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Disentangling Water Governance in Dar es Salaam: The Role of NGOs and Community Water Provision

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Abstract

This thesis aims to provide a contemporary account of the Dar es Salaam’s water sector as well as the role of the myriad stakeholders involved in it, taking into account the complexity history of the city’s water governance. As a rapidly growing city over recent years, the infrastructure of Dar es Salaam’s municipal system has not been updated for a significant period of time. As such, the areas served by this system face intermittent and piecemeal coverage whereas other large sections of the city are forced to come up with alternative, often expensive water resources that are unreliable and at times, unsafe. This thesis attempts to explore the lived realities of the individuals who reside in these unserved areas, and the ways in which community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a role in the city’s water sector. Through analysis of community-level water provision schemes in two case study areas of Dar es Salaam, this research provides a thorough account of the ways in which water resources are managed, debated and utilised at the local level and the challenges faces by these local organisations. In addition, through an observational research at two local NGOs working in the water sector in Dar es Salaam, this research examines these organisations’ place within the city’s broader water governance framework, as well as how they operate and prioritise their day to day work and their outputs. This research also takes into account the national and international policy environment, as well as the ways in which Tanzania’s socio-political history has influenced the current means of water governance. Through an exploration of the prevalent discourses in policy creation and implementation and the aforementioned stakeholders in the water sector, this thesis examines the multitude of influences on Dar es Salaam’s water governance, as well as the tensions that arise between rhetoric and reality, and the impacts these have upon its citizens.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the thesis

“Among the myriad problems facing Dar es Salaam’s residential areas, lack of sufficient water supply is arguably the most enduring, problematic and important” (Dill, 2010:613)

Access to water in the Global South and its associated challenges have been included in the international development framework for a number of years. 663 million people in the world are without safe water (Charity Water, 2015). 900 children die every day from a disease caused by unsafe water and sanitation (WaterAid, 2015). In “developing countries”, up to 80% of illnesses are associated with poor access to water and sanitation (The Water Project, 2015). Statistics can indicate the endemic and ever-increasing difficulties faced by a significant proportion of the world’s population when attempting to find a potable supply of water, but fail to provide an explanation of the myriad challenges faced by these individuals as they must navigate the ecological, economic, political, and social environments that impact upon their means of access. As well as this, statistics are unable to address the ways in which water supply is governed at a variety of levels, and in turn, how the variety of ways in which water is understood and experienced must be considered in its planning and management.

Those with access to a clean, affordable and dependable supply think little of turning on the tap for his or her daily needs, an incomparable experience for those who face a daily challenge in simply accessing a viable resource. This research aims to address the variety of actors that can be present in a city’s water governance framework, and in turn the ways in which different stakeholder groups experience water governance within a particular locale. Taking the increasing role of water as an economic good (as laid out by the Dublin Principles of 1992) into account, and the impact that neoliberal ideology
has impacted upon water governance in the last thirty years, this research also examines the way in which these values have been incorporated into contemporary forms of water governance and the implications of this. Additionally, this research examines the role of NGOs in water provision and their position in the increasingly complex provision and governance hierarchy. Paying particular attention to economic, political and social understandings of water, this thesis provides a qualitative analysis of water governance within Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam. Through an examination of the ways in which policy has been conceptualised and implemented, a contemporary explanation of Dar es Salaam’s water governance and provision, and the politics surrounding this is provided. Crucially, this research examines the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community level water provision in the city’s water governance and the power relations and daily challenges that are prevalent within these groups.

1.2 Dar es Salaam’s problems with water governance

The residents of Tanzania have been facing issues when trying to access water for a number of years. Tanzania is not only affected by increasing water scarcity, but also outdated institutional arrangements, and fragment and poorly coordinated management (Seppala, 2002:368). In 2013, WaterAid (2013:6) reported that water coverage on average across Tanzania was 58%, but in urban areas this figure rose to 80%. However, thousands of residents in Tanzania’s largest city and former capital, Dar es Salaam have limited access to a regular water supply and are often forced to explore the suite of methods of access available to acquire a potable supply of water. Taking the complex and varied history of Tanzania’s water sector into account, Lein and Tagseth (2009:209) state that “calls for water reform in Tanzania have been based on claims and notions of a water crisis”. However, it is unclear as to who in particular is describing the situation in Tanzania as a crisis, and in turn, the ways in which crisis is itself understood. WaterAid (2017) discuss Tanzania’s water crisis through statistics, explaining that within the country, 23 million are without access to safe water. Morrireset (2012) adds nuance to this information,
questioning why a country that seemingly has an abundance of fresh water resources is unable to provide an adequate supply to its citizens. Analysing the different ways in which the idea of crisis can be interpreted, Henrik Vigh (2008) argues that in some situations, when faced with conflict or extreme levels of poverty, crisis can become so embedded in day to day life it becomes difficult for residents to distinguish between a state of crisis and normality. This thesis attempts to explore this supposed water crisis in Tanzania, and the ways in which water governance is articulated and implemented in Dar es Salaam, and the experiences of the residents living there. The ways in which Tanzania’s water policy has been developed over time is examined, along with the varied ways it has been implemented and by which actors. Taking the role of key actors in the water sector in Dar es Salaam into account, this research provides an in-depth analysis of the role of NGOs and other development organisations in the city’s water governance, as well as these organisations’ interactions with the Tanzanian state and the population of the country’s former capital. The community-based water schemes prevalent in Dar es Salaam are also included in this thesis, as an example of how Tanzanian water policy materialises at the grassroots level and the driving force behind the establishment of local-level water provision and management. Finally, Vigh’s (2008) theme of endemic crisis is used throughout to interrogate structural and institutional process at work within water governance in Dar es Salaam.

Tanzania is an interesting example of the ways in which postcolonial trajectories and involvement in global economic markets can affect a country’s development and ability to provide services and basic needs to their citizens. To quote at length from Edwards (2014):

“Here was a nation that had received very substantial amounts of foreign aid per capita, and yet had experienced one of the most colossal and calamitous collapses in the history of economics. Income per person had declined precipitously, exports had all but vanished, poverty had skyrocketed, inflation was extremely high, once promising industries such as sisal had disappeared, health conditions had deteriorated markedly,
millions of people had been displaced from their homes, and the premium in the currency black market exceeded 700%.” (Edwards, 2014:xiii)

After independence in the 1960s and the country's foray into its own brand of African socialism, Tanzania was facing a multitude of issues with regards to its economy and subsequently the welfare of its population. In 1991, with a low gross national product (GNP) per capita at just under $100, at that time it was only Mozambique who had a lower figure at $80 (Edwards, 2014). Tanzania's water sector became a casualty of the country's economic difficulties, with Dar es Salaam bearing the brunt of the issues as residents from all over the country moved to the former capital city in order to improve their livelihoods. Pressure increased on the existing water infrastructure and external donors became embedded in the financing of the city's water provision, driving both the changes made to the country's water sector but also the ways in which citizens were able to access it.

More generally, in East Africa donors have played a “significant political and financial role” in water governance (Seppala, 2002:374). Tanzania has received a significant proportion of this donor money since independence. As noted by Edwards (2014):

“After independence in 1961 the country became one of the “darlings” of the international aid community; between 1962 and 1983 was one of the highest recipients of foreign aid in the world. A high proportion of this aid was bilateral and came from the European nations – especially from the Nordic countries.” (Edwards, 2014:2)

Foreign aid donated to Tanzania in the early 1960s was largely used to target specific initiatives, but after the implementation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 aid was geared towards fulfilling the various elements of Julius Nyerere's African Socialism (Edwards, 2014). One of the key tenets of the Arusha Declaration was the wholesale lamentation of the reliance on foreign aid which was prevalent in Tanzanian culture for a number of years.
However, Tanzania’s relationship with the aid is not merely historical, with large amounts of bilateral aid and a variety of development organisations still having a visible presence in the country. Tanzania’s complex and rich history with donors and aid indicates why non-governmental organisations and an analysis of the development sector in general are an important part of this thesis, in assessing the various components that play important roles in Tanzania’s water governance. Water was provided for free by the Tanzanian state to its citizens up until 1991, until the system could no longer keep up with demand. Dar es Salaam’s water system was transferred to the control of a number of private providers who after short periods of time ended the contract and ceased ties with Tanzania’s water. The most notable was City Water, jointly owned by British, German and Tanzanian companies, who after failing to collect revenue and meet targets ended their contract after two years (Dill, 2010). The city’s water is now under the control of a publicly limited company called DAWASCO (Dill and Crow, 2014)1 which provide an irregular supply to the areas of the city under its jurisdiction (Dill, 2010). Tanzania’s water sector has received a notable amount of funding from the donor community; the $164 million World Bank loan granted for the (failed) privatisation of its water system was granted in 2003, which expired in 2010 and was replaced by a $951 million loan from the World Bank and their other development partners such as a German bank and a development organisation from the Netherlands (Pigeon, 2012:53).

Many of Dar es Salaam’s residents lack the capital to connect to the city’s municipal system, or are resident outwith the jurisdiction of the system’s inadequate coverage. As indicated in Figure 1.1, the city’s population is growing at an alarming rate, from 850,000 in 1978 to over four million today (Dill and Crow, 2014).

1 For a full explanation of Tanzania’s water history, see Chapter 5.
Indeed, whilst Robinson et al (2011) argue that Tanzania’s economic growth can be attributed to the incorporation of market values into the country’s governance, there is evidence to suggest that introducing a market economy into the water sector has restricted access for Tanzania’s population with limited capital available to purchase water for a variety of needs. Discussing water governance in general, Franks and Cleaver (2007) suggest that the dominant discourse held by international institutions such as the UN asserts that private and voluntary providers are vital to supplement the work of state-provided water sources. As Dar es Salaam’s water is provided to some areas of the city by a publicly limited company, with other areas of the city forced to use alternative
providers, it appears to be the case that Tanzania is following this model and that the water sector includes a number of stakeholders.

A variety of coping mechanisms are employed by residents in the city in order to access water, such as digging illegal wells, buying from informal water vendors, or buying and selling between neighbours and others that sell water they have collected from the municipal system and deliver to unserviced areas. Residents can buy water for their household directly from a sole provider, or can pool their finances within their community in order to create access to a water resource for a number of households within that locale. Within these stakeholder cohorts, there are a multitude of different individuals and groups that both influence and are influenced by the city’s waterscape. Those fortunate enough to live in an area under the coverage of the municipal system are able to enjoy piped water directly into their home, and pay monthly bills to the public limited company that controls Dar es Salaam’s municipal water system. In the instances where supply has been intermittent, these individuals must challenge the bills sent to them by DAWASCO as well as find and pay further capital for the alternative sources available. Those who provide these alternative sources can travel from area to area, transporting water from an active source to individuals who can afford the convenience of delivery. For those outwith the coverage of the municipal system, these alternative sources become the core means of water access, taking up not only a large proportion of the household budget, but also the time spent queuing daily, sometimes only to find out that the day’s supply of water at that source has run out.

For those that install a water point in their home, the benefits are twofold. Their household is able to benefit from a resource of water directly that can be conveniently accessed, and they can collect money from their neighbours, which can pay for maintenance and expansion, as well as any other household expenses. In addition, locally constructed points such as these serve to strengthen community bonds and relationships, and can reinforce an individuals’ standing in a community. Schemes funded and managed between a whole community (rather than one household) equally reinforce these inter-
community relationships, and allow informal community leaders such as local government and those in positions of authority to influence the water provision of their community and improve their means of access. Those involved in Dar es Salaam’s water sector at the NGO level also have a multitude of roles and motivations. Although some receive remuneration for their work, others are part of these organisations on a voluntary basis, and are motivated by either improving access to water within the city or educating residents on how to manage local water resources efficiently and in a way that limits the spread of water-borne diseases. Others see their role as an opportunity to carry out in-depth research and empirical analysis, which in turn could contribute to policy advocacy and affect long-term change.

Dill and Crow (2014) discuss the ways in which residents were mobilised to manage their water from a community-level and Carter et al (1999) explain that community-based provision is largely borne of a result of state inefficiencies, this means of provision has now been written into Tanzanian water policy, and is becoming embedded in the Tanzania’s water governance framework. Furthermore, Bakker (2008) notes that community water provision has been heralded as a key alternative to privatisation, providing some explanation for this means of provision’s visible presence in within water governance in Dar es Salaam. This research pays particular attention to community-based water organisations, referred to by Dill and Crow (2014) as water user associations or by Lein and Tagseth (2009) as water management communities, these organisations usually form committees from local members in order to manage a community’s water supply. Residents often pay a joining fee to become a member of the scheme and then pay smaller subsequent amounts in order to purchase water from the community’s supply as and when they need it. Committee members are often elected by the community on the basis of an individual’s community standing and their capacity at managing a community water scheme. Taking Bakker’s (2008) point of community provision being an alternative to privatisation, within Dar es Salaam there is evidence to suggest that community-led provision originated in and around the city’s privatised
water, and has long been a part of the complicated social network that is water provision and access.

Notions of crisis can often be used to discuss a country’s economic performance, and the impact of this on the lives of its residents. Edwards’ (2014) book on Tanzania refers to, as explained in the title, the country’s “economic recovery and collapse”. Edwards (2014:253) discusses “the great crises of 1973-4, 1979, 1981-5 and 1991-4” in reference to times when Tanzania’s economy was facing a number of challenges. However, the word crisis can be used to describe a number of other topics pertinent to this thesis, beyond Tanzania’s economic performance. Dill and Crow (2014:188) argue that:

“The many subsequent and documented shortcomings of privatisation have led scholars and practitioners to interrogate and advocate for more comprehensive approaches to solving the water crisis.”

However, taking Vigh’s (2008) view that crisis can in fact become an embedded and enduring state, it is important to consider the issues that Tanzania’s water sector has been experiencing for a number of years, and that there is no imminent sign of significant improvement. Indeed, this research attempts to consider Tanzania’s water sector beyond its history with private providers, in order to understand how citizens access water in a post-privatisation setting, and the varying dynamics that exist surrounding this. This thesis also takes into account Franks and Cleaver’s (2007) assertion that too little attention is paid to the ways in which individuals citizens experience water governance. Providing a multi-scalar analysis of Tanzania’s water sector, this research critically assesses water governance in Dar es Salaam via policy documents, through the experience of development organisations, and the lived realities of residents in the city. Crucially, this research shows the contradictions and tensions between what is asserted in terms of policy and what exists in practice, elucidating the gaps between policy-based rhetoric and the complicated realities experienced by the residents of Dar es Salaam. Answering Dill and Crow’s (2014) claim that no published research exists on community water organisations in Dar es Salaam,
this research attempts to provide some analyses of these groups and the ways in which Tanzanian water policy has materialised at the grassroots level. In addition, paying attention to Dinar’s (1998:369) claim that “the focus on water resources management to solve a country’s water resources problems is now viewed in qualitative as well as quantitative terms”, this research uses a series of qualitative research methods in order to address its objectives.

Taking into account these themes, this research provides an in-depth investigation of NGOs and community organisations in the water sector in Dar es Salaam through research with two organisations working in the water sector in the city, and a case study analysis of two areas and their local community initiatives. Whilst both organisations work in the water sector in Dar es Salaam they differ in their organisational mandate, daily activities, and the individuals that work for and with them by researching these organisations and their related networks it was felt that a comprehensive analysis of NGOs in the water sector in Dar es Salaam could be achieved. Taking the significant population growth of Dar es Salaam and the large areas of the city outwith the remit of the city’s municipal system into account (Dill and Crow, 2014) is into account, I made a conscious decision to include these areas in my case study selection, in order to provide an assessment of two areas of Dar es Salaam that had been using alternative means of water provision for a significant period of time. Both areas had separate histories, population growth and geographical locations, and allowing the inclusion of two diverse areas of Dar es Salaam accessing water through community-based water provision allowed for the experiences of these case study areas to be compared and contrasted.

1.3 Thesis outline

Whilst Tortajada (2010) asserts that there is no universally agreed upon definition of water governance, this thesis uses Franks and Cleaver’s (2007:291) understanding of governance in order to examine the water sector in Tanzania;
“Governance provides a way of conceptualising this emerging network of relationships between different sectors and interests in society, enabling us to analyse how governments, the public and private sectors, civil society, citizens groups and individual citizens forge networks and linkages to provide new ways for society to order itself and manage its affairs.”

As such, this thesis attempts to explore the messy, multi-faceted and complex means of water governance currently in existence in Tanzania, tracking the policy discourses and their grassroots implications, and the role that the NGO sector has to play in this. Within this thesis, the following objectives will be addressed:

- How is Tanzanian water policy constructed and disseminated, and what are the key themes that are prevalent in water policy documents produced since 1991?

- What role do NGOs play in Tanzania’s water sector, and what are the challenges faced by these organisations in their work?

- How does community water provision fit within the water policy framework in Dar es Salaam, and how does this materialise at the grassroots level?

The thesis is divided into eight chapters, with two chapters providing a review of the relevant literature, one discussing the methodology of this research and three devoted to this research’s empirics. Chapter 2 reviews the literature surrounding the growth of neoliberalism as a global economic doctrine as well as the ways in which this ideology has manifested in a variety of geographical contexts. The chapter explores neoliberalism’s origins, as well as the key principles that drive neoliberal ideology and governance. Discussion of the ways in which neoliberalism has changed over time is also included, with reference to the Washington Consensus and the impact of neoliberal policy in the Global
South. Finally, the chapter explores the different literary perspectives on neoliberal policy in the water sector, and how this has impacted upon the way in which water is governed and accessed by those under the remit of this type of policy framework.

Chapter 3 assesses the literature on the growth of NGOs as key vehicles within development and explores the challenges faced by these types of organisations in carrying out their work. The ways in which Global North definitions and practices have been imposed in Global South settings will be explored, being mindful of ideas of crisis and how they coalesce around contemporary international development practice. The rise of NGOs as an established stakeholder in the international development sector is discussed, as well as the changing role of these types of organisation and the reasons behind this. Using examples from recent literature on the NGO sector in a variety of geographical locations, the difficulties faced by NGOs in their daily work is examined, as well as the broader structural challenges prevalent in the sector. The chapter also uses postcolonial literature to assess the role of NGOs in the Global South and the role of external actors in influencing water governance and how it is experienced by the communities that development organisations work with. The topic of Global North/South relations is addressed, and the ways in which the legacy of postcolonial relationships can impact upon future interactions, particularly in the case of international NGOs.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the methodology used to conduct this research, and elucidates some of the methodological challenges associated with the research methods used. The methodological perspective of this thesis is explained, followed by an explanation of the research methods used in this thesis and the reason behind their inclusion. The chapter also discussed the potential drawbacks with each of the research methods employed, and my attempts at mitigating them. The ethical implications of this research are also included in Chapter 4, with a specific focus on the ways in which my positionality as a young, white, female conducting research in the Global South could have impacted upon the data collected in this research.
As the first empirical chapter, Chapter 5 assesses the dominant discourses prevalent in a number of Tanzanian national policy documents, and assesses the ways in which the country’s prescribed water governance framework is explained. In addition, a selection of other documents that impact upon the rhetoric of Tanzanian water policy are also examined, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The socio-political history of Tanzanian politics is also examined, such as the legacy of the socialist policies implemented by Julius Nyerere in the country in the 1960s, and their modern manifestations in contemporary water policy. As such, an attempt is made to understand the variety of discourses prevalent in current Tanzanian culture, and each of these discourses relate to the water policy framework in place today. The neoliberal manifestations in Tanzanian water policy are discussed, particularly in terms of decentralisation of responsibility and the decreasing role of the Tanzanian state, and how the role of the Tanzanian state has changed in the country’s water sector over time. The chapter also explores some of the terminology used in Tanzanian water policy, and the ways in which these are understood within different stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania.

The sixth chapter in this thesis analyses the experiences of NGOs working in the water sector in Tanzania and the myriad challenges faced by these organisations in their day-to-day practices. Using the ethnographic data collected from an in-depth study of two organisations working in the water sector in Dar es Salaam as well as data gathered from interviews and focus groups, this chapter explains the main activities undertaken by these organisations, and the rationale behind them. Discussion follows on the impact of these activities on improving access to water for the people of Dar es Salaam, and the variety of factors that often impact upon water NGOs being able to carry out the work they desire. This includes specific challenges that can affect individual organisations, such as a lack of available funding. It also includes sector-wide issues such as partnerships and competition that can lead to more focus on power relations between organisations rather than water-related outputs.
The final empirical chapter explains the experiences of community water projects in Tanzania, through the use of the two aforementioned case studies. Chapter 7 describes the manifestations of community water projects in Dar es Salaam, and their place within the wider and messy water governance framework of the city. The ways in which these grassroots schemes were conceptualised and implemented is discussed, as well as the challenges faced by those in charge of the projects and the residents trying to access the water they provide. The chapter also discusses the impact of the Tanzanian water event ‘Maji Week’ and how it is experienced by various groups across Tanzania.

Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to this research and highlights the questions raised by this data that must be asked in order to provide a full understanding of the water sector in Dar es Salaam. The key findings of this research are discussed in relation to Dar es Salaam’s water governance, as well as the impacts that the data in this research can contribute towards broader debates on international aid, NGOs and the Global South’s place within contemporary development practice. The chapter also reflects on the politics and ethical considerations of conducting research in the Global South and speaking on behalf of research participants, and refers to a number of further research questions generated from the findings of this thesis that must be examined in future.
Chapter 2: Neoliberal Policy and its Impact on Water Governance

2.1 Introduction

Peck et al (2009:107) explain that “processes of neoliberalism operate, articulate and interpenetrate unevenly across places, territories and scales”, exacerbating uneven global development and perpetuating economic inequality. Although Pollard et al (2009) claim that economic analysis within academic literature is ontologically placed within a Global North mindset, Peck and Tickell (2002) instead explain that existing research into neoliberalism within various cultural contexts has been executed most effectively in research in the Global South. By creating a dichotomy between the market and the state (Fine, 1999), neoliberalism has become what is described by Mackinnon and Cumbers (2007) as “economic common sense”. As neoliberalism manifests itself in different ways across a variety of locales, this chapter aims to address the impacts of the economic doctrine in a Global South, and in particular, how this impacts upon water governance and related policy. Services like water provision are increasingly being subject to market-values and have been impacted upon by the rise of neoliberal governance. As such, this chapter explores this form of water governance and the ways in which this has affected how residents in the Global South access water.

As neoliberalism became embedded in global social and geopolitical fabric in the 1970s and 1980s, free market values took precedent in many countries’ agendas, in keeping with the values imposed upon them by international financial institutions. The privatisation of state water services was put in place by a number of states, at a time when their appeared to be no alternative (Loftus and McDonald, 2001) to managing water governance. Capitalising on the narrative of the time, states were blamed for inefficient water provision, and global initiatives such as the Dublin Principles of 1992\(^2\) provided a viable alternative,\(^2\)

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\(^2\)The Dublin Principles were announced at the International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) held in Dublin in January 1992, which was attended by government representatives, as well as individuals from international and nongovernmental organisations. (Gorre-Dale, 1992)
justifying the need for more market-based logic in water provision to solve the current issues with state led provision (Ioris, 2012). However this has been subject to much criticism, with Swyngedouw (2005:93) noting that privatisation altered “choreographies of power” and Rees (1998) explaining that private companies are not social services, and will provide water system under a different ethos to a state. Additionally, those without the capital to afford to install a connection to privately provided water are faced with sourcing alternative means of access, often with questionable quality or higher prices than the municipal system. The increased marketisation of water services has led to class division and the introduction of market logic into something previously understood as a natural depoliticised resource. As such, neoliberal policy has had a significant impact on contemporary water policy, as residents are often faced with the challenge of finding enough capital to acquire water to fulfil their needs.

This chapter begins by discussing the origins of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and its key tenets. It then attempts to deconstruct the idea of neoliberalism as a uniform context by discussing its application in various Global South contexts, before leading onto a discussion of the neoliberalisation of water. Through exploration of the ways in which neoliberalism has impacted upon Global South access to water, coalescing around water’s simultaneous roles as an environmental good and essential to life, the commodification of this resource will be examined. Finally, the chapter will discuss the ways in which neoliberalism has impacted upon the water sector in Tanzania and how the implementation of free market ideals have been carried out in this context and the subsequent effects on domestic access to water. The chapter will end with a brief discussion of crisis and how this relates to understandings of neoliberal governance and access to water in the developing world.

2.2 The beginnings of neoliberalism; definitions, understandings and incorporation into global economic doctrine

Neoliberalism has been defined by Mackinnon (2009:ii) as;
“A political and economic framework that seeks to reduce state intervention and embrace the free market, stressing the virtues of enterprise, competition and individual self-reliance”

McGregor (2001:83) also notes that “neoliberalism is comprised of two notions – ‘neo’ meaning new and ‘liberal’ meaning free from government intervention.” For many years, Peck has problematised definitive descriptions of this economic framework, noting that it was a “transnational, reactional and messy hybrid right from the start” (Peck, 2010:39). Although neoliberalism as an economic doctrine is in many ways variegated across time and space, the core belief of its propagators is that the free market is the most appropriate means for individuals to fulfil their own needs and desires, and that the state is either inefficient or a curb or individual freedom (Crouch, 2011:vii). Through this “essentialisation of the market” (Kendall, 2003:3) neoliberalism usurped Keynesianism as the dominant post-war economic strategy, by providing a stark alternative to the system that found itself in a crisis in the 1970s. Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism rose in popularity in the 1970s due to the context of the time by appealing to the political and economic needs of an electorate who were dissatisfied by the means of current economic governance;

“For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit.” (Harvey, 2005:5)

Harvey then goes on to discuss the various anti-statist political movements of 1968, which allowed neoliberals to capitalise on their dissatisfaction with an influential state and instead transfer a number of public practices to private hands. As a result, the role of the market became increasingly important in service provision, and sectors that were previously under the control of states became owned and ran by private companies.
As a dominant viewpoint in post-war economic policy in the United Kingdom until the 1970s, the Keynesian method of dealing with inflation included reducing state expenditure or increasing taxes, although this resulted in decreased spending on public services and an inevitable rise in unemployment (Crouch, 2011). When Keynesianism became in a state of economic crisis, neoliberal propagators viewed the labour market differently; working against those who tried to unionise and increase their wages to survive inflation (Crouch, 2011), and advocating the core belief that those who became unemployed had done so on a purely voluntary basis (Harvey, 2005). The core belief was that market regulation should decrease in order to allow economic growth.

Continued inflation in the 1970s led to measures being put in place to curb the crisis, irrespective of the consequences for the labour market (Harvey, 2005). Under ‘monetarism’, the supply of money circulation in the United States became restricted in order to curb inflation levels (Mackinnon and Cumbers, 2011). Governments in the Global North began to follow suit, and in 1976 the British Labour Government formally announced a move away from Keynesianism in exchange for financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Crouch, 2011). It was evident at this point that supporters of the free market and a move away from the strong welfare state were significantly impacting upon economic discourse in the Global North, and neoliberalism was fast becoming the viable economic alternative. This is not to suggest that the Global North was the only set of countries experiencing a change in economic discourse during this period. Following the coup d’état in Chile in 1977, overthrowing the socialist government of Allende (Crouch, 2011), General Pinochet achieved power and allowed neoliberal policy to become the key element of Chilean economics, working alongside the IMF (Harvey, 2005). Nationalised industries were privatised, and natural resources were introduced into the market, aligning with Harvey’s claim that neoliberal policy will create markets where they previously did not exist (Harvey, 2005). Additionally, foreign companies were encouraged to operate on Chilean land.
Politically, as well as economically, neoliberalism was increasingly gaining dominance in other locales. The elections won by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1979, and Ronald Reagan in the United States of America in 1980 were seen as key moments for the increasing hegemony of neoliberal policy. Following on from British Labour’s denunciation of Keynesian economic policy in 1976, Thatcher also advocated monetarism, as well as the privatisation of state assets, a reduction in taxes for the upper classes and fundamentally, a reduced welfare state (Crouch, 2011). Reagan’s election in 1980 further cemented neoliberal economic doctrine in the Global North, supporting the increased interest rates put in place by Paul Volcker in the United States Federal Reserve, and initiating the deregulation of industry and the economy (Crouch, 2011) (Harvey, 2005), also supporting decreasing state power.

Although the transfer of power from the state to the market can be rightly seen as one of the key tenets of neoliberal theory, there are other reconfigurations of power that must be examined in order to assess its dominance. Building upon the ideas of Duméil and Lévy (2005), Harvey (2005) claims that irrespective of rising inflation, the so-called ‘neoliberalisation’ of global economics was simply a means by which power could be restored to the ruling classes; as a reactionary measure to the apparent rising political clout of communist and socialist parties in the 1970s, as well as the fact that Keynesian policy had restricted the ability of the ruling elites to increase their share of national wealth.

Others have been equally critical, stating that neoliberalism is “a global system of minority power, plunder of nations and despoilment of the environment” (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005:5). It could be suggested that as economic influence was transferred to the private sector away from the state and labour organisations such as trade unions, so too was the financial security and stability of the labour market taken from the hands of the working classes. Stuart Hall commented in the late 1980s that neoliberalism was simply a “class-based ideology that attacks the welfare state in advance liberal countries” (Hall, from Ong, 2007:3). Moreover, Harvey (2005) notes that neoliberalism’s main achievement has been the redistribution rather than regeneration of wealth and
income, using the example of privatisation of social housing in the United Kingdom and how it was seen as a way to increase personal wealth, but the fluctuations of the housing market ended up displacing the working class from gentrified areas. This is a neat example of how the choreographies of power were altered under the guise of individual responsibility and self-sufficiency away from the welfare state, and the “chill wind” of the market (Amin, 1999) having a significant impact on the working classes. Nonetheless, it must also be noted that for Thatcher, the reconfiguration of economic and political power was not simply a reversal of post-war class relations; instead creating a financially viable environment for what Harvey (2005:31) terms the entrepreneurial “nouveaux riches”, instead of the traditional aristocratic ruling elites.

Additionally, neoliberalism cannot be viewed as simply this transfer of state-to-market power. It also promoted the idea of individualistic values, and ownership over one’s own success. Taking the education reforms implemented by Thatcher during her time as prime minister as an example, by making league tables public, parents were able to have an individual influence over their child’s education, using information provided to decide which school suited them best (Coman, 2013). Although this is not an explicit transfer of education entirely into the private sector, state schools thus had an element of competition introduced between them, each attempting to provide the best education and attain the best pupils. This illustrates how market-led and individualistic thinking was becoming increasingly commonplace, infiltrating the political psyche, and indicates how widespread the influence of neoliberalism had become.

2.3 Post 1980s neoliberalism and the effects on international financial institutions

By the early 1980s, the commitment to Keynesian policies had all but disappeared from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and in the United States, economic research had begun to teach the key tenets of neoliberalism as standard (Harvey, 2005). As a departure from the outwardly neoliberal values of both Thatcher and Reagan, a so-called ‘second
wave’ began to permeate in the early 1990s, advocating what Ong (2006:11) describes as “individual internalisation of neoliberal traits”, and the expectation that individuals would begin to take a degree of responsibility for themselves in aspects of their lives such as health and education. Moving on from this, a ‘third way’ of neoliberalism then became the dominant discourse, described as “neoliberalism with a human face” (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005:4). Involving Bill Clinton’s New Democrats in the United States, the German ‘die neue Mitte’ and New Labour in the United Kingdom (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005, Crouch, 2011) there was a new emphasis on community and self-responsibility. Additionally, whilst still accepting the key values of neoliberalism, the Third Way wished to “humanise the market” (Duménil and Lévy, 2005:28) and an acknowledgement that the state did have a role to play in market failure (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005).

Castree (2006) warns against using the term ‘neoliberalism’ within academic research in a general sense, as there is a risk that this will lead to tenuous links between specific practices and wider contexts that may not actually be evident, and my simply be being used to make research link up to a “much bigger and apparently important conversation” (Castree, 2006:6). Additionally, Peck et al (2009) support the idea of “neoliberalisation” (Peck et al, 2009) rather than ‘neoliberalism’, refuting Brenner and Theodore’s (2002b) idea that it follows a ‘one size fits all’ model, and arguing that it is an economic doctrine that is applied and implemented differently across various contexts and locations. The ‘pure’ neoliberal governance that took place in Chile in the 1970s, was subject to a failure which led to adaptations and compromises within neoliberal practice, something that was replicated in the United Kingdom in 1983 (Harvey, 2005). Additionally, Fourcade-Gourinchas et al (2002) noted that whilst the United Kingdom, Chile, Mexico and France all subscribed to free market ideals, how this was implemented in each location had was varied. The United Kingdom and Chile adopted neoliberalism as a wholesale rescaling of state-market relations, as opposed to France and Mexico who adopted the new economic principles more gradually (Fourcade-Gourinchas et al, 2002).
As noted by Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005), viewing neoliberalism along a simply linear trajectory neglects to consider the myriad ways it has become embedded in international economics and become the “commonsense” of the times (Colás. 2005:78). Ahiwa Ong makes the distinction between the ideology and the practice clear; “big N Neoliberalism as ‘a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes’ while ‘small n neoliberalism’ operates in practice ‘as a logic of governing that mitigates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (Ong, from Springer, 2012:136). An example of this is in Europe, where Nordic countries have incorporated a significant amount of neoliberal doctrine into their governance, yet they still possess a far-reaching welfare state and trade unions still have a significant amount of influence (Crouch, 2011).

The current manifestations of neoliberalism have once again adapted to suit the political climate in which they operate, escaping supposed crisis such as the financial crash of 2008, seemingly unscathed (Mirowski, 2013). Those who enforce this economic set of values are said to “occupy positions of considerable influence in education (universities and many think tanks), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions in key state institutions (treasury departments, central banks) and also in international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation that regulate global finance and trade” (Harvey, 2005:2). Mirowski (2013) further argues that the real propagators of neoliberalism are not those directly interacting with society, but instead those who disseminate their ideas through subtle means, such as academic conferences or social media. As such, it could be argued that neoliberal thought has a significant presence without any direct link to those who promoted this ideology in the first place. The growing power of multinational corporations has led to them exerting influence over political decisions to suit their own business interests (Crouch, 2011) as financial institutions are increasingly able to sway policy for their own needs. Instead of the existence of what Crouch (2011:viii) terms an “ideologically pure” neoliberalism, as this economic doctrine has evolved over time, renegotiating the relationship between the market and the state and further reconfiguring the power relations intrinsically related to capital.
Ong (2006) argues that governments have created new economic spaces in which to exert power over national populations. As well as the aforementioned example of the Conservative British Government’s introduction of league tables into British schools, a more contemporary example of this is through the United Kingdom Government’s initiative of the Big Society, whereby localism and decentralisation are being advocated as a method of restructuring governance in Britain (Featherstone et al, 2012). The power of the market nonetheless has an effect here, as local initiatives must apply to the wealthy for project funding, allowing those with capital to determine which local services prosper based on their own personal preferences (Crouch, 2011). Policies that follow the rhetoric of austerity and welfare reform have meant that the state has a decreasing role to play in the provision of local services, leaving residents dependent on them subject to the volatility of the free market.

As the relationship between the state and the market becomes increasingly complex, combined with the ways neoliberalism adapts to different spatial and temporal contexts, it is useful to consider the impacts of this through the idea of neoliberal governance. Using the conception that governance by definition is fundamentally “more than government” (Evans et al, 2005:77), governance implies that there are multiple stakeholders involved in service provision beyond simply the state. The ideas of Big Society and progressive localism could be suggested to be explicit examples of this. Using neoliberalism as the method of governance, market-led values become intrinsic to political decision making, and through individual values (echoing Thatcher’s derision for the idea of society) the idea of self-governance also came into the fore. Therefore, it is clear neoliberal values have become intrinsic both in top-down methods of governance as well in everyday discourse and practice, the ideas of this economic doctrine can become even more endemic. States become an inherent part of “entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour” (Fougner, 2008:308) and although the manifestations of neoliberal governance can vary between places, there is nonetheless an emphasis placed upon the market over the state.
Peck et al (2009) and Larner (2003) insist that neoliberalism should be understood as a process constantly mutating and adapting to the context it operates in, and never as a simply definable end state. Taking these viewpoints into account, the impacts and interpretations of neoliberalism in a number of Global South contexts will be discussed, in order to ascertain the malleability of this economic doctrine.

2.4 Neoliberalism in the Global South

Specifically considering how neoliberalism has impacted upon the Global South is necessary in order to understand how this form of economic governance manifests in Postcolonial contexts. Pollard et al (2009) made an explicit call for this by elucidating the lack of attention economic geography has paid to settings outwith the Global North when assessing the global economy. Whist Mackinnon and Cumbers (2007) note that the supposed ‘Third World’ is often discussed within literature as a monolithic geographical location, there is evidence to suggest that processes of neoliberalism have played out differently within different contexts. Rodney (1972), in his discussion of capitalism’s manifestation in Africa, addressed this, noting that the rise of capitalism had a very different impact within Africa compared to Europe, and argued that capitalism had in fact been detrimental to Africa’s overall development. Although the terms ‘capitalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are not explicitly synonymous, this is simply an early example of how an economic ideology can have different impacts in different geographical locations.

Within developing country contexts, neoliberal ideology served as a departure from previous discourses existing in this field. Modernisation Theory, the belief that imposing Global North values upon non-Global North cultures would advance their development, was followed by Dependency Theory, holding the belief that a withdrawal from the global economy would sever any exploitative ties between developing and developed countries (Mackinnon and Cumbers, 2007). Neoliberalism however, offered an alternative to previous modes of thought, instead simply actively encouraging developing countries to subscribe
to Global North free market values and resulting in a number of countries in the
global south adopting this form of economic policy. Instead of existing in relation
to Global North countries, neoliberal policy offered an opportunity for Global
South states to implement their own interpretation of this global economic
document.

This is not to say that adoption of neoliberal policies in the Global South
happened smoothly, however. For example, De Soto’s hypercapitalist views of
title deeds came into conflict with cultural understandings of property security
that do not naturally lend themselves to market led ideology (Neuwirth, 2005).
This is further explained by Harvey (2005), who notes that it is a commonly-held
view that the lack of private property rights in many developing countries are
one of the key barriers to their economic development, and echoes previously
held Modernisation Theory values of the precedence of Global North knowledge.
The conscious move of the international financial institutions from Keynesianism
to neoliberal values led to the formulation of the Washington Consensus in 1990,
defined by “financial liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, the creation of
secure property rights, tax reform, introduction of competition and public sector
fiscal ‘discipline’” (Bakker, 2010:88). Wachtel (2005) argues that the values of
the Washington Consensus in fact predated the 1990s, and were used as a
vehicle in the 1970s to reduce debt in the Global South, through conditional
lending by the IMF. In the 1990s, by using IMF loans as a condition for following
this economic path and adopting policies that suit this framework, it is clear as to
how neoliberalism was able to exert influence over a number of countries
irrespective of their economic history. In Africa, the market-led reforms put in
place were unable to alleviate the public health issues faced across the continent,
and the supposed success stories of this economic reform were short-lived and
in relation to other global economies, still in a tenuous and fragile position
Rodrik (2006).3

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3 Rodrik (2006) uses the examples of the Latin American economic recovery at the beginning of
the 1990s and the ways in which Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique are lauded as success
stories from neoliberal economic reform to illustrate this argument.
Additionally, Weiss (2010) describes how the Washington Consensus posited the ‘state’ and ‘market’ as working against each other. The increasing role of international financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) had significant levels of impact;

“Because of its decisive role on a global scale, the World Bank is often seen by adherents and critics alike as the most influential partner in bringing about particular types of change in developing countries.” (Singh, 2009:487)

Whilst neoliberalism’s role in the Global South must be analysed, it is equally important to examine how the adoption of this global economic doctrine has impacted upon the Global North’s relationship with the developing world. As recipients of aid and other forms of financial assistance, the multi-scalar ways in which neoliberal policy has played a role in development in the Global South must be assessed.

As a form of financial assistance to indebted countries in the Global South, structural adjustment is a useful example in order to examine the presence of Global North values in the Global South. Structural adjustment advises that countries operate upon the principles of austerity, free trade and the privatisation of state services in order to obtain financial aid (Mackinnon and Cumbers, 2007) which means that those experiencing it are obliged to follow what the advanced capitalist countries advocate, and shows the link between Dependency Theory and neoliberal economic policy. Structural adjustment has been replaced by poverty reduction strategy papers in 1999, yet these require governments to produce detailed plans for these global institutions to assess (Mackinnon and Cumbers, 2007), maintaining the advanced capitalist countries hegemony over developing countries’ decision making. This is exemplified by McDonald and Smith (2004) who in their assessment of the increasingly neoliberalised form of governance being used in South Africa concluded that it had become effectively a “home grown” form of structural adjustment (McDonald and Smith, 2004:161). McDonald and Smith (2004) found that
although there were mechanisms in place from local decision makers to make choices based on their own principles, they largely defaulted to subscribing to global economic ideals.

The recent move away from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus had an impact upon how countries in the Global South are governed:

“While the Washington consensus made economic growth the main goal of development, the new consensus moves away from the neo-liberal, market-friendly approach and places sustainable, egalitarian and democratic development at the heart of the agenda.” (World Health Organisation, 2015)

Taking the viewpoint that markets are in fact, imperfect (Fine, from KS and Fine, 2006), and not an absolute and issue-free form of governance, the Post-Washington Consensus has been described as a “new phase of neoliberalism” (Van Waeyenberge et al, 2011:7). Referred to by Peck as “the post-laissez-faire credo of neoliberalism” (Peck, 2010:65), the Post-Washington Consensus has once again redefined the state’s role, and a “grudging tolerance of the state has re-emerged” (Bayliss, 2011:73). As such, under the Post-Washington Consensus states are encouraged to intervene to manage these market imperfections, and the social relations embedded in society are described as a vital ingredient to a country’s economic development (Fine et al, 2001). This is an explicit example of the ways in which neoliberalism changes its ethos to suit the contexts it is operating in, agreeing with previous comments made in the literature and explaining its continued hegemony. By advocating the role of the state in certain situations and emphasising collective-decision making at the national and local level, the Post-Washington consensus is a means by which modern neoliberal policy is able to continue to promote economic values without being wholly and explicitly market-driven.

As previously discussed, a prominent feature of neoliberalised governance is that of the decentralisation of state power, and a focus on a more local or community
aspect of economic interaction, which has materialised in a number of ways in the Global South. Willis and Khan (2009:992) noted that;

"Neoliberal policies throughout the world have been associated with attempts to decentralise decision making in order to promote greater involvement of people and communities."

There has been a rising interest in local and regional economic spaces within economic geography since the 1990s (MacKinnon and Cumbers, 2007), and Brenner and Theodore (2002a) stated that they are increasingly being “viewed as key institutional arenas for a wide range of policy experiments and political strategies”. However, commentary on the success of decentralised governance has concluded with mixed results. Grindle (2004) states that the supposed benefits of decentralisation, in that it can lead to quicker decision making, more accountability in local level government and the empowerment of citizens, is not necessarily what happens in practice and can often lead to increased inequality within decentralised regions. Whilst the Post-Washington Consensus advocates the importance of local social relations and governance to a country’s economic development (Batemen et al 2011), McDonald and Smith (2004) disagree, stating that the impact of neoliberal policy outweighs the potential for participatory grassroots movements to subvert this economic doctrine.

Additionally, Akin et al’s (2005) consultation of literature on this topic concluded that due to a lack of appropriate knowledge, local level decision makers do not often have the ability to make the best decisions for those they are accountable to, which can lead to a detrimental impact on the service provision available. Atampugre (1997) is also incredibly cynical about the supposed benefits of decentralised governance, maintaining the view that political devolution is meaningless unless economic resources are decentralised also, and that economic disparities and class divisions remain or worsen when this reconfiguration of governance is put in place, thus leading to very little benefit at the grassroots level. In Bolivia, decentralised governance strengthened local rights movements, reconfigured political power dynamics and led to the election
of the country's first indigenous president (Kohl and Farthing, from Miraftab, 2009). However, McDonald and Smith (2004) concluded from their research in South Africa that policies and decision-making within these localised methods of governance were still heavily influenced by the hegemonic nature of neoliberal ideology. In their research in Cape Town, McDonald and Smith (2004) argue that since the 1990s there has been a reduction in the scope of policy debate, and an increasing importance placed upon the private sector and commercial interests. Whilst decentralised governance can encourage grassroots decision making that is appropriate for the local context, the above examples suggest that the necessary resources are often not in place for this to happen effectively.

The decentralisation of power across a number of states and its impact on economies and their social relations has been explored in depth. The decentralisation of governance to the local level is also part of mainstream development discourse, which has presented challenges in its implementation. McDonald and Smith’s (2004) research into decentralised governance in Cape Town found that even though local-level government was given a great deal of autonomy, “ideological pressures” (McDonald and Smith, 2004:1461) meant that although adopting centralised policy practices was not officially enforced it largely happened at the grassroots anyway. Whilst Tungaraza (1993) discusses the importance of kinship values in Tanzania to the social security and well-being of many of the country’s residents, it is clear that such values could conflict with the neoliberal values that are currently in place across the globe and the ways in which water is provided through decentralised forms of governance. Water is a resource with both local and national properties, being accessed at the grassroots level whilst simultaneously being part of a complex hydrological network. As such, the ways in which local and national economic values impact upon water governance in the Global South will now be discussed, in order to explore the ways in which neoliberal economic policy has impacted upon how residents access water.

2.5 Water governance in the Global South
Currently, the World Health Organisation and UNICEF estimate that there are 880 million people without access to safe drinking water, and 2.6 billion people without access to an adequate level of sanitation (Jiménez and Pérez-Fouget, 2010). Moreover, whilst there might be a tendency to attribute this to climate or technical issues, many of the challenges faced by those living in the Global South could be suggested to be a result of the social and economic impacts of inadequate water governance (Jiménez and Pérez-Fouget, 2010). Returning to Evans et al’s (2005:77) distinction that governance is “more than government”, in order to account for the hybrid and messy forms of service provision and access that can exist, this section attempts to explore the extent to which water provision in the Global South has become subject to neoliberalised values and complex means of governance. Analysis from this viewpoint allows for a detailed examination of the numerous networks and relationships currently in place involving the public and private sector, residents and grassroots initiatives, and the state (Franks and Cleaver, 2007). Franks and Cleaver (2007) point out that residents no longer rely solely on the state for access to water, and thus define water governance as “the system of actors, resources, mechanisms and processes which mediate society’s access to water” (Franks and Cleaver, 2007:303).

The ways in which residents in the Global South have accessed water has changed within the last forty years. Water governance has been one of the areas that has been most affected by rising neoliberal discourse, with privatisation of the resource serving as a neoliberal solution to providing water to those without. A significant change in global economic policy resulted in structural adjustment in the developing world, as well as the global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank using conditional loans to enforce their agendas on countries in the Global South. The aforementioned Washington Consensus of the 1990s introduced a culture largely surrounding privatisation, deregulation and private property rights, leading to a number of countries in the Global South engaging in private water contracts with multinational water companies and placing their country’s water provision outwith their jurisdiction. As privatisation of water (and other state assets) became the dominant discourse, global development initiatives also took an interest in water governance, placing
it as a key component of Millennium Development Goal 7, involved in water and sanitation (Franks and Cleaver, 2007).

Encounters with water privatisation and the subsequent impacts on governance have been mixed, both in terms of experience and the ways in which individual countries introduced private sector participation into their water sector. In addition to this, informal methods of water provision continue to be a vital method of access for many living in the Global South, making a full understanding of water governance a complex issue in many areas. Swyngedouw (from Ioris, 2012:126) notes that in terms of water governance, issues faced are “not merely a question of management and technology, but rather, and perhaps in the first instance, a question of social power”. Thus, by considering the power choreographies as a result of wider economic practices, as well as the subsequent implications for both formal and informal water provision, the complex nature of water governance in the Global South will be addressed.

Continued reliance on the market and configuration of the role of the state are at the heart of neoliberal ideology, with the continuing belief that as a result of the “profit motive” (Bayliss, 2011:73), services will be provided at a higher level than those controlled solely by the state. The 1980s was referred to as the International Drinking Water and Sanitation decade, placing emphasis on increasing access to water for those without in the Global South. As the 1980s came to a close and it was evident that the targets set out by the decade’s plan had not been met, there became the core belief that private sector participation was the solution to extending water provision for those in the developing world (Budds and McGranahan, 2003) aligning with the key tenets of neoliberalism and the current economic discourse.

This belief was combined with and reinforced by a series of international agreements and meetings that all supported this shift in water governance away from the control of individual states. Complementing the key components of the Washington Consensus, both the United Nations Convention on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janerio in 1992 and the Dublin Principles
created in the same year advocated that water should now be viewed as an
economic good, in order to promote efficient use and market-led principles in its
governance (Budds and McGranahan, 2003) (Bjornlund, 2004), further
explaining the trajectory along which this neoliberalised consensus surrounding
water became commonsense.

Returning to Saad-Filho and Johnston’s (2005:5) description of neoliberalism as
“a global system of minority power, plunder of nations and despoilment of the
environment”, the word ‘environment’ is key here. The so-called
‘neoliberalisation of nature’ (Bakker, 2005) moved discussions away from water
as a natural resource to that of a commodity to be traded and profited from.
Asthana (2011) discusses how water policy can be used as a political tool to
redefine contemporary understandings of water under the guise of a new
paradigm shift and a subsequent improvement in access. Supposedly, if an issue
is receiving political attention and is causing unrest, an opportunity is created for
policymakers to raise morale with new agendas or policy directions (Huitema et
al, 2011). Swyngedouw (2005:82) is equally polemic, stating that “privatisation
is nothing else than a legally and institutionally condoned, if not encouraged,
form of theft”.

Tucker states that;

“Challenges for managing watersheds and distributing water equitably
can multiply in contexts where multiple stakeholders have competing
legal or traditional claims, or poorly defined property rights. Ineffective
or inappropriate institutions (rules-in-use), including unclear or
inequitable property rights, have been viewed as root problems of poor
natural resource management and associated social tensions.” (Tucker,
2014:216)

In turn, broader arguments surrounding resource sovereignty are pertinent
here, where the privatisation of natural resources has caused a situation of legal
pluralism whereby usufructuary rights come into conflict with private
acquisition. Sovereignty over a natural resource implies that a state or indigenous community has control over said resource with the ability to use it as they see fit, with little consideration for external forces such as the market (Emel et al, 2011). Such a concept has been eroded by liberalised ideals, with a number of contemporary capital-focused teachings arguing that these views have no place in modern society (Tarlock, 1997). The increasing popularity of neoliberalism has begun to threaten these values. Harvey (2005), building upon Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, uses the phrase ‘accumulation by dispossession’, explaining that “dispossession is not part of some “primitive” past but is rather an on-going process associated with the accumulation of capital” (Roberts, 2008:541). As noted by Emel et al (2011:70); “national sovereignty over territorial resources is often couched in opposition to foreign capital". Land privatisation in Morocco has labelled any impoverished pastoralists who use the land as “outlaws” (Davis, 2006:100), criminalising indigenous rights and following a market based agenda that has presented a number of obstacles for local people. It could be argued that the Dublin Principles and their counterparts were used to instil hope for those at a loss as to how to improve water provision across many developing countries, whilst also acting as a means to bring neoliberal values in to global policy discourse.

Privatisation of water in the Global South4 was put in place through a variety of measures advocated by the international financial institutions who were the key proponents of this practice. Based on the core belief that the private sector will be more efficient in providing water and injecting finance into underfunded municipal water systems (Bakker, 2010; Hall and Lobina, 2005; Hall et al, 2005), advocates of water privatisation also claimed that private provision would help to facilitate the growing belief set out in Rio de Janeiro and Dublin that water should be treated as an economic good (Bakker, 2010). As with in many other sectors, countries in the Global South were coerced by the international financial

4This is not to suggest that privatisation of water only occurred in the Global South. Both the United Kingdom and Canada experienced their domestic water being placed under the jurisdiction of private companies. However, as the key focus here is how those without water experience privatisation it is more useful to focus on the Global South where coverage and access is much more problematic.
institutions into handing over their power over water provision from the state to a private company in exchange for loans and overseas aid. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank provided Ecuador with a loan of $40 million, under the condition that half of this loan was spent on privatising the public water system (Swyngedouw, 2005). When faced with existing crippling debt and an inability to generate funds within the country for national improvements, countries were faced with little choice but to adopt these neoliberal principles in their water sector in order to continue to survive.

In addition to this, in several instances water provision followed the neoliberal tenet of decentralisation, altering governance and power structures and funding allocations, something that Uhlendahl et al (2011) found was a problematic institutional shift in Zambia. Decentralisation of water became a convincing argument when the dominant discourse became that grassroots systems required localised knowledge to operate efficiently (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000), yet dismisses discussions of water systems existing as natural monopolies (Budds and McGranahan, 2003) or fragmented water governance with uncomplimentary elements. Additionally, a World Bank review of decentralisation in health care in the developing world admitted that there was no evidence that it had any benefit to access and provision (McGregor, 2001), so it could be called into question why this mode of governance is continually pursued.

Proponents of water privatisation had a series of arguments against state provision of water, such as a lack of finance, inefficient management and political interests, and in some cases, corruption, inhibiting improvement in water systems (Bakker, 2010; Budds and McGranahan, 2003; Robinson, 2004). Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Guy (2007) also note that states in Africa especially (and in some areas of Latin America and Asia) have been blamed for over-bureaucratisation of water provision and subsequent inefficiency. Fundamentally, one of the key ways in which privatisation seemed such an attractive prospect is through the ‘pro-poor’ values it seemingly provided.
It has been argued that state provision is problematic for the lower classes, as it is the wealthier, planned areas that receive subsidised water whereas the lower-class informal settlements often are completely underserviced (Bakker, 2010). Neoliberal propagators believe that private provision would alleviate this inequality, providing water to all areas at equal prices. However, Budds and McGranahan (2003) refute this, arguing that large private water companies have showed little interest in extending provision to these underserved areas. As poorer residents have the least capital available to pay for water on a regular basis, they end up paying higher prices in order to gain ad hoc access to the resource if and when they are able to afford to do so (McGranahan, 2002).

Another issue that impacts upon water provision is the nature of how it is provided. As water systems are said to be ‘natural monopolies’ (Bayliss, 2003; Budds and McGranahan, 2003) it is suggested that it is more cost effective for one provider (be it a government or a private company) to be in charge. This means that prices and provision can be altered by the provider without consequence, as there is no element of competition that means that people will stop using their water. This also, in the case of private companies, allows them to gain more profits from the service that they provide. Additionally, whilst foreign investors were crucial to provide the capital to improve Global South water systems, the number of countries privatising their water systems at the same time created problems as they competed to attract foreign investment (Bayliss, 2003). Paradoxically, granting provision rights to one sole private company removes any element of competition from their work, allowing them to charge high prices and invest profits elsewhere (Loftus and McDonald, 2001), undermining one of the key arguments for privatisation of water.

The public-private dichotomy of water provision is nonetheless fraught with confusion, with Hall and Lobina (2005) and Prasad (2006) both stating that research has been inconclusive as to whether public or private provision is the best option. In terms of monopoly markets, Budds and McGranahan (2003) have also argued that both public and private monopolies can lead to a number of issues in terms of regulation and provision. It is therefore useful to look at
specific examples of the water privatisation to develop an understanding of the reasons for whether these projects were successful or not. Bayliss (2003) argues that privatisation is unable to generate the capital required to make a significant improvement to a country’s water system, and does not address some of the nuanced issues in place such as the inability of a section of the population to afford their water bills. Other examples cited by Budds and McGranahan (2003) include the impacts of privatisation in Colombia, Peru and Cote d’Ivoire, where lower income settlements were left out of the remit of provision by private companies, and did not improve on the coverage that the previous state-controlled provision had been criticised for. Furthermore, Yeboah (2006) discusses at length the issues faced in Ghana when the water was placed under private provision, whereby access in lower income areas worsened and led to resistance from the people most affected by the privatisation of water. The failure of the privatisation initiative of the international financial institutions can be mostly attributed to one key paradox, that it is difficult to attract investment from efficient companies to a low income environment where the potential for profit margins is limited from the outset (Bayliss, 2003). Negative outcomes from the privatisation of water extend beyond economics also, as post-privatisation price hikes and service disconnections in Kwagulu-Natal in South Africa forced the poorest residents to access water from a polluted river, resulting in a cholera outbreak that killed hundreds and infected thousands (Bond, from Roberts, 2008).

However, this is not the case everywhere. Cocq and McDonald’s (2010) research into the privatisation of water in Havana, Cuba, revealed that the experiences of residents had been rather positive. Although initial questions were raised as to why a country with such a strong commitment to socialism would adopt such an inherently neoliberal framework for water provision, Cocq and McDonald concluded that in this instance, water privatisation in Havana had been successful, as the state made a point of creating a close working relationship with the private company involved, leading to a strong regulatory capacity and assurance that the affected population were receiving an adequate supply of water. As the Cuban state had worked with the private company in question
previously, this allowed for a fluid, co-operative contract to be drawn up without rigid parameters. Conversely, Cocq and McDonald (2010:10) describe Cuba as still “essentially a socialist state” which may indicate why the state has an atypical involvement in the work of the private company, and explains why this example could be considered somewhat of an anomaly. The success is perhaps also attributed to the way the private company marketed itself to the Cuban state; by highlighting that it had knowledge of water provision that the state did not possess. Furthermore, whilst private contractors have been critiqued for not venturing into areas that do not appear to be lucrative business ventures for them (Budds and McGranahan, 2003), it appears that in this instance the private company did take a financial risk where other companies would not. However, it must be considered as to whether a similar situation would occur in a fully marketised economy, so the context of this privatisation ‘success’ must be noted. Indeed, it is important to note that if private actors are able to offer expertise that could genuinely benefit an area’s water provision then they may be the most beneficial option for residents living there.

Bayliss (2003) discusses the mixed experiences of water privatisation across Africa, concluding that the successes or failures of individual privatisation strategies in many instances reflect the broader economic climate of the country itself. Guinea’s water sector was facing significant difficulty before privatisation, which undoubtedly inhibited its success. Conversely, Gabon and Senegal’s water systems were performing well when they became privatised, yet this indicates how the international financial institutions were using privatisation to exert influence as opposed to a solution to those unable to provide their populations with water.

Indeed, it is impossible to consider the specific experiences of successful or unsuccessful water privatisation without considering the Cochabamba Water War in Bolivia. Latin America privatised water and sanitation more than anywhere else in the world (Budds and McGranahan, 2003), and although initially described as a “star reformer” that implemented some of the most significant structural adjustment on the continent (Spronk, 2007:9) by the late
1990s, widespread opposition to neoliberalism on the whole in Bolivia was a key aspect of the Bolivian people overthrowing the private contractor there (Kohl, 2006). One of the central facets of the privatisation of Bolivia’s water that sparked unrest was the fact that community based water that had been implemented and funded by the communities themselves was taken under the remit of the private contractor and thus taken away from the communities' ownership (Spronk, 2007). Acting as a wholesale marketisation of a natural resource, and those who had worked within the “structures provided” (Yeboah, 2006:61) had instead become very much a part of the hegemonic neoliberal structure, and residents began to be charged for water from their own wells (Spronk, 2007). This was an explicit and unjust removal of power by the private company, and coupled with tariff increases of 200% (Budds and McGranahan, 2003) led to the street protests that began in April 2000.

However, the resistance by the Bolivian people against the private company was not fully successful. In 2006, six years after the ‘Water War’, connection rates were less than 50% (Bakker, 2010). Returning control of the water sector to the state resulted in the debts that were previously wiped out by the private company being returned to the Bolivian government (Spronk, 2007) and an explicit divide between those living in wealthy areas who are provided with subsidised water and those living in lower income areas who must come up with both labour and financial resources in order to access water.

Whilst anti-privatisation activists herald the Bolivian Water War as a key example of how community can triumph over private power (Bakker, 2010), this line of thought fails to consider the elements of private provision that caused the unrest in the first place. Although indeed, community water sources were transferred to the control of a private company, there does not appear to be an indication that this situation has been rectified, or that those outwith the remit of the municipal water system have been accounted for. The market mechanisms prevalent as a result of neoliberal discourse still appear to perpetuate in Bolivia, which community resistance was unable to fully defeat. In a situation where water provision has been transferred back to centralised state control, it could
be argued that this is no better an alternative than placing water provision under the role of a private company. Conversely, recent debates on the remunicipalisation of water has examined the ability of municipal organisations in water provision in response to failed attempts at privatisation. Described by McDonald (2012) as the transfer of ownership of water resources from the private sector to municipal institutions, Hoedeman et al (2012) argue that recent successes of remunicipalisation across the globe can be attributed to more than just a transfer from private to public provision, but additionally a renewed form of water governance that includes increased transparency and accountability. It could be suggested that improvements to water provision are not simply a dichotomised argument for market-led or state-led provision, but in fact call for a complete reconceptualization of the ways in which water is managed and provided, in alignment with contemporary understandings and requirements of the resource.

2.6 The ‘other’ private sector – informal markets and their importance in the Global South

There is a danger that discussing private sector water provision indicates that this is only in reference to global water companies taking over a water system previously under the control of a nation-state, and ignores the complexity of water governance in the developing world and the multiple ways in which people access water (Bakker, 2010) (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). However, in the Global South, where cities are rapidly expanding and the infrastructure of the municipal water system often does not serve unplanned or peri-urban settlements, residents have to look to alternative means in order to access water. Thus, by considering the ‘other’ private sector (Kjellen, 2000) (Solo, 1999), the messy and complex system of water governance and informal provision must be discussed.

In a number of countries in the Global South, small-scale provision of water by informal sources such as water vendors, tanker trucks and selling between neighbours has long been established (Agyeman, 2007). Spronk (2007) notes
that there used to be a general belief that this sector would eventually disappear as countries became more economically developed, but the sector has since gained legitimacy, now growing faster than the ‘official’ provider in Asia and Latin America (Solo, 1999). As an informal response to the ‘formal’ service vacuum (Kjellen, 2000) existing outwith the framework of structural adjustment and other policies driven by the international financial institutions, the flexibility of these providers has been a necessary component of many residents’ means of accessing water. These small-scale providers are lauded for a number of reasons; they require no external funding, are financially sustainable and are not biased in terms of income levels or legality of tenure when providing to customers (Solo, 1999). Additionally, although not generally viewed as an ‘official’ provider, they align with the growing neoliberal discourse of water as an economic good as they do not waste water (Solo, 1999) and treat it as a product to be bought and sold on for a profit.

The ways in which these small-scale providers have managed to provide a means of access to water for unserved areas is a clear example of seeking alternative means of survival under the hegemony of neoliberal governance. As noted by Yeboah (2006:61), with reference to research in Ghana, residents “operated within the structures provided to come up with solutions to [their] water problems”. These providers work within the (market) system to provide and sell water to those who do not have a connection to the main water system. As the reasons that people are not connected to the system are due to a lack of coverage in their area, or that the household cannot afford the exorbitant costs to install a connection, these small-scale providers are attempting to provide water to those without. Nonetheless, the ubiquity of market-led thinking is evident here, as these small-scale providers also make a profit from their services.

The issues of pricing and profit made by these small-scale providers are nonetheless contentious. Mashauri and Katko (from Kjellen, 2000) critique these informal sellers for their high prices, arguing that the costs that they amass whilst collecting the water are minimal compared to the prices that they charge. However, Solo (1999) noted that in the developing world informal water
providers determine their prices depending on the distance that they travel and the number of alternative sources available, whilst Kjellen’s (2000) research into informal water provision in Dar es Salaam described the physical exertion that this group must do in order to transport water, and that it is a means of income for many young men. These aspects provide a partial explanation for the logic of pricing by small-scale providers, although does not excuse the fact that they are often much higher than the municipal system. Conversely, although arguably the intention for neoliberal critics would be to provide a lower price for the water provided to the working classes, the complexity of water governance in many Global South contexts means that it is often the working classes selling the water also (Spronk, 2007). Lowering prices would result in lower incomes for these individuals, indicating how the neoliberalisation of water is more than an increase in privately owned providers, but the rules of the market that exist within these networks. As noted by Swyngedouw;

“Supplying water therefore becomes a means to achieve economic objectives: capital accumulation and profit maximisation.” (Swyngedouw, 2005:93)

Water risks losing its social or cultural meaning, or as noted previously, any environmental value when continually valued as an economic good. The introduction of market logic into providing a vital resource has undermined previous cultural understandings of it, resulting in a capitalist agenda always taking priority. Bakker (2002) refers to this as “mercantilización”, whereby the change in neoliberalised water governance is not an abrupt change from public to private control, but instead what Bakker describes as “an organisational and/or institutional shift along a continuum or water-management options towards the market and private corporations and away from the state” (Bakker:2002:769)

High prices could be considered additionally problematic as often these providers are selling water to those who live in low income areas and subsequently are the ones facing the highest prices. Smets (from Prasad, 2006)
states that in Mexico, the upper classes pay 0.8% of their income for water whereas the poorest pay 5.2%. Furthermore, Kjellen (2000) found that in Tanzania, households resold water for more than four times what the municipal system charged. This aligns with what Dill (2009) notes is a choice between having expensive water or no water at all, and questions the impact of this supposed resistance to neoliberalism if those living marginally within a market-led system are still paying exorbitant prices as a means of survival. Friedrich Engel’s nineteenth century commentary that “water pipes are laid where people can pay for the service” (Swyngedouw, 2005:84) shows how history is repeating itself and that the same sections of society remain a priority when implementing a municipal water system.

The fact that residents in lower-income areas are willing to pay high prices to access water has led to the belief by some scholars that if a service is provided, residents are willing to pay for it irrespective of price. (Bayliss, 2003; Budds and McGranahan, 2003). This type of research can be incredibly problematic however, as it implies that these groups have a choice, and that there are not wider, economic processes involved also. Another critique that can be made of this body of literature is that, once again returning to the idea that the private sector can extend provision to the previously “untapped market” (Budds and McGranahan, 2003) that a state-owned water system did not provide coverage for, seeing these residents as a group of potential consumers ignores the myriad difficulties faced living in the Global South. Whilst residents may in some instances be able to afford expensive water (provided to their door by a vendor, for example), this does not mean that this does not take funding away from other expenditures such as healthcare, transport or education, or that this amount of money spend on water is a regular occurrence.

As small scale and informal providers of water in the Global South gain increasing prominence in local water governance, their future role in water access must be considered. To return to ideas of water provision existing as a monopoly, there are generally restrictions on entering the sector, which means that these providers are often considered illegal (Solo, 1999). Furthermore, the
flexibility of these providers means that even if they are operating within a supposed ‘monopoly’, they can introduce competition into the market in terms of price and quality (Ahlers et al, 2013). Spronk (2007) noted that those within the informal economy are extremely vulnerable workers with no contract or welfare provision. As a means to combat this there have been discussions over whether formalising these small-scale providers would help alleviate these issues. Aligning with pro-formalisation arguments of Hernando de Soto and once again, a discourse propagated by the World Bank (Ahlers et al, 2010), there is the belief that formalisation will not only protect those employed informally but improve regulation also (Matsinhe et al, 2008).

However, there are also social impacts related to formalisation, in a context where residents have been continually disappointed by formal water provision and do not have a great deal of trust in it. Ruano et al (2011) noted that in Guatemala, once an informal community based water group became legally recognised by the state the community lost trust in it, believing their practices to reflect the supposed issues of corruption synonymous with state provision. There is a possibility that residents choose informal sources of water simply because they know that they are separate from the official provider, and the formalisation of small-scale providers could potentially alter the choreographies of water governance significantly. Whilst Matsinhe et al (2008) believe that formalisation of these groups is necessary, there is the risk that the flexibility and autonomy over their own prices will be removed if they become part of the ‘official’ system of water provision. These types of water provision would no longer act as a form of resilience within the broader economic climate, and will simply transfer their power back to the private company or state involved in the main water system.

The complex ways in which people access water in the developing world align with the idea that governance extends beyond just state provision and involves a multitude of stakeholders. It is necessary to be cautious of attributing this wholly

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5 Using Katz’s categories of resistance, reworking and resilience, whereby resilience is a means of survival by individuals or groups that does not significantly alter the broader environment that these individuals or groups are living in (Katz, 2004).
to the growth of neoliberalism as the infrastructure used to provide water had not kept up with population growth before the introduction of structural adjustment, privatisation and deregulation, and thus methods of informal provision must have been called upon for a number of years previous to this market-led paradigm shift. Nonetheless, Graham and Marvin (from Bakker, 2010) directly attribute the fragmentation of utility provision to economic projects (such as neoliberalism) changing the way cities in particular are governed and how services are provided. They especially note that as national debt increases, states are unable to extend service provision, which is perhaps an indication of why these informal methods of provision continue to grow and water governance becomes increasingly complex.

The aforementioned discussion surrounding ideas of self-governance become relevant once again here, as there is evidence to suggest that an individual or community’s access is largely based upon their personal ability to source a means to acquire water, and to raise the personal capital to be able to afford it. The distinction between providing governance and being governed (Ong, 2006) (Isin, from Phillips and Iican, 2011) becomes blurred in a situation where residents must draw upon their individual or community capacity to access water, yet nonetheless are subject to the infrastructure and distribution of the local municipal system, and in a more abstract sense, the fluctuations of the market. Ong’s definition of “neoliberalism with a small ‘n’” (2007:4) as a means of governing supposed “free subjects” shows how neoliberalism is able to exert influence over those who believe they are acting on the basis of their own agency. Neoliberalised water has created messy and complex hybrid systems of governance across a number of different contexts, as a product of specific social and historical trajectories. Acknowledging this, and neoliberalism’s more general abilities at mutating to suit specific discourses, the impact of the marketisation of the water sector in Tanzania will be discussed in this thesis.

2.7 Conceptions of crisis; economic crisis, the global water crisis, narratives and realities
The origins and history of neoliberalism have been explored in depth in this chapter, as well as its mutations over time and to fit specific geographical contexts. More recent literature has questioned the future of neoliberalism in light of a global recession and the volatility of a free-market society having been exposed;

“While previous crises of the neoliberal era, such as the wave of debt defaults across Latin America and the Asian financial collapse, may have been (problematically) “managed” by way of a series of midcourse adjustments in neoliberal governance, discourse, and strategy, the current crisis threatens, perhaps fatally, to undermine the political legitimacy of neoliberalism” (Peck et al, 2009:95)

However, it is unclear from Peck et al’s (2009) argument where the future of neoliberalism in an African and in particular a Tanzanian context, lies, and if the idea of the economic ideology in crisis is as evident within this locale. Investigation into water poverty or issues in water governance and the Global South immediately becomes embroiled in discussions of a “global water crisis” (Mosse, 2008a:939) to describe those without potable water across the globe. However, it must be called into question what these supposed definitions of ‘crisis’ mean. Whilst Peck et al (2009) describe the last three moments of ‘crisis’ for neoliberalism as predicted, the global water ‘crisis’ is instead generally referred to as an endemic problem that requires urgent attention, and in the case of development organisations, immediate financial support. Henrik Vigh provides an alternative understanding of crisis, problematising its definitions and use in contemporary discourse;

“When we look a bit closer into the phenomenon of crisis it becomes clear that conflict, violence, and abject poverty can become so embedded in the social fabric that they become indistinguishable from it (Das, 2006:80) making crisis chronic and forcing people to make lives in fragmented and volatile worlds rather than waiting for normalisation and reconfiguration.” (Vigh, 2008:8)
Peck et al’s (2009) discussions of neoliberalism align with this, as they question how such a dominant economic system can be truly considered in crisis, as it is so firmly embedded in the global financial structure. Additionally, the issues faced in accessing water services in Tanzania act as a clear example of Vigh’s understanding of crisis. The growing informal sector in Tanzania, and other Global South countries, indicates how residents have been “forced to make lives” in a situation where potable water is not readily available. Kjellen’s (2000:145) research into water vendors in Dar es Salaam concluded that “the reliance on vendors can also be a sign of relative deprivation and exclusion from the often higher quality piped-supply systems”. The increasing legitimacy of this sector and the intentions of governments to bring this into formal policy also dismantle understandings of normality, when it could be argued that a response to crisis has become an embedded practice.

However, ideas of a ‘crisis moment’ (Peck et al, 2009) become inappropriate when a crisis has become part of a social structure, and is so endemic it is difficult to separate from a ‘pre-crisis’ state. In Tanzania, there is no clear definable moment where the population had a plentiful amount of potable water, explaining the need for Vigh’s (2006a) definition of “crisis as context”. Furthermore, Vigh raises an interesting point about cultural nuances and related conceptions of crisis;

“For most of us crisis is an experience of temporary abnormality primarily related to traumatic events such as violence, disease or bereavement. We experience crisis when a traumatic event fragments the coherence or unity of our lives, which we otherwise take for granted, leaving us to reconfigure the pieces before we normalise our social being and once again go about our lives.” (Vigh, 2008:7)

Whether intentionally or not, Vigh’s use of ‘we’ indicates a knowledge situated within Global North discourse, reinforcing the use of the term to indicate a ‘moment’ (Peck et al, 2009) of unrest. Aforementioned discussions of embedded
crisis situations do not fit this model however, and it can be called into question how useful this terminology is when used in Global South contexts.

Huitema et al (2011) deconstruct ideas of a crisis related to water, explaining that governance responses to a flood or other natural disaster cannot be placed in the same category as those to an economic or financial crisis. They argue that crisis can be exploited to issue governance transitions, particularly those related to neoliberal values such as the privatisation of state assets. Peck et al (2009) correctly notes that neoliberalism requires crisis to survive, as at times of financial or economic crisis global financial institutions are able to capitalise on this by insisting that affected countries adopt their policy frameworks (Huitema et al, 2011). This offers an opportunity for a "parallax movement" (Zizek, from Ioris, 2012) of policy to take place whereby it is continually updated to improve upon the previous document without any significant change. Governance-through-crisis creates an environment where piecemeal changes in policy are welcomed, with no measurable results occurring.

The previously held belief that the informal water sector would eventually disappear (Spronk, 2007) indicates that it was viewed as a means of crisis response, as a short term coping mechanism until Global South countries caught up and developed in such a way that allowed them to extend the coverage of municipal systems. However, the continuing growth of informal water provision can allow two alternative conclusions to be drawn; firstly, that crisis has worsened, putting more residents into the situation where they must self-govern and adapt their own behaviour to access water, or secondly, that informal, flexible and localised means of water provision suit the needs of those living in the Global South best, and that a consistent mandate from global financial institutions to extend the monopoly provision of a centralised system is not appropriate for these specific social and cultural contexts. Willingness-to-pay literature provides some level of justification for high prices faced by residents, and ignores larger budgetary issues faced within households, whilst neoliberal discourse views citizens-as-customers, detracting from humanitarian concerns
about water access to simply viewing the provision of water as a business transaction.

Ioris states that;

“The water sector has become entrapped in a vicious circle or social exclusion, passive governmental responses and fresh opportunities for a new round of demagogy and populism.” (Ioris, 2012:276)

Arguably, it could be suggested that ideas of a water crisis have been used in Global North rhetoric to justify the pressure placed on developing countries to privatise state assets, when in reality systems that have been generated at the grassroots level are materialising as the most successful. Crucially, this argument does not intend to be reductive of the struggles faced by Global South residents in both acquiring and affording potable water, but wishes to elucidate that Global North based conceptions of crisis and subsequent responses are perhaps not always appropriate.

2.8 Conclusion

Whether neoliberalism is understood as a theoretical concept or a political project to reconfigure power, markets and governance (Harvey, 2005), it is important to continue to be critical of how these ideas materialise in many different cultures; of which a specific attention to the Global South has been discussed here. It is important to consider Peck’s (2010:7) continued argument that “neoliberalism has only ever existed in ‘impure’ form”, and that there is no clear-cut example of this global economic framework. As such, analysis of its manifestations must consider its mutating forms and the adaptable nature of this ideology. Considering both ‘official’ private provision and more informal types of private provision has provided a useful framework in which to view the impacts of neoliberalism on water governance in the Global South. Nonetheless, simply explaining the ways in which water is accessed in these areas neglects to
consider the issues faced by those living in lower-income, unserviced areas who perhaps cannot afford the water that is essential for their survival.

To return to the ideas of Duménil and Lévy (2005) and Harvey (2005), that neoliberalism was simply a transfer of power from the middle and working classes to the elites, there are clear parallels between these ideas and the lived experiences of those trying to access water in the developing world. The lower classes have been left powerless by the transfer of water to the private sector. In Bolivia, community-owned water pumps were placed under the jurisdiction of the private provider. In the Global South, the lower classes can often pay up to thirty five times what the wealthy pay (Solo, 1999). Admittedly, states have been unable to keep up with growing populations and rapidly expanding cities, but it could be argued that the international financial institutions capitalised on this and forced them to privatise their assets, leaving them without a choice but to involve the private sector in their water provision. Cocq and McDonald (2010:39) rightly state that “water reforms are therefore one piece of a much larger puzzle” as each country’s move towards market-based ideals is undoubtedly a decision based upon broader discourses imposed by the international financial institutions.

There is little indication that support for private sector involvement in water provision will decrease in the immediate future. Ahlers et al (2013) state that its key advocates have yet to change their stance, the only significant change being that small-scale providers are now being considered as legitimate as the larger institutions that provide water, although the previously discussed issues of formalisation of this type of water provision make this remain a contentious issue. Nonetheless, it is clear that privatisation has not been a panacea for inefficient water provision (Bayliss, 2002), and there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that in countries that have taken part in a neoliberalisation of their economies, most residents have seen their standards of living fall (Kohl, 2006). Additionally, proponents of privatisation’s arguments are not based on evidence from the water and sanitation sector (Budds and McGranahan, 2003), so it is
unclear as to why private sector participation was vociferously advocated in so many countries.

With water being a natural resource and part of the physical environment, water governance is a unique issue, and should not be taken as all-encompassing of neoliberal governance in the Global South. Governance failure is more than simply a result of economic relations, and can be affected by ecological and social impacts also (Bakker, 2010) (Ioris, 2012). As well as this, there are numerous health implications involved in the different sources of water available (Reweta and Sampath, 2000), so access to water may be affected by more than just price and the fluctuations of the market. Nonetheless, water governance in the developing world is complex and ever changing. Through discussions of both the formal and informal ways in which private sector participation has affected water governance an attempt has been made to explain the varying methods of provision, and the impacts faced at the grassroots level as a potential result of neoliberal policy.

The effects of neoliberal governance in terms of water provision and its subsequent privatisation are evident. Tanzania’s move to privatisate water as a result of a World Bank ultimatum is indicative of the vicious circle that many countries in the Global South have found themselves in, as the increasing influence of global markets and the decision to move power away from the state meant that in many cases national governments were faced with no option but to privatisate state assets in order to survive. Whilst examples such as the resistance to water privatisation in Bolivia are not wholly positive, these are examples of the ways in which residents access water in the Global South that tell a different story, involving formal provision. Taking myriad definitions of ‘crisis’ into account, day-to-day coping mechanisms that have become embedded in Global South discourses can partially be seen as a response to a crisis of a lack of water, but in turn can problematise notions of crisis when a response has been in place for some time. This raises the question of whether descriptions of water access in the Global South truly exist in a state of crisis, or this is simply a construct used to make sense of a situation that rarely occurs in the Global North.
Chapter 3: NGOs and the Role of Development Organisations in the Global South

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grassroots organisations in the current development framework, examining their growth and transformation into an integral part of Global South governance. The post-Cold War development discourse followed by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies was that of the “New Policy Agenda” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:961) which placed importance upon the role of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and grassroots organisations. Since the 1980s those referred to as either NGOs, private voluntary organisations, and non-profit organisations (Vakil, 1997) had mandates which were described as “nongovernmental (private), tax-exempt, non-profit agencies engaged in overseas provision of services for relief and development purposes” (Gorman, from Vakil, 1997:2058). Additionally, Fisher (1997) explains that discussion around NGOs uses a number of key terms, such as “participation, empowerment, local and community” (Fisher, 1997:442). The size of the NGO sector has since expanded to align with neoliberal economic policy and the increase in funding available for their activities, and they have since been charged with the tasks of “poverty alleviation, social welfare and the development of civil society” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:961).

In order to examine the complexity of contemporary water governance in Tanzania, this chapter explores literature on participatory development and the increasingly popularity of NGOs in service provision in the Global South. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Post-Washington Consensus exists as a departure from the neoliberal derision of the state, and recognises the role that governments have to play in a country’s economic development. Thus, NGOs exist as a gap between the state and the market, playing a pivotal role in the reconfiguration of governance in contemporary society (Cameron, 2000). Through examining the ways in which NGOs work across a growing suite of
activities in Global South regions, as well as the challenges they face in doing so, the following discussion aims to address the power relations that exist in this sector. The internal dynamics of these organisations will be discussed, as well as how different organisations working towards the same goals interact, and the impact this has on the local communities surrounding them. Alongside this, the chapter considers the impacts of external influences on the NGO sector, and the conflicts that can occur as a result of local needs versus international donor motivations. Taking into account Briggs and Sharp’s (2004:662) view that ‘development experts’ from the West are brought in to analyse a development problem and offer a solution’, this chapter assesses the impact of Western economic thought and development rhetoric on grassroots-based agendas.

NGOs can vary in size, mandate and capacity, and as such, the term can be used to refer to a wide range of organisations. Cameron attempted to define NGOs;

“The NGO idealised position is as a pure civil society institution negotiating with both market and state agents to ensure the sustainability of those civil society institutions most conducive to increasing the certainty of livelihoods for the most vulnerable.” (Cameron, 2000:632)

A similar viewpoint will be used in reference to NGOs in this chapter, whilst keeping in mind that a variety of different organisations also refer to themselves as NGOs as they oscillate around this fluid definition. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the discourses that supported the rise of NGOs, including the role of the community in local activity and the impact of participatory development. The chapter continues by exploring some of the key terms discussed by Fisher (1997), before detailing the historical trajectory of NGOs and subsequently, the current challenges that they face. The chapter concludes with some theoretical examination of North-South development relationships, taking into account the power relations inherently related to this topic, before linking the discussion in this chapter to the concept of crisis.
3.2 Decentralised governance, the role of the community and participatory Development

Accompanying the so-called ‘rolling-back’ of the state that has occurred along with the rise of neoliberalism, also evident is the increasing prevalence of the discourse of participatory development. The idea of participatory development originated within the NGO community, but was written into the plans of international development agencies and governments in the 1990s (Williams, 2004). Reflecting a changing policy discourse, the belief of the time aimed towards destabilising hierarchies that impeded development and transferring ownership of projects to communities that would be most affected by them. Drabek (1987), referring to the World Overseas Development Institute Symposium in 1986, notes how the main theme of the symposium called for a paradigm shift in relationships between Northern and Southern NGOs. There was a call for more of an equal partnership between these organisations, in an attempt to alleviate previous issues of dependency and lack of trust. Combined with the rise of the Post-Washington Consensus, the move towards development that originated at the grassroots level was adopted fully by the International Financial institutions, and adapted so that it became embedded within their wider neoliberal project (Townsend et al, 2004).

Simply put, participatory development means involving communities in the implementation of development projects that will affect their local areas (Clark, 1995), allowing them to act as “producers as well as consumers of knowledge” (Drabek, 1987:xii). Participation implies the idea that impoverished communities can play a role in their own development (Wallace, 2004). The core belief by its propagators is that participation by local communities increases transparency and accountability in the activity by donor organisations, as well as empowering the communities and individuals involved (Kang, 2011). In addition, citizenship is said to be strengthened by participatory methods of development, through the expectation that they would increase the capacity of local groups to hold the state accountable for their rights as citizens (Hickey, 2002).
Chambers (1994) believes that instead of top-down imposed development projects, an increased level of participation by local people in their own development would dismantle pre-existing power structures. Endeavouring to dismantle hierarchical power relations and inclusion of the communities affected, Chambers and other supporters of participatory development believed that this was the paradigm shift required for development policy. At a basic level, participatory development is said to create inclusive spaces for marginalised groups to express opinions and to have more influence over local activity (Cornwall, 2003). Chambers (1994) describes the ways in which the use of participatory research methods in rural settings (described under the title of Participatory Rural Appraisal) have enabled rural residents to express their knowledge of their lives as well as provide reflective analysis of the information they provide. Those who advocated participatory forms of development and the empowerment of communities were motivated by a variety of theoretical reasons. Through participatory diagramming, mapping and modelling, amongst other methods, rural residents were able to take ownership of the research process and in turn provide a more holistic and rich set of data to the researchers involved.

Williams describes the three main critiques of this mindset;

“Participatory development today stands accused of three interrelated failings; of emphasising personal reform over political struggle, of obscuring local power differences by uncritically celebrating ‘the community’, and of using a language of emancipation to incorporate marginalised populations of the Global South within an unreconstructed project of capitalist modernisation” (Williams, 2004:558)

However, there has been a significant amount of literature that criticises participation both for its ethos and the ways it is implemented. Kothari (2001) provides the key argument that by bringing local people into development activity they become so embedded within the process they are unable to
objectively critique the unequal structures that in many cases created their problematic situation in the first instance. Despite this, some literature, such as Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Kesby (2005) argue that, for all its issues, participatory development practices have provided a platform for marginalised groups to acquire knowledge on their rights, enabling them for future advocacy (Walker et al, 2007).

As noted in Chapter 2, one of the key tenets of neoliberal ideology is that of decentralised governance, and the reification of community. Gibson-Graham (2006:166) commented that community as a concept is an “unmapped and uncertain terrain”, yet there is an increasing body of literature that has assessed relationships within communities in a number of ways. This section expands upon previous discussion of decentralised governance and the role of the community and participatory development in contemporary development practice.

The emphasis on the community within the development sector has been critiqued by Cleaver (2001), who states that there is a widespread belief amongst development practitioners in support of participatory development that communities are “capable of anything” (Cleaver, 2001:46), which is often not the case. Williams (2004) expands on this, problematising the ways in which communities in the Global South are often viewed as uniform social structures by the development sector, and how in some instances the development sector’s instance on working with communities leads to arbitrary divisions of space that bear no reflection on the lived realities of the affected individuals. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that whilst participation is heralded for its inclusiveness, it can actually have a detrimental effect on the gender relations in certain locales, further marginalising the role of women (Agarwal, 2001, Cornwall, 2003). Cornwall (2003) explains that many participatory projects continue to support the status quo in which women have a limited role in community activities, and it is only the voices of men who determine the direction of community-based projects. Agarwal (2001) alludes to this using data from research in India, using the sample of community forestry management
where women were generally not represented at planning committees and the results of meetings not passed on to them, and women in the community continuing to play an implementation role even as part of a participatory project.

It is clear that these critiques are relevant to the situation in Tanzania. Whilst Tungaraza (1993) stated that within Tanzania, kinship and social networks within communities are strong, it could be argued that this does not mean that states should completely withdraw from the provision of services. Whilst established community relationships may be evident, they often do not possess the capacity to deal with issues such as poor infrastructure or electricity shortages, aligning with Cleaver’s (2001) point about the misunderstood capabilities of communities. Williams (2004) also importantly notes that with the greater involvement of local individuals, supposed failures of development projects can be blamed upon these groups, devolving responsibility from international or donor organisations. Nonetheless, with the increasing prevalence of NGOs and subsequently, the responsibilities places upon them by retreating states, participatory development seems like it will be part of the contemporary development framework for some time. With this devolved responsibility to local communities and actors, comes a reconfiguration of governance and an emphasis on what can be achieved at the grassroots level beyond the state. As such, this chapter goes on to discuss the growing number of these types of organisations, and the impact that it has had on governance and access to services for communities affected.

### 3.3 The rise of non-governmental organisations

The ways in which decentralisation and changing social relations are most evident in the Global South is through the increasing influence of NGOs. Also generally situated within the community, NGOs align with the ethos of participatory development by avoiding hierarchical models of development. Harvey (2005:176) claims that by filling the gap left by the decreasing influence of the state, NGOs are simply another subtle way for neoliberal hegemony to influence governance, supporting the findings of McDonald (2010) and aligning
with Fine's (2002) scepticism of how contemporary social relations in the Global South are conceptualised. Described by Smith (2010) as a way of expanding and reinforcing neoliberal ideology, many of the arguments for their increasing prevalence in the developing world could be seen as an example of the rhetoric surrounding decentralised governance to other, sometimes locally based, organisations.

The role of NGOs in the Global South has changed dramatically since the preliminary organisations of the 1960s and 1970s (Mawdsley et al, 2005). Beginning as small, almost radical organisations, NGOs currently play a far more significant role in governance and service provision in the developing world, often working closely with the state or simply acting as a supplementary level of governance, filling the so-called gaps left by many states in the Global South. As such, as NGOs have grown both in size and in number, and as the world becomes increasingly globalised, a new type of politics has emerged surrounding these organisations, both internally and amongst the groups that they work with.

The early NGOs of the 1960s and 1970s often originated from social movements that existed in opposition to the state (Mawdsley et al, 2005). They were fundamentally grassroots oriented, and any relationship they had with their Northern counterparts was “highly personal in nature” (Mawdsley et al, 2005:77). As a result of this, NGOs have often been “idealised as organisations through which people help others for reasons other than profit or politics” (Fisher, 1997:442), and are seen as organisations entirely separate from the state. However, during the 1980s and 1990s when neoliberalism was gaining increasing economic prominence, donors significantly increased funding to third sector organisations, dramatically increasing the number of these organisations in existence, and expanding their remits to service provision, advocacy and examination of policy (Mawdsley et al, 2005) (Kang, 2010). As a result, those such as Tvedt (from Mawdsley et al, 2005) and Wallace (2004) believe that this eroded the autonomy once held by NGOs, and instead made them merely another agent in the broader neoliberal project. International donor agencies and NGOs began to provide support to local NGOs for their pursuit of the New Policy
Agenda; a suite of policies largely based on neoliberal values (Fisher, 1997). The New Policy Agenda indicated that NGOs are the best means to provide services instead of the state.

As a way to empower and increase accountability and participation, the theory behind NGOs is that they would overcome previous failures in development policy. However, the word ‘theory’ is key here, as both Mkandawire (from Hearn 2007) and Edwards and Hulme (from Hearn, 1998) remark that the case for NGOs was indeed based on theoretical assumptions of the benefits of these organisations, and not based on empirical evidence. They argue that instead, the growth of NGOs aligned with the growing economic influence of neoliberalism. Nonetheless, any discussion of NGOs as new actors created to enforce the neoliberal paradigm should be held with caution, as there is a long history of NGOs providing health and education services in Africa and Asia, when states were unable to provide coverage themselves (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). It must be noted however, that these organisations originally provided these services by “default rather than design” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:961) whereas neoliberal development policy sees NGOs as the preferred means of service provision. In the 1980s, NGOs were closely linked with local popular movements and marginalised groups, whilst working alongside states to facilitate service provision (Molyneux, 2008). Whilst NGOs that originated at the grassroots level often began as informal organisations (Vakil, 1997), for some organisations there was an emphasis on formalisation and expansion so that these organisations could fulfil their increased responsibilities. This in turn increased the fluidity of the understanding of what an ‘NGO’ officially is, and at which levels and geographical scales the organisation operates. Kang (2010) discussed the variety of terms used to separate the different categories of NGOs, such as referring to more locally-based organisations as community-based organisations, whereas Northern NGOs refers to those with their base in Global North countries but operate internationally.
In terms of the marketplace, NGOs sit in a unique position, existing in a space said to be unaffected by national politics and market values (Smith, 2010) (Cameron, 2000). Controversially, Hearn (1998) instead states;

“On the economic side, NGOS are viewed as ‘market-based actors’ able to deliver social welfare services to poor people at a lower cost and higher standards or quality than the government.” (Hearn, 1998:89)

Furthermore, Leat (from Beckmann and Burja (2010) remarked that NGOs cannot be fully theorised if their political nature needs to be ignored, so the political and economic impact of their practices must be assessed to understand the impact of their existence in the Global South and as part of contemporary international development practice. In many cases, NGOs have taken over the role of the state in some areas such as service provision, altering the dynamics of governance in many countries. Hickey and Mohan (2005:244) refer to this as “the weakening of the ‘social contract’ between state and citizen”, which can undoubtedly have a fundamental impact on expectations of the state and how citizens relate to it.

The significant growth in NGOs’ influence over a relatively short space of time can be attributed to the context in which they carry out their work in. Nagar and Raju (2008:452) refer to their willingness to take on issues that are “politically and/or culturally so sensitive no government wants to touch them with a bargepole”, whereas Molyneux (2008:788) states that they are able to “[plug] some of the many gaps in existing provision. Moreover, Howes (1997:820) explains that the donors that largely fund NGO finances expect them to contribute to “the emergence of a stronger civil society.” This is a contentious issue however. Smith (2010) defines civil society as;

“Situated between the state and society, or as occupying the political space between the individual or household and the state.” (Smith, 2010:244)
Woods (2000) however critiques the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for using the terms ‘NGO’ and ‘civil society’ interchangeably when they have incredibly different meanings, explaining that civil society is the society over which a state governs, which may or may not contain organised groups but either way, is affected by government policy. NGOs on the other hand are described by Woods (2000) as organised groups, perhaps working in a particular sector and in turn potentially only representing the members of society impacted upon by that sector.

There are understandable merits to an increased role for NGOs in development in the Global South. Lawrence and Brun (2011) argue that as NGOs work at the grassroots level, they are far more equipped to understand the cultural, economic and political nuances of specific geographical locations and should therefore be able to provide support and services successfully. However, the rising presence of NGOs in the Global South has not been met without issues. Nagar and Raju (2008) suggest that NGOs are often being asked to perform roles beyond their remit. This leads to a complex relationship with the state and increased confusion with respect to accountability. Gugerty (2008) explains this paradox;

“On one hand, many governments viewed NGOs as competitors, fearing that funding for NGOs would crowd out funding for public services. Also, governments became increasingly reliant on NGOs for public service delivery and needed new ways to manage relationships with these organisations, particularly since many regulatory frameworks dated back to the colonial era and were inappropriate for current conditions.” (Gugerty, 2008:106)

This provides some insight as to how the role of NGOs can blur state-society relations, as whilst they may fill gaps in governance and provide services that the state cannot, this does not indicate whether this is now a permanent role of NGOs or a temporary fixture. This aligns with Cameron’s (2000:632) argument that the mission statements of NGOs often refer to them as being “superseded by
other institutions, grassroots and/or state and/or markets”. The international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also supported the increased responsibility on NGOs, lauding civil society as a productive space of economic, political and social development, and NGOs as the key part of this, correcting the failures of corrupt and inefficient states (Smith, 2010).

There was also the widely held belief across the development sector and international financial institutions that NGOs were more cost-effective at providing services than governments, which further enabled their infiltration of Global South governance. Edwards and Hulme (1996) cite the example of a sanitation project in Pakistan run by a larger NGO that was able to operate at the third of the cost than the private sector or the state. They also note that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that smaller organisations operate at any lower costs than the public sector. It must also be noted that the relationship between NGOs and states is somewhat paradoxical. Gugerty, (2008) explains that in some instances, governments saw themselves as in competition with local NGOs that would take the majority of donor funding for providing public services, whilst simultaneously not being able to provide these services without the help of NGOs (Gugerty, 2008).

The impacts of the increasing proliferation of NGOs have been discussed at length within academic literature. Their prevalence in many countries in the developing world has risen significantly since 1990. Reuben (from Hearn, 2007) notes than in 1990, there were forty one registered NGOs in Tanzania, yet by the year 2000 there were almost ten thousand of them. The sector was growing at such an overwhelming rate that in Tanzania that the government suspended the registration of any new NGOs in 1996 (Igoe, 2003). Replicating this growth, in Kenya there were five hundred NGOs in 1990, (Ndegawa, from Gugerty, 2008) and in 2004 there were over three thousand (NGO Council, from Gugerty, 2008). Interestingly, Smith’s (2010) research in Nigeria revealed that a number of NGOs were created solely on the basis that there was donor money available to do so, rather than for altruistic reasons. Smith (2010) argues that the money made
available by donors to establish and maintain local NGOs was instead used by individuals to improve their social and financial standing within the community.

It is pertinent to note that discussion of NGOs as subjects of discourse or monolithic organisations neglects to acknowledge the roles of the individuals employed by them. Indeed, Vakil (1997) discusses the variety of ways in which NGOs are structured in practice, and problematises trying to categorise them into distinct categories. The impact of individuals who are employed by or volunteer for NGOs could further differentiate these organisations from each other. Whilst NGOs as a cohort could be said to be no longer as critical as in previous decades, there is still a general assumption across the literature that employees do subscribe to a mindset of poverty reduction and increased participation by local people (Bebbington, 2005). Bebbington (2005) questions which broader structures must be in place that make it so difficult for well-meaning NGO employees to have any measurable impact. Some of the issues faced by NGO employees in their day to day practices will be discussed in the following section.

3.4 Contemporary NGO practices and challenges: autonomy and financial pressures

As participatory development discourse and the responsibilities transferred to NGOs have gained prominence, so have the number of issues that face NGOs in conducting their day to day activities. The NGO sector has become increasingly globalised, creating new connections between different organisations and expanding the levels of influence of the international, long-established ones. As the number of NGOs in existence in the Global South (and North) is constantly increasing, so too rises the pressure on potential funding sources for these smaller, localised organisations. In many cases, local NGOs are forced into partnership with international NGOs who can capitalise on the smaller organisations’ financial dependence on them to affect their practices and politics, which is problematic when establishing a partnership is almost necessary for smaller organisations to access funding (Porter, 2003).
Although smaller organisations are not forced against their will into entering partnerships with larger international NGOs, both Clark (1995) and Edwards and Hulme (1996) discuss the difficulties of existing independently without these donors, and that an NGO's preference for isolation (Clark, 1995) may impact on a smaller organisations ability to access funding and in turn, carry out projects. Additionally, being in partnership with an already established organisation can lead to more opportunities for future funding, yet can make things even more difficult for new and not yet established NGOs who have to comply with the needs of donor organisations as opposed to their own agendas (Barr et al, 2005).

As stated by Porter, donor partnerships;

“[are] promoting a pernicious form of clientalism, refocusing NGO effort upwards towards satisfying donor demands, rather than downwards to the poor.” (Porter, 2003:135)

With increased competition for funding, for many smaller organisations they must comply with donor conditions in order to maintain their funding, irrespective of whether they agree with the conditions imposed upon them or not (Dolinhow, 2005). The pressure to keep funding coming in begins to consume organisations, which then begin to lose sight of their other tasks. Dolinhow’s (2005) research into the colonias lived in by Mexican immigrants to the United States of America found that local NGOs had simply began to focus on short term projects with quick results as a result of donor pressure, and had lost sight of the larger structural changes that would have more of a long term benefit for the colonias. To return to Smith’s (2010) point that a number of Nigerian NGOs were created solely because donor funding available, this provides some explanation for the rapid growth of the sector and the change in

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6 Although typically a form of community located in Mexico, in Dolinhow's research the colonias discussed are situated in the United States of America, described as "any identifiable community in the US-Mexico border regions of Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas that is determined to be a colonia on the basis of objective criteria, including lack of a potable water supply, inadequate sewage systems, and a shortage of decent, safe and sanitary housing" (Dolinhow, 2005:560).
donor dynamics that has led to far less funding available for the number of organisations currently in existence.

Just as the international financial institutions helped facilitated global neoliberal governance, as the NGO sector has become more saturated market-led thinking has started to infiltrate their practices. As their presence grows in a variety of sectors in the Global South, their increasing competition for human and financial resources has resulted in what Power (from Mueller-Hirth, 2012:651) referred to in the 1990s as “the audit explosion”, whereby NGOs are increasingly required to spend time and resources on monitoring and evaluation exercises in order to secure funding for the future. Both Mueller-Hirth (2012) and Smith (2010) have remarked that this reconfigures NGO practice, both decreasing their agency and meaning that projects that please donors are given precedent.

Whilst NGOs previously had almost entire control of their programs and locations of their projects, even when using donor funding, increased competition for funding has meant that donors can now fund only the projects that they believe in, and have more of an input in NGOs day to day practices (Lawrence and Brun, 2011). Elbers and Arts (2011) cite an example where a Ghanaian NGO was given funds by its only donor to build ten hand-dug wells. However, local communities wanted boreholes constructed instead, which resulted in the NGO having to visit around fifty communities until they found some willing to accept these wells. Whilst it is unclear what the most appropriate approach for the community was in this instance, this is a clear example of Porter’s (2003:135) point about “donor fashion dominating local ideas”. The Ghanaian NGO’s leader admitted that yes, his actions were donor driven, but as the organisation had only one donor, simply surviving as an organisation and complying with the donor’s wishes had to be his main priority.

Wallace (2004) describes at length the changing ways in which the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) has awarded funding to smaller organisations. He argues that DFID changed the scope of its funding to allocate more money to projects that aligned with DFID’s own
objectives, and less to the Joint Funding Scheme which provided grants to organisations with organic project proposals. With DFID’s funds only available to its self-determined priority countries and themes, grassroots NGOs are no longer able to come up with project plans by themselves. The awarding of grants has lost its holistic nature, with one organisation who proposed work in politically unstable South Sudan receiving a grant rejection from DFID because they had not included anything about “poor people claiming their rights” (Wallace, 2004:206), even although this was not appropriate in the context of the project the organisation was attempting to propose. There are also examples of organisations including fashionable terms in their project proposals whether relevant to the project or not, simply to increase their chances of funding. Elbers and Arts (2011) cite the example of organisations in Ghana adding in gender or HIV/AIDS aspects to the projects under the direction of donors but in many situations did not understand how these themes related to the projects these organisations had requested funding for. Additionally, Igoe (2003) discusses how donors encouraged pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania to “scale up their operations and diversify their activities” (Igoe, 2003:874). By trying to persuade NGOs to replicate the practices of the private sector, these actions by donors indicate the widespread prevalence of market-led thinking across the NGO sector, and how the neoliberal values of the international financial institutions has been able to permeate all levels of the development industry.

Examples such as this call into question the viewpoint held by Lawrence and Brun (2011) that one of the benefits of NGOs is their understanding of the cultural specificities of the areas they work in, as examples suggest that pressure from external donors is potentially restricting the use of this knowledge. As well as this, although embedded within their own localities, NGOs are increasingly employing individuals from the private sector in managerial posts, providing a platform for many private sector practices to infiltrate third sector ones (Wallace, 2004) and giving some explanation for the increasing use of market-based logic employed by these organisations. Whilst NGOs are “idealised as organisations through which people help others for reasons other than profit or politics” (Fisher, 1997:442), such values may have been eroded by the rising
prominence of neoliberal methods of governance. Moreover, activities such as complying with donor requirements can subsequently lead to distrust from local communities towards NGOs, as they are seen as largely ineffective and working closely with outsiders (Kapoor, 2005) which may eventually damage an organisation’s reputation beyond repair. Porter (2003) also warns that as competition for resources increases, NGOs stop working in tandem with each other and instead see other local organisations as competitors, which could result in the NGO sector becoming a hostile and individualistic environment.

3.5 Accountability and reporting difficulties for NGOs: the new managerialism

Monitoring and evaluation of their projects has now become a regular output of NGOs. Grants are often now awarded on the basis that the donor will receive detailed feedback on the results of the project, in the form of reports. Part of a drive towards results-oriented development, formally stated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, these new reporting mechanisms were put in place to increase the accountability of NGOs to their donors (Mueller-Hirth, 2012). Based on the belief that increased accountability will lead to greater efficiency by development staff, reporting and evaluation mechanisms were promoted for their ability to help development professionals self-govern their own behaviour (Cavill and Sohail, 2007). Although some donors do not stipulate how much of a grant should be spent on auditing activities, USAID grants awarded to South African NGOs require that nine per cent of the project budget is for monitoring and evaluation (Mueller-Hirth, 2012). More broadly, the increase in monitoring and evaluation is a materialisation of the belief that organisations would be more effective if they employed the use of private sector practices (Shore and Wright, 2000). This is exemplified by the highly neoliberal language used when describing this process;

“Donors tend to look for the highest return for their investments. NGOs do what they believe is needed, irrespective of the return.” (Lawrence and Brun, 2011:80)
Furthermore, it is clear that the use of capitalist, profit and results driven values does not complement the core ethos of NGOs, and provides an explanation for why imposed monitoring and evaluation practices have been problematic to implement for a number of these types of organisation.

The constant insistence on NGOs being made accountable for their activities has led to polarised opinion in the literature. Some believe that as the number of NGOs increases and the intentions of some organisations begin to overlap, NGOs must be as transparent and clear on their practices as possible (Burger and Owens, 2010, Kang, 2010). However, other believe that this so-called ‘new managerialism’ culture within NGOs instead creates increased levels of bureaucracy within the sector, and means that the majority of these organisations’ time is spent writing reports rather than with the communities or local people that they are supposed to be working with (Roberts et al, 2005, Townsend and Townsend, 2004). This section of the literature believes that increased bureaucracy and paperwork is one of the core reasons that NGOs are no longer radical organisations, and are instead simply functioning as a business that is subject to constant auditing. Mawdsley et al’s (2005) research into NGOs revealed that respondents felt so pressurised by donor imposed targets and report writing that they had little time left for the organisation’s day to day tasks, and in turn no opportunity for critical analysis of their current outputs.

The impact of this ‘new managerialism’ on NGOs is apparent both at the conceptual and grassroots level, as discussed in depth by Roberts et al (2005). The type of management and bureaucracy introduced to these organisations is, as described by Roberts et al (2005:1849) “of a distinctly Northern type” which could jar with some of the cultural practices that exist in organisations in the Global South. Additionally, Mueller-Hirth (2012) discusses the evaluation criteria of monitoring and evaluation set by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, including “effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency” (Mueller-Hirth, 2012:654), a further set of externally imposed values imposed upon NGOs in the Global South. These changes could be seen as an
imposition of Global North values in the NGO sector, irrespective of whether local employees agree with these practices or not. Additionally, the rigidities and rules that come along with reporting, monitoring and evaluation somewhat undermine the flexibility and local adaptability that NGOs are lauded for (Fowler, 1993). Wallace (2004) additionally argues that NGOs have simply become vehicles to distribute the ideas held by Northern organisations, helping to reinforce development trends and fashions whilst having little influence over them. Conceptually, it could be argued that these viewpoints validate Shivji’s assertion that “colonialism left by the front door and returned through the back door in the form of neo-colonialism” in the form of NGOs (Shivji, 2007:16), discussed later in the chapter.

There are specific examples of the issues that this new focus on accountability, transparency and participation can create. Roberts et al (2005) discuss how most reports must be written in English, with the specific buzzwords and jargon used in NGO report writing. This can prove difficult for the many local NGO employees who do not have English as their first language, and can mean that a lot of time is spent concerned with the correct use of language rather than achieving the targets that have been set. Conversely, Wallace (2004) states that at the levels that these countless reports are written for, very few people have the time to read or meaningfully engage with them. It must be called into question why there is such an emphasis on reporting culture when there seems to be little justification for it. Muller-Hirth (2012) discusses how NGOs perceive monitoring and evaluation as a “tick-box exercise” (Mueller-Hirth, 2012:657), and led to them describing themselves as weak subjects with little agency within these reporting structures.

The pressures of accessing money and keeping a good relationship with donors are potentially having a negative impact on NGOs practices as it has altered their focus onto an additional set of administrative tasks. However, it is not clear what alternative these organisations have, and there are some merits to the argument that NGOs should be held accountable to both their donors and the groups that they are working with. The main difficulty that is faced in terms of accountability
is that NGOs have a number of stakeholders that they must be held accountable to; “downwards” to their partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters, and “upwards” to their trustees, donors and governments” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:967). A significant barrier faced is often the physical distance between NGOs and their donor organisations, as well as conceptual differences (Lawrence and Brun, 2011). This is exacerbated by Townsend et al’s (2004) research in Mexico City, where NGO employees expressed a desire for more face to face contact with their donors, or for donors to come and visit their projects, which they believed would be more valuable than sending a series of reports via email. Indeed, Mawdsley et al (2005) discuss at length the value in these face to face interactions, such as a reduction in administrative tasks, more opportunities for meaningful dialogue, and the opportunity for the smaller organisations receiving funding to have more of a voice in the partnership and for the donor organisation to understand their issues better. The problematic relationships that exist between NGOs and their donors results in “lopsided friendships” (Gibbs et al, from Porter, 2003:135), whereby the smokescreen of partnership masks how the partner that holds the funding dominates the relationship through accountability mechanisms.

Furthermore, this “downwards accountability” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:967) often becomes forgotten about amongst all of the report writing and evaluation (Hickey, 2002, Mueller-Hirth, 2012), potentially having an impact on the reasons that NGO and participatory development are advocated and making development hierarchy unequal;

“Participation thus becomes a means of servicing donor requirements, rather than an act of citizenship.” (Hickey, 2002:843)

Therefore, it is clear that with the growing numbers of NGOs in the Global South and in turn, increased competition when accessing funding, the inherent bureaucracy of this sector may impact upon NGO culture for many years. Returning to ideas that the individual characteristics of NGOs mean that many of these organisations could still be attempting to affect meaningful change in their
work, it is also relevant to consider Fisher’s (1997) viewpoint that NGOs are not homogenous organisations with the same views and structure. Nonetheless, with the process of auditing and report writing to donors increasingly becoming standard practice for contemporary NGOs, whether these organisations individual traits impact upon their actions remains to be seen. NGO staff can often be put in the complex situation where every stakeholder that they are accountable to has unrealistic demands of the NGOs capabilities (Igoe, 2003).

The ways in which NGOs subvert increasing pressure from donors or partners, and the specific strategies employed by NGOs as a means of survival and maintaining some of their organisations’ principles, has been discussed at length within the literature. Elbers and Arts (2011) discuss some of the main strategies employed by Southern NGOs, such as withholding information from donors, sending inaccurate information to donors and agreeing to donor conditions on a superficial level, without changing anything substantial in their day to day practices.

Burger and Owens (2010) are rather critical of the ways in which NGOs subvert the influence of donors and partners, referring to it as “deceit and ineffectiveness” (Burger and Owens, 2010:1265). In fairness, Burger and Owens (2010) also highlight the potential consequences of these activities; citing examples where NGOs had claimed to work closely with local communities, whilst these communities maintained that this was wholly inaccurate, and that there ‘had been little or no contact from these organisations. Moreover, Barr et al (2005) found that in their research into NGOs in Uganda, smaller NGOs feel under scrutiny from donors and partners, and in turn, hide the cost of salaries paid to employees as well as per diem payments. The audit culture seems increasingly complex, as so much time seems to be spent on general administrative tasks that little work is getting done in a practical sense. Conversely, it is questionable as to whether misrepresenting data to donors and partners is the correct approach by NGOs, especially in light of research into corrupt or “briefcase NGOs” (Townsend et al, 2004).
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that corruption is becoming increasingly prevalent in the NGO sector, through a variety of means;

"INGO misbehaviour has been highlighted in terms of misuse of funds, the abuse of power over vulnerable people, dishonesty in fundraising/advocacy, poor management and governance, and so forth." (Cavill and Sohail, 2007:232)

Smith (2010) states that in Nigeria, NGOs are being continually created by elites so that they can access the organisations’ resources for their own personal gain. Igoe's (2003) research in Tanzania supports this, explaining that some NGO leaders salaries were not enough to fulfil their families’ needs, so NGO resources were often used for personal use, meaning that the NGO’s funding often had more of an individual benefit than a community one. This echoes neoliberal thinking on promoting individual values, and perhaps elucidates the fact that decentralising governance and service provision will not reinforce collectivity but instead only benefit certain individuals.

Nonetheless, Smith (2010) also notes that corruption accusations are often used as a mechanism to explain the failures of individual development projects, masking any more complex reasons behind why a project has not been as successful as predicted. Additionally, generalised accusations of corruption fail to recognise the complexity of certain situations faced by NGOs and the individuals that work for them. Townsend et al (2004), in their research of NGOs in Ghana, discussed how one respondent working for a grassroots NGO accepted funding from donors for projects that she did not believe in and knew would not work. The respondent justified this by her need for her and her family’s own personal need for survival, and explained her pursuit of long-term goals that she believed would make a difference, describing donor money as a short-term solution to ensure that the organisation she worked for continued to exist (Townsend et al, 2004). Barr et al (2005) provide an additional point about employees within NGOs, arguing that whilst the development sector attracts very competent individuals, the funding is not in place to maintain the salaries of
these employees, or for them to carry out the projects that they want to. Whilst it could be argued that this is a further example of corrupt NGO practice, it also indicates how the donor-NGO relationship sometimes creates a situation in which certain unethical practices become necessary for survival.

Igoe (2003) cites an example whereby a pastoralist NGO in Tanzania took donor money to fund a water project even though the local community had no need for one. Additionally, the donor, supporting the rhetoric of participatory development, required that a women's group be involved in the water project, as a means to empower them, and although a women's group already existed within the community, the donors selected individual women to form a new one. The community complied with the project against their wishes, based on the fear put forward by NGO staff that it would appear that they “didn't like development” (Igoe, 2003:873). Igoe (2003) further discusses this case study:

“In speaking of this experience women stressed that they had no control over the processes of development, which came from mysterious white people and were mediated by the male elites of their community.” (Igoe, 2003:873)

The use of “mysterious white people” is interesting here, and indicates the vast difference between donor knowledge and that of local organisations. Phillips (2013) reinforces this when discussing the high numbers of “posh white blokes” working in the development sector:

“There is so much rich information and understanding vital to tackling poverty, that those who have never been hungry and never been shut out can never fully possess.” Phillips (2013:1)

Whilst Phillips does not completely refute the presence of individuals from the Global North in the development industry, he problematizes their dominant role and the effects this can have on the projects selected and how they are implemented. The impact of inappropriate projects being implemented by
foreign donors has an impact upon how relations between the Global South and developed countries, which will be discussed in the following section.

3.6 North-South relations and the impact on development

Parpart states that;

“Development is predicated on the assumption that some people and places are more developed than others, and therefore those who are ‘developed’ have the knowledge and expertise to help those who are not.” (Parpart, from Kothari, 2005:2005).

As previously discussed, the NGO sector has expanded rapidly in recent years, creating a variety of power relations between local and international NGOs, and the donor organisations that support them. It is important to consider explicitly the role of organisations whose base is outwith the Global South, and to return to Bebbington’s (2005) point, examine in-depth the hegemonic structures that these development organisations exist within. Sheppard and Nagar (2004:558) note that “the geographies of global North and South are progressively fractal and closely inter-related”. This is exemplified by previous discussion surrounding the impact of international donors over grassroots organisations, and the imposition of these organisations’ ideas at the expense of local knowledge held by grassroots NGOs. The increasingly blurred relations between the Global North and South in contemporary development practice must be examined, and the root of the most hegemonic and embedded discourses traced and understood. These power dynamics serve as an important lens within which the water governance structure of Tanzania can be examined.

Early attempts at defining NGOs created a dichotomy between knowledge that originated from the Global North or South. Vakil (1997) critiques Gorman’s (1984) description of private voluntary organisations, and the inclusion of the word ‘overseas’;
“The inclusion of "overseas" activities in the definition implies that these organisations being referred to are exclusively those based in the developed countries and that their mandate is “relief and development” in the nations of the Third World.” (Vakil, 1997:2058)

Vakil believes that this ignores the knowledge base of organisations based in the Global South, and prioritises Global North knowledge over any other. Mohan (2001) agrees with this, warning that even in instances where local knowledge is given precedence over that of international development organisations, it still creates a dynamic where a Global North development worker is a vital requirement to bring together these two sets of knowledges. De Santisteban (2005) refers to how the good intentions of NGOs and other development organisations are often assumed, yet Bienefeld (1994) calls this viewpoint into questions, arguing that it is impossible to understand the benefits without fully understanding the impact if these organisations and modern development practice never existed. There are however, a number of arguments to suggest that the shift in power relations has not necessarily been from those hegemonic powerful states to their former colonies but instead a more diluted and less explicit form of power and control, exerted through a variety of channels. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the World Overseas Development Institute Symposium called for a shift in the relationships between Northern and Southern NGOs which promoted equal partnership. Instead, it could be argued that what has transpired since is simply a reconfiguration of power and influence, manifesting in more subtle ways. Kothari’s (2001) comment that local people become so embedded within development processes they are unable to provide a critical view of international influence is relevant here, as an example of the variety of ways in which Global North organisations and their mandates are able to be hegemonic.

Additionally, there are some instances where colonial language is used to discuss donor-NGO relations. Keeping in mind the aforementioned discussion of the UK DFID’s geographical preference for the projects they are willing to fund, it is
useful to draw attention to Lawrence and Brun’s (2011) research into NGOs working in the health sector in India;

“The large donors have carved up the country for themselves with respect to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. They won’t fund programs in certain regions such as Delhi, UP/Bihar, as they are so called “low prevalence” states.” (Interview Quote, Lawrence and Brun, 2011:80).

The use of the phrase ‘carved up’ echoes other Postcolonial literature, such as Seth (2012:19) who uses the phrase to describe how nineteenth century colonisers divided their rule across Africa, and relates to Shivji’s (2007) point about NGOs being a modern form of colonial control over countries in the Global South. By employing the use of such a phrase, Lawrence and Brun’s (2011) data suggests people living in the Global South believe similar practices are happening once again, perhaps through a more subtle colonialism of the development sector.

Although Simon (2006) notes that there is little connection between Postcolonial literature and development literature, it is clear that there are commonalities between the two. Briggs and Sharp (2004) align with this, explaining how some Postcolonial theorists believe that development literature is still written from a colonial mindset, whereas those conducting research in the latter field argue that Postcolonialism is too abstract and does not consider the lived experiences of those affected. Postcolonial theory in some instances calls into question the validity of comments within economic theory, which calls into question the way in which both theoretical channels have been used throughout this thesis. Discussing the differences between economic theory and postcolonial analysis Zein-Elabdin (2011) states that the latter has usually been used in order to deconstruct the ways in which economic theory has been seen as the primary mode of analysis to theorise an empirical example. Rather than seeing these two modes of thought as “separate analytical spaces” (Zein-Elabdin, 2011:40), Zein-Elabdin does not think of the culture-economy as a binary but instead examines the interrelationship between the two, building upon the teachings of key
postcolonial theorists such as Spivak, Said and Bhabha. In terms of some of the key terms used in economic analysis, Zein-Elabdin (2011) states that:

"Pioneering postcolonial theorists did not always speak to economic themes directly or in the familiar language of 'poverty' 'the market' 'class' or 'capitalism" (Zein-Elabdin, 2011:47)

Zein-Elabdin (2011) also considers this from the perspective of economists and notes that they see any cultural manifestations as a result of a hegemonic class-based structure. In this research, ‘class’ and access to capital undoubtedly has an impact on the water resource, amount and cleanliness that households are able to afford, but there are also supposed ‘cultural’ elements that potentially impact upon this such as community relations or the presence of an international NGO. Indeed, whilst postcolonial theory attaches cultural meaning to some of the constructs of economic theory that initially seem to be a result of the rule of the market, this thesis aims to understand the variety of factors that impact on residents’ access to water in Dar es Salaam, both considering economic factors as well as other cultural impacts upon this also.

Frantz Fanon’s ‘Black Skin, White Masks’ (2008) argues the point that in order to survive in a white world, black people must adopt white identities, and in a sense can never adopt either a white or black identity fully which leads to confusion and as Fanon describes it, an almost schizophrenic sense of identity (Fanon, 2008:119). Indeed, the previous discussion of inappropriate monitoring and evaluation requests from international donors replicates this confused understanding of identity, as well as the use of funding to determine that the projects that the donors support are the ones that receive funding. Pressure on monitoring and evaluation activity also relates to the work of Spivak (1988). Insofar that Spivak argues that for the subaltern to speak, they must speak through the means of Western communication, monitoring and evaluation reports serve as an example of local organisations having to frame their work to fit Western criteria, and report their work in such a way that they will receive funding in future. Hearn (1998) argues that colonialism of states in Africa has
instead become a situation of “multiple spheres of influence” (Hearn, 1998:98) from the Global North. Using Townsend et al’s (2002:829) view that “imperialism constantly reshapes itself”, it is important to assess how current development practices align with some of the key tenets of Postcolonial thought.

Postcolonial analysis of knowledge removes the hegemony of Western knowledge over more local forms of indigenous knowledge situated in the Global South. In doing this, the concept of knowledge becomes one that is multifaceted and made up of a number of different ontologies and belief systems. Taking the example of water in Dar es Salaam into this theoretical lens, Postcolonial literature can elucidate the local experience of accessing water and the coping mechanisms used by residents, as well as how these have been altered by supposed external ‘Global North’ knowledge through aid and the presence of international NGOs. As well as this, neoliberalism and the growth of water as a commodity explain how this mode of thought compares and contrasts with the views of aforementioned stakeholders, and provides further insight into how complex the water sector in Dar es Salaam is. Spivak (1988) problematizes the concept of representing the knowledge of another group, as those speaking on behalf of others are unable to determine the variety of factors related to that groups’ experience, and that is something that group can only know themselves. Such analysis of knowledge, power and representation will be used in this research, as the impact of external development thought on water policy and practice is examined, as well as the ways in which local individuals and community groups experience the work of various stakeholders in the water sector in trying to access a supply of water.

Expanding upon the work of Spivak, Briggs and Sharp (2004) also explain that for a subaltern to ‘speak’, it may not necessarily be through the medium of voice but instead of practices and actions. In this sense, the behaviours and choices made at the grassroots level in Dar es Salaam will be taken as a form of expression in this thesis, and posited against the top-down structures in place that may be impacted upon by economic influences. Furthermore, this research takes the way in which economics and market-let thought influence access to
water, and interlink with postcolonial theory in order to determine the ways in which external Western influences have impacted upon this access. It is also important to be mindful of the irony of commenting on the dominance of Western research and analysis in the Global South when I as a researcher from the United Kingdom am part of this imbalance. This thesis involves sections of introspective writing on my behalf, examining my positionality in the field and exploring the power relations and dynamics within this piece of work, also feeding into the thesis’ theoretical discussion.

In a further examination of relationships between the Global North and the Global South, Porter (2003) refers to the “power of aid” (Porter, 2003:142) as a means of Global North control over countries that require financial assistance. Additionally, Townsend et al (2002) discuss how dependency and unequal relationships are inherent to bilateral and multilateral aid, not necessarily as explicit as neo-colonial relationships but in many ways replicating them. Some, such as de Santisteban (2005) question why the wealth of the Global North continues to increase whilst overseas development assistance is in decline, whilst others, such as Moyo (2009) believe that when aid is assessed against its conceptual origins, and the goals of economic growth and poverty reduction, it is seen to be a complete failure. Paradoxically, although participatory methods of development are lauded for their ability to empower communities and increase notions of citizenship, Martin (2014) argues that the persistence of the foreign aid culture has instead resulted in the opposite, leading to civic disengagement and increased distrust of politicians when money received in aid does not lead to results.

In what Edwards (2014:47) refers to as the “Easterly-Sachs” debate, a number of development scholars are indeed polarised in opinion over whether the agenda of foreign aid should be pursued. On one side, theorists such as William Easterly believe that foreign aid makes little difference to the lives it is supposed to benefit. Contesting this, Jeffrey Sachs, along with others such as Joseph Stiglitz instead believe that foreign aid still has an important role to play, not in a top-down imposed way, but in a holistic manner that is appropriate to local
conditions and culture (Edwards, 2014). Paul Collier (2008) notes that whilst overseas assistance in the last three decades has contributed to a one per cent gross domestic product growth in some of the world's poorest countries, vastly increasing the amount of aid donated to these nations will not add any more to this growth unless technical assistance and the skills of local populations are prioritised (Edwards, 2014:48). Indeed, Collier (2008) believes that there needs to be more creativity in the development sector in order to combat each of his self-described “four poverty traps” (2008:5). In 2004, United Kingdom based NGO War on Want was even more damning of current development practice, and published a report stating that current development approaches were ineffective, and instead of trying to correct these issues a complete overhaul of the development sector was required (Simon, 2006). Taking this into account, and all the aforementioned challenges faced by NGOs and the development sector on the whole, it is important to consider what lies ahead for these organisations, and what merit there is continuing to support a sector that seems so fraught with issues.

It is important to make note of the fact that Tanzania’s socio-cultural history extends beyond an exchange of South-North cultural ideas, with China having a large presence in the country since the 1960s and impacting upon Nyerere’s conceptualisation of Tanzanian socialism. Across Africa, China has had the most significant impact in Zambia and Tanzania, playing a significant role in the construction of the TAZARA railway between the two countries between the 1960s and 1970s (Lee, 2009). At the same time, China also built over one hundred factories in Tanzania (Lee, 2009) and Tanzania had a stronger diplomatic relationship with China compared to any other country at that time (Bailey, 1975). It is believed that the success of Sino-Tanzanian relations can be attributed to the sense of optimism provided by the large amounts of development that the people of Tanzania could see (Lee, 2009) and importantly, the commonalities between each country’s development policy (Bailey, 1975). In addition, the format of Chinese aid differed from that of Global North donors, normally being provided in the form of interest free loans on the condition that Tanzanian would begin to import Chinese goods:
“The Tanzanians – who have seen too many expatriates come to ‘develop’ their country from the comfort of an air conditioned office and a luxurious villa – certainly appreciate the Chinese attitude.” (Bailey, 1975:43)

However, Lee (2009) discusses the fact that the Chinese and Tanzanian work ethics face some incompatibility issues, with the Chinese finding the pace at which Tanzanians work frustrating, which caused conflict during construction projects and in factories.

3.7 Challenges within the development sector, and the future of NGOs?

Drawing upon ideas of crisis discussed by Vigh (2008) in Chapter 1, the direction of the development sector, and more broadly, Global North relations with the Global South overall, must be examined. As previously discussed, the original mandate for NGOs was said to be to fill the gaps left by inefficient or underfunded state provision, with a view that in time these responsibilities would be transferred back to the national government or another appropriate providers (Molyneux, 2008; Cameron, 2000). Yet whilst the origins of these discussions began in the 1990s, and large amounts of money have been donated, allocated, and spent on various development activities since, the industry shows no sign of disappearing and has instead become an integral part of many countries’ governance frameworks in the developing world. Instead of existing as a temporary solution, NGOs and their development counterparts now exist as an industry that continues to grow and secure its place as part of the fabric of developing world culture. As organisations that originally existed by “default rather than design” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:961), increasing the mandate and responsibilities of NGOs without providing them the resources to do so has simply transferred the failures in governance and service provision by the state onto another actor.

The current issues faced by development organisations have been discussed at length in this chapter, examining the implications of monitoring, evaluation and
endless report writing. The day to day practices of organisations have become filled with bureaucratic activities to ensure an organisation’s survival, and have taken significant time and attention from the practical and in some cases, radical activities that materialise in measurable change. This provides a somewhat ironic outcome, when the rationale behind implementing these activities was to promote “results-oriented development” (Mueller-Hirth, 2012:651) when the reality appears to be a multitude of reports that are not even properly read (Wallace, 2004). Downwards accountability to supposed beneficiaries is weak (Townsend et al, 2002, and with these groups often having no alternative means of accessing the services an NGO may provide (Vakil, 1997), they are unable to do anything but accept what the organisation delivers, allowing inadequate and inappropriate provision to continue to exist unchallenged.

With many organisations completely relying on a small number of donors to carry out their work, they exist on a project to project basis, often because their work is not well known enough to be funded without significant effort (Wallace, 2004). NGOS must organise their activities based on securing the next funding grant, resulting in a cyclical system of outputs, that echoes Zizek’s ideas surrounding a “parallax movement” (from Ioris, 2012) in which work continues to be produced but with no quantifiable difference. If organisations with uncommon or innovative ideas struggle to get funding (Wallace, 2004) because they do not comply with development rhetoric or the use of fashionable buzzwords, it is impossible for new ideas to enter the foray or for the NGO sector to reclaim its position as a dynamic one. Moreover, heavily structured reporting techniques required by donors could mask the complex and nuanced successes of any grassroots based NGOs (Mueller-Hirth, 2012), which could eventually result in these activities being abandoned in exchange for ones that appear more lucrative within reports.

As opposed to paperwork and bureaucracy being a necessary task that takes up only a portion of NGOs time, the current situation indicates that it is instead taking up the majority of it, creating a situation of “endemic crisis” (Vigh, 2008:7) whereby this situation has become so normalised that these organisations exist
in an entirely different way to their time of creation. These organisations could be said to be in a state of crisis simply because their key mandate has become somewhat eroded by the influence of neoliberal governance, and there appears to be no means of solution to reorganise the balance of their activities. As explained succinctly by de Santisteban (2005:200); “[NGOs] are not only failing to change the prevailing international order but may even be helping to sustain it”. De Santisteban (2005) expands further on this, referring to the existence of NGOs as a “tragicomedy” (de Santisteban, 2005:206) whereby roles and activities are scripted, repeated and embedded in a system where the broader issues in place seem too complex to address and are thus ignored at the expense of day to day menial tasks.

There is the potential that these organisations end up inhibiting their success in order to maintain their longevity, holding back on their outputs in order to perpetuate their employment. Although undoubtedly a cynical view, the continued growth of the sector does appear not correlate with any significant change, and whilst organisations are faced with aforementioned issues, it does seem that contemporary development organisations are almost unrecognisable from their original counterparts. Additionally, Fisher (1997) discusses the fickle nature of the development industry, and the sector’s ability to generate new ideas and disregard existing ones. Fisher (1997) warns that NGOs are very much at risk of this possibility, and questions what will be the next supposed panacea to development. Whilst Fisher put forward this idea almost twenty years ago, it should still be considered whether NGOs really are the final solution for the development industry, or perhaps that their behaviours have made them an indispensible part of governance and service provision in the Global South.

To return to ideas of corruption, Smith’s (2010) viewpoint that corruption is often blamed for the failures of development organisations in Nigeria is pertinent here;

“...The use of deceptive mechanisms for corruption has diffused throughout society, creating a popular sense of crisis, wherein Nigerians see the
repercussions of corruption in everyday life as both caused by and contributing to the demise of morality. The perception that corruption is rooted in social amorality obscures the political and economic underpinnings of inequality, while paradoxically creating hope.” (Smith, 2010:248)

As such, it is evident that embedded discourses of corruption and failure have led to a cultural expectation within Nigeria that these issues are inevitable. As an avoidance tool by Global North to explain the limited successes of NGOs in Nigeria, Nigerians now believe that their own people are not able to run NGOs by themselves, further increasing dependence on the Global North by creating a sense of crisis within Nigerian managerial practices and morality.

Howes (1997) discusses Esman and Uphoff’s framework for the success of strong local organisations;

“Success is shown to be partly a question of how well certain functions are carried out – the capacity to deal with conflict, to plan effectively, to mobilise resources, and to execute routine resource management tasks.” (Howes, 1997:821)

Using this framework against the current practices in the NGO sector, NGO’s ability for success must be called into question. NGOs have a limited capacity to deal with conflict. Existing on a project to project basis means they are unable to build up any reserve resources for emergencies, which also undermines Esman and Uphoff’s second point, their ability to plan effectively. Current NGOs are unable to mobilise resources to their full potential because their resources are so focused on these “routine resource management tasks” (Howes, 1997:821). Thus, whilst this framework is not an all-encompassing assessment of the abilities of NGOs, it is apparent that there are many issues in place that undermine their successes. It is the fact that these issues are so embedded, and often unquestioned, within the NGO sector that reflects Vigh’s (2008:9) idea of
“crisis as a constant”, as this problematic situation continues to perpetuate with no real move towards an alternative solution.

3.8 Conclusion

As noted by Wallace;

“Recent critical writings on NGOs, whether stressing their role in fostering ‘a new type of cultural and economic colonialism’ or in becoming ‘an increasingly important part of the international regulatory system’ of global capitalism, have unfortunately painted an over-generalised picture, failing to capture the concrete mechanisms and specific effects of what is a complex and contradictory process” (Wallace, 2004:202)

Indeed, whilst at times this chapter may have come across as a wholesale critique of the NGO sector and the structures that allowed its rapid expansion, it instead attempts to take into account the established and recognised problems with this industry discussed in the literature and to make sense of these issues. NGOs have become adept at externally enforced auditing practices, at the detriment of their core values (Mueller-Hirth, 2012) Nonetheless, Vakil’s (1997) attempt to provide a taxonomy of NGOs is pertinent here; although these aforementioned issues broadly affect the sector and its practices, this chapter does not mean to dismiss the meaningful work done by these organisations across the globe, and the significant impact that their work can have on a number of individual’s lives. As noted by Fisher (1997:447) “the generalisations about the NGO sector obscure the tremendous diversity found within it”.

The discourse surrounding participation has been problematic, with thinly veiled promises of empowerment and increased attention being paid to the voices of those experiencing the issues that NGOs wish to mitigate failing to make any measurable difference. Igoe (2003), discussing his research in Tanzania, goes as far to say that;
“Communities become commodities of an international NGO industry, rather than active participants in Tanzanian civil society.” (Igoe, 2003:881)

Whilst Hickey and Mohan (2004) are of the mindset that participation, despite all its failures, is “better than nothing” (Walker et al, 2007:438) there are still a number of recognised issues that must be addressed before this form of development activity continues to be promoted. Townsend et al (2004) suggest that the neoliberal version of empowerment is simply being given small pieces of power by those in control, rather than empowerment originating from an individual’s own doing. The difficulty faced in maintaining an organisation’s survival often neglects the needs of the poor, creating a dichotomy between what participation means when written into funding proposals, and how it materialises in reality (Porter, 2003).

Instead, in some instances this chapter has questioned the very existence of these development organisations in the first place. As their temporary and responsive nature has been eroded, fully integrating them into Global South governance frameworks, the continued transfer of responsibilities from states to these organisations fails to address the broader structural issues in place, and continues the uneven power dynamics that exist between the North and the South. The ways in which Northern development ideology has impacted upon the work of grassroots-based organisations in the South has been examined as well as the changing trajectory of these types of organisations as the development sector becomes increasingly globalised and configured by international donors. The current system of decentralised and non-governmental governance maintains the temporary solutions that fail to implement significant change, and offer no clear strategy for solving the various development issues, or a recognisable ‘end point’, whereby the role of these organisations will become obsolete. An industry that’s success is measured upon organisations closing down, offices being cleared out and individuals losing jobs elucidates Vigh’s (2008:7) idea of “endemic crisis”. Conversely, it must be noted
that this is not an argument for the wholesale return of power to the state. Whilst Lawrence and Brun (2011:75) discuss “responsibilities that should rightly fall to the government”, this fails to recognise the inability of certain states to fulfil their responsibilities, or the availability of other sectors at doing so more efficiently.

NGOs cannot expect to replicate the same work carried out by bilateral and multilateral aid organisations, but this does not mean that their locally based work exists in a development vacuum (Drabek, 1987). Amongst concerns that NGOs have lost their “critical voice and role” (Townsend et al, 2004:871), it could be argued that NGOs should pay more attention to their radical origins and less to donor and other financially related pressures. However, as the sector becomes increasingly turgid, it is difficult to ignore these issues and continue to exist as organisations without paying a significant level of attention to them. Ferguson, (1994:255) notes that “reducing poverty to a technical problem” and offering affected communities technical solutions fails to address the problematic structures in place, depoliticising a previously radical and progressive sector. As the issues faced in the Global South such as poverty, environmental degradation, and the provision of services become increasingly complex and interlinked, NGOs should recognise the role they play in the governance framework, and how to make the best of this.

Taking these ideas into account, this research aims to provide an account of NGOs working in the water sector in Tanzania and the dynamics and challenges that exist within this industry. Issues such as funding, monitoring and evaluation and inter-sectoral politics will be examined through an in-depth analysis of two organisations as well as interviews across a number of water NGOs, in order to ascertain how the myriad themes discussed in this chapter reflect Dar es Salaam’s water sector. Through participant observation and interviews on the issues faced by these organisations, this research aims to provide a contemporary analysis on the practices of the NGO sector in Tanzania and the impact that their work has. This work will aim to conceptualise this data against the backdrop of Dar es Salaam’s complex and multi-layered water governance and policy framework, and in addition, discuss the ways in which communities in
the city experience the action of these organisations and play an active role in their local area's access to water. In addition, through my own experiences as a researcher and other data collected, the aforementioned power relations between the Global North and the Global South will be explored. Building upon the discussion of neoliberalism in Chapter 2, alongside the supposed "complex theories" (Briggs and Sharp, 2004:662) of Postcolonial literature, this research aims to explain the current water provision in Dar es Salaam, and theorise the variety of complexity that exists within it.
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodological Reflections

4.1 Introduction

Del Casino Jr. et al. (2000) explain that:

“Methodology requires the translation of epistemological and ontological precepts and assumptions into ‘data’ that can be analysed” (Del Casino Jr. et al., 2000:523).

They suggest that a methodology should follow the process of selecting objects for analysis, conceptualising data collection, and deciding upon the research being address. Taking this into account, this chapter will explore the ways in which I collected my data for this thesis, as well as my justifications for the research used, and the power-relations and ethical challenges intrinsically linked to this research. Through an in depth discussion of my research methods and the impacts of my positionality and the power-relations inherent in conducting research in the Global South, this chapter endeavours to explore the myriad of aspects that must be considered when researching water governance in Tanzania.

Taking some of the key discussions surrounding various research techniques into account, as well consulting literature that has employed these techniques in various settings, I have attempted to explore fully the myriad of issues that can be faced when conducting fieldwork, and more specifically, the specificities that can result from this data collection taking place in the Global South. I will use the experiences of other researchers and literary discussions of methodologies to relate to my own experiences of fieldwork in Tanzania, and explore in depth the varying methodological issues that are intrinsically linked to this research project.

This chapter firstly explains in detail the ways in which this research was conducted. The chapter then explores some of the politics of conducting research
and the challenges surrounding my positionality as a white, young, solo researcher from the United Kingdom conducting research in the Global South. After some personal reflections from the field the chapter takes each of the data gathering methods used in this research in turn and discusses the justification for using them and explains how they were employed in the field. The chapter finishes with how the data was transcribed and interpreted, before reaching a conclusion.

Denzin and Lincoln (2000) note that:

"Qualitative research is a situated activity in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible." (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, from Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:2)

It is therefore clear why qualitative research is the appropriate methodology for this project, as it will enable the subtleties and nuances of water governance in Tanzania to be examined fully, to see what is unseen. Researching the topic of water governance in Dar es Salaam from a qualitative perspective allows for the myriad understandings and perceptions of the city’s water sector to be examined, and in turn, compare and contrast these understandings in order to achieve a robust understanding of the current situation. From the perspective of critical realism, this research attempts to understand the structures that are in place (Bryman, 2008:14) with respect to water provision in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Using a combination of research methods, this research attempted to understand the structures in place that form the water governance framework in Tanzania, whilst considering the social and cultural practices and prevalent discourses that individuals are involved in when navigating these structures.

Through conducting the majority of data collection through participant observation, this research aims to explore what Cook (2005:167) explains as viewing people “from the 'inside', in the context of their everyday, lived experiences” in order to understand the complexity of water governance in Dar es Salaam. Supplemented by interview data and documentary analysis, this
research attempts to provide a robust and comprehensive account of the ways in which residents of Dar es Salaam access water and the challenges that they face in doing so.

4.2 Research design

The fieldwork period for this research was carried out over a during two fieldwork periods in Tanzania in 2013 and 2014, comprising of around eighteen weeks of fieldwork in total. This research also uses data from my Masters research into the water sector in Tanzania, which served as an interrelated project to this thesis. As well as conducting research with two civil society organisations working in the water sector in Dar es Salaam, five in-depth interviews were conducted with those working for other organisations in the same sector. In addition to this, interviews were conducted with two separate representatives from the Ministry of Water, as well as one with at the municipal government office in Temeke. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with customers, board members, and community water scheme employees in both case study areas.7

The case study is referred to by Flyvbjerg (from Seale et al, 2007:390) as a detailed examination of a single sample; a study of a phenomenon within its real-life setting (Kitchin and Tate, 2000:225). Whilst case studies have been critiqued for being context-biased and for their lack of contribution to wider theoretical frameworks (Flyvbjerg, from Seale et al, 2007:391), Loftus and Sultana (2012:7) have commented that in terms of water a geographic specificity to the study is required to understand the complexities of the water system being studied. Scheyvens and Storey (2003:65) claim that the task of qualitative research is not to come up with undisputable truths, but it is my belief that by using a case study, this research will be able to produce truths about Dar es Salaam of the specific temporal context during which this research was undertaken. This research aims to use a case study approach to elucidate individual properties of

7 For full details of the fieldwork carried out in this research, see the appendices of this thesis.
specific situations, as well as provide some commentary on the underlying debates of water governance in the Global South.

The first organisation in this research, Water Project Management (WPM), are located in a small office in the Kinondoni district of the city and employ around ten members of staff. Their output generally involves the provision of technical training to community water projects both in Dar es Salaam and across Tanzania, and their funding for this work comes from donors or other larger organisations on an ad hoc basis. The other organisation, Tanzania Water Network (TWN), are situated in an office in another area of Dar es Salaam, also within the district of Kinondoni, and largely exist as a co-ordination organisation for all small organisations working in the water sector in Tanzania. As well as co-ordinating the network, TWN carry out work of their own, including technical training, education workshops and liaising closely with the Ministry of Water on large, government related initiatives, such as Maji Week. WPM were former members of TWN’s official network, and during my research both organisations worked together on several projects within Dar es Salaam.

This research also made use of two case study areas of Dar es Salaam in order to elucidate the complexities of water provision that occur within specific localities and amongst communities. The first case study involved in this research was the Maji Kwa Wote Water Project, located across three villages within the Temeke district of Dar es Salaam. This project was part of a wider initiative of fourteen water projects established in Dar es Salaam, as a result of a large amount of Belgian donor money. The Maji Kwa Wote project had an official board of management, as well as eight elected committee members in each of the three areas the project covered. Residents typically accessed water from the project using communal wells dispersed across the three areas. The project also had strong links with local government representatives and the board of management worked closely with them to manage the project. The Mitonga Water Users Group, situated in Ilala, was a fast growing community water scheme that had started in the area but had since began making links with local government and NGOs. Managed by a board including a chairperson,
maintenance officer and an accountant, the scheme also had a committee of eight elected community members to assist in managing the project. Residents accessed water from the project through either communal wells who were watched by security guards, or household wells managed by local community members. All names of organisations and community groups have been replaced with synonyms in order to protect the anonymity of research participants. In addition to this, the locations of these groups has only been referred to by the district of Dar es Salaam that they operate in, to further anonymise participants. Both case studies were selected based on recommendations from interview participants as well as TWN and WMP staff after I expressed an interest in studying community water provision in Tanzania. Suggestions were made about which areas of the city I should look into, and it was only after making initial contact in these areas I specified which projects and communities I would carry out my data collection with.
Both TWN and WMP were approached as a result of connections made in previous research trips to Tanzania and were asked if they would be willing for me to volunteer at their organisation as part of my research. Both organisations were small in size, with less than ten members of staff, and worked closely with communities to improve their water provision, either through maintenance training or the hosting of activities such as handwashing workshops. I explained...
to both TWN and WPM that my research was interested in their organisational practice and the work carried out on a day to day basis. Through working there two or three days a week on a voluntary basis during the final period of fieldwork, I expressed my intention to attempt to understand the workings of their organisation within the water sector in Tanzania on the whole, and the challenges that they faced in carrying out their work. In terms of my role as a volunteer, the expectation from both TWN and WMP was that I helped with small administrative tasks when there was work available. Overall both organisations were supportive of my research and made an effort to ensure I had access to a number of key documents and was invited along to any events they thought might be useful for me. Examples of these events were planning meetings for events or update meetings with other organisations working in the sector. In terms of the results of my data, no official request was made from either organisation for access, but representatives from TWN and WMP attended a data dissemination workshop I held at the end of my fieldwork in Tanzania.

After three months of volunteering at these organisations, data based on my observations was collected in a field diary and a field notebook. The distinction between these two documents is important, where the field diary was used to write extended, and at times, reflective accounts of my thoughts on my data. This method of writing gave me an opportunity to critically reflect upon the data I had collected so far, and enabled me to organise my thoughts for subsequent pieces of data collection during the fieldwork period. The field notebook instead served as a vessel for these “scratch notes” (Allsop et al, 2010:209), as a place where I could write down quick statements or pieces of information collected, or even to remind myself of something that I should explore at a later date. Although both organisations I volunteered at were aware I was a researcher, at times I was not sure if they were aware of how observational my research was in nature. As a result, sometimes I would write openly in my field notebook whereas on other occasions I would conceal this activity either by waiting for people to leave the

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9 For discussions of the politics of research and the complexities of the 'inside/outside' relationship when conducting ethnographic research, see later sections in this chapter.
room or going to the toilet to write up notes quickly, an example of the ‘ethnographers’ bladder’, as discussed by Cook (2005).

My day-to-day experiences during my observation tended to vary. As explained by Allsop et al (2010), as a research method, ethnographic and observational research is difficult to plan in advance of the fieldwork period. I therefore had to adopt my data collection on a regular basis in order to fit in with the daily task of the organisations being studied. My time was largely spent in the offices of each organisation, either helping out with daily tasks (which ranged from things such as folding promotional items of clothing to writing reports) or reading through documents that the organisation had given me so that I could learn about their work. Occasionally, I was invited to attend meetings alongside members of TWN and WPM, and was generally presented in these meetings as a member of the respective organisation as opposed to a researcher. These meetings led to a number of encounters with other stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania and also led to me being introduced to individuals who would later become interview participants during my fieldwork. Lastly, for TWN I was involved in the planning and hosting of a community sensitisation workshop in a village on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam. TWN and WMP also served as a means of access and introduction to other stakeholders in the water sector within Dar es Salaam, and enabled me to find other research participants;

“[The chairman of TWN] is going to set up loads of meetings with smaller water CSOs and also I’ll be doing some administration and report writing for TAWASANET themselves. Afterwards I went to WPM who kindly drove me to Temeke to meet an MWST. After that we drove with some MWST members to meet a COWSO. This type of research is great as I don’t really feel like I’m imposing too much, as WPM need to continually monitor local COWSOs and also MWSTs anyway.” (Field Diary, 22nd June 2013)

Both organisations also helped me to access participants working in other NGOs and civil society organisations within Dar es Salaam. For the five in-depth
interviews I carried out with these organisations, meetings were either set up by the chairman of TWN or the chairman of WMP, or I would come across these organisations during my day at the TWN or WMP offices. In addition, sometimes I would attend meetings alongside members of staff from TWN and WMP and would be introduced to individuals there, which gave me an opportunity to explain my research to them and ask if I could interview them. Whilst participants from these organisations have been fully anonymised in this thesis, and each organisation only referred to by a numeric value, some context on the organisations included is displayed below.
Table 4.1 NGOs and Civil Society Organisations involved in this research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO #1</td>
<td>An organisation that comprises of a network of over seventy NGOs registered in Tanzania, that has been in operation since 2002. NGO #1 is focused on a number of topics across all sectors of Tanzanian governance, and the organisation largely works towards strengthening the voice of civil society and enabling organisations to work together towards the same goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO #2</td>
<td>NGO #2 is an internationally recognised organisation for their work in the water sector, that has been in operation for a number of years. Their work involves project-based efforts as well as enabling local organisations to carry out local work in partnership with this organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO #3</td>
<td>This organisation was set up by a group of locally based environmental engineers in Dar es Salaam. NGO #3 provides technical expertise to communities in water projects in their area, and they have been in operation less than a decade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO #4</td>
<td>NGO #4 has been in operation since 2009 and is a medium-sized Tanzanian NGO that works across a number of sectors. They focus on research, advocacy and innovative approaches to development in Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO #5</td>
<td>As an established international organisation, NGO #5 works across a number of sectors in development, with a particular focus on human rights and policy advocacy. The organisation have been in operation in Tanzania since the 1950s, in both an emergency capacity and as part of the wider NGO community. Within the water sector, the organisation focus on research into improving water and sanitation, especially for young people in Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within my days spent at my case study communities, the days would be spent either interviewing those who managed or sat on the committee of community water organisations or the customers that purchased their water. Some days it would generally be the case that one community member would guide the day and introduce me to other research participants, which enabled me to speak to
around twenty individual members in each case study community. Occasionally these individuals preferred to be interviewed collectively, and instead a focus group format was used to collect data.

Interview questions tended to be based on the role of the participant in Dar es Salaam’s water sector. When interviewing the Ministry of Water, questions focused around water governance and policy implementation, as well as some of the key terminology in use in contemporary water policy discourse in the city. In terms of NGOs included in this research, participants were asked questions surrounding their role in the sector and their impact on the city’s residents accessing water, as well as the challenges faced in working in their organisation and how this had changed over time. Within communities, both interviewees and focus group attendees were asked about their means of accessing water and how this was managed within the community, as well as any inhibiting factors. Questions also covered the ways in which their respective locality’s means of accessing water had changed over time, and in terms of the broader changes in Dar es Salaam’s water sector being discussed at within policy and NGO documentation, how these had materialised at the grassroots level.

In interview and focus group settings, I employed the use of a translator who translated for me during interviews and focus groups. I made every effort to ensure the translator I worked with during this research was of a high standard and understood fully what the research was aiming to achieve. Every interview or focus group where the translator was involved was preceded by a conversation in which the aims of the encounter were discussed in depth. During interviews, the translator and I communicated throughout, which also gave me an opportunity to ask ad hoc questions based on respondents’ answers. Additionally, a conversation was held immediately after every interview or focus group to confirm the data collected and to ensure that any nuances of the translation had not been misunderstood. Based on previous challenging experiences working with other translators, this method ensured a harmonious working relationship between myself and the translator during this research,
and ensured that a robust and accurate set of data was collected during interviews and focus groups.

4.3 My positionality, reflexivity and conducting research in the Global South

As noted by the Women and Geography Study Group (Mullings, 1999), ‘knowledge is never pure but situated in the complex and sometimes contradictory social locations of producers and audiences’. Therefore, when conducting academic research, collecting raw data and drawing conclusions from it, it is important to situate you as a person within the research process and understand what implications this has. A close similarity or vast differences between the researcher and those being researched can have a significant implication on how data is collected and understood and whilst some of these issues will always exist, an acknowledgement of them can lead to a more comprehensive and nuanced set of results. As well as the Women and Geography Study Group, since the 1970s (Murray and Overton, 2003) a number of other Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the need to explore relationships between the researcher and their participants and the aspects of positionality that can affect these relationships. They believe that every ‘individual and group’s position in contextually specific yet enduring networks of power and privilege’ (Eubanks, 2012:228) and that this impacts upon our knowledge of our research, our knowledge of ourselves as a researcher, and how these combine to produce results.

Before discussing the specificities of my data collection for this thesis, it is important to examine my own positionality as a young, white, single, Scottish woman in Tanzania and how this impacted upon the entire research process. Gabriel (2000) reinforces the importance of reflexivity in current academic research, as a means to overcome ideas of ‘value free’ research that does not acknowledge a hidden bias in a researcher’s analysis of their data. Furthermore, whilst Lee-Treweek (2000) discusses a reluctance to discuss her own thoughts and feelings about the research process in an academic capacity, I would argue
that in many cases the epistemological impacts of the researcher on their findings is every bit as important as the raw data that they collect. The problematic nature of research conducted by “development experts” from the West (Briggs and Sharp, 2004:662), as alluded to in Chapter 3, places even more relevance on self-exploration of my role in the research process. By considering the dynamics of my postionality and role in the research process allows for epistemological analysis of the data created, and provides further insight into the postcolonial elements of discussion included throughout this thesis.

One of the most difficult aspects of research in the Global South to overcome is justifying the research in the first place. Scheyvens and Storey (2003) discuss at length the almost existential crisis faced by researchers carrying out fieldwork in the developing world, whereby they fear becoming ‘academic tourists’ or ‘research travellers’ (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003:2). It is not clear however, what can be gained from abandoning research in the Global South altogether. This would only exacerbate the separation between the West and the South (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003), and would continue to make academic research from institutions in the Global South marginalised and ignored. What is instead useful is to acknowledge the potential issues as a Western researcher in Africa, and make every effort to overcome them. In fact, whilst Razavi (from Scheyvens et al, 2003) felt that being a young, small, single woman conducting research in her home country of Iran helped to reduce power relations, it must also be considered how this reflects my own research. Conducting research outwith my own country could reinforce West/South dynamics, but my physical presence may reduce this, and in many situations my reliance on others for access to information may reduce any possible ‘exploitative’ tendencies in my research overall.\footnote{There is a more in depth discussion of the power dynamics that can exist in research later on in this chapter.}

There is also an element of safety that must be considered when conducting fieldwork. Leslie and Storey (2003) discuss the day to day aspects of avoiding and managing illnesses like food poisoning when in the field. As a result, there is
a definite sense of never fully separating from the role as a researcher when in the field. Practices such as taking anti-malarial medication and washing hands a little more often than you do at home become inherent aspects of the research experience, certain smells, sounds and behaviours become associated with being the field and collecting data. There are however more serious safety issues that must be considered. Peterson (2000) reflects on an incident where a man approached him drunkenly with a knife in Mexico and how when he discussed it with locals, they explained that Peterson as a male should be able to handle himself on the street, but his partner (also in the field with him) should not be out unaccompanied. This provoked some reflection on my own time in Tanzania, as there was an incident during my pilot research people where a man with a machete tried to mug at the place I was staying at, but the gardener noticed and was able to prevent the incident occurring. For the remainder of that trip in Tanzania all of the men at the house became very overprotective of me, watching me leave and return each day and ensuring I was safe. This did reassure me but did not completely alleviate my safety concerns for the remainder of my time in the field. In light of recent news reports on acid attacks in Zanzibar and the Westgate mall shooting, it is impossible not to acknowledge that a significant amount of time in the field is spent simply being concerned about keeping safe, which undoubtedly had an impact on the data collection and my level of focus during data collection. In order to minimise any risks to the best of my abilities, a full risk assessment of the fieldwork was conducted in line with the University of Glasgow’s guidelines before departure for the field.¹¹

Ward and Jones (1999) also state that the relationship between the researcher and those they are researching can often be significantly determined by the ‘mode of entry’ of the researcher. Putting discussions of nationality, age and gender to one side, one of the ways in which I often found my position to be problematic is when I oscillated between the role of a ‘researcher’ and a ‘volunteer’ at the civil society organisations I was working with. In many cases I was often treated as a full member of staff, yet on other occasions I was

¹¹ A copy of which is in the appendices of this thesis.
presented to others\textsuperscript{12} as a researcher and placed in an environment where it was completely acceptable for me to sit and write in my field diary. What was most problematic with these switching roles is that I often had no agency over what ‘character’ I was playing that day, which made it not only difficult to prepare for any meetings that arose, but also meant that I was never fully sure of which tasks, such as making cups of tea for everyone, I was expected to carry out. Ward and Jones (1999) also note that the mode of entry can often impact upon accessibility to data sources, which was often an issue for me as when introduced to one of TWN's member organisations I was never sure whether I was supposed to be interviewing them or helping with a task, which often led to some quite awkward conversations. Generally, I would wait until I had been introduced as a researcher to the individual in question, and wait to be asked about the nature of my research. Once this topic had been discussed and I had developed a rapport with the individual, I then asked them if they would be willing to participate in this research.

As previously discussed, it is often difficult for a researcher conducting participant observation to be aware of whether they have become an ‘insider’ to the institutions that they are researching. Jorgensen (1989:55) stated that the ways in which an observer has become ‘involved’ can be understood by ‘what the researcher is able to see, hear, touch, smell or feel’. Phillips and Johns (2012) also discuss the ways in which eating and drinking alcohol with participants can be a subtle means of carrying out observation. For example, in my own work, when volunteering at civil society organisations, I ate lunch with TWN and WPM’s other employees, ate the same food as them, and participated in the lunchtime discussion. This is an example of food being used to make me feel more of a part of these organisations, and in fact were been some of the most valuable moments in terms of making bonds with these groups. Furthermore, socialising with these groups at evenings and weekends made me consider them more as friends rather than research subjects, which made determining which conversations to record as data and which not to a complex task.

\textsuperscript{12} Such as TWN's member organisations or other stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania.
Another level of complexity in terms of being an ‘insider’ within my research setting was the fact that my accommodation in Tanzania was frequented with other researchers and those working in international development. Some key findings in this research have in fact been a result of conversations at breakfast or at a bar on a Friday night, and once again when writing my field diary I felt somewhat deceitful writing up information that someone probably told me in confidence in a friendship capacity. It becomes not only a question of feeling like an ‘insider’ or not, but instead an experience of constantly observing and never feeling able to ‘switch off’ from being a researcher. This could be tiring and had the potential of my research losing focus if I was unable to ascertain which information is useful or not. However, regular writing in a field diary and a field notebook helped organise my thoughts on the data that had been collected, allowing for introspection and returning focus to the task at hand.

Whilst I may eat the same food, read the same documents and attend the same meetings, this does not change the fact that my own personal experiences and research training as a geographer will view these experiences far differently to the groups I work with. Whether I include information that is perhaps ‘off the record’ or not, this will still have an effect on how I view my other data, and interpret subsequent experiences (Ryen, 2007). This is where the ‘insider’ dimensions become clearer, as it would be impossible for me to fully understand the perspectives of the groups I am working with, since our pathways towards being involved in the water sector in Dar es Salaam are so different.

### 4.4 Reflections from the field

In terms of the internal politics and challenges faced of civil society organisations in Dar es Salaam, a vast amount of information was provided in interviews with those working for NGOs. However, my own experiences as someone who simultaneously acted as a researcher and a member of staff at these organisations can also provide nuanced and important information. Although I was acting both as a member of staff and a researcher simultaneously, it often appeared that in the eyes of TWN and WPM the former took precedent and I had
become fully embedded in these organisations, aligning with the idea of “going native” as discussed earlier in this chapter (Bryman, 2012, Tedlock, 1991). This did cause concern at times during my fieldwork, as I felt a dynamic had been created in both organisations where it had been somewhat forgotten that I was a researcher, even although I continued to make this clear. When scribbling my notes in my field notebook or writing up field diary entries in the evening, I still felt somewhat dishonest and that although these organisations knew I was a researcher they maybe had not realised exactly what I was researching.

There is a clear trajectory that is apparent in my field diary and field notebook that starts off with enthusiasm and excitement at working with these organisations which gradually becomes a tone of frustration and at times, boredom. I was regularly given documents to sit and read, which often felt like an attempt to keep me busy rather than have any measured contribution to the work of the organisation. In relation to this, although I spent a significant period of time at both organisations, in the case of WPM I was confused about what their activities actually were:

“Sat frustrated at WPM as I am sat working away and everyone else is sat reading a newspaper.” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 5th February 2014)

“Someone has literally just said to me ‘It’s Monday so no-one feels like working’. There is no boss today. Everyone has sat on youtube all morning.” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 10th February 2014)

I spent many days at WPM frustrated at my own, seemingly tokenistic work there, but also at the lack of measurable work I could see from other staff. A large amount of my annoyance undoubtedly came from my initial understanding of WPM as a dynamic organisation providing worthwhile support to Tanzanians for them to access something as vital as water, but instead staff seemed to be taking home salaries for doing little to no work. It would have been difficult to directly question individuals on this, but there is potentially the case that they were demotivated because of the perceived lack of impact of the work they were
doing, as this is something I also felt during the research period. This was additionally in stark contrast to my experiences during the pilot period of fieldwork in 2013, where in my field diary I had written “WPM were very helpful and every employee made an effort to understand my research” (Field Diary Excerpt, 14th June 2013). Although aforementioned funding issues and changes in director for WPM perhaps had an impact on these changes, in that WPM perhaps had no ongoing projects at that time, I was equally uncomfortable at the lack of urgency to find a new project, or the fact that any existing project money was being used on staff wasting time on the internet: “Some people I’ve yet to see do any work, how don’t they feel bad?!” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 19th February 2014). As previously discussed, there was a recurring theme that some believed that non-Tanzanian individuals were better at writing funding proposals, and at WPM I was asked to write a number of documents of this type. However, I was not involved in any discussion of why this particular funding was being applied for, and after writing the proposal was never given any feedback or follow-up information on what had happened to the document. Additionally, I had also written in my diary that the combination of staff present at WPM changed every day, and that after three months I was unable to keep track of anyone’s work schedules. A lack of continuity between work days replicated some of the haphazard practice I experienced at TWN, and indicated how volatile this sector can be.

My role at TWN was rather different. I was treated fully as a member of staff and although had similar tasks asked of me, such as proposal and report writing, I was always aware of the general work of the organisation and the reasons behind each individual activity:

“There’s such a different vibe at TWN, I had a long talk with the director this morning about my agenda for that day and also next week. I was able to contribute ideas and also be open about my research contacts and intentions.” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 20th March 2014)
I was given the opportunity to take part in various event planning activities, one notable example being the sensitisation workshop I attended in a small village about an hour’s drive outside of Dar es Salaam. This gave me a useful insight into the ways that these types of events are organised and the types of challenges that can arise such as finding a venue, sourcing a working vehicle to transport staff there, and finding the capital to run the event and pay attendee-sitting allowances in the first place. Although I would cautiously suggest that TWN did not seem to make much more of an impact compared to WPM during my time spent with these organisations, I found myself more forgiving of TWN as they faced far more infrastructural issues and the staff there seemed more motivated on solving the multitude of problems in Tanzania’s water sector. There were similar comments made in my field diary about days where very little productive activity seemed to happen: “We just sat around all day and all we achieved was folding of t-shirts. I really do not know if anything else happened and I wonder how often days like this occur” (Field Diary Excerpt, 26th June 2013). Both WPM and TWN had changed director between my pilot and final periods of fieldwork and were still in the process of establishing new organisational dynamics. Although I felt more involved in the work of TWN compared to WPM, at TWN there were also a number of incidents where documents that I had written had not been read by the director as he said he did not have time:

“After having pressure put on me for that report, I sent [the director] a partial version on Thursday 6th March and he has not even mentioned it again. Whether the report is no longer a priority or my attempt was not good enough I don’t know.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 15th March 2014)

Additionally, towards the end of my fieldwork with TWN I was informed that the staff there were working on a voluntary basis as there were not enough funds within the organisation to pay them. This highlighted that despite the changes in the organisation and the types of activities TWN pursued it appeared that their motivation existed on an altruistic basis and not a financial one. Although at times there were issues with the work of TWN, it occasionally appeared somewhat
excusable due to the well-meaning intentions of the staff there, and how their motivation existed on an altruistic basis and not on a financial one.

Whilst conducting interviews within Ilala and Temeke there were a number of instances that reminded me of my positionality as a white female conducting research in Tanzania. In Ilala, during interviews some respondents (customers, board members and local government) were insistent that there were no issues in the community’s water project, but these respondents asked me for money to fund the project when the interview had been completed. It was challenging at times to ensure separation between my data collection and my positionality, as there were a number of occasions where respondents asked me to become an active participant in their projects, which would have undoubtedly skewed my data and compromised the robustness of this research.

My means of access to participants in Ilala also potentially affected the data I collected. As the Mitonga Water Users Group was far more established and organised compared to the Maji Kwa Wote Project, the manager and other staff members were happy to be interviewed and also accompany me and introduce me to customers and committee members. Ironically, their time spent doing this meant that customers were unable to pay their bills as the office was empty. Additionally, the fact that the majority of participants asked me for money at the end of each interview could potentially have been a result of the management team’s selection of participating individuals, and may have provided a skewed set of information. However, I was nonetheless exposed to some of the issues with the project, as when I attempted to interview one customer, who also owned a domestic point for the project within his home. He explained that he had reported that the domestic point had been broken for a while and he had reported it to the individual who read meters for the project on a daily basis, and that nothing had been done. Although a rather positive picture had been painted of the project with regards to trust, efficiency and community relationships this example indicated there were still some issues prevalent, and calls into question how many other problems were masked by the management team during this research.
Additionally, my work with communities cannot be separated from the fact that I was asking them questions on their means of accessing water, having never experienced some of the challenges myself.

“What people are assuming are problems are just part of their lives. People have just been doing it. That is part of their life. You can't call somebody's life a challenge.” (Civil Society Organisation #4)

It appeared to be difficult to use any negative discourses such as crisis in my data collection as these situations had become reality for so many people I encountered during my research. Unable to address this theme explicitly in my interviews, I instead drew my attention to the fact that the multitude of investment in Tanzania’s water sector did not appear to be making any measurable difference, and some of the case studies in this research can indicate why. As such, earlier discussion in this chapter on how data can be collected in interviews based on not only what a respondent is saying, but the way in which they discuss a topic (Secor, 2010) is relevant here; whilst there was the potential for language and translation issues, the ways in which participants articulated their responses to particular questions revealed hidden power relations and nuances that were not immediately obvious in the initial stages of this research.

4.5 Participant observation

Cook and Crang (1995) state that:

“The basic purpose in using ethnographic methods (such as participant observation, interviewing, etc) is to understand parts of the world as they are experienced and understood in the every day lives of people who actually ‘live them out’” (Cook and Crang, 1995:4)

Thus, whilst participant observation gives participants ownership of the research process, ethnography instead reveals the hidden dynamics and
discourses that exist in participants’ lives that they may or may not themselves be conscious of. As complimentary, but not directly related, research methods, participant observation and ethnographic study can be used in combination to develop an in-depth understanding of a research setting. In the case of this research, letting TWN and WPM’s staff guide my day-to-day activity gave them a degree of ownership of the study, but in turn I observed a great deal by simply being in the organisations’ offices or simply engaging with other stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania. I was witness to meetings, chance encounters and the daily tasks of each organisation. It is important to stress here that the only participatory role played by any research participants was through introducing me to other research participants and dictating the agenda of the days I volunteered with them. In addition, there were occasional discussions with individuals at TWN and WPM about my research that encouraged me to think about my data collection differently, and highlighted other topics that research participants should be asked about. This research did not carry out an ethnography of the organisations in question, but as per Cook and Crang’s (1995) definition, considered participant observation to be part of a wider group of ethnographic research methods. As such, ethnographic study will largely be discussed in this section along with some discussion of participant observation as a review of literature of purely ethnographic research provided inspiration and guidance about how to carry out my own data collection. By carrying out the tasks asked of me by TWN and WPM’s staff as well as observing the practices and behaviours of all the individuals I encountered helped to elucidate the difference between the work these organisations wanted me to see they were doing and the more hidden parts that they had kept me away from.

Cook and Crang (1995) also note that there are a number of different research methods that work together in order to conduct an ethnography of a field site. This allows for a more holistic understanding of the field site, and reveals the social, political and economic context that interviews, for example, are conducted in. Interview data in an ethnographic study is more than a simple dialogue, but instead a means of accessing the ways in which participants interpret and navigate their own lifeworlds (Cook and Crang, 1995) and in turn allows the
researcher to compare these to their own personal interpretations. There are a number of ways in which an ethnographic study can be addressed and carried out. A combination of techniques such as interviews, participant observation and focus groups can lead to a comprehensive interpretation of a field site and a rich and nuanced set of data. Wax (from Irvine, 1998) stated that to know the exact aims of a study before beginning leads to an assumption that the results are also known, but instead an ethnography can very early on determine the research questions that are most pertinent at the time of data collection, and what participants feel are the key issues that need addressed. Wax's point is proven by Cook (from Cook and Crang, 1995) who after a pilot study of blind people’s travel experiences had to completely reassess his research questions based on his respondents’ answers. Cook prepared for interviewing respondents by assuming that their travels were based on memorised routes, and it was only after speaking to respondents he realised that the blind participants in the research navigated their lifeworlds based on a detailed memory of places. This example stresses the point of how ethnographic research can reveal a different set of discourses in a field site compared to those that are explicitly discussed by respondents involved.

Nonetheless, whilst participants will guide the researcher towards specific topics, an equal amount of information can be revealed from the topics that participants do not want to address or do not feel are important to them. This was made clear by Kurzman (1991), in a study of postgraduates who had conducted ethnographic studies of various topics and presented them to their peers in class. One student concluded that the fact that her predominantly female participants in a public employees’ union had not mentioned gender meant that this was not a topic worth paying attention to in this study. This analysis neglected to address the fact that gender could have been a problem but that there were wider processes in place that meant that participants were not aware of it (Kurzman, 1991). Nonetheless, if there is an attempt being made to make the ethnographic study participatory, then participants must be allowed some jurisdiction over the focus of the study. It is dilemmas such as this that can occur when conducting an this type of research.
As well as broader issues surrounding the focus of the study, there are also issues that can be faced in the day-to-day practicalities of conducting an ethnography. Cook and Crang (1995) suggest that the best way to begin an ethnographic study is to identify the supposed gatekeepers who are most aligned with the research project’s aims, following the belief that even if these individuals are unable to help the study they will be willing to pass the researcher onto those who will. This type of research can be altered significantly depending on which individuals or groups form a key part of the study. Davies (1999) discusses this in depth, noting that an ethnographic study can often be altered by which individuals or groups are accessible, and in turn, which ones are willing to take part in the research. This ‘self-selection’ of participants in an ethnography can perhaps prioritise the views of certain groups over others, but conversely can help to alleviate the potential power dynamics that can result from conducting research in the Global South, and in terms of conducting participatory research, give participants some ownership over the focus of the research. Moreover, Davies (1991) suggests that the selection of participants is key information that should be included in the write up of the final project.

One of the main ways in which ethnography is carried out is often through participant observation, which is the way in which data was collected for this research. Aligning with previous discussions of participatory research, participant observation as a research method can bring many of the positive means of conducting participatory research into an ethnography (Davies, 1999). There are two ways in which participant observation can be carried out, either in an overt or covert manner. Overt participant observation involves being explicit about the researcher’s role and their project’s aims, whereas covert observation results in the researcher playing an alternative role in the research setting and collecting and recording their data in secret (Bryman, 2012). I feel that my research straddles both these types of observation, employing what Fine (from Ryen, 2007) would refer to as ‘shallow cover’; explaining the role as a researcher but being vague about the exact aims of the project. This is often seen as a means of deceiving participants. Whilst I agree that a lack of knowledge of the project
can be ethically questionable (Bryman, 2012), issues of language and translation (see section 4.8 of this chapter) made it very difficult for me explain the finer details of my data collection. Taking this into account, an adapted description of the research project had to be created that was understood in Swahili and ensured that participants had a full understanding of their contribution using appropriate language.

The process of recording data in participant observation goes far beyond verbal interactions with those being studied. It is also an entirely sensory experience, and what the researcher hears, smells and touches can be as equally important to the study (Fife, 2005). The environment I volunteer in, the chairs I sit on, the facilities available to edit reports on, as well as the food served, and the 'off the record' conversations overhead all have equal importance in the field diary. Whilst civil society organisations may say to me that reports have not been written in time because they are busy or tired, I am able to assess that one working laptop to three people has just as much of an impact on their workrate. Additionally, Mosse (2005) discusses how the writing up of notes is in itself a key part of the process. The production of the field diary and the time and space the notes are written in can affect the writing up (or in fact, creation) of the data, and can impact upon how it is analysed upon return from the field. As Herndl (1991) notes, the field diary becomes a dialectic between the actual lived experiences of the researcher, and the ways in which they personally interpret them and construct them into written text.

4.6 Institutional analysis

Cook and Crang (1995) state that ethnography is essentially a means of understanding the grassroots lived experiences of people living in a variety of geographical locations. Yet ethnography has more to offer than this localised detail. Burawoy (1991:5) writes “we are interested not only in learning about a specific social situation, which is the concern of the participant, but also in learning from that social situation.” One of the key ways in which this issue has been addressed in ethnographic research in recent decades is through the use of
institutional ethnography. Originating in the writing of Dorothy Smith, she refers to institutional ethnography as “a methodological realisation of the project of writing a sociology for women” (Smith, 2001:160), as a means of using ethnographic data to assess micro and macro level processes that affect participants. Del Casino Jr. et al (2000) stated that:

“Organisations, therefore, do not simply produce geographies; they are, rather, infused with them, and these spatial ontologies and epistemologies are mapped onto their rules, procedures and practices.”

(Del Casino Jr. et al, 2000:524)

There is a clear argument for the ways in which ethnography can make a significant comment on the wider economic, social and political processes that exist and impact upon an ethnographic field site, and institutional analysis has been a means for many ethnographers to assess this. Data can be gathered on the macro-level dynamics that enhance the data discussed by Davies (1991) and the complex nature of organisations and their impact upon these dynamics. Rather than proposing institutional ethnography as a definitive method, Smith instead wished for the framework to be built upon and added to by researchers over time (Devault, 2006), allowing it to be adapted to fit a variety of research projects in a number of academic disciplines. In order to explore organisational dynamics and their wider role in the water governance structure in Tanzania, participant observation was used to analyse the geography of and power relations within institutions in this research, taking inspiration from institutional ethnography as a research method.

As previously mentioned, Smith noted that institutional ethnography arose out of writing about studies of women (Smith, 2001). As well as this, the methodological framework also adopts a Marxist ontology; by tracing the social relations participants experience in a work setting, using a Marxist understanding of ‘social relations’ as connections amongst day to day work tasks as opposed to social relationships (Devault, 2006). Instead of focusing solely on the grassroots experiences of the researcher and those being researched, this
framework concerns itself with the “social and institutional forces” (Mykhalovskiy and McCoy, 2002) that shape people’s lives. It is erroneous to assume that an institutional ethnography focuses on specific institutions, ie a hospital or prison (Smith, 2006a) (Grahame, 1998) but instead uses ethnographic data to ascertain how certain mindsets and discourses have become institutionalised and the impacts this has upon research participants.

Mykalovsiky and McCoy (2002) used institutional ethnography to discuss healthcare systems in Toronto. Through focus groups and interviews they were able to use participants’ responses to uncover the key institutionalised issues in health care for HIV/AIDS sufferers, by allowing respondents to bring up the issues that were relevant to them as well as analysing in what ways these issues were addressed in focus group or interview settings. As well as showing how this methodological framework can uncover institutional dynamics and discourses, Mykalovsiky and McCoy’s (2002) also proves how institutional ethnography can have a participatory element to it also.

Herndl (1991) notes that ethnography is an inherently textual practice, both in terms of gathering the data, and writing it up. Institutional ethnography pays attention to texts in a different way, however. Smith (2001) notes that texts can co-ordinate the practices of a workplace, whilst Devault (2006) expands on this;

“Texts such as medical charts, enrolment reports etc are mechanisms for co-ordinating activity across many different sites. Social science is sometimes a part of this co-ordinative apparatus, and perhaps as a result, we’ve tended to take this kind of textual co-ordination for granted, too often looking ‘through’ texts without noting their power”. (Devault, 2006:294)

Conducting an research into institutions involves more than just texts, however. Devault (2006) describes the process by suggesting that the researcher takes part in all of the work that is done in the setting, and makes a note of which activities are described as ‘official’ and which are not. Additionally, Cook and
Crang (1995) discuss an example of Cook’s own experience of ethnography, whereby interviews with a key participant in an organisation were often interrupted by other employees or phone calls. This allowed Cook to understand the day-to-day activities of this executive and the specific challenges or difficulties that they faced in trying to do their job. As well as this, this type of material enables the researcher to see the differences between the written texts and the actual material practices of an organisation, and perhaps elucidate what organisations perceive they do, and what their actual outputs are. In terms of my own data collection, I was involved in reading the texts produced by TWN and WPM and related stakeholders in the water sector. Additionally, I was also witness to proofreading of a number of these documents and was able to see commentary on different types of documents (such as funding proposals or monitoring and evaluation reports) from a variety of individuals involved. This not only enabled me to see the text-based work produced by these organisations, but the processes that existed behind these texts being created and edited.

Using Smith’s (2001) opinion that organisational texts are able to provide a key insight into institutional practices, given that I was often given full access to civil society organisations’ publications and in many cases, private emails, I was be able to use these texts to develop an understanding of how organisations communicated with each other. Additionally, I was able to use my data from meetings, and day to day practices to ascertain which elements of an organisation are not presented in text to other organisations, funding bodies or communities that these organisations engage with. Looking at direct communication between different organisations in the water sector in Dar es Salaam revealed the different power dynamics that exist, and the ways in which language is used to represent this.

Although the framework of institutional ethnography has gained popularity over the last few decades, there is still a degree of scepticism by some scholars. Jay (from Davies (1999) stated that the close relationships formed between the researcher and participants (especially as a result of participant observation)
means that the data collected is not reliable or objective enough to comment on cultural or social practices. Additionally, Marcus (1995) remarked that;

"The idea that ethnography might expand from its committed localism to represent a system much better apprehended by abstract models and aggregate statistics seems antiethical to its very nature and thus beyond its limits." (Marcus, 1995:99)

Whilst it is understandable to suggest that an ethnography should be able to provide a detailed description of a specific situation within space and time, in the same way that participatory research moves continually between local specificity and broader theoretical conclusions (Pain, 2007), there is a wealth of data that can be gleaned from this type of research that can speak to wider processes and discourses also, and an institutional analysis is a sufficiently appropriate way of achieving this. Detailed study of an individual organisation or event can produce information that is applicable to other spatial and temporal contexts.

In his discussion of ethnographic fieldwork in the developing world, Mosse (2008b) states that smaller development organisations do not offer a comment on global issues such as economic inequality, but by using institutional ethnography’s ability to ‘scale up’ local practices, my participant observation is able to contribute to what is perhaps a gap in the literature, and at the very least identify the role of smaller organisations in development practice and their contributions to water governance that are intrinsically linked to Tanzania’s economic development. Furthermore, Mosse (2008b) argues that it is difficult for development professionals working for these grassroots organisations to be at all reflexive on their working environment. Whilst the data collected in my fieldwork suggests this is not always necessarily the case, I believe that any interviews I conducted with NGO representatives contributed to this supposed issue, and gave civil society organisation employees an opportunity to comment on the way in which their industry operates.
Keeping in mind that my focus was not just on the civil society organisations in the water sector in Dar es Salaam but also the communities that are affected by them, I also had to consider how my research will fit in with these groups. Community residents who managed local water schemes and purchased water from them were also included in this research. Mykalovsiky and McCoy (2002) argue that in some cases, an institutional ethnography is not well suited to community-based research as the processes and individuals involved in them are not necessarily as structured as they would be in a formal setting like a school, hospital or business. However, I feel that as access to water is many areas of Dar es Salaam is increasingly becoming formalised through the creation of Community Owned Water and Sanitation Organisations (COWSOs), the impacts of the state on what was previously an informal means of organisation were be able to be assessed. For the communities in the Ilala district who are not yet, but discussing, becoming formalised COWSOs, I was able to assess how they organise themselves to provide water without official permission from the government, and the differences between their means of providing water to their locality compared to the formalised COWSOs in existence in Tembeke.

In terms of the participatory nature of my research, I felt that involving my participants in the focus of my research questions led to a richer set of data, as they were the ones who had the most comprehensive understanding of the current ways of accessing water in Dar es Salaam and therefore were able to highlight the key issues that I should cover in my data collection. Participants did not write the research questions or help prepare for interviews, but in the preliminary stages of my data collection I had some short informal conversations with members of TWN and WPM about the intentions of my research and which topics I wished to explore. Participants were able to highlight the increasingly popular phenomenon of COWSOs within Dar es Salaam, and after developing an understanding of these community-based schemes in my own time I decided to make them a focus of this thesis. Although Stoecker (from Klodawsky, 2007) warns against letting participants guide the research process, it was almost impossible for me to develop a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of water access in the city without some guidance from those who are directly
involved in it. Furthermore, through conducting an analysis of institutional differences, I was able to identify the gaps that participants have perhaps felt unimportant to include, which will alleviate Stoecker’s (from Klodawsky, 2007) concerns about reliability of data.

4.7 Interviews

The potential issues that can result from conducting participant observation have been explored in depth, and the different ways in which data could potentially be unreliable and affected by the liminality of being both an objective researcher whilst playing a participatory role in the research setting. However, supplementing this research method with another is a means of reinforcing the validity of data, and highlighting the commonalities and differences that appear in the results when using either technique. This section will consider the potential methodological challenges I experienced when conducting interviews, both in terms of the actual interview itself and the existing dynamics surrounding the interview process. Interview participants for this research were identified in a variety of ways. Interview participants in this research ranged from those working nationally to those involved in grassroots village water projects. Interviews were used as a complimentary technique to my participant observation to elucidate such information on water governance in Tanzania.

Some participants were contacted due to the role they played in the water sector in Tanzania, based on my knowledge of conducting research into water in Tanzania since 2010. Snowball sampling was also sometimes used to find interview participants. By asking one participant to introduce other civil society organisations who would be happy to contribute to the research, this technique helped me as a researcher gain trust in the field (Valentine, 2005), something which was extremely pertinent here as I am not from Dar es Salaam and thus have a limited number of connections there. When interviewing the Ministry of Water and street officers, purposive sampling (Ritchie et al, from Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:79) was instead used, as these respondents will have been specifically chosen for their role in Dar es Salaam’s water provision. Upon
introduction, respondents were shown a statement of information that suits their language competency\(^{13}\) acknowledging as a researcher the varying cultural and linguistic identities evident within the city.

Hoggart et al (2002:190) cautioned that interviews are fundamentally an imposition on respondents, so a time convenient to each respondent was agreed upon with the assumption that each interview will last no more than one hour. Interview questions were formulated based on the conceptual framework of the study and the key issues that the research hoped to cover, and were tailored to suit each respondent's role in the city's water provision. Open ended questions were used so that respondents' answers can be full and detailed and can cover the topics they wish (Kitchin and Tate, 2000:213), and interviews started with 'safer' questions so that the interviewee can feel comfortable (Lindsay, 1997:41). As shown by the documents included in the appendices, respondents were made aware that they are allowed to opt-out of this research at any time. The use of open-ended questions allowed me to tailor my interview style to suit who was being interviewed (Rapley, from Seale et al, 2007:18), and in the event of a respondent unexpectedly vetoing a line of questioning (Lindsay, 1997:40), it gave me the scope to alter the conversation towards collecting the data needed. Questions attempted to be clear and understandable, and as recommended by Briggs (from Hoggart et al, 2002) took into account the communicative issues that may be felt as a result of a language barrier. Interview questions were discussed in advance of interviews with my translator in order to anticipate any issues around understanding and mistranslation.

Some literature has lauded the use of a tape recorder during interviews, as they provide a detailed record of the interview to return to at a later time (Rapley, from Seale et al, 2007:18) and can allow the interviewer to spend time engaging with a fast paced conversation instead of constantly taking notes (Kitchin and Tate, 2000:218). Whilst this technique could have been problematic in this research as a result of the language barrier, and it may have made respondents nervous (Rapley, from Seale et al 2007:18), all respondents were extremely

\(^{13}\) These documents can be found in the appendices of this thesis.
willing to be recorded. To supplement this and alleviate any chance of technical error handwritten notes were also taken during interviews and then annotated and expanded upon afterwards, as recommended by Kitchin and Tate (2000:218). Interviews were then transcribed upon return from the field and cross-referenced with the handwritten notes.

Once again, my positionality as a researcher is related to these challenges. There has been significant debate surrounding whether to remain objective or not in the context of an interview, as whilst neutrality can reduce bias in data analysis, without building a rapport it is possible that certain information will not be disclosed by the interviewee (Rapley, 2007). This is an issue relevant to my research, as the close relationships I formed with those working for civil society organisations within Tanzania will undoubtedly had an impact on my interpretation of those interviews. Moreover, considering the time taken by interview respondents out of their day to answer my questions, it feels somewhat ungrateful for me to be outwardly critical of their activity in the water sector; unless I can frame it around direct quotes from respondents. As a way of ensuring that this research remained a robust and valid piece of work, I ensured that relevant pieces of information were included in order to provide an honest and accurate response to the research questions set, and only left out data that was either potentially specific enough that it could compromise a respondents’ employment or was irrelevant to the main themes included in this thesis.

There are a number of issues related to access to participants when conducting research in a culturally different setting (Herod, 1999). Access is something of a complex element of fieldwork, and there is the constant fear that it can be withdrawn at any time (Smith, 2006b). I have been to Tanzania four times now and have built up a network of connections, yet I was still unavoidably reliant on a few individuals who acted as gatekeepers to my research participants, which came with a set of potential risks. If there is a significant reliance on one or two gatekeepers, the researcher is left feeling that they must keep on these individuals’ ‘good side’ whether they agree with their involvement in the research topic or not. Although I would not say I outright disagreed with any of
the activities of the Director of TWN, I was often conscious of keeping her happy (responding to emails promptly, offering her cups of tea, etc) in order to ensure she does not cut off my access to a large part of the water sector in Dar es Salaam. Between my pilot period of fieldwork (from June-July 2013) and my final period of fieldwork (January-April 2014) the director of TWN changed which in turn, significantly altered the dynamics of my role as a researcher at the organisation. The first individual was less willing to link me to other individuals in the water sector in Tanzania and was selective about which elements of TWN’s work that I encountered, whereas the director in the 2014 research period was far more open and keen to introduce me to TWN’s member organisations as well as any other relevant individuals within the water sector in Tanzania. This indicated the importance of a gatekeeper in accessing research participants and also proved how the co-operation and personality of that gatekeeper can have a significant impact on the outcome of a research project.

Valentine (from Scheyvens et al, 2003) warns that gatekeepers can skew the data collected by only introducing the researcher to individuals they want them to speak to. Whilst I do not feel I have been presented with a particularly selective view of the water sector in Dar es Salaam, my overreliance on a small number of individuals for access to participants may have had some subtle impacts on my data. Nonetheless, interviewing every individual involved in the water sector would have been impossible to conduct within the time available, and through contacting organisations of different size, age and structure served to ensure a representative sample was included.

As a young woman conducting research on my own in Tanzania, there were a number of opportunities for gendered dynamics to impact on the interview process. Herod (from Mullings, 1999) argues that whilst gender alone can impact upon the research process, assumptions surrounding gender can also affect how the interview is constructed and carried out. McDowell’s (from Smith, 2006b) research into workplace culture exemplifies this, as she explains that when interviewing men she found herself ‘playing dumb’, with older women she was efficient and business like and with women of her own age treated them as friends. I have found the same in both interviews and other means of data
collection, and have upon reflection, noticed myself playing these varying roles almost unintentionally. As in some cases I was interviewing people I had already formed relationships with (i.e. at the civil society organisations I will be working with) I had to think carefully when conducting interviews about how to navigate this complex relationship. Interviewees were given the same set of questions as respondents who I had met for the first time, and if the conversation took a more interpersonal tone I made every effort to alter the dynamic of the conversation back to discussing my research questions. Interviews do not only reveal what respondents wish to say on a particular topic, but also how they talk about that particular topic (Secor, 2010). As such, as much information could be gained from what respondents did not say, as well as the exact sentences that were recorded. Combined with the other data collected in this research, interview transcripts became part of the bigger picture surrounding the complexity of water provision in Tanzania.

In the way that Secor (2010) discusses interviews as conversations, she also refers to focus groups as another form of conversation as a means of data collection. In addition, focus groups are able to highlight the gaps between respondents’ views and actions (Conradson, 2005), between what they say and what actually happens in practice. Although it was never the intention to include focus groups as method in this research, it was often the case that customers or board members of COWSOs preferred to be interviewed in groups and as such, many interviews became ‘group interviews’ or focus groups during this research14. Conradson (2005) recommends setting up groups on the basis of homogeneity (through age, gender, class, etc) but in this instance groups were formed on the basis of their role in the community water project, either as an employee, committee member or a customer. When I approached an individual customer for example, to ask if they would be willing to participate in my research, often they were accompanied by others during this exchange and all individuals present would then agree to participate, and the group interview would begin. Across all the different groups studied, focus groups were generally

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14 This is a common occurrence during research in Tanzania and this situation had occurred on a number of occasions during previous my research experiences in Dar es Salaam.
between 4 and 8 participants in size, in line with the recommendation of between four and twelve participants by Secor (2010). Focus groups are often praised for their ability to allow topics to be debated within groups and for a dialogue to be created on a particular topic (Conradson, 2005; Secor, 2010). In Ilala and Temeke, they allowed the various groups involved in running water provision to come together and discuss the various issues surrounding their day to day role in the community water scheme. This not only provided a format for these groups to provide information, but by reaching consensus on their opinions also increased the validity of their responses. Whilst focus groups have also been critiqued for allowing a few dominant members to control the opinions of the group, every effort was made by myself and my translator to ensure that every participant spoke, and no one participant was able to speak a disproportionate amount compared to the other individuals present. In addition Secor (2010) recommends that focus groups last around two and a half hours, but as I was conscious that for respondents to participate in my research they were taking time away from their work (and ability to earn money) I did not hold any focus groups that lasted longer than an hour. This meant that I was able to gain enough information from each group without making a significant imposition on their day. Conradson (2005) warns that focus groups should not be used as a fast solution to instead conducting a series of individual interviews, but if participants wished to be spoken to in groups and it was already taking time away from their daily work it seemed pragmatic to collect data in a form of a focus group rather than potentially risk none of the participants willing to participate at all.

4.8 Interviewing elites

The power dynamics that exist and oscillate in interviews must be considered also, as they can often intrinsically linked to other aspects of the research process (Ryen, 2007). Although Madge (writing in 1993, from Scheyvens and Storey, 2003) argues that academics have yet to fully consider the power relations that exist between those researching and those being researched, in recent years there has been a turn towards focusing on these dimensions.
Feminist thought has used positionality to explore in depth the power relations that exist in research (Eubanks, 2012), and argues that exploring these can elucidate the hidden dynamics that could exist in something such as an interview setting (Smith, 2007).

Power dynamics are most explicit when interviewing ‘elites’, something which I have had significant experience of when interviewing those who work for larger international NGOs or the Ministry of Water. When conducting research in the Global South, it is often assumed that the relationship between the researcher and their participants is an exploitative one (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003), and that those being researched are simply powerless. The process of interviewing elites in the Global South particularly is worth focus as explained by Gabriel (2000) who states that there is a perceived sense of power related to whiteness, the researcher is in fact the inferior one in this relationship. This can result in a multitude of impacts. Yeager and Kram (from Welch et al, 2002) noted that as the interview setting when researching an elite actor can often be somewhat hostile, they found themselves altering the focus of the interview to the topics the interviewee wished to discuss. This is an understandable coping mechanism within this difficult research situation, but calls into question the reliability of this data and the critical nature of the interview in general. Additionally, interviewees in positions of authority may only respond to questions using the rhetoric recommended by their organisation (Gabriel, 2000), which makes it difficult to obtain any data that could not also be found on a website or in a written publication. Conversely, Smith (2006b) explained that organisations were the most candid with them, whilst lower level employees were more determined to assert their authority in the interview setting. I had similar experiences when conducting my research in Dar es Salaam, with certain individuals. As a researcher who was clearly not Tanzanian, I often had a lot of respondents in positions of power spending the first few minutes of the interview speaking to me in a rather explanatory way. Some respondents were very keen to explain to me the basic facts surrounding the water sector in Tanzania, and had assumed that as I was not Tanzanian I would not already know this information. It often took me a while and a particular line of
questioning before a respondent was willing to discuss the nuanced dynamics of the water sector or provide me with any insightful information. This is not to suggest that those somewhat explanatory interview responses were not still useful pieces of data, however. As the interviews were used as a complementary technique to other research methods, the validity of the responses from these individuals was able to be correlated with other data, and if the respondent had not provided an accurate response with regards to their organisation, their reason for not being truthful was able to be considered a finding in itself.

As I was conducting research in a culture entirely different to my own, it is worth making note of Sabot’s (1999) experiences of conducting research in recently devolved Scotland. As a French woman, Scottish people were very keen to explain their new political format to someone from a different country, and the number of quasi-governmental organisations she was working with wanted their opinion heard and recorded to add to their legitimacy. This is something I have experienced in Tanzania, especially within the context of the several organisations and other stakeholders involved in water provision in the city, and highlights how being from a different country could in some ways be advantageous in overcoming this ‘elite’ power dynamic. As previously mentioned, whilst some respondents wished to provide me with basic facts on the water sector in Tanzania, others took this an opportunity to engage with someone from a different country about Tanzanian culture, and this made them more than willing participants to my research.

Whilst there is a belief within Economic Geography that displaying knowledge of the role of the elite you are researching can be advantageous to the interview (Mullings, 1999) it was often very difficult for me to do that and it would have felt in many cases like I was coming across as precocious. As well as this, as a visitor to Dar es Salaam it was often assumed that I had no previous knowledge of even basic aspects of the water system in the city, which often led to interviews being incredibly base-level and key issues being ignored. However, it could be the case that the discourse surrounding exploitative research (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003) has exacerbated these power plays, and in some
cases ‘elites’ were seeking to reclaim authority they feel has been taken away from them by the West.

It is however, important to problematise what is meant by the term ‘elite’ (Smith, 2006b). Woods, from (Ward and Jones, 1999) defines the term as a word used broadly to describe those in a situation who are supposedly more powerful than another individual or group in this setting, yet it is often very difficult to determine who ‘holds the power’ in many situations (Smith, 2006b) (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). There can be the power dynamics that exist as a result of wealth or education, and the dynamics that exist as a result of certain individuals in the research process feeling inferior to others for a multitude of reasons (Scheyvens et al, 2003). In my experience this is often the case, as there were a number of power relationships present that can even alter throughout the course of the day. The Director of TWN has been a veritable (yet helpful) gatekeeper for both my Masters and PhD research, introducing me to other civil society organisations and inviting me to high profile meetings with her, so in this instance, she held more power than me. Sometimes, however, she would ask me to proofread some reports for her or rewrite some documents to help her improve her English, and thus the power dynamic shifted. Additionally, when in a room full of many people (other members of TWN, members of other organisations) other relationships are made clear; the Director clearly had an influence over the other employees of TWN but was often made to feel inferior by someone from the Ministry of Water or a larger international NGO, for example. Therefore, the myriad of power relations must therefore be considered when considering the data collected in this research. As well as this, Ward and Jones’ (1999) suggestion of considering the broader structures in place that formulate these power relations, as well as Smith’s (2006b) and Scheyven and Storey’s (2003) belief in a poststructural understanding of power must also be acknowledged.

4.9 Textual analysis
As noted by Mitchell (2003), “discourse helps to set the social context within which social practices occur and are given meaning”, and the importance of institutions in manifesting these discourses must also be considered (Mills, 1997) (Chilton and Schäffner, from Van Dijk, 2011). Taking into account Mitchell's (from Aitken, 2005) view that a sole focus on texts may take away understandings of the material world, but can also be used to understand power structures in place, this research used textual analysis as a complementary technique to other research methods in order to examine these power structures whilst connect these findings to empirics from said material world. The initial texts included in this research were the main Tanzanian water policy documents used to frame contemporary water policy, alongside any additional documents produced on the water sector by the Tanzanian state in conjunction with this policy framework. As well as this, documents produced by the Tanzanian state on the broader issue of poverty reduction involving all sectors were also analysed. These documents were reviewed in order to make sense of the current water policy framework in operation in Tanzania and how consistent it was across a number of documents, including Tanzania's wider poverty reduction initiatives. Additional texts involved in this research varied from reports and conference papers given to me to read by other employees of TWN and WPM, to documents they asked me to write as part of my role as a volunteer at each organisation. These ranged from funding proposals to project concepts and in the case of TWN, a newsletter. Aitken (2005) discusses the multitude of items that can be referred to as a ‘text’. As such, every leaflet, report, email, or conference paper encountered during my fieldwork was gathered as data and analysed accordingly. Including a wide range of documents allowed for analysis of consensus within the direction of Tanzania’s water sector, and the potential reasons for a shift in discourse and the origins of influence in the country's water governance.

Although Rose (2001) praised discourse analysis for producing a set of quantitative results that could perhaps be hidden within vast amounts of data, as this project was entirely qualitative in nature it instead attempted to unpack the text used in these documents, and uncover the hidden meanings behind what is
said. Stubbs (1983) stated that there was no clear-defined method to conduct discourse analysis, so after consulting literature on the topic I devised my own method based on others’ previous experiences that suited my analysis best. Following the advice of Rose (2001) I initially read the texts several times without taking notes, familiarising myself with the broader arguments before analysis. Then, emulating the technique used by Stubbs (1983) I attempted to summarise these arguments in around two hundred words per document, which allowed a brief comparison to be made over their content and viewpoints on water governance in Tanzania. Once I felt that I had a clear understanding of each document, specific arguments made by each were then selected and used for in-depth analysis.

4.10 Translation and language issues

As well as previously mentioned issues, one of the major logistical barrier to conducting interviews was the use of a translator when engaging with respondents who did not speak English. Translation on the whole can be deeply politicised and problematic for the research process. Spivak (from Muller, 2007) argues that translation is in fact a political act, and the ways in which words and phrases are transformed from one language to another can make more of a statement than the words themselves. Whilst it is broadly understood as the literal replacement of words between two languages, it is often much more than this.

The interview setting involving a translator itself can provide a set of issues. Herod, (1999) remarked that the use of a translator in an interview can often be very tiring, as it can add an extra layer of communication to the research process. I have significant experience of this, and as such, understood that a good working relationship with a translator was essential for effective data collection. Whilst Scheyvens (from Scheyvens and Storey, 2003) remarked that lengthy discussions

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15 Such as Sharp (1993;2003; Bryceson et al, 2009; Fine, 2009).
16 In his research, Stubbs (1983) gave a group of adults a short story by Ernest Hemingway and asked them to read the story and summarise the plot firstly in less than sixty words, and then in less than twenty-five words.
in a language she didn’t understand were often reduced to one sentence by her respondents when translating for her, I have had experiences of the translator doing this instead and appropriating their own filter on the respondents’ answers. I have on several occasions watched a respondent speak for almost five minutes then be given three words as a response from my translator. This is where the translation process becomes politicised. Whilst Delamont (2007) notes that informants can often alter responses based on what they think the researcher wants to hear, in my experience the translator can play as much of a role in this, and this is a dynamic that is difficult for the researcher to overcome.

Translation and language, can also have an impact on a setting where participant observation is being conducted. In terms of being considered an insider or not, whilst I was invited to have my meals with those working at civil society organisations, more often than not they spoke in Swahili and only translated into English intermittently. There were a number of reasons for this, some of which have been explained for me and others which I have interpreted myself. Often those working for civil society organisations (and in fact, other Tanzanians) have explained that with English being their third language it is often very tiring for them to speak in it all of the time. As well as this, other employees often (jokingly) remarked to me that the more they speak Swahili around me, the quicker I will learn and be able to speak it with them. However, sometimes after a lengthy discussion in Swahili they will turn to me and say ‘Did you know this?’, often followed by a secret or some sort of gossip about the water sector in Dar es Salaam. I sometimes got the impression that the discussion in Swahili is far richer in ‘gossip’ than they actually translate for me, and perhaps sometimes the discussion is surrounding whether they should tell me this information or not, although this could also have been my own paranoia. (Scheyvens et al, 2003) also found this however, when conducting fieldwork in the Soloman Islands and noted that women would discuss a topic at length amongst themselves and then respond her in a short, and in her opinion, edited, sentence, so perhaps my worries about being excluded from information during my data collection were not unfounded.
As well as this, the specificities of language can also become problematic. Herod (1999) uses an example of this where when conducting research in Honduras he initially thought a respondent was discussing apples, then only later on in the interview realised they were discussing housing policy due to the similarity of some words in the Spanish language. Although I am aware of some of the cultural dynamics of the Swahili language, such as which greetings to use in certain situations, it was often challenging to understand a lot of the nuanced elements of the language, and I initially often misunderstand the true meaning of what was being said by a respondent. This coupled with the extra level of translation by a translator and their own politics could potentially have made confidence in the research data very difficult. However, being prepared for these issues led to me coming up with creative ways of asking questions, in an attempt to tease out some of these linguistic complexities. Even for those Tanzanians that spoke English, at times respondents did not take the same meanings from sentences as I did, which meant that I had to alter my sentence construction and some of the words that I used in order to ensure that my interview respondents and I were discussing the same topic. Having been conducting research in Tanzania since 2010, this was something that I was prepared for and was able to adjust my language accordingly with ease.

Of course, whilst the interview itself is fraught with potential methodological issues, the environment it takes place in can have a significant impact on the data that is collected. Rapley (2007) refers to an experience where he conducted an interview in a coffee shop and when the interview turned to a personal topic (the interviewee’s sexuality) he began to talk in hushed tones. This is something I took note of when conducting my own interviews. I entered the field concerned that members of civil society organisations may be unwilling to discuss the issues within the organisation if others are in earshot, and likewise within the COWSOs, members of the community may not be honest if people from the COWSO are there. However, I used these initial concerns to mitigate any of these issues arising, by interviewing members of NGOs and civil society organisations in a room by themselves, and interviewing different COWSO members within
their own groups\footnote{The three main groups within COWSOs, board members, staff and customers were each interviewed separate from each other. Whilst some customers were interviewed together (in the form of a focus group), customers were never interviewed near any staff or board members.} helped to alleviate the potential for data to be impacted by the surrounding environment. As many of my interview respondents provided me with openly critical information on the institutions they were being questioned about, this made me confident that they had provided honest responses to my questions.

There are also a lot of elements of Swahili that can make me feel more included and thus more ‘inside’ the research setting. This is something I have especially found during my latter trips to Tanzania. Being told I no longer need to use greetings that show respect and instead use ones typically used between friends made me feel more included and that I have been able to form a bond with this person. Additionally, whilst many foreigners visiting Tanzania are often referred to as mzungu (which effectively means a white person or a European), during my pilot research period I was told that ‘you are no longer mzungu, you are mzungu mtaani’ which translates as ‘traveller of the street’ and was used to suggest that I was increasingly becoming ‘Tanzanian’ and had adapted well to Tanzanian culture. Instances like this can often be a clear indicator for me of when it is appropriate to ask certain questions, or when I have become accepted by one of the groups I am working with. This however became problematic as I became concerned that I was no longer being seen as someone conducting research, as discussed previously in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

\section*{4.11 Analysing and interpreting my data}

Notes from the field were written up immediately upon return to my accommodation in Tanzania, and any interview recordings checked to ensure the file worked properly. Upon return from the field, interviews were transcribed in full and then cross-referenced with the notes taken at the time the data was collected. There are various levels of detail that can be used when transcribing an interview (Crang, 2005). In the case of this research, any speech by myself or the interviewee was recorded verbatim, but any other occurrences that took
place during the interview (such as the respondents’ colleague knocking on the door, or a phone ringing) were not included as they were either not relevant to the research, or recording this information would have felt ethically questionable as the voices being recorded were not addressing the interviewee directly.

Secor (2010) writes that:

“Coding can be a systematic process in which themes, words, phrases and interpretations are flagged within and across focus group and interview transcripts.” (Secor, 2010:202)

For those inherently personal reflections from the field already discussed in this chapter, time was taken to review these thoughts after I had been back in the United Kingdom for a few months, to see if these were accurate representations or statements made loaded with my emotions at the time of writing. As such, I took the time to critically reflect on my own field diary and field notebook entries and situated my writing within the context of the fieldwork period, in order to ensure that I was still able to produce a robust and reflexive piece of research. Initially, I used the technique of ‘open coding’ discussed by Crang (2005) where field diary entries and interview transcripts were read through and emerging topics and themes were noted down for further coding once all the relevant themes to this research had been identified. The data recorded in my field diary and notebook were therefore coded in the same manner as all of the other data included in this thesis. Coding themes were identified across all interview transcripts, field diary entries and documents analysed in order to triangulate all of these different forms of data in order to answer the questions set in this research. By creating categories based upon what Kitchin and Tate (2000:235) refer to as “the most logical or implicit classes” this allowed the analysis to focus on each individual theme so that a true understanding of each aspect of this research can be understood and demonstrated. As explained by Crang (2005), there is no comprehensive and absolute way to analyse qualitative data and it must be done so in a way that fits the relevant research questions.
Taking this into account, data was coded based on a small number of codes to fit the main research questions of this thesis, which were then further divided into a series of sub-codes.

4.12 Ethics

It is important to fully examine the ethical implications of one’s fieldwork, and even if there is no means to alleviate them at least acknowledge their importance and potential impact. All respondents or individuals involved in my ethnographic research were informed that I was a researcher from the United Kingdom and was interested in water governance in Tanzania. When appropriate, respondents were shown a document explaining my research in detail, and a consent form for them to sign and give permission to be part of my data collection. Throughout the research process, no remuneration was offered to research participants, with the only expense on my behalf being the purchase of a soft drink if the interview was taking place in a cafe or restaurant. There were a few occasions where respondents asked to be paid to be part of the research process, and they were not interviewed or involved in ethnographic study as a result.

The risks involved for participants are a necessary consideration, especially if their job title and organisation could make them easily identifiable (Secor, 2010). Therefore all research participants have been anonymised to the best of my abilities, with all NGOs interviewed for this research given numbers and those interviewed in Temeke and Ilala only referred to by their role in the community based water scheme (ie customer, board member or employee). As well as this, the organisations involved in the observational part of this research have been given synonyms and their identity protected as much as possible through the omission of the location of their office and the names of their employees. Those who were interviewed in the capacity of either national or local governance institutions were only referred to by the specific institution where they worked,  

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18 At times where there were language difficulties or the respondent had only a limited time available to participate, verbal consent was given by respondents.
with their job title and name omitted. In addition, this research complies with the Economic and Social Research Council’s ethical guidelines in order to ensure the research is a valid and ethnically sound piece of work. As is custom, all respondents were informed that I would destroy all raw data after the research is written up, and the only data that will be public will be that which is included in the final report.

Scheyvens et al (2003) remarked that researchers are often faced with the dilemma over whom they feel obligated to. Undoubtedly, my bias will always lie with the communities (both formal and informal) working hard to provide water within their localities, and it seems the majority of my critique of water provision in Dar es Salaam will be involving the civil society organisations and NGO employees that I will have built sustained relationships with over the course of my PhD. These are the groups that have not only introduced me to the individuals and groups that have been essential to my data collection, but during my time as a Scottish woman in Tanzania have looked after me as a visitor, as an employee and as a friend. However, as noted by Herod (1999), it is often the easiest to maintain a critical distance from those you are least sympathetic to. Therefore it was admittedly difficult for me to have confidence in my data based on my own personal feelings, and reinforces the concerns about ‘going native’ and the pertinence of considering positionality, especially when conducting participant observation (Delamont, 2007).

Additionally, when it comes to the completion of this thesis it is more than likely that those that ask to read the document will be within the latter group (especially noting the fact that many members of the communities I work with will not speak English), and could result in many feeling I have betrayed them and in the worst case, ending friendships. Myers’ (from Phillips and Johns, 2012) ethnographic research in Africa left him unsure what information he was being told was public knowledge, and what he was being told in confidence. This was a constant dilemma I was faced with in the field and during writing this thesis, and returning to Ryen’s (2007) point that you cannot forget what you have been told perhaps in confidence, it is impossible for me to separate these interactions into
data or socialising. Being true to my data but also reflecting on memories of the individuals who have made me feel so welcome in Tanzania throughout the fieldwork process was a difficult conflict to overcome.

4.13 Conclusion

Jupp (2007) states that;

“Whilst social science research might aim at producing shared “spaces of thoughtfulness and imagination” as Thrift (2003) suggests, these are also likely to be spaces of uncertainty, and sometimes difficult negotiations between different subjectivities, knowledges and representations, both for the researcher and the researched.” (Jupp, 2007:2841)

I feel that using participatory research methods helped to alleviate these potential “spaces of uncertainty” (Jupp, 2007:2841), as it has given the participants involved in my fieldwork ownership over the research process, and allowed me to collect data that not only speaks from their point of view but can be scaled up to address the wider theoretical questions that will be included in my final thesis. A noted by Cook and Crang (1995), an ethnographic study is not geared towards producing positivistic data, but instead about uncovering “intersubjective truths” (Cook and Crang, 1995). By exploring research participants’ own interpretations and reflexivity over their own lives and including my own analysis of this data, this research project has addressed this inter-subjectivity, and attempted to provide a fully comprehensive study of the dynamics of the water sector in Dar es Salaam.

Whilst it is useful to consider in depth the methodology of a research project, it still seems difficult to ascertain the most ethical means of collecting data as a Western researcher in the Global South. There are still a great deal of assumptions that need to be made by the researcher on a number of unknown truths, making any idea of reflexivity in the research process problematic (Rose, from Smith, 2006b). Woods’ (from Ward and Jones, 1999) argument for a
A poststructuralist understanding of the term elite can in fact be applied to this whole chapter, as often it is difficult to explain firstly the structures that exist and then in turn, what created them in the first place. Perhaps this ambiguity is what makes this form of research unique, however, as whilst focusing on a specific topic (in my case, access to water in Dar es Salaam) it can also help provide a useful contribution to wider debates within Postcolonialism and Feminism, amongst other academic fields. There may not be a ‘correct’ position to be in as a white researcher (Gabriel, 2000), but the flexibility of this allows a number of different roles to be taken on in the field that can lead to a set of rich and nuanced data. I would argue that it has been almost impossible for me to remain neutral in any means of data collection in this thesis. Even a brief encounter with someone at the Ministry of Water was fraught with politics, as I was still a young, white, female researcher from another country and could have been perceived to be attempting to research something more sinister than I was. Therefore I feel any discussions of objectivity should be framed around how this relates to my own personal politics and those I interact with through my research, and like Letherby (2000:104) I do believe that ‘being critical of my involvement results in a more fuller picture’. This chapter has explored the specific methods used in order to address the research questions in this thesis, and the ethical implications related to these. Secor (2010) notes that data analysis must be linked up to wider theoretical debates in order to be seen as valid. The following chapters will therefore address this, in order to attempt to connect the data collected in Tanzania to wider theoretical debates in water governance and international development.
Chapter 5: Water Policy and Governance in Dar es Salaam

5.1 Introduction

According to Lein and Tagseth (2009), Tanzanian water policy explains that water belongs to the state and all residents who want to access water from one of the country’s rivers or streams must obtain an official right from the Tanzanian state to do so. However, as small and large scale private providers of water gain increasing prominence within the water governance framework in Tanzania, at the same time growing responsibility is placed on grassroots communities to manage and provide their own water. It is clear that a state-owned centralised method of water governance is no longer in place. Instead, a pluralistic policy environment now exists in Tanzania, where a variety of means of provision and interpretations of water’s value are currently in place for residents to navigate whilst trying to access water for their own basic survival.

This chapter will provide a conceptual background for the data collected in this research with regards to water policy discourse and practice in Tanzania. Commissioned in 1995 in order to examine this relationship, the Helleiner Report made recommendations such as avoiding the duplication of parallel projects and the active incorporation of civil society organisations into project planning and implementation, as well as clearly defining the roles of each stakeholder involved (Helleiner Report, 1995, from Wangwe, 2002). As such, these themes and others will be examined in this chapter through the use of a discourse analysis of several water policy and other related documents, also supplemented by observational and interview data. The key policy documents involved in water governance in Tanzania will be discussed at length in this chapter. Alongside other documents produced by the Tanzanian state since 1991, the key themes prevalent in these documents will be assessed, supplemented by empirical data that indicates how these policy discourses have manifested in reality.
Edwards (2014) explains that:

“For a long time scholars, analysts and aid officials had argued that the absence of well-defined property rights was a fundamental problem in Tanzania – and in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, for that matter.” (Edwards, 2014:222)

Taking this into account, it is useful to examine the ways in which water provision in Tanzania has been affected by the transfer of water ownership to the grassroots level, and whether the formalisation of this means of access is the panacea to Tanzania’s water problems. The chapter begins with an explanation of the conceptual framework used to analyse the direction of Tanzanian water policy and the ways in which the country’s socio-political history have impacted upon it. Tanzania’s socialist past under Julius Nyerere is examined, and how the country’s political history has affected contemporary policy discourses. The chapter continues with an analysis of Tanzanian water policy documents, before moving on to further analysis of other related documents that inform Tanzanian policy, such as each poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) produced by the Government of Tanzania. The chapter then moves on to discuss other documents produced on the water sector in Tanzania by external stakeholders, before discussion of the current discourse of community water provision in Tanzania. Finally, the chapter discusses different understandings and interpretations of Tanzania’s water policy amongst different stakeholder groups, before reaching a conclusion to the chapter.

5.2 Contextualising Water Governance in Tanzania

Molyneux’s (2008) research in Latin America noted that ‘neoliberalism’ is too general a description for the varying economic forms of governance being practiced there. As such, taking into account the key tenets of this economic doctrine, as well as the messy and hybrid forms of governance that can materialise from it, it is necessary to consider how this has played out in Tanzania, with respect to this country’s specific political and economic history.
Like many others, the Tanzanian state faced pressure from international donors to privatisate their water, including an explicit refusal from the World Bank to provide any further financial assistance until the country's water provision had been placed under private control.

Tanzania's water falling into a state of disrepair has been attributed by some to the country's first postcolonial president, Julius Nyerere's "failed experiment in socialism" (Rice, 2007). After The Arusha Declaration of 1967, promoting "equality, self-reliance, ‘traditional’ African communal values, and the virtues of education and hard work" (Sharp, 2013:22), water was provided to residents for free by the state up until 1991, until the infrastructure in place could not keep up with rapid population growth. Tanzania was in a dire economic situation, as in 1991, according to a World Bank Development Report, its Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was just under $100, with only one country at that time (Mozambique) having a lower GNP than Tanzania (Edwards, 2014).

Nonetheless, when Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, came into office in 1985, a large proportion of Nyerere's socialist ideals were abandoned, with a conscious move towards the free market and privatisation taking place (Sharp, 2011). To describe Nyerere's values as a "failed experiment" (Rice, 2007) is erroneously polemical however, as they had a significant impact on Tanzania's economic development and adoption of market-led values. Tanzania's conversion to the free market lagged behind its East African counterpart Kenya, and a number of Mwalimu Nyerere's values and teachings are still prevalent today.

Privatisation of the former capital, Dar es Salaam's poorly performing water system was a precondition for Tanzania to qualify for the World Bank and IMF's Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (Bayliss, 2003). After the failure of several private companies to extend provision and the inability to profit from Tanzania's water sector, Dar es Salaam's water was transferred to the control of a public limited company in 2003. Kjellen's research of water vending in Dar es Salaam, published in 2000, stated that at this time less than half of the city's
households were under the jurisdiction of the municipal system. Conversely, compared to the economic situation in 1991, Tanzania has gone through somewhat of an economic recovery, with Gross Domestic Product increasing by 58.1% between 1990 and 2010 (Edwards, 2014:2). Robinson et al (2011) argue that this economic growth is largely due to the increase of market led thinking in Tanzanian governance.

Water as an economic resource does not only contradict Tanzania’s socialist history but its religious and cultural values also;

"Neoliberal conceptions of water inscribed in international water agreements and national water governance strategies that focus on its economic value collide with constructions of water as a “free” good provided by nature, with traditional valuations of water as a religious/cultural symbol.” (Wilder and Lankao, 2006:1978)

Mosse (2008a) discusses how in India water symbolises divinity and power, whilst in Tanzania, Potkanski’s (1994) research into the Maasai community found that this East African tribe viewed water as a gift from God that cannot be owned by an individual person. Additionally, Abdel-Gawad’s (2007) research into Muslim communities in Egypt revealed that water is seen as a gift from Allah. As Tanzania also has a significant Muslim population it is clear that both Muslim and Christian views of water do not align with ideas of water being a commodity that can be purchased and owned by an individual.

Tanzania has one of the fastest growing populations in the world, with its national population predicted to be 276 million by 2100 making it one of the globe’s most populous countries (Fisher, 2013). Additionally, in 1996 it was estimated that 85% of Dar es Salaam’s population lived in unplanned or unserviced settlements (Kanza and Ndesamburo, 1996). Increased population growth, urban sprawl and a lack of infrastructural upgrading in the city will have undoubtedly worsened this figure leaving a larger proportion of the city’s residents without access to basic services;
“Among the many challenges confronting Dar es Salaam’s residential areas, lack of access to improved water sources is arguably the most enduring, problematic and important. As a result of the water system’s low production capacity, high rates of leakage, and limited coverage, the vast majority of the city’s households regularly struggle to meet their daily water needs.” (Dill and Crow, 2014:189)

The Water Resources Management Act of 2009 supported a wholesale formalisation of peri-urban and rural water provision, naming previous informal community-based ‘Community Owned Water and Sanitation Organisations’ (COWSOs). Perhaps based on de Soto and World Bank rhetoric surrounding formalisation, the most notable change is further levels of bureaucratisation for these groups but with a continued requirement for them to acquire start up and maintenance capital by themselves. Contradicting this, the 2009 Act also recognises safe drinking water as a basic human right, even although the majority of the population does not have a household connection to a water system (Dill and Crow, 2014).

The informal sector in Dar es Salaam continues to have an important role to play in the majority of residents accessing their water, as discussed by Solo (1999) and Kjellen, (2000). As previously discussed, the issues of high pricing experienced by informal sector customers are undoubtedly prevalent in Dar es Salaam. Dill and Crow (2014) highlight the increasingly problematic nature of expensive informal water that is often used by residents who face other exorbitant costs (such as rent) in order to survive, compared to the more middle class residents of the city who tend to own their homes. It is clear that capital has become an intrinsic part of Tanzania’s fragmented water governance, with policy updates leading to no measurable change and residents still facing a daily challenge of how to access potable water. With a variety of conflicting discourses prevalent it is important to understand the context that these themes have originated from, and the different ways in which these themes are communicated and experienced.
5.3 Tanzania's social and political history and its impact on water governance

Often referred to as ‘Mwalimu’¹⁹, Nyerere's influence over Tanzanian politics and culture extends far beyond his twenty one years as President of Tanzania. The Arusha Declaration, published in 1967, set out Nyerere's core values towards achieving his own brand of African Socialism, which reflected the political ideology of many leaders across the continent at that time (Berg, 1964). Using the title of the Swahili word ‘ujamaa’ (which translates roughly as ‘familyhood’), Tanzania’s brand of socialist policy was an attempt to combine traditional African family values with the needs of a newly independent post-colonial country (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003; Metz, 1982). Across Africa at that time, capitalism was seen as the system of the colonisers, and a number of African leaders, including Nyerere, were intent on running their country differently after independence (Berg, 1964). Based around three core values, Nyerere believed that the ideal society should include elements of freedom, equality, and unity, and firmly believed that socialism was a ideological mindset rather than a specific economic doctrine (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003; Metz, 1982). Aiming to value local knowledge, ujamaa was described as a small, village-based production unit, emphasised in the policy as a means to allow the ethics of socialism to re-emerge through a collective means and worker-based ownership of production (Metz, 1982):

“This denoted not merely communal production, but much more broadly a co-operative and imaginative way of putting a community's resources, skills and enthusiasm at the service of the development of all its members (hence ‘familyhood’).” (Schneider, 2004:349)

¹⁹ The Swahili for 'teacher', in reference to Nyerere's occupation previous to his political career. Schneider (2004) makes the comment that the reference to Nyerere as ‘Mwalimu’ extends beyond the acknowledgement of his former profession to his role as a 'Philosopher President' who introduced a new political system to Tanzanian governance.
Throughout his time in office Nyerere had a complex relationship with international development organisations such as the IMF (Edwards, 2014). Ujamaa aligned with Nyerere’s belief that the development of Tanzania should be home-grown and not achieved on the basis of external organisations (Schneider, 2004). The policy had a number of critics, with those on the left stating that ujamaa did not fully address the class-based struggle necessary for a socialist society, whilst those on the right stating that Nyerere and his ruling counterparts had taken away the personal freedoms of Tanzanian citizens (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003). There were comments at the time from the World Bank stating the ambitious nature of the policy, but there was no explicit critique of the policy until its failures became evident (Edwards 2014). After ujamaa’s implementation took longer than expected, communities were often forced into relocating, along with the withholding of famine relief and the threat of arrest to communities that would not comply (Edwards, 2014) (Schneider, 2004). Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003) provide a different viewpoint, however, stating that communities were often more co-operative than some literature reports, and that the issues with the policy were far more nuanced and deeply entrenched. However, the policy was largely unsuccessful (as explained in Chapter 1), with Nyerere even critiquing it in his later years (Edwards, 2014).

Even after Nyerere stepped down from leadership he continued to give interviews and provide advice to politicians (Edwards, 2014), and his opinion continued to be incredibly valued in Tanzania. Additionally, the legacy of Nyerere’s time in office still serves as a backdrop to a number of policy documents. The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 explains the values that were key to the Arusha Declaration of 1967, such as socialism and self-reliance but critiques the document for high levels of state control over the means of production and a failure to recognise the complexity of the structures vital to Tanzania’s development (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999). However, the document goes on to state that:

"Notwithstanding these strategy shortcomings, the Arusha Declaration credibly sought to realise a set of fundamental moral, spiritual, ethical and
civil values which stand the test of time. Thus Tanzania today prides itself of and enjoys national unity, social cohesion, peace and stability largely as a result of the Declaration’s core social values. These values have to be acknowledged and should form part of the underlying underpinnings of the Vision 2025” (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999:8)

The reverence towards Nyerere is clear here, as although the failures of his policy are recognised in the document they emphasise that the Arusha Declaration’s core values will still have an important role to play in Tanzania’s future development, even although they ideologically conflict with some of the plans for Tanzania’s development, such as the wholesale incorporation of the private sector.

Nyerere is still discussed on a regular basis in Tanzania’s print media also. The Citizen newspaper mentioned the former president in almost every edition (Field Notebook, 17th March 2014). At the time of writing, a glance at The Citizen’s website provides an insight into how often Nyerere’s name is mentioned. In one article discussing the embezzlement of money from a fund put in place to help elderly Tanzanians, support is given for recovering the missing funds, with the justification that this is the generation that helped Julius Nyerere fight “poverty, ignorance and diseases” and should be given respect for doing so (The Citizen, 2015a). In another article discussing some political fractions amongst the CCM, one Tanzanian politician is reported to have said “in the Nyerere era, [said individual] would have been kicked out [of the party]” before going on to state that:

“If we are really serious about promoting Mwalimu Nyerere’s political legacy, then we must give priority to the people’s demand, and not picking [election] candidates out of our interests.” (The Citizen, 2015b)

Indeed, it appears to be the case that as Tanzania prepares to elect a new president, the influence of the country’s most prominent political predecessor is still integral to political discourse.
Nyerere’s influence still has an impact on Tanzania’s water policy. As noted in a speech at a water sector conference in the north of Tanzania in 2000, the rationale behind community-level responsibility for water provision dates back to the time of the Arusha Declaration, although due to the financial contributions by development and donor organisations the ways in which this policy has been financed has changed over time (Annual Water Experts Conference, 2000). However, the provision of free water by the Tanzanian state until 1991 is critiqued by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who explain that this means of provision was not sustainable and led to significant underinvestment in the sector that has contributed to its contemporary challenges (AMCOW, 2011; WaterAid, 2015). Further discourses were discussed in a field report by a Tanzanian NGO:

“The Government of Tanzania has for a long time convinced the rural people that it was a government responsibility to provide water and it would do so free of charge. Naturally, this historical fact has been deeply entrenched in the minds of the rural people despite the government’s failure to maintain rural water supply facilities.” (Wedeco, 2009)

Within the contemporary governance structure, water is no longer provided for free by the state but for rural Tanzanians still includes elements of local provision dating back to the 1960s. When discussing the decentralisation of education policy in Tanzania, SNV\textsuperscript{20} et al (2011) explained that it had “led to confusion about roles and responsibilities” (SNV et al, 2011:73). Those interviewed in their research felt that communities had become overburdened and did not have the capacity to fulfil their responsibilities. As Nyerere’s villigisation project was widely critiqued not only by scholars and development organisations, but later by Nyerere himself (Edwards, 2014) it is interesting to see similar ideologies still being used in contemporary water policy in Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{20} SNV stands for Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers and is the name of the Netherlands Development Organisation.
Lein and Tagseth (2009) also found this in their research into water policy in Tanzania;

“the activities...can probably best be interpreted as a continuation of a traditional top-down bureaucratic approach to water management, rather than representing a renewal. The water laws and the water management system – formulated by the British and later carried on by Nyerere’s socialist government and continuing right up to present-day policies – have neither been designed to secure local communities’ active participation in water management nor to facilitate the emergence of a functioning market for water.” (Lein and Tagseth, 2009:216)

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that there is the chance of history repeating itself, and the potential for another policy to be deemed unsuccessful. It appears to be the case that instead of a full paradigm shift in policy discourse, policy in Tanzania instead follows a parallax process, where incremental changes are made but with no measurable difference to policy rhetoric (Zizek, from Ioris, 2012).

A number of informal conversations about Nyerere’s impact on contemporary Tanzania often provided some insight into different understandings of access to water:

“We spoke about the legacy of Nyerere and the clear generational gap that exists in terms of expectations from the state. He said that because pictures of Nyerere are up in every building some rural people in Tanzania still believe that he is alive!” (Field Diary Excerpt, 15th February 2014)

Indeed, conversations such as this revealed the disparities in understandings of policy across Tanzania, indicating that the policy shift from water provided for

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21 This field diary excerpt refers to a conversation with an expatriate individual who ran an NGO in Tanzania.
free to water as a commodity and a community owned resource had not been as severe and has instead been a gradual process. The confusion between the distinctions of a Water User Association and a COWSO is also relevant here, as it appears to be the case that the concept of a COWSO was only introduced into Tanzanian water policy in 2009 but certain groups still refer to these groups with either dated or incorrect terminology. The ways in which Tanzanian water governance currently reflects policy documents and the country's postcolonial history will be discussed in the following section, before an analysis of the ways in which certain policy terminology is understood by different stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania.

A diagram has been included below to indicate the documents discussed in this chapter.
Figure 5.1 ‘Inter-relationship of the NWSDS with other policies and strategies’ from the National Water Sector Development Strategy. (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005a:9)

This diagram is described within the National Water Sector Development Strategy (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005) as showing the interrelationships with this policy document and others produced by the Tanzanian state. This follows on from discussion of how the National Water Sector Development Strategy will guide the implementation of the National Water Policy published in 2002, which will then:
“in turn, guide the formulation of the National Water Sector Strategic Implementation Plan and the sub-sectoral investment programmes under the Water Sector Development Programme (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:8)

Therefore, this diagram explains the pathway of policy development that the government of Tanzania has taken with regards to the planning and implementation of its water policy, and which documents have impacted upon which. As an attempt to encompass the variety of perspectives included in the contemporary Tanzanian water policy framework, this chapter discusses the following documents highlighted in Figure 5.1:

- Development Vision 2025
- Poverty Reduction Strategy
- Millennium Development Goals
- National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA)
- National Water Policy 2002
- National Water Sector Development Strategy

The chapter also discusses other documents not listed in the diagram, which are listed fully in the appendices of this thesis. This chapter attempts to assess the key themes prevalent in a number of Tanzania’s water policy and related documents in order to understand the way in which water governance in Tanzania is visualised, and in turn, lay out the policy framework with which to compare this research’s other empirical data to in subsequent chapters.

5.4 Tanzanian water policy, 1991 – present day
Table 5.1 History of Dar es Salaam’s water sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Independence from the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Tanganyika and Zanzibar merge to become Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Julius Nyerere elected as first president of Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Arusha Declaration published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Last significant investment in the infrastructure of Dar es Salaam's water system (Pigeon 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Julius Nyerere throws the IMF out of Tanzania (Edwards, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Julius Nyerere steps down as first president of Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1991</td>
<td>Water in Dar es Salaam provided for free by the Government. Residents could collect free water from public kiosks and only had to pay for water if they had a private connection in their home (Pigeon, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>National Water Policy is developed – removal of Government subsidies for water, aim for water utility to be self-financed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>To further develop self-financing, and as a condition by the World Bank and the International Monetary fund for Tanzania receiving debt relief, semi-autonomous Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) is created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Government of Tanzania consults with private water companies about a concession contract, but none were willing to invest in a system that had not been improved for twenty years (Pigeon, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Tanzania Development Vision 2025 published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>DAWASA’s assets released into the private sector, bid won by City Water. New National Water Policy is Developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>After great losses, poor performance and no improvement to the municipal water system, City Water is replaced with newly formed DAWASCO, a publically owned company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The Water Resources Management Act and the Tanzania Water Supply and Sanitation Act are published.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the earliest water policy document available, the National Water Policy (1991) was described by one interview respondent as being heavily informed by the various approaches used by international donors, explaining these
organisations’ prominence in Tanzania’s water governance framework. The 1991 National Water Policy has been replaced with a new water policy, published in 2002 which focused more on the decentralisation of water governance to the grassroots level and supported the increasing involvement of the private sector in Tanzania’s water provision. The documents discussed in this section, namely the National Water Policy (2002), the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2009) and the Water Resources Management Act (2009) were all produced by the Ministry of Water in Tanzania, and are publicly available in English.

The National Water Policy (2002), recognising the changes in Tanzania’s population, geography and outputs, suggests that the country’s water policy should be adapted to fit its modern needs:

“Over the past [fifteen] years these demands have intensified with the increase in population and concurrent growth of economic activities requiring water as an input such as hydropower generation, irrigated agriculture, industries, tourism, mining, livestock keeping, domestic, fisheries, wildlife and forestry activities.” (National Water Policy 2002:4)

Recognising the multifaceted uses for water, as well as its importance across a number of different areas in Tanzania, the policy attempts to consider how improved water use can be achieved for all of these needs, whilst promoting an integrated water resources management framework of governance. The policy explains that the institutional frameworks in place for managing water sources need to be strengthened, and that the current mode of governance is too fragmented to promote successful water management explaining that the new approach to water policy will include three major shifts, detailed in the table below:
Table 5.3 The Tanzanian State’s Water Policy Approach in 2002 (National Water Policy, 2002:14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensiveness</th>
<th>A holistic basin approach for integrating multi-sector and multi-objective planning and management that minimises the effects of externalities, and ensures sustainability and protection of the resource.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
<td>Decentralising decision making and devolving to the lowest practicable level, with stakeholders participating in the planning, design, implementation of the management actions and decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Decision making in the public sector, private sector and in civil society on the use of water should reflect the scarcity, value of water, water pricing, cost sharing and other incentives for promoting the rational use of water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three key shifts discussed indicate the change in focus for Tanzanian water policy, and align with the neoliberalisation of water through documents such as the Dublin Principles (1992) as discussed in Chapter 2, by emphasising the economic value of the country’s water. As well as this, they reflect each of the models of water management discussed by Lein and Tagseth (2009); by using a basin approach they align with a state method of water management, by decentralising provision the policy reflects a community model, and by placing economic value on Tanzania’s water they reflect a more market-based model of water governance. Whilst Lein and Tagseth (2009) discuss these models as three distinct modes of water governance, the Tanzanian state appears to be straddling each of the three categories, providing a conceptually complex method of managing the country’s water. This could inhibit the possibility of a clear and robust strategy that provides the most effective means of water management for the Tanzanian people. The disparity between rural and urban access to water is also recognised in the document, explaining that only fifty per cent of the rural population has access to a water supply service, and coverage in urban areas stands at seventy three per cent but with malfunctioning water sources reducing the availability of sources to urban dwellers.
Aligning with the rhetoric surrounding participatory development discussed in Chapter 3, the 2002 policy suggests that “beneficiaries participate fully in planning, construction, operation, maintenance and management of community based domestic water schemes” (National Water Policy, 2002:5) explaining that this will promote sustainability and a stronger institutional framework in which Tanzania’s water is managed. Community level water groups are described in the policy as:

“Responsible for local level management of allocated water resources, mediation of disputes among users and between groups within their areas of jurisdiction, collection of various data and information, participate in the preparation of water utilisation plans, conservation and protecting water sources, and catchment areas, efficient and effective water use and ensuring return flows, enforcement of the law and implementation of the conditions of water rights, and control of pollution.” (National Water Policy, 2002:28)

The policy also notes that local water user associations must provide representatives to meetings held at the basin level. It is apparent that the Tanzanian state believes that decentralising water provision will promote more efficient and sustainable water governance, but appears to somewhat contradict the document’s concern that the mode of water governance in Tanzania in 2002 was too fragmented. Additionally, the above quote suggests that the expectations on communities extend beyond simply the management and distribution of a local water resource to the environmental and legal elements of it. The emphasis on community provision is discussed throughout the policy, noting that the different roles and responsibilities at each level (national, basin, district and community) of governance will be clearly established. As well as the topic of decentralised water provision, the other recurring theme in the policy is that of formalised guidelines and regulatory mechanisms across the water sector in Tanzania, both within local level community provision to dam safety and ownership.
The National Water Policy (2002) provides a clear warning that with population growth levels in Tanzania and the rapidly depleting resources of fresh water available, the country is on track to experience water scarcity by 2025. However, after discussing this important statistic, the document then goes on to discuss the varying water uses required in the country in detail, for example explaining why water is important to Tanzania’s beekeeping and mining industries. Although it is stated within the policy that “use of water for human consumption shall receive first priority” (National Water Policy, 2002:31), the overall document neglects to acknowledge how detrimental water scarcity in Tanzania would be to the country’s population and instead diverts attention to the need for water in Tanzania’s economic production.

The National Water Policy (2002) states that the institutional reform in Tanzania’s water sector suggested in this document “requires effective institutionalised linkages between key sector actors including Central Government, Local Government, External Support Agencies, Private Sector, NGOs, Community Based Organisations, and the Communities themselves” (National Water Policy, 2002:37). This multi-stakeholder framework is reflected in the diagram below:
Figure 5.2 New Institutional Framework for Water Supply and Sanitation (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:46)
The diagram shows the variety of stakeholders present in the water sector in Tanzania, from various Ministries to local-level councils, to the non-governmental and grassroots organisations that directly engage with consumers. As can be seen, there are multiple routes in which consumers can achieve water, through the listed service providers, COWSOs, or through water supply authorities such as DAWASA. To add a further level of complication, if a consumer does receive water from a COWSO, this COWSO could be represented at either a municipal, district of village councils. COWSOs can also provide water to a consumer directly, or via a proxy service provider. In turn, service providers such as NGOs are able to provide water to consumers directly or through the guidance of DAWASA. Importantly, Figure 5.2 provides an accurate visual representation of the complex nature of Tanzania’s water sector and the ways in which its population are able to access water.

Published more recently, The Water Resources Management Act (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009a) provides a legally specific explanation of water governance in Tanzania. The document states that “all water resources in Mainland Tanzania shall continue to be public water and vested in the President as the trustee for an on behalf of citizens” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009a:366). Although this conflicts with the promotion of involvement of the private sector mentioned in the National Water Policy (2002), it aligns with the recommendation of the involvement of Tanzanian communities in their local water resources. Discussing the ways in which ideas of crisis can become embedded in the fabric of everyday life, Vigh (2008) explains how it becomes difficult to determine a state of normality in which to govern in response to. Taking this into account, it may be the case that Tanzania has faced such difficulties in providing a potable water supply to its residents for a number of years, and as a result there is no policy direction in place that is deemed to have been successful, which contributes to significant changes in direction over short spaces of time.

Interestingly, unlike the 2002 and 2009 policy documents produced by the Tanzanian state, the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005)
acknowledges the existence of peri-urban areas in Tanzania and the issues that could affect them specifically:

"Peri-urban Areas: Emerging settlements outside the formal housing areas of an urban area. In these settlements there is lack of basic services such as water supply and sanitation facilities. Generally the people living in these areas are in the low income group with limited ability to pay for water and sanitation services.” (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:11)

Whilst this definition includes a consideration for those unable to afford to pay for water services, there is very little within the aforementioned policy documents to suggest what alternative means of access are available for these groups. In the way that the 2002 and 2009 policy documents talk about financially self-sustainable community based water services, the National Water Sector Development Strategy goes on to discuss other terminology such as ‘water consumers association’ indicating that water is seen within Tanzanian water policy as a consumer good.

Overall, the text within the document states that the main objective of the National Water Sector Development Strategy is to develop a coherent and integrated plan for the implementation of the 2002 National Water Policy, further promoting more integrated sector wide governance across Tanzania (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005). Like the 2002 National Water Policy, the document acknowledges the various sectors that require water to function in Tanzania, such as agriculture and mining, reinforcing the importance of water access for Tanzania’s industries in order to promote the country’s economic growth. In addition, the document “recognises the important role that NGOs have to play in the provision of water and sanitation services, particularly at the community level” (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:23) explaining that this has increased the importance of COWSOs within Tanzania’s strategy for improved water provision for its population.
Rather than laying out specific policy clauses or acts, the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005) sets out the background to the water sector in Tanzania, before identifying a number of problem statements, then following each of them with a policy direction and a specific goal and a strategy in order to achieve this. For example, the document states that effective allocation of water and monitoring water use is difficult because of issues such as water rights being inadequately enforced and ineffective prioritisation of resources. The policy direction stated to solve these issues is as follows:

"Allocation of water for basic human needs in adequate quantity and acceptable quality will receive highest priority, while other uses will be subject to social and economic criteria. Water for protection of the environment and eco-systems will be reserved." (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:34).

This is followed by a stated goal of “responsive, effective and sustainable water resources utilisation and allocation” (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:35) and a multi-direction strategy involving the classification of river systems and the development of a detailed set of criteria in order to determine water allocation. Although the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005) and the National Water Policy (2002) explain the different sectors that require water for Tanzania’s economic development, it is interesting to note that human needs are explicitly prioritised here, as this does not necessarily align with discussion in other areas of Tanzanian water policy. In addition, the document states that the role of the Tanzanian state is moving from one of provision to that of co-ordination and policy making, firmly placing the provision of water to Tanzania’s people to what the document refers to as “successor organisations” (National Water Sector Development Strategy: 2005:42), whilst acknowledging that local government institutions are currently weak and need additional support in order to play a key role in Tanzania’s water governance.
5.5 Poverty reduction strategies in Tanzania and links to international development initiatives

As well as producing policy documents, the Tanzanian state has made poverty reduction a central part of their strategy since 2005 (Edwards, 2014). As such, there have also been poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) produced by the government in recent years. Also known as the ‘National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction’, the first version of the MKUKUTA\(^22\) was published in 2005, followed by a second edition of the document in 2010. The documents discuss various goals pursued by the Tanzanian state, such as poverty reduction or the improvement of basic services, and details in a step by step manner how these goals will be achieved (Edwards, 2014). Also produced by the Government of Tanzania, these documents discuss a number of sectors including water, and are also publicly available. When discussing the Tanzanian annual event of Maji Week (which translates as ‘Water Week’\(^23\)), the Ministry of Water explained that:

“There’s water targets, there’s the Millennium Development Goals target in 2015, and there’s the MKUKUTA. The MKUKUTA initially was supposed to end last year, and it has been extended up to June this year [2014]. And according to the other goals, the MDG goals for the urban coverage, water supply was supposed to reach 95%, and in the rural areas it’s supposed to go from 56% to 65%. For the Tanzanian National Vision, [and] the MKUKUTA, coverage is supposed to be 100%, and this is by 2025.”

(Ministry of Water Interview 2014)

Indeed, this document produced by the Tanzanian state ambitiously intends to achieve more than global indicators such as the Millennium Development Goals. An early version of the document states that:

\(^{22}\) This acronym is based on the Swahili title of the document: ‘Mpango wa Pili wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania’ which translates as ‘Second Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 2010)

\(^{23}\) For a full discussion of Maji Week, see Chapter 7.
“The PRSP encompasses poverty-oriented extra-budgetary activities, and various non-financial considerations that have an important bearing on poverty reduction.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2000)

The PRSP goes on to explore two participatory poverty research projects in Tanzania; namely the 'Voices of the Poor' project conducted by the World Bank and another by the United Nations Development Programme in the Shinyanga region of Tanzania. The PRSP explores the different perceptions of poverty across Tanzania, and how aspects such as poor social service provision, gender inequality, weak governance and scarcity of funding were obstacles to the people of Tanzania's development. This reflects some of the content of Tanzania's policy documents, such as allocating service provision to the grassroots level and formulating a specific governance hierarchy to do so, as well as ensuring that community-based water committees were gender balanced. Additionally, the comment on scarcity of funding indicates why Tanzania is happy to incorporate the work and financial capital of NGOs so heavily into their water policy. This is reinforced later on in the document:

“The financing of poverty alleviation efforts will, as in the past, depend substantially on external funding.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2000:22)

The document goes on to suggest how responsibilities for Tanzania's poverty reduction strategy will be devolved to local government authorities and that water will be one of the seven key areas that the government will direct its financial interventions towards. This was a slightly different line of argument to the water policy documents produced by the Tanzanian state, as they included little to no mention of state funding in the water sector.

The 2005 PRSP firstly begins with an explanation of the changes between this document and the initial one produced in 2000. The 2005 PRSP states that a period of five years will now be used to assess Tanzania's progress in reaching its targets, as opposed to the three year term recommended in the earlier
version of the paper. Additionally, the document recognises that the targets set in the earlier document were too ambitious and the resources required to fulfil them were not available. As such, the 2005 document notes that more resources and more inter-sectoral co-ordination are required for Tanzania to achieve its poverty reduction targets. Tanzania’s poverty reduction strategy is said to be focused around three components, the first of which is an aim to integrate participatory processes fully into a number of sectors, as opposed to making them, as the document notes, a “one-off event” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:2). The further two components mentioned aim towards “greater attention [paid] to cross-cutting issues” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:3) such as HIV, gender and governance, as well as improving policy to address the inequalities experienced by vulnerable social groups.

When the 2005 PRSP moves on to discuss poverty reduction within the water sector in Tanzania specifically, the strategy discussed by the document is somewhat vague:

“Community-awareness campaigns and participation in water and sanitation programmes and regulations to enforce environmental and health safeguards in industry and extractive activities such as mining, logging and fisheries will limit water and air pollution and related diseases.” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:14)

Whilst following the document’s intentions and working towards a multi-sectoral approach to poverty reduction, by covering so many different policy areas in one sentence it fails to provide any clear direction of what activities will actually be carried out by the Tanzanian government. Like other aforementioned documents, the 2005 PRSP emphasises the importance of local-level capacity building and the strengthening of local governance structures. Emphasising the role of communities and civil societies, the 2005 PRSP notes that the government’s capacity is being reduced to that of a facilitator and co-ordinator of various stakeholders involved. The document also expands upon this policy discourse;
“Other challenges include improvement in collection, analysis and use of data at lower levels, addressing broad inequalities among regions and districts; and dissemination of information and sensitisation. Translation of the NSGRP into Swahili and its dissemination to district and village levels were further underscored.” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:22)

It is impressive to see these aims being included in the document. Particularly, the translation of documents into Swahili to enable residents to engage with them is a progressive step, as Dill (2009) noted that the community-based organisations involved in their research in Dar es Salaam were largely producing documents in English which community members were not able to read nor challenge. However, as Dill’s (2009) research was published four years after the 2005 version of the PRSP was written, it is unclear as to how well this objective has been adhered to. Within this research, both organisations I worked with had the translation of documents into Swahili as one of their key mandates, and the majority of public documents produced by TWN were indeed in Swahili. This also appeared to be the case for the water user associations involved in this research, but I did not come across any national documents (such as PRSPs) written in any language apart from English.

Following previously vague discussion in earlier parts of the 2005 PRSP, in the main body of the document specific targets are discussed followed by the specific strategies that will be employed by the Tanzanian state in order to achieve them. With regards to access to water, specific percentage-based targets are discussed, with an aim towards increasing rural water provision from fifty three per cent access to sixty five per cent by 2010 and within urban areas, from seventy three per cent to ninety per cent over the same period of time. The document goes on to discuss how these increases in access will be achieved:

"Measures that will be pursued including expanding and maintain[ing] existing protected-water sources, properly maintaining sanitation
facilities and ensuring facilities at public institutions and meet
Government guidelines.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:47)

However, once again this section of the document does not provide any specific discussion of how and where these strategies will be employed, nor does it explain where the resources will come from to do so.

The latest version of the PRSP produced by the Tanzanian government was published in 2010, and begins with discussion by the then president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete24, surrounding the successes that have been achieved since the 2005 document, in sectors such as education, health, infrastructure (such as roads) and water. Kikwete discussed water sector improvements in the document, mentioning an increase in access from almost fifty four per cent in rural areas to just over sixty per cent and an increase from seventy four per cent to eighty four per cent in urban areas respectively. Kikwete praises these increases in access for Tanzania’s residents, but these do fall short of what the 2005 version of the MKUKUTA set out, and his discussion of how these improvements were made in the latest edition is vague and sparse in detail. Building upon the progress made over the five year period, Kikwete explains that the MKUKUTA II’s emphasis focuses on “sharper prioritisation of interventions – projects and programmes”, increasing the role of the private sector, and strengthening local-level capacity, amongst others. This follows similar themes of other documents produced prior to this, and suggests that this direction of policy pursued by the Government of Tanzania still needs work in its implementation.

The document has a detailed, discursive style of writing that marries statistics about Tanzania’s development with qualitative explanations of the reasons behind them:

24 Jakaya Kikwete was elected as President of Tanzania in 2005 and thus, was also in office at the time this document was published.
“GDP growth shows a rising trend, except for years with shocks such as food crisis, power crisis and global economic and financial crisis. Since 2005, Tanzania’s GDP annual growth rate averaged 7 percent, which was in line with the MKUKUTA target of 6-8 percent per annum. In 2009 GDP growth was 6.0 percent, declining partly due to the global financial crisis. Volume and prices of exports fell, flows of capital and investment fluctuated, tourism and demand for tourism products fell as well.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:6)

In the main body of the document, the rhetoric discussed by Jakaya Kikwete is reinforced and discussed in more detail, whilst also explaining that the 2010 PRSP is part of a medium-term strategy for Tanzania to work towards the Tanzania Development Vision\textsuperscript{25} of 2025 and the Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, it could be suggested that the writing in the documents discussed in this section is more aligned to fitting within the goals laid out by the international development agenda. Considering the ways in which the Tanzanian water sector and its culture are impacted upon by the country’s social and political history and external influences is useful to examine the reasons behind which discourses are prevalent. In Chapter 2, the growth of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine was discussed in depth, explaining the ways in which ideas such as decentralising and devolving services from centralised state providers had become increasingly prominent. Similar themes such as these emerged from the discourse analysis carried out in the documents discussed in this chapter, which will now be discussed.

5.6 Formalising community water provision in Tanzania

The National Water Policy (2002) discusses the Tanzanian state’s recognition of customary water rights and how those in possession of said rights can apply to

\textsuperscript{25} Produced in 1999, the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 is a short document that sets out a list of goals for Tanzania to work towards in order for it to become a middle-income country. The three key objectives of the document are “achieving quality and good life for all; good governance and the rule of law; and building a strong and resilient economy that can effectively withstand global competition” (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999:4)
the Basin Water Board for a Water Use Permit. This aligns with the theme of establishing clear integrated water governance frameworks in the National Water Policy (2002), and reflects Dill’s (2009) discussion on the formalisation of water provision in Tanzania and the dominant rhetoric surrounding participatory development which indicates that residents can only participate if they do so through formally recognised institutions. An explanation of the establishment of Water User Associations is also provided:

“A Water Users Association may be formed by the agreement of the majority of a group of water users for one or a combination of the following purposes to-

- manage, distribute and conserve water from a source used jointly by the members of the water user association;
- acquire and operate any Permit under the provisions of this Act;
- resolve conflicts between members of the association related to the joint use of a water resource;
- collect water user fees on behalf of the Basin Water Board” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009a:397)

According to the Act, a constitution must be submitted to the Basin Water Board for approval in order for a Water User Association to be established, and the document includes a detailed explanation of the details a constitution must include in order for it to be approved. The dynamics of the different levels of the water provision hierarchy reflected my own comments in my field diary, so there is evidence to suggest that these policy documents are informing the thinking of local NGOs in Tanzania.

As well as an effort made to bring informal means of water provision into the policy framework, there has also been an attempt to quantify and report on the water sector's progress. The MKUKUTA II provides an honest account of Tanzania’s progress since the first version of the MKUKUTA, recognising any shortfalls that may have occurred during that period. With regards to education policy, the document discusses how whilst the intention to expand enrolment in
teacher training institutions, this has led to larger class sizes within these institutions which has potentially compromised the quality of education available (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:12). With regards to the water sector, discussion is slightly more specific than the aforementioned discussion by Kikwete:

“The WSDP (Water Sector Development Project) mobilised significant financial resources to the sector. Through its quick-win sub-projects; an additional 8,285 water points have been developed, providing water supply to over 1.89 million additional beneficiaries.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:16)

Whilst the document should rightly praise the development of this number of water points, it is not necessarily the case that these will be a permanent improvement to access to water in Tanzania. Welle and Williams (2014) note that twenty per cent of hand pumps installed in Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Liberia lose their functionality after only a year. The use of the phrase ‘quick-win’ only serves to exacerbate this concern, implying that impressive statistics are being chased at the expense of measureable progress.

The format of the 2010 version of the PRSP is similar to that of the 2005 one, with specific goals and strategies discussed in a point by point format. The MKUKUTA II however, expands upon these by describing Tanzania’s progress towards each goal, before discussing a further set of strategies that will be employed in pursuit of Tanzania’s overall target of poverty reduction. The following are examples of the strategies discussed in the document with regards to the water sector:

“i. Strengthening the capacity of basin level water resources management institutions including water user associations, to effectively and efficiently support multi-sector array of productive activities;
ii. Rehabilitating non-functioning hydrometric stations; designing, constructing and installing new hydrometric stations for proper water resource monitoring in all basins;

...

v. Establishing water use and effluent discharge permit register for proper recording of water extraction and enforcement of water quality standards;

vi. Integrating management of water resources.” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:55)

Again, the MKUKUTA II echoes the rhetoric of other documents, with regards to strengthening the capacity of local water governance institutions and integrating the means of water resource management. The discussion of permits also aligns with the overall discourse of formalising the ways in which residents access water in order to improve the management of the resource. This is referred to later on in the document also, when registration of all COWSOs is noted as one of the key strategies for the next five years. Moreover, whilst previous discussion in the document caused concern about the sustainability of newly installed water points, rehabilitating existing points that are broken suggests a cost-effective and pragmatic approach is being taken in order to improve the Tanzanian population’s access to water. The 2010 version of the PRSP develops the targets previously set in 2005, with different percentage increase targets set for rural settlements, small towns, urban authorities and Dar es Salaam respectively. The overall aim is to increase “improved sources of water” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:77) which suggests again that the strategy is not to simply build new water points but improve existing ones.

It would be difficult to provide an in-depth taxonomy of methods of water access in Tanzania as understandings of definitions varied from person to person, and did not necessarily relate to descriptions used in academic literature. Bjornlund
(2004) argues that the difference between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ provision is that ‘formal’ provision refers to long-term access to a water source whereas ‘informal’ provision refers to a brief period of access to a water source for a short time. However, although the Mitonga Water Users Group had been in place for a few years, one respondent explained that Ilala was ‘unsurveyed’ and thus, informal, although residents were attempting to formalise their means of accessing water. This does not mean that residents were trying to gain access to Dar es Salaam’s municipal water supply, but that they wished for their community means of water provision to be recognised by the state as an official way of accessing water, perhaps aligning with the procedures involved in forming a Water User Association discussed in the Water Resources Management Act (2009). Dill (2009) discusses the importance for community organisations to receive recognition by the state, especially as it assists many grassroots organisations in obtaining external funding. Additionally, Lein and Tagseth (2009) describe the dual system of rights to water that exists in Tanzania, and how the National Water Policy (2002) states that customary rights to water will over time become formalised via the state. This is expected to make it easier for community water organisations to charge customers for water, although there was no evidence to suggest that the Mitonga Water Users Group were experiencing any difficulties related to their lack of formalised status. Indeed, as previously discussed, community provision has been embedded within Tanzania’s water policy framework, but it appeared to be the case that as residents of Ilala had taken their own initiative to set up a community water scheme instead of waiting on direction from the state or a civil society organisation, this was not considered to be ‘formal’. However, amongst the confusion between understandings of formal and informal water provision, it was unclear as to what benefits becoming formal would afford.

As discussed in this section, there a number of documents that inform water governance in Tanzania. When asked their personal opinion on the water sector in Tanzania, one respondent from the Ministry of Water stated:
“As far as I’m concerned [the main problem] is management. Why? Because like...overall we have twenty three, twenty four regional towns. Coverage in these towns averages at 42%. The management of the resource is the problem. The resource is there. A lot of money is put into pumping water into the treatment works, treating water with chemicals, but you can find that some utilities lose up to 50% of what they are producing.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

This emphasises the importance of robust and clear policy documents in order to guide a country’s water governance. The same rhetoric of decentralised provision and the increasing role of communities and civil society organisations is discussed across all documents, yet there is at times vague discussion of how these policy changes will materialise. The fact that the same themes appear in documents over a period of almost a decade calls into question which challenges the Tanzanian state is facing in implementing this type of policy direction and the limitations the state faces when trying to implement them. When questioned on the success of Tanzanian water policy, one respondent from the Ministry stated:

“Our policy successes should be assessed at the lowest local level, because water is for the people, so you have to consider the grassroots management of water resources, for management of water supply services. And this policy aspiration has been implemented by establishing the water user associations all over the country...to have a grassroots level to manage water services, and water resources.” (Ministry of Water Interview 2013)

This quote succinctly sums up the key theme that has arisen across the various documents discussed in that chapter, that of decentralised water provision, the role of NGOs, and the importance of community responsibility over local water

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26 Based on observation and informal discussions, it is my understanding that water is generally lost in local utilities due to theft from local residents and broken pipes that lead to water leaking before it reaches a community tap or evaporating.
resources. The rationale behind this form of water provision will be discussed in the following sections, and its relationship with Tanzanian culture and practice

5.7 Decentralising Tanzania’s water sector

The role of the private sector is emphasised in the MKUKUTA II, explaining that it will “develop inclusive markets that are profitable and pro-poor” as well as create employment and jobs within Tanzania (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010:107). The expectations of communities to participate in service provision whilst supported by the government and other stakeholders is also discussed, as well as how civil society organisations will be key to Tanzania’s poverty reduction strategy, both in the form of capacity building and advocacy. This echoes official water policy documents produced by the Government of Tanzania and suggests this form of decentralised, community-based service provision has been within Tanzanian policy rhetoric for a number of years across several policy areas.

The National Water Policy (2002) states the various responsibilities of each different level of the water management hierarchy. It explains that at the National level, investment priorities and externally funded projects should be managed, as well as the production of a bi-annual report on Tanzania’s water resources. The National Water Board should also advise on a number of issues such as inter-sectoral water resources management, inter-basin water transfer and trans-boundary water resources management. At the Basin level, water resource management plans are produced, alongside guidelines around construction and maintenance of a basin water source. The Basin Water Board is also expected to provide balance sheets of their finances on an annual basis. The document then details the expectations of local waters, such as coordination of water resource management and resolution of water conflicts. Interestingly, unlike the National Water Policy (2002) that focuses on communities and local provision, the Water Resources Management Act tends to discuss decentralised
water provision in terms of the water resources available and which river basin they are served by.

Dill (2010a) asserts that:

“In Tanzania the culture of authoritarianism that was sown during colonial rule and evolved during the postcolonial era has created a particularly unfavourable environment for efforts to impose the institutional superstructure of community-based development.” (Dill, 2010a:43)

However, those such as Tungaraza (1993) would instead explain that community cohesion is a natural social dynamic within Tanzania. One topic that often came up in my data collection was that the ways in which Tanzania’s communities work together to provide services, asking respondents about Tanzanian culture and what led to this natural community cohesiveness. When asked why Tanzanian communities were able to work together to provide water, one respondent explained:

“This one village, the water source is almost seven kilometres away up a steep slope, so women cannot go there. The other source is almost three kilometres away. At this source, the women have to wait. If they go at 8pm, they will come home at 12pm the next day with one bucket27 of water. And that is a person who is lucky. So those are the challenges that our communities are facing. And people have established organisations to support these people. Because we cannot wait until Nicola28 [or any other mzungu] comes to support the community.” (NGO #3)

The Mitonga Water Users Group in Ilala began in a similar way, as a response to inefficient water provision within their locality, so the community took it upon

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27 A ‘bucket’ of water is the colloquial term used for one container of water, which is usually 20 litres in size.
28 This is not to say my research involved ‘supporting the community’ in any way, but more that the respondent was generalising about foreign individuals who come to Tanzania to work.
themselves to establish a formalised means for the community to work together to access water. Other respondents, talking about Tanzanian culture more generally, explained that:

“In my community if a neighbour has lost a child, even a neighbour far away from that house, people will meet, without being forced, and they will work together until that child is buried.” (NGO #5)

“Because of our background maybe, *ujamaa*, we normally share. We share even in funerals, weddings, maybe because of that. Political background, and it’s our culture.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

Brian Dill has also used a comparison between weddings and grassroots water schemes to illustrate the dynamics of communities in Tanzania (Dill, 2010a). Whilst Tungaraza (1993) believes that community cohesion in Tanzania exists beyond these emotional support networks and celebrations, Dill (2009) instead says that there is an expectation of the Tanzania state that community organisations are able to capitalise on these kinship based relationships that the government has previously been unable to make use of. Although there is evidence to suggest that community relationships in Tanzania are strong, it is potentially the case that these are inappropriate to manage a local water scheme. With a lack of knowledge within communities of how to install and maintain local water schemes efficiently it is often the case that schemes fall to disrepair or provide water to communities in an unequal fashion. Additionally, to return to earlier discussions in Chapter 6 on the role of expatriates and INGOs, the comment by NGO #3 on not being able to wait on foreign individuals could be linked to the continued presence of international actors in Tanzanian water provision and the reaction of communities to their inefficiency. Interestingly, similar discussions occurred in other interviews where one respondent explained that Tanzanian community relations had been “borrowed” (NGO #5) into the water sector by international donors, and the idea of community water provision had been promoted more by international actors as opposed to the Tanzanian state.
The temporality of Tanzanian water policy and its focus on community provision is also important to discuss. When questioned on what communities did before COWSOs existed, the Ministry of Water responded:

“[They were] just fetching from the streams or some of the areas where you would find that they had dug their own dams or wells. Sometimes they would just wait for the rain to come.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

It is incorrect to refute this viewpoint completely, as many communities across Tanzania have been accessing water through these methods for a number of years. Dill (2009) explains that local water organisations were often formed to avoid engaging with existing power structures within the Tanzanian state. Nonetheless, this viewpoint from the Ministry of Water fails to recognise groups such as the Mitonga Water Users Group who established community provision without external coercion and before the policy framework aligned with their methods. In addition, the fact that community water provision has been incorporated into Tanzanian water policy comes into conflict for the very reason they perhaps existed for in the first place. Communities took ownership over their water provision because they had been left out of the remit of the municipal system and the Tanzanian state offered no alternative. Now what was originally a coping mechanism has become embedded in Tanzania’s water policy.

The rationale for community based water provision was also attributed to the lack of efficiency of politicians which is ironic given that the Tanzanian state has now adopted a process of formalising community provision as a reaction its own inadequacies into its official policy framework. Respondents discussed the ways in which election periods can lead to unfulfilled promises by politicians:
“A lot of interventions are expected this year and next year. They’re struggling to gain votes, especially the ruling party.” (NGO #2)

“People are talking about magical things that they can do for the community. In Africa, these problems have never ended. They will never end because the MP doesn’t have money. He is waiting on the government budget...If an MP is standing on the platform saying ‘I will bring water’ it’s not a question of ‘How?’ ‘Under which budget?’ Those are the questions which are not asked...politics is playing with people’s poverty.” (NGO #3)

The respondent went on to discuss how a lack of education within communities often led to them being unable to critically assess any policy promises made by election candidates which resulted in a lot of statements being made by election candidates that they do not have to be held accountable for later. Similar points were made in other interviews,

“[The state] will claim over and over again that they are doing their best and that they are trying to reach more people but the figures do not seem to support their claims.” (NGO #1)

Similar views were indicated in an interview with TWN, who stated that after discussion of a number of issues before an election, after the election has taken place “nothing is done” (TWN Interview). This also echoes Zizek’s (from Ioris, 2012) idea of a parallax movement of policy, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, where amongst policy updates and state-led promises no measurable change occurs at the grassroots level.

Although this research involved working with organisations who work nationwide across Tanzania, my proximity to Dar es Salaam and my case study communities within the city provided an insight into the cultural specificities of water provision in the country’s former capital and its surrounding areas. One of the most striking themes to emerge from various documents on the topic of

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29The respondent is referring to the Tanzanian general election due to take place in 2015.
water provision was the focus on upgrading rural communities’ access to water. Notably, access to water in rural areas of Tanzania has traditionally been far worse compared to those living in urban settlements. The World Bank’s development indicators show that for the period between 2010 and 2012, around 79% of Tanzania’s urban population had access to an improved drinking source\textsuperscript{30} compared to 44% in rural areas (World Bank, 2014). This issue was brought up in several interviews where respondents working for NGOs were keen to emphasise the difficult situation that those living in rural settings in Tanzania were experiencing. The Tanzanian Water Policy (2002) indicates a similar disparity, stating that coverage at this time was 73% in urban areas and 50% in rural areas, whilst the PRSP published in 2000 discusses how poverty in Tanzania is “largely a rural phenomenon” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2000:6) although the document does then go on to discuss how urban poverty is increasing in urban areas such as Dar es Salaam. The 2005 document followed a similar theme, before going on to list the multitude of both explicit and nuanced issues that can affect processes such as agricultural productivity. This shows the complex and multi-faceted ways in which poverty can be experienced, and justifies the qualitative nature of this project in order to ensure that these nuances do not go overlooked. As indicated by one respondent, there are issues experienced specifically by urban residents of Tanzania:

“There are urban poors, who are also facing a lot of [the same] problems experienced in rural areas, but also ones that they only experience in cities. Because like, those runaway channels of water are polluted which is not an issue in rural areas and also acquiring that water, one bucket can be sold from up to 500 Tshs\textsuperscript{31} to 1000 Tshs, which is very expensive.”

(NGO #7)

\textsuperscript{30} The World Bank describes this as “piped water on premises (piped household water connection located inside the user’s dwelling, plot or yard) and other improved drinking water sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection.” (World Bank, 2014)

\textsuperscript{31} At the time of writing, the exchange rate for £1 GBP is approximately 3190 Tshs (XE Currency Converter, 2015).
In addition to this, one report found that the worst performing area in terms of latrine numbers in a nationwide study was the Temaeke municipality of Dar es Salaam (SNV et al, 2011). Indeed, whilst the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005) clearly defined peri-urban areas and the issues that affect those Tanzanians living there, there seemed to be nothing within Tanzanian water policy to reflect these areas that span the dichotomy of rural and urban living in Tanzania. After reading through a number of similar documents and spending time in Ilala and Temaeke I sometimes wondered if Dar es Salaam was forgotten amongst all these development initiatives, and that the areas with the worst levels of access were being given priority, which aligned with this viewpoint by one respondent:

“They build a house next to the rich person, and the person thinks “well, all of this area are rich people” and then there is no attention paid to the poor people staying there.” (NGO #7)

This is not to wholly disagree with this method, but aligns with later discussion in Chapter 6 surrounding the continued use of funding to establish new water points instead of mending broken ones. By only focusing on the areas that are the absolute worst state, those not deemed ‘bad’ enough run the risk of being ignored until they reach a detrimental enough state for them to gain attention. Vigh’s (2008) notion of endemic crisis is pertinent here, as it appears that development within the water sector in Tanzania is reactionary as opposed to progressive, as the institutions involved are unable to keep up with demand and the crisis of a number of Tanzanians having poor access to water perpetuates. Instead of anticipating and preventing future problems in the water sector, projects focus on areas that are almost in an emergency state, and then after a piecemeal improvement these communities are left until they reach a problematic state once again. With policy unable to catch up with the issues in the water sector in Tanzania and continually only able to focus on the absolute worst areas, there is limited evidence to suggest that areas experiencing less extreme issues will ever see any measurable change and will continue in a challenging situation until the policy deems them worth attention.
5.8 COWSOs, MWSTs, WUAs: Community water management definitions and dynamics

As community-based water provision becomes written into policy, it is important to make sense of the terms being used and how they are understood by different stakeholders in Tanzania’s water sector. Interestingly, there was no mention of the use of community owned water and sanitation organisations (or COWSOs) within the 2002 National Water Policy or the 2009 Water Resources Management Act:

"[Interviewer] And the COWSOs, they’re a fairly new idea?"

"Yes that’s one of the new ideas because it comes through [the 2009 Act]. With this act they said all water projects should be managed, through COWSOs." (NGO #2)

The act referred to by the respondent is the Tanzania Water Supply and Sanitation Act (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009b). Describing its key mandate as “promot[ing] and ensur[ing] the right of every person in Tanzania to have access to efficient, effective and sustainable water supply and sanitation services” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009b:9) the document discusses the establishment of community owned water organisations. This document goes on to discuss the responsibilities of district councils in the establishment of these community groups, with regards to facilitation, mobilisation and promoting local water and sanitation facilities. The Tanzania Water Supply and Sanitation Act also notes that it is the responsibility of village councils to:

“(i) promote the establishment of community organisations as provided for under section 31;

(ii) co-ordinate community organisation budgets with village council budgets; and
(iii) resolve conflicts arising within the community organisations.”
(United Republic of Tanzania 2009b:12)

The establishment of COWSOs and where responsibilities lie in the hierarchy is explained in this document, but no links are made with similar discussions in other documents, such as the water user associations discussed in the other water policy document produced by the Tanzanian state in the same year (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009a). Interestingly, the document introduces a further level of complexity in how these groups are described;

“A community organisation established pursuant to subsection (1) shall be a corporate body for the purposes of this Act as may be prescribed in any law including-

(a) A Water Consumer Association;
(b) A Water Trust;
(c) A Cooperative Society;
(d) A Non-Government Organisation;
(e) A Company; or
(f) Any other body as may be approved by the Minister.” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009b:25)

With no mention of water user associations in this list of terms, it is unclear as to why so many different names are necessary for the same format of water provision, and the policy documents do not address what the individual differences are between them. Much like the Water Resources Management Act’s (2009) discussion of water user associations and the requirement for them to have a constitution, this discussion is echoed in the Water Supply and Sanitation Act when referring to COWSOs. In terms of the ways in which these organisations are financed, the document provides a variety of sources such as internal member contributions to “any moneys that may be contributed by the respective local government authority to finance construction of new schemes”
To summarise, although the Water Supply and Sanitation Act (2009) provides explanations of COWSOs and how they are to be established and managed, in terms of the terminology used and the lack of clarity in other respects such as financing, it is still difficult to develop a clear understanding of this phenomena, especially when comparing and contrasting the writing in this policy document with others produced by the Tanzanian state.

The concept of COWSOs is also discussed in depth in the National Water Sector Development Strategy, published by the Ministry of Water in 2005. COWSOs are described in the document as the most viable option for local-level water provision, both in terms of sustainability and commercial benefit. Water user associations are described in a similar way in the document, the only difference being that water user associations are noted to be able to resolve conflicts between association members within their locality. However, when explaining that responsibilities will be ‘clustered’ within locally based water supply and sewerage authorities the document states that:

“clustering is envisaged because provision of water supply and sewerage services solely at the levels of individual district or village councils will not only be financially unsustainable but also could create excessive demands on individual government authorities.” (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:4)

This is somewhat conflicting with other policy documents as the very issues the above statement warns against align with the types of policy recommendations made in the 2002 and 2009 documents produced by the Tanzanian state. If the flaws in this type of grassroots based water provision were realised as early as 2005, it remains to be seen why this type of local community organisation is still being encouraged at the time of writing this thesis. It is potentially the case that this in a form of policy by default, in which new policy initiatives are written about existing practices in order to legitimise them and minimise any activity on the state’s behalf. The document also provides a number of definitions for the
different terminology used in the document, such as describing ‘community owned’ as where legal entities are created and owned by communities which they have full responsibility and accountability over (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005).

Moreover, the terminology to describe different kinds of grassroots water provision was incredibly confusing, as a variety of respondents provided completely different definitions. The Tanzanian National Water Policy (2002) states that “water user associations or water user groups will be the lowest appropriate level of management” (National Water Policy, 2002:28). Whilst, as discussed in an earlier section, the use of the term COWSO was only introduced into Tanzanian water policy in 2009, both terms appeared to be used interchangeably by different groups in Tanzania, with a lack of clarity over the distinction between the two terms. In the 2010 version of the PRSP, the phrase ‘water user association’ is used when discussing the improvement of infrastructure for the production sector, and the term COWSO is used when discussing household water access (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2010), but there is nothing to suggest in other documents that water user associations are industry-based institutions, when they are often referred to in a household or village level capacity instead. When asked the difference between a COWSO and a Water User Association (WUA) the Ministry of Water then responded:

“I think that...is it...I think that a small COWSO...it’s a small community getting a water supply from a certain area, for a small community. But a WUA, it could be bigger than a COWSO. So you could have different COWSOs within certain areas, and then there’s a WUA that oversees those COWSOs.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

However, other respondents provided different answers:

“So in these villages, there are some people, like farmers who are engaging in irrigation. Small small small groups. Those ones are called the water user associations. But the COWSOs are bigger. It combines more
than these small WUAs. The COWSOs are the ones that manage the entire scheme. So that's the difference.” (NGO #2)

“A water user association is also a COWSO. A COWSO is a community owned water organisation, and it can be in the form of a water user association, it can be in many forms. I am not an expert on it but I know that a WUA is a form of a COWSO.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

It is clear that there were a number of different interpretations of the policy terminology across different interest groups, with even the Ministry of Water unable to provide a robust definition. For a representative from one of Dar es Salaam’s three MWSTs to state that they were “not an expert” (Temeke MWST Interview) is somewhat concerning and questions who is the authority on which definition is correct. If there is confusion at the policy and management, it would be unsurprising if definitions were equally blurred in the settings where this policy is implemented. Indeed, in Ilala, the word COWSO was virtually unheard of, but WUA was a widely used term. When interviewing the ward executive officer for the area, he claimed he had never heard of a COWSO (Ilala Ward Executive Office Interview).

In terms of the financial resources required to establish a COWSO, opinion also varied. The National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005) states that “COWSOs will be expected to meet all the costs of operating and maintaining their water supply systems through charges levied on water consumers, and to contribute to the capital costs of their systems” (National Water Sector Development Strategy, 2005:43) but this did not strictly agree with the policy interpretations of interview respondents:

“[Interviewer] And COWSOs, do they need financial resources to start up? Do they need a specific amount of money?

"No. They are given it. They get told this is your station to sell water to people, and this is the amount that you sell. They get told that a
percentage of the money they can make goes back to the management and the rest is to go to the project. And then a percentage is paid to the authority figure.” (Ministry of Water Interview 2014)

This conflicted with other data however:

“Each household contributes so that they can become a member of the WUA. So that you can be a participant in the meetings, because not all people in the organisation are members.”

“[Interviewer] So that is how they bring together their start up costs, or do they need external funding?”

“External funding...no. If someone maybe in their community supports them...I’m not aware, maybe. And they have a bank account of their own. Normally they attach their bank statements to the financial reports that they send to us.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

The view that COWSOs did not need external funding contradicted the evidence from each of the COWSOs encountered in this research. A COWSO I visited in Temeke (as part of my observational research with WPM, outwith the case study area) had received start up funding from a large international water NGO, and the Maji Kwa Wote project was set up as a result of an international aid grant from a European country to the Tanzanian government. Although not strictly a COWSO, even the Mitonga Water Users Group had received external financial assistance:

“The government knew our problem, so they gave us help from the World Bank to drill the first well. Because the government knew our problem they came to us and asked people to mobilise themselves. So we had the money from the World Bank and the money from members to start the project.” (Mitonga Water Users Group Employees)
These various means of financing a community based water project align with the work of Dill (2010b) who explained that community based organisations “may be homegrown, catalysed by development organisations, and/or the result of government policies and practices” (Dill, 2010b:612). Whilst Dill (2009) argues that being formally recognised by the government helps a community organisation obtain external funds, the Mitonga Water Users Group originated at the grassroots level and was still able to obtain financial support from the World Bank and another international NGOs. In relation to this, the role of the Tanzanian state becomes increasingly blurred, as its understanding of its own policy does not appear to be comprehensive nor extend beyond the role of distributing funds from international sources. The ward executive officer in Ilala described the water projects in the area (including the Mitonga Water Users Group) as independent from the government, and that he was only involved when customers refused to pay their bills, or the group needed to find expansion space (Ilala Ward Executive Officer Interview).

There were even some basic attributes of COWSOs that caused confusion. COWSOs were explained to me by WPM as autonomous financially self-sustaining organisations that were in control of their own capital, and each COWSO encountered in this research was indeed, in possession of their own bank account. One NGO responded also discussed how bank accounts were required to set up a community water project (NGO #7). However, the Ministry of Water provided a different description:

“In terms of COWSOs they do not have these bank accounts. For the management of COWSOs...in a village there are administrative officers, like a street officer. Such kind of people are put in management of the COWSO.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2015)

However, the quote from the representative from the Temeke MWST not only confirms the requirement for COWSOs to have their own bank account but explains the importance of them for reporting mechanisms.
Across the board, although this research endeavoured to ensure that all data was discussed using the correct terminology it was incredibly difficult to determine what this actually was. Official policy documents provided a different message to Ministry of Water employees, whilst local level government representatives and those playing an active role in community water provision all had their own interpretations of the various acronyms and definitions used. It could be suggested that, as Tanzanian water policy has simply officially recognised grassroots water provision that has been used as a coping mechanism as a result of state inefficiency for a number of years, piecemeal gestures are being made to indicate that the policy is working, when existing behaviours are simply being rebranded without a genuine shift in practice.

5.9 Urban and rural water provision in Dar es Salaam

As well as the variety of definitions in use for community water schemes, it was equally difficult to determine which areas of Dar es Salaam were categorised as urban and which were categorised as rural. I initially explained to WPM that my research was solely focused on urban water provision. After taking me to meet COWSOs in parts of Temeke, they insisted these areas were rural, although these areas were as densely populated as any other area of Dar es Salaam. There appeared to be a sense that as Dar es Salaam’s population had grown and previously rural areas had become part of the city’s urban sprawl, these rural policy discourses had remained even although these communities faced the same issues of overpopulation and resource scarcity than any other resident of the city. Within the National Water Policy (2002), a series of objectives for rural water supply were listed:

“(iii) to emphasise on communities paying for part of the capital costs, and full cost recovery for operation and maintenance of service as opposed to the previous concept of cost sharing,

...
(v) to manage water supplies at the lowest appropriate level as opposed to the centralised command control approach

(vi) to promote participation of the private sector in the delivery of goods and services” (National Water Policy, 2002:30)

The above objectives accurately reflect the form of water provision used in both Temeke and Ilala, even although they were still part of the city of Dar es Salaam. Additionally, the phrase “lowest appropriate level” with regards to water provision was also used in the Dublin Principles in 1992, showing Tanzanian water policy’s alignment with global water policy discourses. In a later document produced by the Ministry of Water, it is stated that:

“The supply of water and provision of sewerage services in urban areas will be the responsibility of regulated, commercialised, autonomous water and sanitation authorities. In rural areas, emphasis is on community owned water supply organisations, with local government authorities playing a financing and facilitation role.” (Ministry of Water, 2008)

It could also be the case that Dar es Salaam is considered to be a separate, unique, entity within Tanzanian water policy, due to the fact that in the 2010 version of the PRSP, Dar es Salaam was given a separate target, perhaps due to the city’s rapid growth and the large proportion of the population outwith the coverage of the municipal system. In urban areas, the ‘market’ model is used to provide water to urban citizens, but in rural areas the ‘community’ approach is being used. However some urban dwellers are accessing water through community-based provision. It is possible to infer here that unplanned settlements that have appeared in recent years as a result of Dar es Salaam’s increasing population are still considered to be rural, especially as the 2002 policy document is, at the time of writing, thirteen years old. However in the urban policy section of the 2002 document it refers to poor water provision in urban squatter settlements in Tanzania’s cities, and the infrastructural
challenges faced there. Whilst the National Water Policy (2002) calls for greater institutional clarity, it is still unclear why certain localities fall under different sections of the policy, undoubtedly making interpretation for those outwith the Tanzanian state incredibly difficult. DAWSACO is lauded by Pigeon (2012) for improving coverage within the city, but it is perhaps the case that coverage has improved only by repairing leaks and reconnecting households that are still within the geographical areas covered by DAWASCO. The peri-urban communities that exist on the edge of the city still remain outwith the organisations’ remit, which provides some explanation for the policy discrepancies. Indeed, Pigeon (2012) explains that any expansion of the network has been driven by industrial or tourism-based interests and has not focused on these unserviced communities.

5.10 The role of NGOs in water policy in Tanzania

As noted previously, the role of NGOs and development organisations has been written into Tanzanian water policy, giving this sector an integral role in the country’s water governance. The way in which donors and development organisations maintain involvement in Tanzania’s water sector (and other sectors) varies, as noted by a respondent with significant experience of policy advocacy:

“Some is passive funding, so donors put directly into say, the water basket [of the overall budget for Tanzania]. There’s the general budget support that I was mentioning earlier, money directly into the Tanzanian budget and then the government decides what they’re going to do with it. And then there is direct project funding.” (NGO #1)

With the decreasing role of the state in Tanzania’s water sector there are a variety of ways in which NGOs can play a part in providing water to Tanzanian people. NGOs can provide their support through the Tanzanian state, or carry out work in the water sector in Tanzania through their own project, subverting any state influence and in turn reducing the role of the Tanzanian state in the
country’s water provision. Both Tanzania Water Network (TWN) and Water Project Management (WPM) participated in all three activities. During my observational research I witnessed a variety of activities such as attending meetings with the Ministry of Water to assist in event planning, applying to external international organisations for funding to carry out local projects, and village workshops that provided hygiene education and technical training to grassroots water schemes. It appeared both TWN and WPM not only worked in collaboration with the state in certain situations, but also came up with their own projects and initiatives to assist the people of Dar es Salaam in producing and managing their own water supply. Through holding workshops and training within communities, TWN and WPM were filling the gap left by the state in educating communities and allowing Tanzania’s water governance to be decentralised to the local level.

One respondent from an organisation that had been working in Tanzania for a number of years discussed the shift in practice for development organisations within the country that had occurred in the last two decades:

“We continued with small-scale water supply, pumps, boreholes, or shallow wells. But the major change was the intervention of participatory approaches and sanitation promotion. The dialogue, the type of activity at the community level, and then that again evolved and we started strengthening the technical skills at the community level to construct any improved toilets.” (NGO #5)

The respondent went on to elaborate how they began training individuals at the village level to manage locally based water and sanitation projects. As noted by the African Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW) (2011:17): “The ministry [of water]’s new role as co-ordinator (rather than implementer) requires a different skill-set and different thinking”. As such, NGOs and other development organisations have an increasing role to play in water provision in Tanzania whilst the Tanzanian state simply manages the different types of projects these organisations are willing to implement. Although this decentralised power from
the state would align with Nyerere’s beliefs, the active incorporation of international organisations into Tanzanian governance goes against some of his core values and in turn, indicates a profound shift in policy discourse which could lead to some challenges faced in its implementation.

As well as the activities that NGOs carry out at the grassroots and regional levels in Tanzania, they also have platforms for direct communication with the Tanzanian state:

“The water sector in Tanzania is having a sector-wide approach to planning, so the government of Tanzania have developed a system where donors and the government plan together, they implement together, they monitor together...within the water sector development programme, it has created various dialogue mechanisms, so there are water sector working groups, technical working, steering committees, and these comprise of the donors, the government, the NGOs and the civil society organisations.” (NGO #2)

“There is the health sector development partners group, a water sector one, education sector one...and then there are mechanisms, these development partners who are mostly the international ones who sit together with the government part" (NGO #5)

The latter respondent went on to discuss how this was an improvement on previous relations between the state and development organisations, as before this, dialogue generally took place between an individual organisation and the Tanzanian state, with no co-ordination across the development sector or different ministries. Another respondent further explained the current relationship between development organisations and the Tanzanian state, noting that they see the state as another one of their partner organisations, and that they work with a number of Ministries in order to carry out their work into

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32 It is assumed here that the respondent is referring to the relevant Ministry to their area of work.
water and sanitation. Both the explanations of the various dialogues in place and the reference to the state as another partner organisation show how integral development organisations are to the policymaking framework. As discussed previously, the 1991 National Water Policy was referred to by one respondent as being heavily informed by the interests of development organisations, and it appears to be the case that this sector still has a significant influence over water governance in Tanzania.

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the dominant discourses currently present in Tanzanian water policy and their origins, be it from Tanzania’s postcolonial history or from the influence of international development organisations. In addition, the chapter has also explored how policy is interpreted by the variety of different actors involved in water provision in Tanzania, and just how messy and fragmented the sector currently is. As the Tanzanian state has retreated from water provision, a variety of actors with conflicting objectives now play a pivotal role in the country’s water governance. The role of water as an economic good with monetary value is prevalent, conflicting with the belief held by others that water is something that should be accessed by all. In addition, the multiple definitions and understandings of community water provision have been a convenient replacement for the Tanzanian state’s previous responsibilities, with no clear mandate or support for these community-based schemes to provide water successfully.

In contrast with Tanzanian policy under Nyerere, where the state took a key role in service provision, Schneider (2004) suggests that the state’s transition to almost absent from a number of contemporary Tanzanian governance processes is a matter of concern. Nonetheless, this chapter has indicated that there are still elements of the Arusha Declaration, and thus, Tanzania’s form of African socialism evident in contemporary Tanzanian water policy. This calls into question how this policy manifests itself without a centralised governance structure in control of the water sector, and with a number of autonomous
organisations, such as NGOs and civil society organisations having such an integral role to play in Tanzanian water provision. By examining the role of these organisations in Chapter 6, before exploring the experiences of community-based water provision in Chapter 7, the ways in which Tanzanian water policy materialises in reality will be examined, in order to analyse the effectiveness of these policy documents and in turn, provided a clearer picture of the complexity of the water sector within Tanzania.
Chapter 6: NGO Politics and the Role of Development Organisations in Dar es Salaam

6.1 Introduction

In 1991 Tanzania had forty-one non-governmental organisations (NGOs) registered within the country, but by 2000 this figure had risen to almost ten thousand (Reuben, from Hearn 2007). Since then, the number of NGOs has continued to grow, and they have an increasingly important role to play in water provision in Tanzania. Involved in service provision, technical assistance and community education, organisations based both locally, nationally and internationally occupy the space held between the Tanzanian state’s former provision and the involvement of the private sector. Some of the earlier discussion of NGOs examined their role in relations between the developed world and the Global South, and whether they are part of “a new type of cultural and economic colonialism” (Wallace, 2004:202). As such, this chapter takes into account data from respondents as well as my personal reflections from the field in order to make sense of the work of these organisations and how my presence as a white researcher revealed some nuances within this data.

This chapter will examine the activities undertaken by both international and locally based NGOs in Dar es Salaam and other parts of Tanzania, and the organisation-specific and sector based problems that they encounter in doing so. Through an examination of three months of ethnographic data and a series of interviews, this chapter attempts to discuss the various barriers to carrying out successful development work in the water sector in Tanzania, and also examines the rationale behind doing so. Themes covered in this chapter include competition between organisations, inter-sectoral relationships and the challenges of funding acquisition. After discussing the issues faced by organisations on a daily basis this chapter will examine the challenges that are embedded within development sector discourse and the impacts that these can have on organisational activity. The chapter will then discuss the role of the development sector in Tanzania and its future prospects, before concluding with
some personal reflections of experiences of being a member of staff and a researcher at two civil society organisations based in Dar es Salaam.

6.2 Organisational activity

Although there are different viewpoints on what work international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and civil society organisations should be doing, ethnographic data collected in this research indicated two main themes in their activity, that of ‘hardware’ and ‘software’. ‘Hardware’ was described as any activity that included the construction of something, for example the drilling of a borehole or the installation of a domestic point. ‘Software’ on the other hand, referred to any advocacy, education or, as described by those in the sector, ‘sensitisation’ activities that involved hosting of workshops or any other water and sanitation themed events. These activities align with academic literature on this topic, as in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with the rise of global neoliberal economic doctrine, NGOs increased their remit to service provision, advocacy and policy analysis (Mawdsley et al, 2005, Kang 2010).

In terms of the general aims of individual organisations, one international organisation interviewed stated that:

“The vision of the organisation is to see one day, to ensure that everyone has access to water and sanitation. And how can we achieve the vision? We have the mission that we work with the poor, with rural and local partners.” (NGO #2)

Another international organisation had activities based across a variety of sectors, but stated that their water and sanitation work was all about improving access and quality of these services, most specifically for Tanzania’s children. The majority of NGOs interviewed also discussed that one of their main outputs was monitoring and evaluation of communities and water projects, in order to elucidate the challenges faced and to help mitigate them in future.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Tanzania Water Network (TWN) manage a network of organisations working in the water sector in Tanzania, and run and contribute to a number of roadshows and education events across the country. Water Project Management (WPM) work on technical assistance for community-level water projects and teaches communities how to manage their own water systems at the grassroots level. When asked to describe their own activities, TWN stated:

“We try to popularise the policies and the laws, in our language, Swahili, so that the poor communities and the rural communities can understand it. And we have created the popular version of policy so even people in poor or rural communities can understand what is going on in the government regarding water and sanitation. And also we print material to raise awareness and educate those in schools and communities.” (TWN Interview)

As well as managing the network of other civil society organisations working in the water sector in Tanzania, TWN’s outputs largely reflected those considered ‘software’. During my time there, I was able to get involved in the organisation of and running of a handwashing sensitisation workshop in a small village just outside Dar es Salaam. This event lasted two days and initially involved lessons on good sanitation practice and timely identification of water borne illnesses. Day two was more practical, allowing the group to participate in a practical handwashing tutorial and a quiz on what they had learned over the past two days. Other tasks at TWN involved report writing or attending meetings with other civil society organisations, INGOs or the Ministry of Water. WPM on the other hand had some more involvement with the technical side of things, engaging with solar power companies and working with engineers, although they did also work on ‘software’ type education practices. Daily tasks at WPM often involved reading documents and meeting with potential partner organisations.

For the NGOs based solely in Tanzania, one other organisation acted as a network in the same capacity as TWN, although they worked across a number of
different sectors. Other organisations worked specifically in rural settings, working on environmental conservation based activities, even although their main offices were based in Dar es Salaam. Some of these environmental organisations’ activities involved trying to protect rural water sources, and teaching communities how to plan their agricultural activity so to not lower the water quality of local resources. Other outputs focused on “train[ing] people so that they can train others” (NGO #3), which seemed to be a common theme across all organisations involved in this research and aligns with their description of ‘software’ activities.

Figure 6.1 An example of a handwashing workshop in Dar es Salaam (author's photography)

A significant proportion of the output from WPM and some other organisations involved in this research was setting up community owned water and sanitation
organisations (COWSOs). A setting up of one of these groups involves hosting classes with the COWSO board on their responsibilities and the activities involved in running a COWSO, and also speaking to the local community about how water is going to be accessed in their area from now on. Civil society organisations also helped COWSOs register with local government and were involved in setting up COWSO's bank accounts.

In a context where development organisations are both numerous and incredibly active, it appeared useful to examine what the Ministry of Water believed was the role of this sector in water provision in Tanzania;

“TWN is an NGO, so they have connections to some of the donors, they have access to funds to cover their ideas” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

This suggests that the Ministry believe that the role of donors and development organisations have a key role to play in water provision in Tanzania, and shows how vital their connections and ability to win funding is for this sector. This is in stark contrast to the early versions of NGOs and their counterparts, who originally existed in opposition to the state (Mawdsley et al, 2005). One respondent, working for an international organisation that provided funding to a number of civil society organisations and provided a lot of support for TWN, had a different view of the role of locally based organisations:

"We are doing advocacy at the national level to ensure that there is enough money that it is fairly allocated and there is environmental care for the resources. But when funds reach there, it's now the role of the local civil society organisations to ensure that it works for the purpose it is intended.” (NGO #2)

It therefore appears to be the case that a large output from the development sector should be acquiring funds from international donors or managing funds already acquired. It is pertinent to note that there was limited discussion of the
welfare of Tanzanian citizens in these examples, or their access to water and sanitation services. The development sector in Tanzania appears to be considered a necessary part of the governance framework, as opposed to a temporary fixture. Edwards and Hulme’s (1996:961) early description of NGOs existing “by default rather than design” is interesting to note, as their role has changed from that of response to a permanent fixture in Tanzania’s water sector. The data from both the Ministry of Water and other stakeholders in the water sector in Tanzania suggests that the role of the state is that of a facilitator, passing on donor funds to NGOs. This places the responsibility of the success or failure on these organisations and leaving the state free from blame when access to water is still a challenge for many residents across the country.

6.3 The impact of INGOs and civil society organisations in Dar es Salaam’s water sector

After making sense of the variety of tasks undertaken by INGOs and civil society organisations in Tanzania, it is useful to analyse the impact of their activities and the challenges that they face on a daily basis. In terms of the countless reports written by organisations in this sector, these can often be misleading, with one respondent claiming that reports only explain the existence of water points, and do not consider whether they are functional or not. This links to a whole other broader debate of the sustainability of the work of these organisations, and their long-term impacts, as explained by an individual from an organisation whose primary focus was research and producing in-depth reporting of various issues faced by residents in Dar es Salaam;

“62% of the water points are functional, 38% are not functional, but just rectifying the non-functional water points, then you’re a step ahead I think. You’ve created crazy access. In every ten water points invested in, four broke down. It’s a waste.” (NGO #4)

Indeed, the scope of organisational impact can be viewed as varying levels of success depending on what statistics are considered. Across the various
organisations involved in this research, there appeared to be a significant focus on setting up new projects, as opposed to returning to ensure the quality of existing ones. The majority of tasks that I witnessed at both TWN and WPM were either writing funding proposals or reaching out to larger, more established organisations to establish new projects. There appeared to be very little attention paid to projects already in place, and instead the focus was on what the organisation could do next in the near or distant future. It is unclear as to whether this behaviour was a result of dissatisfaction with the current output of TWN and WPM, or because of the precarious nature of the ways in which these organisations acquired finance for day to day running costs.

When organisations discussed their work related to setting up COWSOs, there also did not appear to be a long-term strategy in place;

“[COWSOs] don’t call us back because we work privately, we cannot stay there for the whole period. So whatever comes that maybe you can’t afford, you have to report it to the district councils.” (NGO #3)

This quote, from a small, grassroots based organisation in Dar es Salaam, provides insight into how organisations with limited resources and capacity are able to cope with such a significant task. Civil society organisations are lauded for being the most knowledgeable in setting up COWSOs and have been given the majority of this responsibility by the Tanzanian state. However these organisations do not seem to hold any more responsibility over this activity than simply the initial set up process. This results in a situation similar to the building of water points, where an organisation or the Tanzanian state can report that a certain number of COWSOs have been set up, but there is no clear information on how many of these COWSOs are still working, or how successful they are.

A number of organisations interviewed for this research worked closely with the state, with a variety of levels of success. Although the Ministry of Water were the only industry interviewed in this research, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Local Government also have an involvement in the water sector in
Tanzania, and according to a number of respondents, were not co-ordinating effectively. Several organisations spoke about the creation of official spaces for dialogue with the state and the impact that this had;

“Before [formalised dialogue] we were dialoguing [sic] with the government individually, GTZ, the French, we would go alone. But now we’ve started going to the government with one voice and a co-ordinated agenda, and the government was very willing because they were tired of dealing with one donor at a time.” (NGO #5)

The respondent went on to discuss how this formalised dialogue was a key turning point for the Tanzanian Water Sector Development Programme, which began in 2007, and also explained how donors were the ones to suggest more community involvement in development projects. As an international, well-established organisation, this respondent was able to discuss the ways in which a number of divergent external development groups are now able to provide one collective voice within Tanzania’s development. This has not been as easy a process for smaller, more local organisations however, with one commenting that it was only after a long time of attending meetings that their views were trusted enough to be taken into account by the state. A number of examples did however reveal that the impact that INGOs and civil society organisations can have on government practice. One organisation persuaded the government to provide an annual simplified version of their budget to citizens of Tanzania, and this practice has been in place for four years now. Another organisation referred to presenting the same updated study to a government over and over for four years until the government eventually realised the importance of this data and began to include it in their policymaking (Author’s Interviews).

One respondent, working for a large international NGO, indicated that the Tanzanian National Water Policy of 1991 was largely informed by the views of donors. They also stated that the updated policy in 2002 recognised the role of international NGOs and local development organisations in Tanzanian’s water sector. These points indicate the potential for the views of grassroots
organisations to have influence over the Tanzanian state, but do also raise concerns over the influence donors can have over state practices. The following comment by a respondent working for an international development organisation indicates that this is an issue worth considering:

“We sort of stand between the government and the development partners, as almost like an honest broker. To make sure that the donors don’t drive at the government all of the time with their own demands, their own vested interests from their home countries and also that the government stands strong to make sure that national priorities are not being overridden by donor policies.” (NGO #5)

The respondent went onto discuss the various priorities of different international donors. For example, the respondent stated that German aid tends to support large urban-based schemes, which can often influence the types of projects the European Union is willing to fund. The World Bank, on the other hand, apparently “is for huge funding for new projects, to make big differences, rather than look for the people who fall between the cracks” (NGO #5). This indicates the number of different priorities that can exist across the international donor spectrum and the challenges potentially faced by the Tanzanian state in managing this. Clark (1995) discussed how a state can become marginalised from decision-making processes if donors are able to influence the agenda of NGOs that they fund based on their own priorities. In the case of Tanzania, the state may not only have been marginalised from decision-making but also had the extra task of managing and co-ordinating the various mandates of each of the international donor organisations.

It is a bit more complex to ascertain the impact of organisations that exist primarily to manage a network of smaller organisations, which is the case with TWN. Another similar organisation interviewed for this research stated that day to day activities should largely consist of managing email lists and sharing information from one member to all other member organisations (NGO #1). The respondent stated that an ethos should be promoted that the members in effect
own the network organisation, and the network organisation merely acts as a facilitator. However, from my time spent at TWN there was not much of a sense of this, and for what limited contact they did have with member organisations it seemed to be restricted to a small number, notably those with offices nearby to the TWN office. This could be attributed to infrastructural issues, as with power shortages, mobile signal issues and the lack of capital available to travel, it was often difficult for organisations to communicate via phone or email, and it appeared to be the case that TWN had the strongest relationships with those that they were able to meet in person. At one point during my time with TWN I became accidentally privy to an email that revealed more about the uneven dynamics of the network;

“Today at TWN I accidentally read an angry email from one of the founding members of the organisation, complaining that there was no annual general meeting last year, there had been no 2014 plan formulated, no transparency, no invite to represent the network at Maji Week, and ‘secretive selection of member organisations for events’” (Field Notebook Extract, 7th March 2014)

It became clear from this that some of TWN’s member organisations were disgruntled at their involvement in the network, or the lack of a functional network in the first place, and that there had been limited clarity from TWN’s perspective of the organisation’s role and benefits to members. As well as the email, this viewpoint was backed up by a number of interview participants from other organisations. Organisations based in Dar es Salaam that were involved in this research spoke frankly about their close relationship with TWN, and the ethnographic data collected on TWN and its member organisations largely included information on organisations based in Dar es Salaam and the city’s surrounding areas. There is scope to suggest that although TWN could be accused of favouritism with some of their member organisations, there is potentially a geographical bias that exists, based on organisations that are easier

33 This occurred when I was sat sharing a computer with a member of staff at TWN and they were checking through emails in front of me.
to regularly communicate with as there are less infrastructural barriers involved:

"We have a very close relationship, with the co-ordinator [of TWN], because basically the good thing is we are in Dar es Salaam, we have our own base, so it's easy to work with us." (NGO #3)

This organisation has an office within a few kilometres of where TWN is based, and as such has regular face to face interaction with TWN's staff and volunteers. It is potentially the case that the organisations TWN deal with more often are those that initiate the communication with TWN, as opposed to TWN making the initial contact. With the number of pressures placed on TWN on a day to day basis to write reports and source funding they could be forgiven for following the easiest method of doing things. I was involved in some work at TWN that involved emailing members for reports and about Maji Week and received limited replies so an accusation of favouritism is perhaps unfair. In terms of infrastructural issues, the other network organisation interviewed revealed that they had thought carefully about how best to communicate with their members;

“A lot of our members are based up country, they check their internet once a week if they can, so when we communicate with them we normally send an email and what we try to do these days is reduce the number of emails we send to members.” (NGO #1)

It is therefore clear that some communication issues with network members can be mitigated with some consultation with these organisations about how best they would like to be contacted. This organisation further went on to discuss that they limited their emails to being sent weekly so as not to fill up inboxes and to potentially mask important information. This organisation also noted that for something that required a response at short notice, they had elected to use text messages as this had led to a better response from members. Cumbers et al (2008) discuss how the internet enhanced communication abilities between geographically disparate groups, yet it appeared to be the case that the internet
and its communication functions were not being used to their full advantage by NGOs in Tanzania. Reflecting this argument, Marsden (2004) notes how NGOs working in Nepal faced difficulty because they used communication channels that reflected the culture of the Global North which did not align with Nepalese means of communication. It could be the case that whilst communication via email and other means that transcend geographical distance, the most successful working relationships in Tanzania are built in person. During my time at the TWN office I was involved in sending a number of emails to member organisations that in many cases led to no response. My efforts to increase communication with members, such as the establishment of a regular newsletter, were verbally welcomed by TWN staff but did not appear to materialise into anything substantial. It could be concluded that efforts to manage the network from TWN had been limited, and that whilst external factors can often affect communication, other organisations had found ways to work around them.

6.4 Challenges faced in the development sector in Tanzania

As well as the challenges faced that impact upon the minutiae of daily activities for INGOs and civil society organisations, there are also a number of issues endemic within the sector that create a multitude of difficulties. One of the most common issues faced by organisations was the pressures of funding, and how difficult it is to obtain a regular source of income:

"Managing an NGO, it’s not a joke. You need to be creative, you need support, because you are not generating income of your own. What comes in, goes out. Straight to the community. Because that’s the target. So fundraising is a big challenge, to run the organisation. That’s why you’ll find that many organisations, they die out, because of a lack of support.” (NGO #3)

Reinforcing this viewpoint from a small, locally-based organisation, another respondent from a Tanzanian organisation discussed the issues with organisations being provided with funding on a project basis, which inhibits any
forward planning or development of long-term strategies. Also discussed by Wallace (2004), this was incredibly apparent throughout the fieldwork period, and had a significant impact on the day to day activities of organisations. This behaviour is appears to be propagated by the role of the Ministry of Water. One respondent at the Ministry described their activities as;

“We appraise the project for that area. We try to secure finance. We co-ordinate studies.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

Indeed, the project to project cycle exists within state institutions as well as within non-governmental and civil society organisations. Long-term strategies are instead substituted for chasing funding and continually coming up with new projects and finding stakeholders to support them;

“Some of these projects are really time-bound and it's not really clear how it will add to the future so I've seen organisations where for two years they’re doing HIV/AIDS intervention, the next year they jump into the environment, and for me that’s much more of a survival mechanism but prevents them contributing something worthwhile in the longer term.” (NGO #1)

Other organisations discussed how they spent a majority of their time writing grant proposals to international and national donors even although they almost always expected a negative response, and they knew that with the number of organisations competing for the same funding they were aware they could not rely on it. An explicit example of funding pressures occurred during my time at TWN, when one day I was called into the office to help with a grant proposal:

“[TWN] phoned me last week and asked me to come in right away to look at this funding opportunity that they had found, only it was for a $300,000 USAID grant for a family planning project, something which they have absolutely no experience of. It took almost a week of convincing from me that the time taken on this application would absolutely not be worth it,
especially since the grant was for an area that was in no way their specialisation.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 9th February 2014)34.

This is a clear example the views of Wallace (2004) and Leal (2007), that organisations change their priorities to fit in with what funding is available, and as discussed by the respondent from another civil society organisation, inhibits the development of long-term goals and strategies. One respondent discussed how World Bank procedures often created a lot of administrative work for the state and smaller organisations, which resulted in some organisations telling lies on funding application forms in order to secure funding. It could be suggested that certain pressures on accessing funding are in fact breeding dishonest practices amongst some organisations. Somewhat related to this, during my time at TWN I suggested creating an email newsletter to send to the network to keep them informed on TWN and member organisations’ activities. This was met with the response of showing me a printed copy of a newsletter that was several years out of date. It seemed to be the case that TWN were happy to do activities that they could include in a budget or financially account for, but were less interested in activities that could not be measured in this way.

An informal discussion with a Tanzanian working for a civil society organisation based in Dar es Salaam led to a conversation about how in Tanzania “they don’t fund organisations here, just individuals” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 30th January 2014). This theme reappeared in my ethnographic data of WPM. Between my pilot period of research in 2013 and my final fieldwork period in 2014 the director of WPM sadly passed away, which had a significant effect on WPM accessing funding. There was a noticeable difference after a change in director as to how much pressure WPM had on them to gain funding, and how much the loss of one staff member had a negative impact on the organisation. Other informal discussions with international organisations with non-Tanzanian staff also

34Although me attempting to convince the organisations this was not a worthwhile task could be seen to have impacted upon data, I did not express this opinion on other occasions. I framed my argument around the fact that I was researching water in Tanzania and had no expertise in family planning and would therefore not be able to write it. This could be seen as an example of altering data, but it could be argued that writing the funding proposal for the organisation would equally have had an impact on their activity.
alluded to this. Vail and Hollands (2013:543) found similar dynamics in their research of a film and photography collective in the Northeast of England: “even in the most egalitarian of organisations, there may well be certain figures who dominate based on their charismatic personalities and authoritative skills”. Although respondents and other individuals encountered were willing to articulate that WPM had changed since the director passed away, and I was able to witness a stark difference in the work of the organisation between my two fieldwork periods, no one was able to articulate precisely what had changed apart from the director’s funding connections. It is potentially the case that some of the most important attributes individuals can bring to development organisations are intangible and are thus challenging to replicate when the individual is no longer there.

Another theme that came up in interviews and informal discussion was how funding for organisations largely depended on personal networks as opposed to the quality of written proposals. However, it is difficult to determine whether being of Tanzanian origin or not leads to better links to funding networks, as another respondent remarked that organisations run by foreigners tended to fare better with funding proposals. This aligns with the concerns raised by Phillips (2014:1), who calls into question the over-representation of “posh white blokes” in the development sector. Phillips laments that due to this group’s upbringing, they can never fully understand the issues faced in a Global South context, but the fact that certain funding opportunities are only open to foreign development professionals indicates a disconnect in contemporary development practice. Taking Phillips’ view into account, those without the required knowledge are perhaps essential to NGOs gaining funding, creating a situation whereby development organisations always require the expertise of foreign individuals in order to function.

As previously discussed, the majority of organisations involved in this research existed on a project to project basis, which also reflected some of the activities of the Ministry of Water. Pressure to source capital in order to ensure an
organisation’s survival appeared to be intrinsically linked to external pressures from bilateral donors;

“The publics [sic] in Europe are donating less than they used to, taxpayers of governments in the North are asking whether their money has impacted in the countries that it is sent to so there is much more pressure on international NGOs to show that they’re not just a middle man handling money on behalf of poor people in the South, and that creates a scenario whereby they have to react by proving their worth.” (NGO #1)

It is clear that the monitoring and evaluation culture discussed by Mueller-Hirth (2012) and Smith (2010) is equally prevalent within the development sector in Tanzania, which one respondent noting that it had been made worse by the global economic crisis and either less money being made available by donors, or donors having to ensure that what they do fund achieves maximum results. As well as the onus that monitoring and evaluation activities place on the day to day tasks of these organisations, it also breeds some of the corrupt practices discussed by Burger and Owens (2010);

“When monitoring and evaluation people come from Belgium or America, Japan, and you have people from the health ministry, or the water ministry, moving all around them....they're just moving them around so that they can ensure that number one, the donors are happy, so when they're doing their ‘m and e’ they don’t report poorly against them, so they will send them to the sites that are perhaps better functioning, so they are hiding some of those structural problems that exist, and that they're being overstretched.” (NGO #1)

It is therefore apparent that as well as monitoring and evaluation practices taking up a lot of organisations’ time, they are not even providing an accurate picture of their work and could therefore be seen as somewhat of a futile activity. This also indicates the seriousness of funding pressures on organisations working in Tanzania and the lengths that they will go to, to ensure the survival of
their organisations. A superficial narrative is presented to external stakeholders that masks the ground level realities and the issues prevalent, indicating that presenting improvement in order to gain subsequent funding is more important than actually improving grassroots water access. Townsend et al’s (2004) research into NGOs in Mexico City revealed that smaller organisations wished for an opportunity to engage with their donors more in person, in order for them to get a full understanding of the projects they were supporting. However, in Tanzania it appeared to be the opposite, and that face to face interactions with donors could be an opportunity to expose the inadequacies of a project. Although this may fall into the category of what Burger and Owens (2010:1265) refer to as “deceit and ineffectiveness”, there is the potential that organisations have to be creative with the truth in order to guarantee their survival and perhaps be able to do some meaningful work in the future. As noted by Smith (2010), it is often the case that those with the best of intentions can become embroiled in corrupt practices, such as bribing in order to guarantee the success of funding applications, even if they are aware of why this is incorrect behaviour.

Whilst international organisations are able to conduct monitoring and evaluation work with relative ease, due to having both the sufficient financial and human resources to do so, there is perhaps a disconnect in understanding the capacities of locally-based civil society organisations and what is feasible. With perhaps less than five staff in some instances, and none of them in possession of the adequate training and education level to provide reports to the standards that international organisations they work in partnership with can accept, civil society organisations could have tasks put upon them well beyond their abilities, which could detract from any meaningful work that they are able to do. It could be inferred that organisations have to alter their practice in order to provide information that external parties desire, instead of spending time on the activities that are important to them or deemed the most effective. Insofar as Briggs and Sharp (2004:666) note that “for local knowledges and narratives to be heard at all, they have to move to this central terrain, where they may be “accepted” and subsequently appropriated”, for local organisations to gain
legitimacy and gain financial resources for future outputs they must comply with these externally imposed targets and constraints.

Another dynamic of development organisations discussed at length in the literature (Clark, 1995; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Porter, 2003) and prevalent in Tanzania is that of working in partnership with other organisations. Some organisations discussed the partnerships that they were involved in and how they worked;

“First, we identify various partners and then we do a screening of them, so once we are satisfied with the assessments we say we are going to work with them. After that, we come together and plan together, and then they submit the proposals and then we fund them.” (NGO #2)

“It is supported by the World Bank via the Ministry of Water, provided to the district councils for their management. So they are the clients. We have been doing both the technical and the facilitation services. (NGO #3)

Although in some instances partnerships can exist simply between two NGOs or civil society organisations, in other cases international institutions provided funds to the Tanzanian state who then distributed this among grassroots organisations. The use of the word ‘client’ does not suggest the idea of equal partnership however, and more that Tanzanian organisations are given funding to conduct work on behalf of a larger international organisation, and perhaps do not have much agency over the rationale behind this work or how it is carried out. As previously discussed, both WPM and TWN work in partnership with a number of international and local organisations in Tanzania. However, ethnographic data revealed that these partnerships were not necessarily even;

“TWN requested funds from [Civil Society Organisation #2] to improve their office with air conditioning. [Civil Society Organisation #2] instead want them to move to Kariakoo. TWN currently pay 500000 Tshs per
month for a whole house, if they moved to Kariakoo it would be 700000 Tshs for just one room.” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 31st January 2014)

The suggestion by the larger civil society organisation would have resulted in a significant geographical move for TWN, and with traffic issues in the city centre of Dar es Salaam would have caused a lot of infrastructural challenges for their staff and anyone visiting their office. It also seemed peculiar that a request for a slight improvement to an office that is largely working well for TWN resulted in the organisation that provides the majority of their funding trying to make a significant change. Whilst TWN were able to resist this (and did therefore not receive air conditioning), this indicates the unequal power relations and what Gibbs et al (2000) refer to as ‘lopsided friendships’, that can exist between those who provide the capital to smaller organisations and those in receipt of it.

Analysis of documents within TWN offices revealed a lot of similar exchanges with this international organisation, including letters pleading for one desk and one chair for the office, the results of which were not revealed to me. When interviewed for this research, and the topic of TWN came up, said international organisation made a point of referring to TWN as “our child” (NGO #2), further revealing uneven partnership dynamics. Other organisations involved in this research explained similar issues when working with partners:

“It’s not easy because every organisation has its own mission, vision and objectives.” (NGO #3)

This echoes previous discussion surrounding the Tanzanian state’s relationship with international donors, and indicates that these power relations are evident at all levels of contemporary Tanzanian development practice. The above organisation, being both grassroots-based and small in size, commented on the challenges faced by organisations of their capacity in trying to promote a vision that did not strictly align with that of the more larger, international and influential organisations. Conversely, an organisation working in a similar
capacity to TWN, albeit as both a bigger and cross-sectoral initiative, explained how they mitigate these issues:

"With our donors at least I think there’s a bit of room to drive the agenda, to drive the focus to the strategic areas you want to work in. The way we do it is we have a strategic plan that we agree with our members, and then once that’s agreed we do fundraising against that strategic plan.” (NGO #1)

The organisation went on to explain that they controlled the influence of partners by limiting their contributions to a third of the total cost of this project, resulting in a situation where no single donor organisation could have complete financial control over the recipient. This strategy appeared to give this organisation scope to have more agency over their own projects rather than aligning their planned outputs to what funding from larger organisations appears to be available, and is inherently connected to project-based funding that organisations like TWN appear to exist on. The fact that TWN appears to receive their funding from one or two large NGOs is indicative of how little control they have on not only their outputs but their day to day organisational functions. Being referred to as a “child” of one of these organisations calls into question TWN’s agency as an individual organisation and what this means for their relationships with other organisations in the sector. Although it can be argued that for smaller organisations, existing without partnerships with larger organisations can inhibit their survival (Clark, 1995; Edwards and Hulme, 1996), it is clear from the aforementioned data that these relationships can present their own set of difficulties. It becomes challenging for smaller organisations to carve out their own agenda if it differs greatly from that of the larger organisation supporting them, and similarly difficult for them to break away from the relationship if they have become dependent on the larger organisations’ capital for their survival. Taking these power dynamics into account, it may be the case that two or three well-established organisations are able to influence a large proportion of the development sector in one country, potentially inhibiting the potential for innovation and debate.
Another challenge discussed by organisations is that of coverage. Infrastructural barriers have already been discussed as a barrier to running a successful network of organisations across Tanzania, but these issues can also cause problems for organisations that are based in the urban hub of Dar es Salaam but work in rural areas:

"Most of our activities are based in the rural areas, so we have significant operational costs compared to those who are working in urban areas...Most of the infrastructure in rural areas is not good, which means that operational costs are high, because roads are not good, vehicle service costs are high because mostly they break down, so we also need bigger vehicles." (NGO #3)

This means that even if an organisation is able to successfully gain funding there are still a number of challenges that they must mitigate in order to carry out their work successfully. Related to this, the poor quality of roads and the costs of maintaining and repairing vehicles will mean that their work will incur more costs than an organisation based in another area of Tanzania, or an organisation working in a country with a more favourable infrastructure. Issues such as this are particularly problematic for smaller organisations such as the one quoted here, as their limited set of resources are further impacted by these infrastructural challenges. These inevitable costs that organisations face may potentially inhibit their ability to win certain funding, and could significantly reduce the scope and quality of their outputs.

6.5 Competition between organisations

With a large number of organisations existing within the development sector in Tanzania, many working towards the same issues, the competition between them can also result in some unfair behaviour:
“It’s always a mystery to me that at times you feel that people when they are being interviewed hide the obvious competition amongst civil society organisations and NGOs. It comes from issues pretty much around competition. Competition for funds, that sometimes results in smear campaigns. You might hear about negative competition, trying to make out that your organisation is the only entity that is worth donors investing in. It happens a lot.” (NGO #1)

Indeed, this impression was reinforced by reports that I read in the WPM office, which revealed the existence of these practices across the development sector in Tanzania, noting them as a current challenge faced by a number of organisations. The reports discussed how ‘smear campaigns’ between organisations were causing ill feeling across the sector, as well as organisations using ways (such as offering a higher salary) to entice staff from other organisations to come and work for them. Respondents further remarked that competition did not exist simply between organisations of a similar size and output but also between local organisations and those that work internationally. Donor organisations can also end up creating competition between locally pre-existing structures, which can also have negative effects. Aldashev and Verdier (2010) warn that increasing competition between NGOs can divert away from their original objectives. One respondent discussed how the prioritisation of providing healthcare facilities for HIV patients whilst neglecting other illnesses has caused problems across the sector;

“The staff who are working with the poor equipment on one side witnessing colleagues working in a better situation, sometimes earning more because they’re getting the opportunity to attend training workshops and are receiving per diems etc, their lives they can see are improving. You can imagine what that does to a sector if you partition it in such a manner, and you think to yourself ‘why not just have one structure that works for everybody?’” (NGO #1)

It is believed that in this instance the respondent differentiates between civil society organisations and NGOs as they believe civil society organisations to be locally-based and NGOs to be international organisations.
Although not an example strictly related to the water sector, it is clear how practices by international donors and their funding preferences can affect the development sector on the whole, and explains how ill-feeling and the demoralisation of employees can develop. Providing money to preferential areas of a sector leads to conflict and can potentially exacerbate the issues faced in the less popular areas. If funding patterns only ever follow which issues are in urgent need of support, other, less drastic, areas will eventually fall into this position after years of neglect creating a cyclical and inefficient system. For those such as TWN, who operate by managing a network of other organisations, there is also scope for competition to exist between each of their members. This became apparent in the aforementioned email exchange complaining of favouritism and a lack of transparency. Competition can have a negative impact on the outputs of organisations if they become too focused on inter-sectoral politics and devote less attention to providing services and assistance to the communities within their remit. In addition, when one area of development practice becomes in vogue and receives a lot more attention and funding compared to other sectors, this can demotivate staff who are working in the underfunded areas, and potentially lead to them moving to the sectors that are popular with donors.

6.6 Network organisations

Although network organisations such as TWN exist with a number of different nuances and dynamics, it is still useful to compare their activities with those of other similar organisations. Another respondent explained how they make every effort to ensure that they have formed a good relationship with all of their members and that they do not do any work that overshadows the work of their individual member organisations. They remarked that a significant amount of clarity was needed between a network organisation and their members over what the network was going to provide and the various benefits for stakeholders. This organisation discussed the concern that some member organisations could conclude that the network organisation are “building careers
off of our backs” (NGO #1), which in some instances could be representative of some of TWN’s activities.

The aforementioned rushed decision to apply for a family planning project grant did not appear to involve any consultation with members, and reinforces some of the concerns raised in the email complaining of favouritism. Additionally, TWN’s frenzied attempts at funding at times suggested their focus was survival as an organisation of their own merits, as opposed to a synthesis of the work of smaller organisations based across Tanzania. Expanding on this, one respondent remarked that competition can sometimes be exacerbated if organisations are not clear on their outputs, which can lead to issues of perceived competition when in fact organisations are working towards different goals. However, if organisations like TWN continue to alter their outputs based on which funding is available this will continue to blur their role in the sector and will make these issues of competition more apparent. This data aligns with Dolinhow’s (2005) research in Mexico which discussed how local organisations focused purely on short term projects rather than long-term structural strategies. Furthermore, Elbers and Arts’ (2011) discussion of organisations in Ghana inserting gender or HIV/AIDS into funding proposals even although they did not relate to their main body of work shows how development terms that are in vogue can impact upon the types of funding applied for. It is clear that funding pressures and the emphasis on results-based development in Tanzania replicate development practices elsewhere.

6.7 Development organisations and the impact of local culture

Although a large number of the issues experienced by INGOs and civil society organisations based in Tanzania aligned with research conducted in other countries, there were some issues that were evident in this research that were context specific to Tanzania. Some respondents discussed the issue of an embedded “per diem culture” (Civil Society Organisation #1) which had a significant impact on trying to host meetings and the financial costs involved in doing so. The concept of per diems originally existed on the basis that Tanzanian
government officials were paid expenses to attend events in areas of the country outwith the area that they lived in. At the time of data collection, there was a great deal of controversy within the Tanzanian press over government officials receiving a significant increase in expenses provided, which went far beyond the actual expenses accrued by these individuals and was looked upon very negatively by the Tanzanian media and citizens:

“For top officials in government I think it is five hundred dollars a day. It doesn’t matter whether you’re going to Addis Ababa or Nairobi or New York the rate is the same. Can you see why it’s an incentive for anyone not to stay in the office?” (NGO #1)

These expense payments had also extended to ‘sitting allowances’, which were payments provided to those attending meetings within their local area. This behaviour was explained to me by a number of respondents as something that had originally started as an allowance received by government employees, specifically politicians. This culture had extended to the development sector, where from my own observations and experiences of trying to arrange meetings it became apparent that a number of individuals would not attend meetings unless they were being financially rewarded:

“So these [sitting allowances] are if you call up for any meeting, even in the Ministry, you get given a white envelope and in the envelope is an allowance. You have not left your home town. That’s crazy. You can’t even hold meetings with these guys because they want money from you.” (NGO #4)

Notably, this financial reward was often far in excess of the individual’s travel costs and often just seemed to be an arbitrary amount. This often caused problems for organisations when trying to hold meetings, although some were strict in their policies:
“I would rather have two or three people who are really intent on being there, who enjoy or who are interested in the work that they're going to come to do, than a hundred people who are not there for that reason. So I'm not at all ashamed of having five people in that room.”

(NGO #1)

This organisation was nonetheless in the minority in its practices, and the expenses required in order to get individuals to attend meetings often made it feel like their message had been devalued. At the community sensitisation workshop I helped to run, every attendee was handed an envelope of money at the end of the day. Such practices call into question whether individuals attend these meetings out of genuine interest and commitment to better safe water and hygiene practices, or whether these events are merely seen as a source of income. Smith (2003:713) shares a similar level of scepticism based on research in Nigeria; “workshops are opportunities for patronage par excellence, enabling organisers to cultivate networks of clients and reward patrons”. The culture of workshops is, as noted by Smith (2003), approved by both international and locally based donors as a worthwhile activity that can provide a measurable output, for example the number of attendees. However if these events are held based on the premise of financial gain or extending professional networks their ability to enforce real change when tackling key development issues remains to be seen. Whilst this format of dissemination and discussion could be a viable means to mobilise civil society and involve them in development work in their locality, it appears that in some instances workshops have become a vehicle for impressive statistical reporting and personal gain for those that run and attend them.

6.8 The role of development organisations in Tanzania

To return to discussions of issues that are related to elements of Tanzanian culture and society, the longevity of development organisations must be considered, and the long-term strategies that they employ. One respondent raised the point that whilst Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia have similar climates,
infrastructural issues and postcolonial histories, Tanzania currently spends five times that of its East African neighbours on the water sector, with no evidence of measurable improvement compared to its counterparts. As previously discussed, the Ministry of Water indicated that the most important role of these organisations is their ability to access funding, which calls into question where in the process the Tanzanian state believes their role is, or if there is a strategy at all in place with the goal of no longer requiring donor funding to provide vital services. Whilst respondents were keen to suggest that this was a problem with Tanzanian culture specifically, Smith's (2003) research found similar practices taking places in the development sector in Nigeria. Taking the role of international and local development organisations into account, their interaction with communities and ability to provide sustainable water provision raised some interesting questions in this research.

"We have spent fifty years building water wells. One of the biggest things that have come out of investigations into this is that the communities have not been involved in these organisations, but also that they do not feel a sense of ownership over these things that are being installed, even though they benefit directly from them. It’s because outsiders come, build a well, then leave." (NGO #1)

There appeared to be a noticeable disconnect between the work carried out by development organisations and their longevity after an organisation had left the area. Issues of sustainability of projects were unrelated to the quality of water points or wells that were installed, but seemingly attributed to a community's understanding of the project and whether it fit in with their local area's requirements and the existing forms of provision in place there. Community understandings of ownership were not the only issues faced with regards to sustainability, with one respondent stating that because Tanzanians do not have an established tax system, and instead only pay 'hidden' taxes through the purchase of fast moving consumer goods, they do not have a sense of ownership or accountability towards anything built in their communities. This aligns with the discussion of taxation over aid by Martin (2014), as discussed in Chapter 3.
The mention of the word “outsiders” by NGO #1 is also pertinent, especially when these supposed outsiders are connected to an international NGO as opposed to one that operates only at the grassroots level. As discussed by Edwards and Hulme (1996), NGOs have been providing health and education services in Africa and Asia for a number of years, although it appears in Tanzania this applies to the water sector also. As noted by Edwards (2014) Tanzania has a long history with international donors, which has had a significant effect on certain aspects of Tanzanian development in recent years. One respondent discussed how donor fatigue in the late 1990s significantly decreased funding for the water sector at that time:

“Fifteen to twenty years ago, donors were getting tired. Maybe in their home countries policies were changing or maybe they had been in Tanzania for so long that they thought ‘we have supported Tanzania enough, let’s move onto Uganda’ or whatever.” (NGO #5)

This was discussed as a historical issue by this individual respondent, but there was evidence to suggest that this was very much a contemporary issue in Tanzania as well. When a member of staff at TWN attended a meeting with the Ministry of Water and some international donors, he returned to the office and reported that the donors present were refusing to contribute because they were unable to see where their money was going. This was particularly problematic for the Ministry of Water as two thirds of funding for the water budget was expected to be funded by donors. This indicated how much the Tanzanian state was still dependent on external resources, creating a fractured system of governance, and how important positive relationships with donors was vital to the livelihoods of Tanzanian citizens. The future of this relationship is unclear, as the Tanzanian state currently does not have the financial capacity to manage its own water resources, but is unable to provide the progress that donor organisations are expecting. This could result in either a reduction in donor funds available or a change in relationships so that donors provide funds to NGOs directly and hold individual organisations accountable. This would lead to
the Tanzanian state having less of a mandate and influence in its water sector and would make it increasingly difficult for the government to implement any policy changes that do not align with donors and development organisations’ practice.

Although each individual interviewed for this research was of Tanzanian origin they had an in-depth understanding of the impact of the presence of international development actors, and how this dichotomy between what is portrayed at home by bilateral donors and the experienced reality of their activities;

"Donors seem to be driven by the photo opportunities and to write a good story back home and to keep the taxpayers happy. 'Here's a case where a community was sad they didn't have water, and here they are smiling'. A nice before and after picture to keep the money flowing in. And then it's business as usual.” (NGO #1)

This respondent expanded upon this viewpoint by referring to an example in Southern Tanzania where a farmers group were given a new machine to process coffee in 2013. It had already fallen into disrepair as it had not been installed properly and the farmers were not taught how to use it properly. The Prime Minister of Tanzania was however present for the grand opening and “fanfare” (NGO #1), even though the new machine has made very little impact on the people whose lives it was supposed to improve. Another respondent commented that donor funded projects had also had limited success because often communities were not involved in the decision making or setting up of the project, so the communities did not feel any responsibility to maintain it after the donors had left. There appeared at times to be a disconnect between the needs of a community and what services some donor organisations actually provided, and a lack of consideration for the fact that before the donor arrived a community will have had a means of accessing water and instead of improving upon it, it had been disregarded and replaced with a new, and sometimes inappropriate

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36 By Spring 2014, when the data for this research was collected.
method. Igoe's (2003) reference to “mysterious white people” conducting development processes not necessarily supported by local people is pertinent here.

Interestingly, this theme became apparent across the data collection, and it often called into question the long-term impacts of various projects. I witnessed a meeting where a planned water and sanitation event for children was being criticised by one attendee because “this will be another day where a lot of children get a new t-shirt and nothing changes” (Field Diary Excerpt, 8th February 2014). The person in question went on to discuss how it was unclear the legacy of handwashing events and sensitisation workshops and whether they had any impact on the people that attended them. Based on research in Nigeria, Smith (2003) explains that the rationale behind giving out t-shirts and other gifts at these events is so that participants remember attending them. Based on the way that this practice was discussed with such disdain at the aforementioned meeting however, whether participants actually remember the information provided at these events is unclear. I arrived at similar conclusions reading through documents at WPM and TWN on their projects and the work of other organisations in Tanzania. Often phrases such as “this project sensitised 2000 school pupils” were used, but with no follow up or long-term analysis of the work carried out. This relates back to earlier discussion about Smith's (2003) research into a workshop culture in the development sector in Nigeria, and how it was seen as a key way to measure the activity of development organisations. At the sensitisation event I attended with TWN, I witnessed TWN repeat to attendees over and over to shake their hands dry rather than bring them into contact with contaminated materials. Before even leaving the workshop, attendees were drying their hands on their clothes, contradicting the entire message of the day. It was difficult in these instances to see the value in these kinds of activities, and called into question the pressures that organisations put on themselves to fund these sorts of outputs when it’s unclear what difference they make.
An international well-established organisation mentioned that there are key issues in employing people who are not Tanzanian:

"It is not always easy to bring a harmonised understanding [of what we are working towards] because development partners have a tendency of bringing in their people for a maximum of three years. They leave, bring in new people for another maximum of three years, so the dynamics of that also brings in challenges." (NGO #5)

Noxolo (2011) has explored similar themes, examining the tensions that arise from development volunteering in the Global South. Framing her conclusions through Derrida’s idea of gifting, in that nothing can be ‘given’ without being intrinsically linked to economic processes of exchange, Noxolo argues that true altruism is difficult when overseas individuals are so embedded in the paradigm of “the generous donor nation is contrasted with conspicuously needy recipients” (Noxolo, 2011:221). It is understandable that Tanzanian individuals working in the water or development sector view those from other countries monolithically, especially if there is a constant influx of these individuals, none of which seem to have an intention to permanently stay. Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian individuals working in the development sector specifically appeared to be viewed very differently, and were understood as two different groups working together. When discussing the formalised dialogue that had been created between various international donors and development organisations and the state, one respondent remarked that it was positive that “there is the white people and the black ones, there is the international ones and the Tanzanians at the same table” (NGO #5). Another respondent however, provided a somewhat disturbing view of this relationship:

“There’s kind of a saying in Africa. We say the mzungu, the white person, normally looks on an African, the black one, as a monkey. I know you personally don’t, but that’s how we feel.” (NGO #3)
Another respondent went on to discuss how those born in the United Kingdom who have not visited Africa are faced with only negative images of poverty, fighting and other challenges, and that “they don’t show the good stuff” (NGO #2). This viewpoint was backed up by Oxfam in 2010, who after conducting research into how these types of negative images were affecting charity donations in the UK, revealed that it was making the UK population desensitised to the issues faced, and was masking any achievements by organisations such as Oxfam and deterring them from making donations (BBC News, 2012). It appeared that there was a distinct understanding of the opposing cultures of Tanzanian or non-Tanzanians, and that these views were part of an embedded discourse of Tanzanians’ receipt of aid and interactions with development organisations. This aligns with Hearn’s (1998:98) idea of the “multiple spheres of influence” of colonialism that has existed in Africa since countries gained colonial independence, and reinforces Townsend et al’s (2002) of imperialism reshaping itself to suit a contemporary context.

There were a number of instances in interviews that reflected a postcolonial understanding of current development practice. At times, when interviewing individuals from organisations I was described as a representative of international development workers or researchers who come to Tanzania. When asked why Tanzanian communities work so well together in Tanzania:

“We cannot wait until Nicola comes to support the community, we can work together to support the community.” (NGO #3)

Some data suggested that Tanzanians saw a clear dichotomy between local individuals working in the development sector and those from international backgrounds. These views were particularly apparent from grassroots-based organisations included in this study, who only had Tanzanian staff and no-one from a non-Tanzanian background. This relates back to earlier discussion on funding networks and the importance of individual connections for organisations accessing funds. A belief that “institutions run by foreigners tend to fare better with funding” (Field Diary Excerpt, 30th January 2014) is perhaps
related to a belief that non-Tanzanians have higher education levels and are thus able to produce a higher quality of proposal document. My time at TWN and WPM often involved being asked to write funding proposals and I was on several occasions told they needed my writing skills and knowledge to access funding. On some occasions, I was not only asked to write the document but to come up with the entire concept for the project by myself. I was also often being asked if there were any grants that I was aware of that they could apply for, or whether I had access to any funds back home they could use. I spent a lot of these conversations feeling uncomfortable and a little confused as to why they thought a geography student from Scotland would have access to this information. This theme was further expanded upon when a respondent discussed the need for international members of staff in order to improve organisational culture:

“Having someone like Nicola will bring a new communal relationship in terms of culture changing, professionalism, and by doing so we can have an assured budget each year. I believe that when you manage time you increase the sources available to you because getting somewhere in time means maximising the production. So we don’t manage time, so when Nicola comes in, she manages time and we learn from there. There's your culture change.” (NGO #3)

This respondent then went onto discuss how whilst he believed it would be advantageous to have these kinds of individuals working for his organisation, lack of financial security and guaranteed income made attracting these kinds of professionals difficult. The respondent noted that in order to keep an (international) member of staff of a high calibre it would cost their organisation a lot of money, which was funds that they were simply unable to commit to. The dichotomy between foreign and local members of staff is especially pronounced by the respondent’s belief that the work of international staff is superior and more efficient. This echoes an aforementioned viewpoint by Parpart, discussed in Chapter 3:
“Development is predicated on the assumption that some people and places are more developed than others, and therefore those who are ‘developed’ have the knowledge and the expertise to help those who are not.” (Parpart, from Kothari, 2001:2005)

It appears to be the case that this mindset has become embedded in the discourse of Tanzanians working in the development sector, which calls into question their beliefs in their own abilities. Viewpoints such as those of Hearn (1998) and Townsend et al (2004) discussed above could indicate that so called postcolonial imperialist development processes are a manifestation of the West’s influence over the Global South, but there are examples from this research that suggest that some of these ideas originate within Tanzania, potentially as a result of the country’s colonial history. Conversely, it could be argued that these discourses have been embedded within Tanzania for so long it is now difficult for Tanzanians to critically assess them. Although this research has elucidated a number of issues within organisations in Tanzania, it is difficult to estimate whether an outsider voice would be able to overcome an embedded culture, or whether such working practices are the most appropriate in a situation that is by nature haphazard and complex. Additionally, a belief that a change in human resources would have a radical change in the successes of an organisation neglects to acknowledge that issues such as time management are often exacerbated by poor roads, inefficient public or private transport and weather related issues, that one foreign employee would not be able to mitigate.

6.9 The future of NGO practice in Tanzania

It is unfair to fully place the blame on donors for inefficient or unsuccessful development projects. If smaller organisations in Tanzania are providing false reports on their organisational capacity and health of their projects, donors based in another part of the country or in another country all together can be forgiven for accepting this information as fact. Financial pressures for survival and a need to keep on the good side of donors has resulted in organisations only being motivated by monetary sums rather than if the project is possible and can
work. It is difficult for external donors to ensure the sustainability of projects they are involved in if they are not told that anything is broken, but equally, they should make efforts to ensure that the appropriate technology for the respective community is installed in the first place.

One respondent remarked that the most efficient way to work in this sector is to build the capacity of local people and organisations, aligning with the literature on participatory development (Clark, 1995, Drabek, 1987, Wallace, 2004, Kothari, 2001, Williams, 2004). However, with pressure on smaller organisations to chase funding and the often unequal partnerships they find themselves in with international organisations, it is not always clear whether local institutions are being developed or that is simply the rhetoric written into project proposals. The role of civil society organisations amongst this complex sector is also worth considering:

“You realise that there’s a whole gap in the entire thing, if we continue moving like this...people just become donor dependent and they can’t think on their own and they just think about the donors. What should civil society do? Paint the situation on the ground and continuously monitor it, so that you can let the policymakers understand what the situation is so that something is done about it.” (NGO #4)

This respondent worked for an organisation that did a lot of research and report writing on various local situations, although they seemed to be an anomaly compared to the other organisations included in this research. Whilst the above respondent sees civil society organisations as an extra resource for the state to make informed decisions, it seemed more of a common theme for civil society organisations to be replacing the work of the state. Until there is a clear consensus on what work civil society organisations’ role should be it will make the water sector in Tanzania increasingly complex and inhibit the achievement of commonly held goals between these organisations.
There have been a number of theoretical discussions surrounding the idea of ‘fashionable’ development topics (Cornwall and Brock, 2007; Cornwall, 2007; Leal, 2007). Described by Cornwall (2007:471) “passwords to funding and influence”, a number of organisations clearly receive project based funding by simply following development trends. Lawrence and Brun (2011) found that in India, large donors would not fund HIV/AIDS projects in certain areas of the country due to the supposed low prevalence of a disease in these regions. Combined with historical discussions of donor fatigue in Tanzania in the late 1990s, interviews suggested that this was the case in contemporary Tanzania also:

“I think when you have donors deciding where they want to go with their direct funding it creates a situation where “let’s pick the more sexier project, so we can report back really good outcomes”. And that leaves the other stuff that’s maybe not so popular unfunded.” (NGO #1)

Much like the example of HIV facilities being provided over those for other health conditions, it is clear that whichever topic is de rigueur with international donors are the ones that receive funding, meaning that small organisations without regular income must adapt their outputs to fit with current development fashion. Another respondent remarked that it is difficult to make a case for sanitation services in Tanzania, as reports indicate that eighty per cent of households have a toilet, which resulted in a lack of holistic, considered thought around the issue:

“So to be able to get that kind of thinking back to understanding what it means by having 80% of households having a poor quality toilet, what does it mean, in terms of child health, in terms of maternal health, or reducing communicable disease.” (NGO #5)

This is perhaps the reason for TWN’s sudden decision to pursue a project related to family planning having had no previous experience in this area. In addition to this, this example reinforces the issues with the monitoring and evaluation tasks
placed on organisations, and how the pressure to write reports and provide statistics is altering the mindset of the development sector and their goals.

As previously discussed, when examining the relationship between development organisations and the state, there were some examples that suggested that donors had a significant degree of influence over state practices. *Maji Week* (for a full description of *Maji Week*, see Chapter 7) exists as a format for the Ministry and development organisations to present a united front to the people of Tanzania about changes in the water sector, but some of the language used to describe the event indicates some of the power relations involved;

"Each kind of new technology which is in the market you will find there in *Maji Week*. It’s a way for us also to find out what products are currently in use." (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

This almost neoliberal description of the event hints that it exists as some sort of business fair, and is a format for those providing the technology and the services in the water sector to explain their work to the people of Tanzania. There does not appear to be any state-led ownership over these processes and instead the Ministry of Water play the role of facilitators for this event.

### 6.10 Relationships between the Tanzanian state and international donors

The power relations between donors and the Tanzanian state were further revealed by one interview respondent;

"One of the things about aid that I don't like to touch upon...it puts government in the dark in a way, because they don’t know how many resources are actually available. Yes, you can introduce a project to the Ministry of Water but wouldn’t it be better if they just had a clear idea about what’s coming well in advance, so that they know ‘we don’t actually need to put any more wells in Temeke because Belgian aid is building..."
those, and then they can send these funds to places that the donors aren’t going.” (NGO #1)

This line of argument indicates the messy and fractured form of governance present in the water sector in Tanzania, and the lack of co-ordination that exists between the numerous stakeholders. The respondent went onto suggest that yes, bilateral funding has become less popular because of fear of corrupt governments, but that it would be more productive to fix these issues rather than to leave the state out of the process completely. Unfortunately it appeared to be the case that a fear of corruption was embedded across all levels of the spectrum, so it may be difficult to mitigate these concerns:

“There’s a lot of risk of corrupt consultants, corrupt contractors, colluding with corrupt district people, whatever. So there is always that fear as well.” (NGO #5)

These risks became even more possible when during my fieldwork, a Social Accountability Monitoring report was presented by a health NGO working in Dar es Salaam, which was supported in the national press:

“It was reported that Mwananyamala hospital, the main public health facility in the Kinondoni district, was in the 2011/12 financial year supposed to start the expansion of the mortuary to enable it to accommodate fifty bodies at a time, instead of the current fifteen.” (The Citizen, 12th February 2014).

The article goes on to explain that the project had not been implemented properly, even though several documents described it as being fully complete. This information suggests cause for concern with regards to the way funds are appropriated by the Tanzanian state, and provides some justification for why funding has been restricted in some areas due to a fear of corruption. Some of the data in this research has indicated that the Tanzanian state is maintaining its relationships with the aid community and donors, but it is difficult for them to
decide to take an active role in the water sector if they are being left out of large sections of the process. Indeed, as noted by Smith (2010), accusations of corruption can often be used to mask any structural complexities that inhibit the successes of various development projects.

Although one international development organisation remarked that they believed that the Tanzanian state should be responsible for providing water and sanitation services, this was somewhat of an anomaly amongst the data collected. Additionally, it is not as clear cut as this sort of commentary suggests. It is useful to note that from Nyerere’s Arusha Declaration in 1967 to 1991, when the Tanzanian state stopped providing water for free, the Tanzanian state still received a large proportion of its budget from donors. This was mentioned in conference papers I consulted during my time at WPM and also by Edwards (2014). The real change has not necessarily been a rolling back of the Tanzanian state from provision, but a redistribution of donor funding through a variety of channels, creating a complex and messy system of water governance involving a large variety of stakeholders. When posed the question of the future of Tanzania’s status as a recipient of large amounts of international aid, respondents were able to provide some considered responses;

“To really see Tanzania as a country graduating from aid altogether, being able to use its own resources efficiently, accountably, these institutions have to be built up. If these donors say “we’re walking out” but we’ll spend the last few cents in this continent on building institutions for accountability, I’d think that would be money well spent at the end of the day, rather than continuing to build these wells that break down. (NGO #1)

Analyses such as these elucidate the lack of holistic thinking within international aid and even grassroots level development practice in Tanzania, and the ways in which activities are being pursued that do not provide a sustainable or long-term difference to the country’s water sector. The motivations of international aid organisations in their work could be called into question, as the data collected in
this research suggested that a number of local organisations are dissatisfied with current aid practices and believe they are able to provide more successful alternatives. Combined with this, discussions around the development sector as an industry cannot be ignored;

“That’s why all in the aid sector have been accused of self-serving in a way. We don’t want things to change for the better because the reality is we’re out of a job.” (NGO #1)

“People have noticed that the NGO space is a space where you can make money, which I think is wrong. It’s become a business rather than a call to change things.” (NGO #4)

One respondent remarked that NGOs and other development organisations had begun to replicate the ways of the private sector because of pressures on accessing funding and organisations having to make the majority of their decisions based on what capital was available. This is a significant departure from Fisher’s (1997:442) description of NGOs being “idealised as organisations through which people help others for reasons other than profit or politics.” Indeed, it appears to be the case that access to capital, although not necessarily for profit-making, has become a significant part of the work of these organisations. Those following development trends and inserting popular terms into funding proposals to increase their chances echoes the viewpoint of Leal (2007) who noted that the development sector continually reinvents itself with new terminology and buzzwords in order to provide a fresh perspective on its previous inadequacies in certain areas. Grassroots organisations become embroiled in this dynamic, constantly in a process of fighting for funding and wiping the slate clean and rebranding if something does not work.

Observations of development sector employees revealed similar data, with it becoming apparent that those working for INGOs lived lifestyles akin to that of a senior Tanzanian diplomat. Edwards (2014) had similar findings in Tanzania, and in Noxolo’s (2011) research with overseas development volunteers, there
appeared to be a stark lifestyle difference between those expatriates who were there as paid employees compared to those who were visiting the Global South for voluntary work. With expensive vehicles and a driver to escort them everywhere, as well as a number of domestic staff at them and their families’ disposal, it was often difficult to associate their income with supposed altruistic work. It is understandable why, in the meeting I attended that discussed the sustainability of handwashing events, one attendee remarked “you come here with your big cars, after you leave there is still nothing” (Field Diary Excerpt, 13th February 2014). The idea of these flashy vehicles driving about the roads of Tanzania symbolising the wealth and power of their passengers was also discussed by Edwards (2014). To return to discussion about how international donor organisations work in close conjunction with the Tanzanian state via formalised dialogue spaces, it is pertinent to note the updated policy in 2002, driven by donors, recognised the importance of these organisations to Tanzania’s water sector, making the drivers of these cars somewhat indispensable and a key driving force between Tanzania’s water policy.

It is concerning to consider matters from this perspective, in that there is a possibly that water-related crises experienced by Tanzanian citizens are perpetuated by individuals who are content to maintain the status quo. Discussions surrounding expenses payments that individuals working in the sector insist upon before agreeing to attend meetings only serves to support this viewpoint. However, even if the majority of organisations are working with the best of intentions the issues faced by them, as discussed in this chapter, are numerous and detrimental. As the state’s role in Tanzania’s water provision becomes increasingly redundant, pressures on organisations to provide services will only continue to increase;

“Some civil society organisations are doing fantastic work, there’s no denying, but in that fantastic work there are also challenges where the demand is high. There’s forty-five million people in this country and their work is...not to belittle it...not to belittle ourselves...it’s just a drop in the ocean.” (NGO #1)
Another organisation remarked that “it’s not our role to provide everything, it’s to tell the government that it’s their role to provide the services” (NGO #2). From whichever angle the role of the development sector in Tanzania is considered it is obvious that current practices are neither effective nor sustainable, and that future prospects are bleak. It is difficult to determine how to provide a measured improvement that is not at the detriment of Tanzanian citizens however. As one respondent aptly stated; “there are kids that need to be immunised so that they can meet their fifth birthday, are you going to stop aid on that?” (NGO #1). Even although development activity in Tanzania both in the water sector and beyond is in need of a paradigm shift, the execution of this could be as complex a task as the current provision of basic services already is.

6.11 Conclusion

In summary of the points raised above, one quote from my field diary is especially pertinent;

“It must be called into question that in a country like Tanzania where there is a wealth of money available and people with good intentions why so many problems still exist with no real hope of improvement in the near future.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 27th January 2014)

Reflecting this point, Edwards (2014) noted that between 1960 and 2010, compared to Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, Tanzania had been the biggest recipient of overseas aid during this time. Tanzanian NGO Twaweza agreed with this, stating that Tanzania had received substantially more aid compared to its East African neighbours between 1995 and 2005 yet had been the only country within this group unable to increase water provision for its residents. This chapter has attempted to explain the work of INGOs and civil society organisations in Tanzania, and the various challenges faced by organisations working in this sector. As noted by Jad (2007) the donor community is widely heterogeneous with a number of different interests, and it is clear from this
research that these variances are replicated in locally and nationally based organisations. However, there appeared to be a number of difficulties faced by organisations that were replicated in other research across the globe, indicating that some issues in the development sector are embedded in international donor relations and cannot be superseded by local cultural practice. The idea of an NGO working as a temporary fixture to provide a service was not a strong theme in this research, and instead these organisations seem to be a permanent fixture in a context of temporary fixes, as part of a fractured governance framework. Both written into policy and given legitimacy by the Tanzanian state, NGOs in Tanzania do not appear to be part of a transitory phase of improvement, but instead just as much a part of all of the issues faced in the water sector in Tanzania instead of providing a solution for them.

When considering organisational dynamics specifically, it appeared that there was no real structure in place for current civil society organisations and working in Tanzania and that it was largely individual connections and abilities that determined an organisation’s success. There was little to no evidence of standardised tasks, or a set of routine practices to follow. Instead organisations’ main outputs appeared to consist of a frenzied scramble for funding and legitimacy. Civil society organisations, in their own individual ways, are each in a state of crisis, with issues of staff turnover, funding pressures and inefficient infrastructure affecting their capacity to carry out the original tasks they were created to do. INGOs held the balance of power in a number of instances, having the reputation and capital to allow them to push forward their ideas, but these organisations faced a number of challenges also. Returning to ideas of “endemic crisis” explored by Vigh (2008) in earlier chapters, such ideas can apply to a number of themes discussed in this chapter. There is a constant pressure to find funding and outputs may sometimes need to be altered in order to do so. There are challenges to face when trying to provide a sustainable project that will make a measured difference to Tanzanians’ life, and all of the outputs of these organisations come up against a series of embedded issues that have become part and parcel of their practice. Monitoring and evaluation activities are now written into budgets and organisations write endless funding proposals for
grants they know they will not receive. Amongst this, relations between the Global North and the Global South continue to create dichotomous practices and indicate that not everyone working in the development sector in Tanzania is working towards the same goals, exacerbated by a lack of centralised governance framework. However, NGOs are only a section of the many stakeholders involved in Tanzania’s water sector, with policy decentralising the management of water resources to the community level in rural and peri-urban areas of Tanzania. Nonetheless, with many communities only having contact with these organisations and receiving no communication from the state, it is vital that INGOs and civil society organisations are able to work to the best of their abilities in a coherent format that is the most appropriate and effective way to provide water to the people of Tanzania.
Chapter 7: Community Water Provision in Dar es Salaam

7.1 Introduction

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, participatory methods of international development have gained increasing popularity in the Global South in recent years. Whilst lauded by some, and fiercely critiqued by others, this chapter analyses the ways in which Tanzanian communities playing an increasing role in their local water provision impacts upon their access to water, and in turn, their overall position within the country’s complex water governance landscape. Tungaraza (1993) discusses the ways in which Tanzanian social networks and kinship ties materialised during colonial times, and how these were important in times of difficulty for individuals, families and communities. As evidence of these social networks still being prevalent, Dill (2009) discusses the ways in community-based organisations have gained increasing prominence in Tanzania’s development since the urban upgrading organisations that were established in Dar es Salaam in 1992. Community-based provision has been part of the water governance framework in Dar es Salaam for a number of years, largely originating as a coping mechanism for the areas of the rapidly growing city left outwith the remit of the municipal system. As the city’s population has continued to grow and this means of grassroots water management has become more common, Tanzania’s water policy framework has shifted to legitimise this means of water provision. In addition, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other development organisations work towards establishing community-based water schemes and providing the technical training to community members in management and maintenance skills.

This chapter attempts to develop a contemporary understanding of Tanzanian community relations through the lens of grassroots water projects, whilst examining how they relate to Tanzanian water policy and the wealth of NGOs currently working in Dar es Salaam. As well as this, the chapter aims to provide information on the lived experiences of residents within the city, as they negotiate access to water as well as in some cases, help others in their
community access water also. Related to the prevalence of NGOs, community-based development initiatives have been supported by development professionals and institutions such as the World Bank (Dill, 2010b), using the argument that participation of local communities is vital. Considering as to whether participatory processes contribute to what Hickey and Mohan (2004:244) refer to as “the weakening of the ‘social contract’ between state and citizen”, and the notion suggested by Dill (2009) that these methods are wholly ineffective, the role of community water provision will be discussed and in turn situated within the complex framework of water governance in Tanzania. The grassroots manifestations of Tanzanian water policy will be assessed, alongside an exploration of residents of Dar es Salaam as both recipients and active agents within the city’s water sector.

This chapter uses interview and observational data collected on community based water provision, as well as documentary analysis of the various reports and publications involved in my daily work at these organisations. Additionally, this chapter examines the data collected with two community-based water organisations within Ilala and Temeke, the two case study areas of this research.37 The chapter begins with the rationale behind community water provision in Tanzania and how policy is understood by various different groups. It then goes on to problematise various definitions used in community water provision in order to explain my understanding of the terminology and what definitions are used to describe the data collected in this research. The ways in which Tanzanian water policy materialises at the grassroots level will then be discussed, followed by a section on the specific sets of challenges that community-based water groups face. The chapter concludes with a section devoted to Maji Week, discussing how the event is understood by communities in Tanzania and their level of involvement in this week of activities.

7.2 Grassroots water provision and policy realities

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37 For a full description of both the Mitonga Water Users Group in Ilala, and the Maji Kwa Wote Project in Temeke, see Chapter 4.
In terms of whether community owned water and sanitation organisations (COWSOs) were considered to be a successful part of Tanzanian water policy, one NGO explained that the idea was still too new to make any full assessment (NGO #2). However, there are a number of examples in this research that indicate the ways in which this policy is materialising at the grassroots level. The manager of the Maji Kwa Wote Project spoke positively about the impact of the project:

“[Before the project] people were collecting from people’s houses and local water wells. It was a problem, because the supply of private owners was not enough. Their network was not at every corner. Their prices were too high. If they were to connect you, at your home, because they don’t have those public domestic points, they would only do an in-house connection, their price is very high.” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager Interview)

The manager went on to state that since the implementation of the project residents did not have to travel as far for water and can access it more easily. The local government representative near to the Maji Kwa Wote project agreed with this, saying that before the project water was too expensive for the local community at between 600 and 1000 Tshs per bucket, but now residents paid only 50 Tshs per bucket. (Temeke Street Chairperson Interview). However, experiences were not wholly positive across the project:

“It’s still difficult to access water here even after the scheme was put in place. There is poor coverage, and water is not available frequently at the domestic points. The scheme hasn’t helped at all here.” (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group)

“People cannot afford to get water for their whole household and their dependents. There’s only one domestic point for the whole area, and it is expensive to get to as your must pay transport costs.” (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group)
It appeared to be the case in Temeke that those in close proximity to the first village and the board of management had been offered a far more affordable form of water provision, although these benefits had not extended to all areas supposedly covered by the Maji Kwa Wote project. These geographical discrepancies were also admitted by the Maji Kwa Wote Manager, who explained that for the eight domestic points in the second village, they were all located in one section of the area, so many residents did not live near a domestic point that they could purchase water from. Nonetheless, residents of the first village also had complaints about the project, stating that distances and queue times at domestic points still meant that collecting water was a challenge:

“The domestic points are open at six in the morning, but the water in them has run out by half past ten. You have to wait two hours for the tank to fill, if the power is working, and this pattern goes on until six in the evening. Often you have to queue for two hours.” (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group)

Residents also discussed that they often had to resort to the more expensive, privately provided means of water provision during these periods when the Maji Kwa Wote project is not available, which indicates that the project has not been established as a wholesale replacement for the previous means of water provision in the area.
Residents in Ilala also discussed the impact that the creation of the Mitonga Water Users Group had on their access to water. One customer, who used the water for both his family and his farming, explained that it was cheaper and safer to access water from the scheme, as well as the benefits of a community working collectively to provide water:

“When you are alone, you cannot get assistance. Before becoming a member I was using a shallow well and it was not good water. You're supposed to have clean water. If you have clean water you cannot get any diseases, which is important for me and my animals.” (Mitonga Water Users Group Customer #1)
The resident went on to describe how the cost of purchasing water from the scheme was a “manageable” (Mitonga Water Users Group Customer #1) portion of his income, and that for a bucket the scheme charged 1250 Tshs. This was, according to the resident, much cheaper than private providers who could charge up to 3500 Tshs for the same amount of water. Similar views were expressed by local government representatives in the area. Taking the above prices for both Temeke and Ilala into account, it is useful to compare these results to other studies that have taken place in Dar es Salaam. Dill and Crow’s (2014) work stated that the official price of water in Dar es Salaam, as established by EWURA was 20 Tshs per bucket. Dill and Crow’s (2014) research with residents in the city revealed that households without a connection to the city’s municipal water system paid the median price of 100 Tshs for a bucket of water. It is interesting to note that the water project in Temeke had brought the price residents paid for water below this threshold, although it was still above what the regulatory authority suggested. In Ilala, resident were paying far more than this for water but this was still seen as a positive move away from the even more expensive private providers.

The rationale for decentralising water provision to the “lowest appropriate level” (Tanzanian National Water Policy 2002:30) was related to the established hierarchical structure in place for communities to report issues to and for information to be communicated:

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38 The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority
The information presented in the above diagram is a result of documentation consulted on the topic during my research as well as a number of formal and informal conversations on the topic, and partially aligns with the four different levels discussed in the National Water Policy (2002): national, basin, district and community. In Dar es Salaam, instead of a District Water and Sanitation Team there is Municipal Water and Sanitation Team (MWST) for each of the city’s three municipalities. It is difficult to ascertain how established or well-known this hierarchical structure is. The Temeke MWST representative interviewed for this research stated that the chain of communication between different levels of the hierarchy was strong, going into detail about how this materialises:

"Normally we instruct the WUAs to bring the reports to mtaa\textsuperscript{39} level and they have to report to us. And it can be fast tracked if there is an issue or anything that requires immediate action, to avoid delays. Because these reports sit at mtaa level, then go to ward level and sit with members of the ward executive committee, they have to then sit and discuss the report. And after discussing it they agree, then they transfer it to the

\textsuperscript{39} Mt\textsuperscript{a}a literally translates from Swahili into 'street', and is often used to describe the lowest level of local government. Similarly to this research, Dill (2010a) explains that the communities he encountered often corresponded with this level of government.
director’s office, which is at the municipal level.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

Although this respondent provided a comprehensive explanation of how the hierarchy works, this was not reflected across all of the data, as one respondent from the Ministry of Water had no knowledge of what a DWST or MWST was:

“[Interviewer] What are the role of the District Water and Sanitation Teams? Are they directly above COWSOs in the hierarchy?”

“I’m sorry, what are those?”

“[Interviewer] I’ve seen them written in publications about COWSOs and in some reports.”

“This must be a rural thing. I’m overseeing urban water so I don’t know.”

“[Interviewer] I think in Dar es Salaam they might be called Municipal Water and Sanitation Teams? There’s one for Kinondoni, one for Ilala and one for Temeke?”

“So these are municipal water sanitation teams?”

“[Interviewer] Yes, I’ve seen the term used widely in reports.”

“Sorry, what was your question again?” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

This highlights the disconnect between the Tanzanian state and the practices that exist at the grassroots level, and emphasises the lack of clarity with regards to Tanzanian water policy and the ways that it is implemented. Moreover, the phrase ‘COWSO’ was virtually unheard of in Ilala, which indicates the policy is not widely known or has not been communicated effectively by the Tanzanian
state. It appeared to be the case that the DWSTs and MWSTs were “institutionally weak in capacity and did not have the resources, nor, it seems, the interest to help establish or facilitate COWSOs” (Field Diary Excerpt, 6th March 2014). This comment in my field diary was based on the lack of clarity received from the Ministry of Water on this issue, and was also reflected in both Temeke and Ilala. For example, respondents within Ilala had never even heard of the term COWSO. These findings align with research conducted by Dill (2009) in Dar es Salaam, who noted that the relationships between community-based organisations and the Tanzanian state was often either ad hoc or insubstantial, rather than an institutionalised process created to benefit these community-based groups.

SNV et al (2011) found similar poor relationships in the education sector, between school committees and village governments. Additionally, the Ministry of Water recognised these issues in a strategic framework document written in 2008, noting that the human resources required to make community water organisations successful were often in limited supply, both at district and village level. The document also referred to the lack of understanding within communities about why a decentralised approach to water provision was important and what their personal responsibilities were with regards to this. The fact that many communities do not have the skills required to manage their own water systems was also discussed. WPM explained that a large amount of their work involved helping communities access this knowledge, which indicates that several years later these issues are still prevalent, to the extent that a civil society organisation’s work focuses predominantly on alleviating them.

As alluded to previously, the importance of a connection with local government or managers seemed to have an impact on residents’ experiences of the project in Temeke. The Maji Kwa Wote manager explained that a monthly meeting was held with a leader of each of the three areas, and the local government representative for the area of the project noted that:
“Sometimes when [residents] have a problem they report their problems to the Maji Kwa Wote [management] group. And then later I will be forwarded what has been reported to them and then we sit together to sort out the problem. The three groups of eight [from each area] what they have discussed at subward level they are then supposed to report their problems to the Maji Kwa Wote [management] group.” (Temek Street Chairperson Interview)

However, the residents in the community told a different story:

“In [the first village], where the management and a large number of the domestic points were located, customers were happy to complain to the managers about issues faced and felt that they were listened to. In [the second village], ten minutes on a dala dala [micro bus] from [the first village], customers only complained to local government representatives and felt that their views were not listened to at all.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 3rd April 2014)

“We’ve reported challenges to our local leaders but they’re not taking any action, so we have given up complaining. We’re just working on our own to get water from private providers, although this is very expensive.” (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group)

In addition to this, some of the basic statistics about the project were reported differently by the project’s manager and a local government representative. The manager stated that the scheme had twenty-four domestic points, whereas a local government representative in Temek believed there were only eleven points. When conducting my research it was explained to me that a number of the points were too far away for me to visit all of them, so I was unable to verify this information. Residents interviewed in the third village which was furthest from the board of management said they did not feel that the Maji Kwa Wote project had made any real difference to their lives and they were still largely using the same sources of water in place before the project was started. This
information shows the effects the visibility of those in control of the project can impact on residents’ opinions of it, and their ability to raise issues with these individuals and in turn alleviate them.

This was not strictly the case in Ilala, however, with the ward executive officer for the area stating that residents did not complain to him about the project. The street officer for the area said she did receive complaints from residents, but that they were either related to bills being too high, or any work being done in the area that could affect the supply, such as road improvements. Whilst it is interesting that residents chose to complain to her about issues affecting the project that were not necessarily within the remit of those on the committee or management team, the street officer said that she responded to these complaints by simply passing them onto these groups. When customers discussed complaining to the project staff about issues faced, one respondent explained that his complaints were often acted on (Mitonga Water Users Group Customer Interview #2). Conversely, at the beginning of an interview with another customer, he explained that he had one of the domestic points for the project in his home and it had been broken for a while, which meant he had lost a lot of customers. The resident stated that they had reported the issue to the meter readers, but the manager, who accompanied me to conduct the interview, was unaware of the issue. This is an example that potentially indicates that whilst the hierarchical structure is different from that in Temeke, similar issues are prevalent.

7.3 Residents’ experiences of community water projects

In the Maji Kwa Wote project in Temeke, after only two months the water committees complained that the coverage of the project was poor, and that neither the committees nor the customers had been properly trained in community management:

"We’re not getting training on how to run the project, we’ve only had it at the initial stage but we’ve had nothing since and we would like more."
We’d like some training on management, controlling the water supply and how to lead a committee.” (Maji Kwa Wote COWSO Committee Focus Group)

The respondents went on to state that neither the international donors, local NGOs or local government were willing to help them receive this additional training. As well as the ability of committee members to run water projects, these individuals were also able to impact upon the success of a local water project in other surprising ways:

“The water scheme’s manager [in Temeke] reported that some committee members are able to be more influential than others, providing a very specific example of COWSO members that support the CUF only placing the project’s domestic points near to the homes of other CUF supporters.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 2014)

This reflects Dill’s (2009) argument that it is problematic for a small group of people to be representative of a whole community, when these groups they are representative are often large and incredibly diverse, based on similar findings in his research in which religious and class-based tensions affected the ways in which a community-based water scheme in Dar es Salaam was run. The requirement for communities to provide a financial contribution per household to a water system also led to some difficulties and confusion. WPM explained the difficulties faced with regards to this:

“Whist people seem to support the principal of the National Water Policy, they believe that the government should be financing COWSOS and do not understand that they are designed to be self-sustaining. WPM are trying to help with this education but I learned today that they can only do this when there is funding available and they are invited by a COWSO or CWST to do so.” (Field Notebook Excerpt, 19\textsuperscript{th} June 2013)

\footnote{The Civic United Front (CUF) is a political party in Tanzania who exist in opposition to the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), who have been in power since Tanzanian independence.}
This aligned with earlier commentary on this project, as SNV et al’s (2011) report discussed the idea of ‘contribution fatigue’ and how the expectation that households must fund local water, health and education systems can be especially challenging for the most financially constrained households. Conversely, one INGO explained that the government policy indicated that only five per cent of start up costs needed to be provided by the community, however I could not find any evidence of this reported statistic within Tanzanian water policy documents and instead simply a clause saying that communities should provide a contribution without specifying a specific amount. As well as this, the COWSOs engaged with in this research appeared to have contributed a significant amount of the start up costs, as opposed to a small amount. There are also potentially issues of household gender dynamics to contend with. Although COWSOs try to ensure that women’s voices are heard by making them make up the majority of a COWSO committee, as men often control the household budget this can cause issues, as one respondent described it “he is not bothered with water problems because he does not participate in the water collection” (NGO #4).

However, there are justifiable reasons for asking communities to make a contribution to a local water project:

“If I had paid money for a water point, I would make sure that water point worked. But if I had not then I wouldn’t. So I believe that if communities have a stake in the water point, they will make sure that it works, because they have invested in that water point. But when you get a free water point, then it’s different.” (NGO #4)

Dill (2010a) explained the difficulties faced for communities asking for local contributions, and that there is often a choice between necessary running costs of the project and what households can feasibly be able to contribute. Dill (2010a) asserts that community-based water organisations often consider the financial capacity of the local people over the financial requirements of the
project. This is potentially the case with both case studies in this research as whilst they claimed to be financially self-sustainable both explained that they would require additional funds for project expansion.

Whilst this chapter discusses the realities of community based water provision it should be noticed that similar policy models are being put in place across a number of sectors in Tanzania, further exacerbating concerns of overburdening financial and human resources in communities. The Citizen newspaper reported that free tuition in primary schools may have led to a dramatic increase in enrolment figures, but this was not accompanied by a proportional expansion of teachers and classroom resources, which led to a number of issues (Field Notebook, 17th March 2014). This is a further example of a lack of holistic thinking with regards to policy initiatives by the Tanzanian state, and links back to discussion in Chapter 6 about chasing impressive figures that mask a problematic reality. It further shows the lack of resources available for effective service provision across a variety of sectors in Tanzania. Another field report commented that one of the main issues faced was that communities did not understand their rights in relation to water access, but if articulating rights is intrinsically linked to providing a financial contribution it may be that simply the commodification of a right to water is inhibiting communities from fighting for it.

There was a general feeling of scepticism across the board with regards to the Tanzanian state and their role in water provision. A number of civil society organisations mentioned that the topic of water was often used as a political tool to win elections, but this issue was soon forgotten about after those elections were won. Some field reports by civil society organisations on water projects also explained that some politicians guarantee free water for communities if they win the election, which then causes confusion when communities are expected to provide a financial contribution to access a local water project.

WPM introduced me to one COWSO in Temeke that had been established for three years at the point of data collection. It had begun with funding from a large international water NGO, and provided water to sixteen domestic water points in
the local area. Like other COWSOs, each domestic point was metered and residents were charged for the amount of water used, with one domestic point providing water for around three streets. The COWSO was financially self-sustainable, and two of the sixteen water points had been constructed from their own profits. Whilst this appears to be a successful example of a community water project, when the COWSO’s committee members were asked how many people their project provided water for, their answer of six hundred thousand people called into question whether this really was water provision at the “lowest appropriate level” (Tanzanian National Water Policy 2002:30) and whether devolving this amount of responsibility to a small group of community residents was the most efficient way of providing water. The coverage of COWSOs appeared as a theme in other instances, where the representative from the Temeke MWST explained that the current population of the area of the Maji Kwa Wote project was 75000 according to the most recent census in 2012:

“[Interviewer] So eight people provide the water for these 75000?”

“It is supposed to be like that, I don’t know how many are using the COWSO because there are other sources of water.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

In terms of the “lowest appropriate level” (Tanzanian National Water Policy 2002:30), if the representative from MWST’s opinion is widely held then it appears that an inordinate amount of responsibility is being placed on a small number of community representatives. In relation to levels of population supported by a COWSO, when questioned on the success of COWSOs, the Ministry of Water stated:

“COWSOs are very successful. Because in some of the COWSOs, they manage all of the project, and there comes a time when in an area where COWSOs are operating, then it becomes a small town. Once you provide the services people start moving there. It qualifies as a small town, and
when it does so it is supposed to have a utility.” (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014)

Somewhat confusingly, this respondent from the Ministry of Water appeared to be suggesting that the real benefit of COWSOs was their ability to promote population growth in areas not deemed populous enough to merit their own water utility. The respondent did not allude to the merits of COWSOs for those living rurally in Tanzania, or the impacts overpopulation can have on a community’s water source. This also relates to earlier discussions on terminology and how other understandings of what a COWSO is may differ from this individual’s description of them.

In terms of sustainability, whilst the case studies in Ilala and Temeke were able to provide an accurate depiction of their water projects over the three month fieldwork period, it was difficult to ascertain where these projects would be in a few years’ time, as populations continue to grow and pressure on water resources increases. The Mitonga Water Users Group appeared to be able to be financially self-sustaining for its current levels of coverage, with one respondent claiming "We don’t need the World Bank anymore" (Mitonga Water Users Group Employees Interview) with regards to how they funded the last domestic point that they built. However, the respondent went on to explain that for them to expand the project they would need more funding to do so. Other examples however indicated that periods of success within local water schemes do not always last. An informal conversation with someone who owned a school in Dodoma alluded to this:

“[The water project] started with his school and other local businesses putting in large chunks of the initial investment and residents paying twenty Tanzanian shillings per bucket of water. But then people stopped wanting to pay and unless he chased them, the local businesses stopped investing and eventually the whole thing fell apart.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 15th February 2015)
Although this project did not follow the exact same management methods as a COWSO, there are enough similarities to suggest that the sustainability of COWSOs may only be for a short length of time. In their research of social networks in Tanzania, Tungaraza (1993) also had similar findings, explaining that the coping mechanisms used by communities working together for survival are simply that, and not long-term appropriate strategies. Indeed, the Ministry of Water described the idea of COWSOs as being a short-term solution (Ministry of Water Interview 2014), and the Temeke MWST agreed with this mindset (Temeke MWST Interview). This aligns with Dill’s (2009) finding that community-based water organisations only had contact with the Tanzanian state on a short term basis, in that long term relationships were perhaps not created by government representatives as they do not see COWSOs as a long term solution. An NGO noted that:

“most of the issues with water wells or water points were not a technical problem as such, but more of an accountability issue. An issue of an engineer who should be accessible, who is instead sitting in his office not really caring about anything, when it’s actually just an issue of a community reaching out to him, and bringing him over to fix a well” (NGO #1).

It seemed that the hierarchical structure in place to support and establish COWSOs is not robust enough to ensure the success of these grassroots organisations, and calls into question their potential for sustainability. Whilst in could be argued that the intention for these COWSOs to be short-term solutions may be part of the reason that the hierarchy is not as well established, it does call into question why the effort has been made to establish these community based organisations in the first place.

7.4 Challenges faced by community water organisations

The idea of a weak and ineffective management hierarchy that did not support community water schemes was alluded to within some reports also:
“The principles of subsidiarity (ie things that are done locally/at lower levels rather than by central government) within education policy documents have led to confusion about roles and responsibilities. Those interviewed felt that the community is overburdened, particularly in the case of WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene], and do not have enough capacity to supervise construction.” (SNV et al 2011:73)

As noted by the Ministry of Water (2008), the success of COWSOs is largely dependent on human resources, yet in the same publication, the Ministry of Water noted that many communities did not have the skills required to manage their own water systems. This aligns with Akin et al’s (2005) view that in a situation of decentralised service provision, local level individuals often do not have the capacity to provide services effectively. It is interesting to note that the Tanzanian state was happy to devolve responsibility over water systems to the grassroots level, even if they were aware that this process would be met with some issues. Unfortunately, as time passed and community water systems continued to be established the same challenges predicted in the report continued to be evident. A representative from the Temeke MWST explained that they help to build the capacity of local communities so they are capable of running their own water projects (Temeke MWST Interview). Conversely, the Maji Kwa Wote water project committee members provided information that contradicted this;

"What was most striking about the project was the comment by the committee members who said that the project needed funding to expand its coverage and that they had a little training at the start but required more, and the donors, local leaders and the civil society organisation involved in the training were not listening to them.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 3rd April 2014)

Whilst inefficient coverage and a lack of training are fairly common complaints from COWSO committee members, the fact that these issues are prevalent in a
project that at the time of data collection, was only a few months old, shows the barriers that COWSOs face in their success and how these challenges are faced from their establishment. Similar issues were discussed in reports sent to TWN by four of its member organisations, each working in different areas of Tanzania, where communities either did not understand that their local water system was their responsibility, or that they did not have the skill set to manage it sustainably (Field Notebook Excerpt, 17th March 2014).

The ways in which water committee members were selected tended to focus around an individual’s role in the community and their capacity to make a contribution to the project. Returning to earlier discussion of the confusion between different definitions within community water provision, the Ministry of Water explained that when a community grows in size and merits its own water utility, original start up members often get replaced by formally elected ones which can cause conflict. (Ministry of Water Interview, 2014). This did not explicitly appear to be the case in either case study area, as there did not appear to be a stark difference between the types of individuals involved in the original management committee compared to committee members at the time of research.

Communities often select members that have other professional roles, which resulted in some committee members having to balance a demanding job as well as their role in the community’s water scheme. One committee member in Ilala explained his reasons for volunteering for the position:

“Because I have an education, I was trained how to operate water projects, and then just to do work for our community, just to help them. You have to do something.” (Mitonga Water Users Group Committee Member #1)

In my data collection it was often difficult to meet with all members in Temeke as most were often busy, which calls into question their ability to fulfil their role in
a COWSO. The committee members from one the Maji Kwa Wote COWSOs stated that:

“For some there is a conflict between our own personal needs and those of the community. The committee was elected based on people who focus on the latter.” (Maji Kwa Wote COWSO Committee Focus Group)

The respondents stated that they believed they had been elected because of their ability to be committed and responsible, yet whilst they were enjoying their current roles, they were not sure if they would run for election again.

The Mitonga Water Users Group in Ilala however appeared to be run slightly differently:

“I think what works so well for this group is that they have a dedicated group of employees working on maintenance, meter readings, expansion, rather than a board of people who all have other jobs and are busy. I met one board member who was a housewife, so it may even be the case that the board selection has been less arbitrary here.” (Field Diary Excerpt, 1st March 2014)

When asked about their role in relation to the elected committee, the employees stated that “We do the day to day running, and the board deals with bigger tasks” (Mitonga Water Users Group Employees). In addition to this, one of the individuals employed by the Mitonga Water Users Group stated that his salary was sufficient and that he did not need another job. The fact that the Ilala project had more individuals who gave their undivided attention to the running of the project appeared to have a generally more positive impact on the project’s success, compared with Temeke.

The topic of ‘trust’ was brought up several times with regards to why people had been selected, which could be due to the fact that this community decided amongst themselves to come up with a local water project as opposed to being
mobilised by local government or a civil society organisation, which may affect who is then selected for committees. Although vandalism had been mentioned in reports on COWSOs and by respondents in other areas, this was also reported as not an issue for this water project as they employed watchmen to look over the water points during the day and night time. It is potentially the case that as the Mitonga Water Users Group is not accountable to higher levels in the hierarchy such as CWSTs and MWSTs they are able to manage their locality’s water provision more efficiently, as opposed to COWSOs who are set up in such a way that the involvement these other levels of the hierarchy are necessary for a local water project’s success.

Additionally, relying on employing community members to collect finances from domestic points also reportedly caused issues in Temeke, with delays of two to three days in passing the money collected on to the management of the project:

“Sometimes during these elections [to select those who collect money from water points] there are no qualifications so you can find that the one who is collecting money has no capacity to do the required job at that time. And they have other jobs, so sometimes people at the domestic points are not committed to their work, and others do not have enough education, so they do not have the skills required.” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager)

The manager also discussed similar issues with those who had been selected to sit on the project’s committee. The Temeke MWST representative praised one COWSO in the area for selecting committee members who had previously worked in the water sector or local government, believing that they were the best people to manage the project (Temeke MWST Interview). However it appeared to be the case that a supposed ‘best’ type of person to sit on a COWSO committee was a matter of personal opinion.

Language was also an issue for many COWSOs. One respondent in Ilala explained that she was no longer able to be on the project committee when they started
interacting with international donors, as she was unable to speak English (Mitonga Water Users Group Customer #2 Interview). A field report by a local civil society organisation also referred to how one district council only produced documents in English which were then inaccessible to the community and prevented them from participating in the project. It appears that a continued use of the English language can be somewhat exclusionary for the members of the community who only know Swahili, and in the instance of the respondent in Ilala, can result in key figures in the community not being able to participate. However, the respondent from Ilala who was a former committee member went on to explain that all meetings and reports written used Swahili, so it was unclear why she was unable to be a current committee member. Dill’s (2009) research indicated that community-based organisations were publishing a number of documents in English, so it was impressive to see that the Mitonga Water Users Group were using Swahili and allowing their members to engage with the literature they produced.

Issues of affordability did not seem to be recognised by the Ministry of Water. One respondent from the Ministry stated that there was an arrangement set up in urban areas where the richer residents subsidised those who were unable to afford to pay for water, but this research showed no evidence of this. Ribot (1995) also finds the converse situation applying, stating that the poorer residents of a community often have to make more substantial financial contributions to their wealthier counterparts. In fact, the accountant for the Mitonga Water Users Group provided an interesting viewpoint, that “poor people always pay their bills on time, rich people are very difficult customers” (Field Diary Excerpt, 1st March 2015). This was backed up by another respondent, who explained that the only group that were likely to complain about an inefficient water supply are the upper classes, as they are not used to the challenges in accessing water that so many households in Tanzania face (NGO #4). Nyerere warned against this exploitation of Tanzanians without capital by those that do, in the Arusha Declaration:
“If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants.” (TANU, 1967, from Edwards, 2014:73).

It is potentially the case that having a community-based water scheme masks the different levels of income within the community that impact upon the ways they access water. The aforementioned quote from Nyerere is in a sense prophetic with regards to perceived differences between urban and rural access to water, as “town dwellers” could be conceived to be those with a private water connection and the capital to buy from the private sector, whereas the “peasants” are those working as a community to try and provide a cost-efficient means of water access for their locality. Additionally, one NGO responded suggested that a number of COWSOs face a number of issues in maintaining their financial sustainability:

“There are charges that appear on bills that are unaccounted for, maintenance costs are not yet included in their bills, and completed project maintenance is not budgeted for, and then the people cannot afford to maintain the project, and then the project collapses. For instance, many studies have shown that 12% of water projects have failed within two years of them starting because they have no finance to maintain them.” (NGO #7)

Whilst the case studies did not appear to have reached the detrimental state described by this respondent, some of the issues they faced indicated that this is an entirely possible situation for them. The idea of being financially self-sustainable for these organisations was perhaps simply based on day-to-day survival rather than being able to meet growing demand or deal with unplanned issues that require surplus capital.

There were also some infrastructural issues that caused problems for COWSOs. In the case of the COWSO in Temeke funded by a large international water NGO, committee members noted that their water tanks could only hold a limited
amount of water, and with high demand they often needed to refill this tank every two hours. This issue was intrinsically related to electricity based issues, as regular power cuts in the area often inhibited the community’s access to their water supply. The Ministry of Water recognised this as an issue:

“Electricity is still a problem. At least now it’s being produced by gas, initially we were relying on hydropower generation, hydropower plants. If we have droughts, if there is not enough water in the rivers, there is not enough power. But now that we are using gas turbines, power is stabilised.” (Ministry of Water, 2014)

However, this response from the Ministry of Water still indicated that there was a disconnect in understanding the issues faced by community water schemes. Respondents from both case studies indicated that power was still an issue and was not stabilised in the way that the Ministry had suggested. One of the board members from the Mitonga Water Users Group explained:

“There is a lack of water, or breakdowns, and sometimes some people have no water because of a lack of energy. Because of a lack of electricity.” (Mitonga Water Users Group Committee Member Interview)

The Tanzanian electricity producer, Tanesco, has been under much criticism of late for its intermittent supply in Dar es Salaam, as well as being embroiled in a corruption scandal with the Tanzanian state (The Guardian, 2014). Problems of accessing electricity in Temeke seemed to be even more apparent than in Ilala. The manager of the Maji Kwa Wote project explained that:

“Yes electricity is a big problem because now we cannot use electricity. We are using a generator, because of the low voltage of the electricity supply. It cannot operate our pump.” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager Interview)
Indeed, the Maji Kwa Wote project had experienced significant damage to a water pump that at the time of research was only two weeks old, due to power surges breaking the equipment:

“[Interviewer] So this building only opened two weeks ago?”

“Yes, on the 12th of March. The power issue happened on the 23rd [of March]. But the whole scheme started across the city in 2013.” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager)

Although the city-wide project had started in 2013, at the time of data collection the project in Temeke had only been established for “three or four months” (Temeke MWST Interview). Residents also agreed that electricity was a main challenge with regards to accessing water in the area. In the village geographically closest to the board of management of the project, residents said that their complaints to the management board and local government were generally listened to, but that when they complained about electricity they had not seen any action being taken on this issue (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group). With so many issues already visible in Temeke, it called into question the sustainability of the Maji Kwa Wote project and more broadly, the intentions of international donors, as in this case by insisting on the participation of a community and the provision of limited support has potentially left the community with more challenges than they started with. The donors visited this project a few weeks before data collection, for the grand opening of the water point that had already broken, when issues of project coverage and a lack of training within the community were prevalent. The data suggests that the donors did nothing to address these issues and aligns with previously discussed discourses of referring to a project as a success to provide impressive statistics and to mask the disappointing reality of it. With reference to the work of bell hooks, Briggs and Sharp (2004:667) note that “experts look for experiences to analyse, but not the voice of the indigenous peoples which might offer different – and challenging – interpretations”. In this instance, external ‘experts’ took their own understanding of the success of the project and reported that as fact, rather
than offering an opportunity for local residents to provide their views on the success of it. Examples such as this call into question the sustainability of such projects and initiatives, and problematize the concept of when such activities are considered to be a successful output.

7.5 Community relationships with NGOs

NGOs relationships with community provision varied from those who took an active role in promoting it to those who provided critique over this policy agenda. In terms of local NGOs, there was evidence of close relationships with local government:

“[Interviewer] So what is your relationship with NGOs?”

“With [local NGO], I only deal with the technical issues. So the software component, the teaching, the mobilisation, the sensitisation, is [local NGO]...we share the same building so we sit together and discuss how to tackle the issue or to solve a problem.”

“[Interviewer] So you would go to them for help if there were issues?”

“Yes, I would say that there is a problem and that I need their action, their interventions, that they have to go there to instruct the people what is the proper way to organise and manage the project.”

“[Interviewer] And where does the funding come from for them to do that?”

“We support them. Because we share the office we share the costs, we share everything.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

This response provides some indication of the blurred lines of distinction between the state and non-government organisations. Residents under the
jurisdiction of the Maji Kwa Wote project however, reported they had no contact with any NGOs which not only calls into question the effectiveness of any community education projects supposedly executed by the aforementioned local NGO, but also suggests that work by said NGO could be operating through local government representatives, further complicating governance networks. Najam (1996) notes how it is often difficult to measure the ways in which NGOs are accountable to the communities they are supposedly assisting, but providing an analysis of accountability with local government institutions is more tangible and understood. As such, with previous discussions of proving the impact of work in order to secure more funding, it is potentially the case that the NGO in this instance prioritises their relationship with local government representatives (and potentially a wider professional network) in order to benefit their organisation.

One NGO employee (who was Tanzanian) explained the disjuncture between Tanzanian community relations and the expectations placed on communities to provide their own water:

“[For the international donors] it's something new to them, and they feel 'can we use it in the water sector, maybe it will work? But for a Tanzanian it is a normal way of life, I cannot imagine how to use it in the [water] sector...a person coming from Europe, seeing that kind of life, they can imagine that if they are so cohesive maybe they can work together to contribute, and if they can contribute towards a funeral, maybe they will contribute towards the operation and maintenance of a pump.” (NGO #5)

The respondent then went on to suggest that the Tanzanian state was not aware of the support required by communities in running locally-based water schemes and accepted the idea of community-based provision “wholeheartedly” (NGO #5) without understanding the necessary role they had to play in facilitating this. Dill (2010b) agrees that community relationships are not necessarily suited to water provision and inappropriately lauded by external forces:
“By implicitly characterising urban and rural ‘communities’ as internally cohesive and, for the most part, harmonious entities, such community-based approaches not only reveal their lack of grounding in reality, but also, and more importantly, obscure both local and wider structures of power.” (Dill, 2009)

There was also evidence to suggest that what international donor-led projects were providing was not necessarily what the communities had asked for. One respondent from an NGO discussed how distance from water points was often cited as a major issue by communities, whereas there was an expectation amongst international and national NGOs that long waiting times at water points was the major issue. Customers in all three areas of Temelke involved in the Maji Kwa Wote project complained of these long waiting times and how much they detracted from other daily activities, offering little improvement to their day to day life.

A field report by a Tanzanian civil society organisation on water planning and management in the Shinyanga area of Tanzania revealed a number of issues that inhibited the sustainability of services (for earlier discussion on the sustainability of water projects in Tanzania, see Chapter 6). The report discussed issues such as a lack of consideration for wider issues and only the inclusion of a simplistic aim to increase the number of water points, relating to earlier discussion of the inappropriate goals often pursued in community water projects. In addition to this, the report discussed examples of projects not involving the community properly, which undermined understandings of ownership. Lastly, the report mentioned inefficient monitoring and project maintenance, and how some projects did not align with the cultural values of the locality. Although the report did not stipulate the nature of these cultural values, other findings, such as the previous section on the use of water as an election-winning tool, suggest this may be related to the fact that some Tanzanians still believe that water should be provided for free. This was the viewpoint of some of the customers in Temelke:
“Another challenge we face is that we contributed 5000 Tshs per household to be part of this scheme and therefore we expect the water to be for free. We still need to pay for every bucket that we collect, this is too expensive for poor families.” (Maji Kwa Wote Customers Focus Group)

At the very least, some believe their original financial contribution to set up the project should be enough remuneration for them to then access water from that project without having to pay for it. Communities not being willing to pay for water after their initial financial contribution was not unique to those living in Temeke, with one of TWN’s neighbour organisations also encountering this viewpoint during their work in the Meru area of Tanzania (Field Notebook Excerpt, 17th March 2014).

The aid used to fund the Maji Kwa Wote water project was also used to construct fourteen other similar projects across Dar es Salaam and the city’s surrounding areas:

"Why not just complete a project properly rather than minimise the issues that you leave behind for ill-equipped communities to deal with?" (Field Diary Excerpt, 3rd April 2014)

This quote emulates the ways in which starting a project is more impressive in monitoring and evaluation documents as opposed to sustainable projects that continue to work and provide benefits for their locality for a number of years. What should be remembered, however, is that amongst all the statistical reporting, publications, and fashionable development rhetoric, there are communities being guided to manage their own water needs in a certain way to fulfil state and outsider expectations, when in reality the lives of these communities have experienced no tangible improvement. When discussing projects led by international donors, one NGO recommended that:

"You build your water point, you want people to get water. Give it to them for free! Water is life. I would say charge them for this, or give this water
project to a COWSO that is already existing, then there are people who can manage these projects.” (NGO #4)

However, what this respondent appears to be insinuating is that placing a community’s water provision under their responsibility will mitigate issues of sustainability and efficient coverage. However, whether an international donor has had involvement or not, there is evidence in this chapter to suggest that community based water provision is not without its issues.

The level of support provided to community water projects after being set up with the assistance of an NGO also appeared to vary. In the case of the Maji Kwa Wote project, when consulted on the start up costs provided by a large international donor, the manager stated that:

“I cannot say properly how we got the money because this was initiated by the government, so we are a community. We just see the water coming.” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager Interview)

Although community water schemes are lauded within the literature for incorporating local people and following a participatory approach, the apparent disconnect between the donors and those facilitating the project once again calls into question how participatory these projects actually are. Whilst the Maji Kwa Wote manager noted that “donors like to see the commitment of the community” (Maji Kwa Wote Manager Interview) there was little evidence to suggest which agency the community had within this project beyond the day to day operation and maintenance of it. In terms of the electricity issues faced by the project, the manager explained that their decision to stop using the government’s electricity supply and to swap to using a generator, for fear of causing further damage to the project's equipment (Maji Kwa Wote Manager Interview). The assistance provided in this instance appeared to be purely advisory as opposed to providing any financial or technical support to the Maji Kwa Wote project in order to alleviate a challenge that was severely inhibiting its success. The relationship between the project in Temeke and development organisations appeared to be
somewhat one-sided, and considering that one of the project’s main water tanks fell to disrepair mere days after the donors visited due to an ongoing issue calls into question whether establishing the community scheme was more to do with the impressive statistics chased by development organisations, discussed in Chapter 6.

Moreover, Shivji (2006) takes the view that international donors are replicating the colonial practice of control, ensuring that they still have a stake in the organisation of social or community practices. It is perhaps the case that the aforementioned issues faced by community-based water organisations are a result of these international misunderstandings of Tanzanian culture. Whilst the communities in question may have the capacity to help each other on an ad hoc basis, this is not necessarily the foundation for established community institutions that provide vital services. It could be argued that the colonial practice of control discussed by Shivji (2006) has halted the development of the effective community relations and agency needed to enact efficient local service provision. Instead of community loyalties and relationships existing as support mechanisms in times of crisis, they have instead been incorporated into the minutiae of daily life placing often inappropriate expectations on small groups of individuals. Returning to discussion in Chapter 3 about the ways in which Western knowledge is seen as both dominant and aspirational, this example aligns with this viewpoint. Tanzanian community relations have been interpreted by external influences, and provided with an imposed solution that has not materialised well within indigenous culture and day to day life.

7.6 The private sector and the commodification of water

This chapter so far has discussed the role of community run water projects in Tanzania, it is incorrect to assume that these are the only means of accessing water within individual localities. Indeed, whilst ‘the private sector’ gives connotations of large conglomerates taking control of a municipal system (as was the case in the early 2000s in Dar es Salaam, discussed in Chapters 1 and 5), a number of respondents used this phrase to refer to any means of purchasing
water not related to the community or the government, for example a private borehole owned by a household who sell water to their neighbours:

"[Interviewer] So who are the private sector then?"

“It is individuals. Someone drilling a well in their house and selling water to others.” (Mitonga Water Users Group Customer #1)

To return to earlier discussion about the differences between rural and urban areas, some believed that there were clear differences between understandings of water by rural and urban inhabitants. One respondent explained that people in rural areas viewed water more as a natural resource belonging to them, whereas in urban areas water was seen as more of a product that was bought and sold. However, this distinction was blurred with community-based water schemes. As previously discussed, community members often felt that the initial contribution they made at the beginning of a project was enough to mean they should receive water for free. Taking this viewpoint, community members echoed the supposed rural understanding of water, as a resource that is owned by the community and to be used by it. However, by having to pay to access this water it also aligns with the urban discourse of access to water in Tanzania. It is clear that although the concept of paying for water is widely accepted across Tanzania, the exact nature of paying for the resource varies between different interest groups, further complicating residents’ understandings of payment and access depending on how they choose to purchase water. The idea of neoliberalism not being “ideologically pure” (Crouch, 2010:viii) is relevant here, as there is evidence to suggest that the commodification of water has adapted to various cultural understandings of it, yet the fact that it is an economic good to be paid for is central to citizens’ understanding of it.

There are also examples of corporations in Tanzania providing water services in communities. Tanzania Breweries, who are one of the largest producers of beer in Tanzania, have built a well in Ilala for the residents to run a community-based scheme. One resident explained to me that they had asked Tanzania Breweries to
donate money to implement a water project but instead Tanzania Breweries bypassed this and built a well directly. To return to earlier discussions of corruption in Chapters 3 and 6, it is pertinent to note that Tanzania Breweries preferred direct involvement rather than delegating the money to another party.

The roles of these various privately providers of water highlights the increasingly prevalent discourse of water as a commodity, which calls into question the role that the Tanzanian state should be playing in providing water to its residents. Indeed, Saad-Filho and Johnston's (2005) view that neoliberalism should not be viewed as a process that happens along a linear trajectory should be considered in this case, as the number of stakeholders involved in providing and selling water in Dar es Salaam indicates the variety of ways in which economic values have become embedded in Tanzanian discourse. In addition, the idea of neoliberal self-governance is also pertinent when community-based schemes appear to be increasingly autonomous with limited state intervention. This was alluded to earlier in this chapter when the use of water as an election winning tool was discussed, but it is also important to recognise where the government of Tanzania's role lies in the country's water provision, irrespective of which specific individuals are elected as members of parliament. Respondents from some NGOs indicated that they believed the Tanzanian state should play a stronger role in Tanzania's water sector:

"[Interviewer] And you were saying that the government has a strong role to play in water provision..."

"Exactly."

"...but does the government think that? Do you think that you and the government agree on this?"

"They say yes, but that “we’ll do it once we have funds.” That’s the answer that they normally say." (NGO #2)
This aligned with the response from the Temeke MWST, who explained that the reasons that COWSOs were only short term solutions is because eventually the municipal system’s level of coverage will improve, and that COWSOs were being used as there was “no other option just now” (Temeke MWST Interview). As such, it was apparently the case that a lot of time and financial resources were being used to set up forms of fragmented water provision only perhaps intended to exist until the state was able to bear financial and technical responsibility for Tanzania’s water.

Also related to discussions of the capital available for state-led water provision, one respondent, whose organisation had carried out research in this area, suggested that the transfer of responsibility to a number of different stakeholders meant it was difficult for residents to hold the state accountable:

“If people see a water point is not functional they would stand together and hold a government accountable. Or hold the local leaders accountable. If the local leaders are held accountable then they just try and get sources [of income] and then they come back and say ‘you know what? There is no money here’. So what people simply do, is you guys [mzungu] have to give money.” (NGO #4)

Indeed, the fragmented nature of water governance in Tanzania makes it unclear how the state would reclaim any responsibility as they have been heavily dependent on external sources of finance for a number of years. In Dill’s (2010b) research into community-based water provision in Tanzania, it was suggested that the government favoured these grassroots level institutions as it required very little from the Tanzanian state in terms of financial or logistical support. Whilst the Tanzanian government could be accused of neoliberal rolling back of the state in its water provision, there did not necessarily appear to a viable alternative when the country’s economy has been so intrinsically linked to foreign aid for a number of years.
7.7 Maji Week

Whilst Maji Week had been lauded by the Ministry of Water for its work and TWN seemed enthusiastic about being involved, there was limited knowledge of the event both within Ilala and Temeke. As a week-long celebration that coincides with the international event World Water Day, Maji Week consists of a variety of activities that take place across Tanzania. As well as education events and handwashing demonstrations, musical and theatrical performances, water sector NGOs and the Ministry of Water are heavily involved in a number of tasks across the week. Not one customer involved in this research from either case study area was aware of Maji Week, even although the Maji Kwa Wote project had sent three committee members to attend the event. This was not specific to the case studies involved in this research, with newspaper cartoons at the time reflecting the mood of the people of Tanzania.

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41 These cartoons were sent to me after an informal discussion with someone working in the water sector in Tanzania. They were published in Tanzanian print media at the time of fieldwork, between January and April 2014.
Figure 7.3 Maji Week cartoons from Tanzanian newspapers

The first cartoon shows the disconnect between the lived realities of the people of Tanzania compared to the somewhat inappropriate commendations that occur within the confines of Maji Week. As noted by one respondent, “it’s a
celebration day” (NGO #4), but the discourse implied by the first cartoon is that with broken water points and continued challenges in access to water there is very little happening at the grassroots level worth celebrating. This was backed up by other interview responses:

“But the challenge is, [Maji Week] takes place in an environment where people are not getting sufficient water, on a daily basis, and even in Dodoma there are these kinds of places. In the villages the situation is worse because water supply coverage in the villages is less than 50%. So people are asking ‘What are they celebrating? What are they commemorating? We don’t have water! Why all of this pomp and ceremony when all of the money spent on these meetings can buy one pipe and extend it to our village?’” (NGO #5)

The second cartoon alludes to the issues of sustainability discussed in Chapter 6, and the state and development organisations’ continued endeavour to build new water points and provide impressive statistics rather than correct previously existing issues. The fact that this is being discussed within a national newspaper suggests that this is a well-known issue across Tanzania and explains the cartoon’s scepticism towards an event such as Maji Week. Indeed, this scepticism is perhaps justified when the data collected in this research shows that there was very little knowledge or interest in the event within the communities studied. The Temeke MWST representative interviewed explained that around six water user associations had accompanied them to Maji Week in 2014 in order to explain to others how COWSOs work:

“How to produce a report, how they are working, how they link to other levels of government, with the mtaa and the ward office.” (Temeke MWST Interview)

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42 As of 1974 Dodoma is the capital of Tanzania, and has experienced far less urban sprawl and population growth than the country’s former capital Dar es Salaam. Dodoma is often referred to by Dar es Salaam’s residents as having a preferable infrastructure and less problems than Dar es Salaam has.
Additionally, the Temeke MWST representative explained that these groups have to provide their own financial support to attend *Maji Week*, which potentially inhibits the abilities of a number of water user associations to attend. Maji Kwa Wote committee members stated that they were unable to attend this year due to the fact *Maji Week* was held in Dodoma (Maji Kwa Wote COWSO Committee Focus Group).

One respondent from an NGO provided some justification for *Maji Week*, explaining that it was an opportunity for the state to provide their guidance to communities and to provide advice on the best ecological and economical means of accessing water (NGO #5). This respondent also suggested that one of the main issues with the event was that it was only held in the capital city which resulted in those living in other parts of the country being left out of the celebrations and discussions. Indeed, whilst discussions of geographical bias in Chapter 6 related to the preferential situation for NGOs operating in Dar es Salaam, it could be suggested that residents of Dar es Salaam experience this bias negatively in terms of *Maji Week* as they are not located near to Dodoma. Another respondent noted that, whilst events such as *Maji Week* are a theoretically a good idea:

“*It should be a day of celebration, a day when we tell people we’ve increased access of clean and safe water from 10% to 20%. But the movement for that day stands on the other 364 days, what have we been doing, what progress we have made, what progress haven’t we made, what have we done wrong. What is the hardcore evidence out there for what this situation is at the moment...which studies are available to give you high frequency data of the situation on the ground?*” (NGO #4)

However, the Ministry of Water described *Maji Week* as a format for businesses to showcase the latest water technology products to the people of Tanzania (Ministry of Water Interview 2014) which made the event sound more like an business fair as opposed to one pursuing information sharing and inclusion of the Tanzanian people in their knowledge of the country’s water sector. Indeed,
the fact that whilst some groups, such as the Ministry of Water and a select number of NGOs seemed to be positive about Maji Week compared to the lack of knowledge of the event within communities, combined with a lack of robust policy knowledge and understanding across the various stakeholders, calls into question the government’s ability to articulate itself to the people of Tanzania:

“Well I mean, the government, generally, the way they communicate is funny to say the least. They are not good in communications and there are a number of other examples of that nature where they claim to be making efforts to reach out to the local people so they can understand what they are doing. A normal person either has an incorrect assumption of what the government is doing, or absolutely no awareness at all.” (NGO #1)

It could be suggested that Tanzania is following the neoliberal doctrine of decentralised governance by devolving all responsibility to a number of locally based autonomous institutions. It appears that the way in which water policy has been devolved to the lowest possible level in Tanzania has led to a disconnect between the state and the lived experiences of Tanzanian people, and aligns with the critique of decentralised governance in the literature (Atampugre, 1997; Akin et al 2005; Grindle, 2004; McDonald and Smith, 2004). There is also evidence to suggest this mode of governance exists across other sectors in Tanzania as opposed to being unique to water provision. Those working for the Ministry and various NGOs were able to talk about the importance of Maji Week and its benefits for Tanzania, but Tanzanians had little knowledge of or interest in the event, reflected in both my data collection and media commentary at that time. In the way that NGOs have been criticised in Chapter 6 for performing various activities to produce impressive statistics and publications, it could be suggested that the Tanzanian state are doing the same with Maji Week. The fractured and complex ways in which water governance materialises have been discussed in this chapter, and it is potentially the case that as lines become increasingly blurred between the various institutions involved, some of these flawed practices have been adopted both by the Ministry of Water and their international development counterparts.
Dill and Crow's (2014) conception of a global water crisis is that of injustice and inequality as opposed to one of scarcity. Indeed, Vigh's (2008) idea of endemic crisis is most pertinent here as existing coping mechanisms become rebranded as a policy initiative and bring further sets of issues to communities attempting to manage their own water supply. Moreover, research such as Tungaraza (1993) has also explored community level social dynamics in Tanzania, but Tungaraza (1993) includes the caveat that the data collected for that paper was during the time of the devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling and that this had contributed to community members relying on each other for survival. This research was not conducted in a similar economic situation however, yet these community relations prevailed, indicating that community relationships in Tanzania are indeed, a response to crisis, but a crisis that has existed in the form of a backdrop to their lives for a number of years. In terms of the rhetoric surrounding participatory development, for citizens to make a meaningful contribution they must be able to do so within legitimised institutions (Dill, 2009), which the Tanzanian water policy is currently attempting. Although there are a number of challenges faced by COWSOs and other community-based water organisations, there is the potential that they will be alleviated over time, but only if the Tanzanian state ceases to see community water provision as a short-term solution. However, as indicated in this chapter, there appears to be a lack of clarity amongst stakeholders over the terminology used in water provision and how policy materialises, which results in communities focusing simply on accessing water rather than take direction from external sources. These organisations appear to lack the financial and technical know-how required to manage these schemes successfully, and are overwhelmed by Dar es Salaam’s growing population. NGOs and international donors make piecemeal improvements but often these are inappropriate for the community's needs, or create more problems than were there in the first instance.
Indeed, whilst Tungaraza (1993) agrees that the community networks found in their research were often vital to the survival of Tanzanian community, Dill instead critiques the incorporation of this into policy and development rhetoric. As noted by one respondent earlier in the chapter, the idea of community-based provision is something that has been imposed upon the people of Tanzania by international development actors. For all the issues both within and faced by community water projects, however, Dill (2010b) is correct to assert that community based institutions can catalyse local energy that state and market practices cannot. Faced with little other option, these communities must be lauded for attempting to take ownership of their local area’s water, irrespective of the relationship this has to Tanzanian water policy or the role of external stakeholders. Dill (2009) claims that in his research, government officials took the view that community-based organisations largely existed to provide assistance to the government. However the evidence from this chapter indicates that whether community organisations exist, in the case of Mitonga Water Users Group, as a result of a grassroots initiative, or for the Maji Kwa Wote Project, as a response to being given external funding, these are nonetheless responses to the state not providing its citizens with water. Instead of assisting the state, community water groups exist as quasi-state institutions, that have now had what was previous a coping mechanism written into Tanzania’s water policy, yet have had very little in the way of institutional support and still face a myriad of challenges. Whilst Kjellen (2000) describes informal water provision as a response to the formal service vacuum, there is evidence in this chapter to suggest that the line between the two types of water provision may not be so discreet, and that community-based water provision, despite its challenges, has an important role to play in many Tanzanians’ access to water irrespective of its role in Tanzanian water policy. Moreover, this chapter has elucidated the ways in which policy rhetoric can be experienced by citizens, and the ways in which ideas surrounding the commodification of water and the various power relations within the development sector can be theorised within empirical examples.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Making sense of water governance in Dar es Salaam

The ways in which water governance can be interpreted and understood can vary. Rogers and Hall (2003:7) describe it as:

“the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society.”

Taking this into account, this thesis has attempted to consider the variety of stakeholders that play a role in Tanzania’s water governance, and the ways in which this materialises in Dar es Salaam. In addition to this, this research has attempted to encapsulate the social, political and economic aspects that impact upon the ways in which Tanzania’s water sector is managed in theory, and how it is experienced in practice in the country’s largest and rapidly growing city. The complex nature of water governance in Dar es Salaam has been examined, showing the decreasing role of Tanzanian state and the ways in which communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are now key components of the city’s population accessing water.

Abers and Keck (2009) suggest that when researching water, too much emphasis is placed upon how the policy is created and in turn, how it is implemented, and too little attention is paid to the processes that exist in between, such as local cultural understandings of water or other prevalent and sometimes conflicting discourses. Taking into account a variety of interrelated stakeholders in Dar es Salaam’s water governance, this thesis elucidates the social flows and processes that water policy mediates through and attempts to coalesce around, and the myriad of challenges that can arise throughout these processes.

Tanzania could be considered to be an economic success story, with an increase in GDP figures as well as curbed inflation and increasing expenditure in a
number of social programs. However, this is just one perspective. Edwards (2014) references Yale Professor T.N. Srinivasan who claimed that quantitative data is often full of biases and errors that can affect a piece of research’s conclusion (Edwards, 2014:241). As a qualitative piece of work, this thesis has instead attempted to provide a detailed and nuanced picture of the complexities of water provision in Tanzania, endeavouring to do justice to the stories told and the experiences in the field, which can be woven together to construct this interesting story. It could be suggested that Edwards’ opinion of Tanzania’s success is purely subjective based upon which quantitative indicators and statistical information was selected to make this judgement. Indeed, the evidence in this thesis suggests that there are still a series of issues that plague Tanzania’s development, which can be easily masked by selective use of statistics, mirroring the behaviours of NGOs discussed in Chapters 3 and 6. The main conclusions of this research are threefold; that a variety of discourses are in place in Tanzania’s water policy and the way in which water governance manifests in Dar es Salaam, that NGOs play a vital role in the city’s water governance and the ways in which it is implemented, and that the coping mechanisms of unserviced communities have become a permanent feature in Tanzania’s water governance framework, despite being plagued with a series of challenges. These findings and the contributions of this thesis to academic research will be discussed in this chapter.

8.2 Tanzania’s relationship with international donors and NGOs

In terms of Tanzania’s relationship with the international aid community and the important role of NGOs in the country’s water sector, it is important to consider what a significant departure the country’s embrace of development organisations is from Nyerere’s views in the 1960s. The third section of the Arusha Declaration, entitled “The Policy of Self-Reliance” states that:

"It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves
of our poverty through foreign assistance rather than through our own financial resources.” (TANU, 1967, in Edwards, 2014:73)

Tanzania has received a sizeable contribution of funding from the international aid community, and “foreign assistance” makes up a key component of both funding and implementation in the country’s water sector. However, with the important role of both informal and formalised community water networks there is evidence to suggest that the locally-based, self-reliant ideals advocated by Nyerere still have a significant role to play in water governance in Tanzania and in other policy areas. Whilst international stakeholders have become an intrinsic part of Tanzanian water policy, the ideals of Nyerere are still evident amongst Tanzanian culture and practice. Taking the view that water governance encapsulates a variety of power relations, and institutionalised systems of inequality and allocation (Franks and Cleaver, 2007) it is important to consider the variety of stakeholders involved in Tanzania’s water governance, and in turn the ways in which some stakeholders are able to influence others in order to achieve their goals.

Nyerere is once quoted in The Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs (1980) saying that:

“My Government is not prepared to give up our national endeavour to provide primary education for every child, basic medicines and some clean water for all our people. Cuts may have to be made in our national expenditure, but we will decide whether they fall on public services or private expenditure.” (The Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 1980, from Edwards, 2014:97)

This type of rhetoric is all too familiar at the time of writing this thesis, when austerity policy is being implemented across the world as countries attempt to recover from the global financial crash of 2008. Analysing this quote from Nyerere in isolation does not do justice to the positive effect and his revered legacy in contemporary Tanzania, but still indicates that policy during his time in office pursued ideology to the detriment of measured improvement. Moreover,
taking into account the current water situation in Tanzania, this is somewhat an indication of the way in which that Tanzanian water policy is intent on following a specific policy pathway irrespective of whether it is providing a better means of water access for the Tanzanian population. The policy in place is unable to take into account the ground realities, and instead adds on new components in a reactionary manner to chronic water issues, resulting in a messy and complex policy message with no clear mandate. Metz (1982) explains that Marxism materialises based on the external forces present, that continue to mutate and coalesce around an ever-changing social and political world. Taking a critical view of neoliberal policy and its manifestations, this research has attempted to provide an in-depth insight into water governance in Tanzania, and more broadly, current methods of fragmented and complex governance across Tanzania on the whole. Whilst comparisons can be made with foreign aid relations and community water provision in other countries and research settings, this thesis stresses to address the elements of Tanzania's current water governance that are truly Tanzanian, based on social and cultural values, and historical and political trajectories.

8.3 Tanzanian water policy

When discussing the transition between the types of policies used under Nyerere compared to his successors, Edwards (2014) dichotomises between those of the Arusha Declaration and the market-led forms of governance that followed. However, I believe that there is not a clear distinction between these two ideologies. Indeed, at the time of the Arusha Declaration’s publication, a market approach to policy making was avoided by the Tanzanian state, instead aiming towards their form of African socialism. However, there is evidence to suggest that the values of that seminal document still live on within water governance in Tanzania, even as contradictory policies continue to gain prominence. This confusing policy hybrid has undoubtedly contributed to the complexity and chaos of the current water governance framework in Tanzania, as a variety of different ideologies and methods of provision are working together towards conflicting goals. In terms of a water policy framework that acknowledges the
practices that communities have used for a number of years and incorporates them into policy discourse, it is important to consider that in their research of water policy in Brazil, Abers and Keck (2009) concluded that whilst a participatory method of water provision could provide some benefits to Brazil’s citizens, the way in which the Brazilian state was structured did not enable this means of provision to manifest itself successfully. There is evidence within this thesis to suggest that the situation is much the same in Tanzania, and there is the potential that community-level means of water provision have simply been written into policy as a matter of convenience for the Tanzanian state, with no real institutional change or effort made on their behalf. Indeed, in discussion of urban water provision more generally, Bakker (2008:245) correctly claims that it is worth paying attention to the “broader economic dynamics which foster desires on the part of governments and the development industry for greater community involvement”.

Moreover, continued reference to ‘Tanzanian’ water policy risks recognising the role of the international aid community and the multitude of development organisations that play an integral role in the theory and practice of Tanzanian water governance. Edwards (2014) asserts that:

“the “productivity” of aid depends on the level of “effort” exerted by the local government and community. Effort, in turn, will depend on a number of factors, including how well the donors’ intentions and goals are understood, the beliefs of the recipient community, and the degree of participation of the local population in the design and formulation of aid programs.” (Edwards, 2014:187)

Franks and Cleaver (2007) also take the view that analyses of a country’s water governance can often be indicative of wider governance issues in place there. As such, through an examination of the role of the NGO and development sector in Tanzania and the ways in which this sector operates, this thesis is able to provide a comment on Tanzania’s relationship with the aid community more broadly, as well as the ways in which these organisations have historically played a role in
Tanzania’s development and their prospects in Tanzania’s future. Water policy and infrastructural changes have been largely donor-driven, and incorporated a variety of different donor goals and intentions across the country. As such, the lack of clarity in Tanzanian water policy is replicated in the multitude of activities being directed by various members of the international donor community, often resulting in the experiences of Dar es Salaam’s residents being impacted upon which project happens to be implemented within their locality. With the Tanzanian state increasingly placing control into the hands of the development sector and the grassroots based organisations that are funded by them, it reduces its ability to guide the policy framework for water governance and other sectors.

As a piece of research that examines the impact of aid on Tanzania’s water sector, as well as the role of the Tanzanian state and its people in providing water, this thesis has used Edwards’ (2014) recommendations in order to reach its conclusions. Edwards (2014) states that to develop a true understanding of the impact of aid a number of resources should be consulted, such as archival data, primary sources, direct contact with key stakeholders and a consideration of the historical background to the context being researched. Through the use of observational and interview data, as well as a detailed examination of policy documents and other related publications, this research has attempted to situate itself within the broader field of study of water in Tanzania and in turn, Tanzanian governance on the whole, whilst endeavouring to produce a unique piece of work.

Dill and Crow (2014) argue that the key components of supposed crisis of water governance is not that of scarcity, but instead a lack of an appropriate institutional framework to manage and distribute that resource. Vitally, whilst there was a key theme of the influence of aid and development organisations across the three objectives addressed in this thesis, it is important to note that without effective co-ordination between all stakeholders in Tanzania’s water sector it will be challenging for the sector to see any measurable improvement for some time. However, it is important to note that whilst this thesis provides
critique of the ways in which Dar es Salaam’s governance has been decentralised to the community level, this is still not a wholesale argument for Tanzania’s water to become centralised under the control of the state once more. As noted by Tortajada (2010) there is not one universal method of water governance that will be successful in all contexts, and it is important that the residents of Dar es Salaam are able to pursue a means of water access that is the most appropriate and advantageous for them. If community water provision is the endeavoured policy direction, then adequate support and training must be provided for these communities to become truly autonomous, or pressure on the Tanzanian state and external funding bodies will only continue to increase.

8.4 Key findings

The key findings of this thesis are related to several of the stakeholders present in the water sector in Dar es Salaam. This research indicates that water governance in Tanzania’s former capital is in a complicated and ever-changing state of existence, with extra layers and policy directions being continually added with no real sign of improvement. The policy documents and other related writings illustrate the variety of discourses prevalent in water policy in Tanzania since 1991, and provide some explanation for the variety of ways these policies have been interpreted at the grassroots level. Indeed, the findings of this thesis prove that the absence of a clear policy direction and the presence of a number of conflicting governance mindsets can result in a convoluted and misunderstood sector, with no measure of success or indication of the most viable direction to go in future policy writing.

In relation to this entangled and contradictory governance framework, the lack of a clear policy mandate has been exacerbated by the fact that NGOs have become so embedded within Dar es Salaam’s water sector. Playing such an integral part in driving the direction of Tanzania’s policymaking and providing both technical assistance and education at the grassroots level have led to these organisations becoming an almost irreplaceable element of the city’s water provision, and show no sign of disappearing any time soon. Such dependence on
NGOs creates a number of challenges for the people of Tanzania, as the state is constantly in need of independent organisations to facilitate the country's water governance, but the sporadic nature of their funding means that this by no means a reliable means of providing water. As a key part of Dar es Salaam’s water sector, these organisations are constantly in a state of trying to continue to survive, which draws attention away from their key activities and creates a further set of challenges for water provision.

For those in the forgotten pockets of Dar es Salaam, a coping mechanism of community-based water has become part of the official policy rhetoric with insufficient assistance provided to those without the technical skills or capital to provide water to their local community. A change in policy direction to incorporate community-based water projects has made little to no difference to those who desperately need it for their survival. These residents still exist in a policy vacuum, in which they are dependent on a chance amount of funding from an international donor or local business, and are still heavily reliant on their own means of raising money to establish a local water source. Local government seems unaware of the issues faced by nearby residents, and these individuals have given up on lobbying the state and simply take matters into their own hands. On the whole it is clear that a series of temporary fixtures are now a permanent part of Dar es Salaam’s water governance, creating a reactionary state of existence that is only able to struggle with past mistakes and has limited capacity to anticipate and manage future challenges.

8.5 Theoretical contributions

Exploring the ways in which neoliberal policy impacts upon the water sector in Tanzania indicates how neoliberal policy does not exist in a true and prescriptive form, and is always impacted upon the context in which it manifests and its socio-cultural surroundings. With regards to the failed privatisation of Tanzania’s water sector, it is important to consider Bakker’s (2002) research into the introduction of markets into the water sector in Spain, where she noted:
“an organisational and/or institutional shift along a continuum or water-management options towards the market and private corporations and away from the state” (Bakker:2002:769).

This research conversely provides a unique take on a country who has wholly bought into the idea of private provision only to instead introduce a variety of different stakeholders into the water sector instead of one single private provider. In Tanzania’s post-privatisation setting, policy changes have not developed upon the “continuum” suggested by Bakker (2002) but have instead shifted in a number of directions that incorporate the role of NGOs, the emphasis on decentralising policy to the local level and the role of water as simultaneously vital to life and an economic good with monetary value. The evidence in this thesis indicates that the neoliberalisation of water does not solely result in the advocacy of market-led thinking but can lead to a fractured and complex policy environment when neoliberal ideology comes into conflict with a country’s cultural values.

In addition, although there is evidence to suggest that the Global South is negatively impacted upon by this global economic doctrine, there is an argument for whether neoliberalism is simply a modern day form of Postcolonial policy, in which a select group of countries gain from the resources of others not included in influencing international development policy. Aligning with writers such as Moyo (2009), this research calls into question the continuation of aid and foreign assistance in the Global South and the ways in which vast amounts of money are used with limited sign of improvement. Some hold the opinion that aid is used to “exert control and influence by governments and corporations alike” (Alford, 2015), but what this thesis illustrates is the myriad power structures in place within the involved sectors that require further examination. There is evidence within this research to suggest that even perceived success stories of aid and donor funding may not be entirely beneficial to the communities that it is directed to. Aligning with Sharp et al (2000:1)’s view that understandings of power involve: “countless processes of domination and resistance which are always implicated in, and mutually constitutive of one another”, this research
addresses the complexities of the domination/resistance couplet discussed by Sharp et al. Whilst this thesis notes the complex nature of water governance in Dar es Salaam, it also indicates the intricate relations and inter-dependencies that exist within the city’s water sector, and illustrates Sharp et al’s (2000) point that power relations do not simply exist on a binary basis. The variety of different agents involved in water governance in Dar es Salaam both influence and are influenced by each other, despite their diversity and contradictions. This research illustrates the numerous ways in which power can be exerted and experienced in Dar es Salaam’s water sector, and that it does not originate from one individual source.

In turn, there is evidence to suggest that there is a dichotomous power relationship between the governments of countries that NGOs work in and the NGOs themselves. NGOs are an integral part of contemporary development practice and many Global South states are heavily dependent on them, but the multitude of challenges faced within this sector inhibits the ability of NGOs to exert their supposed influence. In addition, it is clear that civil society has an important role to play in modern day access to water in the Global South. Grassroots-based organisations have a significant degree of responsibility over their own water provision, yet their agency is often constrained by wider social, political and financial frameworks in place, and their capacity to enact change is severely limited. The civil society relationships currently in place in Dar es Salaam indicate strong community ties and collective responsibility for friends, family and neighbours’ needs, but this may not be the most appropriate environment to provide water to the city’s residents.

Incorporating Townsend et al’s (2004) view that any study of NGOs is relative to the context and social situation in which they operate, this thesis has examined the roles of NGOs in the water sector in Dar es Salaam in relation to other key stakeholders prevalent in the city, and attempted to make sense of the challenges these organisations face when operating within Tanzanian culture. In turn, this thesis also provides some commentary on the broader issues impacting upon the NGO sector more generally, and the ways in which funding challenges and the
“new managerialism” (Townsend et al, 2002:831) affects these types of organisations in a variety of contexts. To provide an objective analysis of where the true agency lies in water governance frameworks such as Tanzania’s is a difficult judgement call to make, as power relations and influences are so interrelated and co-dependent it is unclear which stakeholder group has a key mandate for directing policy and governance over any other.

8.6 Personal reflections

Discussing the variety of methodological perspectives that can be used when conducting research, Del Casino Jr et al (2000:530) take the view that:

“Researcher and research subject are both embedded in larger social and spatial structures, and thus the research findings are contingent on these structures and must be taken into account.”

It would be erroneous to suggest that my personal thoughts, feelings and memories of Tanzania did not have as much of an impact on this research as the empirical data collected in the field. This thesis has shown that the water sector in Dar es Salaam is fraught with issues, and is entirely dependent on a set of institutions that are experiencing a number of issues that inhibit their ability to carry out water provision and governance effectively. However, amongst these difficulties are groups of incredibly hard-working people, who have committed themselves to water provision in Dar es Salaam and constantly endeavour to provide an improved situation for the city’s residents. In addition, it was these people who had the patience to explain their work to me and the challenges they faced in doing so, and who took the time to answer all of my questions as I attempted to make sense of Dar es Salaam’s complex water governance framework. Discussions of governance run the risk of simply discussing a series of static institutions and anonymising the individuals who play a significant part in it. This research has attempted to bring life to this discussion and highlight the mix of people and personal experiences that play a role in Dar es Salaam’s water sector.
As noted by Smith (2010):

"The notion of local, situated knowledge raises the broader political (and ethical issue) of who has the entitlement, or authority, to represent the lives of particular people to a wider audience." (Smith, 2010:415)

I claim no entitlement to represent the experiences of those Tanzanians attempting to manage water within their communities, or those simply trying to find an affordable access to a clean resource of water where they do not have to queue for hours to receive it. I speak with no real authority on the challenges faced by those who have worked unselfishly for NGOs in Tanzania for a number of years and who have watched the sector become saturated and increasingly office-based as they struggle to exact real change on the lives of those in need. I only hope that the data gathered in this thesis highlights the myriad struggles that take place in the water sector in Dar es Salaam, and that the questions posed by this research are eventually answered.
Appendices

Appendix 1: List of abbreviations

COWSO  Community Owned Water and Sanitation Organisation
DAWASA  Dar es Salaam Water and Sanitation Authority
DAWASCO  Dar es Salaam Water and Sanitation Corporation
DWST  District Water and Sanitation Team
EWURA  Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority
MWST  Municipal Water and Sanitation Team
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TWN  Tanzania Water Network
WPM  Water Project Management
Appendix 2: Information sheet

INFORMATION SHEET

Water Governance in Dar es Salaam

Invitation

My name is Nicola Pritchard and I am a research student from the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of Glasgow. I am doing research into water governance in Dar es Salaam and the different ways people access water in the city. I would be very grateful if you would participate in this study. Before deciding whether you would like to contribute to this project, I would like to present you with some information on it to ensure you are fully aware of what is involved in your participation. Please read the information that follows very carefully and feel free to ask any questions. A decision over whether you would like to take part is not required immediately, however, I will be in Dar es Salaam from the 25th January until the 21st April and I am contactable during this time. Contact details will follow.

Confidentiality

If you choose to participate, your contribution may be used in written work that may result from the project such as reports and a PhD thesis. Your name will NOT be associated with your response. You will be identified only by your professional capacity in this organisation. You are free to express any opinion you wish without any risk to yourself or your job. You are free at any time to retract any statements made and this will NOT be used in any form of research output.

Background

The field research aspect of this project will run from the 25th January until the 21st April. The final output of this project will contribute to a larger PhD project which focuses on the challenges surrounding water provision, rights and governance in Dar es Salaam. All research will be conducted personally, and if you are willing to participate in this study you are fully entitled to request a summary of the final findings of the project.

What will participation entail?

If you decide to take part in this project, you will be asked to contribute your professional knowledge in a semi-structured interview setting. This interview
will be an open discussion surrounding water governance in Dar es Salaam and your organisation’s role in the city’s water sector. Interviews will last approximately one hour and will be conducted in your place of work, or any other location that you wish to be interviewed in. If you are willing, written notes will be taken by the researcher throughout the interview and a dictaphone will be used to record the interview to ensure that your contributions are fairly represented. If granted permission, I would also like to spent time with your organisation to observe your practices and how you work. I will only observe aspects of your organisation that I have permission to, and if at any point you want my research to stop then you are within your rights to request so.

**What will happen to the information that I provide?**

As you will be performing in a professional capacity, your name and the organisation that you work for will be included in the final written thesis unless you wish to remain anonymous, in which case a pseudonym will be used. I will use your responses to extract information that is relevant to my research aims, and as a result of this only part of your responses may be included in the final submission.

**What are my rights?**

You have the right to ask for extra information about this project and you are free to refuse to participate. You are free to withdraw from this research at any time.

**What do I do now?**

Please read and sign the accompanying consent form if you are willing to participate in this research and we will arrange a time and location for the interview to take place. Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please keep this information sheet for reference.

**Contact Details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nicola Pritchard</th>
<th>Professor Joanne Sharp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Room 521</td>
<td>Room 503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School of Geographical &amp; Earth Sciences</td>
<td>School of Geographical &amp; Earth Sciences</td>
</tr>
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<td>G12 8QQ</td>
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Email: n.pritchard.1@research.gla.ac.uk  
Telephone: 0141 330 5405

[Consent Form]
Appendix 3: Consent form

CONSENT FORM

NB. This form must be completed by the respondent and signed in the presence of the researcher.

Tick appropriate box

Have you read and understood the Information Sheet?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Have you been given an opportunity to ask questions and further discuss this study?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Have you received satisfactory answers to all of your questions?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Have you now received enough information about this study?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you understand that your participation is entirely voluntary?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from this study at any time without having to give a reason for withdrawing?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you agree for your interview to be tape recorded?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you understand that the audio tapes will be destroyed after the research?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you understand that the information gathered from interviews will contribute to a PhD thesis?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Do you agree to take part in this study?   Yes ☐ No ☐

Subject's Signature __________________________________________ Date ____________

Subject’s Name Printed __________________________________________

Organisation ________________________________________________

301
## Appendix 4: Research details

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Fieldwork periods:  
June-July 2012 (6 weeks)  
June-July 2013 (6 weeks)  
January-April (14 weeks)
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