plants with Chinese assistance for the production of Plutonium used in nuclear weapons (Slavin & Kralev, 2009). These developments triggered panic in Washington and pressured the White House to coerce Pakistan into decisive action against the Taliban. Hillary Clinton, who accused Pakistan in her previous testimony one day before that it was abdicating to the Taliban in reference to the Swat agreement, said on the second day that “Why are we concerned about this? One of the reasons is nuclear weapons”. She continued “We spend a lot of time worrying about Iran. Pakistan already has them, and they are dispersed in the country” (Slavin & Kralev, 2009). Her view was also echoed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who said, “I think we are certainly closer to the tipping point. I don’t think that we are there. But events continue to move in the wrong direction” (India Today, 2009). The United States’ concern about the simultaneous expansion of the Taliban and growth of nuclear weapons were precisely reflected by Bruce Riedel, who said, “Pakistan has more terrorists per square mile than anyplace else on earth, and it has a nuclear weapons program that growing faster than anyplace else on earth.” (Shanker & Sanger, 2009).

These apprehensions shifted the administration attention from Afghanistan towards Pakistan during a strategic review of US policy towards Afghanistan in April 2009. Therefore, Washington demanded that Pakistan should allow US intelligence and security personnel to
embed within Pakistani troops in Swat and approve training of the Frontier Corps in line with a doctrine of counter-insurgency. According to *The New York Times*,

The embassy setup, with American demands for importing more armored vehicles, is a significant expansion over the last 15 years. It comes at a time of intense discussion in Washington over whether to widen American operations and aid to Pakistan — a base for Al Qaeda — as an alternative to deeper American involvement in Afghanistan with the addition of more forces (Perlez, 2009).

US personnel apparently came to Pakistan to provide security to diplomats and other officials of the US embassy, but their key mission was to collect intelligence on Al-Qaeda, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and domestic extremist groups as revealed in Raymand Davis’ case. Vali Nasr claims that the United States almost converted its consulate in Peshawar into a spy station due to large number of intelligence personnel, which played a significant role in the arrest and killing of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s members (2014, p71).

The worries in Washington regarding the capabilities of Pakistan to defeat the Taliban and protect its nuclear weapons triggered another controversy as to whether Pakistan used US aid and assistance to enhance its capability against the Taliban or diverted it towards nuclear program and conventional weapons against India (Schmid, 2009). These questions were raised at the time when the US Congress was considering tripling Pakistan’s economic and military assistance in 2009 in order to enhance its capability against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Senior members of the US Congress were already concerned that Pakistan was using US money to counter its historical rival India rather than enhancing its capability to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Cable, 2009). During the budget debate, US Senator Jim Webb, a Virginia Democrat, asked Admiral Mullen in reference to Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons whether they have any type of control factors that would be built in, in term of where future American money goes (Perlez, 2009). These apprehensions in the US congress and administration forced Pakistan’s army to change its policy towards the Taliban from appeasement to containment. It also coerced Pakistan to allow the US trainers for the first time to train the Frontier Corps in order to enhance its capacity and capability. Pakistan’s security establishment only accepted the US demands when it realized the gravity of the threat to US national security due to the Taliban expansion in Pakistan. Pakistan didn’t only change its policy towards the Pakistani Taliban, but also significantly enhanced the security of its nuclear weapons to address US concerns. This evidence illustrate that Pakistan’s behavior was more dependent on Army’s perception of the United States’ concerns.
6.4.2 Lack of domestic constraints

The second important factor in Pakistan’s decision to accept the United States’ demand was the lack of domestic constraints. One of the key factors for the failure of Pakistan’s earlier operations in South Waziristan and Swat was domestic opposition to military operations from within the army, political parties and the public at large. In 2009, when the Taliban violated its peace agreement with the government by refusing to disarm and expanded to Buner from Swat, just sixty miles from Islamabad, even religious political parties demanded the army and government to counter the Taliban’s expansion. Moulana Fazal Rehman, an important religious politician, said in parliament on 23 April, 2009, “If the Taliban continue to move at this pace, they will soon be knocking at the doors of Islamabad as the Margala Hills seem to be the only hurdle in their march towards the federal capital” (The News, 2009). Leader of the main opposition party, Mian Nawaz Sharif, criticised the Swat deal and asked the government to review it after the Taliban expansion. In May 2009, all political parties, except some religious ones, unanimously called for military operations against the TTP in Swat and South Waziristan in an APC (All Parties’ Conference) conducted in Islamabad. These political developments reduced the constraints on Pakistan’s army to conduct successful military operations against the TTP. The lack of popular support was one of the key factors for the failure of army earlier operations in Swat and FATA.

Pakistan’s military learned during a Swat military operation in May 2009 that it was essential to have public support to conduct a successful military operation. According to a UNCEIF report, 80 percent of internally displaced people were accommodated by communities from neighbouring areas during the Swat operation, which profoundly reduced the pressure on the government’s fragile infrastructure. The military operation in South Waziristan against the TTP in October 2009 in particular was initiated after domestic pressure. The Pakistani army initiated two phases of military operations; economic blockade and aerial bombardment in July 2009, but a ground offensive was started only after number of terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. On 22 September, 2009, the TTP attacked a church in Peshawar, which killed seventy-eight people and wounded more than one hundred. After two weeks they struck the United Nations World Food Program office in Islamabad and killed five people. The UN office was providing food to IDPs from the Swat operation. Finally, the Taliban orchestrated a sophisticated attack on the Army Headquarter (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. When the Taliban attacked GHQ, Army Chief General Pervaiz Ashraf Kiyani was also present in his office. It took Pakistan’s army Commando eighteen hours to clear the building from terrorists. The Taliban’s successful attack on GHQ raised different questions on capabilities of Pakistan’s
army and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons domestically and internationally. The attack on GHQ did not only provide much needed public support against the TTP, but also an opportunity to remove the internal differences on ground operations against the TTP in South Waziristan.

Before 2009 there was widespread support for the Taliban in Pakistan’s mainland and tribal areas. The Taliban were perceived as aggrieved Pashtun nationalists who were responding to Pakistan’s army military operations in FATA, the US occupation of Afghanistan and the socio-economic marginalisation of the area by the federal government. All political parties were supportive of them. In 2006, when there was drone strikes in Bajour on a Madrass that killed eighty-two people, ANP, a liberal and secular political party from Khyber Pashtunkhawa, was the first to protest against the drone strikes. According to a PEW global survey, only 33 percent of Pakistanis had a negative view of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 2008 (Pew, 2009, p. 9). The unfavourable view of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda jumped to 70 percent in May 2009 due to changes in the national narrative, which helped Pakistan’s army to initiate ground offensives against the TTP in South Waziristan (Pew, 2009, p.9). In 2009, The Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda were no longer perceived as victims of military operations but rather as insurgent groups who want to overthrow the government and bring chaos to the country. Some nationalist parties, who were ambivalent towards them before 2009, started considering them as Indian agents who created anarchy in Pakistan in order to damage its nuclear program. According to Mufti Zubair Usmani from the Jamia Darul Uloom, Karachi, “TTP is an instrument of RAW to defeat Pakistan [which] happens to be in a strategic location [and] an atomic power. Because of this, the violence will continue” (Qadri, 2010, p.5). Before the Swat operation in April 2009, all political parties unanimously passed a resolution in support of military operation against the TTP. This shift in national narrative helped Pakistan’s army to conduct successful military operations against the TTP in Swat and South Waziristan. These developments confirm that Pakistan’s responses were more the result of internal changes than a response to Indian influence in the region.

6.5 Conclusion

There were two different phases of Pakistan’s policy towards the Pakistani Taliban. The first phase of Pakistan’s policy from 2001 to 2008 under General Pervaiz Musharraf was a policy of containment to pacify FATA and adjacent areas of NWFP through dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban who were supporting the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This policy was serving three purposes. Firstly, it supported the Afghan Taliban because they enjoyed
uninterrupted sanctuary in FATA and re-organised their insurgency in Afghanistan, which the military establishment and the right wing political parties believe are serving Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan against India. Secondly, it avoided the domestic backlash of military action against Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. Thirdly, it did not need Pakistan’s army to shift its resources and personnel from the Pakistani border with India to the one with Afghanistan. On the other hand, this policy had two significant drawbacks as well. Firstly, it provided enough opportunity to Al-Qaeda and its sympathisers in FATA to establish well entrenched sanctuaries in North and South Waziristan. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda systematically killed more than 500 Maliks in FATA, who were responsible for law and order in their areas and replaced them with their own commanders. Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and their tribal supporters have virtually occupied tribal areas and reduced the state writ to the army fortresses in North and South Waziristan. Secondly, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries in FATA created turbulences in Pakistan’s relationship with the United States.

When Afghanistan became the top priority of the Obama administration, the United States forced Pakistan to change its policy of containment towards the Pakistani Taliban to military action.

The second phase of Pakistan’s policy towards the Pakistani Taliban started in May 2009, when Pakistan’s army under tremendous pressure from the United States launched a military operation in Swat and Malakand division. Pakistan’s military operation in 2009 was different from the one in 2007 and 2008 in two different ways. Firstly it did not end up signing a peace deal at the end of the military operation as it was doing before. Secondly, it held Swat and Malakand division and did not let it slip again into the hands of the Taliban due to weak civil administration following military operation.

The change in Pakistan’s policy towards the TTP was the result of its threat perception from the United States. As long as the TTP was operating in FATA and did not pose security threat to the United States, Pakistan had policy of appeasement towards them, but when they expanded to areas that were 70 miles from Islamabad, it created concerns in Washington regarding safety of Islamabad’s nuke and security of Pakistan as State. The Taliban expansion also shifted public opinion against the Taliban and provided space to Pakistan’s foreign policy elites to accept the United States’ demand of military operation in Swat, expansion of operations to FATA and training of Pakistani forces. These were fundamental steps in the war against the Pakistani Taliban and played significant role in curtailing the Taliban’s influence in Pakistan.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction:

Pakistan has been one of the most important countries in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It has been a frontline ally of the United States in the global war against terrorism. Its cooperation has been significant for three reasons. Firstly, Al-Qaeda had its sanctuaries in lawless tribal areas of Pakistan. If Pakistan didn’t comply with American demands to shut these camps down, Al-Qaeda would have benefited from a base from which to attack the United States. Secondly, the Afghan Taliban were using the Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan as sanctuaries for attacks against the Afghan and American forces. Many counter-insurgency experts, including Jones (2008), Fair (2011), and Nagl (2011), believed that as long as the Taliban enjoyed support in Pakistan’s tribal areas, it would be very difficult to defeat them in Afghanistan. This was because of the sanctuaries provided to them with the requisite resources, recruits and ammunitions to run an insurgency in Afghanistan. Thirdly, counter-terrorism cooperation between Pakistan and the United States was also essential for the survival of the Pakistani state. The Pakistani Taliban’s prominence in tribal areas challenged the writ of the state in FATA, while also furnishing that organisation with a platform from which to launch attacks on other parts of the country. There were concerns in the international community, particularly in the United States, that Pakistan’s reluctance to change its policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda jeopardised regional security. Bruce Riedel warned that,

The dangers could be enormous if Washington fails to arrest the deterioration in relations with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed but largely dysfunctional state run by a feckless, military-cowed government and teeming with Islamist militants. At stake are, the fights against terrorism, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and – as Islamabad plays off its friendship with China against the United State and regional stability (2011).

The cooperation between Pakistan and the United States was particularly important in light of crises in the Middle-east and North Africa. The failure of the United States and the international community in Iraq and Afghanistan further encouraged the non-state actors to take their struggle to next level.

7.2 Pakistani Cooperation with the US

The question then arises: To what degree had Pakistan cooperated with the United States in the context of the war on terrorism? As illustrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the Pakistani government accepted the counter-intelligence and logistic demands of the United States...
against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, but it was reluctant to conduct military operations against the Afghan Taliban. The US government succeeded to change Pakistan’s strategic calculation in respect to the Pakistani Taliban by changing its policy from appeasement to containment, but it did not achieve the same result against the Afghan Taliban.

7.2.1 Al-Qaeda

In response to the United States’ seven demands against Al-Qaeda, this study found that Pakistan had provided three kinds of assistance: logistic, intelligence and military\(^{46}\). The logistic assistance consisted of granting over-flight rights to the United States’ jets for aerial bombing against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan from seven bases in Pakistan. Pakistan had given permission to the United States to use its ports and roads for supply to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The United States made 2160 requests from Pakistan for landing and over-flight, out of which it accepted 2008 (DoD, 2003). The United States used the Samungli and Bareder airbases in October, 2001, for military operations against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban temporarily, but the rest of five were jointly used by the Pakistani and US forces till the end of mission in Afghanistan. The second important logistic support was the use of Pakistani roads and naval ports for supply to the United States forces in Afghanistan, as depicted in chapter 4. According to Wiki-Leaks document, “85% of supply to the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan were passing through Pakistan” (7state153352)\(^{47}\). The Pakistani government did several military operations in Khyber agency to keep the supply to the US forces in Afghanistan safe. The Frontier Corps had deployed a special wing consisting of 600 soldiers on roads to escort the US and NATO convoys to Afghanistan.\(^{48}\)

The second area of cooperation against Al-Qaeda focused on counter-intelligence. Pakistan permitted the United States to conduct activities in Pakistan’s major cities and tribal areas. As discussed in chapter 4, the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari made an arrangement with the United States by granting a pro-American Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani a special exclusive discretion to issue visas to the US intelligence personnel without prior security checks from the intelligence agencies back

\(^{46}\) For detail on the United Stated demands against Al-Qaeda on 12th September 2001, please go to chapter 4, “Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against Al-Qaeda.

\(^{47}\) Pakistan blocked the supply to NATO and US forces in Afghanistan for six months in November 2011 in response to the US bombing at Salala check-post, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and two officers, but restored it again after an official apology from the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the attack
The Abbotabad Commission found that the Pakistani embassy issued 1200 more visas to the United States officials in 2010 than 2008 and 2009 without prior security checks from the intelligence agencies. The permission to the United States’ intelligence personnel and their modern technical equipment profoundly assisted the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Pakistan to arrest several thousand Al-Qaeda’s members. The same intelligence network eventually identified and killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011 (Nasr, 2014, p. 74). Finally, the United States extended its intelligence network from urban centres to the tribal areas, which assisted the use of drone strikes in FATA.

The third type of cooperation was military, against the Al-Qaeda in tribal areas. The Musharraf government deployed 115,000 troops on Pakistani border with Afghanistan on the demand of the United States to intercept fleeing Al-Qaeda’s members in October, 2001. The Pakistani Army on the border had to do military operations against Al-Qaeda in North and South Waziristan, which eventually erupted into a full-fledged insurgency in tribal areas that inflicted significant costs on Pakistan’s security, economy and society as whole, as discussed in a chapter 6.

7.2.2 The Afghan Taliban

Regarding the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan provided intelligence and logistic assistance, but did not accept the United States’ demands to conduct military operations in North Waziristan in November 2010. The intelligence network that was established against the Al-Qaeda, discussed in chapter 4, also targeted the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan’s mainland and tribal areas. The most important of these was the use of drone strikes, which was initially focused on Al-Qaeda but later on targeted the Afghan Taliban as well, especially after the surge of the US forces in Afghanistan. The Obama administration did not only increase the counter-terrorism activities, including the use of drone strikes against the Afghan Taliban, in Pakistan’s tribal areas, but also expanded the targets of the drone strikes by allowing signature strikes, as discussed in chapter 5. The Pakistani government was not happy with the high frequency of the drone strikes in tribal areas, but it did not create any hurdle for the CIA in FATA either. The Pakistani government did not accept the most important demand of the United States, which was to carry out military operations against the Haqqani network.

49 Normally, the Pakistani embassies are not allowed to grant visas to an individual or an official without prior security clearance, which is issued by the Ministry of Interior after an approval by the intelligence agencies particularly the ISI

50 (The Abotabad Commission, 2013, p215)

51 A detail analyses of the modern equipment and the presence of the US forces in Pakistan is present in Mark Mazzetti book, “The way of the Knife: the CIA, a Secret Army and a war at the ends of the earth”.
in North Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban in Quetta. The United States wanted the Pakistani forces to conduct military operations in North Waziristan in 2010 and 2011, when there were high numbers of American forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government did not accept the US demand against the Haqqani network.

### 7.2.3 The Pakistani Taliban

One of the key objectives of the United States’ policy towards Pakistan was to change its policy of appeasement towards the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani government started a military operation in Swat against the Pakistani Taliban on 7th May 2009. It was a sea change in Pakistan’s strategic thinking to counter the Pakistani Taliban militarily and restore peace in Swat by defeating the Taliban instead of making a peace deal\(^{52}\). After Pakistan’s military operation in Swat in 2009, the Army also conducted several military operations in FATA. In September 2009, Pakistan’s army started a comprehensive counter-insurgency military operation in South Waziristan, which was extended to Bajaur, Orakzai and North Waziristan Agencies, which were hotbeds of terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The second important cooperation against the Pakistani Taliban was the permission to the United States Special Operation Forces to train and equip the Frontier Corps and the Special Operation Group\(^{53}\). The most significant development in this regard was the deployment of the US Special Operation Forces in tribal areas and Swat to provide Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (IRS) assistance to the army and FC. The deployment of the US forces in a war zone was a significant for two reasons. Firstly, it provided an opportunity to the US forces to closely monitor the progress to avoid the suspicions that the army and FC were not targeting the right people. Secondly, the US special forces were particularly trained for counter-insurgency operations and had access to modern technologies like drone videos, which significantly increased the capability of the Pakistani forces in the war against the Taliban\(^{54}\). But the presence of the US forces with Pakistan’s army had profoundly damaged Pakistan’s narrative in tribal areas. It helped the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to depict that there is

\(^{52}\) The government the following peace deals with the militants; the Shakai peace deal in 2004, Srarogha Peace agreement 2005, and the Swat agreement in May 2008

\(^{53}\) The USSOF also provided modern equipment and training to Pakistan special operation forces called The Special Services Group. It is an elite unit of the Pakistan’s army, which carries night raid and other counter-terrorism operations.

\(^{54}\) Technically the United States could not allow the Pakistani forces to use its state of art equipment that included videos from drones without permission from the United States Congress. When the Pakistani forces allowed the USSOF to deploy with the Pakistani one, it allowed the forces to take advantage of the modern warfare equipments.
no difference between the US and Pakistani forces and that they both are killing innocent Muslims in Afghanistan and tribal areas for American dollars.

7.3 What Explains the Variance in Pakistani Compliance?

This section consists of two parts. The first one provides a brief summary of the existing literature on Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The second section explains the major claim of this thesis, which has demonstrated that Pakistan’s behavior is correspondent with that of a tribal state vis-à-vis the US demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The existing literature on Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda falls into three categories. A large majority of the scholars on the subject sees Pakistan as rent seeking state. They believe that Pakistan’s army has complete control on its foreign and defense policies. It promotes its institutional and personal interests at the cost of general population. The second influential group of analysts perceives Pakistan as an ideological state. They argue that Pakistan’s army controls its Pakistan’s foreign policy and has created the myth of India as existential threat to the country. They are of the view that Pakistan’s army presents India as a “Hindu” state in order to justify using Islam for foreign and domestic policies purposes. The third group thinks of Pakistan as security seeking state. They are of the opinion that Pakistan has serious security threats from India; therefore, it keeps its security objectives at the top, sometimes even at the expense of other goals.

7.3.1 Pakistan as rent-seeking State

The key proponents of neo-liberalism believe that Pakistan’s responses to the US demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda correspond with the behavior of a rent-seeking state. They consider the army dominancy of politics a historical legacy of the country. According to neo-liberals, the immediate conflict with a politically and militarily stronger India over the issue of Kashmir has made the Army central to the survival of the country, which gives it an edge over the civilian institutions (Shah, 2012, p.71). They claim that in order to counter the threat of India, Pakistan’s army co-opted Islamists as a second line of defense. According to them, the flow of cash from the United States during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s provided the army financial resources to expand insurgency to Kashmir against India, seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and suppress secular forces at home by using extremism as a tool of foreign and domestic policy (Grare, 2007, p5).
They presume that Pakistan cooperated with the United States against Al-Qaeda by arresting and killing its top leadership to meet the United States’ objective to acquire economic and military benefits. They are of the view that the change in Pakistan’s policy against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was not a strategic shift, but a tactical move to re-establish relationship with the United States after a decade of economic and military sanctions that badly affected army modernization and tilted the balance of conventional weapons towards India. They believe Pakistan’s army didn’t accept the United States demands against the Afghan Taliban, because it still considers them as a strategic asset in Afghanistan’s end game. According to rent seeking group, Pakistan’s army did military operations against the Pakistani Taliban after suicide attacks on General Musharraf and army. Aqil Shah claims that Pakistan army dragged its feet for months before carrying out the military operation in South Waziristan and was spurred into action only after militant attacks on the army General Head Quarter (GHQ) in Rawalpindi in 2009 (Shah, 2011, p. 74).

The rent-seeking group asserts that the strengthening of democracy and internal reforms in FATA are the panacea of all problems. They suggest that Washington DC should stop treating Pakistan’s army as a state above the state, because it reinforces the exaggerated sense of indispensability of the army (Shah, 2011, p.81). They argue that militant extremism can be fought effectively only through serious governance reforms that ensure the rule of law and accountability. They think Pakistan is too important to be left to army generals because of its nuclear capabilities, a war-prone rivalry with India and the presence of some of world most dangerous terrorist groups. They appreciate the shift in Obama’s policy by tripling civilian aid and urge Washington DC to approve the multi-billion dollar Marshall Plan for building Pakistan’s civilian institutions to counter the army’s influence domestically. The suggest that such aid should be made conditional to economic reforms, governance changes in FATA and supremacy of civilians over the army on issues of strategic importance.

It is obvious that the strengthening of democracy and internal reforms will help Pakistan to effectively fight terrorism and cooperate with the global community. The strengthening of democracy will also reduce tensions between India and Pakistan that will positively affect developments in Afghanistan. But, the United States in the short term is fixed between the promotion of democracy and counter-terrorism assistance from Pakistan, because Pakistan’s army is the only institute that can deliver against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in FATA. It is very difficult for any administration in the United States to pour in billions of dollars without immediate reliefs in Afghanistan against the Afghan Taliban, in FATA against the Pakistani Taliban, and globally against Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the United States needs to change Pakistani Army’s perception that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are not strategic assets but
liabilities, as it did after 9/11. The differences in Pakistan’s responses against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as demonstrated in chapters 4, 5, and 6, established that Pakistan’s army accepts the United States’ demands when the stakes are high and doesn’t accept when the stakes are relatively low. It confirmed that Pakistan’s responses are more dependent on the perceptions of its army of the United States’ stakes than governing system in Pakistan.

7.3.2 Pakistan as an ideological state

Constructivists see Pakistan as an ideological state and consider its problems as psychological rather than physical. They are of the view that no amount of money, weapons, and concession will change Pakistan’s strategic perception of itself and its rivalry with India, which is the mother of all other problems including the use of extremism as a source of foreign policy in Afghanistan and support for Islamists at home, as long army controls its polices. They believe that Pakistan is an insecure state; any effort to appease its concerns in Afghanistan or in Kashmir will further encourage its anti-status quo policies. According to them Pakistan will suffer any number of military defeats in order to undermine India’s emergence as a major power in the region, which is considered as the ultimate and genuine defeat of Pakistan’s army (Fair, 2015, p.6). They believe Pakistan’s army considers itself as custodian of territorial and ideological frontiers; therefore, it uses Islam in order to garner public support against “Hindu” India. Hussain Haqqani claims that the national security institutions of Pakistan have played a leading role in building Pakistan’s national identity on the basis of religion since independence that has turned Pakistan into an ideological state. He says the political commitment to an ideological state eventually evolved into strategic commitment to jihadi ideology after 1971 war (Haqqani, 2005, p.207).

They believe that Pakistan’s U-turn in 2001 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was a tactical move to re-engage the United States for modernization of its military and economy in order to balance Indian influence rather than a strategic change to give up use of extremism as source of foreign policy. According to Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s relations with the United States have been part of the Pakistani military’s policy tripod that uses Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principle objectives, and an alliance with the United States as a mean to bear the costs of Pakistan’s massive military expenditure (Haqqani, 2005, p205). Constructivists claim that Pakistan’s army historically has been willing to accommodate the United States’ immediate global concerns to ensure the flow economic and military assistance. Similarly, Musharraf government after 9/11, accepted the United States demands against Al-Qaeda, but didn’t give up using supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan
or Islamists at home. They believe it is impossible to finish terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as long as the army doesn’t change its conception of national interest and let democracy flourish domestically.

They believe that the United States’ economic and military assistance to Pakistan has been part of the problem, not the solution. They think it helped Pakistan’s army to maintain its otherwise unsustainable rivalry with India by bailing out its economy and selling modern weaponry. They are of the view that the United States can only reshape Pakistan’s army conception of its national interest, if it uses its aids to pressurize army to cede power to the civilian governments, invest in social and human developments and develop capacity of Pakistan’s civilian institutions. They recommend that the United States should demand reforms in those aspects of Pakistan’s governance that involve the military and security services. They are of the view that if the United States succeeds to restore genuine democracy, it will not only help to resolve the rivalry between India and Pakistan, but will also change Pakistan’s perception of Afghanistan and weaken Islamists home.

This group of experts fails to answer three questions. Firstly, The United States had imposed strict economic and military sanctions on Pakistan for more than two decades. The United States stopped selling weapons and providing economic assistance to Pakistan and India after a war between them in 1965. The sanctions profoundly affected Pakistan, because it was an ally of Washington DC and New Delhi was closer to Soviet Union. The United States again suspended its relationship with Pakistan in 1990s due to its nuclear program and stopped delivery of 72 F-16 jet aircraft that were the backbone of Pakistan’s offensive defense strategy against India. The economic and military sanctions of these two periods further pushed Pakistan into China’s orbit instead of changing its strategic perception of national interest. Secondly, they expect the United States to ignore its vital interest for peripheral one. For example, how the United States could have ignored the defeat the Soviet in Afghanistan for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Similarly, after 9/11, the United States wanted Pakistan to cooperate against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban irrespective of the type of government in Islamabad. Thirdly, it is not true that the army initiated all those policies of Pakistan that are in conflict with the United States’ objectives. On the contrary, the civilian governments have always proclaimed credit for several such policies whether they are the initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear program, creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the testing of nuclear weapons in 1998.
7.3.3 Pakistan as a security seeking state

The third group of scholars believes that Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands are India-centric, because it perceives security threat from New Delhi. They think India and Pakistan are locked in a rivalry since their independence in 1947 on the issue of Kashmir and India’s rise as a regional power poses threat to Pakistan’s stability and security. According to them Islamabad gives special importance to Afghanistan, because an India-friendly government in Kabul will pose a threat on two fronts to Pakistan and will also damage Pakistan’s internal stability due to its long and porous border with Afghanistan. They believe Pakistan will prefer to sign peace deals with those Islamist groups that are not involved in terrorism inside Pakistan, because engaging army in military operations in FATA will affect its strategic posture against India and will also escalate violence domestically.

They claim that Pakistan should cooperate with the United States against Al-Qaeda, because it doesn’t serve Pakistan’s interests against India and unnecessarily brings a rivalry with the United States without any strategic gain. Therefore, they think Pakistan has been successfully cooperating with the United States, which significantly damaged Al-Qaeda’s core network in Pakistan. They don’t see any possibility of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States against the Afghan Taliban because Pakistan’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is in direct conflict with that of the United States. The United States supports the current political democratic dispensation in Kabul, which is dominated by the Northern Alliance and anti-Pakistan Pashtun, who have strong relationship with India and Iran that are Pakistan’s regional rivals in Afghanistan. On Pakistani Taliban, they believe Pakistan cooperates with the United States against those groups who target security personnel and conduct suicide attacks inside Pakistan. They claims that Pakistan’s interests matched with that of the United States against the Pakistani Taliban, therefore there is better cooperation against the Pakistani Taliban than the Afghan.

This group supports the United States’ efforts to resolve the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. They also suggest that the United States should accommodate Pakistan’s genuine security concerns in Afghanistan, because it is important to its security and stability. They believe the United States’ policy of de-hyphenating India from Pakistan will significantly disturb the conventional balance of power in the region and precipitate a nuclear arms race between two arch rivals. They are not in favor of the United States’ policy of containment towards Pakistan, which they believe could further escalate the violence in Pakistan and push it towards becoming a failed state, which will be an unfavorable situation for the international community.
There are three problems with security seeking explanation of Pakistani behavior. If India was the major concern of the Pakistani decision-makers then how did it cooperate with the United States especially against the Afghan Taliban after 9/11? There is ample evidence that shows that the United States’ lost interest in arresting and killing the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan ignored the Afghan Taliban, because a full-fledge crackdown against them would have precipitated domestic violence as in 2007 after military operation against the Red Mosque in Islamabad. Secondly, they recommend the resolution of Kashmir issue to convert India and Pakistan’s zero-sum game into positive sum one in Afghanistan. It is important to remember that there are strong vested interests in India and Pakistan, which don’t allow the resolution of Kashmir issue, because they use it domestically to gain political power. Thirdly, they recommend accommodating Pakistan’s concerns in Afghanistan that practically means sharing power with the Taliban in Kabul, which is as difficult as defeating them militarily.

7.3.4 Pakistan as a US Sceptic state

This study has provided an alternative explanation to the existing literature on Pakistan’s responses to the United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. After rigorous empirical analyses of the evidence in chapters 4, 5 and 6, this thesis reached the conclusion that there were three significant factors that influenced Pakistan’s behavior towards the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They were the perception of the Pakistan’s army of the United States’ commitment to the war against a terrorist group, the capability of the Pakistan’s army to meet the United States demands in the presence of threat from India, and the domestic opposition in Pakistan to cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistan’s army perception of the US’ commitment

This thesis has illustrated that the impact of the United States’ relative power on Pakistani responses was indirect and problematic. It has demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that the perception of the Pakistan’s army of the United States’ pressure was the key intervening variable. The perception of Pakistan’s army of the United States’ commitment linked the international pressure with Pakistan’s responses. It assessed and filtered the international pressure from the United States and responded accordingly. The Pakistani Army made its perception of the United States commitment to a threat on the basis of three indicators. The first element that determines the United States’ commitment was the threat from the terrorist organisation to its national security. The second indicator was the political will to punish or reward Pakistan for its policy of compliance or noncompliance. The third indicator was the domestic support in the United States for a policy that shows to the security establishment
in Pakistan the importance of the issue. The perception of the Pakistani Army on the United States’ commitment was the key factor responsible for different responses to the United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

There was no doubt in the Pakistani Army post-9/11 that Al-Qaeda poses a national security threat to the United States. The seriousness of threat from Al-Qaeda to the United States national security was confirmed from the intensity of 9/11 attack. Richard Armitage warning to the chief of Pakistan’s ISI that if they didn’t cooperate against Al-Qaeda, they would be bombed to ‘Stone Age’ clearly communicated the United States’ intentions. Therefore, General Musharraf said in his seven hours long meeting with Army Corps Commanders after 9/11 that the United States would act like “wounded bear”. There was also unanimous support in the United States for military action against Al-Qaeda and its harbourer after September attack in 2001. The United States’ Congress unanimously passed a bill by giving the President unprecedented power to use all appropriate means to punish those who have planned, committed and aided September 11, 2001 attack. Pakistan was also assured that if it cooperates against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it would not only be exempted from the United States’ sanctions but also awarded with generous economic and military assistance. These developments forced Pakistan to accept the United States’ seven demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda even at the cost of domestic stability and geo-strategic repercussions.

The Pakistan Army’s perception of the United States’ commitment to defeat the Afghan Taliban was not the same as the one against Al-Qaeda. They believed that the Afghan Taliban didn’t pose any threat to the United States’ national security, because they were not involved in any attack on the United States’ homeland. The domestic support in the United States was also waning especially after the US invasion of Iraq, which forced the Obama administration to order surge of forces only for a limited period of time with specific

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55 The United States removed one decade old strict sanctions, and also increased economic and military assistance from $10 million in September 2001 to $1 billion in 2001. According to CRS report, ‘U.S. assistance to Pakistan rose steeply after September 2001, from about $10 million in FY2001 to more than $1 billion in FY2002. P.L. 108-7 includes authorization for Pakistan to use $188 million in FY2003 Economic Support Funds to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. The Bush Administration is requesting bilateral assistance to Pakistan in the amounts of $305 million for FY2003 and $395 million for FY2004’ (CRS, 2003, p3). The Bush administration also waved up the payment of debt interest that was around $1 billion for 15 years and gave the US assistance to Pakistan in cash without any condition on the use of money. Secondly, the Bush administration also did not audit the Pakistani claims in war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which were found exaggerated in 2007 (CRS, 2008). Thirdly, the United States also gave the status of ‘Major non-Nato Ally’ to Pakistan in March 2004 just before military operation against Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan, which qualified Pakistan to busy the United States’ Excess Defense Articles’ (EDA). According to a cable sent to Washington from US Embassy in Islamabad on 24th April 2008, in September 2006, the US and Pakistan reached an agreement to provide US manufactured F-16’s to the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) (08Islamabad1673).
objectives. It was not the same as against Al-Qaeda after 9/11, because of the Iraq war and economic crisis in the United States. It led the Pakistani Army to believe that the United States would neither offer any strategic partnership nor punish it significantly, because Afghanistan didn’t constitute the top national priority of Washington DC. This perception of the Pakistani Army of the United States’ commitment was the key intervening variable that affected Pakistan’s responses to the US demands against the Afghan Taliban.

The United States’ pressure on Pakistan’s army against the Pakistani Taliban escalated when they expanded from North and South Waziristan to Swat and Malakand divisions, which are at a distance of 70 miles from Islamabad, as discussed in chapter 6. It created concerns in Washington DC on the ability of the Pakistan’s army to protect Islamabad and especially its nuclear weapons from the Taliban. Pakistan’s army under tremendous pressure from the United States shifted its forces from its eastern border with India to Swat and started a comprehensive military operation based on doctrine of counter-insurgency against the Pakistani Taliban, because it understood the alarming concern of the United States’ regarding the safety of its nuclear weapons and the survival of the political regime in Islamabad. The Pakistani Taliban didn’t only expand its influence in Pakistan, but also nearly succeeded in attacking the United States’ homeland at Times Square in New York on 1st May 2010 as discussed in the previous chapter. The United States succeeded in changing Pakistan’s policy from appeasement to containment towards the Pakistani Taliban due to elevation of threat to United States’ national security after its expansion from FATA to Swat and attempts to attack the United States’ homeland.

The strength and capacity of the Pakistani Army

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56 President Obama said he was “gravely concerned” about the fragility of the civilian government of President Asif Zardari (Obama, 29th April 2009)

57 President Obama further said in the news conference “We have huge national security interest in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t ended up having a nuclear-armed militant state” (Obama, 29th April 2009)

58 When Faisal Shahzad, the Time Square bomber, unsuccessfully attempted to blow his vehicle on 1st May 2010 after training from Pakistan, the Obama administration gave a clear message to Pakistan that: “If, God forbid, the SUV has blown up in Times Square, Jones told Zardari, we would not be having this conversation. Should a future attempt be successful, Obama would be forced to do things that Pakistan would not like. “No one will be able to stop the response and consequences”” (Woodward, 29th September 2009).
Chapter 7

The second important intervening variable was the strength and capacity of Pakistan’s army to meet United States’ demands against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It could also be called the national power of Pakistani state, which was dependent on military capability to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the presence of threat from India and the popular support in the war against terrorism, because they both were determining the availability of resources at the disposal of Pakistani army to meet the US’ demands.

The military capability of the Pakistani army was a significant factor that affected its calculation to accept or not the United States’ demand. As has been illustrated in chapters 4, 5, and 6, Pakistan accepted the logistic and counter-intelligence demands of the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but hesitated to accept the military one, first against the Pakistani Taliban, then the Afghan. The demands of the United States for military operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda didn’t only require a substantial number of troop’s deployment in FATA, but also for a long period of time. According to RAND corporation research, an average insurgency in South Asia runs for 14 years. Pakistan’s army had to decide deployment of forces while keeping two other very important factors in mind: the presence of threat from India and the shifting of forces to a new theatre before stabilising the previous one.

Pakistan’s army accepted the United States’ demands of troop’s deployment in North and South Waziristans in 2001 and then started a military operation against Al-Qaeda and its harbourers in 2004, as discussed in chapter 4. Pakistan accepted the United States demands because its army was not thinly stretched in different parts of tribal areas. Secondly, Al-Qaeda’s influence was limited to tribal areas; it didn’t have as widespread support in Pashtun belt of Pakistan as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, because they were not ethnically from the same group. Pakistan’s army countered the threat of Al-Qaeda by conducting counter-terrorism operations and gained substantial success against it.

Pakistan’s army refused to accept the United States’ demand of military operation against the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban in North Waziristan in 2010 due to capability problems. The Pakistani Army was facing two capability related challenges against the Haqqani network. Firstly, it didn’t have enough number of troops to deploy in FATA and settled areas to start another military operation against the Afghan Taliban, whose influence extends beyond FATA to Khyber Pukhtunkhawa, Karachi and Quetta. Secondly, counter-insurgency operations are very complicated and difficult one as discussed in chapter 5, which takes on average 14 years for sophisticated armies to complete. Its army was already involved in different theatres; Swat, Bajour, Orakzai and South Waziristan. It wanted to stabilise them before embarking another military campaign in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s
army succeeded in defeating the Taliban in those areas, but were not been able to transfer these areas to civil administration.

Pakistan’s army accepted the US demands of military operations in Swat, Bajour agency and South Waziristan in 2007, 2008 and 2009, because it managed successfully to fight al-Qaeda without spreading its forces thin, but the fight against the Pakistani Taliban turned ugly and inflicted high casualties on Pakistani army, which forced it to pursue the policy of appeasement towards the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan succumbed to the US pressure by changing its policy into containment and shifted its forces from eastern border with India to Swat and FATA, only when the Taliban influence reduced to FATA due to suicide attacks, which allowed Pakistani army to launch major counter-insurgency military operations against them, as discussed in chapter 6.

**Domestic opposition to cooperation with the United States**

Domestic opposition was another important factor that influenced the strength of Pakistan’s army to cooperate with the United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Although, there was not a democratic regime in Pakistan in September 2001, it was profoundly concerned regarding domestic opposition to Islamabad’s cooperation with Washington DC against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The level of anti-Americanism, the influence of right wing political parties, the network of militant madaris, the mushrooming of armed Islamist *lashkars* and the close relationship between the army and the Islamists in Afghanistan and Kashmir were the primary concerns of the Pakistani government regarding its cooperation with the United States’ against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These problems finally produced a very brutal insurgency in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which significantly damaged its security, economy and polity.

There was opposition to Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism, but it didn’t affect the intensity of Pakistan’s assistance against Al-Qaeda for three reasons. Firstly, Al-Qaeda’s members, unlike the Taliban, were not from the same ethnic group that inhabit FATA, KPK and Balochistan; they were not Pashtun. Their Muslim identity helped them to seek shelter in FATA, but they were still alien to the culture and areas. Secondly, Al-Qaeda’s members immediately started terrorist activities inside Pakistan when they fled from Afghanistan in December 2001, as illustrated in chapter 4. It reduced public support and helped the government to move against them. Thirdly, the nature of cooperation against Al-Qaeda was more related to counter-terrorism than counter-insurgency. It didn’t involve deployment of large number of troops, use of heavy weapons, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people as in case of the Taliban; therefore, it didn’t provoke significant domestic opposition to Pakistan’s cooperation against Al-Qaeda.
This lack of domestic opposition led the Pakistani Army to cooperate as per the satisfaction of the United States.

Domestic opposition was one of the key factors that forced Pakistan’s army to avoid military operations against the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban, unlike their Pakistani counterparts, didn’t take part in terrorist activities inside Pakistan instead of government crackdown against them. They deliberately avoided terrorist activities inside Pakistan to garner support from the security establishment and right wing political parties. This policy of the Afghan Taliban always separated them from the Pakistani Taliban and put tremendous pressure on the Pakistan’s army to avoid military operations against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan and Quetta Shura. The second important factor was the close relationship between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s religious political parties. The religious parties were more vocal in support of the Afghan Taliban than the Pakistani one, because of their combined jihad in Afghanistan before 9/11. Thirdly, the level of support for the Afghan Taliban was stronger in madaris than the Pakistani one, because the Afghan Taliban were the product of these religious schools and seminaries, whereas the Pakistani Taliban were mainly consists of the tribal people, who had grievances against the Pakistani government.

Similarly, the lack of domestic support for the Pakistani Taliban helped Pakistan to cooperate more closely with the United States. Pakistan didn’t only accept the demand of military operations against the Pakistani Taliban, but also allowed the United States Special Operation Forces to take part in them against the Pakistani Taliban. The Taliban’s terrorist activities in Pakistan’s mainland in 2009, 2010 and 2011 forced Pakistan’s army to change its policy from appeasement to containment and start military operations based on the doctrine of counter-insurgency. The Taliban’s terrorist activities didn’t only reduce their support in right wing political parties, but also in religious circles. The weakening of the Taliban’s narrative in Pakistan’s mainland provided space to Pakistan’s government to create a counter-narrative against the Pakistani Taliban. This lack of domestic support for the Pakistani Taliban significantly helped Pakistan to accept the United States’ demand of military operations, which profoundly affected the Taliban’s movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan as illustrated chapter 6.

7.4 Conclusion

The key objective of this project was to determine to what degree Pakistan has cooperated with the United States and what factors were responsible for the variance in Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. To determine the responses of the Pakistani government especially of its army, which is the core decision-making body on issues of national importance, this thesis disaggregated the United
Chapter 7

States’ demands against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. The main purpose of identifying the demands against the three separate terrorist organisations of different importance to the national security of the United States was to determine its effects on the Pakistani cooperation with the United States. The existing literature on Pakistan’s responses to the US demands falls under three categories, which perceive Pakistan as rent-seeking, ideological or security-seeking state.

This thesis provides a different answer for the Pakistani cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, which is based on the core principles of neo-classical realism. It has found that international system is important, but it is always not important. It primarily depends on the significance of the issue to the national security of the major power. For example, the role of international system was different in case of Al-Qaeda from the Afghan Taliban, because Al-Qaeda had posed greater threat to the national security of the United States than the Afghan Taliban. This study has also confirmed that the effect of the international system is not direct and not always consistent. It depends on the perception of the foreign policy elites of the other country. The foreign policy elites of the other country make their perceptions on the basis of importance of the issue to the national security of major power, domestic support in that country and the will to punish/reward the behaviour of other country. This study has also established that the second important factor that affects a state’s foreign policy is the strength of that state, what is referred in the literature as the national power of a state, not a nation itself. It depends on the capability of the state to counter the threat and the popular support that allows the state to mobile national resources. This study found that Pakistani cooperation with the United States against Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban was determined by two factors: the perception of the Pakistani army of the United States’ commitment against the terrorist organisation and the strength of the Pakistani state. These factors don’t only provide explanation to the variance in Pakistani cooperation against different groups but also across different times and demands.

This analytical framework raises an important question: how will Pakistan respond to the United States’ demands against other terrorist organisations, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, and even to issues of nuclear weapons safety, which are of different importance to the United States’ national security. A further research on these issues can generate important knowledge in the field of international relations related with developing countries.
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