

Commentary on  
Kant's Critique of Judgment.

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### Introduction.

The Critical Philosophy is, in my opinion, a whole each part of which is in the closest relation to the others. For this reason, and in order to prepare the reader for my interpretation of the third Critique, I propose here to set out by way of introduction the most general principles of the first two Critiques. I cannot and need not attempt to give an account of the many problems discussed in them. I shall deal with them only as parts of a system the main lines of which must be grasped if we are to understand the detailed interpretation of that part of it with which we are here chiefly concerned.

## THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

The principal task which Kant sets himself in the Critique of Pure Reason is the analysis of human knowledge into its elements. The first part of the Critique is therefore called the Transcendental Doctrine of ~~the~~ Elements. It is divided into the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, the former dealing with intuition and the latter with the understanding. In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason we find the following passage: "By way of introduction or anticipation we need only say that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding which perhaps spring from a common but to us unknown root. Through the former objects are given to us; through the latter they are thought. Now in so far as sensibility may be found to contain a priori ideas constituting the conditions under which objects are given to us, it will belong to transcendental philosophy. And since the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought the transcendental doctrine of sensibility (B29) constitute the first part of the science of the elements" (B29) We see here that even before beginning to ~~set forth his argument~~ <sup>thing</sup> Kant takes one ~~fundamental fact~~ for granted, namely, that human knowledge depends on something that is given to it. This follows from the fact that it <sup>requires</sup> ~~is in need~~ of two different sources, ~~namely~~, intuition and understanding. In so far as all our knowledge depends on intuitions, it depends on something that does not belong to itself but must be given to it from outside. Human knowledge is never wholly productive of its object. ~~Objects must be given to it.~~ This is a fact which for Kant is beyond all shadow of doubt, and does not require any proof. The Transcendental Aesthetic begins with the following words: "In whatever manner and by whatever means <sup>cognition</sup> ~~a mode of~~ knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which

it is in immediate relation to them, and from which all thought gains its material. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving ideas through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. ~~Objects~~ Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us! (B33) This is a belief which Kant maintains throughout his philosophy, and it has to be noted in particular that the Transcendental Aesthetic cannot be properly understood unless we are aware of the assumption on which it is based, ~~namely that human knowledge is incapable of producing an object, and that it depends on something that is given to it, and with regard to which it is merely passive.~~

The special task which Kant sets himself in the Aesthetic is to show that there are a priori forms of intuition, and this task he believes can ~~only~~ <sup>only</sup> be accomplished if it can be shown that objects, if they are to appear to us, must conform to certain forms of intuition. Space and time are shown to be such a priori forms, for objects cannot even be given to us ~~unless~~ <sup>unless</sup> they have been made subject to them. At the same time we can show (a) that they are pure forms, and (b) that they present us with a world of mere appearances ~~and not with~~ <sup>as distinct from</sup> a world of things in themselves. Space and time are formal and subjective conditions of appearances. No objects can appear to us independently of these ~~forms~~ <sup>forms</sup>. They are a priori forms because every object of experience must conform to them; ~~they are prior to the actual object.~~ <sup>are a priori</sup> At the ~~same~~ <sup>same</sup> time it must be borne in mind that these necessary and a priori conditions of all experience reveal to us a world of mere appearances, and that we have to presuppose the existence of a world of things in

themselves, which is fundamentally different, <sup>in character</sup> from our own world because it is independent of the subjective conditions of our experience. The distinction between things in themselves and mere appearances is absolutely essential to Kant's argument. This <sup>may be seen</sup> follows from the fact that he believes ~~that~~ it would be impossible to establish the a priori validity of space and of time unless we were aware ~~of the fact~~ that our world was a world of mere appearances as distinct from things in themselves. ~~For~~ If <sup>only</sup> the objects ~~that were presented to us~~ <sup>if they were</sup> were things in themselves that is to say, independent of the mind that knows them, it would be absolutely impossible, according to Kant, to have any a priori knowledge of <sup>these</sup> ~~such~~ objects. It is their very subjectivity <sup>of space and time</sup> which makes it possible to attribute a priori validity to them. They are forms which the human mind imposes upon its objects, and because this is so it can be said that in this restricted sense, namely as applicable to mere appearances, they are necessary and a priori forms. ~~Their objective validity is due to the fact that every appearance must conform to them. They are prior to the actual object, because in order to become an object an appearance must have been formed by them.~~ "Were intuition of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, intuition could not take place a priori, but must be always empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then incomprehensible how the intuition of a present thing should make me know <sup>to</sup> the thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation; but even granting this possibility, an intuition of that sort would not take place a priori, that is, before the object were presented to me; for without this latter fact no ground of relation between my representation and the object can be imagined: it must then depend upon direct inspiration (Eingebung). It is therefore only possible in one way for my intuition to anticipate the actuality of the object, and to be cognition a priori: if it (the intuition) contains nothing but the form of the sensibility

which precedes in me all the actual impressions through which I  
am affected by objects. For I can know a priori, that objects of  
 sense can only be intuited according to this form of the sensuous  
 intuition. Hence it follows; that propositions, which concern this  
 form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and valid for objects  
 of the senses; as also, conversely, that intuitions which are possible  
a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our  
 senses". (Prolegomena § 2). Thus it seems as if in the  
 Transcendental Aesthetic and in the corresponding passages of the  
Prolegomena Kant were setting forth the following doctrine. Our  
 world is a world of mere appearances. We can prove that certain  
 forms of intuition are prior to actual experience because they  
 can be shown to be necessary conditions of our world of appearances.  
 Beyond this world there ~~exists~~ <sup>exists</sup> a world of things in themselves. We  
 have no a priori knowledge of our own world except the knowledge  
 that it must conform to certain forms. The matter which is contained  
 in it belongs to the world of things in themselves, and cannot be  
 known by us a priori; it is simply given to us. The world of things  
 in themselves appears to us under the forms of space and time, which  
 are merely subjective, belonging to the human mind which imposes them  
 upon the given matter. "That in the appearance which corresponds  
 to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the  
 manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain  
 relations, I term the form of appearance. That in which alone the  
 sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, cannot  
 itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all appearance  
 is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the  
 sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being

considered apart from sensation" (E <sup>34</sup>~~37~~).

It appears, however, on closer examination of Kant's argument that the account which we have given of it while not exactly erroneous, is yet so incomplete that it amounts to a misrepresentation of Kant's <sup>real</sup> ~~true~~ doctrine. We have seen that Kant's distinction between a world of appearances and a world of things in themselves is to be taken quite seriously, if only because he is convinced that it would be impossible to understand the nature of our knowledge and its objects without contrasting our objects <sup>as they appear to us</sup> with objects as they are in themselves, that is as they exist independently of our minds. We should however misunderstand Kant completely if we thought that he regarded the thing in itself as a supersensible material substance which exercised some mysterious influence upon the knowing mind. Such an interpretation of Kant's doctrine would overlook the fact that, convinced as Kant is that there must exist a thing in itself beyond our world of appearances, he also believes that we are absolutely incapable of forming any conception of its nature. Owing to the nature of our knowledge we are unable to acquire any knowledge of it. Things in themselves are objects which are independent of space and time <sup>and as</sup>. Since our knowledge depends entirely on its own subjective conditions, it follows that we cannot acquire any idea of such things. Thus it may be asserted (a) that our world is a world of mere appearances and that we have to assume the existence of things in themselves, and (b) that we have no conception, not even the most imperfect one, of the nature of these things. An interpretation of Kant's philosophy has to pay attention to both of these assertions, and we should misrepresent his argument if we <sup>thought</sup> ~~believed~~ either that he did not actually believe in the existence of things in themselves or that he believed that the human mind could have any knowledge of them. What makes the understanding of Kant's doctrine so difficult as long as we are

concerned with the Transcendental Aesthetic alone is the fact that Kant does not there give a full account of his doctrine. It has to be noted that Kant himself says that in the Transcendental Aesthetic he is isolating sensibility, and that in that part of the Critique he does not take any account of the understanding as an element in knowledge. That is why it is impossible to understand the doctrine of the thing in itself from the point of view of the Aesthetic. For according to Kant's doctrine, as we shall see in ~~what follows~~ <sup>the sequel</sup>, the principal reason why we are excluded from all knowledge of things in themselves is that we do not possess an intellectual intuition or an intuitive understanding. It is obvious that we cannot hope to understand what this means as long as we are concerned with intuition alone and know nothing of the second element in human knowledge, namely understanding. It is, however, interesting to note that the doctrine of the intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding is already mentioned towards the end of the Aesthetic. We learn there that an intellectual intuition would be absolutely different from our own in so far as intuition and thinking would be one and the same act for a mind that possessed it. It is easy to see that in order to understand this strange doctrine we <sup>shall</sup> ~~should~~ have to consult the Transcendental Analytic - that part of the Critique of Pure Reason which deals with the understanding. At first sight, however, it might seem as if the Analytic tended to complicate our problem rather than to help us to solve it. For we find there ~~a great many~~ statements which not only contradict one another but also seem to be incompatible with the doctrine ~~which is~~ set forth in the Aesthetic.

The first question with which ~~the~~ Transcendental Logic has to concern itself is ; What is the fundamental difference between intuition and understanding? Kant's answer is that our

understanding possesses a faculty of spontaneity, which intuition lacks even in its <sup>pure</sup> forms of space and time. Intuition as such is merely sensuous and passive. The knowing mind regarded as a <sup>of mere intuition</sup> merely intuitive faculty receives objects as they are given to it and does not exercise any activity of its own. For an object to be known by us we must possess a faculty of combining our <sup>representations</sup> ideas, and this is the work of the understanding. Our knowledge thus ~~it~~ depends on two conditions (a) that <sup>representations</sup> ideas can be given to us, which is made possible by ~~by~~ intuition, and (b) that <sup>they</sup> ideas can be combined which is the work of the understanding. From this it can be inferred that intuition and understanding belong together. Intuition can achieve nothing without understanding, and understanding nothing without intuition; they must work together. Our understanding cannot produce <sup>representations</sup> ideas; it can merely combine <sup>them</sup> ideas which ~~are given to it~~. The concepts of the understanding would be empty and devoid of all meaning unless they were capable of being referred to given intuitions, and our intuitions would be blind if we were unable to combine them. Neither of these two faculties of the mind is to be preferred to the other, for without intuition nothing would be given to us and without understanding we should be unable to think, <sup>and yet although</sup> ~~It must be noted, however, that in spite of the fact that~~ they are entirely dependent on one another they cannot interchange their functions. Understanding is incapable of intuiting, and intuition is incapable of thinking. " The understanding has thus so far been explained merely negatively, as a non-sensible faculty of knowledge. Now since without sensibility we cannot have any intuition, understanding cannot be a faculty of intuition. But ~~besides~~ intuition there is no other mode of knowledge except by means of concepts. The knowledge yielded by understanding, or at least by the human understanding, must therefore be by means of concepts, and so is not intuitive, but discursive. Whereas all

intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts rest on function. By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various ideas under one common idea. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions". (B92,93).

So far we have seen no reason why we should believe that the concepts of the understanding are necessary a priori conditions of our experience of objects. ~~For since~~ <sup>It</sup> has been shown that our understanding is a discursive faculty, that is to say a faculty of mere thought, and that objects are given to us independently of the understanding, <sup>if then</sup> ~~why should we believe that~~ <sup>to be</sup> the concepts of the understanding <sup>conditions of our</sup> are necessary for knowledge of these objects? We have succeeded in showing that the pure forms of intuition, ~~namely space and time~~, are necessary and a priori conditions of experience, but only because we were able to show that objects could not be given to us, that is to say they could not be contents of actual experience unless they were fashioned by these forms. But how can the same hold of the concepts of the understanding? <sup>saying that</sup> ~~since~~ <sup>since</sup> objects can be given to us without any reference to these concepts? "Objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of the understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects." (B 122.) "That objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie a priori in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought, is a conclusion the grounds of which

are by no means so obvious" (B122,123). "But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition" (B123).

Thus it might seem impossible to establish the ~~objective~~ objective validity of the concepts of the understanding. This could be achieved only if we could show that thought was as necessary as intuition for the building up of the world of appearances. That this is actually the case can be shown in the following manner. What distinguishes thought from intuition is the faculty which thought possesses of combining <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas of the mind~~. Intuition as such is absolutely incapable of combining ideas which are presented to the mind. Moreover we can say that should such a <sup>representations</sup> ~~combination of ideas~~ take place it could not be ascribed to the object, but would have to be regarded as due to some activity of the human mind. That anything in an object should be combined, -- this is something of which we cannot become aware by means of an intuition, neither can we derive it from the object itself. We are incapable of presenting to ourselves any combination in the object unless we ourselves have brought it about. "But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination - be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts - is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned, as indicating that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined, and that of all <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ combination is the only one which cannot be given

through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself" (B 129, 130).

If we are to be capable of combining different <sup>representations</sup> ideas we must possess a faculty by means of which we are aware both of the diversity of our ideas and of their unity. Kant terms this fundamental principle of all synthesis 'apperception'. Sensibility and intuition present us with nothing but a manifold of <sup>representations</sup> ideas.

~~The mind considered as a merely sensuous faculty is entirely passive, and the different ideas which are presented to it have no connection with one another. If these ideas are to belong to one subject which is aware of their being its ideas we shall require a principle different from mere sensibility. For our ideas could not properly be called our ideas if we were incapable of knowing that they belonged to one and the same mind; if they did not so belong they would have nothing to do either with one another or with the human mind. The idea of the self would be meaningless.~~

~~The multiplicity of ideas would not concern us if we were unable to know that they were ours, that they belonged to one ~~and~~ ~~this~~ mind which could become conscious of their being its~~

ideas. It is by no means necessary that we should always be conscious of <sup>the</sup> this fact. All we have to presuppose is that the mind possesses a faculty of referring <sup>its representations</sup> the given ideas to itself, and comprehending them in a unity. "For the manifold <sup>representations</sup> ideas, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all <sup>representations</sup> my ideas,

if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As <sup>representations</sup> my ideas (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must

conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me." (B 132).

<sup>We see that if the mind</sup> It is now clear that ~~if we~~ possessed no other faculty of the mind but intuition <sup>it</sup> our mind would be filled with an incoherent mass of <sup>representations</sup> ideas. In order to call them our own ideas we have to <sup>capable of referring</sup> refer them to an identical self-consciousness which united them,

~~for~~ Otherwise our selves would be as multifarious as our ideas.

It must be noted, <sup>however</sup> that the fundamental principle of all synthesis, namely, apperception, is not identical with the acts of synthesis themselves, <sup>but</sup> is only a necessary condition of their existence. We should be absolutely incapable of synthesising our ideas, <sup>if we did not possess a faculty of uniting the different acts of synthesis in one self-consciousness.</sup> ~~It is quite impossible to~~ derived ~~this faculty~~ from the objects of experience. It is a ~~faculty of the mind which is prior to all our actual knowledge of objects, and must be regarded as~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~a priori~~ necessary condition of all such knowledge.

We can now understand why the Transcendental Aesthetic, which had to isolate intuition from the understanding was unable to reveal to us the true character of human knowledge. As long as we were concerned with intuition alone we could not help believing that objects of experience were presented to us by means of mere intuition. Now, however, ~~we know that this is far from being true, and that in order to be presented with an object we must possess a faculty of synthesising our ideas as they are given by intuition. Without such synthesis no object in the proper sense would appear to us. All synthesis is grounded on the faculty of apperception. We should not be aware of the fact that anything in the object was connected with anything else if we did not possess this faculty, and, since every object of experience consists of a multiplicity of ideas, it follows that no object can appear to us independently of the understanding, and its fundamental principle of synthesis.~~

<sup>we</sup> We can now give a more precise definition of what an object is. "An object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" (B137). Understanding and the rules of synthesis which are produced by it are quite as necessary as intuitions for the constitution of the world of sensible objects.

Intuition provides us with a manifold of ~~ideas~~ <sup>representations</sup> while understanding enables us to combine them, and it is only by means of the joint working of these two faculties ~~of the mind~~ that we can be presented with a real object of experience. Now all the rules of synthesis are based upon the fundamental faculty of self-consciousness or apperception. Without this faculty no object could appear to us, and thus we see now that the representation of an object of experience depends ~~as~~ as much on understanding as on intuition. "The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me." (B138).

The task which Kant sets himself in the Transcendental Analytic is to show that the functions of the understanding are indispensable conditions of our experience of objects. His first argument is that but for transcendental apperception our minds could not acquire knowledge of objects. This, however, is not enough; it has also to be shown that the original synthetic faculty produces a certain number of rules of synthesis which are objectively valid and prior to actual experience because they first make experience of objects possible. We can become conscious of a world of objects only by building it up ourselves. This is done by the rules of synthesis, and these rules are produced by the understanding. Understanding is the faculty of rules. We ourselves have introduced into objects the order which we find in them in experience. That is why it is in no way more surprising that objects should have to conform to the rules of the understanding than that they should have to conform to the pure forms of intuition. For just as the forms of intuition

namely, space and time, belong to the mind alone and do not possess any independent existence, so the rules of the understanding are products of the mind which we have to apply if we are to be presented with a world of objects. Each rule of the understanding is a principle of synthesis, and is necessary and objectively valid because otherwise we should possess neither self-consciousness nor consciousness of objects. We have now proved that intuition and understanding are necessary elements of human knowledge. This, however, must not lead us to overlook the fundamental difference between them. We have to keep in mind the fact that just as intuition can do no more than provide us with a manifold of <sup>representations</sup> ideas and is quite incapable of combining them, so the understanding for its part can do nothing but unite <sup>representations</sup> ~~unite~~ ideas which are given to it and is altogether powerless to produce the <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ which are to be united. That is the reason why these two faculties are entirely dependent on one another. Concepts of the understanding have no meaning independently of their relation to intuition. We need only remember that we were enabled to ascribe objective a priori validity to those concepts only because we could show that they were necessary in order to transform incoherent <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas as they were given in intuition~~ into the concept of a real object. <sup>Apart from</sup> ~~Outside~~ their relation to intuition the concepts of the understanding ~~have no real meaning. As soon as they are taken out of their connection with intuition they~~ possess no meaning except a purely logical one. They are nothing but mere forms of thought, ~~and it is altogether impossible to determine objects by means of mere thinking.~~ Human knowledge depends on two heterogeneous faculties - intuition and understanding - and these two faculties cannot ~~be separated from one another~~ <sup>in separation give no knowledge.</sup>

It is now our business to raise the question once

more whether this doctrine contradicts the argument of the Aesthetic. We have seen that as long as we were concerned with the Aesthetic alone we had to take Kant to hold that the pure forms of intuition quite independently of the understanding and its rules were sufficient to present us with a world of objects. Our examination of the Analytic, however, has made it clear that this is not really Kant's opinion, and that he is convinced that objects cannot <sup>be given apart from</sup> appear to us apart from the understanding which imposes certain rules of synthesis upon the manifold of given intuitions. How are we to reconcile such apparently contradictory statements? ~~To the first place we may note that the contradiction~~  
~~described to the fact that Kant wrote the Aesthetic //~~  
~~cannot be described to the fact that Kant wrote the Aesthetic //~~  
~~an earlier date, and to the assumption~~ regarded as due to Kant's ceasing to hold in the Analytic a doctrine which he had held when he wrote the Aesthetic. For, as we have seen, Kant begins his argument in the Analytic itself by stating that it is difficult to establish the objective validity of the concepts of the understanding because objects can appear to us without any reference to the understanding and its functions. His argument runs as follows. It is comparatively easy to prove the necessity of the pure forms of intuition, ~~space and time~~, because it can be shown that objects cannot even appear to us without them. To show the necessity of the categories of the understanding is much more difficult <sup>since</sup> ~~because~~ objects are given to us even without being related to the understanding. This is clearly in perfect harmony with the argument of the Aesthetic, and it is therefore all the more surprising that Kant goes on to tell us that we are quite incapable of being presented with an object of experience as long as we have not synthesised our intuitions by means of certain functions which are produced by the understanding. In another passage he even says that the pure forms of intuition themselves depend upon

a certain synthesis to which ~~he~~<sup>representations</sup> gives the name of a synthesis of apprehension. "In the ~~ideas~~<sup>representations</sup> of space and time we have a priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition ; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold of their own, and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold [vide the Transcendental Aesthetic.] Thus unity of the synthesis of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a combination to which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or <sup>in</sup> time must conform, is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of a apprehension - not indeed in, but with these intuitions. This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories, in so far as the combination is applied to our sensible intuition." (E160).

It seems now as if we were confronted with an utterly confused argument. ~~For~~ To begin with we were told that the forms of intuition alone were adequate to give us awareness of objects, but <sup>Kant tells us</sup> now we learn that these forms themselves do not exist independently of a principle of synthesis, that space and time are inseparably connected with the understanding, ~~any~~

~~independent existence being denied to them. If we are to under-stand Kant's argument at all, we shall have to consult other passages of the Critique, and we shall deal in the first place with a passage which belongs to the Transcendental Deduction (1st. edition). It is headed "The synthesis of apprehension in intuition". Kant's argument runs as follows. All our ideas~~  
<sup>To solve our difficulty</sup>  
<sup>may be stated thus</sup>  
<sup>representations</sup>

belong to one time in which they must be arranged. Now every intuition contains a manifold, and we should be incapable of representing this manifold to ourselves if we were unable to distinguish its elements. If we are to represent to ourselves a pure intuition, we must make it subject to a synthesis. Apart from such a synthesis each individual impression of the mind would be absolute unity and would be contained in one moment of time. It follows that in order to arrive at any idea of space or of time we have to be capable of combining several particular <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ into one <sup>representation</sup> ~~idea~~. We must possess a pure synthesis of apprehension. "This synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, that is, in respect of <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ which are not empirical. For without it we should never have a priori the <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ either of space or of time. They can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its original receptivity. We have thus a pure synthesis of apprehension". (A99).

The argument which is set forth in the section which immediately follows seems to be even less consistent with the argument of the Aesthetic, for in it Kant sets out to prove that <sup>our</sup> experience and knowledge of an object depends upon <sup>a further</sup> ~~our~~ condition, viz. our faculty of reproducing representations. Kant argues as follows. ~~capacity to reproduce ideas~~. If we are to be capable of representing to ourselves the time between one noon and the next we must have a faculty of reproduction. This reproduction is brought about by the imagination. We have to assume the existence of a transcendental faculty of imagination. But for the existence of this faculty we should never obtain a <sup>complete representation of anything</sup> ~~complete idea~~, for all the ideas which precede the one we have at the present moment would drop out of thought. Not even the purest and most elementary <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~ of space or of time could arise. "The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis

of reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever - of those that are pure a priori no less than of those that are empirical - the reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination. (A102). We have now learnt that every intuition, whether empirical or a priori (~~the pure forms of intuition, namely, space and time~~) is bound up with two kinds of synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction. In the section which follows Kant explains that there ~~exists~~<sup>is</sup> yet another kind of synthesis which he calls the synthesis of recognition. ~~He argues that the~~<sup>His argument is this.</sup> ~~Reproduction of ideas~~<sup>representations</sup> would be ~~altogether in vain~~<sup>useless</sup> if we could not become conscious of the fact that that which we are thinking at the present moment ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> one and the same as that which we thought at the previous moment. ~~Further there are required concepts we require concepts to provide~~<sup>For this</sup> ~~Further~~ we require concepts to provide us with rules. Reproduction by itself turns out to be insufficient for knowledge. It is dependent upon a third synthesis performed by the understanding. This synthesis first provides our faculty of reproduction with rules for the task which it has to perform. All these rules are grounded on transcendental apperception, which is described as the pure, original, unchangeable consciousness. Kant ~~declares~~<sup>adds</sup> that transcendental apperception deserves its name because even the purest objective unity, that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is only possible through the relation of those intuitions to such unity of consciousness.

It is of course quite impossible for us to attempt to enter into a discussion of the many difficult problems which are

raised by the Transcendental Deduction. It is, however, necessary  
 that we should try to understand the general principle on which  
 Kant's argument is based. ~~What Kant tries to prove again and again~~  
 is that intuition, imagination and understanding belong together,  
 and that they constitute a unity as the necessary elements of ~~human~~  
 human knowledge. If they did not combine, knowledge would be  
 altogether impossible, because the mind would not be presented  
 with an object. Apperception and the rules of the understanding  
 are necessarily related to intuitions, and in the same way  
 intuitions do not have any existence of their own and must  
 necessarily be related to understanding and its rules of synthesis.  
 As regards imagination, we shall have to deal with that later,  
 and for the present shall not even attempt to give an explanation  
 of the meaning of the term or to describe the functions which  
 Kant ascribes to that faculty of the mind. But we can see even  
 now that when Kant speaks of three different kinds of synthesis  
 he is far from believing that they exist separately. What he  
 seeks to prove is that they are necessarily related to one another.  
 The analysis which the transcendental philosopher has to perform  
 must distinguish three different kinds of synthesis, but this does  
 not imply that they really exist separately. "If each idea were  
 completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation,  
 no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is  
 essentially a whole in which ideas stand compared and connected.  
 As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a  
 synopsis. But to such a synopsis a synthesis must always correspond.  
 receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with  
 spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold  
 synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge;  
 namely, the apprehension of ideas as modifications of the mind

We shall fail to understand Kant's <sup>it</sup> argument unless we realise that he believes on the one hand that intuition and understanding are totally different from one another and on the other that <sup>as</sup> far as human knowledge is concerned they are also closely related to one another <sup>so</sup> that <sup>we</sup> they cannot even be said to have a separate existence. Intuition and understanding regarded as elements in human knowledge must be referred to one another. We cannot understand them in separation. Human knowledge is never confronted with mere intuitions. It always seeks at the same time to make <sup>them</sup> intelligible to itself ~~pure~~ ~~intuitions~~ by means of the categories. To understand what constitution is made to knowledge by the understanding and its a priori rules <sup>the</sup> (categories) we have to realise that <sup>these</sup> ~~it is the~~ function of ~~these categories~~ <sup>is</sup> to determine intuitions. Unless the categories [which are rules of synthesis] are applied <sup>to</sup> to intuitions the human mind cannot become aware of objects at all. ~~There is nothing but a stream of subjective ideas with no reference to objects.~~ It is easy to understand why Kant was unable to make this clear in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" <sup>in</sup> which <sup>he</sup> was concerned with intuition alone, and why so many of ~~his~~ <sup>the</sup> statements in it give the reader the impression that Kant believed that intuition by itself can give us knowledge of objects. But no one who has understood the doctrine of the Analytic will fall into this error. <sup>It is at once clear</sup> ~~One sees at once~~ that the argument set forth in the "Aesthetic" is merely provisional. It isolates intuition and takes no account of the understanding which as Kant shows later, is a necessary and inseparable element in knowledge. It may be asked why Kant adopted such a course, why he deals with intuition ~~and~~ understanding separately so that his exposition gives rise to unavoidable misconceptions, ~~on the part of his readers and~~ I think the answer is simple. Kant believes that intuition and understanding are totally different faculties of the mind which are brought into relation only in human knowledge. <sup>we need only consider</sup> ~~It is Kantian-~~ <sup>that he believes</sup> ~~doctrine~~ <sup>actually</sup> that animals possess a faculty of intuition and even

and we shall see that

imagination without having a faculty of thought, ~~the~~ in  
~~his doctrine is that in~~  
 animals the sensuous faculties actually exist by themselves.

Further he believes that it can at least not be denied that there  
 might exist in superhuman <sup>and</sup> purely rational beings a faculty of  
 knowledge which is entirely independent of sensibility.

We shall have to <sup>deal</sup> ~~concern ourselves~~ with this doctrine later.

But we see already that the separate treatment of intuition in  
 the Transcendental Aesthetic gives Kant occasion for making  
 quite clear the fundamental doctrine of his theory of knowledge,  
 that all human knowledge depends on something that is given to  
 it from outside, <sup>and that it</sup> ~~It thus must~~ <sup>therefore</sup> always remain a partly passive  
 faculty dependent on the impression it receives. This is con-  
 firmed by the Analytic in which Kant shows that

in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself - and consequently all experience as its empirical product." (A97)

When we have seen that Kant's main endeavour in the Analytic is to show that intuition and understanding belong necessarily together, that they are inseparable and correlative parts of a whole, it is not difficult to understand why the Transcendental Aesthetic, which dealt with intuition alone, was unable to give a true account of the facts, and why so many of the statements which he makes there must be regarded as merely provisional. The reason why Kant could not make known the whole of his doctrine in the Transcendental Aesthetic was that he could not anticipate the results of the Transcendental Logic in which he shows that the separation of intuition from understanding is artificial, and that no such thing as a self-sufficient intuition exists. It may be objected to our interpretation that we have only made the inconsistency of Kant's argument more obvious than it was before, and that it remains unintelligible why Kant should have propounded in the Transcendental Aesthetic an argument which he himself was unable to maintain. It remains to be seen whether such an objection is fully justified, and whether the main argument which is set forth in the Aesthetic is not only not invalidated but even established more firmly by the Analytic. It is true that Kant shows in the Analytic that intuition and understanding cannot be separated from one another, and it is also true that as a consequence of ~~this~~ he has to modify his own doctrine. But the fundamental doctrine of the Aesthetic, namely, that all our knowledge depends on something that is given to us from outside, is even more firmly established by the Analytic which deals with the second element of human knowledge, ~~that~~ ~~is~~ the understanding. When we regard Aesthetic and Analytic as a whole we may say that Kant's

argument in them is that all human knowledge depends on something that is given by intuition, that it is never purely active but always at the same time passive, and that our understanding, the faculty of spontaneity is quite incapable of producing objects.

~~That is why we cannot know things as they are in themselves. Our~~  
 our  
 Understanding depends on what is given to it, and we can attribute a priori objective validity to its concepts only because we can ~~show them to be~~ prove that they are necessary for the synthesis of the given manifold. Transcendental apperception as the fundamental principle of synthesis is to be regarded as the source of all thought, and therefore as absolutely different from merely passive intuition. On the other hand it is mere function; it is a principle which enables us to combine ideas, but it does not produce them. It is the mere idea of the self, and as regards its relation to its object, it contains no more than that which is common to all objects, a mere X. It is true that we should not be presented with any object at all without this fundamental principle of unity. On the other hand it must be remembered that we are incapable of determining an object by means of mere thinking, and that apperception provides us only with the mere idea of an object in general and must leave everything else to intuition. "The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what ~~alone~~ can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object. This relation is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind, which combines it in one idea" (A109)

~~It is now clear that the synthetic and the analytic do not really contradict one another. For we have learnt~~

(a) that Kant is convinced that intuition and understanding are absolutely different from one another, and that it is for this reason that he has dealt with them separately, and (b) that the Analytic does not in any way modify the fundamental doctrine of the Aesthetic, namely, that it is through intuition that things are given to us, and that the pure forms of intuition are dependent on our sensibility. That all our knowledge depends on sensibility we learn from the Aesthetic, and this is confirmed by the Analytic, which shows that our understanding is a mere faculty of synthesis, entirely dependent on sensible intuitions. The mistake which we made as long as we were concerned with the Aesthetic alone was that we believed that the assertion of the fact that things were given to us through intuition meant that intuition was capable of presenting us with real objects of experience. We have now corrected this mistake, and can therefore understand (a) that objects are given to us through intuition and that <sup>our</sup> understanding is quite incapable of producing objects, but also (b) that in order to have real objects we have to synthesise our ideas by means of a priori concepts of the understanding.

We may now continue the examination of Kant's argument ~~with regard to intuition and understanding and their~~ <sup>and how</sup> ~~mutual relations. We shall~~ begin by considering the following passage: "The principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic, proposition; nevertheless it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the 'I', as <sup>representation</sup> simple idea, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from the 'I' ~~idea/simple/idea~~ can a manifold be given; and only through combination in one consciousness can it be thought. An understanding in which through self-consciousness

all the manifold would eo ipso be given, would be intuitive; our understanding can only think, and for intuition must look to the senses". (B135) In this passage we learn what Kant takes to be the essential difference between our own and an intuitive understanding. An intuitive understanding would be an understanding which contained more than a mere principle of combining a manifold given to it in intuition. In fact the difference between intuition and understanding would not exist for a mind which possessed such a faculty of knowledge. <sup>A</sup> For a being equipped with such a faculty would be capable of producing its objects by means of mere <sup>thought</sup> thinking. Its understanding would not only fulfil the function which <sup>our</sup> ~~our~~ understanding fulfils, namely, ~~the synthesis of representations~~ ~~that of synthesizing ideas, but~~. It would at the same time be capable of presenting to itself the manifold with regard to which our understanding is entirely dependent <sup>(we may ask)</sup> on intuition. But what is the use of assuming the existence of an understanding so absolutely different from our own? The answer is that the contrast may help us to grasp the limitations of our own understanding. The idea of an intuitive understanding is by no means superfluous, indeed it is a necessary idea, but that is not to be taken to imply that such an understanding really exists. We are not concerned with the question whether it exists or not. Our <sup>task</sup> ~~problem~~ is to <sup>explain</sup> ~~approach~~ the nature of our own understanding, and <sup>this has been done. We have seen</sup> ~~we can now see~~ that in order to be presented with an object at all we require the synthetic unity of consciousness, which is the fundamental principle of <sup>our</sup> ~~the~~ understanding. Our ~~understanding~~ <sup>is capable of uniting all our ideas</sup>. It is the condition of <sup>our</sup> ~~their~~ belonging to one and the same self. This <sup>may be said to be</sup> ~~is~~ a merely analytic proposition, because by presupposing this we do not go beyond the sphere of mere <sup>thought</sup> ~~thinking~~. ~~We restrict the understanding within its own boundaries. We merely state that all our ideas are our ideas, without in any way determining the content of our thought.~~

We say nothing more than that all our ideas belong to the one subject which thinks them. "This principle is not, however, to be taken as applying to every possible understanding, but only to that understanding through ~~which~~ whose pure apperception, in the idea 'I am', nothing manifold is given. An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition - an understanding, that is to say, through whose ~~idea~~ <sup>representation</sup> the objects of the ~~idea~~ <sup>represented idea</sup> should at the same time exist, would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. For the human understanding, however, which thinks only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary. It is indeed the first principle of the human understanding, and is so indispensable to it that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding, either of such as is itself intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is different in kind from that in space and time". (B138, 139) <sup>Knowledge</sup> That human knowledge is essentially a knowledge which contains two elements, intuition and understanding, becomes ~~even more clear~~ <sup>quite evident</sup> when we consider the fact that human beings are quite unable to conceive any distinct idea of the kind of knowledge that would be possessed by an intuitive understanding or an intellectual intuition. This ~~does~~ <sup>does</sup> not mean, however, that the idea of such knowledge is arbitrarily conceived. On the contrary, how necessary this idea is may be gathered from the fact that without assuming it we should be unable to understand the specific nature of our own knowledge. The conception of an intuitive understanding is just as necessary as the assumption that there exists a world of things in themselves behind the world of mere appearances. An intuitive understanding would be fundamentally different from our own because, not being dependent on things being given to it, it would know

things as they are in themselves by its own activity. We can ~~not~~ see more clearly what the concept of a thing in itself means. The thing in itself would be the object of a being for whose knowledge there would be no difference between what was to be determined and its determining faculty, a being to whom objects would be given by a mere analysis of its cognitive faculty.

The two ~~ideas~~ <sup>conceptions</sup> - the ~~idea~~ <sup>to</sup> of things in themselves and the idea of an intuitive understanding - are strictly parallel. We had to assume the existence of things in themselves in order to understand the peculiar character of our own objects as mere appearances, but we could not even ask what properties these things possessed. Similarly, we have to <sup>refer to ourselves</sup> conceive the idea of a knowledge absolutely different from our own in order to understand the nature of our own knowledge. But we cannot even ask whether such knowledge exists or how it could take place. ~~The idea of an intuitive understanding is necessary because it makes us aware of the fact that our understanding is a faculty of mere synthesis, incapable of producing its objects. That is why our knowledge cannot derive the particulars from universal concepts by means of an act of mere thinking. Why we cannot fully acquire insight into the nature of our objects and why our objects must be regarded as mere appearances.~~ It has often been questioned whether the doctrine of the thing in itself should be taken seriously, and a great many interpreters of Kant have tried to eliminate it as being of no importance. There is, however, not the slightest evidence that Kant ever gave up this doctrine. Throughout all his writings he maintains his fundamental position, namely, the doctrine that our objects are mere appearances and that there <sup>must</sup> exist behind them a world of things in themselves. ~~But this must not make us forget~~ <sup>It must be noted, however,</sup> - and this is a point of equal importance - that Kant is also firmly convinced that we can have no

*Rumkowski*  
 conception whatever of the nature of the things in themselves, and that we know nothing of the relation between them and our own world of appearances. We <sup>cannot</sup> ~~must not~~ even say <sup>of</sup> ~~that~~ things in themselves <sup>that they</sup> are causes of appearances, <sup>for</sup> ~~because~~ in doing so we should be applying to things in themselves a category which according to Kant is applicable only to appearances. ~~(Neither can we say that things in themselves appear to us under the forms of space and time, for such an ascription might make us imagine that we could represent to ourselves objects that existed independently of space and time.)~~ Kant leaves us in no doubt whatever as to his belief that the human mind can form no conception whatever of any object other than an object of possible experience, and ~~that we can have no idea of a knowledge~~ or of a knowledge which would not like ours contain intuition and understanding as its elements.

The recognition of the fact that Kant ~~holds~~ regards it as quite impossible ~~that~~ for the human mind to form any clear conception of a knowledge which did not consist of intuition and understanding is of the utmost importance, if only in order that we should avoid the mistake of taking Kant's analysis of human knowledge to be a psychological analysis. By opposing one kind of knowledge to another, Kant makes it appear as if he believed <sup>s</sup> ~~that~~ the fact that our knowledge depended <sup>s</sup> on intuition and understanding <sup>is</sup> ~~were~~ a psychological fact, due to the peculiar constitution of the human mind. Such an interpretation of Kant's doctrine is suggested by a great many of his own <sup>s</sup> statements. For instance, he says that intuition takes place only in so far as an object is given to us, and that this is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. (B33) Later he says that it is solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, and that time is a merely subjective condition of our human intuition. (B51) Again, sensibility, he says, is a <sup>cognition</sup> ~~mode of know-~~

ledge which is peculiar to us and need not necessarily be shared by every being, though certainly by every human being. (B59)  
 These are only a few out of many possible ~~instances.~~ <sup>examples and we</sup> We have to examine the question whether these statements really imply that Kant believes his analysis of human knowledge to be a psychological one. If we ~~thought~~ <sup>think</sup> that this ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> so, we should have to believe that what Kant sets out to do in the Critique of Pure Reason is to discover the peculiar properties of the <sup>human</sup> mind. What he finds out in the Critique is that the human mind happens to be dependent on two sources of cognition, intuition and understanding, and that it possesses a peculiar kind of intuition and a peculiar kind of understanding. This would imply that Kant was of the opinion that human beings possessed some peculiar kind of <sup>knowledge</sup> cognition, and that there might be other beings whose knowledge was of an entirely different kind; and on this view knowledge would be nothing but the product of the particular type of mind which the being who knows happens to possess.

It can easily be shown that such an interpretation of Kant's argument would be entirely mistaken. In the first place we may note that in the passage which we have quoted Kant speaks of the human mind not as opposed to the minds of other finite beings, but <sup>as opposed</sup> to a mind capable of knowing things as they are in themselves, that is to say, to the mind of a superhuman being endowed with an intellectual <sup>intuition</sup> understanding or an intuitive understanding. We have already seen why Kant believes it necessary to conceive the idea of a knowledge entirely different from our own, and we have also seen why he believes that we can have <sup>absolutely</sup> no knowledge of it ~~whatever.~~ The idea of a finite knowledge different from our own would be of no help to us in our attempt to understand the nature of our own knowledge. The only kind of knowledge that is real to us is the kind which we ourselves

possess knowledge that is dependent on intuition and understanding. Intuition and understanding contain the a priori objective conditions of all knowledge. The forms of intuition and the rules of the understanding are not merely subjective properties of the human mind, but are a priori conditions of objective experience. Through them we are presented with a world which obeys objective and necessary rules, whereas psychological properties of the mind could never possess any a priori validity. The method of transcendental philosophy is fundamentally different from that of psychology, transcendental philosophy for ~~the latter~~ seeks to discover the necessary a priori conditions of experience whereas ~~the latter~~ psychology depends entirely upon observation of empirical facts. We cannot, therefore, ascribe any necessity or universal validity to the laws which are discovered by psychology. If we are to understand the fundamental distinction between the subjectivity which Kant attributes to psychological properties of the mind and that which he attributes to the pure forms of intuition and the categories we must grasp the specific meaning of his concept of objectivity. The a priori conditions of experience - the pure forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, and the rules of the understanding, i.e. the categories and principles - are subjective in that they do not enable us to know things as they are in themselves. On the other hand, they are objectively valid because experience of objects is impossible without them. This means that we have to deny their absolute objective validity, but assert their objective necessity in relation to every object. To state this is sufficient, since we cannot form any idea of an object independent of the forms of intuition and the categories. But psychological laws are of a different status. Even if we had discovered, by means of psychological enquiry, that all the human minds which we had investigated possessed a certain property, we should be entitled to state only a general rule and not a universal necessary one, since we could not be certain that we should not come across an instance to which the rule did not apply. We can, however,

be quite certain that there ~~cannot be a~~ knowledge <sup>must</sup> which ~~does not~~ contain intuition and understanding.

The fact that intuition and understanding are totally different from one another raises a new problem, for we cannot help asking how two such fundamentally different faculties can be made to cooperate. Kant's answer is that this is made ~~possible~~ possible by the imagination. It is not the understanding but the imagination which performs the synthesis of the ~~idea~~ <sup>representations</sup> given to us in intuition. In the first place we must ask why Kant regards it as impossible that the understanding <sup>itself</sup> should be able to perform the synthesis, and why he should think it necessary to assume the existence of a third faculty of the mind in addition to intuition and understanding. The <sup>an</sup> answer to this is that Kant believes that understanding is a mere faculty of thought. It can only produce rules of synthesis, which are mere functions. In order to indicate their nature as mere functions Kant, as we have seen, calls that which is united by them the transcendental object or a mere X. Similarly, transcendental apperception may be said to be a mere X, and this means that just as the object does not contain any manifold as long as as it is regarded as an object of the understanding alone so the mind as a merely <sup>faculty of thought</sup> synthetic faculty, that is to say the mind in so far as it is nothing but understanding, is empty, a mere X, and as regards the content of its thought entirely dependent on what is given to it in intuition. Apperception by itself is a faculty of determining a manifold by certain rules of synthesis, and what is to be synthesised cannot belong to the determinative faculty. Intuition, on the other hand, is entirely passive, and cannot determine at all. The imagination must fill this gap, and it is qualified to do so, since on Kant's view it is capable both of determining and of being determined. It is a determinative faculty of the mind in so far as it enables us to

pass from one idea to another, and so to achieve a synthesis of the ideas given in intuition; and yet it remains within the sphere of mere determinability, that is to say within the sphere of intuition, and may therefore be regarded as a merely passive faculty of the mind. The imagination itself does not <sup>produce</sup> possess any rules of synthesis. The synthesis which it performs is devoid of all determination, and that is why Kant calls it a

blind function of the soul. "Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called" (B103)

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of synthesis, (a) synthesis intellectualis and (b) synthesis speciosa. The category taken by itself contains a principle of synthesis intellectualis, that is to say a synthesis which has no reference to intuition or the manifold. The different acts of synthesis are mere functions of thought. If our thinking is to receive a content we must refer the rules of the understanding to intuition, and what is given by it. This is made possible by that faculty of the mind which is immediately connected with intuition, namely, the imagination. The imagination is connected with intuition since it is concerned with sensuous ideas, and is also connected with the understanding since it enables us to connect ideas, and thus possesses a principle of spontaneity.

But because it lacks definite rules of synthesis it cannot produce any knowledge, and is entirely dependant on the understanding <sup>which has to</sup> whose function it is to provide it with rules. "But the imagination enables us to represent to ourselves an object that is not present, if it is to bring this about it must be able to do this."

figurative synthesis, if it be viewed merely in its relation to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must, in order to be distinguished from the merely intellectual combination, be called the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application - and thereby the ground of all its other applications - to the objects of our possible intuition. As figurative, it is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, which is carried out by the understanding alone, without the aid of the imagination". (B 151, 152)

It may seem surprising<sup>ing</sup> that Kant defines the imagination here as the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present. It is however easy to see why he does so. For by attributing to the imagination the power of representing an object that is not itself present, he clearly indicates that the imagination comes between intuition and understanding, and has something in common with both of these. Intuition is entirely passive; it merely receives <sup>representations</sup> ideas which have nothing to do with one another. Now the imagination is said to be a faculty which enables us to represent to ourselves an object that is not present. If it is to bring this about it must be able to do more than merely

31. <sup>representations</sup> ~~connected with intuition and~~  
~~receive ideas.~~ We must have a faculty of connecting different  
~~ideas, and this implies that imagination provides us with a~~  
~~certain principle of synthesis.~~ But this primitive kind of  
synthesis must not be confused with the synthesis which has  
been brought to concepts and determined by rules of the under-  
standing. The synthesis of imagination (synthesis speciosa)  
remains within the sphere of sensibility, and when we say that  
imagination enables us to represent to ourselves an object  
that is not itself present we do not mean that this object is  
an object in the strict sense. All that imagination can do is  
to enable us to call back <sup>representations</sup> ~~sensuous ideas~~ and to combine them,  
and that is why Kant says that it is the faculty of represent-  
ing in intuition an object that is not itself present. It must  
be remembered that Kant holds that the synthesis of ideas and  
the principle which gives unity to it belong to two different  
faculties of the mind. The synthesis is carried out by the  
imagination, while synthetic unity is achieved by the understanding  
and apperception. "The synthesis of ideas rests on imaginat-  
ion; and their synthetic unity, which is required for judgment,  
on the unity of apperception". (B194) On Kant's view these two  
facts admit of no doubt; (a) that the synthesis is actually  
performed by the imagination, and (b) that the synthesis of the  
imagination must be brought to concepts. <sup>determinable by</sup> ~~As long as this is not~~  
<sup>done or the</sup> ~~synthesis is not determined by the understanding and by appercep-~~  
<sup>categories</sup> ~~tion, which is the original source of all its rules of synthesis,~~  
~~there can be no real experience of objects.~~ For if we are to be  
~~represented with an object at all we must be able to refer our~~  
<sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas to one self-consciousness, and that is the work of the~~  
understanding and not of the imagination, which is a merely  
sensuous faculty. It is the sensuous character of the imagination  
which compels us to ascribe the act of synthesis to it, for it  
is due to its possession of this characteristic that the

imagination is immediately connected with intuition and  
 sensibility. This is also the reason why we cannot ascribe the  
 principle of unity to the imagination, for we cannot <sup>bring about</sup> conceive  
 of <sup>real</sup> unity of ideas except by means of <sup>thought</sup> thinking, and our idea of  
 such a unity cannot therefore be derived from a sensuous faculty.  
 "It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination,  
 in order to render its function intellectual. For since the  
 synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears  
 in intuition, as, for instance, in the shape of a triangle, it is,  
 though ~~excluded a priori~~ a priori, always in itself sensible. And while  
 concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play  
 through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception,  
 it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought  
 into relation to sensible intuition". (A124) ~~is to bring~~  
 out the difference. The problem of how ~~understanding~~ intuition and  
 understanding ~~can~~ be made to cooperate has now been solved.  
 Kant's solution is that this is made possible by the imagination.  
 Imagination is the intermediate link between intuition and under-  
 standing, and by it the human mind is able to relate these two  
 otherwise absolutely diverse functions of the soul. It may seem  
 as if Kant could not have raised this problem if he had not  
 believed that intuition, imagination and understanding existed  
 as separate parts of the soul. This, however, as we have already  
 pointed out, is not the case. Kant is convinced that the elements  
 of human knowledge are different from one another, but he does  
 not attribute to them <sup>a separate</sup> <sup>in the human mind</sup> existence, independent of one another; ;  
 indeed he sets out to show that they are dependent on one another  
~~To bring about knowledge, intuition, imagination and understanding have to~~  
~~The very nature of intuition lies in its being related to the~~  
~~understanding and its concepts. The sole function of the under-~~  
~~standing is to provide us with rules for connecting our intuitions~~  
~~And the imagination is grounded in its relation to intuition~~  
~~and understanding. What Kant really believes is that human knowledge~~

To bring about knowledge, intuition, imagination, and understanding have to combine. In fact they always do combine. Knowledge would not exist unless intuition presented us with a given manifold, understanding subjected the given manifold to the rules of synthesis, and imagination related our intuition and understanding to one another. All this takes place at the same time. What is given to the transcendental philosopher is the whole of human knowledge, of which intuition, imagination and understanding are parts. The analysis shews that knowledge actually consists of parts, that it contains within itself elements which must be distinguished from one another. The task which is performed by the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements (the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental ~~analytic~~ Logic) is to bring out the different elements in human knowledge and shew their relation to one another.

... is an intellect of a universal rule which he knows, ...  
... cases rest under them.

... they would ...  
... concrete cases ...

...  
...  
... as regards the form ...  
... rule." (C.G. 4.4. 213A).

To the part of the "Analytic" which follows the "Transcendental Deduction" (Book II of the Transcendental Analytic) Kant gives the heading "The Analytic of Principles". Later he makes an addition to the title and calls it "Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment (or Analytic of Principles)".

To understand why he makes this change we have to consult the two introductory passages in which Kant explains what he means by the term "Judgment" (Urteilkraft).

We are told that Judgment is that faculty of the mind which enables us to decide on whether or not a particular case is an instance of a universal rule. The ability <sup>to do this</sup> cannot be attributed to the understanding: for the understanding can do nothing but produce concepts whether empirical or a priori and all concepts <sup>(1)</sup> are universal rules.

The understanding is not concerned with the sphere of particulars at all and to decide whether a particular case is or is not an instance of a universal rule we require a special faculty, viz. Judgment.

It is Judgment which enables us to subsume particulars under concepts. Kant explains this by examples. A physician may have at his command many excellent pathological rules and yet he may in examining a particular case be incapable of deciding whether or not it is an instance of a universal rule which he knows. A politician may know many rules by heart and yet he may be at a loss to decide which particular cases come under them.

The two men would be lacking in Judgment. They would "comprehend the universal in abstracto and yet not be able to distinguish whether a case in concreto comes under it." (C.of P.R., 175)

We are <sup>now</sup> concerned with Judgment in general (Urteilkraft <sup>über</sup> überhaupt). Judgment in general may be described as

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(1) "A concept is always as regards its form something universal which serves as a rule." (C.of P.R., A.106).

the faculty of subsuming particulars under concepts of deciding whether particular cases are or are not instances of universal rules. As regards empirical concepts it is not difficult to see how subsumption is brought about. We can subsume a particular under a concept only if they have something in common. There must be some sort of homogeneity between particular and universal. In the case of an empirical concept it is easy to understand how such a homogeneity between an individual object and its universal concept can exist. We form our empirical concepts by means of abstraction from individual objects. We compare different individual objects according to their common marks and thus arrive at an empirical concept and it is not surprising that we should recognize in the individual objects something they have in common with the concept of which they are instances, that we should for instance be able to find in an individual dog which we perceive characteristics which enable us to subsume our representation of it under the universal concept of a dog.

But how can the same hold for the concepts with which Transcendental philosophy is concerned, viz. a priori concepts or categories? How can we say that individual objects are instances of categories and how can we ascribe to the mind a faculty of transcendental judgment, a faculty of subsuming given intuitions under categories? Categories have their origin in the mind and are not derived from individual objects by abstraction. How then can anything <sup>in</sup> individual ~~in~~ objects correspond to a category? We have learnt that in order to be presented with an object the human mind must <sup>have a power</sup> possess intuition through which a manifold may ~~be given~~ be given to it and a faculty of thought by means of which the manifold may be determined as an object. Thus the problem arises: How can the a priori concepts of the understanding, the necessary conditions of our knowledge of objects, be applied to intuitions? Is it not absurd to assume that there <sup>should be</sup> ~~is~~ something given in

intuition which corresponds to a pure category? How can we ever say of a particular case that it is an instance of an a priori concept so that it can be subsumed under it? It would be absurd to say of a category that it can be intuited through sensation or that it is contained in appearances and consequently it seems impossible to believe that categories can be applied to appearances.

Kant's solution of the problem is given in the chapter on the Schematism of the pure Concepts of the understanding. His argument may be stated as follows. To make possible the subsumption of appearances under categories there must be a third thing which is in some respects homogeneous with the category <sup>and</sup> in ~~some~~ others with the appearances. <sup>This</sup> The mediating representation (vermittelnde Vorstellung) must be in one respect intellectual {like all the categories} and in another sensible so that it has something in common with given appearances. This representation which mediates between appearances and categories Kant calls <sup>the</sup> "transcendental schema". He describes it as a "transcendental determination of time" ~~and argues as follows.~~

"The concept of the understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense and therefore of the connection of all representations contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category in that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule. But on the other hand it is so far homogeneous with appearance in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by reason of the transcendental determination of time which as the schema of the concepts of the understanding mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category." (C.of P.R., B.177/8).

37.

To understand this we have in the first place to explain what Kant means by the phrase "transcendental determination of time." It has to be noted that he means by it not a property of time in itself but a characteristic which must belong to all our representations so far as they are known to be combined in one time. We know from the Transcendental Deduction that the combination of our representations in time is made possible by the transcendental synthesis of imagination. It is the imagination which enables us to combine the manifold of our representations in one time. But it has also been shown that this combination of representations must be determined by definite rules if the human mind is to become aware of objects. The fundamental problem of the Chapter on the *Schematism* <sup>summarized</sup> may be ~~stated~~ thus. How can we find insensible objects characteristics which make sensible objects conform to pure categories? Kant's answer may be stated as follows. If the imagination in performing the combination of our representations determines itself according to the categories then something will be produced that is on the one hand homogeneous with our sensuous representations, or to put it more simply with sensible objects, and on the other with the categories. This something is the transcendental schema, it is a characteristic <sup>imposed</sup> ~~impressed~~ upon the pure manifold by the imagination. Kant says explicitly that the schema is in itself always a product of imagination (B 179). What is common to the different schemata is that they are all sensuous correlates of the pure categories and that they are produced by the imagination. This may be illustrated by an example. The pure category of ground and consequent is in itself a mere form of thought. It has no ~~reference~~ to time, and by mere analysis of the category we cannot make out whether it will apply to objects in time. We can however introduce the reference to time. This is made possible by imagin-

38. 51  
ation which produces the schema of "necessary succession in time". This schema restricts the category to objects in time. The pure category of ground and consequent receives a more precise meaning. It becomes the schematized category, the concept of a ground which always precedes its consequent in time on the category of cause and effect. The pure category could not become the schematized category unless the imagination produced the schema of necessary succession which provides a sensuous correlate of the pure category and makes <sup>possible</sup> an application of the pure category to appearances, ~~possible~~. The schema of necessary succession expresses that an event A must always be succeeded by the event B and if we find ~~in appearances~~ <sup>in appearances</sup> such a relation, we can regard it as an instance of the rule which is contained in the pure category and <sup>can</sup> ~~are enabled to~~ subsume it under the schematized category of cause and effect.

However difficult it may be to follow Kant's argument in details which is not our business here, it is possible to grasp his main idea.

According to his philosophy the categories are products of pure thought. They are derived from the forms of judgment and <sup>by themselves</sup> have ~~as such~~ no reference whatever to sensuous appearances. To put it in his own language, categories are intellectual and appearances are sensible. Thus the problem must arise, how can we say of appearances that they have a reference to categories? How can the purely intellectual and the purely sensible spheres be united? His solution is that this is made possible by the transcendental schemata which are products of transcendental imagination and contain a sensible and an intellectual element ~~in them~~. They are homogeneous with both categories and appearances and thus make possible the application of categories to appearances <sup>or</sup> ~~on~~ the subsumption of appearances under categories.

The Chapter on the Schematism like the transcendental Deduction remains completely unintelligible as long as we take Kant to believe in the actual existence of different faculties of the mind which perform certain operations successively. What Kant is concerned with in the Critique of Pure Reason is the analysis of what is involved in human knowledge. He does not for a moment believe that we gain knowledge of objects by first apprehending representations in one time by means of intuition, then combining them in this time by means of transcendental imagination and then referring the representations thus <sup>combined to</sup> ~~involved in~~ the categories in order to give unity to the combination imposed upon the manifold.

What he is giving us is not a psychological analysis of what actually takes place when we know an object. He analyses thinking and shows what is involved in it and in the Chapter on <sup>the</sup> Schematism he is concerned with the problem ~~as to~~ <sup>of</sup> how we can regard sensible objects as manifesting the categories or, to put it in technical language, how we can subsume appearances under categories.

We may object to Kant's way of stating his problem. We may disagree with his solution of it and we may be confused about the <sup>clarity</sup> ~~elements~~ of his exposition. But we must not overlook the fact that he is struggling with a real problem, a problem which has occupied philosophy <sup>at all times</sup> ~~throughout the ages~~, the problem of the relation between universals and particulars, between thought and reality.

Disregarding the rest of the "Analytic" I now turn to the "Dialectic". I shall try to bring out its general principles and concern myself specially with <sup>those</sup> ~~these~~ points which are essential to the understanding of the third Critique.

occur one after another in time, but there is no connection between them. Imagination as such is the faculty of the mind which reproduces ideas, and as long as we consider it apart from the understanding the synthesis which is performed by it is without any rules. The understanding, when regarded as a mere faculty of thought, can do no more than produce certain rules which have no reference either to intuition or to the synthesis of imagination. The application of the categories or rules of the understanding to sensibility takes place in such a way that the rules of the understanding determine the synthesis of the imagination. Our ideas no longer merely occur in time or are reproduced indiscriminately, but are made subject to necessary and objective rules. Kant calls this procedure the Schematism of the Categories. Categories are schematised when they are made to determine ideas which are given by intuition and synthetised by the imagination. Such a determination is a determination of time. Intuition presents us with particular ideas which the mind apprehends successively. The understanding produces universal rules which as such have nothing to do with time. Categories are schematised when they are made to subject particular ideas occurring in time to the universal rules which they, as categories, contain. We apply a category to sensible ideas by causing it to determine subjective ideas, given in time, by means of a universal rule which arranges them in that time. In such a way the category assigns to each individual idea its proper place in the time-series. By defining the schema as a transcendental determination Kant indicates clearly what his problem is. For, according to his doctrine, time as such is a mere form of intuition, and is absolutely indeterminate. The categories of the understanding are mere functions, containing rules of determination without any reference to that which is to be determined. If we are to be able to determine intuitions by means of the categories we must

be able to produce schemata which are nothing else than determinations of time, and such a determination would be determination of particulars by means of universals. The schema which, as Kant explains, is a product of the imagination does not contain mere particulars like time, the form of intuition or inner sense, nor is it strictly universal like the category. It must be regarded as an indispensable means to knowledge because without it intuition and understanding could never meet and we could have no knowledge; we should in that case be left with nothing but ideas of which we could never become conscious. "The concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense and therefore of the connection of all ideas contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category which constitutes its unity that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule. But on the other hand it is so far homogeneous with appearances in that time is contained in every empirical idea of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category" (B178, 179.) Kant's doctrine of the schematisation of the concepts of the understanding raises many difficult questions which cannot be adequately dealt with in a short introduction. We have not been able to do more here than give a general account of his argument.

Since all that we intend to do here is to set forth the general principles of Kant's argument in the first Critique, we shall not deal with the remaining pages of the Analytic. We have learned that it is one of the characteristics of Kant's theory of knowledge that he believes that there are different elements

of human knowledge, and that at the same time they cannot be separated from one another. Many of Kant's interpreters have thought that the obscurity of many passages of the Critique of Pure Reason was to be ascribed either to confused thinking on Kant's part or to the clumsy manner in which he sets forth his argument. I do not believe that either of those charges is justified. Still less do I believe that different passages of the Critique contradict one another because they were written at different times. A theory which maintains both that the elements of knowledge are fundamentally different from one another and that they are inseparable must encounter insuperable difficulties of exposition. How could Kant while explaining the essential differences between intuition, imagination and understanding have avoided giving the reader the impression ~~the impression~~ that he believed that they existed separately? Or while establishing the doctrine of their necessary dependence on one another how could he have avoided giving the impression that he thought that they did not really differ from one another? It might be objected to Kant's argument that the three elements of knowledge must either exist separately or else be in no way different from one another. But this would be a criticism of the doctrine and not an interpretation, since Kant would never admit the alternatives suggested. It is true that the Critique of Pure Reason seems to be full of ~~inconsistencies~~ contradictory statements, but the semblance of inconsistency disappears completely as soon as the apparently contradictory statements are considered in the light of Kant's general idea. Kant cannot say more than one thing at a time, and that is precisely what he would have had to do in order to exclude all ambiguity from his argument.

We shall now try to give a general account of the doctrine of the Transcendental Dialectic, the second part of

~~transcendental logic~~. The faculty of the mind with which the Transcendental Dialectic deals is Reason. According to Kant's definition, Reason is a faculty of Principles <sup>(Principles)</sup>, as distinguished from the understanding which is a faculty of rules. Kant describes what he understands by knowledge from Principles in the following manner: "Knowledge from Principles is, therefore, that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts" (E357.) We have seen that, according to Kant, understanding is the faculty of making particulars ~~which are~~ (given in intuition) subject to certain universal rules, <sup>This is made possible by the synthesis of the imagination.</sup> of synthesis. Reason is ~~of the imagination. Reason follows an altogether different principle for it is~~ absolutely different from the understanding, for whereas the ~~the understanding determines the individual or particulars by universal rules~~ understanding merely arranges given intuitions or particulars ~~without being~~ <sup>by means of universal rules and is in no way</sup> concerned with the connection between particulars and universals, Reason demands that the particulars should be entirely determined by universal concepts both with regard to their existence and to their order. Reason presupposes the existence of synthetic knowledge from mere concepts. Such concepts are Principles in the proper sense, whereas the universal concepts and principles (Grundsätze) of the understanding are principles only in a comparative sense. "The understanding can, then, never supply any synthetic <sup>Cognition</sup> ~~modes of know-~~ <sup>cognition</sup> ~~ledge~~ derived from concepts, and it is such ~~modes of knowledge~~ that are properly, without qualification, to be entitled Principles. All universal propositions, however, may be spoken of as 'Principles' in a comparative sense" (E357.)

Reason isolates the concepts of the understanding from intuitions, and is concerned with them only in so far as they are concepts. It is not concerned with them as conditions <sup>s</sup> of experience, that is to say, with their character as universal rules of synthesis which must be applied to intuitions. Reason presupposes that the rules of the understanding as such should come under certain higher Principles. It may perhaps seem strange to find Kant believing that Reason is only concerned with the concepts of the

understanding. It is, however, not very difficult to see why he has to assume this. We have just seen that he holds Reason to be a faculty of Principles, and that he holds a Principle to be distinguished from any other concept in that it enables us to derive particulars from it. By calling something a Principle we imply that it is possible to understand from a universal concept the complete nature of the particulars that fall under it. If such a connection between the particulars and the universal concept is possible at all, then particulars and universals must belong to one sphere. Intuition gives us nothing but particulars. These are given to us from outside, and the mind can determine nothing with regard to their inner nature. Concepts of the understanding merely arrange given particular intuitions and do not also determine them. It is for this reason that we must take it for granted that particulars which are to be absolutely determined by a universal concept or Principle cannot belong to the sphere of intuition, which as such is indeterminable. What may be determined by a universal concept and known by simple derivation from such a concept, must be the concepts of the understanding themselves. As the categories, which are concepts of the understanding, and the Principles, which are concepts of Reason, belong to one sphere it does not seem unreasonable to think it possible that the former should be entirely dependent on the latter. What Reason actually demands is that all knowledge obtained by the understanding shall in the last resort be dependent on certain highest Principles. For only if this is so can the fundamental Idea of Reason, the Idea of a complete system of knowledge, be regarded as capable of being realised. If we consider in its whole range the know-

ledge obtained for us by the understanding, we find that is peculiarly distinctive of Reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematisation, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts in accordance with a single principle. This unity of Reason always presupposes an Idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge - a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts, and which contains the condition that determines a priori for every part its position and relation to other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity of the knowledge obtained by the understanding by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system according to necessary laws" (B 673.)

If we knew nothing about Reason except that it demanded systematic unity, we could infer from this fact alone that it could not be concerned with the world of experience, for the only kind of unity which this world is capable of is the unity which the understanding imposes upon it. ~~Now the idea of a system is quite foreign to the understanding.~~ <sup>It is true that the</sup> rules which the understanding produces contain unity within themselves because the understanding is the faculty of the mind that gives unity to the synthesis of the imagination, but this is not a systematic unity. Understanding can neither produce a system of intuitions ~~since intuitions are merely subsumed under its rules~~, nor can it conceive the idea of <sup>such a</sup> a system of its own concepts. Understanding cannot ask why it must perform the synthesis of intuitions. It performs it in accordance with its own nature. To take an example, understanding presupposes that every given event must depend on something which conditions it. It proceeds from one event to another, and always assumes something else as the condition of the given event. Because of this, it is unable to conceive the idea of a system

of those conditions. It does not occur to it to make them dependent on a first condition. But the existence of a system of conditions depends on the existence of a first condition, something which is unconditioned. That there must be such a first condition is the assumption which <sup>our</sup> Reason makes. Guided by its idea of a system, it infers that what is itself conditioned cannot be the first cause of other conditions. Beyond the world of sense in which every object depends on something else, there must exist something that is independent of all sensible conditions. Understanding goes on indefinitely <sup>in its enquiry into</sup> ~~with its synthesising~~ of conditions, without ever asking whether the totality of conditions can be known. Reason, on the other hand, does not allow of such an infinite regress. It infers that no object could <sup>ever really</sup> be known <sup>that</sup> by us, and in fact no object could exist, unless the whole of its conditions were given. <sup>The inference drawn is this.</sup> ~~and since~~ The totality of conditions cannot be given ~~unless~~ unless there is a first member of the series which does not belong to it. <sup>Therefore the unconditioned must exist.</sup> ~~Reason says it for granted that the unconditioned exists.~~ "The transcendental concept of Reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the ~~conditioned~~ totality of conditions and, conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of Reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned" (E 379.)

There are three different classes of concepts of Reason, or transcendental Ideas, which are all based on the same principle of reasoning. In each case Reason infers that, ~~since~~ since the conditioned is given, the totality of its conditions, and therefore the unconditioned, must also be given. Thus there arise these three Ideas; (a) the Idea of an absolute condition

of the knowing subject, an Idea of the soul as the absolute condition of all acts of thinking; (b) the Idea of the absolute conditions of the object (the world), the Cosmological Ideas; and (c) the Idea of an absolute condition of all things-in-general, the Idea of God. We thus have three different sciences; Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology and Rational Theology. The task which the transcendental philosopher sets himself is to discover whether Reason is justified in its claims, and whether Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology and Rational Theology, all of which depend on the validity of the concepts of Reason, are based upon sound principles.

We may begin with Kant's criticism of Rational Psychology. Rational Psychology, which professes to be a science, is, he says, actually based on the single proposition 'I think'. (E 400) Thinking, if it is to be thinking at all, must emanate from an original subject. All acts of thinking must <sup>belong</sup> ~~belong~~ to one original subject that thinks. The subject of thinking must be substance; that is to say, in relation to it all acts of thinking are mere accidents which emanate from it and are produced by it. All acts of thinking are conditioned, and they depend for their existence on the self which thinks, and which, as their original source, is unconditioned. ~~Thinking depends on our being aware of the fact that we think, and that all thinking belongs to the one subject.~~ That the Idea of the self to which all thinking has to be referred is possible, and in fact necessary, proves that the manifold which is thought must proceed from a <sup>which is simple</sup> simple soul. The soul as the subject of thinking is thus (a) substance, (b) simple, (c) numerically identical as regards the different times in which it exists and (d) numerically identical in relation to possible objects in space. (E 402)

What has the transcendental philosopher to say to such

an argument? He does not deny that the proposition 'I think something' is altogether meaningless unless what is thought can be referred to an original, identical self. He knows, however, that the necessity of referring all acts of thinking to an identical self-consciousness proves only that all concepts must be grounded in transcendental apperception. <sup>Now</sup> ~~But~~ transcendental apperception and the concepts of the understanding which are derived from it are, as has been shown in the Analytic, mere functions, <sup>and these, no</sup> ~~and he knows~~ <sup>has also been shown, can by themselves determine no object.</sup> ~~that no object can be given to us by means of mere functions of synthesis.~~ Transcendental Psychology is thus, right in asserting that <sup>could</sup> no object ~~can~~ be known by us unless we <sup>were</sup> are able to unite our <sup>representations</sup> ideas in the one self-consciousness. This, however, does not imply that we <sup>should be</sup> are capable of determining an object by means of mere <sup>thought</sup> thinking. To see this, we need only remember that we ~~were~~ were able to prove the validity of the concepts of the understanding and of apperception, on which they all depend as the fundamental principle of unity, by showing them to be functions necessary for the building up of a world of appearances, that is to say, of such a world as is presented to us by given intuitions and the synthetic functions which connect them. Categories are valid, because they are necessary conditions of our being able to unite our intuitions in one self-consciousness, and because but for such a faculty we should be unable to have objects of experience. Rational Psychology commits a fundamental error in thinking it possible to separate thought from intuition. It takes away from <sup>the</sup> acts of <sup>thought</sup> thinking the only purpose which they have, namely, that of synthesising intuitions. It infers rightly that <sup>all</sup> <sup>thought</sup> acts of ~~thinking~~ must be referred to an identical self-consciousness, but, having isolated acts of thinking from intuitions, it infers wrongly that it is possible to determine the original source of <sup>thought</sup> ~~thinking~~ as an independent object. It fancies that in this way it has acquired knowledge

of the soul as an object, but in this it is entirely wrong. "I do not know an object merely in that I think, but only in so far as I determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists" (B 406) The argument which Transcendental Psychology employs falls to the ground because no account is taken of the fact that in order to know an object, whether an object of outer experience (a physical object) or an object of inner experience (the human soul, the object which Transcendental Psychology seeks to determine), we must employ two different faculties of the mind, intuition which gives us a manifold to be determined and understanding which gives us rules for the determination of the manifold. It has been stated in the Analytic that the reason why the human mind cannot know things in themselves is that we cannot know objects by means of mere thinking. We can see now that for the same reason we cannot know ourselves as we really are but only as we appear. It has been set forth as a general truth that "to think an object and to know an object are by no means the same thing" (B 146), and we now learn that this applies to every object of experience, to the soul as well as to other objects. The agreement between Kant's argument in his criticism of the Paralogisms (A 341-405, restated more briefly in B 406-432) and his argument in the Deduction can be seen in the following passage which belongs to the Deduction. "Now in order to know ourselves there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion) the determination of my ~~existence~~ existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold which I combine is given in inner intuition. Accordingly I have

no knowledge, <sup>of myself</sup> as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of the self is, <sup>therefore</sup> ~~thus~~, far from being knowledge of the self, notwithstanding all the categories which [are being employed to] constitute the thought of an object in general through combination of the manifold in one apperception. Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require besides the thought of an object in general (in the category) an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for knowledge of myself I require besides the consciousness of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought. I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its intuition were intellectual" (B157-159)

The only point in this passage which needs explanation is Kant's emphasis on time. The reason for this emphasis is that the object in question is the self, and that the self is an object not of outer but of inner sense. Now, according to the doctrine of the Transcendental Aesthetic, time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever, whereas space is the formal a priori condition only of outer appearances. (B 50-51) The reason why all appearances have to conform to time is that our becoming aware of an appearance takes place in time. Moreover, we must remember that in the passage of the Critique which deals with the Schematism of the Categories Kant explains that the

categories as such are mere logical functions, and that they receive their meaning as conditions of experience from their applicability to time as the form of inner intuition. That is why the categories must be schematised, a schema being, according to Kant's definition, nothing but a transcendental determination of time. ~~In examination of Kant's criticism of the Paralogisms shows at once that his argument there is based upon the principles set forth in the Analytic. He explains once more that the understanding depends on intuition, and that mere functions of thought can produce no knowledge, whether of our own existence or of other objects of experience, since knowledge requires both universal concepts and particulars which are given. The general principle is that by means of the understanding alone, that is to say, by means of a merely determinative faculty, we can know nothing, and that our being conscious of our faculty of thinking does not give us knowledge of ourselves since for self-knowledge we require knowledge of intuition in the same way as we do for other objects. "The object is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self, that is of my inner intuition (in as far as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thought)".~~

(B 407)

We may conclude our exposition of the Paralogism of Pure Reason by quoting two passages which show clearly the method applied by Kant to refute the arguments propounded by Transcendental Psychology. "The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general yields nothing whatsoever toward the knowledge of myself as an object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object". (B 409) "The unity of consciousness which underlies the categories is here mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of substance is applied to

it. But this unity is only unity in thought, by which alone no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied. Consequently this subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories." (B 421)

We <sup>may</sup> <sup>turn to</sup> ~~must~~ now examine Kant's doctrine of the Cosmological Ideas. Kant calls these 'Antinomies', because it turns out that Reason never conceives a cosmological Idea without at the same time conceiving another Idea which asserts something ~~which~~ <sup>is</sup> diametrically opposed to what has been asserted by the first. The purpose of a cosmological Idea is to subject the objective synthesis to the Principle of absolute unity. An objective synthesis is a synthesis concerned with the objective conditions of a given appearance. It enquires into the conditions which have <sup>made</sup> possible the given appearance. Kant calls it a regressive synthesis. He describes the way in which Reason argues about this type of synthesis, and the conclusion to which it comes. A conditioned appearance, that is to say, an appearance which depends on the conditions which have brought it into existence, could not possibly exist unless all its conditions had existed prior to it. Further, the series of conditions cannot be infinite, because an infinite series, that is to say, a series which contains an infinite number of members each of which depends on something else as its condition, could not be completed in a finite time. It follows that we have to presuppose the existence of a first member of the series which depends on nothing else and which can therefore be called the unconditioned. In such a way Reason conceives the Idea that the world must have an absolute beginning in time, and must also be limited as regards space. (Thesis of the first Antinomy, B 454)

For unless there <sup>existed</sup> ~~does exist~~ an absolute limit in space and in

time beyond which the regressive synthesis <sup>did not</sup> need <sup>to</sup> go, no finite part of space or of time could exist. The possibility of a regressive synthesis depends on the possibility of reaching a <sup>first</sup> last point. The synthesis cannot go on for ever. ~~An infinite regress is impossible.~~ It is comparatively easy to understand this as regards time, for it is easy to see that "the transcendental Idea of the absolute totality of the series of conditions of any given conditioned refers only to all past time; and in conformity with the Idea of Reason past time as condition of the given is necessarily thought as being given in its entirety" (B 438-439). We see here that it is natural <sup>for</sup> Reason <sup>to</sup> ~~that~~ should infer that, since every given moment depends on the time that has passed, the whole of past time must be given, and the time series must be finite. [It is much more difficult to see <sup>why Reason should believe</sup> the ~~grounds for Reason's belief~~ that the same applies to space, <sup>seeing that</sup> for the parts of space coexist and <sup>thus</sup> ~~consequently~~ do not belong to a series <sup>at all</sup>, but constitute a mere aggregate of coexisting parts. It appears, however, that although the parts of space exist simultaneously the synthesis which apprehends them is successive, that is to say, it occurs in time. If this synthesis of the different parts of space is ever to be completed, we must set a limit to it, <sup>this</sup> and that is why Reason ~~must~~ presupposes that every part of space is conditioned by all the other parts, and <sup>assumes</sup> ~~must~~ <sup>the existence of</sup> require a first part of space at which the regressive synthesis can come to an end. "In respect of limitation the advance in space is thus also a regress, and the transcendental Idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of conditions likewise applies to space. I can as legitimately enquire regarding the ~~totality~~ absolute totality of appearance in space as of that in past time" (B 440).

It is a remarkable fact that Reason, after having thus proved that space and time must be limited, can prove equally convincingly that this cannot be true. Reason conceives

but an empty time would have no character by which we could distinguish it as the antecedent premises to some other.

54.

a second Idea which is the direct opposite of the first, and sets itself to prove its validity, that is to say, to prove that the world can have no absolute beginning in time and that space cannot be limited. The argument runs as follows. There can be no absolute beginning in time, for if we assumed such a beginning we should have to allow of the existence of an empty time, and such an empty time would be absolutely indeterminate, that is to say, the difference between being and non-being would not apply to it. Now, if such an empty time existed nothing could ever come into being, for by the phrase 'coming into being' we mean that a thing which exists at a given moment did not exist at a previous moment. The Idea of an empty space is equally absurd, for if we assumed that the world was limited by empty space, then the relation of the world to that empty space would be a relation of it to no object at all. "But such a relation, and consequently the limitation of the world by empty space, is nothing. The world cannot, therefore, be limited in space; that is, it is infinite in respect of extension" (B 457)

We need not examine each of the Antinomies in detail, for in each of them Kant is concerned with the same fact, the fact that our Reason finds it impossible to allow that the regressive synthesis should be either limited or unlimited. Reason proves that space and time are limited, that every physical body consists of simple parts, that causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only kind of causality that exists but that there is also another causality, that of freedom, and that there exists an absolutely necessary being. <sup>And then</sup> ~~The curious fact is that~~ having proved these propositions Reason <sup>goes on to</sup> ~~can equally well~~ prove their opposites; that space and time are unlimited, that physical bodies are infinitely divisible, that causality in accordance with laws of nature is the only kind of causality that exists and that an

absolutely necessary being exists ~~nowhere~~ in the world ~~or outside~~ of it.

If we are to solve the <sup>a</sup>Antinomies of <sup>b</sup>Pure Reason we must take account of two indisputable facts; (a) that the <sup>c</sup>Cosmological Ideas as set forth in the Antinomies are based upon erroneous assumptions, for otherwise they could not contradict one another, and (b) that the <sup>d</sup>Cosmological Ideas have some meaning, for they are necessary products of Reason, as the categories are of the understanding, and as such must be capable of legitimate employment. <sup>(i)</sup>

When we examine the <sup>e</sup>Cosmological Ideas we discover that what is common to them all is that they consider the regressive synthesis as if it were itself given, <sup>From the fact that</sup> and ~~as such~~ the totality of this synthesis is <sup>it is inferred</sup> required ~~they infer~~ that its object, ~~namely~~ <sup>Now we need only</sup> the world, must be either finite or infinite. ~~We must~~ remember here that, according to the principles of transcendental philosophy, <sup>regarded as</sup> the world cannot be ~~held to be~~ a world of things in themselves, that is to say, ~~an objective~~ world which exists independently of the mind that knows it. The world is mere appearance, and when we enquire into the conditions of such an appearance we are not enquiring into objects which exist independently of the regressive synthesis. The conditions cannot be separated from the mind which <sup>enquiries into them</sup> performs the synthesis. If the world of objects existed independently of our mind, we should be right in inferring that conditioned objects could not exist but for the existence of an unconditioned. <sup>But this does not hold for mere appearances.</sup> ~~We know, however, that the world does not exist independently~~

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<sup>(i)</sup> A subjective deduction of Ideas must be possible (B 383)  
 An Idea is, in accordance with the original laws of Reason, a quite necessary product of Reason. (B 396) <sup>positively</sup>  
 They are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very nature of our Reason (B 397)

~~of our mind.~~

The mistake which is made ~~is the same~~ in both the Thesis and the Antithesis. <sup>is the same</sup> In the Thesis Reason supposes that it is possible to determine the world as an object of finite magnitude because the principle of synthesis seems to necessitate such an assumption, and in the Antithesis Reason supposes that it is possible to determine the world as an object of infinite magnitude because the principle of synthesis considered under a different aspect seems to necessitate that assumption. <sup>The</sup> ~~The reason~~ ~~Antithesis does because no account is taken~~ why Reason becomes involved in the Antinomies is that it takes ~~no account~~ of the fact that "the series of conditions is only to be met with in the regressive series, not in the world of appearance viewed as a thing given in and by itself, prior to all regress<sup>o</sup>." (P 533)

We can now see that the question whether the world possesses finite or infinite magnitude is altogether meaningless. ~~The world cannot possess any magnitude at all, whether finite or infinite, because it is not a thing in itself.~~ Since the world is given to us only in the empirical regress which enquires into its conditions, and since this regress is never given in absolute completeness either as finite or infinite, the question as to whether <sup>as such</sup> the world <sup>cannot be asked</sup> is finite or infinite ~~is based on an erroneous assumption.~~

We have <sup>seen</sup> ~~seen~~ that Kant <sup>considers</sup> ~~thinks~~ it <sup>quite</sup> impossible that <sup>Reason</sup> ~~Ideas~~ should be conceived <sup>by Reason</sup> fortuitously, and that they should be of no value for human knowledge. <sup>To determine their</sup> ~~They must have some~~ significance, <sup>is therefore our next business.</sup> ~~and transcendental philosophy, after having shown how these Ideas must not be employed, is called upon to discover what use Reason can make of them.~~ <sup>Now as has been shown</sup> ~~It has already been explained~~ that the principle which underlies all Ideas of Reason is the

principle of totality, <sup>The</sup> ~~and that~~ Cosmological Ideas apply this  
 general principle to our enquiry into the conditions of a given  
 appearance. <sup>In conceiving a cosmological Idea we</sup> ~~A Cosmological Idea~~ assumes that all the conditions  
 of a given appearance must themselves be given. <sup>This, as we have</sup> ~~Now it can be~~  
<sup>shown that in making this erroneous</sup> ~~shown that in making this~~ assumption, Reason mistakes the principle  
 of totality. This principle was given to <sup>human</sup> Reason, not to lead it  
 to imagine that all the conditions of an object were given to it,  
 but to stimulate it to try to find all the conditions of its  
 object. What we are expected to do is to try to discover the total-  
 ity of conditions, but this does not mean that they are given to  
 us, nor even that we shall ever be able to fulfil Reason's demand.  
 The Idea of a totality is an ideal maximum which can never be  
 attained in the sensible world. It is a task set to us, <sup>(aufgegeben)</sup> and not  
 something that is given to us. <sup>(gegeben)</sup> "Since no maximum of the  
 series of conditions in a sensible world, regarded as a thing in  
 itself, is given through the cosmological principle of totality,  
 but can only be set as a task that calls for regress in the  
 series of conditions, the principle of pure Reason has to be amended  
 in these terms; and it then preserves its validity, not indeed as  
 the axiom that we think the totality as actually in the object,  
 but as a problem for the understanding, and therefore for the  
 subject, to undertake and carry on, in accordance with the complete-  
 ness prescribed by the Idea, the regress in the series of conditions  
 of any given conditioned." (B 537)

We misunderstand an Idea of Reason as long as we take  
 it to be a constitutive Principle, that is to say, a Principle  
 which would enable us to determine an object. The only kind of  
 object that we can determine is an object belonging to the world  
 of sense, and therefore conditioned. <sup>to which</sup> ~~Since~~ the object of the Ideas  
<sup>is the unconditioned,</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>As such</sup> can never be determined by us, and Ideas  
 of Reason must be regarded as regulative Principles or ideal

*It is true that to conceive such Ideas we have to*  
 rules. ~~By positing such Ideas we transcend the world of sense,~~  
~~but we do so not because we seek to gain objective knowledge~~  
~~of transcendent objects, but because the Ideas <sup>are</sup> give us a rule which~~  
~~enables us to~~ proceed from one condition to another without ever recog-  
 nising any one of the series of conditions as an absolute condition.  
 The transcendent Idea proves its efficacy in the sensible world  
~~and its condition. For it makes us realise that the unconditioned~~  
~~by enabling us to realise that its object, namely the unconditioned,~~  
 which we must necessarily think, can never be found in the world  
 of experience. "This Idea of Reason can therefore do no more than  
 prescribe a rule to the regressive synthesis in the series of  
 conditions; and in accordance with this rule the synthesis must  
 proceed from the conditioned, through all subordinate conditions,  
 up to the unconditioned. Yet it can never reach this goal, for  
 the absolutely unconditioned is not to be met with in expe-  
 rience" (B 538)

*will be obvious*  
 It is plain that Kant's doctrine of Ideas is very  
 closely connected with the doctrine of the Transcendental

Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Our examination of  
~~these~~ passages ~~preceding the Dialectic~~ has made it clear that the  
 essence of his argument is that all human knowledge contains  
 two elements, intuition and understanding; and that it is because  
 of ~~that~~ <sup>this</sup> that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves.  
 Further, <sup>also</sup> we have seen that Kant shows in the Aesthetic and Analytic  
 that the supposition of the existence of <sup>such</sup> a world of things in  
 themselves is necessary. This becomes even more obvious in the  
 Dialectic, for the faculty of the mind which the Dialectic  
 investigates is Reason, and Reason according to its very nature  
 must transcend the world of mere appearances, ~~the world which~~  
~~cannot be known by us by means of mere thinking. Reason must~~  
~~It~~ conceive the Idea of a purely rational world, a transcendent world  
 of things in themselves. The impossibility of our having any

*a word*

objective knowledge of such objects follows from the argument of the Aesthetic and Analytic, and in the Dialectic Kant can do no more than confirm it. But this negative criticism of the Ideas of Reason does not exempt him from his obligation to determine the real meaning of the Ideas. So far we have been concerned chiefly with the Cosmological Ideas, and it will therefore be useful if we now examine the passage in which Kant gives a general survey of his doctrine of Ideas and explains that all Ideas are to be regarded as regulative principles. He explains this at great length in an appendix to the Dialectic. <sup>in a</sup> ~~The passage with which we are concerned is~~ headed "The Regulatve Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason". (B 670-696) <sup>which is contained in an appendix to the Dialectic.</sup> ~~If our only purpose were to understand the main general principles of Kant's argument, we should not need to concern ourselves at all with this passage, for in it Kant merely repeats some things which we know already; that Ideas are necessarily produced by Reason, that we cannot do without them and that an Idea can be approached by us but never fully realised. In spite of this element of repetition, it will not be wasted time to examine this passage, since the different forms in which Kant puts his argument and the abundance of examples by which he illustrates it may throw further light on his meaning.~~

*Kant's argument may be paraphrased thus.*

~~Kant says that~~ Reason is never in immediate relation to an object; its immediate relationship is to the understanding. That is why its concepts, the transcendental Ideas, never <sup>admit</sup> ~~allow~~ of any constitutive employment. They have, however, an important, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge as upon their point of intersection. This point is a mere Idea, a focus

imaginarius from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed. None the less it serves to give to these concepts the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension. (B 671-672) The illusion with regard to the Ideas, that is to say our belief that they enable us to know a real object outside the field of possible empirical knowledge, is here compared by Kant with the illusion which arises when we believe that objects reflected in a mirror are in reality behind the mirror. The illusion is necessary in both cases, in the one case if we are to direct the understanding beyond every given experience and thereby secure its greatest possible extension and in the other if we are to see besides the objects which lie before our eyes also those which lie at a distance behind our back. (B 673)

Kant goes on to <sup>show</sup> explain that Reason employs Ideas merely hypothetically. Ideas are merely regulative, not constitutive, principles. Reason aims at the systematic unity of the knowledge possessed by the understanding, but this is only a projected unity. It is to be regarded not as given but only as a projected unity. (B 675)

In another passage Kant declares that the things of the sensible world must be ~~thought~~ only be considered as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence. The Idea is thus only a heuristic and not an <sup>as</sup> extensive concept. (B 698-699) Ideas are subjective principles which are derived, not from the constitution of an object, but from the interest of Reason in a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object. They are to be treated as mere maxims. (B 694) The answer to the question whether we are justified in assuming the existence of a divine being depends on what we mean by this. For, on the one hand, we have no right to assume it absolutely (suppositio absoluta), but on the other we have a sufficient ground for assuming it in a relative sense (suppositio<sup>io</sup> relativa). The Idea of God is necessary

relatively to our Reason and to the principle of unity after which Reason is seeking in its empirical employment (B 703-704).

It is unnecessary for us to explain or even to enumerate the different arguments which Kant puts forward as illustrations of his main <sup>doctrine</sup> ~~idea~~. For it is clear that what he seeks to prove is the same in every case, namely, that there is a fundamental difference between Ideas regarded as constitutive principles, that is, as principles capable of giving us knowledge of <sup>things in themselves</sup> ~~an absolute object~~, and Ideas regarded as merely regulative principles, that is, as principles <sup>is</sup> necessary only in relation to the mind of the knowing subject. We have just seen that Kant distinguishes between supposita absoluta and supposita relativa. He says of this distinction: "We here come upon a distinction bearing on the procedure of thought in dealing with one and the same assumption, a distinction which is somewhat subtle but of great importance in transcendental philosophy". This is a very interesting statement, for it shows <sup>(a)</sup> ~~not only~~ that Kant attaches great importance to the distinction between the constitutive and the regulative employment of Ideas, <sup>and (b)</sup> ~~but also~~ that he is fully aware of the fact that acceptance of this distinction will depend <sup>upon</sup> ~~on~~ acceptance of the fundamental transcendental principles. <sup>whole</sup> Kant's doctrine of Ideas, and the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles on which it rests, <sup>isolated from its context</sup> ~~cannot be taken out of its context~~. It is part of a philosophy which ~~XXXX~~ regards human knowledge as limited to empirical objects, but which at the same time believes that the world of experience <sup>can be</sup> ~~is not~~ the only world that exists and <sup>must be assumed</sup> ~~indeed that we must assume~~ the existence of another world. <sup>This is a doctrine that is peculiar to</sup> ~~Now the only philosophy which believes this is the~~ transcendental philosophy. Every other philosophical system would believe either that the Ideas gave us knowledge of real objects or that they were devoid of all meaning. Empiricism

would hold the latter view, dogmatism the former. It is only if we assume the transcendental principles that we can deny both views, and can hold that the Ideas of Reason <sup>do not give us any</sup> ~~are given to us, not~~ for knowledge of <sup>things in themselves, and yet</sup> ~~absolute objects, but~~ to enable us to make our enquiry into natural objects subject to the Ideas of objects belonging to a supernatural world.

On a superficial view Kant's doctrine of Ideas appears to be full of contradictions, and the appearance of inconsistency <sup>persists</sup> ~~lasts~~ as long as isolated statements are contrasted with one another and no account is taken of the doctrine as a whole. For instance, we may ask the question: "Are transcendental Ideas for Kant subjective principles?" On this point <sup>we are told</sup> ~~Kant tells us~~ that Ideas are merely subjective principles (B 644), and that an objective deduction of them is impossible because they have no reference to an object. (E 393) Yet in another passage <sup>Kant</sup> he maintains that Ideas possess indeterminate objective validity (B 691-692), and we find other <sup>passages</sup> ~~statements~~ in which he <sup>attributes</sup> ~~attributes~~ objective validity to them. <sup>in B 679</sup> For instance, ~~he declares, that the~~ <sup>he argues that the law of Reason, according to which we seek for</sup> ~~law of Reason, according to which we seek for principles of unity,~~ <sup>principles of unity, is necessary because without it we should have</sup> ~~is necessary, since without it we should have no Reason at all,~~ <sup>no Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of</sup> ~~and without Reason no coherent employment of the understanding,~~ <sup>the understanding would be possible, and consequently we should</sup> ~~and without any coherent employment of the understanding no~~ <sup>have no criterion of empirical truth.</sup> ~~criterion of empirical truth, and therefore we have no option~~ <sup>save to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively</sup> ~~valid and necessary.~~ <sup>between the different statements we have mentioned</sup> ~~All semblance of inconsistency disappears,~~ <sup>the argument is as a whole</sup> however, when ~~these statements are considered in the light of the~~ <sup>Kant's point is that</sup> ~~argument as a whole.~~ <sup>a kind of</sup> Kant believes that a specific objective validity must be ascribed to the Ideas and to the principle of systematic unity on which they are based. If we <sup>is meant</sup> ~~understand~~ by an objective concept, only a concept which enables <sup>the mind</sup> ~~us~~ to determine

*a. definite.*

an object, that is to say, if we ascribe objective validity only to constitutive principles of the understanding, then the Ideas *must be called merely subjective principles* are subjective. But if we give the name of objective principle also to regulative principles, that is to say, to principles which are necessarily produced by Reason and without which our knowledge (which contains Reason as a necessary element) would be incomplete, then the Ideas are objective. *important* How high ~~a value~~ *think* Kant sets on his distinction between categories (concepts of the understanding) and Ideas (concepts of Reason) may be seen from the following passage: "The discrimination of Ideas, *i.e.* pure concepts of Reason, from the categories or pure concepts of the understanding as cognitions of an entirely different kind, origin and employment is a matter of such importance for the foundation of a science which is to contain the system of these a priori cognitions that without such a severance Metaphysics is absolutely impossible or <sup>is</sup> at best a disorderly and bungled attempt to patch up a house of cards without knowledge of the materials with which one is occupied and of their being fitted to one purpose or another. If the Critique of Pure Reason had <sup>done</sup> no more than merely demonstrate this distinction it would have by this alone contributed more towards the elucidation of our concept (of Metaphysics) and the guidance of natural science in the field of Metaphysics than all other fruitless efforts to treat the transcendental problems of Reason satisfactorily, efforts which have been made at all times by people who did not even divine that they were in a field quite different from the one to which understanding belongs, and who therefore named concepts of the understanding and of Reason in the same breath as if they were of one and the same kind".

While dealing with the Appendix to the Transcend-

<sup>disregarded</sup>  
 ental Dialectic we ~~omitted~~ a passage which we ~~shall not deal with~~,  
<sup>as</sup> since the problem discussed in it will be raised again in the  
 Critique of Judgment. Since, <sup>later that</sup> as we shall see, Kant's solution of  
 the problem in the Third Critique differs from the one which he  
 offers here, <sup>and</sup> it is important that we should be familiar with his  
 original solution. <sup>Kant's problem might be stated thus: Can natural science</sup>  
<sup>makes use</sup> His problem is; ~~can natural science make use~~  
 of the Idea of the systematic unity of nature, and if so <sup>how?</sup> ~~in what~~  
<sup>way?</sup> His argument runs as follows. Reason is the faculty <sup>that</sup>  
<sup>the</sup> ~~derives~~ particulars from universal concepts. With regard to these,  
<sup>possibilities here</sup> ~~two different situations are possible~~; either the universal concept  
 is already known, in which case all we need do is to subsume the  
 particular under the universal concept, or the universal is not  
 given but only assumed, <sup>that is to say,</sup> ~~in the latter case~~ the particular is ~~not~~  
 certain, and the universal is still a problem, a mere idea; <sup>but</sup> we have  
<sup>function there is to examine</sup> ~~to scrutinize~~ several particular instances with a view to bring-  
 ing them under a universal rule. We are here concerned with a  
 hypothetical employment <sup>for</sup> of Reason, ~~because~~ the Ideas which are  
 involved are merely problematic concepts. Kant goes on to <sup>show</sup> ~~explain~~  
 that the systematic unity of Reason is a merely logical principle,  
<sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ only function ~~of which~~ is to assist the understanding by  
 means of Ideas in those cases in which the understanding cannot  
 by itself establish rules. By assuming that the ~~nature of the~~  
<sup>particular</sup> constitution of the objects ~~or the nature of the understanding~~  
~~that knows them is in itself determined to systematic unity~~ we  
 should change a logical principle into a transcendental principle;  
 that is to say, we should believe that the principle was valid,  
 not only subjectively or in relation to human Reason which  
 necessarily seeks the systematic unity of concepts, but also  
 objectively, as a principle of the objects. <sup>Now</sup> On second thoughts it  
<sup>But</sup> appears ~~however~~ that Reason cannot assume a logical principle of  
 systematic unity without at the same time assuming a transcendental

principle. Reason can employ its logical principle only on condition that it presupposes that natural <sup>objects</sup> ~~beings~~ themselves belong to a system, or that Nature itself follows a principle of systematic unity. <sup>and this is clearly an a priori transcendental principle</sup> ~~Such an assumption rests upon an a priori~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~transcendental principle; it cannot be derived from empirical~~ knowledge of natural objects. "Nor can we say that Reason, while proceeding in accordance with its own principles, has arrived at knowledge of this unity through observation of the accidental constitution of nature" (B 679) ~~The law of Reason which prompts it to seek for unity is necessary since without it we should have no Reason at all, and consequently neither any coherent employment of the understanding nor any sufficient criterion of empirical truth. We must, therefore, presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.~~

This transcendental principle <sup>is, in fact, always</sup> has been employed by philosophers of nature and natural scientists ~~at all times~~, although sometimes without their being conscious of it. ~~That it has always~~ <sup>This</sup> ~~been assumed~~ may be seen from the fact that it has always been <sup>held</sup> ~~held~~ that nature acts in accordance with three fundamental laws, <sup>each of which implies</sup> ~~and that these three laws imply~~ the transcendental law of the systematic unity of nature. (a) <sup>The first law expresses itself in the assumption</sup> ~~It has always been held that the~~ <sup>that the</sup> ~~various species~~ <sup>in nature</sup> must be regarded merely as different determinations of a few genera, <sup>The</sup> ~~and that~~ the apparently infinite variety of natural objects need not prevent us from assuming that behind this variety there is a unity of fundamental properties. ~~It has even been supposed that~~ <sup>of species are</sup> ~~Behind all these varieties, there is only~~ <sup>a few genera and these can ultimately be reduced to one highest genus</sup> ~~one genus.~~ This is the principle of homogeneity. The rule which is laid down by it is: "Entium varietates non esse multiplicanda".

(b) <sup>This</sup> ~~The~~ logical principle of genera is balanced by <sup>a</sup> ~~another~~ principle which calls for multiplicity and diversity in things notwithstanding their agreement under the same genus. In following this

principle we suppose that there is an endless heterogeneity of things, that when we begin with the genus and descend to the manifold which is contained under it we shall find an infinite number of species and sub-species and ~~shall never be~~ <sup>we must</sup> ~~able to~~ <sup>never</sup> regard any species as the lowest. This is the principle of specification, and it can be formulated thus; "Entium varietates non esse temere minuendas". (c) The third logical principle which <sup>is</sup> Reason ~~necessarily~~ assumes is the principle of continuity, the principle that the original genera are not isolated from one another. It may be formulated thus; "Non ~~datum~~ <sup>detur</sup> vacuum formarum". The manifold genera are simply divisions of one single highest and universal genus, ~~and all~~ <sup>and</sup> the different species ~~border~~ <sup>continue</sup> upon one another, admitting of no transition per saltum from one to another, but only of a transition through a continuous series of lesser degrees of difference. It ~~can be seen~~ <sup>with the plain</sup> that the principle of continuity, another name for which is the principle of affinity, mediates between the principle of homogeneity <sup>or the principle of genera</sup> and the principle of specification or variety.

~~These~~ <sup>These</sup> three principles are as such merely logical principles, <sup>i.e.</sup> they are applied for the sake of the logical division of concepts. <sup>And yet they are grounded in</sup> ~~But they presuppose~~ three different transcendental or a priori principles. "If therefore the logical principle of genera is to be applied to nature - - - it presupposes a transcendental principle. And in accordance with this latter homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of possible experience - - - ; for in the absence of homogeneity, no empirical concepts, and therefore no experience, would be possible" (B 68a) "The law of specification cannot be derived from experience, which can never open to our view such extensive prospects. Empirical specification soon comes to a stop in the distinction of the manifold, if it be not guided by the ante-

cedent law of specification which, as a principle of Reason, leads us to seek always further differences and to suspect their existence even when the senses are unable to disclose them." (B 685) "This logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum) presupposes, however, a transcendental law (lex continui in natura) without which the former law would only lead the understanding astray, causing it to follow a path which is perhaps quite contrary to that prescribed by nature itself. For if it rested on empirical grounds, it would come later than the system, whereas in actual fact it has itself given rise to all ~~that~~ that is systematic in our knowledge of nature" (B 688)

*See from this*  
We ~~learn here~~ that Kant has no doubt that the principles of Reason which presuppose the systematic unity of nature are genuine transcendental principles, that they are prior to experience and conditions of it. *And yet it must not be forgotten* ~~it must be noted, however,~~ that *he believes also* he is ~~as~~ firmly convinced that as principles of Reason they can be nothing more than merely regulative principles.

*9. is*  
In the passage headed "The Ideas in general", Kant ~~sets~~ *an account of* forth his views on Plato's doctrine of Ideas (B368 et seq.) *he takes B368 to mean*  
He begins by explaining what ~~Plato understands~~ by an Idea.

"For Plato Ideas are archetypes of the things themselves and not in the manner of the categories, merely keys to possible experiences". (B 370) *he is saying more* Plato, ~~is~~ well aware that our faculty of knowledge feels a need much higher than that of merely spelling out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them as experience. (<sup>s</sup> Erscheinungen nach synthetischer Einheit zu buchstabieren, um sie als Erfahrungen lesen zu können.) *needed* He ~~knows~~ that our Reason according to its *had to* nature ~~must~~ transcend the bounds of experience. (B 370-371)

The Ideas <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ by no means mere fictions of the brain. (Hirn-geespinnste). Kant then shows that Plato finds the chief instances of his Ideas in the practical field, and having dealt with Plato's moral Ideas and expressed his agreement with Plato's account of them, he goes on as follows; "But it is not only where human Reason exhibits genuine causality and where Ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects) namely in the moral sphere, but also in regard to nature itself, that Plato rightly discerns clear proof of an origin from Ideas. A plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement of the cosmos - presumably therefore the entire natural world - clearly show that they are possible only according to Ideas and that though no single creature in the conditions of its individual existence coincides with the Idea of <sup>that</sup> which is most perfect in its kind - - - these Ideas are none the less completely determined in the supreme Understanding, each as an individual and each as unchangeable, and are the original causes of things". We should, however, be mistaken if we inferred from these words that in his own doctrine of Ideas Kant showed the same appreciation of the concept of a supreme understanding which <sup>would</sup> create natural objects. according to Ideas. In fact he scarcely mentions this concept, and the only indication of his having approved of it, or at least of his not having thought it unreasonable, is the fact that he criticises the physico-theological proof of the existence of God which is based upon the argument from design much less severely than the other proofs. Convinced as <sup>he</sup> Kant is that even the physico-theological argument cannot be regarded as an adequate proof of the existence of a supreme being, he is fully prepared to admit that it is quite natural to infer from the variety, order, purposiveness and beauty of our present

world to the existence of a supreme cause of the world. (B550-651)  
 "This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest and best suited to ordinary human Reason. It enlivens the study of nature just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests ends and purposes where our observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends our nature by means of a special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This knowledge, again, reacts on its cause, namely, upon the Idea which has led to it and strengthens the belief in a supreme Author (of nature) so that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction" (B 651-652) It would be utterly vain, Kant continues, to try to diminish in any way the authority of this argument. Nothing can be said against the rationality or utility of the procedure involved in it. Yet its claims to apodeictic certainty cannot be granted. "It cannot hurt the good cause if the dogmatic language of the overweening sophist (Vernunftlers) be toned down to the more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate to quieten our doubts, though not to command unconditional submission" (B 652-653)

~~It will surprise no one who is familiar with the~~  
~~guiding principles of Kant's doctrine of Ideas that Kant denies~~  
~~to guiding principles of Kant's doctrine of Ideas that Kant denies~~  
~~to the physico-theological proof, and with it to the logical~~  
~~principle generally, the claim which it makes to apodeictic~~  
~~certainty. It is true that the logical principle extends our~~  
~~concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside~~  
~~nature. But it must not be forgotten that this principle is~~  
 entirely different from the principles of the understanding.  
 It is based upon a mere Idea. The concept of a purpose is a

concept, not of the understanding, but of Reason, and as such it is a merely regulative principle, that is, a principle which does not enable us to determine an object. Ideas are given to us, not that we should derive our world of nature from a supernatural source, but that we should use them as principles of our enquiry into the natural world. We must note that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant does not properly distinguish the teleological principle from the other Ideas of Reason, and that ~~is~~ why he applies to it the same criticism as he applies to the other Ideas. The danger which he wishes to avert by his criticism is the danger of our thinking that we could use the teleological principle as a constitutive principle which would give us knowledge of supersensible objects. *If it is very important to avoid such a mistake as for otherwise we might be tempted* ~~if we fell into this error we might be led~~ to give up our enquiry into natural causes, and instead to have recourse to supersensible causes about which we ~~know~~ *know* nothing at all. "These detrimental consequences are even more obvious in the dogmatic treatment of an Idea of a supreme intelligence and in the theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For in this field of enquiry, instead of looking for causes in the universal laws of material mechanism, we appeal directly to the unsearchable decree of supreme wisdom, all those ends which are exhibited in nature, together with the many ends which are only ascribed by us to nature, make our investigation of the causes a very easy task, and so enable us to regard the labour of Reason as completed when as a matter of fact we have merely dispensed with its employment, an employment which is wholly dependent for guidance upon the order of nature and the series of alterations in accordance with the universal laws which they are found to exhibit." *(B 718, 719)* ~~There are many other passages in which Kant~~ *Kant expresses this view in many other passages.*

~~sets forth the same view.~~ We may instance one - the passage in which he defends empiricism against dogmatism (B 496-501). He states there that the unpopularity of empiricism, and the preference which the common understanding shows for dogmatism, is due to the fact that the latter allows us to leave the world of experience and rise to concepts far outstripping our insight and rational faculties. "If it [the common/understanding] understands little or nothing about these matters, no one can boast of understanding much more; and though in regard to them it cannot express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as those with special training, nevertheless there is no end to the plausible arguments which it can propound, wandering as it does amidst mere Ideas about which no one knows anything and in regard to which it is therefore free ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> be as eloquent as it pleases; whereas when matters that involve investigation of nature are in question it has to stand silent and to admit its ignorance. Thus indolence and vanity combine in sturdy support of these principles" (B 501). In another passage Kant states that order and purposiveness in nature must be explained by reference to natural causes, and that the wildest hypothesis, if only it be physical, is more tolerable than a hyperphysical hypothesis such as the appeal to a divine Author. <sup>The latter</sup> ~~Such a~~ ~~hyperphysical hypothesis~~ would be a principle of ignava ratio, for we should be passing over all causes of which the objective validity could be ascertained in the course of experience in order to rest in a mere Idea. (B 800-801) Kant calls all constitutive employment of Ideas a principle of ignava ratio, a principle of a Reason which will not do its proper work. (e.g. B717 and B801). In another passage he speaks of perversa ratio. He explains that the principle of systematic unity, on

*as has been shown*  
which as we ~~have seen~~ all Ideas of Reason are based, should be used only as a regulative principle, ~~and that~~ We should believe which as we ~~have seen~~ all Ideas of Reason are based, should be used only as a regulative principle, ~~and that~~ We should believe ourselves to have approximated to completeness in the use of it - a completeness which we can never attain - only in so far as we are in a position to verify it in experience. "Instead of this", he continues, "the reverse procedure is adopted. The reality of a principle of purposive unity is not only presupposed but hypostasised; and since the concept of a supreme intelligence is in itself completely beyond our powers of comprehension we proceed to determine it in an anthropomorphic manner and so impose ends upon nature forcibly and dictatorially, instead of pursuing the more reasonable course of searching for them by the path of physical investigation. And thus teleology which is intended to aid us merely in completing the unity of nature in accordance with universal laws, not only tends <sup>to</sup> such unity but also prevents Reason from carrying out its own professed purpose, that of proving from nature in conformity with these laws the existence of a supreme ~~cause~~. intelligent cause <sup>(B 720)</sup> From this and many other passages it can be seen that no real distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason is drawn between the Idea of a purposiveness of nature and the other Ideas. ~~That is why Kant tells us so little there about the Idea of a purposiveness of nature.~~

We may now conclude our examination of the Transcendental Dialectic. We have learned from it that Kant's investigation into Reason and its concepts has confirmed the fact that the human mind is excluded from all knowledge of supersensible objects. Our field is the world of experience. The Idea of the existence of another world is necessary for the knowledge of our own world, but as finite beings we cannot even attempt to acquire knowledge of any sphere other than our own. As finite beings we cannot know the infinite.

The attitude which Kant adopts to this fact is characteristic of him. In his opinion, our inability to know anything other than our own world ought not to depress or discourage us. On the contrary we should be glad that we have found a sphere in which we can work. The limited character of all our theoretical knowledge is a fact, but not one to complain about. "It cannot hurt the good cause if the dogmatic language of the overweening sophist be toned down to the more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate to quieten our doubts." (B652-653)

In the "Dreams of a Ghost-seer", in which the problem of the transcendental philosophy reveals itself for the first time, we find the following passage: "To surrender to every itch of curiosity and to allow our knowledge to be limited by nothing but incapacity is a real <sup>324</sup> that befits scholarship quite well. But to choose among innumerable problems which offer themselves those the solution of which is in the interest of man is the excellence of wisdom. Science after having run through its sphere arrives naturally at a modest diffidence and exclaims indignant with itself, 'How many things there are which I do not understand!' But Reason matured through experience which becomes wisdom speaks through the mouth of a Socrates amidst the goods of a market-place the following words, 'How many things there are which I do not need!'" (385) "But since our fate in the future world will presumably depend a great deal on how we have filled our post in this, I conclude with the words which Voltaire makes his honest Candide say, 'Let us make our fortune, go into the garden and do our work'" (390)

The Critique of Practical Reason.

The Critique of Pure Reason has settled once and for all the limitations of human Reason in so far as it is concerned with theoretical knowledge. We have been shown that theoretical Reason is restricted to a world of mere appearance. The Critique of Practical Reason will have to ask whether the same restriction holds for practical Reason or whether man as a being possessed of practical Reason can reach out beyond the world of sense.

Before entering upon an interpretation of the Critique of Practical Reason, I should like to say something about the method which I have followed. Since I am dealing with the first and second Critiques only in order to prepare the reader for my interpretation of the third, I can and need do nothing more than set out the most general principles of the first two Critiques. It will have been evident that I did not even attempt to give an account of many of the problems which are discussed in the first Critique. This will also be true of my exposition of the second. I shall deal with it only in so far as it is one part of the Critical Philosophy which in my opinion is a whole each part of which is in the closest relation to the others. My main purpose will be to show that the second Critique is based upon the same fundamental principles as the first, and that the two cannot be separated from one another. For that reason I shall examine <sup>I shall examine</sup> Before dealing with the second Critique itself, those passages in the first Critique in which Kant deals <sup>with</sup> problems which actually find their solution in the Critique of Practical Reason. I am thinking here of Kant's discussion of the problem of natural causality and freedom, and of the question of their compatibility. In examin-

ing Kant's doctrine of the Antinomies we did not take any account of the third Antinomy, the Antinomy between causality and freedom. We shall now examine the passages in which Kant deals with it. (C.P.D. B556-593)

Kant divides the cosmological Ideas (~~the Antinomies~~) into two classes; (a) mathematical Ideas and (b) dynamical Ideas. The former are concerned with nothing but the magnitude of the world and the objects which it contains, ~~whether they determine this magnitude as finite with regard to space and time (Thesis of the first Antinomy) or as infinite with regard to space and time (Antithesis of the first Antinomy), or whether it is asserted that every composite substance consists of simple parts (Thesis of the second Antinomy) or that it is infinitely divisible and that there is no such thing as a simple part (Antithesis of the second Antinomy).~~ We have seen above ( ) that every cosmological Idea is concerned with the conditions of a given object. In the case of the first and second Antinomies, the unconditioned and <sup>that of which it is the</sup> ~~its condition~~ ~~condition~~ ~~ians~~ both belong to the world of sense and are homogeneous, and the series is called a mathematical series. Now it has been shown that the series of conditions does not exist independently of the regressive synthesis (see above ). It is no wonder, then, that ~~the mathematical Ideas cannot prove what they prove that the world has a beginning in time nor that it has not set out to prove, and that no member of the series can be neither that there is a first part of space nor that there is not, neither that regarded as unconditioned. For the mathematical Ideas assert natural objects consist of simple parts nor that they do not. Each of these that there should exist an unconditioned member of the series as such involves a contradiction in terms. For what is assumed is which is yet in space and time, and this assertion involves that there should exist something unconditioned within our own world - a contradiction in terms. The dynamical Ideas (we are here which is manifestly impossible. The dynamical Ideas (we have here concerned only with the Ideas of freedom and causality) are~~

at least more reasonable in what they claim. For they place the unconditioned beyond the series of homogeneous sensible conditions. <sup>They</sup> ~~they~~ understand by the unconditioned something that is different in kind from the conditioned, a super-sensible force which has nothing in common with the conditioned. Thus the demands of both Reason and understanding are satisfied; <sup>while</sup> for Reason demands that there should be an unconditioned and the understanding demands that nothing in the world of sense should be unconditioned, ~~and since~~ <sup>in asserting</sup> a dynamical Idea asserts that the unconditioned belongs to a sphere with which the understanding is not concerned, ~~it~~ does not come into conflict with its principles. "Hence in the mathematical connection of the series of appearances no other than a sensible condition is admissible, that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the other hand in the dynamical series of sensible conditions a heterogeneous condition not itself a part of the series, but purely intelligible and as such outside the series, can be allowed. In this way Reason obtains satisfaction and the unconditioned is set prior to appearances, while yet the invariably conditioned character of the appearances is not obscured, nor their series cut short, in violation of the principles of the understanding". (B558-B559) Kant distinguishes between two kinds of opposition; (a) analytical opposition and (b) dialectical opposition. (E 530 et seq.) Of two analytically opposed propositions one must be true and the other false. This does not hold for dialectical opposition. Two propositions may be opposed to one another, and yet both be either true or false. The two propositions - that the world is finite in magnitude and that the world is infinite in magnitude - contradict one another,

but they are dialectically and not analytically opposed. For both are false; the world is neither finite nor infinite, since it is not a ~~thing-in-itself~~ <sup>positive object of knowledge</sup>, the magnitude of which we could determine.

The dynamical ~~concepts of reason~~ <sup>Ideas</sup> possess this peculiarity, that they are not concerned with an object considered as a magnitude but only with the existence of an object. They <sup>the magnitude and consider only</sup> abstract from the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. (B 563-564) A dynamical Idea, as we have seen, is the Idea of an unconditioned which does not belong to the series of sensible conditions. If appearances were things in themselves, that is to say, if <sup>the</sup> space and time <sup>in</sup> which appearances exist were forms of the existence of things in themselves, there would not be an unconditioned beyond the world of sense. In that case, the dynamical Ideas would be based upon an erroneous principle; and since <sup>as we have seen</sup> a mathematical Idea involves a self-contradiction, namely, the idea of an unconditioned belonging to the world of sense, no Ideas of Reason would be possible at all. But according to the principles of transcendental philosophy the world is not a thing in itself, since <sup>are</sup> the forms of intuition and the categories (for instance, the category of cause and effect) <sup>are</sup> held <sup>affordable only to</sup> ~~only for~~ <sup>were</sup> a world of <sup>conception</sup> appearances. Therefore the ~~idea~~ of something ~~that is~~ independent of the conditions of our sensible world is at least not impossible. Hence the two propositions (A) that there must exist a causality through freedom and (b) that there is no freedom, may both be true although in different relations, (Thesis and Antithesis of the third Antinomy). The first may be true in relation to a world beyond our world of sense, the second in relation to our world, the world of nature.

It is obvious that Kant does not <sup>imagine</sup> think that he has  
<sup>thus</sup> new proved the existence of practical freedom. In fact, the  
<sup>is not concerned with this problem. It</sup>  
Critique of Pure Reason can do no more than show that the Idea  
<sup>by itself</sup>  
 of a causality through freedom does not ~~necessarily~~ conflict  
<sup>on the</sup>  
 with the principle of natural causality. It can show this, ~~because~~  
<sup>grounds that it has been established</sup>  
~~its examination of the fundamental principles of theoretical~~  
~~knowledge has established the fact that our world of objects~~  
 is a world of mere appearances, and that it is not only possible  
 but even necessary to assume the existence of a world of things  
 in themselves. The causal law is valid in relation to all objects  
 of experience, whether natural events or human actions. There can  
 be nothing in this world which is not wholly dependent on an  
 antecedent determining ground. This applies to human actions  
 just as much as to natural events; and it is quite certain that  
 if time, in which actions occur, were a thing in itself, if it  
 determined them absolutely, then a free action would be impossible,,  
 for in that case every action would be determined by all the  
 actions which preceded it. Even the possibility of freedom could  
 not be admitted if space and time were properties of things in  
 themselves and not forms of mere appearances, for if space and  
 time determined every possible object, then every possible condition  
 of an action would have to belong to the world of space and time,  
 and the law of natural causality would be an absolute law <sup>from which</sup> and no  
 object would be exempted ~~from it~~. Every possible condition would  
 be conditioned by the causal law, that is to say, by other condit-  
 ions which preceded it in time, and the Idea of an absolute  
 beginning, a beginning independent of the laws of nature, would  
 imply a self-contradiction. But since transcendental philosophy  
 is able to show that the categories and principles of the under-

standing are valid not absolutely but only in relation to appearances, <sup>also</sup> and that the law of causality is one of these principles of the understanding, it follows that the causal law does not exclude the possibility of freedom. If absolute reality be ascribed to the world of appearances, freedom cannot be upheld. <sup>It is only if we allow</sup> ~~for only if we admit~~ that there may be things in themselves which are independent of our world of sense and the laws that determine it. <sup>that we can reasonably assume</sup> ~~can we allow of~~ the existence of a supersensible principle of freedom. "The common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances here manifests its injurious influence to the confounding of Reason. For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will then <sup>the</sup> be complete and sufficient determining cause of every event. The condition of the event will be such as can be found only in the series of appearances; both it and its effect will be necessary in accordance with the law of nature. If, on the other hand, appearances are taken for no more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves but merely as <sup>representations</sup> ~~ideas~~, connected according to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature. This distinction, when stated in this quite general and abstract manner, is bound to appear extremely subtle and obscure, but will become clear in the course of its application. My purpose has only been to point

out that since the thoroughgoing connection of all appearances in a context of nature is an inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom. (E 564-565) We have here one of the many passages in which Kant seems to say things which are incompatible with the fundamental principles of his own philosophy. In the first place, the very term 'intelligent cause' seems to involve a self-contradiction. Further, Kant argues that since appearances are not things in themselves they must <sup>not</sup> depend on grounds which are not themselves appearances. But does this argument not flatly contradict his doctrine that causality is a category and has therefore no meaning except in relation to mere appearances? The category of cause and effect is, in Kant's view, a rule <sup>whose</sup> ~~the~~ only purpose ~~of which~~ is to determine intuitions as they are given in time. What, then, are we to understand by an intelligible cause, that is to say, a cause which is independent of our world of appearances and yet exercises some mysterious influence upon it? What does Kant mean when he says that the effects of such an intelligible cause appear and can be determined through other appearances, but that the intelligible cause together with its causality is outside of the series and that the effect may therefore be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause? The reader who finds himself puzzled by such a strange and obviously inconsistent argument may derive some consolation from the fact that Kant himself says that the distinction between the two causalities, as long as it is stated in a general and abstract manner, is bound to appear extremely subtle

and obscure, but that it will become clear in the course of its application. Kant explains his general idea in a passage which follows the sentences we have just quoted. Unfortunately, however, his so-called explanation is even more obscure than his more general account. We <sup>find</sup> ~~learn~~ much in it that we do not understand and that we can see no reason for believing. We <sup>are told</sup> ~~learn~~, for instance, that our Reason as a purely intelligible faculty is not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the condition of succession in time (B 579), and that in respect of the intelligible character of which the empirical character is the schema there can be no before and after (B 581). At the same time we are told that if we had sufficient knowledge of the empirical conditions of human actions there would not be a single action which we could not predict with certainty and recognise as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions. The whole passage consists, in fact, of unintelligible remarks. I think, however, that it is not difficult to find the reason for this. It seems to me that Kant has discussed <sup>here</sup> all ~~these~~ those questions which in fact cannot be adequately dealt with in a Critique of Pure Reason only because of his enthusiasm for questions of moral philosophy. Whether there is freedom and if so how it is possible - these are questions for the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant's remarks on practical freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason are unintelligible because they are of a merely provisional character.

We shall now turn to the Critique of Practical Reason. In Kant's view it is not the business of the Critique of Practical Reason to ask whether practical freedom exists or not. The first thing it has to do is to state a fact, not to solve a problem. The fact ~~which it has to state~~ is that there exists a moral law. In Kant's opinion it is impossible to deny this fact. The moral law is given to us, <sup>we find it</sup> ~~it belongs~~

*practical philosophy*

to human Reason. Every moral action and every moral judgment is based upon the presupposition of the moral law.

Therefore, the question with which the Critique of Practical Reason has to concern itself is, not whether the moral law exists (for it is given), but how it can affect human actions.

"The moral law is given as a fact of pure Reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is apodeictically

certain", (C.Pr.R. 143) "We may call the consciousness of

this fundamental law a fact of Reason." (C.Pr.R. 142) "The

fact just mentioned is undeniable." (C.Pr.R. 143) "But if it

be asked what then is really pure morality, by which as a

touchstone we must test the moral significance of every

action, then I must admit that it is only philosophers

that can make the decision of this question doubtful; for

to common sense it has been decided long ago not indeed

by abstract general formulae, but by habitual use, like the

distinction between the right and left hand." (C.Pr.R. 304)

~~Now since~~ <sup>the fact that</sup> the moral law is given, and since it belongs to

the very nature of this law ~~that it determines~~ to determine

the will of rational beings, it follows that the will

which recognises it is free. "The moral law which itself

does not require a justification proves not merely the

possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings

who recognise this law as binding on themselves. But

although it is certain that the moral law and with it

moral freedom are given to us, it remains to be asked which of

the two is first given, and an examination of this question

shows at once that we can become conscious of freedom

only through our being conscious of the moral law. It

follows that the first thing given to us is consciousness

of the moral law; and the fact that this law exists and that we ought to act in accordance with it makes us conscious that we can act in accordance with it, that is, that we are free. The Idea of freedom which, as far as theoretical Reason ~~was~~ concerned, <sup>was</sup> is empty and devoid of all meaning now receives real meaning. It may even be stated that theoretical Reason by itself would never have conceived the Idea of freedom, and that it is only because we are moral beings that it occurs to us to assume the existence of freedom; for the theoretical Idea of freedom is of no value to theoretical Reason in <sup>its task which is</sup> the study of nature ~~which is its task~~, since freedom cannot belong to nature and the Idea of freedom cannot therefore be used for the explanation of events in nature. "That this is the true subordination of our concepts and that it is morality that first discovers <sup>to</sup> us the notion of freedom, hence that it is practical Reason which, with this concept, first proposes to speculative Reason the most ~~un~~soluble problem, thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity, is evident from the following <sup>side</sup> consideration:— Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the concept of freedom, but the mechanism of nature must constitute ~~contribute~~ the only clue; moreover when pure Reason tries to ascend in the series of causes to the unconditioned it falls into an antinomy which is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as on the other, whilst the latter, (namely, mechanism) is at least useful in the explanation of phenomena, therefore no one would ever have been so rash as to introduce freedom into science, had not the moral law and with it practical Reason come in and forced this notion upon us." (C. Pr. R. 140-141)

"For as long as one has formed no definite notion of morality and freedom, one could not conjecture on the one side what was

intended to be the noumenon, the basis of the alleged phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at all possible to form any notion of it, seeing that one had previously assigned all the notion of the pure understanding in its theoretical use exclusively to phenomena<sup>2</sup>. (C.Pr.R. 109)

In view of such a doctrine we may be inclined to think that Kant has first over-simplified and then unnecessarily complicated <sup>the problem.</sup> ~~the fundamental question which the Critique of Practical Reason has to answer.~~ <sup>Having first fixed up</sup> For, after having determined that the moral law and freedom are given to us and that consequently we need not <sup>ask</sup> ~~concern ourselves with the question~~ whether they exist or not, he raises a question which seems to be unnecessary, the question which of the two exists first, or more correctly of which of the two do we first become conscious. We must therefore ask ourselves whether this change is justified, and in answering this question we find that there is one important <sup>point</sup> ~~fact~~ of which we have so far taken no account, that is, Kant's assertion that theoretical knowledge of practical freedom is quite impossible or, in other words, that freedom is a supersensible object and <sup>theoretically</sup> as such cannot be known<sub>1</sub> by the human mind. Kant holds that freedom as a practical principle is certain, but that the same freedom is theoretically incomprehensible. <sup>It is hard to</sup> ~~We do not really~~ <sup>and</sup> understand what this means, ~~neither do we know~~ whether it has anything to do with the question we have raised. There are many passages in the Critique of Practical Reason in which Kant explains his distinction between theoretical and practical Reason, between knowledge through ~~the~~ <sup>theoretical</sup> Reason and knowledge through practical Reason. We shall pick out one of them in order to have something to work on, but it should be remembered that it is only one of many passages which would have

served as well. ~~We shall select~~ the passage, headed "Of the deduction of the fundamental principles of the pure practical Reason" (C.Pr.R. 156 <sup>the way</sup> at seq.), ~~and shall~~ begin by giving a brief summary of the argument set forth in it. It has been proved in the Critique of Pure Reason that our theoretical knowledge of objects is limited to objects of experience, but at the same time it has been shown that the Idea of an object beyond the world of experience is possible, and that it is even necessary for us to form such an Idea. Now practical Reason in presenting us with the moral law as an undeniable fact introduces us into a purely rational world (Verstandeswelt). Pure Reason can and indeed must represent to itself the Idea of an original nature (natura archetypa) which it contrasts with our own world of sense, regarding the latter as a mere image of the former or as an object modelled upon it (natura ectypa). Theoretical Reason has left an empty space. <sup>for</sup> Theoretical knowledge is incapable of determining an object beyond the world of sensible experience. <sup>But practical Reason,</sup> Since it is capable of ~~thinking~~ a determinate supersensible law, practical Reason can fill the place which has been left empty. It must be noted, however, that practical Reason conceives the Idea of a supersensible or intelligible world, which is supposed to act upon the sensible world, only in order that the actions of the rational being should be determined by it in this world, and not for the sake of theoretical knowledge. In fact, practical Reason is in no way interested ~~in~~ in acquiring such knowledge, and freely confesses that it is unable to know how a supersensible principle can influence an action occurring in the sensible world. We can have no theoretical knowledge whatsoever of the causal relation between the supersensible and the sensible worlds. "For if Reason sought to do this, it would

have to show how the logical relation of principle (Grund) and consequence (Folge) can be used synthetically in a different sort of intuition from the sensible; that is, how a causa noumenon is possible". (C.Pr.R. 165) <sup>once more</sup> The general principle underlying Kant's argument is now clear. He tells us again and again that he has proved in the Critique of Pure Reason that the Idea of an intelligible world known by mere thought is free from contradiction. We cannot have theoretical knowledge of such a world, ~~since~~, because we are unable to determine an object by mere thought, that is, by the understanding alone, ~~we require for theoretical knowledge intuition as well as understanding.~~ Neither can we determine the causal relation between the intelligible world and our world of sense. Yet in the field of practical Reason the Idea of an intelligible causality is possible and even necessary, for since the moral law is given to us we cannot but assume that as moral beings we are determined by a principle which belongs to an intelligible world. We can see now that Kant's concept of an intelligible causality which, when we first tried to understand it in the Critique of Pure Reason, could not but seem absurd and in conflict with the principles on which transcendental philosophy is based, receives in the Critique of Practical Reason a meaning quite different from anything that we could have expected. The Idea of an intelligible causality would indeed conflict with the ~~fundamental~~ fundamental principles of his own philosophy if Kant believed that we could have any theoretic-<sup>theoretical</sup> al knowledge of it, or even if he believed that Reason was ~~concerned~~ concerned with it. This, however, is precisely what he denies, <sup>along with his conviction</sup> for ~~convinced as he is~~ that intelligible causality is real practically, that is to say, that we are free to determine our

actions according to the moral law, he <sup>maintains</sup> ~~is just as certain~~ that we can have no theoretical knowledge of such a relation, that the very concept of an intelligible causality is impenetrable ~~to~~ <sup>by</sup> the human mind. The only kind of causality of which we have any knowledge is natural causality, which is a rule of the understanding for the determination of natural events. We cannot understand how there can be a causality of an entirely different kind; nor do we need to understand this, for it does not concern us as moral agents since we cannot and need not have any knowledge of the <sup>inapprehensible moral law.</sup> ~~law in accordance with which we ought to act.~~

One is easily tempted to underestimate the importance of what Kant says about the character of man as being both empirical and intelligible, about natura ectypa and natura archetypa, about phenomena and noumena. It is really Kant's terminology that prevents us from taking it seriously enough. No doubt the terms which he uses belong to the period in which he wrote, but this must not blind us to the fact that they represent a moral theory with special characteristics of its own. Kant's moral theory is a part of transcendental philosophy, and as such it must differ from any moral theory ~~which~~ does not recognise the fundamental transcendental principles. It is because it is based on these principles that Kant's moral philosophy, while maintaining that the moral law is undeniably real and that it is an absolute law binding on all rational beings, ~~and can at~~ <sup>of</sup> the same time declare that the freedom <sup>of</sup> the will which follows necessarily from the moral law remains for us an insoluble ~~problem, that we are quite unable to understand how it is possible.~~ Kant maintains that if we knew all that was to be known about the motives of a human being we should be able to predict his actions with the same certainty as we can predict an eclipse

of the <sup>sun</sup> ~~star~~ or moon, because every human action is determined by natural grounds and is wholly dependent on them. But he is none the less convinced that the human will is free. This seems to be paradoxical, but it is <sup>for</sup> not really so, because it arises within a philosophical system which rests upon the conviction that all natural objects without exception are subject to necessary and unalterable laws and at the same time maintains that these laws are valid only in relation to appearances and are not applicable to things in themselves. That is why Kant can believe that the moral law leads us from our empirical world into a supersensible world. We can act according to a law which does not belong to our own world, since it imposes upon us the obligation to make ourselves independent of the causes by which our world, the world of nature, is determined. But we cannot have any knowledge of how such a law can exist. All that we know is that moral freedom is not impossible; how it is possible is beyond our comprehension. Kant sets forth his view of the freedom of the will in many passages both in the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. I shall select for quotation one or two which seem to me to be of special interest. "Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical Reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show, that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also see not merely the possibility but even the necessity of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are <sup>so</sup> inseparably united, that we might define practical freedom as independence

of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility and are now, by the moral law which postulated it compelled and therefore authorised to assume it." (C.Pr.R. 223, 227)

"For the question as to how a law can be directly and of itself a determining principle of the will (which is the essence of morality) that is for human Reason an insoluble problem and identical with the question how a free will is possible." (C.Pr.R. 196) "But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure Reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same problem as to explain how freedom is possible. For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a mere Idea, the objective reality of which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature and consequently not in any possible experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any sort of example or analogy." (Groundwork 94) "And thus while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limits of human Reason." (Groundwork 100)

The different forms which Kant gives to his moral doctrine ~~are all based on the one principle, and these different forms~~ become perfectly intelligible and consistent <sup>one</sup> <sup>on which they are all based</sup> as soon as we take account of the underlying principle. We may

take as an example of this the common objection to Kant's doctrine that he makes morality dependent on merely formal and universal rules. Before discussing this I must ask the reader to remember that in this Introduction I am concerned only with an exposition of Kant's doctrine, and that it is therefore impossible for me to discuss the question whether the fundamental <sup>or</sup> principles of his philosophy are tenable or not. I think I can, however, say this much, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> the doctrine that the rules of morality are merely formal and universal follows necessarily from the general principles of his philosophy, and cannot be disputed by anyone who is prepared to admit that Kant's general position is tenable. For it is easy to see that since Kant believes that the moral law is an absolute and universal law independent of the world of nature he must also hold that moral rules are independent of the principle of nature. Causal laws apply to natural events. Consequently, a rule which refers to the moral law must be independent of these laws. Now let us assume ~~that~~ those rules <sup>to be</sup> were dependent on natural objects of desire, and we can at once see that in that case empirical objects would be the ground of actions, and that the relation between an action and its object would be an ordinary causal relation; the action, then, would be subject to the natural law of causality and could not be free or in agreement with the moral law, <sup>whose</sup> ~~the~~ very nature of ~~which~~ it is to prescribe to us that we should make ourselves independent of laws which are necessary only in relation to the world of sense, and that we should act in accordance with a supersensible law. We have seen that the moral law is given to us, and that it commands us to determine our actions in accordance with it. In face of these facts Kant's problem

is; is there anything which can belong both to the supersensible world and to an action occurring in the sensible world? His solution is that there is such a thing, ~~namely~~ namely, the determination of the will of the agent. Not the effect which is produced by an action, (its matter), but the determination of the will, (its form), <sup>i.e., it can belong both</sup> to the natural world because the action takes place in it, and also to the intelligible world for the will which produces the action considers itself independent of the world of nature and its laws. Now the moral agent determines his will independently of the effects which may be produced by his action in the world of nature. It follows that the agent must represent to himself that which determines his will as <sup>being</sup> a universal rule; for this will is independent of empirical objects, and empirical objects, according to Kant, are mere particulars given to us by intuition, and as such are never wholly determined <sup>by</sup>, but are always merely subsumed under the universal rules of the understanding. Whether a particular object is desired by a particular person depends on the particular nature of the <sup>person</sup> ~~person~~ <sup>in question</sup> ~~letter~~, and a man who acts from <sup>the</sup> desire for a particular object finds no difficulty in the fact that other people desire different objects. If, however, the agent determines his will according to the moral law, he cannot do otherwise than consider himself independent of his own individual nature; that is to say, he must assume that his will is determined by a rule which is universally valid, and which must be recognised as valid by every other person. We can understand now that the question as to how an absolute and universal law can be conceived by a being <sup>that</sup> ~~which~~ belongs to the world of sense is the fundamental problem of the Critique of Practical Reason.

In order to understand Kant's solution better than we have so far been able to do we may consult two very important passages. The first of these is the chapter headed "Of the concept of an object of pure practical Reason". Kant explains here that the only objects which practical Reason has are the concepts of the good and the evil. The fundamental difference between those objects and natural objects which we may desire is that it is a law which brings the former into existence. The fundamental mistake which has been made by moral philosophers is that they <sup>have</sup> first looked for an object of the will <sup>e.g. happiness</sup> which they could make the matter and principle of a law, whereas they ought first to have looked for a law which would have determined the will a priori, and only afterwards for an object of the will. In the case of the moral objects it is a law which produces the objects; and it is quite wrong to assume that the objects of the will exist first and that the moral law <sup>can</sup> ~~could~~ be derived from them. ~~The law in question must be a merely formal law, that is to say, it must be a law which determines the mere form of the will and is quite independent of the empirical objects of the will. A rule of the understanding, a category or a principle (Grundsatz) merely combines a manifold given in intuition, whereas a practical law produces its own objects. This is possible because a practical law is not concerned with natural conditions, since no question arises as to the possibility of the existence of its objects in nature. All that matters is the determination of the will, and this will can determine itself and produce its own objects. Categories of the understanding taken by themselves are mere functions which can do nothing but combine a manifold of intuitions. As such they are outside the sphere of the understanding, and belong to sensibility.~~

But we may ask: How can a law produce its own objects?

This follows from the difference between a rule of the understanding, a category or a principle (Grundsatz), and a practical law. Categories of the understanding taken by themselves are mere functions which can do nothing but combine a manifold given in intuition, and therefore depend for the existence of their objects on something outside their own sphere, namely, on sensibility. A practical law, on the other hand, is quite independent of empirical objects, being concerned not with the existence of its objects in nature, but with the determination of the mere form of the will. The will can determine itself in accordance with a merely formal law. Theoretical Reason is dependent on sensible particulars for the existence of the object which it seeks to know.

Practical Reason, on the other hand, has given to it a universal a priori law, and therefore it does not have to look for something outside itself. ~~That is why~~ It can determine the will directly by means of the universal a priori law which belongs to Reason itself, <sup>and this is done in an indefinite manner.</sup> "These categories of freedom - for so we choose to call them in contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of physical nature - have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch as the latter are only forms of thought, <sup>which designate objects in an indefinite manner</sup> by means of universal concepts for every possible intuition; the former on the contrary refer to the determination of a free elective will (to which indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure practical a priori law which is not the case with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties); hence instead of the form of intuition (space and time) which does not lie in Reason <sup>itself</sup> ~~itself~~ but has to be drawn from another source, namely, the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in Reason, and therefore in the thinking itself. From this it happens that as all precepts of pure practical Reason have to do with the determination of the will, <sup>not</sup> ~~and with~~ <sup>and</sup> with the physical conditions (of practical ability) of the executions of one's purpose, the practical a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer (the <sup>intention</sup> ~~determination~~ of the will) which is not the case with theoretical concepts".  
 (C.Pr.R. 186-187.)  
 This passage shows once more how closely Kant's argument in the Critique of Practical Reason is connected with the general

problem of his philosophy. Indeed, this passage, along with many others, would remain quite unintelligible if Kant's moral philosophy were treated as an isolated moral treatise, and if no account were taken of its place in the transcendental philosophy as a whole. In order to understand the passage which we have just quoted and to see what Kant's problem is, we need only remember that one of the fundamental doctrines set forth in <sup>of</sup> the Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine that all human knowledge depends on particulars given in intuition and on universal <sup>whose</sup> rules the function ~~of which~~ is to combine the particulars. We <sup>also</sup> know from our examination of the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant holds that Reason according to its nature must demand that the particulars should be capable of being wholly determined by universal concepts, and even that particulars <sup>should</sup> owe their very existence to universal concepts. We have seen that as a consequence of this Kant <sup>has</sup> ~~had~~ to assume that <sup>theoretical</sup> Reason <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ concerned with nothing but the understanding. We have also seen that in the theoretical field Reason cannot achieve its purpose since the concepts of the understanding do not possess an independent existence but must be referred to intuitions. Categories as such are mere functions, and can receive real significance only by being schematised, that is to say, by being related to intuitions. It must be noted, however, that a schematised category is a category which is no longer within the sphere of pure thought. It is not a purely universal rule; such universality as it possesses consists in nothing but its being a universal rule for intuitions. Since the universality which the concepts of Reason (Ideas) possess and the universality which must be attributed to schematised categories are not of the same kind, Reason cannot achieve its end. It is unable to regard the <sup>schematised</sup> concepts of the understanding as wholly

*Ideas*

determined by its ~~own concepts~~, because the former now belong to a sphere with which Reason has nothing whatsoever to do, namely, the sphere of sensibility.

As regards practical Reason, the case is quite different. For what is first given to us is the universal law of morality which commands that our actions should be determined by it alone. <sup>But</sup> Now, since all our actions take place in the world of sense and consequently are subject to the conditions of this world, the question arises whether there is anything in human actions which does not necessarily belong to the sphere of nature, and which might be quite independent of it. It appears that the determination of the will might possess the required properties, for whereas the bringing about by our actions of a desired effect depends entirely on natural conditions, the self-determination of the will or its surrender to the moral law irrespective of the consequences which may ensue is determination by the universal moral law alone. Such self-determination is the only thing that matters in the practical field, for the moral law does not command that a certain action should take place in the world of sense, but that an action should be done by a will which determines itself in accordance with its commands. It is only the determination of the will that can be thought to be independent of natural conditions, for in determining the will alone Reason need not go beyond the purely rational sphere. It is the mere form of the action which is determined in this way, a mere function; and this <sup>form</sup> ~~function~~ is real because in the field of practice we are not concerned to know how an action is possible but how <sup>it</sup> ~~they~~ can be determined by a ~~super-sensible law~~. ~~All that interests us is that we can act according to it. That is why a mere function, the~~

~~determination of the will, can be considered capable of bring-~~  
~~ing about the moral action.~~ If practical Reason were interest-  
~~ed to know~~ <sup>in knowing</sup> actions theoretically, it would have to leave its  
 own sphere of mere thought and to rely on sensible intuitions,  
 for every action regarded as a mere event in nature belongs,  
 like every other theoretical object, to the world of sense.  
 We cannot acquire theoretical knowledge of an action in any  
 other way than by regarding it as a natural event; and as such  
 it is subject to the conditions of time. Now every action that  
 takes place in time must be regarded as wholly dependent on the  
 occurrences which are the content of the time preceding the  
 moment of the action itself. But, this being so, the agent, who  
 has no control over what he has done in the past, cannot be  
 regarded as free. Every action in so far as it is a mere  
 occurrence is determined by time, since it is nothing but an  
 event in nature. It has been proved in the Critique of Pure  
Reason that every natural object is dependent on time as a  
 form of intuition. But the Critique of Pure Reason has also  
 shown that time is not a condition of things in themselves  
 but only of appearances, that is to say, of the only objects  
 that theoretical reason can know. Hence we can allow that  
<sup>practical</sup> ~~theoretical~~ Reason, which is not interested in <sup>theoretical</sup> knowledge, may be  
 capable of determining actions quite independently of the  
 series of natural conditions. Theoretical Reason cannot deny  
 the possibility of actions being determined independently of  
 the conditions which precede it, that is to say, it cannot  
 deny the possibility of free actions. Practical Reason assures  
 us of the real existence of free actions, for it makes us  
 conscious of the moral law, a law which is independent of the  
 sensible world ~~and according to which we are to determine our~~

~~Example~~ will. The Critique of Practical Reason teaches us that we can consider one and the same action and one and the same agent from two different points of view. We may regard the former as entirely dependent on its natural conditions and the latter as entirely dependent on his own previous acts and on his empirical character, which determines his present act just as it has determined his previous acts. The action viewed in this way is a mere event in nature, and the agent a mere phenomenon. We may describe the second point of view in Kant's words: "But the very same subject, being on the other hand conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives himself through Reason; and in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in general every modification of his existence, varying according to his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon." (C.Pr.R. 228.)

In order to understand this we must remember that it is Kantian doctrine that only mere particulars are given to us in time. <sup>These</sup> ~~These~~ particulars may be subsumed under the universal concepts of the understanding, but this does not take away from them their character as particulars, because the understanding is unable to determine them absolutely. Now, that is precisely what the moral law has to do; and when we ask what can be determined by an absolute moral law it appears at once that it must be something which is itself a universal and is independent of intuition and in particular of time. The rule which

determines the will is such a universal because it is independent of time and thus of the whole sphere of intuition. The practical universal rule is independent of the world of sense. Unlike a theoretical rule it has nothing to do with a synthesis of the manifold in time. Thus, practical Reason can achieve what theoretical Reason attempted in vain. It can determine an object by means of a universal rule or a mere function of Reason. For, as we have seen, practical Reason makes us conscious of the moral law, and thus the will is provided with a universal rule, and is enabled to produce an object of practical Reason.

It will be evident that my interpretation of the passage in which Kant discusses the problem of the objects of practical Reason is very far from complete, and that a really satisfactory explanation would have to discuss a great many questions which I have not even raised. I should therefore like to point out that all that I have tried to do is to show again that the problem of the relation between universals and particulars is one of Kant's fundamental problems in the Critique of Practical Reason. It seems to me necessary to emphasise this point because it has been overlooked by many of Kant's interpreters.

We may now examine the second of the two passages mentioned above, (p. 92). The passage is headed "Of the Typic of the pure practical Judgment". I should like to say at the outset that this passage seems to me to be of the utmost importance for the understanding of the second Critique, and also that it is very difficult to understand and that I am by no means confident that I can successfully explain it.

The problem which faces Kant may be stated thus. All human actions occur in the sensible world; how then can we judge an action in such a way that we can think it to be in

accordance with a practical rule which as a strictly universal rule is purely abstract and has nothing to do with the sensible world in which the action occurs? If we are to be able to apply that which is contained in the abstract rule to a concrete case which comes under it, we must possess practical judgment. As we have seen in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant holds Judgment to be the faculty of the mind which enables us to relate particulars to universals; it is not surprising, therefore, to find in the Critique of Practical Reason that it is the faculty of Judgment which mediates between the abstract rule and the concrete <sup>instance</sup> case. As regards theoretical judgment, the problem as to how we can relate particulars to universal rules of the understanding has been discussed in the first Critique, ~~chiefly in the passage on the Substitution~~ (see above). The Critique of Practical Reason seems to have to face a still more difficult problem; for, as Kant says, it seems absurd to expect that we should find in the world of sense, which is determined by the laws of nature, <sup>an instance</sup> a case to which we could apply the supersensible category of the good. The Critique of Pure Reason has removed the difficulties which faced theoretical judgment; for the examination of theoretical knowledge made it clear (a) that in order to be presented with an object of theoretical experience we must relate concepts to intuitions, and (b) that we can do this by schematising the concepts of the understanding, that is to say, by taking them not as mere abstract concepts but as universal rules ~~the function of which is to~~ make particular intuitions subject to universal rules. It does not seem insuperably difficult to understand how a concept of the understanding <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ be exhibited in intuition, ~~and how we~~ ~~can represent it by means of a sensible symbol, the schema.~~

But it seems quite impossible to understand how a moral concept, a concept which by its very nature belongs to the supersensible world, <sup>And yet it is</sup> can be represented in the world of sense. ~~It is perhaps~~ not <sup>really as</sup> difficult as it seems, <sup>We need only</sup> ~~at first, for we must~~ remember that when we are called upon to subsume an action under a pure practical law we are not concerned with the possibility of the action considered as an event in the world of sense. It is quite true that in order to judge as to the physical possibility of an action we must apply the categories of the understanding as the universal rules to which all natural objects must conform; for instance, we should have to make use of the principle of physical causality which belongs to the physical concepts. <sup>But</sup> Kant holds that, whereas a pure concept of the understanding can and indeed must be schematised, this is not true of practical <sup>concepts</sup> ~~concepts~~. "Here, however, we have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs according to laws, but with the schema of a law itself (if the word schema is allowable here), since the fact that the will (not the action relatively to its effects) is determined by the law alone without any other principle, connects the notion of causality with quite different conditions from those which constitute physical <sup>connection</sup> causality." (C.Pr.R. 191) [This is certainly difficult to understand. In the first place it seems to me necessary to ask why Kant believes that the word 'schema' is perhaps not allowable in the case of the subsumption of a moral action under the moral law. I think the answer is that what interests us in the moral action is not that which makes it a particular action done by a particular individual, but that in it which makes it universal. We are interested in the particular action only in so far as the will of the agent is determined by a

law. In so far as this law, in accordance with which the will determines itself, is concerned with actions which occur in nature it may be regarded as a law of nature. But it is quite different from a theoretical law of nature, for a theoretical law <sup>as long as it</sup> which is merely formal is devoid of all real significance.

Every theoretical law which is to produce knowledge of an object must be related to the manifold of intuition, the matter which is to be determined by the formal and universal rule.

A practical law, <sup>on the other hand, is not concerned</sup> ~~however, has nothing whatever to do with the~~ the exhibition of an object in intuition, and therefore we cannot <sup>be</sup> schematised ~~it~~. The word 'schema' is thus inappropriate in connection with practical laws, for a schema in the proper sense is the <sup>by means of the imagination</sup> ~~symbolic~~ representation of a concept in intuition.

The concept of the good can indeed be represented, but we must note that that which we subsume under it is not the particular action given in intuition but the formal law by which the will of the agent is determined. We can see now that in the field of practical reason the faculty of Judgment finds something that it may regard as affording adequate symbolic representation of a supersensible concept, <sup>it is</sup> ~~namely~~ the determination of the will in accordance with a formal law which is regarded as a universal law of nature, this law having something in common <sup>with</sup> with the moral law and with the action ~~since~~ <sup>which</sup> it is supposed to determine ~~the will of the person who does the action.~~

"The physical law, being a law to which the objects of sensible intuition, as such, are subject, must have a schema corresponding to it - - - . But the law of freedom (that is of a causality not subject to sensible conditions) and consequently the concept of the unconditionally good, cannot have any intuition, nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the purpose of its application in concreto. Consequently the moral law has

no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical objects(not the imagination);and the understanding for the purposes of the judgment can provide for an Idea of the Reason,not a schema of the sensibility,but a law,though only as to its form as law,such a law,however,as can be exhibited in concreto in objects of the senses, and, therefore a law of nature." (C.Pr.R. 191-192) [If we are to understand this passage,we must first ask ourselves <sup>why Kant believes</sup> ~~what Kant's~~ reasons are for ~~believing~~ that it is the understanding alone which can refer to Reason and its concept of the good. To be able to answer this question,we must remember that according to Kant a concept of Reason has to determine absolutely what is to come under it. Now that which can be wholly determined by a universal concept and by what may be regarded as an adequate representation of a universal concept must itself be some sort of universal concept. The two things - the universal concept of Reason and what is to be subsumed under it - must belong to one homogeneous sphere,otherwise that which is to be subsumed could not properly represent the universal concept of Reason. From this it follows that it cannot be produced by any other faculty of the mind than the understanding,the only faculty with the exception of Reason capable of producing universal concepts. Further,we know that the problem with which Kant is here concerned is not the problem as to the possibility of actions(for this is no concern of practical Reason),but the problem as to how an action which occurs in the sensible world may be judged in such a way as to make it appear to be determined by a supersensible practical law. Kant shows that for this judgment understanding is required,for the understanding can take away from the action all that ~~belongs~~ belongs

to intuition, abstracting from its sensible conditions, and thus can conceive the concept of a universal determination of the action; and this is nothing but the mere form of the will, which can be subsumed under the concept of Reason.

It must be noted, however, - and this is a very important point - that Kant does not believe that the will of the agent is determined by the formal law of nature. He states positively that the will of the agent is determined by the moral law and by nothing else. His question is: 'How can a finite being which belongs to the <sup>world</sup> ~~realm~~ of nature judge his actions in such a way as to think them to be determined by a supersensible law?' And his answer is: 'He can do so by thinking that the maxims of his will are in accordance with a universal law of nature. "Hence this comparison of the maxims of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the determining principle of his will" (C.Pr.R. 193) Kant calls the universal law of nature which represents the moral law a 'Type' (Typus) of the moral law, and the general procedure he calls 'Typic'. His meaning would be more adequately expressed by the term 'symbol', a term which he actually uses once in the passage which we are discussing. Kant is trying to show that the finite moral being is capable of symbolising the supersensible law by means of the concept of a universal law of nature. We must, however, remember that he also holds that the finite being does not in that way acquire any theoretical knowledge of a supersensible object. The intelligible world cannot be represented by us in such a way as to make us know it theoretically. But practical Reason is not concerned with theoretical knowledge, and the Idea of the supersensible is represented by us only <sup>in order</sup> ~~so~~ that we may be able to make practical use of it. "It is, therefore, allowable

to use the system of the world of sense(die Natur der Sinnen - welt) as the type of a supersensible system of things(einer intelligiblen Natur) provided I do not transfer to the latter the intuitions and what depends on them but merely apply to it the form of law in general(the notion of which occurs in the commonest use of Reason but cannot be definitely known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of Reason)" (C.Pr.R. 193)

Kant goes on to explain that a 'Typic of Judgment' which does not mistake that which belongs to ~~to~~ the 'Typic' of the concepts for the concepts themselves, that is to say, a method which regards the universal law of nature as a mere symbol of the moral good, guards us against both empiricism and 'mysticism'; for empiricism regards the good as a mere product of experience, while 'mysticism' turns a symbol into a schema, proposing to provide for the moral concepts actual intuitions which however are not sensible (intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God) and thus plunges into the transcendent". (C.Pr.R. 194) Kant contrasts these two methods with his own which he calls 'rationalism', and he adds; "What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is only the rationalism of the Judgment which takes from the sensible system of nature only what pure Reason can also conceive of itself, that is, conformity to law, and transfers into the supersensible nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited in the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature." (C.Pr.R. 193)

I hope that my exposition of the chapter on the Typic has made at least one point quite clear, that is, that the problem that is discussed in it is bound up with the general principles of the transcendental philosophy. I have said again and again that the ~~for~~ problem of the relation between the supersensible and the sensible worlds seems to me to be the

fundamental problem of Kant's philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason shows that human reason must necessarily produce universal concepts (transcendental Ideas) which imply the existence of supersensible objects. Further, it shows that theoretical knowledge of these objects is quite impossible; for ~~since~~ all our knowledge depends upon intuition, and supersensible objects cannot be exhibited in intuition, since, owing to their nature as products of pure Reason, they are thought to be entirely independent of the world of sense and sensible intuition. But as moral agents we are in a different position from that in which we find ourselves when we aim at theoretical knowledge. For the moral being has an absolute consciousness of an absolute law. The Critique of Practical Reason does not in any way deny this. It even admits that it is possible to represent the supersensible law in the world of sense, but it must nevertheless adhere to the fundamental principle of the Critical Philosophy, namely, that theoretical knowledge <sup>by means</sup> of Ideas is denied to our Reason. An Idea of a supersensible object can be represented by a rational being in such a way as to enable him to make practical use of it by determining his will in accordance with it. But this is all that we can do. We must not mistake a symbol for a schema, and must not imagine that we are capable of discovering intuitions adequate to our moral concepts. If we did so we should contradict the fundamental principles of the Critical Philosophy, for we should deny the limited character of all human knowledge.

At the beginning of Chapter 3 of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason Kant points out that the moral law would be a holy law if it were regarded as a law determining the will of a being that would of his own nature conform to it.

Now the will of a finite rational being does not of its own nature conform to the moral law. On the contrary, the moral law, that is, the law of freedom, commands the finite being to act contrary to <sup>his</sup> ~~its~~ nature, and this raises the question as to what induces a finite being to act according to this law, or what is the subjective principle which makes him submit to its demands. Kant's answer is that it is the feeling of respect for the moral law that acts as <sup>such</sup> a subjective principle (Triebfeder). This feeling of respect shows us the peculiar nature of the finite being as a creature belonging to two different worlds, the finite world of nature and the infinite world of freedom. For respect for an unconditional law can be felt only by a being that submits unconditionally to the moral law and is yet aware of his finite nature and conscious of the fact that as a being belonging to the ~~finite~~ sensible world and subject to natural conditions it can never be in perfect conformity with the law. That is why respect for the moral law both elevates and humiliates the person who feels it. We must now ask ~~whether~~ <sup>if</sup> the feeling of respect produces morality, (moralische Gesinnung). Kant's answer is that it cannot do so, for the first thing that is given to us is the consciousness of the moral law, and the feeling of respect is only a consequence of that. ~~The feeling of respect is~~ <sup>Respect is</sup> Strictly speaking, not a feeling at all. It is a product of Reason, and it arises because the finite being compares his own conditional nature with the absolute demands of the unconditional <sup>subjective</sup> law. It is nothing but the <sup>subjective</sup> state of mind of a sensible being <sup>ing</sup> on finding himself determined by the objective law. "Thus the respect for the law is not a motive to morality but it is morality itself, subjectively considered." (C.Pr.R. 400.)

We must note that the feeling of respect for the

moral law is not a peculiarity of the human mind. It is not comparable to those properties of the mind with which empirical psychology is concerned, and which can be discovered only by empirical observation. Kant says of it that it is a feeling which can be known a priori and the a priori necessity of which we can understand; and this shows that he does not regard it as a special property of the human mind but as a feeling which every <sup>finite being</sup> sensible, which is determined by a supersensible law must have. When he says that the feeling of respect is composed of pleasure and pain, this is not to be taken as a psychological observation. He explains again and again that a holy will, unlike the human will, <sup>would</sup> ~~does~~ not feel respect for the moral law, that the concept of duty <sup>would</sup> ~~does~~ not exist for it and that it <sup>would</sup> ~~does~~ not determine itself by means of imperatives. He is not here thinking of special characteristics of human nature. What he is <sup>as the will of a finite being</sup> trying to show is that the human will is of necessity essentially different from a will to which the moral law is the law of its own nature. That Kant does not believe that the feeling of respect, the concept of duty and the consciousness of the command of the moral law as imperatives are due to the peculiar organisation of the human mind may be seen from the fact that <sup>according to him</sup> all these things are necessary characteristics of the will of every finite rational being. "For men and all created rational beings, moral necessity is constraint, that is, obligation, and every action based on it is to be conceived as duty, not as a proceeding previously pleasing to us of our own accord." (C.Pr.R.208)

"The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty, of moral constraint and of the determination of its actions by respect for this law and reverence for its duty." (C.Pr.R.208)

Just as when Kant says that the categories of the understanding must hold for every finite rational being, he never means that they are psychological peculiarities but always that they are objectively necessary forms of thought (see above), so in spite of many statements which may seem to suggest it he never for a moment assumes that respect for the moral law, the sense of duty and the awareness of <sup>w</sup>imperatives are accidental properties of the mind, but is convinced that they are necessary and a priori properties, the possession of which by every rational being can be objectively proved. "With the view of attaining to this, i.e. to the proof of the existence of a categorical imperative or of a practical law which commands absolutely and to follow which is duty, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings and propensities, may even, if possible, from any particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with a maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act, even though all our propensions, inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it. In fact the sublimity and intrinsic <sup>dignity</sup> of the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the

subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its validity" (Groundwork 52)

I propose now to ~~try~~ to give the main points of Kant's argument in the "Dialectic of Practical Reason". This is not an easy task because Kant's terminology here is so different from the one to which we are accustomed that it may often seem to us as if his argument depended entirely on the terminology of the period ~~in which~~ to which it belonged and had no independent philosophical value. What follows now is a summary of his argument. ~~It has been shown that the moral law gives orders to man unconditionally; it is an absolute law, enjoining upon the finite being that he should do the moral action irrespective of whatever evils may befall him as a being belonging to the world of nature. The only object of the will in so far as it is determined by the moral law is virtue. It appears, however, that practical Reason must necessarily conceive the Idea of an object which contains more than virtue. Virtue is not the summum bonum. The summum bonum, as the object of the will contains both virtue and happiness. Reason must assume that the perfect good is not attained by the will unless the finite rational being can enjoy perfect virtue and perfect happiness. The Analytic of practical Reason has made it clear that the desire for happiness can never be regarded as a determining principle of the will; for such a principle would destroy the moral value of our actions. The moral law commands unconditionally, and if we made an action dependent on happiness as its object we should make it dependent on a condition. The action would not be done for the sake of obedience to the moral law, but for the sake of something (namely, happiness) which has nothing whatever to do with the principle~~

(- - - - What follows now is a summary of his argument.)

Practical Reason, like theoretical Reason, conceives an Idea of the unconditioned, the summum bonum. The summum bonum as the object of the will contains both virtue and happiness. But this does not mean that virtue depends on happiness. On the contrary, the practical Reason must conceive of happiness as depending on virtue.

At first sight it may not appear easy to understand why Kant holds that the summum bonum must contain happiness as well as virtue. The Analytic of practical Reason has made it clear that the desire for happiness can never be regarded as a determining principle of the will; for such a principle would destroy the moral value of our actions. The moral law commands unconditionally, and if we made an action dependent on happiness as its object we should make it dependent on a condition. The action would not be done for the sake of obedience to the moral law, but for the sake of something (namely, happiness) which has nothing whatever to do with the principle of morality.

Yet it is impossible to regard moral virtue as the summum bonum.

(Straight on - p. 110).

of morality. Yet it is impossible to regard moral virtue as the summum bonum. Virtue is not the whole and perfect good. The fundamental Idea of Reason, whether theoretical or practical Reason, is the Idea of the unconditioned, and that is why practical Reason must judge that the will which determines itself according to the moral law has not yet attained to the perfect good. It is true that man has to obey the moral law apart from any idea of his happiness; he recognises it as absolutely binding. Yet <sup>for</sup> as a being which belongs to the world of nature he has necessarily a desire to make himself happy. This desire is a property of the will of every finite rational being. Practical Reason must presuppose that the finite being, while pursuing virtue and <sup>by</sup> ~~in~~ ~~doing so~~ making himself worthy of happiness which is the natural end of every finite being, is not excluded from partaking in happiness. Practical Reason does not allow virtue to be pursued by the finite being for the sake of happiness, but this does not prevent it from assuming that the perfect state of a finite rational being would be a state in which he was both virtuous and happy. "For to need happiness, to deserve it and yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all powers, if for the sake of experiment we conceive such a being." (C.Pr.F. 446, 447.) We see that Kant's reason for assuming that virtue by itself cannot be the summum bonum is that no finite rational being if it had the power to bring about its own happiness would refrain from doing so. But we also see that he believes that such a being in conceiving the Idea of the perfection of its own existence must necessarily make its happiness dependent upon its virtue. The Idea of a union of virtue and happiness such that happiness would be exactly proportionate

to virtue is a necessary Idea of Reason. The ideal state has been reached when happiness is produced by virtue. Such a state is the summum bonum, the perfect object of practical Reason. "Now in as much as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world; hence this summum bonum expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which however virtue as the ~~condition~~ condition is always the supreme good (oberste Gut) since it has no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition." (C.Pr.R.247)

It is not really difficult to understand why Kant holds that the Idea of the summum bonum, that is, the Idea of an object in which the highest perfection of the moral and of the natural life ~~coincide~~ coincide, must be conceived by practical Reason. We need only remember that for Kant there <sup>are</sup> ~~exist~~ two worlds, the world of nature and the intelligible world of freedom. Man belongs to both of these worlds. All his actions occur in the world of nature, and all that he can do is to refer them as regards their mere form to the intelligible world, without however having any knowledge of the connection between the two worlds. We must also remember that, according to Kant, Reason, whenever it is at work, conceives the Idea of an absolutely unconditioned object. In the case of practical Reason this means that Reason cannot conceive that the intelligible world should have no influence on the natural world. It makes the intelligible world the absolute condition of all things in general; it regards it as the source

of all being so that the causal principle which determines the intelligible world, namely, causality through freedom, is thought to be a principle which determines not only ~~the principle of the~~ the intelligible world but also ~~at~~ the world of nature. Thus Reason in its search for an absolute principle removes the fundamental difference between the two kinds of causality, ~~natural causality~~ ~~and~~ causality through freedom and the causality of nature, and makes the latter dependent on the former. Whenever our Reason conceives an Idea it assumes that the conditioned is wholly determined by the unconditioned. For practical Reason the conditioned is the world of nature. ~~Since~~ The finite rational being requires happiness in the world of nature, <sup>on the other hand</sup> and ~~since~~ his Reason necessarily conceives the Idea of an absolutely unconditioned intelligible world in accordance with whose principle he determines his actions, <sup>Therefore he cannot but believe that for the very reason</sup> ~~he believes and in fact must believe that~~ <sup>that in determining his actions</sup> ~~precisely because~~ he does not take any account of his needs as a finite being he will obtain his share of happiness, <sup>also</sup> and <sup>with</sup> that the amount of happiness which he obtains will depend on the extent to which he has determined his actions in accordance with the <sup>intelligible law,</sup> ~~law of morality which is the law of the intelligible world.~~ In other words, the finite rational being regards the world of nature as entirely subordinate to the world of freedom, and his own condition in the former (his happiness) as dependent on his morality (his virtue). "As pure practical Reason it likewise, i.e. like theoretical Reason] seeks to find the unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants) and this not as the determining principle of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law) the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical Reason under the name of the summum bonum." (C.Pr.R. <sup>242</sup> 272).

It appears, however, that the Idea of the summum bonum involves practical Reason in an <sup>a</sup>Antinomy, in the same way as the theoretical Ideas involved theoretical Reason in <sup>a</sup>Antinomies. It is the task of a Critique of pure practical Reason to present, and if possible to solve, the <sup>a</sup>Antinomy of practical Reason. Kant begins his discussion of the <sup>a</sup>Antinomies of practical Reason by showing that both the Stoic and the Epicurean theories with regard to the summum bonum rest upon erroneous assumptions. Both of these schools believed that virtue and happiness could be derived from one another analytically, the only difference ~~between~~ between their theories being that the Stoics believed that the consciousness of one's virtue was happiness while the Epicureans believed that the consciousness that one's maxims led to happiness was virtue. But neither of these is true. Virtue and happiness must be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum bonum; they form a synthetic unity, that is to say, the one is not implicit in the concept of the other. It is because they are quite different from one another that Reason, in conceiving the Idea of the summum bonum which is to contain them both, is involved in an <sup>a</sup>Antinomy. For since the Idea of the summum bonum is necessary and since it unites happiness and virtue, we are faced with these alternatives; either the desire for happiness produces virtue or virtue produces happiness. It is obvious that the former is quite impossible, for it has been shown in the Analytic that a will which makes actions ~~dependent~~ dependent on happiness is not determined by the moral law at all. The latter is also impossible "because the practical <sup>connection</sup> ~~connection~~ of causes and effects in the world as the result of the determination of the will does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will but on the knowledge of the laws of

nature and the physical power to use them for one's purposes; consequently we cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the moral law any necessary connection<sup>x</sup> of happiness with virtue adequate to the summum bonum." (G.E.L., 252)

Since there is no necessary connection between the two elements of the summum bonum, namely virtue and happiness, it follows that the summum bonum cannot be realised at all; and consequently it appears that the moral law which commands us to promote it is directed to vain, imaginary ends, and must be false. Kant solves the ~~Antinomy~~<sup>a</sup> Antinomy of practical Reason in the following way. The first proposition - that happiness can produce virtue - is absolutely false. The second proposition - that virtue might promote happiness - has been refuted on the ground that it is impossible for the moral law to have any influence on the world of nature which is wholly determined by the natural laws of causality; it was, therefore, held to be quite impossible that virtuous conduct, that is, conduct ~~which determines itself~~<sup>determined</sup> according to an intelligible causality, could in any way determine the natural state of the agent, ~~since~~<sup>being entirely dependent</sup> the latter depends ~~entirely~~ on <sup>the</sup> laws of nature. This, however, is not really a sound argument, for it is only if we make the law of natural causality to be an absolute law that we have to believe that the world of nature cannot be determined by any other kind of causality. Since, however, the world of natural objects is mere appearance, it is quite possible that the other causal principle - that of ~~causality~~<sup>causality</sup> through freedom - should determine not only the intelligible world but also the world of nature, the world of mere appearances. ~~It is quite impossible to assert that the intelligible world cannot determine the sensible world.~~ To think that there is a connection between them is ~~a reasonable~~<sup>at least not</sup>

~~an unwarrantable assumption.~~

~~and justifiable idea.~~ Theoretical Reason has nothing whatever  
~~against such an idea,~~ for, however strongly theoretical Reason  
must insist that every change in the world of nature is dependent  
upon the laws of natural causality, it is at the same time aware  
of the fact that nature is mere appearance, and of the possibility  
of the existence of another kind of causality. <sup>From the fact that</sup> ~~For since~~ theoretic-  
al Reason cannot raise any objection, and <sup>that</sup> ~~since~~ practical Reason  
makes us conscious of a supersensible law which <sup>in turn</sup> makes us conceive  
the Idea of the determination of our state in the world of sense  
by a supersensible law, it follows that the Idea conceived by  
practical Reason is theoretically not impossible and practically  
real. ~~What is actually implied in this Idea is the existence of~~  
~~a supernatural being to whom the moral and the natural worlds~~  
~~owe their existence. This supernatural being would bring about~~  
~~the connection between virtue and happiness, for he would apportion~~  
~~to the natural being just as much happiness as he deserved; he~~  
~~would make the happiness of the natural being dependent on his~~  
~~moral virtue.~~

It is interesting to compare Kant's solution of the  
<sup>a</sup> Antinomy of practical Reason with his solution of the theoretical  
<sup>a</sup> Antinomies. Such a comparison shows that although the method of  
solution is the same in both cases - the method being to show  
that it is only because appearances are taken to be things in  
themselves that the antinomies arise - there are nevertheless  
considerable differences between the two cases. In the Critique  
of Pure Reason Kant could do no more than show that the Idea of  
a supersensible world was not self-contradictory. Practical  
Reason, on the other hand, can actually establish the reality of  
such a world, because in the sphere of practice a supersensible  
law is given, and because, as a consequence of this, practical Reason

necessarily conceives the Idea of a unity of the world of nature and the world of freedom. A being <sup>that</sup> ~~who~~ determines his actions in accordance with an absolute law finds it impossible to believe that the two worlds to which he belongs have nothing to do with one another. His reason necessarily conceives the Idea of a summum bonum which unites the world of nature and the world of freedom.

Continuing my exposition of the Dialectic of practical Reason, I <sup>shall</sup> ~~wish~~ now to examine the chapter on "The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of pure Practical Reason." The following are the main points of Kant's argument. The realisation of the summum bonum is the necessary object of a will which is determinable by the moral law. Now the supreme condition of the summum bonum is the perfect conformity of the agent to the moral law. This however is something of which no <sup>finite</sup> rational being ~~in the world of sense~~ is capable at any moment of his existence. The demand which is made is that a being belonging to the sensible world should be absolutely perfect, that it should possess a holy will. <sup>As</sup> ~~Since~~ this can never be fully realised by a finite being, it can only be found in an infinite progress. "Since nevertheless it [holiness] is required as practically necessary it can only be found in a progress ad infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principle of pure practical Reason it is necessary to assume such a <sup>practical</sup> ~~progress~~ progress as the real object of the will." (C.Pr.R. ) <sup>N<sub>o</sub></sup> since such an infinite progress cannot be assumed unless we assume the infinite duration of the existence of the finite rational being, that is, the immortality of his soul, and since, as we have seen, it is a necessary Idea of practical Reason to assume the former, it is plain that the latter must also be assumed. The immortality of the soul is, thus, a postulate of pure practical Reason, a postulate being "a theoretical proposition not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an

unconditional a priori practical ~~idea~~ (C.Pr.L. 263)

Kant's argument will help us to understand more clearly the peculiar meaning which he attaches to the Ideas of Reason, and in particular the nature of the objectivity which he ascribes to them. The argument which we find here is again a transcendental argument, i.e. an argument which rests upon principles entirely different from those which either a dogmatic or a sceptical philosophy would put forward. The latter would deny the immortality of the soul altogether, and the former would regard it as theoretically demonstrable. The transcendental philosophy takes an entirely different point of view. Since perfect virtue is unattainable, since we can only approach it ~~but~~ and never fully realise it, we must, as we have seen, assume the immortality of the soul. But this assumption is not a theoretical dogma. The immortality ~~of~~ the soul is not a supersensible object which we can know; it is an Idea in accordance with which we can act. We conceive this Idea without having any theoretical knowledge of it. ~~It is given to us as a mere idea.~~ We are commanded to realise it, but we can never fully do so; we can only try to approach nearer and nearer to perfection. <sup>Perfect virtue, again,</sup> ~~the Stoics~~ <sup>was believed by the Stoics to be</sup> ~~believed that perfect virtue was~~ realisable in this world. Kant denies this; perfect virtue is an idea, and this implies that we can never attain to it. An idea <sup>refers to</sup> ~~is~~ a supersensible object, and its <sup>determining</sup> function is to make the finite being capable of ~~determining~~ <sup>determining</sup> himself in accordance with it, or to make him strive for its realisation in the finite world, although he knows that he can never fully realise it. In exercising this function, the Idea is real whether it be a theoretical or a practical Idea. Ideas are given us not <sup>in order</sup> ~~that we should~~ <sup>may</sup> imagine that we can transcend the sensible world, but <sup>in order</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>may</sup> that in the sensible world we ~~should~~ determine

ourselves in accordance with them. The Ideas of perfect virtue and  
immortality are given us <sup>in order</sup> so that we <sup>may</sup> should try to be as virtuous  
as we can be. Perfect goodness and holiness can be attained by  
us only in an endless progress. If this fact is overlooked, then  
us "either the moral law is quite degraded from its holiness, being  
made out to be indulgent and conformable to our convenience, or  
else men strain their notions of their vocation and their  
expectation to an unattainable goal hoping to acquire complete  
holiness of will, and so they lose themselves in fantastical  
theosophic dreams which wholly contradict self-knowledge. In both  
cases the unceasing effort to obey punctually and thoroughly a  
strict and inflexible command of Reason, which is yet not dead  
but real, is only hindered. For a rational but finite being the  
only thing possible is an endless progress from the lower to  
higher degrees of moral perfection." That human beings are  
incapable of ever reaching moral perfection we could infer, if  
from nothing else, from the fact that their actions take place  
in time. We must remember that it has already been shown in the  
Critique of Pure Reason that Reason in forming its concepts or  
Ideas does not take any account of time. It has been shown that  
we can never have theoretical knowledge of supersensible objects  
or Ideas because all such objects are quite independent of time,  
whereas our knowledge, being dependent on intuition and understand-  
ing, is always successive. We can have no knowledge of an object  
which is independent of our successive apprehension, ~~and~~ i.e.  
independent of time. Only a being possessed of either an  
intellectual intuition or an intuitive understanding could acquire  
knowledge of supersensible objects. (see above ) In the  
formation of the Ideas of practical Reason there is the same  
neglect of time. In forming the Idea of holiness we do not take

any account of the fact that human actions take place in time, or that the progress of the finite being towards perfection is a progress in time. A series of human acts, even if it were a continuous progress from the worse to the morally better, would be quite different from the concept of holiness. This concept could only be understood by an infinite being, i.e. a being which is independent of time. To such a being the progressive series would be an indivisible whole which it would be able to comprehend in a single intellectual intuition. "The infinite being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which His command inexorably requires, in order to be true to His justice in the share which He assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings." (C.Pr.I. 263, 264.)

We see here that the first Postulate, that of the immortality of the soul, leads immediately to the second, that of the existence of a supersensible being, God. Kant's argument begins from the fact that the summum bonum contains, as has been explained, two elements, namely, Morality and Happiness. Now, there is nothing in the moral law itself which would give us grounds for believing in a necessary connection between these two. Since, however, <sup>we must</sup> presuppose such a connection, we cannot do otherwise ~~than~~ than assume the existence of a supreme cause containing the principle of <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ connection, ~~that is, the principle of the exact harmony of happiness with morality.~~ We have to assume the existence of a supreme being distinct from nature which <sup>brings it</sup> ~~is the~~ <sup>about that</sup> ~~cause~~ our actual state <sup>is</sup> ~~being~~ determined in accordance with our moral character. "Therefore the summum bonum is possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character". (C.Pr.I. 266) [It is

not necessary for us to concern ourselves with the details of Kant's argument ~~here~~, for the general principle is all that we are here interested in. There is, however, one point of which we must take account. Kant's doctrine of practical Ideas seems to contain a great many contradictory statements. For instance, we are told that the necessity of assuming the existence of God is merely subjective (C.Pr.F. 267), that it is only because of the subjective conditions of our Reason that we find it impossible to assume a necessary connection between the moral and the natural worlds without assuming the existence of a supreme being (C.Pr.F. 291. 292.) *See also* In other places, however, we are told that practical Ideas or Postulates enable us to have a definite concept of the supersensible (C.Pr.F. 286), and that to strive after the summum bonum is objectively necessary; the latter is, in Kant's words, "an absolutely necessary requirement" (Bedürfnis in schlechterdings notwendiger Absicht) (C.Pr.F. 288, 289.) We may remember here that when we had to examine Kant's doctrine of the theoretical Ideas a difficulty of the same kind arose. We found it difficult to decide whether on Kant's view the theoretical Ideas were subjective or objective principles. There were a number of statements which seemed to suggest that Kant regarded the Ideas as merely subjective, and there were others which suggested that he thought of them as objective principles. We must also remember that we succeeded in showing that his doctrine of Ideas was not really inconsistent. We have seen that Kant ascribes a peculiar kind of objectivity to the theoretical Ideas. We shall now see that the same is true of his doctrine of practical Ideas. The point is discussed by Kant in chapter 7 of the Dialectic, "How is it possible to conceive an extension of pure Reason in a practical point of view, without its knowledge as speculative being enlarged

at the same time? The problem is: 'How can an idea of practical Reason, a practical Postulate, extend Reason's knowledge in a practical sense without at the ~~same time~~ increasing its theoretical knowledge?' The impossibility of an increase in theoretical knowledge by means of practical Ideas follows from the nature of a theoretical object. An object of theoretical knowledge cannot be determined by mere thought; if we are to know an object theoretically it must be given to us in intuition. Practical Reason on the other hand, in conceiving practical Ideas can do no more than prove that there exist objects towards which our will must be directed. This concept of an object in general cannot be considered adequate to give us theoretical knowledge. It follows that practical Reason does not provide theoretical Reason with theoretical knowledge of supersensible objects. And yet, although our theoretical knowledge of objects has not been increased in that way, theoretical Reason itself has gained in its knowledge of the supersensible in general by the help of practical Reason. For theoretical Reason by itself was unable to say anything more about the supersensible than that it could not be denied that supersensible objects might exist. The position is quite different now that theoretical Reason actually knows that there are such objects. ~~But~~ Since those objects are given to Reason "on practical grounds and for practical use", theoretical Reason must not imagine that it can know them. <sup>And yet</sup> ~~in spite of this~~ it may be asserted that in the sphere of the practical they are not merely transcendent and regulative but immanent and constitutive principles. "In this they become immanent and constitutive, being the source of the possibility of realising the necessary object of pure practical Reason (the summum bonum); whereas apart from this they are transcendent, and merely regulative principles of speculative

Reason, which do not require it to assume a new object beyond experience, but only to bring its use in experience nearer to completeness." (C.P.R. 279) *It is easy to see how Kant can* Now ~~even Kant~~ say that the Ideas of practical Reason are constitutive and immanent principles? ~~imply~~ ~~because~~ For him practical Reason is not at all concerned with theoretical knowledge of supersensible objects; its only interest is that the sensible being should determine his actions in accordance with supersensible Ideas, that he should have supersensible objects to direct his actions in the sensible world. It is for this reason that in the practical sphere the mere thinking of a supersensible object is all that Reason could possibly want. In the theoretical sphere, on the other hand, the fact that an Idea can never give us knowledge of a supersensible object must be regarded as a disadvantage, for theoretical Reason is interested in determining its objects theoretically. Practical Reason is interested in nothing but actions, and our actions can be determined by means of mere thought. ~~Practical Reason~~ <sup>It</sup> need only think the Ideas, and act according to them. A practical concept, unlike a theoretical concept, is not a mere form of thought. Now the object of practical Reason - the summum bonum - can be given to us is a question ~~with~~ which practical Reason need not <sup>ask</sup> ~~concern~~ itself. All that matters is that there is such an object. The mere concept of an object in general satisfies practical Reason, because it is not interested in theoretical knowledge. Theoretical Reason, on the other hand, cannot make use of its Ideas. They cannot give it the objective knowledge at which it aims, for, as has been shown in the first Critique, theoretical concepts are mere forms of thought and cannot give us knowledge of objects.

If we wish to understand the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical Ideas as regards their objective validity, we need only take Kant's term 'regulative principles'

quite literally, that is, as meaning principles which provide us with rules. This makes it clear at once that both theoretical and practical Ideas are merely regulative principles; for neither of them can give us knowledge of supersensible objects; neither categories of the understanding are. The fundamental difference between the two kinds of Ideas is that practical Reason in providing a rule is providing exactly what it requires for its purposes, whereas theoretical Reason is not satisfied with the production of a mere rule, and the fact that it can do no more must be regarded as a disadvantage. A practical Idea can be called a constitutive or immanent principle, because what practical Reason requires <sup>is a rule</sup> ~~are rules~~ according to which it can determine itself and the objects which it has to realise. Practical Reason is in no way concerned <sup>with</sup> ~~about~~ the so-called objective existence of its objects. It is not interested in knowing whether the soul is immortal or whether God exists. It assumes both, and in doing so gives a principle of action. All that it needs is a regulative principle which will make the finite being strive for the realisation of the supersensible object, which will urge him to act in accordance with the moral law and thus realise the summum bonum in his actions. Thus in the practical field the ideal rule is a genuinely immanent or objective principle. ~~Theoretical Reason, on the other hand,~~ must regard it as a disadvantage that it can only provide a rule and cannot know a supersensible object, or ~~provide~~ produce constitutive principles like those of the understanding.

At the end of my exposition of the Critique of Practical Reason I should like to point out once more that what

I have tried to show is that there is a necessary connection between the <sup>first</sup> two Critiques in that they both rest upon the transcendental presupposition that the world of sense is not the world of things in themselves. The Critique of Pure Reason has shown that theoretical Reason cannot know supersensible objects, and that the Ideas of supersensible objects which it conceives are merely regulative principles which can do no more for us than provide us with principles for the systematisation of our empirical knowledge. The Critique of Practical Reason has shown that in the practical field we can transcend the world of sense, and can realise supersensible objects. But it has also confirmed the view of the first Critique that no theoretical knowledge of such objects is possible. There is one other point which seems to me very important. We have seen that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant not only denies the possibility of theoretical knowledge of things in themselves, but also asserts that this is not to be regarded as a disadvantage, for such knowledge would in his opinion be both unnecessary and dangerous. Human Reason, if it were capable of giving us such knowledge, might, he holds, be tempted to abandon its proper task of enquiring into the nature of the sensible world. Thus metaphysics in the wrong sense i.e. a metaphysics which would derive the world of sense from the supersensible Ideas instead of realising the latter in the former, would corrupt science. In the Critique of Practical Reason we learn that theoretical knowledge of supersensible objects, if it were possible, would destroy not only our scientific knowledge but also our morality. Kant deals with this second point - the destruction of morality which would be brought about by an extension of theoretical knowledge to the supersensible - in the concluding section of the

Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, "Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Destination", which I wish to quote almost in full. "Suppose now that in this matter nature had conformed to our wish, and had given us that capacity of discernment or that enlightenment which we would gladly possess, or which some imagine they actually possess, what would in all probability be the consequence? Unless our whole nature were at the same time changed, our inclinations, which always have the first word, would first of all demand their own satisfaction, and, joined with rational reflection, the greatest possible and most lasting satisfaction, under the name of happiness; the moral law would afterwards speak, in order to keep them within their proper bounds, and even to subject them all to a higher end, which has no regard to inclination. But instead of the conflict that the moral disposition ("Gesinnung") has now to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength may gradually be acquired, God and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes (for what we can prove perfectly is to us as certain as that of which we are assured by the sight of our eyes). Transgression of the moral law, would, no doubt, be avoided; what is commanded would be done; but the mental disposition from which actions ought to proceed, cannot be infused by any command, and in this case the spur of action is ever active and external, so that reason has no need to exert itself in order to gather strength to resist the inclinations by a lively representation of the dignity of the law; hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the

person and even that of the world depends, would cease to exist. As long as the nature of man remains what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate well, but there would be no life in the figures. Now, when it is quite otherwise with us, when with all the effort of our reason we have only a very obscure and doubtful view into the future, when the Governor of the world allows us only to conjecture His existence and His majesty, not to behold them or prove them clearly; and, on the other hand, the moral law within us, without promising or threatening anything with certainty, demands of us disinterested respect; and only when this respect has become active and dominant does it allow us by means of it a prospect into the ~~super-sensible~~ world of the supersensible, and then only with weak glances; all this being so, there is room for true moral disposition, immediately devoted to the law, and a rational creature can become worthy of sharing in the summum bonum that corresponds to the worth of his person and not merely to his actions. Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also; that the ~~unsearchable~~ wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has granted. (C.Pr.R. 293-295.)

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.The First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.

Kant wrote two introductions<sup>for</sup> to the Critique of Judgment. The second of these has been published in every edition of the Critique. The first has had a strange history. It would have been entirely lost but for the fact that Kant sent the manuscript of it to his friend and pupil Jacob Siegmund Beck who was at that time engaged in writing a commentary on Kant's philosophy. Beck did not publish the full text of the Introduction, but in 1777 [in the second volume of his commentary] he published an excerpt from it. ~~(1777)~~ In this mutilated form the text was reprinted by Rosenkranz in 1838, Hartenstein in 1838 and 1886, von Kirchmann in 1870 and Erdmann in 1880. Finally Bueck in 1914 published the full text in his edition of the Critique (K.d.U.ed. by Otto Bueck pp. 179-231). There he gives an interesting account of the history of the text. Kant had only one reason, Bueck shows, for replacing the original introduction by a second one, and that was its length. This is in fact the only reason which Kant himself gives for his rejection of it. Lehmann, who published the first introduction in the "Philosophische Bibliothek" in 1927, asserts that "the first introduction was rejected by Kant not merely owing to its long-windedness, but because as a whole it represented a stage of transition On the development of his thought". From my study of the text, however, I am convinced that Bueck is right, and that the only reason for Kant's rejection of the first introduction is the one which he himself gives. I have not been able to discover <sup>any important</sup> ~~any~~ differences in doctrine between the two introductions. <sup>It</sup> ~~The truth~~ seems to <sup>me</sup> ~~be~~ that they present the same problem in two different forms. It is only natural that the first should have both the advantages and disadvantages of the more

elaborate account, while the second should have those of the more concise one. An English translation of the first introduction has been published along with four introductory essays by Humayun Kabir with the title of "Immanuel Kant on Philosophy in General" (1935). In his fourth <sup>essay</sup> Mr. Kabir discusses the relation between the two introductions and the value of each (pp. cviii-cxxxv). These are questions with which I shall not concern myself. I have, however, had to decide which of the two introductions would be the better subject for commentary, and I have chosen the first because it contains more material than the second, and because in reading both I have found that it was possible to understand the first without referring to the second, whereas when reading the second I ~~found~~ that I had to go back again and again to the first, especially for the help which it could give by its greater richness of illustration and example. If Kant had rejected the first introduction owing to a change in his doctrine, then the one which he substituted for it would have to be regarded as the real introduction to the Critique. But, since this does not seem to me to be the case, I feel entitled to disregard Kant's scruples concerning the length of the original introduction. I might of course have written a commentary on both introductions, but that would have led to the most tedious repetitions. I shall therefore deal with the second introduction only in Section vi where Kant considers a problem which is not <sup>fully</sup> discussed in the first introduction, the problem of the connection between the feeling of pleasure and the concept of the purposiveness of nature.

I have mentioned the recently published translation of the first introduction under the title of "On Philosophy"

① Unfortunately the <sup>translator</sup> translator possesses a very imperfect knowledge of the German language. As a result of this his translation is full of serious errors which make it practically useless. This, however, does not detract from the value of his introductory essays.

in General". If we consider the history of this title it will be apparent that there are no good grounds for retaining it as the title of the first introduction when that is given its proper place as the introduction to the Critique of Judgment. The title "On Philosophy in General" was first given to the introduction when it, or rather Beck's excerpt from it, was published in 1833 in F. Ch. Starke's edition of Kant's lesser writings. The editor was forced to make up a title for it since, owing to Beck's omissions, it could no longer be called an introduction to the Critique of Judgment. The full title which he gave it was "On Philosophy in General and on the Critique of Judgment in Particular", and in the index this was shortened to "On Philosophy in General". All subsequent editions give it the shorter name. We may admit that it is not an altogether unsuitable name, since we find in the text a more elaborate account than Kant gives anywhere else of the general principles of his philosophy. There seems, however, no reason why we should give it to the unabridged first introduction. However important it may be to us that Kant has given us a treatise in which he sets forth the general principles of his philosophy so clearly that it can help us to understand his philosophy as a whole, we must not forget that his purpose in writing ~~in writing~~ it was to prepare us for the Critique of Judgment. This, I think, ought to be expressed in the title. The treatise is simply an introduction to the Critique of Judgment based upon the general principles of the transcendental philosophy.

In my interpretation I shall try to show that the Introduction must be understood in relation to the general

principles of Kant's thought, and must be regarded as a part of the whole Critical Philosophy. I have thought it advisable not to give a merely general survey of Kant's problem and its solution, but to follow his argument step by step and to deal with the details of his exposition. My chief reason for doing so is that I have found that even after Kant's general idea ~~had~~ <sup>remained</sup> become clear to me, there ~~remains~~ <sup>and in</sup> considerable difficulty in following his argument in detail. In writing my commentary I have ~~had~~ in mind a reader with the same difficulties about details and have thought that he might be glad of a commentary dealing with them. Further, my idea of a commentary on a philosophical work is that it should try to help the reader to understand particular passages which he finds difficult, and that is what I have tried to do in this commentary. The correctness of my explanations is another matter, and as to that I can only say that I am far from imagining that they are correct on every point. Another reason for choosing to expound the Introduction in detail is that I wish to rebut the charge that it is nothing but a piece of "architectonics", and only a detailed exposition can do this; a merely general survey of the argument would be unconvincing and might even confirm the charge by giving us the impression that the treatise with all its enumerations of divisions (the divisions of philosophy, of the mind and of the cognitive faculties) was to be considered more as a general tidying up of Kant's system than as the presentation or discussion of a real problem.

First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.Section 1.

In Section 1 of the Introduction, which is headed "Philosophy as a System", Kant discusses the question of what belongs to theoretical and what to practical philosophy. There is, he says, a grave misunderstanding as to what is to be regarded as practical. It might seem as if we were entitled to give the name practical to a proposition simply because it expressed a form of doing and was not mere knowing; for example, it might seem as if the propositions which give us precepts as to how to put theoretical knowledge into practice should be called practical. This, however, is not so, for such propositions do not contain anything more than is already contained in theoretical knowledge. A geometrical proposition may prescribe what we have to do to produce a certain effect, for instance the bisection of a line. A proposition of this kind cannot be regarded as a genuine practical proposition, for it contains no principle of its own, that is to say, no principle which would make it independent of theoretical knowledge. A proposition to be truly practical must be determined by specific principles, that is to say, it must be determined by practical principles or laws of freedom, not by theoretical principles or laws of nature. Therefore, not every proposition which is concerned with some kind of doing belongs to practical philosophy. Only those propositions do so which contain a special principle of practical freedom, and are thus fundamentally different from theoretical propositions. All other so-called practical propositions are determined by the laws of natural causality, and are distinguished from theoretical knowledge only formally and not in respect of their content.

*proposition which refers to some kind of action*  
~~content.~~ It is true that every ~~action~~, even one which is determined by principles of nature, is determined by a formula which differs from a merely theoretical formula. Doing something in accordance with our knowledge of natural causes is not identical with knowing theoretically. But the difference between them is merely formal and is not a difference in principle. Even when our actions are determined by precepts for the furtherance of our own happiness, *the precept on which these precepts are contained* they are not on that account to be regarded as practical actions. For the causal relation between our idea of happiness and the effects which are produced by it belongs to the realm of nature; it is the relation between two natural objects, ~~our happiness and our own nature~~. When we act in accordance with such an idea, our action is nothing but the immediate consequence of our theoretical knowledge of objects in relation to our own nature. The concept of happiness belongs to our understanding, and the same understanding determines theoretically the actions which will lead to our happiness. Action in accordance with such knowledge is not *in principle* ~~specifically~~ different from theoretical knowledge. It is an immediate consequence of it, and does not require any independent principle which could be called a practical principle.

*propositions*  
 From this account of practical ~~principles and actions~~ it is evident that the principles of the so-called practical sciences, such as applied geometry, cannot be regarded as genuine practical principles, and that these sciences do not therefore belong to practical philosophy. Neither can we regard as practical the *principles* of a will which determines itself by natural objects of which we can have theoretical knowledge, *express our desire for such objects* e.g. happiness, and the propositions which ~~are produced in this way~~ are not practical propositions. As long as the will obeys none

but the laws of natural causality, the knowledge of which is the concern of our understanding, (for instance, as long as our understanding first makes us conceive the idea of happiness as the object of desire and then determines the relation between happiness and our own nature), no practical rules or propositions are produced. Propositions of ~~the kind~~ produced in this way belong to theoretical philosophy, for they do not contain any <sup>specific</sup> ~~specified~~ practical principle but merely determine the causal relation between a physical object which is desired and our own nature. Only a free will, i.e., a will which makes itself independent of natural objects, can produce practical propositions which belong to practical philosophy. "It is true that practical propositions are distinguished from theoretical propositions as regards the mode of representation. This, however, does not cause them to be different from theoretical propositions which contain the possibility of things and their determination regarding their content. Only those are different which consider freedom in accordance with laws. All the others are nothing else than theory of that which belongs to the nature of the things with the only difference that they apply to the way in which those things can be produced according to a principle, i.e., the possibility of those things through an arbitrary action is represented in them, which action belongs just as much to the sphere of natural causes." (C. of J. 180, Bueck, 4, Lehmann.)

"In a word, all practical propositions which derive that which may be contained in nature from the arbitrary will as cause belong altogether to theoretical philosophy which is concerned with knowledge of nature. Only those practical propositions are as regards their content specifically different from the former (i.e., theoretical propositions) which give laws to free-

dom." (C.of J.180 Bueck;5 Lehmann .) "Now the possibility of things in accordance with laws of nature is essentially different from their possibility in accordance with laws of freedom as regards their principles. This difference does not, however, consist in the fact that ~~the~~ <sup>with</sup> the latter (i.e. the possibility through freedom) the cause is placed in a will whereas with the former it is placed outside it in the things themselves (den Dingen selbst, not to be confused with den Dingen an sich, things in themselves). For let us assume that the will does not follow any other principles than those regarding which the understanding comprehends that the object is possible according to them as mere laws of nature. In that case the proposition which contains the possibility of the object through the causality of the arbitrary will may be called a practical proposition. In spite of this it will, as regards its principle, in no way differ from theoretical propositions which are concerned with the nature of the things, or rather it must borrow its principle from it (i.e. the nature of the things) in order to exhibit the representation of an object in reality."

(C.of J.181, Bueck;  
5&6 Lehmann.)

All this may at first seem very mysterious; yet as far as the general principle is concerned the doctrine is known to everyone who is familiar with Kant's moral philosophy, for it is the basis of his distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. We may remind ourselves that according to Kant hypothetical are distinguished from categorical imperatives in that the command given by the former is made to depend on certain conditions while the latter commands unconditionally. Hypothetical imperatives never determine actions unconditionally but only determine them on the condition that something <sup>shall</sup> is made

an object of the will, our action depends on the object, and this object we may or may not desire. Our action is thus an arbitrary one. Hypothetical imperatives do not command simply that a certain action should be done, but that if a certain object is desired certain actions should be done since they will put us in possession of the object. In the "Groundwork" Kant distinguishes between two kinds of hypothetical imperative, (a) imperatives of skill and (b) imperatives of prudence. ~~The difference between them is that~~ In the case of the former the object is entirely arbitrary, i.e., it is an object which we might just as well repudiate as desire. We may take as an example a doctor who makes the health of his patient the object of his will. <sup>Assuming</sup> ~~Suppose~~ that he wishes to realise this object and has the necessary theoretical knowledge of the means which will bring it about, he will act accordingly, ~~and~~ yet his action will have no independent practical principle; it will be nothing but an immediate consequence of his theoretical knowledge, for that he who wills the end wills also the means which will achieve it is an analytical proposition. The end in the case which we are considering is not a practical object, for the doctor conceives the idea of the object, the health of his patient, by mere thought. The actions which he does are not guided by a practical principle, but are wholly dependent on the desired object and on the means which will realise that object. Now both end and means are known theoretically, and the action is therefore not <sup>determined by a practical principle</sup> ~~a practical action~~.

The same holds for the principles of the so-called practical sciences, such as applied geometry. It is clear that if I wish to bisect a line, and if I know that in order to do so I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs, then I shall do <sup>this</sup> ~~the necessary action~~. It is also clear that my action does not

possess any principle of its own, but is entirely dependent on my theoretical knowledge, of which it is the immediate consequence. The connection between knowing and doing is here analytic and not synthetic, i.e., the principle which determines my action is implicit in what I know theoretically.

The imperatives of prudence, i.e., those imperatives which command us to bring about our own happiness, differ from the imperatives of skill in that their object, namely, happiness, must necessarily be desired by every finite rational being. Yet we cannot attribute to the actions which are determined by such imperatives any practical principle of their own. Happiness is an object of thought; <sup>which we conceive</sup> ~~we conceive~~ the idea of ~~our own happiness~~ by means of thinking. From this idea it follows analytically that we shall use the means by which it can be brought about. It may seem absurd to assume that the actions which will lead to our happiness are implicit in our idea of happiness, since it obviously very difficult or even impossible to have perfect knowledge of what we should do to make ourselves happy. But it is important to notice that the difficulty is in knowing how to achieve happiness. It is not at all difficult to see that if we had full knowledge of the nature of happiness and the means of achieving it, our actions would follow immediately and would be in strict accordance with our knowledge. The imperatives of prudence would on that assumption be merely analytic propositions, i.e., they would be propositions implicit in our theoretical concept of happiness. They would be in no way different from the imperatives of skill. "If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill, and would likewise

be analytical. For in this case as in that, it could be said, whoever wills the end, wills also (according to the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable means thereto which are in his power." (Groundwork 42) "This imperative of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is merely possible, in the former it is given; as however both only ordain the means to that which we suppose to be willed as an end, it follows that the imperative which ordains the willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both cases analytical." (Groundwork 44)

We have now seen why Kant treats the so-called practical propositions employed by such sciences as applied geometry, practical psychology and mechanics on the same footing as the precepts which he calls in the Critique of Judgment the "precepts to further one's own happiness" (C. of J. 180, Bueck; 4, Lehmann), and in the Groundwork the imperatives of prudence; and why he gives to all of these the name of technical propositions. What is common to them is that they are ~~concerned~~ concerned with nothing but the putting into practice of what is already implicit in our theoretical knowledge, and therefore do not contain any principle which affects the action as such. They belong, accordingly, to theoretical philosophy. They do not determine the will as such, but make it dependent on a natural object. The will here is not a free will determined by an independent practical principle, but is an arbitrary will whose actions are dependent on something else, namely, the theoretically conceived concept of its object. They must be

called technical and not practical propositions. "For they belong to the art of bringing about that which we desire should be, which art in the case of a complete theory is always a mere consequence and not an independent part of any kind of instruction." ("Anweisung"). (C. of J. 183, Bueck; 8, Lehmann)  
 Moral propositions alone may be regarded as genuine practical propositions, for they follow a principle which is independent of the world of natural objects. They are determined, not by laws of nature, but by laws of freedom. Kant says of them here that they determine the action through the determination of its form (in accordance with laws in general) without taking account of the object which is produced in this way, that they have ~~THEIR~~ their specific principles in the Idea of freedom and that although those principles constitute the concept of an object of the will, namely, the summum bonum, this object belongs only indirectly to the practical precept. For the explanation of ~~THE~~ this I must refer to my exposition of the general principles of the Critique of Practical Reason. (see above )

Kant goes on to say that the possibility of practical propositions cannot be understood by theoretical knowledge of nature. This is a very important point, for it shows that Kant maintains here the fundamental doctrine of the first two Critiques. The first section of the first Introduction to the Critique of Judgment is apparently concerned with a question of terminology. But this must not make us overlook the fact that Kant's discussion is entirely dependent on the fundamental principles of his philosophy as set forth in the first two Critiques. Kant is convinced that there exist two entirely different worlds, the world of nature and the

world of freedom. Theoretical philosophy is concerned with knowledge of the world of nature, and it is the understanding which furnishes the rules necessary for this knowledge.

Practical philosophy is concerned with the world of freedom, <sup>the</sup> ~~laws~~ <sup>laws</sup> of freedom are conceived by practical Reason. It is true that ~~these~~ laws actually determine our will, but they do not give us any theoretical knowledge of the world of freedom. We are quite incapable of understanding practical principles ~~these~~ theoretically. ~~One of the fundamental differences between the world of nature and the world of freedom is that we can have no theoretical knowledge of the latter.~~ The significance of the distinction between technical and practical propositions for the Critique of Judgment is not shown by Kant in the first section of the Introduction. But we can see from <sup>his</sup> ~~Kant's~~ account of the distinction that the Critique of Judgment will maintain the fundamental principles of the Critical Philosophy.

At the end of the first section of the Introduction Kant tells us that he proposes to use the terms "Technique" and "technical" also in another sense, namely, in cases where objects of nature are judged by us as if their possibility depended on an art. Such judgments are neither theoretical nor practical judgments, for they do not determine <sup>their</sup> objects <sup>at all</sup> ~~or judge nature only~~ <sup>but merely judge them</sup> in relation to our cognitive faculty. We must not give the name technical to them but only to the faculty of Judgment on whose laws they are based. It is not possible for us to understand at this stage Kant's exposition of the second sense of the term "technical", and we may therefore go on <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ Section **XXV 2.**

Section 2.

As regards the point which we left unexplained at the end of the first section, the second section begins unpromisingly for here Kant seems to be concerned with a mere question of division. We are told that there exist three higher faculties of knowledge which constitute a system, namely, (a) the understanding which is the faculty of the cognition of universal rules, (b) Judgment, which is the faculty of subsuming the particular under the universal, and (c) Reason, which is the faculty of determining the particular by the universal, i.e., the faculty of deriving the particular from Principles. What does all this mean?

Our examination of the main principles of the first two Critiques has shown that the problem of the relation between particulars and universals is the central problem of the transcendental philosophy. We have seen that in Kant's view every strictly universal concept is a product of the mind. It is an a priori concept, i.e., it does not belong to the objects as such nor to things in themselves, but is conceived by the mind prior to actual experience. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant has proved that our understanding produces certain a priori concepts or categories which are necessary conditions of our experience of objects. On the other hand, he has also shown that these universal rules do not in any way determine the sphere of particulars as such. The universal rules of the understanding are devoid of all meaning unless they are related to given intuitions. The particular intuition as such is unknown to us. Our theoretical knowledge is incapable of determining particulars by means of universal rules. That particulars should be fully determined by universal concepts is a demand which our faculty of Reason by its very nature must make. For Reason is not a faculty of rules like the understanding but a faculty of

Principles, and knowledge from Principles is, according to Kant's definition, "that knowledge alone in which I apprehend (erkenne) the particular in the universal through concepts," (C.P.R. B357) The first Critique has shown that such knowledge cannot be attained in the theoretical field. The second has shown that in the practical field we are capable of determining particulars through universal concepts. What is first given to us is the universal law of Reason, and we are able to determine our particular actions by means of this universal law. There exists, however, a third faculty of the mind, the faculty of Judgment, without which we should be unable to relate particulars to universals. This faculty does not produce any universal concepts. All that it has to do is to subsume particulars under given universal concepts. It has to decide whether a given particular case stands under a given universal concept which is not produced by Judgment but either by the understanding or by Reason. There are universal laws of nature, laws of the ~~understandi~~ understanding, and there are universal laws of freedom, laws of Reason. Theoretical Judgment subsumes particular intuitions under universal laws of the understanding, and practical Judgment subsumes particular actions under the universal laws of Reason.

We have now to state the problem of the Critique of Judgment. We might think that, since the Critique of Pure Reason had set forth the a priori principles of nature, and the Critique of Practical Reason those of freedom, we had discussed all the a priori principles possible in philosophy. Is this really true, or is there an a priori principle belonging to the faculty of Judgment? It is clear from the outset that since Judgment is not an independent faculty of cognition

but merely mediates between the other two faculties of cognition, understanding and Reason, any a priori principle which it may possess will be entirely different from the a priori principles of the understanding and of Reason which by means of concepts constitute the objective worlds of nature and freedom. Since Judgment does not produce any objective concepts, neither categories (concepts ~~but~~ of the understanding) nor Ideas (concepts of Reason), it is quite impossible that it should view the relation between particulars and universals in the same way as the other two faculties. It is, however, not impossible to assume that Judgment should have a subjective principle. This would be the case if Judgment neither made use of universal concepts which it itself produced like understanding and Reason, nor merely subsumed particulars under universal rules given from elsewhere (that function of Judgment which has been discussed in the first two Critiques) but provided us with a principle which made us look for universal concepts, within the sphere of particulars (which are not yet given). It is clear that if such a principle exists (i.e., a principle which makes us assume (a) that the sphere of particulars itself is subject to some regularity, and (b) that the rules for this regularity are not given to us but that we must look for them) it will be entirely different from the principles of the understanding and of Reason.

[ Kant's first description of this principle is very obscure.

He says that if there were a concept or rule which originated in Judgment, it would have to be a concept of such a nature as to conform to our faculty of Judgment, that is, to our faculty of subsuming given particular laws under more universal laws not yet given. He goes on <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ explain that such a concept would

be the concept of the adaptation of nature to the purpose of our knowing it. For in order that we should be able to have knowledge of nature, it is necessary that we should be able to estimate (beurteilen) the particular as contained under the universal, and to subsume it under <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ concept of nature. This statement is partly explained in the next paragraph, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ we learn there that the concept in question is the concept of experience as a system according to empirical laws. Now we have to remember that in the first two Critiques Kant ~~XXXXX~~ distinguishes ~~between~~ two totally different spheres (a) the sphere of mere particulars and (b) the sphere of universal concepts which are produced by understanding and Reason. The idea that particulars as such should belong to a system is an idea which could not be conceived either by understanding or by Reason. The Critique of Pure Reason did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that we do not merely presuppose that all natural objects are determined by universal laws, but ~~that~~ ~~we~~ must also assume that we shall succeed in arranging particular laws in a system. This is a presupposition on which all our scientific enquiry into nature rests. We must assume that the particular laws of nature which we discover are related to one another. In doing so we conceive the idea of a nature which conforms to our subjective requirements. We expect that the particular laws will not be so different from each other as to make it impossible for our faculty of Judgment to find a universal principle common to them all, and the curious fact is that we have no objective reason whatsoever for believing this to be so. There are only two faculties of the mind which produce objective principles, understanding and Reason. The idea of experience as a system in accordance with particular

or empirical laws belongs to neither of them. It cannot be regarded as a product of the understanding, for our understanding is concerned only with strictly universal laws. Still less can it be regarded as a product of Reason, for Reason by its very nature transcends experience, and is not concerned with the world of experience or its laws. We can now understand much better what Kant's problem is, and why he regards the concept of a systematic unity of particular laws as a concept of the faculty of Judgment. The Critique of Judgment discovers a new fact, namely, that in order to have experience we need not only the universal laws of the understanding, the objective validity of which the Critique of Pure Reason has demonstrated, but also the assumption on merely subjective grounds of a connections among ~~between~~ the empirical laws which we find so that we can relate them to one another and subsume them under the universal laws of the understanding. But for such an assumption scientific experience would be impossible. Physics, for instance, is not so much concerned with the universal law of causality as with particular causal laws, and it must demand that those causal laws be related to one another not only as regards their universal nature, i.e. in so far as they are causal laws, but also as regards their particular characteristics. It is plain that Kant is here concerned with an entirely new problem, a problem of the existence of which he knew nothing when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. We need only remember that one of the questions raised in the Prolegomena is, 'How is pure natural science possible?', and that Kant's definition of the object of natural science, i.e. nature, is. "Nature is the existence of things in so far as they are

determined in accordance with universal laws." (Prolegomena 294)  
 Kant's view both in the first Critique and in the Prolegomena  
 is that we have neither a priori knowledge of particular laws  
 of nature nor any a priori principle with regard to them. In  
 the Critique of Judgment he takes a different view. He realises  
 now that it is not enough to regard nature as a system in accord  
 ance with transcendental laws which constitute the universal  
 conditions of experience but that we must presuppose that nature  
 is a system in accordance with particular laws which it contains  
 "Particular experience connected throughout according to  
 permanent (bestandigen) laws also requires this systematic  
 connection of empirical laws in order that it should be made  
 possible for our faculty of Judgment to subsume the particular<sup>laws</sup>  
 under the universal though still empirical, and to proceed in  
 this way until it reaches the highest empirical laws and the  
 forms of nature which correspond to them; in other words, our  
 Judgment must be capable of regarding the aggregate of particular  
 experiences as the system thereof. For without this presupposit-  
 ion there can be thoroughgoing connection of particular exper-  
 iences in accordance with a law (gesetzmässiger) i.e. they would  
 be without empirical unity." (C. of J. 185, 186. Bueck, 10, 11.  
 Lehmann.)

If we are to realise fully the change which has taken  
 place in Kant's doctrine, we need only remember that in the  
Critique of Pure Reason the Idea of systematic unity is a pure  
 concept of Reason, and that Kant there believes that Reason in  
 conceiving this Idea must transcend the world of nature. Now,  
 however, Kant thinks it possible that there should be an a priori  
 principle which enables us to treat nature as a system even as  
 regards its merely empirical laws without leaving the sphere

of experience. The principle of systematic unity is a principle which is applied by empirical science. It is a principle implicit in every kind of scientific enquiry. Since, however, it is not a principle of the understanding, it is obvious that as regards its objective validity it must be essentially different from the categories and principles of the understanding. We have seen that the faculty of Judgment demands this systematic unity of nature on merely subjective grounds. It expects that nature will meet its demands. The ~~idea~~ faculty of Judgment presupposes that it will succeed in connecting the particular laws of nature with each other so as to be able to arrange them in a system. It follows that the faculty of Judgment is not entitled to assume the objective existence of such laws or of such a system. It can do no more than apply its principle as a principle of enquiry into nature. Since there are no laws given to Judgment, all that Judgment can do is to look for such laws in experience. When it finds them there it must seem as if nature ~~itself~~ had adapted itself to the faculty of Judgment, and its subjective principle. Thus, the principle of Judgment is of an entirely different kind from the objective principles of the understanding which are necessary conditions of experience as such. It is a subjectively necessary principle, a necessary maxim of scientific enquiry. It is true that all scientific enquiry depends on the assumption of such a principle, but this must not lead us <sup>to treat</sup> this principle as if it were equivalent to the principles of the understanding, the objective validity and necessity of which can be established. Since the principle of Judgment is a mere maxim, a merely heuristic principle, i.e., a guiding ~~principle~~

principle of our enquiry, we must attach to it a special kind of objective validity; in fact, whether we call it an objective or a subjective principle depends on our definitions of these terms. The principle of Judgment may be called an objective principle in so far as in enquiring into nature we must employ it, <sup>and</sup> since we cannot but assume that nature will adapt itself to our faculty of Judgment. But we may also call it subjective, for it is quite different from the objective principles of the understanding, and we are quite incapable of knowing prior to actual experience to what extent nature will comply with our desire to bring about the systematic unity of empirical laws. This we could only do if there were given to us an a priori and objective concept of experience in general from which we could derive its particular laws. As a matter of fact, however, we have no a priori knowledge whatever of the particular laws of nature, and all that we can do is to base our enquiry into these laws upon a principle which will enable us to find out what they are and what their relation to each other is.

Kant explains the difference between the principles of the understanding and the principle of Judgment in a note on page 186 (Bueck; p. 11, Lehmann) His language is highly technical and it is not easy to understand him. He begins by stating that experience is based upon synthetic judgments. Experience of objects can be derived from a mere comparison of perceptions, i.e., experience depends on a synthesis which is made possible by the categories and principles of the understanding. A mere analysis of perceptions would never give us knowledge of an object. This is a doctrine with which every reader of the

first Critique is familiar, and it is easy to understand what Kant means. It is far more difficult to understand him when he states immediately after this that empirical cognitions in accordance with what is necessarily common to them all, i.e., in accordance with the transcendental laws of nature, constitute a merely analytic unity of all experience, whereas the unity which regards experiences even in respect of their differences as belonging to a system is a synthetic unity of experience. One thing is clear, namely, that the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" are here used in a <sup>different</sup> ~~different~~ sense from the usual one. We must ask ourselves, "How can Kant say that the transcendental laws of nature <sup>which according to him</sup> ~~in spite of the fact that they~~ are all functions of synthesis constitute a merely analytic unity?" In order to understand this we must remember that the transcendental laws of nature are all products of the understanding. It is true that they are conditions of experience in general, that we can have no experience of an object at all without having synthesised given intuitions by means of these universal rules. It must, however, be noted that the understanding as such has nothing whatever to do with the sphere of particulars, i.e., the sphere of intuition. It is not at all concerned with the application which its universal law will find in experience. The understanding is a faculty of universal rules, for example, the universal law of causality. It is quite indifferent to the particular causal laws which we find in experience. All that it can say about them is that each of them is a causal law. As far as the understanding is concerned, empirical laws constitute a merely analytic unity, ~~because they do not show any difference. The understanding cannot leave its own sphere of mere thought, and~~ The understanding ignores all their differences. It grasps only their common element (i.e., what constitutes their analytic unity) and cannot leave its own sphere of mere thought. As a consequence

*of this it is possible to*

consequently ~~cannot~~ synthetise empirical laws. Judgment, on the other hand, is not a faculty of thought; it is concerned with the world of experience, i.e., with a world which contains not only universal laws but also particular or empirical laws. It is the latter which Judgment subjects to its Idea of unity. It employs a special principle of synthetic unity, ~~for whereas~~ ~~the understanding is only concerned with the universal laws~~ ~~of nature~~ Judgment <sup>4</sup> compares the particular laws of experience with one another in respect of their differences, and assumes that they will not be totally different from one another but <sup>inter-</sup> will be related ~~to~~ and will belong to one system. At the end of the note Kant points out that the "concept" of Judgment is distinguished from a category which determines synthetic unity objectively, <sup>(1)</sup> and that <sup>in</sup> spite of this it yields subjective principles which serve as clues in the investigation of nature. This has already been explained. But we do not yet understand what Kant means when he says that Judgment assumes a formal purposiveness of nature on its own behalf, ~~and~~ that the concept originating in and peculiar to Judgment is the concept of nature <sup>technical</sup> as <sup>1</sup> or a concept of a Technique of nature in ~~respect~~ respect of its particular laws, and that Judgment represents nature not only as mechanical but also as technical. To understand these statements we require further explanation from Kant. The discussion of the problem of empirical and universal laws is continued in Section 4 to which we shall now turn, leaving the discussion of Section 3 till later.

(1) On this point, see below

Section 4.

<sup>Set forth</sup>  
 Kant's argument in this section may be described as follows. We have seen in the Critique of Pure Reason that nature constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental laws, for we have been able to show that the understanding produces universal laws which must apply to every object of experience since without their application we could not unite our ideas and so could not become aware of an object. It is the understanding itself which gives us the Idea of a systematic unity of experience. Now it is a curious fact that in the assumption of a transcendental unity of experience there is implicit another assumption, namely, that of experience as a system of particular laws. The problem of which the Critique of Pure Reason took no account is that, while we must demand the systematic unity of experience even as regards the particular laws, we cannot establish this unity. For as far as the understanding and its a priori knowledge of nature is concerned, we cannot exclude the possibility that actual experience might show us such a variety and heterogeneity of empirical laws as would make it impossible for us to relate them to one another in a system. The variety of empirical laws and of natural objects might be endlessly great, so that nature would present us with a chaotic aggregate and would reveal not the slightest trace of a system. We can now see quite clearly what Kant's problem is. The understanding presents us with a world which is determined by the objective laws of the understanding. But if we are to have real <sup>the</sup> experience, we must also presuppose that nature as regards its empirical laws will be intelligible to the human mind. If nature showed us only laws which were totally different from one another, we must also presuppose that nature as regards its empirical laws will be intelligible to the human mind. If nature showed us only laws which were totally different from one another,

should be unable to apprehend it. Experience depends upon two a priori presuppositions: (a) that nature is determined by universal laws, and (b) that the empirical laws of nature are intelligible to the human mind. That we are entitled to make the first of these presuppositions, Kant has shown in the Critique of Pure Reason by establishing the objective validity of transcendental laws. The second we may call a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition; for we presuppose it, not because there are any objective reasons why we should believe it to be the case, but because without it experience would be impossible. "Thus it is a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition that this disquieting and unlimited diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms do not occur in nature. On the contrary, we must presuppose that nature through the affinity of particular laws which stand under more general laws provides itself with the qualities necessary to become experience as an empirical system." (C. of J. 191, Busck; 16, Lehmann.) It cannot be the understanding which makes us presuppose this, for the understanding in conceiving its objective transcendental laws does not take any account of particular empirical laws; it is concerned only with the conditions of experience in general, ~~and not with particular laws.~~ The presupposition prior to actual experience that nature will be a system of empirical laws originates in our Judgment. Judgment is not only, as was wrongly supposed in the Critique of Pure Reason, a faculty of subsuming particulars under the universal laws of nature which apply to all objects of experience irrespective of their differences. Judgment has also another function. It enables us to compare particular, empirical laws- identical as far as the universal

laws of nature are concerned - in respect of their differences. In other words, Judgment presupposes that the empirical laws are not totally different from one another. It assumes that they possess <sup>particular</sup> ~~common~~ characteristics which enable us to arrange them in a system. The fact that the principle which is assumed by the faculty of Judgment is a merely subjective principle, one which it employs for its own special use so that it may be able to regard experience as a system without having any objective concepts which would justify such a procedure, must not lead us to believe that it is an empirical principle, i.e., a principle which is derived from observation of empirical objects. It is a genuine a priori principle. It cannot be attributed to experience, but is a product of the human mind and is assumed prior to all actual ~~experiences~~ experience. "Such a principle cannot be attributed to experience, because it is ~~only~~ only on the presupposition of it that we can enquire into experiences in a systematic manner." (C. of J, 192, Bueck, 18, Lehmann.)

Kant goes on to explain that formulae such as: <sup>Nature</sup> Nature takes the shortest way, ~~she~~ does nothing fortuitiously, <sup>Nature</sup> ~~she~~ Nature makes no leaps in the variety of forms, <sup>Nature</sup> ~~she~~ is rich in species and yet at the same time sparing <sup>of</sup> ~~in~~ genera, are nothing else than the very same transcendental expression of Judgment which establishes a principle for its own special use, a principle by which it may regard experience as a system. "This is interesting because in the first place we have to note that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant attributed this principle and these formulae to Reason, and we now see that he has given up this part of his doctrine. (See above ) But it is also ambiguous, for Kant does not make it clear that so far he is

concerned only with a special kind of empirical system, viz., the logical system. This will become clear in the next paragraph. But it is important to state here that so far Kant is concerned only with the logical system of our empirical concepts. What he is thinking of is that an empirical scientist, ~~e.g.~~ e.g., a botanist, presupposes that he will succeed in bringing his objects, viz., plants, under certain species and genera, that his concepts and definitions will be related to one another, or, in other words, that he will be able to arrive at a logical system of concepts and not be presented with a discontinuous aggregate. What we have learnt from Section 4 is only that the principle which is applied by us when we presuppose that nature is a logical system is a principle which belongs neither to the understanding nor to Reason but is produced by Judgment.

#### Section 5.

In Section 5 a new term is introduced, viz., reflective Judgment. Reflective Judgment is to be distinguished from determinant ~~Judgment~~ Judgment. The function of determinant Judgment has been explained in the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the chapter on the Schematism. We have seen that in the first Critique Judgment is for Kant a mere faculty of subsuming particulars under given universal rules or concepts. This view is maintained as far as determinant Judgment is concerned. The only function of determinant Judgment is to apply universal rules ~~to~~ or concepts ~~to~~ given by the understanding to particulars given by intuition. Reflective Judgment has an entirely different function. It is interested in the relation

of empirical laws and empirical concepts, but there are no universal objective concepts given to reflective Judgment. For Judgment itself does not produce any concepts or rules, and the understanding produces only strictly universal rules which are conditions of experience in general. In spite of this lack of determinate universal concepts, Judgment assumes that it will find determinate empirical concepts for all objects of experience. Here there is a difficulty, for it might seem as if the principle assumed were not a transcendental a priori principle, i.e., not a true a priori principle, but a principle belonging to formal Logic, which is in no way concerned with objects but only with our concepts of them and their division. It is Logic that teaches us to compare a given <sup>representation</sup> ~~idea~~ (Vorstellung) with others, to abstract what is common to them, and in that way to make a concept. Such a procedure has obviously nothing to do with natural objects, but is concerned only with our concepts and their relation to each other. On closer inspection of the problem it appears, however, that we should be <sup>unable</sup> ~~able~~ to arrive at empirical concepts of actual objects, to arrange them in a logical system and to divide them into classes, if nature contained nothing but an endless multiplicity of totally different objects. In other words, in the presupposition that we shall be able to apply our principle of logical classification, it is implied that nature itself, in spite of its apparently endless multiplicity, yet exhibits a systematic division into species and genera. For only if this is supposed will Judgment when concerned with natural objects find it possible to compare them with one another according to their common characteristics and <sup>thus</sup> ~~in such a way~~ to arrive at a system of empirical concepts.

We see now that the principle of Judgment which assumes an empirical system of nature, although only a system of our concepts of empirical objects, rests upon a transcendental a priori principle, i.e., a principle which is not merely concerned with our concepts of natural objects, but also with the objects themselves. We presuppose that natural objects are of such a kind as to make it possible for our Judgment (a) to arrive at empirical concepts (which would be impossible if natural objects were totally different from each other), and (b) to compare these concepts with each other and to arrange them in a system.

It is, however, very important to make a clear distinction between the transcendental principle of Judgment and the transcendental principles of the understanding. We have to remember that the understanding provides us with definite rules, whereas Judgment can do no more than provide us with a guiding principle, a principle which enables us to look for empirical concepts. Those concepts, however, we can find only in actual experience; we have no a priori knowledge of them. It is quite true that we could never acquire real experience of the world if we were unable to discover particular laws of nature, and consequently the principle which enables us to look for them must be regarded as a genuine a priori principle. But we must not forget that reflective Judgment does not provide us with objective concepts. We do not know prior to actual experience what the particular laws of nature are, and what <sup>are</sup> their relations to each other. The faculty of Judgment presupposes that we shall find a certain regularity in nature, that natural objects will be of such a kind as to make it possible for us to form concepts of them and to discover empirical laws, that nature has observed

a certain economy, that there is not an unlimited number of total different laws but a limited number of laws which are related to each other. This is a subjective principle which we apply only in the interests of our knowledge. It is not an objective principle of determination, but a subjective principle of reflection. That it cannot be regarded as anything else follows from the fact that it is a principle for the logical employment of Judgment alone. Our Judgment presupposes that it can regard natural objects as suitable for arrangement in a logical system. But we may ask: Why has it to assume this? And the answer is: Because otherwise the human mind could not know nature. It is not nature itself, but the human mind which needs a logical system of nature. "Thus Judgment itself makes a priori the technique of nature into the principle of its reflection, without however being able to explain or determine it any further. Nor does it possess for this an ~~object~~ objective determining principle in the universal concept of nature (derived from knowledge of the things themselves). It does so only in order to be able to reflect in accordance with its own subjective law, in accordance with its own needs and yet in conformity with universal laws of nature." (C. of J. 195, Bueck; 21, Lehmann.)

We understand now that the principle which is adopted by Judgment is a merely subjective principle, independent of the principles of the understanding: <sup>that</sup> it cannot be derived from them, and yet ~~it~~ is consistent with them. But we do not yet understand what Kant means by the term "Technique of nature". In the paragraph which precedes the passage we have just quoted Kant points out that reflective Judgment deals with given appearances <sup>(Reinstell)</sup> technically or artificially, not mechanically or schematically. The principle which is employed is an indeterminate principle

of a purposive disposition of nature in a system. We are told that this takes place as it were for the benefit of our Judgment, for it is Judgment which must presuppose that the laws of nature are arranged systematically, since without such a presupposition we could not hope to find our way in the manifold of possible particular laws. This is all very difficult, for Kant does not make it clear whether the idea of a technique of nature is merely subjective or whether it must at least to some extent be attributed to nature itself. We may be inclined to believe the latter, because Kant speaks of a purposive disposition of nature which arranges particular laws in a system so that it may be possible for us to have experience of them, which otherwise we could not have. On the other hand, it seems absurd to ascribe to nature any such purpose. We assume it on merely subjective grounds. Have we any right to believe that nature arranges its laws in <sup>such a</sup> ~~an artificial~~ manner only in order to please us? It seems as if Kant really believed that we had, for he says: "The specific principle of Judgment is therefore as follows: Nature specifies her universal laws into empirical laws in accordance with the form of a logical system on behalf of the faculty of Judgment." (C. of J. 196, Bueck; 23, Lehmann)

A passage in the second Introduction (p. 180) will help us to understand him. There Kant points out that the universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding which prescribes them to nature, <sup>Since</sup> reflective Judgment requires a principle of its own, ~~for~~ it is concerned with particular laws in respect of which our understanding determines nothing. It has to assume the unity of particular laws, and this it can do <sup>only</sup> ~~in no other~~ way ~~than~~ by representing to itself another understanding.

different from the human understanding, which for the benefit of our cognitive faculties has arranged the particular, empirical laws so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws. Kant goes on as follows. "This is not to be taken as implying that such an understanding must <sup>be</sup> actually be assumed, for it is only the reflective Judgment which avails itself of this idea as a principle for the purpose of reflection and not for determining anything; but this faculty <sup>rather</sup> gives by this means a law to itself alone and not to nature." (A. of J. 180)

We can now understand why Kant believes that Judgment, even when it is concerned with nothing but the logical system of nature, must conceive the idea of a ~~technique~~ <sup>technique</sup> of nature. Judgment has to presuppose that the particular laws of nature are all related to one another, that they are a system and not a mere aggregate. Now, the only kind of unity of which our understanding knows is the unity of the universal laws which it is entitled to assume because it is the understanding itself which <sup>imposes</sup> ~~produces~~ these laws. They are all united and related to each other, because they are all derived from one understanding. Now, Judgment is in search of a different kind of unity, viz., the unity of particular laws, with which the understanding is not concerned and in respect of which it can determine nothing. If such a unity is to be thought possible at all, our Judgment must assume that there exists another understanding which contains the principle of the unity of particular laws. We conceive the idea of a <sup>super</sup> ~~supra~~-human understanding which has arranged the particular laws ~~not merely mechanically but~~ technically, i.e., so that they are all related to each other and all belong to

one unity. They are not mere parts of nature, but are dependent upon the idea of the whole, conceived by the mind of a superhuman being to which they owe their existence. But here there is a difficulty. Is the principle which makes use of the Idea of a superhuman understanding and of a technique of nature a subjective or an objective principle, or is it perhaps in some sense both? It is clear that it cannot be regarded as a purely objective principle, for the Idea of a technique of nature taken by itself is a mere Idea of Reason. We have learnt in the Critique of Pure Reason that Reason is the only faculty of the mind which transcends the world of experience and being a faculty of Principles (Prinzipien) presupposes that particulars are absolutely determined by universal concepts. (See above)

(go straight on) In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant has also shown that Reason cannot achieve this, that we can have no knowledge of a transcendent world. It follows that Judgment is not entitled to assume the objective existence of a <sup>super</sup>supra-human understanding, and that it cannot use the Idea of a technique of nature as an objective principle. For to do so it would have to transcend experience, it would have to have knowledge of a supersensible world. We <sup>must</sup> have to note that the Idea of a <sup>super</sup>supra-human understanding which applies the principle of technique is presupposed by reflective and not by determinant Judgment. Judgment assumes it in its own interest in order to have a principle of reflection. It does not presume that nature as such owes its existence to an understanding which employs the principle of technique, but it conceives such an Idea for the sake of enquiring into nature. It gives a law to itself, not to nature. It must take as a basis of its enquiry the Idea of a system of particular laws, because if it did not it could not

even begin to enquire into nature, or to arrange the particular laws of nature in a logical system. On the other hand, it is interested in nothing but its own principle. It does not even attempt to determine nature as such. The Idea which is assumed for the sake of reflection is as follows: "Nature specifies its universal laws into empirical laws in accordance with the form of a logical system for the benefit of Judgment." (C. of J. 196, Bueck; 13, Lehmann)

We see now that the principle of Judgment is both subjective and objective at the same time. It is subjective because it is a mere principle of reflection, which does not in any way enable us to determine nature as such, i.e., as an object independent of the human mind. It is objective in so far as the human mind must necessarily assume it, i.e., in so far as it is an a priori transcendental principle. But there is another difficult point. We have to remember that we do not yet understand what Kant means by "a purposiveness) disposition of nature in a system." (C. of J. 194, Bueck; 21, Lehmann) We shall see as we go on that the problem of the purposiveness of nature is the central problem of the Critique of Judgment, and therefore we have to ask ourselves what Kant understands here by "purposive" and why he believes that the Idea of a logical system which Judgment conceives implies the Idea of a purposiveness of nature. I shall begin my explanation with a quotation. After having defined the principle of Judgment, Kant goes on as follows. "Now here arises the concept of a purposiveness of nature. This is a concept belonging exclusively <sup>reflective</sup> to Judgment. It does not belong to Reason, for the purpose is not posited in the object but merely in the subject and its mere faculty of reflecting. For we call purposive that the existence of which seems to presuppose a representation of the same thing. Now natural laws

which are so constituted and related to each other as if Judgment had designed them according to its own needs are somewhat similar to <sup>such a</sup> ~~the~~ possibility of ~~those~~ things which ~~as~~ <sup>^</sup> ~~(viz., the possibility)~~ presupposes a representation of these things as their ground." (C. of J. 197, Bueck) <sup>Lehmann, 23</sup> What is most difficult here is Kant's very abstract definition of "purpose". It may, however, be illustrated by a simple example. Let us assume that we judge that a natural body, e.g., an organism, serves a purpose. What do we mean by this? We believe that the organism <sup>was</sup> ~~has been~~ created by a being <sup>to</sup> ~~in~~ whose mind the concept of what the organism was to be was present before it created it. We assume this, because we believe it to be impossible that the parts of the organism and the whole organism which we find related to each other and in harmony with each other could exist, if such a relation between part and part and between part and whole and such a harmony had not been intended by an intelligent being. We assume that this being first represents to itself what the organism is to be. The existence of the thing depends on whether <sup>it</sup> ~~the same thing~~ has been represented in the mind of an intelligent being. We judge that but for this it could not exist at all, and we therefore call it "purposive".

We can now understand Kant's definition: "For, purposive we call that the existence of which seems to presuppose ~~^~~ a representation of the same thing". But what is the analogy between this kind of purposiveness and the merely logical purposiveness which is the principle of reflective <sup>This may be explained as follows</sup> judgment? Judgment presupposes that all empirical laws belong to a system. This implies that the empirical laws are related to each other, and also that they are related to the universal laws of nature.

We assume that nature specifies its universal laws according to the Idea of a system so that every particular law is related to every ~~to every~~ other, and all are related to the universal laws of which they are mere instances. Now we cannot regard this relation as merely accidental. We must assume that nature which we represent to ourselves as an intelligent being intended its laws to belong to a system, i.e., to stand in a connection in which every part is related to every other and to the whole. We ascribe to nature a specific kind of purposiveness, namely, a logical purposiveness. We have seen that when we judge an object to be purposive we assume that the object could not exist unless it had been represented by an intelligent being. Therefore, since the assumption of a system of empirical natural laws implies an idea of its purposiveness, we must also assume that it has been brought about by an intelligent being, by a <sup>super</sup>~~supra~~-human understanding which is to be regarded as the ground of its possibility. This is stated in a passage in the second Introduction: "Accordingly the principle of Judgment in respect of the form of things of nature under empirical laws generally is the purposiveness of nature in its multiplicity. In other words, nature is represented as if our understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws." (C. of J. 181)

It is important to note once more that in Section 4 of the Introduction Kant is concerned only with logical purposiveness. He says himself that, in assuming the principle of purposiveness, Judgment in no way assumes that the <sup>objects</sup>~~forms~~ of nature themselves are purposive~~ness~~. It is only interested in asking whether they are related to each other,

and whether, in spite of their great variety, they are fitted to be arranged in a logical system of concepts. (C. of H. 197, Bueck; 23, Lehmann) We can see from this that Kant's problem is a specifically transcendental problem, and that both his question and his answer are entirely dependent on the general problem of transcendental philosophy. We need only ask ourselves; Why does the problem of purposiveness arise at all? The answer is that it arises because it had been shown in the first Critique that <sup>objective</sup> the only concepts of nature possessed by the human mind were the universal principles of the understanding. In the Critique of Judgment Kant discovers that even when we are concerned with nothing but a logical problem, viz., the problem of a logical division of our concepts of natural objects, we cannot but ascribe purposiveness to nature. For we must assume that nature will not make it impossible for us to arrange our empirical concepts of those objects in a system. The concept of purposiveness which is thus discovered is quite different ~~from~~ from what is generally understood by the term. It is clear that since this concept is only needed for use in Logic it cannot be regarded as an objective determining concept. For the purpose which we ascribe to nature is entirely dependent on the knowing mind. It is not posited in the object, but merely in the subject. In the Critique of Judgment Kant discovers a new a priori principle, ~~It is the subjective principle of Judgment,~~ the principle of reflection. Kant himself is well aware of the fact that his problem is a specific problem of transcendental philosophy, as we can see from the following passage: "If nature showed us nothing but this logical purposiveness, we should already have grounds why we should admire her for it since

according to the universal laws of the understanding we cannot adduce any reasons why it should do so. But hardly anybody except perhaps a transcendental philosopher would be capable of this admiration, and even he would be unable to name any definite case which would serve as proof of this purposiveness in the concrete, but would have to think it merely in the abstract." (C. of J. 177, Bueck; 23, 24, Lehmann) 157

### Section 3.

In Section 3, with which we shall now deal, Kant seems at first sight to be concerned with mere questions of division. We must find out whether this is really so, or whether he is discussing in this section a genuine philosophical problem. The section is headed, "The system of all faculties of the mind." Kant begins by stating that there are three such faculties, and that there cannot be any more: viz., (a) the faculty of knowledge, (b) the feeling of pleasure and pain, and (c) the faculty of desire. He goes on to explain that there have been philosophers who have tried to explain away the differences between these faculties as merely apparent, and have tried to derive the other two faculties from the faculty of knowledge. Such an attempt, however, is bound to fail, "for there <sup>always</sup> remains an ~~essential~~ <sup>essential</sup> great difference between representations which being related merely to the object and to the unity of consciousness of these representations belong to knowledge and that objective relation in which they are at the same time regarded as the cause of the reality of the object and are to be assigned to the faculty of desire, and their relation merely to the subject in which case they are their own grounds for merely maintaining their own existence in it (i.e., the subject) and consequently must be

considered in their relation to the feeling of pleasure."

The last type neither is knowledge nor produces it, but may presuppose some kind of knowledge as its determining ground."

This is all very difficult. In the first place we must ask what Kant understands here by the faculty of desire. The term is rather misleading, because one is ~~easily~~ inclined to believe that the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire are concerned with the same object, viz., a natural object. If this were so, the difference between knowing and desiring an object would be a mere difference in our attitude towards one and the same object, and it would <sup>be</sup> impossible to understand why Kant believes that our representations of the object of the faculty of desire are at the same time causes of its existence. Now, we must remember that Kant has shown in the Critique of Practical Reason that the principle of ~~practical~~ or moral actions is fundamentally different from that on which our theoretical knowledge is based. The reason for this difference is that <sup>moral</sup> ~~practical~~ actions are not dependent upon an external natural object. The object with which our moral actions are concerned is not a natural object but the good itself. Moreover, it has been shown that <sup>moral</sup> ~~practical~~ actions are not dependent on this object, but that they produce it. The only object of the practical law is produced by the <sup>moral</sup> ~~practical~~ action. (See above) Thus, in Kant's moral philosophy the term "faculty of desire" means something quite different from what we might expect. Commonly we think of desire as having for its object a natural object, possession of which is desired. Kant, however, holds that there is another quite different kind of desire, viz., the desire to realise the good. That we can attribute an ~~apriori~~

independent a priori principle to the faculty of desire is due to the fact that the object of the faculty of desire is fundamentally different from the object with which the faculty of theoretical knowledge is concerned. <sup>That</sup> ~~This~~ is why the two mental faculties are essentially different from each other, and why the relation between ~~the~~ subject and object changes completely in the case of practical action which brings its own object into existence. It is an entirely different kind of "objective relation". In the practical field the idea of the object is at the same time the ground of its possibility. We can now understand why Kant believes that there is an essential difference between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire. The last part of the passage which we have quoted, where Kant speaks of ~~ideas~~ <sup>representations</sup> which are related to the subject and which are considered only in their relation to the feeling of pleasure, cannot be understood by us yet, chiefly because Kant's assertion that a feeling may not produce knowledge and yet may depend on some kind of knowledge as its determining ground is so far quite obscure. Kant does not here adduce any reasons for his assertion, and we must therefore await his further explanation.

Continuing our examination of Section 3, we find that Kant holds that in experience it is easy enough to recognise a connection between our knowledge of an object, our feeling of pleasure or pain in its existence, and the determination of the faculty of desire to bring it into being. Since, however, this connection is not based upon an a priori principle, the faculties of the mind constitute a mere aggregate and not a system. Further he points out that the fact that a subjective feeling of pleasure is contained in the objective determination

of the will which finds itself determined by Reason's concept of freedom does not connect the three faculties with each other. For this pleasure, by which Kant means the respect for the moral law, does not precede the determination of the will, but follows it; or else it is perhaps nothing but the sensation (Empfindung) of the determinability of the will through Reason itself, and therefore <sup>not a</sup> specific feeling or susceptibility which would require a special division in the system of the faculties of the mind. Kant's argument continues as follows. The empirical analysis of the faculties of the mind shows that there is a feeling of pleasure which is independent of the other two faculties, <sup>viz.</sup> the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire. That the feeling of pleasure is independent of the faculty of desire follows from the fact that pleasure may be the determining ground of our desires. It is important to note that Kant is thinking here of the faculty of desire in so far as it is determined by merely empirical principles, i.e., he takes desire in its ordinary sense, the desire to possess a natural object as distinct from the moral desire, determined by an a priori practical principle. As regards the latter, it is clear that on Kant's ~~of~~ principles the pleasure in the object (viz., the good) must never precede our desire to realise it. All that Kant <sup>means</sup> ~~wishes~~ to say here is that empirical observation shows that human beings may desire an object merely because they take pleasure in it.

Kant actually sets forth this view in the Critique of Practical Reason. (see above )

Another point to be noted, although it is not made explicit by Kant, is that pleasure may also be quite independent of the faculty of knowledge. <sup>then continues</sup> Kant's argument is as follows. ~~But~~ we are to be able to connect the three faculties of the mind in a system, it is necessary that the feeling of pleasure should, like the other two faculties of the mind, rest upon a priori principles. Now, the faculty of knowledge derives its a priori principles from the understanding, and the faculty of desire from Reason. <sup>But</sup> there are three faculties of knowledge, viz., understanding, Judgment and Reason. What could be more natural than to suppose that Judgment, the intermediate faculty of knowledge, will contain the a priori principles for the feeling of pleasure and pain, the intermediate faculty of the mind?

All this is very distressing to the reader who is prepared to take Kant seriously, for it seems as if Kant were concerned here only with an arbitrary division of the concepts of his philosophy and not at all with a serious problem. In other words, Kant seems to produce here a piece of mere architectonic. I do not think ~~it~~ it can be denied that Kant's presentation of his problem is extremely artificial, and that if he has serious grounds <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ holding that the faculty of Judgment and the feeling of pleasure and pain belong together he certainly does not mention them here. We must now try to find out whether he has any good reasons for believing that such a connection exists. Section 3 gives us very little help. We may derive some consolation from the fact that Kant himself tells us that he will decide nothing yet as to the possibility of such a connection. He adduces one reason why it might be so, viz., that the faculty of Judgment is related merely to the subject and does not produce any objective concepts such as those of understanding and Reason, and that the feeling of pleasure and pain

is a merely subjective feeling. Even this, however, is not very convincing and does not really solve our difficulty. But in the second Introduction we find a passage in which Kant explains that there is a necessary connection between the feeling of pleasure and the concept of the purposiveness of nature (Section 6), and we may hope that his discussion of this problem will give us some help. We may expect this, for we know from our interpretation of Sections 4 and 5 of the first Introduction that Kant believes that the fundamental idea employed by the faculty of Judgment is the idea of a purposiveness of nature, and we also know why he believes this. The argument of Section 6 of the second Introduction may be paraphrased as follows. That nature as regards its particular laws should harmonise with our need to discover a universal principle of these laws (Kant is thinking of our need to bring about a system of empirical laws) must be deemed contingent as far as our insight goes, but it is indispensable for the requirements of our understanding. Since the understanding does not supply it with any principle regarding such a unity, the faculty of Judgment must ascribe a principle of purposiveness to nature. This, however, is a special kind of purposiveness, for nature is regarded as purposive only in relation to our own knowledge of it. It is not difficult to understand this argument, for we know already that according to Kant's doctrine the human mind must necessarily aim at bringing about a system of empirical laws. We have also seen that this idea of a systematic unity of nature cannot be derived from the principles of the understanding. The understanding which is concerned with the universal laws of nature cannot guarantee this unity of the particular laws. (See above )

The idea of the systematic unity of particular laws is a product

of the faculty of Judgment which on subjective grounds ascribes to nature a principle of purposiveness. It assumes that nature has taken account of the special needs of the human mind. In our section Kant goes on <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ explain that the universal laws of ~~the~~ understanding which at the same time are the universal laws of nature do not as regards their origin presuppose that nature has taken any regard of our cognitive faculties. "Seeing that it is <sup>only</sup> ~~only~~ by their means that we first come by any conception of the ~~the~~ meaning of a knowledge of things (of nature) and they of necessity apply to nature as an object of our cognition in general." (C. of J. 186, 187) This is again easy to understand. Kant argues that since the universal laws of the understanding are necessary conditions of our experience of nature, it is by no means surprising that nature should conform to them. Since they are the universal a priori conditions of experience, nature as the object of experience must conform to them.

*But it does not seem in any way necessary that*  
 That nature as regards its particular laws with their possible wealth of variety and heterogeneity should conform to our faculty of comprehension, ~~this seems by no means necessary.~~  
 On the contrary, it may seem surprising that it should be so. It is the business of our understanding to introduce unity into nature. As regards the particular natural laws, however, the understanding cannot give us any necessary objective laws regarding their unity, and it may rightly be asked how we can expect such unity of nature. The situation with which the human mind is confronted is that on the one hand it must of necessity assume that it will succeed in bringing about a system of particular laws, and that on the other it has no objective

grounds whatsoever for believing that it will succeed. The faculty of Judgment, according to its necessary a priori principle, must aim at bringing about a system of particular laws, but it can never know prior to actual experience whether it will be able to do this or not. This, Kant argues, is why we feel pleasure whenever we discover that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws have a common principle. "The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure. Now where such attainment has for its condition a representation a priori - as here a principle for the reflective Judgment in general - the feeling of pleasure also is determined by a ground which is a priori and valid for all men." (C.of J. 187)

It is now easy to understand Kant's argument. He believes that our faculty of Judgment must necessarily aim at relating the particular laws of nature to each other, and bringing them under common principles. For this task it does not ~~not possess any objective rules~~ possess any objective rules. It is on merely subjective grounds that the human mind in employing the principle of reflective Judgment seeks to bring about a system of particular laws. The principle of reflective Judgment is necessarily coupled with pleasure. In finding that nature is in accordance with the universal laws of nature, the knowing mind will feel no pleasure at all because the understanding knows that this is objectively necessary. Our understanding has a priori knowledge of the fact that every object of experience must be determined by the universal laws of nature <sup>the understanding</sup> which ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> itself produces. Such a necessity does not exist for the principle of Judgment, and <sup>must</sup> that is why we feel pleasure whenever we succeed in making use

of this principle. Both the principle of Judgment and the feeling of pleasure are a priori necessary and universally valid; and there is also a necessary connection between them. "The discovery

- - - - - that two or more empirical, heterogeneous laws of nature are allied under one principle that embraces them both is the ground of a very appreciable pleasure, often even an <sup>of</sup> admiration and such too as does not wear off even though we are already familiar <sup>enough</sup> with its object." (C. of J. 187) "Something then that makes us attentive in our estimate of nature to its purposiveness for our understanding, an endeavour to bring where possible its heterogeneous laws under higher, though still always empirical, laws is required in order that, on meeting with success, pleasure may be felt in this their accord with our cognitive faculty, which accord is regarded by us as ~~merely~~ <sup>purely</sup> contingent." (C. of J. 187, 188)

I think we have learnt from the argument <sup>e</sup> which we have just examined that Kant has very good reasons for believing that Judgment and pleasure belong together, and that his reason for putting forward such a view is not <sup>merely</sup> that he wishes to put his system in order. His argument is in perfect harmony with the fundamental principles of ~~the transcendental~~ <sup>his</sup> philosophy, and follows necessarily from them. What is the problem with which he is here concerned? According to the doctrine of the transcendental philosophy as set forth in the first Critique, the only concepts and principle which the human mind produces are those of the understanding. It has been shown that they are objectively necessary conditions of experience. But the Critique of Pure Reason had overlooked the fact that for empirical knowledge we must also have a principle which enables us to

study the particular laws of nature. Without such a principle experience would be impossible. In the Critique of Judgment Kant discovers this principle, the principle of reflective Judgment. This principle makes us assume (not only that the universal laws but also the particular laws of nature belong to a system. In doing so we ascribe purposiveness to nature. The curious fact is that we expect nature to serve a purpose which is entirely ours, and which has nothing to do with nature as such. It is a faculty of the human mind, viz., the faculty of Judgment, which demands the system of particular laws. As regards the universal laws, we can know prior to actual experience that nature must conform to them. We have objective reasons for expecting it, for our own minds have introduced them into it. But we can have no objective knowledge whatsoever of the Technique of nature or the idea of a nature which arranges its particulars in a system. We merely wish that it should be so; we expect and hope that it will be, for otherwise we should have no experience of nature. To assume the purposiveness of nature is subjectively necessary and objectively contingent. It is the uncertainty of our own success which makes us feel pleasure when we meet with it. A merely subjective principle manifests itself in a subjective feeling. The connection between the two is a priori necessary.

It may be noted here that Section 11 of the Introduction will discuss the same questions, and especially the question of architectonic, from a more comprehensive point of view.

Section 6.

At the beginning of this section, On the Purposiveness  
of the Forms of Nature as so many particular Systems, Kant  
 explains that the idea of a logical purposiveness, the idea  
 that nature will "conform to the subjective conditions of  
 Judgment in respect of the possible ~~in respect of the possible~~  
 connection of empirical concepts in the totality of one  
 experience," (C. of J. 197, Bueck; 24, Lehmann), does not entitle us  
 to ascribe real purposiveness to nature, i.e., we must not ascribe  
 to nature a faculty of producing particular forms <sup>according to a</sup> ~~in the form~~  
~~of a system~~. It is quite possible to assume that nature produces  
 things in such a way as to make it possible for us to arrange  
 our concepts of them in a logical system, without at the same  
 time believing that those products of nature contain within  
 themselves a principle of systematic unity. Logical purposive-  
 ness is concerned with the relation of things to each other, or  
 rather with the relations among our concepts of them. In pre-  
 supposing logical purposiveness we are not at all concerned  
 with particular things as such, but only with their logical  
 relations; for instance, we believe that certain natural objects  
 such as stones or minerals are capable of being classified  
 according to their characteristics, although we do not ascribe  
 to them any inner unity and in fact consider them mere aggregates.

Kant here introduces a new term, namely, absolute purposiveness,  
 which he defines as follows. "By an absolute purposiveness of  
 the forms of nature I understand those forms whose external  
 configuration or inner structure make it necessary for our  
 faculty of Judgment to take as the basis of the enquiry into  
 their possibility an Idea of these forms. For purposiveness is  
 a conformity to law of that which as such is contingent."

(C. of J. 198, Bueck; 24, Leh-  
 mann)

By "forms of nature" Kant simply means particular natural  
 objects, e.g. trees, stones etc., as distinct from particular laws etc.

Having put forward this very abstract and obscure definition, <sup>he</sup> ~~Kant~~ states that nature proceeds in respect of some of <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ products mechanically; such products are mere aggregates. In respect of others, for example, crystals, plants, animals, she proceeds technically as well. As regards these products, nature proceeds not as mere nature but as an artist. We must note, however, that the distinction between mechanism and technique is made solely by reflective Judgment. Determinant Judgment, i.e., the kind of Judgment which determines nature as an object, does not permit such a distinction. Reflective Judgment, on the other hand, can and perhaps must allow of the possibility that one and the same appearance may be explained mechanically according to objective principles, and at the same time may be estimated (Beurteilung) <sup>technically</sup> according to subjective principles of reflection.

The explanation of this argument and the definition of absolute purposiveness is not so difficult as it might at first appear. We know already what Kant means by the terms technique and purposiveness, although we must not forget that we have so far been concerned only with a special kind of technique of nature, viz., logical or formal technique, and with a special kind of purposiveness, viz., logical or formal purposiveness. <sup>Kant we</sup> We may remind ourselves ~~that Kant~~ <sup>how</sup> has explained ~~that~~ our faculty of Judgment must presuppose that nature is a logical system. Without having any objective reasons for such an assumption, we must presuppose that nature has arranged her particular laws in such a way that they may be related to each other, and derived from one principle which embraces them all. The idea of a logical system as such is, as we have seen, merely

subjective, but we must attribute it to nature herself for the sake of being provided with a principle of reflection. We have also seen that in making use of this principle we regard nature not as mere nature; we assume the existence of an intelligent nature possessing an understanding different from our own. We may ask why such an understanding would have to be fundamentally different from the one which we possess. The answer is that our understanding knows of only one principle, namely, the mechanical principle. Now, when we apply mechanical principles we regard the parts of any whole with which we may be concerned as unrelated to one another and to the whole to which they belong. They exist alongside of one another, and not for or through one another; they are independent of an Idea of the whole of which they are parts. The Idea of a logical system of nature, on the other hand, implies that in some way every part of nature is determined by the Idea of the whole, and that every part is related to every other part. In conceiving the Idea of a logical system of nature, we regard nature as if <sup>it</sup> she were an artist, as if <sup>it</sup> she had arranged <sup>its</sup> her particular laws so that they were all related to each other and all derived from one universal principle conceived by the mind of an intelligent being. <sup>Further,</sup> ~~We may also remind ourselves that~~ Kant has told us that the Idea of such a system of nature is a subjective principle of mere reflection. We have no objective grounds for believing that nature actually is such a system. We assume the logical purposiveness of nature because we need it. If we are still in any doubt as to whether this is a subjective or an objective principle, we need only remember that the only objective principles which we possess are the principles of the understanding and that our understandin

never regards nature in any other way than as determined by mechanical laws. According to the principles of the understanding, nature is an aggregate of mechanically connected parts. The Idea of a system, i.e., of a whole whose parts are determined by a universal concept, is alien to the principles of the understanding. As Kant has shown in the Critique of Pure Reason, there is only one faculty of the mind, wiz., Reason, which regards particulars as determined by a universal Idea, or parts as determined by the Idea of the whole. The Idea of a system is to be regarded as a product of pure Reason. Now, it has also been shown in the first Critique that the concepts of Reason are <sup>objectively</sup> not objectively valid; we cannot determine nature <sup>objectively</sup> by means of them. In the Critique of Judgment we have so far been concerned with a special kind of Idea, the Idea of nature as a logical system, and we have found that the faculty of Judgment which can, and in fact must, make use of such an Idea does so only in order to be provided with a principle of reflection. Judgment does not attempt to determine nature objectively. It does not assert that nature as such is ~~such a~~ <sup>not a</sup> system. What it does is to provide the mind with a principle of enquiry. The Idea of a logical system is implicit in its principle, but it is used merely for the sake of reflection. Judgment does not regard the Idea of a logical system as an objectively valid concept, for if it did it would be determinant and not reflective Judgment, and determinant Judgment, as has been shown in the first Critique, does not produce any concepts of its own, but merely subsumes a given particular case under a given universal concept. Now, in the case with which we are concerned, this activity of determinant Judgment is impossible, since the concept in

question is a concept of pure Reason, the objective validity of which cannot be established.

We have now to explain Kant's definition of absolute purposiveness. This is a special kind of purposiveness. In applying it we judge certain natural products, such as animals or plants, as containing within themselves systematic unity. In the first place, we have to ask what the analogy is between the two kinds of purposiveness. We see at once that it is the Idea of a system which is common to both, for we judge an object to be a purpose of nature because we find that the parts which are contained in it are related both to one another and to the whole of which they are parts. We judge that they ~~have~~ not combined in a merely mechanical way, but are dependent on an Idea of the whole. We find natural forms the parts of which are related to one another and to the whole in such a way as to make it impossible for us to explain them to ourselves without deriving them from an Idea. Once more we think of nature as ~~if~~ <sup>as if</sup> ~~she were~~ an artist; we attribute to ~~her~~ <sup>her</sup> the principle of a technique. It may be asked why we speak of a purposiveness of nature. The answer is that we find it impossible to explain our object according to mere principles of the understanding. The presupposition of a logical system of nature regarding her particular laws made us conceive the Idea of a purposiveness of nature. The reason why we called this purposiveness was that we had no objective reason for believing that nature ~~was~~ such a system, and that the existence of such a system could not be understood from the principles of the understanding. Something similar applies to the principle of absolute purposiveness. That particular forms of nature should be systems, that their

parts should depend on an Idea of the whole, cannot be understood from the principles of the understanding. On the contrary, if such forms existed, the understanding would have to regard them as matters of pure chance. Now, we find certain products of nature which we cannot but judge to be ~~dependent~~ dependent on a principle of systematic unity, a principle of which the understanding knows nothing and for the assumption of which we have no objective grounds whatever. As far as our objective knowledge of nature is concerned, the existence of things which are systems is merely contingent; and that is why when we find such things we speak of a purposiveness of nature. "For purposiveness is a conformity to law of that which as such is contingent." (C. of J. 198, Bueck)

The impossibility of regarding the principle of the absolute purposiveness of nature as a product of the understanding follows if from nothing else from the fact that we apply it only to those objects which the principles of the understanding cannot make intelligible to us. It is a genuine product of reflective Judgment, a merely subjective principle.

We have to distinguish between the mechanical explanation of an object (Erklärung) in accordance with objective principles and the estimation of the same object (Beurteilung) in accordance with subjective principles; the two principles do not contradict each other.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1) The objective mechanical principles are, of course, supplied by the understanding, and not by Reason. Kant says here that under Principles of Reason determinant Judgment would perhaps like to admit only the mechanical explanation, and that the mechanical explanation in accordance with ~~principles~~ objective principles is a task for Reason. This is a very misleading statement. We shall see later that Kant believes that an antinomy must necessarily <sup>arise</sup> between the principles of the understanding (mechanism) and the

We have seen that Kant holds that the principles of logical and absolute purposiveness are closely connected with each other. He even believes that the latter depends entirely on the former, as may be seen from the following passage.

"Although the principle of Judgment regarding the purposiveness of nature in the specification of its universal laws does not by any means extend far enough to entitle us to infer from it the production of forms of nature (since the system of nature in accordance with empirical laws, which alone Judgment had reason to postulate, is possible also without such forms which must be given solely in experience), it still remains possible and permissible, once we have attributed to nature a principle of purposiveness in its particular laws, in those cases in which experience shows us purposive forms in her (i.e. nature) to ascribe them to the same ground on which the former may rest."

(C. of J. 198, 199. Bueck) This seems a most extraordinary statement. Does Kant really believe that we first realise the need for a principle which will enable us to arrange the particular laws of nature, then discover such a principle, namely, the principle of the logical purposiveness of nature, and only then apply the principle of purposiveness to particular natural forms, and come to believe that organisms, for example, animals or plants, are not mere machines but are designed for a purpose? It seems

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principle of reflective Judgment (the teleological principle). In paragraph 70 of the *Critique*, Kant expounds this theory he states that the antinomy between the two principles is not an antinomy of Judgment, "but rather a conflict in the legislation of Reason." (C. of J. 387.) For my explanation of this I must refer to my explanation of paragraph 70. (see below) For the time being it may be sufficient to state that according to Kant the mechanical principles are products of the understanding, not of Reason. Questions to be discussed later are: Why they should come into conflict with the principle of Judgment; why if they do so the conflict is only apparent and the two principles are quite compatible with each other; why the conflict between them must be ascribed to Reason.

clear that Kant cannot possibly hold such a ridiculous view. We need only remember that he has explained that to admire nature for its logical purposiveness is something that hardly anyone would be capable of except a transcendental philosopher. His reason for this is simply that it is only the transcendental philosopher who is aware of the fact that the laws of the understanding do not account for such purposiveness. It is a peculiar type of mind of which Kant is thinking in the passage we have just quoted, the mind of the transcendental philosopher or rather Kant's own mind. In the Critique of ~~Pure Reason~~ Pure Reason he had discovered that the only a priori concepts which we possess are the concepts of the understanding, the universal laws of nature. When he wrote the first Critique he believed that these were the only necessary a priori conditions of experience. In the Critique of Judgment, however, he realises that this is not the case, and that experience depends on a further condition, viz., on our ability to arrange the particular laws of nature according to the Idea of a system. He discovers that we possess a faculty of reflection, that we must ascribe purposiveness to nature, and that this assumption is based upon a necessary a priori principle, the necessity of which transcendental philosophy can and in fact must establish. Thus it is true that in transcendental philosophy the principle of logical purposiveness comes first, and that of absolute purposiveness is only secondary. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant had rejected the teleological method of enquiry. He had believed that the only true explanation of natural phenomena was the mechanical explanation, and that the concept of a purpose, ~~or~~ the concept on which the teleological principle rested, was a

mere Idea. In the Critique of Judgment he retracts this view, but he is fully aware of the fact that but for the discovery of logical purposiveness he could never have done so. This is stated once more at the beginning of Section 7.

### Section 7.

"Judgment, as was shown above, makes it for the first time possible, and in fact necessary, to conceive besides the mechanical necessity of nature also the Idea of its purposiveness on the ground that without such a presupposition systematic unity in the thorough-going (durchgangigen) classification of particular forms according to empirical laws would be impossible! (C. of J. 199 Bueck, 26 Lehmann) Here we are told once more that as long as we apply the principle of logical purposiveness alone, we are concerned with nothing but our concepts of objects and their relation to each other. This principle is a merely subjective principle for the division and specification of nature i.e., it is a merely logical principle and is in no way concerned with particular natural objects as such. We do not presuppose that any particular natural object has been produced by nature according to an idea of its purpose. To presuppose this would be to conceive the idea of a different kind of purposiveness. We assume a specific kind of causality of nature which may be called technique.

Kant goes on to state that mechanical causality is quite different from technique, for the mechanical principle of causation does not employ a concept which would explain the unity of a given manifold. I think that what Kant means is this.

In applying the principle of mechanical causation to the explanation of a manifold of material parts, we simply state that the parts have combined owing to mechanical causes, and we do not assume that there is any relation either between the parts or between them and the whole. Their co-existence is due to merely mechanical causes, and there is no inner relation between them. On the other hand, when we judge an object to be a purpose of nature, we assume that the parts of our object are <sup>necessarily united</sup> in a definite relation to each other and to the whole. We derive the manifold from its purpose. We assume that nature <sup>the given object</sup> has produced ~~it~~ so that it should serve a certain purpose, i.e., we regard nature as an intelligent being in whose mind the Idea of the thing existed before it was actually produced. We derive our object from a concept, for we assume that the parts of the object have combined in a certain manner because nature intended them to do so. The concept of their purpose unites them; it is the condition of their existence and their relation both to each other and to the whole to which they belong. Why is this to be regarded as a specific kind of causality? The answer to this question may be illustrated by an example. We know that human beings can produce things in order that they should serve some purpose. A watchmaker, for instance, first conceives the Idea of the purpose which the watch is to serve, and then acts in accordance with this Idea. In the same way, when we judge an object to be a purpose of nature, we presuppose that nature first conceived the Idea of what its product was to be and then combined material parts in accordance with this Idea. Nature acts according to a special kind of causal principle, for what unites the material parts is not merely their mechanical

connection, but the Idea of the whole to which they belong. The product, e.g., a plant, is not a mere manifold or aggregate of parts, but a system in which every part is determined by the Idea of the whole.

The question as to whether we are entitled to ascribe such a purposiveness to nature will be fully discussed in the Critique of Judgment itself. All that we know so far is that the principle of purposiveness is never an objective principle, but always a subjective principle of mere reflection. This is stated again in the next paragraph in which Kant raises the problem; How can we perceive the "technique" of nature in its products? The problem is solved in the following way. Since purposiveness is not an objective concept, i.e., a concept by means of which we can determine an object, but a merely subjective principle of reflection, it follows that strictly speaking it is not nature that is "technical" but the faculty of Judgment itself. Nature is represented as "technical" only in so far as it corresponds to, and makes necessary, the procedure of Judgment. This is easy to understand. We have learnt that the Idea of a "technique" of nature or the Idea of nature's purposiveness can arise in us only when we find a certain kind of unity in nature which our understanding cannot understand. It is reflective Judgment which makes us aware of such a unity, and from this it is clear that we cannot attribute it to nature as such. For we call nature purposiveness not in so far as <sup>it</sup> ~~she~~ is known by us objectively, but only in so far as <sup>it</sup> ~~she~~ accords with our own subjective principle of reflection.

Kant goes on to distinguish between two kinds of reflective judgment, viz., aesthetic judgments of reflection and teleological judgments of reflection. His argument runs as follows. To every empirical concept there belong three different

activities of the mind, viz., (a) apprehension of the manifold given in intuition, (b) comprehension of the manifold in the synthetic unity of consciousness, or apperception, which gives us the concept of an object and (c) exhibition of the corresponding object in intuition. The first is brought about by the imagination, the second by the understanding, and the third by Judgment. Kant's account here corresponds exactly with what he has said in the chapter on the Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason. I can therefore <sup>ask</sup> the reader to the exposition which I have already given of that chapter. (See above ) It will be sufficient to state here that it is determinant Judgment which is involved in the Schematism, i.e., that kind of Judgment whose only function is to subsume given intuitions under given universal concepts. (see above )

An aesthetic judgment of reflection is quite different from a determinant Judgment, for there are <sup>in it</sup> no determinate concepts given to the faculty of Judgment which could be schematised. Kant tells us that when the form of an object given in intuition is such as to make the apprehension of the manifold correspond with the exhibition of a concept <sup>[although]</sup> without ~~the concept itself remaining indeterminate~~ its being determined which concept it is, then the understanding and the imagination harmonise with each other. This harmony is a harmony in mere reflection; we regard the object merely as subjectively purposive, i.e., as purposive only in relation to our faculty of Judgment. The faculty neither requires nor produces any determinate concept of the object. The judgment is not a cognitive judgment, but an aesthetic judgment of reflection.

This is a very strange and obscure argument, and in order

to understand it we have to take account of Kant's theory of the beautiful as set forth in the Critique of Judgment itself. In the first place we have to ask; Why does Kant believe that there is a connection between aesthetic judgments and <sup>these</sup> logical judgments by means of which we arrive at empirical objective concepts? The connection is that in both cases the faculty of Judgment regards the given manifold not as a mere manifold but as an orderly manifold. But there is an essential difference between the two. In the case of a logical judgment <sup>the faculty of</sup> there are ~~are~~ determinate concepts <sup>Judgment corresponds to</sup> ~~given to the faculty of Judgment~~ which explain the orderliness of the <sup>given</sup> manifold. In making an aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, the faculty of Judgment <sup>cannot make judgment</sup> ~~has no~~ determinate concepts or rules ~~given to it~~, and yet in judging an object to be beautiful we presuppose that the manifold given to us is not a disorderly manifold but is determined by some kind of ruling principle. Kant believes that in making an aesthetic judgment we become aware of a harmony between the imagination and the understanding. It is clear why imagination is involved; for according to Kant's doctrine it is the imagination which enables us to apprehend a manifold. (See above) But why does Kant believe that the understanding is also involved? The reason is that the manifold which is judged by us seems to us not to be devoid of all regularity but to be determined by some rule or other. We do not know what this rule is, but in thinking of the regularity of a given manifold we must necessarily refer to the understanding which is the faculty of rules in general. It must not be forgotten, however, that in <sup>speaking</sup> ~~thinking~~ of the understanding we do not <sup>imply that the aesthetic judgment involves</sup> ~~have~~ any definite concept of <sup>an</sup> ~~our~~ object.

The judgment is a merely aesthetic judgment, i.e., a judgment which involves a merely subjective awareness of a harmony between the faculty of apprehension (imagination) and the faculty of comprehension (understanding). To understand this theory fully, we must wait for further explanation from Kant. (See below )

Kant's preliminary exposition of teleological judgments is almost as difficult to understand as his exposition of aesthetic judgments. He states that in order to be able to judge an object to be a purpose of nature there must first be given to us empirical concepts and laws in accordance with the mechanism of nature, and that it is only after <sup>this</sup> ~~that~~ that our faculty of Judgment compares such a concept of the understanding with Reason's principle of a system. From this it almost looks as if Kant were concerned here with the principle of logical purposiveness, i.e., ~~the principle which makes us~~ <sup>and laws</sup> ~~assume that our empirical concepts of natural objects belong~~ ~~to a system.~~ Such an interpretation is, however, impossible, for teleological judgments judge particular objects of nature to be purposes of nature, and are not merely concerned with the logical relations of our concepts. I think that what Kant really means is that if we are to be in a position to judge an object teleologically or to regard it as a purpose of nature, it must first be given in experience. Now, according to Kant's doctrine, there are only two ways of determining an object. Every object of experience, in order to become an object, must first be determined by the a priori laws of the understanding, and can then be determined by laws and empirical concepts, an activity which is also due to the understanding. As regards the question of the origin of teleological judg-

ments, it is clear that in the first place we must determine an object according to the concepts and laws of the understanding, for it is in this way that we are presented with a material object; and only after having done so can we raise the question as to whether our object is more than a merely material body, whether in fact it is a purpose of nature.

If we are to understand why Kant believes that reflective judgment in order to conceive the concept of a purpose of nature must refer to Reason and its principle of a system, we need only ask ourselves; What according to Kant's principles is the concept of a purpose as it would be used by determinant judgment? I think Kant would say that a concept of a purpose could be formed only by one faculty of the mind, viz., Reason. It could not be formed by determinant judgment, for determinant judgment does not form concepts at all; its only function is to subsume a given particular under a given concept. Now, in order to conceive the Idea of a purpose, Reason would have to transcend the sphere of mere nature. It would have to represent to itself the Idea of an intelligent <sup>being</sup> ~~nature~~ which arranged every particular contained in a natural object according to a universal Idea called its purpose. Determinant judgment would merely subsume the given natural object under ~~under~~ the universal concept. This would be a determinant teleological judgment. It is clear that we are not justified in making such a judgment, simply because Reason does not produce objective concepts by means of which we could transcend the sphere of experience. It follows that we can make use of Reason's concept of a purpose only for the sake of reflection. It is only in order to be provided with a principle of reflection that our reflective judgment makes

use of Reason's concept of a purpose, viz., the Idea that a given object is not a mere aggregate but a system, i.e., such a unity that every part is determined by the Idea of the whole, every particular by a universal concept conceived by the mind of an intelligent being. Reflective Judgment is not interested in the question whether the given object as such is a system. It does not assert that there is such an intelligent ~~nature~~ <sup>being</sup>. It is interested in nothing but the empirical objects. And if it finds an object whose inner form seems to make it necessary for Judgment to refer its parts to the whole if it wishes to understand it, then Judgment makes use of Reason's <sup>Idea</sup> ~~concept~~ of a purpose. It takes this Idea as the basis of its enquiry into the nature of the object, without, however, asserting that the object as such is dependent on the Idea. In other words, in making a teleological judgment we do not maintain that the object given to us is a system or a purpose of nature. We merely say that in order to explain it to ourselves, i.e., on merely subjective grounds, we must regard it as a system or we must employ Reason's concept of a purpose of nature.

We have now learnt that all our teleological judgments are merely subjective. But this raises another difficulty. Kant distinguishes in Section 7 between the subjective purposiveness about which we judge when we make aesthetic judgments and the objective purposiveness about which we judge when we make teleological judgments. What does he mean by this? And what is the difference between these two kinds of judgment? I think that his <sup>meaning</sup> ~~meaning~~ is that in making an aesthetic judgment we do not judge the object at all. We are merely concerned with our own subjective feelings. A teleological judgment, on the other hand, is at least in some way concerned with the object.

It is a cognitive judgment; its aim is to gain knowledge of the object. In that sense, and only in that sense, the judgment is objective, i.e., it is concerned with an object and our knowledge of it. In making a teleological judgment we attribute objective purposiveness to an object, whereas in making an aesthetic judgment we judge about subjective purposiveness which expresses itself in our becoming aware of a harmony of our faculties of imagination and understanding. Yet in both cases we apply a merely subjective principle, viz., the principle of reflection. It must not be forgotten that the Idea of the purposiveness of nature does not belong to nature as such but only to our faculty of Judgment, and that nature is judged to be purposive only in relation to our faculty of ~~judging~~ judging it. In other words, both our aesthetic and our teleological judgments are products of reflective and not of determinant Judgment.

### Section 8.

Kant begins this section by giving a simple explanation, which requires no discussion, of the sense in which he will use the term aesthetic in the Critique of Judgment, and then goes on with his preliminary exposition of aesthetic judgment. He distinguishes between aesthetic judgments and logical judgments, and points out that every determinant judgment is a logical judgment because its predicate is a given objective concept, whereas a reflective judgment about a given particular <sup>object</sup> ~~concept~~ might be aesthetic. ~~for~~ The faculty of Judgment, without comparing the given object with any others and without having any concept in readiness (a concept by which it could determine the given intuition)

is merely concerned with the relation between the imagination and the understanding, and perceives such a relation between them as constitutes the subjective condition for the objective employment of the faculty of Judgment, viz., a harmony between them.

In order to understand this we must ask: What are the conditions of an objective or logical judgment? According to transcendental principles, there are required for logical judgment three faculties of knowledge, viz., imagination, understanding and Judgment. In order to make an objective judgment, we must be able to apprehend a manifold given in intuition, and this is the work of the imagination. Further, we must employ concepts, and these concepts are produced by the understanding.<sup>(1)</sup> Lastly, we must have a faculty of ~~apprehending the given manifold~~ determining the ~~apprehended~~ intuitions by means of concepts, and this ~~is effected~~ <sup>faculty is</sup> by Judgment, ~~which enables us to refer concepts to intuitions or to determine given intuitions by means of concepts.~~ Reflective Judgment, on the other hand, may deal with given intuitions in an essentially different manner. Instead of trying to determine them objectively by means of an objective concept, it may be interested in nothing but the subjective conditions of the objective employment of Judgment. What are those conditions? They are imagination and the understanding, for these are the faculties which the knowing subject must employ if it is to be able to employ the faculty of Judgment. Now, Kant holds that reflective Judgment, without making use of any objective concept at all, without ever being interested in its object as such or having any desire to know what it is, may become aware of a harmony between the two faculties of

(1) The judgments may be either a priori or empirical. In the first case, the concepts employed are produced by the understanding; in the second, they are abstracted from given intuitions by the understanding.

the mind which are the subjective conditions of all knowledge, viz., <sup>(3)</sup>imagination and understanding. Without knowing the reason for it, <sup>(2)</sup>we feel that In presenting certain objects to ourselves we ~~become aware of~~ a harmony between our ~~faculty of apprehension~~ <sup>(1)</sup>imagination and our ~~faculty of comprehension~~ <sup>(4)</sup>the understanding. The relation between imagination and the understanding is quite different here from what it is in a logical judgment. For when we make a logical judgment about an object we know why imagination and understanding are related to each other. In fact, it is the faculty of Judgment itself which relates them, and it can do so because there are concepts given to it which it can apply to the intuitions ~~apprehended by imagination~~. Reflective Judgment, on the other hand, in making an aesthetic judgment, does not know why there should be a relation between imagination and understanding. For there is no definite concept given to it by means of which it could determine the manifold, and which would explain to it why the two faculties should be related to each other. In making use of its power of aesthetic reflection, the subject merely feels that there is some relation between its faculties of knowledge. In judging its object and calling it beautiful, the subject feels that the manifold given to it is not a mere manifold. It seems to it that there is some principle of orderliness in the manifold of intuition. There is no definite rule which would explain this orderliness. If the faculty of Judgment were provided with definite concepts, these concepts would explain to us the regularity present in the manifold. As it is, however, we merely feel a harmony between our ~~faculty of apprehension~~ <sup>on the one hand</sup> ~~imagination~~ and the faculty of rules (the understanding) <sup>on the other</sup>.

~~Judgment does not know what rule it is which determines the manifold.~~ Imagination and understanding do not stand in any definite relation. It is an indefinite relation of which we become aware, a harmonious play of imagination and understanding.

It is very important to draw a sharp distinction between aesthetic judgments<sup>this</sup> which are concerned with an indeterminate relation of our cognitive faculties, and logical judgments which rest upon their determinate relation, a relation made possible by ~~bring about a determinate relation between these faculties by determinate concepts, whether empirical or transcendental.~~  
means of objective concepts. "An aesthetic judgment may, therefore, be explained in general terms as that judgment the predicate of which can never be cognition, i.e., the concept of an object, although it may contain the subjective conditions of cognition in general." (C. of J. 204, Busch) Aesthetic judgments are purely subjective judgments, for they are not judgments about an object as such but about our feelings about an object. <sup>We cannot become aware of the harmony</sup> ~~The harmony~~ <sup>in any other way than by feeling it.</sup> ~~between the cognitive faculties cannot be determined objectively.~~  
It expresses itself in <sup>mere</sup> sensation, <sup>but this</sup> ~~we cannot know what it is; we merely feel it.~~ The sensation which we feel is of a very special kind. It is not to be confused with an objective sensation, e.g., the sensation of a colour or tone. ~~The sensation is purely subjective.~~ When we judge an object to be blue or warm, we judge objective qualities; we attribute certain sensory qualities to the object. There is only one sensation which is purely subjective, viz., the sensation of our own pleasure or pain.

It must, however, be noted that there are other judgments which also judge about nothing but subjective pleasure

This is made much clearer in the Critique itself. See my exposition of Section

and pain, viz., our judgments about the pleasant. In such judgments <sup>then</sup> we judge merely that certain objects give us pleasure or pain, <sup>and</sup>

we are not concerned with knowledge of the objects themselves.

*And yet the two judgments are different. The judgments about the pleasant are judgments immediately actg. is involved in them.*  
~~Our judgment is about the sensation which is immediately~~  
~~produced by the object, and no reflection about the object pre-~~

~~cedes our judgment.~~ We must <sup>thought</sup> distinguish between aesthetic judgments of sense and aesthetic judgments of reflection. The

former have nothing whatever to do with our cognitive faculties, the latter judge about the pleasure or pain which results from our becoming conscious of a harmony or disharmony of our faculties of cognition. It may be asked why Kant believes that aesthetic reflection is necessarily connected with the feeling of pleasure or pain, and cannot express itself in any other way.

The answer is not difficult. <sup>He</sup> Kant has told us that whenever reflective Judgment is at work or whenever we become aware of purposiveness, this awareness must express itself in a feeling of pleasure. The reason for this pleasure is that our reflective Judgment becomes aware of a rule, although it cannot determine this rule. We do not know of any reason why our object should conform to the principle of Judgment, for our understanding does not give us any objective concepts which would explain it; and that is why we <sup>must</sup> feel pleasure. We wish that our object were such as to enable us to make use of the principle of reflection, but we can never know definitely that it will be, as a result of this, those objects that do in fact conform to our principle of reflection <sup>necessarily</sup> give us pleasure.

There is another important point. It must be noted that the feeling of pleasure is an even more essential characteristic of our aesthetic judgments than of our other

reflective judgments. It is true that reflective Judgment, even when it reflects on objects, is incapable of determining those objects by its own principle. But there is a difference between such judgments and an aesthetic judgment, for in the latter we are <sup>not</sup> concerned with our object but simply with our own feelings. It may be asked; in what sense can we attribute purposiveness to a nature which presents us with beautiful objects? Now, it is clear that when we ascribe purposiveness to nature on account of the fact that it presents us with beautiful objects, this purposiveness can in no sense be attributed to nature itself. We ascribe purposiveness to nature only because ~~the~~ nature presents us with objects which make us feel the specific kind of pleasure which accompanies an awareness of the harmony of our cognitive faculties. Such a harmony of the cognitive faculties is a demand made by the subject alone and <sup>is wholly</sup> ~~has nothing~~ <sup>distinct from</sup> whatever ~~to do with~~ <sup>then</sup> objective qualities. The purposiveness of nature is merely subjective. It cannot express itself in any other way than in the specific kind of pleasure which is felt by the subject.

Another important distinction which we must note is that between subjective purposiveness as the principle which underlies our aesthetic judgments about the beautiful (aesthetic judgments of reflection) and that subjective purposiveness about which we judge when we make judgments about the pleasant (aesthetic judgments of sense). The purpose to which we refer in both cases is clearly the same. It is a merely subjective purpose; we judge about the pleasure felt by the subject. Our judgment decides whether this purpose has been fulfilled. But the principle which is applied in order to arrive at this

*From this it is clear that aesthetic judgments of reflection are more closely connected with the feeling of pleasure than are the other kinds of reflective judgment.*

decision is not the same in the two cases. Kant indicates the difference as follows. In the case of an aesthetic judgment of reflection, the subjective purposiveness is thought before it is felt. In the case of an aesthetic judgment of sense, the pleasure is felt immediately, and the judgment has nothing to do with Judgment and its principle of reflection. Kant adds that the essential difference between the two types of judgment is that aesthetic judgments of reflection, unlike those of sense, claim universal validity and necessity, and that in making this claim they make the further claim that they should have their determining principle not merely in the feeling of pleasure and pain but also in a rule of the higher faculties of knowledge, chiefly in the faculty of Judgment. This is difficult to understand, Kant himself <sup>and</sup> tells us that he cannot deal with this problem yet, and will only do so in the Critique itself. He is himself aware of the fact that the reader of the present section cannot fully understand his argument, in this section he is giving a merely preparatory exposition of aesthetic judgments, and that is why his argument is so difficult to follow. The main point of this section, viz., that aesthetic judgments of reflection are merely subjective, is emphasised once more in the last paragraph. Here Kant points out that the reason why Judgment has no consciousness of its own principle - or rule, as Kant says - and why it must relate its reflection directly to the feeling of pleasure or pain is that the principle or rule itself is merely subjective. Yet these judgments differ from aesthetic judgments of sense, for they refer to a principle of the faculty of Judgment as a higher faculty of knowledge, whereas aesthetic judgments of sense are concerned with nothing but the relation of the

representations to inner sense in so far as the latter is feeling". Our judgments may be divided according to the order of the higher faculties of knowledge (viz., understanding, Judgment and Reason) into theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments.

### Section 9.

In this section Kant sets forth the general principles of teleological judgments. He begins by drawing a distinction between formal technique of nature and real technique of nature. The former is ascribed to nature when it presents us with objects which we judge to be beautiful. The form of these objects is purposive in relation to our faculty of Judgment. When we represent them to ourselves, our faculties of representation agree with each other "for the possibility of a concept". All this seems very difficult. In order to understand it we must first remember that Kant believes <sup>it is the faculty of Judgment</sup> ~~that aesthetic purposiveness~~ <sup>which makes us aware of aesthetic purposiveness</sup> ~~of nature is perceived by our faculty of Judgment. It is the~~ <sup>the</sup> faculty of Judgment which, in representing the object ~~to~~ to itself, discovers a harmony between the two faculties of the mind which are necessary for the formation of an objective concept. On the other hand, as has often been pointed out before, when we judge a thing ~~to be~~ beautiful, we are not concerned with <sup>a determinate</sup> ~~the definite~~ relation between imagination and understanding. We consider the relation between them from a merely subjective point of view. We do not even aim at an objective concept. And yet our Judgment in making an aesthetic judgment refers to the "subjective conditions of the possibility of a concept". As we have seen, Judgment finds in that case those conditions

in harmony, just as if there existed an objective concept which would explain their harmonious relation. Such an objective determinate concept is, however, not employed. We simply feel that imagination and understanding agree; and this takes place, as it were, spontaneously and not necessarily. In the case of a logical judgment, it is the objective concept which makes their agreement necessary. In the case of an aesthetic judgment, we find that they agree of their own accord, just as if this agreement had been made necessary by an objective concept of the understanding which our determinant Judgment could apply to the manifold of apprehended intuitions.

The problem which we have to solve now is : How can we ascribe real technique to nature? In order to do so we must <sup>make</sup> use of a concept. It is not the mere form of the object which we judge purposive, but the object itself. We assume that the object as such has been produced by nature for a purpose. Kant says here that the real Technique of Nature indicates a conception of things as purposes of nature or as things the inner possibility of which depends on a purpose, i.e., on a concept which as their condition lies at the basis of the causality of their production. This is very obscure; and it does not give us much help when in the next paragraph he defines purposes as representations which themselves are regarded as conditions of the causality of their object as effect. He goes on to state that if Judgment is to be able to judge certain objects to be purposes of nature, it must be able to regard them as if they were products of a cause, the causality of which could be determined only through the representation of the objects. All this is very difficult, and we cannot fully understand it until we read Kant's discussion in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. Yet even at the present <sup>stage</sup> of the argument it is possible to grasp his main idea, and we may remind ourselves that we have already had to deal with one of Kant's very general and abstract definitions of what he means by an objective purpose. (See above )

~~We have seen~~ <sup>we have seen</sup> From our discussion of this definition, that Kant holds that in order to regard an object as a purpose of nature we must conceive the Idea of a productive nature which acts according to a special principle of causality. We assume that before producing the object, nature which we regard as an intelligent being, conceived the Idea of what the object was to be and what purpose it was to serve. This is a special kind of causality. The cause of the object is its own representation. The object depends for its existence on the Idea or concept of its purpose. *This may be sufficient for the present, and may now go on with our discussion of Section II.*

~~In the present section,~~ Having first stated that judgments which ascribe purposiveness to nature are teleological judgments, Kant raises a new problem which may be stated thus: How is it possible to ascribe purposiveness to nature? or How are teleological a priori judgments possible? <sup>(1)</sup> It is more difficult to understand the possibility of such judgments than to understand the possibility of aesthetic a priori judgments. For although we cannot make an aesthetic judgment prior to actual experience of an object, the a priori principles of such a judgment are present in the necessary Idea of experience as a system which contains the concept of a formal purposiveness of nature. "Nature agrees necessarily, not only in respect of its transcendental laws with the understanding, but also in its empirical laws with Judgment and its faculty of exhibiting <sup>such forms</sup> them in an empirical apprehension of <sup>its (i.e., Nature's)</sup> forms through imagination. It does so only for the sake of experience and therefore its (Nature's) formal purposiveness in respect of the latter agreement (i.e., the agreement of Nature with Judgment's principle of aesthetic reflection) can be demonstrated as necessary." (C. of J.

(1) In what sense teleological judgments may be called a priori judgments will be explained later. (See below)

213, Bueck; 41, 42, Lehmann) [This argument requires explanation. It has been shown that our Judgment must make use of the principle of reflection. We must presuppose that nature as regards its empirical laws will conform to the demands of our Judgment. In doing so we ascribe to nature a merely formal purposiveness. It has also been shown that the principle of reflection is a merely subjective principle. We cannot know prior to actual experience whether nature will conform to our desire to bring about the logical system of empirical laws which we need. All that we can do is to make use of the idea of logical purposiveness, and to put it to the test. ~~it has been explained that the assumption of the~~ <sup>This</sup> principle of logical reflection is subjectively necessary, ~~and also that in assuming it we make no objective judgments about nature at~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~have just established~~ <sup>we can do so without making use of any</sup> assume it in our own interest, because without it we should be left without a guiding principle in our enquiry into the empirical laws of nature. <sup>Now</sup> Once the principle ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> logical reflection has been established, ~~as an~~ <sup>for in</sup> a priori principle, it is comparatively easy to understand the possibility of a priori aesthetic judgments, ~~in order to be able to ascribe to nature a principle of formal technique, i.e., in order to be able to assume that nature will present us with beautiful objects, we need only refer to the fundamental principle of reflection, viz., the principle of logical reflection, the validity of which we have just established.~~ <sup>validity of which we</sup> ~~Once again we ascribe to nature a merely subjective purposiveness; we do not apply any concept, or determine it in any way.~~ <sup>determine concept and without making any objective assertion.</sup> When we assumed the principle of logical purposiveness we did so in the belief that nature would present itself in the form of a logical system, and now in ascribing aesthetic

purposiveness to it we assume that nature will show us forms which we find subjectively purposiveness <sup>on the ground</sup> ~~owing to the fact~~ that in representing them to ourselves we become aware of a harmony of our cognitive faculties, viz., imagination and understanding. We have just as much reason to assume that nature will conform to our principle of aesthetic reflection as we had to assume that it would conform to our principle of logical reflection. We have an a priori subjectively necessary principle of aesthetic reflection, and we try to apply it in the empirical world. We look for objects which will show us a form which we find purposive, and in doing so we need not transcend the world of experience. The difficulty about the teleological judgment is that we must transcend the world of experience if we are to be able to judge natural objects teleologically as purposes of nature or if we are to be able to ascribe to nature a principle of real technique. The concept which we must employ is the concept of a real purpose of nature, and this concept is, as has often been shown, a concept of pure Reason. (See above

¶ Kant says that in order to explain to itself things as purposes of nature, the faculty of Judgment must place the understanding in relation to Reason, which ~~for its part~~ <sup>is</sup> is not at all necessary for experience. We can <sup>easily</sup> understand why Reason is required, <sup>have been told often enough</sup> for we ~~know~~ <sup>know</sup> that the Idea of a real purpose is an Idea of pure Reason. But it is not <sup>so</sup> easy to see why ~~Kant~~ <sup>should believe</sup> believes that a second faculty of the mind is required, and why, if it is, <sup>that</sup> the second faculty should be the understanding. In order to understand Kant here we have to remember that according to him Judgment, whether determinant or reflective is not an independent faculty of the mind, and that <sup>it can never do more</sup> ~~all that it can do is~~

~~to~~ relate two other faculties of the mind to each other, one of which has to present it with the manifold to be judged and the other with the concept or rule according to which it is to be judged. <sup>Now it is clear that in</sup> In a teleological judgment the manifold which is judged is the material world. To be able to judge things teleologically we must first have them given to us in experience, and this <sup>experience</sup> ~~experience~~ of material bodies depends, as has been shown in the first Critique, on whether a given manifold has been determined by the concepts of the understanding. It is only after having determined a manifold according to mechanical laws, i.e., the laws of the understanding, that we can judge it teleologically or can ask whether the material object given to us is determined also by another principle over and above that of mechanism, whether it can, or perhaps must, be judged to be a purpose of nature. Yet it must on no account be forgotten that none of our teleological judgments can ever be more than merely reflective judgment. The concept of a purpose, although, as such, a concept of Reason, is employed by the faculty of Judgment not as an objectively determining concept which would determine nature as such and would ascribe to <sup>it</sup> ~~her~~ purposes and intentions of <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ own. <sup>but as a merely reflective concept</sup> The only reason why the faculty of Judgment makes use of Reason's concept of a purpose is to enable it to employ its own principle of reflection. <sup>himself</sup> Kant tells us that what is of most importance in this section is the proof that the concept of a final cause in nature which separates natural objects from the mechanical laws and judges them teleologically is a concept which belongs neither to Reason nor to the understanding but to the faculty of Judgment. ~~That is why~~ <sup>for in</sup> we must not take it to be an objective concept, i.e., a concept by which we could determine nature as such, ~~in~~ doing so we should say

more than that we had to assume the concept of a purpose in order to explain to ourselves the nature of our object. We should attribute to nature ~~itself~~ <sup>its</sup> itself a principle of objective purposiveness; and for this there is no justification whatever. The Idea of a purpose may be used by reflective Judgment, but only for the sake of reflection; and the principle of real purposiveness may be attributed to nature, but only in relation to Judgment and its principle. As soon as we attribute to nature purposes of ~~her own~~ <sup>its</sup> we transcend the sphere of experience. We ~~regard~~ regard nature as an intelligent being endowed with Reason. But how can we ever justify such an assumption? As regards the products of human art, we know from experience that human Reason is capable of producing objects intentionally. We know that human beings are capable of first representing to themselves the Idea of their work, and then of producing it according to this Idea; and we may rightly call such products purposive or purposes. "But to represent to oneself nature as technical like Reason and thus to ascribe to it purposiveness or even purposes, this is a specific concept which cannot be met with in experience (C. of J. 214, 215, Bueck, 44, Lehmann)"

We may distinguish between two representations of the purposiveness of nature. We may represent it to ourselves either as natural or as intentional. Experience entitles us only to the first kind of representation. This is the concept which is assumed by reflective Judgment. In order to be entitled to assume the intentional purposiveness of nature, we should have to possess concepts of Reason which would lead us beyond experience into the supersensible, and which determinant Judgment could employ for the determination of empirical objects. Since,

however, no such concepts are given to us, it is only reflective Judgment which can make use of the Idea of a purposiveness of nature, and this it does, not in order to gain knowledge of a transcendent world, but merely in order to study empirical objects according to a special principle.

Kant does not tell us in this section what the objects of nature are which we must judge teleologically. He only gives us <sup>only</sup> a very general description of the mechanical and teleological methods. Since what is stated here too briefly to be intelligible is made quite clear in the second part of the Critique of Judgment (the Critique of Teleological Judgment), it would be <sup>a waste of</sup> ~~wasted~~ time to explain it here. It will be useful, however, to remember that we have learnt from this section that the teleological principle which makes us employ the concept of objective purposiveness can never be regarded as anything other than a merely reflective principle. This has been settled once and for all. To decide whether the purposiveness of nature is intentional or natural is quite impossible. The question does not even arise, for since teleological judgments are reflective judgments which are concerned with empirical objects only, <sup>they</sup> ~~and~~ have no concern with the problem of whether a supernatural cause produces natural objects intentionally or unintentionally.

"Now it is clear, that in such cases [i.e., in the cases in which we apply the teleological principle] the concept of an objective purposiveness of nature serves merely for reflection about the object, not for determination of the object by means of the concept of a purpose, and that the teleological judgment about the inner possibility of a product of nature is a merely reflective and not a determinant judgment." (C. of J. 216, Bueck; 45, Lehmann) "The concept of the purposes of nature is, therefore,

a mere concept of reflective Judgment which it applies for its own sake, viz., in order to trace the causal relations of objects of experience. A teleological principle of the explanation of the inner possibility of certain forms of nature leaves it undetermined whether the purposiveness of nature is intentional or unintentional. A judgment which would assert either of the two alternatives would no longer be a merely reflective judgment. It would be a determinant judgment, and the concept of a purpose of nature would also no longer be a concept of mere Judgment employed for immanent and empirical use. It would be connected with Reason's concept of a supernatural intentionally working cause. Whether we affirmed it or denied it, the use of such a concept would be transcendent." (C of J. 216, 217, Bueck; 46, Lehmann)

### Section 10.

It has been shown in the preceding <sup>Section that both</sup> ~~Section that both~~ aesthetic and teleological judgments <sup>are</sup> ~~were~~ merely reflective judgments, or that they <sup>are</sup> ~~were~~ only subjectively valid in so far as they <sup>can</sup> ~~could~~ not determine their objects as such but only in relation to the human mind. The task which Kant sets himself in Section 10 is to determine the special kind of subjectivity <sup>(1)</sup> which belongs to these judgments. What he sets out to show is that if by a subjective judgment we understand a judgment to which no necessity at all can be attributed, a merely arbitrary judgment without any principle of its own, then the judgments made by reflective Judgment are by no means to be called subjective. If the principles of reflective Judgment are to find

(1) for note see p. 205a.

Note to P.205.

The terms "subjective" and "objective" are used by Kant in two different senses. In making the distinction between subjective and objective, we may think of the content of a judgment. In that case, we understand by a subjective judgment a judgment which is concerned with the mind, by an objective judgment one which is concerned with natural objects. "Subjective" and "objective" are here taken in the ordinary sense. "Subjective" is what refers to the knowing subject, "objective" what refers to natural objects. The second meaning of the terms may be stated thus. A judgment is "subjective" if no universality or necessity can be attributed to it, if for its validity it depends entirely on the state of mind of an individual subject. A judgment is "objective" if some such universality can be attributed to it. This is true only of judgments that are based upon some sort of a priori principle. The fact that there are different degrees of universality and necessity complicates matters even more. For "subjective" and "objective" may be taken in a third sense. A judgment may be said to be an "objective" judgment if it is based upon definite a priori concepts, and it may be called "subjective" if it rests upon an indeterminate a priori principle. A judgment such as "Every event in nature has its cause" is "objective" in all three senses indicated; for (a) it is a judgment about objects, (b) it is an a priori judgment and, as such, universally valid and necessary, and (c) it is based upon the definite concept of a cause. An aesthetic judgment such as "This picture is beautiful" is "subjective" in the first sense, for it is a judgment about the subject; it is "objective" in the second sense, for it rests upon an a priori principle and therefore necessity and universality must be attributed to it; it is "subjective" in the third sense, for its necessity and universality do not rest upon a determinate concept. It possesses subjective a priori universality and necessity. (this will be explained by Kant at great length in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment")

a place in transcendental philosophy they must not be wholly subjective; they must be based on necessary subjective principles. Kant begins with aesthetic judgments, and points out that they must not be explained psychologically.

Our examination of the first two Critiques has shown that for Kant psychology is an empirical science and the ~~principles~~ principles applied by it are totally different from those in which transcendental philosophy is interested; for transcendental philosophy is concerned with a priori and not with empirical principles. (See above ) In our Section Kant explains once more the nature of the psychological method. It will be noticed how disdainfully he speaks <sup>of</sup> ~~about~~ it. He points out that the principles of explanation applied by psychology are, as far as he is aware, altogether empirical. He gives a brief account of actual psychological method, and states that not only is it, like empirical physics, based upon purely empirical principles, but also its explanations, in comparison with those of physics are extremely poor and ceaselessly hypothetical. On top of three different psychological explanations, a fourth equally plausible can readily be invented. Kant goes on to express his scorn of the multitude of would-be psychologists who, without being able to give a scientific explanation of the most ordinary event in nature, profess to be able to specify the cause of every affection or motion of the mind. He describes the real task of psychology as follows: "To observe psychologically (as Burke did in his essay on the Beautiful and the Sublime), i.e., to collect material <sup>which are</sup> for empirical rules, to be systematically connected in the future without any attempt to understand them is perhaps the only true obligation of empirical psychology, which will scarcely

ever be able to lay claim to the title of a philosophical science". A judgment which pretends to be universally valid, and claims that what is asserted in it is necessary whether this necessity be subjective or objective, cannot be explained psychologically.<sup>(1)</sup> "It would be absurd if we conceded to such a judgment a claim of this kind [i.e. a claim to necessity], to vindicate it by explaining the judgment psychologically. For In doing so we should defeat our own end; for if we had been completely successful in the attempted explanation, this would only prove that the judgment could lay absolutely no claim to necessity owing to the fact that its empirical origin could be demonstrated." (C. of J. 218, Bueck; 48, Lehmann) [ Kant does not explain here why he believes that aesthetic judgments lay claim to necessity. The questions whether they do, and, if they do, how this is possible, must be left to the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. All that Kant says here is that if they do claim necessity, and if they thus assert not merely how everyone judges (in which case empirical psychology would have to concern itself with them), but how everyone ought to judge, then they must have an a priori principle of their own. "If the relation to such a principle were not contained in judgments of this kind and in the claim to necessity made by such a judgment, one would

(1) Kant distinguishes here between a necessity which rests upon a priori concepts of the object and another kind of necessity, the necessity claimed by aesthetic judgments. This latter necessity rests upon subjective conditions of concepts which (i.e. the ly subjective conditions) lie a priori at the basis of the judgment. With regard to this distinction between objective or logical judgments, based upon a priori objective concepts, and aesthetic judgments based upon the subjective a priori conditions of concepts, - See above,

have <sup>to</sup> presuppose that it is possible to assert <sup>in</sup> a judgment that it ought to apply universally because, as proved by observation it actually is universally applied, <sup>And it is equally</sup> ~~and vice versa~~ <sup>impossible to infer</sup> that from the fact that everyone judges in a certain manner that every<sup>one</sup> ought to judge <sup>So</sup> ~~in that manner, which is obvious~~ nonsense." (C. of J. 279, Bueck; 48, 49, Lehmann.)

We see that it is a very special kind of subjectivity that must be attributed to aesthetic judgments. The difficulty in explaining their nature is that they are not based upon concepts, and cannot be derived from a definite concept (if this were the case, they would be logical and not aesthetic judgments) and that in spite of this they claim universal validity and necessity. The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment will have to discover the subjective and indeterminate a priori principle which underlies our aesthetic judgments.

In the second part of Section 10 Kant shows that teleological judgments are also based upon an a priori principle. It is clear that teleological judgments are not so liable to be taken for merely subjective judgments, i.e., for judgments without any a priori principle. On the other hand, an examination of the general principles of teleological judgment has made it clear that all such judgments are merely reflective judgments, and that they do not determine their objects as such. It is true that teleological judgments make use of a determinate concept, viz., the concept of a purpose. But they do not assert that nature in presenting us with objectively purposive objects actually proceeds intentionally. They are subjective judgments, for in making them we merely assert that in order to explain to ourselves the possibility of such objects we have to judge

them to be purposes of nature. Here ~~a~~ problem arises, for it may be held that we find out by experience alone that certain objects in nature are not mere mechanisms but are purposes of nature, so that our judgments about them would be merely empirical judgments without any a priori principle of their own. Kant denies this. He shows that a teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature in respect of what it is with what it ought to be, <sup>and</sup> he illustrates this by an example. That we can see with an eye is something that we experience immediately; and we can explain the inner and outer structure of the eye in accordance with mechanical laws. When, however, we judge the eye teleologically, we not only assert that we can see with it, but we also assert that it <sup>was</sup> ~~ought to~~ <sup>intended</sup> ~~have a structure suitable for seeing.~~ We regard the mechanical causes as merely accidental. We assume quite a different kind of causality. The eye given to us can see, because this is its purpose. We judge that the eye could not have been what it is unless it <sup>was intended to do</sup> ~~ought to have been~~ so. Experience, on the other hand, only shows us things as they are. If we are to be able to compare a thing as it is with the thing as it ought to be, and to make our judgment about it dependent on whether it actually is what it ought to be, <sup>we</sup> ~~we~~ must apply a special a priori principle. This principle cannot be derived from experience, ~~because experience only teaches us what things actually are and not what they ought to be.~~ "To think of a product of nature that it ought to have been something and to make our ~~and not what they ought to be~~ judgment dependent on whether it actually is, this implies the presupposition of a principle which cannot be derived from the experience. For experience teaches us only what things are."

(C. of J. 2203 Bueck; 50, Lehmann)

We can now understand what the analogy between aesthetic and teleological judgments is. They are both merely reflective judgments, and as such may be called subjective. In spite of this they are based on a priori principles, and are thus to be distinguished from all those judgments which follow merely empirical principles. Teleological judgments can be as little <sup>be</sup> derived from physical (empirical) laws as aesthetic judgments can be derived from psychological laws. They are products of the faculty of Judgment. The Critique of Judgment will have to give a precise account of the nature of these two <sup>types of</sup> judgments. It will contain two parts: a Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and a Critique of Teleological Judgment.

#### Section 11.

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Section 11.

There is perhaps not another passage in the whole of Kant's critical philosophy and certainly none in the "Critique of Judgment" which gives so much the appearance of being a piece of "architectonic". Kant seems to be concerned in it with nothing but an artificial division of concepts. He presents us ~~in it~~ with a number of lists: a list of the faculties of <sup>the</sup> mind, which are said to be three; and a list of the faculties of cognition, which are also said to be three. Further, there is supposed to be a necessary connection between these two lists and two others (a list of the a priori principles and a list of the products of these principles, each of which also consists of three members). It seems hard to believe that Kant is discussing a serious philosophical problem. This however is the very thing I shall try to show. But not only this. I shall try to prove that the argument set forth in this section, far from being <sup>the mere</sup> a product of an architectonic mind, is <sup>in fact</sup> indeed a statement of the general principles of Kant's philosophy in the form of a sketch. It is its form which is artificial, and not its content.

After these preliminary remarks I may now begin my exposition.

The section bears the heading, "Encyclopaedic Introduction of the Critique of Judgment into the System of the Critique of Pure Reason." Kant begins by distinguishing between two kinds of introductions, (a) propaedeutic introduction, and (b) encyclopaedic introduction. <sup>A</sup> ~~The~~ propaedeutic introductions <sup>is</sup> are of a merely preparatory character. <sup>It</sup> ~~Their~~ purpose is to provide the reader with knowledge derived from some other doctrine or science which already exists, in order to introduce him to <sup>the</sup> a doctrine <sup>to be</sup> newly propounded. <sup>It</sup> ~~They~~ give him the material necessary for the

understanding of the latter. An encyclopaedic introduction is of an entirely different kind. It rests upon the Idea of a system. It does not merely enumerate the different parts of the whole as they are discovered in the process of empirical investigation. ~~An encyclopaedic introduction~~ <sup>It</sup> gives a complete inventory of the parts of a whole and showing<sup>s</sup> their necessary relation to one another and the whole to which they belong. For it is a systematic introduction and a system according to Kantian principles is a whole the parts of which are necessarily determined by the Idea of the whole from which they are derived so that it becomes possible to determine them both as regards their number and their nature. What is the whole in the case with which we are concerned? The answer is simple. The whole ~~faculty~~ of which the faculty of Judgment is to be a part is ~~of~~ human knowledge in so far as it is determined by a priori principles. If Judgment is to belong to the system of Pure Reason in the widest sense of this term, (i.e., the faculty of a priori knowledge in general) it must possess an a priori principle of its own. If it does, it will be possible, not only to regard it as a part of the whole, but also to determine the relation of this part to the other parts and the whole. The Critique of Pure Reason had set forth a a priori principles of the understanding, the Critique of Practical Reason the a priori principles of Reason. The principles of the understanding and the principles of Reason are both objective principles. They enable us to determine two different kinds of objects, viz., theoretical objects and practical objects.

Transcendental philosophy regarded as an objective doctrine can contain only two parts, viz., a theoretical and a practical part. The faculty of Judgment cannot belong to the system of the objective sciences of Pure Reason. For those sciences are

based upon objective a priori principles, and in order to be a part of such a system the faculty of Judgment would have to produce objective <sup>o)</sup> a priori principles. Now Judgment is fundamentally different from the understanding and Reason in that it does not provide us with any objective concepts or principles at all. It can therefore not belong to the system of philosophy. Philosophy regarded as a doctrine is concerned with objective knowledge alone. There are only two such objects, namely nature and <sup>morality</sup> ~~morals~~, and only two faculties of the mind which give us a priori objective knowledge of them, viz., understanding and Reason. The system of philosophy is complete if it contains the principles of the understanding and the principles of Reason. The faculty of Judgment can however be a member of the system of the a priori determinable faculties of the mind. It belongs to the system of philosophy in so far as <sup>this</sup> ~~it~~ is regarded as a Critique of the faculties of the mind. For Judgment produces special a priori principles and is fundamentally different from the empirical faculties of the mind with which psychology is concerned. It may also be rightly assumed that it is the very subjectivity of its principle which determined <sup>s</sup> the place of Judgment in the system of the cognitive faculties and enables us to determine its relation to the two other faculties, (understanding and Reason). It is this characteristic which will make us see the necessary connexion between them all as members of the system of the pure faculties of knowledge.

We know already what the a priori principle is which is assumed by Judgment. It is the principle of reflection. It has been shown that on merely subjective grounds, i.e., because we desire to know nature, we must presuppose that nature specifies its universal laws (principles of the possibility of nature in general) into ~~x~~ particular laws according to the Idea of system.

) On the different meanings of the terms "subjective" and "objective" in Kant, see above

We must assume that the particular laws of nature are arranged in a system. We have seen that we must necessarily apply <sup>this</sup> merely subjective principle of reflexion because the knowledge of the universal laws of nature is not sufficient to give us real knowledge of natural objects. But we have also seen that such a presupposition, subjectively necessary as it is, cannot be derived from objective principles. It is an assumption made by reflective Judgment. We cannot determine nature as such by means of the principles which cause us to make such an assumption. For the particular empirical laws must be given in <sup>experience</sup> preference and we cannot know, prior to our actual experience of them whether they really belong to a system. The principle is an a priori principle, but since we cannot prove its subjective necessity we can do no more than take the empirical laws which are given to us and try to arrange them in a system without <sup>ever</sup> knowing in advance whether we shall succeed.

Kant has also shown that since the rule which our reflective Judgment applies is independent of determinate concepts which would prove that nature necessarily presents us with a logical system, we conceive the idea of a purposiveness of nature. We expect of nature that <sup>it</sup> she will serve our own purposes. ~~Kant has also shown~~ <sup>he has told us</sup> in the preceding sections of the Introduction, and he repeats it here, that the principle of logical reflection is the <sup>original</sup> ~~empirical~~ principle of Judgment and that the other principles of the faculty of Judgment (aesthetic and teleological principles) <sup>are dependent</sup> ~~depend~~ on it. It is the logical principle of reflexion which <sup>makes us conceive the idea that there should exist in nature a conformity</sup> first ~~gives us the idea of conformity of law on the part of nature, to law which is objectively contingent, i.e., which cannot be based upon objective~~ <sup>objectively contingent and the subjectively necessary, i.e., in relation</sup> ~~concepts of the understanding, and yet is subjectively necessary because owing~~ <sup>to our faculty of knowing it).</sup> ~~Since the assumption of this prin-~~ <sup>to the constitution of our cognitive faculties we must attribute it to Nature.</sup> ~~ciple is subjectively necessary the judgment which makes use of it~~

Further, Kant tells us once more in our Section that the reason why we are entitled to hold that aesthetic judgments are based upon an a priori principle is that we have succeeded in establishing the principle of logical reflection <sup>6)</sup> as a ~~special~~ special a priori principle. The faculty of Judgment which supplies the principle of these judgments is thus entitled to a place in the system of the higher faculties of knowledge. All this will easily be understood by anyone who has followed Kant throughout the preceding sections of the Introduction. The two subsequent paragraphs of our Section are more difficult.

Kant sets out to prove that of the two judgments made by reflective Judgment (i.e., aesthetic and teleological judgments) it is only the former which have their origin in Judgment and which make a Critique of Judgment necessary, whereas the possibility of the latter can be shown without its being necessary to derive them from a principle peculiar to Judgment. He explains that it is in its judgments of taste that Judgment reveals itself as a ~~faculty~~ faculty with a special a priori principle. These judgments alone entitle it to a place in the Critique of the higher faculties of knowledge, and it is only after its aesthetic faculty <sup>(aesthetisches Vermögen)</sup> has been discovered that its teleological faculty can be dealt with. In order to complete the Critique of Judgment we have to concern ourselves with the teleological judgments as well, and to show that they are contained in one and the same faculty and rest upon the same principle.

Kant himself adduces his reasons for believing that aesthetic judgments are more closely connected with the faculty

6) The principle that nature specifies its universal laws into particular laws according to the Idea of a system.

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Critical principles the human mind cannot transcend the world of nature. A teleological judgment on the other hand, as long as it makes use of objective concepts of Reason, <sup>so</sup> must do this. For in employing such a concept we assert that natural objects owe their existence to supernatural causes. This is the use which has been made of the teleological principle, namely by nearly all dogmatic philosophers. They have all believed that it is possible to prove by means of this principle that there exists a supersensible being which produces things in order to make them serve certain purposes. The physico-teleological proof of the existence of God rests upon this argument. Kant however has shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that ~~this argument~~ is invalid. The concept of a "purpose" is a mere idea the objective validity of which cannot be established. In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment he has shown that we can make some use of the teleological principle in a different sense. Teleological judgments are merely reflective and subjective judgments. The principle which underlies them is not a principle of Reason but of Judgment.

Another point to be noted is that in Section 10, i.e., the section which immediately precedes the section with which we are here concerned, we find a passage in which Kant states that of the two kinds of reflective judgments with which the Critique (1) of Judgment, must concern itself the teleological judgments are more in need of criticism than the aesthetic judgments, ~~owing to this is because~~ the fact that left to themselves they tempt Reason to transcend the world of sense, whereas aesthetic judgments demand a laborious investigation in order to guard against their being wholly limited to the empirical in respect of their principles, which would

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(1) He actually says that they belong to the Critique of Pure Reason, taken in its most general sense. That this means may be seen from the following passage. "A Critique of Pure Reason, i.e. of our faculty of judging on a priori principles, would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgment, which is a faculty of knowledge, and, as such, lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately." (C.of J., 168)n

destroy their claim to universal validity.

This seems clearly to contradict the argument which is set forth in section 11. But I think it is <sup>comparatively</sup> ~~quite~~ easy to reconcile the two passages. Kant has a habit of discussing the same question from different points of view, so that he first lays stress upon one side of a problem and then upon another. As a result of this different passages seem to be incompatible with one another. The semblance of incompatibility disappears, however, in practically every case when account is taken of the argument as a whole.

In the case with which we are here concerned it may be said that Kant's answer to the question as to whether aesthetic or teleological judgments are of ~~a~~ greater importance for the Critique of Judgment, would be this: The answer to this question depends on <sup>the</sup> ~~from which~~ point of view we consider the two judgments. Aesthetic judgments are more closely connected with the faculty of Judgment in so far as they do not make use of any concepts and thus obviously cannot derive their principles from any other faculty of the mind than Judgment. We may, however, reconsider the question from a different point of view. We may say that since aesthetic judgments do not make use of any concepts no one would ever imagine that by means of them the human mind can transcend the world of sense. They do not endanger the fundamental principles of a Critical Philosophy. Teleological judgments on the other hand do this. For they make use of concepts and as long as they are not made subject<sup>ed</sup> to transcendental Criticism, they may be easily held to be based upon objective concepts of Reason by means of which we can have knowledge of a supersensible world. To ~~make the~~ <sup>then</sup> subject to critical examination is therefore far more important than to explain the nature of aesthetic judgments. For if Critical Philosophy does not explain the nature

of aesthetic judgments there is no harm done except that the nature of these judgments remains unintelligible.

As long, however, as the nature of teleological judgments is not explained, i.e., as long as it is not made clear that they are subjective judgments of reflection, the principles of transcendental philosophy are in danger. For it may be said against these principles that the fact that we can, and indeed must, judge certain objects teleologically proves that the fundamental assumption of Critical philosophy—that the human mind can have no knowledge of a transcendental world—is erroneous. Critical philosophy holds the view that ~~we can have no knowledge of anything but the world of nature and its mechanical laws. This, it may be thought, cannot be so. For we can make teleological judgments in which we transcend the world of sense and employ a principle fundamentally different from the mechanical principles of the understanding.~~

We may now go on with <sup>our</sup> ~~an~~ exposition of Section 11. <sup>In the</sup> ~~paragraph which we have just examined and in the one which follows it states in the paragraph and subsequent to that which we have~~ Kant states ~~just-examined~~ that the Critique of taste, if it is undertaken with a transcendental purpose, offers an extremely promising prospect of arriving at a complete system of the faculties of the mind. For it fills a gap in the system of our faculties of knowledge.

The system of the faculties of the mind <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ so far as they are referred not alone to the world of sense (das Sinnliche) but also to the supersensible (das Übersinnliche) will be worked out according to Critical principles. <sup>without the</sup> ~~The~~ limitations which Critical philosophy has set to our knowledge of the supersensible <sup>being</sup> ~~will not be~~ removed.

~~All this is very obscure.~~ ~~Kant~~ Instead of explaining what <sup>he</sup> ~~it~~ means, <sup>Kant</sup> goes on to present us with a number of lists. There is first a list of the faculties of the mind, Then a list of the faculties of knowledge, and two others follow. All this looks exceedingly artificial. As I have said at the beginning of my exposition of this section, I shall try to show that behind these divisions there is concealed a real argument a comprehensive survey of the fundamental principles of transcendental philosophy. It is only a very elaborate study which will bring this argument to light, ~~and I may now be permitted to begin with my interpretation.~~

In the first place I shall examine the first two lists, viz., (a) the list of the faculties of the mind (faculty of knowledge, feeling of pleasure and pain, and faculty of desire) and (b) the list of the faculties of knowledge (understanding, Judgment and Reason). Kant holds that there are three different attitudes which the human mind may take towards an object. It may be interested in gaining knowledge of it, it may take pleasure in it, or it may desire it. In order to exercise those three faculties some kind of knowledge is required. The mind must not remain purely passive. It must have some principle of its own, and this <sup>is possible only through</sup> ~~can take place in no other way than by means of~~ some activity on the part of the faculty of knowledge. ~~It is not necessary that~~ The knowledge involved <sup>need not</sup> ~~should~~ always be objective knowledge brought about by determinate concepts. We shall see that the a priori principle which determines our faculty of taking pleasure in an object (the principle which underlies our aesthetic judgments) does not give us objective knowledge. Kant believes, however, that all the faculties of the mind are ultimately related to the

faculty of knowledge. Besides the faculties of the mind, there exist three higher faculties of knowledge, viz., (a) understanding, (b) Judgment, (c) Reason. If we eliminate intuition and imagination on account of their being sensuous faculties and as such possessed by irrational beings as well as man, we are left with these three "higher" faculties of knowledge.

is

Now Kant's assertion is that there exists a necessary connection between the faculties of the mind and the faculties of knowledge. The understanding supplies principles only for the faculty of knowledge, the faculty of Judgment only for the feeling of pleasure, and pain, and Reason only for the faculty of desire. <sup>It is easy to see.</sup> Why Kant believes that it is the understanding which supplies a priori principles for the faculty of knowledge is easy to see. He has shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that the only objective a priori principles of which our faculty of knowledge can employ are the principles of the understanding; Reason and its concepts (Ideas) cannot give us any objective knowledge, Judgment <sup>as</sup> so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned, is a faculty of mere subsumption ~~given to it by the understanding.~~ It does not possess any a priori principle of its own.

I shall now ~~try~~ <sup>is</sup> to explain why Kant believes that there exists a necessary connection between Reason and the faculty of desire. <sup>may remind ourselves</sup> We remember that in Section I of the Introduction <sup>he</sup> Kant distinguished between two different kinds of propositions, viz., technical and practical propositions. We were told that it is only the latter which are based upon a priori principles <sup>and</sup> which may be called practical. The principles on which the former are based are theoretical principles. It is important

to note here that what Kant believes is not that there is no difference between knowing a theoretical rule and acting in accordance with it. What he means is that the distinction between the two is a merely empirical difference. Of course, we know by experience that knowing a geometrical rule and carrying it out are two different things. And yet there is no difference regarding the a priori principle.

The principle which the actual construction follows is the theoretical principle. We have full theoretical knowledge of the rule of the construction and in actually carrying it out <sup>all we have to do is to</sup> ~~we do nothing but merely~~ apply the theoretical rule.

~~Applied geometry is based upon theoretical principles.~~ We have also learnt that in Kant's view it does not make any difference whether we are concerned with scientific rules or rules of conduct, in so far as the latter are concerned with bringing about our own happiness does not follow an independent a priori practical principle. For happiness is an object that belongs to the world of nature. If we had perfect theoretical knowledge of the way in which it could be brought about, we should act accordingly and our actions would be entirely determined by this knowledge. An action which contains an a priori practical principle must be of an entirely different kind. Not only must it be independent of our theoretical knowledge of an object. It must even be impossible <sup>for us</sup> to have any such knowledge.

It is only moral actions which fulfil this condition. For their object (the good) is a supersensible object of which we have no theoretical knowledge. In desiring to realise the good, and <sup>in</sup> obeying the moral law which commands us to realise

it we follow a principle fundamentally different from the principles of the understanding. It is an independent principle of practical Reason.

~~We remember that~~ The problem with which we are here concerned is: Why does Kant believe that Reason supplies principles for the faculty of desire? In order to understand this we have first to state that Kant is not thinking of ~~/~~ desire in the ordinary sense of the word. It is not the desires for natural objects of which we seek to gain possession in order to enjoy them which are determined by Reason and its a priori practical principle. It is a special kind of desire, viz., the desire to realise the good which as we have just seen is an object fundamentally different from all natural objects. In fact, it is an object of which we should have no knowledge whatever, unless our Reason revealed it to us. Reason makes us desire this object. Hence it may be said that the only desire which is determined by an independent a priori principle is the desire to bring about the good and since it is Reason which makes us conscious of the moral law and the object of moral action (the good) of which the understanding and its theoretical principles can teach us nothing, it may be said that it is Reason alone which supplies the faculty of desire with a special a priori ~~(practical)~~ principle.

As regards the third faculty of the mind which is empirically given (the feeling of pleasure), the problem that faces us is similar to the one ~~with~~ <sup>discussed</sup> which we have just ~~concerned~~ ourselves. There is again given in experience a specific faculty of the mind, and what we have to find out is whether this faculty is capable of being determined by an independent

a priori principle. That the faculty in question, viz., the faculty of feeling pleasure and pain, is empirically different from the two <sup>2</sup> other faculties is manifest. Psychological observation shows that taking pleasure in an object is different from knowing <sup>it</sup> or desiring it. Transcendental philosophy however is not concerned with their empirical differences. It is in search of a priori principles. It appears that when an object produces pleasure in the subject the relation between them is determined by ordinary causal laws. It may be difficult <sup>ever</sup> ~~even~~ to determine their precise <sup>nature</sup> ~~value~~, but it is obvious that they do not rest upon a priori principles. We may presume that if pleasure is capable of being determined by specific a priori principles, i.e., principles which are essentially different from the principles of the understanding (theoretical principles) and the principles of Reason (practical principles), this will be a very special kind of pleasure - a feeling which is just as different from what is ordinarily called pleasure as practical desire is different from what is ordinarily called desire.

Now it has been explained in the preceding sections of the Introduction that there actually exists a specific kind of pleasure, namely, the pleasure which arises in the subject when it finds itself confronted with a rule the necessity of which it cannot understand <sup>because</sup> ~~owing to the fact~~ that it in no way follows from the rules of understanding. We have learnt that every act of reflection is accompanied by <sup>such</sup> a feeling of pleasure. We have seen that since our understanding and our Reason are concerned with nothing but strictly universal rules (~~for~~ <sup>since</sup> they are not concerned with the sphere of mere particulars), and since the sphere of particulars is not determined by

their principles, the knowing subject has <sup>to employ</sup> ~~however~~ a subjective principle of reflection which makes it assume that the particulars themselves are not a disorderly aggregate but a system. In applying this principle the subject must necessarily feel pleasure when it finds <sup>it</sup> ~~this~~ assumption confirmed by the facts (See above, ). We have also seen that although all our reflective judgments are bound up with a feeling of pleasure, this holds to an even greater extent for our aesthetic judgments. The reason is that aesthetic judgments are merely subjective judgments. In making them we do not judge about properties of the object but about our own feelings. It is true that teleological judgments are also merely reflective. And yet they are concerned with knowledge of the objects to which the principle of reflection is applied. They are cognitive judgments of a special kind, viz., reflective cognitive judgments. Aesthetic judgments on the other hand are fundamentally different from all cognitive judgments whether determinative or reflective. ~~They are purely subjective.~~ As has been indicated already and will be made clearer in the "Critique of aesthetic Judgment" the pleasure <sup>is involved in</sup> about which our aesthetic judgments ~~judge~~ is of a very special kind. It is a pleasure arising from the fact that the subject, in representing an object to itself, becomes conscious of a harmonious relation of its faculties of representation.

The faculties involved in this process are the imagination the understanding, and the faculty which relates them to each other, <sup>is</sup> the faculty of Judgment.

The "Critique of aesthetic Judgment" will throw light upon all this. But even at the present stage it is possible to grasp Kant's general idea. ~~We remember that~~ In Section 3

of the Introduction Kant has told us that the reason why reflective Judgment in making any aesthetic judgments does not become conscious of its own principle (of the rule which it applies) and why the judgment ~~it~~ cannot manifest itself in any other way than in a subjective feeling (the pleasure which is felt) <sup>is</sup> ~~so~~ that the rule itself is subjective. It follows that in order to decide whether a particular case does or does not conform to the rule we can do no more than refer to that which is also merely <sup>and</sup> objective, viz. the pleasure which is felt.

I think it has now become clear what Kant's reasons are for believing that there <sup>is</sup> ~~exists~~ a necessary connexion between the feeling of pleasure on the one hand and the faculty of Judgment <sup>in particular</sup> (and its aesthetic principle) ~~in particular~~, on the other. The pleasure in the beautiful is fundamentally different from what is ordinarily called pleasure (pleasure in the pleasant). Kant will make this point quite clear in the "Critique" itself. For the present it is sufficient to state that he believes that in taking pleasure in an object which we find pleasant we are always interested in more than our own feelings. We are interested in the object and its existence. We seek to bring it into our possession in order to enjoy pleasant feelings. Our pleasure in the beautiful on the other hand is of an entirely different kind. It is <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ pleasure of contemplation. We are interested in nothing but our own state of mind and our enjoyment of the object is due to the fact that its representation gives us pleasure.

We may now concern ourselves with Kant's third list. It adds to the faculties of the mind, and the faculties of knowledge the a priori principles which belong to them. These

are said to be (a) conformity to law (Gesetzmässigkeit),  
 (b) purposiveness, (c) purposiveness which is at the same  
 time law (Zweckmässigkeit, also zugleich Gesetz ist).

That Kant defines here the fundamental principle of  
 the understanding as the principle of conformity to law hardly  
 requires an explanation. He has shown in the "Critique of  
Pure Reason" that our understanding produces certain a priori  
 universal laws to which every object of experience has to  
 conform in order to become an object. The fundamental  
 principle of the understanding may therefore rightly be called  
 the principle of conformity to law. (Gesetzmässigkeit) It is harder to see why  
 Kant here calls the principle of practical Reason "purposive-  
 ness which is at the same time law." I shall try to explain  
 this. The concept of purpose is according to Kant (as has  
 often been said before) a concept of Reason (an Idea). The  
 fundamental difference between concepts of the understanding  
 and Ideas is that whereas the former make the particulars  
 subject to certain universal rules without determining the  
 particulars as such, the latter are thought to do this. Our  
 understanding produces universal rules to which all the  
 particulars contained in the world of sense have to conform.  
 But it does not even aim at determining the sphere of particu-  
 lars as such. It leaves the subsumption of the particulars  
 under the universals to the faculty of Judgment. Reason on  
 the other hand demands far more. It demands that every  
 particular which falls under its concepts (Ideas) should be  
 fully determined by them, that the particulars should owe  
 their very existence to universal concepts. We have <sup>already</sup> ~~concerned~~  
<sup>briefly examined</sup> ~~ourselves with~~ this doctrine before (See above. ).

We have also seen that Kant holds that the claim made by

Reason cannot be justified so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned and why he holds this. Ideas do not give us knowledge. We cannot <sup>derive</sup> ~~derive~~ the particulars contained in our world from universal concepts.

In his ethical writings (the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Groundwork"), Kant has shown that the case is different in the sphere of ~~practical~~ actions. We can determine our own actions by means of universal Ideas. A moral action is actually <sup>so</sup> determined. In so far as the agent determines himself in accordance with the moral law, in so far as the only end he pursues is to obey this law and to realise the object which is given to him by the moral law (the good), his particular actions (although they take place in the world of sense) are wholly determined by Ideas of Reason.

We have now to remember that the question with which we are at present concerned is to find out why Kant calls the principle of practical Reason the principle of purposiveness <sup>which</sup> ~~while it~~ is at the same time law. We have often stated that according to Kant purpose is an Idea of Reason. When we say of a thing that it is a purpose, we mean by this that every particular contained in it is dependent on the universal Idea. Now as regards a special kind of ~~purpose~~, namely moral purposes or rather ends (Zwecke), <sup>being purposes of a special kind</sup> we have to <sup>be</sup> distinguish <sup>ed</sup> them from ends of nature (Naturzwecke). Kant's theory regarding moral ends is that they do not exist by themselves. They are in fact implicit in the moral action. A moral action which determines itself according to the moral law has no further end which it pursues. <sup>essential difference</sup> ~~What is the distinction, according~~ <sup>according to Kant,</sup> ~~to Kant,~~ between natural ends and moral ends <sup>^</sup> may be seen from

the following. <sup>purpose</sup> "Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends. Ethics regards ~~a~~ possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case the kingdom is ~~a theoretical~~ <sup>idea</sup> adopted to explain what actually is. In the latter it is a practical Idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realised by our conduct, namely, if it conforms to this Idea." (Groundwork, 67)

I cannot try here to explain this very difficult passage really satisfactorily. For this would involve us in a discussion of questions regarding Kant's moral philosophy which cannot adequately be dealt with in a book on the "Critique of Judgment". For our present purpose it is sufficient to state that the only kind of purposes (ends) of which human Reason has knowledge and which it can realise are moral purposes (ends). It is only in the practical sphere that human Reason can both give the law and realise ends, that it can employ a principle of purposiveness which is at the same time law. ~~So far as~~ The laws of the understanding can give law to which every object of nature has to conform. But the understanding can only teach us what nature <sup>It cannot even ask</sup> ~~is. The question as to~~ what its objects are good for, what purposes (ends) they serve. ~~cannot even be asked by the understanding.~~ Reason's concept of a purpose (end) on the other hand is a transcendent concept which does not give us knowledge. When he wrote the "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant believed that for theoretical knowledge the human mind could not make any use of the principle of a purpose (end). Purpose was for him a mere Idea. In the "Critique of Judgment" he changes this view in so far as he admits now that the principle of purposiveness of nature can be employed by us for an enquiry into nature but only

as a principle of reflexion. <sup>it is</sup> ~~It is~~ <sup>as</sup> such fundamentally different from the principle of practical Reason, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ we cannot determine natural objects by means of it. We cannot give law to nature. It is a principle of purposiveness which is <sup>not</sup> ~~part~~ at the same time law, ~~It is a merely objective purposiveness.~~ <sup>and as such</sup> ~~it is also~~ quite different from the principles of the understanding which as has been said <sup>and</sup> ~~is~~ concerned with nature's conformity to law but not with purposes which nature may realise. It may therefore rightly be said that the understanding applies the principle of conformity to law, Judgment the principle of purposiveness, ~~and~~ and Reason the principle of purposiveness which is at the same time law.

It will be noted that I have not explained here why Kant believes that the a priori principle employed by the faculty of Judgment is the principle of purposiveness. I have thought such an explanation unnecessary in view of the fact that Kant has told us this <sup>time</sup> ~~once~~ and again throughout the Introduction. But there is one point regarding the section with which we are here concerned, to which I should like to draw attention. In ~~the~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~section~~ Kant is concerned with a special kind of subjective purposiveness <sup>namely the purposiveness</sup> which underlies our aesthetic judgments. Unfortunately we know ~~so far~~ very little about it. <sup>so far</sup> Kant will explain in the body of the "Critique" that the purposiveness in question is "a purposiveness without a purpose". In judging a work of art or a natural object to be beautiful we regard every <sup>part of it</sup> ~~particular in it~~ as dependent on the whole, every particular as dependent on the universal idea of the whole, and in so far ~~as~~ the object may be regarded as <sup>a</sup> purposive and harmonious whole. And yet we

do so without making use of a definite concept. In judging the object to be such a harmonious whole, we do not <sup>desire</sup> desire it from any definite purpose which would explain the relation between parts and the whole. We become aware of their harmonious relation by feeling it, and we are incapable of explaining to ourselves why it exists. We have no knowledge of the ground of its existence. The principle employed by an aesthetic judgment is the principle of purposiveness without a purpose. (See below, J.)

That Kant is thinking here of aesthetic purposiveness alone may be seen from the fact that in the last list which he presents art appears as the product of Judgment along with nature as the product of the understanding and morality as the product of Reason and the <sup>corresponding to these three faculties</sup> ~~corresponding~~ principles. The term "product" which Kant uses here is somewhat misleading. Above all it may seem strange that Kant calls nature a product of the understanding and its principle of conformity to law (Gesetzmaessigkeit). But it is not really difficult to see what he means by this. It is not nature as such which is a product of the understanding and its laws but nature in so far as it is determined by universal laws. Kant can and in fact must hold such a view. For the universal laws of nature are according to his philosophy produced by the understanding. They do not belong to nature itself but are introduced into it by the knowing mind.

The following passage will now be readily understood. "Thus nature founds its conformity to law (Gesetzmaessigkeit) upon a priori principles of the understanding. Art conforms in regard to its a priori purposiveness to the faculty of Judgment. Finally morality (as <sup>the</sup> product of freedom) pertains

to the Idea of such a purposiveness as is qualified to become a universal law, a law which is the determining principle of Reason in respect of the faculty of desire. The judgments thus arising from the a priori principles which belong peculiarly to each of the fundamental faculties of the mind are theoretical, aesthetic and practical judgments." (C. of J., Buck, 2007; Levinson, 55.)

Kant goes on to state that there has now been discovered a system of the faculties of the mind in their relation to nature and freedom. Nature and freedom have determinant principles and therefore belong to the doctrinal system of philosophy, which consists of two parts (theoretical and practical philosophy). The faculty of Judgment connects the two parts of philosophy by means of its specific principle. A transition from <sup>the</sup> sensible substratum with which theoretical philosophy is concerned to the supersensible substratum with which practical philosophy is concerned is made possible by the "Critique of Judgment". For the faculty of Judgment, although it cannot produce any objective knowledge and therefore can contribute nothing to the doctrine of philosophy, yields a special kind of judgment, viz., aesthetic judgments, the principles of which are merely subjective. These judgments are of such a special kind that they relate sensible intuitions to an Idea of nature whose conformity to law cannot be understood unless it is referred to a supersensible substratum. All this is very obscure and Kant himself states that he will <sup>simply</sup> ~~prove~~ it in the Critique itself. But I think that even a reader who is so far acquainted with only the Introduction to the Critique can understand Kant's general idea and see how <sup>he</sup> ~~Kant~~ can set <sup>consider</sup> ~~forth~~ the view that the "Critique of Judgment" is a mediating

link between the "Critique of Pure Reason" which is concerned with the world of nature, and the "Critique of Practical Reason" which is concerned with the world of freedom. ~~For~~ We have learnt already that the principle which is applied by the faculty of Judgment is the principle of reflexion and also that this principle necessarily relates the world of sense to a supersensible world.

Now According to transcendental principles the world of sense is a world determined by the objective rules of the understanding. It has been shown in the "Critique of Pure Reason" that this world or a world of appearances and that the human mind can have no theoretical knowledge of the supersensible. The "Critique of Practical Reason" has proved that there exists a supersensible world of freedom. It has been shown that in the field of moral actions we can determine particular actions which take place in the world of sense by means of universal concepts. But we do not know why <sup>or</sup> ~~and~~ how this is possible. The world of nature and the world of freedom are two heterogeneous spheres, <sup>whose</sup> ~~the~~ connection <sup>with each other</sup> ~~of which~~ we do not understand (See above, 25) We have objective principles of the understanding, the necessity of which we can understand. These principles present us with the world of nature. We also have objective principles of Practical Reason which make us conscious of the supersensible world of practical freedom. But we are entirely ignorant as to what the connexion between the two worlds is. We can apply the principles of the understanding for the sake of ~~having~~ theoretical knowledge of the world of nature, and we can apply the principles of Reason in order to determine our actions according to the supersensible principle of moral freedom.

Now the "Critique of Judgment" <sup>and shows that</sup> makes us discover the principle of reflexion, <sup>the human mind</sup> in applying this principle we conceive the Idea of a Technique of nature. The Introduction has shown that we must make use of this principle. We must assume that nature besides being determined by the universal laws of the understanding is also a system in accordance with particular laws. In order to explain to ourselves the possibility of such a system we have to transcend the world of nature. We have to regard nature as an intelligent being that has produced this system purposely, a being ~~which is~~ possessed of an understanding essentially different from our own. This understanding forms the world of nature according to the Idea of a system. It arranges every particular contained in the world of nature (regarded as a mere object of experience) according to this Idea. Whatever the "purposiveness" is which we ascribe to nature, whether it is logical, aesthetic, or teleological purposiveness, in each case we assume the existence of such a supersensible causality.

Reflective Judgment regards nature as subject to a supersensible principle. Although this principle is merely subjective, it first gives us the Idea of a nature which is dependent on laws derived from a supersensible source. This Idea is realised in the sphere of practical philosophy. For it can be shown that moral actions occurring in the world of sense are actually determined by the supersensible causality of freedom. The faculty of Judgment may <sup>thus</sup> be said to make possible a transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.

" Understanding, by the possibility of its supplying a priori

laws <sup>of</sup> ~~for~~ nature furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is cognised by us only as phenomenon, and in so doing points to its having a supersensible substrate: but this substrate it leaves quite undetermined. Judgment by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature according to its estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws provides the supersensible substrate ..... with determinability through the intellectual faculty. But Reason gives determination to the same by its practical law. This judgment makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom." (C.of J., 196; Second Introduction).

Kant's general idea is quite clear. In assuming the principle of reflective Judgment we suppose that the world of sense is in some way dependent on supersensible laws, laws which the understanding (which is concerned with the world of sense alone) can in no way comprehend. This is in some <sup>way</sup> ~~way~~ analogous to the principle of Reason. But the essential difference is that the faculty of Judgment merely assumes that the supersensible substrate has some kind of effect upon the world of sense without being able to determine <sup>the effect</sup> ~~it~~ whereas practical Reason in being conscious of the supersensible moral law can assert objectively that nature "actually is" capable of being so determined.

It is very important to note that in the Critique of Judgment Kant in no way modifies the fundamental doctrine of transcendental philosophy: <sup>namely</sup> ~~viz.~~ that the human mind derives all its objective knowledge of the world of nature from the principles of the understanding and its objective knowledge of the world of freedom from the principles of Reason.

The principles of the understanding and of Reason are the only objective principles. There are only two parts of philosophy regarded as a doctrine, i.e., as a source of objective knowledge, <sup>namely</sup> ~~viz.~~ theoretical philosophy (concerned with the world of nature) and practical philosophy (concerned with the world of freedom). The principles of Judgment are of an entirely different kind. They are not determinant but reflective, not objective but subjective principles. Therefore the faculty of Judgment cannot have a place in the system of philosophy, but it can and in fact must belong to the "Critique of all the faculties of the mind determinable a priori so far as they constitute a system." (C.of J., 222. Buech; 53 <sup>Lehmann</sup> (Telner))

It does not seem to me permissible to regard Kant's distinction between the system of the sciences of Pure Reason and the system of the faculties of the mind is as a merely technical and artificial distinction. For <sup>it represents</sup> ~~there is expressed in it~~ his conviction that there is a fundamental difference between the objective principles of understanding and Reason and the <sup>sub</sup>jective principles of Judgment.

I may now conclude my exposition of the Introduction. I hope that I have succeeded in showing that the argument set forth in the Introduction is by no means artificial and further that it is in perfect harmony with the general principles of Kant's philosophy ~~and that Kant's problem is intelligible if it is viewed in this general context.~~

There remain, however, a great many obscurities especially regarding the aesthetic judgments. Most of these will be cleared up in the Critique of aesthetic Judgment, <sup>to</sup> the interpretation of which I may now proceed.

Critique of Judgment.

## Part 1. Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.

First Section.

## Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment.

First Book.Analytic of the Beautiful.Section 1.

The Transcendental method is distinguished from every other method of philosophical enquiry in that it holds that to understand the nature of an object philosophy must enquire into the nature of our knowledge of it. It never treats an object as a thing existing independently of the human mind. It asks: How do we come to know it? This procedure of transcendental philosophy is implied in its very name. "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." (C.P.R., B.25.)

All our knowledge of objects, actual or assumed, expresses itself in certain judgments about them. Thus the fundamental problem of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is concerned with our theoretical a priori judgments about objects, is not: How are theoretical objects possible? but: How are our judgments about them possible? We cannot become aware of objects independently of our judgments about them. The main problem of the Critique of Pure Reason may therefore be stated as follows. How are these judgments (a priori synthetic judgments) possible? "Much is already gained if we can bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For we not only lighten our task by defining it accurately, but

consider for others who would test our results to judge whether or not we have succeeded in what we set out to do. Now the proper problem of Pure Reason is <sup>contained in</sup> ~~centered on~~ the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" (C. of P.R., B.19.)

The task which Kant sets himself in the first book of the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment (Analytic of the Beautiful) is to explain the nature of a specific kind of judgments, namely our judgments about the beautiful. It is not the nature of the beautiful object as such ~~which~~ which interests him in the first place. What he is concerned with is to analyze the judgments <sup>in</sup> which <sup>we</sup> ~~make~~ call things beautiful. The judgments themselves are given. There exists a specific kind of judgment which declared its objects beautiful or ugly. <sup>judgments of this kind</sup> They may be called judgments of taste. The Analytic of the Beautiful has to concern itself with <sup>them</sup> ~~these~~ judgments. It has to be noted however that the first business of the Analytic of the Beautiful is <sup>not</sup> ~~to~~ to ask: Are human beings entitled to make such judgments <sup>of taste.</sup> ~~when we call things beautiful.~~ <sup>The first question to be answered is:</sup> What is required for calling an object beautiful, what do we assert when we make such a judgment about it? The question as to whether we are entitled to make judgments of taste will be discussed later. ~~In the first place~~ <sup>(then first of all)</sup> We have to resolve the judgments of taste into their elements. We have to distinguish them from other judgments. We have to ascertain <sup>what are</sup> precisely the ~~peculiar~~ characteristics of such judgments which distinguish them from all <sup>the</sup> other judgments which we make.

"The definition of taste here relied upon is that it is the faculty of estimating the beautiful. But the discovery of what is required for calling an object beautiful must be reserved for the analysis of judgments of taste." (C. of J., 203 Note)

The first thing that our analysis of the judgments of taste discovers is that when we call an object beautiful or ugly, we are not at all concerned with the object as such but with the pleasure <sup>or</sup> ~~on~~ pain which we feel when we represent the object to ourselves. When we make a logical judgment about an object we ascribe to <sup>the object</sup> ~~it~~ certain properties. A judgment <sup>such as</sup> ~~like~~ "The table is round" would be an example of such a judgment <sup>of this kind</sup>. It is clear that the predicate of this judgment is a property which we attribute to our object. On the other hand when we say: "The table is beautiful" we do not ascribe to <sup>the table</sup> ~~it~~ any property. We merely state that we take pleasure in it. We see that judgments of taste are essentially different from logical judgments in that they are not at all concerned with the object and its properties but merely with our own feeling about it. Judgments of taste are subjective. For in making them we refer the representation of the object to the subject and its feeling of pleasure and pain. <sup>might</sup> It ~~may~~ <sup>be</sup> seen as if every judgment that <sup>referred</sup> ~~refers~~ the representation of the object to the sensation were a purely subjective judgment. But this is not really so. There is only one kind of sensation which is purely subjective, and cannot be anything else, namely, the feeling of pleasure and pain. Every other kind of sensation may be objective, in a certain sense. To take an example, the sensation of a colour is subjective in the sense that it cannot be determined objectively. The same object may seem green to one person and red to another, and it is impossible to prove objectively which of the two qualities the object really possesses. And yet when we assert that an object is green or red, etc., we mean that the object possesses a certain property of which we become aware

through sensation. There is only one sensation which cannot be other than subjective, namely the feeling of pleasure or pain. For <sup>t</sup>his denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the representation." (C.of J., 204)

We have now learnt that aesthetic judgments, i.e., judgments which are concerned with nothing but the pleasure or pain which is felt by the subject, possess a special characteristic. They must be distinguished from logical or cognitive judgments. The fundamental distinction between logical (or cognitive) and aesthetic judgments is that the former are always objective, the latter always purely subjective.

"The judgment of taste, therefore, is not a cognitive judgment, and so not logical, but is aesthetic - which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective." (C.of J., 205)

#### Section 2.

~~What has~~ In Section 1 <sup>Kant has</sup> drawn a clear distinction between logical judgments and aesthetic judgments. In section 2 he distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic judgments, namely judgments about the beautiful and judgments about the pleasant.

His argument runs as follows. When we judge an object beautiful we are indifferent <sup>to the question</sup> as to whether it ought to exist or ~~ought~~ not. The delight (*Wohligefallen*) which we feel is wholly disinterested. By interest in an object we may understand the delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object. Our judgments about the beautiful are entirely independent of any such interest. Whether we desire

the existence of an object or do not desire it is a question which does not enter into our judgments about its beauty. Kant illustrates this by a simple example. If anyone asks us whether we find the palace which we see before us beautiful or not, we may perhaps answer that we do not care for things of that kind that are merely made to be gaped at. We may perhaps even go a step further and inveigh against the vanity of the great that that are merely made to be gaped at. We may perhaps even say a step further and inveigh against the vanity of the great all this is very well. Only it is not an answer to the question which we are asked.

We were asked if the contemplation of the object gives us pleasure or does not and ~~our opinion is as to whether it ought to excite.~~ <sup>not</sup> In aesthetic judgment about beauty is entirely indifferent to the existence or non-existence of its object.

"All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation."  
(C. of J., 205)

### Section 3.

We have now discovered as a further peculiarity of our judgments of taste that they are independent of all interest. How important this is may be seen from the fact that our judgments about the pleasant are also purely subjective and aesthetic judgments, and that what distinguishes the two aesthetic judgments is <sup>nothing but</sup> the fact that judgments about the pleasant are never disinterested, i.e. they are not indifferent to the existence of their object. <sup>This</sup> as will be shown in ~~this~~ <sup>the present</sup> section.

Kant begins with a definition of the pleasant. It runs as follows:

(small caption)

"That is pleasant which the senses find pleasing in sensation."

(C. of J., 265) He goes on to state that this affords a convenient opportunity for <sup>for</sup> condemning a confusion concerning the meaning of "sensation" and directing particular attention to the double meaning of which the word "sensation" is capable. ~~One~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>commonly been</sup> believed that every kind of delight is <sup>in</sup> itself sensation. But this is not really so. We have to distinguish between different kinds of sensation. There is a fundamental difference between two principal kinds of sensation, namely, objective sensation and <sup>sub</sup> subjective sensation. Objective sensation is concerned with the sensible qualities of an object. Subjective sensation is not concerned with an object at all but with the feelings of the subject. Our judgments about the pleasant are judgments about subjective sensation. They are in no way concerned with knowledge of the object not even with knowledge of its sensible qualities. They are purely subjective, and in making such judgments we make an assertion about nothing but our own subjective sensations about the delight which we take in our object.

"The green colour of the meadows belongs to the objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its pleasantness to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented; i.e., to the feeling, through which the object is regarded as an Object of delight (which involves no cognition of the object)." (C. of J., 206)

Our judgments about the beautiful and our judgments about the pleasant are similar to one another in that they are both merely subjective judgments about feelings. The essential difference between the two judgments, however, is that whereas our judgments about the beautiful are disinterested, merely contemplative judgments, all our judgments about the pleasant

are bound up with <sup>an</sup> ~~our~~ interest in the existence of their object. We never merely judge that an object is pleasant. We are always at the same time interested in its existence. This is evident from the fact that when we judge a thing to be pleasant we are not primarily interested in our judgment. The judgment produces in us a desire to get hold of the object in order to enjoy it, so much so that those who are always intent on enjoyment quite willingly dispense with judging the object and are interested in nothing else than that the object should exist and that they should be enabled to enjoy it.

The delight in the pleasant is necessarily bound up with interest.

#### Section 4.

In this Section Kant shows that delight in the good is also bound up with interest and essentially different from delight in the beautiful. His argument is this.

To be enabled to consider something good we must always know what sort of thing the object ought to be, i.e., we must have a concept of it. A thing may be called good in two different senses. It may be regarded as good for something (useful) or as good in itself. As regards the former it is at once clear that we cannot judge a thing to be useful without making use of a definite concept. The concept which is <sup>employed</sup> ~~implied~~ in our judgments about the useful is the concept of an purpose. For we call that thing useful which is regarded as a means of bringing about something else in the existence of which we have an interest.

As regards the good in itself, i.e., the moral good, it is

also always bound up with an interest, with the ~~only~~ difference that whereas in the case of the mediately good (the useful) we are interested in something else that it will be good for, ~~we are~~ when we call an action morally good or good in itself, we are concerned with the goodness which is contained in it.

It is obvious that we desire the existence of the moral good. For the good is the necessary object of the will of every rational being. It follows that every judgment that makes use of the concept of the good in itself is bound up with an interest. We approve of the good action, we take delight in it because it realises an object in the existence of which we have interest. ~~We see not only the pleasant but also the good in its two forms is necessarily bound up with an interest.~~

"But, despite all this difference between the pleasant and the good, they both agree in being invariably coupled with an interest in their object. This is true, not alone of the pleasant (Section 3) and of the mediately good, i.e. the useful, which pleases as a means to some pleasure, but also of that which is good absolutely and from every point of view, namely the moral good which carries with it the highest interest. For the good is the object of will, (i.e., of a rationally determined faculty of desire.) But to will something, and to take a delight in its existence, i.e. to take an interest in it, are identical." (C. of J., 209) (1)

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(1) With the question as to why Kant believes (a) that the good is the object of the will and (b) that practical Reason determines the faculty of desire, I have dealt several times earlier in this book (See above). It will be noted that in my exposition of this section I have disregarded what Kant says about the difference between the pleasant and the good. I have done so because it seems to be that the question as to whether the good and the pleasant are different from one another is irrelevant to the problem with which the Analytic of the Beautiful is concerned. From the point of view of the Analytic of the Beautiful, it is enough to have shown that our judgments about the beautiful are different from our judgments about the pleasant and the good and the problem as to what the relation between the two other objects is of no importance. Kant discusses this problem here in order to indicate to the reader that he has

(footnote continued).

in no way given up the fundamental doctrine of his moral philosophy that the good and the pleasant are different from one another. He ~~seeks to~~ show that the fact that they are both bound up with an interest ~~does~~ in no way diminish<sup>es</sup> their essential differences.

Section 5.

In this section Kant compares what he calls the three specifically different kinds of delight, namely (a) delight in the pleasant, (b) delight in the beautiful, (c) delight in the good. His general idea is easily understood. The delight in the beautiful is essentially different from the two other kinds of delights, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ our judgments about the beautiful are purely contemplative judgments which are indifferent ~~to~~ to the existence of their object, whereas our judgments about the pleasant and the good are bound up <sup>with</sup> ~~within~~ <sup>an interest.</sup> ~~pain and interest.~~ In judgments of taste ~~we~~ are contemplative; <sup>they</sup> ~~we~~ are not concerned with the properties of the object as such but only with its relation to the feeling of pleasure or of pain. This is the reason <sup>why</sup> ~~that~~ those judgments are neither grounded (gegründet) on concepts nor intentionally directed to them (abgezweckt). Judgments of taste are essentially different from cognitive judgments which make use of concepts. The pleasant, the beautiful and the good denote three different relations to the feeling of pleasure and pain. Our judgments about them contain three different kinds of delight.

"The pleasant is what gratifies (<sup>vergnügt</sup> ~~vergnügt~~) man; the beautiful what simply <sup>pleases</sup> ~~releases~~ (gefällt) him, the good what is esteemed (approved) (geschätzt, gebilligt), i.e., that on which he sets an objective worth." (C. of J. 210)✓

All this is neither difficult nor very interesting. But when Kant goes on to state that pleasantness <sup>has meaning not only for</sup> ~~applies also to~~ <sup>man but also to</sup> irrational animals (not merely man) beauty only <sup>for man</sup> ~~to human beings~~ <sup>in so far as he is</sup> ~~as they are purely rational beings but in~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~so far as they are at once animal and rational~~, whereas the good is good for every rational being in general, it is very difficult to understand what he means. This may not seem surprising in view of the fact that Kant himself says that

his statement will receive its complete justification later. It has to be noted, however, that Kant never does give the promised explanation. In fact he never mentions this point again.

It will be appreciated that what is most difficult and most interesting from the point of view of the Critique of Judgment is Kant's assertion that beauty has meaning only for human beings, and <sup>for</sup> to them in so far as they are not merely rational but at once rational and irrational. I will try to explain what is meant by this. But I am afraid my explanation will be somewhat lengthy.

What I <sup>shall</sup> ~~will try to show~~ is that Kant's doctrine that beauty is an object only for human beings follows from the general principles of his philosophy. It has to be remembered that all our judgments about beauty are according to Kant produced by the faculty of Judgment. Now Kant has shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that Judgment is not an <sup>independent</sup> ~~adequate~~ faculty of the mind, that it merely mediates between two other faculties, namely intuition and understanding. (See above.) It has also been shown in the first Critique that the fact that human knowledge depends upon intuition and understanding is indicative of its <sup>finite character</sup> ~~pointless-ness~~. It reveals that human beings are not purely rational beings, that they are also sensible beings. A purely rational being would know objects by means of mere thought and would therefore not be in need of a faculty (Judgment) which enabled it to refer <sup>its</sup> ~~his~~ concepts to intuitions. For such a being would not be in need of sensible intuition. It would be able to present objects to <sup>itself</sup> ~~himself~~ by means of <sup>pure</sup> ~~pure~~ concepts.

It is true that in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant

shows that our practical judgments are also dependent on our faculty of Judgment. <sup>And yet</sup> ~~It has to be noted however that~~ he believes that the function of Judgment in the practical field is entirely different from ~~the one~~ <sup>that</sup> which it has ~~regarding our~~ <sup>in the</sup> theoretical judgments. Kant believes ~~that the~~ <sup>not only that</sup> practical concepts themselves are valid ~~in~~ <sup>for</sup> every rational being. ~~But not only this,~~ <sup>but absolute</sup> they are also valid for an absolute being, for God Himself. The moral law is an absolute law, and moral concepts are absolute concepts. That human beings have to make use of the faculty of Judgment at all in order to be able to make a practical judgment is solely due to the fact that they are finite beings, living in the world of sense. In order to be able to regard an action which occurs in the world of sense as determined by the absolute moral law, they have to be capable of subsuming the particular actions under the absolute universal law of Reason. This is made possible by practical Judgment. But it is clear that this faculty of practical Judgment is needed only by a being that is not a purely rational being, a being that belongs both to the sensible <sup>to the</sup> and intelligible world, that is both rational and irrational. This, however, does not alter the fact that the object of the moral will, the good, is a purely rational object. The good is good for every rational being in general.

We see that the argument regarding Judgment which is set forth in the two first Critiques implies that Judgment is a faculty ~~of the mind~~ which can belong only to the finite mind, i.e. to a mind which cannot know by means of mere thought ~~and~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~thus~~ <sup>must therefore</sup> possess a faculty which enables it to apply concepts to products of thought, to what is given to it by intuition. In the Critique of Judgment Kant discovers another kind of Judgment,

namely reflective Judgment. The principle of reflection is a merely subjective principle. In applying it Judgment does not make use of ~~any~~ <sup>determinate</sup> concepts at all. All that reflective Judgment can do is to relate two other faculties of the mind to one another without being able to determine what their precise relation is. For to be able to do this it would have to be capable of making use of determinate concepts. It would have to be determinant Judgment, either theoretical or practical. The two judgments <sup>with which</sup> determinant Judgment is concerned are theoretical judgments and practical judgments. Reflective Judgment produces a specific kind of judgment, namely aesthetic judgments. As has been hinted at in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, and will be made quite clear in the Critique itself, the two faculties which the faculty of Judgment must relate to one another in order to be able to <sup>make</sup> ~~lay down~~ an aesthetic judgment are the imagination and ~~the understanding~~ <sup>the understanding</sup>. The relation between these two faculties of the mind is in the case of aesthetic judgments not determined by objective concepts. It is an indeterminate relation. From this it follows that judgment about beauty can be made only by a <sup>finite</sup> ~~priori~~ the rational being, that they have significance only for beings at once rational and irrational. The being that makes them must be rational because in such judgments there is implied a relation to the understanding. On the other hand it must be irrational. For (a) the imagination is a sensuous faculty of the mind which a rational being would <sup>purely</sup> ~~not possess~~ <sup>need at all</sup>, and (b) the relation between imagination and understanding is not determined by definite objective concepts and according to Kant's doctrine a purely rational being would be capable of determining every object with which it is concerned

(1)

by means of pure ~~thought~~ concepts.

The rest of this section is ~~simple~~. Kant states that of the three kinds of delight it is only the delight in the beautiful that can be called "a free delight". As we have seen, ~~that~~ our delight in the pleasant and in the good <sup>is</sup> ~~are~~ dependent on our interest in the ~~existence~~ of the object. In the case of the pleasant the delight is not free because <sup>it is</sup> ~~we are~~ dependent upon our desire to possess the object. ~~Since we are~~ As sensible beings we have a natural desire that those objects which please us should belong to us and that we should be enabled to enjoy them. But since we are at the same time rational beings, we have also a desire to realise the good. Our delight in it (the feeling of respect for the moral law) is not free. As has been explained in the Critique of Practical Reason, the respect for the moral law cannot even be called a feeling in the <sup>proper</sup> ~~proper~~ sense of the word. ~~For it is~~ <sup>It is nothing but</sup> ~~something else than~~ the subjective awareness of our being determined by the objective moral law. It is not an independent feeling but is necessarily connected with <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ moral law. A <sup>finite</sup> being which finds itself subject to the moral law must necessarily have respect for it. <sup>It is given no choice</sup> ~~There is no choice left~~ <sup>in the matter.</sup> ~~to it as to whether it wants to feel it.~~ <sup>respect.</sup> ~~It ought to feel it.~~ <sup>therefore</sup> (See above) <sup>Ja</sup> The delight in the good <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ not free. It is not a disinterested delight.

We may put the matter like this. Our delight in the pleasant is related to inclination, our delight in the beautiful ~~is~~ <sup>to favour</sup> (Ernst) ~~to~~ our delight in the good to respect

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- (1) It has to be noted that <sup>Kant</sup> ~~Kant~~ when he says here that beauty has purport and <sup>significance</sup> ~~significance~~ only for human beings he does not mean that our idea of beauty and our judgments about it are dependent on some peculiar psychological constitution of the human mind. Judgments about beauty are subjective judgments, but they are at the same time subjectively necessary a priori judgments, i.e. judgments which every human being must necessarily make. For this reason it is not psychology (which is based entirely upon empirical principles) but transcendental philosophy which <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ concerned with the a priori conditions of our judgments, must deal with them. ~~About~~ <sup>the</sup> fundamental difference between the psychological and transcendental methods, see above

Of these three favour alone can be called a free delight. For it is only regarding the object of the judgments of taste that we can choose between favouring and disfavouring it. As regards the pleasant our natural inclinations impel us to desire it and as regards the good we are bound by the law of Reason to desire it. "For favour is the only free delight. An object of inclination and one which a law of Reason imposes upon our desire leaves us no freedom to turn anything into an object of pleasure. All interest presupposes a want, or calls one forth; and being a ground determining approval, deprives the judgment on the object of its freedom." (C. of J. 210).

It is now easy to understand Kant's first definition of the beautiful: "Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight <sup>or</sup> in dissatisfaction apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful." (C. of J. 211).

#### Section 6.

In this section Kant <sup>continues</sup> ~~goes on with~~ his analysis of the aesthetic judgments. His argument may be paraphrased as follows. He who judges an object to be beautiful is aware of the fact that he does so apart from any interest in the existence of the object. In calling an object beautiful he is in no way <sup>influenced</sup> ~~prompted~~ by any personal predilection for the object. Therefore he naturally assumes that the object will be judged in the same manner by everybody else. Since in making such a judgment he feels himself completely free, he cannot make his own person responsible for the judgment and the delight which is expressed in it. He is aware that his judgment is quite indepen-

dent of his individual likes and dislikes. Owing to this he  
 will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were an objective  
 quality and he will formulate his judgment as if it were a  
 logical judgment, i.e., a judgment which is concerned with cog-  
 nition of objects. He will do so because there is ~~some~~ <sup>a</sup> resem-  
 blance between the two judgments, (aesthetic and logical judg-  
 ments), ~~namely~~ <sup>in</sup> that they both claim to be universally valid  
 for everyone. <sup>But</sup> ~~now~~ it is obvious that there is <sup>also</sup> an essential  
 difference between the two judgments. For the aesthetic judg-  
 ment about beauty is concerned with nothing but the pleasure or  
 pain which is felt by the ~~object~~ <sup>subject</sup>. The universality of the  
 judgment must therefore be of a very special kind, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ from  
 objective concepts there is no transition to the subjective  
 feeling of pleasure. It is true that in the case of ~~our~~  
 practical laws there is a necessary transition to a certain kind  
 of pleasure, ~~namely~~, the feeling of respect for these laws. We  
<sup>universal</sup> may demand agreement with our practical judgments ~~of everyone~~  
<sup>universal</sup> may demand agreement with our practical judgments ~~of everyone~~  
 because we can presuppose that <sup>one</sup> every other person will feel the  
 same respect for <sup>the</sup> moral laws as we do and <sup>will</sup> therefore approve of  
 it is obvious that all practical laws carry an interest with  
 them. We approve of moral actions, not only because we all feel  
 respect for the laws to which they conform, but also because we  
 believe that the actions which are determined by those laws  
 realise an object in the existence of which we are interested,  
 namely, the good. Aesthetic judgments on the other hand claim  
 universal validity for the very reason that they are independent  
 of all interest in their objects. The universality claimed by  
 them is purely subjective. The subject of the judgment pre-  
 supposes that since it takes pleasure in the object without being  
 in the least interested in its ~~existence~~, ~~that~~ everyone else will

feel the same pleasure. It does not demand that every <sup>one</sup> other ~~person will~~ <sup>should</sup> attribute the same properties to the object, since it is not at all concerned with <sup>its</sup> ~~what~~ properties it ~~may possess~~. It merely assumes that every <sup>one</sup> other ~~person~~ will have the same subjective feelings about it. We see that the subjective universality which belongs to our aesthetic judgments is entirely different from the objective universality which belongs to our logical and practical judgments.

"The result is that the judgments of taste with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached to objects, i.e., there must be coupled with it a claim to <sup>sub</sup> ~~objective~~ universality." (C. of J., 212).

#### Section 7.

In this section Kant explains that the fundamental difference between our judgments about the beautiful and our judgments about the pleasant is that whereas in the former there is implicit a claim to universal validity, ~~of the judgment in the latter~~ are entirely independent of any such claim. ~~All~~ Our judgments about the pleasant are entirely private and individual judgments about our own feelings. To take an example, suppose we asserted that a certain object was pleasant, and someone objected and said we ought to say it was pleasant to us we should not protest at all. This applies to all judgments about the pleasant in general, not only to the <sup>judgments about the pleasure of the palate</sup> ~~taste of the tongue~~ but <sup>just as much</sup> to judgments about what is said to be pleasant to the eye, the ear, etc. All our judgments about the pleasant are <sup>sub</sup> ~~purely~~ subjective. One man may like one colour and another another. One man may prefer the tone of wind

instruments and another the tone of string instruments. It is impossible to quarrel about this and to say that one judgment is true and the other is false. The judgments are entirely private. Everyone has his own taste.

The beautiful stands on an entirely different footing. It would be ridiculous if I said about a poem, <sup>or</sup> a building, ~~etc.~~ that it was beautiful for me. For if they simply please me I ought not to call them beautiful. When I call something beautiful, I do not mean that it merely pleases me, that I take pleasure in it. I expect that others will feel the same about it, and therefore I speak about beauty as if it were a property of the object. I assert that the thing is beautiful and demand of others that they should agree. I blame them, when they judge differently. I say: they have no taste. And the curious fact is that the reason that I expect everyone else to agree <sup>with</sup> to my judgment is not that I have found out by experience what kind of things have been judged to be beautiful. I demand of other persons that they ought to agree with me even if they do not, and even if no one has ever held the same opinion about a particular object as I have. I cannot judge an object to be beautiful without <sup>implying</sup> ~~insinuating~~ that my judgment is universally valid. Regarding the beautiful it cannot be said that everyone has his own taste. For this would be as much as to say: that there is no such thing as taste at all.

It is curious that the difference between our judgments about the pleasant <sup>and our</sup> ~~with the~~ judgments about the beautiful cannot be attributed to the fact that <sup>in</sup> ~~regarding~~ the former different persons do not agree with each other <sup>whereas in</sup> ~~but do regarding~~ the latter. <sup>they do agree.</sup> There actually exists such agreement. It is quite possible to find out what things most people find pleasant, and we may say of a person who knows what most people find pleasant that he has taste.

For instance, someone knows how to entertain his guests. He offers them food which he knows they will like, etc. <sup>It</sup> is customary to say of such a man that he has ~~(a)~~ good taste. There remains, however, an essential difference between such a person and a person who judges things ~~to be~~ beautiful <sup>for</sup> ~~per~~ how does the former know what things will be deemed pleasant by other people? He finds <sup>it</sup> out by empirical observation. He observes other people and discovers that certain things are generally liked, that most people find them ~~very~~ pleasant. He is <sup>not in any</sup> ~~in no~~ way interested in the question as to whether they ought to do so, or ~~ought~~ not. He simply observes and in this way arrives at general rules according to which he makes his choice.

<sup>have to</sup> We distinguish between ~~such~~ general and empirical rules and universal rules. All rules concerning the beautiful are such universal <sup>a priori</sup> rules. They do not <sup>tell us</sup> ~~say~~ what has taken place in most cases but what ought to take place in every case. [We have now discovered that all judgments about beauty claim universality. It remains however to be seen what kind of universality <sup>this</sup> ~~it~~ is. ~~For~~ It is true that our judgments about the good also claim universal validity, <sup>but</sup> ~~and yet~~ they do so supported by definite concepts. We see <sup>that</sup> our judgments about the pleasant do not claim any universal validity at all, <sup>and that</sup> ~~our~~ judgments about the good base their claim to universality upon concepts. Our judgments about the beautiful are made without such objective concepts. We have to answer the question: What special kind of universality is implicit in our judgments about beauty?

### Section 8.

We know already that aesthetic judgments claim merely subjective universality. When we lay them <sup>down</sup> ~~down~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~we do not~~ claim <sup>not</sup> ~~that~~

every ~~good~~ man should hold the same opinion regarding properties of the object but that they should <sup>all</sup> feel the same about it, that they should take the same pleasure in it. At the beginning of this section Kant states that the particular form<sup>s</sup> of universality which is to be met with in a judgment of taste is a significant feature (<sup>Merkmale</sup> ~~Merkmale~~) not for the logician but for the transcendental philosopher. <sup>The discovery of</sup> ~~It is difficult to discover~~ its origin but in return brings to light a property of the <sup>our</sup> ~~our~~ cognitive faculty which otherwise would have remained unknown.

It is easy to see why Kant believes that the particular form of universality <sup>is to be attributed</sup> ~~which belongs~~ to an aesthetic judgment <sup>namely,</sup> subjective universality, is of special interest for the transcendental philosopher. The universality implied in aesthetic judgments is subjective. Before Kant discovered it he held the view that universality is necessarily objective. In the Critique of Pure Reason he has shown that the concepts of the understanding are universally valid. He has pointed out that our understanding produces certain ~~objective~~ <sup>and objective</sup> universally necessary rules. They are necessary because they are the universal conditions of objective <sup>experience</sup> ~~dependence~~. He has also shown that it is the faculty of Judgment which enables us to apply those universal concepts to the manifold of particular intuitions.

In the Critique of Practical Reason it has been proved that the human mind employs also universal practical concepts which are produced by Reason. The difference between universal concepts of the understanding and universal concepts of Reason is that the latter actually produce the particulars which <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ judged to be instances of the universal rule. <sup>As we have seen above</sup> ~~we have seen above that~~ Kant holds that the particular moral action is fully determined by the universal moral concepts. We have also seen that he believes that <sup>there exists a</sup> ~~his~~ power of practical Judgment which enables us

(1) On the meaning of the terms "subjective" and "objective" in Kant. See above.

to refer particular actions to universal practical concepts  
(See above )

It is comparatively easy to understand how theoretical judgments can claim universal validity. For they can rely upon objective concepts, and once the objective validity of these concepts has been established, it can be shown that the judgments which make use of them are universally valid. <sup>We</sup> There <sup>has no</sup> is ~~nothing else to be done~~ than to show that the human ~~will~~ <sup>mind</sup> possesses a faculty of applying universal concepts to particular cases. It has been <sup>proved</sup> ~~shown~~ in the first two Critiques that this is actually the case. We possess a faculty of theoretical <sup>Judgment</sup> ~~object~~ and a faculty of practical Judgment. <sup>The new discovery</sup> ~~Now in the Critique~~ <sup>of the Critique of Judgment is</sup> ~~of Judgment Kant discovers~~ that the human mind can view the relation between particulars and universals in yet another way.

In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant has explained that <sup>there exists an</sup> ~~these events are~~ a priori necessary subjective principle of reflexion. It ~~has been proved that~~ This principle is assumed by the <sup>faculty</sup> ~~facility~~ of Judgment despite the fact that there are no objective concepts which would justify it. The same holds for all reflective judgments, but particularly for aesthetic judgments, which are purely subjective and altogether independent of concepts. The problem which is raised by Kant <sup>with which we are</sup> in the section ~~is without the one~~ here concerned is: How can a purely subjective (aesthetic) judgment lay claim to universal validity? <sup>As</sup> It has already been stated <sup>such</sup> ~~that~~ all our judgments about beauty actually claim <sup>no</sup> universal validity and also that to explain how they can do so is particularly difficult in view of the fact that our aesthetic judgments about the pleasant do in <sup>no</sup> ~~a way~~ involve <sup>such</sup> ~~a~~ claim. It is most curious that it never occurs to us to regard them as ~~anything~~ but purely individual judgments and this, "despite the frequent actual prevalence of a considerable consensus of general opinion even in these judgments." <sup>can</sup> (214).

~~And that~~ The very opposite holds for our judgments about beauty.

Even if everybody else disagrees with ~~my~~ <sup>his</sup> judgment ~~by some~~ <sup>in virtue</sup> of which I call a thing beautiful, I believe that I am right and they are wrong. When I judge a thing to be beautiful I am convinced that ~~everybody~~ <sup>everyone</sup> else ought to do the same. It would never enter into anyone's head to use the expression 'beautiful' if he did not mean ~~by this~~ that everyone else ought to call it beautiful also. It is quite obvious that wherever different individuals disagree about beauty, they never question ~~that the~~ <sup>are</sup> universal principle of their judgments. They take it for granted that ~~there~~ <sup>are</sup> objects which everyone ought to judge to be beautiful, that there is a principle according to which it can be decided whether an object is beautiful or not. They are in disagreement only about the particular case, about whether the object before them actually possesses the universal characteristic, beauty. But that there is such a thing as beauty that some things ought to be judged beautiful and others ought ~~to be judged ugly~~, they do not call in question.

As the universality which is claimed by our judgments about the beautiful is ~~in no way~~ <sup>not in any way</sup> objective, ~~since~~ <sup>and as</sup> in making such judgments we are not at all concerned with properties of the object, but merely demand that the same pleasure or pain ought to be felt by everyone, the universality which is implicit in such judgments may be given a special name, namely, common validity (Gemeinguelteit) "which denotes the validity of the reference of a representation not to the cognitive faculty, but to the feeling of pleasure and pain for every subject." (C. of J. 214)<sub>2</sub>

It is difficult to find an appropriate rendering for the German Gemeinguelteit. Mr. Meredith translates it by "general validity". But this seems to me misleading. For according to Kant "general validity" is the validity which belongs to our empirical judgments. A judgment is said to be generally valid

when it holds in most cases or in all cases which have <sup>so far</sup> been ~~so~~ observed. The claim which is made by our aesthetic judgments ~~on the other hand~~ is of an entirely different kind. The only difference between the universality which is implied in our logical judgments and the universality implied in our aesthetic judgments is ~~in~~ that the former refers to the object, the latter to the subject and his feelings. Since our aesthetic judgments demand that every subject ~~universally~~ ought to take the same pleasure in the object, the validity claimed by such judgments is quite different from the validity which we assign to our empirical judgments (general validity). <sup>however, does not</sup> The whole question seems to me however not of much importance. For Kant goes on to distinguish between <sup>the</sup> objective universal validity which belongs to our logical judgments and subjective universal validity which belongs to our aesthetic judgments. This is much clearer, <sup>as</sup> for the terms used indicate at once that both judgments claim universal validity, with the difference that logical judgments claim that everyone ought to ascribe the same properties to the object, <sup>whereas</sup> aesthetic judgments claim that everyone ought to take the same pleasure in the objects.

Kant goes on to explain that objective universal validity includes subjective universal validity, but that subjective universal validity does not necessarily include objective universal validity. <sup>His</sup> Kant's own explanation of this distinction is somewhat obscure but I think it is comparatively <sup>easy</sup> simple to see what he means. A logical judgment which is based upon objective concepts the truth of which can be established is valid for all judging subjects. <sup>must</sup> They all have to make the same judgment. An aesthetic judgment, which is not concerned with the object at all, can of course not claim objective validity. Its objective truth cannot be established. As Kant puts it, aesthetic universality does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of an object

taken in its entire logical sphere. And yet <sup>it</sup> extends this predicate over the whole sphere of judging subjects.

Aesthetic judgments are interested in their object in a very limited sense. They are concerned with nothing but the judging subjects and their feelings about the object. It follows that subjective universal validity (validity for all judging <sup>subjects</sup> objects) does not include objective universal validity, whereas the objective universal validity of logical judgments includes subjective universal validity.

Kant then explains that all judgments of taste as regards their logical quantity are singular judgments. A judgment of taste is concerned with nothing but the <sup>individual</sup> "singular" object which is judged. A logical judgment compares a given object with other objects and determines their relation by means of concepts. In order to judge an object aesthetically we must represent it immediately to our feeling of pleasure or pain, without using universal concepts. It is of course possible to make a logical judgment out of several aesthetic judgments which are compared with each other. For instance we may judge <sup>that roses</sup> ~~Roses~~ are beautiful because every time we have seen a rose we have found it beautiful. It is however obvious that this is no longer an aesthetic judgment but a logical judgment which is derived from aesthetic judgments which we have previously made. The universality which that aesthetic judgment possesses is not a logical but an aesthetic quantity." <sup>As</sup> For every aesthetic judgment is concerned with an <sup>individual</sup> singular object, and the universality which it claims is <sup>valid</sup> validity for everyone who judges the same object. An aesthetic judgment does not compare the object with other objects, <sup>as</sup> like the universal logical judgments. <sup>do</sup> It does not claim objective universality but merely subjective validity. It demands that every other subject

ought to take the same pleasure in the representation of this particular object.

From the fact that judgments of taste are entirely independent of objective concepts, it follows that there cannot be any rule according to which anyone can be compelled to recognise a particular object as beautiful. We cannot call a thing beautiful unless we take pleasure in it just as if our judgment depended on sensation. No one can convince us that an object is beautiful which we do not feel to be so. And yet we believe every time we are <sup>judge</sup> judging an object to be beautiful that we <sup>make</sup> are a judgment with which everyone else ~~speaking with a universal voice~~ ought to agree.

<sup>Here</sup> "There now, we may <sup>perceive</sup> that nothing is postulated in the judgment of taste but such a universal voice in respect of delight that it is not mediated by concepts; consequently only the possibility of an aesthetic judgment capable of being at the same time deemed valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not <sup>postulate</sup> the agreement of everyone (for it is only competent for a logically universal judgment to do this, in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes <sup>(sunt an)</sup> this agreement to everyone as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks for confirmation, not from concepts but from the concurrence of others. The universal voice is, therefore, only an Idea - resting upon grounds the investigation of which is here postponed." (C. of J., 216)

The last sentence explains why so far it is <sup>harder</sup> difficult to understand Kant's argument. But I think his general idea is clear already. He holds that every judgment of taste refers to an ideal rule. However uncertain it may be whether a particular judgment is in fact in conformity with the ideal rule, the person who calls a thing beautiful refers to <sup>this rule</sup> it. If he did not, he could

not call a thing beautiful at all. Every judgment of taste must claim subjective universal validity. For the person who makes it believes that he has <sup>before</sup> him an instance of a rule which everyone who judges aesthetically recognises as valid for himself.

### Section 9.

The problem which is discussed in this section is: Does In a judgment of taste <sup>does</sup> the feeling of pleasure follow or precede the estimating (Bourteilung) of the object?

Before dealing with Kant's argument in detail, I <sup>must</sup> ~~have to~~ explain the term "universal communicability", which Kant uses in this section. Kant holds that our judgments of taste rest upon the assumption that a state of mind which accompanies a representation can be universally communicated. It is rather unfortunate that the German expressions "Mittelbarkeit" (communicability) and "Mitteilungsfaehigkeit" (capacity for being communicated) rather suggest that one individual should be capable of letting another know precisely what his state of mind is. In the case of a judgment of taste this would mean that the pleasure which is felt, or the state of mind of which this pleasure is an expression, could be accurately described so as to enable one person to explain to another person the precise nature of his feelings and the conditions on which they rest. But Kant does not really mean this. All he means <sup>is</sup> that the feelings of the two persons are identical in character. In spite of this it remains impossible to describe them accurately. For ~~for~~ this, objective concepts would be required, and, as we know already, judgments of taste cannot be determined by objective concepts. We cannot describe

the state of mind which brings them about <sup>in</sup> as terms of objective concepts. Only if we could do this (we could) impart to another person <sup>the reason</sup> why we take pleasure in the object, and why he ought to do the same; just as in the case of a logical judgment we can state why we attribute certain objective properties to the object, and why everyone else ought to do the same.

I will now begin ~~with~~ my exposition of Kant's argument. If we asserted that the pleasure which we take in the object preceded our judging of it, and <sup>you direct</sup> ~~was~~ attributed universal communicability to our judgment, such an assertion would be absurd and self-contradictory. For in that case the pleasure would be precisely the same as the pleasure which we take in the pleasant. Now it has been stated already that the pleasure in the pleasant is strictly individual and private. The relation between the object which we judge to be pleasant and ourselves is the relation between a particular object and a particular person. Whether the particular person <sup>does or does not feel</sup> ~~feels~~ pleasure ~~or does not~~ <sup>depends</sup> entirely on his individual nature. Our pleasure in the pleasant is entirely <sup>we</sup> ~~passive~~ <sup>passive</sup>. We either feel it or <sup>we</sup> ~~do not feel it~~, and it would be ridiculous to demand of another person that he ought to feel the same pleasure. The feeling of pleasantness is produced by the object itself as it is given to a particular person, and <sup>our</sup> ~~that we~~ <sup>went that</sup> judge <sup>one</sup> certain objects ~~to be~~ pleasant is nothing but the result of the pleasure which we feel. It is entirely dependent on it, and it is impossible to demand of others that they should agree with us.

From this it follows that what can be considered universally communicable and universally valid in a judgment of taste cannot be the pleasure which is felt but the specific state of mind of which the pleasure is merely a consequence. It is at least not

become

absurd to say: In representing this object to myself I ~~become~~<sup>become</sup> aware of a specific state of mind. This gives me pleasure. Everyone else in representing the object to themselves will find themselves in the same state of mind, and consequently will feel the same pleasure. The pleasure which I feel is universally communicable because the state of mind which produces it is universally communicable.

But here <sup>there</sup> arises a difficulty. No state of mind can be considered to be universally communicable except such as has some reference to knowledge. It is clear why an objective cognition is universally communicable, i.e., why it can be imparted <sup>by</sup> from one person to others. (straight on)

~~It is easy to see why this must be so.~~ The human mind possesses two sources of cognition, namely, the imagination which enables it to apprehend a manifold of given intuitions, and the understanding which enables it to determine this manifold by means of concepts. <sup>As</sup> So far as our logical judgments are concerned, our faculties of cognition stand <sup>in</sup> in a definite objective relation, and it is clear that the state of mind in which different persons <sup>the same</sup> make such judgments will be identical. The reason is that the relation of their cognitive faculties is a determinate one.

The difficulty regarding the judgments of taste is that since they are entirely subjective and are independent of any concepts the judging subject itself cannot know what the state of mind <sup>is</sup> it which makes him judge an object to be beautiful. And yet there must be some reference to cognition, <sup>for</sup> otherwise no universal validity could be claimed for the judgment at all. "Nothing, however, is capable of being universally communicated but cognition, and representation so far as appurtenant to cognition

For it is only as <sup>thus</sup> ~~they~~ appurtenant that the representation is objective, and it is this <sup>alone</sup> ~~along~~ that gives it a universal point of reference with which the power of representation of everyone is obliged to harmonise. If, then, the determining ground of the judgment as to this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, that is to say, is to be <sup>concerned</sup> ~~concerned~~ independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer to a given representation <sup>to</sup> ~~of~~ cognition in general." (C.of J. 217)n

I will try to explain this. We have often seen that it is Kantian doctrine that every objective cognition is due to two subjective sources, two powers of the mind, namely, imagination which apprehends the manifold of intuitions, i.e., brings them together, and (b) understanding which unites them by means of concepts. Now Kant believes that this cannot apply to our judgments of taste owing to the fact that they are independent of concepts, and it is only concepts <sup>which</sup> ~~make it enable us~~ to be certain of the fact that a manifold of given intuitions which we apprehend is subject to determinate rules, which <sup>unite them</sup> ~~unite them~~. Now Kant's argument concerning our judgments ~~of about~~ beauty is that when we judge an object to be beautiful, we do so on the ground that the manifold of intuitions given to us is not a disorderly manifold, that there is some principle of order implicit in it which unites the parts of the manifold. We do not know why this is the case. We merely feel that there is some kind of regularity present in our object. In becoming aware of this we feel that the faculty of mere apprehension, the faculty by means of which we collect intuitions without being concerned

about whether they are in any way related to each other, namely imagination, harmonises in some indefinite manner with the understanding.

Why do we refer our representation to the understanding? The answer is that in representing the object to ourselves we become aware of the fact that the manifold before us is not a mere manifold, <sup>but</sup> that it is determined by some kind of rule. What this rule is we do not know. Neither are we concerned about it. The knowing subject to be enabled to acquire objective knowledge, depends upon two "subjective conditions", namely, imagination and understanding. When it makes a logical judgment <sup>these</sup> ~~these~~ cognitive powers are restricted to a particular rule of the understanding. When it makes an aesthetic judgment it merely feels that they are in some such indefinite relation, that they harmonise with each other. <sup>Since</sup> But ~~mere~~ in representing the object to ourselves we do not ever aim at having knowledge of it, we can become aware of nothing more than that in representing ~~the object~~ <sup>it</sup> to ourselves we find the powers of cognition in some indeterminable harmony with each other. Now, that the faculties of cognition should harmonise with each other is also the condition of objective knowledge. The <sup>subject</sup> ~~object~~ can have no knowledge of an object at all unless <sup>he</sup> ~~it~~ relates his imagination and his understanding to each other. Objective knowledge however depends also on definite rules of the understanding, <sup>whereas in order</sup> ~~For it is only~~ to be enabled to judge an object to be beautiful there is required <sup>nothing</sup> more than "the feeling of the free play" of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general." (C. of J., 217)✓

Kant argues that since every determinate cognition rests

upon a certain relation between the imagination and the understanding as its subjective condition, it can and in fact must be presupposed that their indefinite and merely subjective relation is ~~the~~ (free play), is universally valid and communicable, i.e., that different subjects in representing the same object to themselves will be in exactly the same state of mind, that they will all become conscious of ~~the~~ harmonious relation between their powers of cognition.

"As the subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgment of taste is to subsist apart from the presupposition of any definite concept, it can be nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding (so far as these are in mutual accord, as is requisite for cognition in general): for we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for a cognition in general must be just as valid for every one, and consequently as universally communicable, as is any determinate cognition, which always rests upon that relation as its subjective condition." (C. of J., <sup>217,</sup> 218).

"A representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations, and, being such, yet accords with the conditions of the universality that is the general concern of understanding, is one that brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for every one who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e. for every man)." (C. of J., 219).

It will be appreciated that the section with which we are here concerned is full of difficulties. But I think it is

clear what Kant's general idea is.

The main question raised in this section is: Does our pleasure in the beautiful precede our judging it or does it follow it, i.e., do we judge an object to be beautiful merely because it gives us pleasure? Kant is convinced that the latter is impossible on the ground that if our judgment were based upon merely <sup>subjective</sup> objective pleasure we could not ascribe to it any universal validity. In a judgment which claims universal validity ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> pleasure the judgment ~~about the object~~ <sup>This pleasure</sup> must precede the pleasure which is felt. ~~It~~ must be a mere consequence of something else, of some kind of knowledge. Kant explains that this is actually the case, <sup>and that this</sup> ~~This~~ is why we can attribute subjective universal validity to the judgment. ~~For we~~ are entitled to presuppose that every other judging subject will in representing the object to itself become aware of the harmony of its cognitive faculties, and as a result of this <sup>will</sup> feel the specific kind of pleasure which is connected with this.

"Now this purely subjective (aesthetic) estimating of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Again, the above-described universality of the subjective conditions of estimating objects forms the sole foundation of this universal subjective validity of the delight which we connect with the representation of the object that we call beautiful." (C. of J.. 218)<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) I have neglected the last part of the section, in which Kant shows that the subjective relation between the imagination and the understanding can make itself known ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> other way than by sensation. For I have dealt with this argument on several occasions. (See above, .)

*only in sensation*

Section 10.

At the beginning of this section Kant gives a definition of "purpose" and "purposiveness". What it has to do with the other problem of the aesthetic judgments remains to be seen. In the first place we have to understand the definition. It runs as follows.

"As purpose is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object is purposiveness (forma finalis)."  
(C. of J.. 220).

Kant himself says about this definition that it <sup>is given</sup> gives in transcendental terms without reference to anything empirical and it is clear that this accounts for its being formulated in <sup>such an</sup> ~~the most~~ abstract manner.

I will try to illustrate it by means of an example. Let us take a judgment of the kind: The purpose of the ear is hearing. What do we mean when we make such a judgment? We mean that the object (<sup>the</sup> ear) would not exist but for the function which it fulfils. This function is not an object of sense. It is a content of thought, a concept. We assume that the object would not exist without this concept. The concept is its real ground. The causality of a concept in respect of its object is called "purposiveness". This again may be illustrated by an example. We do not merely assume that the object could not be known by us without deriving it from a concept, but also that the object would not exist but for the purpose it serves. We ascribe <sup>causality</sup> to the concept <sup>the</sup> (purpose, <sup>viz.</sup> hearing) ~~a causality~~. The concept has brought the object into being. The object is a mere effect which owes its exis-

tence to its purpose. The object would not exist at all or at least it would not have the same form as it has but for the concept which is to be regarded as its real ground.

"Where, then, not the cognition of an object merely, but the object itself (its form or real existence) as an effect, is thought to be possible only through a concept of it, there we imagine (denkt man sich) a purpose. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause and takes the load of it." (C. of J., 220)<sup>7</sup>

This is again difficult. I think what Kant means is that when we say of an object that it is a purpose we presuppose that the being which brought into existence would not ~~have begun to, <sup>begin to act</sup> ~~act~~ <sup>would not have produced it</sup> ~~it would not have~~ have produced it~~, if it had not desired to produce the effect. The cause is determined in its action by the representation of the desired effect. The causal relation which is assumed is quite different from the principle of mechanical causation. For if we regard something as the mechanical cause of a given effect we do in fact presuppose that the effect is determined by the cause. But we ~~do~~ in no way assume that the cause is ~~in any way~~ dependent on the effect. The effect is a mere product of one or more mechanical causes, but these causes are quite independent of the effect which is produced by them.

This is made clear by Kant in a later passage of the Critique of Judgment, namely in Section 65, and I will give an account of the argument set forth at the beginning of that section. Kant begins by explaining the nature of mechanical causality. <sup>To</sup> ~~I may~~ <sup>his</sup> quote ~~Kant's~~ own words.

"In so far as the causal connection is thought merely by means of understanding it is a hexus constituting a

series, namely, of causes and effects, that is invariably progressive. The things that as effects presuppose others as their causes cannot themselves in turn be also causes of the latter. This causal <sup>hexus</sup> is termed that of efficient causes (<sup>hexus</sup> ~~nexus~~ effectivus)." (C. of J., 372)

Kant goes on to explain the nature of a fundamentally different kind of causal connexion (<sup>hexus</sup> ~~nexus~~ finalis). The faculty of the mind which enables us to conceive the Idea of such a connexion is not the understanding but Reason. In assuming this principle we presuppose that causes and effects are mutually dependent on one another. For we assume (a) that the cause produces the effect, and (b) that the cause is dependent on the effect in so far as it would not have been caused to operate at all unless <sup>there had been a desire</sup> it had desired to bring about the effect. Kant illustrates this by an example. He says that as regards things which are produced by human beings it is easy to find examples of the <sup>hexus</sup> ~~nexus~~ finalis. For instance a man builds a house for the purpose of receiving rent. In <sup>such a</sup> that case it is clear that the house is the cause of his receiving rent, and yet conversely the rent is the cause of the house, for the man would not have built the house at all if he had not <sup>desired</sup> expected to receive rent from it.

"Thus a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the building of the house." (C. of J., 372)

We may return to Section 10. We understand now why Kant believes that a purpose is <sup>the object of</sup> a concept and that purposiveness is a causal relation in which cause and effect are mutually dependent on one another in such a way that the representation of the effect is the determining ground of its cause. He simply means that when we judge an object to be a

purpose this implies that what has produced it, whether it is a human being or nature, itself, has before producing it conceived the Idea of what the object was to be, what purpose it was to serve. The ~~will of the~~ cause is determined by the representation of the effect. The concept of the object exists before the object itself exists.

It ~~has to be~~ <sup>must</sup> noted that in ~~one~~ <sup>our</sup> Section Kant is concerned with a definition of purpose and purposiveness, and ~~nothing~~ <sup>with</sup> else. The problem <sup>entitled</sup> whether we are ~~able~~ <sup>entitled</sup> to ascribe to nature objective purposiveness, i.e., whether we are entitled to ascribe to it a causality according to purposes does not arise here. This is a concern of the Critique of Teleological Judgment.

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is interested in a different kind of purposiveness. Kant explains that there is yet another way of regarding something as a purposive. We may mean ~~by this~~ that an object, a state of mind, or even an action, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose is to be called "purposive" because we cannot explain <sup>its possibility</sup> ~~them~~ to ourselves without assuming <sup>as it is given</sup> ~~the~~ the idea of a causality according to purposes and referring our own representation to a will from which we derive this causality.

The special kind of purposiveness of which Kant is thinking here is merely subjective. He holds that in assuming it we are interested in nothing but the mere form of our object and its relation to our faculty of representing it to ourselves. When we judge an object to be purposive in <sup>this</sup> ~~that~~ sense we do not assume that the object itself is a purpose of nature.

"Purposiveness, therefore, may exist apart from a purpose,

in so far as we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, but yet are able to render the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will." (C. of J., 220).

What this means will be made clearer in the next section.

### Section 11.

That our judgments about the beautiful are quite independent of any idea of a purpose may be seen from the fact that as has been explained, they are judgments which are independent of any interest in the existence of the object which is judged. We have seen that it is a specific kind of delight which is taken in the object which makes us lay down judgments of taste, without being interested in the existence of an object at all, without even raising the question as to whether it ought to exist or ~~ought~~<sup>we</sup> not to take pleasure in it. It is the mere contemplating of it which gives us pleasure. From this it follows that our judgment must be quite independent of any idea of what purpose the object serves, ~~for~~ a judgment which depends on the representation of a purpose of the object which is judged is not a disinterested judgment. When we take delight in an object on the ground that it realises some purpose which we ascribe to it, we are naturally in judging the object interested in the question as to whether the object which is judged actually realises this purpose. The object pleases us because it serves a purpose of which we approve. This applies to all our judgments about the pleasant. We take pleasure in the

object which we judge to be pleasant because it fulfils our own subjective purpose, namely, enjoyment. Judgments of taste, on the other hand, do not take any account of such subjective purposes. They are also independent of any representation of an objective purpose. <sup>In this they are unlike our</sup> ~~Our~~ judgments about the good <sup>which</sup> depend on the representation of such an objective purpose, namely, the good itself. We take pleasure in the good because <sup>its</sup> realisation lies in the interest of every rational being. We judge an action to be good on the ground that it realises this objective purpose of which we approve.

Judgments of taste are entirely different from our judgments about the pleasant or the good. They are contemplative judgments. We call objects beautiful because their representation makes us conscious of a harmony of our faculties of representation. We cannot explain to ourselves why they <sup>this</sup> do. We can merely feel it. We cannot ascribe it to the object. We cannot say the object as such serves a purpose simply because we are not concerned with the object at all, but with our own feelings. The idea of a purpose cannot be the determining ground of a judgment of taste. In what <sup>then</sup> sense <sup>now</sup> can we speak of purposiveness at all. Only in so far as the object makes us feel the harmony of our faculties of representation. The object as such serves no purpose at all? We can judge it to be purposive only in relation to our own minds. The idea of purposiveness which lies at the basis of our judgments of taste is the idea of a purely subjective and formal purposiveness which is in no way dependent on any definite concept.

"We are thus left with the subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object, exclusive of any purpose (objective or subjective) - consequently the bare form of purposiveness in the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it - as that which alone is capable of constituting the delight which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally communicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgment of taste." (C. of J. 221).

Kant's general idea is quite clear. Aesthetic purposiveness is independent of any concept of a purpose. ~~For~~ In representing an object to ourselves and calling it beautiful we are concerned <sup>only</sup> with ~~nothing but~~ our own representation. ~~we~~ <sup>what we</sup> ~~do not~~ judge the object to be purposive <sup>is not the object rather the</sup> but our own representation whereby ~~it~~ <sup>the object</sup> is given to us. Our way of representing the object to ourselves, and not the object irrespective of how it is given to us, makes us feel the pleasure in the harmony of our faculties of representation. This is a subjective purposiveness <sup>of</sup> ~~in~~ the representation <sup>apart from</sup> ~~exclusive of~~ any purpose.

It may seem difficult to understand why Kant calls this purposiveness at all and why he <sup>said</sup> ~~says~~ in the preceding section that we can make the purposiveness which is apart from a purpose intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. I think this follows from the argument which is set forth in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. There Kant has explained that <sup>all</sup> our reflective judgments are based upon the Idea of "purposiveness", and also that in conceiving this Idea we attribute to nature a special principle, the principle of technique. There exist two Ideas of merely formal purposiveness, namely logical purposiveness, and aesthetic purposiveness. Both are merely subjective. In ascribing to nature logical purposiveness we do not judge that it pursues any purposes of her own. Nature is purposive only in relation to the mind. We cannot assume that nature is a system according to particular laws without assuming at the same time that nature has produced this system for <sup>our</sup> ~~her own~~ benefit. In bringing about such a system nature does not pursue any purposes of ~~her own~~ <sup>its</sup>. It is "purposive" only from our own point of view. Kant has

also shown in the Introduction that the human mind possesses a principle of aesthetic reflection. This principle <sup>also</sup> is merely subjective. The human mind is capable of <sup>tracing about</sup> a harmonious relation of its faculties of representation and ~~calls~~ <sup>it calls</sup> objects the representation of which makes it conscious of this <sup>beautiful</sup>. Now <sup>^</sup> Nature actually presents us with such objects, <sup>and we</sup> and we cannot explain them to ourselves without assuming that nature in producing them has taken account of our subjective principle of aesthetic reflection. We do not ascribe to ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> any objective purposes. Kant ~~calls the Idea which is assumed the Idea of a "Formal Technique of Nature".~~ He distinguishes in Section II of the Introduction between formal ~~Technique of nature~~ which according to him is the purposiveness of nature in intuition and "Real Technique of Nature" its purposiveness according to concepts. He also explains there ~~that the former provides judgments with purposive, i.e. such forms as make the faculty of Judgment when it represents them to itself become aware of a harmony of the imagination and the understanding.~~ ~~It~~ <sup>I think this</sup> explains why Kant believes that our judgments about the beautiful rest upon the Idea of subjective purposiveness and why he holds that in applying this Idea we must <sup>refer to</sup> ~~derive it from~~ a will. There remains however one difficulty. There are two classes of objects which we judge to be beautiful, namely, products of nature and products of art. As regards the latter, it is easy to see how Kant can believe that in judging them and finding them beautiful, we <sup>must</sup> ~~then~~ refer to a will which has brought about this purposiveness. The will to which we refer is the will of the artist who has produced the work of art purposely. It is obvious that an artist when he creates a work of art does so for an express purpose. He desires to produce a work which

he himself and others will find beautiful. The difficulty is to understand how Kant can hold that works of art can be judged by us without any reference to a purpose. To understand this fully we <sup>must</sup> ~~have to~~ wait until we can <sup>deal</sup> ~~concern~~ ourselves with Kant's theory of artistic production. <sup>As we</sup> ~~We~~ shall see then <sup>Kant believes</sup> (a) that ~~Kant~~ ~~believes~~ that the artist produces a work of art for no other purpose than to make it beautiful, ~~that he further~~ <sup>(b)</sup> ~~believes~~ that the purpose which the artist pursues is fundamentally different from an objective purpose. ~~Moreover we~~ <sup>(c)</sup> ~~shall be told~~ that the artist since he cannot make use of any determinate concept, does not know himself what he is doing <sup>and</sup> ~~we~~ cannot explain to himself how he succeeds in giving beauty to his work which is the only purpose which he has in mind. <sup>(d) Kant</sup> ~~that~~ this "purpose" expresses itself <sup>nothing but the</sup> in a harmonious relation of the faculties of representation both in the soul of the artist who creates beautiful things and in the souls of those who judge them to be beautiful. The product of art is exclusive of any other purpose. The purposiveness contained in it is merely subjective. It is "the bare form of purposiveness, <sup>in</sup> ~~on~~ the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it." (C. of J.. 221.)

### Section 12.

We have seen again and again (a) that our judgments of taste claim universal and a priori validity, and (b) that they depend entirely on the pleasure which is felt by the judging subject. This raises a serious difficulty. For it must seem quite impossible to determine a priori <sup>connection between</sup> the ~~conversion~~ of a feeling of pleasure or pain as an effect and a representation

as its cause. Whether the representation of an object <sup>does or</sup> gives ~~it does not give us any pleasure~~ ~~us pleasure or does not~~ we can find out only by means of empirical observation. This is clear in the case of sensuous pleasure, i.e. the pleasure which we take in an object which is judged to be pleasant. It is manifest that it is quite impossible to determine a priori what the objects are the representation of which will give us this pleasure. The objects must be first given <sup>in</sup> an experience and not until then ~~we can~~ know anything as to the causal relation between our representation of the object and the pleasure which is produced by it.

It is true that the general principle which we have just stated, namely, that a priori knowledge of a causal connexion between a representation and a feeling is impossible admits of one exception. It has been shown in the Critique of Practical Reason that there is a necessary a priori connexion between our consciousness of the moral law and a feeling, namely, the feeling of respect for this law. But this does not really help us in our present difficulty. For <sup>the possibility of</sup> ~~that it was not~~ ~~possible to establish~~ a necessary connexion between the supersensible law and a sensuous feeling was due to the fact that we were able to transcend the world of sense and "call in aid a causality resting on a supersensible attribute of the subject, namely that of freedom." Besides, we did not actually deduce the feeling of respect from the law as the effect produced by it. Only the determination of the will was derived from the moral law and we showed that the feeling of respect for the <sup>was in fact</sup> ~~moral law~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~is identical with this~~ determination of the will. It is nothing else than the determination of the will itself in so far as it makes itself felt. "But the mental state

present in the determination of the will by any means is at once in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it, and so does not issue from it as an effect." (C. of J., 222.) (1)

Kant goes on to point out that something similar takes place in the case with which he is here concerned. Subjective or formal purposiveness, the harmony of the faculties of representation etc. do not produce the pleasure. There is no causal connexion between the representation of the object and the feeling of subjective pleasure. The consciousness of formal purposiveness and the pleasure which we take in it are identical. The consciousness of the formal purposiveness expresses itself in the <sup>sub</sup>jective feeling.

It is important to distinguish clearly between this kind of pleasure and any other kind of pleasure. It is in no way practical and quite different from the pleasure which we take in either the pleasant or the <sup>good</sup> grand. Our pleasure in the pleasant is practical, for it makes us desire the object in which we take pleasure. The feeling of respect for the moral law is of course also practical for it is an impulse (Triebfeder) which makes us obey the law. It fills us with a desire to do moral actions, to realise the good. Our pleasure in the beautiful, on the other hand, is contemplative and disinterested. In feeling it we are concerned with nothing but our own state of mind. And yet there belongs a certain causality to this pleasure in so far as it makes us feel a desire to preserve it. "But still it involves an inherent causality, that, namely, of preserving a continuance of the state of the representation itself and the active engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim. We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself." (C. of J., 222.) (2)

(1) About this theory, see above.

(2) Cf. Metaphysics of Morals, Introd. I. "The pleasure which is necessarily bound up with the desire of the object whose representation affects feeling may be called practical pleasure whether it be cause or effect of the desire. On the contrary the pleasure which is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the object and which, therefore, is at bottom

Footnote continued) not a pleasure in the existence of the object of the representation only, may be called mere contemplative pleasure or satisfaction. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we call taste."

### Section 18.

The question discussed by Kant in this Section is: What special kind of necessity <sup>may be ascribed</sup> ~~appertains~~ to the judgments of taste? His argument may be paraphrased as follows.

We have seen that our judgments of taste are judgments which are concerned with the connexion between a representation of an object and a delight which is felt by the subject that represents it to itself. This holds also for our judgments about the pleasant. We judged an object to be pleasant on the ground that its representation excites pleasure in the subject which represents the object to itself. Now It is, <sup>however</sup>, important to note that in making such a judgment we do in no way assert that the connexion between the representation and the feeling ~~is~~ a priori necessary. We do not even suppose that there is any such necessary connexion. Our judgments about the pleasant are merely empirical judgments independent of any a priori principle. Our judgments of taste are of an entirely different kind. In judging a thing beautiful we assume that there is a necessary connexion between our representation of it and the pleasure which is felt by us. What follows from this? What special kind of necessity is claimed by our judgments of taste? If we could determine the connexion between representation and the subjective feeling by means of a priori concepts this would enable us to know a priori ~~that and~~ why the pleasure which we feel will be felt by everyone else.

The necessity which would belong to the judgment would be the same as that which belongs to our theoretical a priori judgments. <sup>It is never to be seen that no</sup> ~~How~~ such a necessity <sup>could</sup> ~~cannot~~ be ascribed to judgments of taste, simply because they are not based upon objective concepts. It is equally easy to show that the necessity claimed by judgments of taste must be fundamentally <sup>that</sup> from ~~one~~ which is claimed by our practical judgments (practical necessity). In every practical judgment <sup>it</sup> ~~there~~ is implied that there is a necessary connexion between the representation of the moral law and a special kind of delight, namely the feeling of respect for the moral law. But we have already seen that this feeling of respect is nothing but the immediate consequence of our consciousness of the moral law. A will that represents to itself the moral law must necessarily feel respect for it. The feeling is the subjective awareness of the objective law.

We have <sup>also</sup> seen that it is the will of the agent which is determined by the moral law, and that the feeling of respect is in fact identical with this determination of the will. A person who feels that he ought to act morally, and that his will ought to <sup>make</sup> ~~make~~ itself dependent on <sup>the moral law</sup> ~~it~~, must necessarily feel respect for the moral law. "This delight is the necessary consequence of an objective law, and simply means that one ought absolutely (without ulterior object) to act in a certain way." (C. of J., 237.) (1)

The necessity implied in our theoretical and practical judgments is objective. The necessity which belongs to our aesthetic judgments must have a fundamentally different character. For we have to remember that all our judgments of taste are singular judgments, i.e., that they are concerned with <sup>an</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>individual</sup> ~~particular~~ object. Our theoretical and practical judgments

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<sup>on</sup>  
(1) ~~About~~ this doctrine, see above.

derive their necessary validity from universal objective rules. In order to be able to make a theoretical or practical judgment we must subsume a particular case under a universal rule. The universal objective rule is given by the understanding and the subsumption is brought about by our faculty of Judgment. In the case of a theoretical judgment it is our faculty of theoretical Judgment which subsumes the particular case under concepts of the understanding. In the case of a practical judgment it is our faculty of practical Judgment which subsumes a given case under concepts of Reason.  
(1)

Our judgments of taste cannot rely upon objective universal rules. In judging a particular object beautiful we refer our representation of it to a universal rule which we are incapable of determining. ~~The universal rule to which we refer is an indeterminate rule.~~ We judge an object beautiful because we regard it as an instance of this indeterminate and indeterminable rule.

It follows that the necessity which belongs to our aesthetic <sup>judgments</sup> cannot be apodeictic (objective necessity). It may be termed "exemplary necessity", <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ we call a thing beautiful on the ground that we regard it as an instance of a rule which we consider necessary. We demand every <sup>one</sup> ~~body~~ else's assent to our judgment about a particular object because the object seems to us to exemplify a universal rule incapable of formulation. We assume that our judgment is necessary and that every other <sup>sub</sup> ~~object~~ ought to agree to it because it refers to a rule which we must necessarily assume.

It is important to note that even this merely subjective necessity cannot be derived from experience, i.e., from obser-

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(1) <sup>on</sup> About this, see above.

vation of the agreement of judgments. For empirical judgments cannot lay claim to any universality or necessity at all. Empirical observation can never show more than what takes place in most cases. Empirical rules are general and not universal and necessary rules (See above ).

But Although we have to distinguish clearly between the apodeictic objective necessity and universality characteristic of our theoretical and practical judgments and the mere subjective exemplary necessity and universality of our judgments of taste we must not confuse aesthetic judgments with empirical judgments. ~~For the latter have no right to claim any universal validity or necessity at all;~~

#### Section 19.

When we call a thing beautiful we ~~simply~~ imply that everyone else ought to agree with us, i.e., that everyone else ought to call it beautiful. We assume that it is subjectively necessary for everyone else to assent to our judgment, and if they do not, we say that they ought to. It is however necessary to distinguish between the "ought" implicit in a judgment of taste and the "ought" which belongs to our practical judgments, for whereas practical judgments can rely upon definite objective concepts, the objective validity of which can be established, and our faculty of practical judgment has to do nothing but subsume the particular case under the determinate universal rules, <sup>our</sup> ~~our~~ judgment of taste cannot refer to a determinate rule. The "ought" in aesthetic judgments is pronounced conditionally. ~~For~~ Since we have no objective knowledge of the rule to which we refer, we can

never be certain as <sup>that</sup> ~~to whether~~ the given case actually is an instance of the indeterminate rule. The universal subjective necessity claimed by aesthetic judgments depends on a condition, the condition, namely, that the particular case actually is an instance of the rule. The "ought" is conditional in so far as we can never be certain as <sup>that</sup> ~~to whether~~ we have subsumed a particular case correctly. On the other hand it is quite certain that we should be entitled to count on this agreement provided we were assured of the correctness of the subsumption. ~~For~~ The rule must be held to be universally valid and necessary.

#### Section 20.

If our judgments of taste were based upon an objective a priori principle, they could claim unconditional necessity. If they were devoid of any a priori principle (like all our judgments about the pleasant), they could claim no necessity at all.

Now we have seen that our judgments of taste are based upon a subjective a priori principle. In making them we assume that it is possible to determine independently of any concepts, by means of mere feeling, that the representation of certain objects must necessarily create pleasure in every subject which judges them. It is implied in such a pre-supposition that there exists a specific subjective state of mind common to all judging subjects. Kant calls this assumed state of mind, "common sense." What he understands by it will be seen from the following passage.

"The judgment of taste, therefore, depends on our pre-supposing the existence of a common sense. (But this is not

174.  
to be taken to mean some external sense but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition.) Only under the presupposition, I repeat, of such a common sense, are we able to lay down a judgment of taste." (C. of J., 258)

Section 21.

*Kant's*

~~The question with which Kant concerns himself in this~~  
Section is: Have we <sup>any</sup> reason for presupposing a common sense? His answer is in the affirmative. I will try to explain his argument.

In the first place it is important to note that Kant does not set out here to prove that a "common sense" actually exists. It is clear <sup>that</sup> according to transcendental principles that an objective proof of its existence is impossible. For in order to prove its existence the relation between the imagination and the understanding would have to be a determinate one. ~~we can prove the objective validity of a~~  
~~It is not a determinate relation we have of imagination and understanding, i.e. such a relation is determined by objective concepts of the understanding, whose objective validity of necessity can be established, which can be proved.~~  
We can for instance prove that certain logical judgments are objectively necessary because it can be shown that in order to have experience of objects we must bring our imagination which apprehends the given intuition, into a definite relation to <sup>our</sup> the understanding. We must determine the manifold by means of definite concepts of the understanding. Transcendental philosophy can prove that a determinate relation between imagination and understanding is a necessary condition of objective experience. But it cannot prove that <sup>an</sup> indeterminate relations between the two faculties (harmony of the cogni-

tive faculties) actually exists. It can only ask: Have we according to transcendental principles reasons to assume that it might exist?

We have learnt that aesthetic judgments are based upon the assumption that the consciousness of the harmony of the cognitive faculties is the same in all subjects, <sup>and</sup> that therefore one subject when it becomes aware of it is entitled to presuppose that every other subject <sup>will</sup> necessarily become conscious of it also and take the same pleasure in the object.

~~We see~~ Judgments of taste rest upon the assumption of a common sense. The question to be answered is: Is such an assumption in keeping with the fundamental principles of transcendental philosophy? <sup>If we are to be able</sup> ~~To be enabled~~ to answer this question we have to

take note of the fact that all our objective logical judgments rest upon a determinate relation <sup>between</sup> of the faculties of cognition.

It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that logical judgments are universally valid, that one ~~good~~ judging subject can communicate its own state of mind to every other subject. This is due to the fact that there exists a necessary relation between the faculties of cognition which must be the same in every subject which judges the object. It is only a sceptical

<sup>there is never any</sup> that ~~no~~ necessary relation between the faculties of representation <sup>on this view, accordingly</sup> ~~ever exists~~. ~~therefore every judgment which is made by~~ <sup>re</sup> ~~a person is valid only for the person who makes it and conse-~~ <sup>quently</sup> ~~tation ever exists~~. ~~therefore every judgment which is made by~~ <sup>1-</sup> ~~a person is valid only for the person who makes it and conse-~~ quently is in no way universally valid or necessary. The judging subject depends for its judgment entirely on its own subjective state of mind. Transcendental philosophy does not share this view. According to its principles cognitions admit

of being universally communicated. Every objective cognition depends on a specific subjective state of mind. A given object "sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold and the imagination, in turn, the understanding in giving this arrangement the unity of concepts." Now the relation of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding) <sup>varies</sup> ~~very~~ according to the object, or rather according to the concept which is applied for the cognition of the object. This relation admits of being universally communicated; <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ otherwise objective knowledge would be impossible. Kant argues that since according to transcendental principles <sup>we have to presuppose</sup> ~~there is supposed~~ the existence of different determinate relations between imagination and understanding (relations which <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ made necessary by objective concepts) it is possible and even necessary that <sup>we should not presuppose the existence of</sup> ~~there also exists~~ an indeterminate relation which being independent of any concepts, can only be determined by a feeling. <sup>It is unreasonable to assume</sup> ~~We are entitled to pre-~~ <sup>suppose that</sup> ~~suppose~~ that human beings ~~are~~ <sup>should be</sup> capable of becoming aware of a harmony of their cognitive faculties on the representation of certain objects. This indeterminate harmony must be the same in all subjects, i.e., it must admit of being universally communicated. Now, since we cannot become aware of the harmony of the cognitive faculties in any other way than by feeling <sup>the assumption of "common sense" is in keeping with transcendental principles.</sup> ~~it is reasonable to assume the existence of a common sense,~~ <sup>for it</sup> ~~for this means nothing else than that the indeterminate relation of the cognitive faculties, the mere harmony of which we become aware of by means of a mere feeling, can be in-~~ <sup>is identical</sup> ~~parted from one subject to another just as the determinate relation of the cognitive faculties can of which we become aware in thought.~~ <sup>in different subjects.</sup> Our question was: Have we <sup>any</sup> reason for pre-

supposing common sense? This question has now been answered. Since transcendental philosophy, unlike sceptical philosophy, is convinced that <sup>the</sup> universal communicability of knowledge is possible, it can ~~also~~ assume, although not prove, that <sup>the</sup> universal communicability of the feeling which arises from our consciousness of the harmonious play of the cognitive faculties is also possible.

It ~~has~~ <sup>must</sup> be noted that transcendental philosophy does not base this assumption upon psychological observations. For ~~these~~ they would be of no avail, seeing that psychology is an empirical science which cannot yield any necessary a priori principles. Transcendental philosophy bases its theory on its own principle of the communicability of knowledge, which in fact is a principle assumed by every Logic that is not one of scepticism.

"Since now this disposition itself must admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (<sup>in</sup> the case of a given representation), while again, the universal ~~communicability of feeling~~ <sup>communicability</sup> presupposes a common sense: it follows that our assumption of it is well founded. And here, too, we <sup>do not</sup> have to take our stand on psychological observations but we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every Logic and principle of knowledge which is not one of scepticism." (C. of J. 239.)

### Section 22.

When we call an object beautiful we demand <sup>that</sup> everyone else <sup>should</sup> ~~to~~ agree <sup>with</sup> ~~to~~ our judgment, and we do so in spite of the fact that our judgment is not based on concepts, <sup>but</sup> ~~that~~ it is entirely dependent on our own feelings. This implies that we presuppose

(1) See above

that our feeling is not a private feeling, but a feeling which ought to be common to all judging subjects. It follows that our judgments about beauty are not empirical judgments. ~~We do not rest our judgment upon empirical observations.~~ We do not say: This thing is beautiful, <sup>for</sup> observation has shown that it has generally been held to be so. Empirical observation can only teach us what is, never what ought to be (see above, ) and such an "ought" is implicit in every judgment about beauty. The assertion which we make is not that everyone will fall in with our judgment, but that everyone ought to, even if no one ever has or ever will. This shows that, as proved in the last two sections, that we presuppose the existence of a common sense. It has also been shown that all our judgments about beauty are singular judgments (see above ). It is quite true that in judging an object beautiful we must refer our judgment to the Idea of a common sense as the rule to which every judging person is thought to be subject. And yet since we cannot formulate this rule, and since we cannot determine it by means of objective concepts, it is impossible to attribute to the particular judgment any ~~other~~ <sup>other</sup> necessity, than a merely exemplary necessity. When we judge a particular object to be beautiful we mean by this that we have before us an instance of the universal rule. This shows that the rule which we cannot determine is an ideal norm. We are justified in referring to it and we are right in ascribing universal validity to a judgment which refers to it, <sup>for</sup> the principle which we apply is subjectively universal and necessary. Everyone who makes an aesthetic judgment refers to the ideal rule. That there exists such a rule is a necessary Idea. We must presuppose the exis-

tende of <sup>a</sup> common sense, and we should be entitled to claim for our judgment not merely subjective universal validity, but also objective universal validity (i.e., we should be able to establish the truth of our judgment) provided we were assured that we <sup>have</sup> ~~have~~ subsumed the particular case in question correctly under the ideal norm.

All this is obviously nothing but a restatement of the argument which has been set forth in the preceding sections, with the exception of one point. <sup>The description of common sense</sup> It is ~~new~~ <sup>It is novel to the reader</sup> to the reader as an ideal norm is new to the reader of Section 22. <sup>Unfortunately</sup> ~~of Section 22 in that common sense is an ideal norm.~~ <sup>New</sup> Kant does not explain ~~to the reader~~ what he means by this. Instead of this, he presents him with a series of questions. Does common sense exist as a <sup>constitutive</sup> principle of the possibility of experience? Or is it perhaps a principle of Reason, a mere regulative principle "that for higher ends first seeks to beget in us a common sense." (C. of J., <sup>240.</sup> 249). <sup>He</sup> Kant adds a few other questions which are equally unintelligible. We need not concern ourselves with them. For <sup>he</sup> ~~Kant~~ himself tells us that he is neither willing, nor in a position, to answer any of these questions.

<sup>deal</sup> Kant will in fact later ~~concern himself~~ <sup>then all and</sup> with ~~all these~~ <sup>we must remember</sup> ~~questions and we have to take note of the fact that so far we~~ know very little about Kant's doctrine of "common sense" and <sup>must</sup> ~~have to~~ await his further explanations. For the present it <sup>suffices to observe</sup> ~~surfaces to note~~ <sup>he</sup> that so far ~~Kant~~ is not really concerned with the question as to whether "common sense" exists or what its nature is. All he has done so far is to show (a) that the presupposition of such a common sense is not unreasonable and not contradictory to the principles of transcendental philosophy (Section 21); and (b) that the Idea of a common sense is actually

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presupposed by judgments of taste.

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(1) "This indeterminate norm of a common sense is, as a matter of fact, presupposed by us; as is shown by our presuming to lay down judgments of taste." (C. of J., 239)

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General Remarks on the First Section  
of the Analytic.

At the beginning of this "General Remark" Kant states that the result <sup>of</sup> ~~from~~ the foregoing analysis <sup>to show</sup> is <sup>must</sup> that taste ~~has to be~~ regarded as a critical faculty by which an object is estimated in reference to the free conformity to law (Gesetzmaessigkeit) of the imagination. I will try to explain this definition.

In the first place we have to ask ourselves in what sense the imagination can be said to be "free". We remember that according to Kant the faculty of imagination has two entirely different functions: ~~There exist~~ <sup>that</sup> (a) ~~the principle of re-~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~productive imagination,~~ <sup>that</sup> (b) ~~the principle of~~ productive imagination. Neither of the two is "free". For ~~Reproductive~~ <sup>is</sup> imagination is subject to the laws of association and <sup>with</sup> ~~dependent~~ on them. We associate one representation ~~to~~ <sup>with</sup> others because in experience we have found them combined. This is a necessary psychological law. <sup>To take an example, the</sup> ~~the~~ representation "gold" and the representation "heavy" have in all previous experience accompanied each other. As a result of this we associate the two representations with one another. The representation "gold" makes us think of "heavy" ~~and vice versa.~~

Now it has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that

we could not make use of our faculty of reproducing representations unless we assumed prior to actual experience that the objects of our representations were not entirely irregular. This is the principle assumed by productive imagination. We must employ it, and it is to be regarded as an a priori principle; for, if we allowed that the objects of experience changed their qualities continuously, experience itself would be impossible. Our faculty of reproducing representations would find no opportunity for the exercise of its powers.

"It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. But this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a co-existence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules. Otherwise our empirical imagination would never find opportunity for exercises appropriate to its powers, and so would remain concealed within the mind as dead and to us unknown faculty." (C.P.R., A.100.)

I have already dealt with Kant's doctrine of the productive imagination, and it may suffice to state here that according to him both reproductive and productive imagination depend on certain rules or laws, with the one difference that the former depends on empirical, psychological laws, the latter on a priori laws.

Productive imagination is called productive only in so far as, being independent of previous experience, it is an

a priori condition of experience. Experience may therefore be said to be its product. But it must not be forgotten that, according to Kant, imagination could not exercise its power if it were incapable of being determined by the laws of the understanding. If there were no such laws, it could achieve nothing at all.

I think that, although Kant does not use the term "aesthetic imagination, we may distinguish between three functions of the imagination, namely, (a) reproductive imagination, which is not free since it depends on empirical laws, (b) productive imagination which is not free either, since it depends on the a priori laws of the understanding, and (c) aesthetic imagination, which is the principle that underlies our judgments of taste. Aesthetic imagination is both productive, not merely reproductive, and free, for it is independent of any determinate laws of the understanding.

But here there arises a difficulty. When we judge an object to be beautiful, we are tied down to a definite form of the object, and therefore our imagination to the extent does not enjoy free play, as it would if the object were a product of our own fancy.

① Kant says that it is not a free play wie im Dichten. It must be noted that Dichten does not here mean poetry, as Mr. Meredith translates it. It cannot possibly mean this, for the poet, according to Kant's Aesthetic, enjoys an entirely free play of his imagination just as little as the person who judges the poem. Dichten means here to fancy something or to invent something irrespective of any rule. The person who dichtet lets his imagination run away with him without taking any account of either truth or beauty. This is in fact the common meaning of the word Dichten in the eighteenth century. It is used by Kant in this sense in the last paragraph of our passage. Kant states there that beautiful objects must be distinguished from beautiful views perceived indistinctly. As regards the latter, taste appears to fasten not so much on what the imagination grasps (auffasst) as on the incentive it receives to indulge in fiction (zu dichten Anlass bekommt). "It is just as when we watch the changing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook: neither of which are things of beauty, but they convey a charm to the imagination, because they sustain its free play." (C. of J., 243, 244.) (See also Anthropology. Bk. I, Sec. 31, which is headed: Von dem sinnlichen Dichtungsvermogen

Kant goes on <sup>as follows</sup> ~~to state that~~ It is not really difficult to understand how a given object can make us enjoy the free play of the imagination. ~~For~~ "It is easy to conceive that the object may supply <sup>ready-made</sup> ~~read-made~~ just such a form of the arrangement of the manifold, as the imagination if it were left to itself would freely project in harmony with the <sup>general</sup> ~~conformity~~ to law of the understanding (in Einstimmung mit der Verstandes-gesetz-maessigkeit ueberhaupt). (C.of J., 240, 241)

The last words here are particularly important. Kant is convinced that the imagination by itself cannot give us any idea of beauty. In our representation of the object there must be some reference to the understanding. The imagination is free in so far as it is not referred to any determinate law of the understanding, but <sup>it</sup> is not entirely free. There is an indeterminate relation to the understanding and its principle of conformity to law in general. The imagination as such is according to Kant a ~~sensuous~~ faculty. It is not the imagination as such, i.e., free imagination, which enables us to make judgments of taste. Our judgments of taste depend on a harmony between imagination and understanding. "But that the imagination should be both free and of itself conformable to law (gesetzmässig) i.e., carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law." (C.of J., 241)

~~But~~ That the imagination cannot be referred to any definite law of the understanding is <sup>will be abundantly clear by now, since</sup> ~~also clear~~. For in that case the judgment would not be a judgment of taste. Imagination refers to the principle <sup>of</sup> conformity <sup>to</sup> of law in general without any further determination. The judgment which is made is a subjective and not an objective judgment.

(Footnote continued from previous page).

nach seinen verschiedenen Arten. It is a well known psychological fact that certain persons although unmusical and incapable of appreciating the beauty of a piece of music, enjoy it in their own way. It excites in them all sorts of pleasant associations. Kant would have said of them that although their imagination is incapable of grasping the beauty of the object, they enjoy it owing to the fact that their imagination receives from it an incentive to indulge in fiction (zu dichten Anlass bekommt).

"Hence it is only a conformity to law without a law, and a subjective harmonising of the imagination and the understanding without an objective, one <sup>^</sup> which latter would mean that the representation was referred to a definite concept of the object - that can consist with the free conformity to law of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness without a purpose) and with the specific character of a judgment of taste." (C. of J., 241) <sup>^</sup>

The remaining parts of the "General Remarks" are so easy that I will not concern myself with them, <sup>I</sup> and <sup>^</sup> turn directly to the second book of the "Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment", the Analytic of the Sublime.

#### Section 25.

In this Section we find a great many statements which Kant does not make sufficiently clear. This however is not very distressing, <sup>for</sup> most of them will be explained later. I will do no more than give an account of Kant's argument. He begins by comparing the beautiful with the sublime. <sup>Our</sup> judgments about the beautiful and about the sublime are both pure aesthetic judgments. This can be shown in the following manner. (*run on*)

(The beautiful and the sublime please on their own account. When we judge a thing sublime we speak of our own delight and do not judge the object as such. Our judgments about the sublime are reflective judgments, <sup>unlike our logical judgments,</sup> i.e. <sup>^</sup> they do not depend upon a definite concept of the object ~~like our logical judgments~~. But although they are subjective judgments, we must distinguish them from our judgments about the pleasant, which depend entirely on sensation. Our judgments about the beautiful and our judg-

ments about the sublime are essentially different from our judgments about the good and our judgments about the pleasant. They are different from the former in that they are independent of definite concepts and from the latter in that they profess to be universally valid ~~in respect of every subject~~. They do so despite the fact that they are both singular judgments and not directed to any knowledge of the object. They ascribe universal validity only to the delight of the subject. It is assumed that the representation of certain objects is <sup>(1)</sup> necessarily connected with pleasure.

We cannot ascribe any universal validity to a subjective judgment unless we refer our representation to a rule valid for all <sup>sub</sup>jects. It follows that our judgments about the sublime like our judgments about the beautiful, refer in the judging of particular objects to an indeterminate rule which we hold to be valid for all subjects. All this will be fully explained later, but we see already that our judgments about the beautiful and the sublime are in many respects similar to one another. This is due to the fact that they are both aesthetic reflective judgments.

Kant goes on to show that there are also important differences between the two kinds of aesthetic judgments. "The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality. Accordingly the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presenta-

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(1) Kant states here that the "delight" is connected with the mere presentation or faculty of presentation and is thus taken to express the accord ~~en~~<sup>ing</sup> a given intuition, of the faculty of presentation (*Darstellung*) or the imagination with the faculty of concepts that belong to understanding or Reason, in the sense of the former (*viz.* imagination) assisting the latter. The parallel with the judgments about the beautiful is clear. Why he believes that our judgments about the sublime connect imagination and Reason to one another becomes clear later. (See below)

tion of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of Reason."

(G. of J., 244).

This is easy to understand in so far as the judgments about <sup>the</sup> beautiful are concerned. We have seen that Kant holds that the imagination alone cannot produce any judgment because it is a sensuous faculty. In order to be able to make a judgment about beauty we have to refer to the understanding. An aesthetic judgment about the beautiful does not make use of any definite concepts or rules. The relation between the imagination and the understanding is an indefinite one. The imagination is referred to the understanding only in so far as the latter is the source of the principle of conformity to law in general (Gesetzmaassigkeit ueberhaupt). We judge an object beautiful on the ground that the imagination in apprehending the object feels it to be not a mere manifold of discontinuous parts. There is some principle of order and limitation present in the apprehended manifold. In the case of a logical judgment the limitation is due to determinate laws and rules of the understanding. We know why the manifold is subject to order and limitation. In the case of our judgment about the beautiful we merely feel it. We feel that the object which we present to ourselves is not formless. This is <sup>why</sup> ~~the reason that~~ we come to think of the understanding and its principles of limitation, for it is the function of all the concepts of the understanding to delimit an otherwise disorderly manifold which is apprehended by the imagination. Thus the understanding gives a law to the imagination which as such is a faculty of mere apprehension. The imagination left to itself merely heaps up a manifold of given intuitions. It does not provide us with

any rule which would subject the manifold to a principle of order <sup>as</sup> which would set limits to the continuous stream of apprehended intuitions. <sup>such</sup>

Now Kant's problem here is: It is quite easy to see that a beautiful object, the essence of which consists in limitation, should make us feel a harmony of <sup>the</sup> imagination and the understanding. It awakens in us a feeling that there is an indeterminate relation between the imagination and the understanding. We cannot derive this from any definite concept of the understanding, and yet it is easy to see why we should regard the beautiful "as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding." (C. of J., 244).

But how can we regard an object which we judge sublime as representing a principle of order? We call an object <sup>sub</sup>can comprehend. <sup>How</sup> Kant believes, and he will make this clearer later on, <sup>owing to</sup> that the very fact that the imagination can comprehend. <sup>How</sup> Kant believes, and he will make this clearer later on, <sup>owing to</sup> that the very fact that the imagination cannot comprehend the given sensible object the knowing subject feels itself raised above the world of sense. In representing <sup>to</sup> the object to ourselves, we find that we cannot <sup>grasp</sup> comprehend it, and this makes us think of Reason and her Ideas which are principles of the supersensible world. An object which we feel to be greater than any other, an object which defies all our attempts at confining it within certain limits, is considered by us a presentation of an indeterminate concept of Reason. This is due to the fact that Reason's concepts (Ideas) are concepts of the infinite world of the <sup>Supersensible</sup>. Since however our judgments about the sublime are aesthetic and merely subjective judgments it follows that in making them we

cannot refer to any definite concepts of Reason. Our judgments about the sublime are based upon an indeterminate and indeterminate relation of imagination and Reason. ~~Kant will make all this clear in the subsequent sections.~~

We may now ~~go on with~~ <sup>continue</sup> our explanation of Section 23.

Kant's argument may be paraphrased as follows. We have seen that all our judgments about beautiful natural objects involve the idea of a purposiveness of nature. In calling a natural object beautiful we regard it as purposive in relation to our faculty of Judgment. The object seems to be *pre-adapted* to our faculty of Judgment and its principle of aesthetic reflection. Its representation makes us aware of a harmony of our cognitive faculties (imagination and ~~the~~ understanding) and it seems to us as if nature had purposely created certain objects in order that we should become aware of this harmony which gives us pleasure. Therefore we can quite reasonably speak of beautiful natural objects. But how can we ascribe purposiveness to nature when ~~she~~ <sup>it</sup> presents us with objects which we judge sublime? ~~For we call~~ <sup>in view of the fact that</sup> ~~For~~

these objects as regards their form are not only not pre-adapted to our faculty of Judgment, <sup>but on</sup> ~~on~~ the contrary they are called sublime on the ground that they are ill-adapted (*zweckwidrig*) to it? An object which is judged to be sublime seems devoid of all form. It is <sup>as</sup> ~~as~~ if it were an outrage on the imagination, and yet it is <sup>judged</sup> ~~is~~ all the more sublime on that account." (C. of J., 245)

From this it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot call an object of nature sublime. "All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the presentation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind." (C. of J., 245)

The feeling of the sublime arises in us because ~~we think~~<sup>the object is</sup>  
~~we judge it as~~<sup>a</sup> of Reason and its concepts of/supersensible world. Sublimity  
 is in no way to be regarded as a property of a sensible ob-  
 ject. The concepts of Reason (Ideas) are products of the  
 mind and cannot belong to any natural object. We judge the an-  
 object sublime for the very reason that it is ~~unlimited~~<sup>inadequate for the</sup>  
~~expression of~~<sup>expression of</sup> the Ideas of Reason. From this it may be seen that  
 our aesthetic judgments about the sublime are even more sub-  
 jective than our judgments about the beautiful. In judging  
 an object sublime we refer our representation of it to some-  
 thing that has nothing whatever to do with the sensible object  
 itself, namely, to Ideas of Reason.

"Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called  
 sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored  
 one's mind in advance with a rich stock of Ideas, if such an  
 intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feeling which is  
 itself sublime - sublime because the mind has been incited to  
 abandon sensibility, and employ itself upon Ideas involving  
 higher purposiveness." (C. of J., 245, 246) <sup>o</sup>

We have stated again and again that our judgments about  
 natural beauty are bound up <sup>with</sup> in a specific principle, the prin-  
 ciple of <sup>the</sup> purposiveness of nature. We conceive the Idea of a  
 nature which is more than mere mechanism. Nature is regarded  
 by us <sup>on</sup> ~~after~~ the analogy of an art. All this has been explained  
 by Kant in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. He has  
 shown there that although the principle of <sup>the</sup> Technique of nature,  
~~which makes us regard nature as an artist and attribute purposiveness to it,~~  
~~(nature regarded as art, purposiveness of nature)~~ is not an  
 objective principle it is a necessary and original a priori  
 principle essentially different from the principles of the  
 understanding. For, as he has made clear, we assume it for the

explanation of those phenomena which our understanding and its mechanical principles cannot explain. The principle which is assumed by the faculty of Judgment is that of <sup>the</sup> purposiveness of nature relative to the employment of Judgment.

Kant repeats all this here only to show that the principle of purposiveness does not apply to our judgments about the sublime. ~~For~~ We judge those products of nature to be sublime which are ill-adapted to our faculty of Judgment. Kant goes on to show that for this reason the concept of the <sup>sublimity</sup> sublime of nature is far less important than that of its beauty. ~~For~~ It gives no indication of a purposiveness on the part of nature. In order to find a thing beautiful we must seek for grounds external to ourselves. In order to judge a thing sublime, we need not look for any external grounds. It is our own mind which introduces sublimity into nature.

"This is a very needful preliminary remark. It entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of nature, and makes the theory of the sublime a mere appendage to the aesthetic estimate of the purposiveness of nature, because it does not give a representation of any particular form in nature, but involves no more than the development of a <sup>purpose</sup> ~~final~~ employment by the imagination of its own representation." (C. of J. 246.)

Section 24.

In this section Kant makes a few remarks upon the division of the "Analytic of the Sublime". He states that he will follow the same principle <sup>in it</sup> as in the "Analytic of the Beautiful". The Analytic will be divided according to the classes of categories (Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality).

The "delight" in the sublime like that in the beautiful  
will be shown <sup>(quantity)</sup> in its quantity to be universally valid, in its  
<sup>(quality)</sup> equality independent of interest, ~~in its relation it will~~  
<sup>(relation)</sup> to contain subjective purposiveness, and ~~in its modality it will~~  
<sup>(modality)</sup> to be necessary. The only difference will be that we shall  
begin with quantity instead of quality <sup>since the</sup> (sumo.)

The object which we judge to be sublime may be devoid of  
all form. ~~It will have been noticed that~~  
The reader of my exposition of the "Analytic of the  
Beautiful" <sup>took</sup> will have noticed that I have taken no account of  
the fact that Kant's analysis of judgments of taste proceeds  
according to the classes of the categories. It is a curious  
fact that the reader of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" <sup>might</sup> ~~would~~  
~~scarcely fail to notice~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~not even have noticed~~ that Kant's exposition proceeds in this  
manner, if <sup>Kant</sup> ~~he~~ had not indicated it by the headings which he  
gives to the main divisions of the Analytic (Moment of Quality,  
Moment of Quantity, Moment of Relation, Moment of Modality).  
I dare not decide the question ~~as to~~ whether this division is  
merely artificial, but it seems to me that if it is, it has had  
very little influence upon Kant's argument. The same seems  
to me to hold for the "Analytic of the Sublime", and I shall  
take very little account of Kant's divisions.

Kant goes on to state in Section 24 that ~~there is yet~~  
another division <sup>will be</sup> required by the "Analytic of the Sublime", <sup>namely</sup>  
~~There will be~~ a distinction between the mathematically sublime  
and the dynamically sublime. What this means will be ex-  
plained by <sup>him</sup> ~~Kant~~ later. For the present it <sup>is enough</sup> ~~may suffice~~ to  
state that Kant holds that we may judge nature to be sublime  
on <sup>two</sup> ~~the~~ grounds, <sup>(a) because it</sup> that it presents us with objects which we judge  
to be infinitely "great" <sup>to which, therefore,</sup> and we attribute ~~to these objects~~  
absolute magnitude <sup>the</sup> (mathematically sublime); <sup>and (b) because</sup> Nature in some  
of her products makes us feel ~~her~~ <sup>its</sup> absolute might over us

<sup>the</sup> (dynamically sublime). This division seems to me <sup>a</sup> more important <sup>one</sup> seeing that Kant actually draws a clear distinction between the two kinds of sublimity and in his exposition takes proper account of it. <sup>(1)</sup>

### Section 25.

Kant begins his analysis with a definition of the sublime. It runs as follows. "Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great." (C. of J., 248)

~~Next the question is discussed~~ <sup>Kant discusses the question</sup> ~~as to~~ which of the faculties of the mind <sup>is</sup> the concept of the absolutely great is to be assigned? <sup>He</sup> Kant shows that it belongs neither to the understanding nor to sense nor to Reason, but to the faculty of Judgment. I will try to give an account of his argument.

The concept of the absolutely great is not a concept of the understanding. It is true that the understanding produces the category of quantity and that we can assert prior to actual experience, that every empirical object will possess magnitude without any comparison with other things being required. But to be enabled to determine how great an object is we require something else as ~~its~~ measure and standard of comparison. We see that in this way there can never arise the concept of absolute magnitude. The object is great only in relation to the unit which is taken as the standard of our measurement. From this it follows that the concept of the absolutely great (of that which is great beyond all comparison) is not a concept of the understanding and must not be confused with the category of quantity. Neither can it be regarded as a concept of Reason. For Reason and its concepts (Ideas) are concerned with the supersensible and will never make us judge

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<sup>For an explanation of this</sup>  
 (1) ~~Regarding the~~ terminology, see above on Kant's distinction between mathematical and dynamical Ideas.

a sensible object to be absolutely great. In comparison with the Ideas of Reason every sensible object is in fact infinitely small.

It need hardly be mentioned that the concept of absolute greatness cannot be a concept of intuition or sense, <sup>Sense</sup> ~~For~~ intuition and sense by themselves can never be sources of a judgment. In order to determine something as a quantity we have to refer our intuitions to concepts. Sense as such is entirely indeterminate, and the judging subject in order to be enabled to judge an object has to refer its sensuous intuitions to concepts.

The concept of the absolute <sup>ly</sup> great belongs to the faculty of Judgment. The judgment which makes us call a sensible object absolutely great does not <sup>involve</sup> ~~import~~ any principle of cognition. We call objects absolutely great <sup>or</sup> ~~as~~ sublime because we feel that we cannot imagine that any object could be greater.

The judgment ~~is an aesthetic~~ <sup>is</sup> not a cognitive judgment, <sup>but an aesthetic</sup>. It may seem as if when we assert that an object is absolutely great, we have nothing in the <sup>nature</sup> ~~way~~ of a comparison present to our minds. Now, it is quite true that if we took an objectively determined measure as our standard, i.e., if we ascertained the quantity of our object by comparison with a fixed unit, we could not call any object absolutely great. It would be great merely by comparison with the unit or with other objects of known size. But there must be some standard. For when we call an object absolutely great, we demand the assent of every other subject. It is easy to see that judgments about the sublime are not objective judgments, and what is predicated in them is merely that we, the judging subjects find it impossible to imagine that a greater object could exist, <sup>we are unable to grasp.</sup> ~~that the object which is given to~~

the object in its totality. *We feel this without being*  
~~us is beyond our faculty of comprehension. We are not at all~~  
 interested in comparing our object with others and ascertain-  
 ing its objective size. ~~We refer~~ <sup>In</sup> assigning universal  
 validity to our judgment <sup>we refer</sup> to other subjects. We presuppose  
 that everyone else will find it <sup>just as</sup> ~~equally~~ impossible as we do  
 to imagine the existence of a greater object. ~~We assert~~  
~~that the object will surpass the faculty of comprehension of~~  
~~everyone~~ and that in consequence of this everyone will agree  
 to our judgment which calls it sublime.  
~~We see the standard referred to is the judging subject.~~  
~~judgment, and that it~~ <sup>that subjects who judge provide the standard required by the</sup>  
~~it~~ is not the object by itself which is judged but the object  
 in relation to the judging subjects. The judgment is a  
 reflective aesthetic judgment, not an objective logical judg-  
 ment. "Hence a standard is certainly laid at the basis of  
 the judgment, which standard is presupposed to be one that  
 can be taken as the same for everyone, but which is available  
 only for an aesthetic estimate of the greatness and not for  
 one that is logical (mathematically determined), for the stan-  
 dard is <sup>a</sup> merely subjective one underlying the reflective judg-  
 ment upon the greatness." (C. of J., 249)

Another point to be noted is that although we may have no  
 interest whatever in the real existence of an object its mere  
 greatness <sup>is capable of</sup> creating in us a feeling of delight. It is the  
 mere contemplating of the object which gives us pleasure and  
 we ascribe universal communicability to this pleasure, i.e., we  
 assume that the same pleasure will be felt by everyone else.  
 In all this our judgments about the sublime agree with our  
 judgments about the beautiful. The remarkable difference  
 between the two judgments, however, is that we cannot call an  
 object beautiful without at the same time ascribing a purpos-

ive form to the object itself. We call the object itself beautiful because as regards its form it seems pre-adapted to our faculty of Judgment. The object which we judge to be sublime on the other hand seems to us devoid of all form. It is ill-adapted to our faculty of Judgment. We judge it to be absolutely great for the very reason that we are incapable of <sup>grasping it as a whole</sup> ~~comprehending it~~. In the case of a judgment about the beautiful our faculty of Judgment, in representing the object to itself, becomes aware of a harmony of the imagination and the understanding. This gives us pleasure and makes us assume that everyone else, in representing the object, will take the same kind of pleasure in the object, the pleasure which arises from the subjective purposiveness in the employment of the cognitive faculties. <sup>(A should be)</sup>

<sup>But it seems</sup> ~~It is~~ very difficult to understand how <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ object which we judge to be absolutely great can give us any kind of pleasure at all. <sup>to grasp it</sup> How can our very inability give us the feeling that <sup>in relation to</sup> it is purposive <sup>for</sup> the employment of our cognitive faculties? <sup>We understood</sup> ~~It is clear~~ (a) that our judgments about the sublime are merely reflective judgments and as such must be distinguished from judgments which determine the magnitude of objects by measuring them, <sup>and (b)</sup> ~~however~~ that the Idea of purposiveness which lies at the basis of <sup>these</sup> ~~the~~ aesthetic judgments <sup>an Idea</sup> must be of a very <sup>Special</sup> ~~peculiar~~ kind of purposiveness.

"If we say of an object without qualification that it is great, this is not a mathematically determinant, but a mere reflective judgment upon its representation, which is subjectively purposive for a particular employment of our cognitive faculties in the estimation of ~~A~~ magnitude." (C. of J., 249).

In order to understand this we have in the first place to

determine

once more the difference between mathematically determinant judgments and reflective judgments which make us judge an object to be absolutely great. As far as mathematically determinant judgments are concerned an object is ever judged to be absolutely great, <sup>for their business is to ascertain</sup> ~~for the former are concerned with ascer-~~ taining objectively how great an object is. They do this by taking other objects as the standard of the measurement. The object may be ten times, a hundred times, even a million times as great as any other object. And yet the idea of absolute greatness can never <sup>arise</sup> ~~exist~~. For it is clear that nothing can ever be given in nature, no matter how great it is, which regarded in some other relation may not be degraded to the level of the infinitely small. As soon as we compare an object with other objects, we cannot find <sup>it</sup> absolutely great. A mountain, for instance, may be great in comparison with any other mountain, but it will be judged to be small when it is regarded in some other relation. The concept of the absolutely great or of that which is great beyond all comparison is an aesthetic concept. When we call an object absolutely great or sublime, we mean by this that for this object it is not permissible to seek an appropriate standard outside itself, but merely in itself. "It is a greatness comparable to itself alone." "That is sublime in comparison with which all else is small." (C. of J.

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We have stated that no object can be judged absolutely great in comparison with other objects. The Idea of absolute greatness refers the representation of the object, not to other objects, but to the subject. It is the subject which feels that the object which it represents to itself is greater than anything else. "Hence it comes that the sublime is not to be

looked for in the things of nature, but only in our own Ideas. But it must be left to the deduction to show in which of them it resides." (C. of J., 250) <sup>5</sup>

It is clear that it is very difficult to understand what Kant means by this, but the last words show us that he will explain it later. In <sup>and</sup> other Section~~s~~ he gives a mere outline of his argument. We are told that while there is a striving in our imagination towards progress ad infinitum and while Reason demands absolute totality, as a real Idea, <sup>but that</sup> the ~~inability on the part of our faculty for the estimation of things of the world of sense~~ <sup>to attain</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>in</sup> to this Idea awakens in us a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us. ~~We see that~~ Kant believes that our imagination has a natural tendency to proceed with the apprehension of a given manifold indefinitely.

~~Now~~ There are certain objects in nature which we cannot comprehend. Our imagination feels itself checked. It cannot reach the totality of the given sensible object. The imagination cannot proceed and this <sup>reminds us</sup> ~~makes~~ the subject think of Reason's Idea of totality, <sup>and thus</sup> ~~Now~~ Reason in conceiving the Idea of ~~totality~~ <sup>totality</sup> is not concerned with the sensible world but with the supersensible world, <sup>and very</sup> Our inability to comprehend the totality of certain natural objects reminds us of a supersensible faculty within us.

It is now easier to see what Kant's reasons are for believing that the representation of the mere greatness of an object involves, "the consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the employment of our cognitive faculties." The object which is judged sublime is not at all purposive. For the <sup>only</sup> purpose the object serves is that it makes us think of our faculty <sup>con-</sup> ~~cerning~~ Ideas of Reason. Our very inability to estimate the sensible object awakens in us the feeling of a supersensible

power within ourselves. The object is purposive only in so far as it gives occasion to the faculty of Judgment for ~~think-~~<sup>referring to</sup> ~~ing~~ of that faculty of the mind which alone is concerned with the supersensible, namely, Reason.

"And it is the use to which Judgment naturally puts particular objects on behalf of ~~the~~<sup>this</sup> latter feeling, ~~etc.~~<sup>namely</sup> the feeling of a supersensible within ~~us~~, and not the object of sense, that is absolutely great, and every other contrasted employment small. Consequently it is the disposition of soul (Geistesstimmung) evoked by a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective Judgment, and not the object, that is to be called sublime." (C. of J., 250) <sup>Q</sup>

"The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind, transcending every standard of sense." (C. of J., 250) <sup>Q</sup>

#### Section 26.

The argument set forth in this section may be paraphrased as follows. There are two methods of estimating the magnitude of objects, namely, (a) estimation of magnitude by means of numbers (or algebraic symbols), <sup>which</sup> it may be called mathematical estimation, (b) estimation by the eye, <sup>with</sup> it may be called aesthetic estimation. As we have already stated, mathematical estimation of a magnitude can progress indefinitely by simply adding one unit to another, ~~and thus determining the magnitude of the object.~~ <sup>must</sup> It ~~has to~~ be noted, however, that the estimation must ~~make~~ use of a fundamental unit as a known <sup>quantity</sup> ~~quality~~ which can be no further determined. How can this irreducible fundamental unit be estimated, how can its magnitude be determined? Obviously only by <sup>in</sup> ~~intuiting~~ it. We cannot represent to ourselves the first and fundamental unit by means of which

we measure in any other way than by grasping it immediately (i.e., without mediation of numerical concepts) in intuition. It follows that "All estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is in the last resort aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively determined)." (C. of J., 251).

Now It is quite true that as far as mathematical estimation of magnitude is concerned we can never come across a greatest possible object. ~~For~~ Mathematical estimation is merely progressive. It proceeds from one number to another ~~indefinitely. There is no end of it.~~ <sup>It can do this indefinitely, for</sup> ~~For~~ there is not the slightest difficulty in adding as many numbers to one another as we please. <sup>not so</sup> This is quite different in the case of aesthetic estimation ~~estimations~~ by the eye. For aesthetic estimation has to grasp the object in one intuition to represent it to itself as a whole; and this cannot be done without a reference to the fundamental aesthetic measure, which measure is to be kept present to the imagination. The greater the object the greater must <sup>be</sup> the fundamental measure which we take as the basis of our measurement. In order to judge the magnitude of an object aesthetically we have to increase the measure in accordance with the magnitude of the object (i.e., ~~the greater the object is the greater the fundamental measure has to be~~). For ~~Otherwise~~ we could not represent the object to ourselves intuitively. Now this cannot go on indefinitely. There exists an absolute measure, i.e., a measure beyond which no greater is possible, subjectively. ~~Why must there be such an absolutely great measure? Kant's answer is that in order to take in a quantum intuitively so as to be able to use it as a fundamental unit for the measuring of a magnitude, the imagination has to perform two operations. These are (a) apprehension, and (b) comprehension. Kant shows that the~~

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Why must there be such an absolutely great measure? Kant's answer is that in order to take in a quantum intuitively so as to be able to use it as a fundamental unit for the measuring of a magnitude, the imagination has to perform two operations, (a) apprehension (Auffassung, apprehensio) and (b) comprehension (Zusammenfassung, comprehensio~~n~~ aesthetica).

I have here in the first place to explain what Kant means by comprehension. The difficulty is that in English comprehend and comprehension are synonymous with understand and understanding, whereas the German words zusammenfassen and Zusammenfassung have the original meaning of the Latin comprehendere thus zusammenfassen means to put things together. If this is understood the difference between apprehension (Auffassung) and comprehension (Zusammenfassung) becomes quite clear. Apprehension is the immediate awareness of an individual representation, and comprehension is the putting together or combining of several representations. In what follows I shall use the words comprehend and comprehension in this sense. My explanation of the meaning of the German words will, I hope, put the reader on his guard against taking the English words in their usual sense. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1) The more common meaning of zusammen fassen and Zusammenfassung in modern German is summarise and summary. It is interesting to note that the French word comprendre, like the English comprehend, means understand and has lost its original meaning. A German would translate the French comprendre and the English comprehend by verstehen or begreifen. Further, the German words begreifen and Begriff have lost their original association with greifen, to clutch, seize or get hold of. It would in fact require a considerable amount of reflection for a German in using the word Begriff to remember the original connection with greifen and the derivative nature of the common meaning of verstehen to understand or get a mental hold of. The case is different with the English word grasp which has both the literal and the figurative meanings.

Kant's argument is that the process of apprehension of intuitions can be carried on indefinitely. It is only comprehension that becomes more and more difficult the more intuitions there are to be apprehended. It soon reaches its maximum, and this maximum is the aesthetically greatest measure for the estimation of <sup>a</sup> magnitude. "For if the apprehension has reached a point beyond which the representations of sensuous intuitions in the case of the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as it advances to the apprehension of yet others as much of them is lost at one end as is gained at the other and for comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination cannot exceed." (C.or J.252.)

It may be asked why Kant here attributes both apprehension and comprehension to the imagination, and whether this is in keeping with the doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason. The answer is simple. As regards apprehension, Kant has shown in the first Critique that to speak of mere apprehension by means of intuition is an abstraction. Mere apperception would be the immediate awareness of an individual representation. In fact, however, no intuition ever is intuition of an individual representation. It is always the intuition of a manifold of representations, and thus apprehension is always bound up with the imaginative synthesis, which enables us to combine ~~the~~ different representations of a manifold to be apprehended in intuition. To be able to perform the synthesis of apprehension we must possess a faculty of imaginative reproduction. "The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction." ~~12/61/11/25~~ (C.P.R. A.102)

As regards comprehension, it is clear that it must be

attributed to the imagination, for, according to Kant, imagination is the faculty of the mind which enables us to combine representations. It performs the synthesis of representation and may in fact be said to be the only active power of the mind since intuition as such is purely passive. Intuition merely receives impressions, and, as we have just seen, it is not even capable of giving us apprehension. Understanding, on the other hand, produces rules of synthesis, and the synthesis itself is performed by the imagination.

Here there is a difficulty, for it may be objected to Kant's argument that he has also told us in the first Critique that the synthesis of reproduction is always bound up with a synthesis of recognition or a concept. He has made it quite clear that the putting together of apprehended units would be in vain unless the synthesis of reproduction (apprehension) could be determined by concepts. If it were not so determinable by the concepts of the understanding, the imaginative synthesis could lead to no result. In a very interesting passage in the Critique of Pure Reason, (B 103), Kant calls the imagination a blind function of the soul, and in the same passage we read the following: "What must first be given - with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects - is the manifold of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give unity to this pure synthesis and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity furnish the third requisite for a knowledge of an object." (B. 104)

A few paragraphs before this Kant defines synthesis

as "the act of putting different representations together  
 (verschiedene Vorstellung zueinander hinzusetzen) and of  
 grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge.  
 (ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen)  
 (B.103)

In reading this account of synthesis one is tempted to identify synthesis with what Kant calls in our section comprehension (comprehensio, Zusammenfassung), and one naturally begins to wonder how Kant can hold that judgments about the sublime are made quite independently of the concepts of the understanding. Such a criticism would, however, overlook one very important point. Kant is concerned here with a specific kind of judgment, namely, an aesthetic judgment. He does not retract his view that all logical judgments depend for their validity upon concepts, and that the imagination by itself can never give us any knowledge. Judgments about the sublime, on the other hand, do not even aim at knowledge, and so the reference to the understanding and its concepts is unnecessary. The imagination performs the operations of both apprehension and comprehension. ~~But~~ The latter is not to be confused with the intellectual synthesis which is involved in our logical judgments. Kant gives it a special name, comprehensio aesthetica, as distinct from comprehensio logica.

On the other hand it is clear that a judgment which seeks to determine the magnitude of a thing objectively is a logical or cognitive judgment and as such must make use of the concepts of the understanding. Kant shows here that the understanding has always such concepts in readiness (numerical concepts). There is no difficulty here at all. The imagination, supported

by the understanding whose concepts it schematises can perform the operations of apprehension and comprehension without anything hindering it. The fundamental measure may be increased indefinitely, and yet it will be capable of being determined by definite numerical concepts.

The difficulty concerns only the aesthetic estimation of magnitude, for when it judges an object aesthetically the imagination has to grasp the fundamental measure in one intuition, and Kant argues that there is an absolute limit set to this. The more the measure is increased, the more difficult it is for the imagination to grasp it in one intuition, and a point is soon reached which the imagination cannot exceed. This is the absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively. Kant's point is, that when the absolute measure is reached by the imagination, the subject gets a feeling of the sublime.

To understand the peculiar nature of judgments about the sublime we need only compare them with judgments which determine objectively the size of natural objects. In other words we need only contrast the aesthetic estimation of magnitude with the mathematical estimation of magnitude. Kant explains the distinction very clearly. He declares that as far as mathematical estimation is concerned the imagination can advance of itself ad infinitum without meeting with any obstacle because the understanding conducts it with concepts of numbers for which the imagination must supply the schema. He goes on as follows. "In this mathematical estimation of magnitude understanding is as well served and satisfied whether imagination selects for the unit a magnitude which one can take in at a glance, e.g., a foot or a perch or a German mile or even

the earth's diameter the apprehension of which is indeed possible but not its comprehension in an intuition of the imagination (i.e., it is not possible by means of a comprehensio aesthetica though quite so by means of a comprehensio logica in a numerical concept. In each case the logical estimation of magnitude advances ad infinitum with nothing to stop it." (C.of J. 254.)

It is now easy to see why Kant holds that in performing the comprehensio aesthetica the imagination need not refer to concepts of the understanding. It is the very ~~incomprehensibility~~ incomprehensibility of our object which awakens the feeling of the sublime in us. For the very reason that our imagination cannot comprehend the object we call it sublime.

Kant emphasises again and again that the judgment which is reached in this way is a purely aesthetic judgment, and, as such, fundamentally different from objective judgments, i.e., judgments made either by understanding or by Reason. "A pure judgment upon the sublime must have no purpose belonging to the object as its determining ground if it is to be ~~aesthetic~~ aesthetic and not be tainted with any judgment of understanding or Reason." (C.of J. 253)<sup>(1)</sup>

But here we find a new difficulty. It has often been said that our aesthetic judgments are not judgments about objects at all but are judgments about the pleasure felt by the subject. This must also hold for our judgments about the sublime. We have also seen that the pleasure with which

(1) If in judging an object sublime we referred to its purpose we should in fact be making a judgment of Reason, for purpose is a concept of Reason. (See above )

aesthetic reflective judgments are concerned must be of a specific kind. It must involve the Idea of subjective purposiveness. In taking pleasure in the object and judging it purposive the judging subject attributes universal validity to the judgment, i.e., it assumes that the same pleasure will be felt by <sup>all</sup> ~~every~~ other subjects on becoming aware of the subjective purposiveness.<sup>(1)</sup>

- (1). As regards the judgment of taste, it has been shown how such an idea of subjective purposiveness arises, ~~and~~ how the awareness of this gives us pleasure and why we are entitled to ascribe universal validity to such pleasure.

And may we also refer to what Kant has told us in the same section, namely, that as far as our judgments about the beautiful are concerned, the understanding is at the service of the imagination, (C. of J., 242). That we ascribe "objective purposiveness" to the beautiful object is due to the fact that the imagination gains something that the subject in representing the object to itself feels its imagination to be enriched. But how can we ascribe subjective purposiveness to the sublime or absolutely great object, how can we take pleasure in <sup>it</sup> and ascribe universal validity to this pleasure seeing that in representing the object to ourselves we become aware that "our faculty of imagination breaks down in presenting the concept of a magnitude and proves unequal to its task." (C. of J., 253).

Kant's solution of the problem is this. Mathematical estimation of magnitude <sup>can</sup> never arrives at the Idea of the absolutely great. It is <sup>m</sup> merely progressive and proceeds from one member of the numerical series to another without being concerned about comprehension of the manifold. Aesthetic estimation on the other hand arrives at the Idea of the absolutely great owing to the fact that it tries to comprehend the given intuitions in one intuition. When we judge an object to be absolutely or infinitely great we believe that there is given to us in intuition an object which possesses infinite magnitude. Now, <sup>it has been</sup> as shown in the Critique of Pure Reason, that there is only one faculty of the mind which is concerned with the absolute or infinite, namely, Reason. It has been shown in the first Critique that Reason makes every object subject to its Idea of totality and infinity. Even the pure forms of intuition are made subject to this Idea, and Reason regards the infinite number of the parts of space and time as given in

their totality. (See above,

*Kant's argument goes on as*

*we* follows. ~~Our~~ <sup>In our</sup> aesthetic estimation of magnitude comes across

infinitely great objects, i.e., such objects as cannot be

compared with any other natural object. We feel that there

is an absolutely great object given to us in its totality and

this ~~makes us think of~~ <sup>reminds us</sup> the principle of Reason. The mere

ability to think the absolutely great indicates a faculty of

the mind transcending every standard of sense. "Still the

mere ability even to think the given infinite without contra-

dition, is something that requires the presence in the human

mind of a faculty that is itself supersensible." (C. of J..

254) <sup>In the case of</sup> ~~So far as the mathematical estimation is concerned,~~ <sup>the situation is</sup>

~~object is ever judged infinitely great.~~ <sup>quite different.</sup> "In the case of the

mathematical estimation of magnitude imagination is quite

competent to supply a measure equal to the requirements of

any object. For the numerical concepts of the understanding

can by progressive <sup>system</sup> make any measure adequate to any

given magnitude." (C. of J.. 255) <sup>As</sup>

~~Now since~~ nature is judged sublime or absolutely great in those of her phenomena which in their intuition convey the idea of their infinity, it follows that it must be the aes-

thetic estimation of magnitude to comprehend (i.e., an estima-

tion which is not merely progressive, but <sup>seeks</sup> ~~seems~~ to grasp the

progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition) which makes

us conceive the Idea of the absolutely great as sublime. Kant

~~holds~~ <sup>points out</sup> that in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude we get a

feeling of the effort towards a comprehension that <sup>which is made by</sup> ~~exceeds~~

~~the faculty of~~ <sup>the</sup> imagination for grasping the progressive appre-

~~hension of a whole of intuition.~~ <sup>the mind</sup> At the same time we become

aware of the <sup>inability</sup> ~~inadequacy~~ of the imagination (which, <sup>as</sup> ~~so far as~~

apprehension is concerned, can proceed indefinitely) <sup>to</sup> ~~for find~~

<sup>unit of measurement</sup>  
~~ing~~ a fundamental ~~measure~~ <sup>whose</sup> which would be suitable to serve  
 as a ~~fundamental measure~~ if the object ~~the~~ <sup>Kant believes</sup> magnitude of which  
 is to be estimated. He ~~infers from this~~ that since the  
 proper unchangeable measure of nature is its absolute whole  
 it follows that when we find an object the magnitude of which  
 is such that the imagination spends its whole faculty of com-  
 prehension upon it in vain, this object or rather its represen-  
 tation must carry our concept of nature to the ~~super-sensible~~ <sup>supersensible</sup> which  
 is great beyond every standard of sense.

<sup>It is now easy to understand Kant's argument. It may be summarized thus.</sup>  
~~Kant believes that the faculty of Judgment in the repre-~~  
~~The faculty of Judgment judges an object to be absolutely great on the ground that it~~  
~~sentation of the absolutely great object~~ becomes aware of the  
 fact that the imagination is incapable of finding in the world  
 of sense a measure great enough to serve as a standard for the  
 measurement of the object, ~~and~~ This makes the judging subject  
 think of a different standard compared with which everything in  
 the world of sense is infinitely small, ~~the idea of the super-~~  
~~sensible.~~ In doing so it refers the imagination to Reason.  
<sup>Since</sup> ~~we must, however, bear in mind that~~ the judgment in question is  
 a merely aesthetic judgment and being ~~such~~ <sup>is referred</sup> refers the imagin-  
 ation <sup>is referred</sup> (not to any definite concept of Reason but merely to the  
 principle of Reason in general.

The analogy with the aesthetic judgments about the beauti-  
 ful is clear. "Therefore, just as the aesthetic judgment in  
 its estimate of the beautiful refers the imagination in its  
 free play to the understanding, to bring out its agreement with  
 the concepts of the latter in general, (apart from their deter-  
 mination): so in its estimate of a thing as sublime it refers  
 that faculty to Reason to bring out its <sup>sub</sup> objective accord with  
Ideas of Reason (indeterminately indicated)." (C. of J., 256)

*It is now quite easy to understand why Kant believes that the judgment in*  
~~Kant believes that our aesthetic judgments about objects~~  
 which we call <sup>objects</sup> sublime rest upon a specific Idea of purposive-  
 ness. The sublime object is purposive <sup>only</sup> in relation to the  
 mind of the judging subject. <sup>It</sup> ~~The object~~ is purposive in so  
 far as it enables the judging subject to bring about an in-  
 definite relation between imagination and Reason. <sup>The</sup> ~~this~~ purpose  
 which is ascribed to the object, ~~is not an objective purpose.~~  
~~It~~ is a purely subjective purpose. Kant is convinced that  
 the human mind has a natural desire to be reminded of the fact  
 that it is possessed of the faculty of Reason. Human beings  
 like being made conscious of the fact that they are rational  
 beings, that they are not limited to the world of sense, and can  
 raise themselves above it. The consciousness of this capacity  
 fills them with pleasure, ~~but this feeling of pleasure is of~~  
<sup>like any other pleasure</sup> course, purely subjective. Sublimity is a subjective feeling  
 and not a property of any object.

"True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the  
 judging subject, and not in the object of nature that occasions  
 this attitude by the estimate formed of it. Who would apply  
 the term "sublime" even to the shapeless mountain masses tower-  
 ing one above the other in wild disorder, with their pyramids  
 of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean, or suchlike things?  
 But in the contemplation of them, without any regard to their  
 form, the mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a  
 Reason placed, though quite apart from any definite purpose,  
 in conjunction therewith, and merely broadening its view, and  
 it feels itself elevated in its own estimate of itself on  
 finding all the might of imagination still unequal to its  
 Ideas." (C. of J., 256).]

Section 27.

We have learnt in the preceding section that in making judgments about the mathematically sublime or absolutely great we refer our representation of the object to Reason and its Idea of absolute totality. It is therefore not surprising that our judgment about the sublime manifests itself in a feeling of respect for our object. <sup>Respect may in fact be described as</sup> ~~For~~ "the feeling of our incapacity to attain to an Idea that is law for us, ~~is respect.~~"

(G. of J., 257.) <sup>It</sup> It has been shown in the Critique of Practical Reason that when we become aware that we are obliged to act in accordance with the commands of the moral law and at the same time that as finite beings we can never be in perfect accordance with it, we necessarily feel respect for this law. A finite being <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ knows that all his actions ought to be determined by the objective law of morality and is at the same time aware that <sup>he</sup> ~~it~~ is incapable of ever realising the demand <sup>him</sup> made on it feels respect. It is the consciousness of our own incapacity which produces this feeling, a feeling which would not exist in a purely rational being that according to his own nature would be in perfect harmony with the law of morality (See above ).

The feeling which accompanies our judgments about the sublime is of a very similar kind. ~~For~~ We say of an object that it is sublime or absolutely great when we become aware of our inability to comprehend the object in a whole of intuition. Our imagination despite ~~of~~ all its efforts is unable to comprehend the object which is given to it in the whole of one intuition. ~~and~~ This makes us think of Reason's Idea of absolute totality. It is Reason that recognises <sup>no</sup> ~~another~~ measure than the absolute

whole. From the fact that the respect which we feel for the object only arises because its representation makes us refer to Reason and its Idea of an absolute totality, it follows that properly speaking we do not feel respect for the object, but for the principle of Reason of which the representation of the object reminds us. We feel that we ought to realise the Idea of absolute totality, and that we are incapable of <sup>doing so</sup> ~~achieving this~~. The feeling of respect for the sublime in nature is in truth respect for our own vocation (Bestimmung). "which we attribute to an object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object in place of one for the Idea of humanity in our own self - the subject); and this feeling renders, as it were, intuitable <sup>macht</sup> (~~Macht~~ anschaulich) the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty of sensibility."

(C. of J. 257)

*Further, it has been explained*

~~We have seen~~ in the Critique of Practical Reason that respect is a feeling of a very special kind. There are contained in it the heterogeneous elements of pleasure and pain. Our respect for the moral law may be regarded as a kind of pleasure in so far as, in making us conscious of our being determined by the law of Reason, it elevates us above the sensible world. ~~We feel infinitely superior to it and this gives us pleasure.~~ But there is also an element of pain contained in the feeling of respect, <sup>in spite</sup> for we also feel that ~~despite~~ of all our efforts we can never fully realise the demand made upon us. The feeling of respect which is bound up with our judgments about the sublime is of a very similar nature. It is a feeling of pain arising from the consciousness of the inability

of our imagination to estimate the magnitude of the object and thus to conform <sup>to</sup> ~~with~~ the Idea of absolute totality. But it also is a feeling of pleasure, ~~for~~ <sup>to be</sup> it is our own Reason which makes us judge that every sensible object ~~is~~ <sup>to be</sup> infinitely small in comparison with the Idea of absolute totality.

"The feeling of the sublime is, therefore, at once a feeling of pain, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude, to attain to its estimation by Reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with Ideas of Reason, so far as the effort to attain to these is for us a law. It is, in other words, for us a law (of Reason), which goes to make us what we are, that we should esteem as small in comparison with Ideas of Reason everything which for us is great in nature as an object of sense; and that which makes us alive to the feeling of this supersensible side of our being harmonises with that law. Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude involves in itself a reference to something absolutely great, consequently a reference also to the law of Reason that this alone is to be adopted as the supreme measure of what is great. Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with Reason's laws, and a pain that makes us alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being, according to which it is purposive, and consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short of the Ideas of Reason." (C. of J., 257, 258) 7

Kant's argument is now quite clear. The human mind, as being possessed of the faculty of Reason, cannot recognise any other measure than the absolute totality. In estimating sensible objects aesthetically we become aware of the fact that we are quite incapable of fulfilling the demand made upon us. We find that our imagination, in representing certain objects to itself, is incapable of finding among sensible objects an appropriate standard for the measurement of the object. We feel the object to be absolutely great. But what is the ground of this feeling? <sup>Nothing</sup> else than that we become aware of the incapacity of our imagination. This is a feeling of pain. We feel that being <sup>sensible</sup> beings we are unable to estimate <sup>inadequately</sup> the magnitude of certain sensible objects, let alone to fulfil Reason's demand that we should recognise ~~nothing~~ <sup>nothing</sup> as <sup>the</sup> supreme measure <sup>as</sup> but the totality of the world.

At the same time ~~when~~ <sup>as</sup> we become aware of the inability of our imagination to estimate the magnitude of certain sensible objects which makes us call them sublime, we take pleasure in the fact that a sensuous faculty is incapable of ever conforming to Ideas of Reason. It makes us alive to our supersensible vocation. We feel raised above the world of sense.

"The feeling of the sublime is therefore at once a feeling of pain, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation by Reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with Ideas of Reason, so far as the effort to attain to these is for us a law."

(C. of J. . 257) 7

We take pleasure in the realisation ~~of the fact~~ that every standard of sensibility falls short of the Ideas of Reason. The object which we judge to be sublime may be regarded as purposive in so far as its representation enables us to refer to Reason and its principle.

We take pleasure in the object because it makes us realise the fact that every object of sense, even those which seem absolutely great to our imagination, fall short of the Idea of absolute totality. To become aware of the incapacity of the imagination gives pleasure to a rational being. It feels itself elevated above the sensible world. For although the object which is judged to be sublime seems repellent to our imagination which is incapable of comprehending it, it seems ~~a source of attraction~~ <sup>attractive</sup> to our Reason.

"The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself; yet again for the rational Idea of the supersensible it is not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort on the part of the imagination: and so in turn as much a source of attraction as it was repellent to mere sensibility."

(C. of J., 258)

~~It is very important to take note of the fact that our~~

~~judgments about the sublime are aesthetic judgments and as such~~  
~~fundamentally different from~~ logical or cognitive judgments, and

~~in making them we are not at all interested in knowledge of our~~  
~~object.~~ <sup>They</sup> do not employ any concepts at all, ~~we merely feel~~

~~a~~ <sup>determine</sup> harmony of our cognitive faculties. ~~This~~ <sup>and merely make us feel an</sup> harmony however is entirely different from the one which lies at the basis of <sup>in judgments about the sublime,</sup> our judgments about the beautiful. ~~For~~ imagination and Reason

<sup>which are</sup> the two faculties involved are felt to harmonise in virtue of their contrast, <sup>whereas in</sup> ~~in the case of an aesthetic judgment~~ about the beautiful we become aware of a perfect harmony of our cognitive faculties, <sup>and we</sup> ascribe subjective purposiveness to the object because, in representing it to ourselves, we feel that the two faculties of the mind involved accord with each other. ~~The idea of subjective purposiveness on which our judgments about the sublime are grounded is essentially different in that it arises out of our consciousness of the discord of imagination and Reason. The consciousness of that disharmony gives us pleasure because in our capacity as rational beings we like to represent to ourselves the complete diversity of our sensuous and our rational faculties.~~

"For just as in the estimate of the beautiful imagination and understanding by their concert generate subjective purposiveness of the mental faculties, so imagination and Reason do so here by their conflict - that is to say they induce a feeling of our possessing a pure and self-sufficient Reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose pre-eminence can only be made intuitively evident by the inadequacy of that faculty which in the presentation of magnitudes (of objects of sense) is itself unbounded." (C. of J., 258)

The remaining parts of this section add very little to what has already been said, and I will do no more than quote two passages in which Kant's main idea becomes particularly clear.

"The quality of the feeling of the sublime consists in its being, in respect of the faculty of forming aesthetic estimates, a feeling of pain at an object, which yet, at the same time, is represented as being purposive - a representation which derives its possibility from the fact that the subject's very incapacity

betrays the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of the same subject, and that the mind can only form an aesthetic estimate of the latter faculty by means of that incapacity." (C. of J., 259).

"If, now, a magnitude begins to tax the utmost stretch of our faculty of comprehension in an intuition, and still numerical magnitudes - in respect of which we are conscious of the boundlessness of our faculty - call upon the imagination for aesthetic comprehension in a greater unit, the mind then gets a feeling of being aesthetically confined within bounds. Nevertheless, with a view to the extension of imagination necessary for adequacy with what is unbounded in our faculty of Reason, namely the Idea of the absolute whole, the attendant pain, and, consequently, the want of purposiveness in our faculty of imagination, is still represented as purposive for Ideas of Reason and their animation. But in this very way the aesthetic judgment itself is subjectively purposive for Reason as source of Ideas, i.e. of such an intellectual comprehension as makes all aesthetic comprehension small, and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of a pain." (C. of J., 259, 260).

#### Section 28.

Kant's theory of the "Dynamically Sublime" <sup>which</sup> is set forth in this section is so much easier to understand than his theory of the "Mathematically sublime" that I will only discuss the main points of his argument without concerning myself with details.

The terms "Mathematically Sublime" and "Dynamically Sublime" are easily explained. <sup>The</sup> "Mathematically Sublime" is

an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite magnitude. <sup>The</sup> "Dynamically sublime" is an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite <sup>power</sup> might. Kant's argument runs as follows. In order to be enabled to estimate nature as dynamically sublime we must represent it to ourselves as a source of fear. In representing the object to ourselves we feel that even to try to offer any resistance to it is quite impossible. The object is thought to be infinitely superior to ourselves. It ~~has to~~ <sup>must</sup> be noted, however, that <sup>if we are to</sup> ~~he who~~ judges an object to be infinitely powerful or dynamically sublime <sup>we</sup> must not be in an actual state of fear. For when we are afraid of something we cannot play the part of a judge. The feeling of the sublime arises in us when we put ourselves in the position of a person who would have to offer resistance to the object and feel that any such attempt would be futile. We must not actually be in such a situation. We must not be afraid of our object. We look upon our object as fearful and yet are not afraid of it. It is clear, however, that this feeling of imaginary helplessness ~~alone will never make~~ <sup>cannot be the only condition</sup> ~~of our judging objects dynamically sublime.~~ <sup>we judge an object sublime, i.e. take pleasure in it.</sup> We have seen that the judgments about the mathematically sublime or absolutely great rest upon two conditions. In the first place we have to become aware of the incompetence of our imagination. The imagination, being unable to comprehend the object, feels it to be absolutely great, and the judging subject becomes in that way aware of its limitation as a <sup>sensuous</sup> ~~sensible~~ being. But we have also seen that in becoming aware of this incompetence of its imagination the subject refers to its rational faculty, which gives it a standard compared with which every sensible standard is infinitely small. The subject feels that as a rational being

it is infinitely superior even to the greatest natural object.

"In the immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its realm, we found our own limitation. But with this we also found in our rational faculty another non-sensuous standard, one which has that infinity itself under it as unit, and in comparison with which everything in nature is small, and so found in our minds a pre-eminence over nature even in its immeasurability."  
(C. of J.. 261).

Our judgments about the dynamically sublime are based upon a very similar principle. The object which we judge sublime makes us conscious of our own helplessness as <sup>sensuous</sup> ~~sensible~~ beings. We feel that physically nature is infinitely superior to us, that every attempt to offer resistance ~~to it~~ would be in vain. But we also feel that there is within us a faculty infinitely superior to nature. The object which is called sublime reveals to us our faculty of thinking ourselves independent of nature. Physically we are helpless. Nature may deprive us of everything (of all our worldly goods, healthy <sup>and</sup> life), but ~~she~~ <sup>it</sup> has no power over our moral personality. The feeling of our physical inferiority <sup>arises a</sup> ~~raises the~~ feeling of our moral superiority. "Therefore nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature." (C. of J.. 262) <sup>(Amen)</sup>

(Thus it becomes clear once more that the sublimity is in no sense a property of natural objects, and that it belongs

to the human mind alone. We call things sublime on the ground that they make us feel the sublimity of our own minds.

It will be obvious that Kant's theory of the dynamically sublime agrees in every respect with his theory of the mathematically sublime. He states once more that the Idea of sublimity arises from the fact that in representing the object to ourselves we feel the pre-eminence of our rational nature over physical nature even in its immeasurability, and he sets forth the view that it is <sup>our</sup> the consciousness of the incapacity of our imagination which makes us feel this. Kant does not explicitly state it but it is clear from the context that he *also* believes that our judgments about the dynamically sublime contain the two elements of pleasure and pain. The pain is felt because our imagination presents to itself the infinite superiority of nature; the pleasure is felt because this makes us think of our existence as rational beings. Kant might again have said, as in the preceding section, that "The object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of a pain." (C. of J., 260).

I should like to discuss one more point. On page 262 Kant says that the principle from which he has derived the judgment about the sublime may appear to be too far-fetched and subtle (vernunfttelt) and so <sup>be</sup> ~~he~~ thought to be beyond the reach of an aesthetic judgment. He goes on to say that this is not really the case and that observation of men proves the reverse. The principle may be the foundation of the commonest judgments although one is not always conscious of its presence.

*This is somewhat misleading as*  
~~Now this is a most surprising statement. For the reader~~  
 may ~~not infer~~ from it that Kant believes himself to have derived

the principle of aesthetic judgments about the sublime from empirical observation of actual <sup>judgments</sup> subjects. But Kant <sup>does not</sup> ~~cannot~~ really mean this. For as has become clear from the preceding sections he holds that the principle which underlies our aesthetic judgments about the sublime is an a priori principle, <sup>and</sup> ~~as we have seen~~ <sup>now</sup>, it is one of the fundamental doctrines of Kant's philosophy that no a priori judgments can ever be derived from empirical observation (See above <sup>or</sup>). In the next section he will deal with the question as to what kind of necessity and a priori validity can be ascribed to aesthetic judgments about the sublime. He will show that every <sup>one</sup> ~~person~~ who is susceptible to Ideas of Reason <sup>(emphasized his Idea)</sup> must necessarily judge certain objects sublime and is entitled to presuppose that every other subject will agree with him. <sup>and we</sup> We shall see that <sup>in Kant's</sup> ~~Kant is~~ of opinion that it is only the a priori character of the judgments which makes transcendental philosophy concern itself with them. As he puts it, <sup>\*</sup> "lifts them out of the sphere of empirical psychology in which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feelings of gratification or pain." <sup>(C. of J., 266.)</sup> I think Kant must understand in Section 28 by "observation of men" transcendental analysis of their judgments and not their empirical observation <sup>of them</sup>.

### Section 29.

<sup>The following</sup>

~~These~~ are the main points of the argument set forth in this Section. It seems to be impossible to concede to a judgment about the sublime any claim to universal validity and necessity. How can a person who <sup>makes</sup> ~~lays down~~ such a judgment demand everyone's agreement? How can he claim that everybody ought to call certain objects sublime? Such a claim seems to

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~~inexorable of being warranted.~~ <sup>unavoidable</sup> For as shown above, the feeling of the sublime depends on the susceptibility of the mind for ideas, and how can we presuppose that this susceptibility will exist in every human being? It seems obvious that in fact it <sup>can</sup> exist <sup>only among the highly civilized.</sup> ~~in none but the most highly cultured persons.~~ It is <sup>such people</sup> ~~these persons~~ who judge objects sublime which could merely terrify the savage and uncivilised. How can a claim to universal validity and necessity be made for a judgment which presupposes a special disposition of the mind on the part of the judging subject, viz., culture? Kant's answer is that although culture is requisite for the making of a judgment about the sublime, this does not involve its being an original product of culture. The feeling for moral Ideas is not introduced into society in a conventional manner. It has its roots in human nature. Every human being is subject to the moral law, and owing to this we may expect from every human being that ~~it~~ <sup>he</sup> will possess a feeling for moral Ideas. When we find that a man is insensitive to beauty, we <sup>reproach</sup> ~~tax~~ him with a <sup>lack</sup> ~~want~~ of taste; and when we find him indifferent to an object which we consider sublime we say of him that he has no feeling. We demand both taste and feeling of every man; and the only difference is that whereas in the case of an aesthetic judgment about the beautiful we <sup>agree</sup> ~~demand~~ it as a matter of course (since the judgment refers the imagination merely to the understanding), we demand <sup>agreement</sup> ~~agreement~~ <sup>with our</sup> ~~to an~~ aesthetic judgments about the sublime (since <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ refers the imagination to Reason as a faculty of Ideas) <sup>on a certain</sup> ~~rendered~~ subjective <sup>assumption</sup> ~~presupposition~~. What we <sup>assume</sup> ~~suppose~~ is the existence of moral feeling in every human being, and on this assumption we attribute necessity to our judgment.

I should like to <sup>add</sup> ~~make~~ a ~~few~~ remarks on one point which,

although not made explicit by Kant, seems to me to be implicit in his argument. According to Kant all aesthetic judgments, whether they are judgments about the beautiful or judgments about the sublime, are singular judgments, i.e., they are concerned with only one object and refer their representation of this object to a rule which cannot be determined. All aesthetic judgments possess *exemplary* universal validity, i.e., we judge the given object beautiful or sublime because we consider it to be an instance of a universal *exemplary* rule. ~~We assume that~~ Although we can never prove in a particular case that we have subsumed <sup>the object</sup> it correctly under the indeterminate rule <sup>we nevertheless presuppose</sup> that the indeterminate principle itself must be acknowledged by every judging subject. <sup>This means in</sup> In the case of <sup>every</sup> judgments about the sublime we presuppose that <sup>a</sup> subject <sup>possessing</sup> ~~which possesses~~ the faculties of imagination and Reason must necessarily take pleasure in becoming conscious of the harmonious relation of these two faculties. We have seen that the consciousness of this harmony, <sup>which is a harmony through contrast</sup> (~~harmony by way of contrast~~) arises in us when, in representing a sensible object to ourselves, we feel that we are rational beings and as such infinitely superior to nature and all the objects contained in it. Aesthetic judgments about the sublime rest upon the presupposition that this feeling will be shared by every finite rational being, i.e., by <sup>every</sup> a being which belongs to two worlds, the world of sense and the intelligible rational world. ~~That human beings are capable of feeling this pleasure is not due to psychological peculiarities of the individual. The principle on which the judgment rests is a subjectively necessary a priori principle.~~

"In this modality of aesthetic judgments, namely their

assumed necessity, lies what is for the Critique of Judgment a moment of capital importance. For this is exactly what makes an a priori principle apparent in their case, and lifts them out of the sphere of empirical psychology, in which otherwise they would remain buried amid the feeling of gratification and pain (only with the senseless exultation of finer feeling), so as to place them, and, thanks to them, to place the faculty of judgment itself, in the class of judgments of which the basis of an a priori principle is the distinguishing feature, and, thus distinguished, to introduce them into transcendental philosophy." (C. of J., 266.)

I may now conclude my exposition of Kant's theory of the sublime disregarding the passage headed "General Remarks upon the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments." The rest of the Analytic of aesthetic judgments consists of two parts. In the first part Kant <sup>deals</sup> ~~occupies himself~~ with the "Deduction <sup>of</sup> aesthetic judgments," and in the second he sets forth his theory of art and the artist. It is easy to see why Kant deals with the deduction of aesthetic judgments and with the problems of art after his account of the judgments about the sublime.

His reason for doing so seems to me that he wanted to bring the analysis of aesthetic judgments to an end before concerning himself with their deduction and discussing the problem of art and <sup>the</sup> artist. For, as he will explain in Section 50, he believes that the deduction of aesthetic judgments is directed only to ~~the~~ judgments about the beautiful and not to those about the sublime. It is also clear that the problem of art and artistic production does not concern ~~the~~ judgments about the sublime, but only those about the beautiful.

We see that the remaining parts of the Analytic of Judgment will be concerned with the beautiful alone and <sup>will</sup> have nothing whatever to do with the sublime. This makes it all the more difficult to understand why Kant continues giving the heading "Analytic of the Sublime" to those parts of the <sup>aesthetic</sup> "Analytic of Judgment." I must confess that I cannot find any explanation for this.

### Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments.

#### Section 50.

We have stated time and again that our judgments of taste <sup>are not</sup> judgments about the beautiful are fundamentally different from logical judgments. In making them we are ~~not~~ concerned <sup>not</sup> with ~~what~~ <sup>of</sup> properties ~~may belong to~~ the object which we judge, but merely with our own subjective feelings about the object. And yet there is some reference to the object present in our <sup>judgment</sup> ~~subject~~. When we call an object beautiful we presuppose that it possesses certain qualities which make the subject that represents it to itself take pleasure in it. It is true we are not at all concerned with these properties. But we ascribe to it a form which makes the judging subject conscious of a harmony of its faculties of representation. We have called this subjective purposiveness. <sup>that</sup> We see in ~~what~~ <sup>in the sense that they</sup> sense the judgments of taste are referred to ~~their~~ <sup>object</sup> ~~object~~. They ascribe to it a form which necessarily gives every subject pleasure. The purposiveness which we ascribe to the object is merely subjective and yet we cannot but derive it in some way from the object. "For the purposiveness has its foundation in the object and its outward form - although it does not signify the reference ~~to~~ this to other objects according

to concepts (for the purpose of cognitive judgments), but is merely concerned in general with the apprehension of this form so far as it proves accordant in the mind with the faculty of concepts as well as with that of their presentation (Vorstellung) which is identical with that of apprehension."

(C. of J., 279).

It is <sup>concerned</sup> easy to see that since our judgments of taste are in <sup>the</sup> ~~the indicated way~~ <sup>concerned</sup> with their object and its form, the question may be raised, <sup>is</sup> ~~What~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>source</sup> of this purposiveness? <sup>or does</sup> ~~is~~ why nature presents us with objects which make us feel a harmony of our faculties of cognition? It follows that a more analysis of the judgments of taste cannot be considered satisfactory. We have also to answer the question: How are judgments of taste possible, i.e., how can we make an a priori judgment which presupposes that nature will present us with subjectively purposive objects? ~~We have now.~~ Having analysed the judgments of taste into their elements, ~~to connect ourselves~~ <sup>we must now deal</sup> with their Reduction, i.e., we have to ask: Have we the right to <sup>make</sup> ~~lay down~~ judgments of taste? We have to justify the claim to universality and necessity which is implied in them.

This does not apply to our aesthetic judgments about the sublime, ~~for~~ <sup>as we have seen</sup> unlike judgments of taste they are in no way concerned with the form of their object. They are entirely subjective. ~~We have seen that sublimity cannot in any sense be regarded as belonging to any object.~~ <sup>It</sup> ~~Sublimity is a property of the mind,~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~this may be inferred from the fact that the idea of the sublime arises in us when nature presents us with an object which we cannot comprehend.~~ <sup>Therefore</sup> ~~It is clear that,~~ it is obvious nonsense to raise the question: Why does nature present us with objects which we <sup>judge</sup> ~~find~~ sublime? ~~Judgments about~~

~~the sublime do not ascribe to nature any kind of purposive-~~  
~~ness.~~ The consciousness of a purposive relation between  
 imagination and Reason <sup>that consciousness</sup> which lies at the basis of our judg-  
 ments about the sublime is <sup>not in any way</sup> ~~in no way~~ referred to <sup>an</sup> ~~this~~ object.  
<sup>all that has given a to</sup> ~~The object~~ gives us occasion for becoming conscious of a  
 capacity of our own minds. It is not the object itself but  
 our own minds <sup>and this</sup> which make us think of our being possessed of  
 Reason ~~of our~~ being able to conceive Ideas of a supersensible  
 world. And it is clear that since the object which is judged  
 is a sensible object, it can in no way be held responsible for  
 the pleasure which we take in our becoming conscious of our  
 superiority over the sensible world. Judgments about the  
 sublime are a priori and necessary judgments. The claim made  
 by them is that every object which makes the judging subject  
 aware of its rational character will give pleasure to it. The  
 "exposition" of the judgments about the sublime has shown  
 that the human mind, as being possessed of imagination and Reason,  
 is capable of relating them to each other, of becoming aware <sup>on</sup>  
 the presentation of a sensible object of its supersensible  
 capacity. By showing that this is possible we have established  
 the universal validity and necessity claimed by the judgments.  
 It follows that their "exposition" is at the same time their  
 "deduction". For the former has shown that the subject, without  
 attributing to nature any purpose, is capable of bringing about  
 a purposive relation of its cognitive faculties.

"The sublime in nature is improperly so-called, and ~~that~~  
 sublimity should, in strictness, be attributed merely to the  
 attitude of thought, (Denkungsart), or, rather, to that which  
 serves as basis for this in human nature. The apprehension

of an object otherwise formless and in conflict with purposes (unzweckmaessig) supplies the mere occasion for our coming to a consciousness of this basis; and the object is in this way put to a subjectively-purposive use, but it is not estimated as subjectively-purposive on its own account, <sup>and</sup> because of its form..... Consequently the <sup>E</sup>exposition we gave of judgments upon the sublime in nature was at the same time their Deduction. For in our analysis of the reflection on the part of judgment in this case we found that in such judgments there is a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties, which has to be laid a priori at the basis of the faculty of purposes (the will) and which is therefore itself a priori purposive. This, then, at once involves the deduction i.e., the justification of the claim of such a judgment to universally necessary validity." (C. of J., 280).

We see that it is only the judgments of taste which require a deduction. Our first business is to find out what method this deduction will have to follow.

### Section 37.

Only those judgments require a deduction which lay claim to some kind of necessity. This is the case with judgments of taste. They lay claim to subjective universal validity, <sup>and</sup> in making them we demand that every <sup>one</sup> other person should agree <sup>with</sup> to our judgment. Judgments of taste differ from logical judgments in that the predicate of the judgment <sup>of taste</sup> does not make an assertion about the object as such, <sup>whereas in</sup> in a logical judgment the predicate stands in necessary connexion with its <sup>sub</sup>ject because it is attributed to it as a property. To take an

example, when we say: the table is round, we mean by this that the predicate of the judgment (round) is necessarily connected with its subject. Now this subject is the object about which an *assertion* is made in the judgment and to which a certain property is attributed. ~~As regards the Judgments of~~ <sup>on the other hand,</sup> taste ~~they~~ <sup>they</sup> do not attribute any properties to their objects as such; and yet there is a claim to necessity implicit in them, for when we call a thing beautiful, we mean by this that the object judged must necessarily produce pleasure in every person who judges it. The pleasure which is claimed ~~for the judgment~~ is of a specific kind: it is the pleasure in the consciousness of the subjective purposiveness which arises when we present the object to ourselves. A judgment of taste claims subjective universal necessity <sup>in doing so has</sup> and ~~desires~~ <sup>to</sup> vindicate the claim made by it. We have to ask ourselves; <sup>the question</sup> ~~what right~~ <sup>when we judge</sup> has ~~he who judges~~ <sup>what right have we</sup> a thing beautiful on the ground that ~~he~~ <sup>we</sup> take pleasure in it to assume that everybody else will take the same pleasure in it and as a consequence of this <sup>will</sup> ~~agree~~ <sup>with the</sup> to his judgment?

<sup>distinction</sup> But ~~before~~ <sup>draw a clear</sup> proceeding we have once more to distinguish clearly between subjective aesthetic judgments and objective cognitive judgments. There are two kinds of cognitive judgments; (a) Theoretical judgments <sup>which are</sup> based upon concepts of the understanding. Those among them which are pure a priori judgments are entirely based upon the pure concepts <sup>of the</sup> ~~which are~~ the universal understanding, which are the universal conditions of our knowledge of nature. <sup>(b)</sup> Secondly, practical judgments which are based upon a priori concepts of Reason. <sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Kant does not actually state it here but it is important to note that according to his doctrine all practical judgments are a priori judgments based upon a priori concepts of freedom. He does not specially mention this ~~fact~~ because in this passage he is concerned with a priori cognitive judgments alone, namely (a) a priori theoretical judgments based upon a priori concepts of nature and (b) a priori practical judgments based upon a priori concepts of freedom.

It is not difficult to understand how cognitive judgments may claim universal validity, <sup>for</sup> ~~but~~ once the universal validity and necessity of the concepts on which they rest <sup>have been</sup> ~~can be~~ established, it is easy to see why the judgments which make use of these concepts are necessary and universally valid. But it seems very difficult to understand how a judgment which does not make use of any concepts <sup>at all</sup> can lay claim to ~~any kind of~~ universal validity and necessity. A judgment of taste is always a singular judgment. The subject <sup>that makes it</sup> ~~who lays it down~~ does not compare the object with any other object, <sup>and what</sup> ~~that~~ is asserted by the subject ~~which lays down the judgment~~ is merely that the form of the object which it represents to itself makes it become aware of a specific state of mind which it presumes would necessarily be the same in every other subject which would represent the same object to itself. The curious fact is that universal validity is attributed to a singular judgment, <sup>and</sup> ~~i.e.~~ a judgment which is made independently of concepts. Another remarkable thing is that when we <sup>make</sup> ~~lay down~~ a judgment of taste, we do not take any account of other <sup>the</sup> ~~people's~~ judgments <sup>made by other</sup> ~~which may~~ <sup>people in the past.</sup> ~~have been made previously to our own.~~ <sup>(It is clear why this must have been if)</sup> If we made our judgments dependent on other people's opinions we could never ascribe any necessity to <sup>them</sup> ~~it~~. We could find out in that way what things are generally found beautiful, <sup>but such</sup> ~~Such a judgment~~ <sup>voted</sup> ~~no ever~~ which would be based "on a collection of notes and interrogation of others as to what sort of sensations they experience" (C. of J. 281), <sup>It is strange</sup> ~~A judgment~~ <sup>clearly</sup> ~~would be~~ an empirical and not an a priori judgment. ~~A judgment of taste is an a priori judgment~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~it~~ claims universal validity and <sup>should</sup> ~~the strange fact is that it~~ bases this claim "upon an

autonomy of the subject passing judgment on the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation) upon his own taste, and yet is also not to be derived from concepts." (C.of J. 281)

We see that a judgment of taste is as regards its logical character, fundamentally different from every other judgment. "For, first, it has universal validity a priori, yet without having a logical universality according to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgment. Secondly, it has a necessity (which must invariably rest upon a priori grounds), but one which depends upon no a priori proofs by the representation of which it would be competent to enforce the assent which the judgment of taste demands of everyone." (C.of J. 281)

The deduction of the judgments of taste will have to <sup>deal</sup> ~~concern itself~~ with the question as to how judgments which possess such peculiar logical characteristics are possible. But before proceeding to the deduction we have once more to bring out and illustrate with the help of examples the two logical peculiarities implicit in our judgments of taste.

### Section 32.

The first peculiarities of the judgment of taste is as follows. "The judgment of taste determines its object in respect of delight (as a thing of beauty) with a claim to the agreement of everyone, just as if it were objective." (C.of J. 281) We have seen that a claim to universal validity is implied in every judgment of taste. This is <sup>why</sup> ~~the reason that~~ we speak of the beautiful as if it were a property of the object. We express our judgment <sup>as if it were</sup> ~~in the form of~~ a logical

judgment. To take an example: we say, This flower is beautiful, i.e., we speak of its <sup>beauty</sup> as if ~~it~~ were an objective quality. That there is such an objective element present in every judgment about the beautiful becomes obvious when we compare it with our judgments about the pleasant. ~~It is quite true that~~ <sup>indeed</sup> We may say of the same flower that it is pleasant. ~~that~~ But ~~in~~ doing so we do not regard pleasantness as a property of the object, ~~may be seen from the fact that we do~~ <sup>for we do</sup> not expect others to agree with us. We should not protest at all if another person objected to our judgment and asked us to formulate <sup>it</sup> in a different manner. We should have no objection if someone made us say: The flower pleases us, instead of saying: It is pleasant. This raises a difficulty regarding the judgments about beauty. It seems as if it were necessary to regard beauty as a property of the object "which does not adapt itself to the diversity of heads and the individual senses of the multitude but to which they must adapt themselves if they <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>going</sup> to pass judgment upon it."

(C. of J. <sup>282.</sup>) It is however quite easy to show that this is also impossible, ~~for~~ <sup>we</sup> we call a thing beautiful for no other reason than that it gives us pleasure. Beauty cannot possibly be attributed to the object as such. We see what the difficulty is: we formulate our judgments of taste as if they were logical judgments, and on the other hand the predicate of our judgment is devoid of all meaning unless it is referred to the individual person who makes it.

<sup>when we</sup> He ~~who~~ makes an aesthetic judgment <sup>we ground</sup> ~~grounds~~ it on <sup>our</sup> his own individual pleasure. How then can ~~he~~ <sup>we</sup> regard ~~his~~ <sup>our</sup> judgment as ~~in~~ any way as universally valid? "Besides, every judgment which is to show the taste of the individual, is required to be an independent judgment of the individual himself." (C. of J. 282.)

When we call a thing beautiful we do not, and cannot, consult other people, for if we did we could never think of our judgment as a necessary a priori judgment. We should make a merely empirical judgment, which would state what in most cases, perhaps even in every case, actually takes place, but not what in every case ought to take place. It is difficult to understand how we can first formulate our judgments about beauty as if they were objective judgments, and then believe that we are justified in doing so for the very reason that without consulting other people we rely entirely upon our own subjective feelings. We do not allow ourselves to be dissuaded from our judgment. We behave as if it were based upon objective concepts, as if we could prove that we were right and everyone else wrong. We feel the object to be beautiful, and, relying upon nothing but this <sup>purely</sup> subjective feeling, we demand that everyone else should feel as we do.

### Section 33.

"Proofs are of no avail whatever for determining the judgment of taste." (C. of J. 284.) This is the second peculiarity of judgments of taste. It indicates more than anything else their character as subjective judgments. After what has been said it is easy to show why aesthetic judgments are incapable of being made valid by proofs. We have seen that when we judge a thing to be beautiful, we do not take any account of the judgments of others, but rely simply upon our own feelings. Logical judgments are of an entirely different kind. We can make others agree with a logical judgment, for we may be able to prove to them that we are

~~that we are~~ right and they are wrong. The truth of logical judgments is independent of the subject <sup>who makes them</sup> ~~of the judgment~~. They are universally valid and necessary, <sup>and</sup> they hold for every <sup>judging</sup> subject, ~~i.e. they are objective~~. We can enforce our judgment upon others ~~persons~~ by proving to them that the property which we ascribe to the object really belongs to it, and ~~to the other persons~~ <sup>if they</sup> who examine our proof and find that it is logically sound <sup>they</sup> will agree with us.

<sup>^</sup> ~~This is quite different in the case of an aesthetic judgment, as~~ <sup>With aesthetic judgments the position is quite different.</sup> ~~may be illustrated~~ <sup>this</sup> by an example. Let us assume that someone ~~does not think~~ <sup>imagines that</sup> a poem that he reads beautiful on the ground that it does not give him pleasure. However many people may disagree with him, he cannot change his opinion about it. He will abide by his judgment even if others adduced <sup>against it</sup> all sorts of rules laid down by the most celebrated critics of taste. He may begin to harbour doubts as to whether he has cultivated his taste sufficiently. <sup>But</sup> ~~and yet~~ unless the poem gives him pleasure he cannot call it beautiful. Other people's judgments cannot ~~have any effect upon his judgment~~ <sup>make him appreciate what in fact he does not appreciate.</sup> ~~The approval of others affords no valid proof available for the estimate of beauty.~~

"The judgment of others, where unfavourable to ours, may, no doubt, rightly make us suspicious in respect of our own, but convince us that it is wrong it never can. Hence there is no empirical ground of proof that can coerce anyone's judgments of taste." (C. of J., 284.)

Neither ~~then~~ <sup>there</sup> are a priori proofs. There are no objective proofs in respect of beauty. "I take my stand on the ground that my judgment is to be one of taste, and not one of understanding or Reason." (C. of J., 285.)

Kant says that this would appear to be one of the chief reasons why the faculty of aesthetic judgment has been given the name of "taste" (Geschmack). "For a man may recount to me all the ingredients of a dish, and observe of each and every one of them that it is just what I like, and, in addition, rightly commend the wholesomeness of the food; yet I am deaf to all these arguments. I try the dish with my own tongue and palate, and I pass judgment according to their verdict (not according to universal principles)." (C. of J., 285)

Thus it seems as if our judgments of taste were merely <sup>sub-</sup>objective judgments dependent entirely on the personal taste of the individual <sup>making them</sup> ~~person who pronounces it~~. As a matter of fact, as has often been stated before, a judgment of taste is always a singular judgment. It is a judgment about a particular object <sup>made</sup> ~~laid down~~ by a particular person. It ~~does~~ takes no account whatever either of other persons or <sup>of</sup> other objects. It is of course possible <sup>for us to</sup> ~~that we can~~ compare several singular aesthetic judgments and make a universal judgment out of them. For instance we may say: All tulips are beautiful, because we have found that every tulip we have seen so far has given us pleasure and as a result of this been judged beautiful. But such a judgment is clearly no longer an aesthetic but a logical judgment. A judgment of taste as has been stated again and again, is concerned with a particular object and with the feeling of a particular person about it and nothing else. <sup>how</sup>

"But it is only the judgment whereby I regard an individual given tulip as beautiful, i.e. regard my delight in it as of universal validity, that is a judgment of taste." (C. of J. 285)  
What is so strange about a judgment of taste is that although

it is merely <sup>sub</sup>jective, i.e., entirely dependent on the feeling of a particular person about a particular object, it lays claim to universal validity for every person. It does so as unreservedly as it would if it were an objective judgment resting on grounds of cognition and capable of being proved to demonstration." (C. of J. 285) <sup>and</sup>

### Section 35.

We have seen again and again that the difference between logical and aesthetic judgments is that the latter do not make use of concepts. How essential this difference is may be seen from the fact that, as has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason (see above, ), a logical judgment depends entirely on the universal concepts of the understanding. It has been proved that the understanding provides the human mind with certain necessary universal rules, <sup>that</sup> Intuition provides it with particulars, <sup>and that</sup> ~~It is~~ the faculty of Judgment ~~that~~ enables us to relate particulars and universals to one another, to subsume a particular case under a universal rule, <sup>to</sup> and thus <sup>to</sup> arrive at an objectively necessary and universally valid judgment (logical judgment). ~~Now~~ We have learnt that aesthetic judgments do not employ any concepts at all and are therefore incapable of being proved. But we have also seen that the two kinds of judgments (aesthetic and logical judgments) agree on one point. They both lay claim to universal validity and necessity, with the difference that the universality claimed by logical judgments is objective ~~that~~ claimed by aesthetic judgments subjective. <sup>If it be asked</sup> ~~Now~~ What is the subjective condition of all judgments? <sup>the answer may be:</sup> It is the judging faculty itself. The faculty of Judgment, as has been pointed out several times before is not an independent faculty of the mind, <sup>and</sup> ~~It~~ never does more than <sup>merely</sup> relate two other faculties of the mind to one another. In the case

of a logical judgment. it brings about a determinate relation between the imagination and the understanding.

It is clear that in the case of a merely subjective or aesthetic judgment the faculty of Judgment cannot bring about such a determinate relation between imagination and understanding. In making such a judgment the subject does not know of any definite relation between the particulars given to it and universal rules. We merely feel that there exists some such relation, and we judge an object beautiful on the ground that in representing it to ourselves we become aware of a harmony of our faculties of representation (imagination and understanding). In the case of a logical judgment, the faculty of Judgment is <sup>on the one hand</sup> provided with particulars given in intuition and synthetised by the imagination <sup>on the other</sup> ~~on the one hand~~ and universal rules produced by the understanding. ~~on the other~~. Judgment does nothing but subsume the given particulars under the universal concepts. But, as we have seen time and again, there exists yet another kind of Judgment, different from determinant Judgment (which we employ for the making of objective judgments), namely, reflective Judgment. Reflective Judgment does not relate imagination and understanding in a determinate manner. It does not subsume the intuitions which have been synthetised by the imagination under given universal concepts. It is concerned with an indefinite relation between imagination and understanding, and, in applying its principle, there is no assumption that the given manifold is determined by definite concepts of the understanding. All that is assumed is that there is some reference to understanding and its principle of unity.

"But the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts. Hence, it can only have its ground in the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the judging faculty itself, or Judgment. Employed in respect of a representation whereby an object is given, this requires the harmonious accordance of two powers of representation. These are, the imagination (for the intuition and the arrangement of the manifold of intuition) and the understanding (for the concept as a representation of the unity of this arrangement). Now, since no concept of the object underlies the judgment here, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation whereby an object is given) under the conditions enabling the understanding in general to advance from the intuition to concepts. That is to say, since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematises without a concept, the judgment of taste must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually quickening activity of the imagination in its freedom, and of the understanding with its conformity to law. It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be estimated by the purposiveness of the representation (by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free play. Taste, then, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations, (Darstellungen) i.e., of the imagination, under the faculty of concepts, i.e. the understanding, so far as the former in its freedom <sup>(1)</sup> accords with the latter in its conformity to law." (C. of J., 287.)

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(1) Having dealt with almost every point of this argument before, I may refer to my previous discussions; see above,

Section 36.

In the preceding sections we <sup>have discussed</sup> ~~concerned ourselves with~~ the logical peculiarities of the judgments of taste. We had <sup>to do</sup> ~~done~~ so because the deduction of these judgments which will examine the question as to whether we are entitled to make judgments of taste will have to use as its guiding principle their logical form. In fact, it will be concerned with nothing else.

"For the discovery of this title by means of a deduction of judgments of taste, we can only avail ourselves of the guidance of the formal peculiarities of judgments of this kind, and consequently the mere consideration of their logical form." (C. of J., 287).

Before, ~~however~~, proceeding to the deduction it is necessary to be quite clear as to the task which we have before us. We have to state quite clearly what the problem of a deduction of judgments of taste is <sup>and what</sup> ~~that~~ exactly ~~do~~ we mean by <sup>the</sup> deduction of a judgment? <sup>The Deduction</sup> We remind ourselves that in the Critique of Pure Reason we <sup>had</sup> ~~have been concerned with~~ a deduction of the concepts on which our a priori cognitive judgments are based, ~~the categories of the understanding~~. We remember that It has been shown that all <sup>our</sup> ~~out~~ knowledge of objects depends on two faculties of the mind, namely, intuition and understanding. The Critique of Pure Reason has succeeded in establishing the objective validity and necessity of the concepts of the understanding. Why did we succeed in proving that the concepts of the understanding are objectively valid and necessary? For no other reason than that <sup>This was done by showing how to be</sup> ~~we could show that they are~~ necessary conditions of experience. Every judgment about objects, whether it <sup>be</sup> ~~is~~ an empirical or an a priori judgment, depends on the a priori concepts of the understanding. They are a priori necessary because they are conditions

of the manifold of intuitions being united in one consciousness.  
(See above, )

"To form a cognitive judgment we may immediately connect with the perception of an object the concept of an object in general, the empirical predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this way a judgment of experience is produced. Now this judgment rests on the foundation of a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition enabling it to be thought as the determination of an object. These concepts (the categories) call for a deduction, and such was supplied in the Critique of Pure Reason. That deduction enabled us to solve the problem, How are synthetical a priori cognitive judgments possible? This problem had, accordingly, to do with the a priori principles of <sup>pure</sup> understanding and its theoretical judgments." (C. of J., 287, 288)

That the deduction of judgments of taste will have to follow an altogether different principle is obvious from the fact that <sup>these</sup> ~~these~~ judgments are not based upon any objective concepts. The judgments are not concerned with objects as such but only with their relation to the subject. What <sup>(is exactly)</sup> the assertion made by a judgment of taste? What do we mean when we say: This thing is beautiful or ugly? It is clear that what is implied in such a judgment is that the representation of the object excites a feeling of pleasure or pain in the subject which pronounces the judgment. What is asserted in it is that there is a connection between <sup>the</sup> representation of an object and a subjective feeling. <sup>(besides judgments of taste)</sup> How ~~there~~ are other judgments as well in which the same <sup>connection</sup> is expressed, namely, our judgments about the pleasant. When we judge a thing to be pleasant

we also presuppose that there is a connection between<sup>the</sup> representation of the object and a subjective feeling. The essential difference between the two judgments is that when we assert<sup>or</sup> <sup>that it</sup> that a thing is pleasant we do not attribute any necessity to this ~~connection~~. We merely state that it exists in ourselves. But we ~~do~~ in no way demand that another person should take the same pleasure in the object.

Now <sup>As</sup> has often been pointed out, such a claim to necessity and universal validity is implicit in our judgments of taste. It follows that judgments of taste require a deduction. The task of this deduction is to <sup>show</sup> ~~know~~ how a subjective judgment can lay claim to necessity. How can we presuppose that the pleasure which we take in a given object must necessarily be felt by everyone else?

"We may also put the problem in this way: how is a judgment possible which, going merely upon the individual's own feeling of pleasure in an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a pleasure attached to the representation of the same object in every other individual, and does so a priori, i.e., without being allowed to wait and see if other people will be of the same mind?" (C. of J., 288.)

The fundamental problem of the Critique of Pure Reason was: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible, i.e. how are judgments possible the predicate of which is not <sup>implicitly</sup> ~~virtually~~ contained in its subject, <sup>- concept requiring only to be extracted from it.</sup> ~~so that we need do no more than merely extract it from the object by analysing the latter.~~ As regards judgments of taste, with which we are here concerned, it is easily shown that they are <sup>synthetic, and</sup> ~~sympathetic~~ (not analytic) judgments. For that their predicate (the pleasure connected <sup>with</sup> ~~in~~ the representation of <sup>it is self-evident</sup>

the object) is not implicit in the concept of the <sup>sub</sup>object, ~~is, is~~ self-evident. For when we assert that we take pleasure in the object, we do so without being in the least interested in knowing what the object itself <sup>is</sup>, i.e., <sup>we desire</sup> irrespective of any concept. It is equally clear that the judgment of taste ~~gives~~ <sup>goes</sup> beyond the intuition of the object which is judged. Intuition is an element of knowledge. It enables us to know what the <sup>sensible</sup> intuitive qualities of an object are. A judgment of taste on the other hand joins as predicate to our intuition of the object something that has nothing whatever to do with the object. For by asserting that in intuiting the object we feel pleasure we connect our intuition of it with something that <sup>has reference only</sup> ~~is entirely~~ referred to the <sup>self</sup> object, viz., our own feeling of pleasure.

The problem to be solved is: How are such a a priori synthetic judgments <sup>possible</sup> ?

"It is easy to see that judgments of taste are synthetic, for they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and join as predicate to that intuition something which is not even a cognition at all, namely, the feeling of pleasure (or pain). But, although the predicate (the personal pleasure that is connected with the representation) is empirical, still we need not go further than what is involved in the expressions of their claim to see that, so far as concerns the agreement required of everyone, they are a a priori judgments, or mean to pass for such. This problem of the Critique of Judgment, therefore, is part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy; How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (C. of J., 288, 289.)

Section 37.

In this section, which is headed "What exactly it is that is asserted a priori of an object in a judgment of taste", Kant merely repeats things which have been stated before, and with which I have dealt on several occasions. He states once more that the synthesis of a representation of an object with pleasure can never be known a priori. A judgment which determines such a connexion between representation and pleasure is an empirical judgment. (About this see above <sup>on</sup> and <sup>that between</sup> The only connexion between a representation ~~of~~ a feeling which can be determined a priori is the representation of the moral law and the feeling of respect for the moral law (See above <sup>for</sup> For the a priori determination of this feeling, however, we can "rely upon the basis of an a priori principle in Reason" (C. of J. 289) <sup>moral</sup> Moreover, the ~~moral~~ feeling is, strictly speaking, identical with and a mere consequence of the determination of the will. Therefore it cannot be compared with the feeling of pleasure with which judgments of taste are concerned (See above

<sup>for</sup> Moral feeling requires a determinate concept of a law, "whereas the pleasure in taste has to be connected immediately with the simple estimate <sup>prior</sup> ~~given~~ to any concept." (C. of J., 289) <sup>for</sup> (See above, <sup>for</sup>

For the same reason all judgments of taste are singular judgments: <sup>delight with it or</sup> For they unite the predicate of ~~such a concept~~ but <sup>concept but with a given</sup> ~~to a singular~~ empirical representation (See above, <sup>for</sup>

Why Kant repeats all these things becomes clear from the last paragraph of our section. He wants to emphasize once more that the pleasure which is felt in the beautiful object can never be determined, a priori. It is by experience that we find out

what objects give us pleasure. What the Deduction will have to concern itself with is not the pleasure of which we speak when we call a thing beautiful. It is the fact that we attribute universal validity to our pleasure which alone indicates that we refer our judgment to an a priori principle. The problem to be solved is: Are we justified in attributing universal validity and necessity to our pleasure in the beautiful or are we not?

"Hence, in a judgment of taste, what is represented a priori as a universal rule for the Judgment and as valid for everyone, is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure ~~perceived~~, as it is, to be combined in the mind with the mere estimate of an object. A judgment to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empirical judgment. But if it asserts that I think the object beautiful, i.e. that I may attribute that delight to everyone as necessary, it is then an a priori judgment." (C. of J., 289)

#### Section 38.

In this section we find the deduction of judgments of taste. Kant's argument may be paraphrased as follows. It has been shown that ~~our pleasure in the beautiful is a pleasure in the pure form of the object~~ <sup>we</sup> judge an object to be beautiful when <sup>we become</sup> representing it to ourselves ~~makes us~~ conscious of a harmonious relation of our cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding). It is the faculty of Judgment and its principle of reflection which enables us to become aware of this. Judgment relates imagination <sup>and</sup> with ~~the~~ understanding to one another without making use of any definite concept. It is an entirely

indeterminate relation of the two faculties in which we take pleasure. On the other hand our judgment is just as independent of ~~sensation as~~ <sup>it is of concepts</sup> It is the mere contemplation of the object which gives us pleasure. We are in no way interested in knowing what the object is. Neither do we take pleasure in its sensible properties. The judgment is essentially different from our judgment about the pleasant (judgments of sense). It is a judgment of reflection. We possess a faculty of aesthetic reflexion, i.e., a faculty of becoming aware of a harmony of the faculties of the mind which are the conditions of knowledge in general. We call an object beautiful because it makes us feel this harmony. We have shown that our pleasure in the object arises ~~out of~~ <sup>from</sup> its subjective purposiveness for the faculty of Judgment. We take pleasure in the object only because its representation brings the subjective conditions of knowledge in general into a harmonious relation.

Kant's argument goes on as follows. We are entitled to presuppose that the accordance of a representation with these conditions of the faculty of Judgment will be the same in all men, and that therefore ~~they~~ <sup>these conditions</sup> must admit of being assumed valid a priori for everyone.

"In other words, we are warranted in exacting from everyone the pleasure or subjective purposiveness of the representation in respect of the relation of the cognitive faculties engaged in the estimate of a sensible object in general." (C. of J. 290)

What is so strange about this so-called deduction for which Kant has prepared us from Section 30 onwards is not so much that it is so short. Neither is it that

Kant expects the reader to understand his terms, that he

*presuppose* *that we shall*  
~~expects us~~, for instance, ~~to~~ find no difficulty in understanding what he means by expressions like "subjective purposiveness in respect of the relation of the cognitive faculties", etc. For all this has been explained so often that Kant can <sup>expect</sup> ~~presuppose~~ <sub>us to</sub> that we understand what he means. But it is very strange that Kant fails to put forward what is really the main point of his argument. Unless he had told us before, we should find it impossible to understand on what grounds he believes that the subjective conditions of Judgment in general must necessarily be supposed to be the same in all men. We ~~do~~ understand this only because Kant has told us in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" that since for the sake of the communicability of objective knowledge it is necessary that determinate relations between imagination and the understanding should be the same *in every subject* it follows that their indeterminate relation is also identical in every human being *and therefore*

~~From this again it may be inferred that aesthetic judgments may rightly claim universal validity.~~ It is true that Kant in a note on page 290 touches upon this point. His words are, "In order to be justified in claiming universal agreement for an aesthetic judgment merely resting on subjective grounds it is sufficient to assume; (1) that the subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic Judgment are identical <sup>in</sup> with all men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men would be incapable of communicating their representations, or even their knowledge." (C. of J., 290, Note) <sup>2</sup>

*But* I think no one will deny that it would be almost impossible

to understand this unless Kant had explained it before, especially in view of the fact that the most important point of the argument is contained in the last few words ("or even their knowledge", und selbst das Erkenntnis).

I may mention that what I am <sup>criticizing</sup> ~~criticizing~~ here is Kant's manner of exposition. It seems to me beyond all possibility of doubt that so far <sup>as</sup> the doctrine is concerned the "deduction" is in <sup>the</sup> strictest accordance with what has been said before in the Critique of Judgment and also with the general principles of transcendental philosophy.

### Remarks.

I will now proceed with my exposition. The chapter on the "Deduction" is followed by a section headed "Remarks", in which Kant makes a few interesting observations about it. He points out that the reason why <sup>the</sup> deduction of judgments of taste is so easy in comparison with the deduction of the categories is that it does not have to justify the reality of a concept. For a <sup>A</sup> judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, <sup>and hence</sup> to establish its validity we need do no more than show that we are justified in presupposing that the same subjective conditions of Judgment exist in every judging subject.

Another condition <sup>as regards</sup> ~~as regards~~ the validity of a particular judgment of taste is <sup>(the correct subsumption of)</sup> ~~that the particular case has been correctly subsumed~~ with the universal rule. This of course presents a difficulty which does not in the same way affect a logical judgment. ~~For~~ In the case of a logical judgment we subsume the particular instance under definite universal concepts, whereas in the case of an aesthetic judgment we subsume it under an

indeterminate subjective rule (the harmony of imagination and understanding) which cannot be thought but merely felt. It is clear that as a consequence of this the subsumption may easily prove fallacious. We may easily be led to believe that a particular object fulfils the conditions of the rule <sup>when</sup> ~~which~~ in fact <sup>it</sup> ~~does not do so~~. It has to be noted however, that just as the difficulty and uncertainty concerning <sup>the</sup> subsumption of a particular case under the logical principle does <sup>not in any way</sup> ~~in no way~~ affect the logical principle as such, so the same difficulty however great it may be does not affect the aesthetic principle. <sup>As we assume is that provided</sup> ~~All that is assumed is that on condition that~~ <sup>case</sup> a particular <sup>has</sup> been subsumed correctly, we can count upon universal agreement ~~to our judgment~~. The principle upon which aesthetic judgments rest is that an individual person who judges an object to be beautiful is justified in referring to a universal indeterminate subjective rule which is valid for all judging subjects.

### Section 39.

The problem discussed in this section is the problem of the communicability <sup>(1)</sup> of a sensation. There is hardly anything in it that has not been said before. And yet it is interesting because Kant states his case more clearly than anywhere else. His argument <sup>runs</sup> ~~is~~ as follows.

~~By sensation we may understand the faculty of perceiving sensible qualities of objects.~~ Sensation would be universally communicable <sup>if</sup> ~~on condition that~~ we were entitled to assume that everyone has <sup>the same kind of sensibility</sup> ~~a like sense to our own~~. This however cannot be allowed. We are in no way entitled to suppose that organic sensation is identical in all men. It depends on the sense

(1) On the meaning of this term, see above

organs of the individual and it is quite impossible to suppose that the impression one person receives from an object is exactly the same as that of another person. To illustrate this by an example. We cannot communicate to a person who is deprived <sup>of</sup> ~~an~~ one of the senses the nature of the impressions which we receive from the objects of this sense. But even if there is no such deficiency, if for instance there are two persons possessed of the sense of smell, they can never be sure whether the sensation they receive from the same object is precisely the same in both of them.

~~Now~~ can we assume that the feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness should be identical in different individuals. <sup>different people</sup> whether ~~they~~ feel a thing to be pleasant or do not depends entirely on <sup>their individual nature.</sup> ~~the nature of the individual.~~ In respect of pleasantness and unpleasantness, the mind of the individual is entirely passive. Certain objects give pleasure to certain persons and do not give it to others. Therefore it is quite impossible to claim that <sup>a particular</sup> ~~the feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness~~ should be acknowledged by everyone. ~~We see sensation in the two senses just mentioned is not universally communicable.~~

Now there is yet another kind of pleasure, namely the delight which is taken in an action on account of its being a moral action. This pleasure <sup>may be assumed to be identical</sup> ~~admits of being communicated.~~ We <sup>in every subject</sup> ~~are entitled to presuppose that it will be the same in every subject.~~ It has however been shown in several places (see above) that this feeling (<sup>like</sup> moral feeling) is an immediate consequence of our consciousness of the moral law. We can determine it by means of concepts of Reason. And this is the reason <sup>why</sup> ~~that~~ it is universally communicable. "It, therefore, admits of communication only through the instrumentality of Reason and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind for every one, by means of very determinate practical concepts of Reason." (C. of J., 292) (f)

Further, in the "Analytic of the Sublime" it has been shown that our pleasure in the sublime may also claim universal validity and communicability. But we have also seen that, in order to ascribe this to it we have to refer to the moral foundation of human nature. We have to presuppose that every moral being will take pleasure in its becoming conscious of its moral destination. We see that we are entitled to demand that everyone will take the same pleasure in the sublime, "but we can do so only through the moral law which in its turn rests upon concepts of Reason." (C. of J., 292)

The only kind of sensation which is universally communicable is the pleasure in the beautiful. It is neither purely sensuous like the pleasure in the pleasant (pleasure of mere enjoyment), <sup>nor</sup> is it referred to determinate concepts like the pleasure in the good (pleasure of an activity according to law).

<sup>nor</sup> How is it indirectly referred to concepts of Reason like the pleasure in the sublime (Kant gives this pleasure the name of a rationalising contemplation according to Ideas) (<sup>Lust</sup> ~~Gust~~ der vernunftelnden Kontemplation nach Ideen). It is a pleasure of mere contemplation, which does not rest upon any objective principle. According to transcendental principles ordinary apprehension of an object depends on two subjective conditions, two faculties of the mind, namely imagination (faculty of intuition) <sup>and</sup> and understanding (faculty of concepts). The connexion of these two faculties is brought about by the faculty of Judgment. (See above) But whereas in the case of an empirical cognition the faculty of Judgment <sup>recognizes the relation</sup> ~~relates the two~~ <sup>between the two faculties</sup> ~~faculties to one another~~ by subsuming particular intuitions under

① Properly speaking, imagination is a faculty of synthesising intuitions. Kant calls it here the faculty of intuition to distinguish it from the intellectual faculties (understanding, Judgment and Reason). As imagination is the only faculty of the mind which is immediately referred to sensuous intuition, it may in a loose sense be called a faculty of intuition.

determinate concepts <sup>of</sup> at the understanding it takes quite a different course, "<sup>in aesthetic appreciation (aesthetische Betrachtung)</sup> ~~in the aesthetic mode of estimating.~~"

"Its functions are directed ..... merely to perceiving the adequacy of the representation for engaging both faculties of knowledge in their freedom in an harmonious (subjectively purposive) employment, i.e. to feeling with pleasure the subjective bearings of the representation" (den Vorstellungszustand mit Lust zu empfinden). (C.of J., 292).

We may ascribe universal validity and communicability to the pleasure in the beautiful because it rests upon the same conditions as the most ordinary empirical cognition. We merely suppose that the indeterminate relation of the cognitive faculties produces a specific kind of pleasure and manifests itself in the same way in every subject. If we are certain that our judgment is a judgment of reflection, i.e., a pure judgment of taste <sup>in which</sup> ~~i.e., when~~ we call things beautiful on no other grounds <sup>an</sup> than that their representation makes us aware of/indeterminate harmonious relation of our cognitive faculties, we are entitled to impute our pleasure to every one else.

"This pleasure must of necessity depend for everyone upon the same conditions, seeing that they are the subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general, and the proportion of these cognitive faculties which is requisite for taste is requisite also for ordinary sound understanding, the presence of which we are entitled to presuppose in everyone. And, for this reason also, one who judges with taste, (provided he does not make a mistake as to this consciousness, and does not take the matter for the form, or charm for beauty) can impute the subjective purposiveness, i.e. his delight in the object, to

everyone else, and suppose his feeling universally communicable, and that, too, without the mediation of concepts."

(C. of J., 292, 293) <sup>that</sup>

We see <sup>that</sup> the reason ~~that~~ <sup>why</sup> the pleasure in the beautiful is the only kind of sensation which is universally communicable is that it rests upon the same subjective conditions as objective knowledge. As has been pointed out several times before, universal communicability implies that the pleasure which is felt is identical in all judging subjects. The problem of the deduction of aesthetic judgments was: How is it possible to determine a priori that on the occasion of a certain representation every subject must necessarily feel pleasure? This problem too has now been solved. The pleasure <sup>in</sup> of the beautiful may be declared to be universally valid and universally communicable by a philosophy which unlike sceptical philosophy sets forth the view that human beings are capable of ~~communicating~~ <sup>sharing</sup> their objective knowledge <sup>with</sup> to each other. For this pleasure rests upon the same conditions as knowledge. It is <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ result of an agreement of the cognitive faculties ~~of the mind.~~ Kant has stated in Section 21 of the Critique of Judgment that on transcendental principles we have reason for presupposing the existence of a common sense. "We assume a common sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge which is presupposed <sup>in</sup> by every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism."

(C. of J., 239) <sup>in</sup>

In the section with which we are here concerned this is stated again. In Section 40, with which otherwise we shall not concern ourselves, we find the following passage which, although

it does not contain anything new, yet expresses Kant's main idea in so clear<sup>ly</sup> a manner that I may be permitted to quote it here.

"The aptitude of men for communicating their thoughts requires, also, a relation between the imagination and the understanding, in order to connect intuitions with concepts, and concepts, in turn, with intuitions, which both unite in cognition. But there the agreement of both mental powers is according to law and under the constraint of definite concepts. Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding, and the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into regular play, ~~the~~ does the representation communicate itself not as thought, but as an internal feeling of a purposive state of the mind. Taste is, therefore, the faculty of forming an a priori estimate of the communicability of the feelings that, without the mediation of a concept, are connected with a given representation." (1) (C. of J., 295, 296)/7

We may now turn to Kant's doctrine of art and the artist which begins at Section 43. We shall see how closely it is connected with his theory of aesthetic judgments.

#### Section 43.

This section contains nothing but a set of definitions of what Kant calls fine art (<sup>Schöne</sup> ~~schiene~~ Kunst) we may disregard it and turn to Section 44. judg-  
mely  
it

#### Section 44.

<sup>The following</sup> These are the main points of the argument set forth in Section 44. Fine art (~~schiene~~ <sup>Schöne</sup> Kunst) must be distinguished

These are the main points of the argument set forth in Section 44. Fine art (~~schiene~~ <sup>Schöne</sup> Kunst) must be distinguished from

(1) (See above )

Wissenschaft  
 science (Wissenschaft). Whereas the beautiful cannot be determined scientifically, i.e., by means of proofs, science is based upon definite rules and objective proofs. There can be no such things as scientific art or beautiful science.

Further, we have to distinguish between two kinds of art, namely (a) mechanical art, (b) ~~aesthetic~~ <sup>the production of</sup> art. It is only the latter which has in view nothing but to ~~produce~~ objects which will give pleasure to those who judge them. Aesthetic art may be divided into pleasant art and fine art. The former produces things with a view to giving pleasant feelings to others. Cookery for instance may be called a pleasant art; <sup>only</sup> for it is ~~is~~ <sup>only</sup> concerned with nothing but to make persons enjoy its products. It has mere enjoyment for its object. Fine art on the other hand seeks to produce more than mere enjoyment. We have seen that we call an object beautiful on the ground that we become conscious of a harmonious relation of our faculties of cognition. The pleasure which accompanies this consciousness is not a pleasure of mere sensation. It is ~~a~~ pleasure of reflection.

"But should the feeling of pleasure be what it has immediately in view it is then termed aesthetic art. As such it may be either pleasant or fine art. The description 'pleasant art' applies where the purpose of the art is that the pleasure should accompany the representations considered as mere sensations, the description 'fine art' where it is to accompany them considered as modes of cognition." (G. of J., 305)

We have seen that our pleasure in the beautiful is thought to be universally communicable. In feeling it we assume that it ought to be felt by everyone. (See above) It has also been explained that we call an object beautiful for no other

reason than that <sup>in</sup> representing it to ourselves <sup>we become</sup> ~~makes us~~ conscious of a purposive relation of our faculties of representation. All this has been made sufficiently clear and it will be easy to understand the following passage.

"Fine art, on the other hand, is a mode of representation which is intrinsically purposive, and which, although devoid of a purpose, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interests of social communication. The universal communicability of a pleasure involves in its very concept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment arising out of mere sensation, but must be one of reflection. Hence aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the re-  
(1)  
flective Judgment and not organic sensation." (C. of J., 306) <sup>n</sup>

What is interesting in this section is the fact that Kant's theory of fine art is so obviously entirely dependent on his theory of our judgment about the beautiful. He is convinced that there is no other way to determine what <sup>is</sup> the nature of fine art <sup>(1)</sup> i.e., art which is concerned with the production of beautiful objects than to refer to the judgments about the beautiful. If we are to understand what a beautiful thing is and how it is produced we have to know <sup>what</sup> ~~that~~ are the conditions which make us judge a thing beautiful. What they are has been made clear in the "Analytic of the Beautiful". The doctrine of art and the artist has (in every respect) to conform to the analysis of aesthetic judgments. Kant is convinced of this. That his theory of art and the artist is in every respect dependent on his analysis of judgments of taste will become quite clear in the subsequent sections.

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(1) <sup>on</sup> About "purposiveness <sup>without</sup> in Kant a purpose", see above,  
<sup>on</sup> About the beautiful as a predicate of reflective judgments, see above,  
<sup>on</sup> About the distinction between the pleasant and the beautiful, see above.  
<sup>on</sup> About Kant's distinction between taste of reflection and taste of sense, see above.  
<sup>on</sup> About the problem of universal communicability of our pleasure in the beautiful, see above.

Section 45.

We have seen that the idea of beauty arises out of an awareness of a harmonious relation of the faculties of representation, a relation which is independent of any concept. There are no rules of the understanding which would explain to us this "purposive" relation. The purposiveness of the representation is without a purpose and cannot be determined by concepts or rules (See above, *Ja*)

From this it follows that a work of art gives us the impression <sup>of not having</sup> ~~as if it had not~~ been created by a human being for a definite purpose, <sup>but of being</sup> ~~It appears to us as if it were~~ a product of nature. For in order to find it beautiful we must have the feeling that it is free from the constraint of rules imposed upon it by a consciously acting human intellect. It seems to us as if the product of fine art were <sup>unintentionally,</sup> produced/as if it just existed. In order to be capable of enjoying it we must ~~not think~~ of any definite intention on the part of the artist. For as <sup>we were to do</sup> ~~soon as we did~~ this, we should <sup>at once</sup> ~~cease~~ to enjoy it aesthetically. The consciousness of the free play of our cognitive faculties would not be brought about. Our imagination would be fettered by definite concepts. The product of art seems to us free from a definite human purpose. It looks to us as if it were a product of nature.

~~Now~~ It is <sup>a</sup> strange that in order to be enabled to feel a natural object to be beautiful we must regard nature as if she were an art<sup>ist</sup>. This means that in representing the object to ourselves we must think of a nature whose products are determined by a principle other than merely mechanical principles. Nature is viewed as productive in an aesthetic sense. <sup>It</sup> ~~She~~ produces

objects artistically. <sup>It</sup> ~~She~~ gives them a form which we find beautiful and in this it is implied that we ascribe to ~~her~~ <sup>nature</sup> the principle of "purposiveness without a purpose". We conceive the idea of a Technique of nature. We regard nature not as mere nature (acting according to the principle of mechanical causality) but as an artist. (See above, J.)

"Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature."

(C. of J., 306)

But here <sup>there is</sup> arises a difficulty; For it is clear that no product of human art can be regarded as <sup>having been</sup> ~~entirely unintentionally~~ <sup>quite unintentionally</sup> produced. It is a product of the human mind, and we cannot but assume that there must be some intention present in the mind of the artist. "Art has always got a definite intention of producing something. Were this 'something', however, to be mere sensation (something merely subjective), intended to be accompanied with pleasure, then such product would, in our estimation of it, only please through the agency of the feeling of the senses."

(C. of J., 306) As has been shown, we should attribute no universal validity to such a feeling at all. We should merely state. The artist intended to give us pleasure; <sup>the</sup> ~~The~~ object pleases us; <sup>the</sup> ~~The~~ definite purpose which he has had in mind has been achieved.

On the other hand were the intention of the artist directed to the production of a definite object, this object would please us by means of a concept, <sup>and</sup> ~~too~~. we should again not call it beautiful. It would please in the same manner as a product of mechanical art pleases us. To take an example, a watchmaker

has the intention of making a watch. In order to be able to <sup>carry out his intention</sup> ~~do so~~ he must have a definite purpose in mind. He intends the object to serve this purpose. In the case of a watch the purpose would be that it should indicate the time of day. The watchmaker to be enabled to produce a watch must represent to himself quite clearly what purpose it is meant to serve <sup>must</sup> and act accordingly. <sup>and</sup> Now in order to take pleasure in this product we have to set before us the purpose which <sup>was</sup> ~~has been~~ present in the artist's mind. We approve of the object, it pleases us on the ground that it serves the purpose it has been made for. The beautiful is of an entirely different kind. We call an object beautiful <sup>when it</sup> ~~which~~ pleases in the mere <sup>act of judging (in der bloßen Beurteilung)</sup> ~~estimate of it~~, i.e. which conforms to our principle of aesthetic reflection without any reference to mere sensation (subjective purpose, see above ) <sup>or to</sup> ~~of~~ a definite concept (objective purpose, see above ).

We see that the beautiful object must be regarded as intentionally produced in so far as the artist intended it to be an object the representation of which should make us conscious of harmony of our cognitive faculties, i.e. which would make it seem to be a case to which we could apply our principle of aesthetic purposiveness (the kind of purposiveness which is not tied down to any definite purpose). "The purposiveness in the product of fine art, intentional though it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e. fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognise it to be art." (C. of J., 307).

It is clear that we must ascribe to the artist some kind of intention. We must assume that he intends to present us with an object which we shall find beautiful. He must apply some rules

for the production of his work but ~~neither in his own mind~~ <sup>he must not be conscious of the nature of these rules</sup> ~~nor in his own hands~~ <sup>and this is true also of the person who finds his work</sup> ~~precisely what these rules are~~ <sup>handy</sup>. Just as we can ~~only~~ enjoy beauty when our imagination and understanding are in an indefinite relation without being determined by any definite rules, so the artist himself must enjoy freedom <sup>in his</sup> ~~of his own~~ faculties of cognition. He must be capable of producing his work in accordance with rules without being fully conscious of what they are. This point will be made clearer in the subsequent sections.

#### Section 46.

We have seen that ~~he~~ <sup>a man</sup> who produces beautiful things cannot act according to any definite rules and that on the other hand a work of art must be dependent on some rules. It follows that the rules which the artist applies belong to his own individual nature. He must possess a ~~productive~~ capacity for producing things which will be judged beautiful. These rules cannot be determined either by the artist who produces the work of art ~~or~~ by those who judge it. They are an expression of the individual nature of the artist. The productive faculty of the artist may be called genius.

"Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art." (C. of J., 307)

Every art presupposes rules, <sup>not</sup> ~~for~~ otherwise its products would ~~not~~ be products <sup>of</sup> art but products of mere chance. Now since the concept of pure art does not permit ~~of~~ the judgment

about the beauty of its product <sup>to be</sup> ~~being~~ derived from any rule that has a concept as its determining ground, it follows that the artist himself is <sup>not</sup> conscious of the rule which he applies. It is the nature of the individual artist which supplies the rule. "Fine art is possible only as a product of genius." (C. of J., 307.) <sup>Since</sup> ~~From the fact that no~~ definite rules can be given for producing beautiful objects and <sup>since</sup> consequently the artist himself is not conscious of how he creates them, ~~it follows that~~ he can neither teach others the rules which will enable them to make beautiful things nor <sup>can he</sup> learn it from others. <sup>Thus</sup> ~~this~~ originality must be the primary property of the artist. But since there must be some rule present in every work of art, originality cannot be regarded as the only condition of the production of works of art. There is such a thing as original nonsense. The products of fine art in spite of their originality must at the same time be "models, i.e. be exemplary and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation they must serve that purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or rule of estimating." (1) (C. of J., 308.)

The creator of a work of art is incapable of indicating scientifically the rules which he applies. He gives the rules "as nature". He does not himself know how he produces his work. "That he can produce it he owes to his innate ability. Where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the Idea for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in <sup>his</sup> ~~its~~ power to invent the like at pleasure or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts <sup>would</sup> as put them in a position to produce similar products." (C. of J., 309.)

It is important to note that "nature" prescribes the rule through genius not to science, but to art, and ~~to owe~~ to the latter

(1) <sup>See</sup> ~~See~~ about the exemplary universal validity of aesthetic judgments, ~~See~~

<sup>only in its</sup>  
~~on~~ far as it is fine art. Neither science nor mechanical art are products of genius, <sup>for</sup> they follow determinate rules which can be set down in a formula and can be both taught and learnt. This will be explained in the following section.

#### Section 47.

That "genius" and "imitation" are fundamentally opposed to each other is a point on which everyone is agreed. It is clear why it must be so. <sup>we</sup> ~~for~~ have seen that "genius" creates according to indeterminate rules which cannot be learnt and therefore <sup>be</sup> ~~is~~ not imitated. <sup>The case</sup> This is quite different in the domain of science. For the scientist knowing how he arrives at his conclusion, can prove the truth of his argument and set down definite rules which others can learn. They have ~~to do~~ <sup>to do</sup> nothing <sup>to</sup> but follow his argument step by step and they can acquire knowledge of it by industry and perseverance. In matters of science therefore the greatest inventor differs from the most pitiful imitator and apprentice only in degree and not in kind. <sup>f</sup> For what the former has accomplished "is something that ~~could~~ have been learned." (C. of J..

308) <sup>The same does not hold for fine art.</sup>  
~~This is quite different in the domain of fine art.~~ Talent for art cannot be learnt. "It" requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it dies, awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the same way - one who needs no more than an example to set the talent of which is he conscious at work on similar lines." (C. of J..

309) <sup>expressed</sup>  
 We have seen that although product of art is not determined by any definite rule which could be set down in a formula, there is

some kind of rule implicit in it. This is the reason <sup>why</sup> that it can, and in fact must, be regarded as a model. It is an example of the indeterminate rule according to which it has been produced. The rule as such cannot be specified and the product cannot be imitated, ~~but~~ <sup>it is</sup> however possible that the artist's ideas which are expressed in his work <sup>will</sup> arouse similar ideas on the part of his pupil, presuming nature has endowed the latter with a talent for art. But these ideas are to be met with nowhere except in the individual work of art <sup>so an</sup> and ~~an~~ artist will never merely imitate another artist. The work of art by which the productive capacity of the pupil is excited serves as a model not for imitation (Nachahmung), but for following (Nachfolge). An artist following another artist will produce a work of art stimulated by the work of his master. But his own work will again be original. <sup>As has been said before</sup> ~~It must not be forgotten, however, that~~ although <sup>although</sup> originality <sup>is</sup> an indispensable condition <sup>the production of</sup> of a work of art ~~being produced~~ <sup>it</sup> it is by no means ~~the~~ only condition. However different mechanical art and fine art may be, there is something mechanical also in the latter, something that can and in fact must be learnt. There are certain rules which must be obeyed and to aim at originality at all costs, merely for the sake of being different from everyone else, is foolish ~~and no work of art will ever be produced in such a manner.~~ Genius and originality are necessary conditions of fine art. But they can do no more than furnish material. How to give an appropriate form to this material, that is something that must be learnt, and there are certain rules which on no account must be violated.

"Now, seeing that originality of talent is one (though not the sole) essential factor that goes to make up the character of

genius, shallow minds fancy that the best evidence they can give of their being full-blown geniuses (aufblühende Genies) is by emancipating themselves from all academic constraint of rules, in the belief that one cuts a finer figure on the back of an illetempered than of a trained horse. Genius can do no more than furnish rich material for products of fine art; its elaboration and its form require a talent academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to stand the test of Judgment. But, for a person to hold forth and pass a sentence like a genius in matters that fall to the province of the most patient rational investigation, is ridiculous in the extreme. One is at a loss to know whether to laugh more at the imposter who envelops himself in such a cloud - in which we are given fuller scope to our imagination at the expense of all use of our critical faculty, - or at the simple-minded public which imagines that its inability clearly to cognise and comprehend this masterpiece of penetration is due to its being invaded by new truths en masse in comparison with which, detail, due to carefully weighed exposition and an academic examination of root-principles, seems to it only the work of a tyro." (C. of J. 310b)

#### Section 48.

At the beginning of this section Kant distinguishes between taste and genius, and points out that <sup>for the judgment of</sup> ~~in order to be enabled to~~ judge beautiful objects ~~it is only~~ taste ~~that is~~ required, whereas for fine art i.e., for the production of beautiful objects, genius is needed. This is easy enough. <sup>to understand</sup> The passage which follows is more difficult. Kant speaks of the difference between <sup>the</sup> beauty of nature and <sup>we can</sup> beauty of art, and declared that whereas the esti-

~~operation~~ of the former can take place independently of any concept of <sup>the</sup> which sort of thing the object was intended, <sup>to be</sup> i.e. without any reference to a purpose, we must in <sup>applying</sup> ~~estimating~~ a beautiful object of art presupposes a purpose, i.e. a concept of what the object is intended to be. In the <sup>affection</sup> ~~estimation~~ of a beautiful work of art, its perfection must be taken into account.

This is a most surprising statement, seeing that Kant has told us again and again that our judgments about beauty ~~do~~ in no way presuppose a definite concept of the object (purpose) and that beauty is a quality which is fundamentally different from ~~reflection~~. <sup>perfection</sup>

I think, however, that it is comparatively easy to solve the difficulty. Kant is <sup>here contrasting the</sup> ~~comparing here~~ beauty of art <sup>with the</sup> and beauty of nature. What he is trying to show is that in estimating a beautiful product of art we have to refer our representation of it to the will of a human being <sup>who</sup> that intended to give beauty to <sup>his</sup> its product. The purpose which the artist has in mind and the perfection he seeks to realise is beauty. This is his only intention. And yet we must ascribe to him a will to make his ~~pre-~~ <sup>work</sup> ~~duct~~ beautiful, <sup>it would be a product, not of art, but</sup> for otherwise this ~~product would not be a pro-~~ <sup>of pure chance.</sup> ~~duct of art. It would be a product of pure chance.~~ We cannot but assume that its beauty has been given to a work of art intentionally, that the artist intended it to possess perfect beauty. To nature on the other hand we cannot ascribe any such purpose. In order to find natural objects beautiful we need not presuppose that nature intended to present us with beautiful objects. We ascribe beauty to certain <sup>natural</sup> ~~material~~ objects but we cannot say that nature has given them their beauty intentionally. This is in fact impossible, <sup>since</sup> ~~on the ground~~ that we have no knowledge

of an intelligent nature (~~acting according to purposes which she sets herself~~). We do know, however, that there exist human beings, <sup>namely,</sup> ~~artists~~ who produce things with the intention of giving them a beautiful form. It follows that in comparison with our judgments about beautiful natural objects our judgments about beautiful products of art presuppose the idea of a purpose. But this does not alter the fact that even in the case of beautiful artistic products the purpose involved is not a definite objective purpose and the concept is not a definite concept. The principle which underlies all our judgments about beauty is the principle of subjective purposiveness or purposiveness without a purpose. (1)

I will not concern myself with the remainder of this section, <sup>but</sup> ~~and~~ turn <sup>to</sup> Section 49, which as we shall see is both extremely interesting and extremely difficult. It is headed "The faculties of the mind which constitute genius."

#### Section 49.

The analysis of the judgments of taste has shown that for the making of these judgments we depend on certain cognitive faculties and their relation. The question which has to be answered now is: What are the faculties of the mind which

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(1) See above. . Incidentally, it is important to note that according to Kant even our judgments about beauty of nature involve in some way an idea of ~~her~~ purposiveness. In estimating ~~beauty of nature~~, we ascribe to ~~her~~ a certain principle (aesthetic technique of nature). We cannot but assume that nature intended to give beauty to ~~her~~ products. (See above, 12)  
 But the difference is that whereas in the case of fine art we actually know that human beings act according to such a purpose we can ~~regarding~~ <sup>regarding</sup> natural objects never be sure of this. We assume the principle of aesthetic technique as a merely regulative principle, i.e. for the sake of explaining to ourselves the existence of beautiful objects of nature (see above, 12)

enable the artist to produce a work of art, and what is their relation to each other? We have seen that for the production of a work of art there is required more than mere taste (the faculty of judging the beautiful). In order to be <sup>able</sup> ~~enabled~~ to create things which will be judged beautiful the artist must possess a productive capacity which has been called "genius". The question to be answered now is: What are the faculties of the mind which constitute genius? Let us assume we have before us a work of fine art, i.e., a work which lays claim to beauty. It is possible that so far as the rules of taste are concerned, <sup>may</sup> we find nothing to censure in it and yet we <sup>may</sup> miss something in it. Kant calls this element of beauty "Geist". It is difficult to find an English equivalent <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ the German "Geist" and the main reason for this is that the German word "Geist" is quite vague. What is characteristic of the word is its indefiniteness. "Geist" is a quality that is ~~rather~~ <sup>studied</sup> felt ~~rather~~ than thought. It is <sup>an</sup> indescribable.

I will follow Mr. Meredith's translation and render it by "soul" and the phrase "ohne Geist" by "soulless". But I may state that in my opinion the translation "spirit" and "without spirit" would do at least as well or rather as badly.

Kant states at the beginning of our section that we may say of a product of fine art that it is "ohne Geist". For instance we may think of a poem that it is very pretty and elegant but that it is soulless (geistlos). We may say of a story that it has precision and method, and yet we find it soulless. A speech made on some festive occasion may be held to be methodical (gruendlich) and graceful (zierlich) and yet ~~it is found to be~~ soulless. A conversation frequently is not devoid of entertain-

ment and yet is soulless. Even of a woman we may say she is pretty, that she talks and behaves nicely (gesprächig und artig) and yet that she is soulless. Now, what do we mean by "Geist", in the cases mentioned? Kant gives a definition which runs as follows.

"Soul (Geist), in an aesthetical sense, signifies the animating principle in the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the psychic substance (Seele) - the material which it employs for that purpose - is that which sets the mental powers into a swing that is purposive, i.e., into a play which is self-maintaining and which strengthens those powers for such activity." (C. of J., 313).

I do not want to criticise Mr. Meredith's translation of this passage. But it is obvious that because he translates "Geist" by soul he finds himself in an awkward position. He has to translate "Seele" by psychic substance whereas "soul" would of course have been much the better translation. Another thing which makes his translation difficult to understand is that his rendering "sets the mental powers into a swing" of the German "die Gemütskräfte in Schwung" "conveys little or nothing to English readers.

I think, however, that although Kant's definition of "Geist" is difficult to translate into English, its meaning can be explained with comparative ease. "Geist" is nothing else <sup>but</sup> than the indefinite harmony of the mental powers, their subjectively purposive relation. Further, <sup>as may</sup> we remind ourselves, that Kant has told us in Section 12 of the Critique that the consciousness of the formal purposiveness <sup>which involves the free play</sup> ~~in the play~~ of the cognitive faculties of the subject involves a certain form of causality. It pra-

It fills us with a desire to preserve the feeling of the harmony of the  
~~serves a continuance of the state of the representation itself~~  
~~cognitive faculties.~~

and the active engagement of the cognitive powers. As Kant has  
 explained, that we dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful  
 because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself.

(See above

Jo)

Now we learn here that "Geist" is <sup>simply that</sup> ~~nothing else than the~~

faculty of the mind <sup>which brings about this harmony</sup> ~~which brings about these indefinite rela-~~  
~~tions~~ of the faculties of the mind (subjective or formal purpos-  
 iveness) of the faculties of representation. It is "Geist"

which gives life to the work of art, <sup>and</sup> a work of art which is

"ohne Geist" is lifeless, <sup>since</sup> ~~For~~ although it is in accordance  
 with the rules of taste, its representation does not make us

feel the harmonious relation of our mental powers. The artist

As long as <sup>the artist</sup> ~~he~~ does no more than not disobey the rules of taste  
 he cannot produce a genuine work of art. He himself is soulless  
 (ohne Geist). What he lacks is "Geist", the animating principle  
 of the mind.

"Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else  
 than the faculty of presenting aesthetic Ideas. But by an  
 aesthetic Idea I mean that representation of the imagination  
 which induces much thought, (diejenige Vorstellung der Einbil-  
dungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlasst) yet without the poss-  
 ibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being  
 adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get  
 quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible. -  
 It is easily seen, that an aesthetic Idea is the counterpart  
 (pendant) of a rational Idea, which, conversely, is a concept,  
 to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can  
 be adequate." (C. of J., <sup>313</sup> ~~314~~)

We understand now much better why it is so difficult to find an adequate rendering for the German "Geist". For Kant himself tells us that properly speaking it cannot be expressed by any language, that no language can explain what it is. It is an indefinable faculty of the mind.

The main difficulty in the passage just quoted is to understand what Kant means by an "aesthetic Idea". I will try to give an explanation. ~~We know that the Ideas with which Kant is concerned in the Critique of Pure Reason, are the rational Ideas.~~ Now what is according to Kant characteristic of an Idea of Reason. He has told us in the Critique of Pure Reason that Reason in conceiving its concepts (Ideas) does nothing but make the concepts of the understanding free from their reference to experience.

"Reason does not really generate any concept. The most it can do is to free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation of possible experience." (C.of P.R.. 436).

It has been shown in the first Critique that all our objective knowledge of nature depends on intuition and understanding. The human mind contains two essentially different elements which produce knowledge only in conjunction with each other. How these two heterogeneous elements are made to do their common work has also been explained. It is the imagination which enables us to apprehend a manifold of given intuitions. Our understanding produces concepts. By means of the faculty of Judgment it is made possible for us to apply our concepts to our intuitions. Moreover, it has been shown that Reason frees the concepts of the understanding from their relation to intuitions and thus concerns

Ideas of a supersensible, purely rational world.

(1) An Idea of Reason is a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can ever be adequate. For an Idea of Reason transcends the world of sense, the world of experience. We have been told that all our experience of the world of sense is brought about by our relating imagination and understanding to one another and thus determining the manifold of particular intuitions which is apprehended by the imagination by means of the universal rules of the understanding. Now Since an Idea of Reason transcends the world of sensible intuitions it may <sup>therefore</sup> be defined as "a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate." (C. of J., 314.)

It may seem difficult to understand how Kant can <sup>say</sup> speak of aesthetic Ideas <sup>that they are</sup> as a representation of the imagination to which no concept can ever be adequate. But it is possible to explain it. Let us assume <sup>that</sup> a representation of the imagination contains more than can be contained in a concept. In that case imagination <sup>which is</sup> the faculty of apprehending sensible intuitions and understanding <sup>which is</sup> the faculty of concepts, are again separated from each other. In order to explain this to ourselves we have once more to transcend the world of experience in which every concept is adequate to intuitions and every intuition to concepts. So As long as we are concerned with nothing but objective knowledge of the world of sense we can refer every representation of the imagination <sup>to concepts</sup> (run on)

(It is only aesthetic imagination which is really productive and whose representations may contain more than can be comprehended by any concept of the understanding. This is explained

(1) on Kant's doctrine of Ideas of Reason, see above

have just quoted.  
 by ~~must~~ <sup>must mention</sup> graph which follows the passage which we  
 have just quoted. In order to understand his argument we  
~~have to mention~~ <sup>must mention</sup> one point about which we have spoken several  
 times before. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant distin-  
 guishes between (a) reproductive imagination which is dependent  
 on empirical laws of association, and (b) productive imagin-  
 ation which depends on the a priori laws of the understanding.  
 Neither of ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> is "free". ~~There can never be contained more~~  
~~in a representation of the imagination than in the concepts~~  
~~under which it is to be brought.~~ Aesthetic imagination on the  
 other hand with which we are here concerned is "free" and truly  
 productive. ~~The artist's imagination produces more than any~~  
~~concept of the understanding can explain.~~

~~It must~~  
~~There is,~~ however, one point that ~~must~~ be borne in mind,  
~~namely,~~ that the imagination being a merely sensuous faculty,  
 must if it is to be capable of creating anything in some way be  
 referred to the understanding and its concepts. Kant is con-  
 vinced that there is always some such reference. The artist  
 does not merely imagine something. His work represents a con-  
 cept, ~~only~~ <sup>but</sup> that this concept is an indeterminate one. In con-  
 ceiving it the artist transcends the sphere of empirical nature.

"The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition)  
 is a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature  
 out of the material supplied to it by actual nature. It affords  
 us entertainment where experience proves too commonplace; and  
 we even use it to remodel experience, always following, no doubt  
 laws that are based on analogy, but still also following prin-  
 ciples which have a higher seat in Reason (and which are every

what is natural to us as those followed by the understanding in laying hold of empirical nature). By this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), with the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into something else - namely, what surpasses nature." (C.of J., 314).

"If, now, we attach to a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation (Darstellung), but inducing solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in a definite concept, and, as a consequence, giving aesthetically an unbounded expansion to the concept itself, then the imagination here displays a creative activity, and it puts the faculty of intellectual Ideas (Reason) into motion - a motion, at the instance of a representation, towards an extension of thought, that, while germane, no doubt, to the concept of the object, exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly expressed." (C.of J., 314).

These two passages may show us once more how <sup>clearly</sup> Kant's theory of art is connected with his analysis of aesthetic judgments. He has told us again and again in the "Analytic of the beautiful" that to make a judgment about beauty we must refer in some way to the understanding as being the faculty of concepts. He now shows that the creative artist if he is to be <sup>able</sup> ~~enabled~~ to produce a work of art must also use his understanding, that he must have a <sup>definite conception of his intention</sup> ~~concept of his work~~. Furthermore

Further

We are told that since the imagination of the artist is not limited to any definite concept it displays a creative activity. The artist's representation of the thing he is to produce contains more than belongs to its empirical concept. In this way his imagination leads the artist beyond the world of sense. He creates a second nature. His imagination is ~~not~~ free in the sense that it is completely independent of any concept. On the contrary his work expresses more than can be comprehended by any empirical or a priori concept of the understanding. "The imagination here displays a creative activity, and it puts the faculty of intellectual Ideas (Reason) into motion."

(C. of J., 315). The following definition of an aesthetic Idea will now be readily understood. (Sum. m.)

"In a word, the aesthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination, annexed to a given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a definite concept can be found for it - one which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up the spirit (Geist) also." (C. of J., 316).

At the end of the first part of Section 49 Kant explains once more that it is a certain relation between imagination and understanding which constitutes genius. Since <sup>the</sup> imagination of ~~any definite concept~~ is not restricted to any definite concept, and can by itself bring about the harmony with the understanding, it can provide "a wealth of undeveloped material for the understanding, to which the latter paid no regard in its concept." (C. of J., 317).

The understanding can make use of this material not so much objectively for cognition as subjectively for quickening the cognitive faculties "and hence also indirectly <sup>for</sup> ~~to~~ cognitions." (ibidem).)

"It may be seen that genius properly consists in the happy relation, which science cannot teach nor industry learn, enabling one to find out Ideas for a given concept, and, besides, to hit upon the expression for them - the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the Ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated." (C. of J., 317).) I think that neither this nor the rest of the first part of Section 49 (requires now) any explanation, and we may now turn to the second part.

Kant begins by bringing out once more the main points of <sup>his</sup> ~~this~~ theory of the genius. He states <sup>that</sup> ~~genius is a talent for art~~ not for science, which follows clearly known rules. <sup>not for art</sup> This point <sup>already</sup> has been made sufficiently clear before. (See above) The second point is more difficult. Kant asserts that a talent for art presupposes a definite concept of the product as its purpose. What is difficult in this is that it seems inconsistent with Kant's fundamental doctrine that neither our judgments about beauty nor the principles of artistic production are referred to a definite concept. <sup>In my</sup> ~~In my~~ exposition of Section 48 I have already <sup>dealt</sup> ~~concerned myself~~ with this difficulty and tried to show that all that Kant means is that the artist being a conscious <sup>by</sup> ~~acting~~ human being must have one definite purpose in mind, <sup>which is</sup> ~~which is~~ to give beauty to his product. ~~and This~~ This may be called a definite concept of the product as a purpose (See above)

Kant is very far from modifying his fundamental position that although understanding is an necessary condition of <sup>the production of</sup> a work of art ~~being produced~~, what is characteristic of the work is not a definite concept or a definite purpose. This may be seen from the rest of the sentence, <sup>in which he</sup> ~~Kant~~ states that although the talent for art presupposes understanding it requires in addition "a representation, indefinite though it be, of the material, i.e., of the intuition, required for the presentation (Darstellung) of that concept, and so a relation of the imagination to the understanding" (C.of J., 317). <sup>We</sup> ~~Now~~ we must remember that Kant's doctrine is that it is the imagination which supplies the material for a work of art. The concept of the understanding is presented in an indefinite manner. The artist himself cannot have precise knowledge of this material. <sup>For</sup> his imagination gives him a greater wealth of material than can be comprised in any definite concept. This is the reason <sup>why</sup> ~~that~~ although there exists a relation <sup>is</sup> of imagination and understanding it is an indefinite <sup>relation</sup> one. This is expressed once more in the following passage.

"Thirdly, it displays itself, not so much in the working out of the projected <sup>purpose</sup> ~~end~~ in the presentation of a definite concept, as rather in the portrayal, or expression, of aesthetic Ideas containing a wealth of material for effecting that intention. Consequently the imagination is represented by it in its freedom from all guidance of rules, but still as purposive for the presentation of the given concept." (C.of J., 317).

It is well to remember here that Kant has defined an aesthetic Idea as "a representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever i.e., concept being adequate to it." (C.of J., 314).

He has shown that imagination in producing an aesthetic idea creates "as it were, <sup>a second</sup> nature out of the material supplied to it by actual Nature" (C. of J., 314), and further that such representations of the imagination may be termed Ideas, chiefly because "no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal intuitions." (ibid.) ~~It is very important to take note of the fact that~~ Kant is firmly convinced that the indeterminate and indeterminable harmony of the imagination and the understanding of which the artist becomes conscious arises in him when he feels that his representations contain more than can be determined by rules of the understanding. Kant insists not only that there must be some reference to the understanding and its rules, but <sup>also</sup> ~~nevertheless~~ <sup>must be more</sup> that there ~~is more thought con-~~ <sup>produced</sup> ~~tained~~ in the representations which are ~~excluded~~ by the artist's imagination than can ever be made explicit or expressed in words. This is what gives life to the products of art. <sup>The</sup> ~~This free harmonizing~~ <sup>harmony</sup> of imagination and understanding and its principle of conformity to law (Gesetzmässigkeit) cannot be brought about by any observance of rules. It belongs to the nature of the individual artist and expresses itself in his work in an original and ~~exemplary~~ manner.

These are Kant's own words: "Fourthly and lastly, the unsought and undesigned subjective purposiveness in the free harmonizing of the imagination with the understanding's conformity to law presupposes a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about by any observance of rules, whether of science or mechanical imitation, but can only be produced by the nature of the individual.

"Genius, according to these presuppositions, is the exem-

plary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment of his cognitive faculties. On this showing, the product of a genius (in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and not to possible learning or academic instruction) is an example, not for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of the work), but to be followed by another genius - one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art itself a new rule is won - which is what shows a talent to be exemplary. (C. of J., 316.)

#### Section 50.

In this section the last of the "Analytic of aesthetic Judgment" with which <sup>I</sup> ~~we~~ shall <sup>deal -</sup> ~~concern ourselves~~, the question is raised whether taste or genius is more essential in matters of fine art. Kant says that this is the same as to ask whether more turns upon imagination or Judgment. It is easy to see why he believes this. He has pointed out that genius is the faculty of conceiving aesthetic Ideas. Further that aesthetic Ideas are representations of the imagination. ~~Now that~~ To decide whether these representations harmonise with the understanding and its principle of conformity to law Judgment is required. This follows from what has been said throughout the "Analytic of <sup>A</sup>esthetic Judgment". It has been shown that it is our faculty of reflective Judgment which makes us conceive the indeterminate harmony of imagination and understanding. A judgment of taste is a product of the faculty of Judgment, and from this it is clear that the artist himself, if he is to be able to decide whether his product conforms to the require-

ments of taste must employ this faculty.

Kant's answer to the question as to whether genius or taste, imagination or Judgment, <sup>is the</sup> ~~are~~ more important in matters of fine art is <sup>contained</sup> ~~continued~~ in the following passage, <sup>which presents "a difficulty"</sup> "Now, imagination rather entitles an art to be called an inspired (geistreiche) than a fine art. It is only in respect of judgment that the name of fine art is deserved. Hence it follows that judgment, being the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non), is at least what one must look to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art. So far as beauty is concerned, to be fertile and original in Ideas is not such an imperative requirement as it is that the imagination in its freedom should be in accordance with the understanding's conformity to law. For in lawless freedom imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, on the other hand, is the faculty that makes it consonant with understanding." (C.of J., §19).

~~This will not be readily understood. We may now leave the "Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment" and turn to the "Dialectic"~~  
~~Before leaving the "Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment" I should like to say that I~~  
~~at the end of my exposition of the "Analytic" I may express the~~  
 hope ~~that~~ I have succeeded in showing that Kant's doctrine of art and <sup>the</sup> artist agrees in every detail with his analysis of judgments of taste and <sup>that in both parts</sup> ~~on his analysis of the Critique of Judgment~~ Kant follows precisely the same principles.

There is yet another <sup>thing</sup> ~~point~~ I should like to mention. While reading Kant's exposition of Judgments of taste the reader is apt to forget a very important point, <sup>which was made</sup> ~~He may easily forget~~ <sup>namely,</sup> ~~that he has been told~~ in the Introduction, that all our judgments about beauty point to something beyond the world of sense,

to the supersensible. <sup>frequently draws attention to this</sup> What Kant holds ~~that~~ <sup>how he has said</sup> in the Introduction ~~again and again~~. <sup>points</sup> He has pointed out that aesthetic judgments rest upon the Idea of a Technique of nature which refer natural objects to a supersensible principle. I ~~think it is quite intentionally that Kant does not touch~~ <sup>that Kant deliberately avoids touching upon</sup> this problem in the "Analytic"; for before proceeding with the discussion of his problem he has to show that not only the beautiful products of nature but also the works of fine art point to a supersensible principle. This ~~has been done~~ <sup>has been done</sup> now. Kant has shown us that the artist's imagination must transcend the world of nature, that it creates a second nature out of the one that is given to him, that he possesses a faculty of conceiving aesthetic Ideas. Anyone who ~~knows anything about~~ <sup>understands the</sup> Transcendental Philosophy will see at once that in conceiving an "Idea" (Idee) the human mind necessarily transcends the world of sense, i.e., the world to which all our objective knowledge is limited.

The problem to be discussed in the "Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment" is: How are judgments possible which necessarily refer to a supersensible principle, and how are objects possible which correspond to these judgments?

### Section 55.

#### Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment.

What Kant's problem is and what he understands by a "Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment" is clearly stated in this section. We shall ~~have to do nothing but~~ <sup>merely have to</sup> follow his argument. It runs as follows.

If there is to be a "Dialectic" of the faculty of Judgment, the judgments concerned must lay claim to a priori universal

validity. It must be a specific kind of Judgment which gives rise to the Dialectic, namely, rationalising Judgment (vernunft-sinn). Aesthetic judgments about the pleasant being purely subjective and not laying any claim to universal validity or necessity can never produce a Dialectic, i.e. there can never be involved in the propositions which are seemingly or actually incompatible with one another; <sup>for</sup> we speak of <sup>the</sup> dialectical opposition of two propositions in the event of our being confronted with two propositions which both claim absolute universal necessity and validity and <sup>yet</sup> seem or are contradictory to one another.

A purely subjective judgment will never lead up to objective propositions (i.e. propositions which claim universal validity for every judging subject), <sup>the</sup> irreconcilability of which would give rise to a "Dialectic". "Hence there is nothing dialectical in the irreconcilability of aesthetic judgments of sense (upon the pleasant and the unpleasant)." (C. of J.

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As regards the other kind of aesthetic judgments, <sup>namely,</sup> judgments of taste, judgments about the beautiful; it is clear that the subjective element in them cannot produce a "Dialectic". In so far as a judgment about the beautiful is concerned with nothing but the subjective feelings of the individual <sup>who</sup> makes such a judgment, the irreconcilability of different judgments made by different individuals will not lead to a Dialectic, <sup>for</sup> every judging subject is concerned with his own judgment alone and if <sup>another person's</sup> judgments contradict it, this is of no interest at all. ~~The judgment is laid down as a purely subjective judgment, i.e. as a judgment which is valid only for a particular~~

~~subject and not for others. The other person's judgments may be at variance with our own. And yet there will not be a "Dialectic". There will be no doubt as to the possibility of the judgment.~~ We see that it is only their claims to universal validity, i.e. their "objective" element or principle, which may <sup>involve</sup> ~~implicate~~ judgments of taste in a "Dialectic". Kant says: "Hence the only concept left to us of a dialectic affecting taste is one of a dialectic of the Critique of taste (not of taste itself) in respect of its principles: For, on the question of the ground of the possibility of judgments of taste in general, mutually conflicting concepts naturally and unavoidably make their appearance." (C. of J., 387.)

~~What does this mean?~~ The Critique of taste has resolved taste into its elements. We have discovered that there is implicit in every judgment of taste a subjective and an objective principle. The analysis of judgments of taste has revealed ~~that~~ <sup>made</sup> ~~on the one hand~~ every judgment of taste is laid down as a merely subjective judgment a judgment about the pleasure felt by the judging subject and on the other, that every judgment of taste is ~~laid down~~ <sup>made</sup> as an "objective" judgment if we understand by the objectivity of a judgment its ~~laying~~ claim to universal validity. Now it is possible that in considering the two sides of the judgment we may conclude from its first peculiarity that it is a purely subjective judgment (first concept of the judgment), and from the second peculiarity that it is purely objective (second concept of the judgment). The two concepts contradict each other. They are based upon irreconcilable principles. There arises an antinomy of the principles of the judgment which makes ~~it doubtful~~

doubtful

their possibility. The appearance of such an antinomy would raise the question of the ground of the possibility of judgments of taste in general.

"The transcendental Critique of taste will, therefore, only include a part capable of bearing the name of a dialectic of the aesthetic judgment if we find an antinomy of the principles of this faculty which throws doubt upon its conformity to law, and hence also upon its inner possibility." (C.of J. 337)

Section 56.

Now is there such a necessary antinomy of taste? Kant's answer is in the affirmative. He argues as follows.

There exists a commonplace regarding taste. We say: <sup>man to</sup> ~~Everyone has~~ his own taste. <sup>a)</sup> ~~A person~~ <sup>man</sup> whom we reprehend with having no taste may answer us, and do so rightly, that a judgment of taste is a purely subjective judgment, a judgment about the feelings of the individual person who makes it about his gratification or pain (Vergnuegen und Schmerz) and that therefore a judgment of taste has no right to <sup>claim the</sup> necessary agreement of others.

But there is ~~yet~~ another commonplace to which even those agree who do not deny the right of the judgment of taste to universal validity. It may be stated thus: "There is no disputing (disputieren) about taste." new It is obvious that the two <sup>maxims</sup> ~~commonplaces~~ do in no way contradict one another. On the contrary the second may be regarded as the necessary consequence of the first, <sup>since</sup> from the fact that everyone has his own taste it can, and in fact must be inferred that there can be no disputing about taste ~~is impossible, although the judgments are not based upon determinate concepts by the comparing of which differ-~~

(1) Ein jeder hat seinen eigenen Geschmack.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the second maxim may mean something else, namely, that although disputing about taste is impossible

~~ent persons could be made to agree~~, the judgments are based upon indeterminate concepts, to which they may be referred. ~~it~~ <sup>this</sup> is supposed, the judgments of taste are not held to be purely subjective, <sup>and it</sup> ~~it~~ is admitted that <sup>although</sup> ~~decisions~~ about the question as to <sup>which particular</sup> ~~what~~ objects are to be judged ~~to be~~ beautiful cannot be reached. ~~In spite of this it is supposed that~~ Judgments of taste <sup>nevertheless</sup> may be right or wrong. It may be impossible to decide by proofs <sup>which</sup> ~~if~~ they are but it is possible to <sup>quarrel</sup> ~~contend~~ (streiten) <sup>about</sup> the matter, ~~and to contend with~~.

What Kant believes to be the <sup>difference</sup> ~~distinction~~ between <sup>quarrelling</sup> ~~contention~~ (Streiten) and dispute <sup>ing</sup> (Disputieren) may be seen from the following passage. (p. 22)

"For though contention and dispute have this point in common, that they aim at bringing judgments into accordance out of and by means of their mutual opposition; yet they differ in the latter hoping to effect this from definite concepts, as grounds of proof, and, consequently, adopting objective concepts as grounds of the judgment." (C. of J., 338.)

Kant goes on to explain that it is obvious that between the two <sup>ways in</sup> ~~conceptions~~ an intermediate proposition is missing. It is <sup>ways in</sup> ~~(although not explicitly asserted)~~ virtually contained in the second <sup>ways in</sup> ~~conception~~. It may be formulated thus: There may be <sup>quarrelling</sup> ~~contention~~ about taste. It is clear that this flatly contradicts the first <sup>ways in</sup> ~~conception~~ which regarded taste as purely subjective, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ there is implied in it that judgments of taste possess more than merely private validity. If we admit <sup>that</sup> ~~a~~ judgment of taste may be <sup>contradicted</sup> ~~contended~~ by others, we concede to <sup>it</sup> a certain amount of objectivity and universality. In this way the antinomy of taste is brought about. From the first <sup>way in</sup> ~~conception~~ the conclusion <sup>it</sup> ~~follows~~.

that judgments of taste are <sup>not</sup> based upon ~~no~~ concepts at all, ~~that~~ from the second that they are based upon concepts.

"The principle of taste therefore exhibits the following antinomy: (1) Thesis: the judgment of taste is not based upon concepts; for, if it were, it would be open to dispute (decision by means of proofs). (2) Antithesis: the judgment of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise, despite diversity of judgment, there could be no room even for <sup>quarrelling</sup> ~~contention~~ in the matter (a claim to the necessary agreement of others with this judgment)." (C. of J., 338, 339) 5

### Section 57.

Kant's solution of the antinomy of taste follows as we might expect, the same principles as his solution of the theoretical and practical antinomies in the first two Critiques. We <sup>may</sup> remember that Kant solves the theoretical antinomies by showing <sup>that</sup> the contradiction between two apparently incompatible propositions arises from the fact that the object to which the propositions refer is not taken in the same sense. <sup>As</sup> so long as this is not realised the two propositions must necessarily seem incompatible. <sup>To take an example, in solving</sup> ~~We may, for instance, remind ourselves of the third antinomy of theoretical Reason (the antinomy between freedom and causality). It has been shown~~ that the thesis of the antinomy which asserts the existence of freedom refers to the world regarded as a thing in itself and the Antithesis (which denies freedom and does not allow of any other principle <sup>for others</sup> than natural causality refers to the world of appearances. <sup>As we have</sup> ~~We have also seen that Kant believes~~ that the semblance of <sup>between</sup> ~~the~~ incompatibility of the two propositions is natural and unavoidable. Every human Reason must, according to its very nature, arrive at seemingly incompatible

propositions. There is no other way of solving the antinomies than <sup>by</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> apply <sup>the</sup> fundamental transcendental principle according to which the world of empirical objects is regarded as a world of mere appearances as distinct from the world of things in themselves. (1)

~~That Kant applies the same principle for the solution of the antinomy of taste may be seen from the following passage.~~ <sup>follows the same principle.</sup>

"There is no possibility of removing the conflict of the above principles, which underlie every judgment of taste (and which are only the two peculiarities of the judgment of taste previously set out in the *Analytic*) except by showing that the concept to which the Object is made to refer in a judgment of this kind is not taken in the same sense in both maxims of the aesthetic judgment; that this double sense, or point of view, in our estimate, is necessary for our power of transcendental judgment; and that nevertheless the false appearance arising from the confusion of one with the other is a natural illusion, and so unavoidable." (*C. of J.*, 339).

<sup>we remind ourselves of</sup>  
We remember that the two peculiarities of the judgments of taste are. (a) "The judgment of taste determines its object in respect of delight (as a thing of beauty) with a claim to the agreement of everyone just as if it were objective." (*C. of J.*, 281). (b) "Proofs are of no avail whatever for determining the judgment of taste and in this connexion matters stand just as they would were that judgment <sup>simply</sup> merely subjective." (*C. of J.*, 284).

<sup>the</sup>  
The order of two principles is reversed in the "Dialectic" of aesthetic Judgment. It is the thesis of the antinomy which

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(1) See above.

declares the judgment of taste to be <sup>Subj</sup> subjective <sup>18</sup> and not based upon any concept; and the Antithesis which regards it as objective <sup>18</sup> based upon definite concepts.

The question which we have to answer is: Is it really true that the judgment of taste must <sup>(be either)</sup> referred to no concept at all or to a definite concept? It is clear that if the judgment of taste is to be valid at all, <sup>if</sup> its claim to universal validity is to have any meaning, it must have reference to some sort of concept, <sup>and it is equally clear that</sup> Now according to transcendental principles, it is quite possible to allow that the judgment of taste refers to a concept, even if this concept be essentially different from the concepts of the understanding (categories). It is asserted in the thesis that the judgment refers to no concept and in the antithesis that there is such a reference <sup>to a concept</sup> implied in the judgment. Both <sup>assertions involve</sup> are true and false <sup>in a sense</sup>. It is a specific <sup>kind of</sup> concept to which the judgment of taste refers, viz., an indeterminate concept, <sup>and it</sup> is not true that every concept must be necessarily determined and determinable. ~~There may be concepts which are intrinsically undetermined and indeterminate.~~ <sup>Concepts which are to give us</sup> ~~A concept of the understanding is by its nature a determinate concept.~~ <sup>for, as</sup> It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason ~~that it is the function of the concepts of the understanding to determine intuitions and for their part to be determined by them.~~ <sup>This leads for empirical</sup> Every concept of the ~~understanding, whether it is an a priori or an empirical concept, is a determinate and determinable concept.~~ <sup>of concepts are</sup> ~~We must not forget however that it has also been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that the validity and universality of the concepts of the understanding is limited to the world of sense.~~ <sup>categories</sup>

To <sup>the human mind must determine</sup> acquire knowledge of this world by ~~determining~~ our sensible intuitions by means of concepts. And yet these concepts are devoid of all meaning, unless they are referred to intuitions, so that it may be said that our intuitions in turn determine our concepts. They are, as Kant puts it here, "determinable by means of predicates borrowed from sensible intuition and capable of corresponding to it." (C. of J., 339) <sup>(1)</sup>

But have we not also shown that the existence of a world beyond the world of sense must ~~(be necessarily)~~ assumed. We cannot understand our own world unless we contrast it with another world, the world of things in themselves. <sup>and we cannot</sup> ~~Neither can~~ <sup>properly</sup> we understand <sup>the nature of</sup> our own knowledge unless we contrast it with an entirely different kind of knowledge, a knowledge which would know things as they are in themselves.

It has also been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that the human mind produces ~~yet another kind of~~ <sup>of a kind</sup> concepts which are essentially different from the categories, viz., Ideas. These Ideas cannot give us knowledge. All our knowledge is restricted <sup>and yet</sup> to the world of sense. But nevertheless, they are necessary products of our Reason, <sup>since</sup> Reason by its very nature must ~~con-~~ <sup>form</sup> ~~ceive~~ concepts of supersensible objects. ~~Now it must be asked:~~ <sup>In the case with which we are at present concerned, it may be asked:</sup> Is it impossible that the concept to which our judgments of taste refer may be of a similar kind, i.e., that it may be a theoretically indeterminable concept of the supersensible? <sup>This is Kant's solution of the problem, but as his</sup> ~~Kant holds that this is by no means impossible. His own words~~ are not easy to understand <sup>in order</sup> and I may, therefore, to explain them, make use of an argument which, although not made explicit by

- (1) Kant is alluding here to his doctrine of the Schematism of the categories. (See above, <sup>It is the Schematism</sup> which makes it possible to determine concepts of the understanding by means of predicates borrowed from sensible intuition, and which allows the correspondence between intuitions and concepts to be brought about.

(as combined by the transcendental synthesis of imagination)

<sup>him</sup> Kant seems to me to be implicit in his reasoning.

Let us assume <sup>that</sup> our understanding <sup>gives</sup> us absolute knowledge of things in themselves. In that case we could not make a judgment which <sup>refers</sup> to an indeterminate concept. For (a) we should have absolute knowledge of objects, i.e., every object which we should represent to ourselves would be known by us, as what it is. There could not be different ways of judging one and the same object. We could not attribute to an object any properties except <sup>those</sup> ~~the ones~~ which we know by means of pure

thought. It would be impossible to believe that the object possesses properties other than those which we know theoretically.

In other words, there would not be aesthetic judgments, i.e. judgments in which <sup>certain characteristics of the manifold</sup> ~~derive the manifold which we represent to~~

~~ourselves~~ from the indefinite concept of the supersensible. It

is easy to see why. For there would be no such thing as an indeterminable supersensible substratum, <sup>all</sup> and ~~all~~ our judgments would be cognitive judgments based upon determinate concepts.

<sup>however</sup> ~~Now~~ this is not the case. We do not possess an infinite power of cognition and we do not <sup>know</sup> draw things as they are in themselves, <sup>and this is why</sup>

~~is a consequence of this, we can make judgments which on the~~  
<sup>on the</sup> ~~one hand~~ are merely subjective judgments, not cognitive judgments

(based upon determinate concepts) ~~of the understanding~~ <sup>they can</sup> and on the other <sup>hand</sup> refer our representation of the object to the indeterminate concept of the supersensible.

We do not know of any objective reasons why our aesthetic judgments should be universally valid. But we are entitled to ascribe to them subjective universal validity by referring our representation of the object to the supersensible substratum.

~~We are entitled to presuppose that the reason that we feel the object to be beautiful is that the manifold of intuitions represent~~

~~ted by us is dependent on an indeterminate concept to be  
looked for in a world which our understanding does not know,  
in the supersensible.~~

*I think this explains*  
~~We understand now why~~ Kant believes that it is only on  
transcendental principles that the nature of a judgment of taste  
can be explained and the antinomy of taste ~~be~~ solved. It is  
only on principles which allow, <sup>and</sup> in fact presuppose, the exis-  
tence of an unknowable supersensible world that the nature of  
such a peculiar faculty of the mind as taste can be explained,  
a faculty which contains <sup>such</sup> different elements as mere subjec-  
tivity (independence of concepts) on the one hand and reference  
to the indefinite concept of the supersensible on the other.

"Now the judgment of taste applies to objects of sense,  
but not so as to determine a concept of them for the understand-  
ing; for it is not a cognitive judgment. Hence it is a  
singular representation of intuition referable to the feeling  
of pleasure, and, as such, only a private judgment. And to  
that extent it would be limited in its validity to the individual  
judging: the object is for me an object of delight, for others  
it may be otherwise;— every one to his taste.

"For all that, the judgment of taste contains beyond doubt  
an enlarged reference on the part of the representation of the  
object (and at the same time on the part of the subject also),  
which lays the foundation of an extension of judgments of this  
kind to necessity for every one. This must of necessity be  
founded upon some concept or other, but such a concept as does  
not admit of being determined by intuition, and affords no know-  
ledge of anything. Hence, too, it is a concept which does not  
afford any proof of the judgment of taste. But the mere pure

rational concept of the supersensible lying at the basis of the object (and of the judging subject for that matter) as object of sense, and thus as phenomenon, is just such a concept. For unless such a point of view were adopted there would be no means of saving the claim of the judgment of taste to universal validity." (C. of J., 339, 340)

It may seem difficult to understand why Kant believes that the judgment of taste contains a reference to the supersensible both on the part of the object and the subject. But it really is quite easy, for we need only remember that he has explained to us again and again that the principle which underlies our judgments of taste is the principle of a subjective purposiveness of nature. An aesthetic judgment is a judgment of reflexion. It is our faculty of reflective judgment which makes us conceive the Idea of a nature which adapts itself to our needs.

In order to conceive this Idea we have to go beyond nature as it is known by <sup>our</sup> the understanding. The principle of the subjective purposiveness is a supersensible principle a principle which our understanding cannot comprehend since it is <sup>concerned</sup> concerned with nothing but nature and her mechanical laws. Our understanding cannot explain to us why there should be beautiful objects in nature and in judging an object to be beautiful we enlarge our representation of it. We attribute more to it than our understanding can comprehend, <sup>and in</sup> In order to account for beauty we have to refer to a supersensible principle of nature and at the same time to a supersensible principle within ourselves. <sup>for</sup> In conceiving the Idea of a Technique of nature <sup>the mind</sup> we become conscious of the fact that it can <sup>look at</sup> view nature

in a special way, that within itself it possesses a capacity for transcending nature. In making use of the principle of aesthetic reflection it refers to the indeterminate and indeterminable concept of the supersensible.

That a judgment of taste cannot determine the concept of the supersensible follows from the fact that it is a merely subjective judgment, a judgment which is <sup>not</sup> ~~unconcerned~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~about~~ cognition. But <sup>although</sup> ~~allowing~~ every judgment of taste is a strictly singular judgment, a judgment which immediately accompanies the intuitive representation of the object, it is yet referred to the indeterminate concept of the supersensible, for it is implied in it that the judgment should be valid for everyone, i.e. for every human being which can and indeed must make use of the principle of <sup>aesthetic</sup> reflection. We can never understand why we possess this faculty of ~~aesthetic reflection~~, and we can never prove objectively either that it exists or that a particular aesthetic judgment is objectively valid, <sup>but</sup> ~~and yet~~ we can reasonably presuppose that the ground of the judgment, i.e. the ground of the assumed agreement of every subject, lies in a sphere of which we have no knowledge, "in the supersensible substrate of humanity."

"All contradiction disappears, however, if I say: The judgment of taste does depend upon a concept (of a general ground of the subjective purposiveness of nature for the power of judgment), but one from which nothing can be cognised in respect of the object, and nothing proved, because it is in itself indeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet by means of this very concept it acquires at the same time validity for every one (but with each individual, no doubt, as a singular

judgment immediately accompanying his intuition): because its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the concept of what may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity." (C. of J., 340.)

The antinomy of taste has now been solved in the most satisfactory way; for to solve it we had only to show that two apparently contradictory propositions are in fact consistent with each other " although the explanation of the possibility of their concept transcends our faculties of ~~reasoning~~ cognition." (C. of J., 340.)

It has also been proved that for human Reason the antinomy is natural and unavoidable; and this was possible because we could apply the fundamental principle of the Transcendental Philosophy according to which we assume that there is a sphere which human Reason cannot know, the sphere of the supersensible which includes the supersensible substrate of nature (regarded as a mere phenomenon) on the one hand, and of humanity on the other. Both the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomy require emendation. The thesis should read: "The judgment of taste is not based on determinate concepts." (C. of J., 340.); and the antithesis: "The judgment of taste rests upon a concept, although an indeterminate one, (that, namely, of the supersensible substrate of phenomena." (C. of J., 340, 341.) With these emendations, all semblance of incompatibility between the two propositions disappears.

"Beyond removing this conflict between the claims and counter-claims of taste we can do nothing. To supply a determinate objective principle of taste in accordance with which its judgments might be derived, tested, and proved, is an absolute impossibility, for then it would not be a judgment of taste.

taste. The subjective principle - that is to say, the indeterminate Idea of the supersensible within us - can only be indicated as the unique key to the riddle of this faculty, itself concealed from us in its sources; and there is no means of making it any more intelligible." (C.of J., 341.)

The rest of this section is quite simple. Kant declares that his "exhibition" and solution of the <sup>a</sup>Antinomy "rests upon the proper concept of taste as a merely reflective aesthetic Judgment". (C.of J., 341.) It is only on this principle that the two seemingly conflicting principles may be reconciled with each other. If either pleasantness or perfection is taken to be the determining grounds of the judgment of taste, i.e., if the judgment of taste is regarded as either a purely subjective or <sup>a</sup>purely objective judgment the result is an antinomy which is absolutely <sup>insoluble</sup> irresolvable.

"Thus it is evident that the removal of the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment pursues a course similar to that followed by the Critique in the solution of the antinomies of pure theoretical Reason; and that the antinomies, both here and in the Critique of Practical Reason, compel us, whether we like it or not, to look beyond the horizon of the sensible, and to seek in the supersensible the point of union of all our faculties a priori: for we are left with no other expedient to bring reason into harmony with itself." (C.of J. 341.)

Section 47 is followed by two passages, headed Remark I and Remark II. We shall see that they are both extremely interesting and extremely difficult. The reason is that Kant considers the problem of the "Dialectic of <sup>A</sup>esthetic Judgment" from a very comprehensive point of view. He <sup>considers</sup> ~~views~~ it in its

connection with the general principles of his philosophy, and the difficulty is that he expects the reader to be familiar with every part of his system.

### Remark I.

Kant begins as follows. "We find such frequent occasion in transcendental philosophy for distinguishing Ideas from concepts of the understanding that it may be of use to introduce technical terms answering to the distinction between them." (C. of R., 341, 342).

This looks as if Kant were about to enter into a discussion of questions of mere terminology. This, as we shall see, is far from being the case. In fact, no one who is really familiar with the Critique of Pure Reason and knows how fundamental in Kant's view <sup>is</sup> the distinction between categories (concepts of the understanding) and Ideas (concepts of Reason) ~~to~~ will believe that Kant's discussion will be purely technical in character and ~~have no~~ <sup>without</sup> further interest.

In order to understand him here we <sup>must</sup> ~~have~~ in the first place to ask: What, <sup>is</sup> according to Kant, <sup>I</sup> this fundamental distinction? ~~I have~~ In the Introduction to this book <sup>I</sup> quoted a very interesting passage from the Prolegomena (328) <sup>where</sup> Kant points out ~~there~~ that the distinction between Ideas (~~concepts of Reason~~) and the pure concepts of <sup>the</sup> understanding <sup>a distinction between</sup> as <sup>in</sup> cognitions of ~~an~~ entirely different ~~kind of~~ origin and employment is so essential <sup>to</sup> a science which is to contain the system of these a priori cognitions that without it a "Metaphysics is absolutely impossible or at best a disorderly and dilettantish essay." (See above

Now what is the distinction? Categories are concepts of the understanding whose function it is to provide the synthesis of the imagination with rules. (See above) <sup>What is the nature of the concepts of Reason (Ideas) and why they are there regarded as fundamentally different from categories may be seen from the two following passages.</sup>

<sup>Pure</sup> Reason leaves everything to the understanding - the understanding alone applying immediately to the objects of intuition or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity which is <sup>thought</sup> brought in the category up to the completely unconditioned." (C.P.R. B.383)

"I understand by Idea a necessary concept of Reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience (in den Sinnen)." (C.P.R. B.383)

We see that, according to Kant, <sup>Reason in conceiving its Ideas</sup> an Idea is ~~nothing else than~~ <sup>makes the</sup> concepts of the understanding ~~made~~ <sup>independent</sup> of the sphere of intuition. It is the <sup>higher</sup> function of a category to provide the imagination in its endeavour to synthetise intuitions with ~~rules~~ <sup>rules of synthetic unity for</sup> of synthetic unity. <sup>however, takes no account of this and</sup> Reason separates the categories from the ~~imaginative synthesis~~ <sup>imaginative synthesis</sup>. It leaves the world of sense (the world of conditioned objects) <sup>and must do so, since</sup> and ~~seeks for~~ <sup>the conditioned world of</sup> the absolutely unconditioned, <sup>of which it is in search cannot</sup> which can never be met with in sense-experience. Reason's guiding principle is to bring about absolute totality of the conditions of a given appearance. ~~That this~~ <sup>totality of conditions cannot be found in the undetermined world of sense is clear.</sup> "The concept of <sup>the</sup> absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience since no experience is unconditioned." (C.P.R. B383)

~~We see that according to Kant's doctrine as set forth in the Critique of Pure Reason, Ideas are categories made subject to a special principle (the principle of absolute totality). In applying this principle Reason separates the concept from the imagination (which is concerned with the synthesis of intuitions). The concept of Reason cannot be applied to objects of sense. No sense-experience can ever correspond to a concept of Reason. We may now go back to our passage. Kant goes on as follows.~~

"Ideas, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, are representations referred to an object according to a certain principle (subjective or objective), in so far as they can still never become a cognition of it. They are either referred to an intuition, in accordance with a merely subjective principle of the harmony of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding), and are then called aesthetic; or else they are referred to a concept according to an objective principle and yet are incapable of ever furnishing a cognition of the object, and are called rational Ideas. In the latter case the concept is a transcendent concept, and, as such, differs from a concept of understanding, for which an adequately answering experience may always be supplied, and which, on that account, is called immanent.

"An aesthetic idea cannot become a cognition, because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found. A rational Idea can never become a cognition, because it involves a concept (of the supersensible), for which a commensurate intuition can never be given." (C.of J., 342)

~~This is now quite easy so far as the rational Ideas are concerned.~~  
 Kant's meaning is now quite clear.  
 It seems ~~for~~ more difficult to understand (a) how Kant  
 far

can speak of aesthetic Ideas at all and (b) how he can say of them that they are incapable of giving us cognition of objects. In order to understand this we have to remember ~~what we already know about Kant's doctrine of aesthetic Ideas. We have been told that an aesthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination in which there is contained a greater manifold of sensuous intuitions than can be comprehended by a determinate concept of the understanding.~~ <sup>When we judge a work of art to be beautiful we become aware of a harmony of our faculties of cognition (imagination and understanding).</sup> ~~Moreover, Kant has explained that the creator of a work of fine art, in conceiving such an Idea becomes aware of a harmony of his faculties of cognition. We see that Kant holds that although the Idea cannot be determined by the artist he yet feels his imagination which conceives it to be in harmony with the understanding, but we~~

~~the artist cannot explain to himself how this harmony is brought about simply because his intuitions are not determined by concepts of the understanding.~~ <sup>Since our</sup> "An aesthetic Idea cannot become a cognition because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found." (C. of J. 342)

<sup>can now</sup> We understand now in what sense rational and aesthetic Ideas can be said to be analogous to one another. ~~In the event of~~ <sup>When we conceive</sup> our ~~conceiving~~ a rational Idea we think more than our imagination <sup>exhibit</sup> ~~can comprehend.~~ <sup>An aesthetic Idea contains</sup> ~~And if we conceive an aesthetic Idea we imagine~~ more than our faculty of thought can explain. And yet there is a remarkable difference between the two kinds of Ideas, a difference which Kant does not make quite clear here. When we conceive a rational Idea our faculty of thought (Reason) separates imagination and understanding entirely from one another. In this way the Idea of a supersensible world is conceived. Reason's transcendental Ideas are definite concepts of supersensible objects.

The principle of Reason is an objective principle (the principle of the unconditional<sup>ad</sup>) which although it does not give us knowledge of these objects ~~yet~~<sup>nevertheless</sup> is a determinate principle which frees the categories from their application to intuitions and their synthesis in imagination. There are definite transcendental Ideas (~~psychological ideas~~<sup>The Idea of the Soul</sup> cosmological Ideas, ~~theological ideas~~<sup>The Idea of God</sup>). An aesthetic Idea on the other hand arises in ~~theory~~<sup>us</sup> for the very reason that we become aware of a harmony of imagination and understanding. ~~We see that~~<sup>Thus</sup> the aesthetic Idea does not really separate imagination and understanding from each other. It may<sup>even</sup> be asked why the harmonious relation of our cognitive faculties makes us think of the supersensible at all. I think Kant would say that this is due to the very fact that the relation between imagination and understanding is an indeterminate one, i.e., such a relation as the understanding which is concerned with the world of sense and determinate concepts which apply to it, cannot make intelligible. ~~This is the reason~~<sup>why</sup> that we have to refer the indeterminate relation of the two faculties to a higher principle, the principle of a supersensible world in which the grounds of the possibility of such a relation have to be sought for. It is only such a higher supersensible principle which can explain to us the fact that although the imagination contains more than any concept of the understanding can comprehend, the two faculties are yet in harmony with each other. We can have no objective knowledge<sup>of</sup> such as possibility. The principle is merely subjective. It can explain to us neither why we possess a faculty of estimating the beautiful, nor why certain human beings are capable of producing objects the representation of which makes every judging subject feel a harmony of

its faculties of cognition. That there are human beings which possess such a capacity we must ascribe to something beyond nature. ~~The last point will become clearer in the last paragraph of this section.~~

In the third paragraph of the section we find the following statement: "Now the aesthetic Idea might, I think, be called an impossible representation of the imagination, the rational idea, on the other hand, an indemonstrable concept of reason. The production of both is presupposed to be not altogether groundless, but rather, (following the above explanation of an Idea in general) to take place in obedience to certain principles of the cognitive faculties to which they belong (subjective principles in the case of the former and objective in that of the latter)." (C. of J. 342)

The last part of this passage is easy. Rational and aesthetic Ideas are not arbitrarily produced. They follow necessary principles which in the case of a rational Idea are objective and in that of an aesthetic Idea are subjective principles. The human mind, which is possessed of the faculties of imagination, understanding and reason, must necessarily conceive rational (objective) and aesthetic (subjective) Ideas. ~~The first part requires an explanation regarding the terms employed in it.~~

*To understand this we must first understand Kant's use of the terms:*  
~~In the first place we have to understand by the term that~~  
~~Kant means by the terms: demonstrate, demonstrable and indemon-~~  
~~strable. This is not really difficult.~~ *for* ~~Kant goes on to state~~ *say*  
~~that all concepts of the understanding must be demonstrable.~~ *is, that*  
~~an object corresponding to them~~ *must be capable of being*  
~~he himself says, this means that the~~  
 given in intuition. Now, this is a doctrine with which every reader of the first Critique is familiar. Concepts of the understanding by themselves are devoid of real meaning. They are mere

forms of thought. In order to receive an objective meaning they must be referred to given intuitions. It is only as schematised concepts, that is to say, <sup>as</sup> concepts referred to the synthesis of imagination, that they have more than a merely logical meaning. ~~By themselves they are mere concepts of the understanding unless they are referred to intuitions, are empty forms of thought which determine no object.~~ Kant is merely restating his theory of the Schematism <sup>(1)</sup> when he says here that both pure and empirical concepts may be verified by means of an empirical intuition, i.e., the thought of them may be indicated (gewiesen), demonstrated (demonstriert), exhibited (aufgezeigt) in an example. "And this it must be possible to do: for otherwise there would be no certainty of the thought not being empty i.e., <sup>(1)</sup> of having no object." (C.of J., ~~see~~ 343)<sub>m</sub>

Kant goes on to state that he is using (here) the term demonstrate (ostendere, exhibere) as an equivalent to giving an accompanying presentation of the concept in intuition, i.e., in the sense which has just been explained. He criticises the use which is made of the term in logic, in which demonstrable and indemonstrable are ordinarily employed only in respect of propositions. ~~These~~ Propositions which are capable of being proved are called demonstrable propositions, ~~the propositions~~ <sup>those</sup> which are incapable of proof indemonstrable propositions. This ~~deduction~~ <sup>distinction</sup> is so well known that we need <sup>not</sup> concern ourselves with it. We need only take note of the fact that Kant understands here by ~~being capable of demonstration~~ <sup>demonstrable concepts</sup> ~~those concepts which are~~ <sup>are</sup> capable of being referred to intuition, irrespective of whether the concepts <sup>are</sup> provable or not. It is now ~~quite~~ <sup>easy to see why</sup> Kant <sup>what means when he</sup> calls rational Ideas indemonstrable concepts. He proceeds to explain that both the rational concepts of the supersensible substrata of all phenomena generally (he might have

(1) On the doctrine of the Schematism, see above,

said the theoretical concept of the thing in itself) and the rational concept of moral freedom are such indemonstrable concepts. The former <sup>is</sup> immediately clear. As regards the latter it has to be noted that the concept of moral freedom, although it actually determines actions which take place in the world of sense must <sup>transcendent</sup> ~~not~~ be regarded as a demonstrable concept <sup>that we can have</sup> on the ground that <sup>no theoretical knowledge of moral concepts is due to the fact that the</sup> theoretical knowledge of this supersensible concept is impossible. <sup>human mind is incapable of referring them to intuitions</sup> Such knowledge would be possible if we could demonstrate the concept intuition. ~~This however cannot be brought about. As shown in the Critique of practical Reason and the "Grundwerk", moral freedom is a transcendent concept, so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned (see above).~~

What Kant understands by the term, "Inexponible" and why he believes that an aesthetic Idea is an ~~inexponible~~ <sup>unrepresentable</sup> the representation of the imagination, may be seen from the following passage.

"Just as the imagination, in the case of a rational Idea, fails with its intuitions to attain to the given concept, so understanding, in the case of an aesthetic Idea, fails with its concepts ever to attain to the completeness of the internal intuition which imagination conjoins with a given representation. Now since the reduction of a representation of the imagination to concepts is equivalent to giving its exponents, the aesthetic idea may be called an inexponible representation of the imagination (in its free play)." (C. of J., 343)

Kant goes on to say that he will afterwards have an opportunity of <sup>dealing with</sup> ~~concerning himself~~ more fully with the aesthetic Ideas. Unfortunately, however, he never mentions them again at least not explicitly. This is very distressing. ~~For~~ <sup>that</sup> All he adds in the

present section is that both aesthetic and rational Ideas have their principles in Reason. <sup>As we</sup> ~~to~~ shall see in the subsequent section (Remark II), ~~that~~ Kant holds that the antinomy of aesthetic Judgment is brought about by Reason, which ~~possesses~~ <sup>passes</sup> judgment <sup>upon</sup> ~~about~~ the principles of the <sup>faculty of Judgment</sup> ~~faculty~~. This has obviously some connexion with his assertion here that aesthetic Ideas have their <sup>principles</sup> ~~seat~~ in Reason. But (a), as we shall see, it is very difficult to understand the argument set forth in the following section, and (b) <sup>in it</sup> Kant does not mention ~~in it~~ the aesthetic Ideas again. <sup>result</sup> The ~~sense~~ ~~hence~~ is that even if we succeeded in understanding why Kant believes that the Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment is brought about by Reason, it would still remain obscure <sup>to us</sup> why he <sup>believes that</sup> ~~regards~~ the aesthetic Ideas as ~~pre-~~ <sup>themselves</sup> ~~ducts of our reason.~~ <sup>have their principles in</sup> Reason.

In the last paragraph of our section Kant first defines genius as the faculty of aesthetic Ideas. He goes on as follows.

"This serves at the same time to point out the reason why it is nature <sup>the</sup> (nature of the individual) and not a ~~set~~ <sup>set</sup> purpose, that in products of genius gives the rule to art (as the production of the beautiful). For the beautiful must not be estimated according to concepts, but by the <sup>perfective</sup> ~~final~~ mode in which the imagination is attuned so as to accord with the faculty of concepts generally; and so rule and precept are incapable of serving as the requisite subjective standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned purposiveness in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please every one. Rather must such a standard be sought in the element of mere nature in the subject, which cannot be comprehended under rules or concepts, that is to say, the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties

(unattainable by any concept of understanding) and consequently in that which forms the point of reference for the harmonious accord of all our faculties of cognition - the production of which accord is the ultimate end set by the intelligible basis of our nature. Thus <sup>alone</sup> ~~along~~ is it possible for a subjective and yet universally valid principle a priori to lie at the basis of that purposiveness for which no objective principle can be prescribed." (C.of J., 344)

It is clear that Kant <sup>here</sup> expects the reader ~~here~~ to have followed his argument throughout the "Critique of aesthetic Judgment". He presupposes that he will be familiar with all his technical terms and the meaning attached to them. And indeed anyone who has studied the Critique carefully will find little difficulty in understanding <sup>him</sup> ~~Kant~~ here. There <sup>are</sup> ~~only~~ a few points I should like to discuss. In the first place we have to note that once more Kant derives the product of fine art from our judgments about it. He argues that since our judgments about beauty are independent of a concept, since in making them we do not employ objective principles but merely speak of the harmony of our cognitive faculties, the work of art which is to be judged beautiful cannot be produced according to <sup>any</sup> ~~our~~ definite <sup>purpose</sup> ~~concept~~ or <sup>any</sup> ~~definite~~ <sup>concept</sup> ~~purpose~~ of <sup>what</sup> ~~which~~ it is to be. <sup>This is natural</sup> ~~Naturally~~, for ~~it~~ if we derived it from a purpose we should not judge it beautiful. From this it follows that the artist can give no definite rule to art. The rule must belong to the nature of the individual artist, <sup>but what</sup> ~~what~~ does Kant mean here by "nature"?

Obviously not nature as it is known by every human being. <sup>He</sup> ~~it~~ is not thinking here of nature as an object of sense experience which we determine according to the rules of the understanding,

and which every human being can know by determining <sup>his</sup> intuitions by means of the concepts of the understanding and thus bringing <sup>intuition and understanding</sup> the two faculties into a determinate relation. It is <sup>nature in a special sense v. 12, 1</sup> a special kind of nature, <sup>while</sup> the nature of the individual, <sup>his faculty</sup> its ~~super-~~ sensible capacity for bringing about the harmonious relation of the cognitive faculties, which has also been called subjective purposiveness. The artist himself does not know how he brings <sup>achieves</sup> this about and <sup>it, no does the man</sup> who judges his work to be beautiful, <sup>it</sup> to be in accordance with the subjective and yet universally valid principle of aesthetic reflection, ~~do not know it either.~~ <sup>As</sup> Every objective knowledge of nature can be determined by rules and concepts, <sup>but the</sup> a subjective principle of the indeterminate harmony of the cognitive faculties which has to serve "as the requisite <sup>sub</sup> objective standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned purposiveness, in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please everyone" cannot be determined in this way.

We have to find a point of reference for the ~~harmonious~~ <sup>harmony</sup> accord of all our cognitive faculties, and this point we can find only in a supersensible faculty of the subject, its faculty of <sup>forming</sup> ~~concerning~~ aesthetic ideas. In order to explain <sup>to</sup> ~~it~~ ourselves how a human being can produce a work of art which is judged beautiful by everyone, we have to refer to a specific faculty of the subject that produces it, <sup>and we</sup> we cannot derive the rule according to which <sup>he</sup> it produces the work from anything but "the element of more nature in the <sup>sub</sup> object which cannot be comprehended under rules or concepts, that is to say, the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties (unattainable by any concept of the understanding)." <sup>is</sup>

It will be obvious that all this is in the ~~most perfect~~ har-

mony with what has been said before, ~~and we may now go on with our exposition.~~

Remark II.

In this section Kant compares the three kinds of antinomies with one another, viz. <sup>and</sup> Theoretical antinomies, practical antinomies, <sup>and</sup> antinomies of aesthetic Judgment. He begins as follows.

"The following important observation here naturally presents itself: There are three kinds of antinomies of pure reason, which, however, all agree in forcing Reason to abandon the otherwise very natural assumption which takes the objects of sense for things-in-themselves, and to regard them, instead, merely as phenomena, and to lay at their basis an intelligible substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is only an Idea and affords no proper knowledge). Apart from some such antinomy Reason could never bring itself to take such a step as to adopt a principle so severely restricting the field of its speculation, and to submit to sacrifices involving the complete dissipation of so many otherwise brilliant hopes. For even now that it is recompensed for this loss by the prospect of a proportionately wider scope of action from a practical point of view, it is not without a pang of regret that it appears to part company with those hopes, and to break away from the old ties (von der alten Anhänglichkeit)."

(C. of R., 344, 345.)

This will be understood by anyone who has studied the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. I may refer here to my exposition of the first two Critiques. (1)

There is, however, one difficult point. It may be asked, why Kant speaks here of three antinomies of Reason. Does he really

(1) See above.

believe that all the antinomies are <sup>caused</sup> brought ~~about~~ by Reason, even the antinomy of aesthetic Judgment? <sup>That this really is his</sup> ~~The answer has to be~~ <sup>of course</sup> in the affirmative as may be seen from the passage which follows the one we have just quoted. Kant says, "The reason for there being three kinds of antinomies is to be found in the fact that there are three faculties of cognition, understanding, judgment, and Reason, each of which, being a higher faculty of cognition, must have its a priori principles. Now, so far as Reason passes judgment upon these principles themselves and their employment, it inexorably requires the unconditioned for the given conditioned in respect of them all. This can never be found unless the sensible, instead of being regarded as inherently appurtenant to things-in-themselves, is treated as a mere phenomenon, and, as such being made to rest upon something supersensible (the intelligible substrate of external and internal nature) as the thing-in-itself." (C. of J., 345).

What is the difficulty here? We do not find it difficult to understand that Kant believes that there are three higher faculties of cognition and that they all have their a priori principles; for we know this from our examination of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (section XI in particular). We also know <sup>Kant</sup> why he believes this ~~to be the case~~. The difficulty is to understand how <sup>he</sup> Kant can set forth the view that <sup>all</sup> the antinomies are brought about by Reason which <sup>passing</sup> ~~passes~~ judgment upon <sup>the</sup> a priori principles. <sup>(1)</sup> ~~In the first place we have to ask our-~~ ~~selves, is this in harmony with the doctrine of the first Critique? To be enabled to answer this question we have to know what according to the doctrine of the first Critique the fundamen-~~ ~~tal principle of Reason is. This may be seen from the following~~ ~~passage.~~

- (1) On the antinomies of Pure Reason and the antinomy of practical Reason, see above.  
The fundamental concept of Reason is the concept of the unconditioned, see above.

The transcendental concept of Reason is therefore none other than the concept of the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the totality of conditions and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned a pure concept of Reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned as containing a ground of the of the conditioned." (C.P.R., B379).

I have dealt with this doctrine before that I may refer to my previous discussions. It is sufficient to state here once more: According to Kant the fundamental concept of Reason is the concept of the unconditioned. We may just as well say: It is the concept of the absolute. Why? Because unconditioned and absolute are synonymous and interchangeable terms. This may be seen from the following passage: "I shall use the word absolute opposing it to what is valid only comparatively, that is in some particular respect. For while the latter is restricted by conditions the former is valid in that restriction." (C.P.R., B382).

We have now to ask ourselves whether Kant's exposition of the is in accordance with his general doctrine that every concept of Reason is a concept of the unconditioned or absolute. To decide this question we shall consider the third antinomy (we may just as well have chosen any of the others because the same principle applies to them all). The thesis of the antinomy is formulated as follows. "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be desired. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is another causality, that of freedom." (C.P.R., B472).

Why must we arrive at such a conclusion? Kant's argument is this. / Supposing we assumed that rational causality were the

kind of causal principle every given event would depend on another preceding it in time. From this it follows that since there would be no absolute beginning the series of causes could never be completed, i.e. it would be impossible to find all the causes which have conditioned a given event. This is contrary to the causal principle itself which presupposes that nothing in the world ever takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori. Consequently we must assume a first cause, i.e. a cause which is not itself determined by another cause antecedent to it. We have to assume an absolute spontaneity of this cause. It is a cause which begins of itself. "This is transcendental freedom without which even in the ordinary course of nature the series of appearances or the of the causes can never be complete." (C.P.R., B474).

In the antithesis the very contrary is asserted. "There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature." (C.P.R., 475). Kant's proof may be summarised thus.

The assumption of freedom, i.e. the assumption of the absolute beginning of a cause without any cause preceding it contradicts the law of causality which is a necessary law. As soon as we assume the existence of a first cause all unity of experience becomes impossible. For the causal principle is destroyed. Freedom is an empty concept. In applying it we do away with the necessary laws of nature. "Nature and transcendental freedom differ as do conformity of law to lawlessness." (C.P.R., B475).

We must inquire into nature according to the principle of causality which allows of no exception. It is only in this way that we can bring about unity of experience in accordance with

laws. The assumption of a causality through freedom as being contrary to the causal law makes a completely coherent experience impossible and is thus to be rejected.

We have learnt from the examination of this argument that Kant believes that, in the case of both the Thesis and the Antithesis Reason employs its principle of the unconditioned. It ascribes unconditioned or absolute validity to the two propositions which constitute the antinomy. Further, in both cases Reason is not concerned with its own principle but merely applies it to the principle of the understanding which in the case of the third antinomy is the a priori principle of natural causality. In judging about this principle it arrives at the conclusion (a) that there must be causality through freedom; for otherwise the principle of the understanding would not be valid. (b) That there can be no such thing as causality; for otherwise the principle of the understanding would not be valid.

Reverting now to the section with which we are at present concerned, we easily understand why Kant holds that the antinomy of theoretical Reason arises from the fact that Reason passes judgment upon the a priori principles of the understanding. But we have still to ask why he also holds that the antinomy of aesthetic Judgment is brought about by Reason making the principles of aesthetic Judgment subject to its own principle of the unconditioned.

*why Kant attributes the antinomy of Aesthetic Judgment to Reason, we may first remind ourselves that*  
 In order to understand this we must first remember that Kant has told us in Section 45 that there is no such thing as a Dialectic of taste itself, but only a Dialectic of the Critique of taste in respect of its principles. The transcendental Critique of taste will contain a part called Dialectic only if we find an antinomy of the principles of <sup>taste</sup> ~~this faculty~~. In the

subsequent section in which Kant sets forth the antinomy of taste he explains that it is not really the principles of taste which lead to the antinomy, but the conclusions which are drawn from them. The antinomy arises because from the fact that the principle of taste is purely subjective, <sup>it is inferred</sup> ~~the conclusion is drawn~~ that the judgment of taste is based upon no concepts at all and from the fact that the judgment of taste claims universal validity <sup>inference is drawn</sup> the opposite ~~conclusion~~, namely, that the judgment of taste is based upon definite objective concepts. ~~Now it seems to be~~ <sup>It is</sup> quite obvious that according to Kantian principles <sup>these inferences are drawn by Reason</sup> it is Reason which draws these conclusions. Reason in considering the subjective side of the judgment and ascribing to it unconditional <sup>absolute</sup> validity arrives at the conclusion that judgments of taste are not based upon any a priori principle, that they are independent of concepts. In considering the other side and applying the same principle (absolute unconditional validity) <sup>it</sup> he arrives at the opposite conclusion. ~~This seems to me implied in Kant's argument and explains why Kant says in the section with which we are here concerned, that it is Reason which in passing judgment upon the a priori principle of aesthetic judgment gives rise to an antinomy, just as it gives rise to antinomies when it judges about the principles of the understanding (theoretical antinomies) and also when it passes judgment upon its <sup>(1)</sup> ~~practical~~ principles (antinomy of practical Reason).~~

We may now proceed with our examination of <sup>the present</sup> ~~our~~ section. Kant goes on as follows. "There is then (1) for the cognitive faculty an antinomy of Reason in respect of the theoretical employment of understanding carried to the point of the unconditioned; (2) for the feeling of pleasure and <sup>pain</sup> ~~displeasure~~ an antinomy of Reason in respect of the aesthetic employment of judgment;

(1) On the "Antinomy of Practical Reason", see above.

(3) for the faculty of desire an antinomy in respect of the practical employment of self-legislative Reason." (C. of J., 345)

For an explanation of this I may refer to my exposition of section 11, of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. A brief recapitulation of the main points of the argument set forth there will be sufficient for our present purpose. We remember that Kant believes that there exist three faculties of the mind, namely, <sup>(a) the</sup> cognitive faculty, <sup>(b) the</sup> feeling or pleasure and pain, faculty of desire. Further, there <sup>are</sup> exist three <sup>higher faculties of cognition</sup> cognitive faculties, namely (a) understanding, (b) Judgment, (c) Reason. They may be called higher cognitive faculties because they produce a priori principles. The faculties of the mind and the cognitive faculties stand in a necessary connexion. It appears that understanding has a priori principles only for the cognitive faculty, Judgment only for the feeling of pleasure and pain, Reason only for the faculty of desire. ~~Why Kant believes all this~~ I have tried to explain before <sup>and</sup> all that is necessary here is to state that the argument set forth in our section <sup>is a harmony</sup> harmonizes perfectly with what has been said in the Introduction. This will be seen from the following passage.

"The reason for there being three kinds of antinomies is to be found in the fact that there are three faculties of cognition, understanding, Judgment, and Reason, each of which, being a higher faculty of cognition, must have its a priori principles." (C. of J.

345)

It has been shown of the <sup>the</sup> regarding two antinomies (theoretical and practical antinomies) that it has been shown that they are inevitable and insoluble unless <sup>s)</sup> it has been shown that they are inevitable and insoluble unless the theoretical and practical judgments are referred to "a supersensible substrate of the given objects." (C. of J., 345), but that

they can be solved the moment this is done. ~~As regards the~~  
~~antimony of aesthetic judgment~~ the same method must be applied  
 to ~~the~~ <sup>(of the antimony of aesthetic judgment, i.e. the method of)</sup>  
~~for its solution~~ <sup>would be</sup> reference to the supersensible. For other-  
 wise there remain only two alternatives: <sup>(a)</sup> either it must be  
 shown that judgments of taste are not a priori judgments at all,  
 that they are purely subjective, and that the <sup>judgment of taste</sup> consensus of opinion  
~~regarding the objects which are judged beautiful is due to the~~  
~~people agree about it. If this were so, that agreement would be due to a~~  
~~contingent by resembling organization of the individuals. Or~~  
~~similar organization of the different subjects. Or (b) judgments of taste must~~  
~~also, they must be declared to be purely objective judgments,~~  
~~be declared to be.~~ <sup>Actually, the original judgments about the</sup>  
~~disguised judgments of Reason, judgments about perfection. In~~  
~~perfection of a thing are called aesthetic only "on account of the conditions~~  
~~both cases, "the solution of the antimony with the assistance of~~  
~~transcendental Ideas might be declared otiose and nugatory, and~~  
~~the above laws of taste thus reconciled with the objects of sense,~~  
~~not as mere phenomena, but even as things-in-themselves." (C.of J.,~~  
 346).

But <sup>"how</sup>  
~~Kant goes on as follows:~~ "How unsatisfactory both of those  
 alternatives alike are as a means of escape has been shown in  
 several places in our exposition of judgments of taste." (C.of J.,  
 346.)

~~Kant concludes as follows:~~  
~~His concluding words are,~~ "If, however, our deduction is at  
 least credited with having been worked out on correct lines, even  
 though it may not have been sufficiently clear in all its details,  
 three ideas then stand out in evidence. Firstly, there is the  
 supersensible in general, without further determination, as sub-  
 strate of nature; secondly, this same supersensible as principle  
 of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our cognitive  
 faculties; thirdly, the same supersensible again, as principle of  
 the ends of freedom, and principle of the common accord of these  
 ends with freedom in the moral sphere." <sup>(1)</sup> (C.of J., 346.)

(1) The deduction is of course the "Deduction of judgments of  
 Taste" which as Kant said in Section 35 is concerned with  
 nothing but the formal peculiarities of the judgments. The  
 formal peculiarities of the judgments are: (a) they claim  
 universal validity just as if they were objective (Section 35),  
 and (b) they are incapable of proof as if they were subjective  
 (Section 36). The deduction has taken into account both the

<sup>now</sup>  
I ~~will~~ now leave the "Critique of aesthetic judgment" and turn to the "Critique of teleological Judgment". What the connection between "Aesthetic" and "Teleology" is Kant has explained to us in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. In the first section of the "Critique of teleological Judgment" (Section 61) <sup>he</sup> ~~Kant~~ recapitulates what has been worked out in detail in the introduction. I shall follow his argument but ~~may state~~ ~~that~~ for a full understanding ~~of it~~ ~~it~~ is necessary that the reader should refer to the Introduction. ~~If he wishes he may also consult my exposition of it.~~

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(footnote cont. from previous page)

objective and the subjective side of the judgments of taste and distinguished them from the judgments about the pleasant (subjective judgments of sense) and from judgments about perfection (objective judgments of Reason).

The Idea of the supersensible in general as <sup>the</sup> substrate of nature is identical with what is usually called "thing-in-itself". ~~For naturally the thing in itself cannot be determined in any way.~~ That the Idea of subjective purposiveness of nature underlies all our judgments of taste and in fact all reflective judgments, has been shown in several places.

Section 61.

Kant's argument in this section may be paraphrased as follows. According to the principles of transcendental philosophy we have <sup>sufficient</sup> ~~ample~~ reason (guten Grund) to ascribe to nature "subjective purposiveness" in respect of <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ particular laws. It has been shown that ~~and why~~ according to a necessary a priori principle we must presuppose that nature will meet the demand made upon it by our faculty of Judgment. We must assume that nature will present us with a system of particular laws. Such an assumption is necessary. <sup>since</sup> ~~For~~ otherwise we could not make nature intelligible <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ ourselves. If we are to understand nature <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ particular laws must not be absolutely heterogeneous, but <sup>must be</sup> so related to <sup>one another</sup> ~~each other~~ as to enable us to arrange them in a logical system.

We have seen that the human mind necessarily employs this <sup>sub</sup> ~~subjective~~ principle of logical reflexion. We ascribe to nature logical ~~purposiveness~~. We cannot but conceive the Idea of a nature which adapts <sup>it</sup> ~~herself~~ to the requirements of our Judgment. (1)

It has also been shown that we are entitled to ascribe to nature a principle of aesthetic purposiveness, <sup>that is say, we</sup> ~~we~~ may expect that nature will present us with objects which look to us as if nature had designed them for the express purpose of adapting <sup>it</sup> ~~herself~~ to the demands of our Judgment and its principle of aesthetic reflexion. ~~We can and in fact must ascribe to nature this principle.~~ In other words, we are justified in assuming that nature will present us with forms which we shall judge beautiful, i.e., with such forms as bring our faculty of aesthetic reflection ~~into~~ play (that principle

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(1) See above.

by means of which we become aware of a harmonious relation of our faculties of cognition). It is not impossible to understand, how we can suppose prior to actual experience, that nature will present us with forms in which there expresses itself such a principle of unity as <sup>can</sup> to awaken our faculty of aesthetic reflection. We do (of course) not know a priori <sup>which</sup> ~~what~~ objects will be judged beautiful by us. The objects must be given to us in experience in order that we may be enabled to judge them aesthetically. But the principle of aesthetic reflection itself is an a priori principle and <sup>also</sup> that it follows, if from nothing else, from the fact that we should be unable to judge a given object to be beautiful, i.e., to correspond to the principle of aesthetic reflection unless the principle itself were assumed ~~to~~ beforehand as a special faculty of the mind.

In other words, although only the empirical object can make us aware of beauty, the principle according to which it is judged cannot be derived from it. It is a product of the mind. It is an a priori principle. (1)

Now it is quite clear that the only reason why we can make use of the a priori principles of logical and aesthetic reflections ~~must rest upon the idea of logical or aesthetic "techniques"~~ <sup>of nature</sup> is that they are both merely <sup>and</sup> objective principles. In applying them we do <sup>not</sup> assert <sup>anything</sup> ~~nothing~~ about the objects themselves. We are concerned with their purely formal characteristics, whether logical or aesthetic, i.e., with their relation to the human mind which judges them to conform to its own principles. ~~The idea of purposiveness or Technique is purely subjective. It is in both cases the idea of an adaptation of nature to the faculty of judgment and its principles.~~

(1) See above,

~~Now~~ The question arises: Is it possible to regard the objects of nature themselves as purposes of nature? It seems as if the answer <sup>would have</sup> ~~and~~ to be in the negative.

"But the universal Idea of nature, as the <sup>total</sup> ~~complex~~ (Inbegriff) of objectives of sense, gives us no reason whatever for assuming that things of nature serve one another as means to ends (Mittel zu Zwecken) or that their very possibility is only made fully intelligible by a causality of this sort. For since in the case of the beautiful forms above mentioned, the representation of the things is something in ourselves, it can quite readily be thought even a priori as one well adapted and convenient for disposing our cognitive faculties to an inward and purposive harmony. But where the purposes are not purposes of our own, and do not belong even to nature (which we do not take to be an intelligent being), there is no reason at all for presuming a priori that they may or ought nevertheless to constitute a special kind of causality or at least a quite peculiar order of nature." (C. of J., 359, 360.)

This passage will for the most part be readily understood by anyone who has read the Introduction to the Critique. Kant's problem is: How is it possible to regard certain objects as purposes of nature? It seems to be impossible to <sup>do</sup> believe anything of the kind, ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> nature as an object of experience, ~~i.e. nature as determined by the universal principles of the understanding (one among others the principle of mechanical causality)~~ nature as the <sup>total</sup> ~~complex~~ of objects of sense (Inbegriff der Sinne) does not give us any indication that it obeys yet another principle, that it produces objects purposively. It is not impossible to understand how we can ascribe to nature

a principle of <sup>sub</sup>jective purposiveness, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ this principle is thought to be valid only in relation to the human mind. But how can we ascribe to <sup>no here</sup> ~~her~~ purposes of <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ own? How can we make use of the Idea of nature ~~viewed~~ as an intelligent being? It is obvious that such a conception of nature is fundamentally different from the one which is thought by the principles of the understanding, ~~the principle of causality in nature.~~ It has to attribute to nature a special kind of supersensible causality. We assume that there exists an intelligent being beyond the world of sense which produces objects according to a special kind of causality <sup>namely</sup> ~~causality~~ according to purposes.

Before going on <sup>there is a difficulty that we must deal with.</sup> ~~we have to concern ourselves with one~~ difficulty. Kant says in the passage which we have just quoted <sup>there is no reason for assuming either that natural objects</sup> that ~~it may be assumed that things of nature~~ <sup>can be</sup> ~~serve one another~~ as means to ends or that their very possibility is made fully intelligible <sup>only through this kind of causality.</sup> ~~by a causality of this kind.~~ <sup>This differs in the</sup> ~~He does not make~~ sufficiently clear <sup>of course but</sup> ~~what the distinction is.~~ <sup>we</sup> We shall see later that he <sup>distinction</sup> ~~draws a distinction~~ between two kinds of purposiveness, namely, extrinsic purposiveness (i.e., the Idea that nature produces things in order to make them serve one another) and intrinsic purposiveness (the Idea that nature produces particular things according to the Idea of a purpose). <sup>He will show</sup> ~~We shall see~~ that Kant holds <sup>that</sup> ~~that~~ it is only the latter assumption which can be made with any degree of probability.

We can now go on with our interpretation. <sup>As we</sup> ~~We~~ have seen, Kant's problem is that it seems to be impossible to ascribe purposes to nature. He goes on to adduce another argument.

"What is more, the actual existence of these purposes

cannot be proved by experience - save on the assumption of an antecedent process of mental jugglery (es muesste dem eine Vermunfttelei vorgegangen sein) that only reads the conception of a purpose into the nature of the things, and that, not deriving this conception from the objects and what it knows of them from experience, makes use of it more for the purpose of rendering nature intelligible to us by an analogy to a subjective ground upon which our representations are brought into inner connexion than for that of cognising nature from objective grounds." (C. of J., 360)

We <sup>may</sup> remember Section 10 of the Introduction, in which Kant has shown that the teleological principle is not an empirical principle. It cannot be derived from experience of <sup>natural</sup> ~~rational~~ objects. In order to judge a material object teleologically our minds have to read something into it. The difficulty is that it seems as if this were also impossible, as if we were in no way entitled to read purposes into nature, simply because the teleological principle conflicts with the principles of the understanding which knows of no causal connexion except mechanical connexion ( ).

We see <sup>not that</sup> ~~the~~ teleological principle seems to be impossible both as an empirical and as an a priori principle. In <sup>the present</sup> ~~the~~ section Kant goes on as follows:

"Besides, objective purposiveness, as a principle upon which physical objects are possible, is so far from attaching necessarily to the concept of nature, that it is the stock example adduced to show the contingency of nature and its form. So where the structure of a bird, for instance the hollow formation of its bones, the position of its wings for producing

motion, and of its tail for steering, are cited, we are told that all this is in the highest degree contingent if we simply look to the nexus effectivus in nature, and do not call in aid a special kind of causality, namely, that of purposes (nexus finalis). This means that nature, regarded as mere mechanism, could have fashioned itself in a thousand other different ways without lighting precisely on the unity based on a principle like this, and that, accordingly, it is only outside the conception of nature, and not in it, that we may hope to find some shadow of ground a priori for that unity." (C. of J. 360)

This again will be <sup>readily</sup> ~~easily~~ understood by anyone who has read the Introduction, <sup>and the</sup> ~~the same~~ <sup>heads for</sup> ~~applies to~~ the remainder of Section 51, <sup>in which</sup> Kant explains that we can make use of the teleological principle regarding nature only if we do not pretend to explain <sup>nature</sup> ~~it~~ by ~~this~~ means. <sup>of it</sup> It can be employed only problematically, that is to say, for the sake of our own investigation into nature, not for a determination of nature as such. In other words, it is a principle that belongs to reflective and not to determinant Judgment. It gives us at least one more principle (eine Einheit mehr) for our inquiry into nature which we apply in those cases in which mechanical principles are deemed insufficient. In applying it we regard nature <sup>on the</sup> ~~by~~ analogy <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ our own faculty <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ producing things purposively. We regard nature as possessed of a <sup>faculty of</sup> ~~capacity~~ for acting technically. But although the assumption of such a regulative principle is legitimate, it must not make us ascribe to nature purposes of ~~her~~ <sup>its</sup> own. We must not ascribe to ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> definite intentions. For in doing so we should substitute for a merely regulative principle a ~~guiding principle of our enquiry into nature~~, a constitutive

principle which we should use for the determination of nature as such. (Kant)

(The concept of a purpose of nature would be employed not for reflective but for determinant Judgment. It would be an objective concept of Reason by means of which we transcend nature and ascribe to her a supersensible causality. We should introduce a new causality into science, and to do so can be allowed on no circumstances.)

Analytic of Teleological Judgment.

Section 62.

In this section Kant distinguishes between two kinds of objective purposiveness, namely formal objective purposiveness and material objective purposiveness. <sup>the</sup> The "Analytic of teleological Judgment" As we shall see, will be concerned only with the latter. To explain Section 62 we have to understand what Kant means by formal objective purposiveness. He says at the beginning of the section; "All geometrical figures drawn on a principle display an objective purposiveness which takes many directions and has often been admired. This purposiveness is one of convenience on the part of the figure for solving a number of problems by a single principle, and even for solving each one of the problems in an infinite variety of ways." (C.of J.. 362)

We can see from this in the first place that formal objective purposiveness is the purposiveness of <sup>adapted to</sup> geometrical figures. <sup>These</sup> They may be called purposive, because they are ~~suitable for~~ <sup>are</sup> the solution of various problems. Why does Kant call this purposiveness? What is the purpose to which the figures ~~is~~ <sup>are</sup> supposed

~~adapt themselves?~~  
 to ~~lend itself?~~ This may be seen from Kant's examples. Let  
 us assume that we are called upon to construct a triangle, <sup>of which</sup> ~~the~~  
~~the base and the vertical angle are given.~~  
~~base of which is given and the vertical angle.~~ It is clear  
 that this problem admits of an infinite number of solutions, ~~and~~  
~~we find~~ however that all the possible triangles are embraced  
 by the circle as their geometrical locus, <sup>so that</sup> ~~we see that what~~  
~~we find in trying to solve our problem is that it is~~ simplified  
 in the most surprising manner. Our purpose <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ to find all  
 possible triangles which fulfil the conditions and this purpose  
~~is easily accomplished as the circle embraces them all,~~  
~~is satisfied by the figure.~~ In order to understand this better  
 we have to remember what Kant has told us in the Introduction  
 to the Critique (about logical purposiveness). Why does the  
 Idea of logical purposiveness arise in us at all, and what is  
 the situation in which it arises? We are called upon to arrange  
 the particular laws of nature systematically, <sup>and not differently, as</sup> ~~as far as~~  
<sup>is that</sup> our understanding is concerned, <sup>is that</sup> it remains possible that we  
 might find on the particular laws an absolutely different from  
 one another, <sup>so</sup> <sup>would</sup> that their systematisation <sup>would</sup> ~~becomes~~ quite impossible.  
 We find, however, in studying nature that this is not the case,  
 that the particular laws of nature are not totally heterogeneous,  
<sup>adapt itself</sup> that nature ~~leads herself~~ to our own purpose which is to arrange  
 her particular laws systematically. The realisation of this  
 fact produces necessarily, as has been shown, a feeling of admir-  
 ation in us or does so at least in the transcendental philosopher  
 who knows that the a priori principles of the understanding  
 (universal laws <sup>of</sup> ~~and~~ nature) cannot account for such a systematic  
 unity of nature in respect of her particular laws. ~~We will~~  
 admire Nature's purposiveness, i.e., its adaptation to the human  
 mind. Nature seems to conform to the desire of the subject ~~to~~  
~~gain~~ <sup>for a</sup> knowledge of nature the possibility of which depends on its  
 being a system. (1)

(1) See above

The case is quite similar regarding the purposiveness of geometrical figures. <sup>is a similar case</sup> We find <sup>here</sup> once that the objects comply with our own wishes. We seek to solve a geometrical problem and we find that the properties of our objects, ~~geometrical figures~~, make this possible and even easy. No wonder we admire them for their purposiveness. Kant says of the old geometers that <sup>they</sup> "They delighted themselves with a purposiveness which, although belonging to the nature of the things, they were able to present completely a priori as necessary." (C.of J., 565) He goes on as follows.

"Plato, himself a master of this science, was fired with the Idea of an original constitution of things, for the discovery of which we could dispense with all experience, and of a power of the mind enabling it to derive the harmony of real things from their supersensible principle (and with these real things he classed the properties of numbers with which the mind plays in music.)" (C.of J., 565)

Now what has <sup>the</sup> transcendental philosophy <sup>to</sup> say about this purposiveness of geometrical figures and numbers the observation of which made Plato think that the human mind was capable of deriving it from the supersensible? In the first place <sup>he</sup> ~~to have~~ to be noted that the purposiveness which is assumed is manifestly objective and intellectual, not subjective and aesthetic. This is clear: for in assuming it we are concerned with <sup>the</sup> cognition of objects, and not merely with our own subjective feelings about them. And yet <sup>this</sup> "This intellectual purposiveness is simply formal, not real. In other words it is a purposiveness which does not imply an underlying purpose, and which, therefore, does not stand in need of teleology. As such, and although it is objec-

tive, not subjective like aesthetic purposiveness, its possibility is readily comprehensible, though only in the abstract."

(C.of J., 364)

This seems difficult to understand. For from the fact that the purposiveness is objective, i.e., that it concerns properties of objects, it seems to follow that it must be derived from a definite objective concept. It seems permissible, even necessary, to derive objective formal purposiveness from the supersensible. The solution of this problem is <sup>given</sup> ~~implied~~ in the passage which follows the one which we have just quoted. Kant points out that <sup>a</sup>the geometrical figure, e.g., a circle, is an intuition which the understanding has determined according to a principle "This principle, which is arbitrarily assumed and made a fundamental conception, is only found in ourselves, and found a priori as a representation. It is the unity of this principle that explains the unity of the numerous rules resulting from the construction of that conception." (C.of J., 364)

This will be readily understood by anyone who is familiar with the doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason, concerning geometry. According to this doctrine a geometrical figure is not a thing in itself, it is a mere representation and as such must necessarily conform to the a priori conditions of intuition and thought. A geometrical figure is not an external object. It is a product of the mind; <sup>it must</sup> ~~And yet it is not an arbitrary~~ product. ~~It must (why has been shown in the first Critique)~~ necessarily conform to the objective conditions of experience, (space and the concepts of the understanding). Because this is so, it is easy to see how the unity of the rules resulting from

the construction is brought about. It is due to the fact that every geometrical construction must necessarily (a priori) conform to the a priori form of outer intuition (space) and the a priori forms of thought. The purposiveness is <sup>not real but is</sup> merely formal, ~~not real~~ because the object is a product of the mind and as such is purposive "merely in so far as it conforms to the forms which are imposed by the mind."

Now the question arises: Why do we admire this purely formal and intellectual purposiveness? It is quite easy to answer this question in accordance with transcendental principles. We need only *remember* that it has been shown in the first Critique that the rules which guide geometrical constructions are synthetic a priori rules. <sup>The</sup> ~~That~~ properties <sup>of</sup> a geometrical figure possesses cannot be brought out by mere analysis. To take an example. In order to know what properties a circle possesses we must do more than simply analyse <sup>the</sup> ~~its~~ concept. We must apply the concept to intuition. We must construct it in space. ~~In Kant's terminology, the concept must be systematised. The concept itself is a principle of unity (mere function). In order to give objective reality to it we must exhibit in space as being the form to which all external objects have to conform.~~

"This gives the unity the appearance of having an external source of its rules distinct from our faculty of representation, just as if it were empirical. Hence the way the object answers to the understanding's own peculiar need for rules appears intrinsically contingent, and, therefore, only possible by virtue of an end expressly directed to its production." (C. of J.

Kant's argument proceeds as follows. The existence of this a priori purposiveness should make us realize that this is a priori purposiveness exists should bring home to us the fact

that space through the determination of which (by means of the imagination acting in accordance with a concept) the object <sup>is</sup> alone possible is not a <sup>characteristic</sup> quality of the things <sup>external to us</sup> outside us <sup>as there is no (Verdingung)</sup> but a representation existing in ourselves. In other words, <sup>the necessary conformity of the object</sup> that the object necessarily conforms to space and the <sup>mathematical</sup> schematized concepts (~~concepts applied to the synthesis, the imagination~~)

ought to make us realize that the principle of unity does not belong to the <sup>figure</sup> object as such but <sup>has been</sup> introduced by us into it <sup>by the mind</sup>.

"Hence when I draw a figure in accordance with a concept or in other words when I form my own representation of what is given to me externally, be its own intrinsic nature what it may, what really happens is that I introduce the purposiveness into that figure or representation." (C. of J., 365).

<sup>But</sup> Kant goes on to explain that since such a reflection requires, as <sup>Kant</sup> he puts it, a critical use of Reason (einen kritischen Gebrauch der Vernunft), in other words, Since it is only on the principles of transcendental philosophy that the formal intellectual purposiveness can be explained, it is quite natural that we should admire geometrical objects for conforming to our own a priori principle. <sup>But</sup> Kant goes on as follows. "How astonishment (Verwunderung) is a shock that the mind receives from a representation and the rule given through it being incompatible with the mind's existing fund of root principles, and that accordingly makes one doubt one's own eyesight or question one's judgment; but admiration is <sup>an</sup> as astonishment that keeps continually recurring despite the disappearance of this doubt. Admiration is consequently quite a natural effect of observing the above-

mentioned purposiveness in the essence of things (as phenomena), and so far there is really nothing to be said against it. For the agreement of the above form of sensuous intuition, which is called space, with the faculty of conceptions<sup>s</sup>, namely understanding, not alone leaves it inexplicable why it is this particular form of agreement and not some other, but, in addition, produces an expansion of the mind in which it gets, so to speak, the secret feeling of the existence of something lying beyond the confines of such sensuous representations, in which, perhaps, although unknown to us, the ultimate source of that accordance could be found. It is true that we have also no need to know this source where we are merely concerned with the formal purposiveness of our a priori representations; but even the mere fact that we are compelled to look out in that direction excites an accompanying admiration for the object which obliges us to do so." (C. of J., 365.)

~~This~~ The passage is far more important than it may seem at first sight. In order to understand what Kant's problem is we have to remember that <sup>as</sup> he has told us in the Introduction to the Critique <sup>he</sup> that conceptions of the <sup>logical</sup> purposiveness of nature <sup>(a different kind of purposiveness)</sup> are necessarily bound up with a feeling of pleasure. Further ~~we~~ remind ourselves that we have been told that the transcendental philosopher in finding objects of nature <sup>in conformity with</sup> ~~to conform to~~ the principle of logical purposiveness, will necessarily admire <sup>us</sup> it for its being a system according to particular laws. Why is this feeling of admiration restricted to the transcendental philosopher, so, Kant says, ~~that~~ hardly anyone but a transcendental philosopher would be capable of it? (See above, <sup>already</sup>) We know the answer. The transcendental philosopher will admire

nature for its being a logical system because he knows that the objective principles of the understanding cannot account for this. As it. So far as these principles are concerned, nature may be a chaotic aggregate. It is a merely subjective principle which makes us assume that it will not be so and every time we find this principle it confirmed by the facts that nature is a system we shall necessarily ~~admire intuition for it.~~ <sup>admire intuition for it.</sup> ~~The reason is that we know of no necessary reason for it.~~ <sup>This is because we know of no necessary reason for it.</sup> The systematic order of nature regarding her particular laws is merely contingent. We <sup>doubt</sup> know a priori whether it exists; and when we find in experience that it does, <sup>we</sup> know Reason or at least the transcendental philosopher who has made a critical use of his Reason will admire it for conforming to <sup>the</sup> a merely subjective principle of reflection.

The very opposite may be said of material objective purpose-iveness of nature. Anyone but a transcendental philosopher may admire geometrical figures for their purposiveness. For he alone knows that it is our own minds which introduce <sup>purposiveness</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>them</sup> into theirs. Making "a critical use of Reason" he knows that ~~there is a mere~~ <sup>geometrical</sup> ~~figure as mere~~ <sup>then</sup> representation and that it must necessarily conform to the forms of intuition and the forms of thought. Why should he admire ~~her~~ <sup>them</sup> when he finds that this is actually the case? And yet even from the point of view of transcendental philosophy nothing can be said against such an admiration, <sup>for</sup> although the transcendental philosopher knows that the human mind requires for knowledge <sup>but</sup> such intuitions and a faculty of thought, ~~he does not know of any objective ground, why space is the form of our outer intuition,~~ <sup>he cannot explain either</sup> ~~neither does he know why the unity of thought should agree with the faculty of outer in-~~ <sup>or how the human mind can unite that form of sensuous intuition with the faculty of concepts.</sup> ~~tuition.~~ On the contrary, being a critical philosopher, he has to contrast the world of appearances with a world of things

There must be some ground for their agreement but this ground has to be looked for in the supersensible of which we can have no knowledge. The observation of formal objective purposiveness will give us no more knowledge of this supreme ground of the agreement between intuition and thought, but it will fill us with admiration for the object which makes think of it. <sup>(1)</sup>

We have learnt from Section 62 what Kant means by objective formal purposiveness, and we ~~also~~ have also learnt that the Analytic of Teleological Judgment ~~will have~~ <sup>has</sup> to concern itself with a different kind of objective purposiveness, namely, material objective purposiveness.

### Section 63.

What Kant understands by objective and material purposiveness may be seen from the following passage. "There is only one case in which experience leads our judgment to the conception of an objective and material purposiveness, that is to say, to the conception of a purpose of nature. This is where the relation in which some cause stands to its effect is under review, and where we are only able to see uniformity in this relation (welches wir als gesetzmassig einzusehen uns nur dadurch vermögend finden) on introducing into the causal principle the Idea of the effect and making it the source of the causality and the basal (zum Grunde liegende) condition on which the effect is possible." (C. of J. 366, 367.)

In a note to this passage Kant explains once more that

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(1) "We need only say that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root." (C.P.R. B 29.)

the purposiveness with which pure mathematics is concerned is a merely formal purposiveness. Mathematics is not concerned with the real existence of things. Hence it cannot touch the question of cause and effect, and the purposiveness observed does not lead to the concept of a purpose of nature.

We have now to explain Kant's exposition of objective and material purposiveness. This is not really difficult. In the first place, we have to ask: What is the relation between cause and effect which is involved in the principle of mechanical causation? Kant would say that in applying this principle we regard the effect as dependent on the cause without assuming that the cause is in any way dependent on the effect to be produced. This may be illustrated by an example. What do we mean, for instance, when we judge that the sea is the cause of the fertility of the land? Obviously that the effect (fertility) is said to be dependent on its cause (the sea). This connection is thought to be necessary. The land would not be fertile, if the sea had not inundated it. But we do not assume that the sea has inundated the land with the intention of making it fertile. The connection between cause and effect is judged to be contingent in so far as the cause is quite independent of the possible effect.

The case is quite different when we further assume that the sea has inundated the land for the sake of making it fertile.

Here are <sup>you</sup> we should apply <sup>which regards</sup> the teleological principle, Cause and effect are mutually dependent on one another. The effect would be impossible but for the cause, and the cause for its part would not have come into action but for the representation (Idea) of the effect to be produced.

What use we can make of the teleological principle will be explained later. ~~In the first place we have to distinguish~~ <sup>we must first</sup> between two kinds of objective and material purposiveness, viz., intrinsic purposiveness and extrinsic (relative) purposiveness. Kant says: (sum m)

"We may regard the effect as being, as it stands, an art-product, or we may only regard it as what other possible objects in nature may employ for the purposes of their art. We may, in other words, look upon the effect either as an end, or else as a means which other causes use in the pursuit of ends. The latter purposiveness is termed utility (Nutzbarkeit) where it concerns human beings, and adaptability (<sup>2</sup>Nutzneglichkeit) where it concerns any other creatures. It is a purely relative purposiveness. The former, on the contrary, is an intrinsic purposiveness belonging to the thing itself as a natural object."

It would be difficult to understand this if Kant did not illustrate it by examples which make it quite clear.

We may ascribe to nature purposiveness <sup>on</sup> as the ground that it produces things which <sup>serve</sup> ~~sense~~ the purposes of other natural objects, e.g., we may say Nature produces vegetables for the purpose of preserving the existence of animals (~~consciousness~~). Or else we may say that nature produces certain things for the purpose of making the existence of human beings possible and preserving it (~~utility~~). In both cases the

and considers a purposiveness assumed is external, ~~the~~ relation between different objects of nature.

Now Kant argues that we cannot ascribe to nature any such principle; ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> to be enabled to assert that nature produces certain things for the sake of others we should have to prove that the latter ought to exist. This, however, is quite impossible even as regards human beings. Mere observation of nature can never justify us in coming to the conclusion that certain things ought to exist. It can teach us only ~~what~~ <sup>what</sup> is not ~~which~~ ought to be. Even of human beings we cannot say that nature wishes them to exist, that ~~her~~ <sup>its</sup> purpose in producing other things is to preserve their existence.

"We can easily see that the only condition on which extrinsic purposiveness, that is, the adaptability of a thing for other things, can be looked on as an extrinsic ~~physical~~ <sup>purpose of nature</sup> end, is that the existence of the thing for which it is proximately or remotely adapted is itself, and in its own right, ~~an end~~ <sup>a purpose</sup> of nature. But this is a matter that can never be decided by any mere study of nature. Hence it follows that relative purposiveness, although, on a certain supposition, it points to natural purposiveness, does not warrant any absolute teleological judgment." (C. of J., 368-9.)

Without concerning ourselves with every detail of this section we may state Kant's general idea as follows. We cannot ascribe extrinsic ~~(relative)~~ <sup>relative</sup> purposiveness to nature. It is only particular natural objects which we ~~say~~ <sup>can</sup> judge teleologically. The question which has to be answered is: What are the objects of nature in respect of which we are entitled to make

absolute teleological judgments? This question will

be answered in the next three sections.

#### Section 64.

This section <sup>is headed</sup> ~~bears the heading~~ "The distinctive character of things considered as purposes of nature". Kant begins as follows:

"A thing is possible only as <sup>a purpose</sup> ~~an end~~ where the causality to which it owes its origin must not be sought in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose capacity of acting is determined by conceptions. What is required in order that we may perceive that a thing is only possible in this way is that its form is not possible on purely natural laws - that is to say, such laws as we may cognize by means of unaided understanding applied to objects of sense - but that, on the contrary, even to know it empirically in respect of its cause and effect presupposes conceptions of Reason. Here we have, as far as any empirical laws of nature go, a contingency of the form of the thing in relation to reason. For Reason in every case insists on cognizing the necessity of the form of a natural product, even where it only desires to perceive (einschauen) the conditions involved in its production. In the given form above mentioned, however, it cannot get this necessity. Hence the contingency is itself a ground for making us look upon the origin of the thing as if, just because of that contingency, it could only be possible through Reason. But causality, so construed, becomes the faculty of action according to <sup>purposes</sup> ~~ends~~ - that is to say, a will; and the Object, which is represented as only deriving its possibility from such a will, will be represented as possible only as <sup>a purpose</sup> ~~an end~~." (C. of J., 369, 370.)

In order to understand this very abstract description of a

"purpose of nature" we have to anticipate one point that is not made clear here, namely, that it is only organisms that we can and indeed must judge to be purposes of nature.

Kant tells us here that a thing is to be regarded as possible as a purpose of nature only if its origin cannot be explained on mechanical principles. ~~Now what do mechanical laws teach us about the origin of objects?~~ Every object of sense is a manifold of parts. What can the understanding and its principle (Grundsatz) of mechanical causality tell us about the origin of such a manifold? Kant would say that the understanding, <sup>as</sup> so long as it makes use of no other principle than its own principle of mechanical causation can explain to us no more than that the parts of the object have combined necessarily. The object which is given to us ~~comes~~ <sup>owes</sup> ~~its origin~~ to the fact that its parts have combined. One part has been added to another according to the law of causality and the manifold which we find owes its origin to the coming together of its material parts. It is clear that the whole of the object as we find it is <sup>here</sup> regarded as nothing but a mere result of material processes and that it is in no way assumed that the parts have any necessary connexion either with each other or with the whole of the object which has been produced as the result of the material processes just mentioned.

~~Now~~ <sup>however</sup> we find in nature <sup>namely</sup> certain objects ~~of organisms~~ which we cannot explain to ourselves in <sup>its</sup> that way. ~~We find~~ <sup>as</sup> that every part contained in the manifold given to us is related to every other and the whole. <sup>Therefore we</sup> ~~We~~ cannot allow that the coming together of the parts should be purely accidental. The objects given to us have a form which makes us assume that they are not mere products of mechanical causes, but that on the contrary the Idea of the whole existed first and made the parts

combine so as to produce the form which we find. Our understanding <sup>and its principles cannot</sup> can explain to us ~~no more than that the parts of an object have combined successively according to necessary laws,~~ but ~~it can in no way explain why~~ the parts of our objects should be related to one another <sup>in such a way</sup> so that it seems as if each of them existed only for the sake of the others and the whole <sup>to which</sup> ~~for what~~ they all belong, as if each of them existed not merely through the others but also for the others.

In order to explain to ourselves such a connection we have to make use of concepts of Reason. For Reason, as has been explained in the Critique of Pure Reason, is the faculty of the Principles (Prinzipien) i.e. such concepts <sup>which fully</sup> as ~~desire~~ <sup>determine the particulars which follow from (1)</sup> ~~from a universal concept.~~ them,

~~Now since organisms are of such a kind as to make us think that every particular contained in them is dependent on the universal concept of the whole (which connection cannot be explained on mechanical principles), we cannot but ground our estimation of them on Principles of Reason.~~

To the question: What is the origin of this product of nature and its specific form? we answer that nature first conceived the Idea of <sup>what</sup> ~~which~~ the thing was to be and then in accordance with this universal Idea (the purpose of the thing) arranged material parts (particulars) so as to make them all serve one and the same purpose. In other words we represent nature to ourselves as if ~~she~~ <sup>it</sup> were an intelligent being possessed of a will. We ascribe to ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> a causality <sup>fundamentally</sup> ~~quite~~ different from mechanical causality.

As Kant has told us several times before, the difference

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(1) "Knowledge from principles is therefore that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts." (C.P.R., B357)

between the mechanical and teleological principles is that whereas in applying the former we merely assume that effects are dependent on their causes we moreover suppose in making use of teleological principles <sup>we make the further assumption</sup> that the causes are necessarily determined by the effects to be produced. It is assumed that the representation of the desired effect ~~which actuates the~~  
~~causes~~

Thus (it is clear that) in all these cases in which we find it impossible to explain to ourselves the given effect in any other way than <sup>by</sup> deriving it from a cause which intended to bring it about we must make use of the Idea of an intelligent nature.

To what extent we are entitled to make use of such a conception will be made clear in the sequel. For the time being it is sufficient to state that in regarding objects of nature as purposes of nature we ascribe to <sup>nature</sup> her a special kind of causality. We regard <sup>it</sup> her as a rational being possessed of a will which produces certain things according to the Idea of their purpose.

All this will become sufficiently clear in the next two sections, and we may now go on with the examination of Section 64.

Suppose, Kant continues, <sup>someone</sup> ~~a person found in a country which~~ <sup>a geometrical figure</sup> ~~say, a regular hexagon drawn in the sand in a country which he believed~~ ~~seemed to him uninhabited, drawn in the sand a geometrical~~ ~~figure, say a regular hexagon.~~ ~~It is clear that~~ <sup>to be uninhabited</sup> In trying to explain to himself the possibility of this figure in asking himself what its origin was he would find it impossible to derive it from merely mechanical causes. The object <sup>a whose</sup> ~~about the~~ origin ~~of which~~ he is reflecting shows such a form as to make it impossible for him to believe it could be a product of

mechanical causes. <sup>where</sup> "His Reason would then forbid him to consider the sand, the neighbouring sea, the winds, or even animals with their footprints, as causes familiar to him, or any other irrational cause, as the ground of the possibility of such a form." (C. of J., 370). The object which he finds, <sup>namely the geometrical figure</sup> ~~(the effect)~~ seems so manifestly the product of a definite concept present in the mind of a rational being. He cannot but believe that it has been produced purposely in accordance with this concept. "Hence it would seem that the cause of the production of such an effect could not be contained in the mere mechanical operation of nature, but that, on the contrary, a conception of such an object, as a conception that only Reason can give and compare the object with, must likewise be what alone contains causality." (C. of J. 370).

It is clear why he must ascribe the production of the object to a ~~concept~~ rational being, why <sup>in explaining it to himself</sup> ~~he must believe that~~ <sup>he must refer to</sup> a concept of Reason is the cause which has produced it. For there is no other faculty of the mind which regards particulars as dependent on universal concepts <sup>or</sup> ~~ideas~~ <sup>and</sup> causes as dependent on the representations of effects to be produced, ~~then Reason.~~ What <sup>happens</sup> ~~takes place~~ is that the person who is reflecting ~~about~~ <sup>upon</sup> the object finds it dependent on a concept. From this he infers that it has been produced according to such a concept that it owes its origin to <sup>a</sup> rational being <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ first conceived the concept of the thing and then acted accordingly, i.e., that he drew the geometrical figure in order to make it correspond to the concept in his own mind. In other words, the effect (the geometrical figure) depends on the cause <sup>and the cause</sup> (the rational being) in turn is determined by the representation of the desired effect.

"On these grounds it would appear to him that this effect was one that might without reservation be regarded as <sup>a purpose</sup> ~~an end~~, though not as a natural ~~end~~. In other words, he would regard it as a product of art - vestigium hominis video." (C.of J.,

370)

We see that the term "art" is here used by Kant as often in the Critique of Judgment in its widest sense ~~devoting~~ the capacity of the human mind for producing things purposely, i.e. according to Ideas of what they are to be.

Kant's problem here is: How can nature be regarded as containing a principle which corresponds to the principle <sup>underlying</sup> ~~which underlies~~ human art? How can we ascribe to nature a causality according to Ideas <sup>or</sup> {purposes}?

"But where a thing is recognized to be a product of nature, then something more is required - unless, perhaps, our very estimate involves a contradiction - if, despite its being such a product, we are yet to estimate it as <sup>a purpose</sup> ~~an end~~, and, consequently as a physical end. As a provisional statement I would say that a thing exists as a <sup>purpose of nature</sup> ~~physical end~~ if it is (though in a double sense) both cause and effect of itself. For this involves a kind of causality that we cannot associate with the mere conception of a nature unless we make that nature rest on an underlying <sup>purpose</sup> ~~end~~, but which can then, though incomprehensible, be thought without contradiction." (C.of J., 370, 371)

<sup>at the present stage of the argument we</sup> ~~We cannot hope to understand fully at the present stage of the argument~~ Kant's definition of a purpose of nature as a thing which is both cause and effect of itself. But we can see already what his problem is.

It seems impossible, even absurd, to regard anything in nature as a purpose, for this involves a conception of nature

[the concept of a consciously acting nature] which is di-  
metrically opposed to our ordinary conceptions of <sup>it as</sup> ~~her~~ mechan-  
ism. A judgment based upon such a conception of nature seems  
to involve a contradiction. Whether it really does, <sup>so</sup> remains  
to be seen. It is clear, however, that even if we are en-  
titled to make some use of the teleological principle, it can  
never be applied in the same sense as the mechanical principles  
of the understanding.

Another point to be noted is that to be able to judge  
a thing to be a purpose of nature, something more is required  
<sup>when</sup> we regard a thing as a product of human art. It is  
obviously clear why this must be so. For that human beings  
are capable of producing things for certain purposes we know  
from experience. We have, however, no such experience of nature.  
Nature as it is known to us is determined by mechanical laws.  
How then, can we regard ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> as <sup>an</sup> intelligent being, how can we  
say of ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> that ~~she~~ <sup>it</sup> applies a principle of art?

Kant's answer to this question is that we can do so in  
respect of those of nature's products which are both causes  
and effect of themselves.

It is impossible to understand this fully and we ~~have to~~ <sup>must</sup>  
await Kant's further explanation. But we see that Kant holds  
that to be <sup>entitled</sup> ~~enabled~~ <sup>to judge natural objects teleologically</sup>  
~~to base an estimate of a natural object~~  
~~on the idea of its purpose, it is required that a specific~~  
<sup>should be</sup> ~~causal connexion~~ <sup>is</sup> present in the natural objects <sup>themselves</sup> ~~itself~~. It is  
the observation of this connexion which justifies us in <sup>assuming</sup> ~~making~~  
~~use of the teleological principle, i.e. a principle which is~~  
~~fundamentally different from the mechanical principles of the~~  
~~understanding.~~

What the special causal connection is <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ which we apply ~~to~~

the teleological principle, Kant illustrates by an example. The example chosen by him is a tree. He argues as follows.

A tree, according to a law, of nature, with which we are familiar, produces another tree. It produces itself ~~in its genus~~ <sup>generically</sup> and is thus to be regarded as cause and effect of itself. "In the genus, now as effect, now as cause, continually generated from itself and likewise generating itself, it preserves itself ~~generically~~." (C.of J., 371).<sup>67</sup>

Secondly, a tree produces itself even as an individual. This is generally called growth. And yet ~~it must be distinguished~~ <sup>growth</sup> from a merely material process, from a mere increase in bulk. ~~It is to be regarded as a kind of generation,~~ <sup>we have to</sup> for the plant prepares the matter that it assimilates and works it up in a specific manner. It gives ~~a form~~ <sup>to</sup>. In the matter which it adds to itself <sup>a form</sup> "which the mechanism of nature outside it cannot supply, and it develops itself by means of a material which, in its composite character, is its own product." (C.of J. 371).<sup>68</sup> We see the tree, in so far as it grows, generates itself. It is cause and effect of itself.

Thirdly, as regards its parts, a tree produces itself in such a way that the preservation of one part is dependent on the preservation of all the others, and vice versa. For instance, we may regard the leaves of a tree as its products and yet they help in turn to preserve the tree itself. For repeated ~~destruction~~ <sup>defoliation</sup> of the tree would kill the trunk of which they are products so that the leaves depend on the trunk, the trunk ~~on the existence of~~ <sup>on</sup> the leaves. The tree as regards its parts is both cause and effect of itself.

- (1) "Generically", because in its product it preserves the genus 'tree' to which it belongs.

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Section 65.

At the beginning of this section, Kant indicates that his definition of a purpose of nature is in need of further elucidation ~~is indicated by Kant~~ at the beginning of this section. His words are: (A. 372)

"Where a thing is a product of nature and yet, so regarded, has to be cognized as possible only as a <sup>purpose of nature</sup> physical end, it must, from its character as set out in the preceding section, stand to itself reciprocally in the relation of cause and effect. This is, however, a somewhat inexact (uneigentlich) and indeterminate expression that needs derivation from a definite conception." (C. of J.. 372).

Kant goes on to draw a distinction between two kinds of causal connexion, <sup>There is</sup> namely (a) causal connexion as thought by the understanding. In this the series of causes and effects is thought of as merely progressive. The effects are regarded as dependent on their causes, but the <sup>causes</sup> effects for their part are not regarded as determined by the effects. This causal connexion is termed that of efficient causes (nexus effectivus).

<sup>There is</sup> (b) Causal connexion according to the Reason's concept of our purpose. The series of causes and effects is thought to be both progressive and regressive. The effects are regarded as dependent on the causes and at the same time the causes as dependent on the effects.

This is obvious in the sphere of the practical, i.e., the sphere of human art. To take an example, "A house is certainly the cause of the money that is received as rent, but yet, conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the building of the house." (C. of J.. 372). A causal connexion of this kind is termed that of final causes

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(nexus finalis). Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call the former causal principle the nexus of real causes, the latter that of ideal causes, <sup>seeing that</sup> ~~seeing that~~ this would indicate at once that there cannot be more than these two kinds of causality.

<sup>Having</sup> ~~As I have~~ dealt with this passage twice before, I may dispense with an explanation here. But I <sup>10756</sup> ~~should like~~ to make a few remarks on Kant's terminology. It has to be noted ~~(\*)~~ that the terms "practical" and "art" are here used by him in their widest sense. By "practical" Kant understands here every kind of doing as distinct from knowing. It must not be confused with "practical" in the narrower sense <sup>in which practical is identical with moral</sup> ~~(the morally practical)~~. By "art" Kant understands the capacity of human beings for making things for certain purposes. <sup>Why</sup> Kant believes the nexus finalis to be a principle of Reason will be easily understood. He has told us several times that ~~"purpose"~~ <sup>purpose</sup> is a mere Idea, a universal concept produced by Reason. In regarding something as a purpose we derive every particular contained in it from this universal concept, every part from the Idea of the whole. We explain to ourselves the origin of such a thing <sup>by saying</sup> ~~so that we say~~ that the Idea of it preceded its actual existence. A rational being (whether it <sup>be</sup> is a human being or Nature <sup>it</sup> herself) is thought to <sup>have</sup> conceived the Idea of <sup>the thing</sup> it ~~it~~ and then <sup>to have</sup> produced it in accordance with this Idea, ~~so that every particular contained in it depends on the universal idea (purpose) and every part on the whole~~ (See above. 107)

"Now the first requisite of a thing, considered as a <sup>purpose of value</sup> ~~physical end~~, is that its parts, both as to their existence and form, are only possible by their relation to the whole. For the

(1) See above.

thing is itself ~~an end~~, and is, therefore, comprehended under a conception or an idea that must determine a priori all that is to be contained in it. But so far as the possibility of a thing is only thought in this way, it is simply a work of art. It is the product, in other words, of an intelligent cause, distinct from the matter, or parts, of the thing, and of one whose causality, in bringing together and combining the parts, is determined by its Idea of a whole made possible through that Idea, and consequently, not by external nature." (C. of J., 373).

One point here is difficult. It may be asked, Why does Kant hold that a thing so considered is simply (bloss) a work of art? In other words, why is art regarded by him as less than nature? I think the answer is simple. <sup>As</sup> So far as human art is concerned, the purpose of the product is external to the product determined by it. Let us take an example. A watch is a product of human art made for a purpose. There is no doubt ~~as to the fact~~ that the watch would neither exist nor have the ~~same~~ <sup>which</sup> form ~~as~~ it has but for the idea in the watchmaker's mind.

This is the nexus finalis. The cause is dependent on the representation of the desired effect. The watchmaker would not have made the watch unless he had desired to produce the effect. The cause is dependent on the effect ~~for~~ rather its representation, and at the same time, obviously, the effect depends on the watchmaker's art as its cause. Doubtless there exists the reciprocal connection between causes and effects which is required by the nexus finalis. And yet the connexion is merely external. The intelligent cause ~~(the cause~~

which is actuated by the representation of the desired effect) acts from outside. It arranges and combines the parts according to the Idea of the whole, and ~~set~~<sup>yet</sup> in the product itself we do not find the reciprocal relation of effects and causes.

Now It is clear that in the case of human art we are perfectly entitled to presuppose the existence of an external rational agent. For we know from our experience that human beings are capable of producing things in order to make them serve a purpose. But it is equally clear that we cannot in the same way regard nature as an artist, <sup>For</sup> we have no knowledge of a nature acting according to purposes.

It follows that there must be something present in the material object itself which makes us regard it as a purpose. What is this something? Kant says, "But if a thing is a product of nature, and in this character is notwithstanding to contain intrinsically and in its inner possibility a relation to purposes, in other words, is to be possible only as a <sup>purpose</sup> physical purpose, and independently of the causality of the conceptions of external rational agents, then this second requisite is involved, namely, that the parts of the thing combine of themselves into the unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of their form. For this is the only way in which it is possible that the Idea of the whole may conversely, or reciprocally, determine in its turn the form and combination of all the parts, not as cause - for that would make it an art product - but as the epistemological basis upon which the systematic unity of the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given matter becomes cognizable for the person estimating it." (C.of J., 373)

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From this we see <sup>that</sup> and why Kant believes that in order to be entitled to judge objects of nature teleologically the reciprocal relation between causes and effects, the whole and the parts, must be present in the natural object itself. It is not an external agent which acts upon them. The parts themselves <sup>act</sup> rest upon one another. The object is infinitely more complicated than products of human art which owe their existence to an external cause.

And yet it is clear that we can make use of such <sup>an</sup> Idea of nature only for the sake of explaining the object to ourselves. We are entitled to say that we cannot understand the systematic unity present in the object without referring it to an Idea. This Idea is the basis on which alone we can explain the object. It is its cognitive ground. But it is by no means to be regarded as its real ground, i.e., we cannot say that nature as the cause of the object has actually produced it according to an Idea of its purpose. It will soon become clearer why such an assumption is impossible. Before <sup>dealing</sup> ~~concerning~~ ourselves with this question we have to determine more precisely the peculiar characteristics of the things which we judge to be purposes of nature.

"In such a natural product as this every part is thought as owing its presence to the agency of all the remaining parts, and also as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, that is, as an instrument, or organ. But this is not enough - for it might be an instrument of art, and thus have no more than its general possibility referred to a purpose. On the contrary the part must be an organ producing the other parts, each, consequently, reciprocally producing the others. No instrument of art can answer to this description, but only the

the instrument of that nature from whose resources the materials of every instrument are drawn - even the materials for instruments of art. Only under these conditions and upon these terms can such a product be an organized and self-organizing (sich selbst organisierendes) being, and, as such, be called a purpose of nature." (C. of J., 374).

We see how fundamentally different human <sup>art is from</sup> and the art of which nature displays in <sup>its</sup> organized products are.

Kant illustrates the difference by an example. In a watch <sup>which is</sup> a product of human art, one part is the instrument <sup>is</sup> by which the ~~movement of the others is effected~~ <sup>the others</sup> but ~~one~~ <sup>it</sup> part is not the ~~efficient~~ <sup>effective</sup> cause of the production of the others. ~~Every part~~ <sup>No doubt one</sup> certainly exists for the sake of the others, but it does not ~~owe~~ <sup>part</sup> its existence to the agency of them. ~~Exist Among them.~~

One wheel of a watch does not produce others <sup>wheels</sup> and still less <sup>does</sup> one watch produce other watches. Just as little can it replace parts of which it has been deprived.

Now, All these things we may expect from organized nature. "An organized being is therefore not a mere machine. For a machine has solely motive power, whereas an organized being possesses inherent formative power and such moreover as it can impart to material devoid of it - material which it organises. This therefore is a self-propagating formative power which cannot be explained by the capacity of movement alone, that is to say, by mechanism." (C. of J., 374).

Kant goes on to state that we cannot properly speak of Nature's <sup>power to produce</sup> ~~capacity for producing~~ organized products as an "analogue of art", <sup>rather</sup> for in doing so we should regard ~~her~~ <sup>it</sup> as an artist who works from without. Nature organises herself.

This capacity is absolutely incomprehensible and has nothing in common with any <sup>analogue</sup> capacity of which we know. We may call it an analogue of life. But in doing so we do not understand it any better. Strictly speaking, therefore, the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us."

(C. of J.. 375).

Nature, when it presents us with beautiful objects, may properly be compared with human art, for we call things beautiful only in relation to our own faculty of reflexion. ~~It is the mere form of the object which is judged to be beautiful and so something external which we can understand.~~

"But intrinsic natural perfection, as possessed by things that are only possible as <sup>purposes of nature</sup> physical ends, and that are therefore called organisms, is unthinkable and inexplicable on any analogy to any known physical, or natural, agency, not even excepting - since we ourselves are part of nature in the widest sense - the suggestion of any strictly apt analogy to human art." (C. of J., 375).

All this is ~~perfectly~~ easy to understand and the same applies to the rest of the section. <sup>where</sup> Kant goes on to point out that the concept of a thing as a purpose is not a constitutive concept of either <sup>of the</sup> understanding or <sup>of</sup> Reason, ~~and yet it is a~~ <sup>but</sup> regulative concept for reflective Judgment, i.e. a concept <sup>which</sup> ~~whose~~ function it is to guide our investigations into certain natural objects, <sup>namely, organisms</sup> ~~(organisations)~~ "by a remote analogy with our own causality according to purposes generally, and as a basis of reflection upon their <sup>cause</sup> ~~supreme source~~." (C. of J.. 375).

It is clear, however, that in applying this principle we cannot extend our knowledge of <sup>this supreme cause</sup> ~~such original source~~. "On the

contrary it must be confined to the service of just the same practical faculty of Reason in analogy with which we considered the cause of the purposiveness in question." (C.of J., 375).

The only difficulty here is that the term "practical" is used in the *wider* sense which has been explained before (see above) whereas in the last paragraph of this section Kant uses it in the *commoner* sense *meaning by it* the morally practical as distinct from every principle of nature. This will be seen from the following passage.

"Organisms are, therefore, the only beings in nature that, considered in their separate existence and apart from any relation to other things, cannot be thought possible except as purposes of nature. It is they, then, that first afford objective reality to the conception of a purpose <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ is a purpose of nature and not a practical purpose. Thus they supply natural science with the basis for a teleology, or, in other words, a mode of estimating its Objects on a special principle <sup>which</sup> ~~that~~ it would otherwise be absolutely unjustifiable to introduce into that science - seeing that we are quite unable to perceive a priori the possibility of such a kind of causality." (C.of J., 375, 376.)

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(1) On the narrower meaning of practical (principle of freedom as opposed to any principle of nature) see my exposition of Section I of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.

It has to be noted that the term "objective reality" in this passage has to be taken in its widest sense. It is the objective reality of an *a priori* subjectively necessary principle (the teleological principle which rests upon the concept of an objective purpose of nature) as opposed to the mere subjectivity of empirical principles. That no object of nature can by itself be regarded as a purpose of nature but only in relation to our faculty of Judgment and its teleological principle goes without saying.

It may be said of organisms that they first give "objective" reality to the subjective teleological principle by providing the mind with objects to which the principle may be applied. This of course does in no way alter the principle as a constitutive objective principle of either understanding or Reason but a regulative subjective principle to be used by reflective Judgment.

## Section 66.

This section is headed "The principle on which the intrinsic purposiveness in organisms is <sup>estimated</sup> ~~extracted~~." Kant's definition of this principle is as follows. "An organized natural product is <sup>one</sup> one in which every part is reciprocally both end and means. In such a product nothing is in vain, without a purpose, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature." (C. of J., 376).

This is easy and does not <sup>require</sup> ~~negative our~~ explanation. Kant goes on to state that although the occasion for adopting this principle arises in experience, the principle itself is an a priori principle, although a merely regulative one. It may be called "a maxim for estimating the intrinsic purposiveness of organisms". (C. of J., 376).

This is an important point, <sup>for</sup> in reading the preceding section the reader may easily have been misled into believing that Kant holds the teleological principle to be <sup>derived</sup> ~~desired~~ from empirical observation of organisms. This, of course, is not really his opinion. What he actually believes is that the teleological principle is an a priori principle <sup>of the</sup> ~~of the~~ mind and that observation of organisms <sup>merely</sup> gives us occasion <sup>to apply it.</sup> ~~for applying this regulative principle.~~

It is quite true that objects <sup>first</sup> ~~must~~ be given to us in experience <sup>before</sup> ~~to which~~ we can apply <sup>the principle</sup> ~~it~~, <sup>but</sup> ~~for~~ since <sup>it</sup> ~~the~~ principle is a merely <sup>sub</sup> ~~objective~~ or regulative principle, ~~and~~ we cannot know a priori that experience will present us with objects which will justify its employment. And yet it cannot be derived from observation, <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ the human mind <sup>unless</sup> ~~it~~ possessed such a principle for the estimation of <sup>natural</sup> ~~objects~~ could

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never discover the objects to which <sup>the principle would be applied</sup> ~~it could apply it~~. All this may seem difficult, but <sup>it</sup> has in fact been made quite clear by Kant in Section 10 of the first Introduction to the Critique. There Kant has shown that teleological judgments are a priori judgments. What Kant's general idea is may be seen from the following passage. <sup>(1)</sup>

"Similarly it must be admitted that the teleological judgment [like the aesthetic judgment; see the first part of the section] is based upon an a priori principle and would be impossible without such a principle, in spite of the fact that we can discover the purpose of nature in such judgments solely through experience and without this would not know whether things of such a kind are possible at all." (C. of J., First Introduction, p. 219) (Bueck); <sup>^</sup> Lehmann.)

Returning now to the <sup>according to</sup> section with which we are at present concerned, we find that <sup>^</sup> Kant ~~holds that~~ the assumption of the teleological principle as a maxim for the estimation of organisms is absolutely necessary. We cannot <sup>help assuming</sup> ~~do otherwise than~~ assume that nothing in such a product of nature is ~~in its~~ purposelessness. ~~In estimating organisms we can just as little abandon the teleological principle as the general principles of science (mechanical principles).~~ For <sup>^</sup> as the abandonment of the latter would leave us without any experience at all so the abandonment of the former would leave us with no clue (Leitfaden) to assist our observation of a <sup>certain</sup> type of natural things ~~that~~ <sup>which</sup> have ~~once~~ come to be thought under the concept of purposes of nature.

It is clear why this must be so. In judging a thing to be a purpose of nature we derive its possibility from an Idea.

<sup>(1)</sup> For further details see above

In estimating organisms we can abandon the teleological principle just as little as in judging objects other than organisms we can abandon the mechanical principles which are the general principles of science.

It is true that the principle which makes us assume this is a principle of mere reflection. And yet the concept which is implied is fundamentally different from the concept of cause and effect which is employed by the mechanical principle. Kant says it leads Reason into a quite different order of things from that of the mere mechanism of nature, and goes on as follow . "But since this (s.c Idea) is absolute unity of representation, whereas matter is a plurality of things which cannot of itself supply any definite unity of composition, it follows tha if that unity of the Idea is to serve as a priori determining ground of the causality of such a form of composition, and ~~moreover~~ as a law of nature, the purpose of nature must be extended to everything that is contained in its product!"

This requires explanation. In judging a thing teleologically we derive it from a special kind of unity, i.e. a systematic unity. We assume that every part contained in it has some reference to the Idea of the whole. Mechanism, on the other hand, regards every manifold as a mere aggregate. The manifold is considered as a mere composite devoid of any definite unity of composition. The parts assemble according to necessary mechanical laws, but there is no inner connection between them.

Kant infers from this that once we have begun to regard a thing as a purpose of nature, once we have begun to assume that it is more than an aggregate of mechanically connected parts, and have thus derived it from a supersensible ground, we must estimate it on this principle exclusively. We cannot but presuppose that every part contained in it depends on the Idea of the whole. "We have no reason for assuming the form of such a thing to be still partly dependent on blind mechanism, for with such confusion of heterogeneous principles every reliable rule for estimating things would disappear" (C. of J., 377).

This is clear enough. We see that Kant is convinced that in its character of regulative principle for the teleological principle must be applied throughout to the objects to which it is applied at all.

We cannot but assume that the objects which we estimate

in that way (organisms) are entirely dependent on teleological causation. <sup>the point is emphasised</sup> The point is emphasised in the last paragraph of <sup>the present section</sup> this section. Kant points out that it may be the case that certain parts of an animal body (as skin, bones, hair) could be explained on mechanical principles as mere accretions. "Yet the cause that accumulates the appropriate material, modifies and fashions it, and deposits it in its proper place, must always be estimated teleologically. Hence, everything in the body must be regarded as organised, and everything, also, in a certain relation to the thing is itself in turn an organ." (C. of J.. 377) <sup>75</sup>

#### Section 67.

Section 67 of The "Dialectic of the teleological Judgment" with which we have now to <sup>deal</sup> ~~concern ourselves, it might be rightly said that it was~~ one of the most interesting passages in the whole of Kant's critical system. What makes it so particularly interesting is the fact that it is Kant's last and most mature statement of the fundamental principles of his philosophy. It is a special problem which is discussed in it, the problem of the possibility of teleological judgments. And yet the solution of this problem is given in the strictest accordance with the fundamental principles of Kant's philosophy, so much so that a reader who is not familiar with every part of Kant's critical philosophy will find it quite unintelligible.

The view has been put forward by ~~many~~ <sup>Swiss</sup> of Kant's commentators that ~~owing to the fact that~~ Kant was unfortunately incapable of understanding his own philosophy, it is the duty of his commentators to understand his philosophy better than he did himself. The reading of the <sup>m</sup>commentaries which have been

written in this spirit has failed to convince me of the truth of so bold an assertion. In fact I have found them more difficult to understand than Kant's own philosophy. They are full of those inconsistencies which are alleged to be one of the distinguishing features of Kant's system. No one could be more willing than I am to admit that Kant's philosophy is difficult to understand, and that the passage with which we have to deal now is particularly difficult. In spite of my continuous study of the "Dialectic" I still find it full of difficulties, and many of Kant's statements remain to me obscure. And yet if I have succeeded in grasping <sup>his</sup> Kant's general idea, as I think I have <sup>in</sup> and <sup>the</sup> explained some of the difficulties of his argument, this is due to the method which I have followed.

My study of Kant's philosophy has convinced me more and more that there is only one way of understanding it, <sup>and that is</sup> ~~vis.~~ by taking it as a whole no part of which is irrelevant for the understanding of the others.

This holds in particular for the Dialectic of teleological Judgment, ~~with the interpretation of which I now begin.~~ The first question is: Why is there such a thing as a "Dialectic of teleological Judgment?" I am sure that many of Kant's commentators would assert <sup>that</sup> the reason was that there had been a "Dialectic of Pure Reason", a "Dialectic of Practical Reason", a "Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment", and Kant owing to his <sup>that</sup> devotion <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ symmetry <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ what is commonly termed his "architectonic", had ~~of course~~ to write a "Dialectic of teleological Judgment" as well. It would be somewhat difficult to defend such a view, seeing that in the "Dialectic of teleological Judgment" Kant is concerned with the problem of the apparent in-

computability of the mechanical and teleological principles.  
No one would reasonably hold that <sup>his</sup> problem has been invented by Kant. As a matter of fact it is not even a purely philosophical problem. Natural science has at all times been concerned with it. Both before and after Kant there have been scientists and philosophers who have held that mechanical principles <sup>are</sup> were the only principles which natural science <sup>could</sup> employ, that they alone <sup>give</sup> gave us a true explanation of natural phenomena and that to introduce the teleological principle into science <sup>is</sup> was to destroy its scientific character and <sup>to</sup> assume an arbitrary unwarrantable principle.)

Others <sup>chiefly</sup> philosophers have believed that the teleological explanation of natural phenomena <sup>is</sup> was the only satisfactory explanation and that it <sup>is</sup> was only our <sup>enquiry</sup> arguing into the final causes of things which <sup>gives</sup> gave us insight into their real nature. A third type <sup>of thinkers</sup> ~~as we shall see~~, it is the type to which Kant belongs <sup>as we shall see</sup> which holds that natural science must make use of both principles, each in its proper place.

<sup>Kant's</sup> The problem with the solution of which Kant is concerned in the "Dialectic" is: Why is this so? How is it possible that the human <sup>mind can</sup> ~~mind must~~ view natural phenomena in two different ways? Do the two principles not contradict each other? Does the assumption of two fundamentally different principles of natural enquiry not give rise to a "Dialectic", a "Dialectic" which is based upon an <sup>a</sup> antinomy of the two principles?

Kant is convinced that such an antinomy must necessarily arise, and he explains this in the first section of the Dialectic, (section 69) ~~with the interpretation of which we may now begin.~~ It is headed: "Nature of an antinomy of Judgment" (Was eine Antinomie der Urtheilskraft ist).

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Section 69.

Kant's argument runs as follows. Determinant Judgment cannot give rise to an antinomy of its principles, for a very simple reason, namely, that <sup>it does not possess any</sup> ~~there are no such principles of~~ ~~determinant Judgment.~~ Determinant Judgment, as has been shown before, is not an independent faculty of <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ mind. Its only business is to subsume given intuitions under given universal principles of the understanding. The principles belong to the understanding and not to determinant Judgment. It is the understanding which gives the necessary laws <sup>for</sup> ~~from~~ the determination of intuitions. Determinant Judgment is the faculty of subsuming intuitions under concepts, of subsuming particular cases under universal rules. It thus gives reality to the concepts of the understanding which, considered apart from their application to intuitions, are mere forms of thought, devoid of all objective meaning. And yet it may be rightly asserted that determinant Judgment does not possess any independent principle and does not produce laws. It is as Kant puts it here, "not independently ~~nomothetic~~".

"Thus transcendental Judgment, which was shown to contain the conditions of subsumption under categories, was not independently nomothetic. It only specified the conditions of sensuous intuition upon which reality, that is, application, can be afforded to a given conception as a law of understanding. In the discharge of this office it could never fall into a state of internal disunion, at least in the matter of principles."

(C. of J.. 385.)

~~All this is quite different in the case of reflective Judgment.~~ <sup>is quite different</sup> As has been shown it possesses a special principle. This <sup>the principle of reflection</sup> ~~is a principle which belongs to the faculty of Judgment exclusively~~ <sup>may remind ourselves</sup> ~~(the principle of reflection).~~ We remember what this

special principle is which made us draw a distinction between determinant and reflective Judgment. It is a principle employed by us in our enquiry into the empirical laws of nature. The human mind in studying nature must presuppose that <sup>the</sup> her particular and empirical laws <sup>of nature</sup> are not a chaotic aggregate, that there <sup>is</sup> exists a system of the particular laws of nature. This principle, as has been shown, cannot be regarded as a principle of the understanding, which is concerned with the universal laws of nature alone. It is a subjective principle, a product of our faculty of Judgment. We assume it on merely subjective grounds, namely, because we suppose that nature will comply with our wish to bring about the systematic connection of empirical laws. <sup>Further</sup> ~~We also remember that~~ Kant has told us that Judgments being <sup>here</sup> incapable of relying upon objective principles of the understanding, must be <sup>a</sup> principle to itself. All this is repeated by <sup>him</sup> Kant in this section as will be seen from the following passage.

"But the reflective judgment has to subsume under a law that is not yet given. It has, therefore, in fact only a principle of reflection upon objects for which we are objectively at a complete loss for a law, or conception of the Object, sufficient to serve as a principle covering the particular cases as they come before us. Now as there is no permissible employment of the cognitive faculties apart from principles, the reflective judgment must in such cases be a principle to itself. As this principle is not objective and is unable to introduce any basis of cognition of the object sufficient for the required purpose of subsumption, it must serve as a mere subjective principle for the employment of our cognitive faculties in a <sup>particular</sup> ~~final~~ manner, namely, for reflecting upon objects of a particular kind?" (C. of J. 385).

The reader who has not read the Introduction to the Critique very carefully may find <sup>here</sup> ~~here~~ many difficulties. In the

first place he may find it impossible to understand why Kant believes that there is a necessary connection between the principle of reflection as applied to the <sup>study</sup> of the particular laws of nature and the principle <sup>teleological</sup> which is employed <sup>for us in</sup> for reflecting upon objects of a particular kind (~~the teleological principle~~).

~~What is according to Kant the connexion between the logical principle of reflexion which enquires into the empirical laws of nature and their relation and the teleological principle which is concerned with particular objects of nature which it regards as purposes of nature.~~

As we have followed Kant's argument throughout the Introduction we shall find it easy to <sup>understand him here</sup> ~~answer this question~~. But <sup>He</sup> Kant has told us that in applying the principle of logical reflection we <sup>form</sup> ~~conceive~~ the Idea of a purposiveness of nature. For the very reason that our understanding cannot explain to us the existence of a system of particular laws which however we find it necessary to assume we present to ourselves nature as an intelligent being <sup>that</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>produced</sup> has ~~practised~~ this system. <sup>In</sup> ~~For~~ our <sup>interest</sup> ~~own benefit~~, <sup>in order to say</sup> in order to make it possible for us to acquire knowledge of <sup>nature</sup> ~~her~~ which otherwise would be impossible.

Nature is conceived by us as a whole every part of which is related to the other, <sup>3</sup> a whole produced by an intelligent being.

The Idea of such a nature is a concept of Reason. <sup>in 7c</sup> ~~in 7c~~ conceiving it we transcend the world of mere nature and derive it from a supersensible source. <sup>and yet</sup> ~~But~~ the system of particular ~~or empirical laws itself although regarded as dependent on a supersensible cause~~ is thought to be present in the world of experience, ~~itself~~.

<sup>The case of</sup> As ~~regards~~ the teleological principle the ~~case~~ is very similar. Again we derive what is given to us in experience

from an Idea of Reason only <sup>and their relations</sup> that now we are not concerned with the empirical laws of nature but with the particular natural objects which we find in experience.

In other words we regard the particular object given to us as a system. There is ~~not~~ another point which requires discussion. Kant tells us in the passage which we have quoted that the principle of reflection being unable to give us objective knowledge must ~~serve~~ <sup>be</sup> as a mere subjective principle for the employment of our cognitive faculties in a purposive manner.

What does he mean by this? <sup>To answer this we have to</sup> remember that he has told us in the Introduction, that in order to be enabled to make a teleological judgment our faculty of Judgment has to relate two other faculties of the mind to one another, viz. the understanding and Reason.

We have just explained why Reason and its concept of a purpose is involved in every teleological judgment. With the question as to why Kant believes that the understanding is also involved in such a judgment we dealt <sup>have</sup> ~~with before~~ <sup>already</sup> when we discussed the Introduction. <sup>we</sup> As we have seen ~~that~~ Kant believes that in order to judge an object teleologically we must first represent it to ourselves as an object of ordinary experience, i.e., as determined like every other object of experience by mechanical principles. Only after having done so, can we apply our principle of teleological <sup>estimation</sup> ~~principle~~ which makes us <sup>derive</sup> ~~desire~~ the object <sup>which is</sup> ~~as~~ determined by mechanical laws from a higher principle, the principle of Reason. The relation between understanding and Reason which lies at the basis of our teleological judgments may be called a "purposive" relation. The purpose which it serves is merely subjective. As will be shown in the "Dialectic of teleological Judgment", it is only owing to the specific character of human knowledge, to the nature of the

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faculties which are employed by the human mind for cognition that we must judge certain objects teleologically. But it will also be shown that, our faculties of <sup>knowledge</sup> ~~knowledge~~ being what they are, we cannot dispense with the teleological principle.

Owing to the fact that our understanding does not give us a principle for the estimation of ~~certain~~ natural objects we have to employ the principle of teleological reflexion <sup>at</sup> "which serves us as a mere subjective principle for the employment of our cognitive faculties in a purposive manner."

The necessity of the teleological method of enquiry (in its character as a subjective principle of reflexion) has been established.

The difficulty which faces us now is that the principle seems to be incompatible with the principle of mechanical causation. There arises a natural and unavoidable Dialectic between the two methods. This Dialectic is based upon the Antinomy of Judgment which will be set forth in the next section

#### Section 70.

Although it is easy enough to follow the general trend of the argument ~~set forth~~ in this section it is unfortunately exceedingly difficult to understand <sup>it</sup> in detail and I ~~for one~~ am fully aware that I have not been able to explain it satisfactorily. Kant begins as follows.

"In dealing with nature as the <sup>totally</sup> ~~complex~~ of objects of external sense, Reason is able to rely upon laws, some of which are prescribed by understanding itself a priori to nature, while others are capable of indefinite extension by means of the empirical determinations occurring in experience. For the application of the laws prescribed a priori by understanding, that is, of the universal laws of material nature in general, Judgment does not need any special principle of reflection; for

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there it is determinant, an objective principle being furnished to it by understanding. But in respect of the particular laws with which we can become acquainted through experience alone, there is such a wide scope for diversity and heterogeneity that Judgment must be a principle to itself, even for the mere purpose of searching for a law and tracking one out in the phenomena of nature. For it needs such a principle as a guiding thread, if it is even to hope for a consistent body of empirical knowledge based on a thorough-going uniformity of nature - that is a unity of nature in its empirical laws. Now from the fact of this contingent unity of particular laws it may come to pass that judgment acts upon two maxims in its reflection, one of which it receives a priori from mere understanding, but the other of which is prompted by particular experiences that bring Reason into play to institute an estimate of corporeal nature and its laws according to a particular principle. What happens then is that these two different maxims seem to all appearance unable to run in the same harness, and a dialectic arises that throws judgment into confusion as to the principle of its reflection." (C. of J., 386, 387).

The first difficulty here concerns Kant's terminology. At the beginning of this passage the term Reason is used in its widest sense, meaning human Reason in general in so far as it is concerned with external objects and the enquiry into their nature. Later the term Reason is used in a narrower sense. When Kant says that in the estimate of particular experiences Reason is brought into play, he is obviously thinking of the principle of reflexion and <sup>is</sup> repeats <sup>ing</sup> what has <sup>often</sup> been stated by him ~~often~~ before, that the principle of reflexion, the principle by means of which the human mind seeks to bring about <sup>the</sup> empirical unity of nature must ~~by~~ itself make use of concepts of Reason.

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The concept of a purposiveness of nature regarding <sup>its</sup> ~~her~~ particular law is a concept of Reason which our reflection upon nature must assume and by means of which we refer natural objects <sup>to a supersensible principle</sup> ~~which are~~ given to us, ~~to a supersensible principle.~~ This raises at once another difficulty.

We should expect Kant to draw a distinction between the objective principles of nature on the one hand, i.e., those principles which the determinative Judgment has merely to apply to given intuitions without making use of a special principle, <sup>and</sup> the subjective principle of reflective Judgment on the other, i.e., that principle which is concerned with the empirical unity of nature, ~~(unity according to particular laws).~~

We should not even be surprised at the fact that Kant identifies the principle of our reflection upon the particular laws with the teleological principle, <sup>for he has insufficiently explained the nature of the connexion</sup> ~~for what the connexion~~ between the teleological principle and the principle of our reflection upon the particular laws of nature <sup>the fact</sup> ~~is~~ and ~~that~~ they have both their root in the same faculty of the mind, viz., reflective Judgment. ~~Kant has explained to us so often that he may rightly expect us to understand him.~~

The difficulty which faces us is of a different kind. In his exposition of the Antinomy Kant speaks of the mechanical and teleological principles as if they were equivalent to one another. Instead of drawing a distinction between objective <sup>which have</sup> mechanical principles based upon the concept of natural causality and thus derived from the understanding, and the subjective teleological principle <sup>which is</sup> a product of reflective Judgment, he treats both mechanical and teleological principles as principles of reflection. He calls them both maxims, regulative and not constitutive principles. He argues that so long as the two maxims of our enquiry into nature are regarded as what they are, namely, principles of reflection, they do not contradict each other. We are entitled to employ them both at the same time. It does not involve a contradiction when we say that we must estimate all production of material

in accordance with merely

things and their forms as possible ~~on the~~ mere mechanical laws and at the same time that some products of material nature cannot be estimated as possible on mere <sup>by</sup> mechanical laws, that for the estimation of them we must assume quite a different kind of causality <sup>(i.e.)</sup> {causality of final causes}. It is only when these regulative principles are converted into constitutive principles, i.e., principles of the possibility of the objects themselves that the antinomy between them arises. The thesis of such an antinomy would be: All production of material things is possible <sup>in accordance with the merely</sup> ~~on mere~~ mechanical laws; and the <sup>antithesis</sup> ~~proposition~~ which contradicts it (antithesis) ~~may be formulated thus~~: Some productions of such things is not possible <sup>in accordance with merely</sup> ~~on mere~~ mechanical laws.

Kant goes on to argue that as objective principles for the determinant Judgment the two propositions would contradict one another. One of them would be necessarily false. "But that would then be an antinomy certainly, though not one of Judgment, but rather a conflict in the legislation of Reason. But Reason is unable to prove either one or the other of these principles: seeing that we can have no a priori determining principle of the possibility of things on mere empirical laws of nature." (C.of J.. 387.)

Why does Kant say here that the antinomy is not one of Judgment but <sup>is</sup> a conflict in the legislation of Reason? We ~~remember~~ <sup>call</sup> that he has told us in the "Dialectic of aesthetic Judgment" that it is our Reason which gives rise to all the antinomies in whatever form they appear. <sup>have to</sup> We remember also why he believes this to be the case. According to his philosophy Reason is the only faculty of the mind which conceives the Idea of the unconditioned or absolute. <sup>various</sup> The ~~different~~ antinomies

arise because Reason in applying <sup>the</sup> the principle passes judgment upon each of the two propositions which constitute the antinomy and ascribes to them absolute or unconditioned validity. In the case with which we are at present concerned this would mean <sup>on the one hand</sup> that ~~both~~ the assertion made by the thesis that all things are determined by mechanical causes is absolutely true, <sup>of things which are taken to be things in themselves</sup> i.e. of the ~~objects themselves~~. ~~The law of mechanical causality is taken to be a law of the things themselves.~~ In considering the <sup>on the other hand</sup> antithesis, ~~and~~ attributing to it absolute validity Reason would assert that some products of nature are not determined by mechanical principles, that the causality by which some things in nature are produced is quite a different causality, <sup>namely</sup> causality according to purposes. <sup>We see</sup> ~~In that case~~ the teleological principle is also taken to be a principle applying to the things themselves, <sup>in</sup> although not a principle applying to all things generally.

What is difficult here is that the term "Reason" is <sup>now</sup> used by Kant in a third sense. As we have seen at the beginning of the section Kant employs <sup>it in</sup> ~~in~~ a very vague sense. <sup>later</sup> ~~Then~~ he speaks of Reason as an element in our reflective judgments. And now he is concerned with Reason as the faculty which passes judgment upon the proposition which constitutes the antinomy and ascribes to each of them absolute validity so that they are considered to be incompatible with each other. That two entirely different principles cannot apply to the things in themselves is clear and therefore Reason which takes them to apply to <sup>things in themselves</sup> them must find the two principles incompatible. Seeking to determine the real causes of natural phenomena, it is undecided as to which of the two principles to assume, wavering between two alternatives, at one time recognising mechanical causation as the only real explanation of things, and at another (when confronted with certain phenomena) asserting that the teleological causation alone gives a true account of the laws which govern the production of these things.

Now, ~~As~~ we have seen, Kant's solution of the antinomy is ~~this~~,  
that Mechanical and teleological principles are both merely  
regulative principles, ~~that~~ They are both mere objective  
principles of reflexion, ~~that~~ in applying them we do not  
assert anything about the things <sup>as they are in</sup> themselves. The view which  
is put forward by him in our section is that the human mind  
may employ both principles, each in its proper place. See  
~~the following passage.~~

"On the other hand, looking to the maxims of a reflex-  
tive Judgment as first set out, we see that they do not in  
fact contain any contradiction at all. For if I say: I must  
estimate the possibility of all events in material nature,  
and, consequently, also all forms considered as its product,  
on mere mechanical laws, I do not thereby assert that they  
are solely possible in this way, that is, to the exclusion  
of every other kind of causality. On the contrary, this  
assertion is only intended to indicate that I ought at all  
time to reflect upon these things according to the principle  
of the simple mechanism of nature, and, consequently, push  
my investigation with it as far as I can, because unless I  
make it the basis of research there can be no knowledge of  
nature in the true sense of the term at all. Now this does  
not stand in the way of the second maxim when a proper occas-  
ion for its employment presents itself - that is to say, in  
the case of some natural forms (and at their instance, in  
the case of entire nature) we may, in our reflection upon  
them, follow the trail of a principle which is radically  
different from the explanation by the mechanism of nature,  
namely, the principle of final causes." (C. of J., 387, 388.)

This passage raises the most serious difficulties. For as mentioned before, we must ask ourselves: How can <sup>Kant</sup> that treat the mechanical and teleological principles as <sup>reflexive</sup> equivalent? ~~How can he put forward the view that the principle of mechanical causation is a principle of mere reflexion?~~ Such an assertion is obviously contrary to the fundamental principles of his philosophy. According to him the mechanical principle <sup>is derived from</sup> follows immediately from the universal law of causality. This law is a product of the understanding. It is an objective principle. By means of it we know prior to all actual experience that every event in nature must be determined by <sup>understanding</sup> natural causes. This has been made quite clear by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and it will be sufficient to refer to <sup>his</sup> ~~Kant's~~ discussion of the second Analogy which is formulated by him as follows. "Principle of Succession in Time in accordance with the law of causality. All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect." (C.P.R. B252-99).

Now it might be thought that in the Critique of Judgment Kant had changed his doctrine <sup>and</sup> that he now believed that the mechanical and teleological principles were identical in character, that they were both <sup>of them being</sup> subjective principles of reflective Judgment.

Such an interpretation of Kant's doctrine is however quite impossible. We have seen already and it will become clearer and clearer as we go on that in the Critique of Judgment <sup>Kant</sup> strictly adheres to this distinction between the <sup>constitutive</sup> objective principles of the understanding (the principle of mechanical causation in particular) and the <sup>regulative</sup> subjective prin-

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ciple of teleological reflexion. In fact the Critique of Judgment in general and the "Dialectic of teleological Judgment" in particular remain quite unintelligible if this distinction is not taken into account.<sup>(1)</sup>

But how are we to solve our present difficulty? I will try to put forward what seems to me at least a <sup>partial</sup> ~~natural~~ solution. Our question is: In what sense can mechanical causality and teleological causality be called <sup>regulative</sup> ~~subjective~~ principles? I think the answer is: In so far as <sup>neither of them</sup> ~~they both~~ do not give us any insight into the nature of the things as they are in themselves. It is true that we can have no experience of natural objects at all unless we apply the principle of mechanical causality to every object of experience. This principle may thus be said to be an a priori and <sup>constitutive</sup> ~~objective~~ principle of the mind. And yet, the objects of our experience are not things in themselves, they are mere appearances and the principles which we employ for our knowledge of them do not give us any insight into their real nature. <sup>The ultimate ground</sup> ~~The real cause of the world of appearances~~ is to be sought for in the supersensible of which the human mind can have no knowledge whatsoever.

If, therefore, by an <sup>a constitutive</sup> ~~objective~~ principle we understand a principle that gives us <sup>absolute</sup> knowledge of the things themselves (independently of the knowing mind), and if by a constitutive principle we understand a principle that <sup>does</sup> determines the things as they really are and not merely gives us rules for the <sup>synthesis</sup> ~~systems~~ of our sensuous intuitions, then all the principles of the understanding may be called ~~subjective and~~ regulative principles. And in fact the reason why we can

(1) See pages 472 a, 472 b.

It may be objected to my interpretation that I am raising an unnecessary difficulty since Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason calls the Analogies regulative principles. There he explains that the Axioms and Anticipations are constitutive principles because we can construct objects in accordance with them, whereas in the principle of causality we have merely a rule for seeking the cause of an object in experience and a mark for finding it, and the principle must therefore be called a regulative principle. The same applies generally to the Analogies and Postulates which Kant calls regulative principles. It is, however, only Kant's terminology which may here give rise to confusion. When Kant distinguishes on the one hand between categories and principles, (Grundsätze), as constitutive Principles and on the other Ideas as regulative Principles, (a distinction with which every reader of the Critique is familiar), the meaning of the terms is quite different from that which attaches to them in the Analytic of Principles. But what this special meaning is Kant makes quite clear. He distinguishes between mathematical principles (Grundsätze) and dynamical principles. The distinction is that the former are referred to mere intuition, the latter to the existence of appearances and their relation, and Kant's point is that since the dynamical principles cannot simply be constructed in intuition, being concerned with the existence of given appearances, they are mere rules (regulative principles). "An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception. It does not tell us how mere perception or empirical intuition in general itself comes about. It is not a principle constitutive of the objects, that is, of the appearances, but only regulative. The same can be asserted of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which concern the synthesis of mere intuition (that is of the form of appearances), ~~and~~ of perception (that is, of the matter of perception), and of experience (that is, of the relation of these perceptions).

Note P.472, line 4, cont:.

"They are merely regulative principles, and are distinguished from the mathematical, which are constitutive/....." (C of P.R. B 222/3).

All this is clear enough. Axioms and Anticipations are said to be constitutive because they are conditions of our having perceptions at all. Analogies and Postulates are regulative because they merely provide us with rules as to how to connect perceptions.

I should not be in the least distressed if in our section Kant had used the term "regulative" in the same sense and had called mechanical principles regulative principles. This would be quite justifiable, as mechanical principles are derived from the law of causality, which, being an analogy of experience (Second Analogy: B232 ff), may rightly be called a regulative principle.

In fact, however, he <sup>speaks</sup> ~~speaks~~ here of the mechanical principles as if they were in no way different from the teleological principle. Both principles are said to be maxims of reflective judgment, not objective principles of determinant judgment, and thus the fundamental distinction between them is obliterated. This distinction, on which the argument of the Critique of Teleological Judgment rests, is that mechanical principles are objective principles of the understanding, that is conditions of experience in general or constitutive principles, whereas teleological principles are subjective <sup>principles</sup> ~~principles~~ of Judgment applied only for the estimation of certain natural objects, or regulative principles.

make use of the teleological principle is that the mechanical principle does not give us any information as to what our objects really are and by what causes they are ultimately determined.

I offer this explanation for what it is worth and willingly admit that many points of Kant's argument remain to me obscure. I find it especially difficult to understand ~~why~~ <sup>why</sup> Kant speaks here of mechanical principles as if they belonged to the faculty of reflective Judgment and not to the understanding.

Kant gives us in our section at least once an indication of the fact that he does not regard mechanical and teleological explanations of phenomena as being of equal value. He tells us in the passage above quoted that unless the mechanical principle is taken as a basis of our research there can be no knowledge of nature in the true sense at all. That this is his firm conviction he will make clearer and clearer throughout the Dialectic.

This point is later emphasised by Kant so much that many of his statements give the reader the impression <sup>that</sup> ~~as if~~ he believed <sup>s</sup> that the real explanation of things were to be found in mechanical causation, that the mechanical principles were principles applicable not <sup>only</sup> ~~to~~ phenomena but also to things in themselves. Our interpretation of Section 70 <sup>defective as</sup> it is will have served one useful purpose if it has guarded us against such a misconception of Kant's doctrine.

At the end of our section Kant states that by assuming the teleological principle we do not assert that those forms which we judge teleologically ~~are~~ not possible <sup>in accordance with</sup> ~~on~~ the mechanism <sup>^</sup>

of nature. What is asserted is merely that no human Reason can ever understand the specific character of the things which are judged to be purposes of nature on mechanical principles. Whether the physico-mechanical and the teleological principle do not cohere in a single principle remains an open question which cannot be decided. All we can say is that the human mind cannot unite ~~this~~ and that ~~it~~ therefore, to be enabled to estimate certain objects in nature must conceive a principle different from that of its mechanism.

At the present stage we cannot understand this argument. ~~yet~~. But we already see that Kant believes that it is the nature of human knowledge which makes it impossible for us to unite the mechanical and teleological principles and that as ~~according to~~ <sup>a consequence of</sup> this we must employ the latter as a principle of reflection. The problem as to why human knowledge cannot unite the two principles and what the relation of the two principles is, is the fundamental problem of the "Dialectic teleological Judgment", and we may hope that in following Kant's argument step by step we shall succeed in coming to a better understanding of <sup>his</sup> Kant's problem.

### Section 71.

The heading given by Kant to this section is: "Introduction to the solution of the above antinomy". We must therefore not expect to find in it Kant's final solution of the antinomy of Judgment. In fact owing to the introductory character of the section many of Kant's statements remain obscure and ambiguous. At the beginning Kant asserts that it is quite impossible to prove that the production of organised ~~natural~~ <sup>of nature</sup> products according to mere mechanism is possible. The reason why this is so is that "we cannot see into the first and inner ground of the infinite multiplicity of the particular laws of nature, which, being only known empirically are for us contingent, and so we are absolutely incapable of reaching the intrinsic and all-sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature - a principle which lies in the supersensible." (C. of J., 388).<sup>(7)</sup>

It is very important to note here that Kant does not mean to say that the mechanical principle as it is applied by the human mind might <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~possibly~~ be the all-sufficient explanation of ~~things~~ <sup>natural objects</sup>. What he means is that an understanding different from our own might find in the material world itself the causes both of what we regard as mechanically produced and <sup>of</sup> what we regard as dependent on purposes. Such an understanding would have to employ a principle fundamentally different from our principle of mechanical causation. It is owing to the specific nature of the mechanical principle as employed by us that we must make use of an entirely different principle for the judging of certain products of nature. Since

our mechanical principles do not give us insight into the inner nature of the things, since as far as they are concerned particulars and universals, parts and wholes are not regarded as standing in any necessary connexion, we must in order to explain to ourselves the nature of certain natural objects, which show such a connexion, have recourse to an entirely different principle viz. the teleological principle. We cannot but judge that the inner connexion of parts and whole which we find present in certain objects (organisms) is ~~pre-~~<sup>namely</sup> ~~duced by~~<sup>dependent on</sup> an external cause, that it is due to an intelligent being which desired it to exist. We must assume a causality fundamentally different from mechanical causality.

But <sup>they</sup> ~~there~~ is no reason why we should assert that it <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ absolutely impossible to unite the mechanical and teleological principles, that no being could find the real explanation of things <sup>of any</sup> or the things themselves <sup>unless he derives them from a cause which acts intelligently</sup> without knowing them ~~from an external cause.~~

But of course that is not to say that ~~this is really the case.~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~perhaps~~ certain things ~~really~~ <sup>are</sup> what we take them to be, namely, purposes of nature determined by a special kind of causality.

The only answer which can be given to the question as to what the real causes of things are is, that we do not know it. Our Reason is incapable of answering such questions and all we can say <sup>is</sup> <sup>and</sup> that according to the nature of our cognitive faculties we cannot explain (to ourselves) organisms on mechanical principles, ~~that~~ we must judge them teleologically. It is indubitably certain that <sup>human Reason</sup> ~~the human mind~~ in judging <sup>organisms</sup> ~~organic nature~~ must refer to a supersensible causality. In

estimating them we must employ Reason's Idea of a purpose of nature. We must assume a causality distinct from mechanism. But the principle employed by us is a principle of reflective and not of determinant Judgment, i.e., it does not determine the objects as such, it does not assert that an intelligent cause actually exists. All we can say is that we must regard certain objects as if they owed their existence to a supernatural causality. The teleological principle, which is not concerned with the things ~~in~~ <sup>themselves</sup> but only with them in their relation to the human mind, is a subjectively necessary principle of reflexion, a guiding principle <sup>of nature</sup> for our investigation ~~into value~~. "For the reflective judgment, therefore, this is a perfectly sound principle: that for the clearly manifest nexus of things according to <sup>final</sup> ~~purposive~~ causes, we must think a causality distinct from mechanism, namely a world cause acting according to purposes, that is, an intelligent cause - however rash and undemonstrable a principle this might be for the determinant Judgment. In the first case the principle is a simple maxim of Judgment. The conception of causality which it involves is a mere Idea to which we in no way undertake to concede reality, but only make use of it to guide a reflection that still leaves the door open for any available mechanical explanation, and that never strays from the world of sense. In the second case the principle would be an objective principle. Reason would prescribe it and Judgment would have to be subject to it and determine itself accordingly. But in that case reflection wanders from the world of sense into transcendent regions, and <sup>possibly</sup> gets led astray." (<sup>über die</sup> ~~Sinnenwelt~~ <sup>there</sup> ~~hinaus~~ sich ins Ueberschwengliche verliert und leicht ~~innegeführt~~ <sup>verführt</sup> wird.) (C. of J., 389).

Kant's general idea is clear. The antinomy arises because a principle of reflective Judgment is confused with one of determinant Judgment. This is stated clearly by Kant in the last paragraph of this section. I find, however, some difficulties in it. Kant says that the autonomy of the reflective Judgment, which is valid merely subjectively for the use of our Reason in respect of particular empirical laws, is mistaken for the heteronomy of determinant Judgment, which has to conform to the laws, either universal or particular, of the understanding.

Now this may seem easy. Reflective Judgment is rightly said to possess autonomy. For, as has often been pointed out, it gives to itself a principle ~~independent~~ (the principle of reflection) independently of the understanding; and, as has also been explained often before, the fundamental principle of reflection is that principle which makes us assume that nature is a system according to empirical laws. To determinant Judgment on the other hand mere heteronomy may be ascribed, for it possesses neither principles nor laws. It merely subsumes laws which are given to it by the understanding.

My difficulty is that Kant seems to me to be implying here what I should have liked him to have said all the time, namely, that it is determinant Judgment which is involved in the mechanical explanation of objects. In explaining things mechanically our determinant Judgment employs laws (particular<sup>(1)</sup> or universal) given to it by the understanding. Every object of experience must be explained on these principles. Although not applicable to things in themselves, they are not subjective in the sense of the teleological principle

(1) "Particular laws" because the particular laws are specifications of the transcendental universal laws; c.f., e.g. C. of P.R.A 126, where Kant, after having defined the understanding as the faculty of rules, says "Rules, so far as they ~~must~~ are objective and therefore depend upon the knowledge of the object are called laws. Although we learn many laws through experience, they are only special determinations of still higher laws, and the highest of these, under which the others all stand, issue a priori from the understanding itself. They are not borrowed from experience; on the contrary they have to confer upon appearances their conformity to law and so to make experience possible.

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which employs undemonstrable concepts of Reason. I may quote the passage. Kant says:

"All semblance of an antinomy between the maxims of the strictly physical, or mechanical, mode of explanation and the teleological, or technical, rests, therefore, on our confusing a principle of the reflective with one of the determinant judgment. The autonomy of the former, which is valid merely subjectively for the use of our reason in respect of particular empirical laws, is mistaken for the heteronomy of the second, which has to conform to the laws, either universal or particular, given by understanding." (C. of J., 389).

<sup>it may be that</sup>  
Now ~~either~~ the explanation which I have given is correct, and Kant says here that the strictly physical (mechanical) explanation of nature is given in accordance with laws of the understanding, <sup>that</sup> and it is determinant Judgment which applies these laws to all given appearances.

In that case <sup>it</sup> ~~he~~ would contradict what has been said in the preceding section, namely, that the maxim which makes us estimate things as possible on merely mechanical laws is a maxim of reflective Judgment. (See above

<sup>It may be, however, that</sup>  
~~or else~~ he does not mean this, <sup>Then either he is</sup> ~~and he is either~~ concerned with the teleological principle alone which is said to be a principle of reflective and not of determinant Judgment; or he means to say once more that the <sup>compatibility of</sup> ~~fact that~~ the mechanical and the teleological principles ~~are compatible~~ with each other is due to their being principles of mere reflexion. <sup>it</sup> (To accept the former interpretation) I find it difficult because Kant's words seem to me to suggest that he is discussing here not only the teleological, but also the

mechanical principles. And indeed how could a solution of the antinomy between them, be it even a merely <sup>provisional</sup> preparatory ~~one~~ take account of only one of the two seemingly contradictory propositions!

To accept the latter interpretation I find <sup>it</sup> equally difficult. For (a) as I said when I discussed the preceding section I cannot understand how Kant can treat the mechanical and teleological principles as equivalent, ~~how he can regard them as~~ subjective principles which belong to reflective and not to determinant Judgment, and (b) <sup>his</sup> ~~new~~ words here make such an interpretation almost impossible.

I am not in a position to give a satisfactory explanation and must leave Section 71. Since sections 72 <sup>and</sup> 73 in which Kant enumerates various teleological systems and shows the untenability of them all are of merely historical interest <sup>shall</sup> I ~~will~~ disregard them and turn to Section 74 <sup>in</sup> which Kant goes on with the discussion of his own problem.

#### Section 74.

It has been <sup>again and again</sup> stated ~~that~~ the conception of a purpose of nature belongs to reflective and not to determinant Judgment. In drawing a distinction between reflective and determinant Judgment, <sup>in</sup> and asserting that the principles of the former regard objects only in their relation to the knowing mind without determining them as such, we have employed the fundamental principle of critical philosophy. Critical philosophy is fundamentally different from dogmatic philosophy in that it denies to the human mind all knowledge of anything but the sensible world. Now the conception of a thing as a purpose

rationis), or whether it is a rational conception, supplying a basis of knowledge and substantiated by Reason (conceptus ratiocinatus)" (C.of J.,396).

"In other words, not only is it impossible to decide whether or not things of nature, considered as purposes of nature, require for their production a causality of a quite peculiar kind, namely an intentional causality, but the very question is quite out of order. For the concept of a purpose of nature is altogether unprovable by Reason in respect of its objective reality, which means that it is not constitutive for the determinate judgment, but merely regulative for the reflective judgment!" (C.of J.,396).

If there is any doubt left as to whether the concept is provable or not, we need only consider what the situation is in which we are led to assume it. It is when we are unable to understand a thing in accordance with merely mechanical ~~principles~~ laws of nature that we say that it is a purpose of nature. The mechanical principles cannot explain to us why in a natural object every part should be related to every other and to the whole. That there should be such a connection is from the mechanical point of view a matter of chance.

~~Now~~ When we find objects which seem to us to possess ~~such~~ such a form, we must have recourse to a principle different from the mechanical principles. We judge that the existence of objects cannot be explained on mechanical principles which are based upon the law of natural causality. We have to transcend nature and derive the objects

from the supersensible, i.e. from a sphere which cannot be known by us. We do refer <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ objects and with them the whole of mechanical nature to the unknown sphere of the supersensible to something beyond the sphere of our experience. It is the very fact that we cannot have objective knowledge of <sup>the</sup> specific nature of certain objects which makes us leave the objective principles of mechanical explanation and have recourse to a different <sup>kind</sup> ~~mode~~ of explanation.

~~Hence~~ Since it is our ignorance which makes us do away with objective principles it follows that the principle employed <sup>in the present case</sup> ~~instead~~ cannot be an objective principle. It is quite true that we cannot dispense with the teleological principle but this only shows that the question as to whether nature <sup>it</sup> ~~herself~~ produces things intentionally or unintentionally is devoid of all meaning. The concept of a purpose of nature is a problematic concept which cannot be treated dogmatically.

"Hence we can understand how it is that all systems that are ever devised with a view to the dogmatic treatment of the conception of <sup>of</sup> ~~physical~~ purposes <sup>of nature</sup> or of nature as a whole that owes its consistency and coherence to purposive causes, fail to decide anything whatever either by their objective affirmations or by their objective denials. For, if things are subsumed under a conception that is merely problematic the synthetic predicates attached to this conception - as, for example, in the present case, whether the ~~physical~~ purpose <sup>of nature</sup> which we suppose for the production of the thing is designed or undesigned - must yield judgments about the object of a like problematic character, be they affirmative or negative, since one does not know whether one is judging about what is something or nothing." (C.o.F., 397.)

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Kant goes on to state that the concept of a causality through purposes i.e., of purposes of art<sup>(1)</sup> and the concept of a causality according to the mechanism of nature have both objective reality.

What he means is that we have objective knowledge of the fact that human beings possess a ~~capacity~~<sup>faculty of</sup> for producing certain things to make them serve some purpose. We know this only by experience, and yet we are assured of the objective reality of such a causality regarding human art.<sup>(1)</sup>

The causality of nature according to mechanism has also objective reality. We know prior to actual experience that every natural object is determined by the principle of mechanical causation. This has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason in which it was proved that the law of causality is an a priori objective law ~~on the ground that~~<sup>since unless</sup> it is assumed experience of objects is impossible.

The concluding passage of the section with which we are at present concerned reads as follows.

"But the conception of a physical causality following the rules of purposes, and still more of such a Being (is as) utterly incapable of being given to us in experience - a Being regarded as the original source of nature - while it may no doubt be thought without self-contradiction, is nevertheless useless for the purpose of dogmatic definitive assertions. For, since it is incapable of being extracted from experience, and besides is unnecessary for its possibility, there is nothing that can give any guarantee of its objective reality. But even if this could be assured, how can I reckon among products of nature things that are definitely posited as products of divine art, when it

(1) The term 'art' is here used in its widest sense. (See above.)

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was the very incapacity of nature to produce such things according to its own laws that necessitated the appeal to a cause distinct from nature?" (C. of J., 397).)

It is very interesting to note that now at last Kant draws a clear distinction between mechanical and teleological principles. They are fundamentally different from one another. It is only the mechanical principle to which objective reality can be attributed, <sup>and which can give us</sup> ~~it is the only~~ real explanation of natural phenomena; <sup>since</sup> ~~for~~ it remains within the sphere of experience, <sup>and</sup> ~~it~~ treats of laws of nature and not of ~~super~~ sensible causes which cannot belong to nature. To the teleological principle on the other hand the same objective validity cannot be assigned. For (a) it has to rely upon Reason, <sup>as a principle of a supersensible causality</sup> and (b) it is not necessary for the possibility of experience.

The last point is <sup>particularly</sup> ~~very~~ important. For, as we know the objective validity of the mechanical principle is <sup>wholly</sup> grounded in its being <sup>the</sup> condition of experience.

In the passage which we have just quoted Kant goes as far as to say that even if we succeeded in establishing the objective reality of a supernatural causality and showed that products of nature are produced by a divine art, we could no longer call these products products of nature owing to the fact that it is the very incapacity of nature to produce such things according to its own laws that makes it necessary to appeal to a divine source. We see that Kant draws a very sharp distinction between mechanical <sup>and</sup> teleological principles that in his view it is only the former which give us an explanation of natural phenomena in the true sense.

After what has been said before it is very important to take note of this fact. We have seen that Kant began by treating the two principles as almost equivalent. Now we see

that he really regards them as opposed to one another. But he is now over-emphasising the distinction between them so much that unless we had read the preceding sections we should take him to mean that mechanical causation was the only kind of explanation of any value to him as knowledge.

Another point to be noticed is that Kant tells us here that the concept of teleological causality is unnecessary for the possibility of experience. This is again an exaggeration. As Kant will shew later the teleological principle is in a sense a condition of experience. ~~xxxxxxx~~ Unlike the mechanical principle it is not a condition of experience in general. It is not a condition of objective experience. But it is a subjective condition ~~and~~ of our experience of certain objects. Kant will shew that to have even experience of certain products of nature, namely organisms, we must necessarily employ the subjective principle of teleological reflection. Otherwise we could not understand their specific nature.

#### Section 75.

Most of what is said in this section is mere repetition. But, since Kant states his case far more intelligibly than before, the section must be regarded as being of great value for the proper understanding of his argument.

He begins by stating that it is one thing to say: The production of certain objects in nature, or even of nature as a whole, is ~~only~~ possible only through ~~it~~ a designedly acting cause; and another to say: According to the peculiar constitution of my cognitive

faculties I cannot judge of the possibility of these things in any other way than by presenting to myself a being who, in producing things, employs a principle analogous to the causality of an understanding.

In the first case I consider the object as such and have therefore to establish the objective reality of the concept which I employ. In the second I consider the object only in relation to myself and my powers of cognition. Or, to put it another way: The first principle (Prinzip) is an objective principle (Grundsatz) intended for the determinant Judgment, the second principle a subjective principle for reflective Judgment.

The assumption of the second principle is not only possible, but even necessary. According to the nature of our knowledge we must judge certain products of nature teleologically. We have to base our enquiry into their nature upon the Idea of an intelligent cause. Otherwise even mere observation of the specific nature of these products becomes impossible.

It is quite natural that once we have adopted this product principle we should go a step further and regard nature as a whole as a teleological principle. This is permissible, but it must be borne in mind that whereas in the case of our judging organisms teleologically the adoption of the principle is absolutely necessary even <sup>for us</sup> to obtain empirical knowledge of their nature, it is not necessary when we have to judge nature as a whole; for nature as a whole is not given to us as organised. The maxim which makes us regard nature as a teleological system may be useful, but it is not indispensable.

Now as has been said before, when we say of a thing that <sup>it</sup> was possible only as a purpose of nature <sup>and therefore</sup> that it could not exist ~~but for this~~ we imply that its existence is contingent <sup>upon the laws of nature</sup> ~~on mere laws of nature~~ (mechanical laws). Laws of nature <sup>do</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~regarded~~ to give us insufficient explanation of its existence, <sup>and</sup>

<sup>this</sup> ~~this~~ is the reason why those things which we consider possible only as purposes of nature have at all times been regarded as a proof of the contingency of the universe. <sup>The common</sup> Popular understanding and philosophers alike have <sup>inferred</sup> ~~held~~ that the existence of these things proves that the universe depends on an intelligent <sup>cause</sup> ~~cause~~, that it owes its origin to an extra-mundane being.

This proof, however, convincing as it may seem, is invalid if it is regarded as an objective proof, a proof of the real existence of such a being. All that can be proved is that in reflecting upon certain objects we must owing to the constitution of our cognitive faculties, <sup>make use of</sup> ~~assume~~ the Idea of an intelligent cause. This Idea is valid subjectively <sup>but</sup> ~~and~~ not objectively.

"But suppose teleology brought to the highest pitch of perfection, what would it all prove in the end? Does it prove for example, that such an intelligent Being really exists? No; it proves no more than this, that by the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and, therefore, in bringing experience into touch with the highest principles of Reason, we are absolutely incapable of forming any conception of the possibility of such a world unless we imagine (uns denken) a highest cause operating designedly. We are unable, therefore, objec-

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tively to substantiate the proposition: There is an intelligent original being. On the contrary, we can only do so subjectively for the employment of our power of judgment in its reflection on the purposes of nature, which are incapable of being thought on any other principle than that of the intentional causality of a highest cause." (C. of J., 399.)

That we are quite incapable of proving objectively the existence of purposes in nature and the existence of a supreme cause of nature follows from the fact that properly speaking we do not observe purposes in our experience of objects but read them into it. It is our own minds which introduce this conception into nature. <sup>This is only one reason why</sup> ~~That~~ we ascribe purposes to nature is due to the fact that there are certain objects in nature <sup>as follows</sup> for which we cannot ~~account~~ in accordance with principles of mere observation of nature, <sup>and this</sup> ~~this~~ is why we consider it necessary to assume that the thing given to us is more than a mere product of nature, why we leave the sphere of mere experience and say: This thing is not a product of mechanical nature; <sup>it</sup> ~~It~~ is a purpose of nature; <sup>it</sup> ~~It~~ has been produced by a supernatural cause.

We are perfectly justified in making such an assumption. For, "We cannot conceive or render intelligible to ourselves the purposiveness that must be introduced as the basis even of our knowledge of the intrinsic possibility of many natural things, except by representing it, and, in general, the world, as the product of an intelligent cause - in short, of a God." (C. of J., 400.)

But we must not assume for a moment that the same necessarily holds for every thinking and <sup>knowing</sup> ~~perceiving~~ being (denk-

ende und ~~erzwingende~~ <sup>bestimmende</sup> Wesen). And, indeed, why should the question whether it does be of any interest to us? It is sufficient <sup>that we should be able to show</sup> ~~if we can show~~ that for us it is necessary to <sup>make</sup> ~~judge~~ <sup>decide</sup> teleologically and to assume the existence of an intelligent cause of nature.

"Now supposing that this proposition, founded as it is upon an indispensably necessary maxim of our power of Judgment, is perfectly satisfactory from every human point of view, and for any use to which we can put our Reason, whether speculative or practical, I should like to know what loss we suffer from our inability to prove its validity for higher beings also - that is to say, to substantiate it on pure objective grounds, which unfortunately are beyond our reach."  
(C. of J.. 400)

That Kant's "unfortunately" is ironical will be seen at once. He is convinced that the fact that the human mind cannot have objective knowledge of the supersensible is something not to be deplored, but rather to be welcomed. This attitude, as I have said before, is characteristic of his personality, and I have quoted several passages from the first two Critiques in which it clearly expresses itself. (See above)

The same view is taken by him in the Critique of Judgment. In <sup>considering</sup> ~~answering~~ the <sup>problem</sup> ~~question~~ of Teleology he shows that the human mind must necessarily assume the existence of a supernatural being. To answer the question as to whether <sup>such a being</sup> ~~it~~ really exists is quite impossible. But we need not be distressed about this. The question itself is superfluous from every human point of view. But there is one question which is really

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relevant and which can be answered viz., whether the human mind can or ~~even~~ must employ the teleological principle whether we are entitled from our own point of view to ascribe purposes to nature and to assume the Idea of a supersensible causality.

The answer has to be in the affirmative. It is quite certain that we are quite incapable of explaining to ourselves the nature even of the simplest organism by looking merely to mechanical principles of nature.

"Indeed so certain is it, that we may confidently assert that it is absurd for men even to entertain any thought of so doing or to hope that may be another Newton may some day arise, to make intelligible to us even the genesis of but a blade of grass from natural laws that no design has ordered." (C. of J., 400)

#### Section 76.

We have been told ~~again and again~~ <sup>often enough</sup> that it is owing to the specific nature of its faculties of cognition that the human mind must make use of the teleological principle. But so far Kant has not explained to us what, in his view, <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ specific nature of human knowledge is which would distinguish it from a different kind of knowledge. The reader may therefore have failed fully to understand Kant's theory.

In the present section, to which he gives the heading: <sup>Remark</sup> "The mark", Kant to <sup>some</sup> ~~apertain~~ extent makes up for this deficiency by giving a general survey of his theory of the nature of human knowledge.

He ~~himself~~ tells us at the beginning that this survey is one which would deserve a detailed elaboration in transcen-

dental philosophy, and that it is introduced here <sup>only</sup> as an explanatory digression and not as a step in the main argument.

It is most unfortunate that he has nowhere given a more elaborate account of the theory here propounded. We should have been very grateful to him if he had done so. For even ~~his~~ <sup>the summary</sup> account of the fundamental principles of his philosophy is extremely interesting.

Kant gives us here an account of the general principles of his philosophy. Those principles which have guided him throughout his three ~~great critical works~~ and it becomes clear here more than anywhere else that the critical philosophy is an indivisible whole every part of which stands in the most intimate connection with the others.

As regards Kant's assertion here that his survey is introduced as a mere digression and that it is not really essential to his argument I find it very difficult to believe him. I for one should have found his theory of teleological judgments almost unintelligible if <sup>he had omitted this section</sup> ~~this section had been~~ suppressed by Kant and many points have become clear to me regarding Kant's philosophy which otherwise would have remained obscure. It is quite true that if Kant ~~had~~ instead of propounding his argument in outline <sup>had</sup> given us a more elaborate account he would have made matters very much easier. As it is, we must make the most of what we have, and we may be confident that having followed Kant throughout his three Critiques we shall succeed in understanding him here.

He begins as follows. Reason is a faculty of Principles (Prinzipien). The unconditioned is the ultimate goal at which it aims. The understanding, on the other hand, is at

its disposal, but always under certain conditions which must be given. Without concepts of the understanding to which objective reality must be given, Reason can make no objective (synthetic) judgments whatsoever. Theoretical Reason by itself does not possess any constitutive, but only regulative, principles. Where understanding cannot follow it, Reason becomes transcendent. ¶ It displays itself in Ideas which are not objectively valid concepts. Although valid for all human beings, x all of whom possess the same kind of cognition, they do not entitle us to make assertions about things in themselves. Objective judgments cannot be based upon the concepts of Reason, although it may be rightly asserted that these concepts are valid not only for every human being but even for every finite intelligent being. In other words, Ideas of Reason, although as regulative principles they are necessary not only for ~~xxxxxx~~ every human being but also for every finite intelligent being, (according to any conception that we are able to form for ourselves of the capacity of a finite intelligent being in general) are not objective or constitutive principles. To give them objective validity the understanding would have to ~~xxx~~ be able to follow Reason in its search for them unconditioned. This however is quite impossible, seeing that the concepts of the understanding depend on their validity on a certain condition. We know what this condition is; it is their application to sensuous intuition.

The argument which we have considered will be understood by anyone who is familiar with the Critique of Pure Reason. Since I have dealt with it several times before (see above) I need say little about it,.

We may remind ourselves that according to Kant a concept of Reason, an Idea, is nothing but a category extended beyond the conditioned world of experience. The objective validity of such a ~~xxxxxx~~ concept cannot be established, for the categories themselves derive their objective validity from the fact that they are necessary for the synthesis of our intuitions.

They are conditions of our experience of the world of sense, i.e. <sup>the</sup> world of which we become aware by determining our intuitions by means of concepts. Reason, which by its very nature transcends the world of nature cannot claim objective validity for its concepts. And yet its concepts are necessary as regulative principles. Every human Reason, indeed every finite Reason, must set before itself the Idea of a systematic unity of nature. In conceiving this Idea Reason refers to something beyond the conditioned world of sense. As shown in the Critique of Pure Reason, the psychological, the cosmological and the theological Ideas are conceived in this way. They all refer to objects which lie beyond the world of sense. The finite mind must regulate its enquiry into nature according to these Ideas, <sup>and for this purpose they</sup> ~~They~~ are necessary ~~regulative principles~~. But they determine no object, <sup>for</sup> the finite mind is incapable of determining objects by means of mere thought. The fact that it must necessarily think Ideas does not guarantee the reality of the objects to which they refer.

In our section Kant illustrates his argument by examples. He says of them that they possess such an importance and at the same time are so full of difficulty, that they cannot be here imposed upon the reader as propositions that have been proved. And yet they may give him food for reflection and may help to elucidate the problem with which <sup>he is</sup> ~~we are~~ at present concerned.

It is strange that Kant should speak here of examples at all. For he is actually discussing the problem as to how the specific character of finite human knowledge expresses itself in the different spheres with which human Reason is

concerned . His argument is put forward from a very general point of view, and he does not really illustrate his doctrine by concrete examples at all. He shews how the general principle of human knowledge manifests itself in the different attitudes which the mind takes towards its objects. In the first place he describes the nature of our theoretical knowledge and argues as follows.

(1)  
Human understanding/ must necessarily distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things. But the reason for this does not lie in the objects but in the subject and its faculties of cognition. Unless we required for the exercise of ~~such~~ knowledge two heterogeneous factors, (understanding for concepts and sensuous intuition for objects which correspond to them), there would not be any distinction between the possible and the actual.

An intuitive understanding would have no objects except such as are actual. Concepts which are merely directed to the possibility of an object, and sensuous intuitions which give us something and yet do not thereby give us knowledge, would cease to exist.

"The whole distinction which we draw between the merely possible and the actual rests upon the fact that possibility signifies positing of the representation of a thing relatively

(1) It would have been clearer if Kant had said that human beings, owing to the nature of their understanding, had to distinguish between possibility and actuality, for it is certainly not the understanding itself which observes this peculiarity of ~~the understanding itself which observes this peculiarity of~~ its own nature. If this is to be attributed to any special faculty of the human mind at all it must be attributed to Reason, as Kant actually does in the next paragraph. "The propositions that things can be possible without being actual and that consequently it is impossible to infer from mere ~~actual~~ possibility to actuality are quite valid for human Reason but this does not prove that this distinction is to be found in the things themselves!"

"to our concept, and, in general, to our capacity of thinking, whereas actuality signifies the positing of the thing in its immediate self-existence apart from this concept, (die Setzung des Dinges an sich selbst ausser diesem Begriffe). Accordingly the distinction of possible from actual things is one that is merely valid subjectively for human understanding" (C.of J., 402).

I do not think it is really difficult to understand Kant here. According to his philosophy the a priori concepts of ~~them~~ understanding (i.e. the categories) are universal rules. In what does the objective reality of the categories consist? In nothing else than in their being the universal conditions of our experience of objects. What can our understanding teach us about the nature of reality? Nothing more than that every object of experience must conform to the categories. No object can be independent of them since in that case it would not be an object at all. In other words, understanding can specify the conditions in which alone objects are possible. An object which did not conform to them would not be an object of possible experience. <sup>(1)</sup> /

The content of experience, on the other hand, is not produced by the understanding. It is given to us by intuition, which supplies the material for the understanding. Although we should be incapable of having knowledge of it without the understanding, which enables us to unite our representations in one consciousness, the material itself is quite independent of the understanding. The understanding is the source of the forms of thought, but that which we think about is independent of it; we become aware of an object as actual by determining intuitions in accordance with categories. The categories by themselves do not present us with any actual object. Being unable to determine an object by mere thought, all we can say of an object that does not contradict the laws of thought is that it is a possible object. (11).

This holds for all objects which we think by means of the

(i). It must be remembered that the possible object must conform not only to the categories but also to other concepts.

(ii). Kant is here neglecting the distinction between logical and real possibility. This is unfortunate since, had he taken it into account, he would have made this point much clearer. What the distinction is is explained by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason ~~(B 265 ff: The Postulates of Empirical Thought)~~  
B 265 ff: The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General.) An object is logically possible if its concept is not self-contradictory. For real possibility something more is required. It must agree not only with the forms of thought, but also with the forms of intuition. (c.f. B 268; see also B xxvi n:). Kant's definition of real possibility runs as follows: "That which agrees with the formal conditions of appearance (as regards intuitions and concepts) is possible" (C of P.R. B 265).

We see how different ~~our~~ knowledge is from that which a purely rational being would possess. What agrees with the forms <sup>our</sup> of/thought is not even really possible, let alone actual, whereas for an intuitive understanding the distinction between the possible and the actual would not exist at all, and every content of its thought ~~was~~ would at once be an actual object.

concepts of Pure Reason, the Ideas. They are all possible objects. The Idea of God, for instance, is a possible object in so far as it is in conformity with the laws of thought. We are however quite incapable of proving that God actually exists. For to be <sup>able</sup> ~~enabled~~ to do so we should have to demonstrate our concept in intuition which is quite impossible. For in the very concept of God it is implied that He belongs to the intelligible world, i.e. <sup>to</sup> a world beyond the world of sense. Since all our intuitions refer to the world of sense the actual existence of God the objective reality of our Idea of Him cannot be proved. <sup>That we must think certain objects</sup> ~~Even the fact that we must necessarily think the Idea of God it does not follow that He exists.~~  
~~Necessity of thought does not imply necessity of existence.~~

It is due to the nature of our understanding that we must distinguish between possibility and actuality. <sup>When</sup> ~~What~~ we say of a thing that it is possible, we refer our representation of it to our concept of it and to our faculty of thought in general. <sup>When</sup> ~~we~~ we say of it that it is actual, we assert that it <sup>is</sup> also given <sup>to</sup> us <sup>in</sup> intuition. This distinction obviously applies only to a knowledge like our own which contains the heterogeneous elements of intuition and understanding.)

(If we imagine the existence of a different kind of knowledge <sup>the distinction</sup> ~~it~~ disappears. Let us assume the existence of a being whose understanding would produce not merely forms of thought but at the same time the material to which these forms apply. To such a being is being possessed of what we might call an intuitive understanding, the distinction between the possible and the actual would not apply. Whatever it thought would exist, whatever it considered possible would be actual. The distinction between the possible and the actual which we must

make "arises from the fact that even if something does not exist, we may yet always give it a place in our thoughts, or if there is something of which we have no conception we may nevertheless imagine it given." (C.of J., 402)

Kant continues as follows. "To say, therefore, that things may be possible without being actual, that from mere possibility, therefore, no conclusion whatever as to actuality can be drawn, is to state propositions that hold true for human Reason, without such validity proving that this distinction lies in the things themselves." (C.of J., 402)

Here it is Kant's terminology which is difficult. ~~For what we should expect him to say is either that understanding draws the distinction between the possible and the actual or that the human mind being possessed of a specific kind of understanding must make such a distinction. We should certainly not expect that all of a sudden Kant should attribute the distinction to Reason.~~

~~As a matter of fact Kant does not actually do so.~~ <sup>as he</sup> The term "Reason" is used by him here in its vaguest sense. It denotes the human mind in general as sense in which ~~the term Reason~~ is often used by Kant especially in the Critique of Judgment.

~~But that Kant uses it here in this sense is very misleading.~~ <sup>The difficulty is that</sup> ~~in it.~~ For <sup>in the same paragraph he employs it in the stricter and more technical sense, and he</sup> He understands by Reason the faculty of the Principles, the faculty which makes us conceive the Idea of unconditioned necessity and which as such is fundamentally different from the understanding. <sup>(1)</sup> ~~This we shall see at once.~~ <sup>His argument may be paraphrased thus.</sup> ~~Kant says that~~ The distinction between possibility and actuality cannot be attributed to the things themselves and he holds that this follows from the fact that "Reason never withdraws its challenge to us to adopt something or other existing with unconditioned necessity - a root origin - in which there is no longer to be any difference between possibility and actuality." (C.of J., 402)

(1) See above

We see he understands here by Reason the special faculty of the mind which makes us conceive the Idea of the unconditioned, the Idea of a necessary being ~~the being to which the distinction between possibility and actuality no longer applies.~~

His <sup>point</sup> argument is that since even in the sphere of human thought there arises the Idea of a being to which this distinction does not apply it must be a distinction which does not affect the things themselves.

How can, Kant say that in Reason's Idea of an absolutely necessary <sup>being</sup> there is no longer any difference between possibility and actuality? I think this will be understood by anyone who has studied the first Critique. According to the doctrine of the first Critique the Idea of a necessary being is the Idea of a being whose very concept implies actual existence. This is why it is called a necessary being, a being distinct from all other beings which depend for their existence on it. It is the ultimate condition of the existence of all other beings. It is the only being which is necessary because it depends on nothing else as its condition. Its own concept guarantees its existence. It must necessarily be thought and consequently it necessarily exists.

Now, as we know, Kant holds that such an Idea, natural as it is to human Reason, does not ~~really~~ possess objective reality. The only concepts which possess objective reality are the <sup>because they are conditions of experience, and a</sup> concepts of the understanding. ~~the~~ concept of a necessary being, <sup>the</sup> a being to which the distinction between possibility and actuality <sup>would</sup> does not apply, <sup>concerned</sup> cannot be ~~thought~~ by the understanding, <sup>which</sup> ~~For the understanding cannot bridge the gulf be-~~

tween possible and actual existence. ~~Kant says in our sec-~~  
~~tion:~~ <sup>(1. he understands this)</sup> "It can discover no way of representing to itself any  
such thing or of forming any notion of its mode of existence.  
For if understanding thinks it - let it think it how it will -  
then the thing is represented merely as possible. If it is  
conscious of it as given in intuition, then it is actual, and  
no thought of any possibility enters into the case." (C.of J.,  
402). And he goes on to state that the concept of an absolutely  
necessary being, while an indispensable Idea of Reason, is for  
human understanding an unattainable problematic concept.

Now here there is a difficulty. For we must ask ourselves:  
Does Kant believe that an understanding different from our own,  
an intuitive understanding, would be capable of attaining to  
the Idea of a necessary Being? Such an interpretation of his  
argument seems necessary. For has <sup>he</sup> ~~Kant~~ not told us that the  
distinction between the possible and the actual does not affect  
the Idea of a necessary being? <sup>seems to</sup> and does it not follow from this  
that a superhuman understanding would be capable of <sup>attaining to</sup> ~~conceiving~~  
the Idea of ~~such a thing~~, <sup>an absolutely necessary being.</sup>

We need however, only consider our question a little more  
carefully to see that Kant cannot hold such a view. How, <sup>in his</sup> ~~does~~  
<sup>view does</sup> ~~according to Kant~~ the Idea of a necessary being arise in the  
human mind? It arises from the fact that the human understand-  
ing must distinguish between the possible and the actual. An  
object which conforms to the concepts of the understanding is  
called a possible object, and an object which is given in in-  
tuition is called an actual object. Our Reason in conceiving  
the Idea of a necessary being contrasts it with every other  
object. It is an object which must necessarily exist, whereas

all other objects exist merely accidentally. It is due to the nature of our understanding which cannot conceive the idea of necessary existence that our Reason comes to the conclusion that there must exist at least one necessary being.

<sup>Such</sup> Now an Idea of ~~this kind~~ <sup>however not</sup> would never enter the head of a being possessed of a different kind of understanding, an understanding which would be independent of intuition, <sup>and would</sup> ~~therefore~~ <sup>the</sup> not have to distinguish between the possible and actual ~~would think~~ <sup>thought</sup> would exist and the Idea of a necessary being would not arise. Just as the distinction between the possible and the actual belongs to the finite mind alone so does the concept which removes this distinction.

"An understanding into whose mode of cognition this distinction did not enter would express itself by saying: All objects that I know are, that is exist; and the possibility of some that did not exist, in other words, their contingency, superposing them to exist, and, therefore, the necessity that would be placed in contradistinction to this contingency, would never enter into the imagination of such a being." (C. of J.,

403)

The rest of the paragraph is simple. Kant explains that what makes it so hard for our understanding <sup>to cope with Reason</sup> is the fact that what Reason regards as constitutive of its object and adopts as its principle is transcendent for the human understanding. "In this state of affairs, then, this maxim always holds true, that once the knowledge of objects exceeds the capacity of understanding we must always conceive them according to the subjective conditions necessarily attaching to our human nature

in the exercise of its faculties. And if - as must needs be the case with transcendent conceptions - judgments passed in this manner cannot be constitutive principles determining the character of the object, we shall yet be left with regulative principles whose function is immanent and reliable, and which are adapted to the human point of view." (C. of J., 405).)

This does not require an explanation and we may now turn to the next paragraph in which Kant <sup>deals</sup> ~~concerns himself~~ with the problem of practical Reason. His argument runs as follows.

As in its theoretical study of nature Reason must assume the unconditioned necessity of the original ground (Urgrund) of nature, so in the practical field it must assume its own unconditioned causality viz, causality through freedom.

Practical Reason in becoming conscious of its own unconditioned word <sup>causality</sup> is entitled to make such an assumption. <sup>But</sup> ~~How~~ the objective necessity of a moral action expresses itself as duty <sup>and this</sup> ~~this~~ would not be the case if the ground of the moral action lay in nature itself and not in the supersensible causality of freedom. The same action which is morally "absolutely necessary" is physically contingent. Physical necessity does not follow from moral necessity. To put it more simply, "what ought necessarily to happen frequently does not happen". (C. of J., 405).)

From this we see that it is only owing to the subjective character of our practical faculty that moral laws must be represented <sup>by us</sup> as commands and the actions which are <sup>to be</sup> in conformity with them as duties and that Reason expresses moral necessity not by an "is" <sup>but by an</sup> ~~or happens (being in fact) but by an~~

"ought to be". If Reason and its causality were considered apart from ~~the~~ sensibility, i.e. ~~xxx~~ as free from their subjective conditions, (their application to objects in nature), the case would be different. In an intelligible world, a world which would be absolutely (durchgaengig) determined by the moral law, there would be no distinction between "ought to do" (Sollen) and "does" (Handeln), or "between a practical law as to what is possible through our agency and a theoretical as to what we make actual" (C.of J., 404).

And yet although the Idea of such a world, a world in which "everything is actual by reason of the simple fact that being something good it is possible," is for us a transcendent conception, it has its proper function.

For although being a transcendent conception it does not give us theoretical knowledge of objects, and although it is not a constitutive principle, it is a universally valid regulative principle. That it is no more is due to the fact that we are partly sensuous beings, and as far as we can make out from the constitution of our Reason, the same would hold for all beings that are in any way bound to the world of sense. As a merely regulative principle it cannot determine objectively the nature of freedom as a form of causality. And yet "it ~~converts~~ converts, and converts with no less validity than if it did so determine the nature of that freedom, the rule of actions according to that Idea into a command for everyone" (C.of J., 404).

It will have been noted that I have followed ~~Kant's~~ very ~~argument~~ closely Kant's argument, which seems to me perfectly intelligible. Most of what Kant says here has been explained by him before in the Critique of Practical Reason and I have dealt with it in the Introduction to the present book. A short recapitulation of the most important points will be sufficient.

We have seen that Kant holds that "duty" and obligation have meaning only for finite rational beings, i.e. beings which belong to two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible. A purely rational being, which according to its own nature would act morally, would never know of them, as all its actions would be wholly determined by the supersensible causality of freedom.

We have also seen why Kant believes that theoretical knowledge of freedom or its determination as an object of thought is denied to human Reason, and that so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned freedom is a transcendent concept.

There is, however, one point to which I should like to draw attention. I do not think there is any other passage in the whole of Kant where he emphasises "the subjective character of our practical faculty" as much as he does here. Nor is there, as far as I am aware, any other passage in which he actually ~~xxxxxxx~~ calls the moral principle a "regulative" principle.

This might suggest that Kant attributed to theoretical and practical Ideas the same degree of subjectivity. But this is not really so. There is according to him a fundamental difference between them. Theoretical Reason ~~xx~~ is concerned with knowledge of objects. Therefore that fact that ~~x~~ its concepts do not give us this knowledge must be held to be a disadvantage. In the sphere of practical action, on the other hand, our Reason aims at nothing but to discover a rule for the determination of actions. If such a rule, such a regulative principle, is found, this is perfectly satisfactory. The question, therefore, whether moral freedom exists as a supersensible object is of no interest to practical Reason. It seeks to find

a rule of actions, and this it finds in the Idea of practical freedom.

This is indicated by Kant himself in the 1st sentence of our paragraph in which he says that although the regulative practical principle "does not objectively determine the nature of freedom as a form of causality: it converts, and converts with no less validity than if it did so determine the nature of that freedom, the rule of actions according to that Idea into a command for everyone." (C.of J., 404).

In the last paragraph of our section Kant states that it is due to the nature of our understanding that we must distinguish between <sup>have</sup> ~~the one~~ mechanism and the technique of nature, i.e., the final nexus (Zweckverknuepfung). <sup>A,</sup> Since our understanding <sup>has to</sup> must move from the universal to the particular the faculty of Judgment must employ a special principle if it is to find purposiveness in the particular, <sup>for</sup> Now the particular contains by its very nature something contingent in respect of the universal. <sup>Some kind of</sup> Yet Reason demands that there should ~~also~~ be <sup>unity</sup> in the synthesis of the particular laws some kind of conformity to law. This ~~and~~ <sup>conformity to laws</sup> cannot be determined by the universal laws of the understanding, <sup>and as</sup> so far as the understanding is concerned the unity of particular <sup>laws</sup> is contingent. ~~The understanding cannot see any reason why it should exist.~~ The conformity to law on the part of the contingent is termed purposiveness. It follows that the concept of a purposiveness of nature, while it does not determine objects as such, "it" is a subjective principle of Reason for the use of Judgment, and one which, taken as regulative and not as constitutive, is as necessarily valid for our human Judgment as if it were an objective principle." (C.of J., 404).

Anyone who has read the Introduction will understand most of what is said here. We remind ourselves of the main points of the argument set forth in it. (a) Our understanding being concerned with the universal laws of nature alone cannot guarantee the unity of nature according to particular laws. (b) The human mind must demand this unity. It conceives the Idea of a systematic unity of nature. (c) The faculty which enables the human mind to regard nature from such a point of view is the faculty of reflective judgment. It is called reflective as distinct from determinant judgment because its principle is subjective <sup>or</sup> ~~regulative~~ and not objective <sup>or</sup> ~~constitutive~~. (d) The Idea on which the principle of reflective judgment is based is the Idea of a technique of nature, the Idea of a nature which does not proceed merely mechanically but ~~also~~ artistically. (e) Since such a technique of nature is contingent so far as the understanding is concerned the faculty of judgment in finding nature to conform to its own law ascribes to nature purposiveness. (f) Purposiveness is the conformity <sup>to</sup> of law of the contingent as such (*Zweckmaessigkeit ist die Gesetzmassigkeit des Zufaellichen <sup>als</sup> eines Solchen*).

We may now turn to Section 77 in which Kant will tell us more about his doctrine that it is only the human mind which can conceive the Idea of a purpose of nature and that it is the peculiar nature of our understanding which makes it necessary for us to form such a conception.

#### Section 77.

In this section <sup>which is</sup> perhaps the most interesting in the whole of the Critique of Judgment Kant sets forth his theory of the

All this is wazy. Kant has told us often enough that all our teleological judgments are merely reflective judgments and must as such be distinguished from determinant judgment, i.e. judgments which can determine things objectively. The principle employed by them is not a constitutive principle but a regulative principle. We must assume the idea of a purposeiveness of nature. We must in reflecting upon certain things in nature take as the basis of our reflection the Idea of a purpose of nature. Although the concept assumed is not an objective concept, although it is a mere Idea, the human mind cannot dispense with it, According to the subjective conditions of human knowledge we must judge certain objects teleologically.

But why is this so? What is the peculiarity of the human mind which makes its employment necessary? The answer, given by Kant in our section, is that it is due to the peculiar nature of our understanding as distinct from other possible understandings. Or, to put it more definitely, it is the attitude taken by our understanding towards the faculty of Judgment which makes it necessary for the latter to assume a special principle, the principle of teleological reflection.

Kant will explain to us later in the section why he believes that our human understanding is of a special kind. Before ~~giving~~ giving his reason for this belief, he points out that if we speak of peculiarities of our understanding, or of a specific attitude of our understanding towards the faculty of Judgment, we must have in mind a different kind of understanding, just as in the Critique of Pure Reason human intuition was contrasted with another possible sort of intuition, namely intellectual intuition. Only if

intuitive understanding. It is very difficult to understand his argument in detail, but I think no one who has followed him through the three Critiques will find it insuperably difficult to grasp his main idea.

Kant begins by pointing out one difficulty regarding the concept of a purpose of nature. It is clear, he argues, that this concept cannot be determined objectively. The predicate of a judgment which declares a thing to be a purpose of nature refers to the supersensible, and it is clear that the concept of a purpose of nature is a mere Idea. And yet, since the product of nature which is referred to it is given in nature, it seems as if it were a constitutive principle and in this respect different from all the other Ideas.

The whole difference lies however in nothing else than this - that the idea in question is a principle of Reason not for the understanding but for the faculty of Judgment, "and is consequently a principle solely for the application of an understanding in the abstract to possible objects of experience" (C. of J., 405).

It is quite true that the Idea of a purpose of nature is used by us only that we may understand certain objects. And yet the judgment which makes us call things purposes of nature is a merely reflective and not a determinative judgment. No object can be determined by us according to the Idea of a purpose. All that we can do is to make ~~xxxx~~ use of the concepts in reflecting upon the object. "Consequently, while the object may certainly be given in experience, it cannot even be judged definitely - to say nothing of being ~~xxxx~~ judged with complete adequacy - in accordance with the Idea, but can only be made an object of reflection" (C. of J., 405).

the idea of another understanding is assumed does it make sense to say "certain natural products must, from the particular constitution of our understanding, be considered by us - if we are to conceive the possibility of their production - as having been produced designedly and as purposes." (C.of J., 405).

In this assertion it is implied that we do not deny that another (superhuman) understanding might judge differently. We contrast our understanding with a different kind of understanding which would find the real grounds of things in the mechanism of nature and which would not find it necessary to judge certain objects according to a special principle. Such an understanding would not derive any object from an intelligent cause. It would not employ two heterogeneous principles of causal explanation, the mechanical and teleological principles, as we must do owing to the special nature of our understanding.

"What is relevant here is the attitude of our understanding towards Judgment; for in this relation we discover a certain contingency in the constitution of our understanding to which we may point as a peculiarity of our understanding as distinct from other possible understandings." (C.of J., 406).

What this peculiarity is, Kant explains in the next paragraph. It is the fact that the particulars which have to be sub-

sumed <sup>to find</sup> It may seem surprising that Kant <sup>maintaining here that the</sup> says here: "Through the ~~particular is not determined through the universal concepts of our~~ universal of our (the human) understanding the particular is not ~~determined~~ seeing that according to his doctrine it is the very universal of our (the human) understanding the particular is not ~~determined~~ seeing that according to his doctrine it is the very function of the universal concepts of the understanding to determine particular intuitions. What he means may be stated thus. What is common to all a priori concepts of our understanding is that they impose universal characteristics upon a given manifold of particulars and in this sense they may be said to determine

those particulars. But there is one thing the concepts of our understanding cannot achieve. They cannot determine particulars qua particulars. By means of the categories we can determine a priori what universal characteristics every object of experience will have. But the categories cannot teach us anything as to the special characteristics of the objects of experience. To take an example, we know prior to actual experience that all natural objects must be causally connected. But we do not know what the particular causal connections will be or how they will be related to one another. This must be regarded as a deficiency on the part of our understanding and is, as Kant, <sup>has</sup> explained at great length in the Introduction the reason why the faculty of Judgment must devise a special principle according to <sup>which</sup> ~~what~~ we assume that appearances even so far as their special characteristics are concerned, are subject to a principle of order. The faculty of Judgment and its subjective principle of reflexion makes us assume that particular laws of nature and particular natural objects are in some way related to one another. The human mind cannot allow that nature should be a chaotic aggregate of unrelated particular laws and particular forms and therefore it has to adopt a special principle which makes it regard nature as a system according to particular laws. This principle however is not an objective and determining principle of the understanding. It is a subjective principle of reflective Judgment. That nature should be such a system is contingent so far as our objective knowledge, i.e. knowledge obtained by our understanding, is concerned. Our understanding is a discursive understanding whose concepts cannot determine the special characteristics of objects. The case of an intuitive understanding as Kant will explain at once would be different. In the knowledge obtained by such an understanding the agreement of Nature's particular laws with the understanding would not be contingent.

But before dealing with Kant's doctrine of the intuitive understanding I wish to state that what he says here about the peculiar nature of our discursive understanding seems to be in perfect harmony with the argument of the Introduction, which I have tried to state. This may be seen from the following passage. "This contingency is found quite naturally in the particular which the faculty of Judgment is to bring under the universal of the concepts of the understanding for by the universal of our (the human) understanding the particular is not determined and it is contingent to what extent things which agree in one common characteristic and are presented to our perception will be different. Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, i.e., a discursive understanding for which it must indeed be entirely accidental of what kind and to what extent different may be the particular, that can be given to it in nature and brought under its concepts." (C. of J., 406.).

If we ask ourselves why our understanding is incapable of determining the particulars which are to be subsumed under its concepts the answer is comparatively simple. Our understanding is a faculty of thought. It is productive in so far as it actually produces universal concepts which are necessary conditions of experience. But, <sup>as has been</sup> as shown in the Critique of Pure Reason, concepts by themselves can give us no knowledge. In order to have knowledge we must refer the a priori concepts of the understanding to given intuition and it is in this way that we become acquainted with the particular laws of nature. Our understanding cannot give us any a priori knowledge as to what the particular laws of nature will be or what will be their relation to one another simply because those laws must be given in intuition.

Now let us assume that there existed a different sort of knowledge, a knowledge in which intuition and understanding would not be different elements and which therefore would not have to

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distinguish between given particulars on the one hand and  
universals which are determined by the mind. It is clear that  
such knowledge would be fundamentally different from our own.  
The one elements in our knowledge, viz., the understanding, may be  
said to possess a faculty of spontaneity in so far as it produces  
the universal laws of nature. But the other element in it, viz.,  
intuition is passive and receptive. A faculty of knowledge on  
the other hand which <sup>would</sup> be purely active, which as Kant puts  
it here, would be a faculty of complete spontaneity of intuition,  
a faculty distinct from sensibility and completely independent  
of it, in other words an intuitive not a discursive understanding  
<sup>would</sup> not be beset by the same difficulties as our understanding  
experiences. That nature in its particular laws should be in  
accordance with such an understanding would not be a matter of  
chance. It would be necessary.

That the particular laws of nature should be capable of  
being subsumed under the concepts of our understanding is some-  
thing very surprising and we <sup>can never be certain</sup> cannot know objectively that we  
shall succeed in relating the particular laws of nature to one  
another in order to subsume them under its universal laws and  
thus bring about <sup>the</sup> systematic unity of knowledge. The case of an  
intuitive understanding would be quite different. In its know-  
ledge "the contingency of the accordance of nature in its products  
according to particular laws with the understanding would not be  
met with."

This seems to me easy. The reason why the accordance of  
Nature's particular laws with its universal laws would not have  
to be regarded as contingent by an intuitive understanding is  
that in its knowledge the particular laws <sup>would</sup> follow immediately from  
the universal <sup>and would be</sup> ~~laws~~ determined by them. That all this is  
essentially different in the case of our discursive understanding  
is expressed by Kant once more in the next sentence, which I wish  
to quote.

"Our understanding has in relation to the faculty of Judgment this peculiarity that in its cognition the particular is not determined by the universal and cannot therefore be derived from it alone. Yet in the multiplicity of nature this particular has through the medium of concepts and laws to accord with the universal. This accordance under such circumstances must be very contingent and the faculty of Judgment is left without a determinate principle to guide it." (C. of J. 406, 407)

To explain to ourselves at least the possibility of such an accordance of natural objects with our faculty of Judgment, a thing impossible for us unless we refer to a purpose on the part of nature, we must think of another understanding. This would be an understanding for which the unity of nature in accordance with particular laws would not be contingent. It would understand its necessity and <sup>need</sup> therefore not need to have recourse to a special principle in order to explain it. The conception of a <sup>purpose</sup> ~~perspicacy~~ of nature is a product of the human mind and owes its origin to deficiencies in our faculties of cognition. This follows from the fact that we ascribe purposiveness to nature only because we cannot understand how the unity of nature in its particular laws and ~~forms~~ is brought about. The idea of a purposiveness of nature would not occur to a superhuman being, ~~a being~~ possessed of an intuitive understanding.

This point will be made clearer by Kant later in the present section, but in the first place he tells us more about the peculiar nature of the human understanding. His argument may be stated thus. It is a property of our understanding that for cognition it must proceed from the analytic universal, that is to say from concepts to the particular, the given empirical intuition. In this process it determines nothing as regards the manifoldness of the intuition but must leave this determination to the faculty of Judgment which subsumes the empirical intuition under the  
(1)  
concept.

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(1) In the case of a natural product the intuition is empirical intuition in the case of a geometrical figure it would be pure intuition.

It is only Kant's terminology which makes it difficult to understand him here, as it may be asked, How can Kant call the concepts of the understanding including the categories analytic universals? Are not according to his doctrine all concepts rules of systems?

It has to be observed that the term 'analytic' has here a special sense, a sense which not infrequently occurs in Kant and which has to be determined precisely if confusion is to be avoided. All concepts of the understanding, whether empirical or <sup>are analytic universals</sup> ~~apriori~~ in so far as they determine the common characteristics of things and not their special characteristics, ~~are analytic universals~~. To gain knowledge of the special characteristics of a thing it must be given to us in experience. The special properties of an individual thing cannot be derived from its concepts. ~~In other words~~ As we should express it nowadays, a concept is an abstract and not a concrete universal. To take an example, the empirical concepts of a dog cannot explain to us the special characteristics of an individual dog. It can tell us nothing whatever about the particular nature of this individual dog. All it can predicate of it are properties which it has in common with other members of the same class. ~~If~~ The concept of a dog is an abstract universal. Now in the case of an empirical concept it is easy enough to see why this must be so since the concept has been abstracted from individual instances and in <sup>forming</sup> ~~proving~~ it we have purposely neglected all special characteristics of the individual members of the concept-class. As regards the categories it is true that they are not due to abstraction and yet they are even more abstract than empirical concepts. For they can give us no indication whatsoever as to what the particular characteristics of our objects will be. All <sup>that</sup> they can determine prior to actual experience is what will be common to all objects of this experience. Categories may thus be called analytic

universals in spite of the fact that it is their very function to synthetize given perceptions and that without this synthesis objective experience would be impossible.

Of the fundamental problem with which the "Critique of Judgment" is concerned it may be said that it arises from observation of the fact that the concepts of our understanding are analytic universals, i.e. <sup>we</sup> remind ourselves that in the Introduction to the Critique Kant has told us that the reason <sup>why</sup> ~~that~~ the faculty of Judgment has to devise its special subjective principle of reflexion which makes us presuppose that nature is a system according to particular laws is that the a priori concepts of the understanding cannot guarantee the existence of such a system. Since they can only tell us what will be the common characteristics of all empirical objects and thus the possibility cannot be excluded that nature may be a chaotic aggregate of unrelated particular laws and particular things, <sup>Hence</sup> our faculty of Judgment must assume its principle according to which nature is regarded as a system.

I may here quote a passage from the first Introduction in which this point is made particularly clear. It is of ~~a~~ special interest for our present purpose as the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" are used in it in the same sense as in Section 77 and also in the more usual sense. "The possibility of an experience in general is the possibility of empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments. It follows that it cannot be analytically abstracted from perceptions which are merely compared with one another as it is commonly believed. For the combination of two different perceptions in the concept of an object for the sake of cognition of this object is a synthesis. This synthesis cannot make possible an empirical cognition, i.e. experience in any other way than that it proceeds in accordance with principles (Prinzipien) of the synthetic unity of appearances, i.e. principles (Grundsätzen) where-

by they are brought under categories. These empirical cognitions constitute according to what they have necessarily in common, that is to say those transcendental laws of nature <sup>are</sup> analytic unity of all experience. They do not constitute that synthetic unity of experience as a system which combined under one principle the empirical laws even according to what is different in them and where their manifoldness may be infinitely great. The function of the category in respect of every special (besonderer) experience is analogous to (the conception) of the purposiveness or adaptability of nature relative to our power of Judgment even in respect of its particular laws <sup>a</sup> or conception by which nature is represented not as merely mechanical but also as technical. It has to be noted however that this conception, unlike the category does not determine the synthetic unity objectively although it provides us with a subjective principle which may guide our enquiry into nature." (C. of J., 186 ~~Black~~; 17, ~~Lehr-~~

Lehrmann 186

For

In the explanation of the special difficulties of this passage I must refer to my previous discussion. But it is interesting enough to note here that Kant's argument in Section 77 and even his terminology agrees perfectly with what has been said by him in the Introduction. (1)

From what has been said it will have become sufficiently clear what Kant understands by an "analytic universal". He goes on to state that it is possible to imagine (sich denken) an understanding which because it is not <sup>like ours</sup> like our discursive <sup>^</sup> but intuitive world would proceed from the synthetic universal to the particular or the intuitional <sup>of the whole</sup> as such to the particular, that is to say from the whole to the parts. "Such an understanding and its representation of the whole does not

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(1) That the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" are used in the sense indicated already in the Critique of Pure Reason may be seen from B 133/4; see e.g. B. 133, 134. "The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts as such (haengt allen gemeinsamen Begriffen als solchem an).

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contain the contingency of the combination of the parts in order that a definite form of the whole may be possible, which our ~~understanding~~ requires as it must proceed from the parts as ~~universally determined~~ grounds to different possible forms to be subsumed under them as consequences. According to the constitution our understanding a real whole in ~~that one~~ <sup>nature</sup> is to be regarded as nothing but as effect of the concurrent motive powers of the parts." (G. of J., 407).)

This is not merely as difficult as it ~~seems~~ <sup>may seem</sup>. Kant has explained to us in the Introduction that owing to the nature of our understanding there are two things in nature which we cannot understand ~~in that manner~~ <sup>without</sup> a special principle, namely (a) that nature should be a system according to particular laws and (b) that there should be <sup>objects</sup> ~~objects to nature~~ <sup>in which</sup> the whole of ~~which~~ is the condition of their parts and whose parts stand in an inner necessary connection with one another. The only principles of which our understanding knows are the mechanical principles according to which a whole is regarded as a mere aggregate of its parts and therefore the faculty of Judgment must employ a special principle for the explanation of those natural objects which must be regarded as systems, that is to say, whose parts are not merely externally related to one another. Just as to explain to ourselves the possibility of nature as a system according to particular laws we had to assume a special principle, the principle of a purposiveness or technique of nature, so to explain to ourselves the existence of organisms we have to regard them as purposes of nature, that is to say as things which are not merely mechanically produced.

From this we may draw a very interesting conclusion. It is only the human mind which according to the specific nature of its understanding must employ a special principle if it is to represent <sup>to</sup> itself the parts of a whole as both in their constitution

(Beschaffenheit) and combination (Verbindung) dependent upon the whole . An intuitive understanding which according to its nature would proceed not from concepts to intuitions but from the intuition of a whole as whole to the parts would not find it necessary to apply such a special principle since it would not have to regard any such relation of parts and whole as contingent and ~~it would understand its necessity.~~"

What is this special principle which must be employed by the human mind? It is the teleological principle, which derives natural products from the Idea of their purpose. According to the nature of our understanding we cannot regard a whole as the real ground of the possibility of its parts, as this would be self-contradictory in discursive knowledge (disursive Erkenntnisart). We must derive the possibility of such a connection from an ideal ground.

We cannot but believe that the Idea of the whole, its representation in the mind of an intelligent being, is the ground of our object. In other words we must derive the object from a purpose. "But, now, the whole world would in that case be an effect of product, the representation of which is looked on as the cause of its possibility. But the product of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of its effect is termed a purpose. Hence it follows that it is simply a consequence flowing from the particular character of our understanding that we should figure to our minds the products of nature as possible according to a different type of causality from that of the physical laws of matter, that is, as possible only according to purposes and final causes". (C. of J., 408).

It is interesting to observe how here Kant refutes the fundamental argument of dogmatic teleology. Dogmatic philosophers have believed at all times that the existence of organisms, i.e. such natural products as cannot be explained on mechanical principles, proves objectively the existence of a supernatural cause of nature which produces things to make them serve certain purposes.

But Kant shews here not only that this argument is invalid, but also that it is only owing to the subjective conditions of our knowledge that we make use of the teleological principle.~~xxxx~~ Higher beings, possessed of an intuitive understanding, would not have to apply the teleological principle at all. It is by no means ~~impossible~~ to believe that the real explanation of all natural products is to be met with in the ~~inxx~~ material world and that a superhuman understanding might be able to find it there, and it is quite impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that all intelligent beings would find it impossible to form a representation of the unity present in organisms without making the Idea of this unity its producing cause, that is without regarding them as produced by an intelligent being.

Here there is a difficulty as some of Kant's statements suggest that he believes that a superhuman understanding would be able to explain organisms on the mechanical principle as it is used by us. This however is not and cannot be his real opinion. According to him, mechanical explanation, as it is ~~used~~ used by us, is a principle employed by the human mind which does not determine things as they are in themselves.

I think that what he means is this. When we call a thing a purpose of nature we derive it from an external cause, from an Idea which we suppose has been present in the mind of an intelligent being who produced it, a being who is independent of the material world and who fashions material parts according to Ideas in his mind.

But do we in this way really explain the existence of an organism? Is the application of the teleological principle not a confession of our own ignorance? In deriving an organism from a supernatural cause we treat it as if it were a product of human art. As a matter of fact, however, it is infinitely superior to the products of human art; for its parts are not merely externally connected with each other like the parts of an object which we can make.

Kant has already explained the fundamental distinction between human art and the art which nature displays in organisms (Section 61). We may remind ourselves of the main points of his argument. In a machine, a product of human art, every part is regarded as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole. In an organism the parts not only exist for the sake of one another, but also produce one another. An organism organises itself and possesses not merely moving (*bewegende*) but also formative (*bildende*) force. In other words it is alive, and therefore "we do not say half enough of nature and her capacity in organised products when we speak of this capacity as being the analogue of art. For what is here present to our minds is an artist - a rational being - working from without. But nature, on the contrary, organises itself and does so in each species of its organised products - following a single pattern, certainly as to general features, but nevertheless admitting deviations calculated to secure self-preservation under particular circumstances. We might perhaps come nearer to the description of this

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impenetrable property if we were to call it an analogue of life." (C.of J., 374).

What an intuitive understanding could achieve is to penetrate this property of nature which is impenetrable to us. It could understand how matter can live, and it could do so by finding the causes of life in the material world itself without having to appeal to an external cause. The reason why the human mind in explaining certain products of nature has to resort to teleological explanations is that owing to the limited nature of its understanding it cannot really understand these products. It is because of our own ignorance that we have to employ a merely reflective principle, i.e., a principle which explains objects only in relation to our own minds and does not give a sufficient explanation of them even as mere phenomena. "In the same way we explain the fact that this principle does not touch the question of how such things themselves, even considered as phenomena, are possible on this mode of production, but only concern the estimate of them possible to our understanding. On this view we see at the same time why it is that in natural science we are far from being satisfied with an explanation of natural products by means of a causality according to purposes. For in such an explanation all we ask for is an estimate of physical generation adapted to our critical faculty, or reflective Judgment, instead of one adapted to the things themselves on behalf of the determinant Judgment." (C.of J., 408).

This is now easy to understand, and so is the next sentence in which Kant declares that it is quite unnecessary to prove the existence of an intellectus archetypus. It is sufficient to show that we are led to the Idea of a different kind of understanding (intellectus archetypus) in becoming aware of the contingent constitution of our own. In becoming aware of this we call our own understanding an intellectus ectypus, an understanding which is in need of images (der Bilder bedürftiger Verstand) or a discursive

understanding, and we contrast it with an original understanding, an intellectus archetypus. It is sufficient if we can show that the Idea of such an intellectus archetypus does not involve a contradiction.

Kant goes on as follows. "Now where we consider a material whole and regard it as in point of form (seiner Form nach) a product resulting from the parts and their powers and capacities of self-integration (und ihrer Kräfte und Vermögen sich von selbst zu verbinden) (including as parts any foreign material introduced by the cooperative action of the original parts) what we represent to ourselves in this way is a mechanical generation of the whole. But from this view of the generation of a whole we can elicit no concept of a whole as purpose - a whole whose intrinsic possibility emphatically (durchaus) presuppose the Idea of a whole as that upon which the very nature and action of the parts depend. Yet this is the representation we must form of an organised body. But, as has just been shown, we are not to conclude from this that the mechanical generation of an organised body is impossible. For that would amount to saying that it is impossible, or, in other words, self-contradictory, for any understanding to form a representation of such a unity in the conjunction of the manifold without also making the Idea of this unity its producing cause, that is, without representing the production as designed." (C. of J., 408). After what has been said, this does not require an explanation.

The subsequent sentence I find very difficult ~~fully~~ to understand. Kant argues that it would follow that <sup>the</sup> mechanical production of organisms was impossible if we were entitled to regard material beings as things in themselves, since in that case the unity which constitutes the ground of the possibility of material formations (Naturbildungen) would be ~~simply~~ the unity of space. As it is however space is not the real ground of the generation of things. It is only their formal condition and yet it has <sup>his</sup> in common with the real ground of which we are in search, that in <sup>space</sup> it no part can be determined except in relation to the whole so that <sup>the representation of the whole is the condition of the representation of the parts.</sup> ~~to make possible the parts of space the whole of space must be represented.~~

The last part of this argument is not difficult. Space, being the formal condition of ~~the generation of things~~, is similar to the real ground in that the representation of the whole of space underlies the possibility of its parts (dessen Vorstellung <sup>als</sup> der Möglichkeit der Teile zum Grunde liegt). This is a doctrine with which every reader of the first Critique is familiar. Parts of space do not exist by themselves. They are limitations of the all-embracing space. As soon as it is realised that space is not a real thing, <sup>but</sup> ~~that it is~~ only a representation, it is easy to see why this <sup>must</sup> ~~might~~ be so. ~~Space as a whole is a mere form~~  
~~, a mere form of our representation.~~ The representation of the whole of space is original, the representation of parts is derivative, as we can represent to ourselves parts of space only by limiting our representation of the whole of it.

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See C.P.R. D. 28. <sup>29</sup> "In the first place we can represent to ourselves only one space, and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of the one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot proceed the one-all-embracing space, as being as it were constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary they can be thought only in it and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on (the introduction) of limitations."

What Kant tells us here about the properties of space regarded as a mere representation will, however, give us very little help for the understanding of his main argument, ~~as~~ <sup>the</sup> question which he is here discussing is: What would follow if space were ~~not a mere representation it were~~ not merely a formal condition of appearances but a real ground of things in themselves? His answer is that in that case we should be entitled to assert that ~~the~~ mechanical production of organisms was impossible. Why would this be so? Because in such a case the unity of natural products would be the unity of space, i.e. external unity. If space were real and the things in it things in themselves, then the parts of space would be conditions of the whole of space and the parts of a thing in it would be the conditions of the existence of the whole thing. In other words, <sup>the</sup> all production of things would be due to a mere assemblage of <sup>its</sup> ~~its~~ parts. A whole would be a mere result of the coming together of the parts. If a whole is to be <sup>the</sup> ~~conditioned~~ <sup>conditioned</sup> by the existence of its parts and if there is to be an inner connection of parts and whole present in an object <sup>which is</sup> ~~and this is~~ the very thing we observe in organisms, then the production of this object must be ascribed to a special principle. The real ground of the object cannot be met with in the material object. It must be attributed to an external agent who produced it intentionally.

It may be asked, however, why it should be impossible to ascribe to the material world regarded as a thing in itself both mechanical and teleological causality, why it should be self-contradictory to assert that certain things belonging to this world owed their origin to other than mechanical causes. To this question Kant does not give a definite answer, but I think it possible to guess what his argument would be, and I shall try to state it.

If we regard the material world as a thing in itself, and if we attribute real existence to space, we must believe that all material objects owe their existence to <sup>the mere</sup> ~~an assemblage~~ coming together of their parts, to a merely mechanical combination. Now there are certain material objects <sup>such as</sup> ~~(organisms)~~ which cannot be explained in this manner and which we must therefore derive from a special principle <sup>the</sup> ~~(teleological principle)~~ <sup>This</sup> which contradicts our first assertion that all material objects are produced mechanically.

There arises however a new difficulty. We have seen that Kant sets out to prove that <sup>we had no right</sup> ~~it was impossible~~ to assert that mechanical production of organisms was impossible. He has just shown us why this ~~is impossible~~, viz. because the material world is there appearance and not a thing in itself. It must be asked <sup>let</sup> however why he ~~had to~~ prove this at all. Does he believe that the mechanical causation is the real ground of every event in the material world and that in the last resort everything in the material world is determined by mechanical laws? I do not believe that this really is his opinion. He <sup>here</sup> ~~does~~ believe however, (a) that the teleological principle which must make an appeal to external causes for the explanation of material processes is a <sup>subtle line</sup> ~~principle which is applied by finite minds for the explanation~~ of phenomena which they cannot fully understand, and (b) that the <sup>principle</sup> ~~mechanical~~ since it necessarily applies to every phenomenal object, is superior to it. <sup>Kant</sup> He does not believe that mechanical causation as it is conceived by finite human minds is the real ground of material processes. This real ground of things must be sought in the supersensible of which we have no knowledge. To solve the antinomy between mechanical and teleological principles we have to assume that there is a higher <sup>different from both</sup> ~~principle~~ to be met with in the supersensible ~~which is different from both~~. This principle would contain the real grounds of phenomena. It would also explain <sup>we being</sup> ~~why~~ <sup>must</sup> ~~finite minds~~ in judging nature employ two different principles. ~~why~~ To understand nature as an object of

sence as determined by necessary universal laws, we have to  
judge it according to mechanical laws, <sup>and</sup> to explain to <sup>ourselves</sup> ~~them~~  
selves the unity of nature in accordance with particular laws  
and <sup>to</sup> make <sup>the</sup> specific nature of certain natural forms <sup>or</sup> (organisms)  
intelligible <sup>we</sup> they have to judge <sup>them</sup> it teleologically.

(continued on page 528).

"But then it is at least possible to regard the material world as mere phenomenon and to think something which is not a phenomenon namely a thing-in-itself as its substrate. And this we may rest upon a corresponding intuition (diesem aber eine correspondierende intellektuelle Anschauung unter 3<sup>er</sup> 2<sup>ter</sup> 3<sup>ter</sup>) albeit it is not the intuition we possess. In this way a supersensible <sup>ground</sup> ~~seat~~ although for us unknowable, would be procured for nature and for the nature of which we ourselves form a part. Everything therefore which is necessary in this nature as an object of sense we should estimate according to mechanical laws. But the accord and unity of the particular laws and of their resulting subordinate forms which we must deem contingent in respect of mechanical laws - these things which exist in nature as an object of Reason and indeed nature in its entirety as a system, we should consider in the light of the teleological laws. Thus we should estimate nature on two kinds of principles. The mechanical explanation would not be excluded by the teleological as if the two principles contradicted one another." (C.of J., 409).

*In the next section*  
Kant will tell us *more* about the relation of the mechanical <sup>and teleological</sup> principles ~~in the subsequent section~~ and he will make clearer why he believes that to make them compatible with one another we have to refer to the supersensible.

We may now turn to the last paragraph of Section 77, which <sup>like</sup> offers ~~no~~ difficulties.

2<sup>nd</sup>2<sup>nd</sup>

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The last paragraph of our section is very odd. Kant states that it has been shown ~~that otherwise we might easily have conjectured not have been able to persevere with~~. Certainly that while the <sup>mechanical</sup> principle is consistent <sup>with</sup> the teleological principle it can never supplant the latter; <sup>^</sup> We may apply all the laws of mechanical generation to the estimate of an organism and may even hope to make good progress in doing so. And yet we can never get rid of the appeal to a completely different source of generation <sup>√3, causality according to purposes,</sup> for the possibility of such a product of nature ~~(causality according to purposes)~~.

"It is utterly impossible for human Reason, or for any finite Reason qualitatively resembling ~~it~~ ours, however much it may surpass in degree, to hope to understand the generation even of a blade of grass from merely mechanical causes. For if Judgment finds the teleological; nexus of causes and effects quite indispensable for the possibility, of an object like this, be it only for the purpose of studying it under the guidance of experience, and if a ground involving relation to purposes and adequate for external objects, altogether eludes us, so that we are compelled although this ground <sup>lies</sup> ~~lives~~ in nature to look for it in the supersensible substrate of <sup>nature</sup> ~~reason~~, all possible insight into which is, however, cut off from us: it is impossible for us to obtain any explanation at the hand of nature itself to account for any synthesis displaying purposiveness (aus der Natur selbst <sup>Entstehende</sup> ~~hergenommene~~ <sup>in Schöpfung</sup> ~~Beibehaltung~~ <sup>entstehende</sup> ~~gruende fuer~~ Zweckverbindungen ~~an sich~~). So by the constitution of our human faculty of knowledge it becomes necessary to look for the supreme source of this <sup>purposiveness</sup> ~~finality~~ in an original understanding as the cause of the world." (C.ofJ., 409, 410.)

^ This is something which, he says, we might easily have conjectured but could never have proved.

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Having followed Kant's doctrine of the intuitive understanding in detail, we may feel there are many questions we should like to have answered. For instance, it would be quite natural to ask: Is an intuitive understanding, according to Kant, <sup>only</sup> a faculty that ~~only~~ knows things in a way different from our own or does it also produce its own objects? Further are there several intuitive understandings <sup>all?</sup> which ~~all~~ know the things in themselves?

(continued on page 531.)

531.  
or is an intuitive understanding a faculty which can be attributed to God alone?

To none of these questions does Kant give us any answer and I think he has very good reasons for not even raising them. We need only consider for a moment that in his view an intuitive understanding would be a faculty of knowledge completely independent of sensibility. Now, since time and space are forms, and as such belong to the finite mind alone and cannot be met with in the knowledge possessed by an infinite being, is there any sense in asking: Does an intuitive understanding know its objects in a way different from our own or does it also make them? Such a question would be meaningless, <sup>since</sup> as when we say of a thing that it was made we mean that there was a time when it did not exist, and that it was brought into being at some later time. The process of making cannot be understood by us in any other way than as a process taking place in time.

Further, can we have any conception of the objects of an infinite power of knowledge? Certainly not, for they would not be objects at all in the sense in which we speak of objects. They would not be merely given to the mind which knows them, for objects which are merely given could never be fully known. Even the question whether there would be several objects or only one would be meaningless as "oneness" and "plurality" are concepts which have meaning only for finite minds and are used by them for the knowledge of given external objects. And can we reasonably ask: Is there only one subject that knows things intuitively, or more than one, that is to say, is there only one or are there several intuitive understandings?

Of all these questions which we have raised, and we could have raised many more, Kant would have thought that they were meaningless. His purpose in putting forward his doctrine of the intuitive understanding is to make clear the nature of human

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knowledge. He never claims to have any insight into the nature <sup>pure</sup> of a knowledge fundamentally different from our own and he is <sup>of a knowledge fundamentally different from our own and he is</sup> convinced that no human being can have it. The purpose which the "Idea" of an intuitive understanding serves is not to give us knowledge of supersensible objects or to make us comprehend the nature of a superhuman faculty of knowledge. It is human knowledge which we are trying to understand and the Idea of an intuitive understanding serves a useful purpose when it makes us realise that what is characteristic of the human mind is that its understanding is discursive and that knowledge cannot be attained <sup>by it</sup> <sub>A</sub> by means of mere thinking. All human knowledge depends on the cooperation of understanding and intuition which are separate and irreducible elements in it.

This is the fundamental Critical doctrine. The Critique of Pure Reason has shown and the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment have confirmed the view that the human mind is a finite mind and that absolute knowledge is denied to it. We can have no knowledge of anything but the phenomenal world. And yet, as has also been shown, the Idea of something beyond the world of mere appearances is necessary and we must assume the existence of a supersensible world, for how could we speak of a sensible world which we can know unless we assumed the existence of a supersensible world which we cannot know?

To obtain a full understanding of the character of our phenomenal world we have to contrast it with a world of things in themselves, and to understand the nature of our finite knowledge which depends on understanding, and intuition we contrast it with an infinite power of knowledge which would know them by means of understanding alone or by means of intuition alone. But, just as little as we can have <sup>no</sup> a clear conception of the nature of things in themselves, i.e., objects independent of

the human mind, we can have it of an infinite knowledge, a knowledge which would be obtained by an intellectual intuition or an intuitive understanding.

Kant's doctrine of the intuitive understanding is not a dogmatic metaphysical ~~practice~~ <sup>doctrine</sup>. It is part of a critical investigation into the nature of human knowledge and it is put forward by him for the solution of a special problem regarding the nature of this knowledge. We are called upon to solve the problem: "How are we to explain <sup>the fact</sup> it that in its study of nature the human mind can and in fact must employ two totally different principles?"

Kant is convinced that ~~it is~~ only transcendental philosophy i.e. a philosophy which denies <sup>to</sup> for the human mind all knowledge of absolute reality and yet does not deny the existence of such a reality which can solve <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ problem.

By referring both the teleological and the mechanical principles to the unknown supersensible and thus realising that neither of them gives us knowledge of absolute reality, we can solve the antinomy between them. A dogmatic philosophy, i.e. a philosophy which would <sup>have to</sup> attribute to either the mechanical or the teleological principles absolute validity <sup>and</sup>. And thus regard them as principles applicable to things in themselves we would be unable to reconcile them with one another and would be incapable of explaining how the human mind can interpret natural objects in two totally different ways.

Kant will tell us more about the mechanical and teleological principles in the next section, the last section of the Critique of Judgment with which we shall deal.

Section 78.

At the beginning of this section Kant propounds the following argument. It is of the utmost importance to Reason to keep in view the mechanism of nature, for apart from the principle of mechanism no real insight into the nature of things can be obtained. If we say that a supreme architect has either directly created the forms of nature in the way they have existed from all time, or that he has predetermined those which in the course of nature continually conform to the same model, our knowledge of nature is not furthered in the slightest, since we can have no knowledge whatsoever of the manner in which such a supreme being would act, or of his Ideas which are supposed to contain the principles of the production of objects in nature. It is impossible to explain anything in nature by starting from the Idea of God and <sup>moving</sup> from above downwards, (und von demselben von oben herab die Natur nicht erklären können). It is equally impossible to take the opposite course and prove the existence of a supreme being from our empirical observation or purposes of nature, since in that case we should fall into a petitio principii. We should presuppose that ~~x~~ certain things in nature are purposes, which is the very thing we set out to prove. The existence of a cause acting in accordance with purposes cannot be proved either a priori or a posteriori.

Whether we pretend to prove it from ~~above~~ above downwards (von oben herab) or from below upwards (von unten hinauf), i.e., whether we start with the Idea of a supreme being and derive it from natural objects or infer the existence of a supreme Being from our experience of natural objects, we should be cheating Reason with mere words.

"- not to mention the fact that when with this sort of explanation we get lost in the transcendent sphere where our knowledge of nature cannot follow, Reason is tempted into poetical extravagance which it is its preeminent vocation to avoid, (die Vernunft dichterisch schwärmen verleitet wird, welches zu verhüten eben <sup>ihre</sup> vorzüglichste Bestimmung ist)!" (C.of J., 410).

The most important point here is that Kant expresses once more his conviction that the mechanical principles are the fundamental principles of natural science, the only principles which give us a real insight into natural phenomena. This is so because they remain within the sphere of mere nature and do not derive natural phenomena from supernatural causes of which the human mind can have no knowledge. Although in the Critique of Judgment he fully realises the importance and necessity of the teleological principle, this does not <sup>that</sup> make him give up his belief in the mechanical principle, a principle which recognises none but natural causes, is the basic principle of our enquiry into nature. As soon as the human mind loses sight of the natural causes of things, no insight into the nature of things can be attained. When we appeal for the explanation of phenomena to supernatural causes we get lost in a transcendent sphere where our knowledge of nature cannot follow.

(C.of J., 410).

~~idealistic~~ ~~empiricism~~ ~~Verstand~~ ~~and~~ ~~Kant~~ ~~which~~ ~~in~~ ~~his~~ ~~translation~~  
accepts this alteration of the text and translates: "Thus  
empiricism is devoid of the popularity of transcendently  
idealising Reason."

But there is no reason whatever why the text should be  
altered and I can do better than quote Coerland's explanation  
of the passage. He says on page 593 of his edition: <sup>(1)</sup> "The  
sentence means: the empiricism of transcendently idealising  
Reason is devoid of all popularity, which is characteristic of  
the dogmatism of transcendently idealising Reason. Tran-  
scendently idealising Reason is such as makes of the Ideas a  
positive (Dogmatism) or negative (Empiricism) transcendental  
use."

I think this is precisely what Kant means and when we now  
revert to our section we shall not be surprised that Kant tells  
us that just as it is of endless importance to Reason not to  
overlook mechanism, "it is an equally necessary maxim of Reason  
not to overlook the principle of purposes in the products of  
nature." (C. of J. 411).

It is of course not "transcendently idealising" Reason  
of which Kant is thinking here. For it is not asserted that  
either the mechanical or the teleological principle were absol-  
utely valid that they determined the things as they are in  
themselves. It is a Reason which has been made subject to  
critical examination. It assumes the teleological principle  
as a mere maxim and does not believe that it could by means which  
determine the things themselves. Kant goes on to explain that  
although the principle of the purposes in products of nature does  
not make the <sup>when we apply</sup> <sup>purposefulness to</sup> <sup>this</sup> ~~mode in which such products originate any more com-~~  
~~production of these things more intelligible~~

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(1) ~~Immanuel Kant's Works, ed. Ernst Cassirer;~~  
~~vol. III ed. Albert Coerland.~~

~~probable~~ <sup>to be possible</sup> ~~to us~~ it is yet a ~~heuristic~~ <sup>which leads</sup> principle ~~for the~~  
~~investigation~~ <sup>into</sup> the particular laws of nature. ~~And~~ <sup>But</sup> although  
 in applying it we confine ourselves strictly to the ~~term~~ <sup>purpose</sup> pur-  
 poses of nature and do not ~~intend to use it for anything but~~ <sup>employ</sup>  
 the explanation of natural phenomena, ~~although we do not pass~~ <sup>and thus</sup>  
 beyond the bounds of nature, we yet ~~must conceive as~~ <sup>perceive</sup> a special  
 kind of causality, a causality which is not to be found in  
 nature ~~a causality which~~ <sup>and</sup> is fundamentally different from materi-  
 al causality. "For the receptivity for different forms over  
 and above those which matter is capable of producing by virtue  
 of such mechanism must be supplemented by a spontaneity of some  
 cause - which cannot, therefore, be matter - as in its absence  
 no reason can be assigned for those forms." (G. of J.. 411)

It is important however that ~~Reason~~ <sup>we</sup> should be careful in  
 taking such a step and should not explain as teleological every  
 technique of nature. <sup>For instance we must not explain teleologically Nature's</sup>  
~~e.g. the formative capacity it shows in~~  
~~regularly constructed bodies which are purpose merely in re-~~  
~~lation to our apprehension.~~ <sup>capacity for reproducing things which shows merely formal purposiveness or</sup>  
<sup>are purposive only in relation to our apprehension</sup>

"But to go so far as to exclude the teleological principle,  
 and to want to keep always to mere mechanism, even where reason,  
 in its investigation into the manner in which natural forms are  
 rendered possible by their causes, finds a purposiveness of a  
 character whose relation to a different type of causality is  
 apparent beyond all denial, is equally unscientific. It in-  
 evitably sends Reason on a roving expedition among capacities  
 of nature that are only cobwebs of the brain and quite unthink-  
 able, (muss die Vernunft ebenso phantastisch und unter Natur-  
 vermögen, die sich gar nicht denken lassen herumschweifend  
 machen) in just the same way as a merely teleological mode of  
 explanation that pays no heed to the mechanism of nature makes  
 it visionary." (G. of J.. 411). (Schwärmerei) (G. of J., 412.)

(1) On this kind of purposiveness (formal and  
 objective purposiveness) see above, p.

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This will be easily understood by anyone who has read the preceding sections of the Dialectic of teleological Judgment, <sup>and the</sup> ~~the~~ same holds for the rest of our section and I shall therefore not concern myself with every detail of ~~Kant's judgment~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~argument~~.

<sup>He</sup> Kant goes on to say that ~~in relation to one and the same thing the two principles cannot be applied in conjunction~~ <sup>to one and the same thing</sup> a product of nature must be judged by us either according to the mechanical or according to the teleological principle. This point has been discussed previously in Section 66 where Kant has told us that those things which we must regard as <sup>organisms or</sup> purposes of nature (~~organisms~~) must be judged teleologically throughout. We cannot but assume that nothing in them is due to merely mechanical causes. "We have no reason for assuming the form of such a thing to be still partly dependent on blind mechanism, for with such confusion of heterogeneous principles every reliable rule for estimating things would disappear." (C. of J..

(1)  
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The human mind is absolutely incapable of uniting the mechanical and teleological modes of explanation. The principle which is to unite them must (and we must assume that they are ultimately united) <sup>must</sup> be placed in a sphere of which we have no knowledge viz. the supersensible. We must assume that there is a connection between them, for otherwise we should not have the right to employ for the explanation of phenomena two absolutely different principles.

"Now the principle common to the mechanical derivation, on the one hand, and the teleological, on the other, is the supersensible, which we must introduce as the basis of nature as

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phenomenon. But of this we are unable from theoretical point of view to form the slightest positive determinate conception (Begriffe). Now therefore in the light of the supersensible as principle, nature in its particular laws constitutes a system for us, and one capable of being cognized as possible both on the principle of production from physical causes and on that of <sup>final</sup> purposive causes, is a matter which does not admit of any explanation. All we can say is that if it happens that objects of nature present themselves, whose possibility is incapable of being conceived by us on the principle of mechanism - which has always a claim upon a natural being - unless we rely on teleological principles, it is then to be presumed that we may confidently study natural laws on lines following both principles - according as the possibility of the natural product is cognizable to our understandings from one or other principle - without being disturbed by the apparent conflict that arises between the principles upon which our estimate of the product is formed. For we are at least assured of the possibility of both being reconciled, even objectively, in a single principle, inasmuch as they deal with phenomena, and these presuppose a supersensible ground." (C.O.F.J., 412-415).

What is most important here is that we see that Kant <sup>now</sup> ~~believes~~ <sup>works if quite clear</sup> that what unites the two principles is neither the mechanical nor the teleological principle. Both principles are valid only in the explanation of phenomena and it is only because they are both subjective in a <sup>16.</sup> sense, because they are concerned only with the world of appearances, that they can be reconciled with each other.

~~In the preceding sections it often seemed as if Kant's~~

opinion was that teleological causality could be ultimately reduced to mechanical causality. But this is not so and as Kant will tell us later in our section the basis of the compatibility of the two principles lies in what is neither the one nor the other, neither mechanism nor final nexus (Zweckverknüpfung) the supersensible substrate of nature which is shut out from our view.

It is only because we <sup>may</sup> ~~can~~ assume the existence of a supersensible world, <sup>mechanism</sup> ~~that~~ we have to contrast phenomena <sup>with things</sup> ~~as~~ they are in themselves, that it can be made intelligible how we can make use of two principles which we find it impossible to unite. If the things as we know them were the things in themselves an insoluble antinomy between the two <sup>variables</sup> ~~modes of explanation~~ would arise. As it is, however, this antinomy is only apparent.

It is perfectly intelligible why the human mind according to the finite character of its knowledge can ~~acquire and~~ employ two different principles for the explanation of things. "In the room of what is regarded, by us at least, as only possible by design, mechanism cannot be assumed, and in the room of what is cognised as necessary in accordance with mechanism, such contingency as would require an purpose as its determining ground cannot be assumed." (C.of J., 414)

Owing to the finitude of human knowledge we can never be certain as to how <sup>much</sup> ~~mechanism can~~ contribute towards the production of ~~the~~ things and therefore it is our duty to explain material phenomena according to mechanical principles as <sup>far</sup> ~~much~~ as lies in our power. But it is equally certain that no matter what progress we may make with mechanical explanations we must judge certain objects teleologically. Mechanical explanation

will always remain inadequate for things that we recognise as purposes of nature. "Now this is the source of a privilege and, owing to the importance of the study of nature on the lines of the principle of mechanism for the theoretical employment of our Reason, the source also of a duty. We may and should explain all products and events of nature, even the most purposive, so far as in our power lies, on mechanical lines - and it is impossible for us to assign the limits of our powers when confined to the pursuit of inquiries of this kind. But in so doing we must never lose sight of the fact that among such products there are those which we cannot even subject to investigation except under the conception of a purpose of Reason (allein unter dem Begriffe von Zwecke der Vernunft). These, if we respect the essential nature of our Reason, we are obliged, despite those mechanical causes, to subordinate in the last resort to causality according to purposes." (C. of J., 415b)