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Contested Concepts and Practices in Security Governance:
Evolving security approaches in El Salvador

Kari Mariska Pries, BAH, MA

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Social and Political Sciences
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April 2017
Abstract

Hope accompanied El Salvador’s peace agreements, ending 12 years of civil war. New peace and democratic renewal were expected in the tiny Central American state. Instead, extreme violence has persisted as a lived experience for individuals and a part of its state operations. Successive governments proved unable to consolidate control over the post-war crime wave. ‘Tough on crime’ public policy agendas, which included hard-handed violence-repression tactics, had little success in mitigating insecurity. In 2009, a new ex-guerrilla party, the National Liberation Front ‘Farabundo Marti’ (FMLN), was elected on a hope and change platform. The party was committed to a new approach in security governance. This presented an opportunity to study the interactions of implicated actors as they negotiated the governance of security. It raises the question: *To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)?*

To address this question requires an understanding of situated security concepts and an examination of the spaces created for actor interactions to formulate the policy guiding security governance. Broadly, security is often considered to be a response to the issues threatening state, society, or the individual. In the Latin American context, this expansion largely took place within the concept of citizen security – a term which recognised both rights and responsibilities within the state. However, the term has also been responsible for problematising institutional weaknesses or failure where an apparent inability to control violence is observed, justifying the inclusion of a range of non-state security actors. Theories of hybridity or state transformation instead posit that the gaze should be directed on those spaces where security problems, once identified, are managed in practice (Hameiri & Jones, 2015).

For this study, three ‘levels’ of security governance are addressed: the national government, the Central American regional diplomatic structure, and strategic municipal jurisdictions. Second, by providing this multi-levelled analysis, the study includes the regional level, which is often ignored in existing Central American security studies. This is crucial to an understanding of the multiple and often competing agendas organising and supporting security interventions within El Salvador in a regional context of transnational threats. Third, this investigation shows the operational changes required of government institutions when other actors are introduced as authoritative participants in the process. Despite multi-actor, multi-level security governance strategies working to mobilise new actors, security concepts, and operational frameworks to reduce and manage security issues, many practical governance efforts enjoy only limited term results. This thesis concludes that broad changes in security governance structures are likely to be continually mitigated by traditional forces, limiting the potential for true transformation of security policy approaches.
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I am indebted to all of those who supported this work in Central America. For people who generously donated their time and energy to one more researcher asking a multitude of questions, the people who helped to facilitate contacts and connections, and the individuals who provided source documentation, this thesis is down to their efforts just as any errors of interpretation or representation are mine alone. I apologise to those who contributed so much more than I could process for this work and thank those who transferred their sensitive investigations to my care. One day, I hope to do justice to your trust. First, acknowledgement goes to Don Norberto Girón, former Chief of Mission at the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), El Salvador who enthused on the project, hosted me as an analyst, provided office space and resources, and ensured I got safely from points A to B. Additional thanks go to Adela, Alicia, Diana, Dinora, Don Manuel, Gilberto, Jorge, Juan-Pablo, Juanita, Marie-Helene, Oscar, and Yuri for their encouragement and help in their own ways. Without a doubt, I would not be where I am without Claudia Lara Orozco and Luis Garcia Alemán who took me into their home over a period of four years. They were the most accommodating and caring hosts for which one
could ask. Without them, the depth of my understanding about El Salvador, its society and its wealth, would be much the poorer.

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Finally, the light – Norah Constance Marguerite – this is for you.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature:

Printed name: Kari Mariska Pries
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation)</td>
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<td>AMSS</td>
<td>Área Metropolitana de San Salvador (Metropolitan Area of San Salvador)</td>
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<td>Alcaldía Municipal de Santa Tecla (Santa Tecla Municipal Mayorality)</td>
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<td>Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (National Association of Private Enterprise)</td>
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<td>Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Academy of Public Security)</td>
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<td>ARENA</td>
<td>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (National Republican Alliance)</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
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<td>Banco Interamericano de Desentelamiento (IDB: Inter-American Development Bank)</td>
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<td>CAM</td>
<td>Cuerpo de Agentes Municipales (Body of Municipal Agents)</td>
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<td>Caricom</td>
<td>Comunidad del Caribe (Caribbean Community)</td>
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<td>Consejo Ciudadano de Desarrollo Local (Citizen’s Council for Local Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Cambio Democrático (Democratic Change)</td>
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<td>CECI</td>
<td>Centre for International and Cooperation</td>
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<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>Comisión Económica para América Latina (Latin American Economic Commission)</td>
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<td>Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (Interamerican Commission for Drug Abuse Controls) – OAS</td>
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<td>Consejo Interinstitucional de Prevención de la Violencia (Inter-institutional Council on Violence Prevention)</td>
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<td>Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Council on Public Security)</td>
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<td>División de Armas y Explosivos (Arms and Explosives Division)</td>
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<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (US)</td>
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<td>DGME</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica (Central American Security Strategy)</td>
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<td>European Union (UE: Unión Europea)</td>
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<td>Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación de Derecho (Studies Foundation for the Application of Rights)</td>
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<td>FIDH</td>
<td>Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (International Federation of Human Rights)</td>
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<td>FISDL</td>
<td>Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local (Social Investment for Local Development Fund)</td>
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<td>FLASCO</td>
<td>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Social Sciences Institute)</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front ‘Farabundo Martí’)</td>
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<td>Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económica y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (PIB: Producto Interno Bruto)</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization (OIT: Organización Internacional del Trabajo)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IML</td>
<td>Instituto de Medicina Legal (Medical Legal Institute)</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (US State Department)</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation(s)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (OIM: Organización Internacional para las Migraciones)</td>
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<td>IUDOP</td>
<td>Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (University Institute of Public Opinion)</td>
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<td>MINED</td>
<td>Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education)</td>
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<td>MDN</td>
<td>Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional (National Ministry of Defence)</td>
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<td>MPCD</td>
<td>Movimiento Patriótico contra la Delincuencia (Patriotic Movement against Delinquency)</td>
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<td>MSPAS</td>
<td>Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance)</td>
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<td>MJSP</td>
<td>Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (Ministry of Justice and Public Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation(s)</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States (OEA: Organización de los Estados Americanos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PATI</td>
<td>Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso (Temporary Income Support Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Partido de Conciliación Nacional (Party of National Conciliation)</td>
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<td>PCSC</td>
<td>Política de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana del municipio de Santa Tecla (Policy of Coexistence and Citizen Security for Santa Tecla Municipality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Partido Democrática Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)</td>
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<td>PDDH</td>
<td>Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Ombudsman for the Defence of Human Rights)</td>
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<td>PGR</td>
<td>Procuraduría General de la República de El Salvador (Attorney General of the Republic of El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Policía Nacional Civil (National Civil Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNJSC</td>
<td>Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia (National Policy for Justice and Citizen Security)</td>
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<td>PNSPC</td>
<td>Política Nacional de Seguridad Publica y Convivencia (National Policy for Public Security and Coexistence)</td>
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<td>RREE</td>
<td>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Extranjería (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreigners)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTI</td>
<td>Research Triangle Institute</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Salvodoran Gang Truce</td>
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<td>SICA</td>
<td>Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (Central American Integration System)</td>
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<td>SSDT</td>
<td>Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización (Subsecretariat for Territorial Development and Decentralisation)</td>
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<td>UCA</td>
<td>Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (Central American University “José Simeón Cañas”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations (ONU: Organización de las Naciones Unidas)</td>
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UNDP United Nations Development Programme (PNUD: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo)

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID United States Agency for International Development
Chapter 1

Introduction: Hope and its Failure in El Salvador's Complex Security Environment
1.1 The Failure of Hope: Security, Crisis and Governance in El Salvador

At a controlled border crossing between Guatemala and El Salvador cars and trucks lined up as far as the eye could see, idling in great puffs of old-style exhaust. People were milling about; some going into bare-bones government buildings whereas others puttered about outside, waiting for the wheels of officialdom to slowly process their papers. The border guards and Immigration Department officials I was visiting with were eager to show off new computers and processing machinery paid for by recent international project infrastructure funds. A row of quickly yellowing tube screens amongst the sliding windows and peeling paint of the cinderblock tent. Around the side, a more solid building was attached to the processing centre, built to hold the deportees and the children. Outside were men, standing alone or lounging in small groups; they occupied spots of shade or hovered with an eye on the door. ‘Coyotes’ stated one official to me. ‘They are waiting for the deportees to be processed to start the journey again.’

This was the reality at the La Hachadura and Las Chinama border crossings when I visited in mid-2010. Here, three to four buses arrived each week from Mexico carrying children ‘caught’ on the migration route to the United States. That particular day, a group of about thirty children between of 7 and 16 had been returned from a holding centre in Mexico. Some had gone north on their own. Others, with siblings or friends. Some had left with the blessing of their parents or relatives who may have even paid the services of one of those coyotes waiting outside. Some had just, one day, departed.
A little boy of 7 and his 11 year-old brother were picked up by their large, comfortable mother driven to the collection centre by a slight, severe-looking uncle. There were tears all around. It was uncertain as to whether these adults had blessed the trip north but it hardly mattered. A straightforward slim youth of about 16 folded himself onto a chair and replied to my questions that he had attempted to go north to get a normal life with proper sneakers and high school mates. He had an aunt, he noted vaguely, in New York. The girls hung back, reserved and wary. One girl, about 15, had become pregnant on the route. She looked off into the middle distance, generally encompassing within her realm of protection two younger girls around 10 or 12. They had left because of ‘la violencia’. They had left because they wanted to go to school. They faced the danger and uncertainty and the horrors on the road because there was nothing left for them at home. Or it was too dangerous to take part in what services remained. For some, it was a choice of death.

El Salvador, 2010

The high expectations about Latin America’s future nurtured by many a quarter of a century ago have largely vanished into thin air.

Koonings and Kruijt, 2007

This is a study of the protection of civilians as citizens in one of the most violent peacetime nations in the world. Peace was officially declared for El Salvador on 16 January, 1992, between the right-wing government led by President Alfredo Cristiani and the guerrilla Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional: FMLN) after one of the fiercest conflicts of Latin America’s Cold War-era civil wars, which had resulted in massive internal displacements, international migration, and the death of an estimated 75,000 individuals. The United Nations (UN), an important international actor in the peace negotiations, continued in the post-conflict country in a peace-building role that analysts like McCormick (1997, p. 282) termed ‘momentous’ and ‘unprecedented’ in UN history. The Salvadoran Peace Accords were also the first time that a UN member-state ceded significant aspects of the reform and reconstruction of its legal and security institutions to the international community (Wilkins, 1997). This negotiated pacification, demilitarisation, and transition to a democratic political landscape, has been lauded by some as ‘among the most successful instances of implementation of a negotiated
peace agreement in the post-Cold War period’ (Call, 2003, p. 830). Yet El Salvador’s civil war legacy of ‘of terror, of violence, of fear’ lived on to become ‘an endemic and permanent feature of the pattern of nation-building’ -- as within the wider region of Latin America, and as discussed by Kruijt and Koonings (1999, pp. 2-3) in their seminal work *Societies of Fear*. As Moodie has noted, many Salvadorans have come to reference the post-peace period in El Salvador as ‘worse than the war’ (Moodie, 2010). For the tens of thousands who flee the country each year to brave the dangers of the migration route, it is a choice of fears.

However, when I arrived in El Salvador for the first time in December, 2009, a brief moment of hope had blossomed. Elections the previous year had, for the first time, brought the ex-guerrilla FMLN party to the presidency. Many citizens expressed cautious optimism that a popular change might result from the process; the former guerrillas had ‘concluded a journey from armed insurrection to electoral triumph’ (Macías & Ramos, 2012, p. 81). The first three years for the FMLN were a rollercoaster of hope and fear. In mid-2010, alleged gang members set fire to a public bus in Mejicanos, a suburb of the capital San Salvador, shooting dead those passengers who attempted to escape the flames. This prompted the FMLN administration under President Mauricio Funes to pursue a course of hard-lined operations and punitive legislation – despite government promises to try and confront violence through less violent means. Nonetheless, the FMLN administration also did continue to develop grassroots-sourced prevention policy with centrally-supported, municipally-suggested, programming. Security in this context continued to be acted upon simultaneously as an immediate, existential threat as well as a more nuanced puzzle of the ‘historical, geographical, spatial and structural complexities’ affecting individual wellbeing (Moser & McIlwaine, 2014, p. 2).

Two years later in March, 2012, some of the highest murder rates in the world were cut almost in half, and seemingly overnight, as rival gang factions Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (M-18) announced they had agreed on a truce. What initially appeared to be an independently-negotiated ceasefire was complicated by revelations that government ministers and security establishment officials had been involved in all aspects of the negotiations. This presented the question as to whether the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) was government policy or a whim of powerful non-state actors. Gangs were promised that, in return for their ceasefire adoption, their socio-economic needs would be met through jobs training and community reintegration opportunities. A second phase of the SGT saw the establishment of municipalities ‘free from violence’ (*Municipios Libre de Violencia*:
MLVs) that included the withdrawal of military units from these communities. Safe public spaces for youth-at-risk were meant to provide confirmation of the goodwill held by all levels of government as well as civil society and the public. Simultaneously, community policing had been developed across the country and, although this was not to the exclusion of repressive combat activities, the entire police force had been required to undergo the minimal training hours in favour of the programme.

Superimposed on these events were regional diplomatic efforts through the Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana: SICA), with the aid of the international community through the observer-donor Group of Friends, to form a united response to the security threats that they could agree their region was facing as a whole. Emerging from initial plans in the 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic Security, Central American states attempted to define a regional security model that ultimately was manifest in the Central American Security Strategy (Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica: ESCA) in December 2007 and confirmed in June 2011. ESCA was guided by four operating principles: co-responsibility, regionalism, ownership, and the increase of cooperation efforts. Its four negotiated themes encompassed 22 projects for which Central American states solicited international funding, including: crime reduction; violence prevention; rehabilitation, reintegration, and prison management; and, institutional strengthening. The strategy was a Central American-driven initiative to emphasise action on transnational, non-traditional security threats. It also served as a parallel action to the United States-led Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSİ) which was US-funded to provide ‘equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law enforcement options’ (Meyer & Seelke, 2015). El Salvador was an instigator of ESCA and it was heavily promoted by a small group within the government.

A complex picture emerges of security as it is governed in practice. It is comprised of language, ideological frameworks, programming plans, and operational instruments. Guiding these interactions and discourses are the actor conceptualisations of the problems they are addressing. These issues have combined and overlapped in public, national, and regional security agendas, injecting the crime of the local into risks that affect national governments and regional borders, and vice versa, thereby complicating both its study and solutioning. How security is conceptualised has implications for public policy, for government programming, and for the actors that are involved in the formation of that policy as well as its implementation. Typically, research has focused on a dichotomy
between repressive (combat) and prevention operations to address specific security concerns.

Works exploring the links between crime and violence affecting governance, political life, and democracy are many in the Latin American context (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Cruz, 2011; Dammert & Malone, 2006; Jütersonke, et al., 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Kurtenbach, 2013; Moser & McIlwaine, 2014; Frühling, Tulchin & Golding, 2003; Ungar, 2011). Ethnographic studies have also focused on the framing, perceptions, and experiences of violence more locally in Central America: for the urban poor (McIlwaine & Moser, 2007, gangs (Savenije & van der Borgh, 2006), gender (Hume, 2009), elites (Cruz, 2006), the media (Arriagada & Godoy, 2000), and ‘ordinary citizens’ (Moodie, 2010). However, there is only limited work that has been conducted on the policy community’s role in security governance.¹

The actors included in this study are not confined to traditional ‘elites’ involved in the governance of the ‘state’ and relations between states. Instead, non-state actors, civil society, and even violent actors have their role in the formation of security policy. How, and in what capacity, are these actors able to influence the policies and programmes that are implemented? The existing literature covers the debates over the conceptualisation of security from the narrow realist to the encompassing human definitions. How these issues, once defined as a security concern, are subsequently governed, has seen minimal exploration (Krahmann, 2003). Hameiri and Jones argue, ‘little of this literature explores how security problems, once identified, are managed in practice or how the systems established to manage them actually operate’ (Hameiri & Jones 2015, p. L129).

The context of a former guerrilla group in government for the first time cast against a broader Latin American trend of a ‘left turn’ (Cameron & Hershberg, 2010) along with this new government’s invitation that a multitude of actors contribute ideas in the collaborative development of new policies presented a data-rich environment to study security governance. To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)? Founded out of wartime opposition, the FMLN came to office brimming with new ideas on how to solve the security problem. The security governance environment which they entered already contained many cooperating and competing actors; actors not only representing traditional security interests but the non-state violent actors of gangs. Acknowledging they were not the only stakeholders, and

¹ An excellent exception is Holland (2013) who delves into the ARENA party’s relationship with crime policy in El Salvador.
following their own ideological underpinnings, the FMLN was open to governing security in different contexts and spaces. Some acknowledge they were ideologically open to negotiating with criminals.

This study will explore the spaces and scales where security is governed. First, it will outline the diverse conceptualisations of security used by actors and entities operating in the country and in the wider region. Second, it will present the myriad actors involved in the country’s multi-actor, multi-level\(^2\) attempts at managing El Salvador’s security problem. Finally, it will conclude with three case studies – at the regional, the national, and the local levels. The cases create an image of a security environment that remains based in the state but that is governed from a series of scales or spaces. New responses to diverse threats were not solely a government goal but something that took place at multiple scales and created by other sources. This thesis seeks to advance understanding of multidimensional security governance and to provide new analysis of the potential contributions and impacts of violence, crime, and security debates on policy and programming in El Salvador.

### 1.2 Key Concepts

The ‘left turn’ in Latin American politics (Cameron, 2010) and the election of an untried ex-guerrilla party to the presidency in El Salvador has implications for the understanding of security concepts, policy formation, and security operations in the country. How the government reacts to risk perceptions and threat events also has wider implications for questions on governance systems. Both the conceptualisation of security and the manner in which these security issues are approached, are contested parts of actor-driven security governance. However, as noted above, the shift from traditional or national security environments to acknowledge the complexity of non-traditional security has also redirected the academic gaze from a sole focus on states towards non-state actors which also has important implications for the concepts and response mechanisms that may be considered in risk solutioning. Following Koonings and Kruijt’s work on *Violence and Resilience in Latin American Cities* (2015), this work draws on a range of theories to discuss spaces of ‘engagement, mobilisation and participation’ by both traditional and non-

\(^2\) There is no sufficiently descriptive term for a 360 degree concept of governance. Within governance, the terms multi-level, multi-sectoral, multi-scalar, multi-lateral, and multidimensional represent different constructs. I attempt to stick to the terms multi-level and multidimensional, leaning towards the latter, because they best represent the spaces of interactions I am attempting to describe in a non-denominational manner. Here, multidimensional can include multiple sectors, combining multi-level and multi-lateral dimensions. These concepts will be elaborated further in Chapter 2.
traditional actors to examine constructs of violence and security, the impacts of these constructs and the results or outcomes thereof (Ibid., p. L207). This section will thus establish the key conceptual approach to violence and security in Latin America and the multilevel, multi-actor challenges associated with security policy formation that have important implications for policy, programme, and operational outcomes.

Violence and political projects are tied up within concepts of security and for whom the protection from violence is created. Theorising security in the Latin American context has often skipped over traditional disciplinary discussions on the nature of security in favour of discourses that are ‘practical, applied and policy relevant’ (Tickner & Hertz, 2012, p. 92). Tickner and Herz (2012) argue that at the end of the Cold War both domestic and international policies in Latin America defined security as a state-centric, military-dominated enterprise and had done so from the time of their independence acquired in the nineteenth century (also see Haenggi, 2003). In the aftermath of peace negotiations, violence was democratised; appearing as ‘an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 11). With this ‘new violence’ or what Moodie (2010) calls ‘common crime’ on the rise, Latin American states began pursuing democratic security and citizen security arrangements as ballast to institutional weaknesses.

Latin American scholarship has explored in detail the structural weaknesses of state institutions as well as their inability to maintain the basic monopoly on the use of force (Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; 2004; 2007; 2015). However, as López-Alves argues, Latin American ‘states have never been too weakened or shrunken to completely lose control of political power or policymaking’ (López-Alves, 2012, p. 174). Furthermore, the violence affecting Latin American states is considered by some (for instance, Arias and Goldstein, 2010) not a result of institutional failure but rather a function of the multiple violent actors that operate symbiotically with state actors to ‘help each other accomplish their goals’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L4866). This echoes the reflection that opened Koonings and Kruijt’s seminal work a decade previous:

Now I am the vice-president, even the acting president of this country. I have written the essential parts of the constitution. Apparently I am invested with all political power. But in fact, my friends, I have to share power with a lot of players, some of them invisible. (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, pp. 1-2)
Elsewhere, Moser and McIlwaine (2004, 2007) have explored the articulation between different types of violence and how it is negotiated between actors and becomes routine within social relationships from the personal to the institutional. In this way, violence and security discussions in Latin America, through their composition, are most often entangled with questions on the interplay between traditional and non-traditional actors interacting in violent spheres within their roles in directing or governing those spaces.

Developing policies to govern security first requires an understanding of the risk environment. Since the end of the Cold War, concern about the levels of violence and the increasing diversity of criminal activities has risen in Latin America. In the 2011 Latinobarometro survey, the most important problem for respondents across the 18 countries of Latin America was Crime/Public Security (27.8%), approached only by Unemployment (16%) as a distant second (Latinobarometro, 2015). For El Salvador, 40.1% of respondents identified Crime and Public Security as their greatest issue (Ibid.). Indeed, a large body of Latin American study on violence explores the emergence of crime as a security threat -- and developed through securitisation processes defined as the transformation of specific issues into security risks. In particular, the broadening of traditional security definitions for political or control purposes leaves these open to rhetorical manipulation. The Copenhagen School links this process to speech acts ‘within a political community [treating] something as an existential threat’ which facilitates the call to engage ‘urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 491). The links between the conceptualisations of violence and security, relevant actors, and outcomes is central to this work (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Frühling, et al., 2003). This ‘new violence’ has sometimes been constructed as a product of unresolved socio-political and cultural contentions of previous periods and antagonised by incomplete post-conflict institutional reforms weakening the rule of law (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p.11). Regime changes from repressive authoritarian administrations to nominally democratic constitutional entities emerged alongside a ‘violent peace’ (Hume, 2009) on a ‘violently plural’ continent (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). However, Arias and Goldstein (2010) lead the way in conceptualising violence beyond the failure of state institutions or weak democracies and suggest that traditional and non-

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3 These numbers have not changed much. In the latest report conducted in 2015, Latin American concerns over crime and public security decreased to 22.8% whilst unemployment remained a distant second at 16.2% (Latinobarometro, 2015). In El Salvador, 42.4% report crime and public security as their primary concern followed by unemployment at 14.1%. 
traditional actors are each important players in the adaptation of Latin American societies to violently plural realities.

Fluid conceptualisations of violence and vacillating security measures applied to address the risk environment have been accompanied by wide ranging groups of actors sourced from across the political, civil, and non-traditional spectrum. Arriagada and Godoy (2000) position violence and delinquency as ‘multi-dimensional phenomena’ and note that there is a related ‘growing recognition of the need to carry out multidimensional programmes combining both control and preventative measures’ (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000, p. 123). Much of the traditional social construction in public policy takes place within the analysis of national or local government frameworks. However, often the reality is a network of elected officials, international entities, and civil society representatives who contribute to policy-making across borders and institutional silos.

The traditional democratic system government is defined a narrow specified assembly of activities with a set of authorised participants and privileged interests. Flexibilisation of institutional structures has admitted the idea that the state is only one actor among many. They operate to counter a perceived set of violent indicators to provide security, among a plethora of responsibilities which are better encompassed in the term governance (Boege, et al., 2009). In this, governance represents so much more than its basic definition as a ‘new process of governing’ with a particular interest in power and policy (Rhodes, 1996). It has been used to describe decision-making in organisations and across institutional structures for issues management. At its most benign, governance could be considered a power which is shared or a sort of ‘collective problem solving in the public realm’ (Caporaso, 1996, p. 32 quoted in Sloat, 2002, p. 105).

This is not to say that governance has universally overtaken government or that it is an alternative when government or state institutions are considered too weak or fragile to address institutional responsibilities. Rather, the term governance allows for the focus to shift to a variety of new arrangements and practices which have been operating ad hoc (Meehan, 2003). Within governance discussions there are two main strands. First, multi-actor governance is a phenomenon arising as a stop-gap measure where government is not competent to act. Based on the premise that Latin American democracies have failed to deliver competent institutions capable of maintaining a monopoly on violence (e.g. O’Donnell, 1996), the idea of governance has gained traction to fill the gap. This argument suggests that governance may: (1) be essential to supranational entities like the European
Union to step into a role that represents fundamental changes in contemporary rule; (2) that it addresses issues of a transnational or global nature for which states are ill-equipped or unwilling to answer; and (3), in the case of a fragile, weak, or failing state, that the global political community, international organisations (IO), or other entities take it upon themselves or are invited to contribute to the decision-making process.

Diminished violence can be positioned as a function of strengthened democratic processes and institutions and vice versa within the idea of growing governance mechanisms. Categories of failure or weakness for states ripe for alternative governance mechanism include those as explored in development and security strands (Boege, et al., 2009; 2011); classed as illiberal or incomplete (Gledhill, 2000); or those lacking democratic participation with ‘low intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell, 2004). Others, such as Pearce (2010), contest these conclusions. She argues that the proliferation of violence has occurred in parallel fashion with democratic transitions in Latin America and thus is an influential function within government institutions. To these cases, multi-lateral governance strategies have become an increasingly attractive manner by which to solve the problem where ‘government is no longer sufficient’ (FDFA Working Group, 2007, p. 45 quoted in Boege, et al., 2011, p. 2; Corkery, 1999, p. 12). In such states, the government is only one actor among many and some may hold more power, even if this situation does not ignore the complete absence of institutions.

It is this that Arias and Goldstein attempt to address by including the ‘lived experiences of ordinary citizens’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010, p. L129). They propose an alternative frame of analysis that recognises the ‘plural nature of [Latin America’s] current governing regimes’:

In other words, rather than understanding Latin America’s endemic violence as simply a failure of democratic governance and institutions, we call attention to violence as an element integral to the configuration of these institutions, as a necessary component of their maintenance, and as an instrument for popular challenges to their legitimacy. (Ibid., p. L129)

So too in this thesis, actors and institutional structures are explored as they employ and deploy understandings of violence as the means for the creation, implementation, and continuation of power, policies, and operations. Actors from IO, foreign states, shadow
institutions, and national criminal gangs can be argued to hold a role or influence in policy decisions within the governance of specifically constructed security environments.

What this means is that specific bodies of literature on violence and security make separate but important contributions to conceptualisations of security governance. Within discussions of violence there is little consensus on what is included but that it can stem from ‘multiple sources, transforms all that it touches, and configures daily life and the workings of governance in various ways’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010, p. L194). In particular for Latin America, discussions on violence also need to explore the relationship between crime and political violence in order to understand the included actors and resulting policy interventions. As will be explored significantly throughout this thesis, ‘violent crime as a security threat’ discourse is essential to developing a greater understanding of security governance. There is growing academic and policy acceptance that state structures have become flexibilised and therefore many security governance discussions perceive a decrease in state importance. Simultaneously, however, Latin America maintains a rigid hold on the idea of the state, complicating the region’s relationship with the governance of security.

This is where aspects of state hybridity discussions may make important contributions to this thesis. Whereas mainstream realist and liberal approaches tend to deal best in known entities of governments or states, hybrid or multi-lateral forms of governance allow greater flexibility and also provide analysis of practical applications, traditional in Latin American scholarship but not always a priority in the more traditional branches. In order to bring together these different perceptions of violence, crime, and security governance, this thesis will structure discussions in terms of scale which creates the spaces for traditional and non-traditional concepts to interact. This is not just a rescaling of various parts of state governance operations but the creation of new spaces which consider issue delegation or collaboration a constructive tool rather than a measure of traditional state or democratic weakness. Reflecting on scalar arrangements reached through negotiation, cooperation, and competition illuminates the governance approaches to violence and security in the Central American context and the power relationships forged in those multi-actor contexts. Having identified the many concepts and theoretical tools comprising ideas of security governance, it becomes possible to question what impact these dynamics may have on policy creation, programme implementation, and operational outcomes.
1.3 Problem statement

Having outlined the key conceptual and theoretical tools that are needed to analyse the relationship between the spaces of violence, the participant actors, and the results or outcomes of these relationships, I return to the problem statement that drives the structure of this thesis. To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)? In order to answer this question, this thesis must first identify the participant actors and the spaces in which they operate. It then turns to the issues of defining and elaborating the risks as identified by those policy actors.

Finally, this thesis presents three multi-level case studies that emerged from the negotiated policy spaces. In addressing the above problem statement, questions of how security is conceptualised, by whom, and with what outcomes, become essential frames of analysis. These strands of questioning challenge the directionality of violence and security discourses that, in turn, shape the policies and programmes that are funded and implemented in a given sphere of operation.

Question 1: In what spaces, and by whom, is security negotiated and governed in El Salvador?

Despite the argument that the Westphalian state concept in Latin America continues to provide a framework for the understanding of state institutions (Fleumes & Radseck, 2012; Tickner & Herz, 2012), perusal of Latin American security literature indicates that state institutions do not operate in a purely national setting when addressing complex security issues. As such, questions of scale intrude into discussions of actors and definitions of violence. Different levels of traditional government – municipal, departmental, national, regional etc. – even within cooperative governance structures, favour particular strategies or measures with the result that within geographic, institutional, and conceptual scales of operation, there can be overlap, conflict, and resistance (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). At what scales do conceptualisations of violence take place? And at what levels or in what spheres do actors attempt to resolve violence through security governance mechanisms? The objective of the first part of this research is to map security governance structures and actors in operation in El Salvador both laterally and across governance levels.

Given its history of conflict, Central American scholars have engaged with the mapping of actors in security governance within peacekeeping efforts. Particular attention is often credited to the manner in which IO and interested entities may intervene in the affairs of a state for democratisation and institution-strengthening purposes (Bayley, 2011; Boege, et al., 2009). Security sector reform (SSR), where sector refers to those departments or
institutions directly associated with security within states, has also engaged in actor-activity scaling to assess the best means for outside agencies to facilitate security governance within the boundaries of sovereign states (Froestad & Shearing, 2012).

However, little exists for a multi-level analysis which incorporates municipal perspectives with national and international governing efforts. Notable exceptions found in the public security discipline include the work of Froestad and Shearing (2012), who reconceptualise security governance as a nodal assemblage of security actors based on hybrid arrangements, and that of Hoenke (2013), who expounds on the transnational-local dynamics in private security provisioning. These works challenge the conceived potential for legitimate and effective non-state security governance within local or informal settlement contexts; in particular, they ask, ‘whether local, community-based, non-state forms of security governance that respect liberal democratic governance ideals are possible, and if so, under what conditions’ (Froestad & Shearing, 2012, p. 4). This thesis thus questions whether local definitions of violence and locally-conceived security solutions play a role within the more traditional national security frameworks. It further looks at regional security strategy propositions for a set of violence risks and questions whether the supra-national scale can realise impacts and outcomes for the daily lived experiences of individuals. This involves delving into systems of rule (top-down, bottom-up, nodal, network) and the understanding of legitimate (en)actors within these spheres. By deconstructing the nature and impacts of multi-level security governance structures with their participant actors, this thesis makes a timely contribution to multi-level and multi-actor security governance debates. Even though a wealth of information exists on security governance as a theoretical concept and some efforts have been made to elaborate on empirical cases at the national, regional, and global levels, there has been limited empirical work undertaken to link multiple levels operating simultaneously in order to flesh out overlapping and symbiotic relationships.

Question 2: What are the main security concepts framing scales of governance in El Salvador?

In situating the above multidimensional actor study, it is essential to explore the contributions they make to security definitions. How do contributing actors construct their ideas of how the nature of the threat affects the nature of the negotiations that the actors undertake and contributes to the structural formation of the policy networks themselves. In other words, what is the nature of the violence being addressed or the type of security at
A second objective of this thesis is to elaborate on the conceptualisations of security involved in El Salvador’s security governance. Although specific lists of indicators or contributing phenomena to violence vary widely, there are notable trends that persist in generally accepted constructs of violence. Homicides, money laundering, trafficking, extortion, and intra-familial violence are typical indicators used for constructing parameters for understanding violence. Youth and particularly those in poor areas dominated by street gangs and transnational criminal organisations are usually considered the primary violent actors that need to be countered. Specific groups are targeted based on actor and victimisation demographic trends although indicators and subject groups of alleged key perpetrators do not always align. Nonetheless, the term citizen security in all its ambiguity remains central to understanding violence, crime, and security in this thesis.

The term’s construction in Latin American context provides a structure within which to understand the language and policies in security governance. It is within this framework that actors position their own understanding, institutional responsibilities, and operational capacities; in creating responses to situations of violence and crime, the actors and their conceptualisations of security matter as much as the subjects themselves. Furthermore, the institutional connotations of citizen security with rights and responsibilities can be used both to broaden and to narrow the set of agreed-upon security objectives. Academic and policy models have engaged with a wide range of explanations of violence affecting security from realist understandings of state responsibility for violence to human security extending far beyond the traditional threats. Origins discussions may include, but are not limited to: lingering historical and post-war effects of political violence lacking resolution; socio-economic inequalities; gang violence; organised criminal violence; incomplete institutional reforms leaving a security vacuum that facilitates the propagation of violence; and, public discourse / pressure in relation to criminality. This thesis also highlights the importance that ‘new’ plays in crime, security, and policy discussions. Questions arise with the rhetoric of a ‘new’ government and bring hope with ‘new’ approaches to a relatively ‘new’ security threat. In questioning the conceptualisation of violence and security that the actors themselves hold and use to construct spheres of security governance, this thesis connects actor perceptions with policy outcomes.

Question 3: What policies or programmes have emerged from the multi-level spaces of security governance in El Salvador?
The two previous research questions provide the frame for an analysis of multi-level security policies or programmes that emerge. Security negotiations in the context of a new government in El Salvador took place in a window of opportunity driven by public hope to bring about policy for governance changes. These questions have significant ramifications for analysing how concepts, actors, and moments of opportunity – or crisis – may be governed. They also lead to sub-questions on actor interactions for security response outcomes. First, on what basis do these entities choose to collaborate on security governance outcomes in El Salvador? Are they guided by a mutual solidarity, shared responsibility, or collective acknowledgement of potential risks? This is an important question for this thesis as it delineates the selection process for democratic and self-appointed institutions in security governance. A second sub-question looks into competition in policy-making and outcomes. Which projects or operations are actually implemented and developed beyond political rhetoric? This thesis explores the foundations of specific policies and programmes to contrast dialogue and discussion with outcomes to substantiate which security concepts are actioned and by which actors. Finally, can collaboration or cooperation on security governance boost institutional response capacity and who directs the nature of that response? The research will explore the nature of dispersed action in security governance and whether this has implications for responsibility mechanisms.

Crime and violence issues affecting security governance efforts in El Salvador are extensive and evolving. Changing configurations of governance, along with the allocation of power and resources, are contested activities inviting cooperation and power-struggles within non-traditional security governance mechanisms. The appropriate scale, executors, and operators become problems in and of themselves to be negotiated and managed. Shifting the gaze from traditional governance activities to exploration of the underlying socio-economic and power structures are of equal importance to studies on crime and security. However, often those issues addressed are those selected through the lens of citizen security were broadly democratic rights and responsibilities are securitised. Through a range of analytical frameworks and with reference to literatures on crime and violence, securitisation, and security governance, this thesis aims to expand on how security issues are created and managed. In other words, what does security governance look like in practice and in the context of the new FMLN government in El Salvador?

1.4 Methodology
This section outlines how I approached the topic of security governance in El Salvador methodologically within the existing literature and existing gaps that this thesis aims to fill. Due to the voluminous scholarship on the Salvadoran conflict, peace-building, and post-conflict violence as well as the open-ended character of my research question, I adopted an inductive approach to my research framework following the main tenets of Grounded Theory (GT) (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In doing so, I strove to mitigate the dominant narratives emphasising the dysfunctional characteristics of Central American post-conflict security policy and governance institutions to leave space for new discovery in the sensitive and often fence-posted issue of security. First, I outline my research approach as organised to ‘create the conditions for surprise’ (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 243). I then present the research process for this thesis including case selection, data collection, and analysis constructs. My positionality and integrity reflection close the section presenting the limitations to the broad, open-ended question guiding this research: To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)?

1.4.1 The research approach: Indicative and deductive approaches to research decolonisation

The research problem on security guiding this research arose from my experience engaging with Central American residents who were negotiating dangerous migration routes in response to a fraught security climate. During my time working on migration policy in early 2010 I began to question my role as an international contributor to local policy development. At one meeting after another when considering the various components required for inclusion in my policy brief, people would casually remark, ‘well to talk about this topic, you really need to understand about security’. Coming away from this process, the need to ‘talk about security’ in every day policy topics combined with my observations on the contributions of multi-lateral interests to the development of national policy presented a unique opportunity for further investigation. The context of a former guerrilla group in government for the first time cast against a broader Latin American trend of a ‘left turn’ (Cameron, 2010) along with this new government’s invitation that a multitude of actors contribute ideas in the collaborative development of new policies, made the field appear to be data-rich.

Having observed the extent to which diverse actor agendas could sometimes drive policy formation or influence its direction, one of my hunches was that security policy in this
context was a product of actor exchanges – either through policy diffusion between neighbours with similar experiences of violence (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Glatz, 2007; Langer, 2007; Midgley, 1984) or policy transfer from international actors to national institutions building on globalised ideas of best practice (Busch & Joergens, 2005; Dobbin & Simmons, 2007; Drezner, 2001; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Weyland, 2006).

Furthermore, I conjectured that actor conceptualisations of the Salvadoran security environment, along with independent security ideologies and agendas, would influence what kind of policy was produced in these multi-actor contexts. Jervis argues that policymakers’ preferences can be linked with the perceptions they hold of their external environment, impacting on the policy they create (Jervis, 1976). However, formal security actors do not have equal opportunities to imbue policies with their agendas and conceptualisations – and actor debates do not translate directly onto policy and outcomes.

Even when armed with a question and a prior knowledge of the literature, designing a methodological approach is essential to effective data collection and analysis. Margaret Mead advocated that ‘the way to do fieldwork is never to come up for air until it is all over’ (Mead, 1977, p. 136). This sentiment is in keeping with scholarship discussions on cultural difference and knowing to take into account both linguistic and cultural barriers most evident in verbal and non-verbal expressions (Rubenstein, 1988). As such, an inductive approach in keeping with the general tenets of GT was selected to initiate the study. In particular, Transformational Grounded Theory allowed for the combination of both constructivism (subject perceptions) and critical realism (participatory action) within the research framework. The dual methods also fit within Schutz’s social phenomenology of interpretive understanding (Schutz, 1967). However, given that the starting off point in the research question identified policy, it was important that the research design allow for the triangulation of pre-conceived notions of the research subject when embarking on case study empirical data collection (Wagenaar, 2011). GT also provided space to ‘incorporate the complexities of the organizational context’ involved in policy formation analysis, as suggested by Alderfer and Smith (1982); while, at the same time, ‘providing a detailed and carefully crafted account of the area under investigation’ (Martin & Turner, 1986, p.143).

Deductive reasoning based in a detailed reading of existing scholarship was also used to develop the initial case study as well as formulate practical details such as the selection of interview subjects and the writing of questionnaires.

The initial research question was driven by an interest in the role IO played in developing and influencing security policy and programme directions in El Salvador. Despite the
voluminous literature on the subject of security, there was relatively little that focused on the multidimensional actor roles in national security policy formation. Research on Central America is heavily focussed on grassroots, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the interplay between individuals, and government bodies (Cruz, 2006, 2010; Holden 1996; Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010; Snodgrass Godoy, 2006). ‘Security’ trended towards post-conflict peace building or transnational criminal organisations as regional threats. ‘Violence’ focused on gangs and ethnographic studies on the experiences of violence. ‘Actor-networks’ developed categories of hybrid organisational forms with an emphasis on civil society organisations. ‘Multidimensional, multi-level, multi-lateral’ drew scholarship on the Central American Common Market, peace-negotiations, and Southern Cone integration efforts. ‘Policy’ studies had focused police reforms, environmental cooperation, migration and the United States El Salvador doctrine. Most telling, when typing ‘El Salvador’ into scholarly search engines, the first results were split between civil war experiences and contemporary migration studies. A similar effort with ‘foreign relations’ was predictable in the domination of the United States among the sources. However, an inductive approach also proved important here as there is little situated or embedded Latin American theory (López-Alves, 2012; Tickner & Herz, 2012).

Security, violence, organisational, and governance theories are developed, on the whole, with Northern approaches, ideologies, and influences (López-Alves, 2012). Tickner and Herz argue that international actors have facilitated relations between Latin American states and academia and funding provided to develop what amounted to ‘descriptive reflections’ driven by the need to produce knowledge to underwrite policy (Tickner & Herz, 2012, pp. 92-93). These hegemonies were created in a colonial period also experienced in other non-core countries leading to significant critique over IR’s colonial character (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004; Jones 2006; Shilliam, 2011) where knowledge is ‘produced by and for the West’ (Acharya & Buzan, 2007, p. 288). Indeed, Nayak and Selbin (2010) have challenged the discipline’s operating modes, arguing that the very process of situating knowledge within a ‘story of IR’ reproduces the centrality of Northern discipline. The issue becomes how to best engage with this hegemony. Hamati-Ataya questions why non-western IR scholarship should be addressed any differently – that to do so risks marginalising non-core contributions to key debates – in essence, avoiding purposefully adopted marginalisation (discussed in Tickner & Blaney, 2012, pp. 8-9). Nayak and Selbin (2010) argue instead for a ‘disturbing’ or ‘reframing’ of the discipline.
In order to continue with the project while remaining sensitive to the post-colonial realities of IR scholarship, a modified ‘transformational’ GT approach was adopted along with a modification in the planned methods of data collection. As developed by Redman-MacLaren and Mills, transformational GT speaks to this project with its inclusion of participatory action and decolonising methodologies and allows space for the researcher’s experience ‘to enable engagement with people experiencing the phenomena being researched’ whilst still pursuing critical analysis (Redman-MacLaren & Mills, 2015, p. 4). First, this adapted methodology was designed specifically to address questions of colonising data. Critical realism is illuminating in this instance to continue study of the links and sites of exchange of actor subjects but its preference for bounded knowledge is balanced here with a constructivist approach. However, transformational GT merits additional attention for its adoption of participation in action research (Redman-MacLaren & Mills, 2015). This approach is particularly attractive for constructivists for its potential ability to include constructed perceptions within the research process itself. It further offers opportunities to scrutinise relationship dynamics and power differences between entities as well as analyse concepts like security through actor narratives. However, it is less successful in considering case study selection and multi-level operational structures. As such, this thesis employs an open-ended mixed method approach to research design.

Charmaz (2006) highlights the importance of including research participants in the production of knowledge. Its importance was echoed by Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer in expressed concerns over data imperialism: ‘a researcher from a more developed country taking up the time and resources of women in a less developed country and then making off with the data’ (Geiger, 1997; quoted in Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer, 2008). In this way, PO became a strategic effort to decolonise research methodologies and create arenas for exchange which would encourage actor input to the continually evolving nature of this research. Further efforts were made to include a space for comment and critique of the questions and goals of the research project during formal actor interviews. While many more recent researchers would prefer to see the interview process as dialogue, shifting power dynamics play a significant role on both sides – with sometimes detrimental results; especially when it comes to creation of power asymmetries, agonistic interview techniques, and the re-packaging of such interviews as knowledge for public consumption (Kvale, 2006).

1.4.2 Case study selection
The scope of this research was limited at the outset by temporal, geographical, and thematic delimitations. First, this research establishes a timeframe from the time that the new FMLN government took office in 2009 to the end of their first mandate in 2014. However, within this period, attention will focus on the specific case study programmes selected which are not evenly distributed or active throughout the period. Earlier administrations from the end of the Cold War and El Salvador’s 1992 Peace Agreements are considered as a precedent or baseline of how security had been governed over twenty years but does not comprise part of the evidentiary process used to analyse the political processes as such. The opportunity to establish formal actor perceptions and conceptualisations of security as they formed new national policies, instead of attempting to draw out meaningful influences from actor memories of policies long since implemented or abandoned, promised to be a more effective approach to the actor-policy relationship. At the same time, Central American states had initiated a regional security strategy in 2011, just prior to the pilot field study. This development provided a second unique case for analysis as it involved national entities negotiating from national positions with their neighbours on security strategies and programmes that would require national adoption in addition to regional cooperation.

Second, the research focuses on El Salvador using three case studies impacting security governance within state borders as a geographical delimitation. It identifies cross-border and international support but does not pursue regional security as a body of study itself. Instead, the contrast between the two levels of security efforts opened an opportunity to elaborate on process distinctions simultaneously in operation within a single state. In order to assess what policy negotiations were implemented, however, it made sense to limit the study to one country but on several levels in order to follow results. The prevalence of scholarship in the region critiquing empty or failed policy agreements with little to no impact in the real world, and the general dismissal of regional bodies like the SICA, meant that I would have to find a way to study what did happen. The best way to do this was to include municipalities as a third level of study to add outcomes to security concepts and policy production. In some ways, this also transformed the dynamic of cooperation hybridity from a neo-liberal construct, suggesting that functions can be outsourced to a participatory framing with the potential for end-user or subject inclusion. This shift also impacted on employed terminology, with ‘hybrid’ or ‘transformed’ governance spaces more descriptive than ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’. In this way, stakeholder agendas could be
analysed not only within a national framework and on a regional diplomatic level but as their efforts were perceived in operation.

The selection of case study municipalities was done to balance traditional, established, security governance structures with new security initiatives to seek evidence of governance transformation. Santa Tecla, Sonsonate, and Ilopango all had violence prevention programmes which were established after the Peace Accords but prior to the election of the FMLN government. All had had formal cooperation agreements on prevention with international entities, whether international organisations or a foreign government. In this way, all had followed set strategies to establish a set of practices with which the municipality intended to address violence through a conceptualisation of security mitigation. Thus, they all had some form of donor-recipient relationship; they all had Local Violence Prevention Councils (Consejos Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia: CMPV), and they all invited a diverse group of actors to address their security concerns, violent risks, and formulate potential threat interventions (reduction, management, and contestation) at hand. As political allegiances tend to significantly impact official and interpersonal dynamics, the selection was also balanced between the two main parties. At the time of the thesis fieldwork between 2012 and 2013, Santa Tecla was under FMLN local leadership whilst Sonsonate and Ilopango had ARENA-led municipal governments.

Overall, the interactions between structural governance mechanisms of coordination, policy steering, and accountability along with the social mechanisms of actor interests, issues-framing discourses, and mobilised networks and resources, became important competitions in the outcomes realised within these violence prevention municipalities.

Through this thesis, security governance through specific policy development and outcomes is analysed. However, the study is limited largely to the implementation of ‘new’ policies that were largely prevention-focused rather than Mano Dura operations typical of security performances in El Salvador. It does not deconstruct the implementation of crack-down operations as conducted by joint police-military patrols. Although those activities are also highly relevant to the overall debate on the development of security governance in El Salvador, they involve military decision-making with different decision-making structures apart from the multi-lateral networks focused on here. Framed within a national context of security governance, the research only analyses policies and instruments relating to the specific timeframe that have a clear direct or indirect link with the idea of trying something ‘new’ to address security risks in El Salvador. Within these policies, the focus is placed on actor networks and the multi-level dynamics involved in creating security governance
structures. Thus, whilst this work does look at some of the funding sources for *mano dura* responses, it does not aim to cover the operationalisation of joint-military police patrols.

As such, the case studies at three different scales of security governance – the local, the national, and the regional – will highlight the operations and actor networks at a specific point in time in order to address the potential impacts that the ideas of a new governing party could have on the security governance process in El Salvador.

### 1.4.3 Data collection and analysis

To effectively address the research question set out in my work, I used a multi-method triangulation approach to data collection and analysis (Valentine, 2001). Semi-structured interviews form the most importance source of data for this research of which I conducted over 75 with a diversity of formal actors between January 2012 and April 2013. These actors included policy elites (elected representatives, party members, and government officials), security force personnel, foreign representatives, NGO employees, and organisational technical analysts, among others. As laid out in previous sections, actor interpretations of security are essential to the exploration of security policy and operations. However, perceptions are ephemeral and impressionistic. Neoclassical realists have attempted to engage with policy maker preferences beyond the state but tend to start from the assumption that there is an objective reality which policy makers may or may not perceive correctly (Schweller, 2006). In analysing the interviews of formal actors as policy influencers, I did not engage with questions of objective realities. Instead, semi-structured interview subjects serve two purposes for this study’s research structure. First, they provide data on security perceptions, actor network interactions, institutional agendas, and outcomes. They elaborate on their own perceptions of the contributions they and others made to policy development and they provide illustrations on outcomes including programming and operations. Research subjects further pointed to a unique security process in the region which had the potential to be transformative to the nature of the study. Second, these subjects were asked who they thought I should be interviewing to develop understanding of the security processes at work in the country. Not only was this an effective way to use ‘snowball sampling’ techniques to collect potential interview names but their recommendations also provided insight to the actor networks and, in some cases, provided a secondary insight into their interpretations of security.

Generally, I strove to interview at least two people from each institution or organisation with which I had contact (Appendix C; Appendix D; Appendix E). For the Ministry of
Justice and Public Security (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica: MJSP) and the SICA, I interviewed at least one person from those relevant units for which I could gain access and often multiple individuals therein. At the municipal level, I conducted interviews with policy officials and, in some cases, met with the mayor, but also spent time touring various sites and projects with officials as well as conducted informal ‘group’ interviews with project participants. As much as possible, I attempted to maintain the interview as a conversation rather than a rigid line of questioning. In order to keep to the conceptual and structural goals of the questioning, balance was sought between the informal, open-ended narrative guided by the respondent’s experiences, perceptions, and opinions on the one hand and the important structural themes of the research goals on the other (Wagenaar, 2011). The questions themselves had been originally structured to cast questions in a ‘neutral’ light and allow the interview subject to guide terminology development (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Using this guide, interviews began with questions about positionality, including background and responsibilities in the security process. It then moved on to introductory questions on the three main pillars of research, including: (1) perceptions on the type of security risks facing the country and the indicators used to measure these threats; (2) perceptions on the key mechanisms used to attempt to build security; (3) perceptions on the degree of importance prescribed to multi-actor contributions to security building efforts and who those actors are; and, (4) perceptions on the impacts and outcomes of the projects or operations they had highlighted. Most of the interviews were recorded with the permission of the subject and subsequently transcribed so as to have access to written text and include direct quotes in this thesis.

In addition to the data collected through interviews, I undertook participant observation (PO). My motivations to engage directly in the processes of security governance were three: data, gatekeeper access, and contribution. Although PO is helpful both in terms of developing comfort and familiarity with the topic terminology and activities, it does have drawbacks. In particular, documenting observations and conversations at the same time as making a contribution in your participant role is a complicated task. As Tipple and Willis (1991) note, the issue of subjectivity and objectivity may obscure rather than clarify other data results. The third part of the data triangulation involved documentary evidence for which I collected over 200 policies, briefings, and other reports related to my case studies. Many of the documents were obtained from interview subjects as I made a point of concluding every interview with requests for supporting evidence, especially when they had mentioned a specific document in the course of an interview.
To analyse these three components of data, large spider maps were created to allow information to coalesce in patterns. As I moved farther into the data, categories solidified between specific processes and broader issues of security concept development as a natural outcome of focused coding (Charmaz, 2006, p. 58). Thematic mapping served to link broad themes between interviews and observe variation in concepts and terms therein. Building on these observed trends, I returned to the literature in an attempt to place my observances within the larger theoretical contexts. The rough analysis when placed in a governance context pointed towards something more than multi-dimensional or multi-level cooperation but something less than a full security governance construct. From a security studies perspective, the observed processes were undeniably securitised, had undergone a brief period of attempted depoliticised, and then re-securitised. However, in both cases, this left gaps – most importantly how repression and prevention goals were able to be pursued concurrently.

In summary, this study’s research framework was based loosely within Grounded Theory but employed both inductive and deductive methods to establish case studies, identify potential interview subjects, and place the research within greater theoretical frameworks. Through successive rounds of thematic mapping, a set of observable patterns emerged from which it was possible to unpack relationships between multi-scaled actors and the security issues they were attempting to address.

1.4.4 Positionality and ethical considerations

Challenges and ethical considerations are particularly important for security research to protect data sources. The first consideration was purely practical given the topic of crime, violence, and security governance. Given levels of violent plurality and corruption throughout the research environment including institutions, governance structures, and non-traditional participant networks, the connections to individuals that were indirectly or directly involved in aspects of the issues they were attempting to solve was unavoidable. This is a practical reality of the security environment in El Salvador. Reliability of the information was partially assured by ensuring a broad range of interview subjects and through data triangulation. Concerns over credibility in themselves make a contribution to the thesis as the actor relationships at play in security governance. The second challenge was to research criminal engagement in wider security governance efforts whilst mitigating security risks to the researcher and other participants. In all cases, no information was exchanged or commentary made on existing processes with interview subjects to avoid inadvertent transmission of sensitive information. It was also important to ensure that all
interviews took place in neutral spaces. The security environment also posed a practical transport challenge. However, support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) office to provide transportation and accompaniment when required provided my safety on a practical level but did not impact the type of research I was able to do, the people I was able to meet, or the locations to which I had access.

Positionality is especially important here because of the participant observation portion of the data collection as well as the ideological nature of the academic study on crime and security. Within regional SICA meetings, I conducted active PO as a contracted consultant with the IOM. To establish my role, I performed introductions as developed in accepted PO ethics guidelines. In closed door sessions, I introduced myself as representing the IOM when I spoke but that I was also present as a PhD researcher who would be observing the proceedings to enhance my research into the security governance process. In open plenary sessions, there were no introductions and public access limited concerns over proprietary or protected information. Instead, the moderator and technical staff involved in running the meetings were informed prior to the sessions and their consent obtained verbally. Some participants would later ask about my research during breaks, upon which I was happy to elaborate. At national and municipal levels, my approach was closer to direct observation methods for meetings and policy workshops; through my introduction, it was clear that I was there in a research capacity and held no active role in the proceedings. Where possible, I would also attempt to interview participants without having engaged with them on project topics in an effort to reduce influence on interview answers provided by the interviewee. PO remained a particularly useful dimension to the research process in adding actor exchanges to the analysis of interviews and published reports. It also is in keeping with Grounded Theory tenets in that it allows the researcher to ‘choose direction as his/her understanding of the situation grows and new opportunities in the field present themselves’ (Tipple & Willis, 1991, p. 18). Overall, the data collection and analysis decisions were made strategically to address different components of the research question whilst mitigating where possible to the existing challenges and positionality considerations present in the research structure.

1.5 Plan of the Thesis

This introductory chapter has provided several key considerations and debates that frame current research on multi-actor, multi-scalar security governance related to the complex security environment in El Salvador. Contradictions that have developed since the end of
the Cold War with the simultaneous growth of democratic institutions and violent crime in Latin America have complicated security responses provided by government institutions. Instead, the ‘dispersal of security functions fundamentally shapes the distribution of political power, with implications not only for the structure of government but for the very boundaries of the state’ (Bayley, 2011, p. 59). In attempting to take control of hybridisation processes, involved actors have attempted to lay claim to ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ approaches in security governance. This thesis recognises the pluralities involved in scales, actors, definitions, and outcomes in attempts to address security risks in El Salvador. Rather than engaging in the legalities of policy and programme development, this thesis deconstructs how crime and violence conceptualisations impact on practical governance structures, strategies, and outcomes. At its core, there is an idea of shared responsibility within a notion that it takes more than traditional parties to address non-traditional security threats. However, security governance theory, even taking into account state structural changes, fails to fully explain the observed processes through which El Salvador addresses its complex security concerns. First, proponents of security governance do not sufficiently address the implications of existing multi-level governance structures including the relationships between municipal and national governments in incorporating international entities. Second, the delegation of responsibilities to governance structures is incomplete where national governments find it politically expedient to maintain control, especially over combat operations in crisis situations. Third, non-state actor powers can lead to the incomplete implementation of policy objectives or programmes if government structures feel they run counter to their political interests, despite the potential disastrous implications of ending an existing operation. As such, although security governance provides a sufficiently robust framework from which to analyse the multi-actor, multi-level processes at work in El Salvador, the current literature lacks an articulated framework capable of explaining how new modes of governance interact with existing traditional governance in hybrid states that maintain a ‘violent plurality’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010).

Chapter Two engages with theories of violence, security, and governance to pull out theoretical contributions for security governance in the Salvadoran context. Latin American violence and security scholarship is presented as it contributes to the development of citizen security. Relevant security insights are then connected to governance theories, focussing particularly on the issues of multi-dimensionality and hybridity. The chapter engages with questions of scale in an effort to untangle the processes of policy formation in non-government contexts. Chapter Three outlines the
socio-economic and political geographic setting of this thesis. The chapter paints a picture of the historical setting leading to the complex security environment encountered by the FMLN as they took office in 2009. This thesis then turns to the empirical findings of the research. Chapters Four and Five elaborate on the actor structures and security conceptualisations respectively. Each chapter draws out the thematic elements of their subject and maps them in the context of the theoretical framework. Chapter Six delves into the specific examples of policy efforts and outcomes at each level. Here, a short history of the case is given, followed by an account of the associated policies and programmes. Key operations or programme implementations are then assessed in light of stated policy aspirations. Each case is closed with analysis of the case framework in the context of the multi-scalar security environment and its contributions to security between 2009 and 2014.

Finally, the conclusion integrates the case studies and draws out important empirical findings for practical illustration as well as presents gaps for future study. One important conclusion is that although there are arguments to be made for multi-actor, multi-level security governance or ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege, et al., 2009), government by-in is essential in order for these spaces to function. They do not cede their authority but rather undergo a form of transformation. Existing government institutions, both municipal and national, have struggled to take full advantage of multi-level security governance frameworks. However, in the most robust instances, multi-level security governance frameworks can direct and lead transformative policy development and programming implementation.
Chapter 2

Security, Governance, and Innovation: Constructing theory
El Salvador’s citizen security policy: ‘The set of public interventions brought to fruition by different state (national, regional or local) and social actors to confront and resolve the risks and threats, concrete or foreseeable, of a violent and/or criminal character that injures the rights and liberties of the person in a particular space.’ (Smutt & Carsana, 2012, pp. 18-19)

2.1 Introduction

Dead bodies with gunshot wounds sprawled in public streets, tattooed bodies of snarling young men squeezed behind bars, and shady coyotes smuggling vulnerable children across heavily-patrolled desert borders are all popular images associated with crime and violence in Central America. From those popular images, we can extract ideas about what types of violence are at issue: the individuals who are experiencing insecurity; the (alleged) perpetrators of criminal activities; and the local geography or context in which this violence takes place. We can also extrapolate the basic laws that are likely in violation and the institutions responsible for enforcing those laws. However, these are only simplistic presentations of the complex issues of crime, violence, and (in) security which might be considered. Expanding the view frame, another set of actors and issues are brought into focus: the entities involved in making the laws that are being broken; the actors tasked with developing the policies and programmes that redirect potential offenders and provide the social supports for those in danger of victimisation; and the operators tasked with implementing the prevention of violence and the enforcement of the law. Furthermore, we can examine these same issues from other angles outside the sensational gaze, including: the underlying or source causes of violence; what issues can be considered as violence or a security threat; and the work of developing potential mechanisms to reduce and prevent violence. In considering these composite parts of the violence image, actor perceptions become critical for the configuration of the modes and instruments used to confront, reduce, and prevent – to govern – violence.

The aim of this chapter is to review the theoretical approaches to the governance of violence and security in Latin American context. Academic work on the region has explored extensively those links ranging from the interactions of governments to the daily lived experiences of individuals (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Cruz, 2010; Dammert, 2012; Hume, 2009; Jütersönke et al., 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; 2004; 2007; 2015; Kurtenbach, 2013; Ungar, 2011). Tulchin et al. (2003) study the relationship of citizen security to institutional and security reforms and production of public policies. They argue
that insecurity can ‘impinge on the quality of citizenship in democratic governance’ (Ibid., p. 5). Dueñas and Rueda (2011) expand on the changing nature of crime and violence to study it as a continuum of individual, community, and state. Goldstein (2015) repositions citizen security as a concept that has different meanings for its participants in ways that reorient the direction of the state, impacting both understandings of responsibility and action. In this way, theories of violence dovetail with studies in security as they are governed.

A separate security governance literature provides useful insights into how framed issues are confronted and managed but it often fails to engage with the practical governance outcomes. Issues securitisation and crisis governance theories largely overlook both the social conditions that underlie the practice (Balzacq, 2015) and what happens next (Bevir & Hall, 2013a; Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Furthermore, much security and securitising governance scholarship neglects to fully conceptualise the structural changes governance structures undergo to address ‘shifting paradigms of intervention’ (Moser & McIlwaine, 2014, p.4). Most important, governance literature in the context of security provisioning often argues that these structures arise because the governments themselves are unable to fully maintain a monopoly on violence, and are fragile, or failing (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2008; Jakobi & Wolf, 2013a; 2013b; Patrick, 2012). In other arguments, multi-level or multi-lateral strategies are born out of a security situation where the state is weak or impotent or where non-traditional security risks expand beyond a single state’s jurisdiction (Caballero, 2009; Lea & Stenson, 2007; Risse, 2011). However, Arias and Goldstein (2010) posit that for Latin America, at least, the sites of security governance and how security is negotiated is more important than statements of weakness, predicated on concepts of democracy formed in Western Europe and North America.

For this reason, the final section incorporates aspects of state transformation theory which explores non-traditional security governance that constructs governance structures on multiple scales to counter claims that existing national government and governance forms are inadequate (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Arias and Goldstein (2010) observe that similar adjectives from imperfect and illiberal to disjunctive have been used to characterise Latin American government institutions. They challenge these assessments. Instead, they propose turning the analysis to focus on ‘violence as an element integral to the configuration of those [democratic] institutions’, arguing the approach better reflects the relationships of civil society and violent actors have with different elements of the state (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L159; L494). By introducing violent actors to the governance...
continuum, they strive to unpack how this other set of actors ‘affect political practice at various levels of the polity’ including ‘the emergence of new forms of political order’ (Ibid., p. L505). Although not an explicit gap in Arias and Goldstein’s theories on violent pluralism, hybrid political orders (HPO) theory introduces International Organisations (IO) contributions into security governance discussions. Specifically, HPO scholarship explores the ‘multiple sites of political authority and governance where security is enacted and negotiated’ or where governance is found rather than where it is not (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, pp. 9-10). It tends to include multiple security providers, positing that these spaces allow the state to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity in a multi-scalar context where arrangements are determined by both supply and demand entities (Ibid). The significance of security governance at multiple scales, and with a diversity of actors, is contextualised with the expanded and changing concepts of violence and security.

This thesis uses the theories introduced above to discuss security concepts, actors, and scaled approaches in an attempt to move away from ideas of weak or failure in governance. It highlights that, although there is no neat theory to explain how crime and violence affecting security in Latin American states is governed in practice through formal actor efforts, it is possible to draw from across theories of Latin American violence and security governance theories to build an analysis framework. Bringing together these bodies of theory sets the groundwork for this thesis to join multi-level, multi-lateral (scalar) security governance structures to the implemented programmes that strive to change the violent daily experiences of El Salvador’s citizens.

### 2.2 Evolving Concepts of Violence and Security in Latin America

This section explores the key conceptual and theoretical components used to develop the connections between violence and security evolutions in the Latin American context. First, it follows the progression of security definitions as they evolved from a newly independent 19th century Central America state-centric iteration to a 21st century interconnected governance of transnational threats. Next, it focuses further on the human and citizen security concepts that emerged after the Cold War within a framework of securitisation theory as it structured the ‘new violence’ and ‘common crime’ of the post-war period. To close, the section turns to orthodox scholarly explanations for the origins, sources, and
responsibility of violent manifestations. All of these sections are essential components to the manner in which security is governed.

2.2.1 Connecting violence and security shifts in Latin America

The following review traces four distinct periods in the development of Latin American violence and security theory evolutions. Having covered several explicating branches studying violence above, still greater specificity is required when expanding the importance of violence for security development. In a context of violence, how is security defined, by whom, for what subjects? Violence is as diverse as large scale conflict and the personal violence of the home. Alongside violence, what is the associated security risk?

Traditionally, theorising security in the Latin American context is a task fraught with conceptual potholes not least because, like most of Latin American International Relations (IR), security knowledge has been on the whole, ‘practical, applied and policy relevant’ (Tickner & Herz, 2012, p. 92). The nation state sits at the heart of Latin American epistemological and theoretical forays, not least because from their earliest days as nations, they have had to contend with global colonial influences. This ‘strong and permanent presence of “the international”’ has been a conceptual dividing force with both positive forces seen to bring new ideas and negative forces through historical links to enfeebled states (López-Alves, 2012, p. 162). In this, the nation-state remains the primary referent in Latin America as evidenced by the fact that diverse security challenges from public insecurity to transnational criminal trafficking flows are all, on some level, associated with state institutional weaknesses (Tickner & Herz, 2012). Regional security debates have been further influenced by a low incidence of inter-state war balanced with high levels of intrastate conflict with, at best, challenged monopolies on the use of force (Ibid.). In other words, although Latin America has ‘stable state systems’ and ‘formal institutional frameworks’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p.5), many internal institutions lack the capacity to contest violence and provide security.

It is essential to articulate at least four distinct periods in the development of Latin American security thinking in order to understand the region’s contribution to wider security theory (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999; Tickner and Herz, 2012). First, geopolitical doctrine emerged in the 19th century with independence and state-building strategies. Rooted in its colonial past, violence became the tool of a hegemonic oligarchy as domestic state apparatuses were reconfigured to adhere to specific class agendas (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999). This was followed by a national security doctrine inspired by the United States’ influences but which carried over some key tenets from earlier geopolitical
structures (see for instance, Pion-Berlin, 1989; Galindo Hernandez, 2005). These military-dominated states have been by turns labelled ‘Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime’ (O’Donnell, 1979) and ‘Terrorist State’ (Rouquié, 1987) among others. However, the most accepted term used to describe state structures in this period has been the ‘National Security State’: ‘a professionalized military institution wielding a specific doctrine of national security that the subjugation of the citizenry to the state could be attempted’ (Mares, 2008, p. 386). Violence became a tool to aspire, challenge, and keep political power: ‘[it] was based on clear doctrinal guidelines and strategic notions, as in a genuine war, but its perverse effects were inevitable in the sense that internal warfare led to state terrorism’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 10). The military, during this period, was also assigned to domestic security functions or the maintenance of public order. The result, in addition to government-led war on civilian populations’ was that a typically Weberian definition of state sovereignty and national security was embedded into security thinking with a tenacity which outlasted the military dominance of the 20th century.

Following the end of the Cold War in a post-authoritarian Latin America, violence was democratised; appearing ‘as an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 11). This ‘new violence’ was the product of unresolved socio-political and cultural contentions of previous periods and antagonised by incomplete post-conflict institutional reforms weakening the rule of law (Ibid.). Public security followed in the immediate aftermath of war as a redirection of the neoliberal peace. Here, states that had been using violence against their own populations restructured to return to the basic security provisions of the neoliberal state. Cognisant of ‘new violence’ or ‘common crime’ on the rise that was perceived to extend beyond borders (Moodie, 2010), Latin American states began pursuing regional security arrangements to enhance cooperation to ballast institutional weaknesses.  

Latin America’s approach to the state and security shifted again, this time opting for a democratic security which continued to place emphasis on the state but with a distinct civilian focus as a means to inform their public security projects. New security and defence policies changed the patterns of civilian-military relations, although Pion-Berlin argues that the complex nature of the conversion has left scholars ‘justifiably sceptical’ (Pion-Berlin, 2001, p. 10). Democratic security is Latin America’s contribution to IR and

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4 State weakness was also a development of the early post-Cold War period in an attempt to explain conflict and war in the Third World interpreted as a function of the region’s historical interaction with the international system (Tickner, 2003, p. 347).

5 This period is often referred to as a ‘third wave’ of democracy after Huntington’s 1991 pronouncement.
security studies, with particular emphases on post-conflict institution strengthening; civilian autonomy and control over the military; and, increasing space between Latin American efforts and previously dominant American unilateralism (Tickner & Herz, 2012). Tickner (2015) further argues that democratic security located human need in its roots in a manner that preferred institutional development, democracies, and economies that fulfilled the basic needs of the people. In other words, democratic security appeared to further the neoliberal project whilst retaining a significant awareness for the individual residents of the state.

Leading into the 21st century, Latin America has entered a new period of theory development as it struggles to conceptualise domestic insecurity and transnational threats. The region raises a small but significant challenge to the idea of Human Security through its nation-state-dominated lens by pursuing both theoretically and politically the idea of citizen security. In part, the response is a natural one given that international security concerns, like the nuclear disarmament question, pose a challenge BRIC or core countries but pale in importance to the domestic security issues driving immediate public and state concerns for the everyday realities of small, violent democracies. Furthermore, this builds on the previous preference for democratic security as ‘a powerful discourse for talking about the affairs of the state and the duty of democratic regimes towards their citizens’ – a subtle but important distinction from human security’s responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine (Tickner, 2015). It is to these two concepts of security that this discussion now turns.

2.2.3 Redefining violent threats and security issues
When considering the rise of human security and the slightly later adoption of citizen security, the impact of a myriad of issues that can be constructed as a threat must be considered both in scope and scale. During these post-Cold War security iterations, ‘new violence’ and ‘common crime’ became structured as security threats through a process of what is generally called securitisation. Indeed, the development of human security took place in the context of the Copenhagen School’s rise which necessarily encompassed connections between crime, violence, and security. Goldstein (2015) argues that these two concepts represent both the individual lived experience as well as the practical programme of state formation. Both forms represent efforts to widen the conceptualisations of security and include a broad range of possible threats thereto. Citizen security focuses on insecurities incurred through the disruption of state responsibilities to its residents, often through criminal activity, as a new evolution of public security. On the other hand, human
security expanded to securitise a broad range of issues that impacted on the individual. However, in Latin America, it is citizen security that has been adopted and implemented widely whilst human security has remained a largely conceptual term. To unpack the reasons for this below presents important revelations on the nature of lived security in the region.

Human Security

Human Security developed as an important post-conflict term for the developing world. The language of human security encapsulates a wide range of applications, definitions, and terms. It is generally understood as ‘embodying a merger of ideas of development and security’ (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, p. 1) or can even be defined negatively ‘as the absence of threat to various core human values’ (Hampson, 2010, p. 231). In some interpretations, it represents that ‘our accepted definition of the limits of national security as coinciding with national borders is obsolete’ (Matthews, 1989 in Thomas and Tow, 2002, p. 177) because human security represents global interdependence. Emerging from several critiques of Traditional Security, the 1994 UNDP report stated:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. […] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. (UNDP, 1994, p. 22)

Expanding on the safety of the individual led to a vast number of proposals on the types of security which might be included. The UNDP model presented seven fundamental categories for consideration in security discussions including: economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political, and food. Furthermore, by engaging the development community in security discussions, crime, sustainable development, and policing join with the UNDP list under human security and it has been argued that this variety adds to the appeal of the term.
The 1994 UNDP report’s definition is also broad to the extent that it appears that there was a distinct disinterest in establishing specific boundaries and it states as much when discussing the ‘all-encompassing’ nature of the human security concept (UNDP, 1994, p. 24). It also recognised that many of the security threats to individuals in developing world regions are non-military in nature. Critical securities studies allowed for the need to move beyond interstate security considerations, allow the inclusion of security considerations outside of the military, and ultimately reconceptualise notions of power balance between zones of influence as the prime effective instrument of global powers. In fact, as Acharya points out, ‘the logic of accepting a broader notion of security becomes less contestable when one looks at the Third World experience’ (Acharya, 1997, p. 304). Here, the state becomes only one variable in the wider contemplation of the individual and multilateral action where ‘an effective human security approach requires coordination’ (Glasius & Kaldor, 2006, p. 12). Furthermore, whereas traditionally the role or responsibility of the citizen was to support the state in its interactions with the international system, in human security terms, the state must serve the people and promote their safety and wellbeing as the conditions for its sovereignty (conditional sovereignty). If the state neglects to fulfil certain internationally-set standards of human rights and security welfare, the basic standards of sovereignty may be called into question.

Human security not only enjoys popularity as a gentler, more inclusive form of security theory, it has in some ways benefitted from securitisation theory discussions in so far as any issue can be securitised. Whereas human security focuses on how security should be defined, the Copenhagen School has focused on ‘intersubjective processes’ as well as the potential political influences they may have (McDonald, 2010). Securitisation theory is good at explaining how a subject became defined as a security concern which defends ‘the move from a state-centric model towards a more multifaceted interpretation of security’ (Spence, 2012, pp. 189-190). However, the two branches of security theory do not sit equally well within the Latin American context.

Whilst human security often remains at odds with democratic and citizen security objectives, securitisation is a strong reality in practice and fits within the state-centrist region. In part, this divergent fit is a function of the democratic security concept, defined as a ‘[…] more encompassing and positive concept that prioritizes the needs of individuals to live in peace and to have access to the economic, political and environmental resources required for a dignified existence’ (Somavia & Insulza, 1990, p. 7 quoted in Tickner and Herz, 2012, p. 100). It is for this reason that Goldstein (2015) argues that citizen security
became a lived concept in Latin America whilst human security remained largely within the realm of scholarship. The move to prioritise the rights of the individual was not only an embodiment of practical thinking during a post-conflict transition but one which spurred the period’s institutional reform and civil-military relations literatures (Ibid.). Unlike in human security where *humans* are considered the referent object, the citizens of democratic security are imbued with a nation-state construction, and democratic responsibilities in addition to their stipulated rights. Given the aforementioned Latin American persistence of a nation-statist identity, democratic security became a powerful model for 21st century engagements with the structures inherent in security governance for the region and a unique contribution.

**Citizen security**

If democratic security is a structure to conceptualise governance, then citizen security may be considered the referent object. A post-Cold War security crisis across the region was based on real indicators and fuelled by media and rumour that provoked a new climate of fear and uncertainty (Hume, 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Moodie, 2010). Rebuilding states lacked the ability to address the security crisis and neoliberal reforms appeared to be reducing the capacity of state institutions typically expected to provide the basic support to a country’s members. It was in this environment, that citizen security really emerged – as an idea to provoke an image of the threat and the means to counter risk. The term’s organic growth took place within a specific historical context in response to the region’s need for theories of security which help illustrate their reality. Although citizen security did not appear in the 1995 *Framework Treaty* or in the Organisation of American States (OAS) 2003 *Declaration on Security in the Americas*, it has enjoyed steady growth in scholarship and national parlance since 1975, with exponential growth from the end of the Cold War in 1990, (Gómez, 2015). References to citizen security can be found in Spanish laws dating back to 1986 but it is its early impact on Spanish-language scholarship which is noteworthy (Arriagada & Godoy, 2000; Brysk, 2003; Carrion, 2002; Dammert, 2004; Rico & Chinchilla, 2002; Rivera Vélez, 2008; WOLA, 1998). Not only does the idea of citizen security feed into internal policy guidelines for police forces in Latin America, used to ‘generate a new vision’ to move beyond the repression of authoritarian-era institutions, but it drove literature on civil-police reforms, de- and re-militarisation of security operations, and research on public perceptions of security institutions.
This security paradigm therefore invokes government responsibilities from a time when
governments were just relearning what that meant. However, it extends to the individual
citizens themselves, implying that they have both rights and responsibilities of their own.
As such, it can be argued that the idea of citizen security in the post-Cold War era sought
to re-establish understanding of the rights and responsibilities within a democratic society.
Citizen security is emblematic of a post-colonial Latin America that sought to mitigate the
long state neglect of citizens, with a particular acknowledgement that certain sectors of
society were de facto second-class (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007; Peetz & Huhn, 2008). In this
perspective, citizen security is ‘used to establish a conceptual link between poverty,
exclusion, state failure and violence’ (Ibid., 2007, p. 12). Gómez observes that concept of
the citizen ‘resonates with the idea of (re)construction of their nation’s historical
articulation, and, furthermore, reflects in practice the actions of citizen security […]’
(Gómez, 2015, p. 34). Citizen security introduces considerations of rights and
responsibilities whilst it narrows the concept of human security’s ‘freedom of individuals
and communities from threats posed by conflict and violence to their physical, social or
cultural integrity or survival,’ (Ibid., p. 13); thus providing a unique location for the state
and the region to cover this extended range of threats and vulnerabilities. Violence in this
frame is seen as a state’s failure of its governance responsibilities.

Peetz and Huhn (2008) argue that citizen security has become a comfortable term for
governments and other actors due to its connotations of prevention and relatively liberal
approach to the violence and security facing Central America despite empirical evidence
indicating most countries’ citizen security policies are on the whole repressive with little
real consideration given to citizens. Call and Stanley (2001) term the division of
responsibilities as public security rather than citizen security thereby inclusively discussing
all existing security relationships within the borders of a given state but also allowing for
reference to individuals without specifically having to deal with precise borders. In the
context of post-civil war, re-stabilising societies, they discuss how the experience for
civilians is notably insecure, ‘often as an increase in violent crime’ (Call & Stanley, 2001,
p. 151). Thus, despite the widening definitions of threats, risks, and causes of insecurity,
most stay within demarcated perimeters when discussing security definitions, policies, and
strategies or a repackaged focus ‘in order to quantify what could be measured,’ according

Encouraged by the development-friendly idea of measurements contained within citizen
security, the UN has adopted the term in its Latin America strategy. Specifically, a 2009
United Nations Development Programme report for Latin America elaborated that citizen security is the principal form of human security and guarantees its fundamental human rights (PNUD, 2009a). This is not to say that citizen security is an unknown value in other parts of the globe but rather that it has gained almost universal acceptance on the continent and represents a contribution that Latin America brings to other regions, like south-east Asia. Citizen security is thus also a term that can be operationalised for policy building and programme formation. Arriagada and Godoy (2000), for example, note that policies in this frame have the potential to generate new, more integral approaches for greater citizen security beyond the typical control and repression tools. Policies developed under this theory framework would, they propose, lead to improved results in addressing violence and delinquency. In particular, after positioning violence and delinquency as ‘multi-dimensional phenomena’ they note that ‘there is a growing recognition of the need to carry out multidimensional programmes combining both control and preventive measures’ (Ibid., p. 123). Rivera Vélez (2008) argues that citizen security has expanded beyond narrow security institution or specific government entities to join a deliberative field comprised of a diversity of social and institutional actors so that politics, economics, and governance issues are acknowledged for their inherent security risks, complex relationships, and both domestic and international impacts.

Goldstein (2015) observes that this language has been adopted not only by scholars and policy officials but by average citizens as a means to identify their own rights and inform their struggle for the guarantee of those rights under a democratic rule of law. However, the term has also become significantly associated with policing within these states in a neoliberal turn on the interpretation of a narrow set of responsibilities of the state. Goldstein observes that barrio residents have used this language to challenge the state to do more in the basic provisioning of security (Ibid.). However, citizens also may take this one step further: ‘the perceived need to create citizen security seems to authorize people to take often violent measures to deal with crime in their neighbourhoods’ (Ibid.). Strangely, citizen security as an active concept may create more violent actors in an effort to implement security against the specific perpetrators framed by the term. An emphasis on rights, responsibilities, and laws in this approach to citizen security preferences security solutions to a defined set of issues, of which ‘the criminal’ becomes a primary source of risk. Goldstein notes that extrapolation on this approach also allows the state leeway to operate in spaces of exception in order to create the demanded law and order (Ibid.). Ultimately, this can create justification for the remilitarisation of policing in which security
forces use increasing violence against criminal risks (Ibid.). What was a term that emerged out of the desire to reference the individual and shore up the democratic rights and responsibilities of citizens within a state may prove to be a useful tool for increasingly hard-line policies. Indeed, the Latin American creation of a citizen security construct may lie at the heart of why these states are able to apply both hard-line operations and prevention programming as simultaneous endeavours.

**Perverse state formation and violent pluralities**

This violent space created by citizen security falls within Pearce’s ideas of perverse state formation where the democratic state builds its authority through the provision of specific types of security (Pearce, 2010). Similar to Goldstein’s interpretation of citizen security which presents the constructed violent threat of criminals as a primary security risk, Pearce finds that categories of individuals within the state fall outside the rights and responsibilities accorded to citizens to become non-citizens and justifiable if not legitimate targets of abuse (Goldstein, 2015; Pearce, 2010). Arias and Goldstein (2010) challenge the relationship of crime, violence, and democracy, arguing that violent pluralism ‘helps us develop a fuller conception of what relationships civil society and violent actors maintain to one another and to different elements of the state’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L494). Rather than a failure of the rule of law to which the state is supposed to respond, the violence enacted in public spaces may be an evolution from the cultural adoption of citizen security concepts. In this approach, Pearce’s non-citizens may still be considered citizens but they have different rights in a society that has a growing ‘tolerance for privatised violence’ (Ibid., p. L606). It is precisely these relationships that raise questions on the governance practices that unite these polity members.

As this section demonstrates, the evolution of violence and security in Latin America is intimately linked with situated conceptions on the nature of the state and its responsibilities. A post conflict peace-building enterprise initiated the broadening of security definitions in the name of rights leading to the development of a democratic security uniquely Latin American (Tickner, 2015; Tickner & Herz, 2012). At the same time, the emerging concept of citizen security appears to be a product of this understanding of democratic responsibility, becoming a conceptual framework, security measurement tool, protest platform, and response structure. As Goldstein concludes, it has further been culturally adopted as ‘a language for thinking and talking about security’ (Goldstein, 2015). Human security has never enjoyed the same level of engagement and remains
perhaps too nebulous to be of use in a region where security theory is distinctively practical and seeks to solve policy problems (Tickner & Herz, 2012). However, citizen security as a governance mechanism also opens the door to specific manners of operations and policy directions. Indeed, it may provide the justifications for specifically undemocratic acts in the name of security governance. It is to issues of governance that this chapter now turns.

2.3 From Government to Governance Hybridity

Citizen security expands the issues typically considered to be security threats within a conceptual framework of transgression against the rights of citizens. Diverse actors negotiate what constitutes those rights, who supplies the security to confront those transgressions, and what form those actions will take. However, how are these actors and the spaces they have created actually governed? What do these concepts of security and responsibility mean for policy? This section begins by introducing the government – governance continuum. It then discusses governance in multi-level and multi-lateral contexts followed by an examination of governance scholarship for Latin America. Building on the concepts of citizen security in the previous section, the governance discussion concludes with observations on the importance of scale and space in the analysis of violence, security, and governance.

It has become widely accepted that internal and external dimensions of security are inextricably intertwined between cities, states, regions and, to some extent, globally. How the governance of this security reality occurs in practice remains nebulous. Where government was once a narrowly specified assembly of activities with a set of authorised participants and privileged interests, the flexibilisation of institutional structures has allowed for the notion that the state is only one actor among many operating to provide security, conflict organisation, and social services (Boege, et al., 2009). Governance no longer represents just a synonym of government and little more than its basic definition as ‘a new process of governing’ (Rhodes, 1996). In its place, Hufty proposes that

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\text{G}\text{overnance does not presuppose vertical authority and regulatory power as the concept of “political system” and the traditional idea of “politics” do. It refers to formal and informal, vertical and horizontal processes, with no a priori preference. (Hufty, 2011, p. 405)}
\]
Despite the variety of meanings applied to the term ‘governance’ (Rhodes, 1996), the ‘baseline’ term makes reference to the ‘development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred’ (Stoker, 1998, p. 17). The first point of discussion is theory which addresses the necessary features that separate it from other conceptualisations. A second aspect to governance is analytical in how governance frameworks are recognised in a manner which confirms their existence. Are they constructed for purpose or do they emerge organically for specific issues and withdraw when those needs are met? Finally, there exists the normative aspect to the term which imbues judgement as to whether a particular governance approach is desirable, relevant, or significant (Piattoni, 2010). The governance concept became a framework for security studies analysis in this research to analyse the spaces important to security practice.

Mainstream realist and liberal approaches tend to deal best in known entities of governments or states and the international as represented by IO which limits their abilities to deal with the non-traditional security threats that comprise this thesis’ case studies. Hybrid and multi-lateral forms of governance allow greater flexibility and also provide analysis of practical applications which are not always a priority in the more traditional branches. Regional governance, like the international, is competent with its analysis of state systems and sovereignty (Oelsner, 2009). As is typical of governance literatures, however, regional governance places the state as only one of a range of actors which include civil society, regional and supranational organisations, NGOs, and private business interests (Grugel, 2005; Phillips, 2001; Oelsner, 2009). In order to properly consider the range of individual actors in addition to the entities contributing to security governance in Central America, social contestation-sensitive theories also need to be included here. Traditional realist, liberal, and constructivist labels tend to minimize these considerations. Thus, neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist approaches round out governance theories by presenting interests competition, ideological clashes, and relationship dynamics as they affect the ‘uneven, unstable and contradictory nature of governance outcomes’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2015, p. L.412). Ultimately, none of these sub-sections of global governance quite address the complex formal actor interactions observed whilst researching this thesis in El Salvador. The manner of operation and contestation perceived was neither as fluid nor haphazard as poststructuralists sketch and neo-Gramscian theory is more organised and coherent than the diversity of entities working on the plethora of initiatives allow.
Power dynamics can never be underestimated in the study of governance but whom or what wields that power is hotly disputed. Realist scholar Sterling-Folker is decisive in his pronouncement that ‘global governance will always be produced by the choices and actions of…relatively powerful groups’ (Sterling-Folker, 2005, p. 23). Groups in this case are more likely to be states because other entities are considered to lack authority and thereby lack power, rendering international cooperation improbable. Realist scholar Morgenthau illustrates the perspective in broad strokes: IO are mechanisms to be influenced and directed by states without changing the basic character of the international system (Morgenthau, 1967 as discussed in Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 46). Hameiri and Jones observe that realists ignore how different entities within the state ‘may have, and pursue, different interests’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2015, p. L.866). In contrast, liberal global governance scholars argue that cooperation is entirely possible because, whilst power matters, the rules and institutions which comprise global governance will provide restraint; entities will learn from these interactions and modify their behaviour accordingly (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Karns & Mingst, 2010; Tavares, 2010). A key difference from the realists is that undercurrents of domestic politics and vested interest may be essential for successful negotiation in international agreements (Linos, 2007). Neoliberalists like Keohane (1986) argue that cooperation is in the best interests of individual states and that these relationships become more productive over the long-term with regular interactions. Still, neoliberals tend to treat the public as a whole or as divided between those who seek to disrupt the system and the rest.

The international regime framework also falls within the greater liberal theory and their examination of issue areas where regimes have not developed is illustrative for two reasons. First, regimes are perceived as deliberate constructions intended to remove specific issues by creating ‘shared expectations about appropriate behavior’ (Hasenclever, et al., 2000, p. 3). However, the issue of studying where regimes did not arise indicates a lack of sensitivity to the region or topic specific regimes developed in a manner or with a structure outside of those conceived in core states. Furthermore, the focus on IO and institutions created in a formal capacity tends to limit analysis of state transformation in response to changing issues and climate demands. Constructivists acknowledge the socially constructed nature of state interests and the accompanying potential for state transformation through changing ideas and ideologies of individuals (Adler & Greve, 2009; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Norm changes, as instigated by activist individuals can successfully bring about change to an international issue and trench
a new manner of approach whether that is legislation, regulations, or behaviours. Institutions remain important in so far as they are the formal locus for the agreed-upon norms. Multilateralism is particularly important to this theory and underwrites support for contested actions like humanitarian interventions (Finnemore, 2003). Whilst constructivist theory is helpful to the overall argument in this thesis, in its acceptance of new forms of governance and the importance it places on the influence of individuals in international norms negotiations, it is not able to help illuminate inconsistency in results among issues acceptance. Hameiri and Jones correctly argue that issues framing and the empowerment of experts must be situated within the greater power and resource structure of the international (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Karns and Mingst add their concerns that, if individuals and experts hold the stated influence with IO or a state, the relationship could equally be pursued in a negative manner and contrary to the requests of their constituents (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 52). Thus, Neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist approaches to governance are more useful to empirical studies like this one.

Multiple references have already been made throughout this chapter to the idea of scale as a framing reference for interested entity interactions and governance mechanisms for security. Scale becomes especially important when referring to new forms of security risk or non-traditional security threats which likely expand beyond the bounds of the state (Hameiri & Jones, 2015); transnational criminal trafficking of contraband or persons, for example. Violence and crime may have nodes of expression that are at once both urban and trans-boundary. Furthermore, the multi-actor processes may address non-state actors causing governance issues through norms violation but may also include solutions from non-state actors as co-regulators or as executing implementation strategies (Jakobi & Wolf, 2013b). In Latin America, attempts to include non-state actors in the process of non-traditional security solutioning has realised a small but notable shift away from advocacy-led action into professional agencies paid to implement regulations, policies, or other strategies in what was once a typical government realm. This is not to say that non-state actors do not play a role in traditional security activities but rather that these roles have evolved. Jakobi and Wolf observe that previously non-state actors are likely to be brought in by fragile states where ‘governmental activity is weak, ineffective, or non-existent’ to compensate for a particular weakness (Ibid., p. 263). In emerging fields of security, non-state actors are more likely to be an integral part of the process where ‘state activity alone would not be effective’ (Ibid.). As such, not only are we looking at a rescaling of various parts of state governance operations but the creation of new spaces which consider
delegation a constructive tool rather than a resort measure. At the same time, non-state actor delegation has its own set of weaknesses, not least those of long-term commitment concerns, limited responsibility to the citizen population, and potential operations overlap.

Although both globalisation and regional security literatures have expanded the understanding of multilateralism to include non-state actors, they generally remain horizontal in their analysis and do not include sub-national or urban entities. Sperling observes that state responses to a range of challenges, both domestic and international, will have an impact on global governance cooperation (Sperling, 2013). However, Felício’s description of security governance as moving beyond the traditional security issues to ‘governance in a network that includes the different actors engaged in security’ is a descriptive definition which does not elaborate on the action that draws these actors together (Felício, 2007, p. 55 quoted in Lucarelli et al., 2013, p. 2). Lucarelli et al. observe that because a single sense of security governance no longer exists in practice, multilateral security governance illustrates the need for fluidity among different actors at various levels according to the demands of a specific security topic:

This implies not only a multilevel approach, but also a recognition that multilateralism involves the coordinated management and regulation of security issues by different kinds of non-state actors, such as global and regional organizations or non-governmental actors, that operate alongside state actors. (Lucarelli, et al., 2013)

Although non-state and non-governmental actors feature, power dynamics and competing ideologies embodied in individual power interactions are neglected; in this light, multilateralism remains more a system or set of process structures. In a liberalist sense, multilateralism or transgovernmental networks acknowledge internal state normative changes as a function of these operations but place this in a context of interdependence and unaccountable expert networks without considering the political implications (Hameiri & Jones, 2015; Kennedy, 2005). Even in Smillie’s analysis of human security in multilateral security governance, whilst addressing the ‘actual lives of ordinary people’, new multilateralisms focus on actor diversity as entities and not individual potential for changing the nature of the interactions (Smillie, 2006, p. 11). In answering queries as to whether actor individuals actively contribute to the production of governance or whether it is something that emerges as unintended consequences (Britz & Ojanen, 2009),
multilateralism falls short on both the breadth of potential sources for contributing actors and sociological/power dynamics as contributing variables.

Regional governance theories are sometimes included in multilateralism and have become increasingly common in conjunction with global and security governance theories in the post-Cold War period (MacFarlane, 2014). Others position regionalism as a kind of ‘decentred globalism’ (Buzan, 2011) or as ‘regional worlds’ (Acharya, 2014). In Ulrich Beck’s terms, ‘debounded’ risks, or in the more common ‘non-traditional security’, there are threats which are unable to be contained by traditional, territorial boundaries and so must be dealt with either on different levels or within different socio-political spheres – which may contain a great diversity of actors (Herz, 2014). Regions in this concept are a geographical frame of reference beyond the nation-state formed as a social space for ‘interactions that generate governance’ but they are also inherently state-led enterprises in a wider process involving both state and non-state actors with ‘several locations for authority’ (Ibid., p. 237). It is this multiplicity of actors that brings regional governance into the realm of multi-level or multi-layered governance. On the one hand, regional governance theory – including multilateralism to an extent – has grown as scholars discuss the erosion of the concept of sovereignty and see it as a limit on sovereign authority through policy and other governing mechanisms. At the same time, regional governance has been theorised as a mechanism whereby global governance institutions and core states can contribute to governance changes of a, usually, peripheral geographic collection of states. Conversely, states included in those regional governance bodies on the global periphery may use a regional governing body to leverage power to promote aligned interests globally to give them more political heft (Acharya, 2011). Therefore, the latter theory allows the collective to manage some interactions with externalities as well as structure issues-specific relations within the region (Nolte, 2014). Regions are also porous social entities which fluctuate in their official membership depending on national political will and bilateral conflicts between members (Weiffen, et al., 2013).

In Latin America, scholars have questioned whether, in the post-Cold War period, a proliferation of overlapping regional organisations, some of which deal only with security issues, is still evolving and strengthening security governance in a hybrid approach (Sanahuja, 2010) or whether fragmentation and hemispheric disintegration will result (Malamud & Gardini, 2012). In support of the first proposal, Riggiorozzi and Tussie argue that ‘regional governance is currently the result of a mosaic where different regional policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation and competition are
transforming the cartography itself’ (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012, p. 10). Both Malamud and Gardini (2012) and Comini and Frenkel (2014) perceive more problems and potential for hemispheric disjuncture in the multiple overlapping memberships enjoyed by various Latin American states. Regionalism is discussed not only in terms of cooperation or governance architectures but in terms of integration. In Central America, integration ideals are written into national constitutions as an idea for which to strive in what Caballero identifies as the Central American ‘binary identity’ […]:

a national and regional identity in which the latter is activated once national problems cannot be dealt with domestically […where] the inability of a country to find solutions to an issue at the national level may trigger the regional identity and thus lead it to search for answers at the bilateral or regional level. (Caballero, 2009, p. 56)

In other words, integration becomes feasible where the situation of crime, violence, and security necessitates joint action in the face of individual state weakness or impotence. However, in practice, regional activities take on a more functional, collaborative role through ad hoc consensus between elites (Malamud, 2002) and bilateral agreements between states (Grugel, 2004) but which avoid long-term binding agreements. Discussions of new regionalism, which took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Grugel, et al., 1999; Wyatt-Walter, 1995), considered integration ‘as a state strategy designed to minimize risks in the uncertain conditions of economic globalization by promoting activities at the meso-level of the region’ (Grugel, 2004, p. 605).

Approaching this idea from a slightly alternative angle, Caballero (2009) argues that individual Central American states will turn to regional integration and the potential strengths therein as a means of last resort. However, Nolte questions whether too much emphasis is being placed on the spectrum bookended by regional integration and regional cooperation within regional governance theories and instead proposes that new concept alternatives may be required to address something more structured than cooperation but less binding than full regional integration; Nolte proposes regional governance (‘gobernanza regional’) as the best fit (Nolte, 2014). Clearly defined, regional governance refers to international institutions/organizations and normative/ideational constructs as well as to the process that creates these institutions and norms. Regional governance is essentially, but not exclusively, based on
intergovernmental regional organizations. It is not restricted to a single organization but refers to the set of relevant regional organizations and their interaction patterns. (Nolte, 2014, p. 7)

As such, Latin American forms of regional governance do not clearly map onto European Union structures as structural transfer or copied architecture but reflect an independent trajectory where a proliferation of cooperative and competing regional institutions may continue political dialogue even in the face of divisions and competition (Ibid.). Regional governance debates are also framed within security governance discussions.

2.4 Operationalising Security Governance

At first glance, multi-level governance appears to be the vertical edition of multilateralism, concentrated on analysing policy- and decision-making strategies across different tiers of government. On the one hand, this analysis structure aids in discussing ‘internal and external dimensions […] which have become inextricably linked’ (Schroeder, 2011, p. 1). On the other, the term is deceptively simple and covers a multitude of agendas and levels of characterisations. In giving multi-level governance definition and variables through which it can be identified, the theory also poses questions as to its relevance and significance ultimately parsing potential state transformations (Piattoni, 2010). Typically accepted forms of state transformation through multi-level governance mechanisms include aspects of ‘political mobilization, authoritative decision-making, and institutional articulation’ and take into account politics, policy, and operational dimensions (Ibid., pp. 8-9). Thus, not only are the decision-making powers of institutions influenced by experts or advocates taken into account as in multilateralism, but the three ‘conceptual planes’ are analysed in relation to each other (Ibid.). This results in not only a top-down theory but one which incorporates below-up analyses as well as those from within the existing system. Issues of coordination, issue-steering, and both institutional and democratic accountability are raised as governance in practice. Although the national government retains ultimate responsibility for policy, each actor brings their own set of interests, networks, and ideologies or discourse-framing to the process (see Figure 1 below).
The above diagram is a schematic framework of variables influencing issues-specific multi-level interactions. Not only does it illustrate that the challenges of diverse actor goals and mobilisation interact with operational coordination and issues-development frameworks, it also attempts to place these interactions in a multi-level structure where issues interactions take place on multiple levels with a plethora of actors simultaneously along with the potential for overlap. These structures are not always organised nor formalised and so, as Flemes and Radseck argue for security governance in Latin America, these structures are ‘characterised by a higher degree of fragmentation and complexity’ today than during the Cold War (Flemes & Radseck, 2012, p. 6). Thereby, they include both inter-governmental and inter-entity interactions and relationships where municipal authorities have the potential to engage with supranational or IO for direct coordination on specific topics (Peters & Pierre, 2002). Furthermore, Marks argued that there was a distinct lack of attention to ‘flesh and blood’ actors, thus proposing the necessary addition of ‘real life’ through visions, goals, passions, and interests as a third paradigm ‘autonomous explanatory force’ in multi-level governance (Marks, 1992; 1993; 1996 discussed in
Piattoni, 2010, pp. 17-18). Hooghe focused specifically on multi-level structuring as a means for considering regional mobilisations (Hooghe, 1995). Elsewhere, these forces have been described as the ‘open method of coordination’ where research and innovation for policies can be conducted through ‘an informal organisational framework for mutual policy learning’ (Boerzel & Risse, 2001; Kaiser & Prange, 2004) or as a form of policy transfer (Radaelli, 2000).

In many European cases, multi-level governance has not been found to significantly challenge the overall pre-eminence of the central state authority even as sub-national entities actively join and contribute to a multi-level polity (Scherpereel, 2007). However, multi-level governance efficiencies remain questionable and many policy results are non-binding and so, in the European case at least, its strengths remain greatest when applied to the definition of targets or as a basis for policy learning and transfer (Kaiser & Prange, 2003). A particular benefit of multi-level governance theory is its perspective on polity structuring which, taking its basis in cohesion theory also spans different levels of analysis with the frustrating result that numerous literatures spanning governance, state transformation, international relations, and policy-making need to be included in this analysis (Piattoni, 2010, pp. 22-23). In particular, state transformation or restructuring as developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001; 2002) and Hameiri and Jones (2015) attempted to define new spaces within intergovernmental relations. In summary, multi-level governance takes place on several plains. It is an analysis of the theoretical mechanisms of governance: ‘a diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation among formally independent but functionally interdependent entities that stand in complex relations to one another’ (Piattoni, 2010, p. 26). At the same time, its analysis must also be multi-levelled because the very interactions exhibited by multi-level governance raise different types of questions about ‘politics, policy and polity’ (Ibid.).

Multi-level governance has also proved capable of examining state-society or public-private relations within a regional context, most typically the EU, as a ‘composite polity’ (te Brake, 1997). Tarrow draws connections between the multi-level EU interactions of state-society relations with early modern Europe where leagues of cities or city states saw jurisdictional overlap with political and ecclesiastical institutions but where ordinary people could occasionally ‘exercise influence over their fate’ (Tarrow, 2001, p. 242). As such, ‘regional governments, political parties, and even social movements are reaching across territories to increase their leverage against both national states and supranational authorities’ (Ibid., p. 243). It will fall to the empirical chapters in this thesis to provide
analysis on, (1) whether and in what manner multiple levels of government are simultaneously involved in security policy development; (2) to what extent non-governmental actors both civil and private are included at different governmental levels and whether their contributions are given greater weight at one level or another; and, (3) whether these processes noticeably impact the outcomes (after Piattoni, 2010, pp. 83-85).

Multilateralism, regional governance theories, and multi-level theories overlap in their attempts to conceptualise governance architectures involving a broad range of actors. Each body of literature attempts to make sense of a specific political space as coordinated solutions are sought for specific issues. As has been demonstrated, each has its own approach to the analysis of contributing entities but it is the multi-level governance theories which expand on the social-power dynamics in a manner which will be particularly illustrative for the empirical chapters of this thesis. The role of regional organisations in multilateral and multi-level structures also has particular consequences for a Latin American, and Central American, security agenda and so it is to security governance that this discussion now turns.

2.4.1 Security governance

Security governance, building on the changes of processes, conditions and methods of governance, is a concept but also a tool for analysis and understanding the policy developed within and across specific socio-geographic spaces or governance structures. Within security governance, as in almost all governance theories, it is immediately obvious that it has been developed, on the whole, for the European Union and the trans-Atlantic community. Chanona (2011) opens by stating that he is ‘adopting the regional security governance model […] for the study of the European Union’ for his work on the Organization of American States (OAS); many others have done the same, exporting EU-style theories and mechanisms into other regional contexts (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Some scholars have gone so far to declare the EU as an ‘ideal case’ for security governance theory (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007b; Wagnsson, et al., 2009; Schroeder, 2011). Thus, the field is both complicated and limited in the richness of its theory by its EU-style governance framework; explaining this further, Hameiri and Jones note: ‘when looking for security governance elsewhere, the absence of EU-style multilateralism is taken to indicate an absence of security governance’ (2015, p. L.731). Other scholars posit that security governance is not a full-fledged body of theory in and of itself but rather a ‘heuristic device’ with core characteristics as well as numerous contributing structures or variables that can be highlighted or minimised as required (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007b).

Nonetheless, the field is useful for its engagement with and challenging of the nation-state
and associated top-down military security. Security governance allows for greater engagement with and framing of the numerous mechanisms which may once have been exceptional measures but now figure regularly in a multi-lateral security environment.

First, security governance challenges realist and liberal perspectives on security management in the global arena (Bevir & Hall, 2013). Like other forms of governance theory, it expands the circle of actors included for consideration in security discussions and also examines the informal and flexible working structures (Ibid.). Security theory allows for spheres of domestic security including governments and non-government actors to be considered in conjunction with the international sphere and its linkages with NGOs, international institutions, epistemic communities, and others (Krahmann, 2003). The literature includes dynamics of security policy development and sketches relationships between different actors and forums. In a world where the concept of human security and universal norms were growing in acceptance, security governance emerged as a sort of ‘common purpose’ or a ‘normative consensus’ to which a universal good could appeal (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). From the inside, whereas security policy was the work and responsibility of governments, security governance is often used to point at the shortcomings of the nation-state, at frail, fragile, or failing states which require other sources of authority - usually outside itself - in order to maintain security, and at transnational risks too large for the state alone. Globally, security is no longer just security studies or international relations; it combines with social science undertakings and includes public administration theories and policy development theories in a move towards state transformation theories. Thus it remains flexible enough to allow for both governance without government but also governance by governments in overlapping contexts (Zuern, 1998). Thus, within the security governance literature, security is not only contested as a concept but the manner in which security is provided and created has been increasingly diverse.

Security governance rose to prominence in the face of increasingly varied security policy literature as expanding security issues challenged states as the primary providers of security both domestically and in the global realm. It has been explored in both globalisation and cosmopolitan theories since the end of the Cold War and particularly within responses to perceived growing interdependence of international systems. Multilateralism found security governance to be a useful tool in approaching the security portion of various inter-cooperative agencies whilst regional, multi-level governance literatures added security to the number of issues addressed across vertical networks in an
‘enforced cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2006; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006). In particular, it has highlighted the fragmented approaches to security taken within the EU and in other security communities around the world (Adler & Greve, 2009). Constructivists and poststructuralists stress the social meanings and discursive construction of security threats, as in securitisation theory, that provides the structure to security threat perceptions and resulting policy responses in a manner which rejects the ‘apolitical, neutral description of an objective reality “out there”’ (Ehrhart, et al., 2014b, p. 150). However, Ehrhart et al. (2014b) argue that this accepted approach to security governance has been too functional in its mapping of security arrangements, discussing actors and their contributions without identifying its essential characteristics. Instead, they reframe security governance as ‘a critical tool’ which allows scholars to better understand the practices of security provision.

A significant observation is that the majority of security governance literature attempts to engage in problem-solving rather than critical analysis; the mapping of trends to respond to non-traditional security threats rather than the analysis of its characteristics – its prerequisites, structures, and consequences (Ehrhart, et al., 2014b). As one example of this security governance as a critical tool, Adler and Greve (2009) take the theoretical constructs of ‘balance of power’ and ‘security community’ and focus on their mechanisms as structures in regional security governance; they examine the consequences of overlap between the two. They explain their rationale as such: ‘by focusing on the overlap of different kinds of security governance systems, and the practices that go with them, we may be able to get a better idea of the structural determinants of security policies’ (Adler & Greve, 2009, p. 62). Out of this, states and non-state actors together have begun to construct new practices, both formal and informal, and fragment into ‘coalitions of the willing’ for participation in institutions as well as the formation and adoption of particular policies or strategies.

The ‘new security governance’ as termed by Bevir and Hall (2013) is evidenced by the changing roles and functions of key security institutions (structure, consequences). Additionally, it is evidenced by the changing responsibility divisions between public and private actors, networks which now work in conjunction ‘to build policy coordination through persuasion and norm-setting’ (Ibid., p. 27). Bevir and Hall argue that the theory has expanded beyond the typical EU focus to become global in its scholarly focus, acknowledging the strategic partnerships and informal networks at play in diverse regions. However, by expanding security governance literature particular concerns arise over democratic responsibility and accountability to the citizens and other residents in the
geographic or conceptual area for which the governance is responsible. Like other literatures on governance, an immediate concern in this section is affording too much responsibility and decision-making power to non-democratic entities, expert networks, or private entities. Some theorists note with concern the trend towards security governance, even those including multiple level networked interactions beyond multilateralism, because of the perceived reduced influence. Indeed Lea and Stenson (2007) argue that these state-responsibility reductions have been associated with the rise of non-traditional governance powers ‘from below’ including the appropriation of state security functions by non-norm conforming entities like criminals, gangs, and other terror-style operatives. In this way, security governance is not democratised influence but rather ‘state displacement’, the participation of non-state actors is seen as a weakness rather than with the typical assumption of strength in approach diversity. Thus, the ‘assurance, prevention, protection and compellence’ positives are balanced with concerns over democratic deficit, limited or negative efficiency, and non-norm conforming influences. However, despite the concerns of non-norm conforming entities with ‘bottom-up’ influence, most of such frameworks are considered positive for their multi-conceptual perspective that allows for issues-specific concerns to be addressed and are particularly endorsed by the EU who sees the inclusion of a broad range of society-based actors as a means to diversify implementation and oversight mechanisms (Aris & Wenger, 2014; Grugel, 2004).

This section ends with comments on the problems created by security governance with its focus on the regional context. In core scholarship, when diminished state responsibility is observed, either through actor diversification (liberalisation of state responsibilities) or through state weakness (generally considered the domain of the periphery or non-core countries), the typical response of theorists is to look for security governance changes at a supranational collaborative level (Risse, 2011). Sub-state entities and actors are generally considered only in as much as they contribute to state-level dialogues or regional bodies. Non-state actors are thought to be particularly relied upon in those cases where regional or global institutional mechanisms have not yet been fully developed. The exceptions to this are where the governance of violence and crime in addition to security is considered. Jakobi and Wolf (2013a) discuss these threats and this diverse actor base in terms of International Relations – linking the change to the inclusion of human security concepts – and of domestic security governance through the balance of national and individual security threats. In particular, the ability of non-state actors to act as social-service providers in spaces of limited state power represents sub-state actor responsibilities in
numerous security environment examples. It is through their delineation of non-state actors that sub-state or urban security gets a toe hold in the wider field of security governance.

Herr (2013) examines security governance as it reacts to armed conflicts within the territory of a single state. She notes how, in the context of International Humanitarian Law and other international laws applicable to armed conflict, the main implementation mechanisms are still state-centred. As compliance at the territorial state and local levels have almost always been difficult to achieve, Herr proposes that the recognition of armed combatants, individuals, and groups in some capacity encourages their compliance and that the inclusion of non-governmental actors such as NGOs can sometimes bring about compliance through their roles as intermediaries (Ibid.). In introducing two forms of non-governmental actors – non-norm conforming combatants who transform into norm-implementers and norm setting actors who act as intermediaries or even co-regulators in the transformation process – Herr demonstrates just how difficult the conceptualisation of non-security actors can be. Within the very small urban security governance literature, similar questions are raised as to who authorises security and who should be authorising or taking responsibility for security (Froestad & Shearing, 2012). Froestad and Shearing (2012) question whether security governance can be established as a local, community-based enterprise whilst still respecting liberal democratic governance ideals. Indeed, much of their questioning challenges the premise that citizens can be ‘legitimately engaged in their own security governance independently of state agencies such as the police’ (Ibid., p. 4). For private security, the answer is yes, with Abrahamsen and Williams stating that ‘cities are prime sites for the emergence of new forms of security governance that span the global-local and public-private divides’ (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011, p. 174). Yet they observe that similarly classed security actors can have very different effects in different locations, complicating the analysis of multi-actor security governance in their urban case studies. Security governance literature engages widely with multi-actor, multi-level structures with the majority focused on regional and global efforts to include non-government actors. Local urban security governance scholars add a focus on knowledge and capacity of non-governmental actors emphasising innovative initiatives which contain great potential for failure but also for transformative change at the local level. Bringing these two bodies of literature together will allow for questions of democratic oversight as well as for the potential contributions of local security governance models to national and regional policy development to be considered.
2.5 Security Governance through Hybridity and State Transformation

Having introduced citizen security as a central concept for understanding the context of security governance in Latin America, this chapter now turns to pose questions of what does citizen security – security governance look like in the context of policy making practice? The contributors to security governance are diverse and ‘violently plural’ ranging from traditional state actors, civil society representatives, citizens including non-norm individuals from gangs and organised crime, to international organisation representatives and foreign governments (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). The spaces in which security governance are plotted are contested by those actors in the appropriate scale at which they are managed from the contextualised local to a broad regional strategy (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). What emerges as security policy is a product of those spaces of contestation. From one perspective, this process necessarily takes place when state institutions lack the capacity to maintain a full monopoly of violence and its management. ‘Fragility’ or ‘failing’ are typical terms used in this case to reference the inability of a government to respond, provide social support, and control violence (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2008; Patrick, 2012). However, as Arias and Goldstein (2010) argue, a reorientation in approach can liberate discussions from a preponderance of failure discourse.

This section introduces two final theories which can illuminate the security governance discussion. First, hybridity allows an analysis to begin from multiple spaces of governance simultaneously. Because it represents a framework built from the perspective of the end-user, it creates a means to combine in-depth research at the local level with a view out to national and regional power relations (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 17). Second, a state transformation approach (STA) considers the politics of scale where actors contest and recreate scales of governance to fit the security problem. This returns to the idea of security governance created within a violent plurality, going some way to answer questions about the potential development of different types of institutional and non-institutional frameworks that may lead to new governance spaces.

An institution involved in security governance and policy formation in El Salvador, the UNDP, describes that country’s citizen security policy as a series of negotiated interventions:
First, the above quote confirms Goldstein’s argument that citizen security has shown ‘a marked regression to older authoritarian conceptions’ (Goldstein, 2015). Yet, it also highlights the tensions found in hybrid political orders (HPO) that arise where diverse actors negotiate a set of agreed-upon policies rather see them implemented in a top-down fashion. On the one hand, this definition fits well with Luckham and Kirk’s hybrid framework. It brings together development and security in a manner which highlights the contested nature of the state’s monopoly of violence where ‘diverse state and non-state security actors coexist, collaborate or compete’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 1). This framework lens particularly focused the consideration of end-users in the national/global equation where they critique concepts of human and citizen security for struggling ‘to capture security’s contextually contingent meanings in fluid and complex multi-levelled regional, national and local contexts’; an activity that cannot be separated from the exercise of political power (Ibid., pp. 3; 6). Security, the governance of which is intrinsically multi-levelled, becomes deeply linked with rights, entitlements, responsibilities, and obligations. Therefore, a state hybridity framework is less likely to resort to references of fragility, weakness, or failure and less likely to see security governance structures as a one-way process (Call, 2008). The focus of HPO theories on the state-sharing of authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other entities challenge governance as ‘a collection of loosely coordinated and constantly changing processes’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 8).

Hybrid governance frameworks suffer from both security mismatches and a potential to overlook state powers in favour of negotiable governance arrangements. Meagher argues that hybrid frameworks may fall into the trap of celebrating chaotic fragmented governance (Meagher, 2012) while Goodfellow and Lindemann claim that many perceived hybrids may fit better with the description of ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Goodfellow & Lindemann, 2013). The scholarship has also favoured African empirical cases for its development with a distinct focus on traditional authority structures to complete hybrid structures which have limited resonance in state-centric regions like Latin America (Boege, et al., 2009; Boege, et al., 2011; Meagher, 2012). For this reason, the state transformation
approach (STA), which keeps the state at the fore of transforming policy networks, provides a stronger framework for cases such as El Salvador.

This approach looks at new, post-national governance responses which also go beyond the Latin American nation-state case, but which nevertheless provides some useful mechanisms for analysis. Specifically, they consider the ‘politics of scale’ where government and non-government entities challenge the appropriate level or scale at which a security issue should be considered, addressed, or managed. To do this, entities claim that existing structures are inadequate to deal with the evolving security concerns and so ‘construct new modes of regulatory governance at other scales’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2015, p. L.1278). Significantly, Hameiri and Jones argue that this does not involve shifting authority to other levels of government but rather restructuring or rescaling specific components of the state to allow for greater integration or collaboration within new spaces of governance:

The scale at which any issue is governed is not natural or pre-given but, because it privileges different societal interests and agendas, is always contested. (Ibid., p. L.1297)

The spaces and scales of security governance in these complex security environments of traditional and non-traditional security issues are therefore the product of struggles between contending or competing entities resulting in state structural transformations. Still, national political elites often remain the most visible and readily accessible component entities in the design and implementation of security issues.

The challenge here is to understand how the formal and informal relationships work in the scales or spaces created for that purpose. It has been developed here that the HPO lens (Luckham & Kirk, 2013) and STA (Hameiri & Jones, 2015) are illuminating components in the study of how security is governed in practice. Specifically, they aid in the construction of an analysis framework that perceives multiple levels of security governance analysis as being ‘mutually constituted, not merely as separate levels of analysis’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 10). Both provide alternative interpretations of state institutions to move away from predisposed terms like ‘fragile’ to alternative interpretations of institutions that work outside a privileged western gaze. Instead, they focus on the contextualised knowledges and modes of operation that make these spaces distinctive. However, both remain problematic with conceptual gaps. Furthermore, both approaches are sensitive to the social contestations that drive governance change across
multiple scales, allowing for the context to be considered an important variable. In this way, these theories compliment the study of citizen security and security governance to give form to places, networks, and actors thinking, talking, and living security and what that means in the context of a Latin American state.

2.6 Conclusion

The preceding theoretical discussion demonstrates that security governance in a Latin American context of citizen security employs a violent plurality of actors to frame its concepts, its structural forms, and practices. In discussing the connections between the conceptualisations of violence and the shifts in thinking on security, it becomes evident that these concepts are not solely constructed but are contextualised in a historical political reality. In following the broadening of security in the post-Cold War period through citizen and human security, the influence of violence on government institutions and public perceptions is illuminated. Particularly, the linking of citizens to the myriad of civil society, non-state, traditional, and international security actors becomes important in the context of institutional reforms. The evolution of violence and security in Latin America are intimately linked with situated conceptions on the nature of the state and its responsibilities.

In introducing the concept of governance, this chapter next emphasises the necessity to move beyond arguments of institutional weakness or failure to locate the scales and spaces where security is governed in practice. The framework of multi-level or multidimensional governance as producing multiple spaces where formal actors collaborate to govern security outcomes provides the groundwork for later elaborations on hybridity and state transformation theories. For the first group of governance theories, the existence of multiple levels of interaction or across sectors does not entail that a state government has ceded its responsibilities but that it allows other forums for the governance of evolving security challenges that require additional input. However, its formality is at odds with the sometimes ad hoc reality observed in the Latin American security context. In other multidimensional governance theories, the space is created because the state is weak or impotent to address its national security threats. Or, finally, non-traditional security threats have become a regional or international phenomenon that cannot be address solely by a single state.
However, Arias & Goldstein (2010) challenge this perception of fragility arguing that rather than a government failure, other types of spaces developed, including those with non-state violent actors. Most important: due to the contextual nature of institutional hybridity and transformation, new contributions are required from the Latin American context – in particular regarding the application of citizen security which remains an important Latin American driver. El Salvador presents a unique opportunity for exploration both because of its geographical context and because of the policy and programme efforts made by the new government to change the traditional approaches to security governance. Specific gaps have been identified in the literature including the paucity of security governance scholarship addressing how this mechanism functions in practice for multi-level, multi-lateral formal actor networks within a single country.
Chapter 3

El Salvador’s Past with Violence and Security: Following an evolution of violence in historical context
3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the history, dynamics of violence and insecurity, and security policies introduced prior to the 2009 presidential elections and victory of the FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes in El Salvador. It begins with the foundations of political violence in El Salvador’s colonial past leading to a period of dictatorship and, finally, civil war that was brought to an UN-negotiated end in 1992. At the turn of the 21st century, the security situation had not substantially changed from the immediate post-war period. A combination of citizens’ demands and political expediency postulated greater public security through the targeting and punishment of those responsible for that violence. In result, subsequent presidential campaigns focussed on perpetrator framing and promised to respond with hard-line Mano Dura policies. From this point, the rise of gangs and their political framing or ‘securitisation’ as a public threat is brought into relief through an analysis on violent government responses between 2003 and 2007. This chapter focuses on the origins, constructs, and policies addressing crime, violence, and insecurity that were introduced, primarily between 1999 and 2007, as well as the actors and institutions involved in those decisions. The aim is to provide a backdrop for the empirical reality, cultural constructs, and on-going processes of violence deconstruction upon which the actor interactions in later chapters are predicated.

3.2 Origin Narratives

Armed violence for El Salvador did not originate in its urban spaces but rather on its small countryside holdings and its coffee-growing mountain faces. Its history of conflict emerged from a population frustrated by unrealised dreams of development, oligarchic manipulation, and periodic military takeovers. This section touches on the early colonial period including the 1932 peasant uprising and government-led massacre that followed, La Matanza. It then examines popular mobilisation contributing to the outbreak of civil war between military-government forces and those coalescing opposition coalitions eventually forming the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). It concludes with the negotiated Peace Accords in 1992 which led to a violent peace. What it represents is an historical basis for the state struggle to monopolise the legitimate use of force during the early post-colonial state formation processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Centeno, 2002; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Oszlak, 1981). The result is a context of long-term conflict driven by the ‘systematic exclusion of the “masses, castes, and classes”’
It is a basis for the origins of violence in history replicated over generations and with a continuous pattern to the present.

In 1856, El Salvador's elite used their control of the government to force mestizo and indigenous communal farmers off the mountains through strategic legislation. Those farming communities that had been able to resist the initial push were later removed outright in the early 1880s through even stronger legislation that outlawed communal holdings (Booth et al., 2015, p. 138). Booth et al. quote the 1929 *La Patria* editor in describing the evolving power associated with coffee cultivation: ““The conquest of territory by the coffee industry is alarming. It…is now descending into the valleys displacing maize, rice and beans. It is extended like the conquistador, spreading hunger and misery, reducing former proprietors to the worst conditions—woe to those who sell!”” (Ibid.; also see, Montgomery, 1982). Societal relations were dominated by violence. Landowners feuded through personal *peones* or small armies ‘so that merely personal differences were often resolved violently’ (Holden, 2004, pp. 58-59).

Vacillating coffee prices and pliable political institutions helped wealthy elites expand their controls over production (Pries, 2007). A secondary goal of land privatisation was to turn peasants into ‘productive, individualistic entrepreneurs’ according to historian Lauria-Santiago (discussed in Moodie, 2010, pp. 22-23). In the countryside, the long-term result of these privatising strategies was a Marxist-influenced movement demanding land reforms more favourable to *campesinos* or peasants. In urban areas, it created a surge of nationalist fervour against colonialist American, British, and Canadian involvement in key industries including the energy sector (McFarlane, 1989). Decreasing export demands in the 1930 Great Depression drove low coffee prices leading producers to cut the already-meagre wages of their employees. Rising public frustrations culminated in 1931 with a change in government structure from oligarchic government to a military-led institution. The political and economic failures paved the way for Augustín Farabundo Martí to lead a peasant uprising against the elite.

*La Matanza*, the emblematic massacre of some 30,000 individuals, most of whom were peasants rather than insurgent activists, took place in January 1932. The event entrenched the popular view that state security institutions ‘served to protect the interests of the rich against the threats posed by the poor’ (North, 1990, p. 166). It further served to create a lasting illustration that the governing entities had little care for the lives of their fellow citizens and foreign entities preferred enforced security and stability to civil and human
rights (Pries, 2007, p. 104). One observer argued that the repressed movement had been a popular mobilisation to ‘release them from [the] slavery’ of low wages and poor working conditions (Canadian Commander Brodeur quoted in Nikiforuk & Struzik, 1981, p. 7). Others have since interpreted the uprising as failed hope for democracy in action; ‘it is also a story of the first experiences of popular sovereignty and democratic hopes in El Salvador,’ claims Moodie (2010, p. 22). Nonetheless, the event’s power remains strongest among those who see it as a founding myth – of class warfare challenging state institutions in the pay of the oligarchs or a cautionary tale of what happens to those who organise. Its sounding call echoed in the 1960s and 1970s as workers’ unions, religious organisations, and peasant movements organised a second time to challenge socio-economic and political inequalities among the people of El Salvador.

Through the mid-20th century, in the aftermath of La Matanza, state-sponsored forces felt at ease with the use of violence against civilian populations. In 1967, the National Democratic Organisation (Organización Democrática Nacionalista: ORDEN) was established with members recruited from the peasantry and working classes. Its purpose was to grow support for the government and ruling elite whilst working to suppress peasant organisation by advocating members inform on community dissidence (Pries, 2007). However, as Booth et al. report, the organisation developed a feared reputation by ‘murdering organizers of workers, peasants, or political opposition’ (Booth et al., 2015, p. 143). Hume observes that the participation of as many as 300,000 citizens is indicative of a broader trend of violence as constituted and reproduced through social relations (Hume, 2009, p. 55). Specifically, the activities of ‘bodies such as ORDEN suggests that non-state violent actors are not new in the region and the particular patterns and depth of violence in El Salvador owe much to the widespread use of civilians’ (Ibid.; also, Lauria-Santiago, 2005). The government strategies were as much about creating fear and dividing populations as they were engaged in the targeting of specific objectives (Hume, 2009).

Elections in 1972 proved a turning point. The Christian Democrats (Partido Democrática Cristiano: PDC) and the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora: UNO) were led to victory by José Napoleón Duarte on a democratic reform platform. However, the military’s fraudulent intervention inserted Colonel Arturo Armando Molina as president in place of Duarte provoked the first significant popular uprising since the 1932 massacre (Shayne, 2004). Molina (1972-1977) and his successor Carlos Humbert Romero (1977-1979) responded with heavy-handed repression, killing an estimated 200 UNO supporters in the capital and driving PDC leaders out of the country (Booth et al., 2015;
Dunkerley, 1982; LeoGrande, 1981; Prendes, 1983). The death squads that began operations in the mid-1970s were alleged to be comprised of ORDEN members operating in conjunction with regular security forces (Booth et al., 2015). Operations were such that official homicide statistics increased significantly from under 1,000 annually in 1965-1966 to almost 11,500 in 1980 (Ibid., p. 144).

The severe repression against civilians convinced many than agricultural and other reforms discussed under Duarte’s leadership would not be pursued in the political arena. In result, disaffected political participants turned to amassing guerrilla groups and grassroots community organisations (both rural and urban) to demand economic and social reforms through increasingly frequent mass demonstrations. Right-wing groups increased attacks on those perceived to be a threat to the established state order. Molina further sanctioned this ad hoc campaign of official government action and para-groups to attack ‘subversives’ from the Catholic Church and those providing support to documentation of human and democratic rights violations (Dunkerley, 1982). These actions in many ways proved to be ‘the first steps towards the implementation of a “national security” campaign against communism’ (Ibid., p. 108). In return, San Salvador’s archbishop, Oscar Romero, denounced the training of civilians within communities across the country to kill their neighbours (Hume, 2009a). The tense standoff culminated with the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980. Thereafter, Romero became a focal point motivating opposition groups and a challenge to the privileged, wealthy elites with whom the Latin American Catholic Church had once been aligned. Instead of dismantling a perceived threat, the assassination provoked left-leaning political-military organisations to band together, forming the FMLN guerrilla force which promptly declared war. El Salvador’s conflict thus has its roots in the immediate unequal social and economic structures of the 20th century and, with few available alternatives, factions resorted to violence to push for change (Dunkerley, 1982).

What was to follow was 12 years of civil war. The war itself depended significantly on international contributions. After 1979, hard-line parties, the military forces, and elite business interests aligned with the government to drive the war effort. They were supported with over USD6 billion by the end of the war by successive Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations (Booth et al., 2015, pp. 146-147; Moodie, 2010, p. 34). The Reagan

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6 Government, non-government, labour, and private sectors had met with the National Agrarian Reform Congress in January 1970 although campesinos and the rural labour force were not invited and their representatives ignored (North, 1985). One priest, Father José Inocencio Alas, presented on behalf of rural workers and was kidnapped a few metres from the Assembly shortly thereafter in result; he was later released after Bishops intervened with the Minister of Defence (Montgomery, 1983; Prendes, 1983).
administration, at least, was aware that these forces were responsible for a large part of the conflict-related violent deaths that were grabbing headlines because they requested the military, police, and ORDEN reduce their activities during the period the US congress was considering military funding renewals in 1983-1984 (Ibid., p. 150). Over the course of the war, the United Nations Truth Commission found that up to 80 per cent of the estimated 75,000 deaths were attributable to these military and paramilitary sources (Comisión de la Verdad, 1993; Torres-Rivas, 1997, pp. 209-226).

In response to the fraudulent political processes and rising military-driven violence, many disaffected political participants turned to guerrilla groups and grassroots community organisations to push for economic and social reforms (Pries, 2007). The five guerrilla groups that agreed to operate collectively from 1980 on under the FMLN increased their military capacity along with the strikes and protests effectively. The war allowed guerrilla forces to activate a new form of networking with international institutions, media links, and civil society organisations. They mobilised counter-consensus activist networks that developed a ‘cosmopolitical’ approach to international issues with powers grounded in new forms of international laws (Pries, 2007). Successfully applying International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in a non-international armed conflict also meant that the guerrilla forces gained more acceptability among foreign governments. Mexico and France recognised the group’s legitimacy as a belligerent force. However, international support also worked against them. Nicaragua’s backing to the Salvadoran opposition forces was used by then US President Jimmy Carter as justification to send another USD 5 million to El Salvador’s military forces (Moodie, 2010, p. 34). The conflict continued without negotiation until 1989. After a short FMLN siege of the capital, San Salvador, in November of that year, during which military forces massacred six prominent Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter, at the Catholic university, both sides recognised they had reached an impasse. The end of the Cold War also changed the US stance on negotiations, encouraging El Salvador’s warring factions forward to peace.

The FMLN factions and the Salvadoran government, led by ARENA President Alfredo Cristiani, engaged in UN-mediated peace negotiations over two years. Given that the military had directed public security and entities, like the National Guard later charged over forcible suppression of protests and labour movements, the negotiations focused on the creation of a new public security (Amaya, 2006; Holland, 2013). The FMLN negotiated the demilitarisation of the police that would be subordinate to civilian authorities and the resulting 1992 Chapultepec Accords outlined detailed measures for the National Civil
Police’s creation, composition, and control (Call, 2003; Call & Stanley, 2003; Popkin, 2000). Wood calls the power of FMLN insurgents in the negotiations as democracy ‘forged from below via a revolutionary social movement’ (Wood, 2000, p. 5). Post-conflict transition scholarship hailed the peace process as an international success of mediation and a healthy example of demobilisation (Allison, 2010; Boutros-Ghali in Moodie 2004; Burgerman, 2000; Call and Stanley, 2001; López Pintor, 1999; Montgomery, 1995; Sriram, 2004). The UN pronounced the peace a Salvadoran success and an example of well-structured demobilisation. However, analysts of the democratic transition were unconvinced as the resulting political settlements and transition processes exhibited ‘decided mixed results’ (Arnson, 2012, p. 385). Researchers from this period frequently recorded the refrain, ‘estamos peor que antes (We are worse off than before [the war])’ (Moodie, 2010, p. 13; also see Hume, 2009; Rodgers, 1999). The Peace Accords had brought an end to war but they had failed to address the inequality, agrarian reforms, and economic disadvantages that had mobilised insurgents against the country’s authoritarian institutions (Hume, 2009; Pearce, 1998; Popkin, 2000). Other aspects of institutional reform like changes to judicial institutions and criminal laws were less concrete than those negotiated for the police, causing confusion and often abandoned before full implementation could be achieved (Holland, 2013; Popkin, 2000). Thus, a cessation of hostilities may have been achieved but the causes of conflict remained.

3.3 A ‘Violent Peace’: Salvadoran (In)security

The construction of peace in El Salvador is responsible in many ways for shaping the violence that followed in its wake. Montoya (2010) argues that it remains unclear when the political violence that began the civil war actually began and, despite signed peace agreements, when conflict-related violence ceased if indeed they have at all. Pearce suggests that the persistent violence in the face of the peace process also worsened state-building capacities (Pearce, 1999, p. 53). Agreement-mandated institutional reforms were improperly or incompletely implemented. These spaces, which Koonings and Kruijt name ‘governance voids’, provide opportunity for modes of violence to continue unabated; ‘violence is seen as a normal option with which to pursue interests, attain power or resolve conflicts’ (1999, p. 11). Indeed, El Salvador is only one of the many in a Latin American region where weak democratic institutions, crime, and violence go hand in hand. Post-peace institutional reforms did not bring the expected panacea, incompletely implemented as they were. Amidst the failure and disappointment, common crime, criminals, and their
violence became a threat upon which many could agree; that ‘it was worse than the war’, was a refrain which united many. This section will examine the failure to build a new and more peaceful society before breaking down the measures used to discuss crime, violence and insecurity in El Salvador.

3.3.1 Incomplete reforms and more complete neoliberalisation

The Peace Accords instituted a broad range of reforms that were heralded as a UN success story. Hopes held by the people of El Salvador, however, were far from fulfilled. Redress of historic inequalities, improved political participation, agricultural reforms, and economic development were only partially achieved or thwarted by entrenched elites that maintained a hand on power. Public order was the dominant theme of the peace accord reforms of which the National Civil Police (PNC) were considered one of the ‘cornerstones’ (Call, 2003). In the final agreement were terms through which a purge of security personnel would take place, the two legacy security bodies would be abolished, and a new civilian police force under civilian control would be established. It also made provisions to investigate past abuses and issue a truth report on its findings. Out of a total 118 outlined items to be implemented with established deadlines, 81 or 68.6 per cent referred to demilitarisation activities (Macías & Ramos, 2012). National defence and public security functions were placed in separate institutions, limiting their scope. The military forces were required to relinquish control over public security mandates and intelligence networks entrenched within government institutions were intended to be dismantled. They were further required to dismantle existing civilian collaborator networks (Cruz, Fernandez de Castro, and Santamaria, 2012). A reformed civil police was given control over that public security within the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Legal frameworks to cover their areas of responsibility, functions, and operations were developed. Donors were also happy to target these institutional restructurings with their aid programmes as the efforts had almost immediate evidentiary-bearing results (Call, 2003).

Nonetheless, the reforms encountered some serious roadblocks. Limited financial resources often slowed working processes and strained necessary equipment updates. Although the Peace Accords had stipulated that the national police would be responsible for public security until the PNC was up and running, the old training school also continued to function, producing new members of the soon-to-be disbanded order (Wade, 2016). This meant that until 1994, the national police received up to a third more budget than did the new PNC (Ibid.). Disputes also continued over the nature of the new public security model, despite it being one of most detailed sections of the Peace Agreements. As
such, the delay of institutional purges and induction of new police and military officials significantly impacted both effectiveness and capacity to address basic public security functions. When the reforms did take place, Call and Stanley (2001) contend that the drastic downsizing of security personnel across the board, from 75,000 to 6,000 played a short-term role in increasing crime and violence across the country. Weaknesses of internal control mechanisms were partially to blame as the institutions attempted to coalesce incoming personnel. The resumption of death squad activities was evidence of the early lack of control which the government enabled (Wade, 2016). That it proved reluctant to investigate the suspected security personnel behind the killings in 1993 also proved to be a major stumbling block. Reforms did impact public perceptions and support for the new force institutions but the honeymoon lasted only a short time as by 2000 64 per cent of polled respondents felt the PNC was losing the support of the population that had risen to 45.9 per cent in 1995 (Hume, 2009, p. 66). Responsibility for public order was thus limited by internal weaknesses and continuing corruption.

Relegation of social justice reforms to the last days of the negotiations necessarily limited their scope and later proved to be a contributing factor to El Salvador’s post-war violent peace. In particular, the neglect of judicial and penal systems seriously affected the state’s ability to cope and respond to criminal activity as well as to address entrenched impunities. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a statement five years into the peace process lamenting the ‘persistent deficiencies in the judicial system which have contributed to its lack of credibility with the general population’ (Report of the Secretary-General, 1997, par. 22, quoted in Popkin, 2000, p. 197). The criminal justice system also lacked significant reforms and continued to involve drawn-out court cases and extended pre-trial detentions which served to exacerbate prison conditions (Popkin, 2000). It was not until 1998 that the new penal code designed to modernise the criminal justice system was passed. Even then, resources available to various institutions to fulfil functions and coordinate operations were insufficient (Wade, 2016). Justice failures were such that some citizens were provoked to ‘(re)arm’ (Saint-Germain & Chavez Metoyer, 2008). Some of these were fighting forces that had been demobilised in the aftermath of peace but whom had yet to be resettled or find alternative employment, leading them to resort to criminal activity (Ibid.).

Aggravating the situation was Cristiani’s progress on neoliberal reforms which brought in significant structural adjustments (Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010; Saint-Germain & Chavez Metoyer, 2008). The Salvadoran president had begun implementing the economic programme when he took office in 1989 with the help of the Foundation for Social and
Economic Development (FUSADES). Hume notes that this model was ‘incompatible with the goals of peace-building’ (Hume, 2009, p. 63). Nonetheless, Cristiani’s position during negotiations was that structural economic reform policies were not up for debate and the FMLN did not challenge this stance (Wade, 2016, p. L1041). Whilst the economic reforms drew early praise from around the world and promoted impressive short term GDP growth, the programme failed to invest those structures that would have facilitated the conversion of a population from war to peace (Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010). It produced new dimensions of social inequality in already dire conditions whilst flexible wage and labour regulations increased precariousness which kept individuals compliant and led to the emergence of the ‘new poor’ – or provided them with new incentive to turn to crime (Moser & McIlwaine, 2004). Peace Accord measures which might have mitigated some of these issues like a Foro, a space intended for government, business, and labour to address socio-economic concerns like labour rights, were defunct almost as soon as they were created (Wade, 2016). The instrument had been supported by the FMLN to start debate on issues that had motivated them to conflict a dozen years previously. One commentator observed that the private sector understood the risks the Foro presented to promote transformation debates ‘so it killed it’ (Ibid., p. L1230). Indeed, from a perspective of power and opportunity, there were few changes between the consuming control of elites and the social order of a large under-paid class from before the war.

### 3.3.2 A post-war crime wave

Galtung (1995; 1998) argues that reconciliation is an essential part of post-war peace-building. However, peace process reforms and an UN-sponsored Truth Commission failed to resolve the underlying issues dividing Salvadoran society. Continuing allegations of corruption and human rights abuses within the PNC combined with entrenched economic inequality culminated in a space where violence and fear ‘reached the stage of mass production and mass consumption’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999, p. 15). Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer explain that multidimensional analyses of democracy find that ‘on-going human-rights abuses perpetuate “societies of fear” rather than “civil democracies”’ and it was this situation that emerged in El Salvador (Saint-Germain & Chavez Metoyer, 2008, p. 210 citing Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Caldeira & Holston, 1999). Wade notes that empirical evidence illustrates that a post-conflict rise in violence is not out of the norm but rather expected within a population that has long been divided, is facing a vacuum of institutional control, and has a continuing accessibility to arms (Wade, 2016). Thus, that El Salvador’s
crime indicators spiked in the aftermath of the negotiated peace agreements, broke the hopes of many individuals expecting something more, but was generally to be expected.

Media reports, public perceptions, and growing support for vigilantism entities meant that more than half of the population felt more insecure in the aftermath of peace than during the war itself (Cruz & Gonzalez, 1997). Observers and scholars considered and largely abandoned the idea that this violence was a direct continuation of the political violence of civil war. Rather, this ‘new violence’ appearing seemingly without pattern and targeting everyone in a ‘democratization of violence’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999; Torres-Rivas, 1999). Moodie reflects that ‘the violence of the postwar period, apparently unmoored from any sense of deep motivation, any possibility of redemption, would become mere scandal’ (Moodie, 2010, p. 47). Thus, direct causes of this violence in mid-1990s El Salvador has no single answer but rather explanations are nebulously comprised of unresolved conflict motivations, continuing socio-economic marginalisation, and a history of the use of violence to resolve conflicts. Academic discussions (as discussed in Chapter 2) would class these as the historical structural model, the failed democratisation project leading to a weak institutions model, and a persistent sociological culture of violence. For El Salvador, the post-conflict violence trend undermined popular support for the nation-building project. Not only would crime be ranked as the greatest threat facing the country consistently in public opinion surveys between 1993 and 1999 but by 1996 almost half of the population felt individuals could take justice into their own hands, given the provocation (Call, 2003; Moodie, 2010).

Government and UN national crime statistics confirmed peoples’ perceptions of the period; rates of homicide and other violent crimes were increasing. One study reported El Salvador’s homicide rate had reached 139 per 100,000 in 1996 although others suggest that the figure may have been nearer to 80 (Call, 2003; Moodie, 2010; Wade, 2016). Both figures placed the country among the most violent in the world, second only to South Africa (Ibid.). However, whilst many Salvadorean blamed continuing structural problems for the increasing crime risks in the 1990s, they did not believe strict laws would result in crime reductions despite supporting those same laws (Holland, 2013). The wave of violence, climbing as it did in the aftermath of El Salvador’s first post-peace presidential elections in 1994, also scared the new ARENA government into action. In 1996, the national legislature passed a series of emergency measures, including: to quicken legal processes against criminals, to allow youth to serve their sentences in adult prisons, to increase the harshness of penalties, to reintroduce military contingents in policing.
operations, and to establish the framework for crimes of ‘illicit association’ (Holland, 2013). The laws were the subject of much criticism by donor agencies who saw the reactionary measures as undermining the post-war judicial reform projects. The government bowed to pressure and repealed the measures a few months later but it was this first crisis management legislation that provided the blueprint for later attempts at *Mano Dura* in 2003 and 2004.

### 3.4 Gangs as Scapegoats: Insecurity, expediency, and politics

Residents of El Salvador identified everyday criminal violence in the country as a ‘problem […] precisely after the war, when peace was declared’ despite evidence indicating endemic violence over long decades (Moodie, 2010, p. 47). The problem became ‘violence [which] has a social focus, violence has a face’ (Interview with PREPAZ-Official: 2012). This ‘face’ illustrates the everyday violence of the interpersonal (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004; Moodie, 2010), the domestic (Hume, 2009), and the delinquent (Arana, 2005; Rodgers, 2009). The saleability of gangs and their potential to be the violent risk at the next street corner meant that citizens singled out violent groups as their primary villain and one which requires a tough response from state institutions. Carothers argues that, in the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, there was a rush to structural reforms which were based on a ‘disturbingly thin base of knowledge at every level’ (Carothers, 2003). This section will first examine how gangs were constructed as a threat in public perceptions. It will then study government gang policies between 2003 and 2007 to draw out a baseline for substantive discussions in later chapters. This section covers both security concepts, the formal and public actors engaging with those constructs, and early policy outcomes to present the accepted means and modes of security governance prior to the timeframe of this research.

#### 3.4.1 The construction of a gang presence in El Salvador

El Salvador’s street gangs were not a post-conflict phenomenon but, rather, appeared as early as 1963 (Wolf, 2011). As such, the dominant gangs of the current era, *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13) and the *Barrio 18* (M-18) were present and active during the time of the peace negotiations in 1991 (Ibid.). Confirming this established presence, a 1993 survey of Salvadorans reported that almost 50 per cent of those polled acknowledge a gang presence in their neighbourhood (Wolf, 2011). Over time, spaces had been divided and
claimed as aligned territory to be defended against rival gangs. Although gangs began as groupings of youth of close residential proximity in typical street fashion, their ease with violence, intimidation and criminal activity fomented a ‘threatening atmosphere’ in host communities (Wolf, 2008, p. 2). Gang affiliations during the early period numbered in the hundreds but turf wars, growing structural cohesion, and the forced return of affiliated individuals from the United States after the war, consolidated group identifications.

Part of this growing structural cohesion emerged as a result of migration between the United States and El Salvador following the civil war. Strict migration laws in the United States during the 1980s forced many Salvadorans who moved northward to do so in a clandestine manner. Those who landed in urban areas like Los Angeles lived, for the most part, in marginalised communities with established street gang cultures. MS-13 and M-18 affiliation grew whilst a strengthened US deportation policy in 1996 meant that members were sent back to their countries of origin in the years after the peace accords. Individuals who had been children when they left Central America were returned to places of which they had few memories or connections. The dominant gang narrative supports the above development trajectory although some have challenged the narrative, arguing that whilst US-originating gang members may have solidified factions; most groups are home-grown, embedded in the community fabric of the marginalised communities in which they reside. Whilst some commentators tie the gang problem to historic trends, a government security advisor noted that homicides did not rise immediately but that problems really began ‘in 1996’ (Interview with MJSP Policy Advisor: 2012). Nonetheless, in the post-conflict period, both local and internationally identified gangs grew in their visible and psychological presence in marginal communities and urban informal settlements, thus fitting the requirements of a new societal threat.

Jütersonke et al. (2009) observe another line of argument blamed rapid urbanisation in the late 20th century for the rise in criminal violence and gang structure solidification. This direction of analysis points to favelas and informal settlements or marginalised urban slums for both the situation of greater violence in the city as well as the gang structures which emerge (discussed in Jütersonke, et al., 2009). The urban – violence causal relationship is also popular with geographers who examine push-pull factors for rapid growth of city-ward migration patterns to ‘social and ecological disequilibrium’ (Ibid., after Brennan, 1999). Others observe a conflation of on-going social issues and inequalities in the local contexts from which gangs emerge along with antagonistic government anti-
gang policies as the sources of greater gang development and structural solidification (Cruz, et al., 2012).

3.4.2 Gang framing

As Salvadoran society settled into the post-conflict transition, violent incidents and crime indicators rose, inciting among the population and its governing elite a search for ‘new’ sources of violence. Furthermore, in contradiction of existing data indicating a wide range of causes, politicians were eager to assign violence to easily targeted and identifiable sources. Hume astutely observes, ‘Violence does not just ‘happen’, it is defined, interpreted and legislated: who and what we fear is constitutive of who we are’ (Hume, 2009, p. 137). As such, in its management of violence during the 2000s, the Salvadoran state was content to rely on ambiguous notions of potential threat rather than systematic data (Ibid., p. 136). Gangs thus began to feature prominently in public discourse, political strategies and media reporting. These groups became the visible, violent, and ‘anti-social’ targets of the post-conflict period.

One line of scholarship argues that public perceptions of the dominant role of gang members in criminal violence influence the selection of security risks as well as the policy directions which result. Huhn notes that, over time ‘there is an inflationary trend in Costa Rican, Salvadoran and Nicaraguan newspapers to report on crime, violence, and insecurity and that these mass media sensationalize insecurity’ (Huhn, 2008, p. 6). Although Huhn, et al. conclude that they cannot decide with any certainty ‘whether [media] patterns of interpretation are produced and reproduced in other spheres of public discourse’ (Ibid., p.28), opinion polls are sometimes observed to follow media trends. Dammert and Malone (2006) note that victims are more likely to support Mano Dura policies whilst Hume (2007) contends that perceptions of insecurity can result in significant citizen pressure on governments to adopt repressive measures. Misinformation on the part of the media and government representatives also aided in consolidating negative connotations later used in the formation of strong, repressive policies. Cruz et al. argue that ‘the media has

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7 Although gang discussions the world over label such activities as ‘anti-social’, Rodgers and Muggah challenge the term, arguing that gangs by virtue of their territoriality and institutional continuity are social organisations which often have a relationship with their local communities in Central American context (Rodgers & Muggah, 2009).

8 In fact, a great deal of misinformation exists over the extent and influence of gang-related crime. Hume (2009) notes that, whilst President Saca attributed 50 per cent of homicides to gang activities and the press attributed a similar or greater percentage, there was little concrete evidence to back up these figures. Hume’s research also found that police sources only attributed around 30 per cent of violent action to gangs (Hume, 2008). The debate is on-going as, in January 2012, President Funes argued during a speech that up to 90 per cent of homicides and street violence could be tied to gang activities. A 2012 truce between the two main
exaggerated their presence, inflating a phenomenon that is, by its very nature, sensationalist’ whilst ‘governments have inflated the numbers of gang members or suggested possible links between them and terrorist groups […] in order to justify heavy-handed policies’ (Cruz, et al., 2012, p. 319). This interpretation of the perception / reaction relationship suggests at least a moderate public feedback dynamic with public media.

Framing gangs as a security risk was facilitated through the statements and support of key international actors. Hume (2009) highlights the importance of the post-9/11 terrorist trend on public security discourse and observes that, in conjunction with members of the international community, there was a conflation of global terrorism worries with the national gang presence. Members of the international community, led by the United States, fostered these concerns through diplomatic comments as well as through funding for anti-gang measures, with the US State Department commenting, ‘We consider that maras are the greatest problem for national security at this time in Central America and part of Mexico’ (Bruneau, 2005, p. 5) whilst US military analyst Mainwaring warns of gang connections with international terrorist groups (Mainwaring, 2004). Thus, by the end of the 1990s and definitely into the early 2000s, the Salvadoran government had attempted several haphazard attempts to introduce legislation against youth violence within this wider set of inferences. It was not until 2003, however, that formal and strategic repression was instigated at the hand of then President Francisco Flores. Central America, state Cruz et al., ‘declared war on gangs’ (2012, p. 332).

3.4.3 Government anti-gang policies: 2003-2007

Following state institutional history, the typical, post-war response from authorities to security challenges remained a repressive, hard-handed action – especially when facing the country’s street gangs. This has been typical not only of El Salvador but of most of Central America where authorities in Honduras and Guatemala also chose to come down with swift militaristic operations against criminal groups. This section presents the framing of a security concept, the production of laws, and operational outcomes for the ARENA mandate of President Antonio Saca. This case represents a clear example of securitisation theory where gangs were framed as a risk in crisis for political ends. To entrench this discourse, the ARENA government implemented laws and policing strategies which solidified the securitised framing with popular support.

rival gangs, however, resulted in a 50 per cent reduction in homicides, indicating that activities may be closer to the previously proposed numbers in the media and by Wolf (2011).
In 2003, a few short months before the presidential elections, President Francisco Flores announced a brash new set of anti-gang laws and policies, known as *Mano Dura*, and framed them as the solution to violence in notorious gang communities. Authority positioning of gangs as a majority source of violence and crime over the late 1990s and early 2000s smoothed the way for repression as not only the best way forward but actions which constituted ‘a matter of state pride’ (Flores, 2003 expressed in Hume, 2009, p. 142). Flores announced the plan with fanfare, stating ‘It is time we freed ourselves from this plague [of gang violence]’ (Ibid.). The plan had been modelled on a similar contemporary policy implemented by then-Honduran President Ricardo Maduro. Honduras’ administration authorised joint military-police operations on public streets, devised ‘illicit association’ penalties for suspected gang ties, and reduced the age at which children could face prosecution as an adult to the age of 12 (Wade, 2016). Flores’ Salvadoran announcement was made in one of the country’s most notorious neighbourhoods, known for its gang activities; he was accompanied by the police on one side and the military on the other (Barrera, 2015).
Hume (2009) and Wolf (2011) highlight the strong links between this new policy and the electoral advantage it created in the months leading up to the presidential elections. Flores’ right-leaning ARENA party had been behind in the polls until the new policy’s introduction. Right-left party competition on security solutioning combined with internal party politics and elite influences turned security into a tool used to bridge over weak economic issues to satisfy dissident factions (Holland, 2013, p. 53). ARENA, with the aid of US officials, created a spectre of a potential rift with the US if the FMLN was successful at the ballot box (Wade, 2016). Supposedly at risk were the millions of US dollars sent home as remittances by migrants each year (Holland, 2013). This reached the traditional FMLN base of rural poor and urban marginal classes dependent on the funds they received, accounting for almost a quarter of the population according to a pre-election poll (Wade, 2016). However, just prior to the election, US congressional representatives spoke out, labelling the FMLN a ‘pro-terrorist party’, augmenting concerns that former guerrillas were prone to align with El Salvador’s criminal elements (Holland, 2013; Wade, 2016). The security threat construction with gang violence invoked strong reactions amongst the electorate. On the strength of Mano Dura’s popularity among the general public, ARENA regained its lead; Mano Dura made winning political sense (Wolf, 2011, p. 58). In this perspective, ARENA’s early security goals included crime reduction through a comprehensive, preventative approach which included more social involvement and international cooperation. In the face of weakening election prospects, it chose instead to consolidate the security portfolio under its direct responsibility through Mano Dura making it a government-focused responsibility and positioning themselves as the best party to direct repressive actions (Ibid., pp. 60-63).

The FMLN, human rights organisations, and the Salvadoran Human Rights Ombuds office (PDDH) voiced critical concerns with the plan to little avail. Indeed, Mano Dura-type policies have few supporters in referent literature. Domestic critics, such as Oscar Bonilla of the National Council on Public Security in El Salvador (CNSP), worried over the
dominance of imprisonment measures in the policies; tactics that resulted in crowded prisons without the benefit of rehabilitation (Bruneau, 2005, p. 7). Carranza also listed several fundamental issues with both the first and second anti-gang laws (LAM) (Carranza, 2004). First, the law reproduced points already contained in the Criminal Code resulting in duplication, thus negatively affecting justice transparency. Second, the law could not be applied across the board as minor offenders still fell under international agreements like the Convention on the Rights of the Child and national youth offenders’ provisions. Furthermore, the law was considered, and ultimately challenged, as unconstitutional because it countered Article 12 of the Constitution – that all accused have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Actions taken to implement the LAM also resulted in the oversaturation of the criminal justice system, negatively impacting on both individuals and on penal infrastructure. Finally, as Carranza correctly argues, this law was solely constructed to enact punitive actions rather than being an integral piece of legislation allowing for preventative or rehabilitative actions (Carranza, 2004).

President Antonino Saca’s win aggravated existing political polarisations in the country. His term in office was framed by various iterations of anti-gang legislation, the re-introduction of military patrols as backbone components of policing operations, and blaming the FMLN for persistent security threats. Opinion polls reflect that many citizens continued to support Mano Dura for years after its implementation, despite the growing evidence of its ineffective results and counter-productive impacts. At the same time, when new President Antonio Saca’s government proposed even tougher measures through the introduction of Super Mano Dura the following year, general support was low. These reforms again granted power to security forces to conduct stop and searches without cause, to arrest suspected gang members on the strength of their potential affiliations as identified by tattoos and clothing items, and strengthened minimum sentencing for convicted gang members (Seelke, 2011). The replacement policy was written to overcome the human rights legal challenges levelled against Mano Dura but retain profiling and arrest strategies (Wolf, 2008). In time, the government dropped Super Mano Dura under the guise of the need for effectiveness re-

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9 However, although established to suggest solutions to security problems, CNSP has never had much impact in practice due to the presence of many former FMLN members among its senior officials, limiting their exposure to ARENA elite.

10 Over 20,000 individuals were arrested in one year under Mano Dura although Hume notes that there was a percentage arrested on multiple occasions but released due to procedural issues and a lack of proof. Later legislation required some sort of proof and also issued harsher sentences which caused an exponential rise in the Salvadoran prison population (Jutersonke et al., 2009).
tooling. In its place, the government quietly instigated modified policies that targeted gang leaders rather than relying on major operational sweeps with mass arrests.

None of these plans indicated any serious intention to develop a comprehensive gang policy beyond a particular favouring of suppression over other approaches (Hume, 2008). This assessment was also the basic argument of a 2007 report issued by the National Commission for Public Security and Social Peace which called for revision of existing meagre approaches. The Commission argued that in order to make any real headway in combating violent crime, comprehensive policies were required at the national level that were sustainable through the long-term (CNSC, 2007). They called for the adoption of a coherent criminal code to improve enforcement procedures; greater and more dependable resources; the incorporation of more violence prevention plans and activities into policies; and the improvement (strengthening) of related institutions to facilitate greater competency in investigations, transparency, and accountability (Ibid.).

In her study of right-leading politics in El Salvador, Holland concludes, ‘conservative party leaders are more likely to implement Mano Dura policies when the left resists militarized security policies and defends individual rights’ (Holland, 2013, p. 45). Pearce (2010) classifies this method of governance as ‘perverse’ state formation where a state seeks to increase their legitimacy through the securitisation of certain groups. Building democracy on popular fears, Pearce observes that state actions framed through violence ‘enabl[e] the state to build its authority not on the protection of citizens’ rights but on its armed encounters and insidious collusions with violent actions in the name of “security provision”’ (Ibid., p. 286). The image that emerges is one where multi-actor, multi-level security governance is not a given governance evolution in either the European Union-like collaboration-building form nor in the weak or fragile state form. Rather, the process is flexible and may expand or contract, along with concepts of security, depending on the complex interests, ideologies and issues-framing discourse employed by the dominant actors of the day.

In summation of the reasons for which Mano Dura policies emerged in El Salvador, three aspects stand out (Holland, 2013). First, crime rates in a post-peace era required control measures. Second, public opinion in the aftermath of the peace agreements was increasingly concerned about the violence that citizens still perceived in their neighbourhoods, communities, and homes. Finally, the conservative ARENA political ideology looked positively on criminal repression as a means of response. Political
expediency in how security matters help win or lose elections also was an attractive feature. However, between 1990s and the early 2000s, Hume (2009) observes that public opinion data itself changed in its causal perceptions of violence. *Mano Dura* proved simple and influential. Where in the 1990s individuals perceived economic and social motivations behind ‘common violence’ and moderated response demands accordingly, in the 2000s, demands for more authoritarian responses were the norm (Amaya, 2006; Hume, 2009). Holland maps perception data and finds that bumps in demands for authoritarian responses to criminal violence are highest in the aftermath of political promotions of *Mano Dura* policies (Holland, 2013, pp. 49-52). As ARENA activated this political power, they won elections. It was in learning from this and applying a modified strategy that the FMLN too was able to achieve a victory whilst fighting a campaign against a hard-on-crime party. Crime and violence prove to be not just threats to insecurity but powerful tools in democratic processes.

### 3.5 Conclusion

How citizens perceive crime and violence has significant implications for how they interact with their environment and how they demand that these risks be addressed or governed. This is a process constructed through experience, history, and conceptualisation. To inform how security is governed requires an examination of how this environment came to exist, both in its material and constructed contexts. In this chapter, I have reviewed the historical roots of violence and its dynamics in a post-conflict state. I have argued that the processes by which this violence is constructed is essential to the understanding of the rise of gangs and their framing as a problem central to the security governance of the 2009 society. Gangs were not framed as a security risk solely by the government but it does retain a primary role in the promotion of that symbolic threat construction; its responses, central to the continuation of a deeply divided society. However, through this historic analysis, I also draw in the importance of non-state actors in the construction of unequal power relationships and entrenched repression. Citizens were important components of a system that targeted violence not only on political opponents but on society’s public. This reflects a democratising trend in Salvadoran experiences with violence long before the ‘violent peace’ of a post-war criminal wave of violence. As Hume notes, ‘It is therefore important to draw out the contradictions between public perception of crime, policy instruments to challenge it and the measurement of actual violence’ (Hume, 2009, p.77). The discussion therefore has remained focussed on the traditional and leading alternative forms of
violence typically reflected in official and public dialogues. However, as illustrated above, the boundaries between different indicators and definitions of violent risks both normative and ideological become blurred; the spaces between crime, perpetrator, victim, problem-solver, non-existent. It will fall to subsequent chapters to tease out how participants identify and apply these structures to their security governance efforts in El Salvador.
Chapter 4

Mapping Actors and Organisations
4.1 Introduction

Hope accompanied the election of the new FMLN government in 2009. It represented the successful transition from one post-war political party to another. Taking power was also symbolic of the successful transformation and reintegration of the ex-guerrilla party into the polity. The government was headed by President Mauricio Funes, a journalist during the war who had remained unaligned politically until he declared his intentions for office. Having plotted for almost two decades the ideological policies they would pursue in office, the FMLN party began exploring their options on solutions to the significant post-war violence that continued to plague the country twenty years on. Rolling on hope and a belief of new beginnings, they declared a focus on the preventative strategies that would address the root causes of violence and eliminate the unsuccessful hard-line *Mano Dura* legacy left behind by the previous conservative ARENA governments. Part of the fashion in which they intended to distinguish themselves, was through a broad consultation process from the grassroots to create the first security policy of their new government. However, on taking office, they further realised that they had little experience with the structures of government and the processes of governing.

In this knowledge gap, arose opportunity. First, they adapted their consultation plans to create working groups that would contribute expertise to the processes of security governance. Working from a base of broad citizen security ideologies, the party set about recruiting individuals, civil society, and international entities to join their security governance spaces at the community, municipality, departmental, and national levels. When, two years into their mandate, the region began to look for alternative strategies to mitigate region-wide security issues, the region became one more level of consultation and collaborative security governing. Second, acknowledging the moment of hope that had brought them to power and the space a steep learning curve might give, they seized on the moment to experiment with new approaches to security. Prevention policies had never gained significant traction in El Salvador. Guided by ideological strategies devised for their election platform and taking on board recommendations from civil society at work in the field, they set to work.

This chapter introduces the broad structures and actors involved in security governance in El Salvador both prior to and during the FMLN administration. The next section expands on the number of formal actors involved in security governance in El Salvador. Thereafter,
the chapter turns to the introduction of non-norm conforming actors that contribute to a violent plurality in security governance. The third section presents actors involved in a new regional level security strategy and their necessary contributions to national and sub-national security processes. The final section lays out the more fluid and dynamic sub-national and municipal sectors, highlighting the numerous actors from other governance levels that chose to work directly with small, territorial jurisdictions when pursuing the implementation of particular projects and programmes. Mapping the complex collaborations and competitions undertaken by diverse actors involved in security governance in El Salvador is the first step to understanding how citizen security structures hybrid spaces of governance in multi-level context. In order to understand why, and for whom, security, the active entities building security must be addressed.

4.2 National Actors

This section outlines the working relationships of formal security actors at the national level in El Salvador (2009-2014). Under the former ARENA government, civil society participation had been limited to a few select organisations ‘whose ideology was acceptable to the interests of capital’ (Cannon & Hume, 2012, p. L.1183). Not only did the incoming government intend to change the ideological approach to governance, it intended to shift the power balance involved in governance to give a greater role to civil society against the traditional control of elites over key state institutions. The FMLN government attempted to balance the influences of elites through consultation structures formed of ‘moderate elites’ and broad NGO and private sector elements (Ibid.). In order to redress the perceived failure of previous governments to include civil society and epistemic communities from collaboration on security, the government undertook to invite civil society and other non-state actors to roundtable discussions and private group discussions with the new Justice Minister (Interviews with Flores, 2012; Guillén, 2013; Quinn, 2012; Rikkers, 2013; Rodriguez López, 2013). Several noted that they had been encouraged by the early invitations to consult but that the process was extremely political and not always the ‘best’ entities were the ones who were listened to over the medium term (Interviews with Guillén, 2013; Jimenez, 2012; and, Rodriguez López, 2013). Competition for the ear of the new government and participation within specific policy-making circles, expressed a desire to ensure that the best information reached decision-makers, remained a common theme among all consulting actors.
Although these efforts were accepted by pro-Funes actors, more traditional FMLN party backers were conflicted. On the one hand, when the FMLN arrived in power, they had little governing experience and needed to keep on workers, including vast swaths of civil servants, from the previous administration to help them run things. On the other, FMLN party faithful were concerned about issues of loyalty as well as the potential reluctance of employees to implement a radical change programme.\textsuperscript{11} The FMLN’s internal divisions also affected how the next four years were to play out. Most notably, the President’s supporters and personal appointees were at odds with party faithful who had different visions for government interests, issues-framing discourses, and outside support networks. Internal party politics were further strained by external actors who had traditionally played a large role in the governance of the Salvadoran state.\textsuperscript{12} The United States was particularly against the appointment of the first Minister of Justice and Public Security (M-MJSP), Manuel Melgar, due to his previous role as a guerrilla commander accused of involvement with the death of a number of US soldiers stationed in San Salvador during the civil war. Linked to weaknesses in security programme implementation early in the mandate as a result, Melgar was replaced around the time El Salvador signed a ‘Partnership for Growth with El Salvador’ with the United States in November, 2011.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, multi-actor contributions to security governance at the national level have both empowering and limiting impacts on security conceptualisation and operations in El Salvador.

A noticeable change implemented during the transition from the Tony Saca-led ARENA administration to that of Mauricio Funes was the institutional split instigated to deal with repression and prevention files under different command structures. The FMLN government took hold of both the security and violence prevention cabinets (\textit{Gabinete Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia}: GNPV) as a means to put new emphasis on alternative approaches to addressing violence as a star ideology in their new approach to security governance. It further invited the Ministries of Health and Education and these members became important working components of a restructured security dynamic.

\textsuperscript{11} Their fears were not based on political conflict histories alone but on the basis that a labour stability law had been introduced directly prior to the FMLN taking office – a move largely perceived as ARENA attempting to maintain influence and control over the institutions of government (Cannon & Hume, 2012). At the same time, the FMLN was proud that they could be seen to support a ‘progressive’ institutional framework where civil servants could be trusted on sufficient political neutrality to support the government of the day (Interviews with MJSP and DGME Officials, 2012; 2013).

\textsuperscript{12} One interview subject close to the subject matter stated an oft-echoed refrain that by 2010, the government was that of Mauricio Funes, not one governed by the FMLN (Interview with PNC, 2012).

\textsuperscript{13} The political turmoil surrounding Melgar’s appointment and US disapproval was such that, at the time of his resignation, online newspaper \textit{El Faro} reported that the move was a mere ‘formality’ as bilateral cooperation had come to a standstill. FMLN party secretary at the time, Jose Luis Merino, noted that the US had even turned down a basic request for intelligence on drug traffickers based in El Salvador because of Melgar’s continuing presence as M-MJSP (El Faro, 2011; Merino, 2011).
Working in conjunction with the GNPV as the primary consultative and supporting body for the prevention file and designated with the responsibility to oversee violence prevention programmes was the National Council on Public Security (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública: CNSP). It had been developed in 1998 out of a suggestion from the United Nations to create an advisory body at the highest level to support the president in the development of security policies (Interview with Ventura, 2012). Partially comprised of the same institutional entities as the GNPV but with a greater operational support mandate, the CNSP had been left to fend for itself during previous administrations, and regularly made up budgetary capacity through international sponsorship (RESDAL, 2011; van der Borgh & Savenije, 2014). Responsibilities included administering national and departmental observatories on violence and crime which have produced important studies and diagnostics on topics of security including institutions and operational deficiencies (Ibid.). Within these two cabinets, the most present actor is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública: MJSP). The responsibility of the MJSP covers not only security policy but oversees the police, migration and border directorate, and prison services.

Competition and conflict over the division of responsibility and labour on popular files between the different units, directorates, and ministries was also fraught with political manoeuvring. As an advisor to the MJSP, when asked what the role of the Ministry was in the creation of security policies, responded:

> In Article 35, the powers of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security are described and they are to formulate the policies of security and of prevention. […] In the topic of security, it is not difficult to realise that this ministry is responsible; in the subject-matter of prevention, it has been made more difficult. A political consensus has not been achieved in the sense that prevention needs to work in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. This has generated territorial issues. Diverse governmental organisations, within the framework of their responsibilities, say that they carry out prevention and this creates

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14 ANSP director Jaime Martinez Ventura explained that it was the CNSP that proposed the development of a community policing philosophy to address study findings of investigation deficiencies, discipline and internal control problems, and institutional capacity. The project was scuppered by Flores in 2000 and replaced with the Ley Organica de la PNC which he considered to be a grave regression in the police’s institutional development (Interview with Ventura, 2012).
for us a domestic issue that to some extent has consequences in the scope of security. (Interview with MJSP Policy Advisor, 2012)

Bringing the idea of prevention into the MJSP as a companion component to repression in security was not as easy a political task as initially assumed. What helped ease the way for prevention as an equal conceptual, if not operational, component was the introduction of the aforementioned divided institutional structure (the prevention and security cabinets) in 2010 and the eventual appointment in 2012 of Douglas Moreno, former Prisons Director, as vice-Minister of the MJSP. Moreno’s primary responsibility was to oversee the conceptual development and coordination of prevention dossiers (El Mundo.com.sv, 2012). This appointment also helped to smooth the development of the General Directorate of Social Prevention of Violence and Culture of Peace (Dirección General de Prevención Social de la Violencia y Cultura de Paz: PREPAZ). PREPAZ had been created in May 2010 in the security restructuring but struggled to acquire the budget to cover its purported responsibilities. The director’s role was to facilitate an alliance between the central government and local municipalities ‘to work on the issue of citizen security. But fundamentally, [work] began with the strongest component, that is prevention’ (Interview with Flores, 2012). Although the MJSP remained central to the development, coordination, and steering of the security portfolio, the repression and prevention division of resources and responsibilities became a significant bone of contention among formal actors.

As a function of the nature of the security file and the objectives to expand contributions to outside actors, the MJSP encouraged a range of relationships to accomplish their goals from the elaboration of security policies and strategy directives to the implementation of programming through the establishment of local community violence prevention councils comprised of local civil society in conjunction with local government and security officials. A PREPAZ official explained that their department looked at their role as facilitators through which they attempted to establish constructive working relationships with other entities throughout the country (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012). As such, PREPAZ was often presented as a highlight for security relationships and an exhibition of the new manner of coordinating and implementing positive prevention policies in place of the traditional governance dependence on repressive measures (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). These ideologically-driven relationships promoting prevention were often described as resource facilitators and as sub-national institutional support mechanisms; capacity-building [training seminars] on
technical aspects of policy development and programme implementation was key (Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012).

The PREPAZ director explained that consultations with ‘experts’ whether from international organisations or small NGOs working in a local community were a fact of everyday work in an office whose responsibilities traversed the realm of governance from policy to project on multiple jurisdictions: ‘on the one hand there are the experts, academics or theorists, that help and on the other hand, on the operational level they need to look to prevention councils. Now, every prevention council also responds to the needs of the municipality’ (Interview with Flores, 2012). Going even further, Flores argued that this work could not be done without the efforts of the population:

[…] the state government has the constitutional right of responsibility for security, but we know that we have to realise this with the population, with the people. Therefore, we want to give the people space, to the subject, to the citizens so that they can be involved. (Interview with Flores, 2012)

The sentiments thus reflected say much more about the workings of PREPAZ, a joint policy and operations coordinating directorate, than they do about the whole of security governance, or even about ideology within the MJSP. Nonetheless, other sectors were attempting to adopt various approaches to a greater diversity of actors, demonstrating that operational or coordinating changes and ideological, issues-framing discourses were not mutually exclusive but symbiotic with both innovative and regressive features.

4.2.1 Police as security governance actors

Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) are typically considered a tool of the democratic system, responsible for operations but with limited influence over policy. Most police officials, when interviewed, made reference to the civil war, previous authoritarian regimes, and the incomplete institutional reforms. A persistent concern was the manner in which a police history as authoritarian actors impacted on their ability to interact with other security actors. It also affected the way they could do their job in local communities and in discussions with the civil society organisations with which they worked. Struggling to right these issues, members of the PNC emphasised the arduous journey they had been undertaking to improve actions taken within their legal directive to ‘protect and guarantee the free exercise of the rights and liberties of the person’ (Ley Orgánica de la Policía Nacional Civil). First, in keeping with policy directives to strengthen institutions, the PNC
continued to implement internal reforms and improve working relationships with other sectors of society. Collaborations to improve interactive relationships took place at every level of operation; the PNC was both the beneficiary of training relationships and considered itself to be a collaborative partner on the development of new modes of policing including the introduction of a community policing philosophy. INTERPOL, the Regional Commission of Police Chiefs (RCPC), and international delegations provided frequent training exercises, inter-agency cooperation on operations, and information-sharing mechanisms including the slow growth of criminal databases for the region.15

With the new administration, the PNC was asked to expand its responsibilities from combating crime and conducting investigations into criminal acts to building relationships with communities across the country. The move was both political and operational. In building relationships with local community actors, the intent was to include community perspectives in operational policing strategies in practical ways. Argueta argues that in this manner the community becomes ‘an important actor’ and cooperates in the resolution of security problems (Argueta, 2011, p. 157). At the same time, it was intended to build trust with communities at a time when the PNC suffered from historically low levels of trust.16

Partially in recognition of this huge gap in public trust, the police set out community policing as a means through which to regain direct contact with local populations through the territorialisation of strategies, operations, and important community relationships. The community policing ideology consulted community policing best practices in the ‘developed countries’ of Japan, France, and the United States (Ibid.); each country contributed directly to implementation efforts at some point during the process.

The inclusion of community experience and their contributions to local adaptation of operations was further intended to contribute to new security governance efforts. PNC Director Landaverde observed that the police had also been tasked with the role of contributing operational experience and best practice to the formation of national security policies going forward (Interview with Ramirez Landaverde, 2013). Elaborated in the PNC Institutional Doctrine, important relationships would first allow for practical collaboration; community policing relations included local governments, the leadership of regional delegations, and with the central government across portfolios from the Prosecutor General

15 Arévalo Herrera (2011) argues that the presence of foreign police officers can bring a richness of focus but it can also be negative as each emphasises that ‘their own social reality is the best’.
16 In 2009, at the beginning of the FMLN’s first term in power, only 20.7 percent of respondents stated they had confidence in the National Civil Police (IUDOP, 2009, p. 4). In September 2012, almost 70 per cent of polling respondents stated that they had little or no trust at all in the police to pursue criminals although they had up to 72 per cent faith in the work of the military (IUDOP, 2013).
(Fiscalía General de la República: FGR), the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República: PGR), and the Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuraduría de la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos: PDDH) in order to analyse and elaborate existing plans (PNC, 2010).

However, a continuing slip between repression and prevention ideologies was a constant worry between actors collaborating on security governance. PREPAZ officials were reluctant to offer a policy role to police within their department in result. Instead, while lauding the importance of a ‘police with proximity to the community’ as well as the role the police played in the justice system, they saw the policy role as operational within the network of actors working at all levels of security governance to seek out prevention programming options (Interviews with Flores, 2012; 2013; PREPAZ Official, 2012). For PREPAZ, the police contributed amply in their support for the reinsertion of former criminals and on the attention to victims as well as through continuing institutional reforms to improve their interoperability and trust. Operating in the same vein, FESPAD worked to train police through workshops and the publication of a manual on the application of penal code procedures so that they could provide better support to cases in court (Interview with Guillén, 2013). Police involvement in security governance from a purely operational capacity over the early years of the FMLN administration was a contentious action initiative, especially among those who distrusted the institution over historical corruption and repression tendencies. However, as it turned out, adding porous walls to police structures to allow them both greater freedoms to consult on policy directions and to allow non-government entities to submit recommendations, advice, and guide changes on national and community levels did not result in the greatest changes to actor participation numbers during the first administration.

4.2.3 The military as a persistent stop-gap in security governance

The security governance challenge of military participation arose in the spaces between a community policing strategy and citizen demands for stronger operations to reduce criminal violence. Military officials did not contribute to most security governance structures as such. Nonetheless, they remained a contentious associated actor involved in security implementation. The FMLN, along with many civil society organisations and epistemic communities, had roundly condemned military deployments on the streets as a substantive policing tactic. However, the Funes administration reintroduced military actors
to public security shortly after taking office. On the justification that the police were ill-trained and there were insufficient numbers to address the scale of the problem (Participant Observation, 2012; Interview with Ventura, 2013), 2,500 soldiers were deployed to the streets as a stop-gap measure (Ayala, 2009). Uniquely, the military was given permission to carry out searches, make arrests, and operate road checkpoints – all activities of which are generally considered to be the purview of policing institutions. The military was further extended into public security functions when they were deployed to support prison guards in May 2010. This move was again framed as a temporary stop-gap measure to shore up security whilst the new government set about prison reforms and eradicating corruption.

By 2011, about 8,500 military personnel were deployed around the county to support police in public security efforts leading to an overall 57 percent increase in military troops to 17,000 personnel accompanied by a $25 million augmentation in the salary budget (RESDAL, 2011). But, instead of operating solely in conjunction with the police, as had been promised, the military often ran their own patrols and initiatives including the provision of border surveillance at some 62 locations. They also took control of some of El

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17 Decreto No. 70 de la Casa Presidencial, 30 October 2009.
18 Rehabilitation programmes including the Mesas de la Esperanza which relied on the participation of gang members, family members, NGO including FESPAD, and government representatives were neglected in result.
Salvador’s most notorious prisons from the outside. The prison security deployment remained in place, straining working relationships between prison officials and military personnel over several years, partially in consequence of poor military training for prison posts.

The use of the military as a tool in guarding prisons or community patrols appeared to have a positive influence on public perceptions of the government’s capacity to handle security (Wolf, 2012b). Civil society actors worried about displacement; the militarisation of security governance presented as a dangerously regressive step in security building for a country with a history of authoritarian rule (Interviews with Aguilar, 2012; 2013; Guillén, 2013). What emerged from the haphazard approach of introducing the military into the security governance fabric was disorientation on the part of other participant actors. Community policing and multi-actor consultations and strategy developments were underway and emphasised as a new manner of operating for a kinder, gentler government. The unilateral deployment of military to the streets in response to violent incidents was a mark against the integrity of violence prevention actors and observers. Mirroring how involvement in prevention policy development had been a contentious issue among certain strong prevention factions, the military participation occupied a similar position for NGOs and certain government institutional units who regarded it as a step confirming that the military still controlled the ultimate direction of citizen security in the country and limited their hope for a new approach.
4.2.4 Violent officials

Within the 2009 to 2014 timeframe of this research, significant changes within key state security institutions changed the dynamic of actor relations. In November, 2011, the first FMLN M-MJSP, Manuel Melgar ‘stepped down’ after two and a half years in office. During that time, homicide rates had remained high and bilateral relations with the United States on security had deteriorated significantly\(^\text{19}\) although most other foreign bilateral relations had continued as usual. When Melgar resigned, former Attorney General, Romeo Melara Granillo, issued a statement saying that the next Minister must be able to exercise ‘inter-institutional cooperation that would fortify investigations [and operations] carried out by the ministry’ (Voices on the Border, 2011), a clear accusation that the FMLN had been alienating certain historic allies. Melgar’s replacement was General David Munguía Payés, a School of the Americas alumni, who resigned his military position to take up the post.\(^\text{20}\) It was the first time since the signing of the Peace Accords that a military official

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\(^{19}\) A Wikileaks diplomatic cable from July 2009 indicated that US diplomats saw Melgar’s appointment as a complication for bilateral security operations (law enforcement) but that the move originated from within the FMLN rather than Funes himself (Allison, 2011).

\(^{20}\) The Salvadoran Constitution bans military personnel from holding civilian posts. The long-term result of this appointment was a Supreme Court challenge that ultimately ended in the General’s return to the military
had been put in charge of El Salvador’s domestic security, a step which was largely greeted as a regression in El Salvador’s post-conflict state-building efforts.\(^{21}\) His appointment led to many angered individuals within police ranks because they saw the move as the overt militarisation of the police force and several high-ranking commissioners including the Chief of Police Intelligence (Centro de Información Policial: CIP) and the Sub-director of Public Security, resigned (Interview with PNC Official, 2012). Accompanying this appointment was that of another former\(^{22}\) member of the military leadership, Francisco Salinas Rivera, as Director of the PNC.

From the outside, among civil society organisations, the move appeared to confirm their fears of remilitarisation. As Defence Minister, Munguía Payés had overseen the deployment of military personnel to urban neighbourhoods in an attempt to quell 2010 gang activity and he singled out Mexican drug cartels as national and regional risks which were using Central American military bases as a source for weapons.\(^{23}\) At the outset, it appeared that it was from Mexican and American approaches against cartels and other transnational criminal organisations, the ‘War on Drugs’, that Munguía Payés was going to take his lead. Declaring that he would achieve ‘concrete results’ including a 30 per cent reduction in homicides during his first year in office, he set about creating special anti-gang police units trained jointly by the Salvadoran military and US security personnel (elsalvador.com, 2011). He also proposed a specialised judicial track of prosecutors and judges designated solely for gang members. Military influence on security structures was assured through the further appointment of the new directors of the PNC and the State Intelligence Organisation (OIE: Organización de Inteligencia del Estado).\(^{24}\) The

\(^{21}\) FMLN party members alleged that Munguía Payés’ appointment was approved by Funes not only in appeasement to US demands but also as part of a trade with ARENA officials and members of the private business sector (Participant Observation, 2013).

\(^{22}\) Salinas Rivera resigned from active duty hours before his appointment to head the PNC to avoid contravention of the constitutional restrictions on military personnel in civilian posts.

\(^{23}\) In 2011, six soldiers were arrested after attempting to steal more than 1,800 grenades for drug trafficking organisations – a move taken after what Munguía Payés stated was eight months of intelligence work (Stone, 2011). Other arrests were made during rifle, uniform, and military equipment sales both to los Zetas of Mexico and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) indicating that the efforts were not limited to thefts but organised trafficking of old or badly tracked weapons systems (Corcoran, 2011). However, the problem is not unique to El Salvador with US weapons systems sold to Honduras showing up in Mexico, according to WikiLeaks diplomatic cables. Weak institutions in Guatemala and an effective loss of control over up to 40 per cent of their territory meant that los Zetas are more likely to source their weapons from that country than El Salvador but the problem does exist throughout the region.

\(^{24}\) Eduardo Alfonso Linares, a former guerrilla leader in Chalatenango and director of police in San Salvador had been appointed OIE director in June 2009. As a FMLN party faithful he was replaced in December 2011 after Munguía Payés took office. His replacement Ricardo Perdomo, a former Minister of Economy in the
composition of the citizen security governance spaces had taken a significant regressive turn.

4.2.5 Non-norm violent actors

What followed four months later was a militarised solution that differed from boots on the streets. In March 2012, Munguía Payés confirmed media reports from *El Faro* that a pact had been agreed upon between the lead command structures of the country’s two main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the two Barrio 18 (M-18) factions (Martinez, et al., 2012). From the beginning and throughout the process, it was difficult to identify exactly who was responsible for what outcome and even who was a participant in the process itself. First, the police were credited with increased efficacy in law enforcement efforts against key gang factions: ‘coordination, the efficiency of the police, and the intelligence work’ (Martinez, et al., 2012). Then, as the movement of imprisoned gang leaders from maximum to medium security facilities was reported, it was acknowledged that there were more entities involved (Ibid.). National Prisons Director Nelson Rauda avoided answering questions, stating that only the Minister of Justice and Security, David Munguía Payés, was authorised to speak on the nature of the prison transfer and its supposed results (Ibid; Interview with Rauda, 2013). Next, two individuals stepped forward in an attempt to clarify the storyline: Raúl Mijango, a former guerrilla commander; and Monsignor Fabio Colindres, ostensibly a representative from the Catholic Church, introduced that a truce had been brought about by the gangs themselves to lower their negative impact on society. However, a military slant became obvious as it was revealed that Mijango was a former Munguía Payés advisor and Colindres a military chaplain, elements of the military structure negotiating a formulaic military. Nevertheless, Mijango continued to reinforce his narrative that he and Colindres had decided on their own to see what the gangs would be willing to agree to and that gangs would never have acceded to government involvement in the negotiation process (Interview with Mijango, 2013). Initial communiques issued by the gangs themselves also rejected media allegations that the government had been instrumental to the negotiation of an agreement (MSX3 and Pandilla 18, 2012). They stated, ‘we reiterated to all of society that, yes, we have been part of the problem but we ask you today to let us be part of the solution…’ (quoted in Pries, 2013a).
Despite the staying power over the first year of the SGT, most actors at the national and regional levels were reluctant to join in the new security governance space. One NGO worker close to the issue argued: ‘How can we support something we have no understanding of? There has been every explanation under the sun – for a week or so there were even reports from the government that the truce emerged from none other than the “miraculous hand of God!”’ (Interview with Rikkers, 2013). International community members including several embassy representatives had been cautiously optimistic when the SGT initially emerged but within months argued that although they had been ready to join in the process but its lack of transparency, including whether the government was involved or not, limited what they were willing or capable of contributing (Participant Observation, 2012; 2013). Throughout efforts to expand and solidify this multi-level truce structure, the lack of clarity from government actors limited the number of others who were willing to engage.

After six months, Munguia Payés, Mijango, and Colindres cautiously floated that the Truce was not the ‘work of a miracle’ nor was it developed by or at the behest of the Catholic Church as had sometimes been alleged, but rather that it was a ‘process carefully designed from the Office of the Ministry of Public Security, with the endorsement of President Funes’ (Martinez & Sanz, 2012). The belief suggested that Mijango had begun the negotiation process in January 2012, two months following Munguia Payés’ appointment, and Colindres had been brought in as a Church representative after leading bishops had refused to enter the process (Ibid.). A week later, in September 2012, President Funes again denied the existence of a plan to officially treat with gang factions and claimed the administration had not had knowledge of the initiative (Lemus, 2012). As such, government announcements designed to guarantee a long-term strategy to build on the window of opportunity the SGT provided were just as quickly dropped or ignored as the responsible government persons were criticised on multiple sides from Truce detractors. During this first year, it appeared that the only international entity willing to take a risk on the initiative was the Organization of American States (OAS), through Secretary General Jose Miguel Insula and Secretary of Multidimensional Security (SMS) Adam Blackwell. They held meetings with gang leaders, arranged for special ceremonies

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25 Blackwell has since remarked that it appeared that others within the Catholic Church were jealous over Colindres’ involvement in the negotiation process (Blackwell, 2015). Although it did not immediately push the rest of the institution to jump in, elements were significantly involved in the territorialisation of the SGT as well as in new rounds of talks in 2014-2015 after the original SGT had failed (Ibid.).

26 Martínez and Sanz brilliantly catch one potential justification for the Truce to appear to be headed by a member of the church: ‘there are people that when you put a priest in front of them, or at the Church, and it is like they disconnected part of their brain: they stop asking questions’ (Martinez & Sanz, 2012).
of truce acknowledgement, and presided over a partial disarmament of the treating parties which included several weapons drop events as official guarantors of the process (Speaking Notes from Blackwell, 2015). Their participation in the Truce was officially welcomed by gang negotiators who sent an official communication to the OAS to request ceasefire oversight (OAS, 2012a).

The OAS was seen by some to take an eager role in the Truce as a means of shoring up its influence in the region and returning to the importance it enjoyed during the multi-lateral peace negotiations realised at the end of the Cold War. It initiated a multi-sectoral Coordinating Technical Commission to support its actions in the process in keeping with its evolution over the last decade but again the Salvadoran government was relatively ambiguous about the initiative. Truce negotiators Mijango and Colindres had not reduced their involvements, however, and in November 2012, they facilitated a second phase of the Truce which brought the agreement to the people through a mechanism of territorialisation: where municipalities were to be designated ‘Special Zones of Peace, through the Salvadoran application of the concept of SANCTUARY MUNICIPALITIES’ (Interpeace, 2013). Interpeace came on board in a facilitating capacity to help with the implementation of the next phase of the Truce as a trusted independent party and local social infrastructure was pulled in through the very nature of ‘territorialisation’ (Interview with Mijango, 2013; Participant Observation, 2013; Speaking notes from Blackwell, 2015). Through the OAS’ facilitation of the Truce process to include various operations, the implementation of a new Humanitarian Commission, and the implementation of a reintegration work programme, the international community became open to further involvement.

The EU supported the Truce process largely through a specialised foundation set up to transition the process through the next steps of rehabilitation and provided funds for Interpeace’s involvement (Ibid.). Through Interpeace, the EU further provided technical assistance and ‘transferred mediation and dialogue knowledge to El Salvador’ (Blackwell, 2015). It was through these international organisations that the real connection to municipalities was established. Through them, local governments including Salvador Ruano (Ilopango), Oscar Ortiz (Santa Tecla), and Roberto Aquino (Sonsonate) became

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27 The 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas gave renewed power to the idea of multi-dimensional security in the Americas in the OAS-led incarnation of multi-level, multi-actor security building. The expansion has been pursued with great vigour and is becoming increasingly accepted by member states; as Adam Blackwell notes, both Mexican General Naranjo and Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have confirmed the need for the different tools, diversity of actors, and institutions encompassed by the OAS’s multi-dimensional efforts (Speaking notes from Blackwell, 2015).
more closely involved as members of the Technical Committee on the Coordination of the Process to Reduce Violence (CTC), and generated greater confidence in the potential for lasting results (Interpeace, 2013). From within, the gangs’ key figures such as Viejo Lin in prison or Marvin Gonzalez in Ilopango, gained visibility not only within the process but internationally as figureheads of a novel process. Furthermore, the process would not have advanced as far as it did without the direct intervention of female family members of gang members who forced the issue that enough was enough (Blackwell, 2015) and local Violence Prevention Councils who, sometimes for the first time, met directly with gang members. A 2013 systematisation workshop with participant municipalities found that the process had increased inter-institutional connections both horizontally, between local civil society, government, and security operators, and vertically between different levels of government (Interpeace, 2013). In particular, multi-level inter-institutional technical committees allowed for greater communication and responsibility articulations between diverse local entities under the leadership of the municipal government (Ibid.).

At the same time, NGOs and civil society organisations with long-term experience working with gangs felt that they had been side-lined from the whole SGT process as a result of its concentration under military-aligned structures. NGOs FESPAD and SSPAS had both similarly advocated for open discussions with gang structures before 2009 and even begun a new initiative, the Mesas de la Esperanza (Tables of Hope), where family members of gang members worked towards the improvement of prison conditions (Interviews with Guillén, 2013; Rodríguez López, 2013). Former Catholic priest, Antonio Rodríguez López, had been brought in by the Funes government in 2009 to open new approaches to the criminal violence associated with gangs but the relationship broke down (Interview with Rodríguez López). FESPAD director Silvia Guillén was particularly discontented with the treatment the Government had given Padre Toño stating that when he brought a truce proposal to the attention of the government in 2010, the government had him investigated by the Prosecutor General (Interview with Guillén, 2013). She continued that then, when the government decided on a Truce, they had not come to those organisations with a long history of gang work and advocacy, ‘they permanently disqualified us and told us that we were friends of the gangs’ with Munguía Payés stating publically that FESPAD had been ‘penetrated by the gangs’ (Ibid.).

The inclusion of gang members as legitimate actors in a process of hybrid security governance was significantly contentious. Many international bodies, including foreign governments, stated that they could not participate in any section of projects linked to the
SGT because it would appear that they were ‘negotiating with terrorists’ (Participant Observation, 2012; 2013). Civil society actors worried that work programmes designed to facilitate small business ventures for demobilised gang members was favouring criminals over the ‘legitimate’ needs of patient poor individuals already in line: what was to stop gang members from forcing local communities to buy only from their bakery as the newest form of extortion putting others out of business, questioned others (Interviews with NGO Technical Expert, 2013; Rikkers, 2013). Some security officials saw the work of the parallel state in the Truce where organised crime had made agreements with these shadow government directors to bypass institutions for control beyond law enforcement (Interview with PNC, 2012). The parallel state, remnants of the state intelligence community established during the civil war and forgotten after the Peace Accords, was said to have a vested interest in the management of criminal organisations and, as such, even those who had supported talks with gangs were against the manner in which this ‘militarised’ truce had come about (Interviews with PNC, 2012; Guillén, 2013; Participant Observation, 2013). A member of the PNC alleged that it was clear in the manner that the Truce had come about that it had been developed by parallel structures rather than official government institutions (Interview with PNC, 2012).

In this way, the Salvadoran Gang Truce had substantial actor-shifting effects on Salvadoran security governance spaces, beginning at the national level. It introduced a range of new actors but also side-lined long-term civil society actors with expertise in the subject matter. That the process was conducted with changing narratives and actor frameworks also helped to discredit the process among citizens and potential civil society actors, ultimately leading to its downfall. The inclusion of new actors like SGT negotiators Mijango and Colindres served to further problematize the process due to questions over their true allegiances. The inclusion of gang members in the multi-actor fabric, aside from those accusations of parties ‘negotiating with terrorists’, led to fears that gangs had

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28 To clarify, the individual stated that ‘a good part of the proposal was in the hands of the military police and of parallel structures. When speaking about parallel structures, they are not visible, and they do not necessarily respond to an institution.’ The group was alleged to be comprised of a few military personnel, colonels, and the [actual – 2012] director of the police. Continuing, they explained that ‘in this country, the problem of parallel structures is that at a given moment, they could assume a role that they really should not take and in some cases, affect the institutions or even become the institutions that drive other types of situations’. They compare the emerging situation to that during conflict era death squads established to exterminate political opponents and who were sometimes integrated in security details. It was based in this history that the individual was distrustful of the peace process because official accounts only highlighted the actions of two individuals [Mijango and Colindres] when in reality there were other people involved including military intelligence or those who had left military intelligence and who were now participant in parallel structures representing neither the police nor the army. They concluded, ‘if [these individuals] are not in service of an [official] strategy, then this is a risk within the manner in which [the truce] has been negotiated’ (Interview with PNC, 2012).
solidified political capital through the process. In particular, that violent activity could be used to hold countries and populations hostage to their demands and gain a seat at the top tables of government. Indeed, through this flexible security governance space created by the gang truce, gangs were able to establish themselves as actors with diplomatic ties to international organisations and local mayors alike. There were the fears among certain sectors of the actor network that gangs without ideology and little interest in country stability could use new found political capital to establish criminal enterprises with long reaches to protect themselves from prosecution. The SGT demonstrated that gangs have the command structure to operate more sophisticated criminal organisations and that they have the coherence to act at a negotiation level with security institutions.29

4.3 International actors

This section will first present international actors as they operate within state-level security governance structures. It will then introduce the regional Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana: SICA) structure and the actors involved in security governance from the region. Within the national security governance framework, numerous foreign countries, entities, and international organisations make substantial contributions. They provide practical advice and expertise and have the potential to influence ideological shifts in specific policies or how operations are implemented. PREPAZ, as the violence prevention directorate within the MJSP, was particularly involved from 2009 in structuring international involvement with the ministry on the development of prevention strategies – a target focus for many international actors. Director Santiago Flores was said to have provided greater structure or coordinated interactions for international cooperation efforts involved in direct support for communities but which simultaneously provided general policy support to the government (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012). Some countries like China and Taiwan were interested in providing specific resources, such as vehicles, to the ministry for security activities linked to repressive police and prisons actions but were not at all interested in contributing to violence prevention; however, these were generally in the minority (Ibid.). Some countries like the United States, Canada, Germany, and Spain would work directly through their

29 The FMLN administration had been interested in including diverse actors in its multi-level spaces of security governance. First, they arranged negotiations in a manner that offered plausible deniability. Instead of using civil society or even non-security government actors as had been originally discussed in their security governance planning sessions before the election, the structure provided was purely military, likely as a means of backing up violent actors with security actors if something went wrong. The experiment to engage gang entities in security governance lacked the boldness required to be transformative.
Embassies as well as through associated agencies or representative NGOs (USAID/DEA, IDRC/CECI, GIZ, and AECID respectively). Whilst Canada was limited in its ability to contribute to multi-lateral institutions due to domestic restrictions, EU countries had greater flexibility in the multiple directions they could be involved in but preferred violence prevention and collaborative efforts at the regional level over repressive projects at the national level.

Germany, always an interested party in Central American states, had undergone changes in its approach to security over the 2000s. Their long-term strategy had focused on environmental or climate initiatives, energy production conversions, and employment programmes as a holistic, human security approach; the changed approach focused preference on a regional emphasis in citizen security building projects (Interview with German Official, 2012). This did not mean that they stopped working bilaterally with El Salvador but rather that they had decided to move into a regional direct approach with a regional programme to capacitate government officials at the provincial or departmental level instead of attempting to influence security changes from the top, as with their programme PROJOVENS (Ibid.). A German Embassy official explained this changing approach as a two principle strategy: first, an ‘abiding solidarity’ with the people of Central America; and second, as a part of Germany’s commitment to support budding regional integration efforts (Ibid.). In this way, they worked with the state to identify their target municipalities in combination with historical German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit: GIZ) working relationships in particular departments or municipalities and came out with a list of departments and municipalities that balanced the two (Interview with Esmail, 2012).\(^{30}\) In order to ensure that their own working definition of prevention was central to programme development, they identified four Ministries with whom they would work and run training for both government and large-NGO staff (Ibid.). Diagnoses were conducted for the Education, Justice, Youth, and Labour Ministries to bring national policies to the departmental level and through them, implementation for municipal manifestations of national ministry responsibilities (Ibid.). The training programme for government and NGO staff included the National University in order to allow trained individuals to receive a University certificate and to build continuity into the programme. Esmail’s justification was that the more people trained at various levels and with various types of actors, the

\(^{30}\) Esmail explained they had chosen three departments with five municipalities in each department.
more likely it would be that tools would be disseminated and adopted for long-term institutional change (Ibid.).

The United States presented a very different approach to Germany in its ideology, focus, and operations. Instead of the predominant violence prevention focus of the former, the United States had a two pronged approach with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding community projects and prevention initiatives whilst the DEA, INL, and security institutions, through regional strategies like CARSI, worked more directly with police and military forces to combat criminal elements. However, one programme which paralleled the sub-national approach adopted by the Germans was a police strengthening strategy involving the reconstruction of police holding cells, police proximity to schools, and a police-youth soccer league project (Interview with Rose, 2013). Prison reform was a focus for the United States to improve conditions for prisoners. First, they worked with the government to improve electronic documentation and prisoner tracking. Second, they worked with departmental police departments to build a new system of holding cells which had long been overcrowded. The thinking was that improved conditions were important for the whole system, although not falling directly into repressive or prevention programming but rather into intelligence; a cooperative intelligence unit within the prisons was pushed by the US to catch ‘low-hanging’ intelligence fruit (Ibid.). Rose noted that the new government in 2009 wanted to try a new approach differing from repression but the problem got worse, especially in the prisons and it took time to re-establish a constructive working relationship (Ibid.).

Another feature of the relationship between international organisations and foreign governments at the national level was its fluidity of idea transfer between consulting entities and government officials. Although the process was not structured or based on specific selection criteria, a diverse group was able to contribute to national policy development as trainers, baseline data contributors, and as monitors, evaluators, and implementers of policies and programmes. International organisations like the UNDP, the UNODC, and the IOM perceived their roles to be the production of policy proposals for consideration by the government as well as the technical formation required to improve the implementation of government policies that aligned with their organisations’ objectives and goals. Organisations were also involved at the other end of the programme spectrum in operations, implementing related projects at the local level. Institutions involved in the actualisation and implementation of projects developed on the basis of government policies were those like private companies Research Triangle Institute International (RTI) and
Creative International (both US companies). They were contracted as a reliable intermediary by foreign governments and donor bodies that needed to prove to their shareholders that donor funds were being monitored along international standards. RTI director Guillermo Garcia noted that their speciality was working in a local, territorial, and participatory manner based on 15-20 years of experience in the Salvadoran context (Interview with Garcia, 2012). Garcia explained, ‘we work in these areas through non-governmental organisations that are the topic specialists. We facilitate the resources with which the non-governmental organisations work’ (Ibid.). RTI saw its role as a coordinator and a facilitator to advance perceptions on what constituted prevention as well as to ensure that their projects were properly addressed by the ministries in question. After particular projects wrapped up, RTI also made mention of how the equipment, including trucks and computers, involved would be donated to the government (Interview with Garcia, 2012). RTI was also a participant in roundtable consultations on security policy formulation.

Regional and international banks were also engaged in security policy development and consulted on programme implementation. The Inter-American Development Bank (BID) was cautious in its articulation of the role it played, officially limiting itself to an advisory position (Interview with BID Official, 2012). However, it was also noted that the Bank had strict guidelines as to the types of projects for which it could provide technical assistance and financing, indicating that projects might change scope to increase potential for bank loans. Furthermore, the BID only worked at the national level due to the nature of funding-loan structures and preferred to support prevention programming developed nationally for local projects with concrete results; one example provided was that of the recuperation of public spaces. A BID representative emphasised the line that the Bank had to walk between systematisation, modernisation, technification, and increased efficiency on the one hand and requests for facilitation of repression and arms purchases, for example, on the other (Ibid.). In other words, the BID was careful to emphasise that they hold discussions with the government during and after policy making takes place with the intent to provide technical expertise. Their particular concern in each case was to ensure that policies would have the capacity to be operationalised with material, trackable outcomes as well as to be in keeping with their own investment guidelines (Ibid.). The idea, the BID official argued, was to ‘build together’ (Ibid.).

What begins to become clear in the above section, however, is that there are relationship divisions not only due to practical operational necessities but due to the ideological foundations from which they set out their objectives and goals. Problematising these actors
in multi-actor, multi-level security governance is that most of the contributions which they offer are ad hoc and exist without long-term guarantees of continuing responsibility. Thus, it falls to the government to enact the coordinating structures, the accountability mechanisms for their citizens, and the steering of programming to make sure they are in keeping with the established policies and objectives. Running security governance through flexible working relationships may allow for faster response with coordinating actors in the short term but lacks medium- to long-term guarantees to Salvadoran citizens that programmes are developed for their best interest, with the right actors, and the proper mechanisms. Supplementing badly funded, potentially fragile government institutions with a security governance multi-actor network becomes fraught when accountability and oversight mechanisms are hindered by the same scarce resources within those same institutions.

4.3.1 Regional actors

The Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) as developed by the Central American Integration System (SICA) was the most visible and ‘new’ of the regional efforts to address their complex security environment in cooperation and collaboration with other states on the isthmus. Although the SICA’s function has always been more diplomatic and economic than policy-directed, practical, or operational in nature, one of its intended functions from the end of the Cold War period in the region was to act as a broker in regional security. To that end, it perceives of itself as an increasingly important regional body for the collective improvement of the isthmus. The idea of collaborative security remained almost entirely conceptual until 2007 when the ESCA agreement was adopted by the regional countries’ Heads of State and supported by the SICA governing body during the XXXI Reunion Ordinaria in Guatemala. The actors involved in the ESCA included diplomatic headquarters personnel, seconded civil servants from member countries, government representatives from national governments, as well as occasional key municipal mayors. Unique to the process was a ‘Group of Friends’, select international organisations, foreign states, and funding bodies, who had been invited or asked to join the process. Most were not new to working in Central America but rather had been involved in financing and implementing programming as well as influencing policy development at other levels of government over the decades. Although these entities were there to observe, they thereafter took on a greater coordination and facilitation role with growing influence over strategy content and function. The selection was made in an attempt to solidify international support for a ‘new approach’ to regional security.
The SICA was meant to act as a tool of the member states and make representation to the international community, much in the manner of a regional security community organ. Building on the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Central American states suggested a shift towards new modalities of funding in which recipient governments would have more decision-making freedom based on their own established objectives and priorities (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012). Member-states also promoted the ESCA to the international community as a harmonising effort which would reduce inefficiencies, overlap, and repetition of project efforts (Ibid.). By collaborating on security governance at the regional level, participant parties would be able to share best practices and coordinate efforts for efficient implementation, thereby allowing more coverage on a wider number of projects. Some member states were more eager to move the ESCA process forward than others; for example, Nicaraguan representatives were said to have travelled through hurricane conditions by car to make sure that they were present at every meeting whilst Costa Rica and El Salvador would sometimes substitute representatives with lower-level officials or not show up at all (Interview with SICA Official, 2012). Nevertheless, all member-states frequently engaged in positive rhetoric on the overall value of the ESCA.
The General Secretariat of the SICA assumed a facilitating or coordinating role in the process.\textsuperscript{31} Within the SICA, the Regional Democratic Security Directorate is that with the most control over the ESCA although the Border Security Directorate is also integrally involved. The Democratic Security unit was headed up by Erich Vílchez who treated the process as his own legacy contribution to regional integration: security troubles had ‘made possible regional integration – because this is a Secretariat of Integration, not a Ministry of Security’ (Interview with Vílchez, 2012). As the regional project coordinator, Alexander Chacon V. explained, the SICA was ‘a moderator of the processes but the substantive decisions of the subjects fall to the decision of the countries. The Secretary General has facilitated the process as the technical support to the work of the Commission of Security of Central America’ (Interview with Chacon, 2012). The Secretary General was also described as a go-between for the cooperating organisations, the donors, and the friendly countries to generate visibility for the ESCA (Ibid.). However, the structure and responsibilities of the SICA and its Democratic Security Unit changed in 2011.

SICA personnel during these negotiations were comprised of seconded state civil servants and international organisational experts along with individual experts hired to implement specific activities. Within the Democratic Security Directorate, there were seconded members of the UNODC and the IOM to help with the technical tasks brought into the office as a result of the ESCA. Their primary function was to support the elaboration of the ESCA thematic pillars and provide the technical support to develop project documents therein; thereafter, they were supposed to help get the projects off the ground through the facilitation of member-state adoption mechanisms (Interview with Loya Marin, 2012). However, given that there were insufficient personnel to cover all activities, many ended up covering multiple components of the ESCA or collaborating with outside entities who had agreed to take up responsibility to enact specific topics.

The distrust of the international community further affected the working potential of the SICA to build the ESCA. Many saw the SICA as a long-term diplomatic body with little to no experience in the administration, monitoring, or evaluation of a regional strategy like the ESCA which required project budgeting and reporting. Steps were taken to mitigate these fears but not all responded positively. First, Spain, as a primary donor and further administrator of some part of the EU funds, was provided offices directly within the SICA

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\textsuperscript{31} The General Secretariat executes executive functions through the Secretary General who is appointed by the collective Heads of State of SICA members. The agenda is coordinated between the Secretary General and the President pro témpore. The Presidency rotates geographically between the Heads of State member states on a six-monthly basis.
headquarters to increase oversight of all operations (Interview with Democratic Security Official, 2012). Second, each component of the ESCA was assigned administrative members from the group of friends which would oversee and guide both the development of the topic-specific projects, coordinate donor responses, and push the whole system forward. The United States took the leadership for the ‘combating crime’ pillar; Germany took on the coordination of the violence prevention committee; Spain committed to guide the institution strengthening framework; and the BID to coordinating the rehabilitation, reinsertion, and prison security component. The SICA argued that the projects needed to be diverse in their implementation and oversight so that no single actor could claim a specific project or activities therein (Interview with Vílchez, 2012). They were envisioned as ‘macro-activities’ defined by the Central Americans [member-states], coordinated by donors through multi-lateral meetings but maintained as multi-actor frameworks (Ibid.).

The reality was much more difficult to manage. Some countries, like Canada, were restricted through national laws from allocating funds to a regional diplomatic body like the SICA. Other countries were supportive of the process in principle, like Germany, but chose to designate programmes that they already had in progress as constituting their ‘donation’ to the regional effort – thereby effectively bypassing the strict requests of the SICA member states.

Although state representatives made mention of local experts, this did not appear to include civil society organisations and NGOs whilst even more traditional police bodies felt there was a paucity of consultation. Some member-state government officials stated it was unnecessary for police or other security institutions to be involved in the development process because their function was purely operational in nature (Participant Observation, 2012). Outside of the meetings, observing security officials argued that the ESCA was likely to be weakened because it had not consulted with them in any meaningful manner and thus there was perceived to be a disconnect between ESCA aspirations and operational realities (Ibid.). The regional INTERPOL director was more blunt, arguing that the Regional Commission of Police Chiefs had established experience in regional security coordination and not to consult with these bodies would mean that the ESCA was weakened by a lack of operational perspective (Interview with INTERPOL, 2012). As a result, security officials generally remained sceptical that the ESCA could function with any degree of efficacy over the long term.

There was a sensitivity or defensiveness among government officials when acknowledging the lack of consultation with civil society. The Tegucigalpa Protocol (1995) setting out the
parameters of the ESCA provided clear requirements for a consultative council of civil society entities. The difficulty, noted one MJSP official, was putting that consultation into action (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). First, coordination was required among member countries in the selection of entities which was an overtly political process. Second, relatively parallel organisations had to be chosen across member states to ensure consistency of approach which was difficult given the aforementioned fraught relationship specific governments had with specific organisations. There were also significant financial considerations involved with member-states unwilling to divert funds away from projects or other favoured activities to add one more level of negotiation. Civil society organisations were also considered by some government officials to be advocates first and foremost of their own platforms and methodological constructions, some of which had already been considered by national and regional entities. Others tossed off civil society usefulness stating, ‘in many cases, there are good proposals and in other cases, ethereal, idealistic and unaffordable’ (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012).

Furthermore, some government officials were not keen to add what civil society and private organisations had to contribute to the process. RTI Director Guillermo Garcia argued that regional processes needed to be fed from base, that the strategy needed to be more grounded, and that there needed to be greater recognition that individual components or projects could not necessarily be homogeneous across the board (Interview with Garcia, 2012). FLASCO director Carlos Ramos found that Central American presidents were looking for a security in the region without really understanding what the definition of that security was and whether it was a security for which they were sacrificing democracy. The periodic distrust exhibited by Salvadoran civil society organisations over the potential power influences at play in the ESCA might also have played a role in their limited consultation (Interview with Aguilar, 2012). In particular, some like IUDOP Director Jeannette Aguilar were worried whether one more interregional tool might just be one more way the United States could direct economic and security policies within individual Central American states (Ibid.).

### 4.4 The Municipal: Actor or end-users?

Local security governance structures are the most difficult to characterise due to their diversity of actors, policies, functions, and operations. In an attempt to best draw out local dynamics, three municipalities were selected based on their political allegiances, programme experience in violence prevention, and participation in national and regional
security governance initiatives, as already discussed. Although government officials working in national ministries oversaw the development and implementation of security policies, many of the programming and project implementation tasks fell to local government officials working in conjunction with local and national NGOs as well as international organisations and foreign governments through their specialised agencies. A focus point for the FMLN government, although not a new idea, was to source policy ideas and programming innovations from local municipalities to feed into national security governance plans. From the end of the civil war, municipalities have been relatively free to interact with the international community and build violence prevention strategies as suited their objectives and political will. The nation’s largest municipal violence prevention programme was run by the UNDP and supported by the Pan-American Health Organization (OPS: Organización Panamericana de la Salud), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA: Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas), the International Labour Organization (OIT: Organización Internacional del Trabajo) and UNICEF (Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia). With cross-Salvador coverage, it involved follow-up exchanges on best practices because, as UNDP Democratic Governability Director Marcela Smutt argued, there was a great need for better linkages between the different points of state, ‘between the central level and local governments, between the state and civil society’ (Interview with Smutt, 2013).

Believing as Smutt did that there were important developments that could best been seen at the local level, the FMLN began public consultations prior to the 2009 presidential elections in order to build a consultative security and violence prevention policy (Interview with Smutt, 2013). They were building on a process that had begun in 2002 when the first programme efforts were made to build violence and crime prevention mechanisms from the local level. From that point, the UNDP argues that it has been the municipalities which have been leading on the development of citizen security (PNUD, 2009b). Through Dialogue Roundtables (MD: Mesas de Dialogo), the FMLN crossed the country seeking contributions of community leaders and civil society. The party’s outputs considered not only their own ideological leanings but the 2007 results and recommendations offered by the previous administration’s bipartisan Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social. Contained in the National Policy for Justice and Citizen Security (Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia: PNJSC) is the role of prevention as an important function of building security. The document also considers the role of the Ministry for Justice and Public Security (MJSP) as one which facilitates inter-institutional
coordination as well forms alliances with public and private central or local actors
especially for prevention tasks as in the example of the Municipal Councils for Violence
Prevention (MJSP, 2012a, p.32). As such, although bottom-up processes are considered in
national policy, the very nature of their conceptualisation and implementation from the top
as well as being administered by the MJSP’s PREPAZ unit compromises grassroots
contributions. Despite ideological conviction on the part of the governing party, it appears
that the challenge of allowing local innovation which can be scaled up remains
compromised in the practical processes of security and prevention initiatives. As such, they
formalised existing citizen security councils or instigated new councils where none had
previously existed around the country. In the communities of Ilopango, Santa Tecla,
Sonsonate, Sonzacate and Acajutla, local committees were formalised with the help of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during the period 2009-2012. The
Municipal Committees of Citizen Security and Coexistence were created to implement and
follow security policies and priorities. Specifically, ‘these committees are those in charge
of the design, the development and the supervision of the policy, as well as the strategies
and the municipal plans for citizen security and coexistence’ (Smutt & Carsana, 2012, p.
41).

With the launching of the FMLN government security policy, Municipal Councils for
Violence Prevention were officially adopted within the Security and Social Peace
Commission operating under the Strategic Affairs Secretariat. The Councils were to
promote civil society collaboration and the conversion of municipalities and communities
into territories free from arms as a first step to greater ‘convivencia’ or coexistence
(PNUD, 2011). Although viewed primarily as an ‘operative’ mechanism, Violence
Prevention Councils were also intended to facilitate the larger structures of security
governance, according to their individual capacities (Interview with Flores, 2012).
Specifically, explained PREPAZ director Santiago Flores, who was in charge of
implementing the bottom-up consultative approach, each Council was comprised of those
actors unique to that municipality so that larger cities might have greater capacities with a
wider range of public, civil, and private business actors, but that all would be a reflection
of their community dynamics (Ibid.). Councils often further divided into diagnostic and
planning committees with the latter more directly linked to the national level. The make-up
of these councils changed depending on political will, elections, and bilateral working
relationships. For instance, FESPAD had maintained a close working relationship with
Soyapnago, Apopa, Ciudad Delgado, and Ilopango over a decade during which they
provided support and training to earlier iterations of municipal violence prevention councils. When municipal elections took place in 2012, and ARENA mayors were elected in Apopa, Mejicanos, Ilopango, and Soyapango, several relationships broke down.

FESPAD Director Maria Silvia Guillén explained how the Mayor of Ilopango was able to slowly continue the working relationship after a space of time but that the Municipal Government of Mejicanos completely closed the door to FESPAD’s participation in Violence Prevention Council work (Interview with Guillén, 2013). Guillén explained that there were distinct working opportunities with each government but the door had to be opened by the local government – sometimes pushed open by community groups who wanted to work with larger national organisations like FESPAD – and that not all municipalities were equally open to multi-actor working relationships on security.

Furthermore, international organisations like the UNDP, entities like the EU, or foreign government agencies like USAID were sometimes more acceptable counterparts to local organisations than national NGOs or civil society organisations which were perceived to hold political allegiances, specific agendas, and represent a potential competition for funding.

Figure 4-4: Salvadoran security governance actors

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter starts from the point of a new government in El Salvador. The challenge is to understand how their ideals and practical realities led to new or renewed relationships with
diverse security actors. In particular, the history of the FMLN as an ex-guerrilla party rising to power with the help of a president that was not of the old guard created rifts in the approaches used to structure new security governance spaces as well as the actors that should be participant therein. First, at the national level, institutional reforms to facilitate new actor approaches to security are contrasted with the novel event of a national gang truce. In both cases, the government was found to work through traditional actors who were pushed to innovate with new policy formation approaches or mechanisms of dialogue. This is in contrast to the initial motions of the party which promised to incorporate a greater diversity of actors in all security governance efforts. With the Truce, gangs constituted a new and unwieldy non-norm conforming actor, problematizing traditional working relationships and throwing into question the reliability of programme planning based on this unknown variable. However, in cases, actor and institutional accountability mechanisms were relatively minimal.

At the regional level, a new strategy to address security as a region made significant structural changes to the donor-recipient relationship as well as impacting on traditional bilateral state relationships. However, the roster of actors involved did not change in and of themselves. The difference was that the SICA was repositioned to act as a middle-man in collective bargaining. As such, it was accountability that became a troubling factor for the international community as many voiced concerns over SICA’s experience and reliability in administering a large strategy across the isthmus. State accountability was also a concern for security institutions and civil society organisations that were marginalised in the process because SICA lacks civic or democratic oversight, relying on the democratic election of member-state representatives. Finally, local security governance bodies are the most diverse and difficult to quantify. They lack the entrenched coordination and steering mechanisms of national governments, instead relying on a combination of actor interests, local political network mobilisation, and issues-framing discourse to structure policy objectives and strategic plans for violence prevention. As will be demonstrated in following chapters, it is here in municipalities that the most visible change mechanisms can be accomplished over short periods but where accountability can also be subject to local strong personalities. What local security governance actors demonstrate is a decreasing hierarchical framework being transformed into one structured around needs and requirements of the jurisdictional subject matter.

The above structure and actor mapping exercise provides the groundwork for understanding the violent pluralities and hybrid governance theories that illuminates new
security governance spaces operating at multiple levels in El Salvador. Within the decision to place (recently) former military officials at the head of important civilian security ministries, for example, the violent plurality becomes evident not as something located just within criminal actors like gangs but across the security governance spaces in El Salvador. The hybridity of state and non-state actors in both formal and informal scales of governance further highlights the complexity of negotiating policy formation and governance outcomes. In particular, it begins to reveal the contested nature of these new space formations. It situates El Salvador’s experiences of institutional change firmly within the Latin American context that requires we understand its challenges and lived experiences in ‘a more nuanced and sophisticated way’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L707). However it is also in the emerging structures of security governance that the deep-seated citizen security concepts of the assorted actors become increasingly evident. It is to these security concepts that this thesis now turns.
Chapter 5

Security Concepts in Policy
5.1 Introduction

Security governance literature provides ample insight into how issues are framed, confronted, and managed. However, the varied actors involved in those processes of security construction are significantly complex and have been less fully explored. Building on the actors introduced in the previous chapter, this thesis now turns to issues of security concept construction for policy building. Whilst some priorities are clearly defined by the individual institution, risk identification tended to be aligned more closely with guiding perceptions – whether that was institutional or personal in nature. Balsacq argues: ‘the very existence of a security practice depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it is the most appropriate way to secure what they commonly value’ (Balzacq, 2015, p. 3). Few concepts are more important to this context than that of citizen security, as has already been discussed extensively. However, it is worth noting once more that the following security concepts here have been largely structured within the expansive and regressive strands of citizen security. Furthermore, citizen security engagement with violence situates crime and criminal activity as its main opponent. From that point, causal concepts of history, the neoliberal project, and a culture of violence also emerge.

Employing a multi-actor based model of security policy development, this chapter will take into account not just the arguments of elites in identifying security challenges but also a wide range of other, non-dominant, actors from industry, NGOs, the international community and local agents. As discussed in Chapter 4, the security community in El Salvador is very small but even so, not all actors have lines of communication to others but rely on certain actors as conduits (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012). In the development of security concepts in policy and strategy, it is important to elaborate on how these divergent groups perceive the security they are attempting to influence. In the next section, the problems of measuring contemporary violence in a space where much perception is actually based on ‘myth’ are introduced. Even when adopting a standard approach to measurement indicators, the sources and manner in which reporting mechanisms are constructed can speak to the underlying hegemonic processes that typically construct violence and security analysis. Next, international and municipal security perceptions are presented as the multi-level contributions to security governance spaces. Thereafter, the balance of the chapter will discuss the FMLN’s written policy development – how it is reviewed and assessed. Here, combat and prevention-orientated slants to actor perceptions are analysed to assess the manner in which actors are able to contemplate each form of security; the concept of ‘trust’ in security building is an important part of this scrutiny (McSweeney, 1999).
Outside of the main written policies of the FMLN administration, reactions to those policies will be considered under the themes of policing, community empowerment, regional strategies, and a national gang truce. Finally, this chapter concludes by returning to the influence of citizen security in its observations that security governance between 2009 and 2014 invoked both combat and prevention actions simultaneously; as entities competed for strategic dominance, but also in an attempt to be true both to the transformative approach undertaken by a system struggling with violence and respond to the demands for security from a population living under threat.

5.2 Measuring Risk in El Salvador

More than two decades after the signing of the Peace Accords, El Salvador remains a country driven by fear, crime, violence, and aspirations of security. However, understanding of what comprises that security varies widely. Whilst homicides are the most common measure for security, other variables may be used in conjunction, such as disappearance, gender and familial violence, theft, perceptions of victimisation, or trust in security providers (state, police, military) or definitions may be broadened to include inequality and quality of life measures but each come with their own set of limitations. What is certain, violence and crime are complex concepts measured in many different forms, occasionally with conflicting motives and consequences. This section will first examine public opinions on the greatest problems facing El Salvador. It will then proceed to present the chief measurements which have become standard in baseline studies on security in the country since the end of El Salvador’s civil war. It will close with some reflections on the limitations of these measurements as a presentation of the ‘actual’ situation in the country during the period of study.

5.2.1 Indicator producers

There are two major sources reporting on perceptions of the greatest issues in El Salvador, perceptions of security and associated trust in the public institutions of state and civil society. First, is the University Institution of Public Opinion (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública: IUDOP) based in San Salvador. The second resource is the Latin American Public Opinion Project out of Vanderbilt University in the United States. In addition, the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo: FUNDAUNGO) is a small institution in El Salvador that provides academic studies related to development and democratic governance which has accumulated territorial-level
data on violence and public perceptions. IUDOP and LAPOP have both carried out surveys in El Salvador since the end of the civil war assessing life quality perceptions. Evaluations are based on questions that are subjective to the individual respondent including their interpretations, feelings, and value ascribed to the concrete reality of their lives (See Table 5-2; Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2013). The table below presents the important psychological construction of perceptions that affect judgements, values, and emotions; for this case, how security perceptions are constructed.

Table 5-1: Psychological Construction of the Perception of Insecurity (Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987 presented in Observatorio de Seguridad Pública, 2013, p. 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Reference</th>
<th>Type of Perception</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgements</td>
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<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Evaluations of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security or the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>risk of other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Evaluations of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security or the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>personal risks from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2 Measuring perceptions

In 2002, FUNDAUNGO and IUDOP collaborated with the National Council on Public Security (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica: CNSP) and with the Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo: BID) in funding a baseline study on the perceptions of citizen security at multiple levels (CNSP, 2002). Here they found that at the turn of the millennium, people felt the most insecure in the bus, the market, parks and plazas, and in city centres (Ibid., p. 17). The feeling of insecurity in city centres persisted across the country with the highest incidents in San Salvador, La Union, San Miguel, and Sonsonate (Ibid., p. 18). As a result of this insecurity, people were changing their daily habits, closing small businesses, and converting residential streets into closed access corridors (Ibid., p. 21). Among all adult (18 +) age groups, about 50 percent were afraid of home invasions (Ibid., p. 24). Already in 2002, the report noted that the most common crimes reported in their survey were those associated with gang activities. Almost 75 percent of Salvadorans were thought to have been accosted by a gang member (pandillero) with a request for money— with up to 16 percent experiencing the additional
pressure of a fire armed demand—whilst 1.3 percent acknowledged reporting their victimisation to the police (Ibid., p. 37). In this way, only a decade out from civil war, individuals were identifying the main violence in their lives as that associated with criminal violence and individual victimisation rather than the more traditional political violence of the civil war period and the 20th century.

Moving forward a decade, the 2012 LAPOP report noted that given the significance of ‘extremely high crime rates’, the effects of crime victimisation, and perceptions of crime—including fear of insecurity associated therewith—are important for understanding society dynamics, as well as their potential impacts on democratic governance and stability (Córdova Macías, et al., 2013). They further posit that these factors could affect the trust and tolerance citizens feel towards one another and in communities. Perceptions of insecurity and crime victimisation for the neighbourhood in which individuals resided were requested, response levels indicated that El Salvador came sixth in Latin America and Salvadorans felt more insecure than in Honduras by far (43.8 percent versus 32.1 percent reported in Ibid., p. 110). Insecurity perceptions also had a notable concentration in large cities and the capital over the national average reflecting an important urban phenomenon (Ibid.). However, over time, the LAPOP study did not find a significant change in insecurity perceptions which appeared to vacillate between a low of 41.5 (2008) and a high of 49.7 (2010) over the period of 2004-2012 (Ibid., p. 112). However, similar to corruption reports, insecurity perceptions do not necessarily correspond to periods or areas of high incidence or reported victimisation rates.

IUDOP surveys posed questions on the perceived importance of an issue in addition to perceptions of insecurity for the country over the course of two decades. To compile data on problem prioritisation, ‘economic’ reporting numbers were compiled from the categories of unemployment, poverty, high cost of living, and economy whilst delinquency was comprised of petty crime, insecurity, violence, and maras/pandillas.
As illustrated in the above Graph 5-1, whilst economic concerns have long dominated insecurity in terms of risk prioritisation, 2009 appears to be a jump-off point for a new trend of insecurity fears in El Salvador. At first glance, when these concerns are broken down by the most important problems for the country versus those more immediately related to a local municipality in which the subject resides, there appears to be little difference (See for example Graph 5-1 for the year 2012). However, a closer look at the data terms amalgamated within ‘insecurity’ demonstrates that people are slightly more likely to pinpoint a source of insecurity like gang criminality rather than use the generalisation ‘violencia y delincuencia’. At the local level, ‘renta’ or extortion becomes a larger response (up to 2.3 percent versus 0.6 percent at the national level) although this could arguably be considered both an economic and a security concern. Another insecurity concern category which emerges at the municipal level is narcotrafficking. Intrafamiliar violence is a small statistically insignificant concern on both charts (0.3 and 0.4 for country and municipality respectively) despite it being empirically significant. This may indicate that although familial violence has become a policy issue for officials and of note for policing, it remains contested within individual perceptions.32

5.2.3 Measuring indicators

32 Familial violence is often taboo or invisible (Hume, 2009) so perception responses may be skewed in result. Another possibility is that familial violence is considered something that can be endured, thereby of lesser importance to individuals than overt external threats.
There is basis in fact for persistent perceptions of violent crime in El Salvador and Central America: ‘[v]iolence still reigns over Central America’ (Cruz, 2011a, p. 1). In El Salvador, this has meant that it has remained near the top of world list of most murderous countries for the better part of a decade.33 This section presents data produced by state agencies as official reporting indicators of criminal violence whilst making notes of a few of their many limitations due to justice system faults, individual distrust of institutions, and gaps in the existing legislation. Due to the sheer range and complexity of crime statistics, this section will be limited to homicides and familial or gender based violence, covering the dominant data points for repression and prevention strategies. Homicides are the most widely tracked and accepted data on violence and crime. At the same time, within prevention-driven circles, familial and gender-based forms of violence are considered as a starting point to the entrenchment of violence in communities. Furthermore, as Hume (2009) discusses in some detail, knowledge of violence is based more often on myth than on facts, not helped by the notoriously unreliable nature of statistical reporting, and influenced by the contestation of what is considered a security issue. There continues to be value to scrutinising data numbers in triangulation with other sources to illustrate the persistent situation in El Salvador.

Despite concerns over collection and registration mechanisms and the limitations to the typical reporting institutions – the Legal Medical Institution (Instituto de Medicina Legal: IML) and the National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) – homicide figures are the most relied-upon of all criminal statistics for their deep impact on society alone. Furthermore, because of their serious nature and physical evidence of the dead, intentional homicides tend to be recorded with greater care (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000; discussed in Hume 2009, pp. 71-72). Additionally, this data allows for cross-national and international comparisons on violent crime. On the other hand, from a technical standpoint, numbers of unreported or unregistered homicides and disappearances - where homicide victims are hidden and remain undiscovered for long periods – are likely to be somewhat lower than in other categories of unreported crime; individuals are more likely to go to the police despite issues of mistrust over a missing person than an incidence of extortion or robbery.

Thus, to start, Hume highlights Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) homicide figures from the 1960s and 1970s which reported murder rates of about 30 per 100,000, setting an historical precedent for long-term violence (Hume, 2009, p. 69). Moving to the

33 In August 2015, the national homicide rate rose to 91 per 100,000 for the first time in over twenty years and surpassed the rate of what was previously ‘the most murderous country in the world’, Honduras.
post-civil war period, there was a sharp spike in homicides during the immediate aftermath of war. However, this number was significantly reduced and figures remained at just under 40 homicides per 100,000 during the first three years of the new millennium, as can be observed in Graph 5-2 below. Following government policy changes and a gang crackdown, these numbers began to rise again sharply. Graph 5-3 shows the increasing intentional homicides between 2004 and 2011.

Graph 5-2: Homicides per 100,000 in El Salvador, 2001-2014 (Source: IUDOP, 2014; DIGESTYC, 2014; PNC, 2015) *Incomplete reporting figures, January to August 2015 only.

Given the aforementioned reports of 30 per 100,000 in mid-20th century El Salvador and the trends of the post-war period, it is evident that homicides have been a relative constant form of criminal violence in El Salvador. An IUDOP report argues that the official statistics available demonstrate that, with the exception of an immediate post-war increase to 138.2 per 100,000 in 1994, the country has experienced a relatively continuously elevated rate of homicides when compared to global rates (Aguilar, 2014). Despite the recording of these deaths, it does not illustrate the increased brutality with which these incidents were committed with increased practices of mutilation, decapitation, stoning and burning as well as increased evidence of torture and suffering to victims prior to death (Ibid.). Fluctuations in data are also not always immediately evident; for example, in 2009, a sharp increase in recorded homicide cases were not necessarily representative of temporal increase but rather the result, at least in part, of an important discovery of corpses in pits and clandestine graves (Ibid., p. 5). Furthermore, these figures do not illustrate who the targets were, for what reason they were targeted and by whom. As observed in Graph 5-3 below, 2011 documented that almost half of victims are men under the age of 34 (2,031 out of 4,360), 69.8 percent of all homicides are committed with a firearm, and
individuals are most likely to be killed in the street, in a public space or in their own homes (22, 20, and 9 percent respectively) (FUNDAUNGO, 2013). Based on 2009 figures, that year El Salvador’s population lost 22 months of life expectancy as a result of homicides (UNDP, 2013). During this same year, over a quarter of homicides took place in the San Salvador department (1,445) with a rate of 83 per 100,000 and only Sonsonate had a higher rate at 109.2 per 100,000.


As values for measurement, Argueta and Huhn (2014) argue that there are several key limitations with crime data. First, these data are not a reflection of ‘real’ criminality but rather document the work of institutions in the recording of data; they are not scientific but rather working reports of state institutions. Second, they argue, as already mentioned above, that criminal data is obscured by reliance on individual reporting; obscured are the numbers of unreported cases or those which remain undiscovered or unconfirmed by the police. There is also an important delay between the reporting of a crime and its acknowledgement or rejection as an event by the courts and so these statistics change much more with the passage of time than intentional homicides. Police presence and institutional competence are also important influences on diverse crime recording and verification numbers. Finally, there are important distinctions between recorded crimes and the recorded victims including to which authorities a victim might go address their experience (e.g. police vs. hospital for a rape). Similar to the above described crime values there may
be other evidence to collaborate reports, with sexual crimes and intrafamilial violence, the victims’ testimonies are perhaps the only evidence available. These types of crimes are also the most likely to go unreported. As can be seen in Table 5-2, numbers differ widely between reporting agency.

Table 5-2: Register of Reports and Medical Recognitions of Sexual Assaults, 2009-2013 (Aguilar, 2014, p. 29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Police (PNC)</th>
<th>Prosecutor General (FGR)</th>
<th>Medical-Legal Institute (IML)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>2,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>3,540</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>1,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>1,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intrafamiliar violence is another important, indeed an essential, value to discuss in conjunction with criminal violence indicators. Not only is it a criminal value in its own right but it serves to further illustrate what some have pointed out lines the base of societal violence in the country. Hume (2009, p. 49) argues that questions posed by feminism go to the heart of collective violence in all its forms: ‘violence is a profoundly gendered process that is intimately linked to dominant ways of performing masculinities and femininities’. Amidst the data for violence in El Salvador, many often neglect to mention that whilst men generally represent the vast majority of violence victims, statistical reports of femicide and sexual violence ‘conceal complex patterns of victimization and suffering’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 113). Furthermore, whilst the social and economic costs of conflict, crime, and violence on lost productivity and labour market access is often discussed in general or male-focussed terms, the implications of intrafamiliar violence, femicide, and gender violence (including LGBTQ) are ‘rarely considered’ (Ibid., p. 113).

El Salvador had the highest murder of women rate in the world at 12.0 per 100,000 between 2004 and 2009 but fell to fourth in 2007-2012 (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Yet, the disparity between male and female victims of homicide grows as overall homicide rates rise meaning that though fewer women are killed as a percentage, they are nevertheless ever more likely to be attacked in the public sphere, attacks taking place ‘in a general climate of indifference and impunity’ (Ibid., p. 3). This image of female homicides as a percentage of overall violent deaths in violent situations
demonstrates that although some indicators can be of significance to illustrate insecurity, they are difficult to document with frequent inaccuracies especially in relation to their classification: homicide – female, femicide, intrafamiliar violence, gender violence, collateral, or a ‘culture of violence’. What is a fact: homicide is the leading cause of death for young women in El Salvador through 2015.

Women are not only collateral victims in the violence of men; they are often sexualised targets for hate crimes, especially in precarious situations (Freedman & Jamal, 2008). The most extreme form of violence against women, femicide – the killing of women because they are women – has become complicated to distinguish from overall patterns of violence within the understanding of its original definition. Russell, an early discussant of the femicide concept, first considered the term as one used to refer to the ‘sexist murders of females by males’ which needs to be distinguished from those cases when the gender of the victim ‘is immaterial to the perpetrator’ (Russell, 2008, pp. 1-2). In other words, motivation is important and should be distinguished from a conflation with women caught up in violence.

5.2.4 Other contributing indicators to security analysis

As public security concerns have expanded beyond the immediate physical safety of individuals, so to do the variables which may provide its baseline and evaluation. This means that understanding these ‘other’ aspects of insecurity is important to appreciate the narratives at play in El Salvador’s formal security sector. Given that evolving definitions of public and citizen security have included variables from inequality to economics to healthcare and associated social services, this leaves security assessment efforts with a much more complex and potentially unwieldy evaluation framework. Some of the most common variables include demographic transformations, measurements of inequality and access to economic production, and government competence—including corruption indexes, effective provision of essential services, justice effectiveness, and citizen access to/confidence in the democratic process. Many of these measurements fall under the category of development, demonstrating the intertwined nature of security in its many forms.

Inequality and economic potential are inescapably knotted in El Salvador and both provide important variables to illustrate the risks and responsibilities between individuals and their

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34 Indeed, Fernandez (2012) found in a study of suicide in Argentina that misidentification can lead to the obscuring femicides and partner homicides when incidents are recorded or mislabelled as suicide. Also see the Interpeace study on women and gangs for dynamics of violence and related deaths (Tager, 2013).
country. Growth across Latin American countries is uneven and large parts of the population are left behind. El Salvador has never been one of the strongest economies in the region and its performance between 2000 and 2015 has been lacklustre. Various estimates, including those produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have predicted El Salvador’s annual GDP growth to be between 1.8 and 2.0 percent in 2015 – a range within which it has remained for much of the post war period (Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, 2005-2015). It is telling that 57.2 percent of Salvadoran rural residents cited the economy as the greatest problem they faced in a national investigation but only 29.8 percent of urban residents felt the same (Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2013, p. 19). Evidence that the economy is generally ranked lower than violence and insecurity emphasises the strength violence maintains in popular perceptions. Nonetheless, the two issues coexist within a security policy environment.

In 2012, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, called on El Salvador to address its socio-economic inequalities as an essential component of its on-going peace process. The 2013 Human Development report reiterates the continuing inequalities between urban and rural areas which continue to affect individual lives (PNUD, 2013a). Not often measured in the above figures is the impact of Gender Inequality which plays a significant role in the well-being of a society and its security. When measured, values may include reproductive health (maternal mortality and teen pregnancy rates), empowerment (access to education and political participation), and economic activity (labour market access for women). The Human Development Report 2014 makes the point that the Gender Inequality Index (GII) can be interpreted as the negative impact on human development due to gender inequality in these categories or variables (UNDP, 2014, p. 4). In 2015, El Salvador held a ranking of 0.441, which placed it 85 out of 149 countries on the Gender Inequality Index ranking (Ibid.). This was in result of its relatively high proportion of women representatives in the Legislative Assembly (LA) but was negatively affected by maternal deaths, as well as lower penetration points for women when compared to men in secondary education attainment and labour market penetration. As discussed in relation to gender violence, women have often been relegated to peripheral spatial and social spheres, throughout history, and their subjections to violence and inequalities marginalised or ignored with a distinct influence and impact on the physical security of their person, their families, and their communities. In this case, as with so many others, personal and public spheres have remained divided to their detriment but, as will be demonstrated throughout
this thesis, non-traditional security entails not just different types of threat from the local to the transnational but from the political to the home.

What these experiences of gender violence, human rights violations, and persistent inequality demonstrate is that they have a real and lasting impact on individual and collective lives. Furthermore, poverty and gender inequality both contribute to and are products of the insecurity which continues to manifest itself across the country. Some advances have been made on both counts over the last decade to reduce inequalities, close income gaps, and increase access to social services in El Salvador but in relatively limited numbers. Indeed, one of El Salvador’s most important resources continues to be its large expat community, heavily concentrated in the United States. Despite the precarious nature of the migration venture, over the decades of the 21st century Salvadoran families have continued to adopt a ‘transnational economic strategy’, sending family members abroad to improve finances and prospects for the entire group (Coutin, 2007, p. 122). These precarious support-lines have been hailed in recent years by IO and financial institutions as potential sources for economic growth and micro-development of local communities as well as individual family units. As Coutin quotes one Salvadoran analyst, ‘This country is addicted to migration and to remittances. And it always needs a larger dose’ (Coutin, 2007, p. 122). These actions are also not without personal costs; migrants producing the desired remittances and their families pay their own price for access to American jobs including family breakups, dangerous journeys leading to potentially dangerous work, and increased risk of extortion or other threats for remaining family members. As such, remittance-based planning for Central American governments like El Salvador hold real risks for individuals who attempt to take advantage of migration opportunities.

5.3 Conceptualising Security in Multi-actor Governance

Within the multi-actor, multi-level security governance community there is disconnect in approach with regards to the conceptualisation of security and how to deal with it (‘problem-solving’). After 25 years of post-conflict, violent peace, it has become evident that perhaps it is not only the manner of approach but the manner in which security is conceptualised at its base that guides results. Violence is an endemic phenomenon at every level but the form, function, and potential interventions differ widely from actor to entity. Historical, spatially situated understandings of the Central American complex security environment come up against formulaic perpetrator-victim, consequences, and fix-costing strategies. Furthermore, the new post-conflict peace has become a contested space of
criminal violence and new conflicts over violence monopolies between criminal factions and state security actors. Thus, this analysis of security concepts needs to address the spaces created through governance structures, issues responses, and actor ideologies at every level in order to draw out linkages between actors, concepts, and operations.

5.3.1 Security concepts among international elites: Building agreement among states and international actors

This section provides a very brief overview of SICA security concepts. It observes that SICA member states did not come to agreement on guiding concepts of security but rather the structure allows for a significant number of concepts to be addressed therein. It concludes that rather than address concepts of security held by any number of the large number of stakeholders, the projects implemented as addressed in Chapter 6 are more illustrative of the security concepts put into practice.

Defining security as a region was never going to be an easy task. Member states experienced criminal violence differently. To start, non-norm conforming actors in the northern triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala had higher incidence of gang organisations than did the relatively low-crime Costa Rica and Nicaragua. All were transit countries for transnational criminal organisations but not all saw manifestation of the same modes of operation. Furthermore, the goal was to establish a strategy that was not focused solely on combating violence but a holistic approach that would address democratic security with balance, attending equally to prevention, institutions reform, and rehabilitation, reinsertion, and prison security. The Democratic Security Directorate Director, Erich Vilchez, positioned the ESCA as a ‘transformative’ opportunity for the Central American isthmus – given the chance for its implementation (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). But in addition to a communal definition of security risks facing the isthmus, member states also had to agree to a set of regional projects that would emerge from that definition. What resulted was a mix of ideologies, traditional mechanisms, and expensive projects for which member countries lacked funds.

35 For example, Honduras has a prevalence of go-fast boat landings and clandestine air strips in its sparsely patrolled forests. Nicaragua sees most of its transit activities take place in its autonomous zones along its eastern seaboard. El Salvador’s main transit point is in the Golfo de Fonseca – a waterbody complicated by bordering jurisdictions Honduras and Nicaragua and ongoing bilateral contests over marine borders. Costa Rica has seen a slow rise in the number of trafficking incidents within its borders but its primary experience of the criminal trafficking trade is with the money laundering activities taking place in its casinos and loosely regulated banking sector.
It headed its initiatives with a thematic pillar to combat crime and violence. As the most commonly accepted and employed of the ESCA components, it was the most straightforward to be agreed upon. Indeed, the 2011 Conceptual Framework professed a need to ‘deepen the solution of the structural causes of violence’ through the reconstruction of the socio-economic fabric to address phenomena of migration and disintegrating coexistence in a strategically difficult geography (SG-SICA, 2011, p. 2). At the same time, it defined the problems of violence and insecurity in a traditional manner as the consequences of illicit trafficking and other crime scourges including: crime and violence; narco-trafficking; organised crime / maras and pandillas; illicit migrant trafficking and trading; and, the trafficking of small and light arms (SG-SICA, 2011, pp. 3-4). The ESCA was ultimately intended to ‘improve citizen security and arrest the influence of organised crime’ although the general objective focused on individuals: ‘to strengthen security and wellbeing of the person in the Central American region which will allow them to reach their human development objectives’ (Ibid., p. 5). Costing the plan indicated that member states lacked sufficient funds through the SICA to implement this wide-ranging plan and so they expected additional support from the international community, not least because there was an ill-hidden feeling that the international community, especially the United States, was at least a little bit to blame for the security mess on the Central American isthmus.

Within the SICA Democratic Security Unit, the definitions of security generally followed the official statements provided within the ESCA agreements. According to Director Vilchez, the most important priority was that which was contained within the Democratic Security Framework, namely, ‘to propel, promote, protect, augment the security of the person, of Central Americans and their wellbeing, and help Central America to consolidate as a region of peace, democracy, liberty and development’ (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). In this definition, the goal was not just security but greater integration within the region on a range of diverse issues from socio-political issues to natural disaster preparedness and response (Ibid.). Others within the SICA were more precise when establishing the base security concepts from which they were working. Border Security Coordinator Werner Ovalle saw the issue from the point of view of risks and government response actions (Interview with Ovalle, 2012). On the question of indicators, Ovalle saw security as comprised of the ‘aspirations’ of government actions whereas insecurity represented the set of problems or issues generated by society (Ibid.). Here perceptions were also thought to play an important role in the region because communications media had the power to shape both aspirations and perceived insecurity for a population. Furthermore, it was because
national institutions were not able to collaborate or communicate with other national institutions in many cases that the SICA was needed to facilitate coordination at another level of governance in order to overcome nationally-entrenched risks and institutional weaknesses.

5.3.2 Security concepts among municipal entities

The third level of interaction is between local actors and the actors including state and international entities that join at the municipal level to implement security at the site of the end user. International actors tend to interact with municipal entities within the practical terms of project and programme implementation. As has been previously discussed, state institutions like the MJSP made an effort between 2009 and 2014 to derive national policies from the municipal level to be scaled up and generalised for a whole state solution. This section observes the key concepts of security presented by municipal actors working in the subject matter. It concludes that despite early efforts, there remained a gap between national and local concepts of security entailed for citizens and for communities.

First, local Violence Observatories had been established in municipalities throughout the country to provide information to strengthen policies and action plans undertaken by local administrations. They were used to exchanging information between institutions and sectors, making multidimensionality a common working function. Indeed, as an Observatory official explained, the manner in addressing violence prevention was an inter-institutional responsibility (Interview with Ibara, 2013). Coexistence and citizen security in this local context entailed the recuperation of public spaces. It meant youth dialogue to include them in recommendations made to authorities. And it meant that youth programmes were also essential to the concept of security – with an emphasis on community engagement, job training, and academic advancement (Ibid.). In Santa Tecla, this encompassing concept of security had been developed over a period of ten years. The destruction of the town in a 2001 earthquake had led it to rebuild along the lines of sustainable development which formed the base out of which prevention programming arose (Interview with Martinez, 2013).

A Santa Tecla Policy Advisor noted that over the ten year period of rebuilding, they had gone through three versions of a municipal prevention plan (Interview with Rodriguez, 2013). All of these, Rodriguez explained, had been developed within an increasing culture of participatory citizenship – citizenship that was built through quality public spaces, investment opportunities, and promoted ‘neighbourliness’ (Ibid.). Indeed, it was
relationships with others that proved to be key to municipal definitions of prevention: consultations and action plans had to be developed through a culture of participation where residential councils could bring their recommendations to the municipal councils for consideration. Santa Tecla officials felt this multi-level programme development even at that local level had proved to be the most constructive manner to create and implement prevention that would address real risks, concerns, and perceptions of insecurity (Interviews with Ibara, 2013; Martinez, 2013; Rodriguez, 2013).

Sonsonate, on the other hand, been working with prevention programming for a much shorter period than had Santa Tecla (Interview with Cruz, 2013). Coming from a more recent and persistent situation of elevated homicide rates and incidents of violent crime, they defined their concepts of security through the groups of citizens they were trying to secure. Whereas Santa Tecla saw their security in terms of space, Sonsonate identified the need for protective structures – both physical and institutional. For woman, they identified built market structures to remove informal businesses from the streets where they were at risk of extortion for their place on the sidewalks (Ibid.). For youth, the importance was to create safe passage to obtain access to schools. Thus, community policing played an important role in security concepts. As police officers formed positive relationships with local communities and provided a physical presence near school buildings during high-traffic periods, youth could access schools previously challenged by gang extortion rackets (Interviews with Sonsonate PNC, 2013). These contrasting perceptions of security demonstrate that context is important to perceptions formal actors hold and are likely to moderate policies and outcomes discussions accordingly.

5.4 Hope and Violence: Salvadoran security governance responses, 2007-2014

This section will outline the policy developments undertaken by the FMLN during their first term in office. It will argue that whilst attempting to implement a new approach to security governance in the country, it maintained basic commitments to citizen security and traditional state protection mechanisms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Title (Spanish)</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Justice, Public Security and</td>
<td>Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad</td>
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A 2007 report issued by the National Commission for Public Security and Social Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social: CNSC) called for the revision of existing meagre approaches towards security and anti-gang policy. The commission argued that, in order to make any real headway in combating violent crime, comprehensive policies were required at the national level that were sustainable through the long-term (Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social, 2007). They called for the adoption of a coherent criminal code to improve enforcement procedures; greater and more dependable resources; the incorporation of more violence prevention plans and activities into policies; and the improvement (strengthening) of related institutions to facilitate greater competency in investigations, transparency, and accountability (Ibid.).

Presidential hopeful Mauricio Funes requested specialists, including the future director of the National Academy of Public Security (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública: ANSP), Jaime Martinez Ventura, to elaborate on the initiative and develop a proposal that could be acted upon after a successful election (Interview with Martinez Ventura, 2012). The proposal was to be passed off to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) for expansion as a national policy in the case of an election. Included in the intent behind the national policy was a more integrated approach on security issues which intended to build on the emphasis of international donors and multilateral organisations on prevention to redefine the security agenda. Expectations were generated among NGOs, organisations, and community bodies that there would be great change in multiple sectors of the country (Aguilar, 2014). Arguing that previous ARENA governments had limited policy
documents on security to a few rare PowerPoint presentations, the FMLN approached their potential government formation with published documents in hand.

One of the more developed documents released in the lead-up to the 2009 elections, *Políticas de Justicia y Seguridad Publica* by Oscar Fernández Orellana was the most complete of the FMLN’s guidelines prior to taking office (Fernández Orellana, 2009). Arguing that a FMLN government would have to face a transcendental shift in the manner in which social violence was addressed, and citing the need to move beyond the dichotomy of Hobbes and Rousseau, the document proposed a new means of viewing the problem:

The left must assert that the safe society is not that which punishes and denounces most or how the security indicators and police effectiveness are handled. [...] (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 9)

Security was to be considered as a social and cultural construct, “related to and subject to the distinct social actors and the development of the people” (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 16). Within this context, the document specifically defines security as:

The social situation that guarantees and allows the full exercise and protection of each and every one of the rights that are vested in the people, individually and collectively and fulfilling civic [citizen] duties. (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 19)

They argue that this security is situated within the fundamental political objective of a democratic government, democratic state, and social law oriented to the defence and guarantee of life and personal good as well as the provision of dignity and human necessities (Fernández Orellana, 2009, pp. 18-19). To improve security for Salvadorans, it was proposed that justice prevail over security and that improved standards of justice and equality would precede improved security (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 21). Yet at the same time, the indicators or measures of success that they cited were those of the old means of governing violence and crime in the country:

The effectiveness [of the policies] should be measured in the fall of crimes committed, of victims and of damages, and above all in the sensation of insecurity. (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 9)

Although the primary reference was again to indicators of violence and feelings of insecurity, the manner in which the document proposed an FMLN government would operate did included some new modes of proposed operation including coordination with
local institutions and social organisations, in the manner of a network oriented towards the client citizen rather than a hierarchy (Ibid., p. 10). The police system was also to be decentralised and send resources for ‘close policing’ to both urban and rural municipalities (Ibid.). Above all, their emphasis was to work as a public service in the manner of education or health.

True to the spirit of consultation, the document was based on an FMLN-organised Social Dialogue process, Dialogo Social Abierto (DSA) worked to build a potential government platform on a range of topics not limited to security but rather focused on 32 thematic roundtables and 6 ‘espacios especiales’ participation groups which included professionals, NGO specialists, foundation directors, associations, unions, universities, community (campesino) leaders, religious groups, and artists among others. When counted with other territorial dialogues, over 6,000 individuals were estimated to have contributed to the process in some format. Aguilar argues that the common denominator in the process and resulting proposals was the considered necessity of an ‘integral treatment of the topic and the necessary impetus for institutional reforms oriented to the professionalization of entities within the security branch’ (Aguilar, 2014, p. 64).

In this and other documents that the FLMN prepared in the lead-up to the 2009 presidential elections, security was discussed and defined in line with consultations that they held across the country. However, the recommendations remained ill-conceived as a plan of action which could be implemented within an election timeframe. Even the willingness to de-villainise, de-mediatisise, and re-conceptualise gangs as marginalised actors within the greater state issues of poverty, inequality, and political powerlessness was couched in idealised terms rather than concrete actionable points. They did not plan any special actions directed at particular issues like the gang problem as previous governments had sought to do and, as such, it appeared to many observers that the security issue was to be approached in a non-securitised manner. In the official election document for the FLMN Presidency, Cambio en El Salvador para vivir major: Programa de Gobierno 2009-2014 (Government Programme), they defined the government responsibility towards security as ‘a long-term strategy to combat in depth delinquency, organised crime, impunity, in order to attack, again at depth, the causes that generate these phenomenon’ (FMLN, 2009, p. 86). They also emphasised first, out of the crosscutting issues for the new government, its social and democratic nature was that of human security (FMLN, 2009, p. 8). The focus of the Government Programme on social reforms and a new policy focus on social and economic
policies appeared to confirm that they were truly interested in addressing what they considered to be the root cause of the violence and insecurity gripping the country.

The FMLN government had, as opposition, criticised the Mano Dura approach but in government they were faced with the requirements, necessities, and demands of governance. Government officials widely acknowledged at the time and thereafter that the party had not been ready for the realities of taking the reins and that the first couple of years were filled with ‘sleeping soldiers’. The previous planning documents and even the Government Programme presented little in the way of a roadmap for strategy, programming, and projects to manually address the security problems they had ideologically defined. Furthermore, the formulation of the policy was slow. Some policy points were implemented over the first year of the Funes administration but a preliminary strategy document took eight months to be published. In some cases, members of the administration blamed the steep learning curve, others the challenges of implementing vast and radical institutional reforms as promised during the campaign. The transformation of a repressive security approach into a model democratic society that comprehensively addressed insecurity in a consultative fashion was not to be undertaken lightly by a party new to governance, especially one concerned about the continuing organised criminal presence which was entrenched in the structures of state (Aguilar, 2014).

Officials presented existing and developing policy strategies in two distinct categories: policy solely oriented towards law enforcement or criminal investigation and policy which seeks long-term prevention solutions through community building and youth programming. The policy breakdown into security and prevention categories originated from the 2009 policy brief structure and recommendations. They compared new issues framing as well as new roles for key actors in the security sector in light of the increased value placed, at least in theory, on prevention. In attempting to build a stronger, more sympathetic security policy, one of the first re-conceptualisations for a government institution is the position of the police force in security activities. MJSP officials argued that the removal of the National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) from the prevention side of security programming in favour of specialised ‘social agents’ in the new division of labour would help cement a new approach to a security policy with reduced emphasis on repression (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). On the other hand, Cotto as an active director of the PNC, argued that the police still had an important role to play in prevention policy as they were the body best able to identify security risks through the geographic spaces of violence that produce them (Interview with Cotto, 2012).
A further indication of how the Funes government intended to proceed with regards to security policy in the first FMLN government came in the establishment of a two-pronged cabinet framework to address the issue in 2010. The first was the Security Cabinet that integrated civil servants from the MJSP, the PNC, the Directorate of Prisons, the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería: DGME), and president of the CNSP. Also included were the SAE, the SSDT, and the Ministry of the Defence. Not only was their responsibility more repression-directed security initiatives but they took the strategic decisions for the 2009-2011 when it came to immediate reactionary responses to violence and criminal incidents. Although the eventual resulting national security policy was intended to provide a united voice, many even within the Security Cabinet were not of a like mind and clashed over the greater participation of the army in territorial states of emergency. Typically, the military and more militant police members were in favour of more frequent declarations of states of emergency whilst civil servants working across departments, despite their ideological disagreements, would often lean towards the social prevention measures officially adopted as policy. Some of this conflict dissipated when Manuel Melgar was replaced by the recently former general David Munguía Payés in November 2011 who had greater influence with president Funes. Nevertheless, for a government that had presented itself as one fundamentally different from previous mandates, it was an inauspicious start.

The second cabinet was focused on the prevention of violence (Gabinete Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia: GNPV). As previously noted, former governments had resorted to repression as their primary response mechanism for security and, in result, almost all prevention mechanisms had been delegated to the CNSP, which was primarily internationally funded, and so it was an early struggle for the new FMLN government to institute coordination between departments and units with a claim on the prevention file as a relatively new means of addressing these issues (van der Borgh & Savenije, 2014, p. 13-14). The GNPV through the MJSP integrated CNSP participants including PREPAZ, the Social Investment for Local Development Fund (Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local: FISDL), the Subsecretariat for Territorial Development and Decentralisation (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización: SSDT), and the National Youth Directorate with the Ministries of Education, Health, and the PNC. Other members included the Presidential Technical Directorate, the Salvadoran Institute for Women’s Development, and the Ministries of Economy and Works. However, this cabinet received less media attention and enjoyed a lower profile than the Security Cabinet
as they were not called on to react in an operational capacity to immediate threats such as the 20 June 2010 gang attack on a public bus in Mejicanos, a suburb of the capital San Salvador.\textsuperscript{36} The cabinet’s activities were first laid out in the National Policy for Justice, Public Security and Coexistence (Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Publica y Convivencia: PNJSC) as a whole of government action and then further elaborated upon in the National Strategy for Violence Prevention (Estrategia Nacional de Prevencion de la Violencia: ENPV). Both efforts attempted to address FMLN criticisms of previous ARENA administrations by developing a more comprehensive and long-term security policy.

Despite these fundamental disagreements over the implementes of new definitions and actions in policy measures, most were relatively positive concerning the direction in which the MJSP was heading on security policies. They agreed that there was greater coherence and capacity in security and prevention policy balances in terms of policy talking points, budget, and operations and that those developments had progressed further than usually portrayed in the media (Interview with Flores, 2012). Moreover, in the opinions of prevention policy officials, prevention policies between government institutions at the national level and the diversity of governmental and civil society actors at the local level were also afforded greater equality (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). Although meetings at this level were not observed, comments from several consultants appeared to corroborate these assurances, noting the growth of locally focussed programming through multi-level alliances. In particular, a number of programmes were highlighted which were based upon a four-sided relationship structure between political actors, government officials, the Municipal Council of Violence Prevention and local majoralties (alcadias). Flores noted that the stronger relationship structure within institutions and between levels of government in developing and implementing prevention programming had facilitated greater competency and better results in target communities (Ibid.).

Conceptually, Flores and others’ description of policy change entails a shifting consideration from national security to public security and citizen security. Public and citizen security necessitates in this explanation an alliance between local and central government actors as well as space for consultation and resulting contributions from civil society (Interview with Flores, 2012). In this vision, it would entail that MJSP’s prevention

\textsuperscript{36} The Mejicanos attack, which left 14 dead and 17 wounded, ripped through the first year of the Funes administration with a profound effect on security policy.
department, PREPAZ, in conjunction with the Ministries of Health, Education, and Employment, join with municipalities and their civil society partners to create plans of operation and develop diagnostics for action (Ibid.). As Education Director Sandra Alas explained, these governance spaces were strictly by design:

The shift we are working towards is to reverse the national to the local or community standardised or guidelines approach. Instead, we are taking the context based in local level realities to define policies at the national level. [...] As the Ministry of Education we too are willing to insist on an approach that focuses on strengthening coexistence as a prevention strategy. It has become a central axis for the Ministry in its education policy. [...] We had a school system that expelled its members, a school that does not have partnerships or an orientation towards families and our analysis framework demonstrated that for many years, for decades, the school was divorced from the community and this too generates violence [...] Violence is a multi-causal but obviously education and the school as an institution has a fundamental role therein.

(Interview with Alas, 2013)

Whilst PREPAZ officials confirm that this practice of consultation is already in practice, other government officials are not as fond of consultations and note that the very nature of public civil society consultations denotes that, whilst they may present many good policy recommendations, most are unfeasible and un-actionable (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). As a result, a notable tension continued to exert pressure on the policy developments and directions of Salvadoran public policy throughout the first mandate.

Nevertheless, there were several on-going interventions or programmes which featured prominently as examples of progress. First, despite the numerous occasions in which the 2009 Security Policy was referred to as an impotent document due to its lack of implementation, the 2010 Violence Prevention Strategy was built upon it and, through that medium, maintained a clear commitment to local violence prevention programming. However, this is not to dismiss the very basic issues the 2010 Violence Prevention Strategy encountered when first put into action. A SSDT official noted that inter-institutional coordination for government departments was one of the greatest hurdles the FMLN
government faced when first developing the Strategy (Galvan, 2010). However, the Strategy and resulting projects did come to fruition. Aspects of both the policy and the strategy were also continued and elaborated in the most recent Plan Quinquenal (Five-Year Plan). It was here that the Municipal Councils of Violence Prevention were established to aid in ‘effecting tangible results’ (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012).

The government began with this Strategy of bilateral, technical-led programming in about 60 communities chosen for their poverty, violence, and levels of risk (Interview with Flores, 2012). Again, based on the four-point model, activities were initiated in conjunction with the mayoralities, the police, and the communities themselves to ensure that programming was based in a vision of prevention but reflected local differences including political and religious dynamics and always included, at its base, the importance of local community development (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). They also worked to include or build on existing programming such as that work conducted through FISDL and the Temporary Income Support Programme (Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso: PATI) as well as NGOs, mayoralty, or institutional activities in an attempt to avoid duplication and apply existing best practices (Ibid.). Other multi-levelled prevention programming which often received mention included PROJOVENS (financed by the EU and implemented by the CNSP); Prevenir (a Northern Triangle programme financed by Germany); again, PATI (financed by FISDL and jointly overseen by the Prevention Cabinet and Youth Secretariat); and, the community-based Crime and Violence Prevention Project (CVPP) (financed by USAID and jointly monitored by private company RTI International and the Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation: CECI). The idea of working at multiple levels of government from the regional to the local as well as the incorporation of a wide range of actors was highly popular and often received special mention from officials and consultants who sought to abandon a national-level down focus to policy and programming.

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37 Galvan observed that with regards to the Strategy, “it was easier to coordinate the activities of 40 NGO dedicated to prevention and work with youth and municipalities, than with the 5 or 6 institutions of the government” (Galvan, 2010, p. 3).

38 The objective of PROJOVENES is to promote social cohesion and mitigate violent risks with a special focus on youth. It began with an investment of €11.1 million in 57 communities working with individuals up to the age of 25. In August 2009, the project received a further €14.1 million investment to expand to 79 communities, a raised age limit of up to 35 (RESDAL, 2011).

39 Prevenir is a GIZ-monitored programme which concentrates on municipalities, formal and informal education initiatives, and improved training to bring youth into employment with a special focus on the “ni-nis” or neither job nor education which sit at 20 per cent of youth according to the GIZ director in charge of citizen security (prevention) initiatives (Interview with Kuechemann, 2012). The project, set to run between 2010 and 2017, is conducted in conjunction with the SICA as Germany is a leading international supporter of Central American regional integration efforts as well as with the Secretaria de Inclusion Social / Dirección Nacional de la Juventud (DNJ) in El Salvador to coordinate local and national level efforts.
Despite all the positive comments provided across the board for efforts to build and strengthen this multi-level, multi-faceted prevention programming, weaknesses were acknowledged on some level. Both the 2009 Security Policy and the 2010 Strategy required further revisions and new versions to better address the changing situation as well as to encompass learned lessons and new best practices (Interview with Flores, 2012). Some consultants thought that more emphasis needed to be placed on the actual programming and establishing those activities with direct benefit to communities, and especially youth, as an immediate priority rather than continuing with yet further planning meetings, coordination meetings, and workshops. Nevertheless, the key concern among consultants and officials alike was the timeframe in which they had to operate in order to demonstrate concrete and tangible results. Working with a (more) limited budget than crime fighting and penal efforts and in coordination with a greater number of participant parties, some expressed concern that all efforts at a long-term strategy would be at risk of being cut off before progress could be effectively demonstrated (Interviews with Jimenez, 2012; Quinn, 2012).

Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on prevention programming was somewhat at odds with the continuing reality in El Salvador. Financial reports indicated that in 2010, Justice and Public Security as a total consideration received total spending of US$619.6 million, of which the MJSP received 53% or US$330.9 million (RESDLAL, 2011).\(^{40}\) Within the MJSP in the 2012 budget, “public security” including policing received the lion’s share at US$246.2 million whilst “prevention, participation and social reinsertion” received a meagre US$2.9 million (MJSP, 2012b).\(^{41}\) As such, despite protestations that prevention was rising in government importance, financing reveals that little has changed over the course of the 2000s. In fact, just a month prior to revelations of the gang truce negotiations, Insight Crime announced, ‘the Iron Fist Returns to El Salvador’ where responses to insecurity ‘sound less like innovations than a return to the failed policies of the past’ (Stone, 2012). Of particular concern were the appointments of former military personnel to public security posts and that the military itself had been expanded 57 per cent under

\(^{40}\) In 2011, the units under the responsibility of the MJSP included the Migration Directorate, Penal Centres, the National Civil Police, the Academy of National Public Security (ANSP), and “others” under which PREPAZ would seem to fall.

\(^{41}\) According to the official budget, Prevention, Participation, and Social Reinsertion is comprised of: prevention and citizen participation (strengthening municipal community networks); intermediate centres (application of the youth penal law and facilitating the rehabilitation of minors); the toxicological institute (aiding public security through anti-drugs programming); and the national anti-drugs commission (inter-institutional coordination on drugs consumption prevention) (MJSP, 2012b, p. 3). Despite its massive budget, the responsibilities falling to Public Security are comprised solely of administrative, policing and inspectors duties (Ibid.).
Funes’ leadership (Ibid.). News that the gang truce was not, as initially announced, an independent initiative dreamt up by the gangs themselves but rather a strategic government plan initiated by the current Justice Minister when he took office in November 2011 may indicate that Stone’s (among others) analysis may have been premature and that the government is indeed more amenable to structural changes, long-term plans, and prevention activities than they believed. Certainly, El Salvador’s position on the Regional Security Strategy (ESCA) is one of the most prevention-oriented, with officials noting that the main pillars of the ESCA appear to be taken almost directly from the Salvadoran 2009 Security Policy (Interview with Ortiz de Zelaya, 2012). Prevention in security planning remained fixed and, despite its financing woes, of key importance among officials and consultants alike.

In contrast, it was only a much narrower group of individuals who highlighted combating crime projects. Of course, as combating crime involved targeted activities, specialised operations conducted by professional security operatives, and ran greater risks of immediate violence, this is to be expected. Nevertheless, community policing programmes include some forum for citizen participation and building community-PNC confidence as well as building dialogues for community consultation. Other programmes mentioned in this sector included Joint Community Support Groups (GCAC), a police-military initiative across the country that shares responsibility for patrols, detentions, joint operations, and other anti-crime activities. A similar operation called Comando Zeus conducted the aforementioned activities in 19 municipalities with the highest criminal incidences. Thus, through an observation of on-going projects and programmes, roles and responsibilities of individual actors again emerge and demonstrate the differences in practice as well as in theory between combating crime and prevention initiatives.

### 5.4.1 National Policy for Justice, Public Security, and Coexistence (PNJSC)

Table 5-4: Frequently used terms in Salvadoran security governance

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen Security</td>
<td>A social situation which allows the free exercise of rights of all persons and the certainty that when these rights are violated or threatened, individuals may count on protection from the relevant institutions and authorities. As such, it is not just the protection against delinquency but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convivencia: Coexistence</td>
<td>These are the shared norms for all citizens, assumed in a culture of solidarity, respect, and mutual promise with the city for wellbeing within a more harmonious society.</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence Prevention</td>
<td>These are all of the actions directed towards the reformation of violence-generating factors into spaces of security and coexistence through the multitude of projects and programmes developed in that cause.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Violence</td>
<td>Exercise of violence that reflects the asymmetrical power relationships between men and women that perpetuate the sub-valuation and devaluation of the feminine in comparison to the masculine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrafamiliar Violence</td>
<td>Exercise of violence that reflects the asymmetrical power relationships between masculine and feminine as well as adult and child.</td>
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The PNJSP distribution draft emerged sometime between late 2009 and May 2010. The policy elaborated on a range of newly- or re-considered contributing factors to criminal violence and was presented as a “policy of state” to be fully explored in both context and application (MJSP, 2009). The document is presented as arising from “a collective and diverse vision – with the important participation of citizens” and set about to include ranging contributors as well as subjects (Ibid.). As such, those involved in creating the document set about with the goal to ensure that it related to the work of the whole of society and that it promoted inter-institutionality and inter-operability between the diverse institutions of state and civil society alike (Ibid.). Furthermore, the intent of this document was to restructure the nature of security prevision in the country along broader lines: “the new government conceives of public security as an integral part of human security” (Ibid., p. 7). Security risks to the state of El Salvador and its citizens were thus considered to include: the precarious and unequal socio-economic development; migration and the loss of family and social fabric; sexist and violent social patterns; political corruption and patronage; institutional weaknesses; one-dimensional focus and treatment of the phenomenon [of insecurity and violence]; the geopolitical nature of the fight against narco-trafficking; conflicts of criminal groups – gangs; and, the highly available circulation of firearms (MJSP, 2009). In other words, this policy document was an attempt to fulfil Funes’ stated goal to “consolidate the peace and promote social coexistence” (Funes,
2009). It also represented one of the most intensive processes of consultation on Salvadoran security in the 21st century (MJSP Policy Advisor, 2012).

The PNJSC is first and foremost a document for citizen or public security. Latin America has long focused on citizen security as a human security-like means to shift national and state-centred policy to a more complete focus for the individual as encompassed in its citizenry. Following this, the Salvadoran government attempted to build a state security policy that embraces local citizenship perspectives in a manner which seeks to share power and change the direction of policy substance contributions to a bottom up activity. As previously noted, the FMLN was committed prior to its 2009 election to the presidency to engage with local communities and a diverse group of non-dominant actors through Dialogo Social Abierto or Open Social Dialogue roundtables. Thus, the resulting PNJSP presents an opportunity to examine both (1) the contributions of local communities of real security concepts to a national policy; and (2) to what extent the resulting document, in the spirit of citizen security, managed to balance repression demands with prevention aspirations. The Minister’s introduction to the PNJSC states: “This policy assigns equal importance and force to the actions of prevention, repression and rehabilitation, there constituting a coherent and harmonic whole” (MJSP, 2010a, p. 8).

Indeed, one of the PNJSP’s explicative points answering why there is so much violence in El Salvador argues that a mono-dimensional treatment and focus of the security environment left insecurity management in a reactionary position which was ill-equipped to apply the law and resulted in financial spending without strategic planning (Ibid., p.15). Although the PNJSC was presented as both policy and a strategic document which could be operationalised, the 2010 draft remained unpublished until after the MJSP had switched ministers in November 2011 and was never fully implemented. Nonetheless, the PNJSC highlights the thinking of the FMLN members and representatives, after significant national consultation, over how they

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42 Both the SICA and the OAS have made reference to citizen security in declarations and protocols since the end of the civil war period of the 1980s. The San Salvador Declaration in 2011 promised to develop citizen security as “a component of public security” and obligated member states to strengthen “peaceful coexistence” recognising that “the individual is at the center of citizen security, [...] and should therefore be a partner in the definition and implementation of ways to build more secure and sustainable communities and societies” (OAS, 2011, pp. iii-iv) In the 2012 Hemispheric Plan of Action, the OAS presented specific objectives to develop citizen security public policies among member states, “based on national realities, taking into consideration citizen and community participation,” as well as to “identify scientific methods for objective assessment of citizen security and of the specific risk factors in each state, addressing the different needs of its population” (OAS, 2012b, p.2).

43 Although the Minister’s remarks appeared in the draft policy over a year to Munguía Payés’ taking office, that the PJSC was published relatively unchanged entails that there was little immediate intent to change the overall direction set in the first government from the time they took office. Translation from: Esta política asigna igual importancia y esfuerzo a las acciones de prevención, represión y rehabilitación, pues constituyen un todo congruente y armónico.
felt the country could be run for increased security and, importantly, it attempted to balance prevention and repression strategies in a manner which spoke to their ideological hopes and dreams for the country.

Alongside a general discussion on the structural weaknesses of the MJSP itself, the PNJSC highlighted not only the problems within the institution of the PNC but of its General Inspectorate for oversight and its academic training institutions. Over all, there was a general critique of the conditions of ministry politicisation which had allowed the political manipulation of sector institutions, not least that of the PNC, without the development of institutional management oriented to the design, formulation and implementation of public policies (MJSP, 2010a). The PNC, including its oversight and training instruments, were accused of having lost the confidence and credibility of its citizens with too much power on repression whilst unable to pursue its own internal criminal activities (MJSP, 2010a, pp. 19-21). In result, the policy argued, the police were unable to fulfil their function as support to the population because of an accelerated deterioration of its image (Ibid.). Training, it was further noted, had not helped the situation due to a significant emphasis on authoritative and militaristic responses that deemphasised the civil essence of the PNC (MJSP, 2010a, p. 23). Abuses perpetrated against trainees—which weakened the forces—and an institutional power for the sake of power structure were observed as long-term issues that had weakened the police throughout its institutional structure although the policy stopped short of linking these issues to their activities on the streets.

Both in its critiques of the institutional weaknesses as perceived by the incoming government and in the legal and institutional responsibilities it highlighted as the basis for its reorientation of the public security file, the PNJSC presented the government’s determination to provide a positive security function to the Salvadoran population. It strove to increase the capacities and capabilities of the country’s security institutions to produce security through just practice and increased trust between the population and its security structures. First laid out in the Government Programme Plan 2009-2014 (FMLN, 2009) and later reiterated in the PNJSC were the five pillars intended to improve action balance between repression and prevention as well as build trust with the Salvadoran population. They were founded under the premise that actions taken were to be part of an integrated system with full citizen participation within the responsibilities of the appropriate institutions and that such actions would be undertaken in a sustainable fashion (MJSP, 2010a). Among the five pillars as specific policy objectives included:
1) The control and repression of common, organised, and gang crime through an increased management capacity and territorial control;

2) The prevention and reduction of the factors and causes that propagate violence and crime, identified as the resources and potentials of the community and including pacifist conflict resolutions;

3) The implementation of a new penal model developed to guarantee order, security, and control of penitentiaries in a manner which favours rehabilitation and social reinsertion effectiveness;

4) The promotion of the role of the victims of crime in administration and judicial spheres; and

5) The practice of an efficient strategic direction of public security that strengthens relations between those institutions responsible for the public security file and to improve the implementation of existing laws through an improved judiciary. (Ibid.)

These thematic concerns were to be realised through a wide range of programmes, within the guidelines of department-specific policies: 23 strategies with 113 lines of action (MJSP, 2012a). A balance between repression and prevention could only be created if the institutions upon which the operational end relied were also reformed. Controlling crime entailed the improvement of investigative and intelligence techniques. Improving trust meant cleaning up and increasing access to the judicial system. Efficiency in programme implementation required better institutional coordination, management procedures, and the ever present requirement to consult and implement the recommendations of local communities. Within the PNJSP there was also specific acknowledgement of the numerous academic and expert studies which had made recommendations on the security file and with which the ministry intended to consult as it pushed forward to operationalise its policy objectives. However, between the draft and its official publication, the PNJSP removed specific references to consulting and financing parties. In particular, reference to the UNDP and its Spanish funding partner AECID were removed in favour of more general references to international experts and the UN’s Joint Reduction of Violence and Construction of Social Capital Programme. As previously mentioned, the PNJSC also sought to incorporate many of the recommendations made by the CNSCPS in 2007. Ultimately, the efforts exhibited through the PNJSC represented an important step in the country’s security history; its planning and strategic state vision the first of its kind in the post-war security sphere. Unfortunately, the official release of the PNJSP was delayed on numerous occasions and was increasingly side-lined as reactions to specific circumstances involved a return to repressive and military measures.

5.4.2 National Strategy for Violence Prevention (ENPV)
In the first year of government, the FMLN administration created a series of Municipal Councils for Violence Prevention and several policy lines for specific MJSP units that put a specific emphasis on prevention as a replacement for Mano Dura as promised during the election campaign. As discussed in the previous section, the first years of the administration were a contradictory mix of aspirations to a prevention-driven policy whilst resorting to repressive, militarised tactics in the manner of the strongest Mano Dura operations in an attempt to gain control over a deteriorating security situation.

Furthermore, both policies and actions over the first three years appeared to prioritise the prevention and repression of criminal violence and gang activities over the prevention of social violence, as defined by interfamiliar, sexual, youth, and neighbourhood conflicts (Angel Estrada, 2012). Despite the important efforts made to outline prevention options based in citizen trust-building, they did not significantly appear in practice nor were there meaningful budget modifications to support supposed prevention activities (FESPAD, 2012). It was not until 2012, that the GNPV was truly up and running on the part of the executive; its basis for operation was the National Strategy for the Social Prevention of Violence in support of the Municipalities (ENPSV) which had been developed by the Presidential Strategic Business Directorate (Secretaría de Asuntos Estratégicos de la Presidencia – SAE) with the participation of executive institutions and civil society organisations (MJSP, 2012c, p. 6). Building on the ENPSV was the National Strategy for Violence Prevention (ENPV) of 2012. The process was guided by the General Directorate of Social Prevention of Violence and Culture of Peace (PREPAZ) which took the place of the General Directorate of Citizen Security (DGSC) in 2009 with the new government. PREPAZ’ stated role was to guide prevention policy development and ensure that citizen security operations were oriented to community organisations and municipalities.

With the PNJSC, PREPAZ gained importance within the MJSP and took responsibility for the territorialisation of security policies and inter-institutional coordination mechanisms. As Galvan (2010) of the SSDT / SAE explained, the ENPSV (2010) served to coordinate the more than 40 NGOs dedicated to prevention and youth work in the municipalities with the implicated government institutions. The following ENPV (2012) was intended to improve on the gaps in the ENPSV as well as to take into account the changing security situation. In particular, the ENPV was to:

- Place a new institutional emphasis on the importance of violence prevention;
- Create a new national system of violence prevention;
- Re-organise related institutions to deepen the responsibility to prevention-related elements; and
Promote the adoption of related policies and laws that would facilitate prevention-related activities like citizen coexistence and women and youth violence prevention laws. (MJSP, 2012c)

Over all, the ENPV was intended to reduce risk factors and increase protection tools for specific territories and populations affected by violence and crime in a concerted and coordinated manner between all levels of government (Ibid.).

Table 5-5: Goal and General Objective for the National Strategy for Violence Prevention (MJSP, 2013b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End Goal</th>
<th>General Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the construction of a national system of violence prevention with territorial perspective, based in a connection between the State and society, which strengthens citizen security and democracy, as well as lifts the quality of life of the population.</td>
<td>Deploy a concerted and articulated action between the Central Government, local governments and the citizenry to reduce risk factors and increase protection factors in the various territories and populations especially affected by violence and crime.</td>
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The ENPV was a second attempt to materially improve the prevention file within the larger public security framework. Within the ENPV, it was noted that the ENPSV had contained several major deficiencies that required resolution. First, it argued that the definition or conceptual development of violence prevention as well as its outlines for inter-institutional activities to increase and improve prevention results were deficient. Second, it noted that further connections were required between the legal framework and public policies related to prevention. Despite the ENPSV’s stated importance to the outlining of institutional roles and responsibilities, the ENPV acknowledges that this was not done with enough elaboration to truly overcome the disorder and work duplication, which therefore continued (MJSP, 2012c). A year-end draft added that a new consultation process with focus groups sourced from the Violence Prevention Municipal Committees, funded by USAID and the UNDP had further aided the government to strengthen and address acknowledged weaknesses of previous policies; the results of which had been incorporated into the ENPV for actioning (MJSP, 2012d, p. 8). Apparent changes as a direct result of these late-term consultations included an increased emphasis on the impact of machist culture and gender inequality; an increased responsibility for the Minister responsible for prevention and the more frequent meeting of those members of the National Committee of Violence Prevention (CONAPREV).

44 CONAPREV is comprised of the following membership: MJSP, MINGOB, MINEC, MINED, MINTRAB, MINSAL, STP, SIS, SECULTURA, PNC, FISDL, INJUVE, ISDEMU, CONNA, ISNA, INDES and COMURES. It is different from the GNPV in that it coordinates between the national government and
number of organisation, financing, and territorial implementation guidelines, it too remained a relatively marginalised document, according to interested entities. Organisations like the Municipal Violence Prevention Councils (CMPV) argued that, nonetheless, the ENPV represented a large advance in the material conception of violence prevention.

The ENPV was the first published document that developed, to a material degree, the policy tools available not only for crime and violence indicators reduction but also for the improvement of coexistence and social cohesion tools which had long been discussed as ideals (MJSP, 2013a). The published 2013 document also spoke for the first time of a ‘national pacification process that should be based on the construction of a social pact for security, to give continuity and sustainability’ (Ibid., p. 9). It was to be the most direct reference in written policy that the government made to a national gang truce and the window of opportunity that this peace created to push forward its prevention programmes. The national pacification process was intended to provide an integrated solution to the ‘multiple structural causes from which the problems of violence, crime and insecurity originated’ (Ibid., p. 14). Through the strengths and advances listed at the outset of the published document, the definitions of security within the prevention framework can be deduced. An instrument of structured and systematic dialogue between various levels of government was seen as an important advance to create operational spaces within the municipalities and give greater visibility to municipal governments and civil society organisations as the best protagonists of violence prevention. Building trust between local organisations, government officials, and the population through visibility and on-the-ground programming was central to its implementation. Local knowledge and local relationships were considered some of the best possibilities for working with children and youth at risk and reducing the factors that might lead them to join in criminal activity. CMPVs were also seen as important tools for local leaders because they incorporated private entities as well and created a whole of community dialogue with potential results of employment, low-funding high-impact youth programming, and social cohesion. As a target zone, schools with the facilitation of the Ministry of Education (MINED) were considered to be an important area of implementation (Ibid., p. 15).

management cabinets at the departmental and local levels as well as civil society, private entities and international cooperants. It is more directly responsible for the promotion of technical and financial cooperation with non-government entities as well as to provide another system for monitoring and evaluation of policies, strategies, and initiatives to ensure their applicability to municipal prevention activities (MJSP, 2012d).
The risk factors contained in the ENPV were, like the overarching PNJSP, viewed through the lens of citizen security, as a component of human security where individuals are considered the “point of departure” (MJSP, 2013a, p. 18). Specifically, the ENPV cites the Conference of the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights’ (OEA, 2009) definition of citizen security and state responsibility which states:

Citizen security is threatened when the state does not perform its function to offer protection against crime and social violence, decrease the gap of inequality existing between men and women, as well as the causes and factors that generate social exclusion and the abuse of vulnerable sectors, which disrupts the basic relationship between governors and governed. (MJSP, 2013a, p. 19)

In this manner, the strategy opens its discussion through a positive security approach which emphasises harmonic coexistence and the strengthened linkages between relevant actors to support conditions of human dignity with the full enjoyment of their human rights (Ibid.). The multi-actor nature of positive security is also demonstrated through the ENPV’s discussion of the importance of multidimensional security actions over the long term involving society actors and the participation of citizens (Ibid., p. 20-22). It argues that policies, strategies, programmes and projects/activities are not just an extension or application of the law. Instead, an approach from the bottom up or territorial dimension allows for the multi-dimensional nature extend from a diversity of actors to a diversity of issues which may contribute to greater security. In this approach, both social cohesion and social capital are key to the understanding of the security perspective. A conceptualisation of social vulnerability is a means through which security files may also be pursued as the National Institute for Youth (INJUVE, 2012) explained; vulnerability brings in an integral necessity of action which cannot be limited to a reduction in crime (MJSP, 2013a).

### Table 5-6: ENPV Structural Risk Factors (MJSP, 2013b; MJSP, 2013a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structurally-formed Risk Factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Structural and Cultural Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Factors of inequality and discrimination towards women, girls, boys and adolescents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Institutional and Political Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Issue specific factors like the traffic of drugs and others</td>
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### 5.4.3 The treatment of gangs in law and written policy
In the context of the first FMLN government since the signing of the peace accords, policy and operations officials argued that a hard-handed approach was no longer the only tool to hand, nor were gangs the only target. Gangs are the first security risk brought to the fore in Salvadoran official discussion but they are not as dominant for those officials who work in regional context. Furthermore, unlike sensational media reports in daily newspapers, officials were much more cautious to address gang issues not only as a security risk but as based in those deeper historical origins of socio-economic inequalities and position them in terms of prevention programming potential rather than focus on military crackdown, as had been conducted in the past. Whilst all officials interviewed for this study spoke about both gangs and transnational criminal organisations (TCO) at some point when defining security risks and violence indicators in Central America, the means through which they communicated this violence differed. MJSP policy officials spoke in terms of groups and policies. Prevention policy officials preferred to discuss the themes found in criminal violence activities rather than highlighting specific groups or targeting individuals. Namely, they were more inclined to broad types of violence such as armed violence (80 per cent of homicides are perpetrated with a firearm), gendered violence (a source indicator for cultures of violence endemic in society) or drug abuse prevention strategies, than they were to identify typical individuals or groups responsible for these actions. Security operations officials spoke in terms of the types of crime committed. Auto thefts, trafficking (drugs, arms, people, contraband), and the violence of murder were all considered security risks facing Central America but the perpetrators were left more ambiguous. Finally, regional diplomacy officials with the SICA spoke in terms of the abstract and technical themes which would require regional programming implementation in order to be addressed by the states themselves. Thus, even when the ultimate agreed upon sources of violence and crime were similar, the terms and means through which these issues were communicated were sensitive to a particular set of concepts or goals unique to that institution or individual.

Since the topic of gangs is generally unavoidable in the context of criminal violence, all officials did make reference to the issue at one point or another. The general tone, set by a government advisor, was that gangs were not solely responsible for the problems El Salvador or indeed Central America was currently facing: on the one hand, the Salvadoran government positions gangs as “a major impact on the security of the country. On the other hand, they say that an important percentage of homicides are related to the process of trafficking and commercialisation of drugs” (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). In this
regard, although the split between realms of responsibility varies from assessment to opinion, there remained a relative certainty among government officials that a link has grown between gangs and TCO. This advisor on policy development pointed to a 2009 presidential address given by Mauricio Funes that fundamentally restructured the collective gaze on criminal violence by separating the issue of gangs from that of TCO, indicating that whilst both issues needed to be addressed to find solutions to violence in El Salvador, those solutions would be different.

Prevention policy officials also acknowledged the different solutions required for reducing the criminal violence perpetrated by gangs than the actions required to combat TCO, which fell out of their purview. Gangs represented a particular threat not only to the present but to the future stability of the country due to demographics and geography. Gangs are comprised of youth as young as 10 or 12 and the majority are in their late teens or early twenties (Wolf, 2011). These street groups flourish in marginalised and excluded areas where few opportunities exist for youths. As such, prevention programming was thought best directed to these areas and to these groups as a means to provide alternatives to crime (Interviews with PREPAZ Official, 2012; Flores, 2012). PREPAZ director Flores argued that prevention programming was required and needed to be structured specifically for the context of children, adolescents and youth and that the solutions had to be built within local communities (Interview with Flores, 2012). Another PREPAZ official took this argument further, stating that PREPAZ or prevention operations are the only facilitators currently in local communities coming to grips with location-specific security risks (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012). However, he went on to explain, the problems of violence are so much greater than firearms deaths and gang abuses. Prevention in this perspective additionally involves the important issues of maltreated children, intra-familiar violence, and violence against women. In this way, violence and prevention “is much more in-depth than we imagine, because it involves a re-education” (Ibid.).

As such, in the eyes of prevention policy officials, security risks to individuals were not just those of gangs or TCO but emanating from a plethora of sources all of which needed to be addressed when planning solutions. These officials were also united in the conviction that police should not be involved in establishing long-term programming, a position that was contested by operations officials. Cotto’s perception that El Salvador’s position as one of the most violent countries in the world had been generated by government neglect of the spaces that generate violence agreed with those discussed above (Interview with Augusto Cotto, 2012). In other words, that “the state provided weak care for children and youth”
resulting in violent urban and marginalised areas facilitating a spreading gang problem (Ibid.). However, he believed that an essential component of the prevention-led solution had to involve police officers to build community policing networks (as in a pilot project sponsored by the UK government) and to ensure continuing protections against criminal violence. Nevertheless, officials were in agreement along the broad terms of addressing at-risk youth in situ and building opportunities for an alternative lifestyle in conjunction with local governments.

Civil society interested parties (Interpeace) and academics (IUDOP, UCA/Alberto Masferrer) along with foreign government-sponsored organisations such as GiZ (Germany), USAID (US), and CECI (Canada) all highlight the importance of working directly with local governments – even when developing regional initiatives – on gang policy. In the majority, they also supported prevention activities and noted the need for long-term policy to build security through the mitigation of gang influences rather than combating criminal violence over the short term. IUDOP director Jeannette Aguilar was broadest in her definition of the social origins of Central American security, noting that the high human and social cost of insecurity had a long history in the wars of the region and that combating crime was not sufficient to address the new ‘dynamic complexity to criminality’ (Interview with Aguilar, 2012). In this perspective, ‘the main concern is how security affects the poor in populated areas’ because they have little purchasing power to provide their own security (Ibid.). Furthermore, IDUCA, Interpeace, and GiZ officials all note the importance of youth in addressing both security and prevention policies – not just as gangs and vulnerable youth groups but as the future of the country (Interview with Kuechemann, 2012). This was said to require a whole of society solution to build a citizen culture of peace through the ministries of youth, education, and health as issues of prevention included not just gang considerations but ‘the greater issues that are practically the same in every country: school expulsions, familiar violence, and a lack of social/recreational spaces’ (Interview with Aguilar Umana, 2012). In this way, the security risks are not seen as solely violent individuals but as those in the communities of high crime and victimisation (Ibid.).

5.4.4 Reaction to Government Policies

Although FLMN laws and militarised government reactions from 2009 to 2013 had been less criticised by their own party members than similar policies proposed by the ARENA party in previous administrations had been, in discussion on the policy development process as well as its lack of appropriate implementation, many were quick to comment
Truce negotiator Raul Mijango argued that their truce negotiations were a necessary reality after the failure of government policy:

First, it needs to be said that the state public policy has been a punitive policy, expressed in the incrimination of crime repression levels. […] When there was the change in government, the government of Mauricio Funes was not able to disrupt this inertia of how to confront the phenomenon of violence and they gave continuity to the old public policies [of mano dura etc.]. The leadership that the President of the Republic put to the Public Security dossier was very weak and incapable of making an interpretation more profound of the phenomenon and so accommodated to continue with the implementation of the same policies that had already been attempted. This further introduced elements that came to further complicate the issue as in the case of the approval of the Law of the Proscripción de Pandillas that in practical terms penalised the whole of Salvadoran youth. (Mijango, 2013)

Others were not so much worried about the contents of security and prevention policies, some of which they had helped to write but rather over whether the government had, in fact bothered to follow its newly minted publications: ‘This document is not very public; it is not generally known. If you ask people if they know of the security policy document, they don’t know it […]’ (Interview with Guillén, 2013). As such, the FMLN’s early days in office focused on both broadening and deepening understanding of the complexity of violence facing Salvadorans, in consultation with a range of international, regional and local technical experts, but it was done in a haphazard manner which reflected both the newness of the party to governance and a tendency to pursue grand ideas without significant concrete development.

Despite these lofty goals of conflating public security into a citizen security context and promoting a common vision between diverse institutions and civil society, most subjects, when questioned directly, acknowledged that the 2010 Security Policy had failed to be fully implemented and, although serving as a constant object of reference in security discussions and discourse, it remained inoperable. In particular, the Justice and Public Security Ministry (MJSP)’s social violence prevention unit, PREPAZ, noted that there was
a great deal of resistance to implementing prevention programming and that often, when initiating a new program, they would be forced to work on their own or with international institutions instead of with local bodies (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). Local municipalities most often adopted a wait and see attitude and would jump in once they saw progress or benefit to themselves (Interview with Flores, 2012).

Others, such as a foreign organization involved in local social violence prevention programming, argued that even the government was reluctant to act on the 2010 Security Policy (Interview with Quinn, 2012). They observed that it took outsiders with international funds to implement programming along the lines of the government policy rather than initiatives emerging from the government itself. At the same time, the first cabinet of the FMLN government, although it had what FESPAD director Maria Silvia Guillén called a ‘timid intent to give life’ to an integral policy addressing crime and introduce prevention, did not make significant progress (Interview with Guillén, 2013). In particular, Guillén highlighted the failure of former Vice-minister Campos to present a rehabilitation law proposal to the Legislative Assembly. However, she noted that during that period, improvements had been made, such as the end of raids on individual communities, a moratorium that did not last into the second cabinet: ‘With this cabinet [there has been] a return to massive operations in poor communities […] and there is no definitive integral prevention policy’ (Ibid.). As such, the PNJSP, despite beginning with energy, intent and support, quickly sank as the government returned to crisis-driven, reactionary policy initiatives which returned soldiers to street patrols and as guards in penitentiaries.

The immediate reason provided for the government’s backtracking was the necessity for swift reaction to gang attacks on buses and urban centres. Officials acknowledge that the lack of resources and personnel with experience in the development and implementation of prevention policies was also a factor (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). Police officials argued that there were not enough available officers trained on community policing, let alone in regular patrolling techniques, to meet immediate requirements and so military accompaniment was a stop-gap (Interviews with PNC Commissioner, 2012; Martinez Ventura, 2012). Nevertheless, there were several important developments in these early FMLN policies which illustrate its predisposition to a more balanced security framework. The goal was not necessarily to instantly find quick solutions to direct problems, such as homicide, but to generate new platforms from which underlying social structures could be addressed.
5.5 Conclusion

When exploring the relationship between crime, violence, and security, the forms and constructs of violence must be considered prior to attempting to write policy or govern those threats. Chapter 4 already presented the actors involved in security governance in answer to the questions of who participates in policy formation and governance outcomes and in what spaces or levels they make a contribution. Building on those spaces, this chapter has explored the types of security perceptions, measurements, policies, and policy perceptions with which actors engage. To start, the location and scope of security perceptions is important for redefining where actors fit within different scales or levels of governance. How do these multiple levels of actor perceptions structure the security concepts used in policy and governance? What has the potential to emerge is an expansive interpretation of security, ranging from protection from the direct threats presented by gangs to broader themes of accessible public spaces and neighbourliness. What does emerge is often something much narrower – as if competing and contrasting opinions in dialogue end up regressing to the narrow definitions of crime as culprit. Organised crime and gang activities are situated in these spaces where crime is structured through a violent lens. Next, the issues of measurement which can provide the baseline data required for solid policy making. However, measurement inaccuracies and the seduction of numbers can often lead to overestimates on criminal influences. Much of the data produced by crime measurement is based on rumour or popular response (as in LAPOP or IUDOP, for example). For this thesis, these issues can inform the analysis of actor contributions to security governance projects including policy development.

In a turn to the policies outlined above, there remains an uneasy tension between security ideals and the concepts born out of reaction to specific threat or crisis events. Whereas there appeared to be a concerted effort to identify for who the security was for, it was less clear for which values security was being constructed. Whilst citizen security allows for both to be implemented simultaneously, it does not entail that this is done with any great degree of success. In large part, this is also down to the fact that most aspects of the grand policy projects were never implemented or only done so half-heartedly. Instead, the governance structures and implemented programmes became a far greater indicator of
what security was being governed and how than policy publications. This means that while
the spaces of interactions and the types of actors involved were expanded during the first
FMLN administration, and security concept changes within policy development broadened
within the constructs of citizen security, the implementation of policy was less successful.
Through this discussion, an image emerges of the state as an organisation that very much
considers itself essential to the provision of security and the development of national
strategies to guide policy development, even when built on grass-roots contributions. At
the same time, municipal level experiences demonstrate that multidimensional, micro-level
consultations can sometimes be sufficient to address citizen requests for security in and
around their daily lives. In order to interpret the ways in which security governance
changed under the FMLN, an examination of case study governance efforts in practice are
required.
Chapter 6

Security Governance Outcomes: Innovation in El Salvador


6.1 Introduction

Security is a term highly contested both in theory and through the policy development process. As has been explored in Chapters 4 and 5, the different actors involved in policy formation bring their own interpretations of security and unique operational agendas to security governance, the dynamics of which can have very important impacts on programme implementation and outcomes. Not only does the process involve internal government competition on direction and managing authority but it is further impacted by foreign entities, NGOs, and civil society institutions trying to impact management strategies towards their own desired goals and processes. Domestic ‘ownership’ of the resulting forms and processes is also debatable as a function of that governance negotiation reality. How then do interventions and outcomes relate as a function of these actor security dynamics? This chapter argues that there is not one process outcome but that all levels continue to interact in negotiating implementation through interconnecting operational spaces.

This chapter addresses what these security governance efforts look like from the perspective of developed policy through programming implementation and outcomes. To do this, examples of prevention programmes were examined at the regional, national and local level, each characterised by their own transformative space within the Salvadoran context. The first section examines the regional ESCA initiative through the perspective of the German project PREVENIR. It presents a classic example of security governance diplomacy where greater collaboration limited by its own weight depends on individual actors pursuing individual goals. The example of the SGT as a hybrid effort with key support from multi-actor networks developed almost as an afterthought as a sort of sustainability catch-up mechanism. Thus, in the final case study, three municipalities are introduced. Each had been running some form of prevention strategy prior to the SGT. With the territorialisation of the SGT in late 2012–early 2013, each was brought into the SGT framework with the intent of solidifying the pacification tenets through ground-level initiatives. To understand how municipal, national, and regional perceptions and practices in security governance relate to one another, these case studies have been chosen as negotiated spaces for security management. For better cross-case analysis, the selected cases represent prevention programmes leaving methods of combating violent crime and crime repression strategies for later research.
6.2 The Central American Security Strategy (ESCA)

After a brief overview of the ESCA structure and development process, this section will look at the programme outcomes through Germany’s involvement in ESCA and the manner in which it brought its existing efforts in line with the objectives of a regional strategy within specific states. It concludes with local perspectives on ESCA outcomes to 2013.

During the years of ESCA development between 2011 and 2013, El Salvador’s participant government officials were broadly supportive of the strategy. Not only had the thematic pillars and encompassed projects been developed out of a process of national consultations and agreed upon through regional negotiation (not necessarily the most important security risks in each country but the most important security threats that they could agree upon collectively) but it was portrayed as a means of regional and international strategic engagement over the long term (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012). As a member of the Salvadoran negotiation team and Director of PREPAZ, Santiago Flores, explained, ‘Currently, it is a reality that the Northern Triangle has its differences from the rest of the countries but the Regional Strategy rests on the achieved consensus because of this necessity, this reality, and this political decision to work together’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, it fell within the Salvadoran effort to increase a prevention focus within wider security activities as even the ‘combating crime’ component was largely constructed of ‘reduction’ and mechanism strengthening projects. As the Salvadoran negotiation team leader, Francesco Gonzalez, explained, ‘training to give better answers to the problems of insecurity have helped us to start thinking beyond combat-driven responses’ (Ibid.).

In its official documents, the SICA defines itself as an instrument to coordinate regional activities in security with the objective to establish the components and activities necessary to strengthen security and wellbeing for the individual in a regional manner (SICA, 2011). In this context, and through much regional negotiation, Central American states agreed to four thematic pillars encompassing 22 initial projects (See Figure 6-1). Out of these proposed projects, eight were chosen for the initial implementation (See Figure 6-2). Again, the Salvadoran negotiating team was very supportive of this complement of themes and projects because it fit directly within their own national security policy (See Chapter 6). However, Gonzalez emphasised that it would be a mistake for foreign observer states to think that the ESCA was just a strategy for funds on the part of Central American states:
Part of the effectiveness in implementing this strategy is the political support in making it sustainable. We expect all countries that support us to understand the concept that if you are helping one country and not another, the impact will be minimal. We must work together, knowing the mechanisms and procedures of the system, to generate the kind of synergy between countries that will be productive. (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012)

Other members concurred over the strength of continuity and joint responsibility they perceived in the regional process (Interviews with Flores, 2012; Ortiz de Zelaya, 2012). The multi-level, multi-lateral nature of the ESCA was therefore considered one of its chief recommendations as geared to the development of policies, programmes, strategies and actions that permit the prevention of violence in the region (SICA, 2011a; Interview with Flores, 2012).

Table 6-1: ESCA Components (Source: SICA, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Encompassing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatting Crime</td>
<td>Organised delinquency, Narco, arms and human-trafficking, Deportees, Gangs, Homicides, Terrorism, Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Juvenile, Armed, Gender Violence, Illegal Traffic of Migrants, Persons, Drugs Consumption, Local Focus, Regional and Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation, Reinsertion and Prison Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Strengthening</td>
<td>Regional Institutions in Security, Prevention and Criminal Punishments, Local Focus, Femicide, and the Mitigation, Attention and Prevention of Disasters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the significant limitations of the ESCA was its lack of detail contained within the projects presented in the 2012 framework. The debate actually centred on whether the ESCA represented a policy, a strategy, or a collection of projects. The director of the Democratic Security Unit argued that the ESCA was a policy because the projects themselves represented a concept of security and a means for prevention planning over the long term with a regional coordination focus (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). However, other members of the team working on the projects’ development were not convinced. One technical official stated bluntly, when asked about the policies developed for the ESCA, that the ESCA was not a policy and clarified that ‘[The ESCA] should function like a policy but I do not think it will arrive at this, it should, perhaps we are in the beginning stages and we don’t have the results’ (Interview with Loya Marin, 2012). From this perspective, there existed a common base, the ESCA, that had been agreed upon by the member states but the lack of common structural organisation meant that it was a collaborative effort to seek similar paths rather than a regional policy that could implement changes at a national level. Similarly, others argued that while the dialogue which surrounded the negotiation of the projects could be considered on some level as a strategy towards greater security and collective management of specific issues, this did not constitute a regional policy either (Interview with Chacon, 2012). Others were not so
complementary arguing that even the projects were lacking in sufficient definition for immediate implementation (Participant Observation, 2012).

It was this collaboration that had some international donors concerned. At meetings in January 2012, chief hesitations over the initiative included the proposed model of execution; the lack of clarification or definition of responsibilities for participant parties including the SICA and members states; and the lack of flexibility of locking into a regional strategy (Participant Observation, 2012). Donor countries from the US to Germany alleged that the role of the SICA was unclear because it had never previously acted as an implementer of programmes or projects, being primarily a diplomatic body. However, the SICA responded that such concerns were premature; although its primary function to that point had been in the facilitation of relations between various entities, it was ‘in the process’ of developing important monitoring and evaluation capacities along with financial mechanisms to allow the institution to administer regional projects (Participant Observation, 2012; Interview with Chacon, 2012). Questions also arose over what would happen to existing bilateral projects that fit within the constructs of the strategy. Whilst the SICA wanted to have coordination fall under their control, some foreign donors were reluctant to make this move due to legal restrictions or the distrust of a regional process in general. Some like the US and Canada were willing to bring their bilateral projects in alignment with the thematic goals of the SICA without actually bringing their work under the structure. An odd result of this process was that foreign donors ended up ‘adopting’ specific components or projects – a means of implementing consistency across the region through the guiding agenda of one or a small number of interested parties. Nevertheless and despite concerns, the early development of the ESCA managed to provide a certain level of clarification as to what projects and programming were on-going in the region, clarifying gaps that could use further development.

Over all, the initial Strategy received commitments to US$78,316,018 out of an identified/proposed US$333 million; 52 percent of committed funds were designated for violence prevention projects and 31 percent towards institutional strengthening. Projects DB1 and DB2 in the Institutional Strengthening category were the first to be implemented with 590 police among the 1,440 civil servant trained in the first year of implementation to 2013 (SICA, 2012). Combined, prosecutors and judges represented another 500 individuals who participated in various training project efforts on the modernisation and harmonisation of regional legal mechanisms (Ibid.). Under a second project (DB2), national security institutions were provided ‘modernising tools’ (much in the form of training) with a
‘regional vision’ to help support the ESCA from a national perspective (Participant Observation, 2012). First, this meant that countries were facilitated in their creation of security policies that would address transnational criminal concerns within national security and justice institutions. Second, in conjunction with another regional unit, COMJIB, institutions were financed to pursue the harmonisation of criminal legislation to have more consistent prosecutions throughout the region. The quick implementation of these two components can be ascribed to two sources: (1) the effective management of the component leaders, the European Union and Spain; and, (2) the operating mechanism – training and workshop capacitation are well-understood and frequently implemented mechanisms of transferring knowledge (Participant Observation, 2013). Furthermore, they were also accepted topics of institutional strengthening which had an operational history in the region. The first desired result was to ‘increase the capacities for the adequate professional management of police forces and executive institutions of public security, citizens, and justice’ (SICA, 2011a). While the ESCA was not stepping out of traditional paths already long in action, its efforts to ensure both local and regional implementation of institution strengthening mechanisms marked a small step forward in creating a new, multi-level space for implementing specific activities.

The thematic pillar with the strongest funding was that focusing on the Prevention of Violence – a reversal from many state budgets. It was generally agreed that this took place because prevention was less controversial than other topics and with fewer funding restrictions on the part of donor countries (Participant Observation, 2012). Its focus was to address the factors that create insecurity; develop policies, programmes, strategies, and activities that generate opportunities for youth; and strengthen coordination mechanisms on the prevention, attention, and punishment of violence against women, among others (Interview with Kuechemann, 2012). Leading the component was Germany and the UNDP. The German government first signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the SICA in order to promote SICA projects meeting Germany’s funding agenda including violence prevention, health, renewable energy, and sustainable development (Interview with German Embassy Official, 2012). Most projects were executed through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Thus, individuals guiding the Prevention Component in regional negotiations were a representative from the German Embassy in El Salvador, a representative from the GIZ office in El Salvador, and a Panama-based UNDP Official. After the January 2012 regional coordination meeting, foreign donors agreed that the first project that would be actionable would be the BE1 –
‘Project for the Prevention of Social Violence from a Local Government Perspective in Central America’. The project was intended to give a territorial dimension to the ESCA to eradicate generating factors of violence and crime through the greater capacitation of local governments (SICA, 2011a). After its initial implementation, the project then would seek to gather successful experiences or best practices from each country, draw out general criteria, and then define a conceptual framework to guide national and local governments through a regional approach to citizen security and social violence prevention actions (Ibid.). A longer-term plan was to move into trans-border municipalities to strengthen coordination efforts across borders from a municipal perspective.

Germany perceived this project as in line with projects they were already pursuing in the region, PREVENIR, which sought to reduce physical violence among youth through ‘intersectoral’ prevention education (Interview with Esmail, 2012). Thus, instead of providing new funds to the ESCA as requested by the SICA, they chose to consider PREVENIR as part of their overall contribution to the ESCA and the Prevention component (Interviews with German Embassy Official, 2012; Kuechemann, 2012; Esmail, 2012). This approach was not encouraged by the SICA because it did not engage with the fully integrated regional security governance vision adopted by ESCA developers but, at the same time, it was a project that was already operationalised – something that the ESCA desperately needed. Furthermore, that the ESCA projects had not been detailed or provided with a development methodology worked to Germany’s advantage in that they could broadly decide that their project, PREVENIR, was the manner in which aspects of the ESCA projects would be developed (Interview with Esmail, 2012). It was also a multi-level, multidimensional project which linked different security jurisdictions across education, justice, youth, and employment institutions. The goal was to get mid-level management trained in prevention programming so that they could then transfer that knowledge to communities. These mid-level sectors would then be able to monitor implementation in a more detailed way than national authorities and take the results for best practice contributions to national and regional policy building. Sustainability was built into this programme through partnering with universities so that academic institutions would be able to create certification programmes based on these trainings. The project came out of baselines studies which found that national ministries lacked employees with the capacity to supervise the implementation of prevention programming and that, furthermore, there was a lack of knowledge as to what ‘prevention’ actually was (Interview with Esmail, 2012).
PREVENIR itself had gone through several reiterations prior to being brought parallel with the ESCA. Having been initiated in 2009, it was found to have limited impact over its first year. It then underwent significant revisions in 2011 and 2012 to build an internal strategy which, according to programme director Esmail, was missing from earlier iterations (Interview with Esmail, 2012). As introduced into the ESCA system, it had three components: to build prevention policies through the strengthening of Municipal Prevention Committees (CMPV) and the integration of youth, civil society, and the community police into municipal violence prevention strategies; the promotion of youth employment plans and job creation opportunities; and, the addition of prevention in education (Ibid.). In the national context, PREVENIR formed close alliances with national prevention institutions to get their ‘buy-in’ to the departmental and local training strategy. For El Salvador, PREVENIR was described as having a ‘give and take’ relationship with government ministries. Esmail explained that PREPAZ was interested in benefiting from the local level training intentions but that the stumbling block was to realise lasting ‘habits and attitudes’ changes rather than just structures and resources (Ibid.). PREPAZ Director Flores argued that the multidimensional integration of ministries in training at departmental and municipal levels fit with national policies and was also in keeping with the regional sentiments of the ESCA (Interview with Flores, 2013). Furthermore, the built-in replication mechanisms meant that the project followed a basis of peer-support success stories.

The example of PREVENIR as an implemented mechanism of the regional ESCA provides an illustration of how early projects were realised. Specific foreign donors including the EU, Spain, Italy, BCIE, and Germany adopted specific projects elaborated by Central American member states within the SICA and implemented them to their own specifications. In some ways, the lack of project detail proved to be of benefit, allowing for greater flexibility in implementation. However, this also meant that although member states had created a space to address security on mutual terms, the outcomes in terms of which projects were implemented or how they were implemented remained a negotiated and contested process. In principle, however, EU countries like Germany were in support of the overarching efforts of the ESCA and its regional integration efforts – Germany viewing it as a motion of solidarity for the confidence it has in the region and because it supports integration efforts (Interview with German Embassy Official, 2012). The SICA was left in a tight position during this period of negotiation with the international community, wishing to both maintain full coordinating control over the ESCA whilst also
recognising that a degree of compromise was required in order to ensure its ultimate realisation (Participant Observation, 2012). As such, the regional position of the SICA and member states was considered to be one where ‘the [Secretary General of the SICA], in coordination with national requests, is responsible for the integral administration of the projects, in coordination with the coordination mechanism, evaluation and follow-up and the representatives of the group of friends’ (Ibid.). In other words, one regional integration body is responsible for the future administration of the security intentions of its member states and, as such and in spite of the protests of dissenting parties, it intends to move forward with the ESCA as an integral effort for greater security in Central America.

6.3 Non-norm Actors and Territorialised Security Governance

Since a sudden and stunning gang truce emerged in the tiny country of El Salvador in 2012, much was written about the nature and lasting power of such a controversial initiative. Given the lack of available information about the process, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) was alternatively framed as the instigator, the mediator, the dupe of devious criminal elements, or the hindering party in a positive forward-moving process. International observers and academics, a wide range of media commentators, and individuals working in security and gang-related fields also questioned the value of a truce with an opaque negotiation process, ill-defined participant roles and uncertain outcomes. At the same time, some have posited that the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) offered a glimmer of hope for a reimagining of citizen security and peacebuilding in the Salvadoran context. The success of such a truce could not rely on the good behavior of the two main gangs alone. Despite the surprising strength of the gangs’ structural cohesion exhibited by the truce declaration, even they would not be able to control their members over the long term without support. This section first discusses how a territorialised approach to the SGT was introduced. It then presents three short reflections on community cases. It concludes by drawing broad themes on the ability of state security structures to deliver security disputed by special interests.

The SGT was a surprise to the country. On 9 March, 2012, homicide incidents dropped over the space of 24 hours across the country, cutting the number of daily murders by more than half; a clear indication that a new form of violence reduction was in play. The initial
hypothesis floated by media observers was that gang leaders and government officials had reached an agreement whereby, in return for a reduction in homicides, gangs or at least their leaders would receive certain unknown concessions (Pries, 2013a). The report provoked a range of denials and attempted clarifications from diverse sectors. The MS-13 and M-18 gangs stated that they had brokered a truce between themselves and that no other parties were involved. The Minister of Justice and Public Security, David Munguía Payés, first argued that the homicide reduction was due to “‘coordination, the efficiency of the police, and the intelligence work’” rather than a result of any form of government-sanctioned negotiation (Martinez, et al. 2012). Six months following the immediate event, Payés along with the SGT’s chief negotiators, ex-guerrilla and ex-politician Raúl Mijango, and Armed Forces Padre Fabio Colindres cautiously admitted that, in fact, the process was not the ‘work of a miracle’ nor was it developed and implemented at the behest of the Catholic Church, as some had speculated, but rather it was ‘a process carefully designed from the Office of the Ministry of Public Security, with the endorsement of President Funes’ (Martínez and Sanz, 2012).

The international community and several foreign governments guardedly applauded the reduction in homicides, but the initial careful commendation of a proposed long-term strategy quickly faded. As one interview subject described it, in light of the ‘lack of transparency and general openness’ of the truce process, trepidation had overwhelmed most positive responses (Interview with Foreign Embassy Official, 2012). The SGT itself was a shock treatment or short term strategy which required support and programming if it had any hope of success. The Organization of American States (OAS), through Secretary General José Miguel Insula and its Secretary of Multidimensional Security (SMS) Adam Blackwell, was one of the only international organisations to officially and actively support the truce. The OAS was already working in El Salvador on a security diagnostic and had renewed working relationships with a broad range of actors in keeping with Multidimensional Security approach (Blackwell, 2015). A few other institutions, like the UNDP, responded with cautious comments like those of Director Marcela Smutt who stated that because of the truce, there was a possibility for the opening of discussions on the socio-economic integration of youth gang members at the same time as deepening prevention initiatives focused on youth at elevated risk (Interview with Smutt, 2013).

In the minds of the SGT’s chief negotiators, it was indeed a long-term process which they were attempting to build. As truce negotiator Raúl Mijango explained, the immediate homicide reductions and the willingness of the top gang leaders led both him and fellow
negotiator Monseñor Fabio Colindres to the consideration that ‘this is something more than a simple truce; the conditions are being set up through which we can transform this into a real process that seeks the recovery of social peace in El Salvador’ (Interview with Mijango, 2013). There was a slow acknowledgement on the part of the negotiators that support and participation of the GOES, civil society, and the international community was going to be essential to the lasting power of the process. Mijango continued: ‘To think that the [responsibility for] ultimate success of this process will rest on the shoulders of the Bishop and myself is very presumptuous. Now the moment is to involve all the actors: the Government, the NGOs, private enterprise, the churches…so that everyone can own the process and make it theirs’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, within the year, three further gangs operating at the national level, La Máquina, La Mao Mao, and La Mirada Locos, committed themselves to the SGT process. It was through these advances that the negotiators were able to propose the next phase of the truce: to bring the process to a selection of municipalities, have them appropriate it and feed the results back into a national process.

Suggested by the truce facilitators in conjunction and with the support of gang leaders, 18 municipalities were proposed as a product of the new era of multi-lateral peacebuilding where grassroots contribute to national (and regional) policies instead of being enacted upon solely or their local initiatives remaining localised activities. In these zones, gang factions promised to refrain from all forms of criminal activity, turn in their arms and integrate themselves in community collectives that would work for the wellbeing of the locality (Martínez, 2012). Initially named municipios santuarios (sanctuary municipalities), public outcry at the permissive optics saw participants renamed municipios libres de violencia (MLVs). Here, in return for full crime reductions, the police were expected to limit large scale anti-gang operations and the military would withdraw completely. The idea appears to have a historical basis reaching as far back as pre-modern societies where sanctuary cities provided protection for offenders in ancient Israel, the Barotse, and in the Hindu Kush (Mitchell, 2007). Here, ‘the basic protection offered was against retaliatory violence but not against legal process, judgement, and [would result in] an end to protection if the judgement was negative’ (Ibid., p. 5). Zones of Peace (ZoPs), another sanctuary-related concept, also have a basis in the Salvadoran context, including that of the Coordinadora founded in 1998 in response to rising violence following the end of the civil war (Warfield and Jennings, 2012). Rupesinghe argues that this form of ‘empowerment’ helps local communities ‘to build the will and the mechanisms to hold
governments and guerrillas accountable [...] protecting and building on the peace once it is achieved’ (Rupesinghe, 1995, p. 327). As such, it appears that while aspects of the gang truce may be contentious for citizens, civil society and international stakeholders alike, in its current form the gang truce is anything but strange and original. Rather, it is built on a set of best practices, policy initiatives, and ideological methodologies championed by the government and non-governmental organizations since the 1992 Peace Agreements which ended El Salvador’s civil war and maintains a far-reaching historical basis. The reduced violence also allowed plans for service provisions to be contemplated by other government departments including the Ministries of Health and Education. Within the MJSP, an Attention to Victims Unit also had increasing freedom of movement and was able to venture into previous no-go zones and attend to individuals (Interview with Ortiz de Zelaya, 2013).

While it was important that national services be afforded access to the MLVs, the truce negotiators found it essential that these municipalities realize horizontal integration. Mijango explained the hoped-for benefits of SGT territorialisation:

[T]o bring [the process] to the territories; it will deepen [the impact] because in the territories we are providing agreements between the gangs and society and these are mini covenants that can strengthen the stability, the sustainability and the ‘no-reversion’ of the process. (Interview with Mijango, 2013)

Prior to the second phase of the SGT, the process had remained an elite activity involving a select number of negotiators and gang leaders at the top of national gang structures, local level acceptance of these decisions was not inevitable. Local clicas, even when they bore the names of national gangs, did not necessarily enter into the SGT; they maintained their own agency and made their own territorial contributions to the patterns of violence. As one community worker explained, ‘the truce is only for some sectors; it is only small groups that are found in the truce’ (Interview with NGO Technical Official, 2013). Therefore, it was all the more important to SGT participants and facilitators that territorialisation of the process advance. Indeed, it required not only that horizontal appropriation of a top-down process be solidified but that it be sufficiently responsive in order to provide feedback on the functioning innovations to the national level for broad dissemination. The MLVs, with their individual political allegiances, were to have autonomy to pursue projects and programs that best fit their locale but remain mindful of greater applicability. Upward
dynamism in peacebuilding has been much sought-after but has often proved particularly
difficult to operationalise. Donais and Knorr observe that weak political and social
structures often limit full integration of “the local” into existing peacebuilding efforts’
(Donais & Knorr, 2013, p. 56). In the Salvadoran case, as will be demonstrated, an attempt
was made to mitigate the risks of the territorialisation process through the inclusion of
several municipalities already well versed in the implementation of citizen security and
social violence prevention programming. On the one hand, the inclusion of these
municipalities may be seen as a cynical shortcut to results optics. Nonetheless, inclusion of
rallying municipalities like Santa Tecla also created a functioning space for horizontal and
bottom-up policy contributions allowing for the ‘recuperation of peace’ in El Salvador.

6.3.1 Santa Tecla and Sonsonate

Urban areas have long been a target for violence management and reduction. Violence and
criminal activity is not a homogenous phenomenon across the country but is affected by
geography as well as socio-economic and political factors. Marginalised groups that live
with elevated exclusion levels from economic activity or weakened governance capacities
are often those with particularly stringent experiences of insecurity – not only measured
through homicides but through negative interactions with traditional and non-norm
conforming entities from local corruption in government institutions to community
gatekeeper controls maintained by local criminal groups. Through UNDP programmes,
Santa Tecla and Sonsonate engaged in efforts: (1) establish a baseline understanding of the
variables at play within a citizen insecurity framework; (2) develop projects in conjunction
with local actors to manage and reduce variables identified in the first step; and, (3)
implement new initiatives to prevent criminal violence and associated activities through
mechanisms designed to improve structural influences through youth programming and the
improvement of local employment conditions (Interview with Smutt, 2013).

Santa Tecla stands on the edge of the national capital, San Salvador; it sits on the urban
periphery while acting the capital of La Libertad department in its own right. From the
1990s, the municipality manifested the transformations that gang culture was undergoing
in El Salvador. Youth gangs increased territorial confrontations until open warfare ensured
criminal violence spread to every district. Repressive actions only served to marginalize
gang members while community relations deteriorated. The municipality’s moment of
change arrived in January and February 2001 when devastating earthquakes destroyed
much of the city’s infrastructure and caused great loss of life in the Colonia Las Colinas
district. Under the leadership of Mayor Óscar Ortiz, the municipal administration decided
to rebuild in a strategic manner. They conducted a diagnostic study on which the Participative Strategic Plan (2002-2012) was based. Citizens were consulted on their vision for their communities and chief among their demands was the need for greater security. An inter-sectoral roundtable on coexistence and citizen security was also implemented to drive the implementation of plans and programs. The local government developed their own policy of coexistence and citizen security. Included in this plan were: a recovery of public spaces; an identification of target groups, including women and youth; and the training of police officers with a community-specific focus (PNUD, 2012b). From a homicide spike to 66.4 per 100,000 in 2005, the municipality made significant progress in such that it recorded only 8.2 per 100,000 in 2012, becoming a unique success story for the country. Its streets were clean, its parks transformed into relatively safe public spaces and its citizens protected in the case of violence and natural disasters.

Having established a reputation as a prosperous municipality with a dynamic urban life and diverse economic opportunities, Santa Tecla was still one of the first to join the MLV phase of the SGT. Municipal officers argued that this was not because they needed help or more money; they had already been successful in their application for international and private funds to recover public spaces, establish youth scholarships and implement special youth programs to provide comprehensive support. Rather, as Coexistence and Citizen Security Commission Coordinator Stanley Rodriguez explained, their participation in the MLV was a function of their contributions to national security policy building (Interview with Rodriguez, 2013). Santa Tecla had served as the model for national prevention policies on multiple fronts and contributed directly to the PJSC. Because of their success at both implementing long-term programs and soliciting for international financing for their activities, they were also frequently called to share experiences with other municipalities (Ibid.). OAS representative Adam Blackwell also confirmed that it was intentional that many MLVs already had prevention plans in place (EFE, 2013). Thus, when the proposal to territorialize the SGT came to fruition, some saw Santa Tecla’s presence as one which was to facilitate their contribution of lessons learned and urban recovery experiences to other participants.

On the other hand, Santa Tecla’s improvements had not left it immune to wider gang dynamics. Against all efforts, its homicide rate had risen again in 2011 with the rest of the country (Observatorio Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia Santa Tecla, 2012). Thus, some within the political leadership also saw an opportunity in the SGT’s MLV strategy to regain control of security with the result that, in 2013, their homicide rate had
reduced once more to a record low of 17 per 100,000 (Interpeace, 2014). FMLN Mayor Óscar Ortiz argued that the process created an opportunity to guarantee peace both for the municipality and for the country (Serrano, 2013). Residents of Colonia San José del Pino and comunidad San Rafael were particularly eager to join the process after decades of stigmatization, gang subjugation, and repressive police incursions. The MLV designation allowed the municipality to enter into sectors which had remained marginalized or abandoned over the previous decade and reinvigorate efforts to further recover “social peace” (ContraPunto, 2014). At the covenant signing between local gangs and Santa Tecla officials, gang signs proclaimed: ‘we recognize that our Salvadoran people deserve better security to live in peace’. Peacebuilding in Santa Tecla recognized that local-level efforts needed to continue apace while they held the necessary tools and capacity to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding activities to other municipalities and to their country.

### 6.3.2 Ilopango and the Gang Truce Territorialisation

On 22 January 2013, the municipality of Ilopango on the edge of the capital was declared the first municipio libre de violencia (MLV) in the country. It represented the first territorialisation step in a second phase of the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) that had begun in March 2012. Ilopango had, prior to the truce, been one of the municipalities most affected by robbery, extortions and homicides and had been long considered an area to avoid. The two main gangs in El Salvador had become used to using the territory as a battleground as national rivalries were augmented by disputes between local clicas.

Graph 6-1: Homicides in Ilopango (Interpeace, 2014)

Fuente: datos proporcionados por el IML, DIGESTYC y Vice Ministerio de Seguridad y Justicia
Ilopango was one of the first municipalities to experience gang warfare between what grew to become the MS-13 and the M-18. One member explained to Interpeace workers, ‘here was fired the first bullet of the war between gangs’ (Interpeace, 2014, p. 5). As such, the homicide rate moved between 70 and 100 per 100,000 which accounted for about 85 violent deaths in 2010 and 117 in 2011. With the SGT in 2012, this number dropped to 62 and further reduced with the truce’s territorialisation in 2013. Undeniably, gangs had a significant impact on life in Ilopango and it was because of this that the municipality’s ARENA mayor, Salvador Ruano, embraced the idea of a truce as a potential solution to the continuing insecurity faced by his constituents.

Under the opinion that here it began and so here the end must first be realised (Interpeace, 2014, p. 5), Ilopango organised a local declaration echoing the gang truce press release of the previous year with the signing of an official declaration under the watchful coordination of municipal officials, local religious leaders, and with the support of national dignitaries including MJSP Minister Payes, ARENA founder Mercedes Gloria Salguero Gross, and leadership entities of both gangs. Also in attendance at the signing ceremony were members of the Prevention Council, COPACIL, who had long been at work in the community attempting to improve security and trust among its residents. Citizens attending the ceremony heard gang members promise to opt for a channel of dialogue and non-violent conflict resolution: ‘We are in a permanent process of learning how to live the culture of peace and democracy’ (Ilopango, N/A). With the goal of providing space for youth that had joined criminal elements to reinsert themselves into the local community, gangs promised to reduce their criminal activities in exchange for alternative life opportunities. Nonetheless, gang members were determined to follow-up on their original statements. A media statement given by Borromeo Henriquez Solórzano of the MS-13 in Ilopango after the signing of the accord had indicated the awareness these groups had of a national and international spotlight:

This is a historic process despite that many people have doubts and many people remain at the sidelines, but with the help that we have received from some religious personnel, mayors, business people and other non-governmental organisations, we believe that we will raise Ilopango as a national and international example. (Solorzano, 2013)
Despite the fractured nature of the truce in Ilopango, both over-arching gang structures generally committed to reducing ‘bad’ activities in exchange for ‘good’ things from the government, private businesses, and civil society. Rather than a general promise to reduce homicides and other violent crimes like that which was issued in March 2012, both gangs had specific give and take expectations. From the process, Juan Carlos Campos, the M-18 representative, expected ‘like anyone who is human’ to have the space to work, maintain a personal life and to build the trust between them and the Salvadoran people (Campos, 2013). Local gangs expected that they would facilitate negative security allowing local residents freedom from violence and crime and, in exchange, the positive security for the whole community, themselves included, was expected to rise. Gangs representatives professed that public spaces would be safer and access to education, work, and social services like healthcare would be improved for all with the result that trust for them to participate in society would be reinstalled (Campos, 2013).

Many of these expectations emerged following statements made by Raul Mijango and Padre Fabio Colindres in late November 2012 on MJSP property during a press conference marking the first year of Minister David Munguía Payes’ leadership. At that time they outlined the requirements expected of a MLV on the part of the government which included: the integration of gang members into community collectives working for local development; a community-policing dominated local PNC delegation; municipal projects for local development in high risk zones; local authorities, private business and external cooperation working to develop learning initiatives to facilitate youth-focused labour insertion opportunities including for former gang members; mental health campaign implementation prioritisation; accelerated education programmes; and a criminal observatory integrated with resident citizens in the zone (Mijango & Colindres, 2012). The statement also made provisions for the signing of a pact ‘for life and peace’ as a multi-actor document. However, in order to really move the MLV process forward, in each of the eleven cities in which the process was implemented, it appears that success was largely dependent on its champion – the strength of its mayor and the structure surrounding them.45

Taking the step to be the first MLV required leadership on the part of the mayor, Ruano. Interpeace explains that the figure of the mayor had been instrumental for young gang members because they knew that they were dealing with an actor who came from the

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45 Indeed, if judged by the municipal elections following the MLV process, a majority of the participant mayors were rewarded through re-election; this despite the fact that a polled 80% of citizens were against dialogue with gangs according to a year end IUDOF survey.
territory and who knew the realities and requirements for life and community change there as well as the authority to implement those changes (Interpeace, 2014). Furthermore, the mayor was considered “indispensable both in his role as intermediary between the central government and community interests with respect to the process as in his mediation role for the constant conflicts that arose on the land on a daily basis” (Interpeace, 2014, p. 7). Ruano became the spokesperson and advocate for greater gang programme support both for his municipality and for the SGT process in general. His advocacy came up against central government confusion on how to address the SGT process and its vacillating approaches to gangs. Specifically, the 2010 Anti-gang, Groups, Associations and Organisations with Criminal Nature Law (DL No. 458) became a large stumbling block in MLV process as programmes designed to aid youth and gang members reintegrate and rehabilitate within their local communities ran up against the restrictions in the law which facilitated the preference for repressive over alternative or prevention activities.

Despite it being apparent that civil society organisations were generally ready to work within a MLV structure to further their prevention and reintegration efforts, ARENA party leadership were not necessarily as keen. A Security Advisor and deputy for the party, Cesar Reyes Dheming, argued that ARENA had not really been consulted in the launching of the initiative but rather it was the responsibility of individual local leaders. It was they, under their local security platforms in conjunction with private businesses, which looked to local solutions to improve security (Interview with Dheming, 2013). Furthermore, Dheming argued that the documents or declarations that had been signed as part of the MLV founding were rather different than that which had been portrayed in the media and by local actors. He stated, ‘They have driven accords when they do so with civil authorities, the PNC, the society of their communities, private businesses and it is certain not with gangs but that is what to do for the benefit of these individuals’ (Ibid.). Nonetheless, the ARENA party was not going to overtly interfere with local matters and MLVs were considered to be entirely local matters; they would present the risks, and how the government was driving the theme as well as using local ARENA governments, but their decisions were their own (Ibid.).

The truce negotiator, Raul Mijango, and chief advocate for the SGT and its territorialisation across the country, argued that the process had been necessary as a counter measure to government public policy which had been punitive, expressed in the increased levels of crime repression that had been taking place since 2010 (Interview with Mijango, 2013). Thus, to his way of thinking, local governments were stepping in to
assume responsibility for security and violence prevention and through this territorial expression of willpower, strategic programmes for education, health, social infrastructure would also be included for profound results (Ibid.). During the early days of the MLV process, FESPAD director Maria Silvia Guillen felt that what took place in Ilopango would give substance to a transient and opaque truce process in which civil society and NGOs like FESPAD would continue to be facilitators because, despite Mijango’s rhetoric, the MLV were hardly the first to attempt to build solid prevention programmes with reintegration and job creation as a focus, despite the novelty of an official truce structure facilitating the 2013 move. Guillen noted that they had long been working with local governments and municipal violence prevention councils like in Ilopango (Interview with Guillen, 2013). Other organisations like RTI also noted their long-term presence in the municipality where their efforts were specifically aimed at establishing and developing local councils to facilitate prevention activities to reduce indicators of violence and crime in high violence areas (Interview with Garcia, 2012).

At the time of the MLV ceremony, there was some confusion over what it would mean to on-going projects in the municipality. Ilopango already had an active prevention council, COPACIL, which met on a regular basis to provide interaction and networking opportunities for local organisations, entities, and private enterprises. At these meetings, the PNC would also contribute information on their ongoing actions and operations in order that prevention and repression stream operations could be aware if not coordinate. RTI had chosen to work with Ilopango as one of its municipalities of support at the invitation of PREPAZ during its CMPV expansion and numerous other actors had also joined in to share their ongoing prevention efforts and to coordinate in an effort to ‘avoid duplication’ (Observation, 2013). In 2013, the council was working to systematise their efforts and so had undertaken a process of organisational chart and project mapping to ‘ensure an order of agreement when dealing with projects in the community’ (Ibid.). Every two months or every fourth meeting (meetings were held biweekly) special sessions were to be led by a different organisation, each of which would lead a capacititation on new laws and other prevention themes in development both in the community and nationally. Those organisations invited to be members of the CMPV also made bi-weekly presentations or updates on their ongoing projects as well as their ideologies and constructs in order for greater coherence and reduced overlap between institutions working in the field. They stated numerous times throughout an observed meeting and follow-up discussion how
these coordinating actions may appear relatively insignificant but had actually realised some improvements in community effectiveness (Observation, 2013).

During one meeting, prevention projects with different orientations were discussed and commented on for potential strengthening and improvements (Observation, 2013). First, a reinsertion project focusing on at risk youth in Santa Lucia was being facilitated by ISNA with the support or observation of other council participants. Here, thirty individuals were to be enrolled in a 15 month mechanic’s course, part of which would work with aviation training. After six months of organisation-led training, a private company was set up to lead the practical training component. Although the programme was called reinsertion, when speaking about it in practical terms the logistics were considered a process of education and employment rather than specific components to ease reinsertion. Second, a series of workshops were planned in the residential area of San Bartolo to give work orientation workshops to those who attended. Attendance was free for all but information was specifically passed on to at-risk youth.

Workshops were a particular favourite with prevention projects. Members of the council were also organising civil protection and environmental training workshops to training people for practical responses to local situations. It was expected that six communities and six organisations for a total of 22 individuals would participate. Other smaller or more targeted projects included fact-finding trips to Colombia and an international NGO-led ‘Movimiento Scout’ which facilitated education through play. This last project’s philosophy was said to be ‘life for the youth’ teaching values that they are no longer learning through other structures during time spent playing games (Ibid.). Not all activities were training or conceptual, however, as the council had received funds from the MJSP to rehabilitate community centre infrastructure so that support could be further localised. Finally, a more conceptual programme to create a system of youth networks under the direction of PREPAZ was in the design stages. Input was expected from the council but it was expected to be organised and directed from PREPAZ offices in the capital. Aside from these youth networks, new committees of Peace and Coexistence were to be created in at least five different neighbourhoods throughout the municipality. Although the five were to be prioritised initially, others would be created if desired. The groups were to report to the municipal council but had relative autonomy to take care of prevention issues in their own neighbourhoods (Ibid.).
A FESPAD technical official sitting on the local council explained in an interview how FESPAD worked within this structure (Interview with FESPAD Technical Officer, 2013). It was often larger partners, like RTI, AECID, or USAID who would bring in infrastructure funds to improve public spaces, community centres, or football fields and FESPAD would then accompany that process to implement activities for youth (Interview with FESPAD Technical Officer, 2013). The role of the prevention council executive was also to accompany these processes, facilitate coordination with other community actors, and to give sustainability to the ongoing efforts. The local committees were also essential to the strengthening of this work but operated differently from the municipal prevention council. Whilst the council was part of the observatory of the municipality and the range of entities that were in action in that zone, committees at the very local community level were led by community leaders or groups of persons that were identified in each community. These community leaders were to be present at council meetings, a change after they found that leaders were making demands without real understanding so now they were included within the team that took the decisions (Ibid.). FESPAD saw their role as one of accompaniment with the committees to strengthen their capabilities and capacities but only if there was openness to do so. The technical official elaborated:

We are giving the persons knowledge through which they can empower themselves and to look for better alternatives for the conflicts that are in their communities, giving them the tools that permit them to themselves solution the problems, which they have the capacity to negotiate. (Interview with NGO Technical Official, 2013)

FESPAD saw that improvements were slowly being made in result, including that it was easier to enter and implement their work activities as violence and crime indicators slowly decreased and the perceptions of security had increased. Although, for FESPAD, a key cause and indicator of public security was work or the lack thereof, they did not see it as an indicator at the community level where they worked because it was often outside the capacity of the local community to measure this and so needed to be dealt with at a macro level (Ibid.). It was acknowledged that there were other significant limitations with the building and maintaining of these levels of operation including the political climate and political party allegiances that differed at the different levels. They were attempting to reduce the political influences on long-term work but it was a work in progress and in
Ilopango, despite the different lines of work, ‘the councils are functioning, with different dynamics, but they are functioning’ (Ibid.).

It was thus with caution that the prevention council initially approached the MLV proposal. The CMPV had been working over several years, with particular support from the central government from 2010 and so to add one more effort into the mix was approached with some significant concerns. First, local operators understood that local clínicas were not all in favour of a national truce with a municipal agreement. Although the national declaration and corresponding homicide reduction indicated an organisational strength hitherto unsuspected, the nature of local operations entailed that ‘the truce is between the 13 in the zones of Dolores, Apulo, and the 18 that are in San Bartolo but within Ilopango there are other colonias where 13 and 18 operate, but they are not in the truce’ (Interview with NGO Technical Official, 2013). Both the police and FESPAD noted that, in result, it was not unexpected that some homicides had continued in the month following the MLV declaration. Not two weeks following the declaration, a gang member was shot by four MS subjects in San Bartolo Boulevard.

Nonetheless, the military continued their plan to withdraw from their operations in peace zones like Ilopango because the Defence Minister expected violence and violent crime to continue its decline. The legal department in the MJSP noted that despite the publicity and confusion surrounding the MLV, within the boundaries of the law, the government was going to facilitate programming with concrete funds whilst ensuring that those who continued to commit crimes could expect the police to respond with repression tactics (Interview with Solorzano & Legal Team, 2013). Solórzano argued that although those who committed crimes could expect to be arrested, efforts were also being made to improve prison treatment and to improve arrests and put an end to dawn raids: ‘these plans go for the long term; I do not want to have a regression in the topic of gangs’ (Ibid.).46 The Human Rights Ombuds Office (PDDH) worried about the militarisation of security in El Salvador during this period, stated that in places like Ilopango, they did not know to what point a pact had been agreed, from what negotiation point the parties had started, and whether the negotiation was sustainable (Interview with Guardado de Ramirez & Civil and Individual Rights Team, 2013).

Organisations were further worried about the lack of transparency they believed was required to ensure effective policies would follow the implementation of such an initiative.

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46 Translation from: eso va para largo plazo, yo no quiero que haya retroceso en el tema de pandillas.
The government had announced a plan to build on the space created by the truce but details were few and far between, especially within the signed document at the centre of the municipal pact ceremony. IUDOP Director Jeannette Aguilar argued it was unclear as to whether the MLVs would be able to continue: ‘the so called facilitators have been incapable of forming a proposal, what they have been doing is putting it together on what already exists in the four selected municipalities’ (Interview with Aguilar, 2013). She felt that they had deliberately selected those communities, like Santa Tecla, that already had a development model which had allowed for the recuperation of public space and to offer their citizens a better quality of life but did not necessarily have experience with youth at risk or gangs. Because Santa Tecla had had a limited experience with gang violence to begin with, its programmes were not necessarily those of reinsertion or rehabilitation to Aguilar’s mind and thus were of limited benefit as an example to violence-prone municipalities like San Martin, Soyapango, San Marco or Ilopango (Ibid.). Questions were also raised by other concerned entities as to how gang members in Ilopango would make their living with the implementation of the local truce and it was felt that because of the lack of official planning or a transparent strategy moving forward, the MLV risked failing with a sharp uptick in violence.

Despite promises made by the central government to support the second phase of the truce by providing up to US$72 million to MLV programmes, little if any of that money was actually received in those municipalities according to complaints made by MLV mayors.47 Specifically, the government had promised funds for the MLVs that would not be tied to general violence prevention councils or programming. Ruano had initially worked with the central government, including the Vice Minister of Public Security, Douglas Moreno in conjunction with M-18 and MS-13 leaders, but when the promised re-direction of funds did not appear, he accused President Funes of hiding from the process, speeding its abandon. Mijango supported these claims, arguing that it appeared that gang members were making the majority of the efforts to uphold their end of the pact agreements across the country. What saved Ilopango’s MLV efforts from the failure experienced in several of the other MLVs, promoting a 50 percent decrease in homicides and increased local confidence in both their security and coexistence among their local communities, were some of the efforts pushed forward by the mayor, Ruano. Moving forward, community members, especially in the successful community of La Selva, reported a decrease in gang

47 This number changed depending on the source. For officials within the MJSP the range was from good will to $72 million. By April 2013, Funes had reduced that amount to $33 million when discussed at a conference in Washington, D.C.
graffiti, increased security for students who had previously been extorted by gangs to attend school, and strengthened family ties as the connections between gang members and their families were slowly re-established (Interpeace, 2014). The increasing community connections also helped to mitigate the continuing negative effects experienced by police repression activities which the community felt often failed to observe their rights (Ibid.). Extortion continued to be an issue, however. Gang members had indicated that the practice as income generation would continue until the conditions existed for them to be reinserted into the local community through sufficient job programming but the looked-for eradication was never realised. Nonetheless, although it took some time to arrange, some advances did develop.

Some government officials contemplated programmes based on the perception that gang members only wanted for a worker’s bench and a hammer to change their livelihood but the reality was much more complicated. The job programmes that had been scattered in pockets throughout the municipality were augmented with two widely publicised efforts: a chicken farm and a bakery. Whilst the move was widely lauded as a solid and progressive method to further reintegrate former gang members into the community, some posed the worried question as to where the customer business for the bakery was to originate and mused on whether gang members would demand patronage as a new form of extortion. Projects were not necessarily immune from police interference either with the M-18 bakery experiencing significant damage on several occasions after police visits (Interpeace, 2014). That these two token businesses were not expanded after one year, resulting in jobs for only up to 50 individuals, also meant that the leaving-crime-for-work equation did not stand up. Resentment also grew among some NGO workers and community leaders over the money that was being invested in gang rehabilitation through employment training programmes. They felt that the emphasis had the unintended effect of rewarding those who had previously threatened peaceful coexistence in local communities and left behind those who had struggled but had not resorted to a criminal life (Observation, 2013). In particular contention was the Temporary Income Support Programme (PATI). In an April 2013 meeting with the MJSP vice minister, Douglas Moreno, Salvador Ruano, the Ilopango PNC deputy for the municipality, and Padre Toño, gang members were briefed on how the programme worked and offered up to 400 spaces to gang members leaving criminal activities. They were to receive job training and financial assistance for up to six months in exchange for work of up to 6 hours per day in local communities. These meetings on the very local level and attended by central government officials were considered essential to
the cementing of the truce process according to Ruano, but these conversations became political poison as public opinion remained opposed to negotiation with criminals; the president later denied that such activities had taken place on national radio and in media briefs.

The participation of gang members in the PATI programme was also a contentious focal point. Ruano and the mayor of Quezaltepeque, Carlos Figueroa, defended the inclusion, arguing that PATI offered a good balance between the reinsertion programmes they were attempting to establish as MLVs and jobs programmes. However, unhappy community residents were supported by the outrage of the attorney general, Luis Martinez, who commented that gang member participation in the programme was ‘indignante y reprochable’ (Melendez, 2013). Following wide publication of gang participation in PATI, it appeared that FISDL removed its support for the programme in Ilopango (Santos, 2013). Partially in consequence and as a means to keep the pact in Ilopango functioning, Ruano used municipal development funds to further reintegration programmes in his municipality. This meant that the mayor found himself “at the boundary” of the law and especially in contravention of the 2010 anti-gang legislation that had caused issues throughout the truce process across the board.

Unlike in other MLVs, in Ilopango, the pact between the municipality and gangs did not fail in the lead-up to the 2015 municipal elections but, losing some of its credibility through a combination of opaque operations and unclear resource management, managed to hold on to some longer-term projects and programmes. First, central government political support, especially at the hand of President Funes, impacted on international confidence in the truce process and thus in the MLV process despite its progress in places like Ilopango. Early MLV negotiations with central government officials had led to increased goodwill and understanding between government officials and local gang members. Most civil society and NGO entities were not included in the initial process but slowly joined their contributions as more technical and financial resources were required. The international community which had been waiting for an action plan since the SGT had been declared the previous year, also remained unbriefed despite offers of assistance. In some corners, like for the United States, gang negotiations was an anathema and so it would not consider supporting MLV programming in Ilopango despite a history of working there; it cancelled Ruano’s American travel visa around the time the MLV was declared. American support had already cost the Funes government one MJSP minister in the Funes administration so news that another vice minister was negotiating with gangs
directly in Ilopango was also not something that was overtly welcomed. But, most importantly, the Funes government could not decide whether it wanted to maintain a role in the truce or not and so promised funds for MLVs did not materialise.

Second, despite the emphasis on prevention programming when the FMLN came to power, and its seeming ideological openness to truce negotiations, it was unable to bring itself to power-through public dissatisfaction over negotiations with criminal entities. Opacity in the truce process created enough distrust among interested entities that alliances never really formed around the MLV but rather pulled the MLV into on-going and long-term prevention frameworks. On the one hand, the FMLN government had created violence prevention councils and supported community committee networking to strengthen both local and national violence prevention policy and actions. On the other, it was unable to follow through with monetary and policy support to build the communication networks needed between municipal councils and MLV leadership. Interpeace and FESPAD were two organisations who were both members of the local violence prevention council and directly worked with the municipality to facilitate the long-term planning, development, and, crucially, implementation of the MLV’s rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Their work was supported by the EU and by the OAS, both of whom found ways to support prevention programming development despite the central government’s lack of commitment. Their actions became more localised with the change in MJSP minister who further reduced central government interactions with truce activities. Thus, that which had begun in Ilopango with fanfare and benevolent central government presence morphed into an exercise in local-international collaboration with some openness to include gang members directly in the dialogue and development process. Some entities found the upside of this was that projects, like that which was under implementation with EU funding in late 2013, could be developed for the longer term.

Ruano was re-elected as an ARENA-representing mayor in Ilopango in the March 2015 municipal elections despite the concerns and protests against his manner of addressing municipal development and gang rehabilitation and insertion programming. Ilopango managed to lower its homicide rate and keep it low. These tasks were accomplished in the face of anti-gang legislation outlawing the communication and support of gang members and without the support of some traditional international entities including the United States but with the continuing financial and technical support of the EU and the OAS as

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48 Ruano also faced embezzlement and intimidation charges in November 2013, logged by the Ilopango Municipal trustee, Percy Santos, over the alleged misuse of US$235,000. Ruano was also accused of buying weapons with public funds for personal use.
as lines of communications between council entities. Entities like Interpeace were cautiously positive about the outcomes in Ilopango, in which long-term prevention programming in conjunction with the shock policy change of the MLV, had pushed gang member demobilisation and employment issues out into the open. Important here is how the network of interested entities worked together to build security in Ilopango. The violence prevention council, as a network of entities, worked with the broadest range of projects, programmes, and services from basic job training for youth at risk to the facilitation of central government-led community committees for more localised prevention programming. Prevention for them entailed opening new doors to further opportunities for those whom they felt were most at risk of joining gangs; useful employment of time to keep out of trouble was key. Municipal mayor Salvador Ruano became a figure point for gang rehabilitation and reinsertion in his community, driving national and international visibility with some success to attract support. As explained by other entities including central government officials and NGO technical workers, local buy-in with leadership figures was often seen as essential in order to successfully implement councils and programmes. It was international entities like the OAS and Interpeace that built the programme links between local initiatives and local government.

Successful prevention in the opinion of Adam Blackwell, who acted as chief representative and pact supporter for the OAS in El Salvador, required programmes to address social vulnerabilities, state and institutional fragilities as well as the accelerants of crime and violence in pockets of vulnerability (Blackwell, 2015).

Given that the actions and activities of the violence prevention council, the municipal government and participant international organisations still appeared to see gangs as the main security threat to avoid, despite numerous attempts to highlight the underlying causes of violence as poverty, marginalisation and exclusion, the final word on goals may go to the responses of gang leaders at the start of Ilopango’s foray into shock violence prevention via an MLV. First, both MS-13 and M-18 gang leaders felt that the process was not easy and so that, for a time at least, they would trust in the good will of the municipality and the pact’s participants (Campos, 2013; Solorzano, 2013). Second, their idea of violence prevention through reintegration was the possibility of opportunity: public trust to allow them space for work and life and to be given a fair shot (Ibid.). There was so much hope to accompany the persistent doubt and fear of insecurity in the months following the MLV declaration on 23 January 2013. But grandiose declarations and
dreams require grandiose support. And so extortion and fear, along with a healthy dose of opaque government bureaucracy, still rule the roost in Ilopango.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduces specific case studies to provide examples of specific outcomes of formal actor security governance efforts in the Salvadoran context. As has already been demonstrated in previous chapters, interactions between actors and institutions take place in diverse spaces and may be manipulated to the agendas of specific actors within those forums. Security outcomes in the form of projects (PREVENIR) or innovative strategies (SGT) tend to be the product of multi-level negotiations between a range of interested parties or stakeholders. Specifically, in the territorial section of the SGT discussion, local context and actor dynamics have a significant impact on the manners in which they address security and the outcomes which arise.

For the multi-level prevention project effort implemented by Germany in conjunction with the ESCA, the case illustrates the sometimes unintended consequences that collaborative security governance efforts can have. Whereas Central American member states had desired a strategy (with the intent to form a long-term regional security policy) that was developed by them for them and within the context of an institution of collective action, the outcomes were infinitely more fluid. Indeed, the case illustrates a reversion to more traditional frameworks of operations – a project modified by an international donor and implemented to their agenda with recipient modifications. The outcome involves multiple levels, with a diversity of participant subjects across multiple countries but is largely scoped by Germany’s project design (Interview with Esmail, 2012).

In El Salvador’s experience with a national gang truce, the novelty of non-norm conforming actors (gangs, ostensibly independent negotiators) was difficult to manage – especially in the light of public and formal actor distrust. Both the public and international entities were disquieted by the lack of process transparency. One of the largest weaknesses of the process was that a narrative was not established early on along with an action plan for international reaction. Foreign donors exhibited some early willingness to participate in a reintegration process but given the unpopularity of negotiating with criminals and ‘terrorists’, a stronger commitment from the government was required to give others confidence in the experiment’s potential sustainability. The outcome of this lack of commitment was that the territorialisation phase of the truce, an important innovation to
solidify the process, began based on a weak footing marred in public debate and international concerns over the ‘real’ story. Thus, MLVs faced contestation not only within their own communities but nationally as well. This chapter concludes that dominant actor security perceptions combined with their individual guiding agendas, serve to impact on the manner in which rescaled security governance is implemented and sustained. Having thus concluded the last section comprising the research question *To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)*?, the thesis will turn to a chapter on research findings and their implications for security governance.
7.1 Introduction

For El Salvador, the actors at work within multi-level governance spaces may be considered ‘violently plural’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). During the first FMLN administration (2009-2014), negotiations took place on formal scales, like regional diplomatic dialogues and national policy consultations, as well as within informal or flexible spaces, like in the case of a negotiated gang truce. This thesis addressed how these actors perceive security and interpret the nature of their responsibility to address it. It covered both lived perceptions and contested realities. From these spaces of cooperation and contestation, these actors contribute to policy and programme design for security governance. Through the analysis of specific programme examples, this thesis draws out new understanding on the importance of multi-level spaces for the design of governance practice. Scales of security governance are found to shift and change according to the fluctuating goals of its participant actors over short periods. However, lasting change enacted through multi-scaled security governance requires lengthy actor commitments not often found in within a changing security agenda. This conclusion is divided into two parts: (1) a discussion of the research questions and their implications for the problem statement; and (2) the situation of the dissertation’s findings within the key conceptual debates. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgement of the limitations of the study and outlines potential avenues for further research.

7.2 Main Findings

The first research question reads: *In what spaces, and by whom, is security negotiated and governed in El Salvador?* In this thesis, a hybrid approach was used to conceptualise the multi-level spaces created for security governance in El Salvador; some of these are the formal spaces of institutions whilst others are temporary and fluid, established to negotiate a specific risk. What we see in the Salvadoran case of the new FMLN government (2009-2014) is a fluctuation between these two understandings of citizen security. There was already a range of traditional and non-state actors participating in security production at multiple levels although authority, especially with regards to *Mano Dura*, was focused in the state. In the FMLN approach, they began governing in security spaces ideologically closer towards the human end of the citizen security scale. To do this, they sought to turn traditional security governance structures upside-down by proposing broad bottom-up consultations leading to a new national policy to frame security governance. They also went up a governance level to bring these ideas to the regional sphere in collaboration with neighbouring states. Foreign actors joined various rescaling efforts with expertise and
financing; they also implemented many of the programmes in the field. Finally, violently plural actors were included in a time-sensitive governance effort to reduce skyrocketing homicides. In the terminology of hybridity theories, the FMLN government initiated an end-user gaze and turned it on the national and regional security governance processes. What emerged were a set of negotiated spaces, both formal and informal, that brokered relationships for the production of security.

The second research question reads: What are the main security concepts framing spaces of governance in El Salvador? Violence and crime have been positioned as essential components of security conceptualization throughout this thesis. Central to the result is the concept of citizen security as it is lived and applied in Latin America. First, it broadens security beyond the state to include a range of rights and responsibilities accorded to a democratic citizen in a manner similar to human security. Security concepts emerge in the structuring of actor relationships—the entities included in the process necessarily represent sectors considered important for the definitions of security. Thus, it is not enough to read the security policies that emerge from consultation processes to ascertain guiding concepts. Rather, the production dimensions—committees, local roundtables, or international consultations—are as important as the resulting documents for understanding concepts, framing, and intent within security governance spaces. Observed was a continuous struggle on how to confront violence. At its base, however, the issues came back to crime and its perpetrators. Socio-economic issues, gender- and familial-based violence, and access to education were included in security governance for their potential contributions to criminal violence and the creation of new offenders. Somewhat problematically, citizen security frames security in terms of citizen norm violations; insecurity is that which goes against the democratic contract.

The third research question reads: What policies or programmes have emerged from the multi-level spaces of security governance in El Salvador? Both the SGT and the ESCA highlight alternative governance spaces where some part of traditional powers has been subverted. For the SGT, gangs undertook talks on building security with both traditional government actors and members of the shadow security apparatus that comprises another component of a violently plural society. We see that the gangs created or built on relationships with international organisations, state institutions, and local political mayors to influence the direction of security policy development at multiple levels in the years that followed. Specific security governance issues were negotiated between the participant countries with input from national-level officials but many of the programmes, especially
those directly related to prevention, had a local implementation focus. National governments were excited to toot the original approach of the ESCA as it was presented to an interested international community. In turn, the international community was tapped for financing as well as for support in the implementation of this ambitious array of projects. In these examples, entities chose to collaborate on security governance on those issues upon which they could communally agree represented a collective risk. However, those programmes emerging from and in support of the above case studies were less collaborative than they were ad hoc. Often, whilst the proposals emerging from multi-level security governance spaces were actionable, those that resulted were largely driven by individuals or single entities. Even in the case of the MLVs, those cities chosen had established prevention programmes with the capacity to produce programmes independently. Therefore, cooperation in spaces of security governance across multiple levels proved to last longer when there was a single or small number of actors that were willing to take the lead on programme development and push it forward independently.

The problem statement questioned: *To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)?*

As has been demonstrated through this thesis, security governance was expanded in both form and function over the FMLN government’s first mandate. The ideological slant to broad grassroots consultation with which they came to power continued to enlighten their security governance experiments. The concepts of security that informed policy and programme negotiations were, at least on the part of the government, based in citizen security. Here they could pursue new security governance spaces but also the hard-line anti-gang operations when considered a necessary action to fulfil their broad responsibilities to the citizenry. In keeping with an understanding of citizenship as both rights and responsibilities, citizens and civil society were the early governance participants on which their strategy turned. Ideology was also responsible, at least in part, when state institutions supported gang truce negotiations, approaching gangs as outcasts to be reintroduced into society. Nevertheless, despite attempts to approach and implement the broader tenets of citizen security, interventions to reduce, manage, and transform violence were generally underfunded and under-supported by the participant parties that were necessary for their propagation. Most importantly, despite a range of scales and actors involved, government entities tended to be the cogs upon which interventions turned. It is for this reason that ‘state transformation’ or ‘hybridity’ are fitting terms to describe processes that take place with government support.
7.3 Implications for the Literature

Security governance is a small but growing field with the potential for specific contributions to Latin American scholarship. This section will address the contributions this thesis makes to citizen security and governance literatures before drawing out some conclusions from the empirical research for consideration within the wider Latin American security context. First, citizen security is a vital Latin American contribution to wider security governance literatures. It combines the participation, rights, and responsibilities of individual citizens with state protections through the institutional rule of law. Citizen security’s conflation of national and individual security issues offers important contributions to the conceptualisation of complex security environments. Latin American states like El Salvador were early adopters of this fusion in the confrontations of their complex security environments of transnational criminal threats, non-traditional trans-border risks, and criminal activity organised on a government-destabilising scale. This study was conducted during a period where there was new emphasis on local or individual contributions to larger scale policy development and security governance which responds to the broad citizen security concept. However, as Goldstein (2015) observes, citizen security can also be a regressive or reauthorizing concept that allows the state to use violence in spaces of exception or the crisis moments of the securitising process. This thesis has provided evidentiary support to this double-sided nature of citizen security.

Citizen security necessarily demands investigation into how those security issues facing citizens are governed. In Latin America, where states are incapable of fully monopolising the use of violence, citizens do not receive their full democratic rights for security. Thus, rather than a question of government action, citizen security becomes a question of the spaces for security governance. The research presented here has demonstrated that these, in many cases, are not the formalised multi-lateral institutions of the European Union, for example, but rather flexible spaces that are largely issues-driven. Attempts to establish a security strategy within Central America or to scale out/territorialise a gang truce contribute support to theories of security governance hybridity and transformation. In a unique contribution, this thesis presents empirical material on the roles that international entities can play in practice through both hybrid and transformed governance.

Theories of hybridity argue that international actors intervene in securitised policy or governance spaces on behalf of vulnerable end-users. Evidence presented on the development and implementation of the ESCA confirms that international organisations are often happy to participate in security governance spaces, especially those bypassing the
national security level, over a defence of the individual. In its study of the STA, this thesis also presents gangs as actors with the ability to negotiate policy and form diplomatic relationships with international organisations. In this way, multiple scales of security government take on a violent plurality building short-term but highly impactful order. Problematic for the inclusion of these other actors is that in many cases they are not responsible to the polity for their actions. They may be appointed as a representative but security governance frameworks by their nature are not voted on by the population. A significant issue arising of this and requiring further study are the democratic responsibilities of these actors. In the Salvadoran context, it remains elected officials, whether municipal councillors, legislative members, or the president, who ultimately respond to the electorate for the governance initiatives achieved (or failed) during their tenure.

As such, there are inherent risks in dispersing responsibility for security policy development and programme implementation and the formation of security governance spaces does not usually result in coherent, planned, or even logical security responses. This leads to the conclusion that fraught social conflicts within multi-actor multi-level security governance impact on security outcomes but not in the manner intended by the instigating authority. However, it does provide evidence of how multi-level security was governed in practice during the first FMLN administration. In doing so, this thesis has focused specifically on the patterns, scales, and constructs of security governance, contributing material on where governance takes place rather than where institutions are lacking.

7.4 Conclusion

This thesis has provided a multi-level study analysing three different levels of security governance in El Salvador. Specifically, it has looked at the changes in security governance impelled by the election of a new government that, in a small window of popular hope, had the relative freedom to try new things with security. With its studied security governance practices in their infancy at the time of research, this study opens significant new avenues for elaboration. First, the necessary limitations in the scope of this thesis meant that the case selection was relatively narrow. As such, including further actors at these levels alone may bring new insight to overall multi-level security governance in El Salvador. Given the dominance of the United States within regional security governance frameworks, a decision was made to specifically pursue other examples. A first next step would be to compare this thesis’ findings to existing literature and other data on US participation within these and concurrent security governance scales. However, this study
chose to focus on new, developing initiatives to observe opening interactions in the context of a new government. The reasoning was that agendas and working patterns would be less established and thus more easily accessible. This means that this thesis can only be seen as the study of a small number of examples of new attempts to develop security governance within El Salvador. The restriction of this framework notwithstanding, this thesis contributes to the study of security governance frameworks in peripheral states.
Appendix A: Sample research introduction

Information used to introduce my research in situ.

**Resume Ejecutivo**

**Título del Proyecto:** Prioridades de seguridad en Centroamérica: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala

**Investigadora:** Kari Mariska Pries

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal analizar el concepto de “seguiridad” que se construye en las políticas públicas dentro de instituciones de gobiernos Centroamericanos así como conocer quién está trabajando en la formulación y redacción de estas políticas y fortaleciendo los conocimientos especializados y técnicos de las instituciones competentes en dicha materia. Los casos de El Salvador y de Guatemala dentro del sistema de integración son de interés particular.

En Centroamérica se ha realizado nuevas definiciones, términos, acuerdos, y aplicaciones junto a una amplia gama de variables dentro de nuevas políticas de seguridad ciudadana, seguridad fronterizas, entre otras. Además, estos conceptos muchas veces contemplan con referencia a otras participantes como donantes externos, tales como organizaciones internacionales, instituciones independientes y gobiernos extranjeros que mantienen intereses importantes, que funcionan como participantes directos en los programas de la construcción de seguridad en Centroamérica.

En este sentido, se explorarán las estrategias e instrumentos que son implementados y que están dentro del proceso de desarrollo tanto a nivel regional como a nivel nacional, las acciones coordinadas de las partes interesadas y que adoptan los países de la región como objetivos comunes en materia de seguridad. Esta investigación tiene el fin de identificar herramientas con las cuales trabajan las partes involucradas para realizar la seguridad que requieren los ciudadanos centroamericanos, tal como migrantes regionales.

Para implementar esta investigación, se realizarán entrevistas con gente que maneja estos proyectos o que tienen experiencia y conocimiento en este tema para mapear el proceso y las acciones de coordinación entre las diferentes contrapartes. También se observarán las reuniones en el proceso de integración regional y se asistirá a diálogos regionales entre las partes involucradas. Esta investigación maneja con el fin de desarrollar un mejor conocimiento del proceso de formación de políticas públicas en el tema de seguridad a nivel regional como a nivel de país para tener un mejor entendimiento entro ellas.
Appendix B: Letter of introduction

Titulo del Proyecto: Prioridades de seguridad en Centroamérica: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala
Investigadora: Kari Mariska Pries

San Salvador, 14 de febrero de 2012

Lic. Claudio Castro
Coordinadora del Proyecto de Seguridad SICA/PNUD
Unidad de Seguridad Democrática

Estimado(ª) xx,

Tengo el agrado de dirigirme a usted en relación a mi investigación de doctorado “Seguridad Pública en Centroamérica: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala”, que fue patrocinado por la Universidad de Glasgow en Escocia, RU bajo la supervisión de Dr. Mo Hume y Dr. David Karp y con el apoyo de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) en El Salvador. En XX de 20xx, Lic. XX XXX me recomendó ponerme en contacto con usted sobre este tema.

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo principal analizar el concepto de “seguridad ciudadana” así como conocer quién está trabajando en la implementación de estas líneas de trabajo, el proceso Jurídico, y quién está fortaleciendo los conocimientos especializados y técnicos de las instituciones competentes en dicha materia. La investigación se centra en los casos de El Salvador y de Guatemala.

Con el fin de desarrollar conocimientos sobre este tema, se realizarán entrevistas con gente que maneja estos proyectos o que tiene experiencia y/o conocimiento en este tema con el fin de mapear el proceso y las acciones de coordinación entre las diferentes contrapartes.

En un primer momento, pido el permiso de realizar una entrevista con usted la semana 25 de febrero 2013. Propongo el miércoles, 27 de febrero en cualquier lugar sería la más conveniente para usted.

Puede comunicarme a mi dirección correo (kari.mariska@gmail.com o k.pries.1@research.gla.ac.uk) o por teléfono (2521-0500 o 7546-6547).

En espera de la respuesta, hago propicia la ocasión para reiterarle las muestras de mi consideración y estima.

Atentamente,

Kari Mariska Pries
Investigadora
Appendix C: Sample information sheet for interview subjects

Declaramiento de Intención

Título del Proyecto: Políticas de seguridad en América Central: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala
Investigadora: Karl Mariska Pries
Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales
Universidad de Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow, G12 8RT, UK
Correo electrónico: karl.mariska@gmail.com Teléfono: 503-2521-0500

Tengo el agrado de dirigirme a usted en relación al proyecto de investigación "Políticas de seguridad en América Central: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala. Ha sido invitado/a a contribuir como participante en este estudio y es importante que usted entienda qué estamos haciendo y que va a implicar. Por favor, támeselo tiempo para leer cuidadosamente la siguiente información y discutirlo con otra persona si lo desea. Pueden realizársele preguntas si algo no está claro o si desea más información. Tómese su tiempo para decidir si desea participar o no. Gracias por leer esto.

Este proyecto de investigación tiene como intención analizar el concepto de "seguridad" que se construye en las políticas públicas de América Central, quién está trabajando en la formación de estas políticas y las consideraciones que la ciudadanía centroamericana toma. Los casos de El Salvador y Guatemala son de interés particular. Con el fin de desarrollar conocimientos sobre este tema, estoy realizando entrevistas con gente que maneja estos proyectos o que tienen una gran experiencia en este tema para mapear el proceso y ver cómo las políticas están desarrolladas por los actores involucrados.

He sido elegido como participante en esta investigación debido a sus conocimientos y experiencias en la construcción y/o implementación de las políticas públicas en el tema de seguridad en Centroamérica. Sus contribuciones son valoradas pero al mismo tiempo su participación está vinculada a su consentimiento en todo momento. Estoy libre de interrumpir esta entrevista en cualquier momento que lo desee.

En el formulario de consentimiento se le da opciones de identificación y como quiere ser reconocido/a dentro de esta investigación y las publicaciones resultantes. Si tiene cualquier requisito específico con respecto a su identificación dentro de este esfuerzo, por favor hágamelo saber. Además, si acepta que dicha información quede grabada, tiene la opción de decidir si se almacena o si se elimina después que la investigadora haya tomado notas detalladas de la grabación. Tiene también el derecho de solicitar la interrupción de la grabación y/o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento y sin justificación. Voy a disponer todos los datos personales inmediatamente después que mi tesis doctoral se haya completado, de acuerdo con la ley del Reino Unido sobre la Protección de Datos (1998). Esta investigación ha sido aprobada por la Universidad de Glasgow, el Comité de Ética y se lleva a cabo con el conocimiento del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales.

Las entrevistas realizadas van a formar la base de mi tesis de doctorado en la Universidad de Glasgow, Reino Unido, lleva a cabo durante un periodo de tres años entre septiembre 2010 y septiembre 2013. Esta investigación está siendo financiada por una beca de la Universidad de Glasgow. La información obtenida a través de esta y otras entrevistas, así como cualquier documento sobre las políticas nacionales y regionales se puede utilizar en publicaciones como artículos de revistas, informes o libros, pero sólo de acuerdo al consentimiento que proporciona en el formulario de consentimiento adjunto. Estoy invitado/a a solicitar una copia de la obra terminada cuando lo desee.

Si tiene alguna duda sobre el proyecto o la institución patrocinadora, por favor ponerse en contacto con los supervisores del proyecto Dr. Hume y Dr. Karp. Por otra parte, Dr. Bold, como Oficial por la Ética de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, está disponible para el contacto y consultas.

Dr. Mo Hume
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Phone: +44(0) 141 330 3426
Appendix D: Interview consent form

University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

Formulario de Consentimiento

Titulo del Proyecto: Políticas de seguridad en América Central: El caso de El Salvador y Guatemala

Nombre de la Investigadora: Kari Mariska Pries

1. Confirma que ha leído y entiende la explicación del proyecto y en el cual me han brindado la oportunidad de realizar todas las preguntas.

2. Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria y que siempre tengo la libertad de retirarme del proceso en cualquier momento y sin necesidad de justificación.

3. Respecto a mi identificación en la investigación como resultado de esta entrevista:
   (Por favor marque uno)
   - Acepto que la información proporcionada en esta entrevista se puede atribuir a mi nombre y posición a menos que diga algo diferente.
   - Acepto que la información proporcionada en esta entrevista se puede atribuir a mi posición y la organización identificada, pero no a mi nombre, a menos que se especifique lo contrario.
   - Acepto que la información proporcionada en esta entrevista se puede atribuir a mi organización, pero no a mi nombre ni mi posición, a menos que se especifique algo diferente.
   - Acepto que la información proporcionada en esta entrevista se puede utilizar, pero sin atribución específica, a menos que se especifique algo diferente.
   - Mis comentarios están para su información general solamente y no puede ser publicado en ninguna forma, a menos que se especifique algo diferente.

4. Con respecto a la utilización de aparatos de grabación durante esta entrevista:
   (Por favor marque uno)
   - Estoy de acuerdo que esta entrevista se está grabando para las metas de esta investigación.
   - No estoy de acuerdo que esta entrevista se está grabando.

5. En relación al almacenamiento de las grabaciones tomadas en conformidad con sus solicitudes arriba (4):
   (Por favor marque uno)
   - Estoy de acuerdo que estos datos sean almacenados hasta la terminación de este proyecto, después del cual serán destruidos.
   - Estoy de acuerdo que el entrevistador tome notas sobre los contenidos de la grabación: después del registro de dichos datos deberán eliminarse inmediatamente.

6. Estoy de acuerdo / no estoy de acuerdo (cúrcle uno por favor) para participar en este estudio.

Nombre del/la participante ____________________________  Fecha: ____________________________  Firma: ____________________________

Nombre de la Investigadora ____________________________  Fecha: ____________________________  Firma: ____________________________

Researcher: Kari Mariska Pries  Institution: University of Glasgow
Appendix E: Sample interview outline

Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured and open-ended fashion. However, each interview began with an introductory set of subject identify questions if it was the first interview with that subject. All questions were adapted to the individual, organisation, and context. I also changed some structural questions depending on whether the subject was ‘national’ or ‘international’.

- Introduction of the project. Presentation of release forms including discussions on how the information would be handled, processed, and protected.
- Explanation that the information would be used for this thesis only and that there would be follow-up on my part including a copy of the thesis should they note it. They were also free to follow-up and contact me regarding any questions they might have at a future date.

I. Introduction / Baseline

- Introduction of the subject, their position, and their organisations. Some would also choose to include nationality, education, and experience.
- ‘Baseline’: In your opinion, what are the most important issues facing El Salvador / the region? In your opinion, what are the most important indicators to evaluate the situation of violence, security, and insecurity in the country?
- What are the responsibilities of your unit/directorate? What is their role in the creation of security policies in the country / region?

II. Security Actors and Activities

- What are the most important security priorities within established policies?
- With whom do you work / collaborate with on the subject of security and the development of these policies?
- What are the most important / productive / useful committees / working groups / round tables that contribute to this subject?
- What are the most important activities that your unit / directorate realises / implements within the subject of security?
- From where do you get the funds for your activities / projects?

III. Combat, Prevention and Institutions in Security

- How do you perceive the balance for this government on the subjects of combat and prevention of crime in policy? In promotion (vocal support)? In projects and financing?
- Have there been real changes in security policy approach over the past two years?
- Do you see (recent changes) [gang truce, corruption investigations, regional security collaboration] as an ad hoc / short term or long-term policy or strategy?
- Is your unit/directorate implicated/involved in these efforts (change/not change)? How?
- To your mind, has there been a shift in operational funds in relation to the previous discussion? Why or why not?

IV. Conclusion

- Do you think that the mandate / goals of your organisation work well with the expressed goals in current and developing policies? In resulting programmes?
- Are there significant concerns that you have over developing policies and programmes?
- What concrete developments do you foresee over the next year in the subject of security?
- Are you able to provide me with relevant documents that would help me better understand the actions your organisation and others have been taking to develop security policies over the past five years?
- Do you have anything you would like to add? What other questions do you think I should be asking? Do you know of other individuals who would be illuminating to this discussion and open to being interviewed?

Thank you for your participation in this interview
Appendix F: Interviews

AGUILAR UMANA, Isabel, 2012. Regional Coordinator – Youth Program in Central America, Interpeace - Regional Office for Latin America [Interview: 21 03 2012].

AGUILAR, Jeannette, 2012, 2013. Director, Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas", Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) [Interviews: 19 03 2012; 22 01 2013].


ALVARADO, Rubén, 2012. Former Director of Migración / OCAM, Dirección General de las Migraciones y Extranjería / OCAM [Interview: 29 02 2012].


CARSANA, Daniel, 2013. Coordinador de programa de ciudadanía de seguridad en El Salvador, United Nations Development Programme (PNUD) [Interview: 26 02 2013].

CECI Official, 2012. Centro de Estudios y Cooperación Internacional (CECI) - Sub-Director [Interview: 05 12 2012].

CHACON V., Alexander, 2012. Project Coordinator - Democratic Security Unit, Central American Integration System (SICA) [Interview: 27 03 2012].

Civil and Individual Rights Team, 2013. Procuradoría para la Defenca de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013].

CORLETO, Ana Maria, 2013. Asistente Técnica - Dirección Jurídica, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013].

CRUZ, Edwin Wilian, 2013. Secretario Técnico del Comité de Seguridad, Municipio de Sonsonate [Interview: 24 01 2013].

CRUZ RODRIGUEZ, Pedro José, 2012. Lawyer and Consultant, Former UNDP / UNODC Analyst [Interview: 27 02 2012].


Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería Official, 2013. Jefe de Comunicaciones - Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería [Interview: 01 03 2013].


Fiscalía General de la Republica Official, 2013. Unidad Anti-Narco-Trafico - Fiscalía General de la Republica [Interview: 29 01 2013].


FUNES, Ernesto, 2013. Asistente Técnica - Dirección Jurídica, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013].


GUARDADO de RAMIREZ, Gricelda Mercedes, 2013. Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos – Procuradoría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013].

GUILLÉN, Maria Silvia, 2013. Directora Ejecutiva - Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) [Interview: 23 01 2013].

IBARA, Oscar, 2013. Jefe de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana - Alcaldía Municipal de Santa Tecla [Interview: 06 03 2013].

IADB Seconded Official, 2012; 2013. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) [Interviews: 29 11 2012; 01 05 2013].


LARA, Benito, 2013. *FMLN Deputy & Public Security Commission Member - Asamblea Legislativa, FMLN* [Interview: 18 01 2013].


MARTINEZ, Franklin, 2013. *Concejial Municipal de Seguridad y Convivencia - Santa Tecla Municipality* [Interview: 28 02 2013].

MATALLANA, Jairo, 2012. *Especialista Técnico, Seguridad Ciudadana - Área de Prevención y Recuperación de Crisis, PNUD Panamá* [Interview: 27 02 2012].


MIJANGO, Raul, 2013. *Negotiator - Salvadoran Gang Truce* [Interview: 26 01 2013].


ORTIZ de ZELAYA, Fatima, 2012; 2013. *Attention to Victims Director - Secretaria Ejecutiva Consejo Nacional Contra la Trata de Personas, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP)* [Interviews: 02 03 2012; 05 03 2013].

ORTIZ GOMEZ, Francisco Raúl, 2013. *Programmes Coordinator - Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)* [Interview: 22 01 2013].


PDDH Official A, 2013. *Asesor - Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos Civiles e Individuales, Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador* [Interview: 27 02 2013].

PDDH Official B, 2013. *Asesor - Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos Civiles e Individuales, Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador* [Interview: 27 02 2013].

PNC Official, 2013. Analista Criminal - Investigación de Secuestros, Homicidios y Crimen Organizado, Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 26 02 2013].

PNC Official, 2012. Executive Secretariate - Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 22 02 2012].


PNC Official, 2012. Seguridad Publica y Regional - Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interviews: 03 12 2012; 08 12 2012].


QUINN, Alan, 2012. Legal Representative and Projects Director - Centro de Estudios y Cooperación Internacional (CECI) [Interview: 24 02 2012].

RAMIREZ LANDAVERDE, Mauricio Ernesto, 2013. Subdirector General - Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 04 03 2013].

RAMOS, Carlos G., 2012. Director - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) [Interview: 10 12 2012].

RAUDA PORTILLO, Nelson, 2013. Director General - Dirección General de Centros Penales, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica (PNC) [Interview: 31 01 2013].

REYES DHEMING, Cesar Rene, 2013. Diputado - Comisión de Seguridad Pública y Combate a la Narcoactividad, Asamblea Legislativa, ARENA [Interview: 04 03 2013].

RIKKERS, Jeanne, 2013. Coordinadora Regional - Investigación Programa de Juventud en Centroamérica, Interpeace - Regional Office for Latin America [Interview: 29 01 2013].

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-TERCERO, Antonio, 2013. Director General - Servicio Social Pasionista (SSPAS) [Interview: 30 01 2013].

RODRIGUEZ REYES, Stanley Arquimides, 2013. Comisión Coordinador - Comisión de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana, Consejo Municipal de Santa Tecla [Interview: 28 02 2013].


SANCHEZ MEJIA, Juan Carlos, 2013. Coordinador, Programa de Transparencia, Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) [Interview: 22 01 2013].
SMUTT, Marcela, 2013. Coordinadora, Area de Gobernabilidad Democrática – Programa de las Naciones Unidades para el Desarrollo (PNUD) [Interview: 15 01 2013].

SOLORZANO, Boris Rubén, 2013. Director Jurídico - Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013].


TOLENTINO MEMBRENO, Dania Elena, 2013. Asistente de Magistrado - Sala de lo Penal, Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador (CSJ) [Interview: 23 01 2013].


VÍLCHEZ ASCHER, Erich Constantino, 2012. Director of Political and Legal Affairs - Democratic Security Unit, Central American Integration System (SICA) [Interview: 20 03 2012].
Observed Sessions

1. 29 January – 1 February 2012: SICA Regional Meetings with Country Representatives and Group of Friends in Tegucigalpa, Honduras
2. 8 February 2012: Regional Teleconference on SICA Strategies
3. 9 February 2012: Regional Security Trafficking Meetings
4. 15-17 February 2012: Studies conference in San Salvador
5. 12 March 2012: ObSICA Meetings
6. 14-15 March 2012: Anti-Trafficking Meetings
7. 16 January 2013: Santa Ana Site Visit
8. 24 January 2013: Sonsonate Site Visit
9. 31 January 2013: Prisons HQ Site Visit
10. 21 February 2013: Ilopango Site Visit
11. 23 February 2013: FMLN Security Policy Planning Day
12. 25 February 2013: GiZ Training Sessions Preparation for PREVENIR Trainings
13. 27 February 2013: PDDH Group Sessions
14. 28 February 2013: Santa Tecla Site Visit
15. 6 March 2013: Sonsonante and Santa Tecla Site Visits
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