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# G2014: The Security Legacy

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## Abstract

Mega-events such as the Olympics or Commonwealth Games are truly global events. Yet, the way in which these are utilised as a form of events led regeneration, gives these an increasingly local dimension; not only are Games taking place amidst the existing urban setting, but so too are their associated exceptional security features. Mega-events can also be considered representative of a new (in)security situation in which experts have been reactivated to operate on behalf of citizens; associations of invisible and omnipresent risks such as terrorism, have given executive authority to state agencies to define risks and develop responses, a situation which contradicts the last decades drive towards more community focused policing and empowerment. The cumulative and contradictory situation is that as global risks and security have become more embedded at the local level, there is an increasing of social distance between security expert and lay citizens. In short, local residents who encounter security within the context of their everyday environment are stripped of any contextual basis on which to understand associated risks and make sense of the attentive security measures. This situation places a greater emphasis on how risk and security is symbolically 'communicated' between experts and citizens, and how aspects of reassurance and deterrence are balanced amidst this backdrop.

Existing literature in mega-events has tended to focus on security in a 'wide and shallow' sense: 'wide' in that they outline a whole range of security features and governance arrangements, but 'shallow' in the way that they do not take into account how these features are perceived at a deeper, local level. In this way, there is no real legacy to the security legacies. This thesis aims to address this issue by drawing on Glasgow's hosting of the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Qualitative interviews were used to gain the perspectives of both security experts from key stakeholder organisations responsible for delivering a safe and secure Games, and lay citizen's perceptions and experiences of these arrangements.

Using a semiotic theoretical lens, which includes key concepts from the work of Giddens, Baudrillard, Eco and Goffman, the analysis considers 1) How particular security related narratives are 'framed' by experts during the mega-event and how these were understood by residents in relation to local contexts, biographies and experiences. 2) The totalising and globalising claims of late modernity and mediated forms of risk are identified in relation to local understandings of place. In particular, why it is that certain events or places, legitimise the use of exceptional security and continue to licence executive state authority. 3) The sending and receiving of different forms of security as 'control signals' is analysed in relation to how overt displays of security are experienced; how they influence one's position of reassurance, safety and ontological (in)security, and how they may enhance or defray trust in the institutions responsible for providing security.

It is discovered that instances of miscommunication between state and citizen are rife, a situation exacerbated by the social distance created through existing governance arrangements and an overreliance on symbolic security. The thesis concludes by arguing that the governance of security at mega-events is not the best way of doing things and that the appropriation of issues of risk and security by experts creates new sources of insecurity among citizens. It calls for the enlisting of communities into the governance of security as a way of overcoming such limitations.

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This work is dedicated to Georgia.

## Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Printed name \_\_\_\_\_

# 1. Introduction

*“While some studies address the community impacts of hosting Olympic-sized events, very few consider their security infrastructures and there are none that examine the social impact of these security operations”*

(Fussey *et al.* 2011: 4)

## 1.1 The Current (In)security Situation

The post 9/11 era has seen the reactivation of state experts to deal with an array of late modern, global and exceptional risks, such as terrorism. In this format, both the risks, and the preventative remedy, are bound up within a 'bureaucracy of knowledge' (Beck 1992), and sequestering of exceptional risk and security as matters of technical judgement. This situation has placed a reliance upon the symbolic aspects of security in how its function of reassurance, is 'communicated' to members of the public, as Mythen and Walklate (2006: 133) identify, "The way in which the state communicates risk to citizens at the current time has significant implications for harnessing or allaying fears about the current level of risk". However, since lay citizens are mostly passive recipients of securitisation, the communicative messages in security are particularly liable to misinterpretation, "What is the overarching message that the state wishes to send in such circumstances? And who receives it and in what fashion? Such policies are 'authored', predominantly by the states security services. But, clearly, their 'readers' may assume different meanings from those intended - or at least from those projected by the state" (Coaffee *et al.* 2009: 507).

The realisation that physical security can produce the opposite effect of insecurity amongst the public is nothing new. But this process demands further attention, particularly in terms of examining why this occurs, and its consequences. This is especially important when considering that exceptional

security, orientated against globalised forms of threat, is now increasingly manifested and taking place at deeper urban local scales, as Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006: 54) outline, "security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home". However, as in Wæver's (1995: 49) assessment that "the concept of security refers to the state", in terms of the majority of security literature, this is still true; the focus on security as a topic of investigation is dominated by issues of security governance and technical assemblages, and the import/export trade of international and domestic 'best' practice. There is an irony however, in that as global risks and security is becoming more localised, there exists a looming theoretical deficit in terms of understanding how people experience these features in the context of their everyday environment.

Amidst the intersecting between global and local forms of security, there is a need to take lessons from local experiences, to identify how standardised and globally oriented policies impact upon local subjectivities of both material and ontological (in)security, and to understand the empirical contingencies that this juxtaposition presents, as Johnston and Shearing (2003: 5) state, "It is one thing to offer guarantees of security to subjects. It is another to assume that they will be realised in practice". And while there is a recognition in the literature of the growing mergence between global and local security, internal and external risks, militarisation and crime control, this remains an underdeveloped area within criminology, particularly in regards to its effects on the experiential (empirical) aspects of security, as Innes (2006: 98) states, "The interface between neighbourhood security and national security is for another issue", but this *is* the main issue when mega-events occur within an existing residential community.

## 1.2 Opportunities for Furthering Understanding and Knowledge Contribution

Mega sporting events such as the Olympics or Commonwealth Games, are uniquely placed to contribute to the understanding of how risk and security

communicates, and how these issues are perceived by those "who experience security on the thin edge of the wedge" (Maguire *et al.* 2014: 10). These events are truly global in nature, but localised in the places that they occur. And In terms of risk and security, they are the places where exceptional risks are perceived to be imminent, and exceptional and scaled up security measures taken in response. The combination of global threat and the local manifestation of exceptional security, is most acutely felt where host cities utilise the Games as a form of 'events-led regeneration' (Smith 2012). This process results in the inevitable securitisation of existing urban communities before, during and after the Games, to which a number of rhetoric's of revitalisation and 'legacy' are pronounced. It is here, however, that prior conceptualisations and understandings of security and its providers, become influential, yet unexplained, within the interpretive process.

Furthermore, in many ways, mega-events can be considered a microcosm of society; those same trends and issues that are happening around issues of risk and security, are also happening at mega-events. However, the exceptionality and temporality of mega-events amplifies the way in which these global processes and dynamics come into play, presenting a form of hyper society in action. These events bring forth into thought and perception the idea of imminent danger and of something to be protected against. This legitimises the pursuit of exceptional security which bypasses local democratic processes and engagement. However, this infraction of the local by the global requires further clarification, particularly in regards to the totalising claims of late modernity and the seemingly eradication of place and the community as providing a source of security.

Mega-event security operations also represent the move towards a "semiotic shift" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 257) in security delivery, where these depend on the use of various 'control signals' (Innes 2004); experts use the symbolic and communicative powers of security infrastructures to convey intentional messages of deterrence and reassurance. These are used as part of a signification contest which aims to counteract the negative effects of associated signal crimes (real and imagined) which are seared into collective consciousness around such large

events. However, a criticism of the control signals perspective by Loader (2006), is that these features attend to only the material aspects of security and its relation to feeling safe (from dangers), whilst ignoring the contribution that these signals and the way that security is conducted have on the different ontological aspects of (in)security. As Coaffee and Rogers (2008: 102) state, security "must not only be effective but must also be acceptable to the owners, inhabitants and users of particular places". Mega-events are ripe for investigation with regards to the dialectical interplay of the symbolic dualities of reassurance and deterrence.

Another important aspect of mega-events is their reliance on complex governance arrangements and outsourcing of responsibility to state and non-state technical experts to plan and implement security operations. These governing arrangements continue to largely exclude the ordinary citizen from deliberations over security in their local environment (Coaffee and Rogers 2008). If the ensuing social distance between expert and citizen, is aimed to be addressed through the symbolic communication of security, then the fit between what messages were intended to convey by the sender, and how they were actually perceived by the addressee, points to either the strengths or shortcomings of existing arrangements in how these contribute or defray a sense of (in)security. Awareness of this fact raises important questions regarding the normative position of the state and the citizen in the future securitisation of mega-events, and wider society.

### 1.3 G2014: The Security Legacy: Aims of the Research

Despite the potential that empirical investigations of security at mega-events offers criminology, the existing literature is decidedly uncriminological in its analysis. Mega-events contribution to security and criminology is a 'wide' but 'shallow' (Loader 2006) one; wide in the sense that they outline a descriptive overview of the whole range of security, policing and control strategies at such events, but shallow in terms of the level of critical analysis afforded to how

these features are perceived and experienced by everyday people in the host city. The majority of mega-event and urban security analysis often continues to "[remain] at the macro-theoretical level" and "[relies] upon its distance from the details of everyday usage it ignores fine distinctions and significant divergences and so licences sweeping generalisations" (Zedner 2009: 258). A micro approach is needed to counter-balance this, to "allow an understanding of how exactly security governance at sports mega-events permeates and shapes particular places and projects during the event" (Klauser 2013: 2), and the people within. As Coaffee (2014: 3), further identifies, there is a need for research which examines the "Relationship between spaces of concentrated security and the impact of such spaces on the communities which host or surround them", and "How state responses to crime, recidivism, insecurity and insurrection and terrorism and counter-terrorism are experienced". Recognition of the multiple ways in which security is configured and experienced outside of the state and official institutions, is important in developing theoretical and empirical understandings of security,

*"[It] helps to broaden our perspective on what security means, how it is produced, what it includes, and what it excludes in the ordinary struggles of daily life. It brings to light the manifold ways in which global discourses are adopted, manipulated, transformed, and deployed in quotidian interactions and events, revealing the full range of security as lived social experience in a variety of contexts"*

(Goldstein 2010: 492-493)

In recognition of this theoretical deficit, this thesis takes a case study of Glasgow's hosting of the 2014 Commonwealth Games (G2014 hereafter) and its impact on the East End community of Dalmarnock. Through the use of a mixed method qualitative methodology, it aims to uncover the subjective perceptions and experiences of security, from the perspective of those who encounter it within their everyday environment. This entailed an identification of the communicative process in security delivery, between sender and receiver of security. It is the intention that this thesis provides a 'narrow', but 'deep' analysis of mega-event security; narrow in that it focuses on the specific facet of

semiotic communication in security, but deep in that it take a holistic and detailed account of the theoretical and empirical insights related to this area of study. Subsequently, the research was oriented around addressing the following questions, with the answering of each, taking advantage of the aforementioned opportunities for original knowledge contributions in the field of security and criminology,

#### 1.4 Research Questions:

- 1. What overarching narratives are present within G2014 security and how are they experienced and perceived locally?*
- 2. How are global risks experienced at the local level, and what are the consequences on perceptions of (in)security?*
- 3. How is security symbolically communicated between experts and lay citizens, and furthermore, what does it tell them?*
- 4. How do current governance arrangements, and the resultant relationship between state expert and lay citizen, affect the communication of security? And how can security be improved?*

#### 1.5 Overview of Chapters

**Chapter 2: Literature Review** - the first part of the review is centred on the existing mega event literature. This identifies three trends of urban centred, expert mediated and symbolic security. These issues are then examined and contextualised in relation to existing security and criminological perspectives, cementing the research questions as addressing a gap in knowledge around mega-events and security.

**Chapter 3: Approach and Methods** - this chapter provides a descriptive and methodological breakdown of the approach used. The research advocates the

use of Layder's (1998) adaptive theory, as explaining the relationship between theory and empirical research, illustrating how extant theory was used to guide the direction of the research, at the same as the empirical evidence reflexively influenced new directions, as 'arising' out of the data. It also provides a rationale and justification of the chosen methods and how these were implemented in the field.

**Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework** - expanding on the conceptual toolkit identified in the methods section, this chapter outlines the theoretical framework which guided the research and its analysis. A triangulation of perspectives was used. Taking Innes's 'control signals' as its starting point, this perspective is used in synthesis with the competing and complimentary theoretical perspectives of late modernity semiotics and frame analysis. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate how these concepts were used together to illuminate the empirical research, posing new questions and insights around the communication of security.

**Chapter 5: Frames, Place and the Parameters of Experience** - set against the first research question, this chapter aims to address how security is embroiled in a number of overarching narratives or framings of the reality of events, from regeneration to risk prevention. However, the great social distance that existed between experts and lay citizens, modulated the framings of different scenarios. Symbolic messages were reframed through residents' pre-context of biographical and situational narratives.

**Chapter 6: Geographies of (In)Security** - this chapter aims to investigate the totalising and globalising claims of late modernity and its eradication of the local. It is revealed that the experiences and non-experiences of particular places and risks, is fundamental in influencing a sense (in)security that follows. Central to this is the way that exceptional security becomes about the virtual and symbolic, creating a dependency on overt communication. However, the more security tries to communicate the less meaning it has - in hyperrealised spaces there is a collapsing of distinctions between global and local, between reality and virtuality, and between security and insecurity.

**Chapter 7: Communication, Control Signals and Their Effects** - this chapter provides five points of theoretical elaboration to the control signals concept. It is revealed that control signals can be both positive and negative, but at different levels of understanding and experience. In addition, the performative nature of policing and security is considered in relation to the personnel tasked with providing it, this examines how well equipped security experts really are in diverse local terrains where local situational knowledge is fundamental. Furthermore, the intermingling of different, non-state security providers is assessed with regards to their perceived legitimacy in providing security. Lastly, It is shown that aspects of security, both behavioural and environmental, send a number of signals which reaffirm ideas around stigmatisation, identity, community and belonging to a democratic political community. In short, security tells people as much about themselves and their social standing, as it does about their position of safety and propensity to particular risks.

**Chapter 8: Conclusion: Improving Security - Lessons from Theory and Practice** - this chapter addresses the fourth research question. Its aim, as the title suggests, is to diagnose the current security situation and to identify improvements for its practice and pursuit. The governance of security at G2014 was used to assess the normative claims of the competing nodal governance and anchored pluralism perspectives. It was found that, rather than representing a form of nodal governance as many have claimed, G2014 was in fact a form of anchored pluralism in practice, where the state authority of the police, acted as a meta- regulator for the delivery of security. However, strikingly, the normative claims that follow this proposal were not enacted. Reasons were given for why this happened, and furthermore a tertiary normative proposal for security governance is made, which, taking lessons from theory and practice, calls for the re-integration of lay citizens into the deliberative process in security governance and delivery as a way of removing the overreliance on, and failures inherent to, symbolic communication.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a narrative based literature review on mega-events and security literature, with the aim of justifying the need for research into understanding people's perceptions and experiences of exceptional security, and how this is facilitated through symbolic communication. In the first half of the review, there is engagement with existing theoretical and empirical studies into mega-event security. This identifies a 'gap' which this thesis aims to address, mainly, that there is a need to attend to the subjective dimensions of mega event securitisation. Secondly, the gap is identified as a salient and necessary direction of study through identifying current trends in mega-event security practice of symbolic, urban centred and expert mediated security.

Such trends are then contextualised further by referring to the existing security and criminological literature, where these same issues have been discussed more extensively. The existing literature on the risk society and position of state expertise is outlined; this demonstrates expert/lay relations on issues of exceptional security and the reliance on symbolic communication. This perspective is then contrasted with the idea of community empowerment through various community and reassurance policing initiatives, examining how this bottom up practice sits alongside top down resilient practices, which further prioritise expertise. The review ends by outlining different perspectives on the position of the state and lay citizens in the governance of security, and how different levels of engagement between experts and lay citizens may influence the communication of security.

Along the way, issues are raised as to how these different processes exist in tension, and each pose a number of consequences for the communication of security, and influences on lay perspectives of risk and (in)security, which, so

far, remain under researched and unanswered both in the mega-event and security literature.

## 2.2 Identifying the 'Gap': An Overview of Existing Mega-event Research

There is a vast amount of literature concerning the impact and legacies of sporting mega-events (Cashman *et al.* 2004; Cornelissen 2007; Cornelissen, Bob, & Swart 2011; Gold & Gold 2005). Organisers from host cities, often utilise the lessons learned from this body of knowledge to frame their own approach towards creating positive impacts from hosting an event. However, given that security plays such a crucial role in mega-event planning and delivery, it is interesting to note that the issues of security and security legacies are largely ignored by organisers when discussing respective legacies, "Given vast expenditures and training in security, policing and emergency operations at major sporting events, it is notable that the international Olympic Committee (IOC) and its official partners have largely avoided discussing security and policing legacies" (Molnar 2014: 2).

Despite this, the issue of security at mega-events is increasingly providing a prolific area for academic research (Fussey and Klauser 2014). In recent years, there has been an upsurge in research being conducted into mega-event security, perhaps in recognition of the way in which such events are being used as "test sites of increasingly sophisticated high tech security, thus strongly pushing forward the use of new, preventative arrangements of control and surveillance" (Klauser 2008: 69). In addition, mega-events simultaneously are shaped by and influence the global re-calibration of security and so present fertile conceptual territory (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

A number of studies have examined the issue of security at mega-events, constructing their analysis from both theoretical and empirical positions. Some

research is concerned with the analysis of mega-events in terms of the globalized nature of risk among host cities and the transportation and sharing of security techniques across territorial and ideological borders (Giulianotti & Klauser 2009, Coaffee & Fussey 2011, Klauser 2011, Houlihan & Giulianotti 2012). Other research takes a case study based approach focusing on the experiences of specific host cities - research has been conducted into security at Olympic Games - Athens (Samatas 2007), Beijing (Yu, Klauser & Chan 2009), Vancouver (Boyle & Haggerty 2010), London (Fussey & Coaffee 2011), Commonwealth Games - Glasgow 2014 (Burman *et al.* 2013), and also the FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006 (Eick 2011), and South Africa 2010 (McMichael 2013). Research has also been undertaken cross comparatively between host cities - Athens 2004 & Beijing 2008 (Samatas 2011), Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland (Klauser 2011) and at different events within the same host country - Australia (Taylor & Toohey 2011) and Canada (Boyle & Haggerty 2014).

Within this diverse span of research, there are a number of commonalities: the focus on security is mostly concerned with aspects of military urbanism, resilience, social control, lockdown and territorialisation, security governance networks and public-private policing partnerships. These topics are informed through a range of qualitative research methods which include: semi-structured interviews and ethnographic work with key stakeholder organizations responsible for delivering security, participant observation of spectators and protest groups, attendance at security stakeholder meetings, review of security and risk assessment documentations, news reports and photographs. Less attention has been given to researching ordinary citizens who are directly affected by such infrastructures and who live in close proximity to them. This is something which is important to consider given the way that security is increasingly operating at smaller, deeper, urban scales (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006).

Details on the securitisation of mega-events in different host cities, identifies that approaches to security are increasingly globalised and standardised across time, place and culture. Yet, there is a risk that the security which is 'parachuted in' to the urban environment, becomes disconnected from the distinct, locale specificities in which it is deployed (Fussey *et al.* 2011); the

standardised approach may conflict or contradict the idiosyncrasies and existing formal and informal strategies and specificities which are used to maintain objective (and subjective) security. It is therefore worthwhile to study mega-event securitisation at different types of mega-events within a diverse range of host cities, "The harvesting of differential urban experiences of mega-event security are vital, not least to avoid overstated synecdochal assumptions of the endurance and generalisability of particular tendencies, trends and practices" (Fussey and Klauser 2014: 3). In addition, Klauser (2008: 76-77) asks, "What can mega-events tell us about the interactions between security issues on different - local, regional, and global scales?". It is these points which justify research into security at G2014, and a particular focus on its impact within the local area of Dalmarnock, which plays host to the majority of Games related securitisation.

Discussions on the temporary nature of mega-events also identifies that the impacts of these on the host city are often more enduring. Coaffee and Fussey (2011: 168) outline the temporal imprint of mega-event security as occurring over three phases: *pre-event*, *during event* and *post event*, all of which, "serve to shape the built environment and its management in a myriad of connected ways". However, most discussion of the impact of mega-event security are concerned with the latter phase and the concept of 'security legacies', defined as the "...range of security-related strategies and impacts which continue to have significance beyond the life of the sport event" (Giulianotti and Klauser 2009: 53-54).

Security legacies have been discussed in terms of: the retention of lasting and transferable security technologies and specialist security knowledges (Taylor & Toohey 2000; Boyle and Haggerty 2009, 2014; Eick 2011; Eisenhauer, Adair, Taylor 2014); new police powers and legislations (Fussey *et al.* 2011; Toohey and Taylor 2012; Molnar 2014); the forging of new security partnerships and networks (Yu *et al.* 2009; Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012); the creation of social transformations and sanitised spaces (Boyle and Haggerty 2011; Samatas 2011) and the embedding of security into urban regeneration projects, as a form of 'regeneration-linked securitisation' (Coaffee *et al.* 2011; Fussey and Coaffee 2011).

Within the work on security legacies, the impacts of security on local populations has been hypothetically proposed and tentatively discussed. It has been theorised, often through Agamben's (2005) work on 'exceptionality', that security may undergo a transition from its provisional and exceptional nature into more pervasive and everyday techniques of government. It is claimed that local residents of mega-event host cities may become 'normalised' to such features (Coaffee 2014; Fussey and Coaffee 2011) resulting in the 'production of new norms' (Agamben 2005: 28). It has also been suggested that the emphasis newly regenerated spaces place on 'safety', results in the use of control and surveillance measures at the expense of the security, liberty and mobility of ordinary residents (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

While these raise many important issues, there are parallels here with Foucault's claim that, "in political theory we have yet to cut off the king's head" (1980: 191). Mega-event security literature tends to operate with a degree of 'institutional bias' (Coaffee and Fussey 2015), in terms of the dominant methodological approaches adopted. While some studies have conducted research with individuals affected by aspects of security (policing) in the years *before* the hosting of a mega-event (Kennelly & Watt 2010), the majority of mega-event security literature and virtually all security legacy research favours interviewing only security and policing professionals.

Existing theoretical deliberations into the subjective impacts of mega-event security and security legacies could be complimented through investigating the perceptions and experiences of local residents who may encounter these aspects of mega-event security as part of their everyday environment.

## 2.3 Key Developments in Mega-event Security

While it is not necessary to provide a complete overview of all aspects of mega-event security and its chronological developments between successive iterations, several key and interconnected developments are identified which

are relevant here: Firstly, mega-event security is increasingly predicated and reliant upon its symbolic functions, as a display of spectacle and 'security exceptionalism' (Bernhard and Martin 2011; see also Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser 2009; Baasch 2011; Coaffee *et al.* 2011; Fussey *et al.* 2011; Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012). Secondly, the standardised, 'total security' approach is reacting to, and advancing, the global "recalibration of security" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), in which security is increasingly sub-national, regional, and urban in scale (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006), affecting how citizens engage with and are engaged by such features (Boyle and Haggerty 2011; Eick 2011; Fussey and Coaffee 2011; Kennelly and Watt 2011). Lastly, the way that risks and security are defined and responded to, as an elite practice, can be considered to contribute to increasing distance between the role of experts and citizens in mega-event security (Taylor and Toohey 2011; Fussey *et al.* 2011; Samatas 2011; Toohey and Taylor 2012).

### 2.3.1 Symbolic Security

In the post 9/11 era, it seems as if security has become as much part of the hosting of large sporting events as the sport itself, even drawing the title 'security Games' (Bennett and Haggerty 2011). However, the relationship between security and mega-events can be traced as far back as the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. These Games demonstrates the earliest example of the relationship between security as 'spectacle', where overt displays of military strength were used as a projection of the Nazi's political and military power. Paradoxically, it was in response to contemporary sensitivities over public displays of control post WW2, that Games organisers for the 1972 Munich Games sought to implement a 'low key' approach to security. However, this approach ultimately backfired and was considered a contributing factor to the Munich massacre - where members of the Palestinian group Black September managed to gain access to the Athletes' Village and murder five athletes and six coaches from the Israeli national team. The legacy from Munich was a recalibration of mega-event security against the threat of terrorism and to defend the 'spectacle'. Based around several key security themes, Munich was the catalyst

for the 'total security approach' at the 1976 Montreal Games. This standardised and transferrable approach has since become a defining feature of security at subsequent events (Fussey and Coaffee 2011).

Mega-events are considered a target rich environment due to their high profile nature and media exposure (Coaffee 2009), with security now becoming a key aspect of any bidding document and preparations for hosting a mega-event (Coaffee *et al.* 2011). Since "spectacular events are also spectacular targets" (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 513), host cities are expected to provide spectacular levels of security.

The need to contend with so many risks is also buttressed by the unpredictability and uncertainty in the ways that these manifest themselves. For example, the post 9/11 era represented a shift in the distribution of risks such as terrorism, as operating beyond international borders, serving to reinstate the complexity and impossibility of the task of risk management specialists to scientifically and objectively calculate risk: "Risk does not exist 'out there', independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Instead, it is seen as a concept that human beings have invented to help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as 'real risk' or 'objective risk' " (Slovic 2002: 5). A consequence of this is that risk experts must "think outside the box" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 260) and prepare for threats, regardless of how remote.

Therefore, much of the reality of security at mega-events is about constructing the appearance of absolute security in influencing deterrence and reassurance against unknown, yet, omnipresent threats. The result is a burgeoning security and surveillance assemblage which draws on ever increasing financial and technological resources. As Molnar (2014: 1) states, it is not uncommon for security costs to equate to "20-50% of the overall budget" for large sporting events. Sydney spent \$179.6 on security hosting the 2000 Olympics, but this pales in comparison to the amount spent in the 9/11 era where, \$1.5 billion was spent at Athens 2004, \$6.5 billion at Beijing, while London (an area which already had extensive levels of security infrastructure) spent just under \$2

billion (Houlihan & Giulianotti 2012). It could be argued that public declarations of the security budget by Governments months or years in advance of the event is itself part of the spectacle.

Spectacle, defined as, "any form of public display put on for the guidance and edification of a large audience of spectators...created by consciously manipulating space, landscape or objects to produce displays that draw a powerful emotional response" (Gold and Revill 2003: 38), has become a crucial element to security planning and the success of any mega-event. The importance of symbolism and spectacle also extends to another aspect of hosting a mega-event, where wider trends in security increasingly couple accelerated economic development with the control and regulation of urban spaces. "The conceptual expansion of national security to include 'economic well-being' has given the state a new interest in securing economic stability" (Zedner 2009: 59).

Subsequently, security at mega-events has a dual purpose for the entrepreneurial city; to protect against risks *and* to secure inward investment. Utilised in conjunction with place marketing and branding, "Mega-events are also critical junctures where globally mediated urban identities are refashioned, future directions forged, and past lineages overwritten in a context of intense global inter-urban competition" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 257). Hosting large scale events can play an important role in refashioning urban identities, but the stakes, rewards...and risks, are high. As Merrifield (2002: 12) suggests, "Bad imagery means lost investment; lost investment signals the death knell of a city. Image is forever important". This dimension gives importance to the pursuit of security and the notion that 'nothing must go wrong', or at least...be seen to go wrong.

Mega-event security as a form of spectacle or 'security theatre' (Schneier 2006: 38), is largely about creating the idea that something is being done, a performance for public consumption. This explains why so much of mega-event security is about overt displays of security, such as territorial control around key venues and aspects of military urbanism (Graham 2011). Examples of security theatre operate around the visible securing of built environments and the

lamination of policing and surveillance technologies on top of these (Fussey *et al.* 2011). Both of these are central aspects of the 'standardised approach' to security unequivocally adopted by each respective host city.

Key features of the standardised approach include: firstly, the pre-planning, identifying and designing out weaknesses around key locations many months before the Games. Secured by Design (SBD) and Situational Crime Prevention strategies (SCPs), such as the use of robust building materials in new buildings, architectural landscaping which facilitates natural surveillance and upgrading of existing features like fencing or CCTV (Goldby and Heward 2013), are embedded into the environment to make it more resilient to a broad spectrum of threats, from petty crime through to terrorism. Secondly, in the months or weeks before the Games there is the territorial segregation and lockdown of key sites and the creation of 'island security'. This is achieved through use of steel fencing 'ring of steel' and concrete blocks, restricted access points and road closures. These spaces are supplemented by advanced surveillance technologies and on-foot patrols from police and private security personnel. Thirdly, there is the creation of peripheral buffer zones through road closures, gated entry and restricted access to a range of public spaces. Used together, these form the different 'layers' of the total security approach, leaving various spatial imprints on the host city. Lastly, the increasing amounts spent on security has placed a growing demand and emphasis on the post retention and retrofitting of security infrastructures for perceived 'legacy benefits', such as crime reduction and improving feelings of safety (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

Symbolic and performative security was especially evident at the 2004 Olympics in Athens. This was the first major summer Olympics since 9/11 and no expense was spared in demonstrating spectacular security as a show of western, military force: 70,000 military and security personnel were hired, with a further 35,000 military personnel patrolling the streets (Samatas 2011). The technologies and hardware deployed included anti-aircraft missiles on public display, a surveillance blimp, police helicopters and fighter jets, 13,000 CCTV cameras, and the controversial C41 system of cameras and databases...a "super panopticon" (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 222-223). However, this system was

actually "operationally useless" during the event (Samatas 2011: 3353). Nonetheless, the Games went without major incident, a case in point that the symbolic value of security can sometimes supersede its operational functionality.

Security at mega-events has a twofold character: 1) to act as a deterrent against various sources of risk and 2) to promote reassurance and foster subjective sense of safety. As Defence Secretary at the time, Philip Hammond stated of London's 2012 security operation, "The majority of this exercise will be played out in full view of the public and I hope that it will have a secondary effect of reassuring the British people that everything possible is being done to ensure this will be a safe and secure Olympic and Paralympic Games" (BBC News 2012).

However, this relationship has not been developed fully in mega-event literature. The symbolic importance of mega-event security has been outlined and described, but critically, not explored in terms of how this impacts on perceived levels of risk and security among ordinary citizens. Taylor and Toohey (2011: 3262) state that, "It is a matter of judgement whether the security is excessive or the control is out proportion to the risk". And so, the effects of symbolic security cannot assumed or generalised upon, "While security regimes may attempt to 'transmit' feelings of safety and security through the built environment and to reassure the public, the 'reception' of these very same messages may be lost in translation" (Coaffee *et al.* 2009: 496). For instance, the spectacle of security may signal as a reminder of the omnipresence of threat and risk, having the unintended consequences of heightening perceptions of risk and vulnerability, "Processes which render spaces 'secure' are always laden with theatre; the symbolism and performance mixes reassurance with the seeding of anxiety" (Graham 2004: 147).

### 2.3.2 Urban Centred Security

Despite mega-events being truly global events they usually result in unprecedented reconfigurations of the local area in which they occur. In terms of security there is a "juxtaposition of globalized terrorist risks and local manifestations of threat." (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 57). The dominant rhetoric of post-1972 mega-event security is that it provides protection against the external 'other'. However, the Centennial Park bombing at the 1996 Atlanta Games, committed by an American (Bennett and Haggerty 2011), demonstrates a blurring of the distinctions between external and internal threats, where, security threats are more often than not, local in origin (Coaffee *et al.* 2011). In addition, the events of 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London, the Madrid and Boston Bombings, and the Paris attacks of 2015, highlight that acts of terrorism, are increasingly targeting the spaces of the mundane and the everyday. Such trends have placed a new emphasis on sub-national and localised security responses, a product of a new 'paranoid urbanism', and the "everyday securitisation from the enemy within" (Bigo 2001: 112).

In keeping with the symbolic and theatrical aspects of security at mega-events, host cities deploy security most heavily in the spaces *outside* key venues; the rationale is that venues, Athletes' Villages, and areas within security borders represent the sanctified 'inner core' (Fussey 2013), where the spectacle of sport is allowed to take precedence over security. The emphasis on territorial boundaries means that security inevitably "bleeds out" from the peripheries of key venues into everyday locations, something which was identified by Fussey and colleagues analysis of London 2012 security, "Stimulated by fears of a terrorist attack that is spatially displaced to an alternative location, security measures are also bleeding through the borders of the 'island site' (the Olympic Park) to enable new forms of physical and technological security to permeate across London" (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 152).

This bleeding out of security is also important given that mega-event security is increasingly following wider trends in crime prevention and control, "Indeed, since 9/11 many core counter-terrorism practices can be seen to map against a

number of long term changes occurring in broader crime and social control practices over the last few decades. Accordingly, many recent counter-terrorism practices have adopted the crime prevention mantra that 'changing people is difficult and expensive' (Simon 1988, 773)" (Molnar 2014: 2-3). Both everyday crime prevention and Mega-event security planning has seen a move away from focussing on the actions of individuals and issues of causality towards actuarial, future orientated, forms of prevention. Techniques such as target hardening of the physical environment and aggregated surveillance of communities, affect entire populations irrespective of being considered a security threat.

A consequence of these two developments is that exceptional security is being experienced by and affecting more spaces and people within host cities; its impacts are not just felt by those areas which are direct sites for Games activity, or those who attend the actual event, "As one of the effects of 9/11 was the increased securitization of urban centres (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006), it follows that the increased militarization of event security also means the militarization of cities" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 270).

A further point to consider is that such experiences are not limited to the temporal restrictions of the mega-event. The emphasis placed on security legacies and subsequent (partial or full) retention of security technologies has meant that encounters with exceptional security (in its original or different incarnations) can endure long after the Games have finished. The vast amounts spent on security, places a demand for its transferrable usage into the everyday environment, "Mega-events are transient but their effects are not. Mega-event security in any specific urban locality also leaves within the host environment a legacy of ideas and practices that can shape the pursuit of safety and security at the local level" (Eisenhauer, Adair, Taylor 2014: 36).

Giulianotti and Klauser (2009), identify six types of security legacy associated with hosting a mega-event, each of which can leave a legacy of, "long-term implications through the retrofitting of permanent security features" (Coaffee and Wood 2006: 505). These are now discussed in turn:

1. *Security technologies* - such as CCTV which are introduced for the event but retained for more everyday control purposes. For example, both Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008, retained surveillance technologies for the control of issues such as low-level urban disorder and traffic management (Samatas 2011). Furthermore, all 12 host cities at the 2006 World Cup in Germany, took advantage of the event to install and upgrade CCTV into respective stadia, the majority of administrations also extended surveillance into public transport networks (Eick 2011).

2. *New Security practices* - where particular approaches, partnerships and networks created for 'one off' events are used in different situations. Eick (2011) notes that even though the majority of the material security infrastructure for the 2006 FIFA World Cup was temporary, 'shadows of surveillance' - knowledge and techniques among law enforcement and private security remain and can be exploited. As stated by the Minister of Police for South Africa, Nathi Mthethwa, with regards to South Africa's security operation during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, "the resources, the re-skilling of police, expertise and international best practices acquired...are serving as an enormous arsenal in our fight against crime" (Mthethwa 2010b, cited in Eisenhauer, Adair, Taylor 2014: 46).

3. *Governmental policies and new legislation* - the exceptional nature of hosting a mega-event often leads to the introduction of various legislations. For example, Sydney Olympic legislations granted police extra powers to control public behaviour and protests. Such laws were in place long before the Games and were not removed for nearly two years after the 2000 Olympic event (Toohey and Taylor 2000). Similar effects resulted from the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, which, although focused around policing illegal commercial endeavours such as ticket touting, could also extend its remit towards the regulation of political protests (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

4. *Externally imposed social transformations* - where social transformations are stimulated by material security, often through the (re)conceptualisation of certain social groups, individuals and behaviours as security problems. This can occur before, during or after the event, but is usually tied to aspects of place

branding and promotion. For example, in preparation for hosting the 2010 Winter Olympics, Vancouver initiated 'Project Civil City' in an attempt to 'clean up' the downtown eastside of the city, which "can be understood as an attempt to establish a set of socio-spatial ordering mechanisms to manage the spatial distribution of inequality in Vancouver by keeping, for example, the homeless away from the city's tourism and consumption clusters" (Boyle and Haggerty 2011: 3197). Kennelly and Watt (2011), also identified similar trends were evident in the build up to the London 2012 Games, where, there was a disproportionate 'tackling' of youths by police in the East End.

5. *Generalized changes in social and transsocietal relationships* - the securitisation of an area can result in changing relationships between agents of security and of citizens. Coaffee and Wood (2006), state that securitisation raises serious questions over civil liberties and the extent to which democratic processes are sustained through the increasing 'domesticisation' of security. As mentioned previously, it has also been suggested that citizens can become 'normalised' to exceptional security, where a common belief of acceptance may exist towards aspects of 'security creep'; the expansion of security into the everyday realm separated from the context of its initial proportionality and legitimacy. The claim is that, "state responses which extend the securitization of everyday life serve also to extend feelings of vague insecurity, potentially establishing a self-perpetuating circle" (Graham 2004: 298). Mega-events may contribute to an increasing reliance and demand on technological aspects of security and expert mediated conceptions of risk, while at the same time, position the source of such insecurities as existing from external 'others', through the "endless portrayal of the everyday sites, spaces and systems of the city as domains where Others might jump out at any time" (Ibid 2004: 298).

6. *Urban Redevelopment* - urban transformations which accompany legacy ambitions at mega-events are often integrated with issues of security, "broader event-related objectives such as the 'regeneration' of wider geographies has become increasingly yoked to broader processes of securitisation and a refocusing of urban governance towards this end" (Fussey and Klauser 2014: 2). Recent trends among host-cities cite a return to the 'Barcelona Model' of events-

led urban regeneration. Barcelona used the hosting of the 1992 Olympics to upgrade urban infrastructures, develop new housing and transport links, resulting in an improved image of the city and its (re)birth as a top tourist destination (Smith 2012). For example, London used its hosting of the 2012 Olympics as part of wider plans to regenerate the East End community of Stratford. Security for the Games, was planned to be kept for legacy purposes, to prevent crime and fear of crime. As the Chief Inspector of the Metropolitan Police stated in 2006, "We want the security legacy to be us leaving a safe and secure environment for the communities of East London after the Games, on issues such as safer neighbourhoods, lighting and crime prevention. We want a Games legacy that will reduce crime and the fear of crime" (cited in Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 267).

These different security legacies are not mutually exclusive, but are often interlinking and simultaneously existent within host cities. Security legacies influence the pursuit of security beyond the Games and subsequently, "represent fertile theoretical ground for developing new understandings of the form and impact of social control strategies deployed at mega-events" (Coaffee *et al.* 2011: 3314). Mega-event security is becoming more civic, and longer lasting in its form and potential effects, "Mega-events foster a legacy of knowledge, networks and habits that have a bearing on the lives of considerably more individuals than those in attendance" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009: 265). Security legacies also identify the need to greater explore the subjective interpretations and legacy effects from what are considered exceptional happenings. Subsequently, analysis of security legacies could benefit from exploring how mega-event security is experienced by people who encounter such features, not as spectators, but those who observe, interact, are engaged or engage with them, within the context of their everyday environment.

### **2.3.3 Expert Mediated Security**

Mega-events occur amidst, and contribute to, the 'de-localization' of security (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 710), where a rise in global insecurity has

resulted in experts being deployed into the 'management of unease'. The paradox is that as mega-event security becomes embedded deeper into local urban areas, it is increasingly de-localized in terms of the way that it is planned and implemented. This is a trend which is subtly inferred in some of the mega-event security literature, but rarely explicitly discussed. Beck (1992: 4), notes that in the 'risk society', "technical experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose bounding premises a priori on risk discourses [resulting in a dependency upon] institutions and actors who may well be - and arguably are increasingly - alien, obscure and inaccessible to most people affected by the risks in question". This is the situation arising out of mega-event security governance, where the security field or 'security knowledge network', consists of, "state and local law enforcement bodies, public safety and intelligence agencies, international sporting federations, international governance organizations, and security consultancy and technology firms along with a host of mediating actors including event management and logistics firms, industry association, and public policy think tanks" (Boyle 2011: 169-170). Absent from such developments is the inclusion of the ordinary citizen.

An explanation for this absence is due to the exceptional nature of security as a concept and its expansion into different urban spheres post 9/11: "securitization, or rendering an issue a security problem, is a sure way to social and political mobilization and a sense of urgency to set priorities through unprecedented responses" (Bajc 2007: 1579). This urgency is further compounded at mega-events where they operate to strict time-schedules for planning and delivery. A consequence of elite levels of planning and delivery, done at pace, is that the voice of citizens are often marginalized (Fussey *et al.* 2011). Wekerle and Jackson (2005: 35-26) note that, "Anti-terrorism is such a hegemonic project that it insinuates itself into the interstices of everyday life, reframing policies relating to urban form, transport and public space".

Furthermore, mega-event security is framed within a particular risk management response - the standardised and exceptional security model is utilised on the basis of providing security against the wide range of risks associated with the event and to ensure safety for the event, athletes, spectators and wider

community. The exceptional nature of risks associated with such events, legitimise the 'top-down' approach to security, "The security-laden narrative provides a legitimised public discourse to justify the imperative to separate and control these event spaces independent from their local community" (Taylor and Toohey 2011: 3272).

Mega-events are also posited as a public good, with scaled up security identified as a necessary evil; the underlying rhetoric is that temporary sacrifices made, such as enduring the negative consequences of lockdown security, are outweighed by the long term legacy benefits often cited. In addition, Bennett and Haggerty (2011: 12), also state that security measures can sometimes be overlooked amidst the 'festivalisation' of mega-events, "Many of these measures operate away from public consciousness understandably focused on the spectacle of the competition".

The relationship between security planners and citizens at mega-events can be considered one where citizens are passive recipients of security strategies. Dissemination of knowledge to the public around various aspects of hosting mega-events is done through consultation meetings, but these have the potential to be 'tokenistic': "Such regimes have become increasingly skilled at giving the impression that their activities are democratic and hence legitimate, even where decision-making processes occur well in advance of any tokenistic consultation with wider communities of interest" (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 19). Fussey and colleagues (2011: 238) also note that even before the 2012 Olympics, London already had a record of poor public consultation regarding the implementation of security and surveillance practices, where historically, "new control and surveillance measures have been imposed across the city with little more than cursory dialogue with their likely subjects".

Problems with such a scenario are identified by Samatas (2011: 3348), who notes that the hosting of the 2008 Olympics, served to expand and intensify authoritarian security and surveillance practices in Beijing before and well after the Games, "Olympic security and surveillance had a significant post games legacy in regards to rights and freedoms, with wider implications for

democracy". The way that security issues were framed - as threats to citizens and national identity, combined with the Chinese government's intolerance to dissent and great national pride in hosting the event, meant that there was very little resistance to securitisation, "Chinese officials built public support by linking a concern for security with patriotism and classified any effort to disrupt the Games as an attack on the regime itself" (Samatas 2011: 3358). In fact, the Games security preventative plans were actually all-inclusive, seeking to mobilise the population into a huge network of security volunteers at local level. Operating under a zero-tolerance approach, 600-000 security volunteers were used to monitor visitors and citizens, "Beijing deepened grassroots security operations by promoting education on public safety and crime prevention, inciting social groups and the general public to watch their neighbourhoods, care for their home and do everything they could to participate in the Olympic Games security work. According to government rhetoric, to prevent major crime and potential terrorist attacks a harmonious social environment had to be created, in which no criminals could thrive" (Yu *et al.* 2009: 399). The zero-tolerance approach, resulted in the repression of unwanted 'elements' - individuals and social groups who do did not fit the new image that Games organisers were wanting to project from the host city.

Security at Beijing was simultaneously preventative, engaging *and* repressive, creating a scenario in which, citizens, operating under the guidance of the state, were complicit in their own securitisation. Questions on the efficiency and proportionality of security and the preservation of human rights were overlooked, in favour of statist rhetoric which served to mobilise citizens' attitudes towards an acceptance of increased security and authoritarianism.

However, in some cases, the effects of increasing authoritarianism and security creep have been resisted, particularly when mega-event security was used in more 'everyday' settings. For example, after the Games in Athens 2004, left-wing opposition parties, civil rights groups and Greek legal experts raised concerns over the legacy retention of surveillance and CCTV systems. After the end of the Paralympics, the Greek Government announced that it was to retain its security for legacy purposes and as a way of justifying the huge initial

expenditure, resulting in widespread protests from citizens. Concerns intensified further when protestors accused Olympic cameras of monitoring them and acting in breach of terms put in place by the Greek Data Protection Authority (DPA), which banned their use. The DPA eventually resigned due to the Greek government's unwillingness to back down over the monitoring of public protests and demonstrations (Samatas 2011).

A similar situation to Athens occurred in Vancouver through its controversial Project Civil City (PCC), a major initiative launched in 2006 in order to reduce visible signs of street disorder in anticipation for the 2010 Winter Olympics. The programme was notoriously divisive and in its first two years of operation, levels of homelessness, drug offences and street disorder (all issues which the project aimed to tackle and reduce) increased exponentially (The Tyee 2008). In 2009, the projects termination became the platform for the new Mayor of the city, stating that the funds could be better spent to address actual citizen needs, and in 2010 the project finally ended (Boyle and Haggerty 2011).

The example of Athens and Vancouver demonstrate how elite conceptions of security; its planning and implementation without citizen input, can go against citizens own security demands, where disproportionate allocation of financial resources to technological security can undermine their own security requirements and thresholds. Furthermore, the Vancouver example, and its demonstration of specific readings of security, as a social ordering programme, which sought to remove and displace visible signs of disorder, without attending to their root causes, shows "a maddening refusal to connect such issues to the dynamics of urban poverty, policy neglect, marginalisation and social exclusion" (Boyle and Haggerty 2011: 3198). This identifies that mega-event security does not always operate uniformly in producing a sense of security. Instead, security is selectively positioned to the benefit of particular segments of society, at the expense of the safety and subjective security of other social groups, "The accelerated and temporary investments in mega-events, often at the expense of other social goods, can have long term marginalizing effects on vulnerable populations which often find articulation in securitization strategies" (Bennett and Haggerty 2011: 32).

The merging of mega-event security with crime prevention, before and beyond the event itself, without consultation, and the cross-fertilization of such strategies between exceptional and everyday risks, is, "leading to serious questions concerning civil liberties and the extent to which Western democracies are moving towards security states and surveillance societies" (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 515).

Subsequently, mega-event security can be considered both provider and threat to security of the individual; mega-event security, relates to some of the criticisms of wider resilient planning, which can, "produce and reproduce new hierarchical arrangements which, in turn, may work to subvert some of the founding aspirations and principles of resilience logic itself" (Coaffee and Fussey 2015: 86). Instead of mega-events creating a legacy of connected, involved and integrated communities, security can ironically contribute in furthering aspects of isolation and disembedding, creating rather than closing the social distance between state and citizen.

Coaffee (2013: 3) notes that "state-citizen relationships have been irreparably altered", by the way in which post 9/11 has mobilised a range of policy and legal processes enacted under the seemingly permanent state of emergency. This relationship is worth exploring at mega-events, in particular, how the dynamics and consequences from this relationship could contribute to a heightened sense of (in)security among citizens. As stated, much of the security at mega-events and society in general, operates on a symbolic level - where specific messages and effects such as reassurance and deterrence, are assumed to occur. A problem here is that elites are "experientially remote" from the security that they plan (Loader 2002: 142). Coaffee and colleagues state that the transaction between the transmission and reception of messages are characterised by a series of paradoxes, in which messages can be "lost in translation" (Coaffee *et al.* 2009: 496). It is therefore worthwhile to explore how the governance of mega-event security and the (lack of) symbiosis between state and citizenry, has the potential to exacerbate the (mis)communication of security.

Three interlinked and contemporary aspects of mega-event security have been discussed: *symbolic security*, *urban centred security*, and *expert mediated security*. The outcome from such developments is that mega-event security is deployed deeper into the lives of ordinary citizens with the intent of 'communicating' different signals of control, deterrence and reassurance. Yet, in terms of legacy, we do not know the consequences of such an arrangement, particularly when the pursuit of objective security is often achieved without consideration to, and at the expense of, subjective dimensions of (in)security. This gives further credibility in exploiting the research gap previously identified.

So far, discussions have centred exclusively on existing mega-event security literature. However, mega-events bring together the convergence and advancement of existing trends in urban security more generally, and represent, "a magnified version of some central trends in contemporary security politics: urbanisation of security strategies, globalisation of security partnerships, techno-fixation and intense commercialisation of city space" (Aas 2008: 7) Furthermore, any discussion of security impacts or security legacy, often involves discussing a situation in which exceptional security operates within the context of the everyday. As stated, the three outlined key developments have been tentatively discussed in the existing literature, particularly with regards to how these aspects are brought together through mega-event security. The potential consequences of such developments can be better contextualised and explored with reference to wider urban security literature.

## 2.4 Security and Criminological Literature

The focus of discussion shall now turn to outlining current trends and debates in *risk society and security governance*, *urban resilient planning*, *communicative security*, *community policing*, and *issues of democratic accountability in security*. Examples will also be given to how these aspects of security relate to mega-event security and present further research gaps in the literature.

The segregation of mega-events literature and the security and criminological literature, occurs because, in academic discipline terms, the distinctions between domestic crime control and (inter)national security "remain notably distinct fields of enquiry each with their own puzzles, paradigms and preoccupations" (Loader and Percy 2012: 213). Garland (2001: 19) notes that in recent years, policy towards crime control and security has become increasingly erratic and inconsistent, whereby competing mentalities, policies and strategies towards crime control and security exist in a field "marked by tensions and contradictions". Crime control and security is considered to be in a constant state of instability and change, and there remains little agreement on the precise character and direction in which the field is heading, as Garland (2001: 138) identifies, "One strategy seeks to build institutions better suited to the conditions of late modernity, another cranks up the old powers of the state in an attempt to overcome those same conditions". The contemporary nature of the relationship between state and citizen in the governance of security can help contextualise and offer further insight into the three interrelated features of mega-event security previously identified.

#### **2.4.1 Rise of the Experts in Managing (In)security**

"Today, there is a new and urgent emphasis upon the need for security" (Garland 2001: 12). The predominant response over the past fifteen years or so has seen a 'protective' counter-terrorism mode dominate the security agenda (Innes 2014), and a re-activation of state authority and expertise, "hazards can be projected onto all the objects of daily life. And that is where they are now lodged - invisible and yet all too present - and they now call for experts as sources of answers to the questions they loudly raise" (Beck 1992: 54). The post 9/11 crime and security environment has therefore stimulated the 'clawing back by the state' (Loader and Walker 2007: 119). Where the exceptionality of hazards such as terrorism, has legitimised the authority of state experts to operate on behalf of the citizenry, with executive license given to its risk knowledge brokers who discover, gather and process the objective levels of certain risks. For example, the decisions and the rationales underpinning particular strategies occurs

through forms of 'high policing' and security, in which decisions are made based on covert and clandestine intelligence gathering and risk assessment (Brodeur 2010), shielded from public deliberation.

A contributing factor in this development, is the 'ambient' nature of insecurity in the post 9/11 era; recent 'stealth attacks' on inner city urban infrastructures: transport hubs and methods of transport London 2007; Sharm el-Sheikh 2015; football stadiums Paris 2015; shopping centres in Kenya 2013; and cafes, restaurants and other semi-public spaces in Mumbai 2008 and Marrakesh 2011, have resulted in a heightened sense of the riskiness and vulnerability of public spaces and major events, which are under threat from unidentifiable and indistinguishable sources of terror.

According to Zedner (2009), such exceptional acts, legitimise exceptional measures, but the political support for enhanced counter-terrorism strategies is not solely a product of public perceptions of the 'war on terror', but can also be considered a product of late modern-societies, where concerns about security, risk and danger dominate everyday life (Giddens 1991). Acts such as terrorism resonate with the public consciousness of insecurity, reinforcing already existent fears, such as crime and fear of crime, "the threat of crime has become a routine part of modern consciousness, a standing possibility that is constantly to be 'kept in mind' " (Garland 2001: 106).

Risks intrinsic to conditions of late modernity are characterised by a reliance on disembedded expert systems and technological fixes (Giddens 1991). In terms of exceptional security, this has allowed for a 'control creep', which is largely uncontested by the citizenry, even as security and control has expanded and deepening into aspects of everyday life, "This control creep is an artefact of how we as a society construct and react to our collective and individual fears about the dangers that we believe assail us, and the problems we face in manufacturing a sense of security in relation to them" (Innes 2001: 2).

### 2.4.2 Consequences of Dependency

Issues of security at the national and transnational level have been "removed from public concern and oversight" (Loader and Walker 2007: 199). The reactivation of expertise has meant that lay citizens now "empower and (once again) trust the police and intelligence agencies and give renewed primacy to their knowledge and expertise" (Ibid 2007: 199). Yet in the literature, there remains little critical analyses of the consequences of such a situation.

A consequence of expert mediated, and technological security fixes, is that the physical presence of security can reinforce the idea that it is indisputably required. As Wæver (1995) and also Nelken (2007) identify, the mobilisation of security in relation to exceptional threats, acts to legitimise the state to respond to them, giving an "emergency urgency" (Loader and Walker 2007: 12) to its apparatus, which bypasses any grounded, democratic process. In this way, lay citizens are seduced by the idea of security, yet distanced from any say in how security is conducted. This situation, serves to 'Heighten the power [...] with even fewer avenues for legal challenge" (Simon 2007: 272). In this sense, elites are given the power to create the dimensions of their own governance. As Boyle and Haggerty (2009: 271), state of mega-event security, "The undeniable physical presence of all these security measures helps forge a doxic common sense that intrusive security and surveillance measures represent an inevitable feature and future of urban life, foreclosing debate on the necessity, desirability, and inherent dangers in our new spectacle of security".

As Beck (1992: 58) states, the relationship between experts and citizens in relation to risk, is one where, "They [the public] only need to be stuffed full of technical details, and they will share the experts viewpoint and assessment of the technical manageability of risks, and thus their lack of risk". It is this situation which shows how risk perception can be managed and controlled by the actions of the state, where invisible risks can be dramatized, resulting in the manipulation of how such risks are perceived by lay members of the public, "Risks originate after all in knowledge and norms, and they can thus be enlarged

or reduced in knowledge and norms, or simply displaced from the screen of consciousness" (Beck 1992: 75).

Mega-event security may contribute to this situation, where planning is usually top-down, and citizen input and engagement on issues of security, in an objective and subjective sense, is often tokenistic, if at all considered. Mega-event host cities propagate a hegemonic, ideological vision of security, as operating according to common sense principles and in the interests of its people (Toohey and Taylor 2011). Problematically, the hegemonic conceptualising of security can lead to a situation identified by Shearing and Stenning (1997: 303), where, "people can be persuaded to tolerate so long as they believe that their best interests require it". Therefore, particular framings of risk and security, and rhetorics can be created through the nature of the relationship between experts and citizens in the conceptualisation of security.

These examples show how 'manufactured uncertainties' (Beck 1992), through expert-citizen relations in security governance, can result in an acceptance and positive perception of exceptional security. Such exceptionalism is posited as a necessary and incontestable feature of risk management, "For as Furedi (1997: 147-68) argues, set against the backdrop of a heightened sense of risk consciousness, 'the new etiquette' of caution, fear and danger has distanced itself from judgements about what is morally proper or acceptable, becoming transposed into discourses of safety, security and community living" (Hier 2003: 19). But furthermore, it is not considered how "Experts and lay persons [perceptions can] differ, particularly with regard to the probability and consequences of catastrophic incidents" (Slovic *et al.* 2000: 152), or how exceptional security imparts on more localised aspects of (in)security.

However, in terms of further consequences, Beck (1992) states the 'double shock' that occurs through elite conceptions of threat and security; the threat or risk itself is the first shock, while recognition that an individual has no sovereignty in assessing the risks that they are subject to, presents the second. Specific information and knowledge of risks are hard to come by, furthermore, any information gained through direct contact with experts is often, "turned inside

and outside and finally neatly presented so that it does not say what it really means" (Beck 1992: 54).

Unequal power relations can result in distorted communications of risk and security. For example, if expert conceptualisation of security are introduced without consideration to local context, nor bare any relation to locally anchored specificities, questions may be asked regarding who the security is actually for, "The security discourse therefore always begs the question: security for whom?" (Aas *et al.* 2008: 10). In this sense, reassurance and the claims of experts are also brought into question by the way that some security and risk management strategies impart disproportionately on particular activities and social groups, singling them out as security threats. For example, urban areas in anticipation of major events such as political conferences and sporting events, will aim to design out threats and 'lock down' specific parts of the city, the impact of such security measures extends beyond a focus on terrorists and criminal activity, but onto everyday activities (Rogers and Coaffee 2005). Furthermore, strategies such as security cordons and rings of steel may serve to exclude citizens, or impinge on freedoms, thus providing other negative consequences to people who are already distanced from decision making in security and from the event itself. It is this lack of sovereignty that may contribute to feelings of being stigmatised or a lack of belonging to their community (Loader 2006).

In addition, citizens, devoid of access to reliable information surrounding the exact nature of risk or resultant security responses, may rely on other channels to supplement gaps in knowledge, "The ways in which these types of cases are reported by journalists is important in framing social, cultural and political reactions to such incidents" (Innes 2004: 16). Representations of signal events via mediated forms of communication open up further issues with regards to (mis)interpretation, "it poses uncertainty to be denied, risks to be misjudged and judgements to be believed with unwarranted confidence" (Slovic 2000: 152). A problem with mediated experiences of risk assessment and ensuing security strategies, is that information flow and lack thereof, can become a significant contributing factor in the amplification of risk and (in)security (Slovic 2000). While direct personal experience can result in risk amplification, it also offers an

individual the chance to gain better perspective of the risk itself, and the social and political context in which resultant security strategies operate. For most citizens, acts such as terrorism are not experienced directly. And this opens up opportunities for the mass media to be influential in shaping people's sense of risk and security. All of these elements are present both at mega-events and in the everyday securitisation of urban environments, yet have not been studied closely.

The exceptional nature of risks such as terrorism and their resonance within a generalised culture of insecurity, particularly post 9/11, has served to remove aspects of reflexivity from expert-citizen social and political interactions in security governance. As Loader (2002: 140-1) states, " 'legitimacy', becomes self-confirming (Beetham 1991: 99) - amounting to not much more than law enforcement agencies responding to popular anxieties that are in part the consequence of in/securitization projects championed by political elites, the media or police institutions themselves" (Loader 2002: 140-1).

Paradoxically, the nature of expert/lay relations and the pervasiveness of technological mediated security responses, can create insecurity and distrust towards aspects of security and expertise, "the states concentration of coercive power makes it a guarantor of and a threat to the security of individuals" (Loader and Walker 2007: 11). The rhetorical, symbolic and experientially remote way that risk assessment and security is performed, and therefore, communicated to citizens, can create a situation, which far from promoting reassurance and subjective feelings of security, can have the opposite effect, "Security as an ideal remains an illusion and one perpetually subject to potential fracturing. Having invested in 'security' (technologies or people), its failure to secure may deal a severe blow to any trust relations which that person had sought through expert systems or personnel, ones which subsequently may be hard to repair" (Crawford 1999: 523).

## 2.5 Symbolic Communication

The populist turn of the criminal justice system (Simon 2007; Garland 2001), amidst high profile crimes or perceived failures of the state, prompts a renewed, often symbolic, emphasis on appearing to tackle these issues and positions of vulnerability, "Key legislative measures and reforms introduced in the wake of high profile signal crimes are increasingly less important in terms of what they practically accomplish, than what they can be used to symbolically communicate" (Innes 2014: 144). Responding in such a way, what has been termed an 'outrage dynamic' (Pettit 2001), can re-elevate the legitimacy of political actors and elites, "There is a suspicion that it often suits political actors to sustain their somewhat tattered legitimacy by prosecuting an endless war, in domestic matters as well as international affairs" (Sparks 2011: 318).

The unpredictable nature of risks, means that risk experts can never truly know where or when a major incident is likely to occur next. This has placed a growing importance on the symbolic aspects of security and risk management, "Hence, we have not a preventative but a symbolic industry and policy of eliminating the increase in risk" (Beck 1992: 57). Much of this symbolic aspect is achieved initially, through 'control talk' (Innes 2001), where politicians and technical experts have called for the expansion of the apparatus of control - new surveillance capacities, legal powers, and the proliferation of material and technological mediated security into the urban environment. However, in the literature there are no studies which consider how the symbolic communication in exceptional security is perceived by the public.

'Control talk', is essentially a development on the notion of 'securitization' as a 'speech act', extraordinary means are legitimised through public acceptance of the speech act and its construction of particular (vital) responses to socially defined threats (Buzan, De Wilde, Wæver 1998). An example is the way that 9/11 saw the expansion and legitimated acceptance of increased security and control into many aspects of life. The framing of terrorism and the scale of the reported threat, has led to a relinquishing of security to technical experts, "In

the post-9/11 environment, this security syndrome is also promoted by those who claim that the scale of the current threat demands that we empower and (once again) trust the police and intelligence agencies and give renewed primacy to their knowledge and expertise" (Loader and Walker 2007: 199).

In addition, amidst this generalised insecurity, states and political actors must be seen to fulfil their responsibility to the public in keeping them secure, "The problem is one of political rhetoric and appearance as much as practical effectiveness" (Garland 2001: 111). There is tacit recognition that counter-terrorism measures do not necessarily offer greater protection from exceptional threats (Graham 2004). Furthermore, while there has been decreasing recorded levels of crime in the UK, there continues to be pressures for the expansion of crime control responsibilities deeper and wider into aspects of everyday life, between state agencies, the private sector and corporations, as such, "the apparatus of control is not wholly explainable as a rationalised response to crime. It is also a symbolic and emotional response" (Innes 2001: 3). Innes, identifies the concept of 'signal crimes', to refer to the way that certain crimes and their mediated coverage by the state and media outlets, serves to connotatively and denotatively signal to society that these problems require exceptional measures, "Such crimes symbolically display the nature of a problem and establish a need in the popular psyche for something to be done" (Innes 2001: 3).

### **2.5.1 Consequences for Communication**

The emphasis on the symbolic responses, assumes that experts are fully in control over the risk perceptions of citizens, and furthermore, that the messages that risk identification and resultant security inherently contain are received in the way originally intended. Despite the potential for hijacking of perceptions and states of anxiety for various purposes, there is the implicit assumption that both are on the same (albeit, altered) wavelength. This identifies a simplistic process of communication between sender (expert) and receiver (citizen).

However, in the existing security literature, there remains little consideration for the (mis)communication of security.

A lack of information on the part of receiver can result in ambivalent meaning in the communication of security. For example, Manchester's hosting of the 2006 annual Labour Party Conference is an example of how a lack in dialogue between experts and citizens over security measures can increase a sense of fear among the public: in the build up to the conference a series of police raids, based on intelligence regarding supposed bomb plots against Old Trafford stadium, were made in surrounding communities. This story was hijacked by the media and resulting in a growing list of potential targets and anxiety among the public. The story was in fact false, but served to show how particular imaginations over risk and security operations can take hold when adequate or accurate knowledge is not publically available (Coaffee and Rogers 2008), in this sense - displays of overt security and control served to instil a sense of risk and vulnerability. And so, the unequal access to knowledge and information, is one way in which the communication of risk and security can become distorted, as Kaspersen *et al.* (2000: 241) state, "Attributes of information that may influence the social amplification are volume, the degree to which information is disputed, the extent of dramatization and the symbolic connotations of the information".

Furthermore, Schneider (1999: 348) identifies that, "Communicative acts contain language, assumptions, and metaphors, that by conveying meaning, affect what people do. These assumptions and meanings often carry power relations within them. In turn, the way communicative acts are created and used either helps to sustain or challenge power relations". However, the effects of symbolic communication in security on how this situation reaffirms the actions of security providers or presents challenges to them, has not been discussed, nor has the pervasiveness of technological mediated security responses been studied in terms of how this can create the conditions for an awakening of insecurity and distrust towards aspects of security and expertise, and as Crawford (1999: 523) outlines, "Having invested in 'security' (technologies or people), its failure to secure may deal a severe blow to any trust relations which that person had sought through expert systems or personnel, ones which subsequently may be

hard to repair". In addition, amidst the intensification of security post 9/11, symbolic reactions should not be considered as increasing the efficacy of security, but are instead 'signs of ritual against the unknown' (Bigo 2006: 52). With each successive mega-event and each non-event (the non-actualisation of risks), or the distant and unrelated actualisation of these, security is increased, with no option of going back. It is this 'cosmetics of risk' (Beck 1992) which has created the symbolic industry of eliminating risk, through signs of the management of risk. In other words, the symbolic communication of security between experts and citizens, a process in which citizens are disembedded, has the potential to create different cycles of (in)security.

## 2.6 Mixed Messages: Community Policing and Empowerment

Within the wider security and crime control literature, it would seem that two tangled and contradictory directions have been occurring simultaneously, a result of 'deeply conflicted' policy developments that Garland (2001) speaks of. As just outlined, one perspective is that the conditions of late-modernity and the (in)security climate post 9/11, has seen a reactivation of professional and bureaucratic, state-led forms of expertise and specialists. The other perspective, common in criminological and security governance literature, states that late modernity has contributed to the move from "government to governance" (Loader 2000: 330), represented by dispersed arrangements and the inclusion of preventative partnerships occurring 'beyond the state apparatus' (Garland 1996: 451). The co-existence of two dualistic tendencies and conflicting mentalities can have a number of implications for how particular policies are both 'played out' and perceived by the public.

Crawford (1997), Garland (2001) and Johnston and Shearing (2003) claim that there has been a decline in sovereign state monopoly and that a number of 'transformations' (Jones and Newburn 2002; Garland 1996) have taken place in security, marked by the move towards more dispersed and indirect forms of governance. As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 25) state, "trends can be discerned

in recent years whereby executive responsibility for the governance of security is less likely than before to be concentrated within the hands of professional, expert public officials employed by the state or some politically defined segment of it". By outlining examples of changes in security governance and policing that have been happening, "at an arm's length from the state" (Crawford 1997: 93), a contrasting narrative to the one previously outlined, is identified as running concurrent to it, yet it remains unknown how these two contrasting processes; sequestering and empowerment, the global and the local, exceptional and the everyday, interact, or what effect it has on the communication of security at the local level.

The move towards dispersed forms of governance, is embodied by a series of control theories (situational control, social control, self-control) that have come to the fore since the 1980s - termed the 'criminologies of everyday life' (Garland 2001). These control theories, borne out of the increasing rate of recorded crime and normalisation of crime as a taken for granted aspect of daily life, offered a shift in theoretical perspective upon which crime control policy was based. In taking the approach that crime occurs when certain social situations lack effective forms of social or situational control, there is the implicit message that "the state alone is not, and cannot be, responsible for preventing and controlling crime" (Garland 1996: 453). This has been said to have resulted in a changing and dispersing of crime control towards multi-agency or non-state mechanisms (Crawford 2008, Johnston and Shearing 2003). For example, urban environments, leisure spaces, shopping centres, housing can all be managed in order to reduce opportunities for crime. It has resulted in the implementation of a whole new crime control infrastructure based around situational and social crime prevention at the local level; community safety, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), neighbourhood watch schemes, amongst many others. By focussing on the manipulation of the physical environment and reducing opportunities for crime, it expands crime control beyond the sole remit of the criminal justice state, "The criminal justice becomes but one tool in an array of preventative activities undertaken by the community, local authorities, and private enterprise" (Zedner 2009: 76-7).

At the sub-national level, legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act in the United Kingdom has created forms of 'third party policing' (Wood and Shearing 2007), putting in place requirements for joined up, partnership approaches to crime and disorder, "Third-party policing is initiated by a range of actors including but not limited to the police, prosecutors, government agencies, regulatory agencies, community groups, businesses and even citizens" (Ibid 2007: 16). Third party policing can represent an example of policing *through* government when such parties are, "enlisted by government, but provided by others" (Loader 2000: 327). For example, the police often hire private security personnel to assist with the policing at football matches or large sporting events. Yet, little is known in terms of how these non-state actors and agencies are perceived by the public, in terms of how they communicate their roles, and the legitimacy that is afforded to them.

Closely related, is the point that the new security governance has seen an enhanced role and privileging of lay-citizens and commercial agents, while professional experts, "act at a distance - to motivate, inform, and assist other, informal, preventers (such as families, teachers or site managers)" (Ekblom 1998 cited in Johnston and Shearing 2003: 123). The two prominent examples Johnston and Shearing (2003) give of this move towards lay-involvement is 'Restorative Justice' and 'Neighbourhood Wardens'. These examples of 'citizen led' policing are representative of policing *below* government (Loader 2000; Jones 2012), "Signifying a new willingness on the part of citizens to engage in the governance of security 'from below' " (Jones 2012). These policy features, attempt to alleviate insecurity, reduce harm and promote crime control 'from the bottom up', reaching out beyond traditional criminal justice organisations such as the police, while enlisting commercial actors, communities and individuals into the expanding infrastructures of crime control (Crawford 1998).

However, the public police are the one constant figure, amidst ever changing shifts in mentalities and strategies towards crime control and security. The move towards forms of 'community policing' as evident in the last few decades, has been the primary way in which the police and the criminal justice system have attempted to reassert their legitimacy in the 'networked' governance of security,

"Community policing is an umbrella term describing a broad 'family' of initiatives through which the police have sought to re-invent themselves and, by so doing, keep control of the steering of security governance while broadening the range of capacities, agents and knowledges engaged in its rowing" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 74). Wood and Shearing (2007) describe the different 'waves' of change in policing . This includes: 1. Policing as community-based; 2. Policing as solving problems; 3. The influence of neo-liberalism; 4. Policing as Restorative Justice; 5. Policing as fixing broken windows; 6. Policing as intelligence work; and lastly, 6. Policing as reassurance. The current iteration of 'reassurance policing', attempts to close 'social distance' and a 'reassurance gap', demonstrating a reflexive prioritisation towards citizens mentalities, in particular their fears and insecurities.

'Reassurance' is a subjective state influenced by perceptions of safety, a person's sense of order, and fear of crime (Millie 2014). Reassurance policing is closely aligned with the traditional iterations of community policing as security discourse e.g. 'community policing', 'community-oriented policing' and 'neighbourhood policing' (Millie 2014). It seeks to reconnect communities into the policing agenda by utilising community intelligence about the drivers of neighbourhood (in)security. This style of policing is influenced firstly by the notion that the visual and symbolic power of police officers can serve important functions, "the simple function of citizen reassurance-the feeling of security and safety that a citizen experiences when he sees a police officer or police patrol car nearby" (Bahn 1974: 340). Similarly, Povey's (2001) inspired formulation for reassurance identifies the *visibility*, *accessibility* and *familiarity* of the police in contributing to public reassurance.

Reassurance policing is underpinned by social semiotic theory, in particular the 'signal crimes perspective' (Innes and Fielding 2002). Police work is suffused with signs - communicating different signs to different audiences, blending aspects of deterrence, control and suppression with safety and security. By targeting the particular things which act as signals - the sources of unease in a neighbourhood, the police can decrease anxiety and increase levels of reassurance. Therefore, co-operation and co-production between police, other relevant actors and

citizens is crucial in identifying the sources of neighbourhood insecurity, "In effect, developing community intelligence is enacted in order to construct a detailed knowledge base about the contours of the problems and issues that are negatively impacting upon neighbourhood security" (Innes and Roberts 2008: 242).

In providing reassurance, the police use various 'control signals' (Innes 2004) to counteract the negative effects of signal crimes and disorders. Control signals, "act of formal or informal social control that functions to communicate a message about the presence or absence of effective security mechanisms" (Innes 2004: viii). These can be intentionally or unintentionally produced by the sender, and equally, can have positive or negative effects. Criticisms of the control signals concept and its underlying principles, can be sourced both directly (see Loader 2006; Millie 2010, 2012; Barker 2013) and indirectly within the security literature (see Davis 1990, Loader and Walker 2007, Zedner 2009, Coaffee 2009, Jones 2012). The crux of those criticisms can be summarised by three points: firstly, it is problematic to tackle insecurity with security; because security presumes the existence of a risk, therefore it has the ability to raise security consciousness. Second, control signals are conceived of as contributing to a democratic politics of security - yet, they often manifest within an asymmetrical power relationship, in which communication is restricted to a one-sided dialogue. Information is sequestered by experts and withheld from anxious individuals, who have to make sense of security solely through the prism of its visibility. Third, control signals are too focussed on the material aspects of security and feeling secure, in a shallow sense. As such, they ignore the deeper ontological aspects of feeling secure, and how security can influence a sense of belonging within a political community.

Within the security literature it has been identified by some key writers in the field (Sparks 1992; Crawford 2002; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Loader 2006; Loader and Walker 2007) that a sense of security derives from more than just an individual's proximity to risk and control measures such as CCTV or policing. Instead, there are diverse sources of security which are altogether unrelated to material security and the presence or absence of objective risk (Johnston and

Shearing 2003:1). "The 'surfaces' of physical security are connected to the 'depths' of ontological security (Loader and Walker 2007: 18). Loader (2006: 204) has so far provided the most comprehensive review of this linkage. Taking this idea and relating it to police work, Loader outlines the position that "policing is a social institution whose routine ordering and cultural work communicates authoritative meanings to individuals and groups about who they are, about whether their voices are heard and claims recognised, and about where and in what ways they belong". By realising this association, it becomes possible that policing and social control can communicate more than material issues, but can affect the sense of (ontological) security which originates from stable membership within a political community, and that these control signals are "a producer of significant messages about the kind of place that community is or aspires to be" (Loader 2006: 211). Mega-events are ideally placed to examine the relationship between different control signals, and between material and ontological security, especially where exceptional security is deployed amidst a residential community setting.

As Innes (2014) identifies, studies of social control often centre around their behavioural effects, mainly around simplistic notions of deterrence resulting from displacement. Similarly, there is a myriad of studies looking at the effects of social control in bounded settings such as the prison, but the findings and empirical value from these are rarely applicable or transferable to the outside world, which, beyond any doubt, is the place where the majority of acts of social control take place. Furthermore, control signals have only been discussed by Innes in relation to ordinary acts of policing, as responding to signal crimes, and does not take into account different control signals emitted by various others aspects of security, or exceptional forms of it.

### **2.6.1 Reassurance Policing: Bottom-Up or Top-Down**

In practice, it has been said that the police have struggled to implement the key 'bottom up' feature of the reassurance approach, to the extent that Millie (2010) has asked 'whatever happened to reassurance policing?'. In answering this

question Millie notes that reassurance is a part of British Policing, but not to the extent it could be. In particular, it would seem that the community reflexive drive has been forgotten "Minority views are seldom heard and those given a 'signal crime' badge can be heavily policed" (Millie 2010: 231). Within forms of community policing, there exists further manifestations of the ambivalent nature of criminal justice policy. For example, Loader (2006) notes that two contrasting developments are occurring within the policing landscape; firstly, there are the examples of governments and policing responding to demands for policing which promotes equity and social justice and the inclusion of minority and disadvantaged groups. Such approaches have taken on added salience in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7, amidst security and identity construction, perceived institutional racism and the way that governments are linking aspects of extremism to issues of integration and disadvantage, "The result has been a move to address and improve the historically tense relations between the police and disadvantaged groups, albeit one that remains halting, uneven and deeply contested" (Ibid 2006: 204). On the other side there have been a body of policing strategies routinely deployed to reduce fear of crime and increase feelings of security through policing which utilises, "coercive capacity as a central means to managing risk" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 53). These are manifested in aggressive crackdowns on particular signs of crime and disorder as in 'broken windows' or 'zero tolerance' approaches. The commonalities within both sides of policing is their sharing of, "an express or implied commitment to raising overall numbers of policing operatives (whether employed by the police, the local state, or the private sector), coupled with a conception of the policing purpose that is expansive, proactive and visible" (Loader 2006: 205). Mega-events present a good example where tensions between community reassurance and coercive crackdowns and management of risk, coexist, and where increases in policing and security is prioritised. This presents an opportunity to look at the effects of pervasive security within this context.

This issue is particularly important when considering that in preparation for a mega-event, everyday forms of crime prevention sit alongside the reactivation and prioritisation of state expertise in matters of risk and security. And it remains to be seen how the ambitions and efficacy of community reassurance is

undercut by this process. As Sir Ian Blair recognised, the contemporary, post 9/11 and 7/7 era has widened the mandate of ordinary, local police to address issues of serious crime and terrorism, "National security depends on neighbourhood security" (BBC 2005). This raises the question of how the goals of community policing and empowerment, are affected at the interface between neighbourhood and national security. As Innes states, "it remains to be seen whether the values and ideals of community policing and its affiliated approaches can be sustained in an environment where there is a pronounced political impetus to create a harsh environment for those who are perceived to threaten national security" (Innes 2006: 98). Again, this relationship has not been covered in the literature, but a study of mega-event security within a residential community setting, provides a prime opportunity to investigate the interface between neighbourhood and national security.

## 2.7 Back to the Experts: The Rise of Urban Resilience

According to Loader and Percy (2012: 213) "Terrorism is the *sine qua non* exemplar of the erosion of the war/crime divide". This new era of control and security, amidst threats to national security, has created a merging of police and military tactics. Under an overarching precautionary logic, security has become more concerned with crime, at the same time as crime has become concerned with issues of (in)security. This represents a "significant change in the ways in which those same officials operate and in the overarching rationale within which their decision making now occurs" (Zedner 2007: 73). The 'war on terrorism' that has intensified in recent years, may, "ratify the skew toward security and the "culture of control" (Garland 2001), even as it covers up the memory of that war on crime" (Simon 2007: 261).

This situation is most evident through the rise of urban resilience. As a concept, it integrates a range of security and crime control challenges, acting as an 'organising metaphor' for the expansion of the national security framework deeper into the civic realm, "Since the early 2000s, the so-called 'resilience turn'

(Coaffee 2013) has seen ideas, discourses and logics of resilience embedded in an array of social and urban policy and practice at a range of spatial scales, driven by an overarching requirement to secure the future from disruptive challenges, threats and events (Coaffee 2010; Walker and Cooper 2011)" (Coaffee and Fussey 2015: 87). The fluid and diverse nature of potential risks for cities, which increasingly manifest themselves at the local level, called for a reform of emergency preparedness towards one of resilience and the need for "anticipatory or pre-emptive planning; holistic hazard management; and integrated governance or response" (Coaffee 2013: 243).

Subsequently, many cities have undergone significant changes in "morphology and management" in relation to risk (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 101). The logics of resilience are embedded into a range of policies, drawing on a wide range of security infrastructures, organizations and approaches. In this sense, security is becoming more permanently embedded, more pervasive and all-encompassing under the "palatable aegis" (Coaffee and Fussey 2015: 90) of resilience. The geopolitical deterritorialisation of risk and growth in security-driven resilience creates linkages between national security and domestic crime prevention, and in doing so, "generates a range of governmental, scaling and coercive implications" (Ibid 2015: 89). And as Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006: 504) state, "There appears to be an ongoing rescaling and reterritorialisation of security as both a concept and a practice, with security more focused on the civic, urban, domestic and personal realms; in essence, security is coming home".

The shift towards resilience has been facilitated by four key developments, as outlined by Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006) and Coaffee and Rogers (2008), which are said to have surged in popularity post 9/11. Firstly; the correlations between aspects of territorial closure with perceived elevated safety and security in semi-public spaces; shopping centres, urban regeneration developments, and business districts utilise forms of security infused architectural design which fragments these sanctified zones from the remaining topography. Equally, the linking of security with economic development is

posited as an essential aspect in place promotion and global image for the entrepreneurial city (Raco 2003).

Secondly, and similarly, political conferences, music festivals and sporting events increasingly seek to secure such spaces through a temporary rebordering of the city and the physical and symbolic sealing and lockdown of the spaces in which these events occur. The prominence of such techniques in conjunction with large scale events has become common securitisation practice, where 'spectacular events are also spectacular targets' (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 513). For example, Manchester's successful bid to host the 2002 Commonwealth Games, saw the police, military and security services join forces to provide an overarching security operation which was in place many months before the Games. In addition, the conceptual lessons from securing the event were "fed back into the evolving resilient planning structures at local and regional government levels" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 108), providing the necessary security acumen, which contributed towards the city's ability to attract major events such as the 2003 European Champions League final and political party conferences in 2004 and 2006. The 2004 spring Labour conference, in the wake of the Madrid train bombings, resulted in a 'ring of steel' cordon, guarded by armed police, across parts of the city. While, the 2006 annual Labour conference drew on this approach creating a form of 'island security' (Coaffee and Rogers 2008).

Third, there has been moves towards more networked approaches in emergency contingency planning, such as the deployment of military personnel into the civic realm and the coordination/cooperation between different emergency services in responding to particular issues, therefore increasing the 'bouncebackability' to risks. For example, in December 2015 the armed forces were deployed in Cumbria to help build flood defences and work with police, ambulance and fire and rescue teams (Pidd, Meikle, Glover 2015), "Most institutions are reviewing and re-evaluating individual risk assessments in order to become more resilient and create more effective emergency planning, including locally and regionally focused strategic resilience partnerships, and the

adoption of military threat-response tactics and technologies" (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 508).

Fourthly, and more recently, there has been recognition of the importance that 'community resilience' can play in supporting broader institutional security strategies, the idea that a better informed public can lessen the impact of an emergency on a community. For example, the UK governments 2004 'Preparing for Emergencies' scheme saw the distribution of a booklet advising citizens on how to respond in the event of a major incident such as terrorism. However, unlike the forms of RP described earlier, resilience strategies such as these have tended to treat the citizen as a "passive recipient of information rather than an active participant in the process that appears dominated by a specialist consortium of experts" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 105).

The pursuit of resilience enhances the role of the state, rather than diminishes it. As Coaffee and Rogers (2008: 104) state, resilience is essentially a "...professional and technical response developed by 'experts' and critically without any public debate". Similarly, a greater role is being given agents of security within the city planning process; police, private security, risk assessors, specialist CPTED planners, and security experts all have a louder voice in the new resilient urban city, "In the post-September-11 era, these expert actors are once again playing a significant role in the mediation of space and the making of places within major cities" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 112-113).

This anti-democratic condition, until very recently, was the dominant way in which resilience manifested itself. However, more consistent with the 'responsibilizing' tendencies of recent criminal justice policy (Garland 1996), there has been the move towards creating '*community resilience*', "increased attention is now being paid to how individuals and a broad range of local communities might become more responsible for their own risk management" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 102). However, this format operates as a form of "Type One co-production" (Innes 2014: 116) in which citizens are subordinate to the instructions and demands of experts. For example, the successive introductions of various public information and counter-terrorism information

campaigns such as the Metropolitan Police's *'if you suspect it, report it'* and Transport London's *'it's all up to us'*, which ask citizens to take greater awareness and responsibility in responding to situations of suspicion.

However, in devolving national security strategies deeper into the local environment, a greater onus was placed on how these features blend within the existing urban fabric. Underlying this principle was recognition of the visual impact of counter terrorism features in 'transmitting' a range of symbolic messages. Therefore, the way in which these features are 'received' by the public and other observers can be mediated through the spectrum of their (in)visibility (Coaffee *et al.* 2009). The challenge for urban planners is to integrate security in ways that were aesthetically acceptable and unobtrusive, but at the same time, communicate that the area is under control, "The public is 'told' that a place can be used in safety, while would-be perpetrators are 'told' that their malign intent is likely to be in vain or at least will require a significant degree of effort" (Ibid 2009: 496). However, as Boddy (2007) recognises, there is a fine line between creating an 'architecture of reassurance' and 'architecture of dis-assurance'; attempts to provide security at the local level, which at the same time contends with state-focused approaches towards national security, can create tensions in the way that different sets of concerns are prioritised. Mega-event security presents a good example of security which is intended to both deter and reassure, and it remains to be seen whether lay citizens can distinguish the reassurance effect from visible and overt security.

### **2.7.1 Consequences for Subjective Interpretations of Security**

Resilience, harbours a number of contradictions in its practice, "The scalar practices of resilience are thus complicated and fluid and it is therefore not surprising that as it has grown in scope and usage 'resilience' has necessarily harboured internal tensions and contradictions" (Coaffee and Fussey 2015: 95). At best, resilient policy developments work concurrently and contradictory with reassurance policing practices. However, increasingly, the police and non-state agencies are, it seems, trying to provide reassurance *through* resilience itself. In

which, the two overarching ambitions and principles have collapsed into one another. Localised and community centred reassurance programmes have become a bolt-on extra to the national security concerns of resilience. Evidence of this is the way that police officers operate at train stations, airports, and mega-events, whereby reassurance is presumed, through displays of symbolic resilience. Similarly, the distribution of anti-terror pamphlets to every home in Britain (Barkham 2004), represented the prioritisation of exceptional threats as the main point of reference between police and citizens.

The mixing of exceptional resilient practices amidst the ongoing drives of community policing, presents a juxtaposition which presents various challenges which remain under researched within the literature. If so much security is about communicating to its various audiences, then questions remain over how communication is affected by the mixed and contradictory signals between crime prevention and counter terrorism; between integrated military and police responses and between signals which attempt to balance deterrence with reassurance. As Boddy (2007) identifies, the contextual complexity in which signals are created creates opportunities for them to be 'lost in translation'.

Furthermore, the relationship between security programmes and the experiences of local citizens is further complicated when considering the temporal nature of mega-event security; where perceptions of the present are shaped by experiences of the past and also expectations of the future. Millie and Herrington (2005) state that reassurance policing ought to be a 'golden thread' which runs through all aspects of policing and should not be treated as a 'bolt on extra', but the melding of reassurance and deterrence at mega-events, will likely skew policing towards prioritisation the latter. Furthermore, amidst a plethora of state and non-state security networks, it remains to be seen how divergent levels of perceived legitimacy and prestige from the public affect how different security providers communicate these functions. Finally, the imposition of material security may affect or undermine more organic forms of security within a residential setting. All of these issues deserve further investigation.

## 2.8 Governance: the Normative Position of the State in Security Governance

Amidst the dualistic and concurrent tendencies of the empowerment of state expertise in managing (in)security, alongside community empowerment and engagement in issues of crime control, the issue of the best position for the state in the governance of such issues is raised. Governance networks influence and dictate the relationship between state and citizen, and therefore are a contributing factor in creating social distance between them. It is this social distance which results in an overreliance on the symbolic communication of security.

The normative position of the state in relation to other security networks has been debated and discussed through two competing perspectives of *nodal governance* (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and *anchored pluralism* (Loader and Walker 2007). As Crawford (1999: 291) identifies, "The important question for consideration, is how to build the institutions and frameworks in which to negotiate conflict in a socially constructive manner, and to seek the connections which link, rather than separate, people and groups". In light of this, the question remains, should the state relinquish its authority and privileged position and situated itself horizontally amidst the plurality of actors that exist in neo-liberal societies, or should it continue to sit atop of them, orchestrating them from afar. And furthermore, how do these perspectives influence the relationship between state and citizen and subsequently, the communicative process in security.

Both questions fall under the claims of two competing perspectives for a better conceptualisation of security: 'Nodal Governance' (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007) and 'Anchored Pluralism' (Loader and Walker 2007).

Johnston and Shearing (2003: 144), identify that security governance has been dispersed across state, business, non-government and voluntary sectors. The task of governing, is therefore diffused amongst this constellation of networks, with the state being merely "...but one player - albeit an important one - in a

complex network of governing agencies". According to this perspective, the field of security governance consists of a variety of 'nodes'. A node is a site of "knowledge, capacity and resources [...] it need not be a formally constituted or legally recognised entity [...] a street gang can be a node, as can a police station..." (Wood and Shearing 2007: 27). These agencies sit together horizontally in which no one, is 'given conceptual priority' (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 147). Nodes relate to each other in a variety of ways, and within networks some dominant nodes can exist. Subsequently, security governance is still constitutive of 'weak' and 'strong' actors (Drahos 2000). However, given the overall horizontal basis, the claims or instructions of the dominant one can be accepted or rejected by other nodes (Hermer *et al.* 2005).

The normative claims in such an arrangement are that security is removed from its elitist conception, that local communities and their knowledge are important, "Where the old paradigm seeks to mobilise specialist, often force-based, expertise, the new one seeks to mobilise and integrate a wide spectrum of resources, placing particular emphasis on local knowledge and capacity as a key ingredient in any governance programme" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 16). For example, Shearing and Wood (2000; 2003) and Shearing and Johnston (2005) have identified situation in which weak actors and communities have concentrated their knowledge and resources to govern their own security. Weak actors have managed to utilise their resources in ways such as 'peace committees' (Johnston and Shearing 2003), which give them a "bargaining chip in negotiating with the police" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 102), for example. The subsequent relationship to the police being one of partnership, with an equal vying for (bottom up) governance objectives. Through local capacity building, community governance can enhance democratic control over the ways in which security is conducted. Braithwaite (2004) identifies the privileged position of strong actors is maintained through their 'carrying of big sticks', i.e. their symbolic force such as guns or overt displays of security. Weak actors can counter this power by creating community forums for example, utilising the idea of strength in numbers, where many weak actors combine to form a big actor, they can therefore begin to challenge some executive decisions taken on their behalf. For example, community nodes have valuable information of their own,

at a time when standardised global security is increasingly transferred into diverse localities, there can be a shifting in what constitutes 'expertise', "The social engineers of statist diplomacy don't have enough local knowledge to understand the real conflicts that are touching people's lives" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 86), similarly, they lack knowledge of the 'social situational questions' (Beck 1992: 5) of how their the objects of their expertise play out on the ground, "weak actors can, of course, use their situated knowledge to promote their own agendas" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 112).

In this way, nodal governance offers a normative outlook for how 'weak actors' in security governance can direct the steering and provision of security towards locally tailored issues. They give 'voice' and opportunity for disputes to be resolved, and thus enhance the bargaining potential of weak actors to re-define the political security terrain away from traditional state dominated, top down agendas, "a theory of nodal governance offers new insights into how democracy might be enhanced and participation facilitated" (Burris *et al.* 2004: 28). Mega-events incorporate complex governance strategies, involving a range of state and non-state actors and agencies into the planning and delivery of security operations. The dispersed form of governance seen at mega-events such as the London 2012 Olympics, has been identified by Fussey *et al.* (2011: 195) as a form of nodal governance or 'nodal security'. Yet while the governance arrangements have been outlined in the mega-event literature, there remains little analysis into the normative claims of these arrangements as identified through the wider security literature. Subsequently, the governance arrangements at mega-events, and the impacts (both positive and negative) that derive from such arrangements, remains under researched. Nodal governance, in its true sense, as outlined by Johnston and Shearing (2003: 140), suggests that the "mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental", in how it plays out. In this sense, the prioritisation of local knowledge, should in theory, allow for better communication between sender and receiver in security, since any security strategies are developed in cooperation with local input. However, it remains to be seen whether this bottom up aspect of security governance can be sustained amidst exceptional, counter-terror security.

Meanwhile, as an alternative, Loader and Walker (2007) have developed the idea of 'anchored pluralism', arguing for the centralisation of the state as a 'necessary virtue', in operating as the "primary motors of common action and sources of institutional initiative" (Ibid 2007: 264). Anchored pluralism creates a case for the state as a meta-regulator; amidst the neo-liberal creation of new markets, the state ought to act as 'auspices', whilst devolving its 'provisions' to the market. Loader and Walker identify that within the nodal conception of governance, there is the hinting of the idea that states are threats to the liberty and democracy of its citizens through their potential to: 'meddle' - overriding local and individual capacities of governing their own affairs; to act partisanly - in sustaining the interests of powerful political elites and dominant hegemonic orders and asymmetries of power; to act as cultural monolith - enforcing particular ideals around civility, legitimising the disproportionate policing of those 'others' considered on the 'outside' (Loader and Walker 2007: 112) of the dominant culture that policing and security contributes to; and ultimately to act as an idiot - lacking the necessary situational and contextual knowledge to properly understand the issues which affect people in a diverse set of localities.

However, the state still has a positive influence to make - particularly in maintaining and guaranteeing the 'thick' public good of security; to prevent the benefits of security being directed towards those with the 'loudest voices and largest pockets', something which Johnston and Shearing (2003: 149) admit has been the case, "most forms of 'local capacity governance' - notably those associated with the emergence of mass private property and the growth of gated communities - have favoured the wealthy rather than the poor and, by doing so, have given nodal governance a distinctly 'feudal' resonance". Nodal governance has the potential to create distinctions between the 'have' and the 'have nots' in security delivery and coverage. Loader and Walker (2007) stress that the right to security, like health care, water and education, should be a basic social good. And furthermore, the sharing of security as a common social good contributes to ones sense of membership in the social environment, which in turn, raises thresholds of vulnerability and ontological security.

Furthermore, the state is best placed to identify, mobilise, allocate, deliberate and regulate, provide and coordinate the governance of security. As Crawford (2006), identifies, the state has a unique position in terms of its claims to legitimacy and authority, the symbolic power it holds, financial backing it can pool together, and the tactical and material resources at its disposal. As such, there is a 'depth', 'flexibility' and 'security' to state resources (Loader and Walker 2007: 184). However, amidst the plurality of different actors, the privileged position of the state is not necessarily a monopoly, "we can and must divorce pedigree from priority" (Ibid 2007: 189).

Loader and Walker (2007) further identify four pathologies of modern security, showing how the empirical aspects of dispersal and fragmentation, as theorised by Johnston and Shearing (2003), have not coincided with any tangible improvements in security delivery. These pathologies each contributing to 'vicious circles' of (in)security, which "give security its pervasive, uncivil forms, which stands as obstacles to realizing the benefits of security as a thick public good" (Loader and Walker 2007: 197). Firstly, 'paternalism' - the elevation of professional expertise and authority, of not only the state but also other security agencies who possess the relevant knowledge base on risks and crime to elevate themselves above lay citizens with a given 'hegemonic status'. Paternalism, although a by-product in the drive towards community policing and outsourcing of duopolies, has increased in the post 9/11 era, resulting in the reassertion of the importance 'old state agencies' (Ibid 2007: 199) such as the police and intelligence services, while new forms of expertise have been created through these, such as risk management experts. Paternalism gives authority and legitimacy for the state to act on the citizens behalf, giving licence to 'meddle' deeper into citizens' everyday activities. Paternalism therefore counteracts some of the democratic claims that dispersal promises, "by seeking to act in the interests of citizens who cannot thereby be treated as full partners in dialogue" (Loader and Walker 2007: 200).

Second, 'consumerism' - the trends towards prioritising community voice in policing, such as 'ambient policing' practices of community and reassurance policing, has seen the adoption of market logics within the state, outlining

communities as consumers and state agencies as providers, "the state's task is to take steps to discover people's preferences and then seek to meet demands for order" (Loader and Walker 2007: 201). It is this condition which enables the state to 'act out', aligning itself with lay sentiments, even when those may be worryingly polemic and result in the disproportionate targeting of 'others'. Consumerism assumes the prioritisation of citizens' voice as if it were always the correct one. The knock on effect of penal populism, for Loader (2006), is that it misconstrues the role of the police as disproportionately being focused on material aspects of security - 'how safe am I?', while overriding their potential to contribute to the narrower, but deeper, definition of 'who am I?', the result is that visible security is seen as counteraction to material insecurity, making security a pervasive aspect of community life.

Third, 'authoritarianism' - the pervasiveness of security, as it engulfs more aspects of everyday life, is that society becomes governed through security; the presence of perennial risk, and insecurity are seen in relation to the panacea of material security. Security takes on a colonizing 'everywhereness', resulting in a cyclical process of insecurity/security, which in turn creates demand for further security to quell the very insecurity it created, "Authoritarianism, in short, calls forth an over-investment in, and over-identification with, the coercive capabilities of the state" (Loader and Walker 2007: 208), which dilutes the pursuit of civil rights and basic freedoms, by subverting these issues to the bigger (prioritising) picture of tackling insecurity.

Lastly, 'fragmentation' - refers to the idea of the residualisation of the state as a security actor, among many. In weak and failing states, where these cannot alone guarantee the safety of all its people, there is then the stimulus for some citizens to look for their own alternative methods of securitisation and solutions to risk and insecurity. As these individuals (usually the wealthy) retreat into their 'fortified enclaves' (Davis 1990), they become less willing to participate in matters concerning the social good of security, and its pursuit as a collective project, "The security and forms of political freedom, associated with the sense of belonging to, and identification with, a political community is thereby placed into jeopardy" (Loader and Walker 2007: 210).

In outlining these vicious cycles of modern security, and rejecting some of the democracy enabling claims of nodal governance, the necessity of the state is brought back under consideration; a political authority which is able to exert vertical control and regulation over the plurality of actors below it. In this view, Loader and Walker (2007) stress that security can be 'civilized' through the prioritisation of a state directed politics of *resources, recognition, rights* and *reasons*. The state acts as anchor within a pluralistic setting, licensing and regulating the allocation of resources to those agencies below. In terms of *resources*, the state should take priority in the allocation and constraints placed on security.

For example, ensuring that resources are allocated evenly and not disproportionately in ways that reproduce inequality. In addition, it should act to constrain the financially motivated tendency for security providers to respond to demands for more security within a consumer provider model, and instead look at ways of re-directing these demands towards a more reflexive and coherent (public good) strategy. In this way the state acts as regulator in the pursuit of security utilising "its power to fund, to contract, to license, to set conditions" (Loader and Walker 2007: 219) for those in or entering the market, 'fencing them in' around the state's overarching directive of 'solidaristic security practice'.

*Recognition*, cites the need for a conversation regarding the competing claims of security delivery and experience. All too often, the voices of minorities are ignored or remain unheard within security deliberation, even as they are affected by these very decisions. The aim is restructure citizens as both addressee and author. Recognition, therefore, limits the states stance as idiot, through its inclusion of diverse and local experiences of security. Through conversation and contestation, the vicious cycles resulting from blanket, top down, security responses can be broken.

*Rights*, can play an important role in security, by providing a counterbalance the rights dis-regarding emergency urgency surrounding securitisation. Often, in the name of security, basic freedoms and human rights become secondary

considerations. By implementing legal guarantees for the protection of rights, a check is placed on the coercive potential of the state, the unequal distribution and policing by non-state agencies, at the same time as it ensures the basic rights to recognition are met. According to this perspective, Loader and Walker (2007) depart from the conventional idea that security acts in opposition to rights, and instead identify that rights should operate alongside security as a basic prerequisite for its delivery.

Lastly, they stress the importance of *reasons*, that security ultimately should have valid, level headed and politically debated reasons behind its use. While a politics of recognition promotes the inclusion of public deliberation and demands, a politics of reasons, submits these to questioning and scrutiny. It questions whether the emotionally charged public opinion is indicative of the wider common good, or is merely selective and polarising in its demands. In a similar vein, it can also allow for minorities to question the security preferences of the majority or societal elites. Reasons does not guarantee agreement, but at least it provides another platform for diverse opinions to be raised.

In summary, Loader and Walker argue that the state is best positioned to instil these conditions of resources, recognition, rights and reasons, "The state, in the sense set out above, should remain the anchor of collective security provision, but there should be as much pluralism as possible, both, internally, in terms of the constitutional inclusiveness, representativeness and minority protection mechanisms of the democratic and administrative processes through which the aspiration of collective security is reflected upon and pursued. (Loader 2000), and, externally, in terms of the recognition of the appropriate place of other sites of regulatory and cultural production (Walker 2002)" (Loader and Walker 2006: 194). In theory, anchored pluralism should allow for effective communication in security, even as the state and its expertise, is given conceptual priority for its delivery and implementation. The prioritisation of recognition and reasons, for example, ensures that the insecurity generating tendencies in nodal arrangements are removed, and therefore there can exist greater clarity and transparency over why security is being used, what it is being used for and who it is protecting. And so symbolic displays of security as

directed by the state, if done right, should lessen the degree to which these can influence aspects of insecurity.

However, like nodal governance, anchored pluralism is also subject to criticisms. Ellison and O'Rawe (2010) and their review into the police reforms in Northern Ireland, which were based on recommendations by the Independent Police Commission (IPC), identify some issues arising from state activity in nodal governance. The reforms could be considered an experiment in adopting a nodal framework of policing and security, aiming "to provide a system of policing that was not located in any one institutional location" (Ibid 2010: 36). Their findings suggest that rather than being truly nodal, the state "remained reluctant to loosen their grip on control of policing" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 51). It was shown that attempts to prioritise the interests of actors other than the state, tends to result in "a continuing colonization of security space *by* the state" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 40). While their research is primarily about upholding the claims of nodal governance to empirical testing, the findings, which demonstrate an overbearing state reluctant to withdraw, or at least devolve its security and policing responsibilities, also has implications for the normative claims of anchored pluralism, where the state acted according to dominant interests and protection of its regime, by keeping its fingers too deeply embedded "any number of security pies" (Ibid 2010: 51), without letting those at the bottom have a piece.

State power over security and policing in Northern Ireland was maintained through three processes of: *compartmentalization*, *crowding out*, and *corralling*. Compartmentalization occurred where certain issues and responsibilities were separated among different agencies, for example, counter terrorism work being seen as something different from other aspects of community policing. By creating compartments, the state was privileged as an anchor to control these. 'Crowding out', happened when security issues became the purveyor of a number of bodies, bringing more bureaucracy with less clarity over the allocation of responsibilities and resources, "giving the appearance of dynamic community involvement when the reality lends itself more to inertia" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 42). Relatedly, a crowded field of apparent 'strong actors' inevitably

meant that the voices of non-state weaker ones became silenced. In this way, community input became to be regarded as toxic. Lastly, the effects of compartmentalization and crowding out in the security field, are that issues of (in)security become 'corralled' or ring fenced as solely policing issues, within a "narrowly defined state and official agenda" (Ibid 2010: 46). That despite the rhetoric of nodal arrangements, of partnership and community empowerment, the state has only increased its position of power and authority over these issues. As mentioned, it remains to be seen whether the normative, democratic claims of nodal or anchored perspectives, can truly be upheld amidst the reactivation and executive authority of the state as it contends with exceptional risks, and delivers scaled up security.

The complex security governance arrangements at mega-events, presents an opportunity to examine these issues closer, not just in outlining the official actors and agencies involved, but to also assess the normative and democratic claims inherent to particular governance arrangements. Furthermore, it can be inferred the amount of community involvement that particular governance arrangements afford, will also have an influence on security delivery, and the process of symbolic communication between experts and lay citizens.

## 2.9 Conclusion

The first part of this literature review identified that a micro-analysis of security is missing from the existing research into mega-event security. In particular, there is a need to uncover the subjective dimensions of (in)security; the perceptions and experiences of those people who encounter the securitisation of their everyday environment. The trends of expert mediated security at these events, places an over reliance upon the symbolic properties of security in conveying reassurance to the public. The irony is that security is operating deeper into the everyday environment, at the same time as local residents are stripped of any stake in how this security is conducted. Therefore, symbolic

displays of security, acting as control signals, are tasked with conveying meaning and reducing social distance, between sender and receiver.

However, this is not a straightforward process; a number of tensions and contradictions exist, which may influence symbiosis between sender and receiver. The prioritisation of expertise creates the very conditions by which different material and ontological insecurities can surface. Furthermore, this state of dependency can lead to misinformation and manipulation of lay perceptions of risk and security, creating further cycles of insecurity. The complexities of the security landscape at mega-events are furthered by the ephemeral nature of the event, which can never be separated from the situational and local context in which it occurs. It remains to be seen how prior local understandings and experiences of policing, control and security, exist amidst exceptional and globalised resilient practices. To summarise, there is a need to examine closer, the relationship between local place and global security practices, to understand how global risks and attitudes towards security are influenced at these types of events, and understand what messages are conveyed by the symbolic displays of exceptional security, as perceived at the local level. There is also the need to examine how such processes and their inherent tensions are quelled or exacerbated by existing or dominant governance arrangements at mega-events.

## 3. Approach and Methods

### 3.1 Introduction

The literature review highlighted a salient and necessary direction of study, important issues which have received little attention within the mega event and security literature. It was identified that it is necessary to focus on the security infrastructures of mega-events, and explore how issues of security and control impact on the host city, or more specifically, on the existing urban settings or communities in which they are deployed. In particular, it was outlined that there is a need to consider this from the perspectives of those living through the securitisation process, where everyday lives are conducted amidst the backdrop of spectacular security. By considering both the expert opinions of those involved in the planning and delivery of security infrastructure and the experiences of ordinary people who encounter these features most acutely, the complex issue of how security, both exceptional and prosaic, is communicated can be investigated further.

This chapter outlines the research approach and methods used. Firstly, the use of adaptive theory as an approach which identifies the linkages between theory development and empirical research is explained with regards to how this shaped both aspects of the research design and its analysis. Secondly, the qualitative research strategy of triangulation is described and particular methods justified by explaining how they were used in order to gather specific and general, contextual information on aspects of the security planning and delivery and also subjective interpretations and understandings of these. This is followed by details of how the analysis was carried out in order to reach the research findings. Finally, some ethical issues and challenges faced during the fieldwork period are mentioned with reference to how these were dealt with.

### 3.2 The Influence of the Adaptive Theory Approach

As evidenced in chapter two, the primary focus of existing mega-event security research can be categorised as being either primarily theoretical or empirical driven in focus. As such, a 'gap' exists between the application of theory to empirical findings and empirical findings to theory. Adaptive theory (Layder 1998) aims to combine the use of pre-existing theory and theory generated from data analysis into the act of conducting empirical research itself. The idea is that both general theory and empirical research can be strengthened through interplay and dialogue with each other. "[T]heory would be made more robust...by having its assumptions, axioms and presuppositions more closely and routinely measured against empirical evidence...[also] empirical research would benefit from more sophisticated forms of analysis and explanation" (Ibid 1998: 7). The use of adaptive theory is important in extending the scope of the research and to differentiate it from mere information seeking. It also helps to elaborate upon or shape existing theory, moving it beyond its high levels of abstraction and broad explanatory remit, making it more applicable to aspects of the empirical world and more robust as a result.

Adaptive theory states that theorising should be a continuous aspect of conducting research and not limited to specific and discrete moments in time as in the deductive approach of Popper (1961) and Merton (1967) or induction as in early forms of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). By combining an emphasis on prior theoretical ideas which can be used to both guide the research and facilitate the development of theory from the ongoing analysis of data, adaptive theory retains the main benefits of 'middle-range' (Merton 1967) and grounded theory but without many of the inherent, limitations of these orthodox approaches. For example, to reject general or 'grand theories' in place of theory testing or hypothesising around isolated, operationalised aspects of the social world or insisting on theory construction through a one way process of emerging and building theory from empirical data only, is to ignore the many contributions that extant theoretical ideas and concepts may bring to a research project. As will be discussed, the adaptive theory approach can facilitate both research

design and analysis while also expanding the explanatory power and scope of theory elaboration and generation. Furthermore, the epistemological commitments of both middle-range and grounded theory approaches place specific emphasis on either systematic or behavioural phenomenon, inferring the use of exclusive techniques to gather those particular forms of data. This limits the methodological resources available to the researcher. The resulting dichotomy also means that the reciprocal influences and interconnections between people's everyday lives and the wider environment which shape these are not adequately dealt with or investigated.

By contrast, the adaptive approach and its use of prior theory rejects the idea that theory should only be about gathering intersubjective understandings, meanings and interpretations. Instead, it identifies that theory should equally be about acknowledging the social settings and contexts that influence people's everyday lives. This consideration was important when investigating how people experience particular aspects of security at a mega-event, for the rationales and justifications for these measures, either in their exceptional or everyday setting, are deeply ingrained within wider social and structural processes. The adaptive theory approach gives attention to theory which emerges from the act of research as in grounded theory, as well as to theory which exists prior to conducting research, such as general theory, hypothesis or assumptions about social life. It therefore, draws on a wide range of approaches to theorising and resulting methodological resources. "This wider-ranging stance allows for a more flexible, open-ended and inclusive use of resources in the development of theory and cumulative knowledge of the social world" (Layder 1998: 24). It is this flexibility, which resulted in the use of multiple methodological and analytical strategies during this research.

Adaptive theory was beneficial in how it allowed for the use of extant and prior theory and concepts to shape and guide the research process, while enabling theory elaboration and generation from the ongoing analysis. It therefore played a significant role in the research design and analysis stages of the research. For example, by conducting a thorough literature review of previous case studies and a review of key topics and themes which were present within these, I had an

idea of certain key words, phrases and concepts which could be relevant to the research. For example, I knew that mega-event security represented an example of the reactivation of state expertise, and that a gap existed between experts and lay citizens within this process, this highlighted the importance of Giddens theorising on late modernity and the role of expert systems. I was also aware that mega-events relied upon different symbolic displays of security, and so I was aware of the potential importance that the 'control signals' (Innes 2004) concept may have for the research. Similarly, I had an idea of the areas which required further investigation or had been overlooked, as outlined in the literature review, "[Prior] In-depth knowledge of multiple theorizations is thus necessary both to find out what is missing or anomalous in an area of study and to stimulate insights about innovative or original theoretical contributions" (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 173).

Subsequently, during the first year of the PhD, considerable time was spent 'playing around' with these broad topics and themes and relating them to gaps in the literature. This served as way of stimulating the creative process, eventually leading to a way in which I fashioned my own approach, although never becoming fixed or set upon it. "It is important to incorporate the influence of the extant findings and conventional wisdom of the area while at the same time retaining the capacity to distance oneself from this body of knowledge" (Layder 1998: 32). For example, while Giddens does not talk explicitly on issues of security, I was able to relate the idea of expert systems to the way that security is conducted and the relationship between security experts and lay citizens. Similarly, Giddens (1990) talks of 'access points' as the meeting places between expertise and lay citizens, as a way of communicating different messages of trustworthiness. It is here that the importance of semiotics, and communication between (expert) sender and lay (receiver) became further apparent. I was also aware that Innes's concept of control signals was over reliant upon its analysis of the police, and did not cover different aspects of security, or indeed, other subjective and ontological dimensions and sources of (in)security. It was here that a synthesis of these different theories began to be developed. A synthesis of different theories, which were not explicitly related to mega-event security, could be adapted to help understand the process of communication in security,

therefore speaking to different aspects of social phenomenon. This would strengthen both the explanatory power of the extant theories, whilst better contextualising the phenomena under study, and situating it within wider social processes, something which could lead to theory elaboration or generation.

In this sense I made use of an existing 'theoretical scaffold' (Bottoms 2008). The scaffold consisted of key concepts and themes which influenced aspects of the research design and analysis. In terms of research design, particular lines of attack and inquiry were formulated, influencing the methods chosen and the content of questioning within these. This was done in order to explore the relevancy of certain concepts and ideas. However, this abductive process was reflexive, adapting to new information as it emerged from the data, "Abductive analysis specifically aims at generating novel theoretical insights that reframe empirical findings in contrast to existing theories" (Timmermans and Tavoy 2012: 174). For example, during the initial periods of research in the field, it became apparent that some concepts were not as useful as first thought and so the scaffold was reconfigured to accommodate the types of themes that were clearly emerging from the data. This strategy adopted a mutual cooperation between new thinking and accumulated knowledge, "The ability to adapt to the routinely changing circumstances of the research is the keynote of the adaptive approach and represents the conditions under which it thrives and bears fruit" (Layder 1998: 44).

There was adoption of the adaptive theory at all stages of the research process. For example, I had an idea of the potential relevancy of the 'control signals' concept even before the research began. However, while transcribing and hearing the way that control and security agencies were operating and the rationales underpinning particular strategies, it was evident that sending different 'signs' of deterrence and reassurance to a range of audiences was fundamental to their ambitions for the security operation. This prompted me to read further into the work of those who dealt with signs and semiotics, primarily, Baudrillard, Eco and Goffman. The relevancy of the control signals concept was affirmed while listening to how local community members responded to general questions such as "What do you think of the security

measures?" and "How do particular security measures make you feel?". It became clear that the notion that "a signal is a sign that has an effect" (Innes 2014: 1) was highly relevant and applicable to the data that I had gathered.

In a different example, some prior theories were retained throughout the process of data collection and analysis and merely tweaked towards specific clusters of the general theory, rather than adopting the whole package of concepts. For example, Giddens' (1990) notion of late modernity was an overarching theme which was used throughout the research process as an orienting device, for example the collapsing of time and space, and the merging of global risks at local levels. However, as described, the act of research; both knowledge of extant theories and being reflexive to emerging empirical findings, identified a specific facet within this overarching term which was particularly useful. In this case, the disembedding feature of modernity and the placing of trust in expert systems and technical expertise was further illuminated and affirmed by the data at hand, becoming the central important feature of the late modern perspective.

Adaptive theory takes the key aspects of others, but also provides an alternative to them. By allowing the dual influence of prior and emerging theory, it allows theory to shape and be shaped by empirical findings. As such, its open ended approach incorporates a focus and relationship which accommodates middle range and general theory. Its view on the practice of social research is that no one set of rules can possibly represent the diverse nature of the social world, and so no fixed or dogmatic approach should be used.

Consistent with the adaptive theory approach, this research incorporates elements of induction and deduction in an attempt to overcome the epistemological restrictions inherent to each. It recognises that theory can be generated inductively or deductively, or incorporate elements of both. Prior theory, concepts and ideas were used as a platform for theory elaboration as well as allowing theory generation resulting from the interplay of these with empirical findings. In this sense, the position adopted is neither entirely empiricist nor rationalist, but instead recognises that operating in the middle

ground between both positions can provide useful contributions to empirical research and theorising.

The epistemological position stance is neither positivist nor interpretivist. Instead, the interweaving influence of objective and subjective aspects of the social world is recognised. This ontological presupposition, conceives of the social world as consisting of both objective and subjective factors and a mixing of the two. It is this position which justifies and provides the rationale for researching not only those experiencing security as part of their everyday lives, but to also recognise how these shape and are shaped by wider systematic phenomenon i.e. the rationales and justifications underpinning particular measures and the social settings in which they are embedded. This views the social world as being both dense and complex and formed through the interconnections between agency and structure.

### 3.3 Methods

#### 3.3.1 Study Area: Dalmarnock

By focusing on Glasgow's East End community of Dalmarnock, this research takes a 'case study' approach (Stake 1995) providing an in-depth, context specific study into the impact of security on this locale. The case study allowed the opportunity for theory extension, elaboration and modification by using certain concepts and stretching their applicability beyond the empirical data from which they were originally associated. In addition, the collection of context specific data helped contribute to the existing body of knowledge around specific cases of security at mega-events.


Dalmarnock (Figure 3-1) was chosen as the study area because it presented the best location to study security at G2014 in terms of a) observing and identifying the range of security measures deployed and the rationales underpinning them;

b) gaining a better understanding of how security may influence individual and collective sense of (in)security; c) looking at how security 'communicates' to different people in different ways and how this is influenced by the wider social setting and context; d) understanding the ways in which people respond and react to these measures.

This is because firstly, Dalmarnock saw the greatest concentration of Games related activity and range of subsequent security infrastructures in one area. Secondly, the security infrastructure was deployed in and around the existing community in the spaces where normal people conducted their everyday lives. Finally, the socio-cultural context of Dalmarnock is that of an area undergoing ongoing and concerted urban regeneration plans, with the aim of promoting physical, economic and social change.

There are also a number of benefits in a study area which is an existing community. For instance, I made use of the available statistics openly available from Scottish Neighbourhood statistics website ([www.statistics.gov.scot/](http://www.statistics.gov.scot/)). This provided useful contextual background information and figures on a range of socio-economic indicators. I also filed several FOI requests with Police Scotland in order to gain some insight into levels of crime for the area over time. These secondary sources of information were important in providing contextual information which helped me understand potential issues which could influence the public perception of security, the police and other aspects of control.

Figure 3-1: Map of study area.



Source: Google Maps (Author edited).

### 3.3.2 Triangulation

In terms of a research strategy, a natural advantage of using adaptive theory is its multi-strategy approach, which encouraged the use of multiple sources of data and methodological/analytical strategies. This 'triangulation' meant that the research topic was addressed from different angles and allowed for cross comparisons to be made, which in turn, increases the reliability of validity of concepts and findings, "The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry" (Denzin 2012: 82). Also, by using different approaches and perspectives to investigating the research topic, findings could be re-ordered and re-interpreted, which facilitated in theoretical breakthroughs and developments.

This research used a multi-strategy approach within a qualitative framework, as in Denzin's (1970) original conception of triangulation. Three main methods of

data collection were used, these were: unstructured observations of the study area in the form of field notes and photo-documentation; semi-structured interviews with senior figures from key stakeholder organisations involved in security for the Games; and episodic interviews with people who lived in Dalmarnock. The methods were conducted in two phases: phase one consisted of unstructured observations of the study area, as a form of familiarisation and ethnographic immersion. Phase two took the form of semi-structured interviews with senior officials from key stakeholder organisations and episodic interviews with residents from Dalmarnock. This phase was done sequentially, with the interviews with members from stakeholder organisations preceding the episodic interviews with community members. The reason for this was that, by interviewing the official stakeholders first, I would gain further important contextual and historical information, therefore presenting me with a considerable amount of prior knowledge of what developments had been happening in the local area and potential issues of contestation. This allowed me to create particular lines of inquiry and questions to pose for local residents in the research design of episodic interviews.

The use of different combinations of types of data and collection techniques offered a number of benefits to the research (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). For example, the historical and contextual information that I had gathered through unstructured observations helped overcome the secretive nature of the security operation and relative closed responses of many senior personnel that I encountered. This also provided me with some common ground with the local community members that I interviewed, whereby I knew what they were talking about when they referred to certain places, streets or incidents that had occurred in the area. The observations and ethnographic immersion meant that I was able to take on the "role of the other" (Lofland and Lofland 1995: 16), in seeing up close, the issues that affected resident's everyday lives. Similarly, this information could be used as further prompts for discussion during later interviews. In this sense the observational data supplemented the interviews with key stakeholders and local community members, helping to unlock information that would otherwise have been impossible to obtain (Mason 2006).

In addition, key features of security were explored more closely by comparing and contrasting the interview data from stakeholder organisations and ordinary residents of Dalmarnock. For example, interviews with those involved in the planning and delivery of security measures provided important information on the 'signals' that such features aimed to send to their different audiences i.e. deterrence to potential terrorists, while reassurance to athletes, visitors and residents. The effectiveness of how these were being interpreted was then investigated by looking at how residents of Dalmarnock responded to these features, identifying the coherency or discrepancy between these two sets of data. This data could then be used to illuminate or be illuminated by theoretical concepts. For example, the issue of convergence and distance between the knowledge implicated in expert systems such as security and the experiences of these by lay persons, is similar to Giddens' notion of how trust and ontological security is influenced by abstract systems and its access points. This also highlighted (mis)communication in security, and so could be traced back through a further interrogation of the semiotic process between sender and receiver. However, without the merging of these two data sets, such a concept would not have been highlighted. In this sense, I made use of 'structural corroboration' (Matheson 1998), "a process of gathering data or information and using it to establish links that eventually create a whole that is supported by the bits of evidence that constitute it" (Eisner 1979: 215).

These examples show the methodological and analytical practicalities and benefits that accompany triangulation and how this facilitated both data collection and analysis, "Mixing methods helps us to think creatively and 'outside the box', to theorize beyond the micro-macro divide, and to enhance and extend the logic of qualitative explanation. Mixed methods approaches raise challenges in reconciling different epistemologies and ontologies, and in integrating different forms of data and knowledge" (Mason 2006: 9).

### 3.3.3 Unstructured Observations & Photo Documentation

An important factor which distinguishes the research of security at a mega-event from most other areas of research is that they are ephemeral; mega-events occur at specific times and over a set number of days. The Glasgow 2014 Games were from the 23rd of July to the 3rd of August. This date was significant to the research for a number of reasons. Firstly, I had to decide on when to use particular methods at particular times in order to maximise the amount of information as it slowly become more available, the closer it got to those dates. For example, I could not interview security planners too early as they would likely be unsure over concrete plans regarding the use of particular infrastructure, locations etc. themselves. Similarly, the majority of the security overlay for the Games was not obviously identifiable until around two weeks before the Games, and so asking local residents questions around specific aspects of the security operation and experiences of these before then, would have proved futile.

In order to make use of my time before the structured aspect of fieldwork could start, I decided to make use of less structured methods of data collection, which would help with the familiarisation process. This first phase of research involved using unstructured observations of the study area and making recordings through field notes and photo-documentation. The practical utilisation of this approach involved visiting the study area on a semi-regular basis and using my phone to take pictures or record notes while walking around the different streets for a few hours. Although much of this was unstructured and opportunistic, I had an idea of certain areas of interest or security strategies that were directed by my notes from previous visits or from my unfolding knowledge of the area as collected through media/web searches. Some photographs, in particular, made use of this knowledge as a form of 'shooting script' (Suchar 1997), which directed what to photograph.

These techniques required no ethical clearance and were not restricted upon by a set timescale and so began almost straight away after beginning the PhD in early 2013. This allowed me to gain as much historical and contextual

information about the study area as possible; to view first-hand the physical environment in which everyday lives were conducted and to document the changing landscape over time. As described previously, this contextual information was used to great effect in interviews. In this sense, I operated similarly to what Manning (1987: 16) calls a 'limbo member', "Someone who understands and empathises with the group under study, but who retains an alternative perspective".

A further benefit of this method was that it enabled me to see how aspects of security merged and retracted from the environment over time. This was important as mega-event security often transcends the periods before, during and after the Games (Fussey *et al.* 2011). For example, a year before the Games there was very little in the way of identifiable Games related security infrastructure in place. However, key venues such as the Emirates Arena and Transport hub displayed some subtle aspects of CPTED. Furthermore, constructions works around the Athletes' Village, for example, brought other security features to the area which were not directly related to the Games, this the ring fencing and closure of public walkways, CCTV coverage of main roads and building sites and visible patrols from private security personnel guarding these premises. Documentation of this process through photographs and field notes facilitated with the process of developing ideas around useful concepts and theoretical linkages within the existing criminological literature on issues of social control and situational crime prevention.

In addition, the field notes also helped with the analysis from interviews later on in the research. For example, as someone who has studied Criminology from undergraduate through to PhD, and always taken great interest in situational crime prevention and crime prevention through environmental design strategies in the physical environment, I was particularly attuned to noticing this 'security creep' and while many interview participants noted aspects of this, many also did not. This facilitated with lines of inquiry in the analysis, for example, to ask "Why are some people noticing particular features while others are not?", "Why are some aspect of security having greater resonance with residents?" and "What is the significance of context and setting?". This has similarities to what Innes

(2014: 162) refers to when talking of the benefits of 'gonzo research', "A 'gonzo' inflected approach has afforded ways of interpreting and reading social situations through different sets of optics".

As will be evident in later chapters, much of the empirical data and analysis relies on participants describing particular aspects of the physical environment or particular security strategies. And so the selective use of the photographs collected, can offer the reader a visual representation of what I am writing about, and also what the participants were referring to. The practicalities of this approach are identified by Becker (2002: 12) "What can you do with pictures that you couldn't do just as well with words (or numbers)? The answer is that I can lead you to believe that the abstract tale I've told you has a real, flesh and blood life, and therefore is to be believed in a way that is hard to do when all you have is the argument and some scraps".

Although this aspect of research is considered the first of two phases, it actually continued throughout the duration of the fieldwork. This resulted in some novel situations whereby participants during interview (knowing that most people have ready access to camera on their phone) instructed me to take photographs of the very security measures that they were referring to. In one situation, a participant told me that the view from his window summed up his situation and experiences of security for the Games. In another situation, a participant offered to send me (via an instant messaging app) their own images relating to their experiences of the security. Although situations such as these were infrequent, they present a novel and contemporary take on photo elicitation (Pink 2007), and the insistence of some participants to use photographs while being interviewed alludes to the point made by Knowles and Sweetman (2004) that photos can often achieve something that speech cannot.

While unsystematic forms of research are often overlooked in favour of conventional standards and procedures, this phase was pivotal to both the second phase of research and to the overall analysis. "Anything which can be documented either visually or linguistically and which can therefore be pointed to as evidence of some aspect of social life or social reality may become a

valuable resource which may stimulate theoretical thinking" (Layder: 1998: 165). Immersive involvement within the study area provided contextual information and enabled comparisons and developments to be made when triangulated with other methods.

### **3.3.4 Semi-structured Interviews with Stakeholders**

'Communication' is a fundamental yet underappreciated feature of security and social control (Innes 2014: 129). Successful security planning and implementation rests on how security experts can effectively communicate to the range of audiences who will encounter these features, whether for deterrence or reassurance purposes or both. For local residents of Dalmarnock, who are living through the securitisation process, their experiences of security depend upon a degree of trust; trust that the expert knowledge upon which risks are assessed and technologies, strategies and personnel so deployed, is sound. Trust that things will work as they are intended is fundamental to a sense of ontological security (Giddens 1991). It is this relationship between how security functions and how it is experienced, which is central to this research. Therefore, in order to understand how security is experienced and interpreted and responded to, it was important to firstly consider and gain in depth information on the security operation itself. In order to understand how people experiences security, it is important to gain the perspectives of those who have influence in shaping those experiences. Understanding the aims and objectives of the operation and the rationales underpinning the use of particular strategies, in particular locations, gives a more holistic account of security which can then be compared and contrasted with the subjective accounts and experiences of these features. Furthermore, the aligning of sender's intentions of what they want security to communicate, can then be compared with how the addressees' of these signals actually perceived and experienced them, therefore revealing more about the actual process of communication in security and the strengths and weaknesses inherent to symbolic forms of communication.

Semi-structured interviews were selected over other alternative methods because they offered the best way to conduct research with individuals from the key stakeholder organisations. This is because this interviewing technique offers the opportunity to gain information such as the rationales, aims and objectives of the security operation, as told by a range of stakeholders. For example, Miles and Hubermann (1994) assert that interviewing is one of the most powerful methods with which to understand decision making. Interviews were preferable to other methods such as focus groups because here I was interviewing individuals and not groups of people. Furthermore, the individuals belonged to different stakeholder organisations, each with diverging interests and levels of involvement within the security operation. In this sense, each interview was important in its own right and did not require the interaction element associated with group interviews or focus groups. Individual interviews also had a practical benefit in that it was easier to organise a meeting with individual people, one a time, than it would have been to have multiple people together at once.

The line of inquiry used in the semi-structured interviews allowed me to gain qualitative data in the form of opinions, thoughts, and motivations from the perspective of the individual and the organisation they represented. Topics and questions for the interviews revolved around four key themes, which were applicable to extant concepts and theories being used in the theoretical scaffold. The themes consisted of: *Security*, *Legacy*, *Community* and *Urban Regeneration* and were used in each of the interviews as way of ensuring continuity which would allow for direct comparisons to be made. However, before each interview some aspects within these general themes were tailored or modified to fit the particular expertise and knowledge base of the participant, subsequently, no two interview schedules or questions were the same.

A key aspect of the interviews was allowing for the balance between 'structure and flexibility' (Gillham 2005: 70). Topics of discussion that I had created, guided the interview, while also afforded the participant the space to elaborate upon or diverge from these if they wished. However, the structured aspect of the interviewing schedule was necessary in order to go beyond the media friendly

and synthesised sound bites that often accompany researching elites, particularly when discussing a topic as promiscuous as security (Williams 2012). And so the structure allowed me to reign in or redirect the topic of discussion if it strayed into irrelevant topics. Conversely, the flexible nature of semi-structured interviews was also important, for the fact that I was interviewing people who had far greater experience and knowledge of the security operation than I did myself, and so, allowing them to talk in diverse ways about security, helped inform my own knowledge and understanding of the security operation.

### 3.3.5 Episodic Interviews with Residents

As identified in chapter two, limited research has been undertaken in order to gain the subjective accounts and experiences of security at mega-events. The aim of this research was to address this gap by looking at how signs of mega-event related security are communicated and received in the context of an existing urban setting and the resulting effects and social reactions from this. This gap could be addressed by researching the residents of Dalmarnock who are living amidst the securitisation of their everyday environment. Episodic interviews with residents were chosen to gain their subjective accounts of security. Episodic interviewing is similar to semi-structured interviews, but differs in its emphasis on uncovering episodic *and* semantic knowledge. "Episodic knowledge comprises knowledge which is linked to concrete circumstances (time, space, persons, events, situations), whereas semantic knowledge is more abstract, generalised and decontextualised from specific situations and events" (Flick 2007: 4).

The interplay of between real experience and abstract interpretations is pivotal to the research topic, as it allowed for capturing subjective accounts and experiences and more abstract interpretations relating to various aspects of security. For example, questions aimed at obtaining episodic knowledge would provide participants the opportunities to recall their own personal experiences and perceptions of particular aspects of security which had impacted on their everyday lives. Whereas, other questions allowed more general and contextual

interpretations (semantic knowledge) to be uncovered, for example, how they felt about global risks such as terrorism, and the use of exceptional security measures and issues relating to how they understood security within the wider geopolitical landscape.

The interview schedule for local residents used questions aimed at accessing both parts of knowledge. Questions which collected episodic knowledge included "What have been your experiences of the security measures?", "How have particular measures made you feel?" Examples which helped gain semantic knowledge included "What do you associate with the word 'security'? And "What does 'security' mean to you?" Adoption of the adaptive theory approach meant that I did not approach the interviews under the pretence of the "epistemological fairytale" (Wacquant 2002: 1481) of being unaware of existing theoretical preconceptions. By contrast my ongoing literature readings, theoretical deliberations and experiences from other aspects of fieldwork meant that I entered them fully equipped with a range of categories, concepts and ideas ready to be explored. As Timmermans and Tavoy (2012: 169) state, "if we wish to foster theory construction, we must neither be theoretical atheists nor avowed monotheists, but informed theoretical agnostics", for abduction is about the identification of something interesting or surprising in relation to existing theories.

Subsequently, questions mainly centred loosely around the themes of security and social control, policing, perceptions of risk and safety, identity, belonging and ontological security and urban regeneration. The collection of concrete experiences, merged with subjective opinions and interpretations, helped to uncover how people perceived and interacted with the security, how the infrastructure affected them in different localised ways, and how they made sense of and interpreted the security in relation to wider social and political processes. It also helped uncover some of the effects of this process of interaction and interpretation, for example, the cognitive, emotional and behavioural concerns that they had to both global and local aspects of securitisation.

The data derived from the episodic interviews with residents falls into three main types; *Situation narratives* - this included participants describing particular situations with varying levels of direct experience/interaction with aspects of security infrastructure that they were referring to; *Repsisodes* - when participants referred to regularly occurring situations, encounters and patterned aspects of the security overlay; *Examples* - when participants talked about aspects of the security with direct reference to more abstract examples or metaphors; *Subjective definitions* - opinions and interpretations on a range of issues relating to security and more contextual factors relating to the wider social setting in which they lived, as Flick (2007: 185), identifies, "The episodic interview facilitates the presentation of experiences in general, comparative form and at the same time it ensures that those situations and episodes are told in their specificity. Therefore, it includes a combination of narratives orientated to situational or episodic contexts and argumentation".

Consistent with the multi-strategy approach inherent to this research, the use of episodic interviews facilitates a form of 'within-method' triangulation (Denzin 1989; Flick 1992,) which involved Investigating similar topics and themes from different knowledge/experience perspectives, helping to cross-check the continuity between the ways that people experienced and interpreted aspects of the security, in relation to how residents talked abstractly about these same issues, or how these were intended to be framed by the security planners. It was this interplay between the abstract and the concrete, and identification of symmetry between sender and receiver, between global and local, and between perception and experience, which helped with theoretical and conceptual elaboration of theories, this happening through a reflexive back and forth movement between theory and data.

### 3.4 Sampling

The criteria for participants to be included in the research varied according to the two sets of interviews in phase two. Participants from key stakeholder

organisations were selected purposively and chosen according to the information that they could offer in relation to the unfolding theoretical framework and conceptual schema. As Bryman (2008: 418) identifies, "[the purpose] is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed". For example, the governance structure for security at G2014 incorporated a wide range of partner agencies which included, The Scottish Government, Police Scotland, Glasgow 2014 Organising Committee (OC) and Glasgow City Council. In addition, there are a number of non-Games related organisations that also have influence on the planning and delivery of security both before, during and after the Games - these include the Clyde-Gateway Urban Regeneration Company, Community Safety Glasgow, and the actions of local Councillors.

This diversity of participants, meant that issues relating to security and relevant concepts and themes that I had adopted as a guideline for the research, could be addressed from different perspectives, knowledge backgrounds and levels of expertise. This was useful in creating a holistic picture of the security operation; helping to identify the use of particular technologies and resources, the rationales underpinning them and the locations in which they would function. For example, by interviewing officials from Police Scotland or the OC, I could obtain information specifically on Games related security planning and delivery. Meanwhile, interviewing officials from Community Safety Glasgow, Clyde Gateway or some of the private contractors who had been securing venues months before the Games, meant that I could gain an understanding of how more everyday forms of security were being used. In addition, I could use the information from one interview to fill in the (intentional or unintentional) gaps in knowledge highlighted by another participant. This strategy was on which, according to Mathison (1988: 13), "will aid in the elimination of bias and allow the dismissal of plausible rival explanations such that a truthful proposition about some social phenomenon can be made". Furthermore, in terms of theory generation, the interrogation of key issues, from different perspectives, led to the identification of commonalities and distinctions between exceptional and everyday security, how each was performed, and rationalities and the relationships between both.

The emphasis on the sampling from stakeholder organisations was not concerned with the size, but rather on selecting those participants who could offer something relevant to the research: "Very often, the researcher will want to sample in order to ensure that there is a good deal of variety in the resulting sample, so that the sample members differ from each another in terms of key characteristics relevant to the research question" (Bryman 2008: 418). For example, a key stakeholder involved in delivering the Games and its security was the Scottish Government, however, their jurisdiction and influence didn't extend to offering valuable insight into how security operated in Dalmarnock and so no members from this organisation were selected for interview. Conversely, three members of Police Scotland were selected for interview. This was because Police Scotland had numerous departments, each fulfilling different organisational roles and duties which could offer some valuable insight. Interviewees from Police Scotland included: the Security Director for the Games, a Community Engagement Officer, and an Officer on the Commonwealth Games Delivery Team, who also happened to have previously been a Police Constable in the local area. Each was able to answer particular questions on the issue of security, from different levels of expertise and experiences within the overall security operation.

A key feature of the stakeholder interviews was the use of snowball sampling, whereby interviewees would suggest other people that I could interview. However, sometimes I would decline their offer on the basis that the individuals or the organisations proposed were not relevant to the theoretical ideas and models that I was using. In this sense, I made use of theoretical sampling, but the sampling was truly theoretical in terms of selecting participants on their relevance to prior theoretical ideas and concepts and not on the basis of being directed solely by the incoming data. This again, is consistent with the adaptive theory approach and is quite distinct from more conventional forms of theoretical sampling as originally advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967), "...new people or groups or events are included in the sample not simply on the basis of some purely empiricist directive informed and thus determined by the incoming data, but rather, people and events must be progressively included in

the sample through the combined force of prior theoretical ideas or models and the collection and analysis of data in relation to them" (Layder 1998: 47).

Fifteen semi-structured interviews with personnel from nine different organisations were completed between October 2013 and September 2014. A full breakdown of stakeholder participants and their respective organisations is available to view at appendix 1. All of the interviews were recorded digitally and fully transcribed. The shortest of the interviews was twenty-seven minutes, the longest was seventy-three minutes, and the average was fifty-six minutes. In one situation I interviewed two participants at the same time this was on the request of the original participant, who felt it would be beneficial to have their own input complement with that of another colleague with a different role and knowledge base within Community Safety Glasgow. Furthermore, one follow up interview was conducted with the Senior Manager for Security Operations from the Glasgow 2014 OC, this was on the recommendation of the participant himself, who felt that he "would be able to tell me more" once the Games were finished. This follow up interview was also beneficial as it enabled me to probe further on questions relating to the perceived success and failures of certain security measures/technologies and to discuss 'legacy'.

A purposive strategy was again used for selecting participants for the local resident episodic interviews. All participants would be selected from the study area of Dalmarnock, the reasons for this, as has been already mentioned, is that this area had the highest concentration of venues and resultant security for the Games all situated within an existing urban community setting. This presented the opportunity to conduct research into how people experience the securitization of their everyday environment. A criteria in the selection process was that participants should be residents, living in the study area, this was something which was determined verbally before the interview began with each participant. The sampling procedure intended on having an equal balance of age ranges and genders. The reason for this was to explore any differences in how security was perceived and experienced according to those variables. Attempts were also made to interview participants, according to where they lived within the study area, this was done in order to explore if there were any differences in

responses according to their proximity and exposure to specific strategies. Concerted efforts were made to ensure that the sample was distributed evenly across the different streets in Dalmarnock. This sampling strategy is again theoretical, but it was pre-meditated and planned not according to how fieldwork unfurled, but according to my prior reading and ongoing theoretical deliberations.

Thirty interviews were completed in total with forty-five people over a period of three months between July 2014 and September 2014, amassing over fifteen hours worth of interview data. See appendix 2, for a breakdown of resident participants. Again, all of the interviews were recorded digitally and fully transcribed. The shortest of the interviews was seventeen minutes, the longest was sixty-five minutes, and the average was thirty-one minutes. The reason for the higher number of participants than interviews is that some were conducted with two or more participants. Twenty-four males and twenty-one females participated and the age range was from sixteen to eighty-three. Younger participants were represented less frequently within the sample, possible reasons for this will be explained when discussing how access was negotiated.

### 3.5 Analysis

The purposive of a theoretical scaffold and use of particular concepts as orienting devices, enabled a provisional way of guiding research, ordering data and also as a directive of theoretical inquiry in the analysis. General pre-coding was performed in response to the emerging data, where codes were made according to their (non)fit to existing theory within the initial framework. In doing this, it narrowed down the relevancy of particular segments of data and facilitated the development of more concrete thematic codes, and furthermore, stimulated the demand to investigate other theories which could offer light on the empirical data. For example, initial coding served to demonstrate the relevancy of certain aspects of the late modernity theory, such as the notion of

disembedding and expert/lay relations. Furthermore, by comparing data from the stakeholder and resident interviews, the relevancy of semiotic processes and communication became clearer. At the same time, further coding around how local residents talked of their experiences of security and how experts described the planning and delivery of security, identified the concept of 'framing' as relevant to the empirical data and also the importance of governance structures, and subsequent relationship between sender and receiver that it dictates, as influencing the communication process.

The adaptive theory approach, rather than place importance on the 'emergence' of new theory from data, points to the reflexive process of developing existing concepts and facilitating the creation of new concepts when needed, as resulting from puzzling empirical data. The back and forth movement between theory and data, will, as Timmermans and Tavory (2012: 179) state, "likely identify changed circumstances, additional dimensions, or misguided perceptions". As I began to narrow down the thematic codes within the transcripts, it became clear that the existing theoretical frameworks, whilst providing general insight into the social phenomenon under study, did not explain the true nature and complexity of how security was being communicated, and subsequently experienced. It was here that new theoretical elaborations of those existing theories began to emerge, where I was "asking whether these ideas, approaches or concepts can be reformulated, expanded upon, amended or extended in relation to new empirical data or new topics of inquiry" (Layder 1998: 115).

As such, I began to develop new subcodes, which identified alternative insights into the existing theories within the framework, "by making the analyst reshape concepts according to varying empirical circumstances, the received theory may undergo a process of metamorphosis and become recreated in an alternate form as different research conditions dictate" (Layder 1998: 115.) Within this process, I was continually revisiting and defamiliarising myself with the existing theory in relation to the data, which as stated, stimulated the formation of new 'alternative casings'. It was this "zig-zagging back and forth between theoretical ideas, data collection and analysis" (Layder 1998: 77); the mixing of existing

theory and emerging theory, that provided the nodes to code with during the latter stages of the analysis.

## 3.6 Ethics

### 3.6.1 Risks

This research was conducted in accordance with the University of Glasgow's ethical guidelines and codes of conduct (University of Glasgow 2014). The nature of the fieldwork was considered low risk, both in terms of risk to myself and the participants involved. The photo documentation and unstructured observations in phase one of the research, required no ethical clearance and the granting of ethical clearance to conduct both stakeholder and resident interviews in the second phase, was provided without any major issues being raised by the committee.

The first stage of interviews consisted of consensual interviews with some of the representatives of key stakeholder organisation. The topics which were discussed were the sort of things that they were well used to talking about. Similarly, given the senior position many of the participants held, it was expected that they were used to conducting interviews of this kind with the media etc. on a regular basis. In addition, the interviews were held in semi-public locations of the participants choosing such as office spaces or cafes. The second stage of interviews was again low risk as it did not involve anyone under the age of sixteen or anyone who would be considered vulnerable. The interviews were conducted in a range of locations during daylight hours.

At all stages of the research, participants were reminded that participation was voluntary and they could withdraw themselves and any unprocessed data at any time. Furthermore, they were reminded that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not want to.

### 3.6.2 Informed Consent and Anonymity

Participants for the stakeholder interviews were initially approached via e-mail. Alongside introductory information and the research request in the body of the e-mail, an information sheet was included as an attachment (Appendix 3). On the day of the interview I would provide participants with a physical copy of this and a copy of the interview schedule. I would ask for their permission to audio record the interview. In one situation a participant declined my request for this, but was happy to allow me to write notes. Before each interview, I also provided participants with a consent form (Appendix 4). Participants had the option to remain anonymous or be personally identifiable, and although nearly every participant agreed to me using their real name, on reflection during write-up, I decided to anonymise the names used, and instead referred to participants by their initials. The reason for this is that the use of real names did not offer anything to the validity and reliability of the research findings or the points being made in the analysis. However, for the stakeholder interviews, I decided to retain information on their role and position within the organisation to which they belonged. This process enabled anonymity to be ensured for the majority of participants, however, for others their identity remains fairly obvious, due to the seniority and high profile nature of their title and the organisations to which they belong.

A similar process was included for gaining consent of participants for the second stage of episodic interviews with residents. However, this involved negotiating access and conducting the interview within the same period. If participants agreed to participate, which they nearly always did (only two people refused to be interviewed), I would give the participant the information sheet and question schedule and give them a few moments to get a better understanding of the research and the sorts of questions I would be asking. When ready, I would ask for permission to record the interview with my Dictaphone, and gained informed consent via the signing of the consent form. Every participant consented to be recorded. Participants were given the option of using their real names or pseudonyms, however, only two participants opted not to use their real name and for similar reasons just mentioned, I decided to shorten the name to their

initials during the analysis. This preserves their identity. On one occasion, a participant, while being interviewed, told me about a situation which he actually photographed on his smart phone, he willingly offered to send me his photographs via instant messaging. At the time, I asked the participant whether he wanted to retain copyright of the image or transfer copyright to me, if I ended up using any of the images in the thesis. He stated that he did not mind, either way. However, in keeping with the way I have anonymised participants, I have attributed his initials to the one image of his that I ended up using in the analysis.

## 3.7 Negotiating Access and Overcoming Barriers

### 3.7.1 Accessing Elites

All participants in the stakeholder interviews were recruited by contacting senior personnel from the stakeholder organisations directly by email and telephone. However, the process of gaining access to this group of participants was never straightforward. Quite often, I would receive no response to my original email or telephone call, even after numerous attempts. Reasons for the lack of initial responses are wide and varied and in most cases can only be guessed upon. However, my experiences during the fieldwork identified several contributing factors.

One possible explanation is the timeframe in which I was operating; this first set of interviews in phase two began with less than a year to go before the Games. As such, the elite individuals that I was contacting would have been pre-occupied with intense security planning. Indeed, many participants apologised for the time it took for them to participate, blaming the delay on this very issue.

A further delay could be explained by a situation that occurred during my early stages of fieldwork for phase two, where my own research was questioned in

relation to prior research into security at G2014. A Venue Security Manager that I interviewed from Glasgow 2014 limited had agreed to act as 'gatekeeper' in being the middle man to help me gain access to some of his colleagues. He agreed to distribute my information sheets to potential participants and would then give me an email with a list of those who showed interest in taking part. However, the Security Director for the CWG, responsible for overseeing the planning and delivery of the Games, became aware of my contact with some staff from the OC and requested that nobody participate in the research until he found out more about the aims and objectives of my research. The Security Director requested through my gatekeeper that he would like me to send him a copy of my research proposal. I sent this off to his email address and awaited a reply.

Three months (December 2013 - March 2014) passed without a response and I decided to inquire about this delay with the gatekeeper. By sheer coincidence on the day I emailed him, he had met the Security Director at the canteen and asked on my behalf, if he had received my email. As it turned out, my original email and the various attachments within, were not getting past the strict spam filtering system on his email account. I re-sent the original email and split up the attachments into smaller files. The Security Director eventually received my emails and was more than happy to support my research, even participating directly himself.

In addition, the slow uptake with personnel from other organisations may be to do with the contentious nature of security and the responsibilities of key stakeholder organisations to keep the planning a secret. As Molotch (2012: 4) states, "Anyone researching security [...] runs into some unusual methodological problems. Authorities, and sometimes individual persons as well, fear that revealing details of what they do to enhance safety will, in the wrong hands, undo whatever protections are in place". Participants often touched on this during interviews, and in many cases they said that they could not devolve specific information to me.

In addition, Reiner (2000: 353-4) identifies this as one of the problems when researching organisations such as the Police, "The Police studied will inevitably be anxious about how they are going to be represented to other audiences such as the managers or agencies to whom they are accountable". Although, I interviewed a range of personnel from many other organisations other than the Police, many had close working relationships with Police and in some instances, were accountable to them. The fear of devolving sensitive information without the authority of Police Scotland is another potential reason for the initial difficulties in gaining access.

A key factor in allowing me to overcome these initial problems was due to the snowballing techniques of sampling that I adopted, "Snowball sampling is a sampling technique in which the researcher samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research questions, and these samples participants propose other participants who have had the experience of characteristics relevant to the research. These participants will then suggest others and so on" (Bryman 2008: 424). It would usually be the case that at the end of an interview, the participant from a particular organisation would offer to me the details of another potential participant who they felt would be useful to my research. This happened in two scenarios; the first is where the participant would willingly inform me of people from within the same organisation or those that they had close working ties with, who would be beneficial to the research. The second scenario, which would only be used if the first did not present itself and if I knew that the individual had useful contacts, was to ask the participant if they could recommend any other people that I should interview.

I would follow up on these contacts with an email which copied in the original participant or vice-versa. This approach greatly facilitated with the recruitment process. For example, in the periods between October 2013 when I began the first set of interviews, I had only managed to obtain three interviews. However, in the months of May and June 2014 I managed to complete ten. I found that once I had interviewed some influential people, this helped to spread the word of mouth about my research. Many participants who had apparently been

unwilling to respond to my initial emails, were now making themselves openly available to me.

### 3.7.2 Accessing Residents of Dalmarnock

Initial considerations for conducting interviews with residents of Dalmarnock were around where to conduct the research. Taking account of the physical, social and psychological space where research is conducted is something which is rarely discussed in methodological textbooks, "For all this focus on strategy and technique, it is presented to the near exclusion of the places in which such research is conducted" (Stein 2006: 60). In using episodic interviews to uncover people's experiences, interpretations and reactions of particular features of security in their everyday environment, it was decided that the data gathered could be greatly enhanced by conducting interviews within this very setting. Conducting interviews amidst the backdrop of the security infrastructures and social setting under discussion, helped in the retrieval of complex experiences and situations. Considering place, is important when trying to uncover experiences of the interactions between individuals and security operating together within the same area (Clark and Emmel 2010). Most research projects utilise semi-public or neutral venues which are detached from the practice the research seeks to understand, resulting in, "distance between the practical experience [...] and the model used to reconstruct it" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 170).

The problem remained, however, in deciding exactly what locations within the community the interviews would take place. However, the decision to interview participants, as I saw them, in their garden or in the street was influenced by the characteristics of Dalmarnock itself. The study area has undergone years of physical change due to planning for the Games and as part of the wider regeneration of the East End of Glasgow. Since 2007, the area has seen many of its local amenities removed to make way for various new infrastructures. For example, existing shops were subject to compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) and subsequently demolished. In addition, the community centre and play park were

demolished to make way for a coach park for the Games. As such, Dalmarnock is unlike many other communities in Glasgow in that does not have a recognisable 'high street', local newsagent, pub, library, cafe or public park.

Participants were recruited by walking around the various streets of Dalmarnock and contacting potential participants directly. I referred to this as walking "loops". In a day, I would spend approximately five hours, sometimes less and walk ten to fifteen loops of Dalmarnock. Considerations were given to make sure that I covered the streets evenly and that I operated at different times and on different days. The reasons for this, as described previously, were so that I could obtain a balanced sample according to different ages, genders and their location within the community. This adopted an opportunistic approach which aimed to negotiate access and conduct the interview within the same timeframe. This direct approach had the benefit of speeding up the recruitment process and avoiding some of the problems and pitfalls of negotiating via a 'gatekeeper' or organisation. For example, this research period from start to finish, took little over two months.

I approached potential participants, as I saw them, in their gardens or in the street. I would introduce myself and the purposes of my research; I had information sheets (appendix 5) to hand and would often pass this on to them if the participant looked unsure. This only happened once or twice; the vast majority of participants showed a willingness to participate after hearing my initial opening sentence.

Advantages of this strategy of recruitment, beside it speeding up the process of gaining access, are that the method offers participants a greater degree of control over the research process; participants could decide where the interview took place and they were conducted in their own familiar settings. Locations included participants gardens, their living rooms and in the street. The participants showed me the aspects of security and the physical setting as they were describing it. Many of the interviews also incorporated a walking element where participants wanted to show me something that was useful in describing what they were saying. "Routine settings offer not only data which is familiar

and close at hand, but public places have the real advantage of easy accessibility" (Goffman 1959: xi 1974: 14-17).

A key contributing factor to the success of this way of gaining access was the weather and timing of when I conducted the interviews. July and early August of 2014 in Glasgow was unusually warm, with temperatures consistently above the mid to high 20s. In addition, this time period was also during the school summer holidays and the Commonwealth Games, so there were lots of residents out and about the community. I doubt that the same levels of success would have been achieved if this stage of the research was conducted while there was bad weather.

### 3.8 Conclusion

The research adopted a multi-method qualitative approach, which proved successful in obtaining rich and diverse empirical data and facilitated in answering the key research questions posed. While there were some challenges in negotiating access, the quality of the resultant data justifies the approach taken. Being patient, adaptive and flexible during the fieldwork, affirms a point made by Innes (2014: XIII), that "it is important that we do not neglect the importance of creativity and intuitive insight".

However, amidst creativity and flexibility in fieldwork, there existed a rigorous and systematic process and adherence to theoretical and methodological guidelines. The utilisation of adaptive theory was instrumental throughout in the use and refinement of a conceptual framework, which was used to develop existing theories. This theoretical model helped refine and adjust the direction of the research, at the same time as the collection of empirical data helped form the theoretical conceptual framework, and the development of concepts and ideas relating to these. As such, this approach "allows for features which are essential for the construction of sound and robust theory and serves to draw general theory and social research closer together" (Layder 1998: 1-2).

Furthermore, it was this awareness of prior literature and theory, which has prevented the "re-discovery of a well-developed domain" (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 181). Subsequently, within this thesis, there exists a strongly theoretically driven analysis, and it is towards a closer of examination of the theoretical framework that the discussion now turns.

## 4. Conceptual Framework

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual framework which was used to guide the research and facilitate with data analysis. The framework takes Innes's (2004, 2014) 'control signals' concept as its starting point, the principal idea from this, is that acts of policework and social control, or in the case of this thesis, security, sends different signals to its audience which influence their subjective sense of risk and safety. This idea is developed and contextualised in relation to how mega-event security operates, through its synthesis with the theories of Giddens (1990, 1991), Eco (1976), Barthes (1957), Baudrillard (1981 and Goffman (1974). Each theory offers a particular and systematic way of understanding and analysing the issue of mega-event security and the related subjective interpretations and consequences. Through integrating these concepts into a unified framework helps keep emphasis on fact that despite the diversity of approaches drawn upon, they work together in offering a novel approach to conceptualising mega-event security, and provide a tool for uncovering how and what security communicates to those who experience the securitisation of their everyday environment.

The control signals concept was used to look at how signals of security were sent by security planners and received by local residents, and to examine the different effects that this had. The importing of the control signals concept into explaining mega-event security, presented an opportunity for theoretical elaboration, by increasing its explanatory power. Giddens theory of late modernity, the merging of global risks and local places, and the rise of expert systems and sequestering of local involvement, provided a theoretical explanation for the way that mega-event security governance arrangements currently exist, where there is social distance between state expert and lay citizen. Furthermore, recognition of the importance of the 'access points' between state and citizen, affirmed the importance of symbolic communication

in security at these meeting points. Eco's semiotics was used to delve further into the communication of security between sender and receiver, while Barthes and Baudrillard, highlight the lack of rigidity between signifier and signified within this process; the former positing that different levels of signification exist from the same signifier, whilst the latter presents the idea of a collapsing of the signifier/signified relationship. Both perspectives offer insights into a variety of divergent interpretations and experiences of risk and security. Goffman's frame analysis was used to identify the different narratives or framing scenarios that accompany mega-event security operations, where the framing of different strips of activity, pointed to the importance of mutual understanding between security provider and those on the receiving end of such narratives. It also revealed the experiential and residual character of how security is perceived, where experiences in the now, shape future understandings.

## 4.2 Innes - Signal Crimes and Control Signals

Martin Innes's concept of 'control signals' (2004 & 2014) is the starting point of the theoretical framework, with the idea that security aims to communicate different messages to people. Its application beyond everyday policing, and into the areas of exceptional security, provides an opportunity for theoretical elaboration by developing the applicability and relevancy of the concept "across varied forms and situations" (Innes 2014: X).

The control signals concept derives from the wider 'signal crimes' perspective (Innes 2001), which states that particular types of crime and disorders have disproportionate impacts on fear of crime and perceptions, "This concept is proposed in order to capture the ways in which different types of crime are important not just in terms of the harm done to the victim, but also in terms of what they signify and communicate to a wider audience" (Innes 2002: 2). The effects of signal crimes such as 9/11, have had a profound effect on institutions, "the fundamental point is that the effects experienced by institutions are similar in form to those upon individuals. Powerful signal crimes clearly possess the

capacity to change how key social institutions think, feel, and act" (Innes 2014: 126). It could be argued that the sequestering of issues of risk and security, and prioritisation of state authority in governance arrangements, is part of the institutional reactions to global risks and signal crimes under conditions of late modernity.

Innes (2004: 342) defines a signal as "a sign that does something - it has an effect". Signals are composed of three elements: an *expression*, a *content* and an *effect*. It is the merging of these aspects which distinguishes a signal from mere 'background noise' i.e. acts which have no real negative impact on perceptions of risk and insecurity. Using semiotic principles, the expression is the denotative description of an act of crime or disorder, the content is the connotative meaning that is associated with it, and the effect is the physical or behavioural outcome that the signal has on upon on an individual or group.

Subsequently, different types of crimes and disorders have varying effects, some acting as indicators about the distribution of risks and threats more than others, "The signal crimes perspective set out to calibrate how specific incidents were interpreted as connotative indicators of risk to people that caused them to change how they think, feel or act in relation to their security" (Innes & Roberts 2008: 245). The signal crimes perspective also identified that individual and collective reactions to crimes and disorders were not just influenced through direct experience, but rather, can be influenced indirectly, through hearing others accounts of these or by the way that such incidents are reported by various media sources.

These are often high profile acts that have both a high coherency and signal strength among individuals. Coherency, relates to how an act affects people in a similar way, while strength, is about how much of an impact the act has upon individuals. For example, in a community setting, youth disorder is an act which would normally have high signal coherency and strength, as it affects lots of people, in profound ways. While forms of racial harassment, for instance, could be considered to have high signal strength, but low coherency.

High profile acts such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, are signal crimes with a high coherency and strength. These acts served to identify the need and demand for the proliferation of security and control measures at future large scale events. "Such crimes symbolically display the nature of a problem and establish a need in the popular psyche for something to be done" (Innes 2001: 3). However, such responses are not solely the result of a response to individual signal crimes and their perpetrators. Security and control is also symptomatic of the conditions of late modernity that Giddens (1990) identifies. They also serve as symbols of reassurance, attempting to manufacture a sense of safety and security. Subsequently, the signal crimes perspective offered a way of investigating how secondary knowledge and opinions of risks associated with mega-events, such as terrorism, affects primary, subjective experiences and attitudes towards the control measures used in response to these risks.

Control signals are defined as acts of social control which send messages to an audience, "The defining idea of a control signals analysis is that the material effects of a social control action or intervention are irrevocably dependent upon processes of tactic and explicit communication" (Innes 2014: 129). These messages can be intentional, as deliberately instilled by the communicator, or can be an unintended consequence resulting from the act of control interventions. Subsequently, there can be positive and negative signals. A positive signal is where the message promotes a positive effect in promoting reassurance and individual/collective security, whilst negative control signals can induce feelings of insecurity. For example, police work uses control signals to communicate to potential offenders that they will be punished for committing certain crimes, while at the same time, much of police work is about providing reassurance to the public; that they are there to protect against a range of risks, threats and harms, "control signals can be: positive or negative in their effects; targeted or unfocused in terms of whom they are directed towards; deliberately manufactured or more organic in relation to how they occur. They can have diverse objectives, seeking to influence potential or actual perpetrators, victims, or a wider public audience" (Innes 2014: 130).

Mega-event security operates according to similar principles, where the security operation has to balance aspects of deterrence with reassurance, with security communicating to different audiences, in different ways. The application of the control signals concept to mega-event security, helped identify how various signals were intentionally and unintentionally communicated through particular security strategies, and the positive and negative behavioural and emotional effects, that they created.

As inferred, not everyone tunes in to signals in the same way. For example, what is a signal crime or control signal for one person, may be mere background noise for another. As in Goffman's frame analysis, the institutions responsible for delivering social control and security may (intentionally or otherwise) frame the situation differently to those who experience and interpret these measures. The way that acts of social control are interpreted depends upon the social, physical and material positions that individuals occupy, "The capacity of a signal to alter thought, emotion and action, is dependent upon aspects of the social context in which it arises" (Innes 2014: xii).

Innes deliberately uses policing as the empirical and conceptual 'vehicle' from which to study the communicative properties of social control. He states that the advantage of this is that, unlike prior studies into social control which have focussed on closed environments such as prison or asylums, police work, is conducted in more open 'non-bounded' settings such as the community. This presents more problems and challenges to how it is conducted, and subsequently, greater opportunities for analysing how signals are communicated.

However, security at a mega-event transcends both situations: it can be both closed and open (in terms of the spaces it occupies); global and local (in terms of the risks associated); public and private (in terms of the stakeholders involved); temporary and permanent (in terms of the security measures deployed). This presents even greater challenges to how security is communicated. By grasping some of these, the concept of control signals was elaborated upon; widening analysis to a greater number of control strategies (policing, CCTV, private security, perimeter fencing), while, at the same time,

giving further theoretical consideration to the conditions (late modernity and disembedding), relationships (expert-lay), experiences (frameworks) and different (ontological) effects of communicative security (semiotics).

### 4.3 Giddens - Disembedding, Expert Systems and Ontological Security

The concept of late modernity and the ideas of disembedding and a subsequent reliance on technical experts, neatly provides an explanation for contextual environment in which mega event security occurs, the resultant governance arrangements, and the relationship between state and citizen in this process. Giddens writing on disembedding, expert systems and the access points at which lay citizens come into contact with technical expertise, provided a theoretical backdrop to explaining the way mega-event security operates between experts and lay citizens, between global and local processes, and the sequestering of issues of risk and security from public deliberation.

Giddens conceptualisation of modernity and the conditions that it has created, was used to help contextualise the current socio-political landscape that mega-event security and crime prevention, more generally, operates in. Furthermore, the disembedding tendencies of expert systems was used to highlight the conditions in which mega-event security is conceived and implemented, where there is increasing social distance between state expert and lay citizen. Subsequently, it served as a way of describing the current relationship that agents of security; the state, police and private security companies have in relation to the general public. Lastly, the notion of 'ontological security' was used to examine how this relationship, and various other physical security strategies influence not only individuals material position of risk and safety, but can also influence subjective aspects of identity and belonging. This presents a novel way of analysing how physical security may be subjectively experienced, and its consequences on both material and ontological security.

The period of modernity is considered to be "fraught and dangerous" (Giddens 1990: 10). This is not to say that modern life is inherently more risky than previous eras, but rather, risk has become a central feature in which everyday life is organised around. Thinking in terms of risk, is a continual aspect of modernity. The risk profile of pre-modern society was based around the physical world: illness and disease, infant mortality, natural disaster, war and violence. However, in modernity, the main sources of anxiety are not solely the product of nature, there is a new 'risk profile' associated with modernity. This risk profile is combined natural with manufactured risks which have been introduced through the advent of modernity itself...the "dark side of modernity" (Giddens 1990: 9). In the period of modernity, risk takes on a new salience. The threat of terrorism is an example of this. For example, the fluid geo-political landscape of security and risk in the post 9/11 era, has transcended global and local geographies, where there has been a move beyond traditional state centric conceptions of security, to include more sub-national and local considerations (Coaffee & Fussey 2015). It is amidst such a landscape that mega-events can be said to occur.

Modernity is "inherently globalizing" (Giddens 1990: 39); it stretches the connections between different social contexts and regions. Local areas are increasingly shaped by global events and local events can shape global responses. In pre modern societies space and place were linked together where social life was shaped by the immediate presence of those operating within. In late modernity, "Locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them" (Giddens 1990: 19). Security at mega-sporting events is an example of the merging of time and space, and the interlinking of the global and local. Mega-sporting events are hosted in a diverse range of host cities, yet the security strategies deployed are globalised and standardised. The standardised approach contains globalised, generalised and transferable paradigms of security which imprint onto the diverse and uneven terrains of respective host cities (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

Closely related, is the disembedding of social systems whereby social relations are lifted out from their spatial contexts. In pre-modern societies, local

knowledge was gained and utilised in the immediate spatial context, whereas in modernity, people are disembedded, in that the spaces and systems that they encounter, exist independent of the relationship an individual has to them. An example of disembedding is the reliance on expert systems and the placing of trust in abstract capacities.

Expert systems, defined as "Systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise" (Giddens 1990: 27), organise large parts of the social world and have a significant impact on everyday life. Individuals encounter various expert systems as part of their daily routine, knowingly and unwittingly. Seeking the opinion of professionals such as a doctor or lawyer, driving a car, flying in a plane or just switching on a light represent some of the ways in which expert systems permeate everyday life, "I know very little about the codes of knowledge used by the architect and the builder in the design and construction of the home, but I nonetheless have "faith" in what they have done" (Giddens 1990: 27-28).

Expert systems, like symbolic tokens, disembed through presuming and fostering a separation, and eradication, of time and space. They provide guarantees according to levels of expectations which exist beyond and independent of a particular social setting and context, "Expert systems bracket time and space through deploying modes of technical knowledge which have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make use of them" (Giddens 1991: 18). Forms of security, such as the use of CCTV in public space is an example of an expert system. CCTV has shifted the relationship between the state and the citizenry - Surveillance used to be conducted in person and face to face. However, it is now a one way process which denies reciprocal involvement and exchanges of knowledge (expertise), it is "disembodied, anonymous and technologically mediated" (Smith 2008: 128). We frequently encounter expert systems of security and are expected to trust the effectiveness of these measures. For example, when going through security at an airport, we trust that these measures work in detecting a range of threats and risks and we trust the expertise and detailed risk assessments and logic upon which these measures are implemented. Likewise, hosting a mega-event requires a diverse field of experts, including police, military and private security contractors to conduct a detailed

risk assessment and utilise a range of security resources and strategies. Both the risks and the subsequent security overlay are transferrable over time and space, in that the respective Organisation Committees demand basic security requirements from their host city. Equally, this security is abstract and disembodied from the spatial geography in which it is played out, something which is further emphasised when considering relationship between experts and lay persons in this process. However, such claims are totalising, and the generalisability and applicability of such ideas are questioned in relation to the nuances of particular places, as Girling *et al.* (2000: 8) highlight, "how [...] the relations between the global and the local dimensions of existence will be experienced, interpreted and managed by people in the ordinary settings of their lives therefore remains an open, empirical question". As such, the claims of late modernity were assessed in relation to the local context of Dalmarnock, where global and local aspects of risk and security existed together.

Giddens (1990:79) states that, "In conditions of modernity, larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembodied institutions linking local practices with globalised social relations, organise major aspects of day-to-day life". Trust mediates the connections between expert systems and lay persons, and we are all lay-persons with regards to the large majority of expert systems. However, where sufficient knowledge is absent, the trust vested in these systems is fragile, "Respect for technical knowledge usually exists in conjunction with a pragmatic attitude towards abstract systems, based upon attitudes of scepticism or reserve" (Ibid 1990: 90).

In spite of this, abstract systems can also be a great source of security - they offer comfort and security through the guarantees and routines that they provide. For example, travelling on a plane requires little knowledge of the expert system, yet it provides a great number of certainties, such as the safety it offers as a mode of transport or the expected time of arrival at a destination. It is these routines and expectations, embedded within abstract systems, which are central to a sense of ontological security in modernity, "A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security" (Giddens 1990: 92).

Trust in abstract systems is heavily influenced by experiences at different 'access points', the meeting ground between the representative of expert systems and lay persons. It is here that forms of reliability and trustworthiness can be buttressed or reembedded. The example Giddens gives, is that the representatives or operators of systems use 'facework commitments' or specific demeanours which serve to provide reassurance in the credibility of that individual and the knowledge base of the system (of which the lay person does not have access to). This 'business as usual approach' is frequently adopted by flight attendants, particularly during periods of turbulence, where they do not as much as flinch. This demeanour reinforces to passengers that air travel is safe. Similarly, recognising the visual impact of their presence, as a frontstage aspect of a security operation, police officers and security personnel, during a mega-event, may directly engage with local residents and adopt a particular friendly attitude. This is done in order to convey a sense of reassurance to lay persons (spectators and community members) and to mitigate potential fears around some of the risks associated with hosting such an event.

Access points deliberately create and control the divisions between "frontstage" and "backstage" performances (Goffman 1963). This distinction sustains the characteristics of professionalism and expertise, but is somewhat missing at mega-events where all of the security and policing infrastructure is conducted in full view of the public. If expert systems can be the source of trust and security, then, equally, they can also foster a lack of it. Design faults and operator failure can occur in any abstract system. These identify the unintended consequences that can arise from abstract systems. Ideally, expert systems should foster high levels of trust, while at the same time reducing awareness of various vulnerabilities. This idea was examined in relation to the symbolic and performative aspects of mega event security, where security experts tried to create a sense of reassurance by using various security measures and policing tactics, but did not always achieve a heightened sense of reassurance.

Frontstage and backstage distancing and expert-lay sequestering of knowledge intends to keep the monitoring of one's security environment to the level of practical rather than discursive consciousness where it does not have to

be constantly checked. However, experiences at access points, particularly design faults, may raise vulnerabilities in perceptions of that system. For example, rather than promoting a sense of security and ease in one's environment, overt displays of security may do much to exacerbate feeling of insecurity, by making security pervasive (Loader and Walker 2007). This last point is important given the fragile foundations of trust in these systems in the first instance.

Trust in pre-modern times was tied into personal relations with family, kinship, friendships and the community. Although these sources still remain, modernity has transformed the nature of them; they no longer structure daily life in the way that they once did and are now intertwined within abstract systems. Whereas, trust was fostered experientially through personal connections within specific spaces such as the community, it now involves an "opening out of the individual to the other" (Giddens 1990: 121). The routines embedded within abstract systems help foster a sense of ontological security, but the trust that is placed into these systems does not have the same level of psychological reward that trust in persons offers, "Trust in abstract systems provides for the security of day-to-day reliability, but by its very nature cannot supply either the mutuality or intimacy which personal trust relations offer" (Ibid 1990: 114). This is why access points are deliberately constructed to promote a feeling of trustworthiness in that particular environment. Again, the idea of a decline in the importance of place and informal networks in producing a sense of security within a community was investigated and compared in relation to how these dynamics exists amidst the imposition of abstract, mega-event security.

Ontological security, defined as a sense of - "confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity" (Giddens 1984: 375). It provides the framework for how to 'go on' in everyday life, it is a non-conscious process as opposed to unconscious, in that it operates in the background of all social activity, it allows individuals to take for granted everyday happenings. Basic trust in the reliability of things and other people, acts as a 'screening off device' in relation to risks and dangers. To be ontologically secure, is to have a stable

sense of the self and of their place in the world in relation to other people and objects. Thus, ontological security relates to an individual's relationship and belonging to a political community, the positive effects of this relationship can stabilise and increase the thresholds of vulnerability and risk and provide important resources in the collective management of fear and anxiety.

Ontological security is also fundamental to an individual's sense of identity. In modernity, the self is a reflexive project where people constantly seek out strategies to maintain their sense of ontological security. This is achieved through being reflexive to personal and social change (and subsequent feelings of insecurity) and reacting to the knowledge and expertise of expert systems in order to reduce these anxieties. Modernity is characterised by the "retreat of tradition and nature" (Giddens: 1998: 116). People are adapting reflexively to the plethora of diverse and competing expert systems and so the choosing and adopting of particular forms of knowledge and expertise, and subsequent reformulating of social life, is a central aspect in the construction of self-identity, "Reflexively organised life-planning, which normally presumes consideration of risks as filtered through contact with expert knowledge, becomes a central feature of the structuring of self-identity" (Giddens 1991: 5).

Mega-event security operates as an abstracted expert system, in which experts utilise intelligence and technical knowledge in order to conduct detailed risk assessments and provide subsequent levels of security. This knowledge and expertise was used to provide a level of security coverage deemed adequate to protect athletes, spectators and citizens, but little is done in terms of how this relates to individual, subjective perceptions of the adequate security coverage - for instance, where too much or too little, in relation to an individual's existing ontological cocoon and thresholds of vulnerability, can impart on the very conditions which provides a sense of ontological security.

This last point is closely related to the paradoxical nature of being reflexive, in that it can also stimulate anxieties by blurring the lines between practical and discursive consciousness with regards to certain risks. Ontological security is best maintained when the concept of 'security' and 'feeling secure' is something which

does not have to be routinely thought of. And so, introducing levels of physical security below or above an individual's own material and ontological frameworks for security, was examined in relation to its consequences on feelings of (in)security. As Loader and Walker (2007: 8) state, "the 'surfaces' of physical security are intricately connected to the 'depths' of ontological security".

Subsequently, security, widely conceived as 'being secure' through protection from risk and harm, is bound up with the notion of ontological security and wellbeing. Mega-event security, as an expert system, has multiple aspects on which it can affect ontological (in)security. For example, the connections between expert and lay knowledge with regards to risk communication and interpretation; the physical manifestation and subjective interpretation of security and its 'representatives' (human and object) at different access points; the impact of security on reflexive self-identity and understandings of place and relations with others; and finally, the sequestered experiences of security and what this means for the future governance of security and expert lay relations. The identification of security as a disembedding expert system, which can both provide and remove trust in that system and its representatives, depending on how it is communicated and subsequently experienced at different access points, explains how mega event security operates. This situation also provided the contextual narrative for the thesis; where security experts aim to symbolically communicate reassurance to lay citizens who are removed from any stake in this process within the security governance arrangements at these events.

#### 4.4 Eco - Semiotics, a Theory of Signs and Codes

In conditions of late modernity, expert systems are heavily reliant on communication, something which is caused through existing security governance arrangements and distance between state and citizen on issues of exceptional security. Innes (2014: XII), states that an often overlooked, yet fundamental aspect of social control and security is how these 'communicate' to different

audiences, "it is argued that communication is fundamental to how social control works and is a dimension neglected by previous contributions to the scholarly literature". Semiotics was identified during data analysis, as a way of organising the resulting data, where it became clear that different messages were being communicated between experts and lay persons, or sender and receiver. Semiotics also helped to explore the overarching narrative of security as a disembedding expert system, by looking at the way in which interpretations of security as experienced by local residents related to the aims and rationalities of those involved in delivering it. The inherent limitations of Innes's control signals concept, which is based on a linear, one dimensional process of communication in policework, could not provide enough explanatory power alone for the complexity of global and local interactions between perceptions of risk and security and the different distinctions within the communicative process.

Semiotics is a theory of the communication of 'signs', "a semiotics of communication entails a theory of sign production" (Eco 1976: 4). In order to understand what a sign is, it is important to refer to the work of Peirce (1931) and his theory of signs. Peirce (1931: 58) states that "we think only in signs". Signs can take the form of words, images, actions, objects and even sounds. Such signs have no ontological reality, they rely on the meaning that we give them - "Anything can be a sign as long as someone interprets it as 'signifying' something - referring to or standing for something other than itself" (Chandler 2007: 1). The primary value of this approach, for the study, is that it is concerned with the process of meaning-making and representation. This thesis took the various forms of mega-event security as consisting of different signs or 'control signals' (Innes 2004), aiming to explore the subjective experiences and perceptions of these, "This latter concept is important in opening up the communicative properties of much social control work, opening the potential for a richer and more supple analysis of how it functions across varied forms and situation" (Innes 2014: X).

The two main proponents of early semiotic theory are Saussure and Peirce. Saussure's model of linguistic signs is based on a dyadic relationship between signified and signifier, as a form of signification. For example, the word "dog" is

a signifier; it only has meaning because it creates a mental image of a dog (the signified concept). The sign is the whole that results from this relationship (expression = content). Another example given by Chandler (2007), is that the words "open" on a shop window is a sign, whereby the word "open" is the signifier, and the signified concept is that the shop is open for business. According to Saussure, the signifier and signified are inseparable, each giving meaning to the other according to associated linkages. Despite connections such as these appearing natural, it is actually arbitrary; social and cultural conventions are necessary in order to make sense (value) of the sign, and to provide relative stability to the meaning of a sign over space and time. This also relates to the idea of framing, which will be discussed later, where (mis)framings of security prevent a stabilised meaning being transmitted by those involved in the production of different rhetorics around security.

The Peircian model, by contrast, offers a triadic model, consisting of: *representamen*, *an interpretant* and *an object*. The *representamen* is the (material) form which the sign takes. The *interpretant* is the sense that is made of the sign, while the *object* is what the sign stands for or what it refers to, as an idea. An example of this is given by Roderick Munday, who uses the example of a label on an opaque box that contains something. The box and label function as the material value or *representamen*, which gives realisation that something is inside the box, the *object*. While knowledge of the contents of the box is the *interpretant*. " 'Reading the label' is a metaphor for decoding the sign" (Chandler 2007: 31).

The main difference between the two models is that the *interpretant* creates in the mind of the person decoding the sign, an equal or equivalent sign. In this sense, the meaning of a sign is not within the sign itself, but arises from interpretation of it, "something which stands to somebody from something in some respects or capacity" (Peirce 1931: 2-228). Peirce, identifies that there can be unlimited semiosis arising from an initial sign. Peirce classifies signs according to three different modes of relationship between *representamen* and its *object* or *interpretant*, or more conventionally, the relationship between signifier and signified. These are *Symbolic*, *Iconic* and *Indexical* modes.

Symbolic modes, refer to instances where signifier resembles the signified in an arbitrary manner, such as the examples previously given or the letters of the alphabet, numbers, flags etc., it is through social and cultural convention that the relationship between these symbols and their meaning is identified. Icons, are a mode in which the signifier resembles or imitates the signified in some way, they are understood as having the same qualities, e.g. perceived resemblance through metaphors. Finally, the indexical mode, is where the relationship between signifier and signified is not arbitrary but directly related, e.g. the way that natural signs such as smoke signifies fire, red spots on skin signals a rash or chickenpox , or the way that a directional signpost relates to a particular physical place. Indexicality consists of relationships such as co-occurrence, temporal sequence and cause and effect (Bruss 1978).

These modes were instrumental in relating to the different ways in which aspects of security was communicated between 'sender' and 'addressee' (Eco 1986) during the mega-event. For example, CCTV cameras represent a symbolic form of security where their function and intended effect, i.e. preventing crime or providing reassurance, is not related directly to the material object itself, but is produced through conventional association of what it stands for "The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist" (Peirce 1931: 2.299, cited in Chandler 2007: 39). It is this same principle which allows for the effectiveness of 'dummy' CCTV cameras, for example. Security can also be iconic in that it represents or stands for something else, "every diagram, even although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object, but only an analogy between the relations of the parts of each" (Peirce 1931-58: 2.279, cited in Chandler 2007: 40-41). For example, it was fairly common for individuals to refer to encounters with things like CCTV, ring fencing and increased police presence as being like "Big Brother" or similar to "Prison" when describing their perceptions and experiences of these. Security can also be indexical, in that there usually exists a direct relationship between cause and effect, such as the relationship between feelings of (in)security and physical security.

These modes are not mutually exclusive, but exist in a hierarchical relationship; a sign can consist of elements of all three, each with different levels of relevance according to the context in which a sign exists. E.g. the same signifier may be used symbolically and indexically in the same or different situations. For example, forms of physical security: Policing. CCTV, ring fencing, often merges these two modes through their denotative (signifying) and connotative (signified) properties. For example, they have a recognised common-sense or literal meaning and purpose - to prevent crimes, but these same security features can cause a range of subjective responses through the personal associations that a person gives them i.e. a sense of security, safety, or conversely, they may signal that the area that they live in is a dangerous one. This was important in identifying that different meanings can be attributed to the same security signifier.

Also, "Signs cannot be classified in terms of the three modes without reference to the purposes of their users within particular contexts" (Chandler 2007: 45). Subsequently, the same sign may be treated differently across space and time and by different people. Again, it is this idea which gave importance to the use of 'framing' in this thesis, as a way of understanding the biographical and experiential aspects of subjective interpretations of security.

Signs are a process of communicating information, "The sign is used to transmit information; to say or to indicate a thing that someone knows and wants others to know as well" (Eco 1988: 27). Taking influence from Peirce, Eco's own theory of signs, rejects the idea that signs are based on equivalence, where expression = content. In this sense, signs are not fixed to their referent, but can contain different meanings routed in convention and culture, and are so open to varying interpretations. The signified is "a mental image, a concept and a psychological reality" (Eco 1976: 14-15).

In a world of signs, there are natural and artificial signs, with primary and secondary functions (Eco 1976). Natural signs are those which originate through nature or which are unintentionally produced by humans. For example, the position of the sun in the sky to signal the time of the day or chickenpox.

Artificial signs are those which are 1) intentionally produced in order to signify something or 2) signs which are intentionally produced as functions. Intentionally produced signs have an identifiable sender and intended receiver, conventions allow for the conscious transmission and receiving of signs. Similarly, they may also have different functions. A car, for example, has a primary function as a method of transport, but the car also has a secondary function, as a communicator of status or wealth. The function of signs, is context specific and can fluctuate or give priority to its different functions, in different circumstances, "In certain cases, the secondary function is so dominant that the primary function is minimized or completely eliminated" (Eco, 1988, 46). The classification of signs was used to identify different aspects of mega-event security, where both primary and secondary functions of reassurance and deterrence exist and the creation of unintentional signals through situational, contextual and performative aspects of the security.

Semiotics and a theory of signs is relevant to understanding not only the addressee and the process of interpretation, but it also reveals a process of contact, revealing much about the sender of the sign, "These signs, besides revealing the nature of the imprinter, may become marks of the imprinted objects - for instance, bruises, scratches, scars (identifying marks)" (Eco 1984: 15). In this way, it provides a framework for greater understanding both the sender and addressee in the process of communicating signs and subsequently, the governance arrangements which dictate this relationship. Related to mega event security governance, the degree to which signs of security are received as intended by the sender can outline positives and negative factors in understanding how security does or doesn't communicate effectively. In this way, an analysis of the communicative process, reveals strengths or problems in the current governance of security. This presented opportunities to examine the governance of security at G2014, and to identify how this influenced the communication of security, and also the subjective experiences of lay citizens. Recognition of this narrative runs in the background to the analysis, coming to prominence in the conclusion.

According to Eco (1984), there are different ways of interpreting a sign. Disparities can exist between the way that things are intended to be received and the numerous, different ways in which they actually are. Eco gives the example of a piece of text, such as poetry, and an imaginary line between two extremes,  $x$  and  $y$ , where  $x$  represents only one way of interpretation as intended by its author and  $y$  represents unlimited modes of interpretation, "In any case, between  $x$  and  $y$  stands a recorded thesaurus of encyclopedic competence, a social storage of world knowledge, and on these grounds, and only on these grounds, any interpretation can be both implemented and legitimated – even in the case of the most 'open' instances of the option  $y$ " (Eco 1984: 3). This insight was important to the study of security and mega-events security as it demonstrates how security planners and technical experts involved in security planning and delivery at a mega-event may intend on sending particular messages to different audiences, and that these messages may not be interpreted in the way that they were originally intended. Both individuals and intuitions may perceive and experience the same incident in different ways according to their own socio-cultural background and position along the lay-expert divide or position within the overall security governance.

The process of the signification of signs cannot occur if there is not a common understanding (code) between sender and receiver, "In the process of signification, the code is primordial. For example, verbal communication between two people can only occur as a two way process, if both speak the same language. A code is a convention given by culture. It allows for signification to occur between sender and receiver. Codes merge "present entities with absent units" (Eco 1976: 8). Codes comprise of the correlated systems of expression and content systems. In a traffic light code, there are the expressions - green, amber, red and the content structures associated with them - go, prepare to stop or go, and stop. Codes bring together these two elements. The connections between expressions and content are mental, socially created and maintained (Denzin & Lincoln 1998: 252).

In considering security at mega-events, one of the reasons for the introduction of security, in a visible and overt sense, is that its effectiveness in terms of

prevention and reassurance operates on the meanings that are ascribed to particular types of security. CCTV placed on top of security perimeter fencing are the expressions, while notions of resilience, (in)security and reassurance are the content structures associated with these features. However, this is not as simple as it sounds, the range of semantic space available to individuals on the receiving end, something which is closely related to the conditions of modernity, and resultant governance arrangements as described previously, means that a lack of symbiosis, results in the links between expression and content being open to interpretation: "the same message can be decoded from different points of view and in reference to diverse systems of conventions" (Eco 1976: 139). For example, the sequestered nature of information around specific aspects of the security, meant that for lay citizens, these could quite literally mean a number of things. While, for those well informed, there exists a clear understanding of what the security is intended to convey.

Coding was influential in identifying how individuals have knowledge and experiences (particular conventions/codes) of how security works in certain contexts, such as their residential community. But this code became redundant for explaining security in different or unique settings, such as when it was deployed at a mega-event, where lay citizens were removed from deliberation over the specific reasons for security. Similarly, mega-event security or new policing initiatives in the local area intent on providing reassurance or a sense of safety, occurred without considering how safe or unsafe those individuals already feel and therefore provided opportunities for different readings into those measures.

Such circumstances are negotiated through the process of *overcoding* and *undercoding* (Eco 1976: 133-6). Overcoding is the use of interpretive presuppositions and previous experiences and their stretching into different situations. An example is using pre-given courtesy terms as a matter of routine; these often have different meaning from their literal sense. For example, when asking someone who you have not seen in a while, 'how are you?', it is performed as an initial unit of exchange which signifies friendliness, similarly, the common

responses to that question, 'not bad', 'alright', 'could be better', are pre-given phrases used in the frequent overcoding of personal exchanges.

By contrast, undercoding or 'rough coding', is the opposite. It can be considered as the discovery of meaning in uncoded circumstances. For example, when trying to communicate in a foreign country, individuals may quickly learn that certain phrases, accompanied by actions, come to mean certain things - the phrase, 'J'adore tu' accompanied by a hand gesture or smile, can be bracketed as meaning friendship or a positive interaction. Undercoding is the process of assigning meaning, or basic coding, to unfamiliar or unknown messages, without knowing the conventional rules which govern the expression and its subsequent content (Eco 1976: 135-6).

In sum, "overcoding proceeds *from existing codes to more analytic subcodes* while undercoding proceeds from non-existent codes to potential codes" (Eco 1976: 136). This double process occurs simultaneously in most instances of sign production and interpretation, as a form of *extra-coding*. The process of undercoding and overcoding offered a way of explaining how security at a mega-event was interpreted. An example is that most of us have had personal encounters and know how the police function in society. Overcoding helps with the crossover in interpreting their work and role in different situations, such as during a mega-event, which could then help from a new subcode. However, at the same time, undercoding is likely to occur where the police may be functioning in a different way than previously experienced i.e. in a more resilient as opposed to community safety orientation, so interpreting their new roles and an individual's position to these, may come under new, potential codes.

According to Eco (1976), extra-coding impels on the addressee to select the most appropriate code or isolation of subcodes in order to decipher the message. The way that is done is through contextualising the situation in order to receive more information and narrow down the option of appropriate codes. Eco gives the example of finding a bottle with a skull and cross bones printed on it, at first one would think of this as referring to poison, but its meaning can change

according to where the bottle is found. For example, if found in a drinks aisle in a supermarket it could equally be an alcoholic drink, such as rum, "...the choice of the more suitable combination can only be suggested by some surrounding context and circumstance" (Eco1976: 148). Identifying that the addressee of a message has to interpret it amidst a range of codes, subcodes, circumstances and contexts, highlights that the linear process of communication between sender and receiver, is not a simple one. And that messages can easily be misinterpreted or express 'contents' that the sender did not intend or foresee. It is here that the contextuality and materiality of the signifier was identified in influencing how and what it signified. Subtle changes in the materiality of security in security, for instance, led to divergent interpretations of (in)security.

A theory of sign production and theory of codes, was critical in further understanding the intersubjective interpretations of security; It identified that the communication of security and messages between sender (expert) and addressee (lay persons), is a matter of perspective, "Sometimes the addressee's entire system of cultural units (as well as the concrete circumstances in which he lives) legitimate and interpretation that the sender would never have foreseen" (Eco 1976: 141). And that the intended messages are not always received in the 'correct' way as intended.

## 4.5 Barthes - Myth

Related to Eco's theory of signs and codes, is Barthes notion of myth, "cultural myths helps us to make sense of our experiences within a culture: they express and serve to organize shared ways of conceptualizing something within a culture" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 185-6). Myth, serves the ideological function of naturalising culture - to present dominant ideas, values and representations as appearing to be common sense, obvious and self-evident, subsequently hiding the ideological function of signs. In terms of analysing security and subjective interpretations, it can identify the double meanings attributed to aspects of security. For example, how perceptions may appear to be intrinsically based

within such physical objects, but are carefully constructed according to particular rationales and towards desired effects of the myth makers.

Barthes takes the Saussurean notion of signifier, signified and sign. His example is of a bunch of roses, which in normal semiotic terms, the rose is the signifier, romance or passion is the signified and the sign is that relationship between concept and image, roses = passion. In myth, the same tri-relational system is present but this time the sign of the first system becomes a signifier for the second. In second order signification, the signifier is the form, the signified is the concept and the sign is the signified. The meaning in myth is already known, "the meaning is already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas decision" (Barthes 1972: 116).

Barthes gives the example of a cover of a magazine that he read while in a barber shop as showing first level and second order signification. At a first order of signification, i.e. denotation, there is an image of a black French Soldier saluting the tricolour. The *sign* is a black soldier saluting the French flag. But Barthes notes that this sign also has a second meaning/second order signification or connotation; where the sign of the first system signifies that France is a noble empire, which does not discriminate against its people and vice-versa that people of all colours and backgrounds serve faithfully under its rule.

Myth is a form of communication, operating at a second, connotative order of meaning, "Myth then transforms first order meanings with second order meanings" (Allen 2003: 43). Myth also always has an alibi through its first meaning - constructors of this message can hide behind the innocence of the first sign. For example, the wearer of an expensive coat, which signifies wealth, can always state that they bought it for its first order meaning: as an item to keep them warm, rather than its second.

Barthes theory of myth today, offers a way of analysing things: objects, structures, images, sporting events, security, in terms of how these sustain and transmit different levels of meanings beyond their literal state. The strength in the second order meaning is how its ideology or message is presented as 'the

way things are'; myth is not a lie or a confession, it is an inflexion, it distorts meaning, presenting the second signification as natural or unquestionable, "In fact, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that he does not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. Where there is only one equivalence, he sees a kind of causal process: the signifier and signified have, in his eyes, a natural relationship" (Barthes 1972: 130).

Mega-sporting events, such as the Olympics, Commonwealth Games or FIFA World Cup are themselves a form of myth: at first level signification they are a sporting event, showcasing the world's elite athletes. But mega-events are much more than this; they are a demonstration and showcasing of that the host city or country's historical & cultural diversity, political power, economic stability and future aspirations. Similarly, the security is also bound up with this myth, often used as much as show of force, of military and technologic capabilities, as much as it is a genuine response to actual risk.

This second order meaning of security also has a subjective dimension: where individuals may interpret and process signs of security in particular ways - at first level signification, acts of security as perceived by individuals within the host city according to their function - as things which provide a sense of security by reducing exposure to risks associated with that particular event, for example. However, overt and visible displays of security at mega-events, may further legitimate security by providing connotative reminders of the imminence of exceptional risk. This provided one way of looking at how security became self-legitimising, influencing how attitudes to security, and its expansion in order to quell threats, became a normalised and uncontested features of the operation.

## 4.6 Baudrillard - Simulation and Hyperreal

If semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign, and that sign provides a second meaning for something else, which does not have to be

directly related to that first sign, then signs can be used to convey certain narratives, to certain effects, "If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot be used to tell at all" (Eco 1976: 7). If cultural conventions allow signification and the process of communication between sender and receiver, then, the semiotic process is not a matter of the truth or untruth of representations, but rather an issue for whose, or what truth or version of reality is being communicated.

This is an important aspect to consider of security at mega-events, where technical experts are given priority to define and implement risk and security agendas. For ordinary members of society, knowledge of terrorism, for example, is not gained through direct experience with acts of terrorism, but rather how instances of it are communicated through different channels, such as the media or at the access points of expert systems. "...much of our knowledge of the world is indirect; we experience many things primarily (or even solely) as they are represented to us within our media and communication technologies" (Chandler 2002: 81). Similarly, security at airports for example, communicates a particular version of risk and security that we are to place trust in; trust is vested in the expertise of risk assessments, that such security is necessary and also that the security acts as a form of prevention to those risks. Subsequently, perceptions are developed through 'second-hand non-experience' of the risks and second-hand experiences of the security (Beck 1992: 72). The governance structures of security, therefore, have the ability to influence how people perceive and experience the communication of security.

Eco (1976) notes that the circumstances in which a sign occurs, acts as a way of selecting appropriate subcodes as interpretation. However, it is important to consider how that circumstance can be shaped by the initial object or expression itself and how perceptions of the circumstance in which it occurs can alter the way that the sign is decoded. For example, if people believe that there are certain imminent risks associated with a mega-event, and that those risks are real, then it is likely that they may view the subsequent security measures in a positive way - e.g. proportionate as opposed to disproportionate, security inducing as opposed to security reducing, "If the circumstance helps one to

single out the subcodes by means of which the messages are disambiguated this means that, rather than change messages or control their production, one can change their content by acting on the circumstances in which the message will be received" (Eco 1976: 150).

The concepts of the hyperreal and simulation can be used to uncover the way that representations of security allow for the presence or absence of 'reality', "Let's never forget that the real is merely a simulation" (Baudrillard and Petit 1998: 69). Baudrillard's position is that reality was only ever generated through signs, but signs are increasingly detached from a material reality. Forms of advertising and propaganda are examples in which the reality is hidden. The period of 'hyperreality', society is comprised of a series of illusions which are interpreted as being real. Baudrillard gives the example of the map: in pre-modern society the map derived from reality, but now the map precedes reality. For instance, the way that someone might use Google earth to become familiarised with an area without ever being there or those instances where some individuals follow the advice of their sat nav system, rather than the road in front of them. The hyperreal is regarded as real, but it is a "real without origin or reality" (Baudrillard 1995: 3).

Baudrillard talks of simulacrum and simulacra (plural); these represent the ways that society simulates the real. There are three different levels of simulation: A first order simulation is where there is a representation of the real, such as a painting or a traditional map being identified as an obvious artificial representation. Second order simulation blurs the distinctions between reality and representation, Google earth for example, is reality through a form of representation but the map and reality can no longer be differentiated, it is "as real as the real" (Lane 2000: 86). Third order simulation produces a "hyperreal", where reality and representation is detached.

An example of third order simulation given by Baudrillard (1983), is Disneyland. The perimeter walls of Disneyland and its demarcation of the internal and external through its grand entrance gates, creates the idea that inside this bracketed space, is the world of fantasy and illusions: castles, pirates, space,

where children and adults can leave the rationality of the real world and live out their fantasies. However, Disneyland, as hyperreal, masks the fact that such childish fantasies are not restricted to Disneyland, but is a fact of American society. It creates an artificial distancing between what is to be regarded as real and what is imaginary. The outside is regarded as the real, but it itself operates at the level of the simulated or hyperreal. Another example is the prison: demarcating the prison and imprisoned population as separate from everyday society, conceals the way that the carceral can be the everyday. An individual believes in his/her freedom because they are not in jail, thus losing sight of the structural and social similarities between either side of the prison walls.

This way of thinking was applied to security at mega-events. Baudrillard's concept of the hyperreal offered a way of analysing security, identifying how mega-event security presented certain versions of reality, and how this influenced perceptions of risk and (in)security among local residents. In addition, identification of the hyperreal, raised questions over who benefits from the identification and classification of particular risks, and deployment of subsequent exceptional security measures in particular places, "Is any given bombing in Italy the work of leftist extremists, or extreme-right provocation, or a centrist *mise-en-scène* to discredit all extreme terrorists and to shore up its own failing power, or again, is it a police-inspired scenario and a form of blackmail to public security? All of this is simultaneously true...[in]... this vertigo of interpretation" (Baudrillard 1995: 13)

This vertigo of interpretation is also in relation to the merging of the real with simulation. An example is that if someone wanted to stage a robbery, with a fake gun and hostage, the simulation of a real robbery would inevitably become real through the way that it is responded to, "There is no "objective" difference: the gestures, the signs are the same as for a real robbery, the signs do not lean to one side or another" (Baudrillard 1995: 15). Thus, artificial signs are always inextricably linked with real elements. Indeed, Baudrillard states that simulation is often more dangerous than the real thing, because it challenges the reality principle, "Simulation is infinitely more dangerous because it always leaves open to supposition that, above and beyond its object, law and order themselves

might be nothing but simulation" (Ibid 1995: 15). In the same way that the law enforcement responds to a simulated act as if it were real, it was identified that individuals can respond to simulated security as if it were real, with real consequences.

The concept of simulation was applied to security at G2014, where a blurring of reality and simulation in the hyperreal, created a form of reality by models of what reality is meant to be. In the same way that the map precedes the territory, security at the mega-event precede the risk - where there is a lamination of a standardised security model regardless of the objective variations and risk profile of the host city. Similarly, if there is no real, but only simulations of the real, then knowledge of both security and risk and subsequent interpretations of these, is shaped by the signs or simulations of what is presented. Mega-event security blurs the boundaries between the future and present, between potential happenings and actual ones, and between reality and its virtual equivalent.

Mega-events security shares similarities to Baudrillard's (1995: 62) analysis of the Gulf War, which was an example of "Changing war for the signs of war". The publics' experience of the war were through representations by various media sources - satellite images, live video feeds and computer graphics to represent specific aspects of what was happening on the ground. The distance between the event and representations of the event, led to the construction of a 'real', "Information and images of virtual war are not fake. Instead they are hyperreal, instantaneous, actual images from the ground, which the form of communications media abstracts, segments and renders into signs for our consumption" (Pawlett 2007: 142). These images influenced people's perception of what was happening, and were regarded as being indicative of reality, all the while they were virtual copies of what was actually happening.

In addition, the reporting of the Gulf War used simulations of simulations, where even news reporters were using the simulated coverage of other stations as the source for their own coverage, in this sense the news produced the reality of war, not the other way round. This identifies the different rhetorics and

competing simulations of the reality of an event, and that this misplacing of the real can still have real consequences in terms of the relation between representation, perception and interpretation.

Related to mega-event security again, security experts were aware of the reputational risk that accompanied hosting an event of G2014's size, where security is part of the spectacle in ensuring nothing goes wrong (Fussey *et al.* 2011). As such, security planners had to guard against possible future accusations of negligence and inaction, if something was to happen. It was this positioning of security against unknown potential happenings, which severed the distinctions between reality and a virtual order of security; the security took place purely as signage amidst hyperreality without any reference to reality - the risks were suspended in their virtual state by preventative measures, which stopped them from ever occurring i.e. from becoming real. Nevertheless, such virtual potentials still influenced the security operation as if they were real, and furthermore, had real consequences on citizen's perceptions of risk, and their resulting attitudes to overt security.

## 4.7 Goffman - Frame Analysis

Goffman's frame analysis is concerned with "the organization of experience" (1974:11). The starting point for the theory is influenced by the work of William James (1869) and his question '[u]nder what circumstances do we think things are real?' As observers or readers of different 'frames', we try and make that distinction and choose appropriate actions aligned to that, "My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject. I start with the fact that from an individual's particular point of view, while one thing may be momentarily appear to be what is really going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception or a theatrical performance, and so forth" (Goffman 1974: 10).

Frame analysis was used to recognise how the mega-event security planners can craft social frameworks through the way that security is packaged and presented, containing a "will, aim and controlling effort" (Goffman 1974: 22) in order to communicate a dominant meaning to different desired effects, often associated with different rhetorics, not necessarily related to security. Meanwhile, individuals experience and make sense of social frames in relation to their own socio-cultural and experiential backgrounds. Together, this approach adds richness to the aforementioned semiotic aspects of communication, by identifying how these operate within actual situations or strips of activity, which organize subjective experiences. This further reaffirms the importance of mutual understanding between those crafting the frame, and those interpreting the frame or between expert and lay citizen in security delivery. Furthermore, cyclically, experiences within frames have the potential to taint how individuals see future objects and scenarios, influencing the way security, or its providers are viewed. Together provides a different way of conceptualising the notion of a 'security legacy'.

Observations of a situation are made understandable through the application of a particular frame to that strip of activity. "Frames answer the question "what is happening here?"; they tell us how to define the situations in which we find ourselves" (Manning 1992: 118). An example in which frames are necessary is demonstrated where physically identical or similar acts can have very different meanings; twitching or blinking, fighting or playing, these acts are likely to be physically identical, but different socially, "We see an incident but cannot decipher it until we install assumptions about what we are seeing" (Ibid 2007: 119). For Goffman, social interaction is composed of different frames which provide a sense of understanding of others. Manning, gives the example of a woman who strokes a male colleague's leg. This can be a form of banter in the office or also have real sexual meaning, or both, where the latter can be laminated onto the former frame, as a way of disguising what would normally be considered an inappropriate act (Manning 1992: 122).

A social framework is one guided by human intervention, and is an example of "a concerned party guiding our understandings of a strip of interaction" (Manning 1992: 122). For example, watching a newscast report on the weather. In both instances prior knowledge of prevalent frameworks is required to make sense of the situation, "In sum, then, we tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied" (Goffman 1974: 24). Individuals can apply many different frameworks in a strip of activity, both natural and social, in order to predict and interpret previous and future happenings.

However, individuals can be wrong in their interpretations of a frame or can equally be misguided into identifying a particular frame. An example is that if during a job interview, the interviewer loosens his tie, grabs two glasses and invites the applicant to an informal chat. The applicant may believe that the official interview situation is over, or they might feel that this situation is still part of the interview process. The interviewee's responses to particular questions in this new situation will be affected by which frame he believes to be the right one: "job interview" frame or "social/friendly" frame, "The underlying message of frame analysis is, then, that the procedures whereby we persuade others that they see is real or genuine are precisely the same procedures whereby we cheat, deceive, or manipulate them" (Manning 1992: 120). This was important in analysing the different rhetorics, or framing scenarios, that accompany the hosting of a mega-event, where organisers aimed to convey certain narratives to local residents around issues of regeneration, security and safety, as acting in their interest.

Strips of activity are vulnerable and can be transformed through a process of *keying or fabrications*. A primary framework can be keyed when their meanings are transformed into something on which they are patterned on, but independent of. The example Goffman gives is of Bateson's discussions of otters at a zoo. The otters both fight with each other and also play fight. Signs are used between otters to identify that the strip of activity is a playful one or a real fighting scenario. Subsequently, keying is used as a way of identifying to participants in a strip of activity and to others, what it is that is really going on,

"Actions framed entirely in terms of a primary framework are said to be real or actual, to be really or actually or literally occurring. A keying of these actions performed, say, onstage provides us with something that is not literal or real or actually occurring". Keying was applied to security at G2014, where it was often in the interests of security planners to propagate a different meaning to audiences of these features - for example, to reaffirm the reassurance element as opposed to deterrence one within security practices.

Fabrications are situations where an activity is organised, so that certain groups have false ideas of what is really happening in the frame. The difference between a keying and a fabrication is that that keyings are interpreted by everyone in the same way, dependent on involvement within the frame - e.g. those present can, distinguish between an actual fight between dogs or merely a play fight, however, to someone watching from afar, it might appear as if the fight was real. In fabrications certain groups are deliberately misled about a situation, "A nefarious design is involved, a plot or treacherous plan leading-when realized-to a falsification of some part of the world" (Goffman 1974: 83). Fabrications distinguish between those in on the deception and those excluded from it, "Those who engineer the deception can be called the operatives, fabricators, deceivers. Those intendedly taken in can be said to be contained - contained in construction or fabrication" (Ibid 1974: 83). The governance structures of security at mega-events and the way that knowledge of the security operation and risk assessment is diffused among experts and specialists, while largely withheld from members of the public, presented opportunities for fabrications to occur.

There are two types of fabrications or deceptions - those which are benign and those which are exploitative. Benign fabrications are often constructed for the benefit of those who it deceives - such as when a group tell 'white lies', when a child learning piano, performs in front of family for the first time. Exploitative fabrications are performed at the expense of those being deceived, to the benefit of the fabricators - examples are false advertising, mislabelling, and other forms of cheating or swindling. Fabrications may be used in the scenarios and situations in which mega-event security is deployed: For example,

fabrications are present when security planners and organisers deliberately withhold specific information about the security operation or downplay the levels of risk, in order to quell anxiety among the public. Conversely, in a more exploitative example, the same organisers can inadvertently exaggerate the level of risks and security measures required as a way legitimising increasing levels of securitisation and the introduction of more pervasive security measures into the physical environment (Fussey *et al.* 2011).

To recall Giddens, the issue of keying and fabrication relates to the appropriation of knowledge and technical expertise inherent to expert systems such as security. A lack of knowledge or unclarity about exactly 'what is going on', can undermine frames and the trust that is vested in them. It can also allow opportunities of those *with* that knowledge to manage and transform the activity and experiences of those *without*, "Keyings and fabrications undermine frames: they leave people unsure as to what is happening around them. Friends who joke around are amusing up to a point, after which their friends just want to know what they think" (Manning 1992: 126-7). This identifies the importance of fostering good relations between state and citizen in security governance and delivery, as this can facilitate the communicative process.

Strips of activity are perceived in terms of the rules and premises which that particular frame imposes. Goffman argues that these frameworks are not just in the mind but result from the way that the activity itself is played out or organised "Given their understanding of what it is going on, individuals fit their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this fitting" (Goffman 1974: 247). It is this reciprocal relationship between the interpretation of a frame and having ones interpretation (re)affirmed by the organisation of that frame, that provides a sense of trust in the frame itself.

Subsequently, trust in frames is maintained through the 'anchoring' of frame activity. Anchoring is a form of routine servicing that allows frames to be taken for granted - it draws on knowledge and experiences to ensure that there is continuity between the frames intended meaning and its actual meaning. Forms of anchoring give an element of predictability to events "Anchors uses a series of

devices to convince us that what appears to be real is real" (Manning 1992:127). Goffman identifies different types of anchoring activities, such as: *episodic conventions*, *appearance formulas*, *resource continuity*, *unconnectedness* and *the human being*.

Bracketing as a form of episodic convention often features when activity is framed in a particular way and serves to distinguish it from the ongoing surrounding events. For example, a sporting event, such as a football match, uses distinct cues to frame the activity; where it begins (stadium), when it begins (kick off), when it pauses and when it ends (referees whistle). Brackets, subsequently define the situation in which signals communicate "what sort of transformation is to be made of the materials within the episode" (Goffman 1974: 256). The notion of bracketing was identified as being intrinsic to the way that mega-event's, as spectacle, operate. But the bracketing also influences how security is perceived. For example, security occurring within the spatial and temporal brackets of a sporting event, can be considered a normal aspect of the spectacle, anchored in convention and routine. But when such security permeated the boundaries outwith these spatial brackets, and into the everyday urban environment in Dalmarnock, it transformed the stable meanings associated with the security, whereby conventional anchors used by residents no longer accounted for the unconventional situation they found themselves in.

In addition, social situations also contain a number of *person-role* formulas, which provide clues for what to expect from other people in the ensuing activity. Again, police or security guards are a common sight at football matches; we can be sure of their roles and responsibilities within a strip of activity. However, during a mega-event, the conventional roles that representatives of security undertake, may go beyond their expected duties (both as perceived from lay persons and as interpreted by the representative), causing confusion about their actual roles and individuals relation to them, within that frame. The sight of a 'dancing policeman' at a London 2012 Olympic torch relay is an example of the blurring of responsibilities - where, although there as part of the security overlay, to protect against a range of exceptional and ordinary threats, the Policeman has likely been told to conduct his business

with additional personable qualities, in order to sustain the idea of the Olympics as a friendly, sporting event.

A further example of the anchoring of activity is its verification through its continuity and traceability to the real world "The relevant social implication is that we all live in a world that we assume, by and large, has a permanent residual character" (Goffman 1974: 288). The resources we use to frame a scene, have a meaning before and after that strip of activity. For example, in framing mega-event security, individuals rely on their knowledge and experience of how aspects of security operate in different frames.

Closely related to resource continuity is the issue of unconnectedness. In framing a scene, an individual 'tunes in' or gives meaning to particular aspects of that frame, based on their own socio-cultural and experiential biographies, whilst ignoring other aspects of it. Manning (1992) gives the example of the way that a spy may tune into insignificant things, which go unnoticed to ordinary people. For example, the way that an open bathroom door when entering a room in a hotel may signal danger.

The final anchoring device is the assumptions we make about individuals' personal identity. Assumptions about the continuity of individuals' helps rule out various interpretations of the frame. Behind the various roles that someone plays as part of their job, the personal character of that individual 'peeks out'. This was apparent where many police officers and private security personnel at G2014 had to keep frame when dealing with the public, but did not always have the necessary resources to do so, and therefore defrayed the sense of expertise they were trying to convey.

In tying together the anchoring of activity, Goffman uses the example of the way people respond to flags and other ritual equipment as a way of describing how conceptions also become a part of reality with real consequences. This example, serves as a metaphor for uncovering the way that individuals interpret and respond to mega-event security and securitization of their everyday environment beyond the Games: Goffman, states that there is no objective reason why pieces

of ritual equipment such as flags, relics, souvenirs, mementos etc. should not be treated as sacred when used in a ceremonial context and then treated in an everyday sense before or after the event. Although, for some, the distinction between the two scenarios and subsequent treatment towards those materials can be made. For others, they treat these objects in the everyday sense, "in a relatively matter-of-fact-way when not in ritual use [and that] some small circumspection will continue to be displayed" (Goffman 1974: 300). This continuity of character is created not through the continuity of the ritual equipment, but through our application of the continuity of spiritual ones to them. It is individuals who give these materials meaning, and vice-versa, it is these beliefs which give hold to our own sense of self and identity. "Sacred relics, mementos, souvenirs and locks of hair do sustain a physical continuity with what it is they commemorate; but it is our cultural beliefs about resource continuity which give to these relics some sentimental value, give them their personality. Just as it is these beliefs that give us ours" (Goffman 1974: 300).

In relating this to conceptions of security - security at a mega-event is distinctly different from security in an everyday crime prevention sense in terms of its scale, exceptionality and its obvious temporal and spatial bracketing. However, paradoxically, in many ways it is also the same. Aspects of resilience: CCTV, Policing private security guards and the territorialisation of space, are routine features of everyday life. Individuals have prior knowledge and experiences of these. Therefore, despite the bracketing and obvious distinctions which separate Games security and everyday security, there can be some overlap in terms of interpretations towards these. Prior experiences of the past anchor the present and future, where opinions and experiences of security, its residual character, influence perceptions towards mega-event security, and, similarly, experiences of mega-event security can shape attitudes towards (un)connected features in the Games legacy. Individuals give meaning to forms of security at the same time that the security gives meaning to them.

## 4.8 Conclusion

Each of the concepts offered a specific way of explaining the data at hand in itself. However, a synthesis of these into a complimentary framework was required to make sense of the complexity of the social phenomenon under study; the different interplays of governance arrangements, global and local juxtapositions of risk and security, the variable dimensions of how symbolic security measures are perceived, and the different material and ontological affects that this had. The breadth of data and explanation involved, required a combination and interplay of different concepts and ideas. Subsequently, it was this arrangement which provided many opportunities for theoretical elaboration and development and to craft a unique approach. For example, the control signals concept provided the basic idea; that security sends communicative messages to its audience, and that this can have positive or negative effects. However, there is a degree of theoretical stagnation, in terms of the explanatory limitations of this concept: it doesn't account for the mixing of global and local perceptions of risk and security which Giddens theory identifies, nor does it account for the multiple meanings and experiences emanating from the same security signal as described by Barthes and Baudrillard, or indeed, attend to the different depths and components of what contributes to people's perceptions of safety and security situations that they find themselves in, as outlined through the ideas of Goffman. Similarly, and crucially, it tells nothing about the governance structures upon which symbolic security rests, or the subsequent relationship between state and citizen and how this affects the quality of two-way communication. It is towards a further explanation of these issues that the analysis shall now cover.

## 5. Frames, Place and the Parameters of Experience

### 5.1 Introduction

Innes (2014: xiii), states that, "The tenor and tone of any reaction is shaped by the social setting in which the signalling event is itself located" (Innes 2014: xiii). The local cultures and moral orders in which signal crimes or control are situated alters the way and extent to which people respond to these. In developing this notion, I point to the importance of prior experiences of risk, security and related issues as shaping how security is perceived "in the now". The interpretative process is not just a matter of understanding visual cues on the universality of what different things objectively mean or signify. Instead the visual is made sense through a 'structure of experience', "The situated context in which any signifier is located, together with the characteristics of the audience members shapes the construction of meaning" (Innes 2004: 352).

However, this important aspect is underdeveloped within the control signals perspective, and is particularly important when considering the exceptional and temporal nature of mega-events, where lay citizens, devoid of a reliable information source, are likely to rely on prior experiences and perceptions of security and policing agents as a comparative base for trying to make sense of the new securitisation of their environment. Extant analysis of mega-event security has tended to focus on the influx of security into cities and communities as a static process, with little consideration given to how prior experiences and perceptions of security influence the way the influx of measures are understood. Innes (2014: 23) states, "each new signal crime, signal disorder, or control signal is both framed by what has come before it, and alters the frame for anything coming after". Frame analysis, contends that it is the frames that we attach to a scenario and objects within these that give it its meaning. Therefore, the way people perceive exceptional security, is something which is developed and sustained, "both in the mind and in the activity" (Goffman 1974: 247).

The concept of 'crime talk' (Sasson 1995; Girling *et al.* 2000) states that "people talk about crime, place and time in ways that are quite complexly interwoven" (Ibid 2000: 8). Therefore, it is important to consider the way that perceptions and experiences of mega-event security are bound up with other discourses relating to regeneration, crime prevention and legacy i.e. when mega-event security is introduced into the local area, individuals draw on both their prior experiences of the whole ensemble of Games related activity in order to understand what is happening, "participants bring (and are known to bring) of their past involvements to the current one, as well as the context of gestures, other words, and objects in the current environment, combine to rule out all effectively different meanings" (Goffman 1974: 441). As Innes (2014: 130) recognises, "control signals interact and intermingle with a range of other influences upon public experiences, perceptions and judgements about safety and security".

This section now identifies various scenarios, built up of various strips of activity, in the build up to Glasgow's hosting of the Games, in which disparities exist in how particular events relating to urban regeneration and security have been both framed and experienced during that time and immediately before the event.

### 5.1.1 Frame Analysis

*"Assume that the sense of any strip of activity is linked to the frame of the experience and that there are weaknesses inherent in this very framing process. It follows, then, that whatever the vulnerabilities of framing, so, too, will our sense of what is going on be found vulnerable"*

(Goffman 1974: 439)

Goffman distinguishes between 'strips of activity' which are cut from 'the ongoing stream of activity'. A strip is a scenario or particular sequence of events or happenings, and refers to "any raw batch of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one wants to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis" (Ibid

1974: 10). The relationship between particular strips and scenarios and the ongoing stream, is also a reciprocal one, "Whatever goes on within an interpreted and organized stream of activity draws on material that comes from the world and in some traceable continuation of substance must go back into the world" (Goffman 1974: 287). Different strips of activity, as detailed through the empirical realities of Dalmarnock residents' accounts and interactions within their community, will be discussed in relation to three different framing scenarios, identifying how various strips within different situations were framed by technical experts involved in the Games related regeneration and security planning within Dalmarnock. Social frameworks contain a "will aim and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being [...] What it does can be described as 'guided doings' " Goffman 1974: 22). These are then compared with the interpretation of events as experienced by local residents, describing the way that these have been perceived. This process of comparison identifies instances of 'frame disputes' and the unintended, manufactured misframings and 'fabrication' of events, "It is plain, then, that our framing of events can lead to ambiguity, error, and frame disputes" (Ibid 1974: 343). These are then related to how this impacts and influences the 'pre-signalling' context of how mega-event security is perceived.

## 5.2 Frame Scenario 1: Urban Regeneration as Benefitting Local Community Members

*"If you tell people that its rubbish, then they believe that it's rubbish, so they behave like it's rubbish and treat it like its rubbish. If you do it the other way round, where you say 'it is really good', then in theory, the perception then changes and the wheel goes the other way."*

(Interview S-CSG: 1)

Since the Games were awarded to Glasgow in 2007, council officials and those involved in the regeneration of Dalmarnock have tried to frame regeneration as

a form of physical and social transformation disregarding all notions that it is an attempt at state led, 'third-wave gentrification' (Davidson and Lees 2004). Legacy proposals promoted the idea of positive benefits to existing local community members, with promises of over £1 Billion in public spending to be spent on improving the local area, with further promises of new jobs, housing, shops and recreational facilities. The message that has been projected is that the physical transformation that have been occurring since 2008, are first and foremost, for the benefit of the existing community. In this time, much physical transformation has indeed happened: The development of the Commonwealth Arena and Sir Chris Hoy Velodrome was completed in October 2012, it is one of its kind in Scotland, and now the home of Scottish Cycling, whilst also boasting a spa, gymnasium and outdoor football pitches. Furthermore, Dalmarnock's new train station, completed in May 2013, was given an extensive overhaul, as was a section of the M74 motorway, completed mid-2012, in order to incorporate the new 'East End regeneration route', which connects the East End and Dalmarnock to the rest of the city, making it one of the most "accessible urban centres in Scotland" (Clyde Gateway 2014). In addition, Dalmarnock is also home to the Athletes' Village site, which post Games and post security "bump-out", will incorporate 1,100 state of the art private homes, 300 social rented units and a 120 bed social work care home for the elderly.

Whilst this amount of physical transformation and expenditure concentrated within the heart of one of the UK's largest urban regeneration areas is undoubtedly impressive, it has not been without controversy. As time went on, the regeneration and promises of legacy began to exist at odds with the lived realities, as a local Councillor recalls,

*"Because we were promised the moon... I was in the community centre 7 years ago (when Glasgow was announced as the winner), promised aww...we would get everything and then bit by bit...you know what I mean, things start happening, 'we can't give you this, that...'"*

(Interview YK: 1)

Irrespective of the way that Dalmarnock's regeneration has been bound up with notions of 'legacy', a word which suggest only positive lasting impacts (Cashman 2003). The reality of urban regeneration projects, as a market-driven process, means that local residents are often " 'peripheral outsiders' (Marsh and Rhodes 1992) with a ringside seat at someone else's show" (Taylor 1998: 824).

In addition to the demolition of housing, a section of Springfield Road in which the Accord Centre for adults with learning disabilities, a children's play park and BMX track, and various shops such as the post office, were located, were also demolished to make way for a bus parking facility for the Games. Figures 5-1 and 5-2, taken from the same location, shows this particular area before the demolition in 2008, and after in 2013.

At the time of research, Dalmarnock did not have a high street, a pub, a local newsagent or post office. Instead, local residents had been relying on an ice cream van for the past two years, which served as a portable shop, to provide basic necessities to residents,

*"That's the worst thing the district council done, as far as I am concerned, was they put everything round there and left us with nothing and couldn't care less, they couldn't care less about us."*

(Interview 8: W)

The removal of vital services in the community, had left many residents feeling that the regeneration was not benefitting them,

*"They took the wee ones swing park away [...] they knocked the community centre down and weren't giving us a community centre [...] They are building the community centre now, but that's up at the Velodrome, you know, that's the only bit of land they had left and yet they can make car parks, bus ports, you name it, and this is the unfairness that people see."*

(Interview 20: A)

Figure 5-1: Springfield Road 2008.



Source: Google.

Figure 5-2: Springfield Road 2013.



Source: Authors own.

While the council and those involved in the regeneration of the tried to frame events as benefitting the local people, the cumulative effect of taking away vital services in the community had left many residents feeling that the regeneration

was not benefitting them. Such sentiment has been augmented through the years of disruption that has accompanied the physical regeneration, where many locals describe their local community akin to 'living on a building site' for the past five years,

*"see it's wee things like that, people don't mention; you know, like the workmen, the noise, the big lorries. You know the size of the big industrial diggers they use, your whole house would shake, you know what I mean. For me, it's impacted me because I am worried about my mum then [...] it has been like a worksite for probably the past four or five years. There have been wee periods where it's not been, but mostly, this stuff about 18 month, one to two years ago or so, there has been that fence there, before the big fence with the cameras [...] it's just been one thing after another..."*

(Interview 19: M)

In addition to the negative aspects of physical change, the actual types of physical transformations were also questioned by residents, who felt that they have not had a say in what it is happening to their area. Physical improvements had been introduced at the expense of local priorities, compounding the feeling that regeneration has nothing to do with their own lives, and that it's "not for us",

*"This like the land that time forgot, that is what it's like. See the Chris Hoy centre up there, it's a big cycling track. Now this is a working class area, right. I don't know any kid here that is going to go up there and pay money to go and cycle round a track. It'll be people from outwith the area."*

(Interview 10: B)

For the majority of residents, the Velodrome typified their experiences of regeneration; in which they have been left with a venue at the heart of their community that they are priced out of using. Instead, feeling that such facilities are intended to target middle class outsiders,

*"I don't believe they are for this community; I don't think they were built with the intention of this community taking them after it goes because...I'll tell you why; the Velodrome is £70 for me to learn how to use it, £70 I could probably pay that, it's a lot of money but I could probably pay that, but when I talk about things, I always think of my Ma and my Ma has got 4 wains, and see for her to get them all in, the price would be astronomical, it's never going to happen."*

(Interview 29: R)

The effect of negative experiences of regeneration, both in terms of physical disruption and the nature of the regeneration itself, has led to the feeling that regeneration is something that is being done to the area and its people, as a top-down imposition directed by the Council, urban regeneration and Commonwealth Games elites. The result is that a many locals display a degree of suspicion towards those involved in delivery of the Games, and the way that particular events are being framed, as Goffman (1974: 122) states, "Suspicion is what a person feels who begins, rightly or not, to think that the strip of activity he is involved in has been constructed beyond his ken, and that he has not been allowed a sustainable view of what frames him". This was evident when one resident told the story of when a Games official visited a resident, as part of a PR exercise,

*"A person came out, and he started the speech 'By the way, all youse are deprived in this area' And we are going deprived? Nobody told me that, deprived? How are we deprived? Because you just get on with life, and he says 'No, you've no amenities here, you've no swimming, you've not got a library, your quality of life is low.' And we went, 'No, you just get on...', because we never thought we...were [deprived]."*

(Interview 25: J)

The feeling of suspicion around how a strip of activity is to be framed allows for the doubting of the straightness of events and the questioning of what framework of understanding to apply; on one hand residents were being told that regeneration will bring many benefits, but on the other, there was no signs

of this materialising. With respect to regeneration, a frame dispute can be said to have occurred, whereby locals and Games/regeneration officials openly disputed over "how to define what has been or what is happening" (Goffman 1974: 322). This is demonstrated by the two competing perspectives on events, firstly, the perspective of an elite Security Manager,

*"People are there at the moment going 'All I can hear is a generator over there, there is lorries going up and down here all the time'; people don't think what did it look like? What did it look like when it was at that state? The crime that went on in there? [...] But the area is getting cleaned up so much, you know, people will get a sense of pride and erm, I think it will...the analogy of 'you can't polish a turd', I'm not saying that at all, but what I am saying is that you have an area that was really, really run down and the reason the Games and things like that, are placed in areas like the East End of Glasgow is because they need regeneration."*

(Interview DW: 1)

This account lies at odds with the perspective of many residents who question the concept of regeneration and feel that that officials are deliberately keeping things vague, citing benefits as existing automatically through virtue that what is happening is attributed to the unquestionable good, that is 'regeneration and 'legacy',

*"You are taking their word [experts]...you know what I mean, and they are fucking keeping themselves well covered [...] there is no regeneration, it is a complete falsehood [...] Dalmarnock hasn't been regenerated in any shape or form, they have not changed a fucking light bulb on this side of the fence, you know what I mean [...] because this was all promised and it was all supposed to be part of it, you know what I mean, see when they were trying to spin it to us at the start, this was all part of it, that is how the sold it to us."*

(Interview 2: J)

As Hughes (2007: 165) states, false promises and negative experiences of regeneration is a common occurrence, "the possibility of developing 'sustainable' and 'entrepreneurial' communities [...] is also linked to a long history of broken promises and failures". It is here that two parallel and competing narratives as to the reality of events, begins to emerge between experts involved in the regeneration and delivery of the Games, and the lived perceptions and experiences of Dalmarnock residents. Resident framed various strips of activity, occurring as part of regeneration, as something which was 'not for them'. This is important, particularly when considering that "to suspect something is to question more than one event; it is to question the frame of events" (Goffman 1974: 487- 488). Therefore, negative experiences are likely to leave a 'residual character', which is brought to different framing scenarios, "The individual comes to doings as someone of particular biographical identity" (Ibid 1974: 573).

### 5.3 Frame Scenario 2: Everyday Security as Benefitting Local Community Members

Residents of Dalmarnock display a strong attachment and affinity to place. Feeling 'secure' for them is about more than just their mental and physical relation to material risks, but derives from wider sources, such as having a stake in the resources to manage ones different situations of unease.

As will be described in chapter six, the physical and social properties of Dalmarnock, as a close knit community, had always facilitated the conditions by which social cohesion and informal social control are generated and sustained. Social organisation and strong neighbourhood attachment existed amidst a backdrop of a general cynicism towards official providers of security (Anderson 1990; Silver and Miller 2004).

However, events-led regeneration introduces new aspects of security into the environment, even in the period before the Games. The focus on security and

creation of safe places has become integral to the success of regeneration projects, which aim to convey the image of safety in order to attract investment. Regeneration projects, thus result in an influx of 'situational' and 'governmental' control practices (Raco 2003), these include, "design-led approaches, which seek to 'design out' crime, and more governmental programmes which create law abiding subjectivities, thereby making the new urban spaces less threatening" (Ibid 2003:1874). Such practices operate on the notion of what Ditton and Innes (2005: 607) term the logics of 'perceptual intervention' - defined as "an action (or connected set of actions) performed with the intention of altering or manipulating in some defined way how a particular aspect of the world is seen and understood by another individual or group".

Perceptual interventions have been key to the way that the regeneration yoked securitisation has been framed in Dalmarnock. As one senior security official mentions, there has been direct attempts at changing both internal and external perceptions of crime and safety,

*"Security wise...just making it feel and look nicer, there will be an element of pride and in turn that will lead to a better environment to live in, people will feel safe and crime is reduced."*

(Interview DW: 1)

The problem here is that, by and large, residents in Dalmarnock already felt safe, and furthermore, did not feel crime to be a particular problem in their local area, "Because security is subject to the nuances of experience, it should not be regarded as an 'either or' phenomenon - something dependent upon the mere presence or absence of given material conditions" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 5). As such, security and perceptual interventions did not have the desired effect, because the feelings of safety they were trying to create, were already felt by the majority of residents. Instead, the attachment of interventions employed to change and shape perceptions which were tied in with the ongoing regeneration (which locals felt suspicious or negative about), contributed to the ways in which security was viewed with equal scepticism, as Slovic (2000: 323)

states, bad experiences reinforce distrust and cloud judgements on future events, "Initial trust or distrust colours our interpretation of events, thus reinforcing our prior beliefs". Interventions such as an increased police presence, the introduction of situational control measures such as CCTV and environmental landscaping around new developments and key venues, for local residents, at least, did not positively influence their sense of safety. Instead, perceptions of these features became entangled with the negative experiences and framing of regeneration, as something which is not for them. In particular, many residents make the distinctions between security for the community, and security that is used to protect the users/owners of the new regenerated spaces and public investments, such the Emirates arena or the Athletes' Village,


*"Researcher: ('Ad': hereafter) And over the past few years, have you seen an increase in security in the area?"*

*"J: We have seen some security, CCTV, but it's all on the other side of that fence, it's for the new village, so it doesn't affect us."*

(Interview 2: J)

Edwards and Hughes (2002: 203) note that commercial premises are often "complete with an array of features that are specifically designed to render them-burglar proof", and many regenerated spaces and areas that were undergoing development in Dalarnock display these aspects of security; sophisticated alarms, the use of resilient building materials, anti-vehicle bollards and CCTV. So while it is true there had been net increases in the use of material security, these were situated and prioritised to protect commercial developments and patrons, and were not necessarily perceived overall to be beneficial to the community. Figure 5-3, shows an array of aesthetically landscaped CPTED and SCP features embedded into the car park area of the Velodrome; CCTV, architectural lighting, street furniture, wide and open footpaths, bollards/barriers. However, the location of the car park and its dislocation from the existing streetscape topography, as situated on a fifteen foot elevated berm and surrounded by exterior gabion walls, means that such features are only beneficial to users of the facility.

Figure 5-3: Embedded CPTED and SCP features



Source: Authors own.

This was also something that was subtly implicated within the interview responses of officials from Clyde Gateway and Community Safety Glasgow, take for instance, this quote from a senior member of Clyde Gateway,

*"I think it's using the resources available because of the Games to do, things a wee bit better than perhaps would normally do, and to build in that confidence for residents, when using buildings and the area that they feel confident that there is enough security and you know...that it's beyond the Games and it's not just the spotlight about the Games and then disappears again but that there is a continued presence."*

(Interview AC: 1)

Here, a distinction is made between "when using buildings and the area", as if the benefits are equally received between spaces. However, a separation becomes more apparent when further questioning probed deeper into the rationale for urban regeneration linked security in the area,

*"It gives a bit of vibrancy to an area, particularly at night, where previously its perception led that it was unsafe, not all perceptions I suppose, but its perceptions are why people largely don't walk about there when it's dark and that's starting to change. It just adds a different kind of dimension to how people use the area at night, whether they feel safe walking up and down to say the Velodrome or wherever, using the station, parking their car here."*

(Interview AC: 1)

Implicated within this last quote is the notion of changing the *external* perceptions of outsiders or visitors to the area: "velodrome", "station", "parking their car". The framing of security, linked and embedded within the regeneration of space within Dalmarnock, assumes and positions the rationale for these features as providing benefits to local residents and visitors to this space. A more pessimistic account, however, would be that security is being introduced first and foremost to negate against negative external perceptions, as a process of perceptual interventions to the new consumer users of these spaces. By contrast, a slightly less cynical reading, would be that the disparities experienced between the framing of additional security in the area, as a public, unquestionable good, and its reality as part of the ensemble which is not perceived to offer any tangible community benefit, is due to the 'thin simplifications' (Scott 1998: 309), made by policing, council and URC experts in relation to how security works in diverse settings. These agencies lack knowledge into how existing residents in Dalmarnock actually feel in relation to crime, security and the regeneration of their area. Instead, they implement standardised regeneration/security practice "In wilful disregard of...[their] own ignorance" (Loader & Walker 2007: 117), on the basis that they know best. As a legacy research coordinator into the CWG states of the perceived rationale,

*"The redevelopment of spaces that were associated with criminal behaviour or anti-social behaviour; by them they were seeing it as crime [reduction]. By changing the nature of the landscape they were having an impact on crime and therefore security. Others could see quite clear that the construction site and the security associated with*

*that represented a reduction in fear of crime from their point of view; some sense of heightened security coming into an area that had previously had next to no presence of any."*

(Interview RR: 1)

Whilst having little impact on actual perceptions of crime and safety for local residents, the physical transformations in the area, which began to be completed around 2011/12 coincided with actual recorded decreases in crime, as shown in table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Number of Recorded Crimes Dalmarnock Area.

Period: Financial Year.

<b>Group and Selected Crimes</b>	<b>2009/10</b>	<b>2010/11</b>	<b>2011/12</b>	<b>2012/13</b>	<b>2013/14</b>
Group 1 Violence/Assault	10	6	7	1	1
Group 2 Indecency	1	0	0	0	3
Group 3 Dishonesty/Theft	48	93	32	31	31
Group 4 Vandalism/Fire-raising	34	29	28	21	7
Group 5 Drugs/Weapons etc	38	22	22	17	29
<b>Total Crime</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>71</b>
Group 6 Misc Offences	78	47	53	48	35
Group 7 Misc Offences	25	31	13	25	13
<b>Total Crime &amp; Offences</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>119</b>

Source: Police Scotland FOI request.

There are many reasons for the decrease in crime that can be attributed to the use of situational security measures and physical regeneration of the area; these include the physical redesign of former crime hot-spot and reductions in criminal opportunity. This is particularly evident in the years between 2010/11 to 2011/12 where there is a significant reduction in crimes in *Group 3, crime of dishonesty*, which includes common theft and attempted breaking of 'other

premises'. In 2010/11 many of the urban transformations and developments would still have been under construction, with different building sites situated in the local area. According to rational actor theories of crime and routine activities perspectives (Cohen and Felson 1979), these would present significant 'rewards': work tools and building equipment, for example. However, although crime has always existed in Dalmarnock, the majority of crimes taking place do not necessarily result in the criminal victimisation of other local residents. For example, a detailed breakdown of crimes under Group 3 during 2010/11 such as the differences between housebreaking attempts on residential homes and attempts on 'other premises', shows fourteen attempts were made on 'other premises' and only one attempt made on a residential dwelling in that year. Further explanations for the reductions in net crime could be attributed to the net decrease in population that has occurred through demolition and displacement.

However, from the perspective of local residents, crime is decreasing due to the overall ageing of the community, amidst a stable residential turnover. Many residents noted that Dalmarock is an area in which many people moved into the estate at the same time, have remained there ever since, and that individuals who were formerly involved in the gang activity that characterised the area twenty years ago, have simply grown out of crime, as a resident with previous experiences in such activities mentioned,

*"I wouldn't say there is less crime because of what's happened [regeneration], the crime level in Dalmarnock was still bad 5 year ago, it is only in the last three years that things have started changing. And this is mainly because, my opinion obviously, about the people who were causing the crimes are getting older."*

(Interview 19: M)

Another resident affirmed this idea,

*"Well, down here there is hardly any (crime), even before all that happened [regeneration] there has been hardly any. But when I was*

*younger, say like heading into my teenage years, yea you did have the gangs, but after that you are going, "Where is all the wee neds now?"*

(Interview 1: M)

Important to note here is that residents did not consider the influx of regeneration and material security to have had any effect either their perceptions of crime or actual crime rates in the area. Furthermore, the disparities between the framing of security and regeneration of as perceptual intervention, compared against the lived realities and experiences of this, points to the persistence and possible widening of 'social distance', between police and policed, in the community policing agenda.

For example, the phrasing of responses by members of Community Safety Glasgow does not identify any concrete partnership working between members of the community, instead referring to residents as 'customers' of their 'services'. As one member stated when asked about how residents might be experiencing the new crime prevention initiatives,

*"In terms of my dealings with customers in the East End, I would say it's good, but I think there is still quite alot of disparity, I think there is still quite alot of issues and I think people are feeling like the Games are happening TO Glasgow, rather than they feel part."*

(Interview S-CSG: 1)

The rationale behind the current wave of reassurance policing seen across the U.K has been the emphasis on police visibility; whereby police officers are intended to be regular features of the community environment, attentive to community driven concerns, and reflexive in the co-production of solutions with informal agencies and networks (Ditton and Innes 2005). The physical transformation of Dalrnarnock, and influx of situational and embedded forms of security, provided an opportunity for policing to compliment these features, as the Security Director mentions,

*"I mean again we are back this thing about all these things being very interlinked, so you know, the most significant thing that will have happened in the East End is the physical regeneration; the kind of housing stock, the change in the physical resources available to that part of Glasgow [...] then we also need to do our part in terms of crime, keeping people safe, reducing fear and all of that [...] the involvement of local policing teams doing the house to house, door knocking and general patrolling around there, is part of that, creating the environment in which the relationship between the Police and public gets stronger."*

(Interview SA: 1)

Implied here is that in order for police to accompany such changes and frame their renewed presence as being beneficial to the community, they have to be not just visible, but engaging too, promoting and sustaining the idea of 'networked community governance', "built on relations of trust, interdependence and participation, rather than hierarchical command and professional control" (Hughes 2007: 64).

However, many residents reported that the reality of policing, as described through their interaction in various strips of activity, in the area in the periods between the initial regeneration and the Games, police had not been particularly engaging, nor visible, and that if anything, the police-public relations actually became worse as a result,

*"There has hardly been a police presence here since the tenements and the flats got taken away, there has hardly been a police presence down here, whereas a few years ago, you saw the police all the time."*

(Interview 7: R)

Another resident suggests that in the past, although in general police-public relations were never particularly strong, at least they had designated local police officers who patrolled the area with a particular emphasis on engaging community members,

*"Ad: You preferred the more local approach, where it was like local police who knew the area?"*

*W: Aye!*

*Ad: You would rather have more engagement?"*

*W: Aye, definitely. They did say at the meeting 'This is your community police officer' and everybody laughed, because nobody knew him."*

(Interview 8: W)

There are two possible aspects to the apparent failing of police activity to engage residents in Dalmarnock. Firstly, is Innes's (2014: 133) notion that police can be "visible, but effectively not present", the idea is that it matters what they are seen to be doing in communities, levels of interaction and engagement, as opposed to just walking. It might be that police, have attended primarily to the later, while ignoring duties which attend to the former. However, it must be said that the physical properties of Dalmarnock during this time, has not been particularly conducive to facilitating public interactions; with a distinct lack of public spaces, services and a general fragmented street topography, possibly presenting barriers to effective engagement. Some residents acknowledged an increase in police activity in the area, however, through cars as opposed to on foot,

*"But, to see the polis here; that was the first time we have seen polis here for years, you know walking about, you see them going by in the car, but..."*

(Interview 28: T)

A second explanation, can be given by Goffman's notion of how individuals 'anchor' frames, allowing them to take for granted certain situations and their involvement in them. So far, it has been described, that the police and urban regeneration officials tried to frame a renewed security and police presence as part of the beneficial aspects of 'regeneration and 'legacy'. However, the resources used have a particular 'resource continuity' to residents of Dalmarnock, "The resources we use in a particular scene necessarily have some continuity, an existence before the scene occurs and an existence that continues on after the

scene is over" (Goffman 1974: 299). In this sense, prior perceptions and experiences of the police were used as an anchoring point, from which to frame their visible presence within the community. The fact that there had been no successful attempts made to change the 'definition of the situation' (Goffman 1956: 2), that is, improved police-public relations through face-to-face interactions. Allowed the prevalence of prior anchors and individual's 'resource continuity' of what a police presence usually means within a situation, as a way of framing particular strips of activity, As one resident states,

*"what I'm saying is...I am under the influence...I see the polis, I have never been in trouble in my life, I have never been in the jail, I have never even done a weekend or spent a night in a cell, and when I see the police I still think 'Have I done anything?', because it's natural, ...because of the way that police have always acted round...especially [towards] young people, neds or whatever it may be."*

(Interview 29: R)

For many residents of Dalmarnock, a police presence is treated with a degree of scepticism, producing a sense of ambiguity as to 'what is going on'. In situations where the police have not actively engaged community members or provided information as to their presence, a 'clearing the frame' (Goffman 1974: 342), cannot occur, "When an individual finds himself in doubt or in error about what it is that is going on, a correct reading is usually soon established. In some cases he himself will sharply orient to an examination of the setting so as to pick up information that will settle the matters [...] When the individual is contained by others or by himself, his consequent misalignment to the facts is likely to last longer" (Ibid 1974:338).

In the absence of information, doubt arises over how to frame a situation, "The concern, rather, is the special doubt that can arise over the definition of the situation" (Goffman 1974: 302). So in instances, where the police actually may have been trying to engage with the community (albeit through virtue of their mere presence), such attempts may have failed, due to the uncertainty that is felt by individuals over how they should respond in these situations, one resident

for example, described a situation where she deliberately avoided police interaction, based on such assumptions,

*"I seen the polis and the security guy, so I thought 'fuck that', I'll go that way, and they were standing at the other end, so I thought 'fuck that' and went right back around and to the back of the house."*

(Interview 30: A)

Whilst from the perspective of state experts, a visible police presence is projected as a 'good thing' within the community, consideration has to be given towards the experiential, perceptual and contextual aspects of what a police presence might actually mean to people within a particular community, as Johnston and Shearing (2003: 12) mention, "...the 'goodness' or 'badness' of programmes for governing security is a function of complex conditions and calculations which cannot be prejudged". Consistent with the theme in this chapter, it supports the idea that security programmes and perceptual interventions, should take into consideration the diversities and nuances that occur between different places, with regards to risk perception and attitudes towards security, as Innes (2014: 130) states, "How interventions conducted by the police and other institutions of social control are seen and interpreted depends in part, upon the ways individuals, communities and citizens think, feel, and act in relation to these institutions more generally".

#### 5.4 Frame Scenario 3: Commonwealth Games Security as Benefitting Local Community Members

In May 2014, the appearance of the community began to change, as a number of Games specific security measures were rapidly introduced - this recalibrated a number of variables relating to individuals sense of place, security and safety; firstly, the mass securitisation of the everyday environment such as perimeter fencing, lockdown security, CCTV and police patrols, secondly, the introduction

of unknown, exceptional risks within this space. Lastly, the disembedding of safety and relinquishing of security to technical experts, this presented a number of different framing situations, "There are, then, weak points in social life where participants become more than usually vulnerable to deception and illusion, to a wrong relation to the facts and a misalignment to experience" (Goffman 1974: 463).

In the previous framing scenarios, the 'definition of the situation', derived from an individual's reading of situations of what is being "done to and for him" (Goffman 1974: 101). Contextual Information, deriving from prior experiences of both regeneration and security, affected the perceived legitimacy of these agents in various situations. In addition, the way that these interventions had no real influence on the conditions by which individuals construct their own sense of security and safety, did not allow experts to gain control over situations, or project their true influence over the definitions which others (the community) came to formulate.

Conversely, mega-events, through the nature of their exceptionality in terms of scale, organisational requirements, perceived risk and so on, allow for "an agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues will be temporarily honoured" (Goffman 1956: 4). That is to say, experts are given priority above and beyond lay citizens to define appropriate responses in the management of the event. The 'moral demands' within this definition, are that security experts provide adequate levels of security to contend with the various risks associated with the Games. In terms of framing, experts aim to construct the impression of total security, safety and control over the event, and as mentioned previously, there are a number of aspects as to why this is important; reputational, global image and place branding, and the creation of a safe environment for athletes, visitors and residents alike.

The main reference point with by which security, as a primary framework, is conveyed, is through its visual and symbolic apparatus; CCTV, perimeter fencing and lockdown security around key venues, visible police and security presence. However, there are two dimensions as to why security is in place, serving

simultaneously as a deterrent to potential terrorists and criminals, and as a source of reassurance to the ordinary public. The problem herein, is that the methods by which security is regarded as reassuring, is 'keyed' on the same framework and activity by which security acts as a deterrent, "The set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity, but seen by the participants to be something quite else" (Goffman 1974: 44). For example, in the way that two dogs who are play fighting, pattern their behaviour on the existing framework of actual fighting; visible cues of reassurance are patterned on the same activities (overt displays of security), by which security also acts as a deterrent.

The relevance here is that overt security paradoxically communicates the presence of a security problem and measures taken against these, therefore signalling the potential of (invisible) risks in one's locality. In *keying*, participants within a strip of activity are meant to know exactly what is going on i.e. a systematic transformation of materials already associated with another schema of interpretation into another. Therefore, for security experts at the Commonwealth Games, the fundamental aim in their relationship with local community members was communicating that the security was for their safety and reassurance as well as the athletes, as opposed to predominantly acting as a signifier for the potentiality of exceptional risks. The influx of exceptional security into a residential community therefore necessitates the need for both effective channels of engagement and knowledge dissemination, in order to avoid misframings or frame ambiguities in security to occur, as a Security Manager responsible for the securitisation of the Athletes' Village states,

*"This is one of the key difficulties, and that's why here, community engagement is five times more important than it was in London 2012. Because 2012, yea there was some impact to local roads etc., but actually what you are impacting on here is an individual's castle; you are impacting on their home and their daily life and that's what engagement is so important here."*

(Interview AR: 1)

However, a dialectic at play is that it is not in the interests of security experts to communicate their information to lay members of the public. There are two reasons for this; firstly, communicating assumptions regarding the potentiality of certain risks can have the unintended effect of heightening risk perception, "the use of conservative assumptions and worst-case scenarios in risk assessment creates extreme negative reactions in people" (Slovic 2000: 185) due to the complexities of delineating between (remote) possibility and (actual) probability, of which experts themselves are also clueless in this regard (See Beck 1992; Slovic 2000). Second, experts do not want to give too much information away for fear that it will compromise the security operation itself (Molotch 2012: 4).

So while local residents required information to dispel fears of potential risks, and for security to provide reassurance, they did not always a) have the opportunities to obtain information or, b) accurate sources of information. As one Security Manager states,

*"It is a contentious issue because people don't know about it, there might be a lack of education on what we do, but you can't really tell people what you are doing because then it counteracts what you are doing [...] Because if you say 'I've got that there, that is going to stop a vehicle travelling at 50 miles per hour with a bomb in it', if you told Mrs Miggins that at number 50, she would have a heart attack anyway. Whereas if you go 'ok, we are putting a barrier there because the road is closed and we don't want people driving down into the venue because we need buses to run'. That is what they need to know, they don't need to know the ins and outs."*

(Interview DW: 1)

In terms of public consultation between security experts and residents from the east-end, an information website [www.getreadyglasgow.com](http://www.getreadyglasgow.com), was launched in October 2013. However, the first public engagement meeting took place at the Emirates Arena in March 2014, around four months before the Games, and critically, only two months before the security overlay started being introduced.

The second consultation event took place in May 2014, by which time the majority of Games related security overlay was already in place, and was attended by hundreds of community members from the East End. Not only were engagement opportunities few and far between, but many residents questioned the format of the meetings, which left little room for public cooperation and involvement,

*"See at all the meeting, they gave you a presentation and that was it, see when you asked a question, they just talked around it. They were there to give a presentation, they weren't there to give you detailed information at all."*

(Interview 2: J)

*"They did have consultation meetings, the main one had 540 people at it, which they were not expecting, that was two weeks before the Games but it was more about 'here is what is happening', people didn't have any input or say, it was just 'this is happening and you have to deal with it'."*

(Interview 29: R)

This was a common complaint among residents who felt that the 'top-down' format, left them with no input or say in the changes that were affecting every aspect of their daily lives, where significant changes were happening to their environment that they had little knowledge of,

*"We understand that there has got to be security, do you know what I mean, it's the Commonwealth. Obviously there needs to be security. But when you are putting security fences up one and a half months before the Games start and you are locking people inside their house and you are putting it right outside their garden, that's not right. Are you telling me...now the people who are staying on Springie Road, are you telling me that is right where they look out of their front door, for two and a half month, and they come out of their gate and it's just fences, is that right? And then they tell you that there is no scope for conversation."*

(Interview 18: J)

This last quote refers indirectly to two types of fabrication that can occur; the first type is 'benign', where the fabricator organises activity and the frame for the benefit of those who it deceives. The second type is 'exploitative', where the fabricator uses it for their own benefit (Manning 1992: 126). Security experts demonstrated the difficulties of their task in disseminating knowledge, both in terms of logistics and the practicalities of doing so, citing the withholding of information as a necessary evil, a 'benign' fabrication. But by sequestering knowledge, it created the 'exploitative' condition whereby security experts could justify the implementation of various security measures, without contestation, on 'security grounds', irrespective of how much disruption these actually caused local residents, as Wæver (1995: 63) succinctly identifies, "The security label is a useful way both of signalling danger and setting priority".

Mega-event security experts attempted to craft various strips of activity surrounding the securitisation of key sites within the residential community, as a fabrication which intentionally managed activities (community engagement/ levels of involvement), so that "a party of one or more others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is going on" (Goffman 1974: 83). However, keyings and fabrications undermine frames; they create uncertainties and raise further, aspects of suspicion surrounding what is happening (Manning 1992). The paradox here, is that the conditions in which mega-event security planners attempted to project a particular frame through the managing of activity (information and engagement), is also the conditions by which vulnerabilities in framing occur, "Narrowing the conduit of information also increases vulnerability to misreadings" (Goffman 1974: 453).

Vulnerabilities in the 'reassurance framework' occurred when locals residents interactions and engagements with security measures and personnel, did not match the rhetoric that security was for their benefit. For example, in the months before the Games, a security perimeter fencing was set up around the community which blocked residential homes, roads and footpaths, while in the weeks before the Games, industrial scale sand bags were positioned across

junctions and even in some residents gardens (see figure 5-4); a multitude of CCTV cameras were aligned around the perimeter which segregated the community with the Athletes' Village, while police patrolled the streets, on foot, at fixed positions, and spotters were situated on high-rise flats overlooking the area. A consequence of this lockdown security, was that residents could only enter or exit the area via one purpose built road; entrance was restricted to permit holders only, cars could not be parked on the street, while basic care services and emergency services were only allowed to enter the community on foot, this situation was described by the local Councillor,

*"Right now with their security, there is fences going up, there is cameras going up. Dalmarnock right now, if you look at it just in terms of security, the actual operation of security, they have divided the community. Because I used to run a community centre there, this has been taken away for a transport hub. So what you've got is residents that side of the park and residents this side of the park and a big ring of steel fence around about it, so they have split it. The wee path that people walk through everyday, it has now been closed, so people are feeling cut off and isolated, especially people on the Games Village site [...] so they feel isolated, they feel that after seven years of living on a building site, this is just adding more tension."*

(Interview YK: 1)

According to most participants, these developments came somewhat as a surprise to them, where they felt they had not been informed properly about how the security was going to affect them personally, as one resident stated,

*"I have been at every [consultation] meeting and everything they have told us at the meeting is wrong, it is complete lies. I have been to every single one and it is just...what they told us and what is in practice, it is fucking nothing like it, nothing like it [...] When they started putting that fencing up. I said 'why is that going up?'"*

(Interview 2: J)

Figure 5-4: Sandbags outside houses.



Source: Authors own.

The situation at this time was one of confusion; residents' were being told that the security was for their benefit and for their protection, at the same time, that such measures were negatively affecting their sense of security and safety, both in terms of their perceived predisposition to objective risks, and their sense of ontological security, the Councillor neatly summarises the unfolding of events at this time,

*"If anybody asked the OC, they would say 'yes, we are carrying out extensive consultation in communities'. But knowing how the format goes...its kinds of a 'this is it; this is what's happening, if you don't like it, the police are here'. Especially in Dalmarnock where the Games are situated, that is in lockdown and if you look, that has been a building site for seven years. People have been really, really, really keen for information...I don't know if it is a lack of trust on the OC that they*

*think the local residents are going to go mad and they are scared of the negativity surrounding it, and they are trying to keep everything hush hush. You couldn't probably fault them on the quantity of consultations taking place, because they are using social media, they are using Facebook etc etc. I would complain about the quality of the events...consultation is a two way thing but they are going out and saying 'this is how it is, black and white, if you don't like it, tough'. That is it in a nutshell, athletes are taking priority over local residents but it's been that way for seven years."*

(Interview YK: 1)

At this moment, what was needed, was for the security experts and personnel to clarify the situation, providing further information which would allow residents to either successfully frame these activities within the initial fabrication or allow them to 'clear the frame', that is, become informed and aware of the realities of their objective risk situation and the exact reasoning behind various security measures, "To say that a frame is clear is not only to say that each participant has a workably correct view of what is going on, but also, usually, a tolerably correct view of the others' views" (Goffman 1974: 338). The latter of these two situations would not have been as disastrous a scenario as a casino revealing to a customer that management had rigged the table at which he had just endured a losing streak, for there are two existing and legitimate 'tracks' within the strips of activity regarding mega-event securitisation. Of course, lay citizens know that certain risks exist regarding mega-events, but it is the quelling of information regarding the perceived realities of these risks, which can heighten risk perception itself, with residents often resorting to worst case scenarios of terrorism, rather than other risks such as legitimate protest or demonstration, for instance. This was something many Dalarnock residents stated during conversation,

*"Those sandbags and fences are in case there is a terrorist attack!"*

(Interview 10: W)

*"The thing is as well right, see all this security and all that, does this mean this is going to be a high risk place for a terrorist attack or something?"*

(Interview 18: M)

As Goffman (1974: 319) states, "Any strip of activity could be seen as organised into tracks, a main track or story line and ancillary tracks of various kinds. One of the strong arguments for this tracking hypothesis is that distinctive errors, that is, misframings, can occur in the management of each of the several tracks". The two tracks here are of course, reassurance and deterrence (as a signifier of risk). Information could have been provided which would allow the successful framing of both of these tracks, as still occurring within or under the predominant 'directional' (track) of reassurance - "what is carried in the disattend track can be blotted out, in fact as well as appearance" (Ibid 1974: 214). Instead experts managed the situation in terms of the dualistic tendency for the directional track (reassurance) to supersede and negate the other 'disattend' one (risk). By constructing activities around this dualism, by restricting knowledge about risk, at the same time, as restricting knowledge and information about the very measures used to attend to it, the disattend track, was not blotted out, but instead became more prevalent in the framing of activity.

The overarching priority of the security experts and personnel was initially to close guard information regarding the specific nature of why security was in place, this was justified on the basis that, by doing so would contribute to the overall success of the security operation, "Sometimes success can hinge on maintaining effective guard over access to information" (Goffman 1974: 453). However, at the time of the second consultation meeting, amidst large public dissatisfaction with the impact of the Games related security, security planners realised that more information was needed to quell the already strained tensions between Games organisers, the police and the public. As such, at the last minute, police were deployed to go around and speak to every household in the community. As the Security Manager responsible for the securitisation of the Athletes' Village stated of the situation,

*"The 'them and us' is still very much there. And now Police Scotland have been going round to all six hundred and thirty houses, talking to them, but I just get a sense from me, personally, and maybe I don't have visibility of the whole strategy...it's a little bit too late. We have closed the road now, I mean that's a...you have closed the main access point, you would have perhaps hoped that it had been done before that, certainly, if you had a magic wand and in an ideal world, it would have been done beforehand but we are where we are now."*

(Interview AR: 1)

However, the security governance arrangements for the Games were complex; involving a diverse range of public and private stakeholders. Subsequently, the communication regarding further dissemination of information, never reached beyond the police officers who personally visited residents. In between the time that police took to speak to the public, many sought ways of obtaining their own information to understand and define their situation, "In the face of ambiguities or incongruities, the puzzled or suspicious individual himself will sharply orient to his surround and maintain vigilance until matters become clear, sometimes making open requests for facts in order to settle the issue" (1974: 339). For example, many residents talked of approaching police officers or private security guards in the street and asking them for more information, as one resident, who works as a security guard himself, recognised, communication with the public is a key aspect of the job,

*"when you ask any of them (security personnel or police) it is just, 'Don't know, don't know', which, to me, I am in the game, that is not an excuse, it is not an excuse, they are there, the ones that are facing the public, if they want to keep the tensions down they need to tell them and tell them, 'Look, I don't know', or take their names, pass it up to their gaffer and get their gaffer to pass it up the line and see if you get an answer that way, then the next time you see them, tell them to approach you again, they maybe have an answer back for them, that is all people are asking [for],...a bit of common courtesy."*

(Interview 2: J)

What is evident here is that many security guards were unwilling to 'break frame', and so attempted to sustain the fabrication by withholding information, something which is understandable given that this would have been a key requirement of their job description, based on directions from their superiors.

However, what began to happen was the gradual unravelling of the fabrication as residents collated their own information, this was based on what little they could obtain either through what was being shared between residents, or their own prior and in situ experiences of security at the time, "Evidence that becomes available must be used mentally to provide a subjective, cognitive reorganisation before a frame is cleared" (Goffman 1974: 340). In this case, prior and present experiences of security measures, were melded with the present situations to rule out and identify particular meanings, with the biography and experiential character of individuals shaping their perceptions. This did not result in an effective 'clearing of the frame', as information was still lacking, but it did amount to a frame dispute, whereby residents doubted the straightness of the (directional) reassurance frame,

*"It's information; the communication was all wrong from the start [...], it's just about information, you know what I mean, if you don't tell people things they make up their own minds or stories on why certain things have happened."*

(Interview 9: A)

An example which demonstrates this, was a case of an elderly 83-year-old resident who took ill and a 999 call was made by a neighbour, with an ambulance being dispatched. However, the ambulance was refused entry into the residential community due to the restricted access measures, and was instead diverted, taking a detour via the Athletes' Village. In the minds of residents, this was a clear demonstration that the security measures actually exposed them to a number of risks; offering little protection or reassurance, and ultimately, was not for their benefit. Negative experiences such as this, exposed the fabrication, preventing security experts from sustaining residents' misalignment to the facts, as one Police-Community Engagement Officer

responsible for community consultation alludes to the existence of a frame dispute,

*"I think it is still a struggle to get the message across that this security is there to protect everyone, I think maybe there is a slight feeling that you are doing all this to protect the athletes and it is not, we are doing all this, all the security overlay, is to protect everyone and make sure everyone is safe. I think maybe there is still that, that feeling that all your actions are going towards the Games and the athletes that type of thing."*

(Interview SB: 1)

This account can be explained through identification of the perceptual linkages resident have made in order to define events. Residents did not solely frame the security environment as offering reassurance or a heightened sense of safety, although in the overall sense it did, but stated that these measures also increased both their sense of vulnerability and their predisposition to various risks at the localised level,

*"Ad: And how has the CWG security contributed to your sense of security?"*

*S: It hasn't. No, are you kidding on? You feel as though you are caged in; you can't walk anywhere, you can't go anywhere, one way out one way in.*

*Ad: So the security measures that you see outside your house, they have the opposite effect of reassuring you and are making you feel less secure?"*

*S: Aye, aye, definitely. There was has been that many stuff happening with ambulances and...people having bad experiences with it."*

(Interview 23: S)

The difficulties security experts had in projecting and sustaining the overall primacy of reassurance, over risk and insecurity, can further be explained by the relation of the fabrication to the ongoing stream of activity, as Goffman (1974:

116) asks, "what is the relation of a particular fabrication to the ongoing stream of wider social activity in which it occurs?" Here, Goffman's concept of anchoring devices is once again relevant, in particular *brackets*. Brackets identify when a frame begins and ends, also encouraging individuals to adhere to the logics of the frame, "what to expect in the ensuing activity" (Manning 1992: 127). For example, a spectator at a play would assume that the stage actor who speaks to the audience before the lights had dimmed to be 'out of frame' or out of character. However, some playwrights exploit the brackets and distinctions between spectacle and game, as a way of temporarily exciting or deceiving the audience, a 'play within a play', for example.

Mega-events are similarly governed by both temporal and spatial brackets; they are temporary events in the lifetime of a city, physically demarcated from the 'everyday', through the use of stadiums, ticketed entrances, and other forms of security lockdown. For an ordinary visitor to the Commonwealth Games, they would have negotiated security, similar to the way that they would at an airport; they would have had to pass through security fencing and gates which mark out the boundary of the venue from the existing streetscape. Brackets provide the contextual environment in which security is to be understood, they "establish a slot for signals which will inform and define what sort of transformation is to be made of the materials within the episode" (Goffman 1974: 256). In this scenario, the various control signals on display are understood (or at least identifiable) through a reassurance framework which is tied into the 'zones of contractual governance' (Crawford 2003), this is based on the premise that security measures are in place for spectators' safety, functioning as a universal club good. Similarly, a degree of tolerance is likely to be shown towards security in this context, where the perceived benefits outweigh the negotiating of security. Even if one does not feel particularly reassured by such features, they at least know, in a very basic sense, why they are in place, and can similarly expect certain 'appearance formulas' (Goffman 1974: 269), such as person-role expectancies between citizens and security. For example, police or private security may be overly friendly or helpful in ways that they would not normally be in a different frame.

However, at G2014, residents did not experience the security within these clearly identifiable brackets. Instead, their experience of security was within the context of their everyday environment. According to the logics of Goffman, this requires a change in frame and perception towards these measures, as the 'slot for signals' in which they communicate, has changed; whereas brackets for the spectator served to demarcate the beginnings and ends of exceptional and the everyday, for local residents, such distinctions have collapsed, "The bridge ordinarily available for crossing from one sphere to the other - houselights, prologue, preface, tuning up - is simply absorbed into the inner doings, forcing the audience to drink out the handle of their cup" (Ibid 1974: 399). As stated before, the imposition of the exceptional within the everyday, disembeds the relations that citizens have in identifying and attending to their own objective risk situation, placing them in a state of dependency to expert forms of security. However, this unequal distribution does not necessarily mean the smooth framing of events; the increased social distance between citizen and expert, paradoxically, contributes to the situations in which frames become vulnerable to suspicion, misframings, frame disputes or fabrication. When security does not include internal or external brackets, it is less clear as to what frame should be applied in understanding it. But of course, other anchoring devices such as 'resource continuity', exist in order to reduce doubt about the frames meanings, but the problem here, is that it is assumed by planners that all individuals have only positive prior experience of those resources.

If prior experiences and assumptions towards particular resources are negative, then this will provide one of the main subjective ingredients as to how an activity is framed, "each participant brings to an activity a unique store of relevant personal knowledge, attends to a slightly different range of detail, and presumably remains unaware of much that could be available to his perception" (Goffman1974:149). As a resident stated, their experiences of mega-event security was framed partially by their prior experiences,

*"We have lived with it through all these years, you know what I mean, it's not only two weeks, for everybody it just a two week experience but for us it has been like seven year nearly, do you know what I mean [...]"*

*The outside perception is that everything is great and all that and Glasgow is throwing a great Games, but they don't understand what's happening to the people that stay right here in the middle of it."*

(Interview 23: S)

However this problem is also twofold; in terms of security personnel, they may be unsure over how to act as they traverse between bracketed and everyday activity; between spectacle and game, or rather, community and venue, where they inevitably take on different person- role formulas. The risk here is that they change frame so often that they lose their footing, Goffman terms this as 'flooding out', "Individuals attempting to maintain normal appearances under hazardous and fateful conditions, whether engaged in a benign or exploitative fabrication, have a problem, too; restraining themselves from flooding into defensive behaviour can generate what is seen as furtiveness, a flooding out that gives the show away" (Goffman 1974: 353). Examples relating to these internal tensions, will be discussed in the last chapter of the analysis, but one aspect worth mentioning relates to instances where police officers 'inner selves' peeked out from behind their role, thus revealing aspects of the fabrication,

*"Ad: But the police have been quite Ok?*

*M: Aye, they have been alright, the ones that I have spoken to anyway. I mean a couple of them are shocked, the way they have done this with us. I think they are because I heard one of the women (neighbour) saying, she was speaking to one and they says 'I am shocked the way youse are hemmed in here and you haven't even got a shop', she says 'No, they pulled them down...to put tents up'."*

(Interview 3: M)

At G2014, the constant flux and bleeding out of security from beyond its temporal and spatial bracketing, further complicated the issue of framing, for both security actors and citizens, "The difference between spectacle and game...complicates matters of brackets, leading to the possibility of sharply different perceptions, depending on whether the outer or inner realms are of chief concern" (Goffman 1974: 263).

This third framing scenario identified the practical complexities of assuming that material displays of security will have the desired effect for all, "It is one thing to offer guarantees of security to subjects. It is another to assume that they will be realised in practice" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 5). This situation was exacerbated by the way that mega-event security attends to its dual functions of deterrence and reassurance; by sequestering information from the public, and instead, predicating security on the assumption that symbolic presence equals safety, was to submit security to the full vulnerabilities of framing, ironically creating the conditions in which both a mistrust of expertise, and resultant anxiety, unease and insecurity, took hold. As one resident neatly summarised of the situation,

*"Don't tell us lies or mislead us, because that only causes animosity and uncertainty, and it actually makes us feel less safe."*

(Interview 8: W)

## 5.5 Conclusion

### 5.5.1 Frames as 'Pre-signalling' Context

As has been discussed, frame analysis serves as an analytical tool for deepening our understanding of how exactly individuals make sense of the strips of activity in which security occurs, "We see an incident but cannot decipher it until we install assumptions about what we are seeing" (Manning 1992: 119). The notion of frame alignment identifies the way that misalignments can occur between Games organisers and lay citizens in the framing and perception of narratives and activities relating to the Commonwealth Games. It also highlights the situations and conditions under which particular ideas and rhetoric's of security and crime control can be both sustained or become vulnerable, "Frame analysis, then, recommends an analytical basis for discriminating sources of ambiguity. It

also leads us to ask about the circumstances under which an ambiguity can persist through time" (Goffman 1974: 307).

A cross-cutting theme of the signal crimes perspective is that 'culture and situation matter' in how signals are both sent and received. Through identifying the organisation of experience, as existing through the application of frameworks, it can be said that the way in which particular signs function and are interpreted, is dependent on the frame that is applied to the situations in which these signs are located. Therefore, a theoretical elaboration is given towards this aspect of 'pre-signalling'. As Goffman (1974: 256) states, frames establish a slot for signals, which in turn, affects the transformation of materials within a particular episode. For example, local resident's prior experiences of misalignments of regeneration and security contributes to the bank of relevant personal knowledge (in the mind) that they will then apply to different framing scenarios (the activity) in the future.

By identifying control signals as 'resources' within strips of activity, and recognising that these have a continuity (unrelated to the present frame) both before and after particular events, which influences how activity is framed, the organisational principle upon which control signals communicate and are interpreted, is widened beyond one dimensional, 'material' issues of risk and safety. For example, issues of physical and social change in one's community and their sense of attachment to it; levels of existing informal social control; perceived police legitimacy and effectiveness; the nature of police encounters; levels of trust in authority; and suspicion of the straightness of events, were all shown to influence how resources, and the situations they belonged to, were framed. Similarly, if non-security issues and experiences can shape how security is interpreted, then vice-versa, security can also communicate issues unrelated to risk or security, but related to the wider frame in which these occur, such as 'are these measures for me?', 'Do I benefit from them?' and so on.

Lastly, the underlying narrative that is begging to emerge here, and exists throughout all of the remaining chapters, is that the current mode of security governance at mega-events, and the expert/lay relations that it dictates, where

a great of deal of social distance exists between state expert and lay citizen, has significant implications for the (mis)communication of security. In this way, control failures, and instances where security does not result in any heightened sense of reassurance among the public, not only highlights problems of communication, but identify deeper issues with security governance too.

## 6. Geographies of (In)Security

### 6.1 Introduction

Current debates in mega-event and security literature which have been previously outlined, identify an important development which deserves further investigation: On one hand, mega-event literature continues to point to the importance of 'place', in which local host cities are "not reducible to colonial impositions of externally defined practice" (Fussey and Klauser 2014: 2), that is to say that the homogeneity of security orthodoxies "impacts unevenly on its diverse host cities" (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 60). Therefore, place is deemed important, and is a vital component in discovering the "points of harmony and dissonance" (Ibid 2011: 131) that are created between the globalised and localised forms of security. However, at the same time, the dominant perspective in contemporary security and crime control literature points to the eradication of place and 'local' specificities of security and control, as they are engulfed by globalised conditions of risk and insecurity. For example, Simon (2007) and Loader and Percy (2012) note the 'war on crime' has collapsed into the 'war on terror', merging distinctions between internal and external, between military and police. The risk profile of modernity results in a pervasive awareness of 'high consequence, low probability' risks, such as terrorism, which simultaneously exist "everywhere and nowhere" (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 514). As a result, traditional, localised forms of trust and sources of ontological security; kinship, community, ritual and routine are deemed to be ineffective in contending with these issues. Instead, trust is placed in abstract and disembedded institutions, "The routines which are integrated with abstract systems are central to ontological security in conditions of modernity" (Giddens 1991: 113.)

This chapter superimposes these two different, but interconnected, perspectives - investigating and identifying the primacy of place in relation to globalised mega-events, their risk profiles and resultant security infrastructures. By

identifying the geographical and social characteristics of Dalmarnock and the existing attitudes, perceptions and experiences of its people towards crime, risk, state authorities and (in)security *before* the Games, it is argued that place is still vitally important in influencing people's sense of security. This offers a place based criticism of the totalising claims of late modernity, but agrees that disembedding and a reliance on abstract systems of security does occur in particular times and situations, such as mega-events, where these have become 'hyperreal'. It is these place and events which change the dynamics by which people relate to particular forms of risk and security.

## 6.2 The Importance of Place

In late modernity, place has become 'phantasmogmatic', "that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them" (Giddens 1990: 19). The primacy of place, and the community, has been replaced by disembedding systems, which have collapsed time and space, and distinctions between the global and the local, resulting in a lack of stake or control in the nature of individuals' everyday lives, "The lack of control which many of us feel about some of the circumstances of our lives is real" (Giddens 1990: 146). In late modernity, reflexivity is removed from the interactions between experts and lay citizens over modern risks. Places are now infused with abstract systems and technical experts who are in the majority of cases "alien, obscure and inaccessible" (Beck 1992: 4).

However, the extent to which this process has taken shape, is an empirical question; as globalising as Castells' (1996: 697) 'network society' perspective is, he still recognised that "Most of New York, in fact most of Manhattan, is very local, not global". Similarly, Sampson (2012: 23) identifies the city life as a "multidimensional mosaic", where the effects of globalisation are not equally distributed or felt across space. Similarly, in terms of disembedding, it is not true to say, as Giddens (1991: 146) does, that "place does not form the parameter of experience", and while global disembedding systems exist in

shaping the majority of social life, much of everyday life is still firmly embedded within the local. As such, the extent to which we are disembedded is a matter of place, and as Bottoms (2009: 50) states, "human beings remain embodied creatures whose bodies can be in only one place at a time".

Applying this thinking to issues of risk and security, it can be said that significant variations also exist *between* and *within* cities on the likelihood of different exceptional and prosaic risks. This, in turn, is likely to shape both individuals risk perceptions, their sense of (in)security, and their reliance on abstract security systems, as they navigate through different places. As Innes and Fielding (2002: 3.6) state, "public understanding of the seriousness of a risk is not defined solely by the characteristics of the event itself. Rather, it is the nature of the risk, its semiotic properties, together with the context in which it occurs, that shapes how it is interpreted and understood".

## 6.3 Profiles of Risk Perception: Glasgow and Dalmarnock

### 6.3.1 Glasgow City

The city, like many others, had been "stigmatized by historically correlated and structurally induced problems of crime and disorder" (Sampson 2009: 24). Stigma, in the context of Glasgow, gave way to the idea that the city was perceived to be unduly dangerous. However, since the early 1990s, Glasgow City Council, with a particular focus on the city centre, has made a concerted effort to reverse its negative image through forms of 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Harvey 1989). Subsequently, over the past 30 years, Glasgow has hosted a number of hallmark events, gaining global recognition as a world class city: In 1988 it hosted the Garden Festival, this was quickly followed by Glasgow being awarded the 1990 European City of Culture. These events helped contribute to the mass regeneration of large areas of the city and its expansion eastwards. The combination of physical transformation projects and raised international

profile as a leading world city for culture, leisure and consumption, helped make Glasgow an attractive host city for a number of large sporting events, hosting the 2002 Champions League Final, 2007 UEFA Cup Final and 2009 MOBO Awards. It also played host to eight football matches, as part of the London 2012 Olympics.

An underlying aspect to the success of Glasgow's urban revitalisation has been security, "A key element in ensuring the success of such developments is that of perceived and actual levels of security. Regeneration programmes often take place in areas previously characterised by dereliction, petty crime and negative perceptions, something that is critically important given that perceptions of crime are closely linked to particular places (Heal 1999). Ensuring that new urban spaces and are seen to be safe are, consequently, among the main priorities for regeneration agencies" (Raco 2003:1870). The physical restructuring of the inner city Glasgow and its different social uses has enabled security to be 'designed in', increasing resilience and target hardening, at the same time that certain crimes have been 'designed out' through reducing the opportunities and rewards for them taking place. For example, situational crime prevention strategies (SCPs) and forms of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) such as CCTV cameras, improved street lighting, fencing and secured entry to buildings and flats are now commonplace within the city (Helms 2008).

Whilst the quantifiable effects of this on actual crime rates lie beyond the remit of this thesis. Some points will be shown to be relevant to this particular study. Firstly, regarding the effects of this securitising process, one perspective is that crime prevention programmes increase security consciousness and subsequent fear of crime (Norton and Courlander 1987; Winkel 1988). As Garland states, "In this respect, 'crime consciousness' - with its dialectic of fear and defensive aggression - has come to be built into our physical environment (in shopping malls, leisure complexes, airports, train and bus stations, city centres etc.) and thus into the habitual routines of our everyday lives" (Garland 2000: 365, quoted in Helms 2008: 110).

Such assumptions are based on the fact that these embedded security features or policing activities 'signal' something to the public, inducing a change in perception, or behavioural reaction in the receiver, "What separates 'signals' from 'noise' is whether a defined cognitive, affective, or behavioural reaction is elicited" (Innes 2014: 23). However, when the topic of security came up in discussion with residents of Dalmarnock, about how they experienced forms of security, not in their own local community or in relation to the Games, but in their everyday experiences of the city centre of Glasgow, there was a general lack of acknowledgment to the relevancy of these features in shaping both urban experience and perceptions of (in)security, in an everyday sense. As one participant states,

*"I don't think ever think about Glasgow in terms of security, it's a safe place, obviously when I am out and about I know there are things like CCTV, but I don't really think about them, and I wouldn't say that these sort of things make me feel any safer either."*

(Interview 2: J)

Another participant reaffirms this position, this time in relation to crime,

*"Yea, you get some crime in Glasgow, but name me a city that doesn't? And do I think about it when I go about my daily business? Never. It would drive you mad; you can't live your life like that."*

(Interview 5: J)

These examples are representative of the attitudes many Dalmarnock residents have towards both security and everyday crime, whenever they talked about their experiences of visiting the city. What this demonstrates is that much of the visual and perceptual cues relating to physical security or crime are screened out from consciousness. That in the pre-Games, context of their everyday lives, security features such as CCTV, become mere background noise to everyday life, "CCTV cameras have disappeared into the background of urban life and become socially invisible - out of sight and mind" (Goold *et al.* 2013: 985). Similarly, the perceptual evaluation of the city in terms of crime is not something that sits

ambiently in everyday thought but is considered a normal feature of city life, requiring little attention. As Garland (2001: 156) states, "other individuals react with measured stoicism, inuring themselves to crimes, adapting to this 'fact of life' in the same humdrum way that they adapt to the daily grind of commuting".

Possible reasons for these perceptions are that crime in Glasgow, as in the rest of Scotland and the UK, has been continually decreasing (Innes 2014). In 2011, Mercer's (2016) quality of living ranking, which uses levels of personal safety as a key variable, identified Glasgow as the safest city in the UK (The Herald Scotland 2011), a title that it still retains in 2016. In addition, a report from Community Safety Glasgow presented to Glasgow City Council outlines that reductions in crime and fear of crime over have taken place at a faster rate than other cities in the UK, over the past ten years (Evening Times 2016). However, In spite of these findings, caution must be taken when considering the reliability and validity of these findings, as indicative of the ontological realities and experiences of crime facing all citizens in Glasgow.

A qualitative explanation, for this 'banal acceptability' (Girling *et al.* 2000: 153) shown by Dalmarnock residents towards everyday forms of security and crime, when describing their experiences in the centre of Glasgow, is that their home town of Dalmarnock, before the Games, has very little in the way of obvious forms of security and crime prevention...

*"A: I've not seen any CCTV; I've never seen CCTV down here.*

*Ad: It's not something you really think about?*

*M: Na...*

*A: It is something that has never been used. I mean it isn't, it is somewhere that was always just kind of left, Dalmarnock, wasn't it."*

(Interview 4: A & M)

Instead of a high social dependency on formal physical security measures, residents of Dalmarnock show the utilisation of informal measures to provide both a sense of security and help prevent crime. This will be explored further later on. But one aspect relevant here is that through their experiences of living

in Dalmarnock residents have developed a naturally resilient character towards issues of crime and fear of crime. As one former Police Officer for the area stated,

*"[Dalmarnock] used to have high crime rates. The difference now is like night and day. Dalmarnock used to be the murder capital of Europe."*

(Interview MM: 1)

The experience of living in a high crime area, without ever depending on formal security interventions, has meant that many Dalmarnock residents display a naturally 'streetwise' character. According to Anderson (1990: 6), someone who is streetwise, knows "how to behave in uncertain public spaces". Anderson (1999) later developed his work to describe how some people use a "code of the street"; forms of etiquette and informal rules, to help manage how they are perceived by other people within public space. Codes of the street are developed where people have a lack of trust or dependency on the formal providers of crime control and feel personal responsibility for their safety, they are a "cultural adaption to a profound lack of faith in the police and the judicial system" (Anderson 1999:34).

Dalmarnock residents have subsequently built up the necessary 'psychological resilience' (Innes 2014: 43) to withstand the negative effects associated with everyday physical and social disorder. The consequence from this scenario is that when entering unknown or unfamiliar areas such as the city centre of Glasgow, generally speaking, there is a lower dependency on formal security measures in these settings to provide a sense of security, and also a higher threshold at which fear of crime, or a sense of vulnerability becomes a conscious activity. When Dalmarnock residents talked of the visible displays of security and crime prevention or the fear of crime within Glasgow's city centre, it is evident that these features have no discernible effect upon them.

So far, the risk profile of Glasgow and its levels of security infrastructure have been discussed in terms of the everyday crimes and disorders. Much of the security and policing arrangements in Glasgow are organised to protect against

everyday crimes and incivilities; theft, anti-social behaviour, litter dropping, loitering, and street begging. Crime prevention and security in the city is thus predicated against the removal of 'social pollutants' (Urry 1995), which undermine the aesthetic qualities of the city, and such features are now embedded within its regenerated areas and spaces of consumption (Helms 2008).

Hughes (2007) identifies that within criminology, there is a tendency to overpredict the nature and influence of global trends on prevention and safety strategies, and whilst his criticism is directed at proponents of partnership approaches in security governance (Garland 2001; Johnston and Shearing 2003), it can also be applied to the idea of exceptional security and urban resilience. Coaffee and Rogers (2008: 101), for example, state that many cities are undergoing changes in "morphology and management", in regards to the perceived risk of terrorism. Similarly, Innes (2001: 4), states that Britain has been "re-designed in order to try and manufacture a sense of security". However, while this may be case, and while there is no doubting such trends are happening across cities in the UK and Glasgow is one of them (*Glasgow Resilience Unit*). Nor is there any doubt that urban resilience is a consideration undertaken in the background security governance and emergency planning arrangements within cities. However, what is open to debate, is the extent to which the morphology and appearance is indicative of this process, as one Security Manager for the Games states,

*"there isn't that much [security] in place already that would deter a significant threat, I certainly wouldn't rely on it for the Games. So, most of the kit (security overlay) that we are using, is being brought into Glasgow specifically for the Games."*

(Interview DW: 1)

Indeed, the idea of Glasgow's temporal and transient experiences of a heightened state of security is supported by the way that Glasgow's Strathclyde Police (now part of 'Police Scotland') pitched their own existing security preparedness when bidding for the Games. Rather than focussing on Glasgow's pre-existing, ambient and embedded forms of resilience already in place, the

argument that was presented was that Glasgow already had experience of providing safe and secure *one-off*, events. As a Legacy Research Coordinator for the Games mentioned,

*"If you look at the G2014 bid in 2004 that was put in, the security legacy question was addressed entirely by saying that Glasgow has significant knowledge about how to manage events, so 'we know how to do it', and ok, this is a big bigger than what we have done before but we have hosted all these events, sporting events in the past, at Hampden, Ibrox and Celtic park which of the scale, at least in one single event is the scale of what is going to happen at G2014, therefore we should be able to do it [host the Games]."*

(Interview RR: 1)

This last point might seem strange, especially when considering that in 2007 Glasgow Airport was on the receiving end of a terrorist attack. However, the immediate security response to this, was a subtle redesign of the airport entrance in order to be more resilient to any similar attack. And conceptually, a more enduring legacy was that such incidents are now part of the risk assessment process in the building and design of public transport hubs in Britain (International Business Times 2015). But in terms of enduring public perceptions of risk or vulnerability to exceptional risks among the public, the attack does not sit in collective memories in the same way other events do. Out of all Dalmarnock residents interviewed, only one participant mentioned the Glasgow attacks directly when talking of issues of exceptional risk or security. Instead, indirect perceptual links may have been made, where some residents talked of the need for security at the Commonwealth Games due to the "way the world is", in this sense, acts of terrorism such as the Glasgow attacks contribute to the cognitive associations between major sporting events as terrorist targets.

*"they need to do that for the Games, to protect people, don't they. It's a shame they need to do things like that, but that's the way the world is."*

(Interview 13: S)

This section has shown that the individual and collective biography of Dalmarnock residents and their prior experiences of crime and security shapes and mediates the extent to which thinking about risk and security become a conscious activity. Local residents have a sense of ease in their everyday environment which also extends to their use of the city centre. Similarly, the routinised nature of security reaffirms such feelings precisely by being banal and unnoticed, "When the world immediately around the individual portends nothing out of the ordinary, when the world appears to allow him to continue his routines...we can say that we will sense that appearances are 'natural' or 'normal' " (Goffman 1971: 283).

The fact that individuals usually feel in control of their own safety and do not consider Glasgow a particularly dangerous city, allows to them to successfully define the situations in which they find themselves; whether visiting the shopping districts or the underground station, their prior conceptualisations about both risk and security, allow them to answer the question 'what is happening here?', which reaffirms a sense of ease.

For example, the previous quotes by Goffman, describes how residents do not give much serious thought about physical security as affecting their own sense of safety, similarly, the normalcy of physical security as embedded within legitimising practices (shops etc.), does not influence levels of perceived risk in those situations.

By contrast, Innes (2014: 48) states that, "in an era which is, in part, as a result of threats to national security in the form of terrorist attacks and neighbourhood security in the forms of crime and anti-social behaviour, increasingly defined by a pervasive and permeating sense of 'ambient insecurity' (Innes 2003b), people are cognitively and emotionally on a heightened state of alert". However, for residents of Dalmarnock, in the course of their normal everyday lives, this does not seem to be the case. They do not usually think about everyday crime and disorder, nor depend on formal institutions to mitigate against these. Furthermore, residents do not appear to be on a heightened state of alert to the

possibility of attack from terrorists, even when visiting the more 'globalised' city centre.

The late modernity and risk society literature argues that generalised anxiety or 'ambient insecurity' (Bauman 2000) is embedded in everyday, normalised routines "a realm which still has to be watched over, but with minimal carefulness" (Giddens 1991: 128). However, as Girling *et al.* (2000: 8) identify, "neither Bauman nor Giddens (nor yet Beck) are particularly sensitive to variations in these experiences between places". As such, ambient insecurity does not necessarily encourage the proliferation and consumption of security hardware in all aspects of life; nor does it result in the sense that individuals have no control over their lives, retreating into the "safe haven of territoriality" (Bauman 1998: 117). And finally, everyday crime and disorder does not always give form to more inchoate fears, by the simple fact that individuals, by virtue of the places that they operate within, may only experience one or neither of these sensations at any one time.

Subsequently, 'transient insecurity' is a useful concept to consider when thinking about mega-events. These globalising events lead to "the exceptionality and internationalization of the locality" (Fussey *et al.* 2011). This amalgamation has the potential to recalibrate the transitory experiences of risk and (in)security that local residents of the host city encounter in their everyday lives, and replace them with more ambient ones. A heightened sense of risk perception and disembedded reliance on security, are not ambient properties of late modern societies, but come into being at certain 'transient' moments - for example, when at an airport, football match or mega-event.

The examples of risk perception between Glasgow and Dalmarnock shows a transferability between experiences and perceptions of crime and security in a locality and how these can be applied to different surroundings. In this sense, perceptions of risk and security remain stable while place changes. This is due to the fact that, for many residents of Dalmarnock, thinking in terms of exceptional risk or security only occurs in certain transient contexts, if at all; therefore, the similarities in social situations that one find themselves in, whether in

Dalmarnock or in the city centre, mean that the intensity of risk perception, usually remains, more or less, the same.

The reason for this transferability can be explained by Innes and Fielding's (2002: 7:1) distinction between 'situated' and 'disembedded' signals. In negotiating spaces such as one's own community or the city centre of the city in which they live, information is acquired directly from the local area. Signals of crime and disorder, and of control, are 'situated' within place; the everyday risks that they communicate, or signal, and peoples responses to them, are understood through "co-present and personal experience" (Ibid 2002: 7:1). However, mega-events introduce 'disembedded' risks and resultant security into the host city, "sporting mega-events internationalize the local community and, in doing so, create a security environment aimed at responding to exceptional and external needs" (Fussey et al. 2011: 238). Knowledge about the associated risks and forms of security are not based on prior experiences, mainly because most will not have any. Instead, perceptions and the knowledge base underpinning them, is "wholly media-dependent" (Innes and Fielding 2002: 7:1).

At mega-events, it is security and risk that changes *within* place, i.e. the social situations of security. There is a change in residents' stake in security governance: in their everyday community, the governance of residents' security was built into the day-to-day routines and familiarity with informal networks. While during the mega-event, security governance becomes a matter of technical expertise, sequestering the issues of risk and security from public deliberation and oversight. This situation presents an opportunity to look at how prior 'situated' conceptualisations of security are applied to the new 'disembedded' security environment, and between transient and ambient states of heightened risk perception and security awareness. However, in order to do so, it is important to outline the contextual backdrop of both Dalmarnock and the hosting of G2014.


### 6.3.2 Dalmarnock

Both London 2012 and Glasgow 2014 demonstrate a return to situating the majority of Games related activity within the existing urban milieu, in the respective East Ends of the city. Although the CWG occurred over different areas of Glasgow, with some events even taking place as far afield as Edinburgh and Barry Buddon, near Dundee, the majority of Glasgow's Games related activity took place in the 'East End cluster' or 'arena district', situated within the residential district of Dalmarnock. A major success of Glasgow's original bidding document was their situating of the Games legacy within the context of the long term regeneration of the East End (Matheson 2010). As such, many of the venues and facilities that were used for the Games were already fully operational within the community (see figure 6-1). For example, Celtic Park home of Celtic Football Club, played host to the opening ceremony; the Commonwealth Sports Arena and Sir Chris Hoy Velodrome opened in 2012, and usually operates as a gym, sports hall and spa, hosted the Badminton and track cycling competitions; while the recently refurbished Dalmarnock Strain Station that was completed in 2013, acted as a transport hub for visitors and fans. Meanwhile, Dalmarnock was also the location for the Athletes' Village site, lying directly adjacent to the other facilities mentioned and built on a 38 hectare space in the centre of the existing community.

Dalmarnock, itself, is a traditional working class area, lying two miles east of the city centre of Glasgow. A Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics report identifies that its population in 2011 was 3,312, with just 149 people within the total population aged between 16 and 19. 60% of its total population are of working age, 22 % pensionable age, and 18% are children. Further social and economic indicators identify it as an area of relative deprivation in relation to its wider parliamentary constituency, and the rest of Scotland, For example, table 6-1, shows that it has much higher levels of income and employment deprivation, drug misuse, and those aged over sixty claiming guaranteed pension credit compared to its wider constituency and the rest of Scotland. In addition, its property values are much lower than the national average and the physical

dereliction, resulting from years of ongoing regeneration, has meant that everyone within Dalmarnock lives within five hundred metres of a derelict site.

Figure 6-1: Residential community and venues.



Source: Author edited map.

Table 6-1: Key statistics: Intermediate Geography Dalmarnock.

Socio-Economic indicators	Dalmarnock	Shettleston Constituency	Scotland
% Total population income deprived, 2005	46	27	14
% Total population employment deprived, 2008	34	21	12
%Population aged 60+ claiming guaranteed Pension credit, 2010	49	N/A	16
Hospital admission for drug misuse, per	992.44	527.00	127.46

100,000, 2001-2004

Average tariff position of s4 students, 2010/2011	137	168	184
House sales mean price (£), 2011	58,772	119,002	163,264
% people within 0-500 of derelict site	100	N/A	30.9

Source: Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics.

In terms of crime, the area had always been a "community where there has been quite a high percentage of crime" (Interview MM: 1), as one Police Officer who had previously worked in the area had mentioned. However, statistics gained through a freedom of information request to Police Scotland, show (see table 6-2) that even before regeneration began in 2008, serious forms of crime such as assault and robbery were not especially high; crimes within 'group 1' such as assault, robbery or attempted murder were limited to a few individual cases per year. While the breakdown of crimes categorised under 'group 5', drugs/weapons, shows that possession of drugs rather than weapons to be the main source of criminal activity. Interestingly, the total number of offences in group 1-5 contributed in each year, to less than half of the total number of recorded crimes and offences. Instead, the most frequently recorded acts were those under group 6 'miscellaneous offences', which includes breach of the peace, urinating and drinking in public and group 7, 'motoring offences' such as speeding, driving without a seatbelt and other forms of careless driving. As will be shown, crime has not served to undermine the existing social order in Dalmarnock, and it may be that the types of crimes in group 6 and 7 are not particularly impactful in terms of shaping collective risk perception and inducing fear of crime (Innes and Ditton 2005).

Table 6-2: Number of Recorded Crimes Dalmarnock Area.

Period: Financial Year.

Group and selected crimes	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
Group 1 Violence	5	7	11	8

Group 2 Indecency	3	3	3	0
Group 3 Dishonesty	26	30	42	35
Group 4	35	16	41	49
Vandalism/Fireraising etc				
Group 5 Drugs/Weapons etc	21	21	16	42
<b>Total Crime</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>134</b>
Group 6 Misc Offences	64	57	69	125
Group 7 Traffic Offences	37	26	39	15
<b>Total Crime and Offences</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>274</b>

Source: Police Scotland FOI request.

However, irrespective of the different types of crime and disorders, and the subjective interpretation of these, objectively, these quantitative crime and socio-economic indicators have been adopted as part of the 'problem estate' motif ubiquitous in urban regeneration programmes (Atkinson 2002). Providing the contextual backdrop upon which Dalmarnocks regeneration and hosting of the Games has taken place, "The rhetoric of regenerating a physically blighted area offers a great opportunity for host cities to frame legacy" (Gold and Gold 2008: 312).

The concentration of social and geographical disadvantage, is perceived to compound issues related to crime and safety, and for external perceptions at least, areas such as Dalmarnock were identified as 'irredeemable', a symptom and signifier of 'Britain's dangerous places' (Campbell 1993), as a senior member at Community Safety Glasgow states,

*"The East End of Glasgow was rife with criminal activity and behaviour, to an extent that Police Scotland were kind of unsure of half of what was going on."*

(Interview S-CSG: 1)

For example, statistics from the same data set provided by Police Scotland show that in the same period, between 2005 and 2009, the percentage of detected

crimes ranges from as low as 30% in 2005/06 and peaks at 51.3% in 2007/8 (Police Scotland).

Part of the police's inability to contend with much of the crime in the area, was as the local Councillor explains, exacerbated by the fact that police were not particularly active or engaging with community members, leading to the fostering a lack of trust between the police and the community,

*"I mean for a place ten years ago that was a police no go area, police cars were turned over in Dalmarnock years ago, it was viral."*

(Interview YK: 1)

During the 1990s and 2000s, the external perceptions were that Dalmarnock typified the 'dangerous Glasgow', in which presumptions about levels of disorganisation and disorder were embedded in social and political thought. The coinciding moral authoritarian, zero tolerance and managerialist approaches to policing at this time are likely to only have increased social distance through their "detached objectivity towards social problems", which ultimately fostered "a lack of mutual understanding and empathy" (Schneider 1999: 66), between Dalmarnock residents and the police. As such, police and a visible police presence in the community has often been viewed with scepticism and cynicism, as one resident mentions,

*"The only time people see the polis is A) when they have done something wrong, or B) when something wrong has been done to them. That's the only two times you see the polis."*

(Interview 29: R)

However, in criminology and urban sociology, the common sense attitude to 'crime-ridden' or 'problem areas' is that these tend to be characterised by elements of 'social disorganisation' (Sutherland and Cressey 1974), in which the move towards modern capitalist societies has replaced the "steady, uniform, harmonious, and consistent" lives of old and replaced them with "inconsistency, conflict and un-organization" (Sutherland 1934:64). These conditions undermine

informal networks, kinship and communal ties as agents of informal social control. For example, Wacquant (2007: 67) identifies that the process of territorial stigmatization leads to the 'dissolution of 'place' - "the loss of a humanized, culturally familiar, and socially filtered locale with which marginalized urban populations identify and in which they feel 'at home' and in relative security".

The dominant portrayal is that not only are these areas of high crime, but also the people within them experience a high fear of crime; that the threat and fear of victimization dominates everyday life and experience. However, some studies have demonstrated that experiential lived realities in such areas are often very different from the external perceptions. For example, Foster's (1995) research on the 'Riverside estate', a statistically high crime estate in London, identified that crime was not perceived to be a problem by residents who lived there. Reasons for this included its distinct geographic location, which meant that few outsiders visited the area; its resident profile, which included people of similar ages and ethnic backgrounds leading to strong informal networks; and the toleration of various types of low level disorder, viewed as normal aspect of everyday life. As such, residents did not feel powerless or helpless in dealing with crime or structuring and organising their own sense of safety. Furthermore, Walklate's (2000) case study comparison of the residential wards of 'Oldtown' and 'Bankhill' in Salford, demonstrates differences in how residents understand and manage the problem of crime in their respective area. Oldtown was shown to have high levels of informal social control: it was a well organised, socially ordered and well-defended, "It equipped them not only with a sense of well-being, but also a sense of moral, social and public order [...] They trusted each other and their own socially constructed mechanisms of informal social control and punishment, rather than any official mechanisms, to maintain social order" (Walklate 2000: 58). By contrast, Bankhill was a disordered community in which residents displayed high fear of crime, undermining its informal crime control capacity. Instead, people placed trust in official state agencies to respond to issues of crime. The case study demonstrates that individuals can have different ways of managing their everyday lives and that these situate them differently in relation to state agencies, community, informal networks and crime. As Evans *et*

al. (1996: 379) state, "Your place in relation to crime places you in a community of belonging and exclusion...it is consequently important to recognise who is seen to be protecting you and how".

Dalmarnock and its people display both characteristics similar to both 'Riverside' and 'Oldtown'; despite its reputation as a dangerous place, the lived reality was often different for those that lived there, as one resident states,

*"I love Dalmarnock right, but I've sold drugs all my days, like a cardboard gangster sort of thing and it was a brilliant area, but no doubt to people from outside it, it wasn't brilliant because it was just like a cancer for crime and drugs..."*

(Interview 19: M)

What the participant refers to here is that, although there was crime, people still looked out for their own, and that crime had little negative effect on issues of social cohesion or trust amongst residents. In particular, the lack of dependency on formal institutions had created the spaces for other forms of informal control to come into effect, where aspects of self-policing prevailed,

*"What you notice is a lot of self-policing, which I was delighted about. I know that I could have walked out of Dalmarnock centre and left the door opens and see if anything was taken, it would have been returned within two hours."*

(Interview YK: 1)

Dalmarnock is heavily organised in terms of both informal partnership and community reparation, where boundaries of acceptable criminality or behaviour are quickly acted upon by kin ties, neighbours and other members of the public. Informal social control has long been considered an important factor which can mediate the effects of both structural disadvantage and problem behaviour (Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson 1997), "The willingness of locals to intervene for the common good depends in part on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbours" (Sampson 1997: 919). The mutual trust and

cohesion among residents, and the utilisation of informal control measures, contributed to the feeling that crime is not really a problem in the area, as Crawford (1999: 513) recognises, "Strong communities can allow policing by communities". This provided a sense of safety and ontological security, in which residents felt at ease with their environment, free from fears of victimisation, as one participant discusses,

*Ad: And there is a strong sense of trust, people look out for each other and things?*

*J: Aye, see if there is somebody getting out of hand, it gets sorted; they get slapped, you know what I mean. There are things that will be tolerated and things that won't be tolerated, you know what I mean. But it is 80% percent old people down here now, the full scheme is all old, it is not as if there is a great deal of young ones down here, there is very little young people in Dalmarnock.*

*Ad: And in terms of crime over the past few years, would you say it has increased, decreased or stayed the same?*

*J: There is not a great deal of crime, not in this area at all, there is not a great deal at all.*

*Ad: And how does your sense of attachment to Dalmarnock and your relationship with neighbours and things, make you feel? Does that make you feel secure in itself?*

*J: Aye, because, well, you could leave your keys in your door and you could come back and they still would be in the door, and your gear would still be in the house, you can't ask for much more, you know what I mean."*

(Interview 2: J)

The effect of strong informal control and social cohesion among neighbours allows crime to be a matter of 'practical consciousness' (Giddens 1984), whereby residents utilize tactic knowledge about how to 'go on', giving a predictability to everyday life. Residents have never felt that Dalmarnock was a high crime area, nor do they give much thought to conceptualising their lives around issues of safety and security, As Wæver (1995: 56) states, "When there is no security

problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead security is simply an irrelevant concern". This sequencing of events was noted by most residents, as the following section of participant quotes shows,

*"Ad: And you mentioned, in terms of crime before, what was the area like before?"*

*J: Ah it wasn't bad*

*Ad: No?*

*J: Na, it wasn't bad at all, hardly anything..."*

(Interview 2: J)

Even when residents acknowledged that Dalmarnock did have crime, fear of victimisation was never considered a problem. People still felt safe in the knowledge that the close community ties had formulated a type of 'neighbourhood dogma' (Elias and Scotston 1994), in which, 'blue on blue' forms of criminality would not occur,

*"Ad: And do you think that crime has ever been an issue? Fear of crime?"*

*C: No, no, nothing round about here. We have all been...I think because everybody knows everybody else, they will not come near you, you know."*

(Interview 11: C)

Another elderly resident states that, knowing people, particularly young people in the area, provided her with the sense of security to venture out at night, acting as a form of personal bodyguard,

*"You could go out at 2 o'clock in the morning and go down to the garage and you felt alright because you knew the boys were always about, you felt secure."*

(Interview 22: M)

Furthermore, having good experiential knowledge of the area and its people, meant that certain problem individuals were easily identified and avoidable, if need be,

*"We know the ones to watch out for here, so we have always felt safe here."*

(Interview 25: J)

This lack of a generalised fear around crime and victimization provided many residents a feeling safety and ease in their locality,

*"Ad: And have you always felt safe in Dalmarnock?"*

*R: Oh aye, I've been here all my life, aye.*

*Ad: So fear of crime or things has never been an issue?"*

*R: No. I think it's an outsider thing; that this place isn't safe, we are all perfectly safe."*

(Interview 29: R)

Finally, the combination of living in which the internalised perceptions and experiences are that there is little crime, and the resultant feelings of safety, meant that thinking in terms of security was rare,

*"What do I think about security? Well, I have never gave it a thought to be honest with you. There is bigger issues to tackle before security."*

(Interview 24: D)

In addition to strong informal networks, social cohesion, and perceptions of low crime and vulnerability, residents demonstrated a strong attachment to place. Place and community, was identified as integral to life in Dalmarnock,

*"[People here] have to rely on each other and help each other out more, that brings the community closer together, we all chip in and help each other out. So I would say that there is a very strong sense of trust and community in Dalmarnock."*

(Interview 29: R)

In the late modern literature, place is perceived to be 'phantasmogoric'; in which communal life is said to have become "impersonal, transitory and segmented"

(Sampson 2012:5). By contrast, Dalmarnock is an area steeped in rich social capital and social involvement. For example, most residents noted that before the demolition resulting from regeneration, shops and other social services provided many opportunities for socialising with other neighbours,

*"The local shop was also the place where you met up and had a gab, do you know what I mean, your post office and that."*

(Interview 23: S)

For local residents, opportunities for 'schmoozing' (Putnam 2000: 107), and informal socialising, are a big part of life in Dalmarnock. Public space and routine activities provided the buttressing points of social capital and cohesion, "The sum of such casual, public contact at a local level - most of it fortuitous, most of it associated with errands, all of it metered by the person concerned and not thrust upon my by anyone - is a feeling for the public identity of people, a web of public respect and trust" (Jacobs 1961:56). Such interactions also gave residents of Dalmarnock the opportunities to gain first-hand experience of the goings on within their environment, including crime. As one participant states,

*"The shops were important first and foremost for the things they sold, basic things like milk and bread but these places also served another purpose; it was where people met each other and had a chat. That is important because it brought the community together; these places are focal points for people to meet. People can find out about things going on in the community, 'oh have you heard this is happening?' things like that."*

(Interview 29: R)

For residents of Dalmarnock, place, is and always has been, an integral feature to peoples everyday life, providing the contextual backdrop for how people construct an impression of both crime, security, and their sense of ontological security. As one resident stated,

*"Community is the most important thing to me apart from my immediate family. Community is such an important aspect of everyday life in Dalmarnock."*

(Interview 29: R)

The strong affinity to place and community, provides a "sense of dignity and authenticity" (Loader and Walker 2007: 166) to experiences within this setting. To the extent, that when asked about issues of crime and fear of crime, some residents would respond to the question of "feeling safe", responding not in terms of crime or fear, but rather through their belonging to place, as the following quote demonstrates,

*"Ad: And in general, you have always felt safe in Dalmarnock?"*

*R: Oh aye, aye. I have stayed here, forty four years now, this house, know what I mean. Born and bred here..."*

(Interview 7: R)

So far, what this discussion has served to do is to provide examples of the overstated claims of the late modernity thesis; identifying that there are variations according to moments and places which influence the propensity of individuals to succumb to ambient fear and disembedding. Within the late modernity literature, the importance of communities in shaping a sense of security has been replaced by a sense of ambient insecurity. And similarly, late modernity's influence on crime has made, "crime a core everyday concern", in which anxiety about crime has become an "endemic feature" (Newburn 2001:836) of everyday life.

However, It has been shown that residents of Dalmarnock, in the course of their everyday environment, still retain much control in managing their own sense of security, and that experiences of fear of crime or exceptional risks are not ambient, but transient; confined to individual moments or circumstances in which the prevalence of perceived risks, tips security governance towards a reliance on disembedded state institutions.

Subsequently, it can be said that not everywhere has the same objective level of risk; Glasgow's everyday risk profile is significantly different from other cities, and similarly, its existing low-profile security infrastructure is indicative of this. Furthermore, crime as a topic, is not as "constant and unremitting as time itself." (Garland 2001: 107), for some people rarely think about it. Neither has late modernity broken down organic forms of trust, as both attachment and affinity to place, as the locus for informal controls, remain of critical importance in how many of us make sense of crime and disorder, without ever relying on disembedding expert involvement, as Crawford (1999: 513) states, "It is wrong to disconnect communities from any sense of Geography, even with the burgeoning global technologies which stretch and disembed time and space". Proponents of late modernity's influence on crime and fear of crime take a one dimensional and totalising approach to explaining risk perception and attitudes towards security. The reality is that people's lived experiences mediate their attitudes and perceptions towards these, allowing them to oscillating between states of being on and off guard. The argument so far, supports the idea that security is rife for comparison both in how it is performed, and experienced in different locations and contexts, As Girling *et al.* (2000: 8) state, "it cannot be assumed that the impacts of such large-scale social changes are in any sense the same everywhere. Indeed, it is intrinsically the case that globalization holds out very different fates to people depending on who they are and where they live. Exactly how the relations between the local and global dimensions of existence will be experienced, interpreted and managed by people in the ordinary settings of their lives therefore remains an open, empirical question - much more open, we would argue, than much of the talk of globalization in social theory".

## 6.4 Mega-events and the Virtual Potential of Risk

Despite outlining the ways in which place is of fundamental importance in mediating risk perceptions, there are also transient moments where place becomes irrelevant; where global risks attach themselves in thought and perception irrespective of local contextualities, calling for experts to define and

respond to the identification and management of risk through security. This is particularly identifiably through the hosting of mega-events. The combination of global audience and political profile give Olympics' the "unwanted status as a prime terrorist target" (Gold and Gold 2008: 305), and it is this which has led to the international standardisation of protection strategies between different hosts. The 1972 Munich massacre or the 2013 Boston bombing create the associations between international terrorism and sports events, irrespective of the fact that this is exceptionally rare. Ironically, the perceived correlations have been repeatedly amplified by non-sport related terrorism events such as 7/7 and 9/11.

The actual 'riskiness' of particular mega-events is affected by the existing geo-political culture of the host city, as much as the nature of the event itself. Yet, despite these variations, a precondition from the Organising Committee for awarding the Games was that Glasgow is required to provide particular levels of standardised security applicable to the risk profile associated with hosting a major event of the CWG size. This, according to many senior security personnel, remains "an attractive target for anyone that is going to do any hostile engagement" (Interview DW: 1), as the Security Director further explained,

*"I think that the kind of things that we are planning to mitigate against are the same; so the actual nature of the risks and threats will be almost identical in the sense that it's from the top end of the terrorist threat, through organised crime, through public safety, protests, natural disaster..."*

(Interview SA: 1)

Mega-events represent those transient moments which recalibrate the oscillation between being off guard and on guard, skewing perceptions towards the latter, through the "juxtaposition of globalised terrorist risks and local manifestations of threat" (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 57). However, it remains questionable how much of this transferability occurs due to the *real* nature of risks; extreme global risks and forms of terrorism are extremely rare: having only occurred once at the Olympics, in Munich 1972, while the FIFA World Cup and Commonwealth Games

have never been subject to a terrorist attack in their long histories. Instead, domestic threats and more banal forms of risk, still pose the main threat to host cities. For example, for all the talk of repeat Paris style attacks at the 2016 UEFA European Championships in France, the biggest threat and endangerment to life came from rival football hooligans who fought in the streets and stadiums.

Nevertheless, what is apparent is that both for security experts and for lay citizens, certain places and events have distinct and recognised risk profiles which stimulate the legitimisation of standardised security practices, recalibrating the governance of security. The example of airport security is one such case which demonstrates the securitisation of thought and action: risks associated with air travel are not bound to specific countries or airports, but exist, potentially and virtually, at every airport; security responses to events such as 9/11 or the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot of liquid explosives, have resulted in blanket security responses which penetrate distant locales. The invisible and untraceable potential of risks, allows reality to be "set free from its principle" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 4) as such, risk can go off and invade everything and everywhere. Consequently, passengers may be aware of the potential of various high consequence risks, irrespective of where they are travelling to/from, and have come to expect that certain security procedures are put place against these risks: security checkpoints, baggage and body scanning, 100ml restrictions on liquids, and so on. The risks and their attentive security responses impact on us before the event has even occurred; citizens wilfully engage and advocate the ensembles and rituals of 'security theatre' (Zedner 2009: 21). For such is the normalisation and standardisation of these procedures, it is likely that many passengers would actually feel more unsafe if they were able to walk straight onto the plane. Security at airports is therefore dominated by "a precession of thought over the event - and yet, simultaneously, of the procession of the event over thought" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 4). In terms of risk perception, overt security leads to the collapsing in distinctions between what is potential and actual, "There's no longer any possible, since all the possibilities are immediately realized" (Ibid 2007: 78). This creates a cyclical process which heightens risk awareness, at the same time as legitimising and

stimulating the demand for exceptional and expert mediated responses. Citizens are no longer in control of their reality in these spaces, but surrender to the logics of a virtual reality, "In this virtual security order, the subjects of security are no longer in control of the information that is supposed to protect them from dangers and threats" (Lundborg 2016: 7).

In hyperreality, there is the floating of value; signifiers - images and signs which have no stable referential, "This is the end of the signifier-signified dialectic that permitted the accumulation of knowledge and meaning" (Baudrillard 2003:127). The result is that the concreteness of value vanishes, and "everything becomes undecidable" (Ibid 2003: 128). Whereas the old order of signs and things, was based on the reality of objects which exist 'out there'; things that could be seen, touched, felt, a "world in which we confidently spoke of change, renewal, trends or directions was a firm and trusty world where one could tell the difference between an idea and its referent, representation and what it represented, simulation and truth, image and reality" (Bauman 1992: 150). In the era of the hyperreal, signs and images constitute the 'reality' of events, "Signs reference nothing other than themselves; they are their own reality, and the only reality to which humans refer" (Allan 2010: 308). This vertigo of interpretation has a number of implications on how security is perceived and experienced (Lechte 1994: 236).

Mega-events collapse time and space around exceptional risk, where the most distant and unrelated of events suddenly exist potentially in different host cities, through the 'principle of uncertainty' (Baudrillard 2003: 58), that they convey. In this way, there is the 'short-circuiting' (Baudrillard 1983: 15) of reality. This was shown by both elite officials involved in security planning and by lay citizens, where geographically distant, global events, influenced perceptions on the potential for exceptional risk during G2014. For example, one official talked of the possible influence of the 2013 Westgate Shopping Centre attacks on influencing the security operation,

*"I think with the situation in Nairobi last month, it may be that security for the Games itself is stepped up to a level beyond what was*

*originally expected [...] since Nairobi, in the shopping centre, it has changed, it has upped another level."*

(Interview AC: 1)

Similarly, a resident of Dalmarnock identified incidents such as the disappearance of flight MH370, and the downing of MH17, as influencing their risk perception of the Games,

*Ad: And are you worried about any potential threats associated with the Games?*

*A: No, I don't even know, I have not really thought about it. Not really thought about it. You don't think about these things do you not. But, once you hear about all the other ones that has been done, like those planes [MH370] and all that, that has been done as well, it's quite scary, it is quite scary. Because, somebody was saying to me, I think it my wee lassie there, she was saying that was another plane [MH17] has been done, so you don't know really, you don't know..."*

(Interview 16: A)

These examples indicate the "metamorphosis of the real into fiction" (Baudrillard 2005: 124). In virtual reality, terrorism "translates into total insecurity" (Baudrillard 2003: 59), and the pursuit of total security taken in response, becomes the "only thing that is considered worthy of being aspired towards" (Lundborg 2016: 4). However, countering potential risks with security leads to the, "artificial technical production of the world" (Baudrillard 2005: 34); a 'potential politics' (Massumi 2007) of pre-emptive thought and action. The pursuit of total security is predicated against the prevention of an event from ever occurring, it is the "real repression of a virtual crime" (Baudrillard 2005: 118); the suspension of an event in a potential state, "the definitive non-occurrence of events" (Ibid 2005: 119). Material displays of security, then, allude to "something taking place beyond the realm of representation and the actualized layer of reality; something that belongs, rather, to a virtual dimension of reality" (Lundborg 2016: 3).

By bringing potential risk to the forefront of thought, security becomes insecurity, by way of proving the real with the imaginary, "Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form" (Baudrillard 1983: 12). Security measures at mega-events are the appearance of thought itself, it "brings things more quickly to a head" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 4). This was reported by the vast majority of residents from Dalmarnock, who felt that the security measures were indicative of the reality and immediacy of threats,

*"in the beginning I couldn't believe that terrorists could come with bombs and things, because I never gave it a thought, but...and I seen them [police] with the guns and that, I went 'well its true enough!', you know. Aye."*

(Interview 6: A)

Another participant described the way the security infrastructure gave him the feeling that organisers were preparing against an attack,

*"J: To me, they have got an idea that there is going to be an attack somewhere...."*

*Ad: That's what you think?*

*J: Aye, oh aye without a doubt, and by the way that is...if you are wanting to attack the British Empire, the Commonwealth Games, this is the thing to do isn't it.*

*Ad: So you think it is all geared up for this exceptional sort of....*

*J: An attack, oh aye. Because they never done the Olympics; because they were worried about the Olympics getting targeted, so this is the next best thing."*

(Interview 2: J)

These examples demonstrate the precession of thought over the event, but this thought is neither a prophecy nor prediction of *what might be*, but of *what will be*, unless security is enacted against them, "it's a prefiguration. It's already there like the event in a sense, and it finds its fulfilment in something that

wholly escapes it. The event impacts on thought before it has occurred" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 4). The point is no longer about whether risks are real or not; they become real, because security makes them real, by bringing the event into thought, "suddenly it is not the hazards, but those who point them out that provoke general uneasiness" (Beck 1992: 75).

By reacting to the virtual potential of threats, security communicates the possibility for anything, and so becomes "set free from its principle" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 4). The principle of proportional security is no longer grounded by any reality, "the future is folded into the present, and since the future has been reduced to nothing but its virtual potential there are no clear restrictions on what can and cannot be done in order to respond to it" (Lundborg 2016: 9). This was the case when speaking to security planners for the Games, they would mention the importance of proportionality as based on potential or perceived threats, not on actual or received ones,

*"It was proportionate to the threats that we perceived."*

(Interview DW: 2)

This statement from a Security Manager highlights the inherent conflict at the heart of risk assessment, in that there is no such thing as objective risk, it does not exist "out there", waiting to be measured. Instead, "subjective judgements are involved at every stage of the assessment process" (Slovic 2002: 5). Individuals involved in the security delivery can never accurately predict the likelihood of a particular event and where or when it is going to happen, and so experts are hostage to the hyperreal themselves. The security expert is merely a specialist in speculation, as one told me,

*"It's not to stop the attack, we cannot remove risk, it's about management of risk."*

(Interview AS: 1)

The problem here is that by suspending the non-event, by scripting everything ahead of time, prevention becomes universal; because nothing has happened,

we do not know what or how the threat might break from potential to actual, and as a result, "anything that might take place is regarded as terrorism" (Bishop 2009: 62). And so total security becomes an enormous project of trying to contain all threats, as one Security Manager stated,

*"So it [risk assessment] goes all the way from your counter terrorism, from your asset protection, safety of individuals, all the way down to petty crime, so obviously there is going to be alot of very expensive pieces of equipment going in there."*

(Interview AR: 1)

The "pornographic materialization of everything" (Baudrillard 2005: 69), of all risks, was particularly relevant when speaking to security experts, who talked of disaster scenarios as if they were inevitable, as one stated of the risk assessment process,

*"You have got to think of a catastrophic event, where someone would get into the Village, where you have corralled a large amount of people into an area, you know like the Munich Olympics."*

(Interview DW: 2)

So while risk experts inevitably fantasise about the potential of another Munich, and introduce retrospective security measures against such situations, these measures simultaneously signal to their audiences the perpetual possibility of the potential, creating security's own legitimised demand. This was evident by the way that locals sympathised with the need for security to protect against potential threats such as terrorism,

*"Well, you don't know what's going to happen? How can it be excessive? You can see the point of it, you can understand it, you know what I mean, I do understand it. Obviously because it is putting people out [their way] you can understand why they are doing it, because you never know; you could say 'Oh it's not going to happen' and then it*

*happens and then they get the blame of not doing enough. So it's a catch-22. I can understand it, but it's a pain. It's a pain."*

(Interview 9: A)

This causality dilemma, represents the key difficulty facing security experts, and goes to explain the universal application of the standardised security approach at mega-events; if something happened at Munich 72 and then nothing happened at Montreal 76, the fact that nothing happened is credited to the security operation. The model is then replicated on the basis of good practice. The success of security, then, is measured solely on whether something happens or not, as a Security Manager states,

*"So, I would say that that was the utmost success, and that is the only way that you can really decide on what is a success in security, is 'has something happened or not?' "*

(Interview DW: 2)

Total security equates to the 'zero deaths' formula, where total security becomes the definitive non-occurrence of the event, of the enemy, and of death itself. However, by trying to prevent death at all costs, counter-terrorism becomes a terror itself through its relentless expansion, "a terror which the power exerting it ends up exerting on itself under the banner of security" (Baudrillard 2005: 119). The exchange of this 'vital illusion' of potential risk, with the 'unconditional promotion of good', of total security, is exactly how "things are getting better and better, and at the same time, worse and worse" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 34). This can be related to mega-event security where it continues to expand in a forward direction; no host city dare break the chain in the pursuit of total security. With each successive non-event, security is lauded, and with each identification of a weakness, security is expanded.

Unlike the first section of this chapter, which showed how perceptions of risk and attitudes towards security were borne out of personal and placed experience, the opposite is true for how perception of exceptional risks are constructed. 'War on terror' responses highlight everyday locations as potential

sites of danger (Graham 2011). This uncertainty and intangibility of a potential, omnipresent, and yet, invisible threat, means that the media are increasingly influential in the social construction of risk, "It is clear that the media play an important role in influencing and shaping public perceptions of crime" (Mythen and Walklate 2006: 130). This is because, unlike more conventional risks like everyday crime, which are rooted in direct, personal experience, and tangibly grasped in relation to experiences in particular places, the 'new terrorism', by contrast, is experienced as a form of 'second hand non-experience of risk' (Beck 1992), whereby, "What can no longer be called in by the individual from his own personal memory is called in from a trusted knowledge source" (Barnes 1985: 83). In this case, that trusted knowledge source, the only source, is the mass media. The actual global, becomes the virtual local, through "reducing the psychological and emotional distance" (Garland 2001: 158) at which global issues penetrate local perceptions.

As such, risk assessment at large events or places of high risk, are characterised by their associations with "stereotypical images of danger" (Garland 2001: 193). For example, as mentioned previously, security experts talked of disaster scenarios as if they were inevitable,

*"Now, they have to start off with a planning solution of 'how likely is this place to be subject to attack?'"*

(Interview AR: 1)

Furthermore, many lay citizens also talked as if a terror attack was synonymous with the hosting of mega-events. This correlation had been imprinted through mass media reportage, which allowed conceptual linkages to be drawn, as one resident stated,

*"Obviously you hear this, you get it on the television that this ISIS mob, this new Muslim mob that is going to target Britain, well what bigger target is going on in Britain just now than the Commonwealth Games?"*

(Interview 10: B)

In addition, the selective construction of risk taps into popular fears, allowing for their social, spatial and temporal de-bounding and the removal of any quantitative or predictive rationality or actuarialism. Instead, the risks become "Invigorated with cultural constructions and speculative popular imaginations about what could potentially transpire" (Boyle and Haggerty 2008: 261). As such, security at mega-events becomes detached from any notion of reality, becoming subverted to a virtual order of risk. Security at mega-events therefore becomes a demonstration of speculation, rather than of actual prevention, as a Security Manager stated of the risk assessment process,

*So it goes all the way from your counter terrorism, from your asset protection, safety of individuals, all the way down to petty crime."*

(Interview AR: 1)

The detachment of proportionality is also felt by lay citizens, who amidst the perceived likelihood of potential threats such as terrorism, feel that certain levels of security have to be in place, as one resident stated,

*"I can't say it is excessive, because if I turn round and say it is excessive, then something happened and breached security then, I would be looking a fool."*

(Interview 10: B)

This subversion to a virtual order of risk, re-legitimises the nation state (Nelken 2007: 379), whereby ambiguity is transferred to experts. As Zedner (2009: 139) states, "exceptional acts legitimise exceptional measures", and the state is viewed, by the public as best placed to deal with virtual threats through advent of its resources, perceived legitimacy, and symbolic power (Loader and Walker 2007). Not only is trust placed in these experts, but there is the reciprocal demand and legitimisation for the measures they purport, as evidenced by the majority of lay citizens attitudes towards security,

*"It's the Commonwealth [Games]. Obviously there needs to be security."*

(Interview 18: J)

In this way, the purpose and efficacy of security becomes more concerned with the projection of an image of control, rather than practical effectiveness. This last point coincides with the other non-security agendas relative to the host city, such as managing reputation. As one security expert mentioned, the performance of security and projection of the images of control are fundamental to the security operation,

*"There is reasons why you see pictures of aircraft missiles on the top of things and it is a deterrent; you put that in the media... it is a show of force."*

(Interview DW: 1)

Security becomes less about risk and security and more a demonstration of political rhetoric. Security takes the form of cinema; it is scripted ahead of time, using special effects to enthrall its audience, "everything all in place and safe when the lights go up" (Bishop 2009: 62). The effect here is two-fold; total security becomes a part of the politicisation of risk, creating a sub-politics of political involvement for lay citizens who are (willingly) distanced in the governance of security, at the same time, security experts are also confined to 'keeping up appearances'. This explains why the total security approach is continually adopted and replicated by mega-event host cities, irrespective of diverse and local specificities. The information that is used to protect people from threats, takes control of them (both experts and lay citizens), as a form of 'subject-object inversion' (Lundborg 2016), "we believe we think the world, but the belief is mutual...we can think it only because it thinks us in return" (Baudrillard and Noailles 2007: 103). Security then, becomes self-confirming and self-legitimising, in particular places,

*"Ad: Could the security measures have been improved?"*

*S: No.*

*Ad: You are happy with them?"*

*S: Aye, they need to do that for the Games, to protect people, don't they? It's a shame they need to do things like that, buy that's the way the world is.*

*Ad: And do you feel they offer you some protection?*

*S: Aye, if anything happened aye."*

(Interview 13: S)

The consequence of this continual and irreversible expansion of total security and transferability of security praxis between host cities, is that these measures ironically construct new dilemmas of insecurity. Problematically, the very act of doing something (securitisation) always sets the focus on the potentially infinite amount of "what might be" (Graham 2004: 298). Security comes full circle in providing conceptual linkages with the very media images these measures are borne out of. The reliance on performance and symbolism, "Mixes reassurance with the seeding of anxiety" (Graham 2011: 147). Overt displays of security presume the persistence of a potential threat, and in doing so, heightens risk awareness and anxiety (Zedner 2007). This anxiety then stimulates further demand for more signs of control to alleviate the unease, "the spectacle of terrorism forces the terrorism of spectacle upon us" (Baudrillard 2003: 30). It is here that questions are further raised over the current position of the state and citizen in the governance of security, where citizens are distanced from the risks, and the security measures taken in response. Subsequently, many residents felt that the security measures reaffirmed the likelihood of exceptional events,

*"The Games made we worry both more and less but in different ways: more in terms of extreme things like terrorism, I became more aware that that sort of thing, when you saw police with machine guns and snipers on roofs, as a real possibility, I had never really thought about it before."*

(Interview 29: R)

## 6.5 Risk Perception and Security: Neither Late Modern or Postmodern, But Both

What is apparent, then, is that lay citizens perceive and react to security at mega-events very differently from the way that they do to more everyday forms of security, as was discussed in the first part of this chapter. A key difference being their levels of involvement within the governance of their own security. What was just described shows a marked change from citizens demonstrating a banal acceptability towards risk and security in some situations and places, to a heightened state of alert and active support of the rationales behind security apparatus in others. Furthermore, in some places, individuals maintain full control over their own security governance, and in others they are fully disembedded to expert systems of security. What this points to is a situation that is neither fully late modern nor postmodern, but rather, some element and hybridity of both.

The traditional notion of security is that the subject have the opportunity to change conditions of their own (in)security. However, Baudrillard's concept of the hyperreal coincides with the disappearance of the modern subject (Baudrillard 2003), the 'political stake is dead' (Baudrillard 1983: 19), "The realities of modern life have been superseded by the saturation of electronically generated images and signs...social reality is becoming redundant because 'simulation' dominates in cultural life and replaces social life" (Heaphy 2007: 62). However, is the virtual as all-encompassing as Baudrillard suggests? Overt security does not always communicate the potential for risks: a banal acceptability was shown to exist when people negotiated their community and the city in everyday settings; security at underground stations in Glasgow does not communicate the potential for similar events to 7/7, they go barely noticed. Similarly, not all media images have the same effect; we tune into some and ignore others, irrespective of severity of 'signal value'. This criticism is consistent with others of Baudrillard, in that he confines human agency to "the bovine immobility of the masses" (Bauman 1992: 153-4). The point here is that, a multitude of different social realities can exist outwith the stereotypical play of

cinematised images and signs, and furthermore, that for many, life is real and still firmly embedded in the social and not in the TV screen, "To many, reality remains what it always used to be: tough, solid, resistant and harsh. They need to sink their teeth into some quiet real bread before they abandon themselves to munching images" (Bauman 1992: 155).

The total abandonment of the social, by Baudrillard does not explain the way that individuals of Dalmarnock appeared to keep one eye on the social, amidst the hyperreal; while most residents subscribed to the mediated images of terror and the normalcy of exceptional risks and total security responses, these were always seen in relation to more novel aspects of their social reality and everyday lives. One example, is the way that many felt that security was important and needed to contend with potential risks, but at the same time, there were considerations as to the negative implications these features had on more prosaic situations,

*"Well, obviously security for the Games, we obviously understand right, there is a big thing happening here, know what I mean, so there has got to be security measures in place. I just don't agree when there is...if you stay in these streets mate, come on, they are blocking your full street in and there is people, old people, who can't get in and out their house with shopping etc. Now, how are these old people meant to get their shopping in if they are not letting people deliver to them and they are not letting them get in a taxi? 80 year old people, how possibly are they meant to get their shopping in? Do you know what I mean?"*

(Interview 18: J)

What was apparent was that residents appeared to weight up the use of security as a cost-benefit scale in terms of the protection it offered from global risks versus the negative effects it caused on their everyday situation, a kind of global versus local trade-off occurred in how residents perceived and experienced the security.

Furthermore, although the security measures communicated aspects of risk, and provided conceptual linkages to more global and extreme happenings, many residents were still able to discern a degree of rationality as to the likelihood of the Games being a realistic target,

*"Security to me, means that they are trying to protect people from something, erm, but to me I don't understand what the big deal is?! It's the Commonwealth Games, it's not a big...thing, they never had this in India [Delhi 2010], you never seen them...do you know what I mean, and I'm like what is going on? Has there been threats? Is this why there is all this security? Things like that, so aye, I think it's a wee bit over the top, so I do."*

(Interview 4: A)

Baudrillard states that in the hyperreal the subject of security has no room for resistance over what happens to it within the realm of the virtual. However what the accounts of Dalmarnock residents suggest is that there is the simultaneous capture and resistance to the hyperreal, whereby people actively consume certain ideas around risk and security at mega-events, but reconfigure (resist) these ideas in relation to their own localised situations and experiences. The meaning and value of security around mega-event security does exist within a virtual realm, but its physical manifestation reintroduces it back into the actual realm, where people see and experience total security within the context of their everyday environment. It is this juxtaposition between the global and the local, which stimulates the desire for certain aspects of resistance; issues and questions around proportionality, aesthetics, disruption, curtailing of freedoms etc all existed alongside the generalised acceptance of exceptional risk and legitimised demands for security.

This point aligns with Nicholson and Siedman's (1995) critique of postmodernity, in that it is too focused upon representation, at the expense of forgetting the importance of social context. At G2014, both aspects were important in how security was experienced and perceived. Giddens, takes a similar view, criticising postmodernity's rendering of the self as a passive entity amidst media

images, "A universe of social activity in which electronic media have a central and constitutive role, nevertheless, is not one of "hyperreality" in Baudrillard's sense. Such an idea confuses the pervasive impact of mediated experience with the internal referentiality of the social systems of modernity" (Giddens 1991: 5).

The first section of this chapter sought to identify weaknesses in the totalising claims of late modernity, questioning its universal applicability for how people make sense of risks and security in society. Baudrillard's idea of the hyperreal exposes more frailties. For example, the notion that the information media is fundamental to our understanding of the world. Giddens, meanwhile positions the mass media within the idea of reflexivity; that the production and spread of knowledge and information, emancipates the subject. Crucially, however, as Kellner (1992) and Meštrović (1998), identify, this idea does consider the way that the media itself continually delves into propaganda and the production of signs *without* reference to reality. For example Kellner noted the way that, U.S journalists placed a particular slant on the reporting of the Gulf War, which falsely informed the U.S. public. Similarly, Mestrovic (1998: 159) identifies the unwillingness of the west to intervene in the mass genocide in Bosnia, instead, becoming "indirect accomplices to the slaughter". Both examples counteract the late modern claim that the information media provides channels for the dissemination of knowledge, democracy and teaching of reflexivity.

Baudrillard's hyperreality theorises new forms of slavery, whilst Giddens' late modernity identifies new forms of emancipation. Each perspective, attributed to the respective era's they are associated with theorising, Baudrillard is associated with identifying the current era one of 'postmodernity', while Giddens promotes the idea of 'late modernity'. In sociology, there is the idea that "we must not mix these caustic acids" (Latour 1993: 6). But the empirical world, as has been extensively discussed in this chapter, does not fit neatly into the rigid definitions each has of the same era. As Latour (1993: 2) identifies, "all of culture and all of nature get churned up again everyday". Latour and Mestrovic point to the era of *hybridity*. Latour (1993: 6) gives the example of the ozone debate, which is "Real like nature, narrated like discourse", is the depletion of the ozone the work of humans or nature, and furthermore, is it global or local. The correct

answer is probably a mix of both. Similarly, this chapter has shown that how people interpret global risks, and the degree to which they are truly embedded in relation to technological forms of security, is placed in nature and that fluctuations over the extent to which theoretical proposition of security rings true exist across these, as Meštrović (1998: 161) states, "Western societies exhibit traditional, modern, as well as postmodern characteristics simultaneously".

## 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has taken a hybridist approach to some of the key aspects of late modernity and postmodernity, identifying that the singular use of these resources, is insufficient in contending with the complexities of the contemporary security/insecurity situation at mega-events, as Latour (1993: 75) states, "I may use an electric drill, but I also use a hammer. The former is thirty-five years old, the latter hundreds of thousands. Will you see me as a DIY expert 'of contrasts because I mix up gestures from different times?'"

In terms of late modernity, there *is* the interconnectedness of global issues such as terrorism, which bring nations together through risk and crisis; time and space become irrelevant to the extent that knowledge about high profile events are instantaneous transmitted, while the reactionary responses taken in the name of prevention become universally applied. However, amidst this global interconnectedness, exists simultaneous fragmentation and localisation. So while elements of Giddens' late modernity thesis are true, it is not the complete picture of actual events on the ground, where much of the everyday contradicts these universalising claims. Similarly, the extent to which individuals become aware of certain risks or become disembedded, also varies according to this transaction; more 'globalised' places are generally those which are also more disembedding, and this particularly true for globalised and exceptional risks, where they lead to a recalibration of the relationship between state and citizen in the governance of security.

Perceptions of risk, in situations where individuals are disembodied, are built up from mediated, second-hand sources of information, therefore presenting opportunities for the postmodern 'dark side' of creating synthetic emotions (Meštrović 1998: 6) to surface. Again though, like the applicability of the late modernity thesis, the extent to which the social is imploded in the media is also subject to permutation, and is not to be taken indicative of a universal or totalising truth, the sign and the image is *not* everything; individuals are empty vessels in some situations, and reflexive practitioners in others, sometimes adopting aspects of both at the same time.

For example, at mega-events, individuals are 'lifted out' (Giddens 1990: 21) from traditional social relations, interactions and experiential judgements, these spaces become places where trust is invested in expert systems. However, when functioning in one's regular everyday community setting, the individual is still embedded, and can utilise experiential, first-hand knowledge, to remain in control of their security governance. This is not an either or situation, individuals are simultaneously disembodied in some situations and fully embedded in others.

Again, the underlying narrative and importance of security governance is evident here. In places where individuals have a greater stake in their own security governance, their interpretations of risk and overt displays of security are more stable, and less susceptible to the cycles of (in)security that can exist when issues of risk and security are sequestered by technical experts. Realisation of this, poses important questions for considering the current, and normative, position of the state and citizen in security governance.

## 7. Communication, Control Signals and Their Effects

### 7.1 Introduction

The premise of communication between sender and receiver is fundamental to aspects of social control. However this relationship is undeveloped within the criminological literature, and a non-existent consideration within extant mega-event security analysis. The signal crimes perspective, and related 'control signals' concept, provides "a diagnostic method for taking apart people's speech acts as they construct representations of their reactions to instances of crime, disorder, and social control" (Innes 2014: 3). The defining characteristic of a control signals, given by Innes (2014: 129), "is that the material effects of a social control action or intervention are irrevocably dependent upon a process of tactic and explicit communication".

However, the concept also has a number of limitations in its application to mega-event security: firstly, within the control signals concept, there is the underlying assumption that police send signs of control and reassurance based on their reflexive orientation around citizens actual concerns, or demands about various signal crimes and disorder. In this situation, it is assumed that there is a mutual basis of understanding around why particular control signals exist. As such, the control signals concept gives no prior recognition to the existent relationship between the sender and receiver of these signals, or how the governance of security contributes to the (mis)communication of these. It merely assumes that both sender and receiver are on the same wavelength. However, at mega-events, security governance arrangements recalibrate the distance between state and citizen, where security is designed and implemented from above. Furthermore, the control signals have been discussed in binary terms of their relationship to global or local process, not both. At mega-events, the control signals have different global and local dimensions; they are globally oriented, but locally implemented. In addition, control signals have been discussed only in terms of how aspects of control influence the material aspects

of safety and security. However, where exceptional security occurs in a residential community amidst everyday life, and where residents are stripped of a stake in the governance of security that paradoxically affects the nature of everyday life, the surfaces of material security are brought into tension with the factors which contribute to a sense of ontological security. This chapter explores these gaps within the control signals concept by looking at the different control signals during G2014 and their examination through pragmatic semiotics.

## 7.2 Control signals at the Macro-level

Innes (2014: 153) states that, "any meaningful analysis in this domain has to be able to disinter the unique effects of individual control signals, but also, the cumulative outcomes of the multiple control signals that can be identified within any given social situation". G2014 is an ideal environment to look closer at the interaction of different control signals and variations in their effects. Control signals at mega-events act as simultaneous deterrent against the realisation of risks, whilst also providing reassurances to the public that these will never happen. As a senior Security Manager for the Games stated, there were two aims of the security operation, with control measures aiming to send two different signals, the first is:

*"[it's] a show of force. So it is always important, erm, and it comes with that holistic security operation, you know, it is very, it is important to do [...] and it acts as a deterrent...that show of force."*

(Interview DW: 2)

In addition, the control measures are also meant to serve the dual function of reassurance,

*"We try to reassure at all times, that, you know, this is...you are not a direct threat, you as an individual, these are just precautions that we need to put in place. But, you can understand that some people, with a*

*nervous disposition, would think 'why on earth is there a guy with a machine gun, stood outside my front door? Why me? Why me?' "*

(Interview DW: 2)

However, the effects of this dual process are that (in perception), there is "no possible distinction between the crime and the crackdown" (Baudrillard 2003: 31). There is a contradictory and cyclical system at play; the awareness of collective signal crimes (real and imagined) which attach themselves to major events, means that security is viewed objectively as necessary, i.e. positive. However, the same security features ironically operate negatively by signalling and reaffirming the possibility of potential risks, and so increase security consciousness, and a sense of anxiety. This movement then comes full circle by further stimulating and legitimising the use of the initial control measures. This moment between positive and negative and back to positive, was inferred by the vast majority of residents, all of whom recognised both why security was in place, and that it offered a sense of reassurance against various risks. The security was therefore self-affirming, it "generates its own paranoid demand" (Davis 1990: 224).

*"I can understand the reasoning behind it, so you kind of get to accept that, and it makes you feel a bit secure."*

(Interview 20: A)

This situation can be explained through the concept of second level signification and 'myth' (Barthes 1972). At the denotative level, various forms of security will be objectively recognised as technical features or personnel which are meant to provide security, few would argue otherwise. However, the mental connection that the sign makes, 'security = safety', then acts a sign for the second level of signification, in that 'security = risk', as Jones (2012: 757) states, "The increased visibility of security hardware and personnel sharpens the social perception of threat".

*"I don't think that level of security is what they originally intended; I actually think it was supposed to be a lot less, but somewhere along*

*the lines they got intelligence of a threat, because after a few days you then started to see increased police numbers and police carrying rifles and things."*

(Interview 29: R)

Myth naturalises the connotative associations of a sign, making them appear as if they are indicative of reality, and in doing so can preserve an ideological function on the part of the myth-maker, "to make dominant cultural and historical values, attitudes and beliefs seem entirely natural, normal, self-evident, timeless, obvious common sense - and thus objective and true reflections of 'the way things are' " (Chandler 2007: 14). For many residents, the presence of specialist police officers, for example, signalled a situation of controlling a terror threat, which ironically legitimated their presence,

*"And see to be fair, the police snipers are there, so the police are maybe stopping the guys [athletes] getting shot [by terrorists] because the snipers have picked them up, you know."*

(Interview 24: D)

By utilising the ability of security to reaffirm or increase the 'signal value' of potential risks, it also legitimises its unquestionable expansion: millions can be drawn from public funds to pay for security; barriers can be erected around communities and armed police can walk the streets in full view, all of these measures ultimately impact negatively on the communities which they surround, yet, they are hard to argue against, at least amidst the backdrop of perceived imminent risk. As one resident stated of police patrolling with guns, the perceived potential of exceptional threat, legitimated the use of exceptional measures. This attitude was indicative of wider attitudes towards the security operation,

*"They can have them if they need them."*

(Interview 22: M)

What has been outlined represents the 'macro' interactions of control signals at G2014; where mediated understandings of global risks, and their associations with particular places and events, legitimises the use of heightened security. The security assemblage, acts both positively and negatively at the same time; reaffirming the potential of risks to materialise, which reinforces the original ideas behind securitisation. This was neatly captured by one resident who stated,

*"The presence of the police is...it makes you feel safer right enough...we would be open to alot if the police weren't here, you know."*

(Interview 5: J)

The overarching intention of control signals (signals of control) is to provide reassurance to the public. However, the way that it does this is through the cyclical '*security>insecurity>security*' model, and so, at the macro-level, mega-event security always has an overarching positive dimension. Control signals, in terms of this 'bigger picture', then, were always received positively, and always understood in respect of this. In the same way that Barthes states of a wrestler, who utilises the full range of actions (signs), based on popular mythologies, to align his performance with what the audience expects of him. Security at mega-events is self-confirming and reassuring through its mere presence, which aligns both with public expectancies, at the same time capitalising on the very insecurities it reaffirms. As such, it "ceremonially offers to the public a pure and full signification, rounded like nature" (Barthes 1972: 23).

## 7.3 Experiencing the Macro Through the Micro

### 7.3.1 Positive Micro Interactions

The security measures at G2014: policing, private security, CCTV, ring fencing, road blockades, sand bank barriers and so on, had a local dimension, as well as a

global one; they were experienced in relation to the macro-level interactions as outlined above. But within this grand scale, further micro-level interactions took place between individual control measures, the local environment and community members - the "micro dramas of control" (Innes 2014: 138). Again, these measures elicited positive and negative reactions amongst the public, and in some instances, both at the same time.

The way control signals are perceived is mediated by who we are; that is to say that different social groups, from different contextual and situational backgrounds will react differently to these control measures. But furthermore, even within a social group within the same community setting, there are still likely to be variations resulting from an individual's biography, "at a neighbourhood level, different signals can act in different ways for different groups of people" (Innes and Roberts 2008: 246).

For example, one elderly woman in her 80s, lived right beside the main entrance to the Athletes' Village, and so naturally, there were police and private security guards positioned only a few yards from her door, throughout the day and night. Instead of finding this intimidating or intruding, as others did, she found it offered her a sense of security because the police and security guards were there to keep an eye on her,

*"It makes you feel safer, if you put security round you, you know, like if anybody came to my door, I could just shout over to one of those men [security] that is working there and ask them if they would come over [to help], because I just stay by myself, nobody in the house with me."*

(Interview 11: C)

This woman represented one of the few (three in total) who mentioned that they felt wary of others in their community, and so, the security measures for the Games had a benefit on this localised aspect of her insecurities. In this sense, the control signals had an unintended positive effect through the way that they interacted at local level.

A further aspect in which control measures were received positively, was in relation to the influx of 'outsiders' that the Games brought to Dalmarnock; what was usually a tight knit community in which everybody knew each other, during the Games, had been infiltrated with 'strangers', such as athletes, police and private security personnel. For some, this presented more prosaic security concerns, to which the additional security had a beneficial aspect,

*"That is one thing about the security, although you complain about, otherwise you are quite glad too, because you don't want the people walking about that you don't know, and then there is the stories you are hearing about...people from other countries, like, doing things to people as well, so you are not really wanting that either, so in a way, I do understand that."*

(Interview 4: M)

These examples represent the positive reassurance effects which resulted from the interactions of globalised security measures upon the local environment and its people. This mutual interface between macro and micro processes was best summed up by one individual who had stated that the security measures in place made him worry more and less, but for different reasons,

*"The Games made me worry both more and less but in different ways: more in terms of extreme things like terrorism, I became more aware that that sort of thing when you saw police with machine guns and snipers on roofs, as a real possibility, I had never really thought about it before....but in saying that other aspects of the security provided some elements of reassurance for me and for others - for example, there is that big patch of derelict land that people walk to and from the garage, if for instance, someone slipped and fell in a ditch there it could be days before they would be found, whereas during the Games that wouldn't have happened as there was plenty of police about. So the Games made me worry more in terms of extremes, but less in terms of day-to-day community issues."*

(Interview 29: R)

### 7.3.2 Negative Micro Interactions

At the macro-level, exceptional threats justify exceptional measures, this leads to security at mega-events which goes far beyond the everyday levels that most people are used to. But it is this divergence from its grounding in the everyday which ironically impacts on the everyday lived experiences and concerns of residents i.e. where the macro interacts at the micro-level. The first respect in which the control signals were received negatively was in relation to their dosage and scale.

During the Games, Dalmarnock was effectively in a state of Lockdown. To give some context, Dalmarnock was surrounded by perimeter fencing (figure 7-1) with cameras on top ever few metres, the fence created a new boundary between the Athletes' Village and the existing community. In addition to the fencing, a makeshift single road entrance was created which required permitted access for vehicles (one permit was issued per household and some resident's only received their permit days after the restrictions were actually in place). Whilst beyond this entrance lay the strategic positioning of road blockades and sand bags which further splintered the community. The area itself was heavily policed, with police officers stationed statically and on period patrols around its streets 24/7. Alongside the actual fencing, private security guards were positioned at some entrance points for athletes and at other 'weak points' along its perimeter.

Such disruptions resulting from high security provided further interactions between the global and the local. The majority of residents' viewed the security measures that were in place as overwhelming or over the top, despite knowing and appreciating why they were in place,

*"Well I think the barrier and that there was a bit much, you know, as I say with the barrier and the cage, it was a wee bit overwhelming, aye."*

(Interview 27: N)

Figure 7-1: Perimeter fencing, CCTV, road closures and police patrols.



Source: Author's own.

The security caused a number of disruptions to resident's everyday lives: many were not able to park their cars inside their own driveways due to the positioning of the fencing and road blocks, while parking in the street was completely prohibited. This meant that care services for the elderly or disabled or even basic things like ordering a takeaway meal, required the driver of those services to park outside the community and walk in on foot. Bus stops were removed completely, and in their place, was a small minibus service which provided a basic looped route to nearby areas such as Parkhead. Such restrictions raised concerns over emergency access, where several incidents in the community had highlighted their position of vulnerability stranded should a 999 situation arise.

What is interesting in relation to the signalling process was the merging of fact and fiction through the circulation of rumours amongst community members. The Police-Community Engagement Officer talked of the problems in addressing rumours around the exact protocol for emergencies,

*"There is a concern that where there are these fences or other blocks where people can't get past, that there is a concern that the emergency services won't get through either and it has been trying to reassure the public that the emergency services won't be compromised."*

(Interview SB: 1)

The problem for the police and security organisers was that by the time such rumours had circulated around the community, opportunities to produce 'hard facts' to counteract these, were limited, as the Games were already underway. The situations in which information is limited are those which rumours thrive on, as Innes (2014: 79) states, "Rumours are claims where the empirical warrants for that which is being claimed cannot be assessed". This situation was outlined by one resident,

*"The rumours were the road was getting...one minute the wee road was getting shut and then the next minute it wasn't getting shut, then nobody was to come in, nobody was to come out. So you were having all that and you didn't know whether it was true or not. When you asked them [security or police] they said 'No' they weren't shutting the road and then somebody said they were shutting the road, so, they probably had just been rumours."*

(Interview 16: A)

In the context of a lack of information, residents confided in themselves, to 'fill in the gaps', "Because ones friends or co-workers provide reference points for validating perceptions but are also likely to share a more general cultural view or bias, the potential exists for both amplifying and attenuating information. If the risk is feared, rumour may be a significant element in forming public perceptions and attitudes" (Kasperson *et al.* 2000: 242). Rumours are important in that they acted as a signal in their own right, which offset the reassuring intentions of one of the overarching principles of the security measures. Security features such as fencing and road blockades and even the procedures of security personnel, all of which were intent on signalling or communicating reassurance, suddenly became the sources of further insecurities relating to local situations.

Whether the rumours were true or false, no longer mattered, as they had already elicited perceptions, which had consequences on individuals sense of safety and insecurity, as one resident states,

*"S: Before the Games, a wee ambulance couldn't get into the guy, he ended up...he died. And erm...and another lassie who had phoned an ambulance for her boy, he'd fell and broke his arm and they wouldn't let the ambulance in for that either.*

*Ad: And how does that make you feel?*

*S: Well it worries me for that side of Dalmarnock, because I say to myself that I am quite lucky because I'm right near the road and I don't have any parking restrictions here, but obviously my ma's got alot of health issues and she's right on Springfield Road and if she ever needed an ambulance, what happens? What happens then? They are not going to let them in, you know what I mean."*

(Interview 23: S)

## 7.4 The Materiality of the Sign

In semiotic theory, it is well regarded that the materiality of a signifier can influence the signified, or may signify itself (except for proponents of Saussurean semiotics - who do not allocate room for materiality to signify in the dyadic model). For the same reasons Baudrillard agreed with McLuhan's (1964) dictum, "the medium is the message", the material form a sign takes can modulate what is signed, or even be a sign in-itself. Similarly, the material nature of a text has been considered to signify in its own right (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996, 231). Here the importance of the different mediums of security in relation to how these were geographically positioned within Dalmarnock is identified. This feature becomes more apparent when considering another semiotic principle of Eco's (1988: 46) that there are *primary* and *secondary* functions of signs.

As Gould (2008: 16) identifies of surveillance, the success of measures in having a positive or negative effect on trust relations "depend primarily on how it is carried out". Therefore, the materiality and geographical locations that security takes, are important not just in terms of how these respond to particular risks, but also in how these variables influence the control signals ability to change perceptions of reassurance or insecurity among the public.

Mega event security is intended to create the conditions hostile to terrorism, while also providing safety and reassurance. These two dualisms are negotiated at mega-event venues by creating distinctions between *inside* and *outside*; a hardened outer exterior which is robust and securitised. For example, airport style security checkpoints greeted visitors to events at G2014, and once inside this perimeter, visitors could then enjoy the softened security; which did not detract from the sporting festivities. However, such distinctions are obsolete when, for local residents of Dalmarnock, existing on the outer periphery, the hardened exterior was the only side to security that they perpetually saw and experienced.

If the hardened security perimeter is there to stop an event from materialising, then this outer area represents the likely conflict or 'danger zone'. The fence not only represents the formation of a hardened security perimeter, but in changing the spatial fabric surrounding the event, it actively creates locations in which conflicts are likely to arise, and also the contexts in which it would be handled. Recognition of this fact among locals, therefore changed the way in which the primary or secondary function, either reassurance or deterrence, became more dominant as the primary sign vehicle within the control signals. This was the big security challenge for planners and those responsible for communicating the reasons behind specific security measures to overcome, as the Police-Community Engagement Officer told me,

*"I think it is still a struggle to get the message across that this security is there to protect everyone, I think maybe there is a slight feeling that you are doing all this to protect the athletes and it is not, we are doing*

*all this, all the security overlay, is to protect everyone and make sure everyone is safe."*

(Interview SB: 1)

At G2014, Dalmarnock represented the unsecuritised outer layer; in the same way that the check-in line presents the real 'weak spot' in airport security (Molotch 2012), the peripheral zones between securitised venues and unsecuritised community is similarly weak in terms of the security coverage it offers. This crossing point between macro and micro processes was summarised neatly by one resident,

*"Ad: And has the Commonwealth Games increased feelings of safety or has it had the opposite effect?*

*M: Well, I am starting to worry now, has there been threats? Is this why it is?*

*Ad: Because all this security is scaled up?*

*M: Is there something going to happen and we are living here right next to it?"*

(Interview 4: M)

As a public good, mega-event security should offer protection to residents, particularly considering their position of vulnerability. However, at G2014, security instead, signalled weaknesses in the overall security design which affected individuals own perception of their security coverage, as one resident mentioned,

*"They [the police] say 'we are doing this for security', ah right you are doing it for 'security', but not MY security. I am not happy about it, I am not happy about it."*

(Interview 5: J)

This point related to the way that specific security measures, rather than provide all-encompassing security, actually exacerbated the communities awareness of their exposure and position of vulnerability to potential risks. For

residents of Dalarnock, the function of deterrence became the primary signifier amongst control signals, rather than its dual aim of reassurance.

*"They said that the sandbags there and in front of here was to prevent terrorists driving a van load of explosives, so they couldn't target the [Athletes'] Village there. Right, but it doesn't give us, the residents here much [security]..."*

(Interview 10: B)

Therefore, the materiality of the control signal, specifically the geographical situation that they took, was of vital importance in influencing the reading of the signal in terms of its primary and secondary functions.

*"J: Well, they are locked in and we are locked out, so if they are going to blow up something they are going to blow us up. They are going to blow us up, not anybody else, know what I mean."*

(Interview 18: J)

For the majority of residents, security at G2014 through aspects of its enclosure and 'enclavization' operated as a form of 'club good' (Bayley and Shearing 1996), in which the security coverage operated at varying levels, with athletes and spectators (members of the "club") offered full protection from exceptional events, while residents (non-members) were offered less coverage. In conventional terms, the idea of 'clubbing' (Hope 2000), has meant that individuals who often most require security, are unable to obtain it. The typical example in this regard is of 'gated communities', in which wealthy insiders live inside their "fortified cells", whilst those outsiders live amidst "places of terror" (Davis 1990: 224). There are similarities here with G2014 security, only this time the problem was not a lack of security per se, but rather, a lack of security which offered adequate protection to those on the 'outside', as much as it did to those on the 'inside'. As Zedner (2009: 147), states, this is also one of the paradoxes of pursuing security, "Pursuing security necessarily places some sections of the populace outside protection and entails targeting and incapacitating those deemed to pose a threat."

In order for control signals at a mega-event to signal reassurance to community members at the micro-level, depends on their strategic positioning in relation to the community itself. As Eco (1988: 46) states of the function of signs, "In certain cases, the secondary function is so dominant that the primary function is minimized or completely eliminated". The way that security operated at the boundary between venues and the existing community, enabled the deterrent function (as a signifier of risk) to come to the fore. Furthermore, the materiality in terms of geographical location and proximity within the everyday environment raised questions over security coverage, therefore lessening the effect of the reassurance function. Material and technological security, has the potential to offer protection and reassurance (at both global and local levels), which relates to Eco's (1976: 150) realisation that "it remains possible...to change the circumstances in the light of which the addressee will chose their own ways of interpretation". That is to say, that mega-event security could be conducted in such a way which induces reassurance at both macro and micro, global and local, levels. However, equally, it also has "the capacity to disempower, to alienate, to oppress and to endanger those subject to their use" (Zedner 2008: 269).

As Zedner (2009: 269) states, "The securing one space may be brought about at the price of rendering another yet more insecure". However, the real difficulty of making the dual function of reassurance, override its deterrent function at the micro-level, can never be fully achieved under the current format of mega-event securitisation. By creating an 'outside', is to recognise that within this space lies potential threats. In this way, the community, geographically speaking, presents the site and source of any danger to which securitisation (of the area) does not necessarily equate to protection (of the people within). These two aspects of security do not sit well together within the context of a melding of global and local security issues. Inevitably then, within every security act or control signal which exists on the boundaries of the event (inner) and community (outer), is the unavoidable message that "populations themselves are a terrorist threat to the authorities" (Baudrillard 2005: 120), and in reaffirming this message the authorities continue to legitimately define risk and security responses for the public at the macro-level, at the same time as these may work

against the public at the micro-level. This is how security can be both reassuring in one material sense, and anxiety inducing in another, as one resident stated,

*"Ad: Do you think then the Games have made you worry more then?"*

*M: Oh aye, oh aye.*

*J: Worry like MY [own] security wise? Aye, exactly!"*

(Interview 18: J & M)

This aspect of this discussion identifies an important distinction regarding control signals; firstly, that in situations where there is a melding of the global risks and the local places - these signals can be polysemic, signalling both reassurance at one level and anxiety at another. Furthermore, it gives credence to not only the materiality of control signals (as in their outward appearance), but also the geographical situation and location that these measures take. Although based on empirical evidence from mega-event security, both lessons are transferrable and increasingly useful to other scenarios, particularly when global and local security issues are becoming increasingly interconnected (Loader and Percy 2012).

## 7.5 Policework and Performance

Alongside the environmental and situational measures mentioned, existed the widespread use of police and security personnel, the mix of behavioural and environmental security providing a holistic security approach which compliments each other, as a Security Manager for the Games stated,

*"So the whole part of a holistic security operation is the fact that you have all these bits together, working together, for the common purpose."*

(Interview DW: 2)

The aim of using such high numbers of police and private security personnel during the Games, was that these people act as representatives of expertise at the access points where lay visitors and (importantly, here) community members interact with the abstract and disembedding systems of overt physical security, as the Security Director stated,

*"I hope we can achieve through having, in particular, such a high proportion of police officers and military personnel, uniformed services, is that we get that very positive facing public engagement, that will look proportionate, but will be friendly and professional and support the objectives."*

(Interview SA: 1)

The geographical setting of Dalmarnock and its proximity to the G2014 security operation, mean that it functioned as an 'access point', to which security personnel were given with the role of providing the necessary 'facework commitments' (Giddens 1990: 85) with lay community members. The aim, as outlined by the Security Director, was to reinforce the trust that was expended in the expert systems, through the remedial potential of those who represent those systems, such as the police and private security personnel, "At access points the facework commitments which tie lay actors into trust relations ordinarily involve displays of manifest trustworthiness and integrity, coupled with an attitude of "business as usual" or unflappability" (Giddens 1990: 85).

However, access points are those situations of vulnerability between expert systems and lay persons, "they are places of vulnerability for abstract systems, but also junctures at which trust can be maintained or built up" (Giddens 1990: 88). Giddens (1990) notes that nearly all expert systems have clear distinctions in the spaces at which front and backstage performances are conducted; from hospitals, to planes, the technical work is performed out of sight. Mega-events are different in this respect because most of the security work exists without a 'backstage' for police or private security workers; instead their work is conducted in full view of the public. Both roles of deterrence and reassurance

have to be conducted by the same personnel, and in same 'frontstage' arena; police and private security have to be both globally and locally minded.

In terms of reassurance the onus here is on how the individual officer can perform these responsibilities while curtailing the peeking through of deterrence. It is this issue which Innes (2007: 98) identifies when asking how feasible it is for police officers to oscillate between the two seemingly polarising roles, "it remains to be seen whether the values and ideals of community policing and its affiliated approaches can be sustained in an environment where there is a pronounced political impetus to create a harsh environment for those who are perceived to threaten national security" (Innes 2007: 98).

The police, in particular, were told to perform their duties according to the 'friendly Games' narrative. However, performances require not only the enactment by the individual performer, but also the acceptance of this role by the audience. "When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them" (Goffman 1956:10). There is a problem in this regard in that 'police' are made sense of in relation to the viewer's, prior experiences and expectations of what the police signal, which gives rise to a particular way of seeing them in the current setting. Many residents subsequently questioned the authenticity of the police in encounters with them,

*"I felt the police were told during the CWG that they had to be nice to people, because we are from the...the East End of Glasgow, especially from these areas: Bridgeton, Dalmarnock...polis aren't generally nice to you [...] whereas, during the CWG it was all "Oh hiya, how are you?", and I think it took people a couple of days to get used to it."*

(Interview 29: R)

The sudden influx of a reassurance policing drive and visible police patrols served to make people wary of their presence and their behaviour, which was completely at odds with how they had previously experienced police work.

Police officers projected their own internalised idealised view of the situation upon the basis that people would find these behaviours reassuring. However, devoid of prior knowledge of the community, its people, or the prior police/community relations, what Goffman (1971: 35) terms 'minimal understandability', meant that such idealised performances actually worked as signs which raised levels of suspicion. In signification the "code is primordial" (Guillemette and Cossette 2006: 2), bringing together "present entities with absent units" (Eco 1976: 8), and the lack of a common code over the reassurance functions of police visibility, allowed a reading according to the stronger code of police as signalling that something is wrong. In objective terms, police usually operate as a form of alarm by raising the alarm about alarming situations.

For residents of Dalmarnock, however, the mere police presence (and dosage), their patrolling and increased engagement, acted as a signal for alarm, without an actual source of alarm. If the common code, or the message is weak or imprecise, the receiver is left with a lot of work still to do in order to decode the sign; they have to use abductive reasoning and subjective judgements to select a particular code - "the choice of the more suitable combination can only be suggested by some surrounding context and circumstance" (Eco 1976: 148). In trying to foster normal appearances, without an appreciation of what normality was/is for people of Dalmarnock (a banal and withdrawn view of police), police inadvertently signalled to the community that something was unnatural or wrong, "Such opaque acts may not be threats in themselves but they leave the witness not knowing where the mind of the performer is, or what his purpose, and therefore not trustful of him" (Goffman 1971: 358).

A further aspect of effective performances is that the performer conveys the attributes they are meant to possess, "They [audience] are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess" (Goffman 1956: 10). Police officers were drafted in from all over Police Scotland. The Games did not utilise merely the former Strathclyde Police cohort, but drafted in officers from Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Dundee and further afield. Furthermore, when considering there are 'strong' and 'weak' (Goffman 1956: 10) performers to a given role 'strong' is when an individual is convinced in their own

capabilities, and that the reality they project is the real reality. By contrast, 'weak' performers are those who are not convinced by their own routine. In any case, the task is that they "do not give themselves away" (Goffman 1971: 315). However, it became clear for local residents that the experts did not possess some of the expertise that they were trying to convey, "We find sometimes that disruptions occur through unmeant gestures, faux pas, and scenes, thus discrediting or contradicting the definition of the situation that is being maintained" (Goffman 1956: 152). One example of this was when residents asked the police for specific local information, such as how to manoeuvre around the community, and the police were unable to respond properly. The consequences of these simple 'flooding out' interactions were that they revealed how incapable the police would be in attending to actual risks, thus rupturing the very basis upon which trust was initially invested in them at the macro-level,

*"You would have thought they would have got local police that know the people, know what I mean. Then you have got police saying to you, 'I don't even know the area. When I first started, I was told to go along this road and along that road.', and I'm like that, 'You don't even know where those roads are?!', So how are they supposed to...if eh somebody has been injured."*

(Interview 17: S)

Amidst an apparent legitimacy crisis with regards to their position of expertise unravelling, many police officers resorted to relying on their backstage duty of 'deterrence' as a way of reasserting their authority onto the audience. Residents gave various examples of suspicious police being overly authoritative. One particular example was when one woman, while being interviewed, showed me a video on her phone that her partner had recorded the previous night. It shows him being interrogated by two police officers for "looking suspicious" while walking his dog at night, the transcript of that video is detailed below,

*"What's suspicious about me? What is seriously suspicious about me? I walk my dog every other day round about these streets and now there is all these fences and cameras, what is suspicious about that? [...] Don't*

*tell me that I look suspicious walking about my streets with my dog and then you are walking about radioing in saying 'There is a guy with a camera, looking suspicious, walking his dog', A dog that I walk I walk this way every other day, alright."*

(Interview 23: S partner)

What these examples show is that police officers had difficulty in oscillating between frontstage reassurance and backstage deterrent. The consequence of these encounters was that they defrayed public confidence in the police, the lasting importance of which, is identified by Skogan (2006), in that, negative encounters have an asymmetrical and lasting influence on public perceptions of those agencies.

The interfaces between global and local, frontstage reassurance and backstage deterrence, are also identifiable when considering the different types of policing which were on display. While ordinary officers patrolled the streets in a way not dissimilar to how they would during everyday reassurance or community policing, amidst this, was the visible specialist officer, who patrolled on foot with machine guns, or were perched on top of various buildings around Dalmarnock. These officers were tasked with conducting the more overt deterrent control signals. However, the problem here is that lay individuals do not tend to differentiate between what is a specialist officer and what is an ordinary officer, neither do they clearly identify the roles of each in terms of what their intended primary or secondary functions are. To most residents of Dalmarnock, both forms of policing were identified just simply, as 'police'.

In most instances of policework, the specialist officer is a backstage performer; consigned to rare exceptional moments, or serving as a control signal in train stations or airports. We rarely see police with guns in the UK, as a matter of course, and especially do not expect to see them in our everyday residential environment. Unsurprisingly then, the effects of overt gun carrying officers was not a reassuring one. Instead it served to reaffirm the potential of exceptional risks,

*"Ad: What do you think when you see the police with machine guns then? You mentioned that earlier?*

*J: Aye, that is OTT, come on! They don't need a machine gun to walk about down here.*

*M: That is what make you think is there a terrorist going to walk along this street and blow himself up?*

*F: It must be scary for the wee ones.*

*M: It's scary for older people too...looking out their windows and seeing that."*

(Interview 18: J, M & F)

Policing with guns at a mega-event is an obvious example of 'acting out' (Garland 2001); it was a symbolic and rhetorical gesture which aims to convey the idea that something was being done against the potentiality of threats, and therefore, aimed to provide a sense of reassurance to the public. Central to this is the utilisation and enactment of public sentiment, and one level, this was the case. It has been discussed that police with guns served to create a self-confirming acceptance, at one level, that such measures were needed. However, for residents of Dalrnarnock the pursuit of this approach was tempered by how officers with firearms were perceived in the local setting. For example, the sight of guns in the context of people's ordinary environment, decreased the demand for this style of policing. As such, although residents did not question the use of this tactic in terms of the overall, more globalised aims of counter terrorism, they did feel it both unnecessary and inappropriate in the apathetic nature at which these specialist officers interacted at the local level,

*"it is a bit heavy. The security measures...when you are coming into your court at four o'clock in the morning and the Games haven't even started yet and the police are walking along with machine guns or AK[47]s or whatever it is they are carrying, I don't think that is right, come on, who is kidding who?"*

(Interview 18: J)

This same participant elaborated on this idea. He told me he woke up to go to work one morning and when drawing the curtains saw two armed police officer walk past his window, an image he managed to capture on his mobile phone (figure 7-2). His initial reaction when seeing the officers was that 'something serious' must have happened. Previously, armed police had tended to restrict their movement to around venue entrances, and the Athletes' Village site, and so it was unusual to see them patrolling the streets, as this was usually done by the 'ordinary' officers.

Figure 7-2 - Specialist Police patrolling outside a resident's home.



Source: Participant J.A

The specialist officers in this context were unlikely to have been responding to intelligence of an actual threat. Instead, it is more plausible that they were being deployed as a meta-message of authority. As stated, the visual effect of guns signalled immediate threat, and so police in the general sense, were able to reaffirm their position of authority by utilising aspects of the 'front' (Goffman 1956: 13), mainly their expressive equipment (guns). Giddens (1990: 86) notes that controlling of the threshold between front and backstage is part of the "essence of professionalism". Here then, amidst the collapse of front/back distinctions, specialist officers can be considered an attempt to reinforce the

position of the expert, through the use of specialist equipment. However, while the specialist officer may have legitimised their position of expertise they did not provide any secondary aspect of reassurance.

In addition, the specialist officers, in trying to maintain their specialist role and performance, and primary function of deterrence, were perceived as being less approachable, less 'friendly' and rarely engaged with the public. Tactically, this provided fewer opportunities for 'flooding out'; by maintaining a stern appearance,

*"There are the guys walking around with the guns or the dogs, they don't smile or anything, I didn't want to approach one of them."*

(Interview 20: A)

In terms of reassurance, the problem was that residents were encountering both the friendly 'PC Dixon' type officer, and the stern faced 'Robocop' specialist officer within the same area. As a result, mixed signals were sent; some officers were polite and friendly, whose behaviours aligned with the reassurance performance role, while other officers, who were performing the deterrent role, were (un)naturally antagonistic in their relationship with local residents, as explained here by one resident,

*"Ad: And when the police were speaking to you were the friendly or...*

*J: I'll be honest with you, a couple of them were, but other ones were trying to show their authority, do you know what I mean. I only show respect to people who show me it. I don't see why I should show them respect because they are a police officer; I don't see...if they are not going to show me it, then I'm not going to show it back. "*

(Interview 21: J)

The effect of such negative interactions were that they undermined the positive work that was been done by the friendly officers. Furthermore, the circulation of stories about these negative encounters between community members meant rumours of such encounters also influenced, to a more or lesser degree, people's

overall opinion of the police as an institution and their legitimacy in the local sense.

A further aspect of policing performance relates to Goffman's analysis of social relations and tie signs between anonymous individuals, where biographical and contextual information is used to identify and project our relationship to others. The key here is not about how the two 'communicate' to each other, but how conduct towards each other affirms their relationship and social position to one another (Goffman 1972: 234). To recap: Dalmarnock and the rest of the East End of Glasgow, had an external reputation of a place of high crime and negative stereotypes around its people. Added to this, was the point that such officers had no prior relationships with any residents of Dalmarnock. In the face of two anonymous individuals, police are likely to have relied on information and judgements "which have been largely acquired outside of the current situation [...] yet will closely influence the reading put upon the behaviour that the two manifest in regard to each other" (Goffman 1972: 236). Many residents felt that this was the case,

*"I also heard that officers were stopping people and searching people and you think...that is the good thing about if they get to know the people walking about, they don't then stop and search them every single day, do you know what I mean."*

(Interview 29: R)

As such, some residents felt that the negative perception of the area influenced how police and other private security members were quick to shift out of the 'friendly Games' persona or to view everyday activities as signs of malign intent. Sampson (2009: 2) states, stigmatised areas can "set in motion long-term processes which reinforce the initial stigmatized state and thereby contribute to the social reproduction of inequality". Instances of negative encounters, combined with imposing physical security, share similarities with Flusty's (1994: 16-17) taxonomy of 'interdictory spaces', in that the makeup of space can contribute to aspects of exclusion, or a feeling of hostility, or passive aggression. Displacement and exclusion does not have to be physical, but can be mental.

And it is here we begin to see the moving away of (in)security in purely material terms, to influencing ontological aspects. Some residents touched on this when stating that the security contributed to a feeling that residents themselves were under suspicion, or that the security was being used to prevent *them* from causing trouble, rather than being orientated primarily against any external threat,

*"Ad: And do you think the security measures make it feel like you are out of place?"*

*S: Aye, like you are in the...like you are doing something wrong."*

(Interview 23: S)

As Loader (2006: 204) identifies, police treatment of citizens sends important messages which can reaffirm or question their sense of belonging to a political community, "Policing is a social institution whose routine ordering and cultural work communicates authoritative meaning to individuals and groups about who they are, about whether their voices are heard and claims recognised, and about where and in what ways they belong".

## 7.6 Hierarchies of Legitimacy in Policing and Security

Within the literature control signals have so far been conceptualised within the sole jurisdiction of the state police (Innes 2004; 2014), and so it is interesting to note similarities and differences in efficacy between non-state providers, and how these different agencies are perceived by the public. The role of private security personnel at G2014 was to provide manned guarding at venues and different access points. Whereas police patrolled within the streets of Dalmarnock, private security personnel were stationary and strategically positioned on its boundaries and alongside different points along the perimeter fencing. To give an idea of numbers, the Security Director for the Games told me that the number of private security personnel was slightly greater at roughly

7,000 than the number of police used 6,500. Private security personnel were therefore tasked with a great deal of responsibility in also performing and contributing to the dual functions of reassurance and deterrence by signalling the visible presence of control.

Within the overall security assemblage there are hierarchies of legitimacy. Smith (2008: 135) for instance identifies that CCTV operators are often considered 'bottom of the pile', both in terms of the nature of their job, and within the overall social control chain, which often results in feelings of "powerlessness, frustration and resentment" towards other agencies in the chain, and in terms of their own job satisfaction. Private security contractors often recruit from the DWP pool of unemployed jobseekers, inevitably offering low paid work in return for their ability to maximise profits from the (in)security market. The jobs on offer are associated with the 'dirty work' of the security industry, and lack any real specialisation. Coupled with some high profile security failings and blunders from some of the more established names in the business (G4S being a repeat offender), the effect is that, in the eyes of the public, private security personnel, generally speaking, are part of a 'tainted occupation' (Löfstrand *et al.* 2015) and are not regarded in the highest of esteem. As Fussey and colleagues recognise, this raises a number of questions for the use of private security at mega-events, "Such developments generate a range of socio-ethical issues. Amongst these is the theme of legitimacy. For example, one of the most valuable areas of agreement across much policy, practice and research is that policing agencies require legitimizing via the consent of the policed (inter alia Reiner 2007)" (Fussey *et al.* 2011: 159).

In security and control signal performances, regardless of whether they are effective or not, the police hold a specific symbolic aura honed through semiotic iconography: the blue colour, chequered motifs, uniforms, badges and insignia adorned on clothing and vehicles are instantly recognisable amongst the public. Similarly, in terms of performance such symbolism provides the police with a degree of 'mystification' (Goffman 1956: 44) over their audience. The social distance helps create a situation where "the audience itself will often co-operate by acting in a respectful fashion, in awed regard for the sacred integrity imputed

to the performer" (Ibid 1956: 45). It is this quality which gives the state police their legitimacy and ability to introduce definitions of the situation, in a way that other professions, such as a parking attendant, for example, often cannot.

Private security personnel possess limited powers; their effectiveness in terms of reassurance and deterrence relies more heavily upon their visible presence, and having the right kind of soft skills. As the Security Director stated, their efficacy was based on their ability to provide the visible face of positive public engagement. However, at G2014, both presence and personality caused problems. For example, unlike the police, private security personnel were not issued with specific uniforms. They wore ordinary clothes which were overlaid with a high visibility vest and accreditation badge. For many residents, this image conveyed unprofessionalism. Furthermore, with the London 2012 Olympics G4S scandal still resonating in the public perception, residents felt that the lack of uniform was indicative that the personnel were hastily recruited, and lacking in adequate training, as one resident stated,

*"Now as I say, some of the security, it looks as if they done like a two day course, they had on old jeans and trainers and...they have all got different shirts, and the only thing they have is a florescent vest, not even a jacket, a vest! and they are security? I'm going 'Are you sure you are security', I've got one of those jackets in my motor, I could put it on, put something round my neck and walk through. That's the impression you get with them. And they are manning the roads down here, for the roads going In...for goodness sake."*

(Interview 8: W)

Not only were there difficulties in using visibility as an axis for reassurance, but the complexities of the hierarchical governance arrangement also provided barriers in another reassuring function, whereby conflicting messages were being sent downwards between the police and private security. Because private security personnel were positioned at different points of access and egress, both within the community and its perimeter, many residents encountered them in two types of scenarios: the first was when the security personnel told residents

not to do something, for example, that they could or couldn't enter in a particular way or that they couldn't do certain activities like taking photographs. The other scenario was when residents went directly to these people for information. In both circumstances, conflicting messages were being sent between what the police and private security were telling the public. A resident outlined this problem,

*"The police say you can take them [photographs], it's these security guards [who say that photographs are prohibited]; I don't know, they just don't seem to know what they are doing. I mean it is security; they are standing there with old t shirts and jeans and trainers and a yellow fluorescent jacket and they call them security guards, they try to tell us what to do. I don't mind, see if it was somebody like the police that said to me 'Don't', that's fine, he has got a warrant card, he was done the training for it, they haven't."*

(Interview 8: W)

Private security guards lack of projection of discernible identity, combined with their actual inability to clarify situations or alleviate fears by providing information, meant that rather than provide the desired outcome of "positive public facing engagement", they actually further eroded trust. However, this situation was also exacerbated by the 'soft skills' and 'personality traits' (Innes 2014: 134) of individual personnel. Important here is how the security personnel internalised both their weak performance and stigmatisation, as perceived by the public, and their position of subordination to the police. Löfstrand *et al.* (2015: 15) state that private security workers will often use coping or deflection strategies in order to reframe the idea that their work is important, or to create the idea that they should be held in higher esteem than they actually are. One method identified was the use of 'paternal oversight', "Another way of finding self-worth in a job with low social value is to view patrons and clients as akin to children over whom security officers need to exercise paternal oversight".

However, at G2014 security workers appeared to have gone a step further than mere paternalism, and instead, deliberately adopted an overly hostile, and

aggressive attitude with residents from Dalmarnock, as a way of deflecting their stigmatization and asserting their authority (and internalised sense of legitimacy or worth) over locals,

*"N: it's the cheek off of half of the security; the way they talk to you is a disgrace. I was off work one day and I had...I was in the motor with the wee one and they had parked right across the junction and I said 'Are you going to move that?' he is like that to me 'na it's alright', and I said, 'you are just a pure halfwit' and he looked at the wee one in the back of the motor and then he looked at me and he went 'ah but who puts food on your table?', as if...I am paying your taxes because you sit on the social, I was off work one day...I was raging. [He] Just looked at me, saw the kid, and assumed I was on the social, just because I was off work one day. Honestly, the cheek off them is just...there is no benefit out of this [for us]."*

(Interview 17: S)

One resident noted that she overheard some private security workers rallying together before their shift, urging each other to show that they are in charge,

*"See some of these security...they are fucking dead cheeky; my partner was nearly fighting with them, I've nearly fought with them, everybody I know has been arguing with them. I mean, they were shouting the other day, 'assert your authority, remember we are in charge down here, they are fucking idiots', and you can hear them!"*

(Interview 21: J)

As with the police using stereotypes to frame the banal actions of residents as potentially troublesome, many residents felt that private security were acting towards them based on this same idea, capitalising on it as a way of deflecting their own position of tainted reputation and stigmatisation; effectively transferring the label of who it is that is stigmatised. The idea of security as contributing to stigmatisation, is discussed further below.

## 7.7 Ontological Security Effects

As Sparks (1992: 124) states, security is connected to "wider, subjective and non-rationalistic elements of social identity and well-being". Innes (2004: 159) contends that control signals, specifically policing, cannot influence the ontological, 'context layer' (media, individual, community, environment) and that they can only react to "particular threats to security", these being within the 'impact layer' (of policing) such as crime, disorder and social control. However, as the previous chapters have shown, policework and security has both direct and indirect influences on those aspects of the 'context layer'.

Taking inspiration from Loader's (2006) criticism of 'ambient policing', and applied through Innes's (2004) signal crimes and control signals concepts, this last section aims to demonstrate the relationship between material and ontological security. It shows how the objective conditions of security in the former can influence the subject dimensions in the latter.

As a starting point, it is worth justifying the necessity of this approach by looking at how participants of the research responded to the question - "What does security mean to you?" and "What do you associate with the word 'security'?", as one would expect, this elicited a variety of different responses: some associated it with the pragmatic and material issues of safety,

*"Being secure; safe in your own house, safe when you walk the streets, during the day or at night, your cars are safe, things like that."*

(Interview 8: W)

Others associated the word with signalling the proximity of external threats,

*"Violence and stopping people from coming in and wrecking things or taking somebody's life, that is what I associate with security."*

(Interview 1: M)

Further conventional interpretations viewed security in relation to the idea of its trade-off with freedom, whereby more security equated to less freedom,

*"It's having that choice and being able to do it, things I took for granted [before the security]."*

(Interview 3: M)

However, amidst these diverse interpretations sat the explicit and subtly referred to notion that security was about something altogether different, having both an emotional and political element,

*"Security for me just means to 'be safe' isn't it, to be thought about and to be considered, I would think. To be considered in decisions that is concerning my welfare and my community."*

(Interview 19: M)

Heavily implied within this quote is the concept of 'belonging'. Miller (2003: 220) defines belonging as "a sense or ease or accord with who we are in ourselves [and] a sense of accord with the various physical and social contexts in which our lives are lived out". Furthermore, as May (2013: 78) summaries, "It is a feeling that tells us something about a person's connection to themselves and to the surrounding world of people, cultures and places". Therefore, belonging is heavily intertwined with ontological security and the emotional, rather than cognitive, aspect of "being in the world" (Giddens 1990: 92). It is recognised that belonging "has both an emotional component of 'feeling at home' or 'yearning for a home', and a political element of claim-making for space and recognition within a society" (May 2013: 986). This last point is important, because embedded within the responses of participants was that physical security and policing, impacted on both of these variables.

The first way in which this process happened was through physical security and policing conveying the idea of dangerousness, and therefore reinforcing the concept of stigma onto Dalmarnock residents. As Gregory *et al.* (2000: 341) state, stigma tends to become "generalized to technologies, places and products

that are perceived to be unduly dangerous". Many residents felt that the hosting of the Games and the securitisation of their everyday environment was something that was predicated upon their lower social standing. Furthermore, such associations were made directly in relation to the security measures and the way that they negatively impinged on basic freedoms, and the attitudes of police and private security, and instances of negative encounters, their 'treatment', served to signal their status as being lower than more affluent areas,

*"Once again, they are treating us like second class citizens. If this was Newton Mearns or somewhere more affluent than the East End of Glasgow, do you think they would be treated the same way? They wouldn't be, that is for certain."*

(Interview 18: J)

In addition, residents felt the security acted as if to signal to outsiders (spectators and athletes) that they are to be avoided or dangerous. It was noted earlier that the majority of residents felt that the security was not *for* them, but moreover it also gave the impression that it was, in part, *because* of them,

*"Now that [security measures] is just to stop you from going in there [Athletes' Village], and when that was being built, did we try to go in? no...so why put that fence up?"*

(Interview 1: M)

Many residents talked that during encounters with athletes or even the police, these outsiders were shocked at the scale and intensity of the security and so they became conscious of the outward negative perception it gave. One resident who lived opposite the Athletes' Village mentioned a situation where two athletes inquired why the fence was in place, mentioning that it looked like they (residents) were imprisoned,

*"They [athletes] called us over and they were, kind of, asking why and you were, 'it was like the jail'; you were shouting, 'I know'. But anyway...It made out as if we were right...bad, you know."*

(Interview 6: A)

Residents felt that it was the scale and proximity of the security to the everyday residential environment which gave the outward appearance of dangerousness. Subtle signals implicit in physical nuances of security, contributed to these internalised perceptions,

*"F: It feels as if they [security measures] are saying to the athletes, 'these people aren't very good, so we are keeping them away from you'."*

*W: They are going to say 'Look at that fence, they must be trying to keep them away from us' "*

(Interview 8: W & F)

Invasive security, combined with instances of poor police and private security treatment, served to communicate small authoritative signals which gave the impression that security organisers felt residents were somehow a threat or hierarchically 'below' 'them,

*"I don't understand what they think we would do?"*

(Interview 23: S)

What was also interesting is that when articulating these internalised perceptions, residents often used metaphor as a way of explaining their situation. For example, when describing how they felt about security and attitudes of police, as signalling that they themselves were dangerous or not to be trusted, many residents noted that it felt like they were being imprisoned,

*"You would probably be better in the jail [...] because all of us feel as if we are caged in."*

(Interview 18: J)

Similarly, others used metaphors comparing their situation to real or fictional scenarios from history or popular culture, from "Big Brother", "Berlin" or "Belfast", and even the 1981 film 'Escape from New York'. The commonality between all of these is that these were cities or places that have experienced intense securitisation and segregation. But further still, these metaphors also identify not only their situational experiences of security, but also their treatment by the authorities. 'Big brother', for example is a term commonly used in respect of state abuse of power (Aas 2008). While references to Berlin, not only also incorporates the symbolism of the Berlin Wall, but also of the police and security as the Stasi, acting as snoopers. Similarly, identifying Dalmarnock as being similar to "Belfast during the 1980s", is to share an obvious visual comparison with the cities 'Peace lines',

*"Don't get me wrong, I appreciate there is a reason for it [security], you know what I mean, but at the end of the day, this is like fucking Belfast in the 1980s, that is exactly what it is like, it is the same way; the tone coming from the authorities."*

(Interview 2: J)

Metaphors act as agents of signification with "one signified acting as a signifier referring to a different signified" (Chandler 2007: 127), important here is the way that residents themselves intended to communicate their experiences to me by "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:5). By referring to conventional associations these acted as both 'ontological' and 'structural' (Ibid 1980: 5) metaphors; presenting their emotional experiences through the structuring of one concept (situation) in terms of another. In this way, the metaphors used are 'systematic clusters', derived from social and cultural experience (Chandler 2007: 129), these being understood "dystopically as 'visions of social control' " (Lyon 1994: 203).

The previous examples demonstrate how security and policing communicated the internalised idea that these measures were indicative of the way authorities and outsiders felt towards them. Security produced a particular status identity for Dalmarnock residents, which, they felt was indicative of their social standing. In

this way, security presented material issues of risk and insecurity, which were then internalised as ontological ones. However, these effects still have a material dimension as they signalled a reframing of what security risks these measures were also being used against.

Here, it will now be outlined how further aspects of the security communicated to residents, in a purely ontological sense; in which the security and policing served to act as a mediator of collective identity. To recap once again, residents felt that they had no say in the security; that they hadn't been informed and that these measures (literally in some cases) appeared overnight without any dialogue or proper consultation. Exchanges between expert officials and lay citizens was one sided, top down and instructive in nature,

*"I just think with the security; if at the end of the day they turned around and gave us a bit more info and less us know what was happening, rather than just forcing it upon you and saying 'that's it'. Basically, the way I feel is that it's 'That's it, that's what's happening', whereas there could have been a bit of 'Listen, we are going to do this, it's not going to be comfortable we know that, we are sorry, but it's because of this, that and the next thing', and give us a bit of an explanation why things are happening, not just 'it's happening end of, shut up'. Know what I mean, that's the way we all feel."*

(Interview 18: J)

This lack of involvement gave way to a feeling that residents' voices were not important and that, they were effectively being silenced or "railroaded into everything" (Interview 12: F), as one participant put it. They felt that Glasgow, acting in the interests of big business, global image, marketing and profit conducted security according to their own aims and objectives. Security was viewed as part of the architecture by which a controlled environment could be created and an external positive image portrayed. This is not an entirely new idea; the introduction of enclosed 'fan zones' at the 2006 FIFA world cup in Germany, and all subsequent events, serve as a way of 'choreographing security' (Manzenreiter and Spitaler 2013: 48). However, the focus on this section is on

the perspectives of those on the outside, of the 'external' show, where security operated as 'stigma symbols' (Goffman 1963).

Goffman (1963: 23) asks the pivotal question surrounding the application of stigma, of how individuals respond to their position as stigmatised, where they are often "unable to keep out of consciousness the formulation of some chronic feeling of the worst kind of insecurity". That is to say, that being aware of their label produces a feeling of anxiety and unease with one's self and their relation to others, giving an 'uncertainty of status'. Stigma then, has an obvious relation to how it may affect ontological insecurity.

Relevant to this discussion around physical security is the notion of 'stigma symbols', whereby certain security features acted as signs of social information regarding a "debasing identity discrepancy" (Goffman 1963: 58). In effect, acting as a form of 'security stigma'. Signs used to convey reassurance and deterrence were internalised by residents of Dalmarnock as also being indicative of their stigmatised position. As Goffman (1963: 61) states, "It is possible for signs which mean one thing to one group to mean something else to another group". The receiving of stigma security and internalising of the position of the stigmatised was borne out of the combination of top-down, one sided dialogue between security experts and lay citizens, poor treatment by authorities, negative encounters with security and police officers, and the physical attributes and positioning of physical security measures, such as when positioned in a residents garden, for instance. The cumulative effect of these encounters, were that security was viewed with a double gaze, which not only communicated objective levels of material risk, and subjective perceptions of (in)security, but also undermined their social identity, affirming their (lesser) social standing and relational belonging within a democratic political community.

A prominent example of an aspect of security which functioned as a stigma symbol was the perimeter fencing. Many residents made use of zoo analogies to convey the how they defined their situation, in which the fence was the obvious boundary point between the outsiders (athletes, world media, and spectators as

visitors to the zoo) and insiders (residents as the wild animals caged in), as the following examples demonstrate,

*"When I saw them [fences], I went 'they are caging us in like animals', I says, 'we would be better off in a prison' with all these fences and that. I said it has gone beyond the joke, it really has. Alright protect the athletes, I agree with that, but don't disrupt us."*

(Interview 3: M)

Another resident takes the metaphor further,

*"It's as if we are all animals in here. It is a wonder they have not go signs up 'Don't throw any food over that fence' or 'Don't talk to the natives'."*

(Interview 10: B)

One particular aspect of the fencing that residents picked up on was that at certain parts, particularly the access points for the Athletes' Village, where the visible gaze of the media, television crews, Royal visits etc were mostly situated, was that there was a screen placed over the fencing itself (figure 7-3), which blocked both residents view of the 'action', and also prevented these officials from actually seeing Dalmarnock. Most residents felt that the main reason for its use was that it provided a way of blocking the view of the outside world to Dalmarnock, as if Games organisers were somehow ashamed of them, that they had to be hidden from sight,

*"Did you not notice how those cages there, those wire fences, they go along and have the big Glasgow banners on it, that is so the people can't go in and see the houses like that. They put a sheet up to kind of shield us, 'Don't look in there'."*

(Interview 10: B)

Figure 7-3: Security fencing as stigma symbol.



Source: Authors own.

Others felt that their shielding from view was emblematic of their overall experience of the Games, signalling their lack of involvement or lack of belonging,

*"We are not part of it. See if they could have shipped us out, they would have, or see if they could have put the fences higher, with curtains on them and you wouldn't see us, without a doubt they would do it, without a doubt."*

(Interview 2: J)

The concept of 'belonging' is important in this respect because unlike 'identity', it posits a relational aspect; that belonging is something which is affirmed not just through attachment to place, but is confirmed or denied by the treatment and relation to others. As was shown in chapter six, residents displayed a strong attachment to Dalmarnock, yet, in many ways, still felt out of place, "an individual's sense of belonging is affected by collectively negotiated understandings of who 'we' are and what 'we' stand for, and who gets excluded as

the 'other' " (May 2013: 3), this sentiment was summarised well during one interview,

*"We feel Dalmarnock isn't...doesn't belong to any...it's theirs and that's it, you know, we don't count anymore [...] we don't count."*

(Interview 8: F)

A feeling of belonging derives from both from physical rootedness and the psychological familiarities of mutual concern. These provide the 'stable circumstances of self-identity' (Giddens 1990: 144) and therefore, contribute to ontological security. What was particularly lacking among the security and policing arrangement was the latter ingredient of mutual reciprocation and recognition within the policing and security operation. Giddens (1990) notes that expert systems rely on the lifting out of social relations and removal of information exchanges, with the expending of trust being dependant on the sequestering of information. Yet, trust placed in abstract expert systems is fleeting and ambivalent, and is often reliant upon being reaffirmed during experiences at different access points. For example, the flight attendant who displays facework commitments of trustworthiness and integrity helps to reaffirm the faceless commitments shown to abstract capabilities. Such interactions, although small beer, play crucial roles of 'reembedding' within the wider context of expert-lay displacement. Therefore, help to sustain trust, by contributing to positive experiences at these access points. In short, all disembedding institutions usually allow for reembedding of some kind as it is this prerequisite which contributes to a continuation in the expending of trust.

To relate to G2014, the policing and security operation did not allow for situations of reembedding. Police and private security interactions in streets and outside residents houses were not enough to provide the feeling of being reembedded, particularly when the majority of these access point experiences were negative ones. Reembedding opportunities could have, for instance, provided situations in which residents felt as if they were contributing to the key arguments around the security operation, particularly considering how closely and personally these affected them. As stated above, "mutual seeing and

hearing" (Silverstone 2002: 766), is one of the conditions which contribute to a sense of belonging, "arguments about what should be argued about, and why...to be able to feel that in doing so one is contributing to one's own world, one must be able to participate in the argument, interpersonally, in interaction with others, as well as intrapersonally, in one's 'thinking', in one's own 'inner speech' " (Shotter 1993: 193 in May 2013: 84).

However, it was noted that the one-sided, top down dialogue, gave the impression that residents' opinions didn't matter, which in turn, signalled their position within 'hierarchies of belonging' (Wemyss 2006),

*"So basically, what they are doing is 'We are in there, they are in there, we will do what we want out here, they are the riff raff.' That is just how I feel."*

(Interview 18: J)

One resident elaborated on this point, going into more detail about the lack of involvement and democratic development,

*"I don't believe residents were included at all. I think there were decisions made and you were told ' this is what's happening' [...] you can only feel as if you are included in something if you are actually included in it. The local residents in this area were'ny, [...] it was very much, 'This is what needs to be done, this is how we need to do it and that's what's happening.', it was never [...], 'Right, we need this, right, what do youse think of this?' "*

(Interview 29: R)

Loader (2006) identifies that a sense of security exists in relation to the levels of attachment to and membership within a political community. Security and policing, or control signals, then, also have the ability to influence the ontological aspects of feeling secure, by contributing to the "experience and expectation individuals have that those institutions recognise their legitimate rights, entitlements, and loyalties" (Ibid 2006: 210).

Belonging can be considered an ideal state of security which derives from the interlinking of cultural, material and relational variables. Material security intersecting with all three components. As has been outlined, the material and relational aspects of how security is visually presented and conducted, can have important implications for the cultural aspects of how it is "experienced, felt and understood" (Cohen 1982a: 11), which in turn, inform collective identities and hierarchies of (not)belonging.

Not belonging is an important topic to recognise as it highlights a failure in the present way of doing things, "a sense of not belonging can open up new possibilities of, for example, political action if we become conscious of the fact that the "way things are done round here, is not the only possible one" (May 2013: 88). If, as we have seen, material security is inextricably linked to ontological security, then aspects of the former should be visually constructed or performed in such a way as to positively influence the latter. Negative encounters with the authorities, physical security which impinges on basic freedoms and rights and internalises feelings of stigma, and governance arrangements which promote misrecognition, all have the effect of influencing (not)belonging and the sense of (in)security which derives from (a lack of) it.

It is here that the discussion turns back full circle in identifying the importance of effective communication in security. Many residents pointed out that the current format of communicating security was the source of much of the problems associated with sending and receiving of control signals,

*"But they could have, as I say, it's information; the communication was all wrong from the start. We were promised so much and we got nothing. Nothing at all. That's how alot of people are disappointed; it's not about the Games or people coming, it's just about information, you know what I mean, if you don't tell people things they make up their own minds or stories on why certain things have happened."*

(Interview 9: A)

As Loader (2006: 210) states, a sense of security has to do with "having the resources individuals and groups possess for managing the unease and uncertainty that the risks present in their environment generate - and these resources differ in amount according to people's sense of their place within that environment". Therefore, a lack of resources, and a lack of 'voice' around the use of these, are not only symptomatic of social standing and hierarchies of belonging within society, but also contribute to the situations in which an "insecurity-sustaining-circle is thereby joined" (Ibid 2006: 209). The undemocratic nature of mega-event security governance and the sequestering of information, reliance upon top-down communication through visual and symbolic measures, that the governance arrangements contributed to, created an insecurity circle in two ways: first, is that the security measures ambivalent nature communicate the presence of the very risks they are meant to prevent. And secondly, the lack of involvement also influences the feeling of a lack of secure belonging, which creates unease of a different kind. Once again, the underlying importance of governance arrangements, and the ensuing position of the state and citizen, is revealed as being of key importance in how security (mis)communicates.

## 7.8 Conclusion

Through investigating the sending and receiving of control signals at G2014 between security experts and lay citizens, some key issues have arisen. Firstly, is the way that control signals operate in a signification contest with risk, whereby more visible, symbolic security responses are seen as the antidote to tackling insecurity. However, this is not a linear trade-off, in which the over use of one prevents the surfacing of the other (as is inferred within the control signals rationale). Rather, the use of security to quell insecurity, creates the cyclical demand for yet more security still. This is because control signals are polysemic and have multiple meanings. Control signals are intended to communicate two messages; one of deterrence and one of reassurance. Innes (2014), creates this distinction by assuming that these two messages are conveyed at different times

or by different control signals, "Police work is suffused with the transmission of control signals designed to deter people from engaging in acts that are criminal or breach conventions of order, *whilst other* (own emphasis) aspects of policing are intended to convey reassurance and protection from risks" (2014: 131). However, what this doesn't consider is that these two messages often emanate from the same signifier. By relying on 'open symbols', a degree of ambiguity is retained, leaving interpretation to the receiver, "When a symbol is too open, it becomes ambiguous, overstepping the limits of communication." (Eco1986: 300).

A second contribution identifies that control signals are not restricted to signalling at particular levels of society, but can operate fluidly at more overarching or localised ones. In particular places such as mega-events, or airports or even securitised city centres, control signals can be understood in relation to two processes; the macro and the micro. At the macro-level, the proliferation of media constructions of risk, and their manifestations in particular places, drives an acceptance of security which operates in the self-affirming reassurance sense. Even if these measures do highlight the presence of risks, the ensuing sense of anxiety filters back into the acceptance of even more security. However, amidst this totalising acceptance, are micro interpretations - for example, how these affect issues of freedom, rights, access, or further still, create distinctions between 'inside' and 'outside', which in turn, highlights issues of security coverage and differential exposure to risks.

A third contribution to control signals concept, is that it matters what the form and materiality that the control signal takes; it is too simplistic to assume that it mere presence which provides the sole medium of communication. Innes (2014: 134) himself, recognises this in relation to policing, that it depends on "what they are seen to be doing". In the same way, consideration has to be given towards the nuances of materiality in physical security; the precise geographical positioning and their aesthetic sensibilities can act as signifiers in itself, sending macro signals which influence more individualised aspects of (in)security.

In a similar vein, the performatory aspect of policing has to be done in a way that is both convincing not only to the receiver, but also to the performer.

Central to providing a strong performance is knowledge; both in terms of the ability to have contextual and situational knowledge of the audience, but also informational in terms of what they can provide to them. This requires, at the very least a mutual basis of understanding in terms of obligations and role expectations.

Fourth, is that within the existing control signals concept (Innes 2004 2014); it has not been considered how agencies other than the police send control signals. This chapter has shown that significant difficulties can arise when two different agencies are instructed with sending the same control signals. Not only do non-state agencies hold different levels of legitimacy according to the public, which affects their ability to effectively get their message 'across', but the impracticalities of this governance arrangement can (literally in some cases) result in messages being lost in translation, between different auspices (the overall security assemblage).

The last contribution made, elaborates on a criticism of 'ambient policing' made by Loader (2006), who identifies that Innes (2004a) makes a problematic distinction between ontological and material security in strongly implying that policework cannot influence aspects of identity or belonging. By contrast, and in support of Loader's point, this chapter has shown that issues of policing and security, the material aspects, which are constructed upon only answering the question 'how safe am I?', actually also contribute to the ontological issue of 'who am I?'. In particular, it has been identified that material security influences ontological (in)security in situations where security acts as form of stigma symbol or 'security stigma'.

According to Innes (2004b), control signals communicate a message about the presence or absence of effective security mechanisms, but there is a more at play here; they also reveal much about the state of the existing governance relationships between state and citizen, and the efficacy of such arrangements. If much of security is about communication between sender and receiver, then the degree to which the sender's intentions are, or are not, realised in the perceptions and experiences of the receiver, reveals much about the current

state of relationship between them. This chapter, and the chapters preceding it, have revealed that instances of miscommunication are rife, and, in the majority of cases, exist because of, or are exacerbated by, the social distance between state and citizen within the existing governance arrangements of security. The importance of governance arrangements in affecting the communication of security, has been an underlying narrative to the thesis, and as way of providing an analytical conclusion to the thesis, it is natural that this topic finally surfaces the main point of discussion in the following chapter.

## 8: Conclusion: Improving Security - Lessons from Theory and Practice

### 8.1 Introduction

By way of the previous chapters outlining the ways in which symbolic security has failed to deliver a sense of security, it identifies possibilities for change; that trends in mega-event securitisation and security more generally, could be improved upon. The thesis has identified several aspects instances of control failure where symbolic security has miscommunicated its intentions, creating new sources of insecurity. In chapter five, it was shown that the overarching narratives accompanying the mega-event were unsympathetic to the existing communities experiences of these same issues long before the Games. As such, disparities existed between the reality of events, as framed between Games organisers and the community, a situation exacerbated through a lack of common understanding between these parties. Chapter six showed that people move between situations where they are fully in control of their own security governance such as the community, and places where they become disembedded from it, such as at a mega-event. In the latter situation, citizens are disembedded, lacking in information around issues of risk and security in their own environment. It is this one-sided situation of information exchange, which allows for risks to be heightened and exceptional security to signal the presence of the very insecurities they are oriented against. Similarly, in chapter seven, it was shown that a reliance upon symbolic communication, where symbolism is used to close the resultant information gap between sender and receiver, is ineffective in dealing with the contextual and empirical complexities resulting from a juxtaposition of global risks and security, amidst the local everyday environment. Leaving the receiver with too much interpretive guesswork, opened up opportunities for multiple meanings, and levels of insecurity to exist. This brings the discussion back full circle to the factors which have created an over reliance upon symbolic communication in the first place; the extant risk

knowledge bases of both parties; positions of reliance and dependency in preventative security, and resultant widening of social distance between experts and lay citizens. The common denominator between these factors is that they are all a product of security governance itself. The underlying narrative that has existed throughout the analysis is that the governance of security at mega-events is not the best way of doing things because the appropriation of issues of risk and security by experts, and its over reliance on symbolic communication, creates new sources of insecurity among lay citizens. However, as this chapter identifies, this is not the only way of envisaging the governance of security.

This concluding chapter aims to provide a discussion of security governance which outlines some ways in which security can ultimately be improved. Consistent with the argument that this conclusion presents is the inclusion of recommendations from both experts and lay citizens. The discussion starts by critically evaluating the extent to which G2014 security was either a form of nodal governance or anchored pluralism, before outlining the importance of localities and local knowledge, and the fundamental importance of developing a framework of security governance which promotes the ideals of "democratic political development" (Bayley 2001: 13). Finally, the chapter ends by outlining some theoretical and practical insights into improving security governance at mega-events.

## 8.2 Security and the Decline of Democracy

At mega-events, exceptional security can be considered pseudo-democratic at best through the way that it reactivates in risk perception, the very fears, that it offers the solution to. As such, the security field, is like the control field described by (Garland 1996: 466) in that it is, "dualistic, ambivalent and often contradictory". For example, aspects of reassurance policing, and its emphasis on visibility and responding to what matters in communities through community consultation and targeted partnership approaches, in theory, shows an elevation

of the position of the citizen within formal governance arrangements. However, it would seem that the bottom-up aspects of policing have been forgotten about amidst the backdrop of seemingly bigger issues of national security, "minority views are seldom heard and those given a 'signal crime' badge can be heavily policed" (Millie 2010: 231). This is especially true at mega-events where the reappropriation of technical expertise has led to the relinquishment of issues of risk and security from communities into the hands of abstract judgement.

Wood and Shearing (2007: 60) note that, "the public police are becoming part of a more varied and complex assortment of organisations and agencies". However, at the same time, their conceptualising of a nodal reality of security governance still posits the public police as the centre of any nodal (networked) structure. That is to say that, although the police have been mindful of the contribution of other non-state agencies, the police continue to organise them in such a way that gives them a centred and privileged position amongst other nodes, "This police-centred view of nodal partnerships, while both predictable and understandable, has limited innovation (Wood and Marks 2006)" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 61). Critically, any network existing at mega-events has tended to rely on a directive state which commands non-state auspices. And furthermore, lay citizens are not even considered part of this network. As Coaffee (2013: 247) notes, resilience and exceptional security has resulted in the "centralisation of power to shape the agenda, back towards the state through a constant stream of nationally derived guidance". Exceptional security then, is still very much based around "hypodermic models of information distribution" (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 111), with citizens being passive recipients amidst an inherently "anti-democratic condition" (Balibar 2002: 84) of the securitisation of their everyday environment in which they have no stake of.

The narratives of exceptional risk and security remain institutionalized in the habitus of the new specialist, as 'habits of thought and action' (Garland 2001: 161). This aligns with Hughes' (2007) rejection of claims about the demise of expertise. Hughes (2007: 74) identifies that the preventative reductive sector is still a largely 'top-down', central-state driven project". He claims that dispersed networks are merely 'duopolies' of the state, managed and coordinated by the

police and local council, with symbolic ownership of policing and security remaining firmly with state institutions, "For the most part preventative partnerships remain duopolies of the public police and local government" (Hughes 2007: 80). So while there has been a reported decline of expertise via networked forms of governance, the networks are neatly aligned so as to re-activate the position of the state, "Despite the apparent critique of 'expertise' implicit in appeals to 'community' and 'partnership', the reality remains highly reliant upon expert knowledge which managerialises any significant community input or control. Rather than the end of professional expertise, 'partnerships' reconstitute a new model of professionalism" (Crawford 1997: 224).

The post 9/11 crime and security environment has stimulated the 'clawing back by the state' (Loader and Walker 2007: 119), and its executive authority to contend with invisible, unknowable, risks. This situation has meant that securitisation occurs within a realm of 'subpolitics', "taking place outside or beneath the formal democratic arena" (Dodd 1999: 191). As Loader (2002: 137) identifies, issues of risk and control are lifted "above the realm of normal politics, sever[ing] their connections to questions of social justice, and subsumes them with a discourse of 'effectiveness' that evidences a strong tendency to trump considerations of civil liberty".

The pursuit of security, and intense securitisation, has the potential to violate the security of individuals by the way that it may override issues of liberty, justice and more localised and subjective aspects of (in)security. In its current guise, the state directed governance of security at mega-events exists as a framework which is simultaneously provider and threat to the security of the individual. (Zedner 2007: 51).

### 8.3 The Killing of Invention

The previous examples show the executive position of experts to assert their authority over the insecurity situation, qualifying them to act in the public

interest, even if these measures have deep and profound effects on the public's levels of fear, anxiety and insecurity, not to mention issues of liberty, access and civil rights. Eco (1986: 294) in examining the modern world Expo outlined its peculiarities, "They open up a phantasmagoria that people enter to be amused". Amidst global competition, the only solution left is symbolic, "Each country shows itself by the way in which it is able to present the same thing other countries could also present. The prestige game is won by the country that best tells what it does, independently of what it actually does" (Ibid 1986: 296). Eco's analysis of Expos have obvious similarities to the way that mega-event security operates; amidst the world stage, and a background narrative of attracting footloose capital and achieving 'legacy', host cities are put into a symbolic lock; no country dare deviate from the status quo, and subsequently, "The bug of grandeur kills invention" (Eco 1986: 300).

Security could be improved by reassessing the actual purpose of security; who it is intended to benefit, who it actually benefits, and to what social and financial expense. Lyon (1994), talking of surveillance, stresses the importance of constant sociological and political concern regarding its usage amidst the ease at which the aims of surveillance can be 'subverted, obscured, or replaced.' At mega-events, fear around the virtual potential, licences further disembedding; submitting citizens to security which is neither proportionate nor acceptable to them, nor fear reducing; trust in expertise and authority is diminished, at the same time as it is inevitably reinvested by proxy of subordination. Such risks develop an incredible political dynamic, "They forfeit everything, their latency, their pacifying 'side effect structure', their inevitability. Suddenly, the problems are simply there, without justification, as pure, explosive challenges to action" (Beck 1992: 77), and it is this call to action, manifested in a top-down governance arrangement, which creates new cycles of insecurity.

## 8.4 Bringing Communities Back In

Giving greater 'voice' to lay citizens is a point made by the overwhelming majority of thinkers in security and criminology (Loader 2002, Johnston and

Shearing 2003, Shearing and Wood 2007, Loader and Walker 2007, Crawford 2009; Zedner 2009). To break the cycles of insecurity discussed in this thesis, there is the need for openness, transparency and accountability in security, "to require that security measures have a firm basis in law, be clearly and precisely articulated, be demonstrably necessary, targeted, and, in the case of exceptional intrusive measures, temporary provides a pragmatic basis for democratic accountability that might limit their tendency to erode civil liberties" (Zedner 2009: 170). As the previous chapters have shown, many of the ways in which security is miscommunicated could be overcome by bringing citizens back in; by involving them and keeping them informed around the risk assessment and security delivery processes, as Crawford (1999: 265) states, "community involvement is [...] a means of managing and steering expectations". For residents of Dalmarnock, the source of their insecurities stemmed from a lack of information. When asked "how security could be improved?", rather than calls for more security or more robust securitisation, residents felt that information distribution would have provided the greatest improvements,

*"Better communication with the local people: More information, more meetings for the local people to come and hear what is going on and tell the truth. Don't tell us lies or mislead us, because that only causes animosity. If they told us 'Look, this is what's going to happen' and explained 'It's difficult for us, we are trying our best', ok, but they are not telling you, they are just going doing things and you are phoning up, trying to find out, and they are that cheeky on the phone to you and...If they involved you a bit more, it would have been alot easier for them."*

(Interview 8: W)

Residents noted that the hypodermic, top-down, method of information distribution only allowed for a limited understanding of the security operation. The consultations, rather than providing space for conversation and discussion between experts and lay residents, only consisted of a PowerPoint presentation, with no opportunities for questions. Furthermore, residents viewed the methods

of information distribution used, such as sending flyers to doors, similarly restricted any opportunities for two-way dialogue,

*"J: See the end of the day mate, I honestly think it should have been more communicated. It's not what's happened about us, nobody got told nothing mate.*

*MF: It was all last minute.*

*J: This happened and that was it, we didn't get any letters. We just got letters there about measures they are going to take. Now, what is the point in telling you about the measures they are going to take when they have already taken them all? Know what I mean, they are giving you the letter after it happens. So, it's not how they have done the security, it's how they have went about not letting the local people, who I think have every right to know what is going to happen, what is going to be closed. It just happened; It wasn't 'we are going to do this, we are going to do that', it just happened and then after it they went 'oh, that's the way it is'."*

*MF: They done it so it was too late for anyone to do anything about it."*

(Interview 18: J & MF)

In addition, residents outlined that knowing why certain measures were being used, and why security was in place, would have enabled them to understand the security and the situation better. One resident mentioned how, as a result of a PR exercise, a member of the G2014 security team came down, with the press in hand, to speak to some residents in his street. It was actually this method of two way dialogue that was seen as effective,

*"Once he explained to me about the arena and how London didn't have that, you know, it [Games] never being so close [to an existing community] and things like that, you know, I could understand it. Once he explained, everything fitted in. I could understand it."*

(Interview 25: JW)

Similarly, one resident commented that he felt there needed to be a greater 'personal touch' to consultation and information distribution. In particular he identified that my own method of interviewing, which allowed for reflexive discussion, was something that would have been good for the distribution of information for the Games, as opposed to the top-down telling, with no opportunities for asking,

*"[if security planners had] came and sat down and took a bit of time and spoke to us all about it, it could let you try and understand it, but it is just coming upon you and coming upon you' you have got to do this', 'you have got to do that', 'you are going to do that', 'we are saying you are doing this'."*

(Interview 5: J)

Such responses identify that improvements can be made; a sense of material and ontological security would likely be increased through finding more inclusive or participatory means of conducting security. As such, there is a need for a platform in security governance which allows citizens to articulate their experiences and provide democratic deliberation over the issues that affect them most (Girling *et al.* 2000: 162).

At a time when exceptional security is increasingly becoming infused deeper at the everyday local level, the need for such rights regarding institutions and platforms is perhaps greater than ever. However, despite a general acceptance in the literature, that this is the case, there remains much debate over the position of the state in relation to its citizens, within any change in security governance. As outlined in the literature review, the normative position of the state has been discussed in relation to two competing perspectives; 'nodal governance' (Johnston and Shearing 2003), and 'anchored pluralism' (Loader and Walker 2007). The former argues that the state should exist horizontally and equally amidst a network of security agencies and providers, whilst the latter assert that the state is still best placed as meta-regulator in the democratic pursuit of security.

## 8.5 Mega-events as Nodal or Anchored Security Governance?

At G2014, the Scottish Government was responsible for the safety and security operation, however, it devolved this task to the Chief Constable of Police Scotland who would oversee all aspects of the planning and delivery for security at the Games. In a unique situation to mega-event security governance, the state police were given sole control over the operation, as the Security Director explained,

*"I don't know of another example where that has been done before. But what it has meant is, we as the police, have taken leadership of activity which is being done by the OC [...] it has led to a really, really integrated partnership team, where the police, the OC, the Scottish Government, UK Government and Glasgow City Council have worked really, really effectively across organizational boundaries."*

(Interview SA: 1)

As part of this process, a dual governance arrangement was created which included four key actors: Police Scotland, the OC, the Scottish Government and Glasgow City Council. In addition, the police took the decision to utilise a mixed workforce, enlisting the support of military personnel, British transport police, and Scottish prison officers along with private security personnel. Furthermore, in late 2013, Police Scotland invited applicants from the private security industry for procuring private security contracts to help assist with staffing and stewarding of the Games. Seventeen private security companies were contracted.

The multi-agency approach, distributed certain responsibilities as a matter of property, devolving ownership within the security network. For example, the OC were given control of venues, while police personnel were responsible for the safety of people around these. As a Security Manager from the OC told me, this partnership approach involved the mutual cooperation between themselves and the police,

*"We [the OC] then report and have a partnership with Police Scotland and we do all of our planning and delivery alongside them, so we have, embedded in our team is a Chief Superintendent, Superintendent, Chief Inspectors, Inspectors, we have got Police Search Advisors, Security Coordinators, that is on the Police side and also Counter Terrorism Security Advisors [...] there is an opposite number in Police Scotland that you can always refer to, so I have one on the physical security side and we have programme managers, an OC Programme Manager and a Police Scotland Programme Manager."*

(Interview DW: 1)

Furthermore, roles were distributed among personnel, private security staff would act as stewards around venues; military personnel were used to provide a public, front facing and engaging symbolic presence outside venues, while prison staff were used for searching the public and their possessions upon entry into venues.

As in the mapping of security outlined by both nodal and anchored perspectives, we see here the same diversity and pluralisation of actors and agencies involved in the provision of security, these agencies coming together under the same 'policing assemblage' (Brodeur 2010). Furthermore, at face value, this appears to be a form of nodal governance, where the 'strong' node of the state police, acts horizontally, amidst others, with the property of delivering a safe and secure Games appears to be distributed across the network rather than the sole responsibility of any one "single centre of action" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 148). This was outlined by a Venue Security Manager, who even describes the process as 'nodal',

*"You could argue then that in a way this is nodal policing in a sense, because the partners, not only are the police service themselves that are sitting in the middle of the spiders web, but there is the OC and all its offshoots and then Glasgow city council and some departments within them and transport and all that. And at the moment we are pretty nodal*

*as well in that we are....this group is dealing with transport, this group is dealing with building the overlay, we are dealing with the security."*

(Interview AS: 1)

The Venue Security Manager further described the process as being in their own respective "silos" (Interview AS:1), each dealing with their own node, to which they are not actively thinking about, but at the same, actively contributing to, the bigger picture of the overall security operation. As in nodal governance, there is no particular locus of power. As a senior Police Officer told me,

*"A big thing for us [police] has been partnership working: the police are used to being the top stakeholder and in control of security operations but with the CWG this is not the case - we [police] are just one of many."*

(Interview MM: 1)

Certainly, the language here speaks of nodal governance, if not the practice itself. For one important node missing among any discussion is that of lay citizens or any community networks from Dalmarnock. As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 140) state, "the mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security governance". Yet, lay citizens and Dalmarnock residents are missing from this self-described horizontal network, with no opportunity or platform available to mobilise their resources, mentalities and technologies. An informal collective, as community, was available, so a node existed in that sense, but as Wood and Shearing (2007: 27) identify, nodes "must have sufficient stability and structure", to enable their mobilization. While not providing further elaboration on the definition of 'structure', it is taken here, not to mean the organisational structure upon which the node operates, but a wider organisational framework in which these exist. Many residents stated the strength and stability of the community as a unit, but highlighted there was nowhere for them to go, i.e. no platform upon which they could enact themselves as, one node among others, and so they remained at the bottom, of any governance arrangement with no way of gaining recognition within the constellation of actors and agencies. So in an opposite way to the

democratic claims of nodal governance, which states community voice is important, instead, community voice appeared to be decidedly unimportant, in the way that this node was unable to "play the nodal governance game" (Wood and Shearing 2007: 153). As one resident stated, there was nowhere for him to go to air his concerns, "Where else can you go?" (Interview 2: J). In the same vein, another resident stated that there was no point in the community airing its voice, because it simply wouldn't be heard,

*"There is no point in us just moaning to bigwigs, because it will just go there and there (over the head)."*

(Interview 13: S)

However, it is questionable whether mega-events are even nodal at all; yes, there is the an array of state and non-state providers, but as in the earlier critique of Garland's claims, the new security situation is one in which both adaptive and sovereign responses have coalesced to strengthen the dominant position of the state. Just as Hughes (2007: 76) identifies that the claims of Garland and Johnston and Shearing (2003) may be "empirically questionable and conceptually overstated". The current (in)security situation of increased state authority increasingly renders any chance of a nodal conception of security, increasingly difficult to achieve in practice.

For example, the 'habits of the mind' (Kempa and Johnston 2005) surrounding the executive authority of the state to deal with exceptional risks is well grounded in that it remains a fact that the state possesses qualities far and beyond, any other node might; its financial, material, informational and symbolic resources are far superior in this regard (Crawford 2006b). While the 'conceptual obstacle' of a culture oriented around insecurity, amidst demands for security provision by the state, is one which is unlikely to be overcome through merely enacting other nodes into the constellation.

Mega-event security at G2014, rather than being a form of nodal governance, actually shares more commonalities with state anchored pluralism. What appears to have happened is that in the initial pre-event stages of security

planning, the arrangement was fluid and nodal, but as the Games drew closer, the state police elevated itself above the plurality of different agencies, to become the lynchpin among them. In the first instance, the police were given executive authority and responsibility regarding the security operation, they have then acted almost like a business, in the way they have contracted out various tasks to different agencies. They are 'directing rather than doing' (Shearing 2006: 24) or 'ruling at a distance' (Rose and Millar 1992); setting the overall agenda, advertising the requirements, and then picking agencies who can work to these overarching principles. For example, as the Games drew closer, the language security experts took, began to show a more hierarchical format,

*"What happened when the budget was raised to £90 million pounds was, as part of that process, the Chief Constable was asked by the First Minister to take personal responsibility for the whole safety and security operation."*

(Interview SA: 1)

In this arrangement, the state is strengthened not weakened, it rows with, and steers from above, "using many different oarsmen to implement their policies" (Shearing 2006: 25). The state police operated in a top-down sense, affirming its sovereignty while utilising different agencies towards its own goals and purposes. There is a plurality of actors, but they are directed towards state aims, as Shearing (2006: 26) describes it, "Private governments are once again hidden from view. We have private governance, in the sense of private provision, but only public governments". The language among security experts, reflecting that amidst a plurality, they are tied together by the elevated anchor of the state police,

*"What you've got is Police Scotland [as] the final arbitrar, having responsibility for securing the Games, [they] sit at the top of the tree."*

(Interview AS: 1)

At G2014, the police enlisted 'strong actors' (Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2004) who they have thought are capable of doing security towards their overall objectives.

In entrusting only the strong, the police ignored the inclusion of 'weak' actors into this process. As Wood and Shearing (2007) state, it is not until weak actors become more strong, that they are able to unlock the democratic potential of nodal governance. In short, the state appears to have an inherent distrust of 'weak actors', such as local communities, in issues of exceptional risk and security. So while the normative claims of anchored pluralism outline the states potential to enact the politics of resources, recognition, rights and reasons to civilise security, security at G2014 was still...uncivil.

For example, resources at G2014 were mobilised according to the needs for providing security for the event and not guided by the pursuit of security for all. The state police, rather than provide their own distinct take on security for the Games which would have allowed for some 'resource constraint' (Loader and Walker 2007: 217), they instead acted fanatically and fearfully, in merely replicating the standardised total security approach seen at all other mega-events. Issues of proportionality and effectiveness are disregarded as security is pursued in a way that retains its uncivilised nature - by devolving responsibilities to strong plural actors, without the inclusion of the interests and ideas of weak ones affected by these very 'allocation decisions' (Loader and Walker 2007: 218).

Closely related was the absence of any platform for recognition of all those affected by the security measures, and the inevitable problems they caused. The state in anchored pluralism, should "devise and sustain mechanisms of public conversation and contestation in respect of security problems", to prevent the providers of security from acting in ways which "prematurely and illegitimately disregard the interests and ideas of those who can reasonably claim a stake in the outcome of their decisions" (Loader and Walker 2007: 220). However, at G2014, the inclusion of communities and residents of Dalmarock was conducted through platforms structured around the top-down, distribution of information, rather than those which allowed any reflexive, two-way, or bottom-up, information exchanges. As has been outlined, there were many examples where the quality of security delivery, and its communication, would have benefited from informed dialogue. Security providers could have greater informed residents around the true likelihood of risks and the actual reasons behind

security measures, rather than leave these as 'open symbols' from which multiple meanings and interpretations could be made. This would have helped to break the vicious circle of fear caused by overt security. Similarly, local residents, as the true experts within the community, could have provided local, contextual knowledge and information to those very security providers, whilst also aired the contradictions and unequal distributions of security practice and the ways that these negatively affected their material and ontological security.

In terms of the rights of residents of Dalmarnock, security was still implemented in a way that saw the mobilisation of exceptional security as a procedure which could override the basic rights of residents in the process; the 'emergency urgency' (Loader and Walker 2007: 12) given to security responses around exceptional risks, meant that rights disabling and freedom restricting measures were implemented in the name of security, and under the idea that these were for residents own good. In short, security and rights, were seen in *opposition* to each other, rather than being implemented *through* each other. As a security expert stated, they are having their "head of tolerance heightened" (Interview DW: 2). In the name of security, roads, paths and pavements were closed, bus services redirected and care and emergency services diverted. Family members found it difficult to visit relatives, and residents could not do basic things, without feeling under suspicion. Many residents talked explicitly about the security as infringing their human rights, as one example shows,

*"But see at the end of the day, this has got to be an infringement on your human rights this [...] this has been up for two months or something and the Games are only on for twelve days."*

(Interview 18: J)

The instilling of basic rights for residents would have prevented such things as security measures being deployed in resident's gardens, or security which, through its situational nuances, increased their own exposure to risk. Whether the risks materialise is irrelevant, for it is the perception of the potential, which creates the insecurity anyway.

Lastly, the reasons for why the security existed, were devoid of any reasoned debate. Loader and Walker (2007: 228) position the idea of reasons, as a method of placing the demands of citizens under scrutiny in order to limit decisions being made according to "unbridled emotion, or the pursuit of self or parochial interest", thus preventing any measures being taken which are not in the interest of the public good. However, at G2014 (and other mega-events), the inverse is true: it is the emotionally charged demands of the state; to protect its own interests; to ensure its own legacy; to attract footloose capital, which results in the pursuit of security as an unimaginative process. The 'bug of grandeur'; of having to create exceptional, total, security, prevents planners from deploying security in any other way. This is why the security model at each mega-event, no matter where it occurs, is always more or less the same. Rather, the importance of the local, becomes dissolved amidst a prioritisation of the global; resources are allocated in ways which do not sustain democratic deliberation, but instead eradicate it, and along with it ideas of security as a collective pursuit. Security at G2014 was deployed according to state induced, unreasoned expressions of preference.

As in Ellison and O' Rawe's (2010) review of security governance in Northern Ireland, the *compartmentalization*, *crowding out*, and *corralling*, aspects of which, were also evident at G2014. Compartmentalization occurred where certain issues and responsibilities were separated among different agencies, for example, counter terrorism work being seen as something different from other aspects of community policing. By creating compartments, the state was privileged as an anchor to control these. At G2014, compartmentalization was rife, where different policing responsibilities were separated and different security and stewarding roles given to individual private security contractors, with no interlinking of these roles. Instead these separate compartments were organised through a single centralised structure, as one Security Manager stated,

*"The 3C's structure, so Command, Control and Communication, was difficult because we ended up deploying private contract security, military and the police and we had to control all of that through the centralised 3C structure and that within itself was difficult."*

(Interview DW: 2)

What happened is that if there was any issue, there was always the need to relay things through the formal channels. i.e. to move it upwards through the hierarchy. Individual compartments did not feel they had the power to tackle issues themselves, as the Security Manager further explains,

*"Someone is going to tell someone and he is going to say 'right I need to let someone know' he is going to pick up the phone and phone someone else and people are going to go 'no I won't speak about this until it's gone up the formal channels', you know, you just can't stop that."*

(Interview DW: 2)

By using compartments, where these were not allowed to stray into the territory of others, executive control was inevitably given back to the state police as controllers of the overall operation, these served to "privilege the position of the State since it become tasked with interpreting and resolving any apparent contradictions." (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 42).

Similarly, a crowded field of apparent 'strong actors' inevitably meant that the voices of non-state weaker ones became silenced. In this way, community input became to be regarded as toxic, and any bottom-up input deriving from community policing was subject to bureaucratic approval from other compartments, therefore the state continued to steer. From an organisational perspective, the relationship between Police Scotland and the OC, resulted in different strong actors voices over how things should be done,

*"So the venue security command centre that was OC paid, you then had a bronze commander which was Police Scotland and then you would have like a military liaison, who would work to see the bronze commander. What that means is that you have three people at a similar level, all with different experiences and all want to run it in a different way."*

(Interview DW: 2)

The increasing levels of bureaucracy and spreading of accountability in decision making, meant that in terms of issues such as community involvement and engagement, no single agency took responsibility for it. As the Security Director explained,

*"That engagement with communities really is something that has to be owned as a partnership [...] I think we were...I think...I think we have been a bit slow to get going with our, sort of engagement activity, if I'm honest."*

(Interview SA: 1)

It has earlier been described how community consultations took place as two planned events; one many months before, and one immediately before the Games. The problem of keeping residents in the dark of security issues until they began to see things for themselves was that by the time of the last consultation meeting, all of the Games security infrastructure was already in place and impacting on their everyday lives, without them knowing exactly why, or what, was happening. The third consultation meeting was met with angry scenes as residents sought information and clarity. This resulted in the police scrambling out officers on foot to conduct individual door to door knocking duties, by which time it was far too late for any meaningful engagement. A senior Security Manager describes how community involvement was not helped by the crowding out of the security field,

*"The difficulties are that community engagement, who takes ownership of that? Is that an OC issue, is that a security department? And then who actually has the resources in order to go out and do the door knocking? Now, we were very late in the day going out and speaking to those people [...], I believe that obviously, community engagement was key you know, and I don't think that worked particularly well."*

(Interview DW: 2)

This point clearly aligns with the fears over nodal governance's anti-democratic tendencies as identified by Loader and Walker (2007). However, these same

criticisms are also applicable to the anchored pluralism arrangement seen at G2014. This was not a nodal arrangement in which the state was one among many, it had executive authority, but still did not mobilise sufficient levels of engagement, a point which is applicable to its relationship with other non-state agencies and the community itself. For example, from the perspective of those on the ground, many residents would seek sources of information themselves, either by engaging a police officer or a private security contractor in the street. However, residents often received mixed messages, either because the police or security members did not know the answer themselves, or because they were unaware of what information was publicly available and what could and couldn't be given out between different agencies. For instance, many residents noted that they were told one thing by a security contractor only for that information to be contradicted by a member of the police, and vice versa, and that the crowded field of security presented more communicational problems, even as this assemblage was constructed to contribute to "positive public facing engagement." (Interview SA: 1). By contrast, the crowd, and its intra/inter communicational issues, meant that many residents felt that accurate information was hard to come by, as one resident explains,

*"Now the people that done all this [security] who would this come under, as a heading? Would it be Clyde Gateway? Or the District Council? Well the Council could have taken one of those flats up that close and just used it as an information office. So anything that you heard, or you weren't sure of, go round there and they can reassure you or tell you what is happening. But there has been nothing, everybody hides out the road."*

(Interview 10: B)

Similarly, even from the perspective of security actors and agencies, the crowded security environment meant that there was a hierarchal access to information. For example, the police had information and knowledge of official protocols which private security members didn't, and similarly some officers had greater security privilege, being more 'in the loop' than others. Many residents

described situations where there were inter and intra clashes of information between police and private security, as shown in one example,

*"The problem [...] is that some of the police let you walk a certain way, while others don't let you do it. So you don't know where you stand sometimes. The first policeman wouldn't let him walk across and he went and spoke to the other guy and he like a kind of higher up policeman and he says, 'well, this guy is just here, he has just started, it is a public walkway and you can walk it, he just doesn't know what he is doing'."*

(Interview 23: S)

While some police and security individuals acted out their role, based upon their own limited knowledge base, others, when confronted by the public, tended to divert responsibility upwards. For example, it was often the case that when local residents asked the police or private security for information, a typical response would be that the individuals didn't know, because such information was outside their remit, and that they would have to ask their superiors, as one resident explained,

*"And it seems to me, sometimes when you ask people [police or security] what is happening, and this is people that are meant to know what is happening, the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing, and, to me, that is a farce."*

(Interview 18: J)

In encounters of these kind, 'expertise' existed as something higher up in the chain which was neither here nor there in many interactions on the ground. In this way, residents had no opportunity to access knowledge and information, or to properly contest the issues which affected them. Any contestation was simply subverted through the idea of nebulous state expertise; something which existed out of the reach of ordinary residents. Because of this, community involvement or issues of contestation could not be addressed adequately in situ, further removing their ability to have say as to how policing and security operated, "the

degree to which the police embrace a proactive willingness to take the views of local community representatives on board remains bounded by a police centred hierarchy of expertise" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 46).

Lastly, At G2014, security was also corralled. For example, while many senior figures from key stakeholder organisation in security delivery talked of nodal governance, the indications given from the police were more of a top-down, hierarchical arrangement, as the Security Director stated of the relationship the police held in relation to private security agencies,

*"We are being very intrusive about their systems and processes, requiring them to give us data on an almost daily basis."*

(Interview SA: 1)

The governance arrangement at G2014 prioritised the inclusion of private security as a supplement towards its own overarching commands. These agencies, although compartmented, existed underneath the state police in terms of both legitimacy and authority. The state existing as primary steerer whilst enlisting others to help them with the rowing. The "holy grail of national security" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 51) re-activates state authority. Just as private security agencies were enlisted under top-down guidance, 'community' became something which security was *done* to them, rather than *with* them. As described, the exceptionality of terrorism licences exceptional measures to be taken in response. Exceptional risk becomes the wilful jurisdiction of experts. The effect of both processes is that both partnership and community become police led. As Ellison and O'Rawe (2010: 36) identify, the "willingness, inclination and capacity" of the state to act genuinely in the interest of the public good, "depends on the state itself" (Ibid 2010: 36). While their fears are made in relation to states in conflict or post-conflict, such as Northern Ireland, consideration has to be given to how the state in nonactual conflict operates amidst the virtual conflict of counter-terrorism, in particularly, the way that terrorism channels trends in governance away from any radical notion, and places it "firmly back in their box" (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 40), within traditional, state-led frameworks. For example, community consultations were

orchestrated events of telling not asking, based on the principle that the state is acting on residents behalf, and in their best interests. Naturally, this portrayal tempers the amount of transparency required. As such, the degree of community involvement remained oriented around state centred terms of information exchange, and an overreliance on receiving messages in symbolic security. This situation reaffirms the potential of the risk, simultaneously legitimising the position of the state as guarantors of security, "As iconic figures in the production of national security, the police, despite their lack of democratic credentials, often acquire the 'right of legitimate pronouncement' (Loader and Mulcahy 2003: 46)" (Loader and Walker 2007: 111).

At G2014, the processes of compartmentalization, crowding out and corralling, as in Ellison and O'Rawe's (2010) analysis, have called into question the extent to which nodal governance truly existed, even if the rhetoric assumed its reality. These three processes served to re-activate state authority, leveraging it above the plurality of agencies it enlisted, whilst furthering the social distance that 'community' has on issues of risk and security governance, "A somewhat traditionalist mindset still prevails in terms of the degree to which security needs and expectations are corralled to serve an agenda clearly branded in favour of the public police" (Ibid 2010: 50).

To summarise, G2014 represented a rare form of anchored pluralism in practice, presenting an opportunity for its normative claims to be assessed. What appears to have happened is that the state, unconditioned towards enacting the 'four R's' of civilizing security practice identified by Loader and Walker (2007: 216), has operated in a way which has failed to deliver on its democracy enabling and pathology preventing potential. It stands that amidst the current security situation of exceptional risk and entrusting of security to the state, the state itself has acted in ways which have made security still uncivil. In other words, it appears that it can still be problematic to elevate the state above a plurality of agencies, especially when that plurality does not consist of 'weak actors', "No matter what governments say about their commitment to provisions of resources to the weak, they do not wish to trust the weak" (Shearing 2006: 31). And it this point which affected both the relationship between state and citizen, the

resultant social distance, and overreliance upon symbolic communication, and the subsequent miscommunications that occurred at G2014.

However, as Johnston and Shearing (2003: 140) state, "Crucially, security is also affected by local conditions", and in recognition that any change in security governance would be easier to implement, working *with*, rather than *against* the prevailing order, the state is still a necessary, although not unproblematic, virtue amidst this current security situation. Important to note here, is that Police Scotland had not been 'conditioned' (Loader and Walker 2007: 231) towards enacting and ensuring the democracy enabling potential provided by the 'four R's' they identify. G2014, therefore, represents anchored pluralism in its raw, uncivilised form. But nonetheless, still serves as an empirical reminder to the fact that, "Whatever role the state is given there is still extensive evidence that state-led initiatives come to be dominated by professional interests, rather than the interests of those they serve, frequently vis-a-vis the police" (Button 2008: 208). Furthermore, it raises the issue of how the state can ever be conditioned amidst the contextual backdrop of its involvement in (virtual) conflicts.

It would seem that the current security situation and amidst the reactivation of state authority to contend with it, has meant that the 'leap of imagination' (Kempa and Johnston 2005: 189) required by nodal policing arrangements is just too great at this time. Similarly, anchored pluralism seems to be the dominant tendency of state arrangements in security governance, but rather than being conditioned through Loader and Walker's (2007) normative, civilizing practices, the state still exists within the context of outdated 'habits of mind' (Kempa and Johnston 2005: 182), rendering this arrangement inherently uncivil in the way that local knowledge is still bypassed.

At G2014, the state acted as an idiot as in Loader and Walker's (1996) sense when outlining state scepticism critiques "an entity whose bureaucratic remoteness renders it at best to unable to make good on its well-intentioned promises, at worst a clumsy, homogenizing force riding roughshod over the

possibilities created by more locally responsive, 'bottom-up', security institutions" (Loader and Walker 2006: 176). How then can security be improved? At the heart of current security governance arrangements is the one sided forms of communication between state and citizens around both risk and security.

In identifying that many of the miscommunications in security, and resultant cycles of insecurity, are created or exacerbated by the social distance between state expert and lay citizen. While also recognising that both nodal governance, and anchored pluralism are always dependant on "empirical contingencies and cannot be taken for granted" (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 5), and as such, have tended to operate in ways in which makes genuine 'bottom-up' community engagement and the public good of security, difficult to realise in practice. There is a need to consider different options in security governance, as Ellison and O'Rawe (2010: 37) state, "We are forced to consider imaginatively and non-prescriptively how non-state entities can be utilized to provide for an effective and responsive bottom up security governance".

The current security situation and prioritisation of expertise renders community involvement as something which is intentionally or unintentionally avoided, and it could be argued that in many ways this is a good thing given the flippant and selective ways in which public emotion can be directed towards some issues and away from others (collective social media responses on twitter are a prime example). As Loader (2011: 348) states, "There seems little doubt today that the genie of public emotions is out of the bottle". And in this way, state experts can act as 'cooling devices' (Loader and Sparks 2011: 85) through the way that a detaching of expertise or an 'insulation' (Loader 2011) of matters from lay involvement, can provide a source of restraint against the "punitive, majoritarian tyrannies of democracy" (Ibid 2011: 353). However, the legitimate fears that a state, that gives 'uncritical expression' to the claims of citizens (Loader and Sparks 2011: 91) would allow for the selective and disproportionate security coverage, does not consider the way in which state actions themselves produce specific ways of thinking around risk and security. The state is equally responsible for heating public emotions by responding to virtual risks in a way which erodes local context and understanding. As Beck (1992: 75) states, "Risks originate after all in knowledge and norms, and they can this be enlarged or

reduced in knowledge and norms, or simply displace from the screen of consciousness". The norm of standardised and sequestered security, heightens awareness of risks, at the same time as it heats up the demand for more security through the way these become selectively and socially constructed themselves; these risks are suddenly, potentially everywhere and demand immediate and exceptional measures to tackle them.

Exceptional security, its overreliance on symbolic communication, and its vicious cycles of insecurity, can be worked against, by bringing lay citizens back in, providing a platform for local experience and lived reality of these totalising and globalised measures. In the way that forms of restorative justice provide an opportunity for more grounded approaches which counteract 'state writ large' ones (Ellison and O'Rawe 2010: 37), bringing community in, can help temper some aspects of the cyclical pursuit of total security. In short, deliberation and the maintenance of democratic security governance can be deployed to act as a 'coolant'. As Call and Cook (2003) state, too little focus has been given to the contradictions that exist between elite interests and communities on the brunt end of these policies.

## 8.6 Improving Security

Although, given the limits of a single study and space available, it is not possible to provide an exhaustive outlining of a new normative framework for security governance, there remain lessons that can be learned. Slovic (2000: 191), has long identified the problems of one sided risk communication, stating how the asymmetrical condition between expert (sender) and lay (receiver) of risk communication, can serve to heighten the signal value of certain risks, "Risk communication efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured as a two-way process (Renn 1991)". He calls for the alignment of expertise and knowledge to include lay citizens within the process of risk analysis. The positive effects of creating an 'informed citizenry' are multifaceted: firstly, providing better

information over risks would serve to limit the extent to which the popular imagination succumbs to hyperrealised security. All that would be required in such instances is the clarification by experts to lay citizens that security is a matter of *precaution* rather than *prevention* i.e. to ground and rationalise security which automatically signals the virtual potential of exceptional events. For example, the objective risk profile as was admitted by the Security Director is likely to be less than London's hosting of the Games, yet, the silence of security experts spoke volumes in allowing associations of riskiness between the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, between London and Glasgow, to exist. In terms of risk, Glasgow is not London, and neither is the Commonwealth Games the Olympics. A clarification of this disassociation and of the importance of place as a mediator of objective risk, would have produced a reassuring effect amongst the public, as one resident stated,

*"Involve the community; let the community know what they are planning on doing and why they are doing it, because this is just a big mystery to all of us, why are they protecting the Village? What is it, has there been threats? Has there not? Is this just normal? Why not other passes? So more just involve the community, let the community know what they are going to do and ask 'what could we do to help youse.'"*

(Interview 4: M)

In addition, amidst the recognition that security infrastructures (to varying degrees of securitisation) will always be required at mega-events, the key is to provide reflexive security, which is both attentive to global risks, but also sensitive to the local contexts and circumstances in which these are deployed. For example, the inclusion of those on the receiving end of securitisation into deliberations over aspects of security can offer insights into the (in)effectiveness of these measures in actually producing a sense of security. At G2014, much of the control signals, rather than produce a sense of reassurance, equally, or even more so, created a sense of anxiety and insecurity, in a material sense. And similarly, it was this lack of voice and inability to influence their own security situation which contributed to feelings of ontological insecurity.

Furthermore, the bringing in of communities into the risk assessment and security delivery process would create conditions in which trust around state agencies and their practice could be fostered; one of the reasons around why the communication of security to produce reassurance failed, was due to the inherent distrust or lack of frame alignment between state authorities and residents of Dalmarnock, a situation which allowed signs to be read more ambivalently than perhaps they could have been. "Initial trust or distrust colors our interpretation of events, thus reinforcing our prior notions" (Slovic 2000: 323). Public participation in knowledge of decision making would not only provide a platform on which recognition and trust could be built, but it would also enable the public to understand why certain aspects of security or policing styles are in place, and what their overall aims are, therefore, enabling them to be better understood, as Slovic (2000: 318) states "If you trust the risk manager, communication is relatively easy".

There is a practical element in including lay citizens too; recent trends in terrorism point to the local significance of these seemingly global acts; 7/7 and the Paris and Belgium attacks, to name a few, were all conducted by 'homegrown terrorists' or citizens of the countries in which these events occurred. At G2014, security experts such as the police patrolled the residential community looking out for 'suspicious' activity but because they were not local to the area and not familiarised with its people, their habits and routines, they ended up routinely wrongly categorising long term residents as suspicious persons, when all they were doing was conducting their everyday business such as walking their dog after nightshift. The close-knit nature of Dalmarnock meant that any local resident holds good community knowledge and are familiar with its people; they know their habits and routines, and similarly, this means that they are also best placed to identify those activities or behaviours which are genuinely unusual. For example, a local resident could discern between resident walking his dog at night, and a stranger doing the same, meanwhile the police would just see both activities as suspicious. Similarly, they could identify a car that has been left abandoned or one which is unknown to the area, while a policeman who doesn't know the area, would not be able to distinguish such nuances. As was shown, the parachuting in of security experts into the local

area, actually served to undermine aspects of their expertise, the 'flooding out' of which also served to create anxiety among the public by revealing the fragility of expertise should something go wrong. In addition, and with regards to the last point, if the virtual potential did become actualised, in the event of an actual security breach or terrorist attack, an informed citizenry, as Molotch (2012) argues, would be better placed to respond in such a scenario; what to do? How to act? Where to go? Casualties could be minimised by not leaving such questions to pure chance and instinct. From speaking with security experts, it appears that they consciously try to keep things "relatively woolly" (Interview DW: 2), in other words, the fear is that by telling the public the truth around risk and security not only comprises the security operation itself, but also makes the public more anxious.

By contrast, what has been shown above, is that not only could the overall security operation be improved, but the public insecurity could be reduced through adopting a degree of transparency. This does not mean the need to disclose the technical specifics of the operation, but in a more general sense, to let people know what is actually happening in their area, or to provide a degree of personal experience and understanding to impersonal and secondary risk calculations, "whereas direct personal experience can serve as a risk amplifier, it can also act to attenuate risk" (Kasperson *et al.* 2000: 241). To insulate exceptional risks from public deliberation, and to position security in ways which create assumptions around 'worst-case scenarios' (Slovic 2000: 184), is to create the conditions which heighten risk awareness and insecurity among the public anyway. In many ways, there is nothing to lose, but everything to gain, by creating an informed citizenry.

Coaffee (2013) and Innes (2014), note that the state is becoming aware of the individual and communities as an untapped informal security resource, and has made tentative steps towards fostering forms of 'co-production' and 'individual and communal resilience'. However, the key here is not to mobilise these as forms of community responsabilisation towards counter-terrorism, but to enact them as an integral feature under the steering directive of the state (for it is questionable how democratic it would actually be to leave communities to

defend themselves from possible terrorist acts). Such aspects of co-production will be "most effective when it involve[s] a mutual and accountable network of civic institutions, agencies and individual citizens working in partnership towards common goals with a common strategy" (Coaffee *et al.* 2009: 3).

The lesson here is that "Each side, expert and public, has something valid to contribute. Each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other" (Slovic 2000: 191). Security could be improved and insecurity reduced through the creation of a 'reflexive learning process', whereby security measures could be empirically evaluated by those who experience them most acutely, the local residents of the host city. This would allow their amendment and tailoring of idealised security systems to be examined under local conditions, "With the benefit inter alia of the different forms of knowledge held by people other than scientists [experts]" (Beck 1992: 5).

Openness and involvement would not only help reduce the cyclical ways in risk and security communicates insecurity and anxiety of the material kind, but it would also help foster ontological security through a restoration of trust in the democratic process, "Clearly better information about risk is crucial to making better personal decision and to participating more effectively in the political processes through which societal standards are developed and enforced" (Slovic *et al.* 2000: 166). The insulation of exceptional risks as a matter of technical expertise, as in Loader's (2011: 354) review of the insulation model in criminal justice, "is problematic in principle and at risk of proving counter-productive in practice", and those same issues are raised here. In practice, the sequestering of expertise is a problematic, double-edged sword; it provides a sense of relief that something is being done about exceptional risks, at the same time as it sharpens perceptions of those risks happening. So, as has been described in an earlier chapter, expert systems can be both reassuring and unnerving, in a material security sense. And similarly, the problem of how these security measures interact negatively at the local level means that the long term legitimacy of this mode of governance, and in public security institutions is placed under strain. A commonly cited question in critical security perspectives is to ask for 'whom' security is for? (Zedner 2003, 2007b), but in the contemporary era, the more

pertinent issue is to ask 'what' security is for? Firstly, as has been shown, there exists critical distance between security and actualised risk, where these measures are mostly oriented against potential rather than actual risk. But similarly, security of this kind, as directed by its sender, in reassurance terms, is only positioned to answer one question - that of objective risk and a sense of safety. In being structured in such a way, security and insecurity exists like yin and yang; both sides complement and perpetuate each other in ways which make security pervasive. So in terms of 'what' security is for, if it is to every genuinely attempt to reducing insecurity, it has to break free from this loop. As Slovic *et al.* (2000: 153) states, "Giving experts an exclusive franchise for hazard management would mean substituting short-term efficiency for the long term effort needed to create an informed citizenry". An informed citizenry, would allow better personal decisions and assumptions regarding global risks, at the same time as it would contribute to a democratic conception of security. Which in turn, could heighten compliance towards security measures, while also enhancing the legitimacy afforded to its pursuit, without the current trend of governing through security (fear). Just as Nelken (1985: 239) asked of merging trends in urban regeneration and crime prevention, "Is crime the appropriate vehicle to regenerate communities? And if so, what sort of community will we be generating?", it is important to question whether fear and insecurity is the appropriate vehicle to gaining compliancy and legitimacy, and what sort of (un)democratic society is being generated by this.

As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 140) stress, "The mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security governance". However, the way in which they position this argument is to hint at the juxtaposition of a state anchor against the mobilisation of community, as if the two cannot exist together. Loader and Walker (2007) talk of the 'necessary virtues of the state', essentially, that the state is best positioned towards creating the democratic, public good of security. And from a slightly different perspective, the state is necessary in mega-event security; just as lay citizens would feel more anxious if nobody took responsibility for delivering security at airports, the public rely on the state to provide security against exceptional risks. Its overarching legitimacy, and position within

International Relations, its ability to mobilise and allocate resources, along with the 'public good' potential it holds in promoting deliberation vis-a-vis the inputting of representations and output goals of seeking compliance, combined with its authority as meta-regulator over non-state agencies, makes it, in theory, best placed to act as anchor within mega-event governance structures. One just needs to look at the G4S debacle at London 2012 to look at the problems of placing too great dependency on those whose sole intention is to profit from the insecurity market. In other words, a state anchor offers the greatest democratic enabling potential structure upon which to govern mega-event security. The key however, as Loader and Walker recognise, is not for the vices of the state and its propensity to meddle and so on, to become an inevitable by-product of its pursuit of its virtuous cultural and ordering functions. It appears that this is what actually happened in the 'unconditioned' strain of state anchor at G2014. The one remedy they offer to prevent this from happening, is to "focus in more detail on the deliberative and regulatory elements within the state's functional catalogue and argue for two things: first, as much openness to concerned interests in the production of security and the reduction of insecurity as possible, and as many checks as can be incorporated against undue meddling, bias, uninformed decision-making and cultural imperialism in the ordering and cultural work of the state; and secondly, as much recognition as possible of the ordering and cultural work of other sites of collective security as is consistent with the elements of state priority set out above" (Loader and Walker 2007: 192-3).

Creating an informed citizenry is integral towards improving security governance, and the pursuit of a public good of security. The ambition is to make citizens 'active participants', as opposed to 'passive recipients' (Coaffee and Rogers 2008: 115), incorporating them into a deliberative process, "rather than leaving them as keenly interested but basically impotent spectators" (Loader 2011: 356) of security strategies, and taking on board the social experiences of those who encounter these measures within their everyday local contexts. Here the discussion, comes full circle in coming back towards the issue of communication; as Fischhoff *et al.* (2000: 133) states, an informed citizenry requires a redistribution of resources to make public participation possible, and

it would also require "new tools for communicating with the public", and a retreating of its overreliance on symbolic communication via overt, and ultimately distanced security measures. This new form of communication is essential in providing a platform by which risks are outlined and preventive measures presented to lay citizens, and also offers an opportunity for eliciting their own values and experiences, both of the sources of their insecurities, and their localised encounters with different aspects of security.

However, the effects of creating an informed citizenry are twofold; not only would this attenuate the insecurities arising from disembedded security, it would also help attend to the ontological aspects of (in)security. As was outlined in chapter five, framing issues, - material risk, attitudes towards overt security, and feelings of insecurity, is only half of the bigger picture; these issues 'in the now' at the mega-event are important, but individuals also make sense of them and relate these according to their own biographical narratives built up from prior experiences. Similarly, their experiences 'in the now' also contribute towards their attitudes of these same issues in the future. It was shown that local residents' perceptions of physical and social changes in their area, their sense of involvement in these processes; their prior (negative) encounters with authorities, and levels of trust and legitimacy that they had in the 'straightness' of activities, as benefitting them, all 'coloured' their interpretations of overt displays of security at the event, contributing to ontological aspects of insecurity. In chapter six, it was shown how overt security can manufacture an artificial, self-affirming, sense of material security, while in chapter seven, it was shown that amidst a heightened sense of security, local residents can also feel insecure in an ontological sense by the way that these globalised security processes juxtapose with local, 'micro' interactions. In other words, the current methods of securitisation create a shallow sense of security, at the same time as it contributes to deeper ontological anxieties.

Similarly, in the mega-event literature, security 'legacies' are often outlined in this material sense; where concerns exist about too much physical security being left behind in the environment after the event. In reality, this rarely ever happens. The real security legacies are much more complex than this, and occur

in relation to the way that the mega-event security operation itself is conducted, during the event. As Loader and Sparks (2011: 123) recognise, "In a democratic polity, it matters not only *that* crime risks are regulated and controlled, but also *how* they are regulated and controlled". Mega-events bring together moments of police-citizen contact and non-contact, and both aspects are 'teachable moments' (Tyler 2014); they signal much about a citizens and a communities identity, "about whose claims are considered legitimate within it, about whose status identity is to be affirmed or denied as part of it (cf Sparks and Bottoms 1995: 60)" (Loader 2006: 211). After the temporary mega- event has packed up and moved on, and the exceptional risk perceptions in the minds of the public subsided, the community and the police return back to normal. Yet, for residents, there is a lasting memory of how they were treated during that time, and such experiences contribute to the bank of knowledge which is used to frame the future activities of the police and authorities, once again. The majority of residents of Dalmarnock appreciated the concerted efforts made by the police, during moments of contact, to project a new 'friendly Games' attitude, even if as stated, they found it contrived at times. This form of public engagement gave a sense of recognition to the community from the police, something which had barely existed beforehand. As one resident describes her police contacts when she met them patrolling outsider her house,

*"Oh they went up and down there and they would say 'Good morning' to you or...you know they would speak to you or that, and usually they don't want to speak to you, you know, but it was...they were very good, going up and down there, you know."*

(Interview 31: J)

Furthermore, many residents felt that if such policing styles continued after the Games then this would help to change the community's perceptions of the police. One resident, who was interviewed around a month after the Games, noted that the 'friendly Games' attitude would help improve police-public relations in the East End, but also identified that this policing style had not been continued over into everyday policing interactions after the Games,

*"Ad: So you're calling for a continuation of that 'friendly' attitude?"*

*R: Aye. Because alot of the time the police are on the beat, they are just walking about, they are not necessarily looking for people that are committing crime or they are not necessarily dealing with crime issues, they are just walking about. And when they were just walking about during the CWG, they were very nice to everybody, how can they not be like that all the time? [...] Know what I mean, it is easier to speak to people when you are on that personal level and I think, for me, that would be a continuation of what has already happened through CWG [...] See the [negative] attitudes towards the police, nobody is going to change it and the people that have got the attitudes cannae change them, it's up to the police to change the perceptions people have of them."*

(Interview 29: R)

This shows how improved engagement has the potential to improve public perceptions of the police. By improving the attitudes the public have of them, the police are considered more transparent and accountable.

However, the area that needs improving most, are those of non-contact, between police and public, i.e. the places where decisions are formed, debated and contested. As stated, the post 9/11 era in security has reactivated state authority to contend with the problem of exceptional threats, with little room for lay involvement, even while the merging of global and local, is deepening the extent to which such measures interact at local levels. The result is that decisions are being made on issues of risk and security which removes those who should have a legitimate stake in some aspects of those decisions, or at least given the opportunity to agree or contest them. The state, in this unconditioned guise, by removing opportunities for deliberation, instead operates, according to what Wood and Shearing (2007: 147) identify as a, "top-down, force-focused way", but as they also identify this, "Constitutes one way, but only one way of making up the world and acting on it" (Ibid 2007: 147).

Recognition of deliberative processes as a way of ensuring greater democratic accountability is fairly commonplace within key writers in the crime control and sociological literature: Charles Taylor (2000: 281) calls for the creation of a "shared identity space"; Kaldor (2003: 160) talks of the need for a "conversation" in which different parties can talk over the best way to do things; Nancy Fraser (2003: 36) calls for "parity of participation"; and Sampson (2011) talks of the need for a "supportive institutional framework", each of which proposes a hypothetical situation in which state and lay citizens, and other agencies, come together to discuss policy outcomes which are organised for the common good. In terms of the import of these same principles into matters of policing, Loader (2000: 337) proposed the idea of 'policing commissions', as a way of bringing the dispersed and pluralised network of state and non-state agencies under democratic control. Yet, nowadays, these same agencies have a more linear and centralising feel to them, particularly where exceptional risks are concerned. Nonetheless, the state holds its rightful position as anchor with issues of exceptional risk. But as in Loader and Walker's (2007) assessment of their anchored pluralism approach, in order to access its true democratic potential, requires openness and transparency, and this means bringing communities, particularly those who are most acutely affected by exceptional security, as in Dalmarnock, into the fray of security governance in some capacity or another.

Bringing communities into deliberation over exceptional risk and security, whilst against the grain, is not as radical a proposition as it may seem. After interviewing a senior security official after the Games had finished, he admitted that public engagement was something that G2014 and all future events can improve on. Furthermore, the Security Director also conceded the faults with the current governance arrangements, whereby top-down community engagement was seen as an 'ownership issue', which nobody wanted to take responsibility for, with the result that public engagement duly suffered. While another security expert recognised that engagement is a critical aspect within the securitisation process,

*"Talk to people - give them facts. If you are giving someone facts, make sure those facts are 110% accurate, if those facts change then go back*

*and tell people. So I think local engagement is a big one and it has got to be done in advance and properly."*

(Interview AR: 1)

Similarly, despite the majority of citizens wilfully giving legitimacy to the state to operationalise security on their behalf, such feelings did not stretch to giving an exclusive franchise to actual decision making process, as one resident mentions,

*"See if they [police/security experts] had got the community together and aid 'Listen, we are going to have some amount of security, we have had a threat.' Or whatever, right. They don't need to...because obviously they are not going to tell us the threat, but they could have said that they 'had intelligence that something might happen, so we are putting in extra measures, what do you think? How should we go about this?' I am not saying the community would have come up with great ideas, but they would have come up with better than what they are saying."*

(Interview 20: A)

In recognising the need for better engagement and participation of local communities into issues of risk and security, one security expert talked hypothetically about how mega-event security could be improved. He talked for the need to have a specific 'Security Liaison Officer', who would work with the community engagement team, providing a link between community issues and opinion and security planners decisions,

*"if I was doing this again, I would say that you would need a Security Liaison Officer to work with the community engagement team, in order to really understand these [local] issues. The actual conducting, the plan and the security, isn't so much of an issue, it is really realising the impact that it has on the local communities, and I think that is important, and it is something that we did understand early on in the day, but we weren't resourced and we didn't have the necessary support in order to go out and do the door knocking."*

(Interview DW: 2)

However, this way of governance and community engagement still sounds top-down and instructive in nature. Furthermore, the issue of realignment between expertise and lay perspectives is still sequestered, albeit mediated through a buffer on the ground. It is also questionable how well this format would aid in two-way information flow in terms of how diverse community experiences and opinions are voiced through this narrow, one man conduit. Such fears over the representativeness of diverse social experiences are therefore likely to affect the pursuit of security as a 'common good'. As Wood and Shearing (2007) recognise, even within communities themselves, there can be 'weak' and 'strong' actors, and the fear that the voices of the strong dominate any expert-lay deliberation, is a legitimate one within this model.

A problem within the academic security literature is that the complexity of security governance, both as theoretical concept, and as something actually existing in the field, mean that disparities between theory and practice often exist. In order to provide a basic merging of theoretical recommendations and visions for security governance at the local level, I propose the bringing to life of Innes's (2004: 164) 'control hubs' metaphor into mega-event security governance. The basic idea of the metaphor starts from the basis that the security governance field represents not a nodal assemblage of horizontal and equivalent actors, but exists in a hierarchical or state anchored fashion, whereby, the public police exist at the conceptual centre - "coordinating and in effect steering the allocation of policing services" (Innes 2004: 166), as they did at G2014, and tend to do at mega-events. The overarching principle of a control hub is based upon the realisation that effective policing, and in this case, security solutions, cannot exist as a top-down, 'one size fits all' model, but have to be tailored to locally specific contexts. As has been described in detail, much of the problems in communicating security at mega-events arise from the imposition of standardised globalised measures without any consideration to local contexts, perceptions and experiences. Control hubs would give a local dimension to security governance; they would be locally based and be operated by the police, providing a platform for deliberation with key stakeholders and the community,

in order to elicit their social experiences of security, or find out more about specific aspects of the security operation. It would also provide opportunities for aspects of the security delivery to be revised according to the feedback given by other security agencies and community members themselves. In the first instance, security workers of any rank or level, and members of the public could 'drop in' to the hub and inform the police officer of their issue or concern or gain information. Recorded issues of concern will then be logged and distributed among hub members, and solutions sought, according to frequency or severity, in cooperation with various partners affiliated with the hub - those agencies responsible for security delivery, Games organisers, and existing community groups and agencies.

Control hubs could operate out of existing buildings such as local community centres. This would offer a significant benefit to the rigidity of temporal and informationally stagnant consultation meetings, providing flexibility, real time adaptability, and a constant and identifiable 'access point' between expertise and lay citizens. In addition, the format is not structured solely around top-down information distribution, but allows a reflexive process of information exchange. Furthermore, as was identified, a great deal of uncertainty existed over official protocol between agencies and the public; the hub could provide a source of clarity to such issues, as well as site for collating and amending these aspects of misinformation and the reasons for misalignment. This would help provide a consistency of service and information distribution between the many stakeholder agencies, whilst always having the meta-authority, and regulatory power, of the police in situ. The key of opening up security to deliberative processes, is of course, not to take on board and enact upon every issue or concern of the public, but to submit these, along with the aims, desires and actions, of the state police, the directors of the security operation itself, to critical reflection.

This format provides an alternative to purely symbolic security. It attends first to aiding material insecurities by grounding the myths surrounding risk and security. Providing facts on the exceptionality of terrorism and clarification around what risks are more and less likely, and the reasons behind specific

aspects of security, would go some way towards breaking or lessening the cycles by which security translates into insecurity, and the normalcy by which lay citizens perceive the (un)exceptionality of terrorism. Secondly, by submitting security and its providers to democratic accountability around their actions, and by orienting them around the broadest level of public agreement is to not only produce a conception of security which is more directed towards its enactment as a public good, but is also to maximise public involvement in the decision making process. This 'politics of recognition' (Loader 2000: 337) can go towards removing the ontological insecurity generating conditions of cultural domination and institutional disrespect with regards to lay involvement, and replace it, by giving recognition to the fact that citizens, particularly those most acutely affected by decisions taken in the name of security, have a stake in how these decisions are made, and how particular measures impact on their very own, subjective sense of (in)security. As Loader (2012b) states, "It matters enormously that people are given a stake in how decisions are arrived at". Lastly, by giving a platform to lay involvement in this process is to also secure compliancy through consent, as opposed to compliancy through control; it is inherently undemocratic to fashion consent and legitimacy on the basis of keeping citizens in a state of perpetual fear and uncertainty. If lay citizens feel that decisions are being made in their best interests, and actually serve to affirm this feeling when conducted in the field, then this is to increase compliancy towards those measures and the institutions delivering them. The concept of legitimacy in security is to govern with the permission of the public. By unpacking this in relation to how both legitimacy and compliance has previously been attained at mega-events, is also to question the current arrangement of governing security and to point to a better, more democratic way of achieving it, not only 'in the now', but also in creating a more credible idea of what a 'security legacy' arising from mega-events should be.

A surprising effect that the Games had on local community members was that their feelings of isolation and social distance between themselves and those 'calling the shots' in security delivery, resulted in the community coming together and the formation of several new community groups during the Games, to provide a louder voice. And while no platform existed for these groups to be

recognised formally, they acted intuitively, and proactively, in bringing certain issues into consideration. In some cases, they even managed to prompt a change of decision from the experts. For example, a decision was made by the OC to place restrictions on the ice cream van, which also acted as a portable newsagent for the community, from entering due to security concerns. Furthermore, the security lockdown also meant that no bus stops functioned in the area, and buses were diverted elsewhere. Such decisions would have had drastic consequences for many elderly residents who depended on these services for basic everyday tasks. Similarly, an issue arose where household and recycling bins were unable to be collected due to the vehicle restrictions. Although these matters may seem trivial, they contributed greatly towards the feeling that security was not for them, and not benefitting their own situations. Subsequently, in response to these decisions, and from the lack of input the consultation structure offered residents, a community group called 'Dalmarnock matters' was formed by some local residents. This was a handful of local residents, politicised individuals who were well known in the community and had excellent knowledge of its residents. They were also known to the local councillors, having fought against some of the negative effects of regeneration that had occurred over the years. The aim of the group was to lobby against these kinds of decisions, and restructure them so as to limit their distribution to residents in the neighbourhood. Essentially, they acted as representatives for the common good of the community, by raising awareness to local councillors about some of the negative social experiences of the security that residents were having. They obtained this information through direct engagement with other residents, through word of mouth and from other social media platforms (a Dalmarnock community group existed online via Facebook). Through being a 'weak actor' and having no formal structure to exist as 'one node among many', the community group engaged directly with the local councillors, who then used their political leverage to help gain some valuable compromises. For example, the ice cream van was subsequently allowed to enter the community during specific times, and a mini bus service was also put in place which picked up residents and took them to neighbouring communities and supermarkets.

*"This is down to the community; the wee people who are saying 'no, no, no'. We know it's not great and its maybe not 100% but we feel it's something rather than sitting back, sitting moaning and not doing anything about it."*

(Interview 20: A)

However, it must be stated, that this form of community action was severely limited, both in terms of its size, organisational capacity, and outcomes achieved; it was constructed during the Games, and so had no time to gather momentum or widespread political recognition. Furthermore, this also meant that many local residents were unaware of the group's existence, even if the group was aware of their problems. However, it showed that an appetite existed for the kinds of functions that a control hub could provide. It also shows that the temperature of public emotions in issues of security, can be much cooler than they are often given credit for, where the majority of residents sought less securitization and restrictive measures as opposed to more of it. The key factor in arising to such decisions was based on the viewing and experiencing of security through a localised context. It further demonstrates that engaging community members and taking on board their experiences, does not necessarily mean a reinventing of the security wheel; as has been discussed in this thesis, 'security' and the feeling that its namesake affords, is about much more than exceptional, material control measures, it is also about fairness, equality and recognition. In this sense, even the smallest, rights regarding actions can have big effects on the overall security experience. As one resident states, these trivial but vital amendments helped people cope better with the restrictive aspects of securitisation,

*"So fighting for those little extras, those small but essential things which helped people acclimatise to the situation a bit easier, really helped people out and it also demonstrated our togetherness and power as a community."*

(Interview 29: R)

Lastly, a question I posed to local residents at the end of interviews was, "What do you think the legacy will be from the Games?" As with all aspects of security talk, such questions and topics do not elicit straight answers. Yet a common theme whether spoken of directly, or felt in sentiment, was the recognition that residents needed to challenge more, the security decisions that are being made in their name,

*"What I suggested at the beginning was we should have formed a committee, and we didn't do it. I am not saying we would have got any further forward, but I think we would have been consulted a lot more. Because if you have got a recognised committee, I am not talking about people going and shouting at people at a meeting, I am talking about constructive, 'yea, what is happening, so we can let people know'."*

(Interview 10: B)

And considering that the regeneration plans for the area is only in its early stages, there exists now a greater impetus among residents to participate in decisions regarding the inevitable regeneration-linked securitisation of their community in the future. Fischhoff *et al.* (2000: 135) states, "The more scientific and lay perspectives applied to a problem, the better chance we have of not getting it wrong". As has been discussed, a reflexive learning process and a bringing together of lay citizens and expertise would undoubtedly contribute to enhancing security delivery at subsequent events.

The consistent idea which has emerged across these four analysis chapters is that giving people better information around risk and security would help alleviate the anxieties that these very issues inevitably generate. For final clarification, this does not mean giving explicit, detailed information on the finer details of the security operation, or telling the public of particular risk hot spots. And so, conversely, this also means that there is no chance of the security operation being compromised by doing this. Rather, it is about clarification; to conduct security in such a way that it is not entirely interpreted solely through the axis of its visibility, and to bring a more human centred approach to technological security fixes, "Giving people a say also increases the amount of

information that goes into the making of those decisions and thereby enhances their quality" (Loader 2012a).

While, much of the thesis has focussed on the theoretical aspects of this process, in recognising that institutional reform, and a 'conditioning' of the state, towards changing current governance trends, is something that takes time and alot of persuasion. Perhaps this is the best role those researching aspects of security can take; as highlighters of inefficiencies in the current way of doing things, no matter how big or how small these may be.

## 8.7 Epilogue

In these times, we will always have security, something must be done. But the task lies not with improving security in terms of the endless pursuit of robustness, fortification, lock-down and secrecy. As the distinctions between policing and security are blurring, and as forms of exceptional security are no longer the exclusive realms of mega-events or airports, but exist amidst the everyday working of communities, never more has the lessons to be taken from mega-events security been so important. Pessimistically, if nothing changes, these events offer a glimpse into the future of security and policing institutions, and of our cities.

This thesis has aimed to give a different angle on mega-event securitisation; by looking at it from the narrower perspective of communication between sender and receiver, the deeper aspects of experiences of security are revealed. It was identified that: firstly, structures of experience mediate the extent to which security is understood; that different places matter in how risks are perceived and security made sense of; that security signals not only risk and safety, but also aspects of identity and belonging; lastly, that we are experiencing a new security situation which has widened the social distance between experts and lay citizens. Taken together, the overall message is about the need to do things

differently; to refocus security both at the top level, and on the ground, in creating conditions which improve both how and what security communicates, and therefore, how it is experienced.

## Appendix

### Appendix 1: Stakeholder Participants

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>	<b>Role</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
RR	07/10/13	Legacy Research Coordinator	Glasgow Commonwealth Games Research Partnership
AS	08/10/13	Venue Security Manager	Glasgow 2014 Limited
AC	29/10/13	Senior Manager	Clyde Gateway URC
YK	09/05/14	Councillor Calton Ward & Regeneration Manager	Glasgow City Council & Peoples' Development Trust
DW	16/05/14 & Follow up 23/09/14	Senior Manager Security Operations	Glasgow 2014 Limited
S&L	20/05/14	Accounts Manager & Partnership Working Coordinator	Community Safety Glasgow
WC	22/05/14	Scottish Regional Representative BSIA	British Security Industry Association (BSIA)
MM	29/05/14	Commonwealth Games Delivery Team	Police Scotland
AR	09/06/14	Project Lead Commonwealth Games	Wilson James
SB	12/06/14	Community Engagement Officer	Police Scotland
CM	13/06/14	Senior Performance and Information Manager	Community Safety Glasgow
SA	16/06/14	DCC/Gold Commander Commonwealth Games	Police Scotland
KH	24/06/14	Recruitment – ScotGap programme	Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)

## Appendix 2 Resident Participants

<b>Participant(s) Initials</b>	<b>Date of interview</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Gender</b>
M	08/07/14	43	F
J	08/07/14	42	M
M	09/07/14	68	F
A & M	09/07/14	29,31	F,F
J	17/07/14	65	M
A	17/07/14	72	F
R	17/07/14	41	M
W and Family	17/07/14	65, 62, 32, 25	M, F,F,F
A	17/07/14	32	M
B	17/07/14	58	M
C	18/07/14	81	F
F & S	18/07/14	38, 41	M, F
S	24/07/14	43	F
J	24/07/14	30	M
S	24/07/14	16	M
A	24/07/14	36	F
S, S, M	24/07/14	30,18, 42	M, F, F
J, M, F	25/07/14	31,32	M,M
M	25/07/14	32	M
A	28/07/14	44	F
J	29/07/14	30	F
M	29/07/14	83	F
S	30/07/14	31	F
D	30/07/14	30	M
J & W	31/07/14	60,60	M, F
M & M	01/08/14	18, 23	M,F
A	10/09/14	46	F
D	10/09/14	43	M
R	12/09/14	28	M
D & A	12/09/14	30 & 41	M, F,

## Appendix 3: Information Sheet for Stakeholder Interviews



### G2014 - The Security Legacy

#### Information Sheet for interview discussions with research participants

##### **What is the study about?**

I am currently a PhD research student at the University of Glasgow investigating the security legacy of the G2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games. The Research is an ESRC/Scottish Government funded project and aims to investigate the governance of security at Glasgow G2014 compared to other Mega-events, outlining the distinctiveness of its approach and how this may contribute to the security legacy of the Games.

##### **Why have I asked you to take part?**

As a senior figure involved in security planning for the Games you have been chosen to participate with the hope of being able to provide invaluable information and offer insight into various aspects of security, governance, policing and legacy which can help with the overall aims of the research.

##### **What does taking part involve?**

I would like you to take part in a one-to-one interview with the topics of discussion based around a loose framework which will include issues of security, policing, community safety and legacy at G2014.

Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw yourself and unprocessed data at any time.

If you agree to participate I would like to audio record the discussion.

##### **What will happen to the audio-recording?**

All recordings and notes will be stored securely on a password encrypted computer within University of Glasgow premises- to which only I have access. The findings will be used as part of my PhD thesis and may also be used for related journal publications or seminars.

I expect the research to be completed by December 2016 and I am happy to share with you a copy of my PhD thesis and any related publications arising from the research.

### **Anonymity**

Before the interview, you will be given the option to be personally identified or to remain anonymous as far as possible in the thesis and any resulting publications.

If you have any further questions or want to discuss any of the issues covered in the interview, you can contact me on:

Tel - 07833191274

Email - [a.aitken.2@research.gla.ac.uk](mailto:a.aitken.2@research.gla.ac.uk)

Alternatively you can speak to my supervisors:

Professor Simon Mackenzie - [simon.mackenzie@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:simon.mackenzie@glasgow.ac.uk)

Professor Michele Burman - [michele.burman@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:michele.burman@glasgow.ac.uk)

If you have any further concerns regarding the conduct of the research project you can contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer by contacting Dr Valentina Bold, College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer, [Valentina.Bold@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:Valentina.Bold@glasgow.ac.uk)

Yours Faithfully,

Adam Aitken

## Appendix 4: Consent Form for all participants



### Consent Form

**Title of Project: G2014 - The Security Legacy**

**Name of Researcher: Adam Aitken**

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw myself and any unprocessed data at any time, without giving any reason.
3. I do / do not give consent to interviews being audio-taped (delete as applicable)
4. Please select from the following two options (delete as applicable)
  - a) I consent to being personally identified as the source of my interview data in the thesis and any publications arising from the research
  - b) I request that my interview data be anonymised so far as possible in the thesis and any publications arising from the research
5. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant	Date	Signature
Researcher	Date	Signature

## Appendix 5: Information Sheet for Resident Interviews

### Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games - The Security Legacy



#### Information leaflet for Participants

You are being invited to take part in a research study and this leaflet will tell you more about it. Before you decide whether or not you want to take part it is important for you to understand why the research is being carried out and what it will involve.

Thank you for reading this.

#### What will happen to the results of the research study?

The information collected will be used to write a PhD thesis. A summary of the main findings will also be provided to the study funders to inform them of issues relating to the security legacy from the games. The findings may also be written up to be published in an academic journal.

#### Contact for Further Information

If you would like more information, please do let us know. You can call or e-mail, myself, Adam, or my principle supervisor, Simon, using the contact details below:

Adam Aitken, University of Glasgow:  
[a.aitken.2@research.gla.ac.uk](mailto:a.aitken.2@research.gla.ac.uk) / 0141 330 7320 / 07833191274

Simon Mackenzie, University of Glasgow:  
[simon.mackenzie@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:simon.mackenzie@glasgow.ac.uk) / 0141 330 4303

If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project, you can contact Dr Muir Houston, College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer,  
[Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk](mailto:Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk)

 University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

 SCCJR  
 The Scottish Centre for Crime & Justice Research

### **Why is the research happening?**

The aim of the research is to help understand the impact that the Commonwealth Games has had on the use of security in local communities and also to find out more about people's own understandings of security, identifying the factors that help them to feel safe and secure.

### **Who is doing the research?**

My name is Adam Aitken, I am a postgraduate research student at the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR), University of Glasgow. The research is co-funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) & the Scottish Government.

### **Why is the study important?**

The findings from this study will provide valuable information about the impacts of large scale events like the Commonwealth Games and how they affect a wide range of issues relating to security once the games have gone.

### **Why have I been asked to take part?**

You have been asked to take part because you are a local community member. Your views are important in helping to understand the security legacy of the Commonwealth Games and its impact on local community members.

### **Do I have to take part?**

No, you do not have to take part. If you do decide to take part, you can change your mind at any time without having to give reasons for doing so. You can also withdraw yourself or any unprocessed information that you have provided at any time.

### **What will taking part involve?**

You are being asked to take part in a research interview with me (Adam). During the interview I will ask you about your own experiences and opinions on a range of issues relating to security, safety and community. If there are any questions that you do not wish to answer, you do not have to do so.

### **How long is the interview?**

The interview will last for approximately 30 minutes although it may be shorter or longer if you prefer. It will take place at a time and place which is convenient for you.

If you agree to take part in an interview, I would like to ask your permission to audio-record the interview to ensure that so that I can remember what you say. No one will listen to the recording other than me.

### **Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?**

Before the interview I will give you the option to have your name used in the study. If you don't want your real name used, I will use a made up name instead.

### **What do I do now?**

If you are interested in taking part, please let me know and we can arrange a suitable time to meet up. My contact details are on the first page.

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