



Galloway, Alasdair (1990) *Maintenance of hierarchy*. PhD thesis.

<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1972/>

Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

MAINTENANCE OF HIERARCHY

Alasdair McCormack Galloway

Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. to
the Glasgow Business School, August 1990.

(c) Alasdair Galloway, 1990.

Volume One

Acknowledgements

My first acknowledgement must be to the anonymous firm for allowing me access to undertake the research work, and to my respondents in the firm for answering a stream of questions which must at times have seemed, to them, to be without end.

Any acknowledgement would be incomplete without reference to the advice, but in particular the friendship, of my supervisor David Weir.

Finally I must acknowledge the assistance of my family - my wife June, and my children Andrew and Emma, who were always willing to show me that there is world other than writing PhDs, but have also been a source of much encouragement as well as joy and love.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my parents, William and Laura Galloway, who were a constant support during our time together. They are both missed very much.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME ONE

Chapter 1	Theoretical Bases	1 - 38
Chapter 2	Methodological Considerations	39 - 58
Chapter 3	Negotiating Entry	59 - 68
Chapter 4	Perceptions of Communication	69 - 109
Chapter 5	Perceptions of Control of Decision-making	110 - 229
Chapter 6	Theoretical & Empirical Considerations	230 - 350

Volume Two

Appendix One	Footnotes to Chapters 1-3, 6	1 - 296
Appendix Two	Bibliography	297 - 316
Appendix Three	Further Perceptions of Communication & Control	317 - 477

Volume Three

Appendix Four	Interview Excerpts from Chapter 4	1 - 35
Appendix Five	Interview Excerpts from Chapter 5	36 - 137
Appendix Six	Job Satisfaction & Hierarchy	138 - 357
Appendix Seven	Media & Other Data	358 - 404
Appendix Eight	Tables 5.27, 5.29, 5.32, 5.34, 5.37, 5.39, 5.42, 5.44, 5.47, 5.52, 5.54	405 - 426

Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL STRUCTURES

This work considers how it is that company structures, based on hierarchy, are able to persist over time. This question, though simple, is basic to industrial society, since although business organizations do in general operate with sufficient cohesion to produce their goods/services for sale, the traditional hierarchical structure ¹ has on occasions come under attack ². Our aim will be to establish and understand the conditions under which hierarchy is able to persist - or conversely, under what conditions we might expect it to come apart. Our consideration does not however, preclude the possibility that the attack on hierarchy is more apparent than real - that any attack is at the level of limited ideology rather than social praxis. Hence it will be our position that we shall suspend belief in the persistence of the hierarchical structure and in this way be able to consider the conditions both for its persistence, and also for any challenge to be made to it.

By pursuing the initial problem in this way we do not preclude the possibility of either

- 1) the permanence of hierarchy, or
- 2) the inevitability of its replacement with more/less democratic structures.


Our aim is to understand the conditions for the persistence of hierarchical structures, and by implication the conditions under which they may be challenged by more democratic structures.

Given this aim we must now consider the manner in which we shall attempt to resolve the problems we have set. We have stated our argument that we must suspend belief in the hierarchical basis of organization, but not ourselves posing any particular alternative ³. Thus we must treat as problematic what our subjects treat as obvious, and investigate the structure of their thought to establish the hold of hierarchy.

Our starting point shall be the Lifeworld ⁴ of employees by which they interpret their working lives and therefore of the company for which they work, and its actions - for instance the expectations which they make of the firm in all kinds of areas from job methods and wages, to the determination of strategy. We shall begin from the Lifeworld since it seems to us that its structure can sustain belief in the hierarchical structure of the firm. We cannot, however, accomplish this without a proper theoretical perspective or a methodological view. This chapter shall be concerned with the former, while the latter is considered in the following chapter.

Our perspective is illustrated by our initial, but provisional, model (fig. 1.1) ⁵ which is based on two distinct, but inter-dependent, assertions:

Fig 1.1



KEY

Red Boxes - Social Experience

Green Boxes - Subjective Experience

1) that employees make expectations of their firm, which they structure at a cognitive level using the knowledge available to them.

2) that the social situation in which these expectations are made is asymmetrical in two respects

a) the chances of successfully making an expectation - getting what one wants from the firm - may be unevenly distributed (ie that there may be inequality of power so that some are consistently successful and others unsuccessful).

b) expectations are not pressed in such a way as to subvert the organizational structure and expectations which would subvert the organizational structure are either not pressed effectively or conclusively or not made at all.

Hence there are two important features to our theoretical perspective:

A) the process of knowledge selection to produce and structure expectations,

B) a theory of power to structure the situation in which these expectations are made.

In respect of the former we shall rely heavily on the work of Schutz ⁶, Habermas ⁷, and of Laing and Esterson ⁸, while for the latter we shall consider Lukes' three dimensional theory of power ⁹, developed from the perspective of Habermas, and in particular his Ideal Speech Thesis ¹⁰. This will result in a theory of the Lifeworld, which while substantially consistent with Schutz continues to establish in what respects the Lifeworld creates but conceals the possibility of the exercise of power.

The importance of Schutz for us is that he provides a theoretical basis for knowledge creation for the individual social actor, and the structuring of knowledge into categories ¹¹, which is consistent with our own view. We shall argue, however, that the view presented by Schutz does not take adequate account of the "restricting" or "limiting" aspects of the Lifeworld and the taken-for-grantedness (or uncritical attitude) which it sets up - that as Morgan's "Images" suggests the Lifeworld (as our "subjective stock of knowledge" ¹²) can be a "Psychic Prison" ¹³. This argument in turn leads on to possible exercises of power of which the participants (ie power holder and subject) are not conscious. This will be developed by reference to Habermas's work ¹⁴.

The importance of Lukes is his provision of an analytical framework for power, which recognises that power is a concept of greater variation than has been realised. Lukes, however, does not make sufficiently clear the meaning - particularly at the empirical level - of his third ("radical") dimension of power. For this reason we shall introduce the thesis of ideal speech, put forward by Habermas, to clarify and extend Lukes' work in a manner which is theoretically and empirically stronger, and methodologically more practical. We shall use a synthesis of Lukes and Habermas as a basis for our analysis of the social situation in which expectations are

a) structured

b) developed as a project in a social situation.

By bringing together these two elements (ie the Habermasian adaption of Schutz and Lukes) we shall argue that individuals make expectations on their company which they develop from their Lifeworld and its subjective stock of knowledge. This process of knowledge selection and development of expectations, analytically sets a number of issues which shall be important to us in considering whether there is the social asymmetry we suggested exists as a support to existing organizational structures ¹⁵:

1) the knowledge selected may be so structured as to forestall the development of particular expectations, or so constrain behaviour that, in either situation, the structure of the organization goes unchallenged.

2) expectations can only be satisfied in competition with others - hence interaction with other employees will be important and particularly the Lifeworld definition of these employees (for instance competition between Management and Hourly paid may be influenced by the definition which the latter make of the former).

3) expectations shall be arbitrated upon by the company decision-making system (ie by the individual/group who have the authority to make the decision in question). At a relatively superficial level we must consider the values of this individual/group - but we have to go still deeper to understand the conditions under which this authority is regarded as legitimate or conversely regarded as illegitimate ¹⁶.

These issues are closely connected since the legitimacy and illegitimacy or the decision-making system are largely determined - in our model - by the selection of knowledge, part of which is constituted by one's experience and/or interaction with other employees, as well as wider social knowledge which is employed by defining and interpreting the behaviour of others to develop expectations.

Our perspective on this process is composed of two parts:

- 1) Employees make expectations of their company.
- 2) These expectations are generated in a process of experience and learning.

We see no causal implications in this, but instead take the view that employees select from the knowledge available to them, in order to structure, guide and justify their behaviour. For instance this may be to

A) justify the expectation of having more influence in their company's decision-making, and to indicate what would be appropriate behaviour to this end. Or alternatively

B) indicate that this is not a reasonable expectation, and not a reasonable form of behaviour.

Similarly the knowledge which is accessible can be employed to define and interpret the behaviour of relevant others in their own group, and throughout the work situation - to account for, and explain what is happening, to foretell how to behave/not behave in the future. The process can, in other words, encourage or discourage the taking up of particular projects. Our particular interest is the dominance of hierarchy is maintained, restraining the development of more democratic organizational forms.

Schutz

We have indicated, in a general sense, the existence of certain types of knowledge, but before going on to consider the particular form in which these are defined, we must re-emphasise and expand upon our initial theoretical statement. In particular, as well as the particular definitions of knowledge, we must examine the constitution of knowledge to a point where it serves as a meaning structure by which we define the action we are concerned with, and guide our subsequent behaviour toward that action.

Schutz makes clear that these two moments cannot be separated, since he argues that an external object is constituted out of appearances as we encounter them in our stream of consciousness. Such appearances "hang together" in a context of meaning.

As they follow one another up in regular sequence, our experience of the object is built up. We can by means of a monothetic glance look upon the whole sequence as a unity in itself - the object of outer experience, the thing of the external world. ¹⁷

Our experience, therefore, is added to stratum by stratum ¹⁸ to create a meaning structure or Lifeworld - a process Schutz saw as on-going. Thus the stock of knowledge, and the Lifeworld are not in any sense "once and for all" - we do not have a Lifeworld and that is that for all time. Rather by our continued behaviour we reinforce it by fulfilling our expectations, or we weaken it by experiencing frustration of our expectations. For example, in a mundane sense, we use the Lifeworld when we cross the road. Thus it informs us that cars drive on the left (at least in the UK) and keep to 30 mph (at least in built up areas). We continue to take this for granted - at least until we get knocked down by a car travelling at 60 mph, or driving on the right in a one way street. Such an event may lead to reassessment of the Lifeworld and the knowledge which it contains and structures ¹⁹. What, therefore does Schutz mean by the Lifeworld?

The Lifeworld is exactly what it seems to be ²⁰ - it is the world we occupy and take for granted in our ordinary everyday life ²¹. In this Schutz was influenced by Husserl who argues that to understand the objective world we must first of all suspend (or "bracket") our belief in its existence so that we can establish how it is formed by our subjects. What Husserl encourages us to is

A phenomenological understanding of the world, one that aims at elucidating the essential structures of this life-world, structures which are themselves constituted by intentional consciousness. ²²

This lays down the cardinal problem for Husserl,

a) that the essential structures of the life-world (or the natural attitude, the constructs of common sense) cannot, and should not, be taken for granted, but are instead important subjects of study, and thus

b) to establish how the Life-world, in this sense is formed.

Therefore we then have to ask, how, as individuals, we come to acquire knowledge of the Lifeworld and how it is that the Lifeworld comes to be formed - to develop what Schutz describes as "the subjective stock of knowledge" ²³.

Put at its very simplest our knowledge of the Lifeworld is formed by our experience, and what we are taught about it by "parents and teachers". As we grow older, and encounter a wider range of experiences, so our stock of knowledge of the Lifeworld grows and develops ²⁴.

Thus the knowledge we have of the Lifeworld - that which we take for granted - will depend on,

a) previous experiences (either of our own, or of others, which we have learned, heard of etc.) - for instance, we learn as children that to talk in class will result in some sort of punishment, and that it is "wrong".

b) current experiences, interpreted by the existing stock of knowledge and the rules by which it is structured ²⁵.

Hence an experience which goes against this system of rules will either

i) be rejected as somehow wrong, or

ii) lead to a change in the system of rules.

Hence as well as enabling us to interpret what goes on around us, the Lifeworld also acts in such a way as to restrict our understanding ²⁶, since it predisposes us to understand reality in a particular way ²⁷. But, moreover, we assume that others with whom we are in interaction occupy the same Lifeworld ²⁸.

While much of our learning may be at 2nd or 3rd (or more) hand, we cannot separate what we know from our experience - the stock of knowledge which we employ in the Lifeworld is a summation of those experiences ²⁹. Our understanding of the Lifeworld is to enable us to "act in it and operate upon it" ³⁰. In other words through our Lifeworld we understand the Social World and can act within it.

So, what is the stock of knowledge of the Lifeworld composed of in Schutz's theory? Schutz suggests that there are three categories of knowledge relevant to the Lifeworld. These are

Basic or Fundamental elements or structures ³¹,

Routine or Habitual elements ³²,

Specific Component contents ³³.

There are therefore three categories of knowledge in Schutz. There is the type of knowledge we are all aware of having - what to do when driving and coming to a police officer with his arm raised, indicating that we should stop ³⁴. In addition there are two other elements to the stock of knowledge we use in the Lifeworld - at the deepest level there is knowledge which is used (unconsciously) to categorise and structure this conscious knowledge - and at an intermediate level certain skills or knowledge which we use without even thinking or being conscious or aware of using ³⁵.

The issues which remain to be clarified in Schutz's theory are that having acquired this knowledge,

a) what is its structure?

b) how does this, essentially individual, stock of knowledge relate to the stock of knowledge in society generally?

The acquisition of knowledge in Schutz's theory is through our experience - in other words we acquire knowledge through learning ³⁶, as we have already made clear above. When we have experienced a situation, our knowledge of it is "filed away" in our existing structure of knowledge.

The stock of knowledge is then given form by the system of "relevances and typicality" ³⁷, which are its fundamental structures (see above). Experience therefore, enters into our stock of knowledge, and is given structure, according to

1) our system of typicality - what kind of experience it is ³⁸ (consequently there are what Schutz describes as "provinces of reality").

2) our system of relevances - which indicate to us how important each of the elements of the situation are. This system of relevances determines why we are interested in one thing rather than another ³⁹.

If an experience fits in with our basic organizing system then it is likely to be sedimented (added to our existing knowledge) without being questioned ⁴⁰. Other experiences which do not satisfy this condition, however, will require further explanation. This may result in such experiences being reinterpreted to fit in with the structure of relevances or that relevances are restructured to allow for this experience ⁴¹.

Thus, we have established the structure of the stock of knowledge in Schutz's theory. Our subjective stock of knowledge, which we acquire through experience is composed of three categories -

Basic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),

Routine or Habitual elements, and

Specific Component contents.

The subjective stock knowledge (its routine elements and specific contents) is given structure and is organized by a system of themes (thematic relevances) and typifications - the basic or fundamental structures. As the knowledge which we employ is used over time, and proves to be successful, its use becomes increasingly unconscious, and thus uncritical ⁴².

We can therefore, consider Schutz's view of how this structure of knowledge of the individual is related to the social structure of knowledge. While the preponderance of Schutz's theory is at the level of the individual, the social fits well, and in an obvious way.

For Schutz, the individual does not make his own history freely, does not form relevances etc. on his own. Rather the individual is "delimited and determined by social givens" ⁴³. The sedimentation of subjective knowledge, which we have discussed above, takes place within the context of society ⁴⁴, so in the construction of reality, the individual cannot be imagined to be acting autonomously. Rather the individual acts within the context of society. Indeed in the language we employ in our social lives, we express the structures of meaning of the everyday life world of the society of which we are part ⁴⁵.

So how does this work? It works, in Schutz's view, because when we enter into a situation (eg a "We relation") we are not free to act as we will, but rather the situation forces certain facets on us. For instance, when we enter into a situation we will draw on certain subjective relevances (eg when I last met with this person, he appeared to be a jolly type of person). In so doing, however, we do not just select any old relevance structure - we do not work at random. Rather we use data gathered from the situation to determine which relevance structure is appropriate (thus the previous example would depend on the two contexts being the same - hence it is possible for a boss and subordinate to have different relationships at work and in the golf club of which both are members). In other words, while as individuals we select the relevance structure, the basis for doing so is the reality of the situation (ie it is social).

Moreover, the individual will have been socialized into interpretive and motivational relevances during the course of his life. Were it otherwise he would not be able to master the situation - he would misinterpret the situation, and/or act for the wrong reasons. Thus the relevances we select will

- a) have been used for social reasons
- b) have been acquired socially also.

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that society merely imprints itself on the individual, in the way we might expect a "Parsonian" sociology to suggest. In Schutz's theory, however, the individual is never fully determined. This is because when the individual enters a situation he brings with him his own subjective system of relevances, which will have a "social prehistory" ⁴⁶. The prehistory of different individuals will differ, so when two individuals enter a situation, they are likely to interpret it differently for this reason ⁴⁷.

Hence while there may be a "community of relevance structures" ⁴⁸, the individual's biography will determine

- a) which relevance structures he uses,
- b) what he understands by each of them.

The individual is not, therefore fully determined by society in Schutz's theory - but equally he is not fully free to act either ⁴⁹.

The subjective system is composed of independent, empathic and socialized relevances ⁵⁰, but the largest role is played by the empathic and socialized relevances, since they operate in the most comprehensive sectors of the life of the individual. These include skills which, as Schutz points out

the other...considers to be obvious to any educated person ⁵¹

Thus the two key dimensions we considered above in the context of the individual - relevance systems, and typicality - are both socially derived ⁵². Of particular importance in this process are the relationships within which we construct our lives. These are categorised by Schutz as depending on:

- a) "we orientation" ⁵³ " or
- b) "thou orientation" ⁵⁴ " or
- c) "they orientation" ⁵⁵ ".

Relations based on these orientations vary in their degree of intimacy for the individual - thus the "we" is more intimate than the "thou", which in turn is more intimate than the "they" relation ⁵⁶. It is, however, through these relationships that we acquire and practice our subjective stock of knowledge ⁵⁷. Through "thou" and "we" relations we can

a) acquire subjective knowledge (eg that a particular type of person, in these circumstances behaves in these ways)

b) use our subjective stock of knowledge (eg that we expect this type of person to behave/react in particular ways) ⁵⁸

But, how does social knowledge emerge? Is it simply the agglomeration of individual subjective knowledge? Schutz argues that we can consider the subjective level without the social, but not vice versa. In other words the subjective stock of knowledge, while being restricted by the social stock (what Schutz calls "social givens" ⁵⁹), contains its origins. The subjective, in other words, has priority ⁶⁰, though only in theory, as Schutz himself points out ⁶¹. The reasons for this are that:

a) the volume of subjective knowledge which enters into the social stock is relatively small, and often adapted during its absorption into the social stock,

b) the social stock is greater than the sum of its parts (the subjective stocks of individuals). In other words we cannot merely sum all of the subjective stocks ⁶².

For subjective knowledge to enter into the social stock requires that the subjective knowledge of individuals feeds into the collective social stock of knowledge. This occurs as result of a process referred to by Schutz as "objectivation" ⁶³. By this process, human, subjective processes come to take on for us the appearance of objective reality ⁶⁴. Objectivations can take the form of products, recipes, explicit elements of knowledge, skills, models of behaviour to be followed ⁶⁵ - all of which are critical elements of the social stock of knowledge on which we all draw for our subjective stocks of knowledge.

We do, however, have to ask why it is that some objectivations become part of the social stock, while others do not? For objectivated knowledge to become part of the social stock requires that two conditions are satisfied:

1) there is a similarity of subjective relevance structures for all parties. This requires that the problem for the person who originally solved it, is the same as for the person who accepts this solution ⁶⁶.

2) knowledge is transferred across the generations, and thus does not die with those who "know it" ⁶⁷.

The social stock of knowledge, therefore, requires that this stock must never die, and as such the stock is capable of protecting itself ⁶⁸. Thus in society, issues of typical problems, transmission of solutions, to whom the solutions are to be transmitted are not matters left to chance. Rather the answers to such questions are themselves components of the social stock of knowledge (eg the role of teacher is an example of a specialist role for the transmission of the stock of knowledge, but even more basic, as Schutz points out is the role of the family ⁶⁹). Consequently the transmission of the stock of knowledge, by being built into the social structure, becomes independent of subjective relevance structures and thus of the individual ⁷⁰, to the extent that he can simply take up solutions and apply them directly.

This is supported by the likelihood that if the use of certain solutions become rigid ⁷¹ better, improved solutions will not be considered for use by individuals ⁷². A motivation for this is that by using pre-established solutions time can be released for the solution of other problems. This creates the possibility of an inter-generational division of labour (eg one generation invented electricity, so another has the time to work on electronics) ⁷³.

In parallel to this, there is a social division of labour. This means that the social stock of knowledge will be, broadly speaking, categorised as

- a) general and available to all, and
- b) specialised and thus not relevant for all, but restricted to a specialised groups.

Thus the stock of knowledge is socially distributed - some of it is in general use, while some of it is known and used only by specific office-holders (eg usually only doctors have detailed medical knowledge). For Schutz this appears to be purely a functional necessity, so that when we need specialist knowledge we turn to a specialist ⁷⁴.

We can now turn to the second question of the structure of the social stock - in distinction to the structure of the subjective stock of individuals. The latter, it will be recalled emerges - is sedimented from - experiences of individuals. While it draws on the subjective stock, the social stock

- a) depends on an inter-subjective process of objectivation and social relevances.

- b) is institutionalized by processes for the transmission of knowledge, both interpersonally and across time.

Consequently the structure of the social stock is different from the structure of the subjective stock. The subjective stock's structure in any one case will depend on the individual's biography. The structure of the social stock on the other hand depends on its accumulation over the years/centuries, which will depend on its institutionalized processes for the collection and transfer of knowledge ⁷⁵. Thus while the social stock may derive from the subjective stock, their methods of accumulation differ and therefore their structures.

There are a number of features to the structure of the social stock which Schutz draws attention to:

1) the social stock of knowledge cannot be distributed uniformly ⁷⁶. Thus my access to the stock of knowledge will not be that same as yours. On the other hand

a) the more similar our biographies are,

b) the more our interpretive relevances are alike, and

c) the more the problems we face are related,

the more it will be true to say that our access to the stock of knowledge will be similar. Hence the more a group has corresponding problems, biographies and interpretive relevance systems, the more alike their access to the social stock will be. For similar reasons their Lifeworlds will be similar also. Schutz's argument is similar to that of Esterson ⁷⁷, namely that behaviour is a function of our experience.

If we apply this idea to our research site, where Hourly-Paid and Staff have experience only of

a) hierarchy,

b) managers telling them, without dialogue, what is viable and what is not,

then hierarchy will be all the employees will have to behave toward - since it is all of their experience. Alternatives to hierarchy have not been matters of experience, and thus they know nothing of them. This gives rise to Schutz's second observation.

2) the stock of knowledge will be socially distributed. This relates back to a point we have made already - that the social stock is composed, broadly of two categories ⁷⁸. The first and most prevalent is that part of the stock which is general, and as such available to all ⁷⁹. The second and more restricted is special knowledge which is role specific ⁸⁰. There are therefore deep and very real differences in the stock of knowledge available to the members of a society. The stock of knowledge has become unequally distributed ⁸¹. For Schutz there are a number of consequences of this:

a) the social stock of knowledge, in its entirety, cannot be surveyed by any one person.

b) that there can be no comprehensive view is a feature of our society ⁸² - though some may be able to take a wider view than others ⁸³.

Consequently there are, in effect discrete areas of meaning set up in set up in society ⁸⁴, both because of the differentiations which exist in general knowledge, but also because of the different specialised areas of knowledge.

The final area of Schutz's theory to be considered here concerns how the social stock operates within the subjective stock - "how the social stock of knowledge present(s) in subjective experience" ⁸⁵. There are two important points here:

a) the social stock of knowledge does not appear as such to the individual. The individual is not aware of drawing on the social stock, rather they are, for him, just another part of his subjective stock. The social stock simply blends seamlessly into the overall knowledge base of the individual. The elements of the social stock are, therefore, taken-for-granted by the individual ⁸⁶, and thus, we would argue, have power implications.

b) we have identified above, the existence of special knowledge, which is restrictedly available. Schutz points to a further dimension of this when he argues that specialist knowledge is not only not known by the population in general, but may also appear to be out of their reach, either for individual reasons ⁸⁷ or for institutional reasons ⁸⁸. Thus not only is specialised knowledge restricted to a (often small) proportion of the population, but also the population who are without it may feel that it is out of their reach - it is not for them. This again is a matter we would argue has important power implications.

Schutz points to the tendency for this to develop. As the specialty, whatever it may be, evolves over time the complexity of the meaning structure becomes all the greater. This has the following consequences

a) that the specialty becomes all the more impenetrable for those who do not share in it ⁸⁹.

b) it becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to take a view of society wider than the view from their specialty ⁹⁰.

The increasing importance of specialist knowledge is related to the increasing development of the social division of labour, each section having its own specialist knowledge, which is increasingly restricted to their area of specialization ⁹¹. Each area of expertise, therefore, has its place, having been classified ⁹², and that this system of classification is part of our system of typifications. Hence when we encounter a specialist called "manager" we accord him a certain level of prestige on account of the specialist knowledge he possesses. ⁹³

Hence our Lifeworld - in the form of the subjective stock of knowledge - cannot be separated from the social stock of knowledge, which is in turn supported by the institutionalized practices of the society. The social stock and its institutionalized practices are matters of which we are not fully aware in our subjective stock. Through these vehicles power can operate in ways of which we are unaware. This goes much of the way to giving our theory of power the foundation it requires.

There is, therefore, a research problem in as much as such a routine process passes by largely unnoticed within the social context. It is, as our example of crossing the road shows, only problematic when our expectations (crossing the road safely) are frustrated that we question the knowledge in the Lifeworld, or even the very structures of the Lifeworld. Normally they remain in the background, uncriticised. Hence the very routineness of social interaction may be regarded as a breach of Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis, as thus potentially as a source of power - but one which by virtue of its ordinariness, goes unnoticed (ie is unconscious). For instance, while shop floor workers may regard a particular management decision as wrong - for instance buying what they see as the wrong machine - their Lifeworlds may be such that they do not challenge the right of Management to take this decision (in other words while they may challenge the substantive outcome, they do not challenge the process if the Lifeworld defines Management as the decision-making group).

Much behaviour is structured in this way, and consequently is lacking in full consciousness, but this does not rule out the possibility of bringing out the basis of such behaviour in terms of the actor's Lifeworld. This is already done from the perspective of ethnomethodology ⁹⁴, and could be done from a Schutzian perspective, but the difficulty is that much of this is descriptive, in that it does not consider

- a) what is taken for granted, and in particular
- b) the social implications of this.

Thus, while we have learned through Schutz's work that we have to attend to the manner in which reality is formed, we must also consider the role that power plays in this. It is to this that we now turn.

The 3-D Theory of Power and an Amendment

The 3-D theory of power is put forward by Lukes in "Power- a Radical View"⁹⁵, in which he advances the case for 3 dimensions of power. The first two dimensions are directly visible, conscious exercises of power, but the third (which Lukes describes as "radical") is unobservable directly and unconscious.

There are, however, certain problems with Lukes' view of unobservable and unconscious power, as it is not entirely clear what he means here, particularly at the empirical and methodological levels. This is further confused by his reference to Crenson's "Un-politics of Air Pollution"⁹⁶ as an example of 3rd Dimension power. It would, in contrast appear to us that Crenson is more typical of the 2nd dimension. This is why this section is described as "The 3-D Theory of Power and an Amendment", since we shall introduce Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis which is theoretically and empirically clearer than Lukes and methodologically more practical.

Our discussion will start out from the conscious/observable dimensions, moving on to the unconscious/unobservable dimensions revealing that

- a) we can only fully comprehend the former and their implications by recognition of the latter,

- b) we cannot fully understand the structuring of behaviour and our perception of the behaviour of others unless we undertake to conceptualise of power in all its guises and not merely its conventional form as a visible, conscious social phenomenon.

In particular we shall further our view that the Lifeworld is restrictive and, as a function of its use, acts to restrict our behaviour within certain parameters acceptable to the form of organization, by limiting our view of acceptable alternative forms of behaviour/organizations.

The first dimension of power considered by Lukes is based on Dahl's definition that

A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something he would not otherwise do.⁹⁷

This is a description of a restricted form of behaviour, which, in analytical terms, excludes from its sphere of competence, much social action:

a) it puts power and conflict in a contingent relationship - in other words it does not consider the possibility that power may actually be used to prevent conflict.

b) since it can only consider decisions which have actually been taken it cannot accommodate the situation where B is made to do something because A will not take a formal decision. An illustration of this is the black community in the US who were forced to accept second-class citizenship to a considerable extent because the legislature would not put forward appropriate legislation. It is this difficulty which leads Lukes to the second dimension.

The second dimension involves a "qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view" (qualified because it is still assumed that non-decision-making is a form of decision-making), which does, however, allow consideration of situations where decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is observable conflict of (subjective) interests as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances ⁹⁸.

For this Lukes relies heavily on Bachrach and Baratz's theory of power ⁹⁹. The main feature of this is that one party (A) can exert power over other parties (B) by preventing a decision from being taken ¹⁰⁰. Evidence of management protection of what they regard as their prerogatives could be considered as examples of this second dimension. On the other hand this could only be in a situation where

a) these prerogatives had actually been challenged and

b) Management had resisted by simply refusing to negotiate, since Bachrach and Baratz, like Dahl, require the presence of conflict for the exercise of power.

This is the basis of Lukes' critique of Bachrach and Baratz and the development of his own third dimension of power. Essentially Lukes criticises Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz for

1) being too individualistic,

2) preventing consideration of the many ways in which issues can be kept out of politics through

i) the operation of social forces,

ii) institutional practices,

iii) individual decisions.

Moreover, in Lukes' view the exercise of power by no means necessarily involves the presence of conflict. This is not to say that there may not be the potential for conflict in the situation, but it is not necessary for the conflict to be realised. As we shall see, in Lukes' view it is a particularly effective use of power to exercise it to prevent conflict. It is, therefore, possible that the conflict is only latent, in that there is a contradiction between the interests of those exercising the power and the real interests of those over whom they exercise the power (the less powerful). The less powerful may not express, or even be conscious of their own interests but

the identification of those interests
always rests on empirically supportable
and refutable hypotheses ¹⁰¹

In this view the exercise of power is not necessarily a conscious process - the third dimension does not require us to look for Machiavellian smoke-filled rooms to prove our view. ¹⁰²

The relevance of this to industry is in so far as power is employed to

prevent people from having grievances
by shaping their perceptions,
cognitions and preferences in such a
way that they accept their role in the
existing order of things either because
they can see or imagine no alternative
to it, or because they see it as
natural and unchangeable or because
they value it as divinely ordained and
beneficial ¹⁰³

Thus power can be used not merely to sustain hierarchy, but also to diminish the perceptual viability of any alternative to it as a form of organization. Thus if we are concerned with either the maintenance of existing structures, their modification or replacement, we must first understand what supports existing arrangements. Such supports may indeed be highly visible but those hinted at by Lukes, at the subconscious level, may be the most effective.

There are, however, not inconsiderable problems with Lukes' position - problems which will lead us to amend his theory with Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis. There are, for us, two main problems with the position which Lukes sketches out:

a) his empirical example - Crenson's "Unpolitics of Air Pollution". We would argue that it is not at all clear whether Crenson's work is 2nd or 3rd Dimension ¹⁰⁴.

b) Lukes is unclear about the empirical meaning of the 3rd dimension, as well as failing to give clear indications about its methodological practicality.

Crenson's work concerns the failure of anti-pollution activists to introduce clean air proposals in Gary, Indiana. In contrast such proposals had been successfully proposed in nearby East Chicago. The difference between the two areas, Crenson explains by reference to the absence of alternative employment in Gary, which was dominated by US Steel - pollution laws would have closed the plant and lost all the jobs. In East Chicago, on the other hand, there was alternative work. There are, however, two problems with Lukes' position here:

1) the whole radical dimension is rooted in establishing the real interests - or as Lukes puts it "the relevant counterfactual" - of the people in Gary. This comes very close to what could be regarded as an unacceptable level of value judgement. Lukes makes much of it being in the interests of people to avoid pollution - but would they do so at the cost of their jobs ¹⁰⁵? Establishing real interests poses problems which are particularly contentious and should be avoided if at all possible.

2) As Bradshaw points out ¹⁰⁶, the fact that Crenson can find no evidence of a decision does not prove that no decision was taken. For instance Crenson cannot show that the people of Gary did not take a decision that polluted air was acceptable if it meant they could keep their jobs. Lukes in reply argues that Bradshaw would have to show that such a decision was taken by the inhabitants of Gary ¹⁰⁷. This easily degenerates into trading assertions, and should be avoided. In any case having to prove that something has not happened poses very real methodological problems. In our case we would have to show that employees have never considered replacing hierarchy.

In our view a more productive way forward - rather than showing whether or not the people of Gary have or have not taken the decision to have/or not have clean air - is to establish why they put up with polluted air (as we know at the time that Crenson wrote that it was polluted) or, for our purposes - why it is that hierarchy is accepted (since, as we pointed out already, in the sense that goods and services are produced hierarchy does work). This means that we do not have to prove a negative - instead we have to show how there is operational consent to polluted air (hierarchy). Nor do we have to attribute real interests, but rather can consider the Lifeworld obstacles to introducing an alternative to hierarchy.

We shall do this by employing Habermas's Ideal Speech thesis. There are several advantages in Habermas's position

a) it allows the respondents to speak for themselves, and thus avoids the problems of what real interests are,

b) it has methodological advantages, which we will discuss in the next chapter,

c) it is possible to distinguish more clearly between the 2nd and 3rd dimensions of power, both theoretically and empirically,

d) it provides clear and usable guide-lines for the identification of 3rd dimension situations.

It is central to Habermas that for a rational decision to be taken we must suppose the outcome of the discussion leading to the decision to be the result of simply the best argument, and not due to any systematic or accidental constraint (whether conscious or not) on the discussion. A structure can only be free of constraint when for all the participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts and assume dialogue roles.

We can develop a theory of power from Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis, in the following way. The Ideal Speech Thesis is a consensus of theory of truth ¹⁰⁸, which argues that speech is oriented to the achievement of consensus, but that a genuine, or rational consensus can only emerge if its conditions are satisfied in the dialogue: that

a) that all the participants to the discourse should have the same chance to speak,

b) that all participants should have the same chance to put forward, or call into question, or ground, or refute statements and explanations etc., such that no assertion is exempt from critical consideration,

c) that all speakers should be able to demonstrate to the others in the discourse their "good intent" (This is described by Habermas in the original German text as Wahrhaftigkeit. See D. Held supra, pg 340.) - that all speakers will have the same chance to express their attitudes, feelings etc. so as to show that they are being truthful to themselves and to the others in the dialogue,

d) all speakers will have the same chance to employ regulative speech acts (ie to command, oppose, permit, forbid etc) such that one-sided norms and privileges are ruled out, and formal equality can be practiced. ¹⁰⁹

¹¹⁰ This Thesis sets out an strong definition of equality which ensures, if satisfied, the four validity claims on which a consensus can be based ¹¹¹. What is its use for us?

Its use for us is that, as McCarthy points out,

if the agreement achieved in critical discussion is to provide a warrant for truth claims, there must be some way of distinguishing a rational consensus from a merely de facto consensus.¹¹²

Hence we would have to ask whether the degree of consensus we find in the firm concerning the distribution of power over decision-making and communication, was rational or not? In other words whether it is a genuine or distorted consensus, in that it could have been different¹¹³.

Habermas points out that in normal discourse we have to assume that the conditions of the ideal speech thesis are satisfied - that we cannot avoid treating our discussions other than that these conditions are true in fact (eg that we usually assume that the other party is not lying). That we

counterfactually proceed as if the model were really the case - on this unavoidable fiction rests the humanity of intercourse among men.¹¹⁴

Thus we behave as if the Thesis were true, though in practice it very seldom (if ever) will be, in its strict sense.

Hence we treat the result of communicative action¹¹⁵ as if it were a rational consensus, when in fact it will usually be a de facto or strategic (non rational and partial) consensus, and the result of domination. This will either be open strategic action¹¹⁶ - conscious domination, where both A and B are aware of the exercise of power - or the result of concealed strategic action¹¹⁷, where either only the powerful party is aware of the use of his power or neither party is aware.

In other words the agreement between the parties reflects either,

a) Open Strategic Action where power is consciously used by one or more of the parties (ie both parties are aware of the exercise of power - or at least no secret is made of it), but which may be

i) inclusive, in which case both parties use their power within the decision-making system or

ii) exclusive in which case the powerful party uses his power to keep the powerless out¹¹⁸, or there may be

b) Concealed Strategic Action where the use of power is either

i) covert, on the part of the more powerful party (for instance Manipulation through propaganda)¹¹⁹, or is

ii) unconscious for both parties - systematically distorted communication¹²⁰, which is distinguished from the rest, in that where power is conscious the dominant party at least is aware of the exercise of his power, but in this case the dominant party too is unaware of the exercise of power¹²¹.

However, as McCarthy points out, Habermas's

thesis is that the structure is free from constraint only when for all participants there is symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts, when there is an effective equality of opportunity for the assumption of dialogue roles.¹²²

If this is not satisfied then the consensus we have found in the firm is non-rational in Habermas's sense¹²³ and power must be operating in at least one of the four senses implied by Habermas's theory.

The connection between Habermas and Lukes becomes clearer if instead of defining communicative action in the restricted sense of people talking to each other, or corresponding in a newspaper, we accept that Habermas's linguistic theory as a paradigm for social behaviour and interaction. We have argued above that the structure and, by implication, the use of knowledge is normally such that a discussion cannot satisfy the conditions set out by Habermas in the Ideal Speech Thesis. This is all the more true in a hierarchical system, based on division of labour, in which there are unique technical skills (accountant, engineer, or simply decision-maker- and thus in a parochial sense, a social stock of knowledge unevenly distributed), which creates a means for events to be shaped, influenced and determined in a non-arbitrary way.

In this way the problem of recognition of the 3rd dimension (the unconscious exercise) of power can be resolved by Habermas's 4 conditions for Ideal Speech¹²⁴.

To the extent that one, or more, of the conditions are not satisfied then it can be claimed that there has been an exercise of power.

Thus our view of power permits us to identify three different contexts of power -

1) a decision - the 1st dimension. Where an expectation is introduced and dealt with, possibly involving a trial of strength on the part of those involved.

2) an expectation defined as being inadmissible - the 2nd dimension. Where an expectation is developed by a group, but is defined by relevant others as inadmissible to the decision-making options - for instance for shop-floor workers to obtain staff status.

3) the 3rd dimension, or radical dimension. This is recognisable only through the breach of any one of Habermas's four conditions, such that no participant is aware of the exercise of power.

The Lifeworld and the exercise of power

How then, can we bring these two views together? Putting Schutz (very) simply, it appears to us that he argues that the individual acquires a subjective stock of knowledge from the social stock and in interaction with others ("we" and "thou" relations), and that this stock is then employed to interpret the behaviour of others and to structure our own behaviour. The problem we have is that we would argue that the construction of reality cannot be considered adequately, isolated from

a) the use of power as a component in the definition of reality,

b) and that while the social stock of knowledge may appear to be neutral, this is illusory, and that we must attend to a wider social reality than Schutz's "Ego and other".

By discussing further, Habermas's work and in particular his views on how reality comes to be defined - what he describes as "communicative action" ¹²⁵ - we shall begin to resolve these difficulties. Considering "communicative action" requires attention to two facets of a situation for the actor:

a) what Habermas describes as the "teleological aspect" ¹²⁶ - the realization of our aims in the situation ¹²⁷

b) the "communicative aspect" ¹²⁸ - to interpret a situation, and achieve agreement ¹²⁹.

In contrast to Schutz's model, which is developed as a philosophy of consciousness ¹³⁰, Habermas develops communicative action on the basis of language ¹³¹. It is not, however, a study of the syntax and grammatical forms used by speakers, but rather a study of "language-in-use" - in other words of speech ¹³². In Habermas's theory, language is the means through which social action is conducted, through its role in the achievement of understanding ¹³³. To engage in social action, however, requires that a speaker should possess communicative competence ¹³⁴, to be able to take part in communicative interaction ¹³⁵.

The purpose of communicative interaction, for Habermas is not only that the participants will be able to reach agreement on what is "going on" but that they will also be able to reach a rational, and thus sustainable, agreement¹³⁶. This is fundamental, as the concept of communicative action requires agreements are not based on power and/or one-sided norms, but rather on the best argument and thus on truth¹³⁷. For Habermas it is a primary requirement that agreements should be capable of being sustained and justified in a rational discourse¹³⁸.

The conditions required for this to happen have been set out in the Ideal Speech Thesis¹³⁹. It will, however, be readily apparent that the Ideal Speech Thesis is unlikely to exist in reality¹⁴⁰, but as Habermas points out, these assumptions are made by us in communication in practice¹⁴¹. Thus,

No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of potential speech, since all speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented toward the idea of truth.¹⁴²

It is therefore, perfectly possible - or even very likely - that an empirical situation will not correspond to the Ideal Speech Thesis. This will happen (indeed it is true by definition) where the participants are aware that they are not oriented to understanding, but rather are oriented to success. For instance

a) in situations of Open Strategic Action the two parties are aware of the power which they are using against each other. This would clearly not be an Ideal Speech situation.

b) again in Concealed Strategic Action, at least one party - the powerful - will be aware of their exercise of power, and their orientation to success.

c) On the other hand in a situation of Systematically Distorted Communication, at least one party may perceive themselves to be oriented to understanding, but in fact are oriented to success - a fact which goes unnoticed by the participants.

By contrasting the empirical situation to the Ideal Speech Thesis we can identify a configuration which does not correspond to its requirements. We can identify power, even where there is systematically distorted communication, and the participants are unconscious of its operation.

This, however, still leaves us to consider how systematically distorted communication works in situations where the participants are unconscious of the operation of power? This problem (of identifying this "repression of rationality" ¹⁴³) is given to Psychoanalysis ¹⁴⁴, and in particular the psychology of Freud ¹⁴⁵.

Habermas sees a number of advantages from using Freudian Psychoanalysis at least as an analogy for the analysis of social situations ¹⁴⁶. Essentially its advantage is its emphasis on reflection ¹⁴⁷ and through reflection to understanding how we can move to the emancipation of the individual by freeing him from his repressions ¹⁴⁸, and in particular from meaning structures which are not consciously intended ¹⁴⁹. It is, however apparent that his use of Freudian Psychoanalysis has been a source of criticism for Habermas ¹⁵⁰.

That much of the criticism of the use of psychoanalysis fails to consider that Habermas is drawing an analogy, does not however disguise the fact that Freudian psychoanalysis represents in our view a weakness in Habermas's theory. We do not wish to criticise the use of psychoanalysis as an analogy which can guide attempts to reveal repressions of rationality and unconscious deviations from the Ideal Speech Thesis and pure Communicative Action. The problem does not lie with psychoanalysis, but with the use of Freudian psychoanalysis ¹⁵¹.

Intersubjectivity has been axiomatic in Habermas's theory since it is, after all based on language. Yet if we examine the image of the individual which underlies Freud's work, we have gone back to the solitary individual we found in Schutz's work ¹⁵². In Freud, as we have seen, there must be something "wrong" with the individual ¹⁵³ - there must be something to treat in the individual. This creates the problems we identified above.

What we require is a model of psychoanalysis which analyses beyond the patient himself. We shall do this by stepping out of Habermas for a moment to consider the work of R. D Laing, and others associated with him. We shall then return to Habermas to consider the sources of repression in the Lifeworld, and how in this way the Lifeworld does not only (as in Schutz for instance) enable us to interpret and act in the social world, but also achieves integration and control within organizations.

Laing's work has mainly been with schizophrenics ¹⁵⁵, and in particular to seek to show that in some cases the mental illness and the apparently bizarre behaviour can be understood in the wider context of their circumstances and family circumstances in particular ¹⁵⁶. This work is reported in such studies as "The Divided Self" ¹⁵⁷, "Sanity Madness and the Family" ¹⁵⁸ and in "The Leaves of Spring" ¹⁵⁹ which deals at more length with the case of the Danzigs ¹⁶⁰, who were one of the families in "Sanity Madness and the Family" .

In these studies

Not the individual but the family is
the unit of illness. ¹⁶¹

Hence his analysis in the case of Sarah Danzig focuses on her condition only as a starting point for the analysis ¹⁶². Her understanding of events around her, and her behaviour are then analysed in the context of her family ¹⁶³.

Laing's form of psycho-analysis involves,

a) the diagnosis of mental illness being suspended since

the judgement that the diagnosed patient is behaving in a biologically dysfunctional (hence pathological) way is, we believe, premature, and one we shall hold in parenthesis. ¹⁶⁴

The parallel between this, and the emphasis on "bracketing" (or epoche), following Husserl and Schutz, is very evident - ie that we suspend belief in the "obvious" explanation that this is a schizophrenic who requires medical treatment, and instead tries to understand how the patient's situation and behaviour in this situation. In the same way by questioning the existence of hierarchy we have questioned something which is treated as "obvious", and sought to understand its foundations in a business organization.

b) a focus on the relations which exist within the family rather than only on the patient ¹⁶⁵. This has the important implications that it becomes essential to understand not only the perspective each takes of the other, but also how these perspectives mesh together ¹⁶⁶. This is significant since it echoes an idea which is basic to our work - that we can only understand Hourly-Paid workers in relation to Management and Staff, and likewise for the other groups. A group cannot be understood in isolation from others ¹⁶⁷.

c) using the concepts "praxis" and "process", he shows the possibility of enabling the patient to understand that the former may be in fact the latter. By praxis, Laing means action which can be traced back to the motivated action of others, and by "process" is meant events which appear to just happen and can be traced back to no particular person ¹⁶⁸.

The purpose of this for Laing is to show to the patient under treatment, and indeed the family, that what appears to them to be "process" - the illness - may in fact be "praxis" - in other words it can be understood in the context of motivated behaviours of members of the family. In this way it can be shown that the illness is not an accident ¹⁶⁹, but that it can be understood by considering the behaviour of the patient as a function of their group situation.

By analogy, in the context that we have analysed the areas which may appear to Hourly-Paid workers to be process ¹⁷⁰ (Investment decisions, for instance) can be seen to be praxis, in the Laingian sense (ie that such decisions are not in fact out of control, but can be traced back to the motivated actions of particular persons). Thus what appears to be process, may in fact be the operation of unconscious power ¹⁷¹.

d) a different concept of the unconscious which is more satisfactory than that of Freud (at least for our purposes). Freud's concept of the unconscious is that

the most thorough and honest self-examination possible fails to make it conscious, conspicuously misses it, avoids and circles around it. It is this conspicuous avoidance by which the analyst can locate the resistance to the repressed idea becoming conscious. ¹⁷²

Laing's concept of the unconscious, however, is somewhat different from this, since as we have seen the patient is subject to contradictions in their family relationship, which they are unable to recognize as such. Thus Laing's concept of the unconscious is closer to areas of which we are less than fully aware. There is therefore a distinction between the unconscious in Laing and Freud ¹⁷³.

The role of psychoanalysis for Laing is to reveal unseen contradictions in the life of the patient ¹⁷⁴. Since the source of the contradictions is identified through the dialogue of the patient and his/her family, we can therefore locate the origins of the unconscious in the language of the group. The analyst by assisting the reflection of the patient to become aware of the contradictions in his/her relationships and the repressions and contradictions with which these are associated, assists the individual to become free of them ¹⁷⁵. This is a process much closer to the Habermasian project, as we pointed out above, since the emphasis is on communication ¹⁷⁶ and the ways in which it is distorted.

e) the study of situations which contravene the requirements of the Ideal Speech Thesis ¹⁷⁷. The extent to which there are breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis indicates the operation of power ¹⁷⁸. The situations which are the data for analysis in Laing's work - relations and communications within families - are therefore typically situations where power will operate, and not always in ways which are apparent.

Hence Laing provides a theory of psychoanalysis which, by considering not only individual consciousness of the patient but also their social context, and in particular those aspects of it of which they may be unconscious, is more consistent than Freud with the social project with which we are involved ¹⁷⁹.

Laing's theory, therefore, provides us with two specific advantages:

a) it is intersubjective in its nature, unlike Freud's theory

b) through its emphasis on both the communicative and teleological aspects of action it is consistent with Habermas's concept of communicative action ¹⁸⁰.

However even if we accept Laing as an analogy for social repression ¹⁸¹, then it would still be necessary to establish why it is that the members of a hierarchy acquiesce in this system of repression ¹⁸². To do so, we have to return to Habermas.

A Habermasian Lifeworld

The concept of the Lifeworld which we have developed is one which understands it as

a) shared by social actors and which they take for granted,

b) acquired through our social experience, either at first hand, or acquired through other forms of learning (eg education, from parents etc.), and as such is developed over time as we acquire and/or modify the content knowledge.

c) having knowledge organized into three categories

i) Basic or Fundamental elements or structures,

ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,

Iii) Specific Component contents.

but with category three being the only one we are routinely conscious of.

The first - Basic or Fundamental elements or structures - is responsible for organizing our knowledge and our use of knowledge. Habermas in discussing the analysis of narrative statements, suggests that

In adopting the narrative form, we are choosing a perspective that "grammatically" forces us to base our descriptions on an everyday concept of the Lifeworld as a cognitive reference system. ¹⁸³

Thus when we question our respondents about perceived control - how do you think control is/should be distributed? - or quality of communication - how well are you informed about (whatever) and how much do you trust the information you receive? - they will respond to this by drawing on the basic and fundamental elements of their Lifeworlds ¹⁸⁴. It is important to appreciate, therefore, that it is not our respondent's knowledge - or the specific component contents - alone which is important. Rather it is these basic or fundamental elements or structures which are of even greater significance for the exercise of power, given their organizing role in the Lifeworld.

Category two involves skills which we have used so often, and are so familiar with we may not even be aware of using them - they may be "obvious". This creates the possibility of the very organizing categories which we use, being a source of unconscious power, since it may create, for instance one-sided norms which cannot be redeemed in communicative action ¹⁸⁵.

d) as using knowledge determined by a system of relevances and typicalities, which indicate to us what type of situation we are in and the relative importance of its elements

e) where the knowledge which we employ is substantially drawn from a social stock of knowledge, and our use of it is limited by "social givens". Action takes place within social context in a series of relationships which can be categorised as "we" or "thou" (ie other social actors, differentiated according to the degree of intimacy). This (and especially the former relationship) is particularly important in Laing's work, as we have seen. It too creates the possibility of power, since

1) the social givens may explicitly involve power (eg the power of a policeman)

2) the social givens may create unconscious power, since, for instance, they may limit the right of some to speak in discourse.

f) where the social stock of knowledge will not be evenly distributed - there will for instance be specialised knowledge, which is not open to those outwith the specialty in question. This too creates the possibility of unconscious power since it will be difficult for others to question specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only limited access. To the extent that these are accepted in an uncritical way (which they normally will be) they create the possibility of unconscious power. An example of a typicality would be "a manager", and to the extent it accords that type of person certain powers, these may simply blend into the social horizon and appear to disappear.

Likewise the subjective stock of knowledge of individuals will vary inter-personally, since being drawn from our biographies (which will vary), the subjective stocks will differ. Hence we will each bring to a social situation, stocks of knowledge which to some extent will be inter-personally different. This too creates the possibility of unconscious power since it will be difficult for others to question specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only limited access.

g) where the Lifeworld, in aggregate defines our social horizons

Communicative action takes place within a lifeworld that remains at the backs of participants in communication. It is present to them only in the prereflective form of taken-for-granted background assumptions and naively mastered skills¹⁸⁶.

This, almost by definition, creates power, since it keeps our thinking within the defined parameters. Alternative organizational structures which fall outwith those parameters are unlikely to be seen as realistic¹⁸⁷.

h) where the social meanings to be applied are negotiated between the parties, and in this way power may be employed, either in a conscious way, or in a way of which the parties may be unaware. When the Ideal Speech Thesis is broken it creates the possibility that agreements reached (successful negotiation) has been the result not of the force of the better argument and rationality, but of the use of power - either conscious or unconscious (eg one sided rules operating during the negotiation to the advantage of one side, but not perceived as power by the other, or perhaps by either side).

i) that the Lifeworld is "held together" in a social sense through power, and in particular that the Lifeworld does create horizons for us, which we are unaware of, but which define out of consideration other forms of social arrangements which may be seen as non-viable.

The Lifeworld is, therefore, not only a stock of ideas by which we make sense of our surroundings, and are enabled to act. The Lifeworld is also, in an important way, about control¹⁸⁸. In Morgan's "Images", the Lifeworld is a "Psychic Prison"¹⁸⁹.

The Model and its Component Parts.

We contend that the manner in which we behave toward our fellows depends on the structure of power, but also structure of the Lifeworld, and the power to which this gives rise. Our model is a representation of such behaviour. What we shall now do is to consider each of its component parts (see above, 1). The view we have developed of the Lifeworld is one where knowledge is organized by

i) Basic or Fundamental elements or structures,

ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,

Iii) Specific Component contents.

but with category three being the only one we are routinely conscious of. The first is responsible for organizing our knowledge and our use of knowledge, and thus structures the remaining two levels:

a) while the second concerns knowledge and skills which we could be conscious, but are not because we are so familiar with it (using a knife and fork would be an example).

b) only in the third level is there full consciousness.

What we have done in the model has been to take a number of areas of knowledge and highlighted them in the model - singled them out for special attention - trade union influence would be an example of this. Others, however, are much more general - past experience, needs and identity. Thus the model "unpacks" certain variables which seem likely a priori to be important categories of the Lifeworld. At the same time there are a number of variables which are of sufficient generality to bring in any other Lifeworld variable which influences the maintenance of hierarchy. We shall consider first of all those which are closer to the social stock of knowledge in the model.

Political Ideology

It should be kept clearly in mind that we do not have in mind anything as restricted as party label, but rather the general image of society. The model indicates that this is predicated upon personal experience. The experience of Jimmy Reid and his adoption of Socialism, as a reaction to his early childhood experiences in Govan would seem to illustrate nicely ¹⁹⁰, as his earliest images of society were of an exploitative society.

This variable is related to the media and the influence of trade unions, in that one's political ideology can crucially affect one's use of the media and of the trade union movement. For instance a social image like that of Jimmy Reid (c. 1972) may be associated with a critical view of the media but an acceptance of the trade union movement ¹⁹¹. There is, however, no good reason why we must be logical in the sense of a logical spectrum from left to right. Indeed it may well be that we embrace elements of left and right wing ideology at the same time. As Blackburn and Mann point out, this is

an accurate reflection of the reality which confronts them (employees). What are they to make of normal affluence and sensible industrial relations on one hand, and intermittent redundancy and authoritarianism on the other. ¹⁹²

In other words the ideologies which we find may be no less confused than the realities from which they have been formed. Political ideology may, therefore, be driven less by logic and more by a confused and illogical pragmatic experience.

Trade Union Influence

This too should not be regarded in an overly specific way. Rather we have in mind the pragmatic use values which trade unions may have for the respondent. This probably appears in its most obvious way for the shop floor worker, for whom by custom the trade union has played an important role - though it is certainly true that more recently white collar unions have become increasingly significant ¹⁹³.

In the spirit of pragmatism of our discussion of political ideology, we must leave open the level of the trade union, and accept that there may be influence from the domestic union (ie intra-firm) and/or from the union organization (ie the union as a national organization). Nor need attitudes toward these two things be consistent - for instance a union member may have a positive attitude toward the former, but be negative toward the latter. This may be, for instance, because the member perceives the stewards as acting in his interests, but not the national officials. Or it may be the other way round!

The area where the research has been carried out - Clydeside - has a long tradition of trade unionism and this traditional aspect will be shown to be important, but only in a bounded sense, such that the attitude toward trade unionism is not wholly uncritical. This attitude, in terms of the particular form it takes, is contingent on the particular position in the company of the respondent in question.

The Media

By this we have in mind the content and structured presentation of the media (television and newspapers). As we have already argued, such knowledge is not received tabula rasa, but is defined and interpreted by the recipient. The model indicates, for instance, that the influence of the media associated with political ideology. An individual of left wing views may regard the output of the media as biased toward the status quo.

These factors are element of what is described in the model as social knowledge, which is closely connected with the subjective knowledge of the individual. As we argued above, the individual draws on the stock of social knowledge, and in this respect our subjective experience is moulded by social power in that the stock of social knowledge is determined by, and an expression of, the particular social structure.

While our subjective knowledge is influenced by social knowledge, this is not to say that our experience is wholly bounded - as Schutz suggests social experience can lead to contradiction of social knowledge, and thus social knowledge can be added to and modified with the passage of time.

We shall now consider the variables which can be considered as closer to the individual's subjective stock of knowledge.

Personal Subjective Experience.

Through various forms of experience (eg education) we acquire both subjective and social knowledge which structure the expectations which we may realistically make of our firm. Hence if our experience of management has been bad in the past, one may in future distrust all managers, irrespective of current behaviour. ¹⁹⁴

Similarly, the model shows as the company makes decisions, these have a continuous effect upon perception of the firm - for instance in respect of what one may hold as a realistic expectation of the firm, in that it is likely to be granted (anything of which it could be said, "well we'll get away with that").

We cannot, however, restrict ourselves to the experience of the world at work, since to do so would be artificial, since out-work experience may be just as important, perhaps more so.

There are a number examples of what we have in mind. For instance as we pointed out above, Jimmy Reid explains his adoption of Socialism as a reaction to the poverty of his childhood in Govan in the 1940's and 1950's (see above, (?)). In a similar way, Fryer and Martin explain the respect of workers in Casterton to the Millowners by reference to their socialisation as children into deference to the family who owned the mills locally ¹⁹⁵.

These two examples show how experience from our first days is relevant as the "we relation" is forced upon the child from the outset, and it is in this relation that we first experience the social world. First of all in the acquisition of language and then by the knowledge which that acquisition permits us to acquire. This is then used by the individual to define or interpret this social world to which he has been granted access.

Personal subjective experience, therefore, has two key concepts for us:

- 1) its relation to and dependence on the social stock of knowledge, and the meaning structures which are imposed upon us by the particular social structure.

2) its continuous nature, such that what is happening to us now will become our past experience. This will feed back into these meaning structure, reinforcing and/or modifying.

As McHugh puts it

Actors assume before the fact that a pattern of meaning will be discovered in the events they observe. They are future oriented, in that they take it for granted that they will be able to make something of what is yet to occur. They are past oriented in that they take for granted that what has already occurred will inform the future. ¹⁹⁶

Our past experience, therefore, depends upon our acquisition of social knowledge, for its definition and interpretation in the future - but as Schutz and Luckmann point out the definitions and interpretations to which the social stock of knowledge gives rise will vary from one individual to another given the uniqueness of our individual experiences (see above, 8).

In principle, therefore, since our lives are unique sets of experience, the definitions and interpretations of social action will not be exactly the same for any two individuals. While this point is recognised, we shall go on to consider another problem of less generality - the problems posed by holding a particular position in the firm.

Position in the Company.

For us there are two particular areas of importance in this:

a) it provides the individual respondent with a conceptual basis in assessing expectations of what can be realistically made of the firm ¹⁹⁷. There are for instance, several stereotypes of what a manager ought to receive from his company in the way of remuneration, perks authority, etc. which are summed up in expressions like "the going rate" and "market rate".

b) By providing empirical grounding to consider the problem of the social distribution of knowledge, and therefore to move toward consideration of the establishment of an operable reality for diverse individuals distributed in space but not in time. As we have already indicated the knowledge available to us will appear differently to us, depending on our biography. An important aspect of this is the position the individual occupies in the firm, and in particular the knowledge he possesses. This leads on to "special knowledge" and "role specific knowledge" - the knowledge that one possesses by virtue of one's position in the firm. This may be technical or it may be privileged - but acquiring particular knowledge makes possible the acquisition of particular definitions and interpretations. Thus it makes possible acquiring a particular perspective on reality, which therefore is an expression of one's relation to the means of production.

Our argument in this section is, therefore that individuals select items of knowledge - both social and subjective - in order to structure their behaviour, which for our analytical purposes will be the pursuit of expectations. This action is power-influenced in two respects:

- 1) our behaviour is guided by the use of knowledge, which is an expression of the existing social structure.

- 2) this behaviour takes place within the constraints of the existing social structure.

These expectations are in turn an expression of two closely connected concepts:

- 1) Identity,
- 2) Work Needs.

Identity.

This is defined by Esterson as

the pattern of experience and being by which a person is recognised by himself and/or others in his relation with others ie who he is recognised or defined to be.¹⁹⁸

The use of this definition grounds identity in one's interaction with others ¹⁹⁹, and is therefore consistent with our previous discussion of knowledge selection within a social context.

It is moreover, an extension of our discussion of "Personal Position in the Company", being the means by which those who define themselves as broadly the same (eg managers) define themselves and by implication set themselves apart from others who have different identities. It is, however, important that this identity be defended in the face of challenge from other groups. For instance the identity of managers as decision-makers may under-go challenge from any imposition of industrial democracy ²⁰⁰. Another instance would be the role of foreman which it has been argued was severely damaged by the imposition of labour laws ²⁰¹ and by the development of management services - for instance by laws on unfair dismissal and production control.

The definition of self, which Esterson refers to, we regard as an expression of the particular work needs which the group will manifest in its expectations. The identity is unlikely to be a constant, but rather to change by virtue of the acquisition of knowledge over time.

Work Needs

The implication of the model is that these are not "God-given" in the sense of being universal or immutable²⁰², but rather are developed from a social process of learning and experience by which, in pursuit and defence of their identity, these needs may be held constant or may be modified. Clearly needs and identity are inextricably linked since the concept of identity to a considerable extent determines what one's needs shall be, while one's needs impose parameters on the identity one maintains, or seeks to maintain. It should be kept in mind that this involves social action on the part of the particular individual, which will take place within a constraining social context and be guided by constraining knowledge.

The conclusion of this is that for stability, behaviour must be kept within certain parameters, a function we have argued is carried out by the Lifeworld. This does not, however, lead us into a bounded Parsonian-type model, but rather one which treats this stability as problematic and requiring explanation. Indeed, given our insistence on the variability of experience and the social distribution of knowledge (with specialized areas partitioned off to many, restricted to a segment of society), we should expect that there will be differing Lifeworlds, differing perspectives on reality. Hence difference should be regarded as normal rather than deviant. What needs to be explained is how, in spite of this variability of Lifeworld, the hierarchical firm continues to function, continues to produce goods, continues to persist.

It has been our argument that while Lifeworld and behaviour can differ, this is limited to the point where continuation of the hierarchy remains unthreatened - in other words this variability is permitted only within certain parameters, which are contained within the Lifeworld. Hence in what follows we shall consider the expectations of employees in respect of

1) their jobs and the rewards they bring, both in respect of others in the company and in what respondents define as being an "ideal" ²⁰³.

2) the perceived quality of company communication, and the degree to which they trust this ²⁰⁴.

3) the perceived distribution of control, both within the current situation, and what respondents define as being an "ideal" ²⁰⁵.

Our results will reveal areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In respect of both of these we shall be concerned to consider what this means for the persistence of hierarchy.

A) Where there is a source of dissatisfaction (frustrated expectations) then we might expect this to undermine hierarchy on its own - but on the other hand it may be that this frustration is regarded as normal. The particular source of dissatisfaction may be perceived as something which just has to be accepted as natural. In other words where there is dissatisfaction we can ask why it has not led - as it apparently has not - to a challenge to hierarchy

B) Areas of satisfaction too will be informative in that the nature of the satisfaction may be illuminating about the persistence of hierarchy. For instance if employees outwith management say that they are satisfied with subordinate status to management in company decision-making, then we can ask why it is that they hold this view. What is it about their Lifeworlds which justifies this view? In other words sources of satisfaction can be considered from the perspective of what they mean for the persistence of hierarchy.

What we have presented in this Chapter is an explication of the problem in theoretical terms - of how the Lifeworld structures behaviour and the role played by power in this process in the sense of

1) conscious power - power which is perceived as a social force and is a guide to the likely success of particular activities, and

2) unconscious power contained within the structure of the Lifeworld

The process of the use of knowledge from the Lifeworld is shown in the above model (see 1) - that in structuring expectations we make use of items of knowledge, which in our theory of power could be so structured as to make inequality acceptable, at least in the sense that the inequality is not challenged. The model is applied to the hierarchy of the firm to show how the hierarchy persists over time despite Lifeworld variability. The model as we pointed out above is only provisional (see above 1), indicating only categories which seem theoretically likely to be influential. This will have to be considered in the light of our empirical findings. The model will be adapted as necessary leading to a final model presented in the concluding chapter. We shall now proceed to Chapter 2 which will deal with some methodological considerations.

chapter 2

CHAPTER 2

The theoretical perspective, which was described in the previous chapter, set certain empirical problems, and it shall be the purpose of this chapter to consider the methods used to investigate these problems.

Our aim is to consider the phenomenon of hierarchical persistence. Our theoretical model reflects on the expectations which employees make of their firm. These expectations originate in the subjective and social knowledge of the Lifeworld, which organizes this knowledge according to Basic or Fundamental elements or structures. This organization of knowledge represents a system of logic which, we argued, sustains hierarchy ¹.

The argument developed in the previous chapter has been therefore that we are constrained not only by the knowledge we think with but also by its structure. Within the context of the practical problems of persistence of hierarchy, this gives us three areas to consider -

- 1) the expectations which our respondents hold of the company
- 2) the knowledge they employ and its underlying logic
- 3) the manner and intensity in which expectations are put forward, and the manner in which they are dealt with.

Much of this chapter will refer back to the previous chapter as it is important to us that our methodology should not only be clearly set out but at the same time be seen to clearly relate to our theoretical concerns.

Quantitative and Qualitative Methods. ³

The questions posed by our theoretical perspective raises questions of what we describe as social statics ⁴ and social dynamics ⁵.

Through using social statics we can consider the structure of the system of logic, and the particular knowledge which is used. We cannot, however fully understand the full complexity of reality in this way. In addition we have to look into the future. The current position can be understood by the use of social statics. If, however, we want to understand how we got there, or the possibilities for moving away from here, then we have to move on to a dynamic approach ⁶.

Methods of social statics are mainly quantitative, and these are used by us to obtain an image, at one particular point in time, of the current image of the firm and the organization of working life - for instance what the current expectations made of the firm are. This will not, however, reveal to us the process by which the system of logic actually operates, only the situation which it has led to. It does not reveal how knowledge is used, which is a dynamic process, nor the Lifeworld system of logic, nor why the subjective and social knowledge of the Lifeworld has been used in a particular way.

These projects can only be achieved by the use of methods of social dynamics, which for our purposes shall be:

- 1) semi-structured interviews, tape recorded for data provision,

- 2) data analysis, subordinated to theoretical purpose.

In this way we shall assess the experience of our respondents in its essential form - as a process in which knowledge is used as a guide to future behaviour. Important to us in this respect will be the image and structure of particular experience and especially the manner in which this is built up (sedimented). Our purpose will be to establish the system of logic which has been employed by our respondents, and its behavioural consequences. In other words our aim must be to grasp the subjective and social knowledge employed which is passive to and consequently subordinate to the Lifeworld's system of logic.

Through using social dynamics we can therefore consider the manner in which knowledge is used, rather than how it has been used which is a matter for social statics. The important distinction therein is that by using social dynamics we can move directly to the system of logic, whereas by using only statics we can move only to the system of logic as a matter of theoretical inference. It may be that our theoretical perspective would permit us to do so, but to employ the methodological philosophy we have developed here is an advance on this position, meaning that we can demonstrate our perspective directly rather than simply by inference.

The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the methods which we shall employ sequentially over the period of research.

Quantitative Methods

In the previous section we specified that our methodological practice has to be subordinate to our theoretical perspective. Thus, in considering the quantitative methods to be employed we shall primarily be concerned with the measurement of as many dimensions of our theoretical perspective as we can, in a meaningful sense but only in so far as we do not do violence to the theoretical perspective. It is clearly wrong to allow methodological considerations to interfere with theorising, or to allow these to dictate a research area. Methodology is a research tool, and as such must be subordinate and capable of fitting in with the requirements of the research to be conducted.

The data for our quantitative measures was gathered using a structured, fixed choice questionnaire, which was used to interview a stratified sample of the firm which was our research site. The sample totalled 175 - about 10% of the firm.⁷

Measuring Expectations

A central dimension of the theoretical perspective was that employees have expectations of their firm. This section will be concerned with a discussion of the measurement of these expectations.

At this stage we shall restrict expectations to the day-to-day (job) expectations which an employee has traditionally been held to have of his working life (at least for research purposes). Subsequently this shall be widened to consider perceived quality of communication and decision-making. These will be considered subsequent, and in more detail, given their theoretical relevance. For this section, however, we shall be concerned with a set of the traditional (in the research sense) expectations⁸.

Our perspective indicates that job expectations are made of the company, but that these shall not be of equal intensity for every individual. Some job expectations will be held more intensely than others, and consequently it will be possible for respondents to order them (ie indicate that which is most important, second, third and so on). There are, however, other aspects to job expectations which are concerned not with the importance of one expectation as against another. We shall, therefore, be concerned with the adequacy of provision by the firm for each job expectation in two additional respects:

- a) adequacy of provision in relation to other groups in the firm - management, staff, hourly paid - in order to measure the adequacy of provision in relation to the internal political reference system of the company.⁹

b) adequacy of provision in relation to the respondent's ideal job. ¹⁰

Each expectational dimension was subjected to testing from both perspectives. The specific expectations tested were:

1) control of work environment; 2) job security; 3) job variety and interest; 4) promotion prospects; 5) supervision; 6) trade union; 7) wages/salary; 8) working conditions.

The procedure for measuring each dimension in the respects described above was as follows:

a) respondents were asked to rank the above list in the order of importance to them. Ties were not encouraged, but if it was the sincere belief the respondent that two (or more) were of equal importance, then they would be accepted. ¹¹

b). The second stage in measuring job expectations was to consider the adequacy of provision in relation to relevant others - within and outwith the firm, as described above. Each respondent was asked to assess each job expectation in the manner discussed above (see above, page 41). ¹²

The relevance of these measures of employee expectations is that their frustration may - as with the others we shall discuss below - lead to criticism, rejection, and modification of the Lifeworld which sustains the hierarchical organization of industry, through doubt being raised as to its adequacy as a behavioural guide and means of conceptualising reality.

We shall subsequently go on to consider more "radical" expectations in respect of perceived quality of information and distribution of control over decision-making, but as a connection between these and the traditional expectations which we have looked at already, we shall consider the micro-organization of the direct work experience of the individual. In other words we shall consider the experience of any one individual of the specific part of the firm in which he operates - his immediate world of work as a day-to-day experience of hierarchical authority at a mundane level. We shall explore this in two inter-connected respects:

1) the quality of the relationship which the respondent has with his immediate superior. Research has emphasised the "technical quality of supervision" ¹³ - how good the supervisor is at the job being done by his subordinates, how well he organizes their work, resolves any work problems they may have, and so on. In addition we consider the "man management" qualities of the supervisor. ¹⁴

2) the freedom the individual has in choosing the task which he does - in other words the discretion which the employee has in work ¹⁵. Our concern with direct work experience has concentrated, therefore, on two different aspects of this experience:

A) the technical and social qualities of one's superior,

B) the perceived and desired discretion in work.

Given these twin concerns, suitable questions were employed to measure

1) the perceived technical quality of one's superior (is your superior a good superior? does he give you enough discretion in doing your job? is he a good source of guidance when you need it?)

2) the social qualities of one's superior (does he appreciate the problems you have with your work? does he consider you as a person, as well as how you do your job?)

In addition, given our reservations about Fox's thesis (see previous footnote), we approached the problem of discretion by allowing the respondent to speak for himself - by asking how much discretion he had in his work, and how much he would ideally have? By comparison of these we can measure the extent to which existing structures concur with ideal work structures.

Discussion of challenges to hierarchy has emphasised the wider aspects of control in a company ¹⁶, but for many employees this is not directly relevant to their experience. Then again for employees the relationship with one's superior will be directly relevant. Clearly we cannot adequately consider the organization of the firm and experience of it as a total institution without considering the wider (organizational) aspects, but the direct relationships we have discussed at this point represent their day-to-day application. The company may not, therefore, in our view be adequately considered without dealing with the wider aspects of control we shall go on to discuss below as well as the more mundane, day-to-day aspects we have considered already.

Measuring Company Decision-making Systems.

These systems have, for our methodological purposes, two important aspects:

a) the possession of information necessary to be able to participate in making a decision,

b) the influence necessary for one's views to play a meaningful role in the taking of a decision.

Both of these are necessary conditions for participating in company decision-making systems.

A) One must have both the information necessary to form a view, pose counter-arguments, or enter into a dialogue.

B) Moreover one must have the power (either formal - by virtue of hierarchical position - or informally - through internal company politics or other means like industrial action) to enter into the decision process.

Our model suggests a competitive decision-making system of asymmetrical power relations. We do not mean to imply by this that one party has all the power, and the others none at all. Our characterisation of the decision-making system is instead that one party has relatively more power than the others. However, we would argue that this is magnified by the hierarchical system, which is systematically maintained by the operation of unconscious power - of which neither party is conscious.

Access to information and influence in decision-making can in themselves be regarded as expectations, as we suggested above. They can in addition be regarded as factors which establish the parameters within which the traditional expectations, we have considered above, are dealt with (for instance wage negotiations may crucially be influenced by information on the profitability of the firm and its future prospects).

The degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with such expectations can be measured quantitatively in the manner we shall discuss below.

Measuring information

The function of information, from our point of view, is its use value for those who receive it and/or feel they should receive it - in other words information is not valued in itself, but as a means to other purposes. For instance if a manager is deficient in the information available to him he will be that much less able to take decisions - similarly if hourly-paid employees are deficient in the information they receive they will, in the same way, be less able to make decisions, or influence decisions relevant to them, but made by others. Consequently they will only be able to react to decisions which are made, and at best can only be imperfectly understood by them.

Hence information, unlike wages, conditions and other traditional job expectations is not valued in itself, but as a means to some other end. The degree to which expectations concerning the provision of information were satisfied was measured by a relatively simple process.

Respondents were asked how well informed they were kept by the company about a particular aspect of the company. Various aspects were employed for this purpose, the list being a modification of the aspects used by Bowen¹⁷. Any modification to this list was based on preliminary interviews, carried out to gain insight into areas of particular relevance in the company not included in our original research programme¹⁸. This gave a final list of the following items:

i) amount of work expected of an individual;
ii) company financial policy; iii) company order situation; iv) company profitability; v) cost reduction; vi) investment; vii) overtime available; viii) pay rates and bonus payments; ix) promotion; x) recruitment; xi) redundancies; xii) safety; xiv) transfer of employees between departments/jobs; xv) work study.

It seems to us unsafe to assume congruity of perception of volume of information and the accuracy of information - for instance a firm could invest a great deal in a sophisticated communication procedure which is perceived cynically by the employees who regard it as a source of highly distorted, and as such, devalued information. Hence our questions in this area were in two parts:

1) how well informed does the firm keep you about (one of the above)?

2) how far do you trust that information?

If a respondent answered the former by saying he did not receive any information, the latter was coded appropriately, since in those circumstances the question became meaningless.

Measuring Control.

A well developed and straightforwardly simple means of measuring perceived control is the Tannenbaum control graph method¹⁹. This method employs averaged judgements by employees to questions on the amount of influence exercised respectively by (for our purpose)

- 1) management
- 2) non-supervisory staff
- 3) supervisors
- 4) hourly-paid.

By using this method the respondent is able to speak for himself, at least as far as the pre-established categories of response permit. This contrasts, for instance, with the type of external judgement made in using time-span of discretion²⁰.

In addition the control graph method .

a) allows aggregation of individual responses to yield a group view.

b) gives a solution to the problem that if one respondent has an opinion widely at variance with that of other group members, this deviant view is not presented in a way which is out of proportion to the total.

Each respondent was asked how much influence each group, specified as above, actually had over each of a number of decision-making item, and how much influence the respondent thought each group ought to have. The decision-making item used were:

i)cost reduction; ii)decisions affecting the ability of the firm to win orders; iii)decisions affecting the firm's profitability; iv) discipline; v)financial policy; vi)fixing work standards; vii)investment; viii)pay rates and bonus payments; ix)promotion; x)recruitment; xi)redundancies; xii)safety; xiv)transfer of employees between departments/jobs; xv)work pace.

21 This, as with the previous list, is adapted from Bowen in the manner described above.

Each respondent was asked in relation to each of these item, whether each group:

A) had

1) A great deal of influence, or 2) Some influence, or 3) Very little influence, or 4) No influence.

and

B) how much influence they felt each group ought to have on the particular item.

Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with existing structures could be measured by an item by item comparison of (A) - actual - and (B) - ideal perceptions of control. The greater the desirability of change, and by implication at least the latent desire for change, the greater the gap between (A) and (B) will be.

It may be objected here that if employees do want change then surely they would do something about it - agitate in some way like taking strike action. We would argue (and will go on to show), however, that this is not a problem of method but rather a theoretical-empirical problem since

a) if there is a gap between what is and what ought to be, but

b) no action to close that gap

the solution in our view lies not necessarily in an examination of method, but perhaps in consideration of the nature of social reality.

By making use of a list of different decision-making areas we are able to recognize the possibility that influence in a firm is not uni-dimensional - for instance it would seem likely that hourly-paid workers would have more influence on a decision about redundancy, than on a decision about financial policy, given existing structures of decision-making, and in particular the limited negotiable areas in collective bargaining which is the normal avenue for employees to express influence ²².

Method of Ordered Alternatives

This method ²³ involves putting to respondents possible scenarios in the future, and questioning their degree of acceptability/unacceptability. Its usefulness to us is in resolving the problem that, having made considerable use of the potential in lack of satisfaction with access to information and decision-making in the company, we have not considered in detail the direction which the employees would like to see their firm go. This technique involves putting a number of ordered alternatives to each respondent and asking whether each alternative is for them:

1) totally acceptable, or 2) acceptable, or 3) neutral, or 4) unacceptable, or 5) totally unacceptable.

These alternatives were grouped in three sets:

1) Access to company information

A) all information to be available to all employees, B) all information to be available to all employees, subject to a management veto, C) only information directly related to an employee's job to be available to him, D) no information to be available, except what management decide to make public.

2) Policy making

A) Policy in the company to be decided by the shopfloor and unionised staff alone, B) Policy in the company to be decided 50-50 by management and unionised employees, C) Policy in the company to be decided 50-50 by management and all employees whether unionised or not, D) Policy in the company to be decided by management in consultation with their employees, E) Policy in the company to be decided by management in consultation with staff alone, F) Policy in the company to be decided by management alone

3) Profit Distribution

A) Company profits to go to the parent company, B) Company profits to go to the parent company but with a bonus for the management, C) Company profits to go to the parent company but with a bonus for all employees whose size will be determined by Management, D) Company profits to go to the parent company but with a bonus for all employees whose size will be negotiated with the unions, E) Company profits to be shared 50-50 between the parent company and the employees of this firm, F) Company profits to go to employees alone.

It appeared to us at the outset, that using this method posed two possible problems:

1) a problem of unreality, since respondents were being asked to answer questions on items which at the time did not exist. In practice this certainly did not pose any practical interview problems, and can be discounted.

2) it specified situations which respondents may or may not have been aware of (for instance industrial democracy is mainly concerned with the rights of employees, but it has never been seriously questioned whether a majority, or even a sizeable minority have thought about it, or even know very much about it ²⁴). This is a much more difficult problem than the former, and required an additional open-ended question before the set of question we are discussing at the moment. This question took the form of

Are there any alternative methods of decision-making you would like to see introduced, or changes in existing ones?²⁵

This is in any case largely an academic's problem, since in any survey this problem exists - we as academics freely make the assumption that non-academic respondents share the same concerns as we do. On the other hand given the Bullock Report, the Vredeling proposals, the European Social Charter, the organizational form of hierarchy is important and consequently in need of research.

Recognising this, our questions on decision-making were terminated with a series of questions oriented specifically to industrial democracy viz. whether the respondent would have as much confidence in the company if there were workers on the board. Respondents were asked to order the following:

1) protecting workers' rights, 2) encouraging participation in company affairs, 3) keeping workers informed of company affairs, 4) working to improve relations in the company, 5) helping the firm to be more efficient

We asked this first of all in the context of the existing board (in what order of importance did the present board put these matters), and then for a board with worker directors (in what order of importance would a board with worker directors put these matters).

Respondents were also asked

a) which quality would be most important in a worker director - integrity, a good negotiator, or an interest in making the firm more efficient and competitive than it already is?

b) whether a worker director would be valuable, or be a liability to the firm?

c) whether, if there were worker participation, employees would take a greater interest in the affairs of the company?

d) how the existing board would order the following:

1) providing good, well paid employment; 2) making as many sales as possible; 3) being as efficient as possible; 4) making profits; 5) keeping employees informed about how the company is doing,

The next question was how they thought a board with worker directors would order them? ²⁶

Measuring Knowledge.

In the previous chapter, the importance of knowledge was not in itself, but rather in its use value - as part of a Lifeworld process. We have already elaborated our view that quantitative methods cannot adequately contend with a social process and that for that reason we must make use of qualitative methods. At this stage, however, we wish to make use of quantitative methods in their most useful form - measurement of frequency. We shall not consider the use-value of knowledge, but instead the frequency of one's exposure to particular sources/forms of knowledge. ²⁷

The model in Chapter 1 itemises a number of forms of knowledge which were categorised as Subjective or Social Forms of Knowledge.

Subjective Knowledge.

(A) Personal Position in the Company. The relevance of this in theory is that it is a basis to establish what one could expect from the firm, as a particular position in the hierarchy compared to similarly placed others either in the firm or in other similar firms. For the moment its purpose is purely classificatory. Each respondent was classified for analysis as

- 1) Management, or 2) Staff, or 3) Hourly paid, or 4) Shop Steward, or 5) Staff Union Representative.

(B) Past Experience. This is, in fact, the most difficult of all the sources of knowledge discussed owing to its almost infinite dimensionality. There are, however, two forms of experience which appeared to us to be relevant a priori

- 1) the number of times one has been made redundant

- 2) the proportion of one's working life during which one has been unemployed.

Frequency of these experiences was calculated for each respondent, but even if we find, for instance, that those made redundant most often were most critical of existing social relations, we would not then have an adequate explanation, since

- 1) we must be able to develop not only a statistical relationship, but also a meaningful relationship - ie to show how these relate in terms of meanings

- 2) the relationship would exist as a small part within a more complex Lifeworld.

(C) Interaction with other groups, as sources of knowledge, measured, at this stage by frequency of contact - for instance how often do hourly-paid interact with foremen, staff with management and so on.

Social Knowledge

(A) Political Ideology. We described this in the previous chapter as "one's stance toward society at large, and not a party label". This led us to pose two questions²⁸:

1) whether the respondent saw the firm in terms of

i) managers, staff and skilled groups on the shop floor: or

ii) just as people with different contributions to make to the company.

2) whether the respondent saw society

i) composed of social classes: or

ii) just by people doing various jobs

In each of these questions, the former response takes a class-based perspective, while the latter takes a view of greater equality. In each case we can only establish a statistical relationship rather than one based on social reality - nevertheless such data is at least indicative of political consciousness.

(B) Trade unions. This again can be measured only for frequency, and only to a very limited extent, giving it at best restricted meaning. We began by measuring the frequency of membership (except among the hourly-paid, which operates a closed shop). We then went on to develop an indication of the meaning of trade unions for those in the firm. Respondents who were unionised were asked as guide to their active participation in their union, how often

1) they attended union meetings, and

2) they discussed union matters with colleagues.

Those who were not union members were asked if they had any objection to belonging to a trade union and

a) if not, why they had not already joined?

b) if they had an objection, what it was?

All respondents were asked in addition

a) what functions and aims they believed the unions in the firm ought to have, and whether management respected this?

b) how united the unions in the firm are, which was an issue which had proved important from our preliminary interviews?

This data does not, however, directly give a sense of what it is to be in a union - we can only make reasoned guesses on the basis of theoretical conjecture. Since this again is a social process it can only be subject to qualitative methods.

(C) The media. In measuring this we considered

1) how often a particular newspaper was read, or TV current affairs programme watched, and

2) whether any political bias was present.

The list included all major daily newspapers, TV news and current affairs programmes. In this form of knowledge we are clearly most subject to the caveat expressed above that frequency of exposure does not inevitably lead to acceptance - for instance TV News has been portrayed²⁹ as presenting information in a way which is biased toward sustaining the status quo. But high frequency of exposure will only produce this bias if watched uncritically - if watched critically it may only confirm a radical view of society.

(D) The Clydeside Culture. This is discussed more fully in the next chapter, but is included here since we found from conducting the preliminary interviews, a significant emphasis - particularly from managers - on the traditions of "Red Clydeside". The aim of these questions was to measure

i) how long the respondent had lived on Clydeside

ii) whether he saw anything distinctive about the area.

The questions were structured in such a way as to measure

1) the length of exposure to the local culture, and

2) awareness of any local culture, to check whether there was any distinctive form of knowledge present.

From quantitative to qualitative methods.

Our questionnaire covered, as can be implied from what has gone before, a very considerable number of areas - too many for a semi-structured interview. Thus in advance of commencing on the programme of semi-structured interviews means had to be found to reduce, in as rigorous way as possible, the number of areas to be covered to a manageable number since the sheer volume would have forced us into either of the following situations:

1) by allowing the respondent to find his own direction, but at the same time introducing each area, as appropriate, the length of interview would have been much extended, risking boredom and tiredness on the part of the respondent, and it is clearly desirable to avoid this. In addition we would have generated a volume of only semi-structured data of vast size - probably too large to be handled in any way properly: or

2) by the interviewer bringing in every aspect, the interview would have been constrained to such a degree as to be fully structured.

In terms of our theoretical structure, we are considering the issue of the acceptability of hierarchy as a company structure. A clear manifestation of this is the existence of the management group, a staff group, and an hourly-paid group. These constitute the clearest hierarchical distinctions in a firm. Given our initial consideration is the acceptability of hierarchy it was decided, given the central position of these groups, that a theoretically meaningful procedure would be to select those areas which

a) constituted the greatest divergence between these groups, and

b) constituted the least divergence between these groups.

In terms of theory, therefore, we would then have the areas in which the operation of the firm's hierarchical structure appeared to be least agreed, and those areas on which there appeared to most consensus. By considering the process by which these subjective positions have been reached, and in particular why the former does not defeat the operation of the latter, we shall be able to increase our understanding of the persistence of hierarchy.

In a methodological sense this procedure is at least equally acceptable, since by its adoption we are able to make use of the comparison in two different ways:

1) within the firm we have the existence of three, for our purpose, distinct groups (management, staff, hourly paid) for the purpose of comparison,

2) within the areas we cover we have two groups (conflict and consensus) - one (where there was conflict) which may constitute the basis of rejection of hierarchy, the other (where there was consensus) constituting the basis of its acceptance.

The problem which remains is to find a method by which we can draw out these two sets of areas (conflict and consensus). One method would be the relatively simple method of inspection of cross-tabulated results. A stronger method than this was used, however - "Discriminant", which is a programme in SPSS ³⁰. The objective of the programme is to

statistically distinguish between two or more groups or cases ³¹

Using the programme requires:

1) that two or more groups or cases be specified. For our purpose we specified three groups - Management, Staff and Hourly paid.

2) that no more than 53 variables be introduced in any one run. Since we had no fewer than 359 variables, the data had to be divided into 6 separate runs which were within the following "themes"

a) traditional work variables - questions 6-31: b) information variables - questions 32-63: c) control variables - in two runs. First questions 65-112, followed by 113-176: d) future options variables - questions 178-193, with industrial democracy variables - questions 194-200: e) a combination of union function variables (questions 243-247), social and firm image variables (questions 252-253), with the interaction variables (questions 295 to the end), and semantic differential data (questions 201-236).

Certain variables were omitted from this procedure, as they seemed unlikely to be useful to us:

a) biographical data - age, length of service, etc.

b) media exposure data, since on inspection it could be seen that Hourly paid read "the Daily Record", while Staff and Management read "the Glasgow Herald". In any case our interest was in how the information from the media is actually used, rather than with exposure to it.

From each set of 6 results we selected

1) those 5 variables which contributed most to the obtained discriminatory function, and

2) those 5 variables which contributed least (or not at all) to the obtained discriminatory function.

It may be objected that by employing this selection procedure we were casting aside valuable data, since on one run 8 or 9 variables may have considerable discriminatory power, whereas on another run most of the discriminatory power may be from only 2 or 3 variables. Hence we reject 2 or 3 variables from the first run, which have an apparently high level of discrimination, but in the second run include 2 or 3 with an apparently lower level of discrimination. This, however, is a feature of the programme, and can only be accepted. In any case by dividing the questionnaire into these (albeit arbitrary) 6 groups, we are able to ensure that each distinct area - work expectations, communication, control, etc. - are adequately represented in the semi-structured interview. Thus no particular area is emphasised to the exclusion of others, and our inquiry is not reduced in width.

As a check on the adequacy of the procedure - especially since the management group only had 32 respondents - we requested that option 6 of the Discriminant programme be run. This gave us univariate F-ratios - a one way analysis of variance which tested the equality of the group means on each variable. From the printed coefficients we selected the largest 5 and the lowest 5 for each of the 6 runs. This provided a second list of 60 variables (2x5 variables @ 6 runs). Only 12 variables were selected by the two methods. Hence to be as accurate as possible both lists were used - giving a total of 108 variables (2x60 minus the 12 "doublers"). This still reduced the total areas to be covered to a manageable number since with the 108 variables there were a number of questions which covered the same area. For instance it was found that the question

how much influence do you think
management have on financial policy?

was selected on Discriminant, but analysis of variance
selected

how much influence do you think foremen
have on financial policy? and

how much influence do you think shop-
floor workers have on financial policy?

This was reduced to a question about the distribution of control over financial policy, with out specifying any particular group.

The reduced list of variables was then re-constructed to create an interview "check list", used to re-interview a total of 53 respondents. We shall discuss these interviews in the next section

Qualitative Methods.

The purpose of this section is to describe the collection of qualitative data. The qualitative data was largely collected on cassette tapes of the semi-structured interviews described above. The interviews were entirely carried out with respondents individually, each respondent having been interviewed at least 9 months previously using our standard questionnaire: some had indeed already been encountered in the preliminary interviews, so in these cases this was our third meeting.

Other qualitative data was collected with tried, true social science methods - dropping in, hanging around, looking at things and listening to conversations which were wholly private and had nothing to do with us, listening to gossip, reading graffiti on toilet walls, picking up odds and ends wherever we could. Such data (the value of which is well illustrated by Dalton ³²) will be referred to whenever valuable or instructive, but cannot be regarded as proof in any sense. The manner of its collection was so diverse as to make discussion altogether impractical, and has probably been forgotten in many cases, or is too confidential in others. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the more formal interview situation.

All the interviews were carried out in private, as were those with the questionnaire. The site differed from time to time, owing to pressure on space in the firm, but in all cases privacy was assured. For the interviews a cassette tape-recorder was used, where possible, to record what was said. This was only done with the knowledge and permission of the respondent ³³.

Where permission to record the interview on tape was denied, we carried out the interview as normally as taking notes at the same time would allow. Where the tape recorder was used the interview was carried out as near as possible to a normal conversation rather than a formal interview.

The respondent would be started off with a few general remarks about trade unions, and then the interview was allowed to find its own direction through the matters we had to discuss.

The phrase "allowed to find its own direction" then raises the issue of just how far our tape-recorded interviews were in fact semi-structured. Our aim was to initially stimulate the respondent with initial inquiries, but omit further probing (other than interested grunts, nods, etc.) as far as possible in order that the respondent be able to speak for himself. This, however, encountered the problem that the respondent was not always clear of his role in the process. No matter how often it was explained or even how well it was understood there was in many cases (especially among Staff and Hourly paid) a severe status problem in that some respondents felt "here's this clever person (from the Uni., therefore he is clever) who wants to ask us questions". This created the problem that once the initial stimulus had been talked out, as far as they were concerned, they waited for the next question. This was something which we had to learn to live with - having considered the constraints of the Lifeworld in the context of hierarchy, we may consider its constraints for the average Scot in relation to what he sees as the educated person.

The best solution to this was pragmatic - to go through each area, one by one like a check list. Of course this did not happen in every case - there were those who treated us with equality, where the interviews flowed as the research strategy had hoped. The data quality was probably unaffected by this problem - which was largely one of conceptual compartmentalisation (the use of relevances), and the data from both types of respondent should be treated as having equal value.

In both cases the flow was allowed to continue as uninterrupted as possible, the aim being to get the respondent to talk rather than give the researcher what he wanted. Only in this way could the respondent be expected to talk about his life, and not think he was expected to provide answers to questions for which there are no answers, only opinions and experiences. It is this which we are after, not formal answers to formal questions, but rather the subjective experience of a particular form of organization. This experience is infinitely dimensional, but defined and interpreted in particular ways dictated by the Lifeworld. Only by getting the respondent to talk about this experience can we hope to assess the Lifeworld and its system of logic.

That is how the qualitative data was collected. The tapes (where used) were transcribed by ourselves or by an audio-typist who was instructed to leave out anything she was unsure of - inaudible, both speaking at once and so on. These transcripts were then analysed for evidence to confirm or modify the provisional model presented in chapter 1. What we sought to do with the data has been well described by Esterson³⁴ :

a) to examine and define the event to be understood - for our purpose the persistence of hierarchy.

b) to clarify the pattern of inter-group action - for our purpose to consider the perception of each group of the other groups in the firm. In this was we moved toward a deeper understanding of their praxis. In respect of hierarchy - how Hourly paid behave toward Management for instance - how they were understood and acted toward, which is a process guided and constrained by the Lifeworld and its system of logic.

c) to elucidate the pattern of experience - to establish how one group experiences the other and in consequence defines the other.

d) to relate the pattern of experience (eg the pattern of experience of Hourly paid of Management) to their interaction - in other words what does the experience of one group mean for the way in which they interact with each other ³⁵.

Hence what we shall consider is why it is that hierarchy remains acceptable, but at the same time look for whatever elements of critical attitude toward hierarchy which there may be on the part of our respondents. These sources of acceptance and rejection of hierarchy are to be located in the Lifeworld - hence our analysis will focus on doing this.

CHAPTER 3

The identity of the firm used as our research site, will not be revealed since it was agreed between ourselves, the Management and the workers that their identity would remain confidential.

In this chapter we will sketch out the relevant features of the firm as well as the locality as a background to the presentation of our findings. We shall first of all consider the firm as an entity - a brief consideration of its history, its business and market performance as well as its organization. We shall then consider the locality in which the firm operates - the west of Scotland - and in particular its socio-economic position and social traditions. The final part of this chapter will be concerned with the negotiations for our entry to the firm.

The Firm

The firm is a heavy electro-mechanical engineering firm which produces its product under licence to an American company. This in certain respects subordinates it to the American company since, by the terms of the licence, it cannot sell into certain parts of the world, nor produce the latest design of the product. There is, however, no relationship by virtue of ownership - neither firm has a financial interest in the other. The firm is part of a larger UK group which has its HQ in London¹.

The firm is old and well established in the locality, though in its present form it is relatively new. This apparent paradox is explained by our firm having, in the past, produced a part of a larger product. From the early 1960's, however, there was a progressive disengagement of the two parts, with our firm making its initial entry into its new market while still producing for the original firm. In 1967, however, our firm "went solo", severing all day-to-day links with the larger entity.

This picture is made all the more complex by the fact that our firm is itself composed of two companies. As well as a production company there is a sales and marketing company, which is controlled commercially and financially by the production company. The reasons for this, and its implications, will be discussed below, and will be referred to, where appropriate, in the chapters which follow. The two companies, however, though legally separate, are in practice inextricably linked, and in recognition of this we shall refer to them collectively as "the firm".

Since 1967 the business interests of the firm have gradually built up. Its peak was in 1976 when it received a large number of orders from overseas (it has not until recently sold into the UK) which represented a significant increase on any previous year. The primary effect was to give much greater security of employment to its employees, who at that time numbered 1700. Prior to these orders being received the threat of redundancy had been made if orders did not pick up. This did not come about, ensuring security of employment until 1979, at a greater annual level of output. By 1980, however, the orders received by the firm fell back and 500 employees were made redundant. Since then the workforce has been approximately stable.

The firm is in most respects a traditional west of Scotland engineering firm - both in its similarity to those operating at present, and in continuing the traditions of the past. This tradition has not, however, been untouched by time and is no longer identical to the "Red Clyde" myth firm of imagination - if indeed such an entity did ever exist.

Location and Tradition

The firm is located near Glasgow in a town of 57,000 inhabitants. Its organizational structure is discussed in footnote ². It is the major private sector employer. In the original form of the firm, it is the feature that the town developed around.

Given its location near Glasgow it is in an area of multiple social deprivation ³. The area is, of course also historically associated with the "Red Clyde", and following on from our discussion of the area's socio-economic background and culture, we shall seek to locate the behaviour which appears to fulfil the Red Clyde tradition, as a reaction to its socio-economic experience, arguing that this can only be understood as part of a much more complex tradition.

There can be little argument that historically Clydeside is not in good socio-economic health ⁴. Given this, the area's social history, and in particular its more or less traditional relative deprivation, then the militant behaviour held to be typical of "Red Clyde" becomes less surprising and more understandable. It is, however, easy to romanticise and exaggerate the "Red Clyde" ⁵.

The tradition of the area is, however, one which is critical of existing social arrangements which are perceived to be responsible for the deprivation described above, not such as to seek to over-throw the capitalist system but rather to seek "a better deal". The area's tradition is expressed in solidarity and loyalty to one's work-mates as well as a keen eye for victimisation. It can hardly be denied that workers on Clydeside have a keen criticism for management - but this hardly makes them unusual.

It can be argued that much of the blame for the economic decline of the area can be attributed to a failure by management to see the decline of heavy industry after 1918, and that this is a direct cause of the unemployment rates quoted above. The behaviour of management cannot be said to have always been enlightened - for instance discrimination on political and/or religious grounds was not uncommon ⁶.

There are however not insignificant positive qualities of the area and its people - their self reliance, common industry, pride in their area, determination to overcome any set-back or adversity, their originality. In spite of the many critical observations he makes of the area, Checkland describes Glasgow as providing

a legend of vigour and barbarity, but accompanied by a sense of warmth, shared hospitality, together with a powerful native wit. ⁷

The west of Scotland can, therefore, accurately be described as socio-economically depressed. We would argue, however that the "Red Clyde" associated with this, is more true in belief than in action - and that what truth there is in it is a not unreasonable reaction to a hostile and not always very pleasant environment (for instance without the Work-in, which appears to confirm the Red Clyde, the collapse in employment which would have ensued would have been horrifying to imagine). This experience has created a sense of solidarity and loyalty to each other, but not to the constant revolution or even militancy of the Red Clyde.

Negotiating Entry.

The firm was selected as our research site for two reasons:

a) it is located in the west of Scotland. Besides convenience, this was important since our theoretical perspective is concerned with the persistence of hierarchical organization and the possibility of challenge to such organization. The tradition of criticism of management made it appear to be a fruitful area for such research.

b) it is a firm using traditional methods of engineering so that conflict was less likely to be a function of technology (less likely than in a car plant ⁸.)

The possibility of entry was first mooted in 1975, while we were putting together the very earliest stages of the theoretical perspective. This initial approach was not altogether welcomed, as the Manufacturing Director had recently been "rebuffed" by the unions, as well as some managers, when he had attempted to bring in "one of the better known commercial exponents of attitude survey" ⁹. Undaunted by this, when we were ready to commence field-work approximately one year later, we made another approach, and this time received an invitation to come down for discussions.

Despite the initial problems the year before, entry at this point in time posed few problems - at least with the Manufacturing Director. This was largely because:

a) after the initial attempt to introduce "commercial exponents of attitude survey", things had been allowed to cool off.

b) I was an academic, and as such independent of the company, and thus perhaps more acceptable to the unions - or so we thought.

The initial discussions with the Manufacturing Director and the Personnel Manager in June 1976 were followed in August by a meeting with the Joint Works Committee (hourly paid employees) and the Joint Staff Committee (salaried employees). The latter group at no time put any obstacles or opposition in the way of the proposed research, so the remainder of this section will focus on our, not always straightforward, negotiations with the Joint Works Committee.

The concern of the Joint Works Committee was mainly on the possible consequences of our research for their members. Their doubt focused on the possibility of our producing at the end a "these-guys-spend-all-day-in-the-toilet-reading-dirty-books-and-smoking" kind of report, or an ultra right wing report which would only be critical of the unions. Eventually a majority of the committee - a quite substantial one, we believe - were sufficiently convinced of our good intentions to vote to co-operate as much as they could. Indeed despite the initial suspicion of the Works Committee, compared to the Staff Committee, the former were much more helpful than the latter - giving directions and advice.

This agreement, however, only resolved our problems in the Engine works. The Fabrication works were dominated by the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers who played a skilful game of cat-and-mouse with us. This eventually involved our bringing in as support the then General Secy., John Chalmers. The negotiation with the Boilermakers ended with a flat refusal from the membership of the ASB in our firm - despite the acceptance of the project, and the reassurances supplied by John Chalmers. The origins of our problems lay with a view held by a majority of ASB stewards that if management thought we were OK, then there must be something wrong. The refusal of the Boilermakers to co-operate meant we had to omit a majority of hourly paid workers in the Fabrication works.

The labourers in the Fabrication works (member of the GMWU) did, however, agree to be interviewed, and the staff section of the ASB also agreed to co-operate.

The next stage of the project was to carry out initial, exploratory interviews with what we perceived to be "key figures" in the firm - shop stewards, staff union reps. and managers. The aim of this, basically informal, interview was

- 1) to obtain a "feel" for the firm. The information which was obtained was used to extend and to develop the questionnaire into areas which appeared likely to be fruitful.

- 2) to create a situation in which we could meet, for the first time in a basically social conversational atmosphere, individuals who could be important for the future conduct of our research. In addition it provided an opportunity for us to explain more fully our research, answer any questions, and generally to make ourselves and our project better known.

We have alluded already to the co-operation given by shop-floor workers, but we should extend this to staff and management who were equally co-operative. Much of this originated from the atmosphere of the firm, as well as a common social identity of our respondents and ourselves. The part played in exploiting this by our initial interviews and "putting ourselves about a bit", generally answering any questions on the research as fully and openly as possible, was considerable.

The information gained from the initial interviews was used to put some empirical "flesh" on our theoretical "bones" and guide the subsequent design of the questionnaire, which was used to interview 175 employees between March and May 1977. There were 6 refusals/non-contacts. The results of this questionnaire and the subsequent semi-structured interview conducted between October 1977 and March 1980 (about six months prior to the redundancy (see above, 2) provides the substance for what follows.

Biographical details of the sample

The total number of respondents who agreed to be interviewed in the first phase when we employed the questionnaire to obtain quantitative data was 175, which was a 10% sample of the firm's employees of approx. 1700.

<u>Table 3.1</u>	Number	Interviewed
Management	36	32
Staff	79	78
Hourly paid	65	65

The number of Staff and Hourly-paid were 10% of each category in the Firm, selected at random (every tenth name) from a list of wage records, set out by department, supplied by Personnel. To do this with Management, we felt, would have given too few management respondents to be useful, so we employed a 100% management sample. This reflects:

- 1) the key role of management in the firm
- 2) the wider range of areas in which Management were concerned. Using a 100% sample of Management was intended to reflect that width of experience, and possible variation of Lifeworld.

The firm employed its own definition of "manager", which was generally reflected in being able to use the Management Dining Room, as opposed to the Senior Staff Dining Room. This definition, it seemed to us, lacked rigour, and instead we included as managers:

a) all those members of the Board who worked for the firm on a full-time basis,

b) those who were

- 1) defined by the firm as managers, AND
- 2) had control of a particular function (eg Works Manager, Production Test Manager, Chief Inspector, Engineering Tendering Manager, Financial Accountant, etc.).

Our definition is therefore, more restrictive than that used by the firm - see figs 3.1 and 3.2.

Staff, we defined as, anyone who was

- 1) salaried,
- 2) not a Manager according to our definition.

The age distribution of each category is shown in Table 3.2

Table 3.2 Ages of Sample

Years	Management	Staff	Hourly-paid
<25	0	10(13%)	5(8%)
26-35	2(6%)	25(32%)	18(28%)
36-45	20(62%)	15(19%)	16(25%)
46-55	7(22%)	17(22%)	12(19%)
56-65	3(9%)	11(14%)	14(22%)
Total	32	78	65

Amongst management it can be seen that there is middle age bias, with 84% being 36-55. The Staff distribution, on the other hand peaks twice at 26-35 and 46-55, with the larger peak being the former. The Hourly-paid distribution is mainly between 26-45, but with a slight turn-up at the older end of the distribution, 22% being aged 56-65.

From this it would appear that there is a middle-aged Management, youngish Hourly-paid (though with an "older" group") and Staff divided between those aged less than 35 and those aged over 46.

Length of Service is dealt with in table 3.3

Table 3.3 Length of Service

	Management	Staff	Hourly-paid
< 5 years	7 (22%)	44(56%)	22(34%)
6-10 years	15 (47%)	23(30%)	25(39%)
11-20 years	7 (22%)	5(6%)	9(14%)
20 years +	3 (9%)	6(8%)	9(14%)
Total	32	78	65

The modal length of service of Management and Hourly-paid is 6-10 years, whereas for Staff it is less than 5 years, which becomes particularly pronounced when it is observed that only 14% of Staff have more than 11 years service, whereas for Management the same figure is 31% and 28% for Hourly paid.

We have previously referred to the fact that the Firm had previously been an integrated part of a larger firm. Respondents were asked if they had ever worked for the firm at that time. The results are set out below in table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Did you ever work for the firm when it was part of (the larger firm)?

	Management	Staff	Hourly-paid
Yes	18 (56%)	23 (30%)	39 (60%)
No	14 (44%)	55 (70%)	26 (40%)

Typically around 60% worked for the firm in its previous form and were, therefore, acquainted with its traditional customs. The deviant case is clearly Staff, 70% of whom had not done so. This allows us to explain the relatively shorter modal service of Staff shown in table 3.3. As we pointed out above, in 1967 the firm changed the product which it manufactured. The change did not require significantly different skills on the part of Hourly-paid employees or of Management (which would be an important consideration in its choice), but did require different and/or additional Staff skills. Indeed if we break the Staff group down into their constituent departments, it can be seen that in fact all the foremen in the sample had worked for the firm in its previous form. Different skills requirements (eg selling, design and so on) meant that many of the Staff

1) had not worked for the firm in its previous form, and

2) typically had less experience with the firm than other categories of employee.

An important feature of the firm, which became apparent in our initial interviews was the extent to which the firm was like a family, in that many of the employees were following a family tradition by working there ("my father worked [works] here, and his father worked here too, and his father," and so on), and that many joined the firm through family or social connection. This can be seen in Table 3.5

Table 3.5 How did you come to join the firm?

	Management	Staff	Hourly-paid
1) Reading an Advert *	14(44%)	41(53%)	25(38%)
2) Through Friend/Relative	10(31%)	35(45%)	40(62%)
3) Approached by the Firm	8(25%)	2(3%)	0

*This included adverts in newspapers/Job Centres/Trade Magazines and so on.

In the sample as a whole 48% joined via a relative or friend, and 46% through an advert or Job Centre, or some other official channel. Yet far and away the largest category for the former are Hourly paid, some 62% of whom joined through a friend or relative. For Staff and Management, on the other hand, adverts were a more important vehicle. Indeed if we decompose the sample into its departmental elements (ie horizontal as opposed to vertical decomposition) we can see that the closer a category is to the shop floor the more important joining through a relative or friend becomes.

Table 3.6 Proportion joining through an advert.

Finance	67%
Quality Control	50%
Sales & Marketing	48%
Production Control	44%
Foremen	40%
Works Staff	36%
Skilled Hourly-paid	36%
Unskilled Hourly paid	44%

It would appear to be the case, therefore that those closest to the Shop-floor - Labourers, Skilled Hourly paid, Works Staff, Foremen - have a greater tendency to join the firm by the relatively unofficial, essentially social channels, and that by implication the sense of community is strongest in these group, since around 60% of them joined the firm through a friend or relative in the firm ¹⁰.

The additional category - approached by the firm - was necessary, mainly for management, to include those who had not themselves approached the firm for employment, but instead they were approached by the firm, or by an intermediary. Amongst Management 25% were accounted in this way - 3 board members, 3 in Sales and Marketing. 2 in Quality Control, and one each in Shipping and Personnel. Only 2 cases were detected in Staff.

Hence the sample appears to be biased toward the middle aged, broadly defined as those between 26 and 55. There is also a high degree of stability, since in every category except Staff more than 50% had been with the firm for at least 6 years. Indeed this stability was a noted feature of the firm, with talk of three generations having worked there being not uncommon, and as we shall see in Chapter 5 when we consider Redundancy, the firm was perceived as one which attempted to hold on to its employees whenever possible.

Part of the stability was, as a matter of policy, due to the firm's wages being high relative to the area (they paid in the upper quartile of the wage rates in the locality for their kinds of labour). Hence among Management and Hourly-paid, the apparent stability of the work force can be explained by social and wage factors. Staff are rather different, in that a higher proportion of them have lower periods of service. This does not, however, reflect a higher level of turnover among staff, but rather that with the change in product in 1967 the labour needs of the firm changed, and this was much more pronounced among Staff than other categories.

The firm, therefore, exhibits a high degree of stability with respect to its employees. This is due to its high wage policy, but also due to the critical loyalty which it engendered in its employees, as we shall see in the two chapter which follow.

In both chapters 4 and 5, we refer to a number of excerpts - for instance excerpt 5.2, or excerpt 4.7. All such excerpts - which are relevant excerpts from semi structured interviews with respondents - can be found in Appendix 4 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 4, beginning 4.) or in Appendix 5 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 5, beginning 5.).

chapter 4

CHAPTER 4

"Telling the shop stewards is a courtesy" - senior Board Member.

This chapter will be concerned with the information given by the firm to its employees. It will be our argument that the practices of the firm in this respect reveals certain major dissatisfactions on the part of the employees and that the improvements they would like to see, represent an initial break with hierarchical organization in that information would be less completely controlled by the elite at its head, and would be more widely distributed than in the past. This, it should be understood, is not a break with hierarchy and does not in itself lead to an alternative of a more democratic nature, but is probably a necessary condition for this to happen.

Satisfaction with company communication of information.

Legislation which over the period of our research has required statutory access to certain information about a company's activities (eg the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974) indicates a measure of secrecy in British industry with respect to the communication of information to employees. Our initial

impression of the Firm was that this was no bad thing either, as, for instance, early on in our field work, the Firm won a large foreign order which alone was expected to provide secure employment for up to 3 years. However, while Management were informed, the Staff and Hourly-Paid only found out from the Glasgow evening paper or on T.V. news. Compounded to this was the dominant Management attitude that this really was not important, and in any case it was the fault of their P.R. Consultants who released the news to the media. This rationalisation was advanced by at least 3 Managers, usually during informal meetings. Subsequently our attitude was modified slightly on uncovering a communications network, which could really only be described as 'secret', by which senior Shop Stewards were kept informed on matters of interest to them, on an informal basis by a Manager who, on describing this to us said, "Christ, if (Board Member D) knew what we told the Unions he'd go ruddy bananas and then have me sacked". This 'secret' operation, in our view, performed the function of keeping the employees informed to a level which could at best be described as a holding operation in so far as it prevented communications becoming a much wider issue than it already was, in that any information communicated was at the initiative of the Shop Stewards.

We should not, however, wish to give the impression that Management took the view that all information was to be restricted - most wished to see the situation in this respect improved. Many managers provided their subordinates with as much information as they felt they safely could - as our example shows - but as a development of the existing situation what information was to be provided will be a major issue in this chapter.

There are two major problems facing this Firm in its communication -

(1) what information should be communicated to its employees - or conversely what should not be communicated on the grounds of secrecy, confidentiality, or just because they should not know? (2) how should this communication be achieved, and by implication what rights to information do employees have?

These problems shall be discussed subsequently, but for the moment we shall concern ourselves with satisfaction with the existing system.

This was considered in 2 steps:

(1) general questions on the communications system as a whole, and the motivations implied to its failures;

(2) (a) questions specific to particular aspects of the Firm and its activities.

(b) At this stage, respondents were also asked how far they felt they could trust the information they received, since it seemed important to us to open up the possibility that even if this Firm did provide adequate quantities of information, it could be perceived as a 'con', and that the information was not perceived as accurate and as a deliberate distortion either to throw employees off the right track, or as a means to secure other Management aims.

We first of all asked respondents if they felt they were kept as well informed about matters affecting them, or if they felt they could be kept better informed. This produced the following responses:

Table 4.1

Do you feel you are kept as informed as possible by the Company about matters which affect you, or do you feel you could be kept better informed than you are at the moment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Well Informed	15 (47%)	22 (32%)	0	18 (38%)	5 (29%)
Could be Better Informed	17 (53%)	49 (69%)	7(100%)	30 (62%)	12 (71%)

Hence there is no one group which could be described as really well informed. Even amongst Management there is a majority (53%) who say they could be kept better informed. Only slightly worse than this are the Hourly-Paid (62%) and their Shop-Stewards (71%). Worst informed of all are the Staff (69%) and their Union Reps. (100%), perhaps because, given the relatively recent introduction of Staff Unions into the Firm outside the point of production, there has not been time to develop the sort of unofficial system which operates for the Hourly-Paid. The Staff Unions (T.A.S.S. in particular) were described as being less reliable than the Hourly-Paid Unions, and less in control of themselves. (Recounted by 3 Senior Managers with an important daily role with the unions). Managers suggested that if they negotiated with an Hourly-Paid Shop Steward he could be more confident of the agreement being honoured than if he was dealing with a Staff Union Rep. The dominant attitude appeared to be that the Staff Unions had not been socialised into the system of collective bargaining which existed in the Firm. By implication, therefore, they could not be trusted with the information, unofficially and secretly, imparted to the Hourly-Paid. There was no evidence that the Staff Unions showed the same on-going

relationship with the Management as did the Hourly-Paid. This, however, is not inconsistent with the axioms of our model since the introduction of Staff Unions represented a fairly basic break of traditional expectations - as, for instance, the highly personal way in which our Firm reached to the initial unionisation of non-unionised Staff (e.g. Foremen about 10 years ago. This breach required a re-negotiation, and re-learning of expectations by both Management and Staff. This is certainly happening, since the Board member who described the place of the unions to us as "absolutely vital", 10 years ago reacted with what was almost violence to the prospect of Foremen joining A.S.T.M.S.; talking about "betrayal" and "breach of trust". Recounted by an A.S.T.M.S. foreman who was among the first to join A.S.T.M.S. His position as a foreman made the situation even more delicate.)

This break with expectations, and consequent exclusion from the unofficial system we described above, is largely responsible, in our view, for the results shown. At the same time we shall go on to show that in looking at specific types of information, Staff were on the whole better informed than Hourly-Paid, but that this was due to their position in the Firm, by virtue of which particular types of information are more readily available. It is, however, important that this is on an individual and not a collective basis. One staff respondent, who had 'served his time' before being promoted, on being asked whether he had changes in any way since becoming Staff makes it clear that he has, in Excerpt 4.1 (See Appendix 4).

On certain specific items of information, however, Staff are badly informed, but usually less so than Hourly-Paid.

We then went on to ask of those who said they could be better informed, why they felt this was. The results of this are shown below in table 4.2

Table 4.2

Why do you think this is?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Deliberate Management Policy	1 (3%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	8 (17%)	3 (18%)
Regarded as Unimportant by Management	8 (25%)	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	10 (21%)	1 (6%)
Carelessness by Management	8 (25%)	22 (31%)	2 (29%)	7 (15%)	8 (47%)
Management Believe Those Below Not Interested	0	4 (6%)	2 (29%)	5 (10%)	0
Well Informed	15 (47%)	22 (31%)	0	18 (38%)	5 (29%)

The dominant attitude is that Management are careless, or, less strongly supported, that Communications are not perceived as being sufficiently important to the Management. Even less strongly supported are the views of Management as having a deliberate policy (though amongst Hourly-Paid this is just more popular than that they are careless), or that they believe their subordinates are not interested in being kept informed. There is, however, no particularly strong view which would be conclusive at this stage, but the reasoning used to explain poor communication will become clearer later in the chapter, involving recognition that failure to communicate may be judged differently on each aspect, depending on its content and relevance to the individual.

Given that 63% of all respondents felt they could be kept better informed than at present a problem does appear to exist. A rather simplistic and naive method is to ask all those amongst Management and Staff how they kept their subordinates or Hourly-Paid with whom they came into contact, informed. This question drew the following responses.

Table 4.3

In dealing with those subordinate to you which of the following comes closest to your views of how you keep them informed?

	<u>Manager</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Rep.</u>
You Keep Them as Well Informed as Possible	32 (100%)	69 (97%)	7 (100%)
Communication is Not Important	0	1 (1%)	0
You Want to Tell Them But Don't Get Round to it	0	1 (1%)	0
Those Below You Aren't Interested in Being Kept Informed	0	0	0

The question this immediately brings out is that if everyone is keeping his/her subordinates "as well informed as possible" then why do 63% of our respondents feel that they could be kept better informed. Who then is screwing up communications in the Firm? It seems to us there are two principal reasons for this.

- (1) The question itself is naive, as it asks the respondent either to endorse his own action, or by implication condemn it. To do the latter is extremely difficult for the respondent.
- (2) Each respondent may sincerely believe that he is indeed keeping his subordinates as well informed as he possibly can. He may in fact be doing so. This, however, is a separate issue for his ~~subordinates~~ who are receiving less information than they feel they ought to be. The problem then becomes what is a reasonable allocation of time to communicating with others, and by implication what place in the multitude of tasks a manager in particular must fulfill will communications take. There is no possibility that we can a priori guarantee that the relative importance given to communication by a manager will yield a result whereby his subordinates feel well informed - yet the manager may honestly feel he is keeping them as well informed as possible. The constraints on his time imposed by his work-load may mean his output of information does not match the input expectations of his subordinates.

These results represent some combination of these two factors, but to have posed the question throws into relief a problem of communication more subtle than the "to communicate or not to communicate?" question we started out from, and has introduced what transpired to be the more subtle problem of how important communication is. The former, less subtle issue, we shall show was relevant in certain specific items of

information, but the more subtle latter issue was relevant as theme in communication in the firm as a whole.

The results for the questions on specific types of information fall into 3 categories:

1) Those specific types of information in which there was a majority in each of the 3 main categories - Management, Staff and Hourly paid - who were satisfied with the quantity of information they received - Safety: Overtime: Work Expected of the Individual by the firm: Pay: Order Situation: Redundancy: Recruitment: Promotion.

2) Those specific types of information in which one main category was dissatisfied with the information received - Cost Reduction: Profitability: Financial Policy: Transfer of Employees between jobs/depts.

3) Those specific types of information in which two main categories were dissatisfied with the information received - Investment: Work Study.

For reasons of economy we are unable to present all the data collected here. What we have done is to take particular issues which are representative, the remainder being presented in Appendix 3. In this section we deal with Pay: Cost Reduction: Financial Policy: Profitability: Investment. While only these issues are considered in this the main part of the thesis, those which are contained in the Appendix, while dealing with different specific issues, follows the same structure of argument, and the same logic in the thinking of our respondents.

First of all let us consider communication about pay.

Information on Pay. In the previous examples those least well informed have been the Hourly-Paid. In this example, however, the roles are reversed, since here we find the least well informed are the Staff and the Management.

Table 4.4.

How well informed does the Company keep you about Pay?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	14 (44%)	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	14 (29%)	4 (24%)
Quite Well	8 (25%)	25 (35%)	2 (29%)	25 (52%)	10 (59%)
Quite Badly	9 (28%)	18 (25%)	2 (29%)	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	15 (21%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	1 (6%)

The table shows 31% of Management, 46% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps. to

be badly informed about Pay in the Firm, in contrast to 18% for Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards. The reason for this was the almost obsessive secrecy about salaries paid in the Firm, and it was not unusual to find 2 Staff/Management working together, with no idea of what the other was earning. This was in contrast to the openness created on the Shop-Floor by all the skilled men working for a common rate, and the unskilled working for their rate. Even though bonus was paid for production the Hourly-Paid had a much clearer idea of where they stood in this respect.

This obsessive secrecy appeared in the early days of our field work, as to take our sample we required to know who and how many were in each department. We were told the best means to do this was to obtain copies of pension records. The Hourly-Paid details were simply handed to us, but, since pension contributions were a fixed proportion of income, we were told we could not use the Staff and Management details, as knowing their pension contributions we could work out their incomes and "incomes are completely confidential in this Firm". Well, some more than others perhaps!

The problem with information on this item, therefore, related very much to actually obtaining the information. Once this hurdle is resolved the level of trust appears to be high.

Table 4.5

How far do you trust the information you receive on Pay?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	19 (59%)	24 (34%)	3 (43%)	17 (35%)	8 (47%)
Quite a Lot	9 (28%)	22 (31%)	2 (29%)	22 (46%)	6 (35%)
Not a Lot	2 (6%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	6 (13%)	3 (18%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	4 (6%)	0	1 (2%)	0
No Info. Received	1 (3%)	11 (16%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	0

This table reinforces our earlier argument on obsessive secrecy about 'who gets what', as 16% of Staff and 1 of the 7 Union Reps. say they receive no information on which to make a judgment. In contrast to these 2 categories, the other 3 have in excess of 80% expressing at least 'Quite a lot' of trust in the information which they receive on Pay. Amongst Management - in contrast to Staff - there does appear to be an ability to get the information required, though from the previous table, and our own experience, it is hard to come by.

Cost Reduction. When we initially began our field-work the Firm had a small section which designed and sold another similar, but smaller, product, which was produced in the factory, alongside the main, much larger, product. By this time, however, this smaller product constituted only a tiny fraction of the Firm's production, and as sales of the main product were developing rapidly to a point

where available production capacity was under severe pressure. It was decided to put all capacity over to production of the main product. The small section which designed and sold this minor product was, therefore, without a function. Most of it was easily absorbed into the Firm e.g. to assist in a hard-pressed drawing office. The solution for the senior levels of the section was to create a Cost Reduction section in the Firm, to look for ways by which the Firm's costs could be reduced and/or held down by using more efficient methods, cheaper raw material and parts (of equal quality) etc. It may be that to portray this as a means to give employees something to do is rather cynical, especially as the Firm was aspiring to being one of the major world firms in its market. The timing and manner of its establishment, however, suggested that the two events (closing one section, establishing another) were not wholly separate, and could hardly be said to be opportune. Given this, our own view of the Cost Reduction section was that the Firm was not being entirely serious about the aims of the new section of its operation. Its 'activities' to some extent confirmed this view, (although lack of activity may be a more apt description) since its main function appeared to be a most impressive production of reports, rumours etc. among Management but very little action, as the following tables show.

Table 4.6

How well informed does the Company keep you about Cost Reduction?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	17 (53%)	14 (20%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	0
Quite Well	9 (28%)	27 (38%)	2 (29%)	15 (31%)	3 (18%)
Quite Badly	5 (16%)	20 (28%)	2 (29%)	19 (40%)	5 (29%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	10 (14%)	2 (29%)	12 (25%)	8 (47%)

From this table it can be seen that 65% of Hourly-Paid, 76% of Shop Stewards, 58% of Union Reps. say they are Quite/Very Badly informed about Cost Reduction. Even among Staff this figure is 42%. If we look at this figure more closely we find it to be unevenly distributed among the departments in the Firm i.e. in Finance 44% are Quite/Very Badly informed, in Sales it is 34%, in Production Control 44%, in Quantity Control it is 50%, and in Works 36%. It seems to be, therefore, that while the Management are kept well informed about this, Staff are less well informed (even in departments where such activity may be important e.g. Quantity Control), and Hourly-Paid are even less well informed (65% of Skilled respondents and 74% of Labourers are Quite/Very Badly informed about this). One may, however, have reason to expect that the Hourly-Paid would be kept informed, in order to make use of the expertise which they have gained, as Excerpt 4. :2 from a Staff respondent indicates.

This informant reports the system to operate as far as him - for Managers to look to their section leaders (as he is) - but that he himself has never been asked. He also makes a case, which was repeated by certain Managers, for keeping the Hourly-Paid involved - by telling them what was happening, asking for their advice, etc., because of the position which they occupy. The data presented in the previous table indicates, however, that communication in this respect is inadequate among Staff and Hourly-Paid, and in particular the latter for whom it often was a blank, as Excerpt 4.3 from an Hourly-Paid Informant reveals.

Frequently this was the response to such questions - "no we never hear anything about that" - or that they are aware something is going on, but they never know what. This failure to communicate both downwardly to employees, and to facilitate their upward communication is a major problem for the Firm, since solutions to it, in the eyes of the Management may compromise their position. We shall discuss this problem at greater length below.

The question of how this information is trusted by employees is shown in the following table.

Table 4 7

How far do you trust the information you receive on Cost Reduction?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	12 (38%)	21 (30%)	0	4 (8%)	1 (6%)
Quite a Lot	10 (31%)	18 (25%)	2 (29%)	16 (33%)	3 (18%)
Not a Lot	7 (22%)	19 (27%)	3 (43%)	14 (29%)	3 (18%)
Not at All	3 (9%)	1 (1%)	0	4 (8%)	2 (12%)
No Info. Received	0	12 (17%)	2 (29%)	10 (21%)	7 (4%)

From what has been said by the Staff respondent the system of operation of the Cost Reduction section is not clearly understood. The effect of

this table is to show

(1) the members who report knowing nothing about it - 17% of Staff, 29% of Union Reps., 21% of Hourly-Paid, and 41% of Shop Stewards.

(2) that when information is received it is not always regarded as altogether trustworthy i.e. 31% of Management have 'Not a Lot' of trust in it/'None at All': 28% of Staff; 37% of Hourly-Paid; 30% of Shop Stewards; while 43% of Union Reps. have 'Not a Lot' of trust in the information they receive on cost reduction. The other way to look at this is that only amongst Management does there seem to be solid trust expressed - 69% trust it Completely/Quite a Lot - but among Staff it is 55%, 41% for Hourly-Paid, 29% for Union Reps., and 24% for Shop Stewards. This initially indicates a point we shall make at greater length at the end - namely that the better one is kept informed the more one will trust that information, and conversely the less well one is informed the less one will trust what is received.

4.4 Information on the Firm's Financial Policy.

Respondents were asked how well informed the Firm kept them about the Financial Policy it pursued. The results are shown in the following table.

Table 4.8

How well informed does the Firm keep you about its Financial Policy?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	13 (41%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	7 (15%)	1 (6%)
Quite Well	12 (38%)	28 (39%)	1 (14%)	14 (29%)	8 (47%)
Quite Badly	7 (22%)	21 (30%)	2 (29%)	17 (35%)	4 (24%)
Very Badly	0	12 (17%)	3 (43%)	10 (21%)	4 (24%)

The failure to keep employees informed on this is made clear by the table i.e. 56% of Hourly-Paid, 48% of Shop Stewards, 47% of Staff and 72% of Union Reps. say they are Quite/Very Badly informed. This confirms the trend we have seen up till now i.e. that Management are informed best, then Staff and finally the Hourly-Paid. If we look at the data in more detail, however, we can see that certain departments are better informed than others e.g. no Director describes himself as badly informed to any degree, but 34% of Sales and Finance are Quite/Very Badly informed, 40% of Foremen, 50% of Quality Control, 54% of Works, 56% of Production Control. Hence the dissatisfaction on this item is not evenly spread through all departments, but becomes worse the closer we are to the point of production.

Why should the Firm perform so badly in this respect? Excerpt 4.4 from a senior Manager in Finance makes clear that commercial secrecy is one rationalisation of this.

It is important to observe that refusal to provide information is not explicitly based on some idea of managerial prerogative, but instead is based on "how far they want the information and what they are going to use it for". On the surface these may appear rational reasons. They, however, also represent a justification of total Management control of this information and controlled access to it by others "in the

interests of the Company". It is, in the light of this, all the more interesting, to observe the concern with communicating this information to other Managers - or members of the 'same club'. This, on our experience of this man, is completely genuine, but it is interesting to observe the free access to information for Managers - the impression is almost of open house - to the restricted access offered to Staff and Hourly-Paid, which though in principle open, is hedged with conditions and required justifications.

As in the previous case we find that those who are least well informed place least trust in what they do receive.

Table 4.9.

How far do you trust the information you receive on Financial Policy?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	20 (63%)	20 (28%)	0	7 (15%)	1 (6%)
Quite a Lot	9 (28%)	21 (30%)	2 (29%)	14 (29%)	7 (41%)
Not a Lot	2 (6%)	17 (24%)	3 (43%)	16 (33%)	3 (18%)
Not at All	0	1 (1%)	0	2 (4%)	1 (6%)
No Info. Received	1 (3%)	12 (17%)	2 (29%)	9 (19%)	5 (29%)

It can be seen that only amongst the Management is there a foundation

of trust for this information, where 91% trust it either 'Completely', 'Quite a Lot', but amongst Staff this is 58%, 29% among Union Reps. Among the Hourly-Paid 44% trust this information either 'Completely' or 'Quite a Lot', and 47% of Shop Stewards. In every other case the respondent either receives no information, or has little or no trust in it. We found Management best informed, then Staff, then Hourly-Paid - a similar ordering clearly holds for this trust put in the information.

Information on the Firm's Profitability.

Responses to questions on how well the Firm kept them about its Profitability brought similar responses, for reasons very similar to those for failure to keep employees informed about the Financial Policy, as the Manager in Finance made clear in the previous section.

Table 4. 80

How well informed does the Firm keep you about its Profitability?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	19 (59%)	15 (21%)	0	6 (13%)	1 (6%)
Quite Well	6 (19%)	28 (39%)	3 (43%)	17 (35%)	3 (18%)
Quite Badly	6 (19%)	18 (25%)	2 (29%)	10 (21%)	6 (35%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	10 (14%)	2 (29%)	15 (33%)	7 (41%)

While the Staff and Union Reps. appear to be slightly less badly informed than on Financial Policy, the Hourly-Paid response is very similar (25 as opposed to 27 being Quite/Very Badly informed), but the Shop Stewards level of satisfaction is much worse.

The reasoning for the Management not providing this information was revealed by the Manager in Finance in the previous section i.e. for reasons of commercial security. This argument is, however, challenged in Excerpt 4.5: from Shop Steward who argues that for him or his members to do anything to harm the Firm would only harm them, and that Directors are at most no more trustworthy than a Shop Steward's Committee.

The argument of commercial secrecy is, therefore, one which is not impregnable in the minds of the Hourly-Paid and the Shop Stewards. The idea that they were not as trustworthy as the Board or the Management was an offence to their pride in themselves. As a result of the failure of the Firm to keep their employees informed we have the figures of the previous table which reveal a considerable dissatisfaction with communication of information on the profits made by the Firm; particularly among the Shop Stewards.

The data collected on the trust put in this information is presented in the following table.

Table 4.11

How far do you trust the information you receive from the Company on its Profitability?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	23 (72%)	23 (32%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	2 (12%)
Quite a Lot	7 (22%)	22 (31%)	0	19 (40%)	3 (18%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	13 (18%)	5 (71%)	9 (19%)	2 (12%)
Not at All	0	3 (4%)	0	3 (6%)	2 (12%)
No Info. Received	1 (3%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	8 (17%)	8 (47%)

This information appears to have a firm foundation among the Managers. Among the Staff and the Hourly-Paid this trust is less pronounced (63% of the former, and 59% of the latter trusting the information Completely/Quite a Lot), but among the trade union officials the data is less complementary to the Firm, as 71% of Union Reps. say they do not trust this information a lot, and among Shop Stewards, while 24% say they either do 'not trust the information at all' or 'not a lot', 47% say they get no information on this. This result is in part due to the effect of the observation expressed by a Shop Steward in Excerpt 4.6.

The argument of this Shop Steward is that they are badly informed, not because the Firm does not tell them anything, but because they cannot understand what they are being told, i.e. they lack the skills to interpret the information. For this respondent the solution is to let them see the action that lies behind it, which is an important point for the next Chapter, but for the moment the social arrangements in

which information is passed on is relevant, especially where the employee lacks the innate expertise to grasp the information e.g. as we shall show an Hourly-Paid worker would give valuable advice on purchasing a particular machine, but is lost in the technicalities of a balance sheet, whose meaning, of necessity, would have to be spelled out to him - as it may have to be to a professional Management engineer. At the same time there remains the problem of who provides that interpretation. The respondent said they would go to the legal services of their Union, but for Shop Stewards/Union Reps. in every Firm to do this is hardly practical for the Union, and few Shop Stewards/Union Reps. are as highly trained as they should be in this respect. Hence we return to the problem of interpretation of information, which will be taken up again at the end of the Chapter.

The problem of trust is, however, deeper rooted than this - than the fact the employees do not fully understand a profit and loss account. It is not logically necessary that there should be such distrust - what, therefore, is the origin? Excerpt 4.7 from an Hourly-Paid informant indicates why this should be.

The implication of this is fairly straightforward - the Management say one thing and then do another in the experience of this employee. This, however, as we can see from the Table is not a dominant view, as most Hourly-Paid feel they can trust the information they receive. The principle view is that the Shop Stewards say they do not receive the

information. This problem is rooted in the general problem of communication which we shall discuss below - namely that it is not merely necessary to inform employees (e.g. to give them a bit of paper with writing on it), but that how they are told is equally important - at least equally important. The response of the employees has been either to say they do not trust the often less than adequate information they receive, or to deny having received it at all, on the grounds it is not information at all.

The last two items of information are those in which at least two major categories are dissatisfied with communications. This schema was drawn up prior to the field-work, as we believed there would be areas where there was no dissatisfied majority, areas where the Hourly-Paid would be dissatisfied, and areas where Hourly-Paid and Staff would both be dissatisfied. We did not foresee that on any item all sections would be dissatisfied. The firm, however, on the last item we shall consider - Work Study - nearly proved us wrong on that. First of all, however, we shall consider the data on Investment.

Table 4.12

How well informed does the Company keep you about Investment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	12 (38%)	6 (9%)	0	4 (8%)	1 (6%)
Quite Well	11 (34%)	18 (25%)	2 (29%)	15 (31%)	4 (24%)
Quite Badly	7 (22%)	22 (31%)	0	10 (21%)	3 (18%)
Very Badly	2 (6%)	20 (28%)	5 (71%)	19 (40%)	9 (53%)

On this item we find that both Staff (59%) and Hourly-Paid (61%) had majorities who said they were either Quite/Very Badly informed about investment, as well as the 71% of both Union Reps. and Shop Stewards who were likewise dissatisfied. The major complaint was not, however, based on job protection i.e. that employees ought to be told because the Management might bring in equipment which would reduce employment in the Firm. The complaint was based on the fact that since they (Staff/Hourly-Paid) did not know the Management had a new investment in mind, they could not make their views known and inadequate decisions were carried out. Excerpt 4.8 from an Hourly-Paid informant is typical.

The complaint of this Hourly-Paid employee is that he and his work group were not consulted, and could not employ their experience because they were not provided with the relevant information.

A similar story is told by a Staff employee in Excerpt 4.9.

Once again the problem which the Firm faces is one of failure to communicate with its employees, and to make use of the full range of skills which they have, causing frustration.

This is reflected in the large numbers who say they receive no information about Investment.

Table 4.13

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Investment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	19 (60%)	15 (21%)	0	8 (17%)	1 (6%)
Quite a Lot	7 (22%)	18 (25%)	1 (14%)	13 (27%)	4 (24%)
Not a Lot	4 (13%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	12 (25%)	3 (18%)
Not at All	1 (3%)	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	0	1 (6%)
No Info. Received	1 (3%)	20 (28%)	4 (57%)	15 (31%)	8 (57%)

Hence in all categories, except Management, the largest single response category is 'No Information Received'. If we look at this in more detail we find 39% of Labourers and 33% of Skilled (both largest response categories) say they receive no information. Among the depts., however, the picture is less clear e.g. 44% of Production Control say they get no information, 34% of Sales say likewise, as do 25% of Quality Control, though in the first two that is the largest response. Among Works, on the other hand, no one says he gets no information and 72% say they trust what they get 'Completely' or 'Quite a Lot'.

Management do not consistently ignore their employees like this. A Financial Director puts his policy forward in Excerpt 4.10

The response pattern in Finance was as follows:-

Table 4.14

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Investment?

<u>Very Well</u>	<u>Quite Well</u>	<u>Quite Badly</u>	<u>Very Badly</u>
4	5	6	2

How far do you trust the information you receive on Investments?

<u>Completely</u>	<u>Quite a Lot</u>	<u>Not a Lot</u>	<u>Not at All</u>	<u>No Info. Received</u>
7	5	3	1	1

While the data could show a more satisfied department the figures are much better than other departments/areas of the Firm, and indicate the communication we have discussed will be effective. The problem which the Firm faces is, therefore, that its employees seek to add their expertise to that of Management in running the Firm. To that extent, we shall show, hierarchy as a form of organisation is challenged, but, as we shall also show, this challenge is restricted to an extent that a radical move away from it would be extremely difficult.

Company Communications

Examining all this data simultaneously can be accomplished by using statistical techniques of varying sophistication. Even the simplest, however, can be of great interest.

We, first of all took the mean ranking of

- (1) all information judgments, within each category, and associated standard deviation
- (2) all trust judgments, within each category, and associated standard deviation.

Table 4.15

	<u>Information</u>		<u>Trust</u>	
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>
Management	1.75	0.79	1.6	0.98
Staff	2.28	0.94	2.7	2.25
Union Reps.	2.63	1.04	3.38	2.44
Hourly-Paid	2.38	0.94	2.79	2.09
Shop Stewards	2.4	0.85	3.22	2.3

From this table a number of points should be noted

- (1) the order of rankings which is the same for both information and judgments - Management
Staff
Hourly-Paid
Shop Stewards
Staff Union Reps.

From this it can be seen that, with the exception of union officials, the hierarchical ranking is followed. It can also be seen that the union officials are more critical of the Firm than are their members.

- (2) that the average ranking on information is higher than that for trust, for all categories except Management, for whom it is reversed i.e. the judgment on the acceptability of the volume of information is slightly more favourable than that on the acceptability of its content.
- (3) the degree of consensus, measured by the size of standard deviation, is greater on the information judgment than for the trust judgment, and is at least 25 % larger on the latter, except amongst Management whose standard deviation is less than one for both sets of figures.

Most importantly these, relatively simple, statistics again indicate the declining satisfaction with communications in the Firm as we move down the hierarchy from Management. This point is made all the more strongly by the following table, which summarises an Analysis of Variance on each item discussed. As the table shows only on 4 items - Overtime, Work Expected, Promotion and Work Study - was the information judgment not significant at 0.05 or better and on the Trust judgment data only in 2 cases was there an insignificant result. This is reflected in the previous table in which the mean level of trust was lower than the mean information judgment.

Analysis of Variance of Information and Trust Data

Table 4.16

<u>Item</u>	<u>Information</u>	<u>Trust</u>
	<u>Level of Significance</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Safety	0.001	0.001
Overtime	-	-
Work Expected	-	0.05
Pay	0.05	0.05
Cost Reduction	0.001	0.001
Profits	0.001	0.001
Orders	0.01	0.05
Financial Policy	0.001	0.01
Transfers	0.001	0.001
Redundancy	0.01	0.05
Recruitment	0.001	0.05
Promotion	-	0.01
Investment	0.001	0.001
Work Study	-	-

If we consider the data which was discussed in the previous section it would be clear which category would be most likely to be causing the significant results which are shown in this table. That category will be Management. This is again shown in the following table which shows the Pearson Correlation Coefficients between each item of information, and its associated trust.

Table 4.17 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Information and Trust

	<u>Safety</u>	<u>Overtime</u>	<u>Work Expected</u>	<u>Pay</u>
Coefficient	0.556	0.947	0.698	0.662
Significance	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	<u>Cost Red'n</u>	<u>Profitability</u>	<u>Orders</u>	<u>Financial Policy</u>
Coefficient	0.694	0.658	0.544	0.699
Significance	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	<u>Transfers</u>	<u>Redundancies</u>	<u>Recruitment</u>	<u>Promotion</u>
Coefficient	0.684	0.783	0.652	0.672
Significance	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	<u>Investment</u>	<u>Work Study</u>		
Coefficient	0.702	0.811		
Significance	0.001	0.001		

These coefficients - which consistently are significant at 0.001 - indicate that the better one is informed the more the information is trusted. This has two implications.

(1) Management, as we have seen, are consistently the best informed category, and consistently the category with the highest level of trust. The findings only add greater weight to the inspection of that data. We have also seen that Staff are next best informed, then Hourly-Paid. The argument that the better one is informed the more one trusts the information must be understood in the context that Management, given their position in the hierarchy are in a position to be well informed, and that the trust associated with how well informed they are, may reflect that position in the hierarchy and their attachment to it. Conversely Hourly-Paid are not well informed because of their position in the hierarchy, and their associated level of trust expresses the nature of their attachment to the hierarchy. In brief, therefore, these coefficients reflect not only the association of trust and

volume of information, but also different positions in the hierarchy, and these results are an expression of these positions and their attachment to hierarchy as a system of organisation.

(2) On all items there was a distribution of responses within each category (e.g. 8% of Hourly-Paid were Very Well Informed on Investment, 31% Quite Well Informed, 21% Quite Badly Informed, and 40% Very Badly Informed) and the indication of these coefficients is that the better informed an Hourly-Paid respondent feels he is about Investment the more he will trust that information.

Hence these coefficients can be seen in two ways at the same time i.e. as showing a simple relationship that the better informed one is, the more one will trust that information, and as an expression of the system of hierarchy - the higher one is in the hierarchy the better informed one is, and the more one trusts the information received. The question then must be posed whether we can talk of information as a generic term, or consider it only item by item. Our data shows, by using McQuitty Linkage Analysis on it, that one can consider information as a generic term.

In carrying out this analysis the first time we found that by putting information and trust judgments in together we could never break out of the link of item and associated trust. We, therefore, separated information and trust. This brought about a considerable improvement in our results as the following table makes clear.

Table 4.18 Information Clusters

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Cluster One	Work Expected Cost Reduction Transfers Redundancies Recruitment Investment Work Study	Safety Overtime Work Expected Pay Cost Reduction Profitability Orders Financial Policy Transfers Redundancies Recruitment Promotion Investment Work Study	Safety Pay Cost Reduction Financial Policy Recruitment Promotion Investment Work Study
Cluster Two	Safety Overtime Promotion		Overtime Profitability Orders Transfers
Cluster Three	Pay Orders		Work Expected Redundancy
Cluster Four	Profitability Financial Policy		

To a very large extent we can see that within categories we can indeed consider information as a generic term as Management and Hourly-Paid have 7 and 8 items respectively in their largest cluster, while for Staff we can put all items into one large cluster. On Trust, the situation is similar, except that Management can put all items into one cluster, while Staff and Hourly-Paid can put 10 and 6 items in their largest clusters. These tables do indicate, in view of the fact that the largest cluster in each category has more than 50% of the items, that information can be regarded as a generic term without doing much harm to the data, and that the level of trust associated therein can equally be so regarded.

Table 4.19 Trust Clusters

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Cluster One	Safety Overtime Work Expected Pay Cost Reduction Profitability Orders Financial Policy Transfers Redundancies Recruitment Promotion Investment Work Study	Pay Cost Reduction Profitability Financial Policy Recruitment Promotion Investment Work Study Cost Reduction Orders	Pay Cost Reduction Profits Financial Policy Investment Work Study
Cluster Two		Overtime Work Expected Transfers	Overtime Work Expected Orders Redundancies
Cluster Three		Redundancies Safety	Safety Transfers
Cluster Four			Recruitment Promotion

Hence these statistical methods show

(1) Overall Management, then Staff, then Hourly-Paid

- (a) report greatest satisfaction with the information communicated to them by the Firm
- (b) report greatest trust in the information communicated to them by the Firm.

We must emphasise that this follows the hierarchical arrangement in the Firm, and that, in addition, we find the union officials to be more critical than their members. This latter point is especially true of the Staff Union Reps.

(2) Analysis of Variance reveals that on 10 of the 14 items there is a significant difference, which on the basis of what has been reported up till now is most likely to be due to Management deviating from the view of Staff and Hourly-Paid, even on those items which all major categories report in excess of 50% Quite/Very Well informed, it is frequently the case that Management's largest category is 'Very Well Informed' or 'Trust the Information Completely', whereas among Staff and Hourly-Paid it is the next response down on the scale which is modal i.e. 'Quite Well Informed' or 'Trust the Information Quite a Lot'. A more subtle movement is apparent between Staff and Hourly-Paid, with the former's position often being between that of Management and Hourly-Paid. The data presented on information about orders shows this.

Table 4.20

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Orders?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Very Well	24 (75%)	33 (47%)	18 (38%)
Quite Well	5 (16%)	31 (44%)	25 (52%)

This portion of a previous table illustrates this argument since it is apparent that while Staff have an approximately equal distribution between Very Well and Quite Well Informed, Management's modal category is 'Very Well' informed, while for Hourly-Paid it is 'Quite Well' informed. This pattern can frequently be observed on other items of information. This leads to the third statistical presentation.

(3) The better one was informed the greater the level of trust one had in the information, but we have seen that the better informed are those

further up the hierarchy, and that the Pearson Correlations which showed consistently high levels of association between how well one perceived oneself to be informed, and how far this information was trusted does not only indicate a relatively simple association of volume and trust in information, but that the data we have presented in this Chapter, including the Pearson Correlation, express one's position in the hierarchy i.e. that one is well informed and trusts information because one is a Manager and conversely one is less well informed and less trusting because one is Staff, and even less well informed and trusting because one is Hourly-Paid. Given this, merely to step up the volume of information is not in itself adequate, as it will not alone lead to higher levels of trust. The context of communication is, as we shall show, relevant in this.

There are arguments which put forward the idea that employees have a right to be informed of what is happening in their Firm, and that this right is inalienable by virtue of their employment in the Firm. This view was not challenged from any side - there was an acceptance that information was not being passed on, and that the Firm was not really adequate in this respect. Excerpt 4.// from a Staff informant, was typical of this criticism.

The attitude of this respondent is that the system of communication is not adequate because Management are not aware of the problem - a view expressed in the table on why respondents felt they were not as well informed as they may be. This much would have fairly universal acceptance in the Firm, even amongst Management, many of whom are aware that the

Firm's employees are not as well informed as they ought to be. His view that Hourly-Paid would, however, be better informed if they asked for information is not, however, consistent with the total experience of many Hourly-Paid, and accepts the unspoken assumption that Management have an overall right to control the system of communication in the Firm. Historically this has been the case (i.e. that Management have certain rights to be informed, and to decide whom they should subsequently inform), but there are indications that this situation is being challenged from below. We have already seen this in respect of certain items of information, in which the expectations of the Hourly-Paid are clearly less well satisfied, than those of the Staff and of the Management in particular. This situation, as the data we have presented already, and Excerpt 4.12 from a Shop Steward makes clear.

The respondent makes clear that formal communications are not adequate - either because the foreman does not have the information, or lack of motivation on his part. The strategy around this is to go to a Manager, in Works, to get the information, or the Head Foreman. Time and experience has taught that this is a successful strategy, and the means to resolve the inadequacies of the system.

This Shop Steward also goes on to make clear that he (and by implication his membership) is concerned with more than "the price of industrial boots" as the previous Staff respondent stated. This is not to say an

Hourly-Paid worker is not interested in the price of boots, but he is, on the basis of our data interested in more than this - as the Shop Steward says he wants "everything appertaining to the work", because ultimately each thing that happens affects everybody in the Company, and information of a complex nature (e.g. financial data) may be of interest to him if it indicates the Firm is going to be bankrupt. Certainly the Management may inform them of this, but, as the Shop Steward's statements make clear, as does our data, they cannot rely on the Management to do this as quickly as they may like. Instead the relevant information should come to them "as second nature". At the same time the difficulties in getting to this are recognised - "it would need to come down to a government decree first of all" - and that their inequality of power in respect of Management is recognised. This puts into relief the major perceptual shift between Hourly-Paid and certain Staff and Management.

We quoted earlier a Manager who said if he was asked for information by a Shop Steward for reasons 'a, b, and c, and they were valid reasons', he would give it. Both that Manager and the Staff respondent imply that Management wish control over information to reside with them, but as the Shop Steward makes clear this is not the aim of the Hourly-Paid. Instead their aim is to generate the information which they want and not take simply what Management will give them, when they are prepared to give them it. Their aim is a fundamental shift in power in this respect.

The position with Staff is rather more complex than this, since Staff by virtue of their interaction with Management have greater access to the information which they require, though perhaps on an unofficial basis. In addition they appear to have a greater appreciation of the problem in

communication posed by confidentiality and other problems, as Excerpt 4.13, from a Staff informant, makes clear.

This contrasts with the attitude of mind, expressed by a previous Staff informant on the 'Newsletter' which aims at bringing employees together with the Firm. The Management aim is to bring the Firm together as a unity - but at the same time control access to information i.e. to create a sense of 'togetherness', but at the same time preserve the 'separateness' of access to information. The Hourly-Paid in particular are in a fundamentally different position than either Management, or even to a lesser extent than Staff. One can perceive this from what Staff respondent B said when he was asked he would assess information for its trust value - "Well if it looks reasonable and you can follow a pattern, and doesn't deviate too much from the norm, then that information is reasonable. Don't forget you don't get one piece of information - you get lots of pieces of information which you can link one with each other. If you've got something which is way out, you've got to check it." This means of developing trust is less available the further down the hierarchy one goes. The further down the hierarchy one goes the less clear the picture which is available of the company and one's part in it becomes, because of (i) lack of information and/or (ii) the uncertainty of what information is received, as the less one receives of a particular item of information the less one is able to assess its accuracy, and trust becomes largely an article of faith - or absence of faith. Hence the less well informed one is, the more Management expect, or rely on, their employees to make an act of faith in them. In fact our evidence shows that they are in fact prepared to do this within boundaries, as we can see, returning to what the previous Staff respondent has to say, in Excerpt 4.14

Hence he is prepared to trust the Board, because they are the Board, and as such they have a special competence. It is, therefore, acceptable that information be held back, because the Board decide this must be the case, and this is right because of the competence which they have. This acceptance, whilst generalisable to other categories in the Firm, is bounded by the need for a guarantee i.e. the trust which they invest the Firm with is increasingly less absolute the further down the hierarchy we go - because one is less well informed, as we have seen, and, therefore, can be that much less certain of the little which is heard. There is an expectation, therefore, that some guarantee will be provided if certain items of information are not to be completely available, or may not be grasped by the respondent. The need for this is shown in Shop Steward C's call for regular meetings of Shop Stewards with the Management. There would, however, it is clear from this, be more than Management telling Shop Stewards how it was - rather Management could be questioned by Shop Stewards, and by Union Reps. In other words it would be necessary that this system be two-way, and in so-doing the latter part of Staff respondent R's requirement for Management being able to contribute, and inform the Board, is satisfied - as is that of the Staff and Hourly-Paid's requirement to be able to exercise their professionalism and expertise, albeit of a more limited scope.

By such a system of meetings of Directors, Managers, Union Reps. and Shop Stewards, the employees can be fully briefed of the position of

the Firm, in a controlled atmosphere if confidential information is to be discussed. At the same time the view advanced by the Firm can be challenged by those present, and subject to scrutiny in order that its veracity can be assessed (a) by comparison with previous information (b) personally by questioning. This point is, however, of lesser importance than that the meetings take place, as by introducing such a procedural change in communication, the satisfaction with communication being an expression of one's hierarchical position is removed as all levels should be equally well informed, and the level of trust will correspondingly increase.

Meetings of this kind, by enabling employees to pass on their information (e.g. on the projected purchase of new machines) in the light of a new-founded well-informed view of the Firm, would remove the frustration we observed over many items of information.

The employee does not seek to be as well informed as his Shop Steward or Union Rep. - that is an insurance - but he does seek to be informed by his Shop Steward/Union Rep., as well as by the Firm. By a system of keeping union officials informed all employees can be kept informed about their Firm, and in this way resolve the greatest problem each employee faces - job security. As we pointed out in the previous Chapter, and on the section on Information about Orders, employees 'know' about the order situation if large numbers of A.O.s begin to appear in production schedules. Among all categories there was frequent reference to the need to know about the Firm in order that they should be as sure as possible that they have a job to come back to the next day. Confirmation of this can be seen very clearly in the reference to a possible take-over by Vickers-Armstrong. If information

is provided in a way acceptable to the employees such that they are informed as fully as they wish to be then the problem of assessing security becomes that much less difficult, and the reliance on rumour is at least reduced.

The implications of this for hierarchy as a form of organisation are important. In this Chapter, however, we cannot go into this as fully as possible, because as we shall show in the next Chapter, communication and decision-making are intrinsically linked in the minds of our respondents. For this Chapter, however, the contradiction of the operation of hierarchy whereby information gathers at the top, and those at the top control access to this information, is clear, as access must, in the view of Hourly-Paid Staff, be opened up, and additional information passed up for consideration to above. Frustration in the way the Firm is operated at present leads employees to develop a critique of the existing structure, and to posit alternatives - though as we shall see this is limited.

chapter 5

CHAPTER V - Control and Hierarchy - "The boss may not always be right, but he is always the boss"

Introduction

We finished the previous Chapter by pointing to the firm's *problems* in communicating with its employees. People, very often, *claimed not to know* what was happening. This, as we saw, led to a great deal of frustration and latent resentment. The important point, however, is not that the firm's communications are *perceived to be* poor - but that, with effort, they could be put right (1). We saw in the last Chapter not only that there was frustration because information was not being passed down, but also that there was frustration expressed because communication was blocked. The lower order participants were not able to express their views on their work - they were unable to tell management how they felt about their work in the Firm. Excerpts 4.14 and 4.15 are a good example of this, where the employees points to new machines which have been brought in, but have never worked efficiently. This kind of upward communication is infrequent in the Firm - just as downward communication is infrequent. But it creates problems for the Firm - and indirectly costs. This, as we said, could be resolved with some difficulty.

This would, however, ignore a crucial issue about information - what do you do with it, once you have it? From the previous Chapter it is clear people do not want information purely for its own sake. They don't want to be told something just so as they can say they have been told. Information, rather, is a resource. It is something people want, in order to do something with. For instance Excerpt *A3.1* shows this. In this Excerpt the Respondant talks about information concerning

orders which the Company receives. Now this is information which may be valuable simply in itself - employees may simply like to know that their Firm is doing well and winning orders, as the respondent does. But, there is clearly another dimension to this - job security. Orders mean jobs - no orders = no jobs. Hence while the information may have a value in itself, it has a further value.

Similarly with upward communication - employees do not wish merely to communicate with their managers merely for the sake of it. They wish to communicate with their managers in order to influence them - that by informing managers, this will alter their decisions. Information, therefore, is a resource - it is something to be used. Given this, there are implications for hierarchy.

(1) Upward Communication. As we have said employees seek to inform managers in order to influence their thinking and decision-making. Hence communication of this kind has a close, and meaningful attachment to the issue of decision-making. As we shall see, as this Chapter progresses, this attachment is much closer and much more important than may initially seem the case. This is because effective communication (including effective influence) are seen, as we shall show, as a more effective and desirable alternative to direct participation in decision-making.

(2) Downward Communication. We have argued that employees do not wish to be informed only so that they can say they have been informed - information is a resource. So how does that lead to an issue in respect of control in the Firm and of hierarchy? It leads to these issues when we appreciate that the fact that employees are

not kept well informed is not always accidental. Excerpt 4.10 with a Finance Manager is an illustration of this, when we discuss security. In that part of the Excerpt, communications with lower order employees is clearly conditional - "It depends how far they want the information and what they are going to use it for"!

This can usefully be contrasted with Excerpt 4.11, with a Shop Steward, whose policies on communication are clearly in conflict with those of the Finance Manager, in respect of conditional information - "Well O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the factory is to our interest".

Communication, therefore, is not only about information, its adequacy, and the trust which one places in it. It is also about control, and about hierarchy. It is a reflection of one's position in the Company structure - we showed in Table 4.33 that adequacy of information and trust placed in it, declined as we moved down the hierarchy. Communication, therefore, could be said to be organisationally systematic i.e. that how well/badly one was informed was a function of one's position in the hierarchy. Hence to challenge the system or the principle of communication is to challenge the hierarchy. It is not merely to criticise the hierarchy - to call it inadequate, or inefficient or whatever. It goes rather further than this - it is to seek at least a measure of change in the organisation of the Firm. To insist that the previously uninformed should be better informed (downward communication) and that the previously silent and ineffective should be heard and made more effective (upward communication).

This Chapter, therefore, is a development of the previous area - it is looking at, among other issues which become clear, information as a

resource and not just information for its own sake. We shall show that the views expressed on decision-making as practiced, and as desired, are quite consistant with this, and lend substantial support.

In particular, in this Chapter, we shall show:

- (1) on a wide range of issues, the Hourly-Paid sample see themselves as being relatively powerless, as do Staff though on a narrower range of issues.
- (2) both Hourly-Paid and Staff samples believe they should exert greater influence on decision-making in the Firm.
- (3) neither Staff nor Hourly-Paid want decision-making power equal to that of Management - we will see there is a widespread view that "it is Management who take the decisions" - indeed that taking decisions in the managerial role.

We shall see, as we have said already, that the desired change is in the direction of Management continuing to take the decisions, but on the basis of information, views and opinions of Staff and Hourly-Paid. In other words the Management's right to take decisions is not being challenged, nor is the idea of hierarchy. It is the idea of "all-knowing, all-seing Managers whose decisions are in the interests of us all", that is subject to challenge.

The ideal Management role expressed is one in which

- (a) the Management's professional ability to take decisions, would remain, but
- (b) these decisions would, at least partly, be taken on the basis of information passed upwardly in the Firm.

In addition Management would be carried out more publicly - there would be more downward communication, as we saw in the previous Chapter.

The hierarchy, therefore, persists. What would be the conditions for this persistence?

Data Sources

The data is from a number of sources:

- (1) questions dealing with expressed satisfaction with existing degrees of influence on a number of issues.
- (2) questions dealing with the desired level of influence on these issues.
- (3) the desirability of possible future situations which vary from full worker's control to full managerial control.

The first 2 data sources and the Tannenbaum control-graph method (2)

Questions took the following form

'How much influence do you think (Management/Staff/Foremen/Hourly Paid) have on decisions about (particular issue)?'

(1) A Great Deal (2) Some (3) Very Little (4) None.

"How much influence do you think (Management/Staff/Foremen/Hourly-Paid) ought to have on (particular issue)?"

(1) A Great Deal (2) Some (3) Very Little (4) None.

The issues respondents were questioned on were - Safety: Pace and Hours of Work: Pay Rates and Bonuses: Cost Reduction: Transfer of Employees

Between Jobs/Depts. : Setting Work Methods and Standards: Redundancy: Recruitment: Promotion: Discipline: Investment in new equipment: Financial Policy; Decisions which affect the order situation: Decisions which affect the profitability of the company.

By comparing the results of the two sets of questions:

A) how much influence does (a particular group) have on (a particular issue)?

B) how much influence ought (the particular group) to have on (the particular issue)?

the desired degree of change can be established.

The third data source presented respondents with possible future situations for

a) decision-making on company policy:

b) distribution of company profits:

c) access to company information.

Respondents were asked to say whether they found each specified situation,

1) Totally acceptable, or (2) acceptable, or (3) neither acceptable nor unacceptable, or (4) unacceptable, or (5) totally unacceptable.

This data will indicate the feasibility of alternatives to, and the future existence of hierarchy as an organizing principle.

Finally we consider the possibilities and problems perceived in a system of worker directors

It is clear from this that this chapter covers a great deal of ground and the issues in each area will vary greatly. We consider, for instance,

1) pay and job security which have an obvious immediate relevance to the individual.

2) We also cover areas of much less immediate relevance (though no less relevant) like financial decision-making, and investment policy.

Consequently the details and content of our findings in the chapter vary greatly.

What we shall demonstrate, in particular, in each case is the operation of the third ("radical") dimension of power. Consequently, while the details of the argument is obviously crucial, what is primary for our purpose is not so much the particulars of the speech of our respondents, but rather the structure of their argument, as it is through this that we shall be able to access the rules of the Lifeworld (its basic and fundamental elements and types, by which knowledge - the particulars of the speech - are organized).

What we shall seek to do, is

A) to show that that structure is consistent with the hypothesized operation of third dimensional power, and that

B) hierarchy is sustained by this.

While the content of each section will be different, since we are dealing with different areas of working life, our analysis of the structure will not, since the issue is the structure of the argument. In light of this (and also given the substantive results) we have decided that some of the material can be safely appendicised. ~~In this chapter~~ we consider perceptions of decision-making on

1) Pay

2) Cost Reduction

3) Discipline

4) Investment and Financial Policy

These four areas are typical of our results in the other areas, showing the importance of on the one hand,

1) the direct experience of employees, but on the other hand

2) their perception of the importance of the expertise of management in the maintenance of management control, and thus of hierarchy.

The remaining areas considered in relation to perceived control of decision-making can be found in appendix 5.

The remainder of this chapter is taken up with further statistical analysis of all the data of perceived control, and consideration of perceptions of how industrial democracy might work.

Control of Decisions on Pay.

This has probably been one of the most explicitly contentious issues in industry, and no less so today than at any time before. When this data was collected, however, we were toward the end of the last period of incomes policy (1975-1978) and this is likely to have distorted perceptions - but by how much is difficult to say.

The data is shown in 5 tables - tables 5.1-5.5. There will be a discussion for each main category (Management: Staff and Staff Union Reps: Hourly paid and Shop Stewards), and then conclusions will be drawn.

a) Management. The view expressed here (table 5.1) is that they see themselves as having only "some" influence. The same assessment is made of Staff and Foremen. The dominant group as far as Management are concerned are the Hourly paid. Indeed quite considerable resentment was expressed by managers about the influence of the unions on wage bargaining. This took two forms:

- 1) resentment against the perceived influence of the trade unions on the (then) Labour government, and in particular on its incomes policy.

- 2) resentment concerning the efficiency of trade unions in winning their members pay rises, which they, as Managers, did not get, and/or which reduced what managers saw as the appropriate differential between management and other employees. Indeed one Director privately told us that he had advised his managers that they ought to join a union, or else "they would be left behind", pointing to developments over Mitbestimmung in Germany.

The former point is well illustrated by Excerpt 5.1 in which a manager expresses his perceived case of being treated unfairly, because of the efforts of an incomes policy, which he sees as inspired by the unions.

The latter point is made in Excerpt 5.2. At the outset the power of trade unions is identified, but perhaps,

Table 5.1

	<u>Management</u>		<u>Actual/Ought</u>	
	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	7/21 22%/66%	6/9 19%/28%	2 /11 6%/34%	19/11 59%/34%
Some	16/11 50%/34%	19/21 59%/66%	15/20 47%/63%	9/20 28%/63%
Very Little	7/0 22%/0%	4/1 13%/3%	12/1 38%/3%	2/1 6%/3%
None	2/0 6%/0%	3/1 9%/3%	3/0 9%/0%	2/0 6%/0%

Table 5.2

	<u>Staff</u>		<u>Actual/Ought</u>	
	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	46/51 65%/72%	5/21 7%/30%	4/20 6%/28%	22/19 31%/27%
Some	17/19 24%/27%	36/46 51%/65%	34/46 48%/65%	25/47 35%/66%
Very Little	5/1 7%/1%	24/4 34%/6%	26/5 37%/7%	19/4 27%/6%
None	3/0 4%/0%	6/0 9%/0%	7/0 10%/0%	5/1 7%/1%

Table 5.3

	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Actual/Ought</u>	
	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	7/0 100%/57%	1/2 14%/29%	1/2 14%/29%	3/3 43%/43%
Some	0/3 0%/43%	4/4 57%/57%	3/3 43%/43%	2/3 29%/43%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	2/1 29%/14%	1/0 14%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/1 14%/14%	1/1 14%/14%	1/1 14%/14%

Table 5.4

	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>		<u>Actual/Ought</u>	
	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	37/32 77%/67%	9/14 19%/29%	7/13 15%/27%	15/29 31%/60%
Some	7/12 15%/25%	23/23 48%/48%	23/22 48%/46%	21/17 44%/35%
Very Little	3/2 6%/4%	10/9 21%/19%	11/10 23%/21%	7/0 15%/0%
None	1/2 2%/4%	6/2 13%/4%	7/3 15%/6%	5/2 10%/4%

Table 5.5

	<u>Shop Stewards</u>		<u>Actual/Ought</u>	
	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	14/10 82%/59%	3/4 18%/24%	3/5 18%/29%	8/10 47%/59%
Some	3/7 18%/41%	5/7 29%/41%	8/7 47%/41%	5/6 29%/35%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	5/3 29%/18%	3/4 18%/24%	3/1 18%/6%
None	0/0 0%/0%	4/3 24%/18%	3/1 18%/6%	1/0 6%/0%

more interesting is the latter part of the Excerpt where he talks about the alternative which he would like to see introduced. The idea of the union claiming 20% is introduced without explanation or rationale - but the alternative system is directly linked to the ability of the Company to pay as well as the cost of living. This indicates a certain type of understanding or knowledge of union thinking - wage claims are just shots in the dark without rationality. What is needed is a rational system (based on ability to pay) which would benefit all (based on the cost of living). This is indicative of the desired direction of change for Management.

Fairly clearly, though, the Managers regarded the Hourly-Paid as the most influential group in this respect.

If we look at the contrasting figures for how things ought to be we can see the change desired quite clearly - that Management should be in control. This desired situation would give them the most influence, and Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid more or less the same., but with less influence than Management - which is consistent with the presentation in Excerpt 5.2.

(b) Staff and Staff Union Reps. Staff respondents themselves clearly dissent from the Management view. For Staff in table 5.2 it is Management who have the greatest influence in the Company - more than any other grouping, though it would appear from the distribution of responses that the Hourly-Paid employees are differentiated from Staff and Foremen, as Hourly-Paid are perceived as having more influence than Staff and Foremen. If we look at Table 5.3 we see the same thing among these union reps. - only probably in an even more pronounced way. The ranking amongst

Staff, therefore is (1) Management (2) Hourly-Paid (3) Staff and Foremen.

In talking to Staff respondents the dominance of Management was very clear as Excerpts 5.3 and 5.4 make clear.

Excerpt 5.3 makes clear the role of negotiation - "the union goes in and shouts for as much as possible and management shouts for as little as possible" - and the role of the union in this. In Excerpt 5.4, on the other hand, the role of the union, while endorsed, is rather more circumscribed - "Well they would start to demand too much and put your job in jeopardy".

There is, however, an interesting common theme running through both of these views - objectivity and fairness. Excerpt 5.3 refers to the unions as pretty level-headed and not being extortionate. The objection he expresses relates to Management's pay, and in particular the fact (for the respondent) that Management can set their own pay - though he suggests that putting this right would be very difficult. Nevertheless the need for objectivity and fairness is made clear in this Excerpt.

In Excerpt 5.4 objectivity and fairness are made clear in an even more direct way - "Well they could sit down and analyse the payroll, and they will be able to say "How come this bloke's getting so much and this other whose doing the same or more is getting less?" - what is needed is systematic study of every job he almost appears to be saying.

It is, however, clear from both that the Management role as decision-maker is endorsed. What is required, however, is a greater input from

their employees to ensure that this role is actually carried through. This is made clear from examining table 5.2, as the desired direction of change for Staff is, if anything to give Management slightly more influence over Pay - but to give everyone else rather more influence as well (i.e. a positive sum game), though with Hourly-Paid employees having slightly less influence, by being reduced to the same influence as Staff and Foremen.

Staff Union Reps are slightly more confusing, as

- (1) they wish to reduce Management influence
- (2) they seek to increase Staff influence, and of Foreman - though the change in distribution is marginal
- (3) they seek to increase Hourly-Paid influence - once again, however, the change in distribution is marginal

It does however, indicate a gap between Staff and their Union Reps. - something we have seen happen in the previous Chapter, and which will be seen again.

More interesting, however, is the desired direction of change among Staff, to a situation where Management take the decision - but influenced by the employees. This is something we shall see throughout the Chapter - and which will also be seen amongst Hourly-Paid. The rationalisation for this will be more clearly seen in other issues.

A feature we have already seen amongst Management is resentment about incomes policy. This was also expressed amongst Staff, but, as Excerpt 5.5 shows, in a more muted form - perhaps as recognition of the weakness of white collar workers and unions, in relation to some

of the manual unions (eg the NUM which he implicitly refers to).

This is clearly somewhat more ambivalent than Excerpt 5.1, where incomes policy is criticised for the anomalies which are created - but 5.5 is rather more sophisticated as while the anomalies are recognised, there is a belief expressed that within a norm (eg 5%) this could be distributed in a dept. in such a way as to resolve anomalies, and therefore is rather less individualistic than Management views.

Incomes policy has been, up to now, a transitory and temporary phenomenon - the most important findings are

- (1) the role of management as decision-makers
- (2) the role of employees as suppliers of information, sources of influence and assessors of management objectivity and fairness.

This section has only shown this in a rather peripheral, and way - but both will be developed to become the main theme of this Chapter.

And not only for Staff. - but for Hourly-Paid as well!

- (c) Hourly-Paid. Examining tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicates the direction of attitudes among Hourly-Paid employees and this Shop Stewards. For these groups there is little doubt that it is Management who exert the greatest degree of influence over Pay. This can be seen in Excerpt 5.6 - S "Who controls Pay?" R "management". Nevertheless a degree of influence for themselves is indicated in this excerpt later on - "Its up to the man whether they accept it or don't accept it". This can also be seen in table 5.4, and

even more strongly in table 5.5. In table 5.4 the perceived influence of Hourly-Paid employees, which being less than that of Management, is seen as greater than for either Staff or Foremen - this is seen all the more clearly in table 5.5 among the Shop Stewards. This was not investigated directly, but an important reason - as can be seen in Appendix 6 when we look at the role of trade unions - is the relatively recent unionisation of white collar employees in the Firm (about 1967-1970, it advanced rapidly, and was still doing so to the extent that during our research period about 80% of employees were unionised). Clearly the perceived least influential groups were Staff and Foremen.

In wage negotiation, of course, the role of the Shop Steward is crucial - it's him who does the negotiating on behalf of his numbers. This is recognised in Excerpt 5.6 - but rather more explicitly in Excerpt 5.7. Both of these Excerpts show 3 things

- (1) the dominance of Management
- (2) the subordinate - but still influential role of Hourly-Paid
- (3) the role of the Shop Steward

The role of the Shop Steward, therefore, is one which is seen by their numbers as important. The 2 Excerpts we have just referenced both, essentially, perceive the system as fair - not necessarily as perfect, but at least as basically a fair system. The views of Shop Stewards do not, however, always appear to be consistent with this - rather they appear to take a much more critical line. This is very clear from Excerpt 5.8.

Once again the role of Management's dominance is apparent (though this

time including the parent Company), but of greater interest is the development of the critique of the distribution of income within the Company. It is not simply that he is under-paid it is that certain highly-paid people make no contribution to the Company - "I see some guys in here that just waddle about". The basis of this critique is the secretiveness of Management - differentials on the Shop-Floor (foreman, skilled, semi-skilled etc) are respected because it is apparent what they do. On the other hand - taking the roles of the Director and the Labourer as his models - he points to the gap between the two, but that (i) he and his members are ignorant of the size of the gap, because they, don't know what the Director is paid, and (ii) they don't know what the Director does. The implication from this is that more details should be supplied - people on the Shop-Floor have the right, therefore, to know as much about this Director as he knows about them. Once again we are involved with fairness, and offence against this.

Toward the end, objectivity enters in - that salaries and wages should be determined throughout the Company by Management and Unions, on the basis of what people do for the Company - not just for "waddling about".

In Excerpt 5.9 we see a similar view put forward - only this time applied to the Shop-Floor, by an Hourly-Paid respondent.

At the outset the role of the Shop Steward is emphasised - as in 5.6 and 5.7 - but when we go on to consider the fairness of the system directly, objectivity is raised again. The respondent speaks of his sense of perceived unfairness that 2 men should be paid the same, irrespective of the size of crane they operate (in his example), as the

degree of responsibility varies between the two. This is an identical line to the one expressed in Excerpt 5.8 - that people should be paid according to what they do - because this is fair!.

Interestingly enough, if we look at tables 5.4 and 5.5 we find that, as we would expect, the direction of desired change is toward more equality of influence between Hourly-Paid and Management. This - in the light of what we have seen already - is hardly surprising. What is perhaps surprising is that Staff and Foremen maintain - for both Hourly-Paid respondents and their Shop Stewards - a lesser degree of influence compared to the other two.

The increase in influence for Hourly-Paid is similar to the Staff situation - Staff too wanted more influence. The distinction lies in the fact that staff wanted equal influence for all other groups except Management, who would have greatest influence. The dominance of Management was sustained for Hourly-Paid - but Hourly-Paid wanted to have greater influence than Staff. This clearly is a puzzle. Why should Hourly-Paid wish to keep Staff in a subordinate position? This is a generalised problem, rooted in Hourly-Paid resentment at Staff attempts to maintain their better conditions e.g. holidays, sick-pay etc. The sense of Hourly-Paid resentment is an issue which arises frequently, and which ~~will~~ be discussed in the next Chapter when we discuss the role of Unions in the Firm, as it is most clearly and directly exposed there.

For now, however, the Hourly-Paid view is a function of their *systematically different perception compared to* many Staff employees - in particular the white collar Staff who work away from the Shop-Floor.

Conclusions

The major distinction between the 3 main categories has concerned the distribution of influence on Pay -

- (1) Management who take the view that their influence should be increased - particularly by the removal of incomes policy which has created anomalies in Management salaries.
- (2) Staff and Hourly-Paid, who both take the view that Management should not be so dominant. Both groups accept Management dominance, but seek to qualify this with their influence, as we have seen.

All categories, however, seek objectivity and fairness in settling wages. There is a constant emphasis on paying people what they are worth. At the moment a number of obstacles stand in the way of this

- (1) Management salaries are unknown to anybody outwith Management
- (2) other salaries and wages are set by negotiating strength - which may not be the same as an objective process would produce.

Clearly there is a strong utopian element in all this - few would disagree that one should be paid what one is worth. The problem is how this can be done. We do not present solutions to this. The point which emerges, however, is that influence over pay would ideally,

- (a) be established with the consent of all i.e. there would be an openness and fairness which was seen as lacking (again a communication problem).
- (b) reflect more than bargaining strength - objectivity, would be more transparent in the Company wage structures.

Nevertheless the inter-connectedness of these cannot be ignored i.e. to what extent would objectivity be assessed by (subjective) standards of fairness. This would, obviously, be a significant problem in any attempt to provide a solution to the present inadequacies of the system of wage bargaining.

It is, however, clear that

- (i) there is a significant change desired in the system of wage bargaining, and
- (ii) the motivation for this change, amongst Staff and Hourly-Paid, is to implement their idea of how the system should be organised;
- but (iii) the fundamental aspect of the system - hierarchy, and ultimate Management control - is not fundamentally challenged.

Cost Reduction

Over much of the period of our research, the Firm was involved in a Cost Reduction exercise, as we explained in the previous Chapter. To this end a special unit had been established with a general function of looking for ways in which the costs of the Firm could profitably be reduced. To this end, the unit performed 2 main functions

- (1) examining the firm's costs and searching for ways to reduce them (eg by looking for alternative suppliers of parts, or for an alternative for a particular part) - basically monitoring a significant aspect of the firm's commercial, external environment.
- (2) acting as a central 'clearing-house' for suggestions put forward by employees, and examining and researching their viability.

The former, obviously, is largely internal, and subject to little outside control. The latter, however, would obviously be open to such

Cost Reduction

Table 5.6 Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	19/28 59%/88%	3/17 9%/53%	6/19 19%/59%	3/17 9%/53%
Some	12/4 38%/13%	23/14 72%/44%	23/13 72%/41%	21/14 66%/44%
Very Little	1/0 36%/0%	6/1 19%/3%	3/0 9%/0%	8/1 25%/3%
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%

Table 5.7 Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	51/59 72%/83%	6/25 8%/35%	8/27 11%/38%	7/22 10%/31%
Some	18/11 25%/10%	41/43 58%/61%	46/43 65%/61%	29/43 41%/61%
Very Little	2/1 3%/1%	22/2 31%/3%	16/0 23%/0%	27/5 38%/7%
None	0/0 0%/0%	2/1 3%/1%	1/1 1%/1%	8/1 11%/1%

Table 5.8 Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	4/3 57%/43%	1/2 14%/29%	1/2 14%/29%	1/1 14%/14%
Some	3/4 43%/57%	3/5 43%/71%	4/5 57%/71%	1/5 14%/71%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	3/0 43%/0%	2/0 29%/0%	4/0 57%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	1/1 14%/14%

Table 5.9 Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	37/40 77%/83%	13/19 27%/40%	13/18 27%/38%	9/19 19%/40%
Some	8/7 17%/15%	22/22 46%/46%	22/19 46%/40%	17/22 35%/46%
Very Little	3/1 6%/2%	9/4 19%/8%	8/8 17%/17%	8/2 17%/4%
None	0/0 0%/0%	4/3 8%/6%	5/3 10%/0%	14/5 29%/10%

Table 5.10 Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	13/10 77%/59%	2/5 12%/29%	2/6 24%/35%	3/10 18%/59%
Some	4/7 24%/41%	8/10 47%/59%	11/10 65%/59%	5/7 29%/41%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	4/1 24%/6%	2/1 24%/6%	5/0 29%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	3/1 18%/6%	2/0 24%/0%	4/0 24%/0%

influence - indeed, by definition, this aspect of the units activity was dependant on outside influence, by putting forward suggestions etc. Hence we may be able to expect rather more widespread influence than we saw on Pay.

On the other hand, as we argued when we looked at information on Cost Reduction, the 'creation' of this Cost Reduction unit was coincidental with the closure of part of the Firm and the need to find these people something to do. The general impression we obtained was, as we said, that the Firm was less than 100% serious about Cost Reduction - perhaps 60-75% serious, but definately not 100%.

Yet in the competitive commercial environment in which the Firm operated, cutting costs to gain competitive advantage was of significant importance. Hence - despite the establishment of the unit at an opportune moment - one may have expected significant influence from all areas of the Firm, in order that costs could be universally reduced. As we shall see, this did not prove to be correct.

Management

Table 5.6 shows fairly clearly 2 situations

- (1) that Management have most control over Cost Reduction, and that they believe this situation should persist.
- (2) that no grouping is heavily involved (even amongst Management only 59% are said to have "A Great Deal of Influence") - but that, subject to (1) there should be greater involvement.

The system operated for reducing costs is illustrated in Excerpt 4.2 i.e. that a Manager can initiate action by the Cost Reduction unit.

The emphasis on this Excerpt is nearly all on Management - that it is a Management function to reduce costs. The implication of table 5.6 is that this is the case. On the other hand the direction of the desired change is toward spreading influence on this around somewhat, but with Management still in control i.e. for Staff and Hourly-Paid to put forward ideas, but for Management to take the decision. There is however one point, which militates against such a change, namely the ignorance among Hourly-Paid and Staff about Cost Reduction decisions in the Company. Table 4.7 shows that 17% of the Staff sample and 21% of the Hourly-Paid sample knew nothing about Cost Reduction in the Firm. This takes us back to the communication problems we looked at in the previous Chapter. To obtain this type of change will thus require they be resolved, which as we saw in that Chapter is unlikely to be either easy or straightforward. Nevertheless, in the absence of such change, relative ignorance is likely, and little external influence other than from Managers is likely.

Staff and Union Reps

The responses of Staff are fairly similar to these of Management - Staff perceive Management as having the greatest influence by far, over Cost Reduction, though to a greater extent than Management do, but the direction of desired change, like the Managers, is to sustain this Managerial control, though with more influence from Staff, Foreman and Hourly-Paid (for whom the respective distribution of responses are very similar), as can be seen from table 5.7

Their Union Reps., however, take a rather different view shown in table 5.8. Once again management are seen as being the dominant influence, but this time the desired direction, while not showing,

equality, is at least in that direction.

Clearly, therefore, there is a difference of view between Staff and their Union Reps - the former fairly clearly endorsing continued Management dominance, but the latter while not showing a desire for equality, do show an inclination in that direction, and certainly for rather less Management dominance.

As we shall see this is repeated among Hourly-Paid.

Hourly-Paid

Table 5.9 shows very similar ideas to those of Staff i.e. Management are dominant, and this this dominance should remain. The major difference is in the influence which Staff are perceived to have - Hourly-Paid perceive this as much greater than Staff do.

Like Staff Union Reps, the Shop Stewards perceive the Management as being the dominant category, but unlike their numbers they are less willing to allow this to continue. Like the Staff Union Reps. their desired direction of change is toward rather less Management dominance, and a more equal distribution of influence.

Conclusions

It is clear from the data that Management are seen as the dominant category on this issue. It is also clear that there is a desire to spread this influence around a bit more - to allow more influence for Staff and Hourly-Paid. For Management, and indeed for these 2

categories, however, Management would still retain control. Against this, however,

(1) the relative lack of information among Staff and Hourly-Paid

see Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Without the relevant information it is hard to see how either Staff or Hourly-Paid could exert influence. This being remedied would therefore be a condition of change of this type.

(2) the desired change among Union Reps and Shop Stewards is less strongly in this direction, and towards more equality. Their influence on Staff and Hourly-Paid could be seen as a counter-weight against Management, and thus that the Management view is not tenable. On the other hand it is the Management view which is endorsed by their numbers at the moment.

Discipline

Since 1971 - and the passage of the ill-fated Industrial Relations Act - dismissed workers have had the legal right to claim their dismissal was unfair, in terms of the legislation. This has meant that management wishing to dismiss a worker are restricted - to some extent - in the power to do so. Prior to 1971, add the legal right to claim unfair dismissal, therefore, workers had to rely on collective strength to resist a dismissal of one of their number. Given the level of union organisation in the company (100% union membership among hourly-paid workers and approximately 80% among Staff) the a priori power of

Table 5.11 - Discipline - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	15(47%) 22(69%)	2(6%) 7(22%)	7(22%) 17(53%)	4(13%) 6(19%)
Some	14(44%) 10(31%)	19(59%) 24(75%)	22(69%) 15(47%)	17(53%) 24(75%)
Very Little	3(9%) 0(0%)	9(28%) 1(3%)	3(9%) 0(0%)	8(25%) 1(3%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	2(6%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	3(9%) 1(3%)

Table 5.12 - Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	38(54%) 56(79%)	8(11%) 21(29%)	18(25%) 35(49%)	9(13%) 18(25%)
Some	18(25%) 15(21%)	32(45%) 35(49%)	41(58%) 33(47%)	21(30%) 35(49%)
Very Little	15(21%) 0(0%)	26(37%) 14(20%)	12(17%) 3(4%)	30(42%) 14(20%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	5(7%) 1(1%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	10(14%) 4(6%)

Table 5.13 - Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	2(2%) 3(43%)	0(0%) 2(29%)	2(29%) 3(43%)	1(14%) 0(0%)
Some	3(43%) 3(43%)	3(43%) 5(71%)	2(29%) 3(43%)	3(43%) 6(86%)
Very Little	2(29%) 1(14%)	4(57%) 0(0%)	2(29%) 0(0%)	2(29%) 0(0%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	1(14%) 1(14%)	1(14%) 1(14%)

Table 5 14 - Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	35(73%) 38(79%)	14(29%) 18(38%)	22(46%) 22(46%)	9(19%) 18(38%)
Some	12(25%) 8(17%)	24(50%) 20(42%)	21(44%) 22(46%)	17(35%) 22(46%)
Very Little	1(2%) 2(4%)	6(13%) 4(8%)	3(6%) 4(8%)	12(25%) 3(6%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	3(6%) 5(10%)	2(4%) 0(0%)	10(21%) 5(10%)

Table 5.15 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	11(65%) 7(41%)	3(18%) 2(12%)	7(41%) 5(30%)	3(18%) 3(18%)
Some	5(30%) 10(59%)	8(47%) 11(65%)	8(47%) 11(65%)	8(47%) 13(77%)
Very Little	1(5%) 0(0%)	4(24%) 3(18%)	2(12%) 0(0%)	4(24%) 1(6%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	2(12%) 1(6%)	0(0%) 1(6%)	2(12%) 0(0%)

workers to resist dismissal should be quite considerable - and, therefore, by implication (since dismissal is the logical end of any disciplinary procedure) on discipline.

An examination of table 5.11 - Management attitudes on the perceived distribution of power on discipline - indicates that for Management (1) they exercise more power than any other group, and (2) they seek ideally to exercise more power over discipline - increasing the differential over all groups, except Foremen. At the same time Management themselves wish to see all groups exercise more influence than they do at the moment - but it is clear that, for Management, the dominant influence should reside with themselves, and to a slightly lesser extent, with Foremen.

The Management attitude is fairly well summed up in Excerpt 5.10, from a Manager in a white collar area of the Company. As far as this Respondent is concerned the interests of employees are fairly well looked after in this respect. In fact he suggests that if anything Management are fairly lax in respect of discipline in the Company, in that "certain things are allowed to go too far" - a conclusion which (perhaps surprisingly) is shared by other employees. The reason for this slackness is indicated in Excerpt 5.11 - from a Manager in a Blue Collar area. This Manager indicates that problems arise because of lack of support for line Management in understanding and working with the legislation (This is 1978 - 7 years after the Industrial Relations Act, and 4 years after the rather stronger legislation in TULRA 1974, and the Employment Protection Act 1975). The responsibility for this is put with Personnel, with whom their communications are difficult because the Personnel specialist is "too theoretical rather than practical". Line Managers are, therefore, in some cases unclear about their duties and responsibilities in respect of discipline.

From personal observation in the Company of a particularly visible disciplinary issue - wearing safety glasses - it was evident that there was a degree of laxity in company disciplinary practices. It was not uncommon to see workers on the shop-floor without wearing safety glasses, which was a breach of company discipline. Disciplinary rules stated that whenever anyone (Management and Staff or Hourly-Paid) stepped on to the shop-floor they had to be wearing safety glasses. While protection was worn in obviously dangerous situations (e.g. welding), it was not uncommon to see people without safety glasses, on the shop-floor. This situation persisted throughout over time in the Firm, and seemed normal. Occasionally a Manager, or a Foreman, would suggest that the situation was terrible, and something should be done. Nothing ever was done, to our knowledge. This observation is confirmed by Excerpt 5.12, from a Staff Union Rep.

Examination of Table 5.12 shows a view amongst Staff, which is very similar to that of Management i.e. that Management have most influence, and that this should remain so - with the same exclusion for Foremen which we referred to above in discussing Management views. If anything the Staff view emphasises Management influence - both in actual and ideal perceptions - even more than Management themselves do.

Table 5.12 shows that among Staff Union Reps there are certain similarities in their views to those held by their members. Management - with Foremen - would have most influence on discipline, with an increase for Staff and Hourly-Paid workers. The dominant role, though shared with Foremen, would still belong to Management. This may perhaps be surprising in view of the importance of discipline, related as it is to dismissal in the way suggested above. In Excerpt 5.10, a Management respondent suggested that the system which the Company operated was one where "we treat people like adults" - though "sometimes

things are allowed to go too far" by some managers, As we shall see these 'qualities' are emphasised by Staff as well.

The Staff Respondent in Excerpt 5.13 emphasises for us the perceived fairness of the system, and in particular that while the final decision on a disciplinary issue lies with Management, the Management still seek to make out a case as to why any individual should be disciplined - as well as consulting with unions. Thus, for this respondent, while Management take the decision, they do so in consultation with their other employees, and make out a case for taking a decision, which the employees see as fair and reasonable.

The idea of fairness can be seen to be important for the Respondent in Excerpt 5.14. Clearly in this Respondent's ideas, fairness means that a superior will treat, as he puts it, 2 sections in the same way, not be soft on one and hard on the other. It is clear, however, from what is said in this Excerpt that this does not always happen in the Company. It is also clear from Excerpt 5.14 that a Manager, in exercising his disciplinary power, should be reasonable. This clearly does not mean that the Manager should be soft - "I wouldn't care if he was strict, as long as he was fair", In other words, for this Respondent a superior can be strict, as long as he is consistently strict. Where discipline seems to be going wrong - in this Company at least - is inconsistency on the part of Management. We shall see below that this point is largely shared by Hourly-Paid employees as well.

At the same time employees do not just 'lie down' to Managerial discipline. This point is made clear in Excerpt 5.15, in which the Staff Respondent makes clear his boss is strict - as he has to

be to get the work out - but that he has stood up for 'his rights'.

The important dimensions of discipline for Staff appear to be (1) the work has got to be done

(2) Management should act reasonably- this will be assessed by Staff against this need for work to be done, and their 'rights'

(3) Management must act fairly (i.e. be reasonable and consistent)

All of this is consistent with what we have seen in Table 5.12 and with the analysis of this Chapter as a whole i.e. that Management take the decision, but subject to the influence of this subordinate employees.

This, we can see is also true of Hourly-Paid workers. From Table 5.14 we can see that any desire for changes in the direction of equality by comparing actual to ideal perceptions, is fairly small. The decision to be taken on discipline should - Hourly-Paid workers make clear - be taken by Management, though as before, subject to the influence of their subordinate employees. The exception for Hourly-Paid workers, is that, unlike Management and Staff they perceive Foremen as having significant influence, probably due to their greater proximity, and the difference in the authority relationship.

The most important point is that, as we've seen, the dominant role is played by Management, subject to the influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid, and to a slightly greater extent by Foremen. This may appear to fly in the face of recent record, in so far as a dismissed person will be represented by their union representative. In relation to this Excerpt 5.15 - from a Shop Steward - is quite revealing. This Excerpt makes clear that the events leading up to

a dismissal will go through a procedure, but at the end he may be dismissed. Perhaps most surprising, however are the following 2 points.

- (a) under appropriate circumstances a Shop Steward will positively approve of a dismissal, but
- (b) even in such a case would still represent that person, and 'plead that he should get his job'.

The role of the union, therefore, is not mainly one of power - but rather one of representation. The union - as a case proceeds through procedure - will plead for a man, seek to ensure that no one is dismissed "for some wee stupid job.....used as an excuse bag the man". The union, therefore, seeks to maintain norms of fairness and reasonable action - but, as the Respondent himself agrees, at the end of the day its up to Management to decide whether or not more should be dismissed.

This, we would argue, makes clear again a dominant theme of this Chapter - Namely, that decision-making is a Management matter - that Managers are the people who take decisions. This, however, is subject to this decision-making being carried out keeping in mind the views and interests of their employees. Management take decisions, therefore, as decision-makers subject to the influence of their employees - but Management take decisions.

WE shall see this arise again subsequently in this Chapter - and in particular in the next 2 sections, where deal with areas which are a particular Management monopoly - (a) Investment and Financial Policy, and (b) Decisions affecting the Company's ability to win Orders, and its Profitability. These, clearly are areas which are of crucial importance to employees below Management level (e.g. no

orders, obviously means no jobs), but we shall see that, despite this, these are seen as Management prerogatives because only Management have the training etc. to take the appropriate decisions.

Investment and Financial Policy

These areas, probably more than any other, represent the inner sanctum of managerial prerogative, except perhaps the decision to open/wind-up a company. The financial policy, and the decision to invest company resources in particular ways are strategic decisions for any organisation. Indeed it can be argued that such decisions are not the prerogative of management generally - but are the prerogative of a restricted group of managers, usually at the level of the Board of Directors, and perhaps just below this level. Furthermore such decisions require particular skills. If we contrast these areas with other decisions we have considered up to now - discipline, for instance, - these, while not without the need for skills, are imbued with issues of right or wrong in a moral, as well as a technical sense. The technical element of these areas we are considering now is, however, much stronger, requiring the knowledge and use of financial techniques - a quality possessed of few outwith the financial specialists in the company. Though this is not to deny the reality of a moral element e.g. keeping a factory open as an obligation to long serving workers.

At the same time while these areas, by their very essence, are largely opaque to the majority of company employees, they are not without great relevance. Following the wrong financial policy - investing in the wrong equipment - could be disastrous for the Company, and for employment. Hence these are areas in which the knowledge of many

employees varies from the scanty, to the totally non-existent. This is, as we have argued, because of the nature of the subject. It is, however, also because of the inadequate communication of such information by the Company, as we saw in the previous Chapter. Table 4.8 shows that 56% of the Hourly-Paid sample felt they were quite/very badly informed about the Company's financial policy - and 19% said they received no information at all (Table 4.9). Similarly 61% said they were quite/very badly informed about Investment in the Company (Table 4.12), and 31% that they received no information on this at all (Table 4.13).

Hence before the discussion of our findings in these areas, we should like to emphasise 2 points

- a) these are areas of decision-making which, for technical reasons, are (at the moment anyway) impenetrable to many employees
- b) the above is compounded by the fact that the Company doesn't tell them all that much anyway

As we shall see, however, these are areas of Management prerogative for reasons other than these, as well.

Management

Responses by Management to questions on Investment and Financial Policy are shown in Tables 5.16 (Investment), and 5.21 (Financial Policy). One result which is perhaps surprising is in Table 5.21 - the low degree of control Managers perceive themselves as having over Financial Policy, as only 53% believe they have 'A Great Deal' of control in this area. Furthermore this figure rises to only 69% when they are asked how much control they believe they ought to have. While it is true that 53% and 69% are not, in themselves,

Table 5.16 - Management-Investment

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	28(88%) 30(94%)	2(6%) 3(9%)	1(3%) 7(22%)	1(3%) 3(9%)
Some	4(12%) 2(6%)	13(41%) 18(57%)	21(66%) 20(63%)	2(6%) 14(44%)
Very Little	0 0	14(44%) 9(28%)	9(28%) 5(16%)	23(7%) 13(41%)
None	0 0	3(9%) 2(6%)	1(3%) 0	6(19%) 2(6%)

Table 5.17 - Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	60(85%) 64(90%)	1(1%) 8(11%)	2(3%) 18(25%)	2(3%) 5(7%)
Some	9(13%) 7(10%)	25(35%) 49(69%)	39(55%) 47(66%)	14(20%) 44(62%)
Very Little	2(3%) 0	31(44%) 10(14%)	23(32%) 5(7%)	27(38%) 15(21%)
None	0 0	14(20%) 4(6%)	7(10%) 1(1%)	27(38%) 7(10%)

Table 5.18 - Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	7(100%) 6(86%)	0 0	0 0	1(14%) 1(14%)
Some	0 1(14%)	2(29%) 7(100%)	5(71%) 7(100%)	1(14%) 5(71%)
Little	0 0	4(57%) 0	1(14%) 0	4(57%) 1(14%)
None	0 0	1(14%) 0	1(14%) 0	1(14%) 0

Table 5.19 - Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	43(90%) 44(92%)	6(13%) 10(21%)	8(17%) 16(33%)	4(8%) 11(23%)
Some	4(8%) 4(8%)	24(50%) 30(63%)	23(48%) 26(54%)	11(23%) 28(58%)
Little	1(2%) 0	13(27%) 5(10%)	13(27%) 3(6%)	13(27%) 5(10%)
None	0 0	4(8%) 2(4%)	4(8%) 3(6%)	20(42%) 4(8%)

Table 5.20 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	14(82%) 13(94%)	2(12%) 5(29%)	4(24%) 6(35%)	2(12%) 5(29%)
Some	2(12%) 4(6%)	5(29%) 8(47%)	6(35%) 11(65%)	2(12%) 10(59%)
Little	1(6%) 0	6(35%) 3(18%)	4(24%) 0	5(29%) 1(6%)
None	0 0	4(24%) 1(6%)	3(18%) 0	8(47%) 1(6%)

Table 5.21 - Financial Policy - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	17(53%) 22(69%)	0(0%) 1(3%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)
Some	10(31%) 9(28%)	9(28%) 19(59%)	9(28%) 21(66%)	6(19%) 18(56%)
Very Little	4(13%) 1(3%)	18(56%) 9(28%)	15(47%) 8(25%)	16(50%) 10(31%)
None	1(3%) 0(0%)	5(16%) 3(9%)	8(25%) 3(9%)	10(31%) 4(13%)

Table 5.22- Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	49(69%) 60(85%)	0(0%) 8(11%)	0(0%) 10(14%)	1(1%) 7(10%)
Some	16(23%) 11(16%)	19(27%) 47(66%)	18(25%) 48(68%)	8(11%) 35(49%)
Very Little	4(6%) 0(0%)	30(42%) 13(18%)	35(49%) 9(13%)	27(38%) 19(27%)
None	2(3%) 0(0%)	22(31%) 3(4%)	18(25%) 4(6%)	35(49%) 10(14%)

Table 5.23 - Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	6(86%) 5(71%)	0(0%) 1(14%)	0(0%) 1(14%)	0(0%) 1(14%)
Some	1(14%) 2(29%)	0(0%) 5(71%)	1(14%) 5(71%)	0(0%) 5(71%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	5(71%) 0(0%)	4(57%) 0(0%)	4(57%) 0(0%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	2(29%) 1(14%)	2(29%) 1(14%)	3(43%) 1(14%)

Table 5.24 - Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	44(92%) 44(92%)	5(10%) 14(29%)	4(8%) 12(25%)	3(6%) 12(25%)
Some	3(6%) 4(8%)	22(46%) 26(54%)	14(29%) 26(54%)	7(15%) 26(54%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	13(27%) 6(13%)	18(38%) 7(15%)	10(21%) 5(10%)
None	1(2%) 0(0%)	7(15%) 1(2%)	12(25%) 3(6%)	28(58%) 5(10%)

Table 5.25 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	11(65%) 12(71%)	1(6%) 3(18%)	0(0%) 3(18%)	1(6%) 4(24%)
Some	5(29%) 5(29%)	5(29%) 10(59%)	6(35%) 12(71%)	2(12%) 10(59%)
Very Little	1(6%) 0(0%)	5(29%) 2(12%)	5(29%) 1(6%)	2(12%) 1(6%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	6(35%) 2(12%)	6(35%) 1(6%)	12(70%) 2(12%)

'small' figures, they are less relative to the control perceived in other areas e.g. Investment (Table 5.16), the corresponding figures are 88% and 94%. A related point which can usefully be made here, is to observe that this view of Management having relatively less control over Financial Policy is not shared by other groups e.g. Staff (Table 5.47) 69% say Management have a great deal of control, and 85% say they should have a great deal of control. Even more so for Hourly-Paid workers, as 92% of them believe that Management do have - and should have - a great deal of control over the Company's Financial Policy.

Why should this be? There are 2 reasons

1) Management are conscious of the Firm being only one part of a group of companies (this was pointed out in Chapter III) - the implication of this for them is that the Financial Policy of the Company is to some extent subordinate to the needs of the group. Decisions which affect or pertain mainly to their firm e.g. discipline, even Investment are decisions over which they can exercise more control than in Financial Policy where authorization is required from the group.

2) this area of decision-making is one which - as we said of the beginning of this section - is particularly opaque to others outside Management. Hence the problem of 'group considerations' is one of which Staff and Hourly Paid workers are much less aware of, than are Management - if indeed they are aware of them at all. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that Management on one hand, and Staff and Hourly-Paid on the other, should take such different views on this area - they do in fact see the Financial decision-making process in different terms. Parent Company considerations play a much larger role in the Management perspective than in that of Staff and Hourly-Paid.

The above notwithstanding, it is clear that Management - taking only those within the Firm into account - see themselves as the group of within the firm in control of both Financial, and in particular of Investment decisions. There is, however, also a clear indication on the part of Management that - as with other decision areas we have looked at - Staff and Hourly-Paid workers should exercise a greater degree of control than they are perceived to have at the moment. At the same time, Management will retain control. As we have seen before, the intention appears to be to allow others in the Company to exercise more control - to have more influence, to have more say, more of an input - when decisions on Financial Policy, or to invest in one way or another, but that the final decision is one for Management to take, but with the views of their Staff and Hourly-Paid workers in mind.

Perhaps the million dollar question is how this would happen? It is one thing to say this - another to do it. We saw in the previous chapter that 98% of Managers and Staff said that they felt that they wanted to keep their subordinates well informed, but just did not seem to have the time to do this. This showed up very clearly in the reports on how well informed people in the Firm felt they were - perhaps badly informed would be a more apt description.

The development of Financial Policy - and of consultation - is clearly illustrated in Excerpt 5.17, from a Manager. This Excerpt makes clear

- 1) that the objective of Financial Policy for the Firm is to improve the rate of return on the capital which it employs.
- 2) the only way in which that can be done is by ensuring the involvement of all department in the Firm,

This much is fairly obvious - it could be taken from almost any Financial Management text. A deeper point is reached where the input of non-Management personnel is raised. This Manager makes clear that he cannot talk for Manufacturing as that is not his area. There is, however, a very clear division of responsibilities in this area,

- 1) "computation of figures, calculation of forms, filling in pieces of paper which the work-force, the shop-floor isn't qualified or employed to do that". This is the technical area which we drew the reader's attention to at the beginning of this section - the accounting conventions and knowledge in which certainly most non-Managers, and indeed many non-accountant Managers are not trained. To expect an Hourly-Paid worker to understand the meaning of a cash-flow projection would ^{be} like expecting a graduate Personnel Manager to understand a complex technical drawing. To work in the area of Financial Policy and Investment decisions required certain skills which are only seldom found outwith the realm of Management. Full participation in these areas would, therefore, be contingent on possession of this knowledge. It would certainly be true to say that this is not an insurmountable problem (e.g. through a training programme) - it is, however, equally true to say that current reality is that such solutions are not being put into effect with any great vigour, if at all. This however, is not to say that non-Managers have no contribution to make. This is the substance of the second part of this division of responsibility
- 2) this applies largely to what we could call Investment Decisions. Not, though, at the level of the decision to invest, but rather that once that decision has been taken - to buy new machines for instance - that the views of Staff and Hourly-Paid are taken into account. The example given in Excerpt 5.17 concerns the

purchase of a photo-copier. Once the decision to make the purchase has been made, consultation should take place on exactly what type of machine to buy. As we pointed out the example concerns the purchase of a photo-copier - once it was decided to buy a photocopier, there were consultations with Staff (there are no Hourly-Paid in this part of the firm) on what type of machine to buy - hence the Rank Xerox was purchased as a result of informal consultations with Staff, and taking their views into account. It is, however, interesting to note the respondent's observation that "I don't know how far (their views would be taken into account) in that situation".

Thus while in this latter area non_management personnel do have a role to play, we have in considering this Excerpt 5.17 identified so far 2 problems with this role.

- a) the extent of their role - just how far would their views be taken into account? Would it be too much a small or limited extent that Staff and Hourly-Paid would simply not see such consultation as in any way being worth-while.
- b) the procedure to be adopted is extremely informal. This is given a very real justification by the Respondent - "Formality put everybody under pressure, puts everybody in a situation where they are reluctant to express his views" - a very real problem. On the other hand lack of formality may lead to no consultation taking place at all. For instance while there has been consultation in this department, it is by no means universal.

Excerpt 5.18 from a Staff Respondent in Manufacturing illustrates this point quite succinctly. While the Firm has been spending a great deal on new machines, the Respondent reports that they have frequently purchased the wrong machines in his view. These machines have been purchased because Management did not consult with their

work-force who "have experience of the type of machines". The solution discussed with this Respondent is to have a formal mechanism - "2 or 3 people from the Union each going on a Board meeting". The purpose of this would be to make the views of their numbers known to the Board - the intention of this being "to help everyone", and not just their own partisan interests. Something very similar to this arises in Excerpt 5.17 where the Management respondent discussed the contribution that he - as a non-Engineer - can make to an Engineering problem. While he puts his idea from a "common-sense" (or non-Engineering) view, he suggests that his contribution is worth while, because it gives another perspective on the problem. The same argument could be put for non-Management personnel involvement in financial or investment decisions. They may - as we pointed out above - lack the financial skills required, but their contribution may still be worthwhile.

There is, however, one more obstacle to extended participation in financial or investment decisions - financial interest. This enters into Excerpt 5.17 in 2 senses

- 1) possession of financial information - the view in Excerpt 5.17 is clearly that it is not advisable for more people than is necessary to have access to private (financial information as it could be to the detriment of the Firm. Once again though there is an exclusion clause - namely that if, for instance, a Shop Steward was to ask to know the profits of the Company for particular valid reasons than he would be given that information. It is, however, clear that judgement of the validity of the Shop Stewards reasons would lie with Management. Thus (i) it would remain a system subject to Management control, and (ii) by implication Management are more trusted with this information than others in the company.

Neither would be acceptable to the Shop Steward interviewed in Excerpt 5.19. A strong justification for the Manager in Excerpt 5.17 is that confidentiality is in fact in the interests of everyone in the Firm - that keeping financial information within a restricted group of Managers is in the interests of all the Firm, and not just Management. The views of the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.49 in fact run counter to this for 2 reasons

- i) if he and his members were taken into the confidence of Management and given not only the information but the reasons behind following one policy rather than another, they could structure their expectations (e.g. a wage claim) in an appropriate way
- ii) the confidentiality argument - which is probably widely held among Managers - may be, from the point of view of non-Managers implicitly offensive. Confidentiality within a restricted group after all could be regarded as suggesting that those outwith this group (or at best some of them) are not to be trusted. As the Shop Stewards says in Excerpt 5.49 "All I'm saying is that a Board of 10 or 12 directors, or 20 or 30 directors are more honest than 20 or 30 shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it would be the other way about".

Hence while there is a measure of agreement between the Managers in Excerpt 5.17 and the Shop Steward in 5.19, on this point - both agree that there should be communication about financial information - there is a clear disagreement on the degree to which this should be done. There is, however, a more clear-cut disagreement between them on the second sense of financial interest.

2) toward the end of Excerpt 5.17 we raise the question of the relative power of shareholder and employee interest. In particular we encouraged this Manager to consider the possibility of reducing profits (shareholder interest) or preventing a redundancy (Employee

interest). It is clear from his answer that the redundancy would be very much the last act - "the last thing anybody would want to do is to deprive another human being of his livelihood". A redundancy would only take place "the morning the Banks wont give you any more money" - in other words only if all else has failed only then would there be redundancy.

The view put forward by the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.49 does, however, at least treat such a view with caution as it is his opinion - basically - that Directors are only out for a profit viz. "There's 2 Directors, they're wanting to keep the shares (in S.U.I.T.S.) and there's another 20 or 10 Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting to sell it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them".

While we have no proof that what is said by the Manager about financial interest in Excerpt 5.47 is untrue, the perception of Managers held by the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.49 clearly runs counter to this. The importance of that is that it is that view on which the Shop Steward will act.

Thus if we accept that the Manager is being basically truthful, the problem at this level (or at least, much of it) is one of lack of mutual comprehension, and consequential lack of trust.

We have seen so far in this section

- 1) that this is an area where technical expertise in financial matters is important, which gives Management significant control as they are trained in appropriate techniques in this area
- 2) that non Management can play a role in decision-making - but at the level of what to buy rather than the higher level of to

invest or not.

- 3) that Management are in principle willing to provide financial information to, for instance, Shop Stewards.

We have however, also identified a number of problems

- a) the degree to which Management would take the views of non-Management personnel into account, as Management would still take decisions on what equipment to buy.
- b) whether or not such consultations would in fact take place (see Excerpt 5.18).
- c) Management would have control of financial information, causing 2 problems (i) employees may structure expectations on the basis of inadequate information (e.g. profits for a wage claim) or rumour, (ii) the implication that only Managers are fully trustworthy - or that non-Managers (e.g. Shop Stewards) are not to be trusted.
- d) that Managers are perceived by others as being more strongly motivated by profit than they see themselves.

While we have made these difficulties clear, there is one point which has run through all of this discussion of control over financial and investment decisions - that Management perceive themselves as being in control and that this should continue subject to consultation with non-Management employees and listening to their views. The difficulties we have drawn the reader's attention to are all subject to that general finding within Management.

We shall now proceed to discuss the views of first of all Staff respondents, and subsequently Hourly-Paid respondents.

As we shall see the general finding in each of these 2 groups is

remarkably similar.

Staff and Union Reps

One point we have already drawn attention to is that Staff perceive more actual as well as desired control for Management than Management perceive themselves to have, where Financial Policy is concerned. The reason for this, we have suggested above, is that the pressures of group ownership are more apparent among Management than among Staff.

It is apparent from Tables 5.17 and 5.22 (Staff responses on Investment and Financial Policy) and 5.48 and 5.23 (their Union Reps views on the same areas) that for both these groups it is (1) Management who do control decisions in both these areas, and (2) this situation ought to persist. On the latter question - how control ought to be distributed, - it is, however, clear that there is a desire that Staff and Foremen and Hourly-Paid ought to be more involved in these decisions. It is, however, still the case - as with the other decision areas we have looked at - that their involvement would still be subordinate to that of Management. It would seem from the figures in these tables that non-Management personnel should advise and be consulted - should play a role in the decision-making process - but that the final decision was one for Management to take. This interpretation is confirmed by the Staff respondent in Excerpt 5.20. For this respondent decisions of this type are to be taken by the Board of Directors - "I don't see any way in what that.....could be changed really". On the other hand there is - as we suggested - a role for what this respondent describes as 'representation' to the Board of Directors which in his view "would make for a more profitable firm". This simply echoes the point we made from Excerpt 5.48 - from another Staff respondent. It was his conclusion that the firm had made a poor purchase in buying particular

machines, and that by sending up "2 or 3 people from the Union side", that better decisions could be taken by Management with the views, advice and guidance of their non-Management employees.

One final point about these Staff views - are which has appeared in other decision areas - is that there is rather less strength in the view of greater participation for Hourly-Paid than for Staff and Foremen. This does, as we have pointed out before, indicate a very real tension among the employees of the Firm - though not one which is reproduced among Union Reps or indeed among the Hourly-Paid sample.

Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards

Like Management and Staff both Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards (1) perceive Management as the dominant group, and (2) perceive that this ought to remain so, but with a greater degree of control going to Staff and Foremen as well as themselves.

As we suggested for the Staff sample, and for Union Reps. Management as seen as being the group who take this type of decision, a point well made by an Hourly-Paid Respondant in Excerpt 5.21. He justifies their control by reference to "they've got the brains.....they're qualified people".

This Excerpt extends this point rather more - it is not just that Management takes these decisions because they are Managers - they take these decisions because that is what they have been trained in. In other words the legitimacy of Management resides not just in the fact that they are Management (a sort of 'traditional legitimacy see for instance Stewart Clegg's Power, Rules and Domination), it resides further in their technical expertise (a rather more technical/

administrative legitimacy). The role of a Manager is in this respect rather like that of a welder say - it is right that a welder should weld because that is his skill; so similarly it is right that a Manager should take decisions, because that is his skill. We shall return to this argument and develop it at much greater length in at the end of this Chapter, but the point we wish to make for now is that the dominant role of Management, even in judgements of how control ought to be distributed, is not simply contingent on the fact that they are Management, but on a claim by Management, and its acceptance by Staff and Hourly-Paid employees, to a technical expertise which is special in that only Managers can make such a claim to this expertise (by virtue of training, or even 'brains', as well as the fact that they are Managers). It is, in other words, two-interdependant claims to legitimacy -

- i) authority is legitimised by virtue of the fact that he is a manager
- ii) a manager's authority is also legitimate because he has the training, or expertise etc. to take decisions

These 2 points can be clearly seen in Excerpt 5.22. In this Excerpt the Hourly-Paid respondent first of all accedes to the first claim - managers take decisions on Financial/Policy and Investment because they are managers. Later on he accedes to the second claim - "Well its just a Management decision I think. I mean personally I wouldn't know anything about that all".

Nevertheless, even if this double-claim by Management is accepted, this does not rule out a demand by Hourly-Paid workers that they should be heard. This point comes out clearly in Excerpt 5.23. In this Excerpt another Hourly-Paid respondent clearly accedes to the claim by Management to have control over

Financial Policy, and Investment decisions. As we suggested earlier, though, on the basis of Tables 5.19 and 5.24 while Hourly-Paid workers may accede to the legitimacy claim made by Management in this area, they still demand to be heard. The respondent in Excerpt 5.23 makes very much the same argument as the Staff respondent in Excerpt 5.18 - indeed they are both talking about the same machines. While each accedes to the Management right to take decisions, the view is put forward that in so doing they should listen to and take into account the views of non-Management personnel.

Thus in this section we have found yet again

- 1) that while Management are and should be - in the view of all groups - in control of decisions in the area, but
- 2) that in taking these decisions Management should be influenced by the views of non-Management personnel.

The direction of any developments that such views would suggest would not be toward any type of radical change in decision-making structures. Any change which has been suggested up to now has been in the direction of greater consultation by Management of their Staff and Hourly-Paid employees. This would be a development consistent with the double claim we discussed above, and indeed would be consistent with the strong demand for greater communication of company information we considered in the previous Chapter.

Influence and Decision-Making Within the Firm

The picture of the actual and ideal distribution of influence and decision-making we have presented up to now has emphasised the role of hierarchy both in actual and ideal perceptions. It is clear that the Management of this firm see themselves as being in control of decisions taken, and that this ought to continue. Perhaps more surprisingly this seems to be the dominant view of Staff and Hourly-Paid employees. Any change as we moved our consideration from what actually happens to how things ought to be, has been in the way of increasing the influence of Staff, of Foremen and of Hourly Paid employees - but not to the extent to an equality with Management, far less deposing Management. The change has been to look for greater consultation by Management with their other employees, and to consider their views, before a decision is taken. It is, however, clear that it is Management who shall take the decision.

What we shall do in this section is to consider further statistical tests on all of the control data split into two sections for each group (1) perceptions of how influence is distributed, and (2) perceptions of how influence should be distributed. The statistical tests we shall use are - ..

- X (A) Mc Quitty Linkage Analysis (used on the information data provided in the previous chapter), and
- (B) Factor Analysis

The findings on each test will indicate a conceptual distinction between them, on the one hand Management influence, and the influence of other groups (though there are also distinctions between Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid), as indeed we have shown already.

We shall consider both of these tests, group by group, taking Actual and Desired Influence in turn.

Management

The results of the Linkage Analysis are shown as Table 5.64 for perceptions of the actual distribution of influence within the firm. There are, altogether, 15 Clusters to account for the 56 variables. Within these 15 Clusters there are 2 which are concerned with Management influence exclusively - Cluster 1 - on Safety, Pay, Orders and Profitability, and Cluster 15 on Work Standards and Recruitment. There are 7 Clusters where Management influence is absent - 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 - which are made up of Staff, Foremen's and Hourly-Paid influence. The decision areas in this latter group of Clusters are (a) Work-Pace (Hourly-Paid only) (b) Work Standards (c) Discipline (Hourly-Paid and Staff) (d) Pay (e) Recruitment (f) Cost Reduction (Hourly-Paid and Foremen) (g) Decisions Affecting Profitability (h) Financial Policy (i) Decisions Affecting the Order Situation (j) Redundancy. (Note Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid unless specified to be contrary beside the decision area).

In the remaining Clusters - 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14 - there are decision areas which include Management with one or more of the 3 other groups. For instance Cluster 8 is solely concurred with Decisions on Transferring Employees from one Dept/Job to another; but it specifies Management,

Table 5.96 McQuitty Linkage Analysis Clusters of Management Perceptions of Actual Influence

Cluster 1

Management Influence on Safety Decision
" " " Pay "
" " " Decisions Affecting the Order Situation
" " " " " Company Profitability

Cluster 2

Management Influence on Work Pace Decisions
Foremen " " " " "
Management " " Promotion "
" " Discipline "

Cluster 3

Staff Influence on Safety Decisions
Foremen's " " " "
Shop-Floor " " " "
Management " " Redundancy "

Cluster 4

Shop-Floor Influence on Work-Pace Decisions
" " " " Work-Standards Decisions
" " " " Discipline "
Staff " " " " "

Cluster 5

Staff Control of Work-Pace Decisions
Foremen " " Discipline "
Management " " Financial Policy Decisions

Cluster 6

Staff Influence on Pay Decisions
Foremen's " " " "
Shop-Floor " " " "
Foremen's " " Recruitment Decisions
Shop-Floor " " " "

Cluster 7

Foremen's Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
Shop-Floor " " " " "
Foremen's " " Work Standard "
Staff " " Recruitment "

Cluster 8

Management Influence on Transfer Decisions

Staff	"	"	"	"
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop-Floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 9

Staff Influence on Work Standards Decisions

"	"	"	Decisions Affecting Profitability	
"	"	"	"	"
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop-Floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 10

Staff Influence on Promotion Decisions

Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop-floor	"	"	"	"
Management	"	"	Investment	"
Staff	"	"	"	"
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop-floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 11

Staff Influence on Financial Policy Decisions

Foremen's	"	"	"	"	"
Shop-floor	"	"	"	"	"

Cluster 12

Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting the Order Situation

Foremen's	"	"	"	"	"	"
Shop-floor	"	"	"	"	"	"

Cluster 13

Staff Influence on Redundancy Decisions

Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop-floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 14

Management Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions

Staff	"	"	"	"	"
-------	---	---	---	---	---

Cluster 15

Management Influence on Work Standards Decisions

"	"	"	Recruitment	"
---	---	---	-------------	---

Staff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid, indicating a consistency of view over this decision area as a whole for each group - in other words on transferring employees within the firm the issue or decision area was statistically more powerful than the group. Whereas in the Clusters specified in the immediately previous paragraph the distinctiveness of the Management group from the other 3 groups was more powerful. Only Cluster 10 has a form similar to Cluster 8. There, Promotion (all groups but Management) and Investment (all groups) appear in the Cluster.

In Cluster 2 and Cluster 14 only one group interrupts the Management group monopoly of each Cluster. This is especially true of Cluster 2, where only Supervisors influence on Work-Pace intrudes. Table 3.24 draws attention to the desired increase in Supervisors influence expressed by Management on Work Pace. In Cluster 14 the only 2 variables are Management and Staff influence on Cost Reduction - as small a 'cluster' as there could be, and one, which remembering the discussion of this decision area above, does not appear particularly meaningful. Similarly, Cluster 5 does not appear to be more than a statistical association which lacks meaning. Cluster 3 concerns mainly the influence of Staff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid on safety decisions - with Management influence on Redundancy decisions intervening.

Thus in considering these Clusters we can see that on 6 decision areas Management see their influence as being totally distinct - Work Standards, Pay, Recruitment, Profitability, Orders and Safety (Clusters 1 and 15), and on 4 more almost totally distinct from the influence of others - Work Pace, Promotion, Discipline and Cost Reduction (Clusters 2 and 14). Only on Redundancy and Financial Policy (where there are statistical associations in apparently meaningless Clusters) and on Investment and Transfers (where the decision areas seem more important than the groups) does this distinctiveness of Management influence break down.

The results of the Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Actual Influence are shown in Table 5.27. Those variables whose loadings on each factor core marked with an asterisk are significant for inclusion using the Bur -Banks formula. This is a statistical test, requiring a certain factor loading for a variable to be considered in interpreting a particular factor. The level of significance required was 1%. We have, therefore, erred on the side of excluding variables which on a weaker test may have been included.

Table 5.28 gives a more accessible view of those variables which were significant in each factor.

Those first 8 factors whose significant variable loadings are highlighted in Table 5.28 explain between them 65% of the variances within the data on which the analysis was done. No factor alone explains an amount of variance significantly larger than any of the others. Factor 1 explains 12.9%, while Factor 8 explains 4.4%, with a smooth decline in variance explained, in between these 2 factors.

Factor 1 gives a measure of support for the argument we have put forward throughout this chapter - namely that Management influence is meaningfully and statistically distinct from that of the other 3 groups in the analysis. In Factor 1, there is no significant loading for any Management variable - all significant loadings are Staff (4 variables) or Supervisors or Hourly Paid (6 variables each).

Factor 2 does, however, include significant Management variables, as well as significant variables for the other 3 groups. This is especially so on 3 decision areas - Work Pace, Transfers and Profitability. In the cases of decisions on Work Pace, and decisions affecting Profitability it has to be remembered that relative to other areas these were decisions

on which Management saw themselves are being less powerful - these were areas in which other groups were seen as having more influence than elsewhere. When we considered Transfers we saw - especially among the hourly-Paid - that while Management took the decision on whether or not an employee would be transferred to another Dept/job, an employee could ask for a transfer, and would usually get it. Thus the mixture of Management variables with other groups does in this case reflect reality. Just as in Factor 1, the fact that Hourly-Paid and Management are not significant on their 'influence on Pay' variables - reflecting the higher degree of influence perceived for Hourly-Paid on that issue.

In Factor 3 the only Management variable which is significant concerns Investment decisions. It also should be noted that a number of the significant loadings on other variables for the other groups are negative (i.e. Factor 3 is a bipolar factor). Thus it would seem that in Factor 3 it is being said that while Management have more influence on Investment, and Staff on Cost Reductions, Promotion and Investment, the Hourly-Paid have less on Safety and Profitability, Foremen on Safety, and Staff on Safety and Redundancy. It has to be recalled in Trying to understand this that on Safety and Profitability, Management saw influence on these issues as relatively dispersed (i.e. that it was not only Management for whom there was 'A Great Deal of Influence' - especially on Safety: see Table A3.56).

Factor 4 largely recalls Cluster 8 in Table 5.26, where decisions on Transfers for all groups were included. We suggested in relation to this that this issue may have a high degree of unique variance. This factor analysis would seem to confirm this. Management influence on Promotion is also significant in Factor 4, but it has a positive sign, while decisions on Transfers all have a negative sign. We would suggest that this points to a contrast between these 2 decisions - with Promotion being

Table 5.28

Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.27)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Supervisors</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Pay	0	X	X	0
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	X	X
Promotion	0	0	X	X
Investment	0	0	0	X
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Work Pace	X	X	X	X
Pay	0	0	X	0
Transfers	X	0	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Discipline	X	0	X	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	X	X	0
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Safety	0	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)
Reduction	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	X(-)	0	0
Promotion	0	X	0	0
Investment	X	X	0	0
Profitability	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Transfers	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)
Promotion	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Safety	X(-)	0	X(-)	0
Cost Reduction	0	0	X	0
Financial Policy	0	X	X(-)	0
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	0	X(-)
Work Standards	0	0	0	X(-)
Discipline	0	X(-)	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	0	0	0	X
Investment	X	0	0	0

X - Significant Loading x(-) - Significant Loading, Negative Sign
 0 - Insignificant Loading.

a Management decision like the decision to Transfer employees, but in the former decision without the influence of other groups as we have seen is true in the latter.

The remaining factors which had significant loadings on more than one variables do not seem to indicate a great deal individually. Indeed Table 5.28 does not indicate as clear and incisive a view on the part of Management as we would ideally have liked

Nor is a much clearer picture produced by a 'Varimax' rotation of the original factor matrix. This procedure will simplify the columns of the factor matrix, and should thus draw out distinctions between the constituent groups of our sample which define the columns (i.e. Management, Staff, Foremen, Hourly-Paid). Tables 5.29 and 5.30 do not, however, present a much clearer picture than we have presented in Tables 5.27 and 5.28.

The loadings required for significance (and thus for consideration) are the same as in Table 5.27 (the original factor matrix).

Table 5.30 makes clear the variables whose loadings are significant in each factor. As with the original factor matrix, there does not seem to be a consistent image in all - or even most - of the factors. Any factor which is of interest tends to be of an isolated meaning. For instance factor 3 in Table 5.30 indicates a dimension relating to 'Transfers' for all the groups in the sample. Factor 5 suggests the same thing for 'Cost Reduction' (though it is muddled by the presence of Staff influence on Recruitment. Factor 10 indicates a similar dimension on Safety - though smaller by the absence of Management, suggesting a distinction between the influence of Management and the influence of other groups on this issue. Management influence on Safety appears in Factor 7, with the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid on Redundancy - though with

Table 5.30

Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Work Pace	0	X	0	0
Promotion	0	X	0	X
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	X(-)	0
Work Standards	0	X(-)	0	0
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Transfers	X	x	X	X
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Orders	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	0	X
Work Discipline	X	X	0	X
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Safety	X(-)	0	0	0
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	0	X
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Safety	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Work Standards	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	X	X
Discipline	X	0	0	0

Table 5.30 (contd)

<u>Factor 12</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Pay	0	0	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 14</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 15</u>				
Investment	0	X	0	X
<u>Factor 16</u>				
Discipline	0	0	X	0

a negative sign. We suggested above that Management saw themselves as having more influence than the other groups on both Safety and Redundancy. Factor 7 and 10 - and in particular the reverse signs - would seem to emphasise this.

Despite the fact that the Varimax Rotation should have emphasised the aegument within groups (i.e. emphasised, for instance, those issues on which there was a Management influence dimension), this has not happened. Nor is this situation, as we shall see, much improved when we look at the analysis of their perceptions of how they think influence should be distributed. This lack of precision will, however, be seen to be interesting in relation to the results of Staff and Hourly-Paid whose view is much more clearly brought out by Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis. We shall, however, discuss this later. First of all we shall consider the results of our analysis of Management perceptions of how influence ought to be distributed.

Table 5.31 gives the results of the Linkage Analysis on Management perceptions of how influence ought to be distributed. This resulted in 15 Clusters. Within these 15 there is only one which is composed only of Management variables. This is Cluster 11 which contains Management influence on Investment, Financial Policy and Profitability. Cluster 3 is also of interest on Cost Reduction, Recruitment, and Decisions Affecting Orders, as well as Transfers (on which Supervisors are also mentioned) and Work Standards (on which Staff are also mentioned). In the case of Transfers, as we pointed out in the section above which was concerned with the Transfer of Employees between Departments/Jobs, supervisors did occupy a significant position as work requirements could mean employees being transferred on the authority of a supervisor (e.g. to do a specific job) as well as on the authority of a Management. The influence of Management on the standard to which work was to be done

would not be direct - it would take the form of instructions passed to employees via Supervisors. In this respect both Management and Staff would occupy non-direct roles. The active roles on standards of work would be occupied by Supervisors and Hourly-Paid employees. The presence of non-Management groups on these 2 issues is thus explicable in relation to the role which these groups played.

Thus on 8 of the 14 issues Management influence is seen as totally- or almost totally in Cluster 3 - distinct from the influence of other groups. On 3 of the remaining 6, however, there is an important contrast. Cluster 1 deals only with Safety - but includes all 4 groups. This, as we suggested above on how influence is seen as actually distributed on Transfer decisions, indicates unique variance on the issue of safety (i.e. that the issue is more powerful than the groups). Cluster 2 has a strong similarity, though is a little less clear. It includes Work Pace, and Pay decisions for all 4 groups, as well as Management influence on Promotion and Discipline, and supervisors influence on Investment. It would seem, therefore, there is a marked degree of unique variance on Pay decisions, and Work-Pace decisions - though given the greater number of variables in Cluster 2, less than is true for Safety decisions.

The remaining Clusters are composed of varying combinations of Staff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid influence on various decision areas e.g. Cluster 8 (all 3 on Redundancy), Cluster 13 (all 3 on Financial Policy), Cluster 14 (all 3 on Decisions Affecting Orders), Cluster 15 (all 3 on Decisions Affecting Profitability). The exception is Cluster 7 which includes only Hourly-Paid on Work Method decisions, and Management on Redundancy decisions. The correlation in this Cluster is negative, so the relationship must be inverse (e.g. high Management influence on Redundancy, low Hourly-Paid influence on Work Method decisions or vice-

Table 531 McQuitty Linkage Analysis Clusters of Management Perceptions
of Desired Distribution of Influence

Cluster 1

Management Influence on Safety Decisions
 Staff " " " "
 Foremen's " " " "
 Shop-Floor " " " "

Cluster 2

Management Influence on Work Pace Decisions
 Staff " " " " "
 Supervisors " " " " "
 Shop-Floor " " " " "
 Management " " Pay Decisions
 Staff " " " "
 Supervisors " " " "
 Shop-Floor " " " "
 Management " " Promotion Decisions
 " " " Discipline "
 Supervisors " " Investment "

Cluster 3

Management Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
 " " " Transfer "
 Supervisors " " " "
 Management " " Work Standards "
 Staff " " " " "
 Management " " Recruitment "
 " " " Decisions affecting Orders

Cluster 4

Staff Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
 Supervisors " " " " "
 Shop Floor " " " " "
 Supervisors " " Discipline "

Cluster 5

Staff Influence on Transfers
 Shop Floor " " "

Cluster 6

Supervisors Influence on Work Methods Decisions
 " " " Promotion "
 Staff " " Discipline "
 Shop Floor " " " "

Cluster 7

Shop Floor Influence on Work Method Decisions
 Management " " Redundancy "
 (Note Pearson Correlation was Negative)

Cluster 8

Staff Influence on Redundancy Decisions

Supervisors " " " "

Shop Floor " " " "

Supervisors Influence on Recruitment

Cluster 9

Staff Influence on Recruitment Decision

Shop Floor " " " "

Cluster 10

Staff Influence on Promotion Decisions

Shop Floor " " " "

Cluster 11

Management Influence on Investment Decisions

" " " Financial Policy Decisions

" " " Profitability "

Cluster 12

Staff Influence on Investment Decisions

Shop Floor " " " "

Cluster 13

Staff Influence on Financial Policy Decisions

Supervisors " " " " "

Shop Floor " " " " "

Cluster 14

Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting Orders

Supervisors " " " " "

Shop Floor " " " " "

Cluster 15

Staff Influence on Profitability Decisions

Supervisors " " " "

Shop Floor " " " "

versa). It is, however, difficult to find any explanation for this association.

The results of the Linkage Analysis are, as we suggested above, perhaps less clear than we may have liked. It is, however, clear that whatever direction there is in this analysis does tend to support the idea that Management influence ought to be seen as conceptually distinct from the influence of other groups. On these issues where this appears to break down a pragmatic explanation appears to be satisfactory.

The Factor Analysis of this data is given in Table 5.32, and as before those variables whose loading is significant are marked with an asterisk. Table 5.33 gives a more accessible view of those variables where the loading is significant by the Burt-Banks formula.

This Analysis suggests the existence of 2 Management sub groups:

- (a) a group which sees Management influence as relatively less distinct from that of other employees. This is represented by Factor 1 where the influence of all 4 groups appears over a number of decision areas. This factor explains 18.5% of total variance, suggesting this 'liberal' (at least relative to the other grouping) is the larger of the 2 groups whose existence we are suggesting. The issues on which sharing of influence appears are Work Pace, Pay, Cost Reduction and Transfer of Employees - none of which are strategic decision areas. Strategic decision areas - like Investment, Financial Policy etc. always appear to be quite distinct, even for this sub-group.
- (b) There is, however, a second sub group indicated by Factor 2. For this sub group Management influence on Pay, Cost Reduction and Transfer of Employees (and on Recruitment as well) is distinct. This view is reinforced by the negative signs for the significant variables of other

Table 5.33 Significant Variables in each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.1.)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Supervisors</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Work Pace	X	0	X	X
Pay	X	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	X	X	X	X
Transfers	X	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	X	X	X
Orders	X	0	X	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Pay	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	0	X	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	X(-)
Promotion	0	0	0	X(-)
Financial Policy	0	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)
Orders	0	0	X(-)	X(-)
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Work Pace	0	X(-)	0	0
Recruitment	0	X	X	0
Promotion	X(-)	X	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Orders	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Safety	0	X	X	0
Transfers	X	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	0	X(-)	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Investment	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Safety	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)
Investment	0	0	X	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X	0	X	0
Profitability	0	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)

Table 5.33'(contd)

<u>Factor 7</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Supervisors</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	0	0	0	X(-)
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	X(-)	0	0
Financial Policy	0	0	X	0

Factor 8

Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Investment	0	X	0	X

X Loading Significant

X(-) Loading Significant Sign Negative

0 Loading Not Significant

groups which enter this factor as significant later on (e.g. Financial Policy).

The remaining factors do not appear to have the same degree of clarity, and any interpretation would be, to that extent, confused. Tables 5.34 and 5.35 give the results of a Varimax Rotation of the original matrix. We suggested from the results of the factor analysis of this matrix, that 2 Management groups could be distinguished - (i) a relatively 'liberal', prepared to share influence with other groups on a restricted range of directly job related issues; and (ii) a group who sees Management influence as something which ought to be distinct on all issues - and not just on the more strategic issues (e.g. Financial Policy) which the former Management group also saw as distinct.

The rotated matrix does provide further confirmation of the existence of these 2 sub-groups (a) Factor 1 in Tables 5.34 and 5.35 indicates confirmation of the more liberal groups, as does Factor 4 and Factors 9 and 11, (b) the existence of a relatively less liberal group is confirmed by Factors 2, 5 and 6.

The factors specified in group (a) i.e. 1, 4, 9 and 11 all combine Management influence on various issues, with the influence of other groups. It is, however, interesting to note that these include what we have described as 'strategic issues' Financial Policy (Factor 4), and Orders (Factor 9). With respect to the former, however, the only Management influence in that Factor is on Safety decisions.

The factors specified in group (b) - 2, 5 and 6 - either exclude Management influence completely, being composed of the influence of other groups (Factors 2 and 5), or are composed almost entirely of Management influence (Factor 6 where only Hourly-Paid influence on Promotion appears with the influence of Management on a range of issues).

The remaining factors in Tables 5.34 and 5.35 do not appear to be particularly clear. The analysis has, however, provided some further support for the existence of 2 Management sub-groups, one relatively more liberal than the others. This liberalism, however, extends only as far as work-related issues. There is little evidence that there is strong support for sharing influence on strategic issues like Financial Policy. Any support for a dilution of Management dominance is purely related to job issues (e.g. Pay, Work Pace etc. - and as we have seen is not a view held by all Managers, with the existence of another group who would reject this view (the relatively less liberal) wishing to use Management influence dominant over all the issues we have considered.

It is, however, still true to say that Management perceptions (as a group) are less clear than those of Staff and Hourly-Paid. It may however be that to expect greater clarity from Management is unreasonable. What, in effect, we have done is to ask a group of insiders about what they do (i.e. Managers who take decisions). We have already said that the analyses of Staff and Hourly-Paid are clearer than we have seen among Management. These are in this sense outsiders. We may expect them to take a less complicated view of decision making. Management precisely because of their involvement are likely to take a more complicated view of decision-making.

This explanation does show why the Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Actual and Desired Influence was so complex. . . Despite this complexity, however, we have been able to point to Management influence being seen as distinctive from that of other groups (especially on strategic issues like Financial Policy, though slightly less so on routine decisions like Work Pace). It has, therefore, provided further support for the main thrust of our findings presented in this Chapter.

Table 5.35 Significant Variables in Each Factor

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Work Pace	X	0	X	0
Pay	X	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Pay	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	X	X	X
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Promotion	0	0	0	X
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Orders	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	X	0	0	0
Investment	0	0	X	0
Orders	X	0	0	0

Table 5.35 (contd)

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Investment	0	X	0	X
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Safety	X	X	X	X
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Recruitment	X(-)	X	0	X
Promotion	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Discipline	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 14</u>				
Recruitment	0	0	X	0
Promotion	0	0	X	0

Staff

The results of the Linkage Analysis of Staff perceptions of how influence is distributed, is presented in Table 5.36.

This Table indicates further support for the special nature of management influence. This is especially obvious in Cluster 1 which includes Management influence on 8 of the 14 decision areas which we are concerned with. This Cluster contains the influence of no other group except Management. It is, furthermore, interesting to note that issues like Pay, Promotion and Redundancy should appear in the same cluster as more 'strategic' issues like Investment and Financial Policy etc. We suggested already that those were perceived as decisions requiring special skills possessed only by Management and thus subject to a specially high degree of Management influence. The association of those job-related issues (like Pay and Promotion or Redundancy) with the strategic issues may indicate that among Staff, Management are seen as exercising a high degree of influence on their personal fortunes, which may explain the relatively recent and developing unionisation of Staff (at the time the research was actually carried out). Unionisation could well be seen as a means for Staff to protect themselves against what they perceive as a lack of influence on those 'personal' issues. Examination of Table 5.2 supports this argument in respect of Pay, as it can be seen from this that Staff see themselves as being at a disadvantage to the (already unionised) Hourly-Paid.

The remaining 6 Management variables appear in other clusters. Some appear to do so with little real meaning. Not all however can be said to be like this. For instance Cluster 5 is solely concerned with Work Standards. We found in looking at Management, that a similar view was taken by them about the Transfer of employees between Depts/Jobs. In that case we said that the issue had proved to be more important than any of the groups. Applying

that explanation here means that there is a feature of Work Standards which is quite unique. That may be what is discussed in Excerpt 5.15, where the Staff Respondent suggests that work has to be done to "such and such a standard, and that's it". In other words that the technical/engineering requirements of the job/product remove effective influence from any particular group. The standard of work is, in other words, simply a *given*.

In Cluster 8 Management influence on Discipline appears with the influence of Staff and Supervisors on Discipline. Within this Cluster as well is the influence of Staff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid on Investment and Financial Policy. It may well be that this is simply a statistical association. It could be suggested, however, that the association of Discipline, with Investment and Financial Policy is indicative of a Staff view about the exercise of Discipline within the Firm. It has to be remembered that Investment and Financial Policy were decisions of little influence from any group but Management. The association of that with Management, Staff and Supervisors influence on Discipline could suggest a perception of lack of Discipline within the Firm. This would give further weight to, for instance, Excerpt 5.14 (from a Staff Respondent) and Excerpt 5.16 (from an Hourly-Paid respondent) both of which suggest precisely this (i.e. a lack of discipline). This point was further developed by our own observation of failure to wear safety glasses, despite regulations. Why, however, do Hourly-Paid not appear here? Their unionisation - and its effectiveness in representing them - may be the reason for this. This is given some force by the fact that Hourly-Paid influence on Discipline appears in Cluster 2 with Management influence on 2 areas of decision-making.

The remaining clusters are largely composed of non-Management influence on particular areas i.e. Cluster 4 on Work Pace, Cluster 9 on Orders,

Table 5.36 McQuilty Linkage Analysis. Clusters of Staff Perceptions
of Actual Distribution of Influence

Cluster 1

Management Influence on Pay			
"	"	"	Redundancy
"	"	"	Promotion
"	"	"	Investment
"	"	"	Financial Policy
"	"	"	Decisions Affecting Order Situation
"	"	"	Company Profitability
"	"	"	Cost Reduction

Cluster 2

Management Influence on Safety			
"	"	"	Transfers
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"
"	"	"	Promotion
"	"	"	Discipline

Cluster 3

Staff Influence on Safety			
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"
Management	"	"	Work Pace

Cluster 4

Staff Influence on Work Pace			
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly Paid	"	"	"

Cluster 5

Management Influence on Work Standards			
Staff	"	"	"
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"

Cluster 6

Management Influence on Recruitment			
Staff	"	"	Profitability
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"

Cluster 7

Staff Influence on Recruitment			
Supervisors	"	"	"
Staff	"	"	Promotion
Supervisors	"	"	"

Table 5.36 (contd)

Cluster 8

Management Influence on Discipline

Staff	"	"	"
Supervisors	"	"	"
Staff	"	"	Investment
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"
Staff	"	"	Financial Policy
Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"

Cluster 9

Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting Order Situation

Supervisors	"	"	"	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"	"	"	"

Cluster 10

Staff Influence on Transfers

Supervisors	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"

Cluster 11

Staff Influence on Cost Reduction

Supervisors	"	"	"	"
Hourly-Paid	"	"	"	"

Cluster 12

Staff Influence on Pay

Supervisors	"	"	"
-------------	---	---	---

Cluster 13

Staff Influence on Redundancy

Supervisors	"	"	"
-------------	---	---	---

Cluster 14

Hourly Paid Influence on Pay

"	"	"	"	Redundancy
---	---	---	---	------------

Cluster 10 on Transfers, Cluster 11 on Cost Reduction and Cluster 3 on Safety (though Management influence on Work Place also appears here).

All of this again supports our contention of the 'special' nature of management influence - which is repeated in the Factor Analysis. Before going on to that, however, Clusters 12-14 are worthy of mention as they indicate a differentiation of on the one hand Hourly-Paid influence on Pay and Redundancy, and on the other hand Staff and Supervisory influence on these 2 areas. This is a further indication of the significance of unionisation for Staff. We have suggested this in relation to 2 other matters in this Section, and in this context it would seem clear that Staff differentiate between their influence on Pay and Redundancy, and that of Hourly-Paid employees. The role of unions in those 2 issues does of course require no elaboration. We shall see in the next Chapter the protective role of unions seen by Staff as the reason for becoming union members - and in particular the need for protection not from Management, but from the already unionised Hourly-Paid employees.

Table 5.37 gives the results of the Factor Analysis of Staff perceptions of the distribution of influence. Table 5.38 highlights the variables whose loading in each factor was significant (again by the Burt-Banks formula).

Unlike our findings for Management, this time there is one factor which explains a relatively large amount of variance (Factor 1 which explains 20.1%) while the remainder never explains any more than half of that (e.g. Factor 2 explains 7.8%).

Factor 1 in Table 5.37 and 5.38 is mainly concerned with the influence of non Management groups. Management only appear in Safety, Work Standards, Redundancy and (surprisingly!) Financial Policy. This factor specifies

Table 5.38 Significant Variables on Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.37)

Factor 1	Management	Staff	Supervisors	Hourly-Paid
Safety	X	0	X	0
Work Pace	0	0	X	0
Pay	0	0	X	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	X	X	X
Work Standards	X	X	X	X
Redundancy	X	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	X	X	X
Promotion	0	X	X	X
Discipline	0	X	X	X
Investment	0	X	X	X
Financial Policy	X	X	X	X
Orders	0	X	X	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
Factor 2				
Safety	0	X	X	X
Work Pace	0	X	X	0
Pay	0	X(-)	X(-)	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X(-)
Work Standards	X	X	0	0
Promotion	0	0	0	X(-)
Discipline	0	0	0	X(-)
Financial Policy	0	0	0	X(-)
Orders	X	0	X(-)	X(-)
Profitability	0	X	X	X
Factor 3				
Safety	0	X	0	X
Work Pace	0	0	0	X
Pay	X(-)	0	0	X
Cost Reduction	0	0	X	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Redundancy	X(-)	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	0	0	X
Investment	X(-)	0	0	X
Policy Policy	X(-)	0	0	X
Orders	X(-)	0	0	0
Profitability	X(-)	0	0	0
Factor 4				
Work Pace	0	X	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)	X(-)
Discipline	0	0	0	X
Orders	X	X	X	X
Profitability	X	0	0	0

Table 5.38 (contd)

<u>Factor 5</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Supervisors</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Work Pace	0	0	0	X
Pay	X	0	0	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Work Pace	0	0	X(-)	0
Pay	0	X	0	0
Transfers	0	X	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Investment	0	0	X(-)	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Redundancy	0	0	0	X(-)
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	X	0	0
Profitability	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Transfers	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X(-)	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	X	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Safety	X(-)	0	0	0
Work Pace	0	X	0	0
Transfers	0	0	X	0
Redundancy	X(-)	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Transfers	0	X(-)	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Investment	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Transfers	0	0	X	0
Redundancy	0	X	0	0

all 14 decision areas we are concerned with - and on 10 of them Management influence can be seen to be conceptually different for Staff. Similarly, in Factor 2, which contains 11 decision areas Management only appear twice - Work Standards and Orders. This, however, is a bi-polar factor. It suggests a continuum of influence e.g. if Staff have a high degree of influence on Safety or Work-Pace, their influence on Pay is relatively low. Similarly while Hourly-Paid have have a higher degree of influence on Safety, Cost Reduction and Profitability, their influence on Transfers, Promotion, Discipline, Financial Policy and Orders is relatively low.

In Factor 3, if we reverse all the signs, this can be interpreted as saying that if Management influence is high on Pay, Redundancy, Investment, Financial Policy, Orders and Profitability, the influence of Hourly-Paid on Safety, Work Pace, Pay, Cost Reductions, Transfers, Redundancy, Receruitlment, Promotion, Discipline, Investment and Financial Policy is relatively low (compared to that of Management).

It does, however, have to be remembered that in terms of explanatory power this 3rd factor has only about 30% of the power of the first factor. This, of course, becomes increasingly true as we move down through the factors - that they come to have increasingly less explanatory power. We shall, therefore, draw the attention of the reader also to factors of some particular interest.

Factor 4 repeats a *finding* shown in Table 5.36, Cluster 5 - namely the close association on perceptions of influence on Work Standards. The influence of all groups on Work Standards is significant in Factor 4, as is the influence of all groups on Decisions affecting Orders, though the signs are different, indicating a continuum with these 2 issues at either end. It is, however, difficult to see a meaning to this. It is more interesting to consider the fact that on these 2 issues - Work

Standards and Orders - the issue proved more powerful than perception of group influence. Indeed in Factor 1 Work Standards behaved in the same way - and in the linkage analysis. It would seem, therefore, that there is a very high degree of unique variance within Staff perceptions of Work Standards and that, therefore, perceptions of influence in Work Standards are rather different from perceptions of other issues. We suggested above, for instance, that it may be the view that Work Standards are exogeneous i.e. that they are set by the demands of the product and in that sense there is no decision to be made and no influence exerted,

The remaining factors after factor 6 explain 4% or less of variance each, and have only 4 or fewer significant variables each. As such they are of little interpretive value. Similarly while factors 4 and 5 do more in the way of explaining variance - about 5% each - and have a greater number of significant variables, their interpretation would be by no means clear.

We would thus direct the attention of the reader back to the first 3 factors which again indicate the conceptual distinctions of Management influence. This point is clarified further by a Variance rotation of the matrix. The results of the factor analysis of the rotated matrix is presented in Tables 5.39 and 5.40. A number of the factors in this factor analysis are worthy of note, though for different reasons:

- 1) there is a clear 'Management factor' - factor 4 specifies only Management influence on 7 of the 14 areas which we examined, including the 4 'strategic' issues we defined already (Investment, Financial Policy, Orders and Profitability) as well as Pay, Redundancy and Promotion,
- 2) there is a clear 'Hourly-Paid' factor - factor 9 - with the inclusion only of Staff on Discipline decisions. Factor 5 is also largely Hourly-Paid - though Staff and Foremen are also included on Pay decisions;
- 3) there are a number of Staff/Foremen factors -

Table 5.40 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.1)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Safety	X	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Profitability	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Promotion	0	X	0	0
Discipline	0	X	X	0
Investment	0	X	X	0
Financial Policy	0	X	0	0
Orders	0	X	X	0
Profitability	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Work Standards	X	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	X	0
Promotion	0	0	X	0
Investment	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Pay	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Pay	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
Investment	0	0	0	X
Financial Policy	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Cost Reduction	0	0	X	0
Transfers	0	X	X	0
Recruitment	0	0	X	X
Promotion	0	0	X	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Pay	0	X(-)	0	0
Investment	0	0	0	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Pay	0	0	X	0
Discipline	X	0	X	0
Financial Policy	X	0	X	0
Orders	0	0	X	0

Table 5.40 (contd)

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	X	0	X
Investment	0	0	0	X
Financial Policy	0	0	0	X
Orders	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Safety	0	0	0	X
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Investment	0	0	0	X(-)
Orders	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Transfers	X	0	0	X
<u>Factor 14</u>				
Redundancy	0	X	X	0
Recruitment	0	X	X	0
Promotion	0	X	0	0
Investment	0	0	X	0
Financial Policy	0	X	X	0
<u>Factor 15</u>				
Safety	X(-)	0	0	0
Financial Policy	0	0	X	X

- (i) Factor 2 - both Staff and Foremen
- (ii) Factor 14 - both Staff and Foremen
- (iii) Factor 6 - Foremen, with Staff and Hourly-Paid significant on one variable each,
- (iv) Factor 8 - Foremen with Management also significant on Discipline and Financial Policy decisions,
- (v) Factor 3 - Foremen, on 3 issues significant alone, and with all other groups on Work Standards.

Thus on 8 of the 15 factors produced by the Varimax Rotation, one group appears exclusively, or is at least dominant. Thus provides further support for -

- (1) the main hypothesis of the role of Management decision-making in hierarchy - especially Factor 4,
- (2) the view we have presented at various points in this Chapter, that Staff Distinguish between themselves, and Hourly-Paid employees, and between themselves and Management to a greater degree than either of the other 2 groups. We are not suggesting that Management, for instance, see Staff and Hourly-Paid as a single group. It has been made clear that Management do see distinctions between Staff and Hourly-Paid. These distinctions are, however, more pronounced in Staff perceptions. This is consistent with what we have established already i.e. that Staff watch their relative position to Hourly-Paid employees very carefully indeed.

It is, furthermore, interesting to note a feature which has not been apparent in other groups - namely a perception of a 'special' influence for Foremen (who are, of course, part of the Staff group). In Factors 3, 6 and 8, for instance, the significant backings are on variables concerned with the influence of Foremen. It is widely accepted that the role of the Foreman has undergone such significant change over the last 20-30 years

that the role is now in difficulty (see, for instance, John Child and Bruce Partridge "The Lost Supervisors", or David Dunkerly "The Foreman"). This result is, however, some indication of the continual existence of a special role for Foremen. This is not to say that their old role will re-appear at some future point - indeed when we deal with Supervision in the next Chapter we shall see -

- (i) an overall satisfaction with Supervision expressed by those being supervised,
- (ii) the role of the Foreman, on the Shop Floor, was seen as essentially an enabling role - of ensuring work was done by giving advice, having materials etc. available - but with little or none of the disciplinary element which has been traditional to the role.

We shall argue in Appendix 6 that, at least as far as the supervised are concerned, it is this enabling role which ought to be developed among Foremen. It is, however, interesting that in Factors 6 and 8 the Foreman's influence on Discipline is significant in each of Factor 6 and Factor 8. Two points have to be understood in relation to this -

- (a) that these are views expressed by Staff alone, and not, for instance, by Hourly-Paid, and
- (b) the criticism of the disciplinary role was mainly aimed at arbitrary discipline once exercised by Foremen. A degree of discipline was clearly felt to be required, but within prescribed limits.

Table 5.41 shows the clusters which emerged from a McQuitty Linkage Analysis of the data from questions to Staff on how they considered Influence ought to be distributed. These 16 clusters altogether each containing from 2 to 5 variables. With the exception of Cluster 1 (which largely deals with Influence on Decisions about Safety) the clusters are either -

Table 5.41 McQuitty Linkage Analysis Clusters of Staff Perceptions of Desired Distribution of Influence

Cluster 1

Management	Influence	on	Safety	Decisions
Staff	"	"	"	"
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop Floor	"	"	"	"
"	"	"	"	Transfers

Cluster 2

Management	Influence	on	Work	Pace
"	"	"	"	Transfers
"	"	"	"	Financial Policy

Cluster 3

Staff	Influence	on	Work	Pace
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop Floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 4

Management	Influence	on	Pay
"	"	"	Work Standards
"	"	"	Discipline
"	"	"	Orders

Cluster 5

Staff	Influence	on	Pay
Foremen's	"	"	"
Shop Floor	"	"	"

Cluster 6

Management	Influence	on	Cost	Reduction
"	"	"	"	Redundancy
"	"	"	"	Investment
"	"	"	"	Profitability.

Cluster 7

Staff	Influence	on	Cost	Reduction
Foremen's	"	"	"	"

Cluster 8

Shop Floor	Influence	on	Cost	Reduction
Staff	"	"	"	Transfers
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Staff	"	"	"	Work Standards
Foremen's	"	"	"	"
Shop Floor	"	"	"	"

Cluster 9

Staff	Influence	on	Redundancy
Foremen's	"	"	"
Shop Floor	"	"	"

Cluster 10

Management Influence on Recruitment
" " " Promotion

Cluster 11

Staff Influence on Recruitment
Foremen's " " "
Shop Floor " " "
Staff " " Promotion
Shop Floor " " "

Cluster 12

Foremen's Influence on Promotion
Staff " " Profitability
Foremen's " " "
Shop Floor " " "

Cluster 13

Staff Influence on Discipline
Foremen's " " "
Shop Floor " " "

Cluster 14

Staff Influence on Investment
Foremen's " " "

Cluster 15

Shop Floor Influence on Investment
Staff " " Financial Policy
Foremen's " " " "
Shop Floor " " " "

Cluster 16

Staff Influence on Orders
Foremen's " " "
Shop Floor " " "

- (a) entirely concerned with Management influence on various issues (i.e. Clusters 2, 4, 6 and 10), or
- (b) concerned with the influence of the 3 groups other than Management on the decision areas dealt with.

We suggested in analysis of the Staff data on the actual distribution of influence, that it offered support to our theories of Management influence being perceived as 'special'. It would appear from the results of Table 5.41 to have an even more special quality in relation to the desired distribution of influence, as only in one Cluster (number 1) does the influence of Management appear with the influence of any other group. In 5 clusters (3, 5, 9, 13, 16) there is the influence of Staff, and Foremen, and Hourly Paid on a single decision area. The remaining 'non-Management' clusters (1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14) are each composed of the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid on more than one decision area. Clusters 2, 4, 6 and 10 are solely composed of Management influence. There is, however, no clear meaning to the grouping of decision areas in each cluster - except perhaps cluster 10 which deals with Promotion and Recruitment. The remaining 3 are composed of decisions which are directly related to particular jobs (e.g. Work Pace and Transfers) while others are related to strategic decisions (e.g. Financial Policy) - taking Cluster 2 as our example. The same thing can, however, be seen in clusters 4 and 6. We are unable to conjecture as to why this may be. It has already been seen in this chapter that on strategic decisions, like Financial Policy, the influence of Management is at its height. Quite why it should be associated with these non-strategic issues (e.g. Work Pace) is unknown. It is, however, clear that the special quality of Management influence has remained. It is perhaps expecting a little too much to have all types of Management influence in one cluster, or in two - Strategic and Non-Strategic.

Tables 5.42 and 5.43 deal with the Factor Analysis of this data. The results of this analysis again point to the same argument as for the Linkage Analysis and the preceding Control Analysis - namely that the influence of Management has a special quality. Table 5.43 makes this point particularly clear. Nearly all the Factors are either exclusively Management or non-Management - Factor 1 has no significant Management variable - or are predominantly a Management Factor, while the others are again predominantly non-Management, except Factors 7 and 8 (which are unclear) and Factor 12 (which is entirely Management, but of unclear meaning). The Factor Analysis has, therefore, once again incisively pointed to a clear distinction in the perceptions of the Staff sample between Management influence, and the influence of other groups.

Tables 5.44 and 5.45 give the results of a Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis. This shows our argument even more clearly. Even considering how they would like influence on decisions to be distributed, there is a clear distinction between Management and non-Management influence. Factors 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14 are all composed of non-Management influence. Only in Factors 2 (which concerns Safety only) 3 and 5 does a Management variable appear with a non-Management influence variable.

It is interesting to note that in Factor 4 all 3 of the 4 strategic influence variables (Financial Policy, Orders and Profitability - but not Investment) appear together.

This section on Staff perceptions of Influence - both how it is actually distributed, and how they would it to be distributed - provide further support for the argument that we have made throughout this chapter. Namely that the influence of Management has a special quality which differentiates it from that of other non-Management influence. We have shown, using

Table 5.43 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.42)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Safety	0	X	X	X
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	0	X	0	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	0	0
Transfers	0	X	0	X
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	X	X	X
Promotion	0	X	X	X
Discipline	0	X	X	X
Investment	0	X	X	X
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	X	X	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Pay	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	X	X	X
Transfers	X	0	X	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	X(-)
Promotion	X	0	0	X(-)
Discipline	X	X	X	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	X(-)
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Safety	0	X	X	X
Pay	0	X	X	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Promotion	0	0	X(-)	0
Profitability	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Safety	X	X	0	0
Pay	0	0	0	X
Cost Reduction	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X(-)
Discipline	0	0	0	X(-)
Investment	0	0	0	X(-)
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Work Pace	0	X(-)	0	X(-)
Pay	0	0	0	X(-)
Transfers	0	0	X	0
Work Standards	0	0	X	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	X
Promotion	0	X(-)	0	0

Table 5.43 (contd)

<u>Factor 6</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Safety	0	0	0	X(-)
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
Recruitment;	0	0	0	X
Investment	0	0	0	X
Orders	X	0	0	X
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Safety	0	0	X	0
Work Standards	0	X(-)	0	0
Recruitment	X(-)	0	0	0
Promotion	X(-)	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Profitability	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	X(-)	0
Redundancy	0	0	X(-)	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Safety	0	0	X(-)	0
Pay	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	X	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Transfers	X	0	0	X
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Redundancy	0	X	0	0
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
Orderss	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X(-)	0	0	0

Table 5.45 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.44)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Redundancy	0	X	X	0
Recruitment	0	X	X	0
Promotion	0	X	X	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
Investment	0	X	X	X
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	X	X	0
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Safety	X	X	X	X
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Orders	0	X	X	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Discipline	X(-)	0	0	0
Financial Policy	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Promotion	0	0	X	0
Discipline	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Pay	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Pay	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	0	X	0

<u>Factor 9</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
Transfers	0	X	X	0
Discipline	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	0	X	X
Investment	0	0	0	X
Profitability	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	0	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
Promotion	0	X	0	X
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Orders	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Profitability	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 14</u>				
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	0	X	0

Tannenbaum Control methods, that (i) Management are perceived as dominant in every decision area, and (ii) Staff perceive that this dominance should continue - though subject to greater non-Management influence. The McQuitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis provide results which yield further support to this.

We shall now move on to consider the results of the same analysis of Hourly-Paid data.

Hourly-Paid

We have seen in the earlier parts of this chapter that, like Staff, Hourly-Paid respondents have a perception of Management influence as being imbued with a special quality. That finding is given further support by the following McQuitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis. Perhaps equally interesting, we shall see an indication of Staff influence (distinct from that of Foremen) is also perceived as qualitatively different from that of Management, and of Hourly-Paid employees, i.e. that unlike the view we have suggested exists for Management and Staff, whereby Management influence is on one level, and the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid exist on another level, for Hourly-Paid workers there is not just a distinctiveness about Management influence, but also about Staff influence.

This latter point can be seen immediately in Table 5.46 which shows the results of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly-Paid perceptions of the Actual Distribution of Influence. Cluster 1 is clearly dominated by Staff variables (9 of the 14 available), with only Hourly-Paid influence on Pay intervening. Of the 5 Staff variables outstanding (a) in 2 of them - Pay and Cost Reduction (clusters 12 and 13) - they appear with Foremen, and (b) 2 of the other 3 - Safety (cluster 2) - and Transfers (cluster 6) - they appear with all 3 of the other groups. Work Pace in cluster 7 is

Table 5.46 McQuitty Linkage Analysis Clusters of Hourly Paid Perceptions
of Actual Distribution of Influence

Cluster 1

Staff Influence on	Redundancy
"	" Recruitment
"	" Discipline
"	" Work Standards
"	" Promotion
"	" Financial Policy
"	" Investment
"	" Orders
"	" Profitability
Hourly Paid Influence on	Pay

Cluster 2

Management Influence on	Recruitment
"	" Promotion
"	" Discipline
"	" Safety
Staff	" "
Foremen's	" "
Hourly Paid	" "

Cluster 3

Management Influence on	Work Standards
Hourly Paid	" Redundancy
"	" Recruitment
"	" Promotion
"	" Financial Policy
"	" Orders
Foremen's	" "

Cluster 4

Foremen's Influence on	Promotion
"	" Investment
Hourly Paid	" "
Foremen's	" Work Standards
Hourly Paid	" " "

Cluster 5

Management Influence on	Investment
"	" Profitability
"	" Orders
"	" Work Pace
Foremen's	" " "

Cluster 6

Management Influence on	Transfers
Staff	" " "
Foremen's	" " "
Hourly Paid	" " "

Table 5.46 (contd)

Cluster 7

Staff Influence on Work Pace
Foremen's " " Redundancy
Hourly Paid " " Work Pace

Cluster 8

Foremen's Influence on Recruitment
" " " Discipline
Hourly Paid " " "

Cluster 9

Management Influence on Pay
" " " Financial Policy

Cluster 10

Management Influence on Cost Reduction
" " " Redundancy

Cluster 11

Foremen's Influence on Profitability
Hourly Paid " " "

Cluster 12

Staff Influence on Pay
Foremen's " " "

Cluster 13

Staff Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen's " " " "

Cluster 14

Hourly Paid Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen's " " Financial Policy

the outstanding variable. It is clear, therefore, that on the basis of the McQuitty Analysis, Staff influence is largely regarded as conceptually distinct from that of other groups.

The findings in Cluster 2 and Cluster 6 are much as one would expect, given the discussion of Hourly-Paid perceptions of Safety and Transfers as largely consensual matters (in particular the former). Cluster 12 is also not surprising as the annual salary negotiations for Staff and Foremen were in the main carried on in the same bargaining unit. The finding on Cost Reduction (Cluster 13) is more surprising, as is the position of Staff influence on Work Pace in Cluster 7.

The fact that Hourly Paid see Staff influence in this way leaves the Foremen in an uncertain position. Is the influence of Foremen also seen as distinctive? Is it seen in the same terms as that of Management (i.e. as the direct representatives of Management on the Shop Floor)? Is it seen in the same terms as that of Hourly Paid themselves? Examining the location of Foremen variables we find them to be distributed as follows:

- (i) Seven of them appear in clusters only with Hourly-Paid variables (Clusters 4, 8, 11, 14 being the Foremen variables on influence on Promotion Investment, Work Standards: Recruitment, Discipline: Profitability: Financial Policy).
- (ii) One of them with Management and Hourly Paid Variables (Cluster 3 - mainly an Hourly-Paid Cluster)
- (iii) One of them with a Staff and Hourly Paid Variable (Cluster 7)
- (iv) Two of them with Management, Staff and Hourly Paid Variables (Cluster 2 and Cluster 6 which include Foremen influence on Safety, and Transfers - both of which we have suggested already are consensual matters).
- (v) Two of them with a Staff variable (Clusters 12 and 13 which deal with Pay and Cost Reduction).

(vi) One of them with Management variables (Cluster 5) - Foremen's influence on Work Pace.

Thus if we take cases (i) - (iv) 11 of the 14 Foremen variables appear in a cluster which also specifies one or more Hourly Paid variables. Indeed 7 of these 11 variables appear in clusters which are composed only of Foremen and Hourly Paid variables. It would, therefore, seem to be the case that Foremen are perceived by Hourly Paid - at least in terms of influence - to be largely 'one of us'. Two Foremen variables (Pay and Cost Reduction) enter into 2 clusters with Staff variables (influence on Pay and Cost Reduction) and one Foremen variable (Work Pace) into a Cluster with Management variables (on Investment, Profitability, Orders and Work Pace). The remaining 4 Foremen variables appear in clusters in which there are at least 2 other groups besides Foremen.

Only on influence on Work Pace is there a clear identification with Management, and on Pay and Cost Reduction with Staff - the remaining types of influence appear mainly with Hourly Paid alone, or in 4 cases with a combination of other groups. That Foremen should be identified with Management where Work Pace is concerned is perhaps not altogether a surprise - but what about the associated variable, Discipline, or Standard of Work - in both of these cases the relevant variable appears in a cluster with Hourly Paid alone (Clusters 8 and 4 respectively)! The dominant association of Foremen for Hourly-Paid would, therefore, appear to be with them.

Management influence is, as we suggested above, also regarded as distinct. In two clusters (9 and 10) there is only Management influence present (Pay and Financial Policy: Cost Reduction and Redundancy). The remaining 10 Management variables do appear in clusters containing variables of other groups. This, however, does less harm to the idea of a special quality for

Management influence than it may appear.

There are 4 such clusters where Management influence is combined with the influence of other groups.

(a) Cluster 2. This is clearly a 'Management' cluster, including as it does 4 Management influence variables, as well as the influence of the other 3 groups on Safety which is, we have argued already, largely a consensual matter.

(b) Cluster 3. This is largely an 'Hourly Paid' cluster, with 5 Hourly Paid variables, and are Management and one Foremen variable entering in.

(c) Cluster 5. This again is clearly a Management cluster, including 4 Management variables, with a single Foremen variable.

(d) Cluster 6. This clearly concerns the issue of Transfers rather than demarcating the groups. Like Safety we have suggested that this is largely a matter of consensus.

Thus of these 4 clusters we would suggest that 2 of them - Clusters 2 and Cluster 5 - can be regarded as Management Clusters. This would account for a further 8 Management variables. The remaining 2 Management variables would then be attributed to (i) statistical chance - Cluster 3 and (ii) an issue in Transfers which dominated the distinctiveness of the influence of Management.

The perceptions of the distribution of influence among the Hourly Paid would, therefore, seem to be based on 3 'types of influence' -

(a) that of Management,

(b) that of Staff,

(c) that of Hourly Paid, and of Foremen (though as we have suggested there are certain distinctions between the 2 groups).

The question which now arises is whether the Factor Analysis gives support to this? The data is presented, in the usual way, in Tables 5.47 and 5.48, and would appear not to yield a great deal of support, particularly to the perceived distinction of Staff and Foreman.

If, for instance, we look at Factor 1, which explains 21.7% of the variance, it could be described as a 'non-Management' factor as the 3 non-Management groups (Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid) are all heavily suspended (11 significant variables, 11 significant variables and 13 significant variables respectively). There are no significant Management variables and the only decision-area not included is Safety (Safety is 'dealt with' in Factor 3, where the variables of all the groups on Safety are significant. Given its 'consensus' basis, this is as we would have expected).

Factor 2 does provide some limited support for a distinctive Staff influence as of the 11 decision areas in this Factor Staff variables are significant in 10 cases (in 9 the sign is negative), while Management have 34, Foremen 2, and Hourly Paid 3 significant variables. Influence on Work Pace yields significant variables for all 4 groups.

Factor 4 would appear to be a Management Factor, with their variables being significant in 6 of the 7 decision areas in the Factor. The non-significance of Hourly Paid on Pay is a notably interesting feature of this Factor.

Factors 6 and 7 would also seem to be minor Management factors. There does not seem to be any clear meaning to the other factors produced here (5, 8 and 9).

The results of this Principal Factor Analysis would seem to provide limited

Table 5.48 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.47)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Work Pace	0	0	0	X
Pay	0	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	0	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	X	0	X
Promotion	0	X	X	X
Discipline	0	X	X	X
Investment	0	X	X	X
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	X	X	X
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Work Pace	X	X	X	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Work Standards	X	X(-)	0	0
Redundancy	0	X(-)	X	0
Recruitment	0	X(-)	0	X
Promotion	X	X(-)	0	0
Discipline	X	X(-)	0	0
Investment	0	X(-)	0	0
Financial Policy	0	X(-)	0	0
Orders	0	X(-)	0	0
Profitability	0	X(-)	0	0
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Safety	X	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Transfers	0	0	0	X(-)
Recruitment	0	0	X	0
Discipline	0	0	X	X
Financial Policy	0	X(-)	0	X(-)
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	0	0
Pay	X	X	X	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	0
Recruitment	X	0	X	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Safety	0	X(-)	X(-)	0
Work Pace	0	0	X	0
Transfers	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	X	0	0	0

Table 5.48 (contd)

<u>Factor 6</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Safety	0	X	0	0
Work Pace	X(-)	0	0	0
Pay	X	0	X	0
Discipline	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Pay	0	X(-)	X(-)	0
Transfers	X	X	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Work Standards	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Cost Reduction	0	0	X(-)	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0

support to the 2 arguments being advanced here i.e. that Management influence is seen as distinct, and to a lesser extent that Staff influence also is regarded as distinct.

The results of a Varimax rotation provide much stronger support. The results of this rotation of the factor matrix appears in Tables 5.49 and 5.50.

On this basis Factor 1 is clearly a Staff factor, giving support to the idea of a distinctive Staff influence. Factor 2 gives some further support as while it is clearly an Hourly Paid factor, Foremen are well represented, certainly much more so than Staff. Factor 3 would seem to be a Management factor, as does Factor 6, 9 and 13 (though these are of minor importance). Factors 4 and 5 would appear to be 'decision-area' factors rather than groups factors (Safety and Transfers respectively - the 2 consensual factors). The remaining factors do not appear to have any clear meaning.

Thus, if we concentrate on the first 3 factors, they provide further, and more distinctive support for what we found in the McQuitty Linkage Analysis (Table 5.46) - namely -

- (a) a distinctive Management influence - Factor 3
- (b) a distinctive Staff influence - Factor 1
- (c) a distinctive Hourly Paid and Foreman influence - Factor 2.

We have, therefore, been able to establish further support for our view of the power of hierarchical groups being distinctively and qualitatively different. So far - in looking at Management and Staff - the image which has emerged has been of Management influence being distinguished from that of the other 3 groups, within whom there is no distinction. In this section, however, we have been able to refine that latter point in the case of Hourly Paid perceptions. Hourly Paid share with Management and

Table 5.50 Significant Variable in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.19)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	0
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	X	0	0
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
Promotion	0	X	X	0
Discipline	0	X	0	0
Investment	0	X	0	0
Financial Policy	0	X	0	0
Orders	0	X	0	0
Profitability	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Cost Reduction	0	0	0	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Work Standards	0	0	X	X
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	0	X
Investment	0	0	X	X
Financial Policy	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	0	X	X
Profitability	0	0	X	X
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Work Pace	X	0	X	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Safety	X	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Transfers	X	X	X	X
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Pay	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	0	0	0	X
Work Standards	0	0	X	X
Discipline	0	0	X	X
Investment	0	0	X	0

Table 5.50 (contd)

<u>Factor 8</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Work Pace	0	0	0	X
Pay	0	X	X	0
Promotion	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	0	X(-)	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	0	X	0
Profitability	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	X	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Pay	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	X(-)	0
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0

Staff a perception of a distinctive Management influence, but unlike Management and Staff they do not see the non-Management groups as amorphous, rather they distinguish between (i) Staff and (ii) themselves and their Foremen. This, however, is in the context of how they perceive the present (how influence is actually distributed), what we want to move onto now is how the Hourly Paid would wish to see influence distributed.

Table 5.51 presents the results of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly Paid Perceptions of their Desired Distribution of Influence. A particularly striking cluster is cluster 3, which is solely composed of Management. In fact 7 of the 14 Management variables appear in this Cluster, which provides further support for our claim of a special quality being attached to Management influence. The remaining 7 Management variables appear in 2 other clusters -

(a) Cluster 1 - Management influence on Safety, Pay, Redundancy and Recruitment.

(b) Cluster 7 - Management influence on Transfers, Promotion and Orders.

The distinction between Cluster 3 on the one hand, and Clusters 1 and 7 on the other, may be that the issues of Cluster 3 may be seen as peculiarly Management - these are the issues on which Management influence should be most special. The issues in Clusters 1 and 7 may, therefore, be concerned with a Management influence which is less special - but special nonetheless. For instance in Cluster 1 while other groups enter into this Cluster, with the exception of Recruitment only Management has influence on Safety, Pay and Redundancy. This is unlike Cluster 7 where as well as Management influence on Transfers there is also Staff, Foremen's and Hourly Paid influence on Transfers.

This may suggest a very fine grading of Management influence -

(i) those issues specified in Cluster 3 may be associated with the highest

Table 5.51: McQuitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly Paid Perceptions of Desired Distribution of Influence

Cluster 1

Management	Influence on	Safety
"	"	" Pay
"	"	" Redundancy
"	"	" Recruitment
Foremen's	"	"
Staff	"	" Work Pace
Foremen's	"	"
Hourly Paid	"	"
Foremen's	"	" Promotion
"	"	" Discipline
Hourly Paid	"	"

Cluster 2

Staff	Influence on	Safety
Foremen	"	"
Hourly Paid	"	"

Cluster 3

Management	Influence on	Work Pace
"	"	" Cost Reduction
"	"	" Work Standards
"	"	" Discipline
"	"	" Investment
"	"	" Financial Policy
"	"	" Profitability

Cluster 4

Staff	Influence on	Pay
Foremen's	"	"
"	"	" Redundancy

Cluster 5

Hourly Paid	Influence on	Pay
"	"	" Redundancy
"	"	" Recruitment

Cluster 6

Staff	Influence on	Cost Reduction
Foremen's	"	"
Hourly Paid	"	"

Cluster 7

Management	Influence on	Transfers
Staff	"	"
Foremen's	"	"
Hourly Paid	"	"
Management	"	" Promotion
"	"	" Orders

Table 5.51 (contd)

Cluster 8

Staff Influence on	Work Standards
"	" Investment
"	" Orders
"	" Profits

Cluster 9

Foremen's Influence on	Work Standards
Hourly Paid	" " " "

Cluster 10

Staff Influence on	Redundancy
"	" Recruitment
"	" Promotion
"	" Discipline
"	" Financial Policy

Cluster 11

Hourly Paid Influence on	Promotion
Foremen's	" " Financial Policy
Hourly Paid	" " " "
Foremen's	" " Orders
Hourly Paid	" " " "

Cluster 12

Foremen's Influence on	Profits
Hourly Paid	" " " "

Cluster 13

Foremen's Influence on	Investment
Hourly Paid	" " " "

level of special Management influence,

(2) the special quality of the influence of Management on those issues in Cluster 1 is slightly less

(3) the special quality of Management influence in Cluster 3 is slightly less again.

This, however, is only a tentative suggestion, as this method is not nearly significantly powerful to make such a claim. The suggestion is based purely on the degree of Management exclusivity in each of these 3 Clusters.

It is, however, clear that Management influence is still seen as distinct for Hourly Paid employees, even when they are asked how they would ideally like influence to be distributed. It is evident that even on that basis Management are still dominant, and to that extent hierarchy also.

We did, however, show above in looking at 'Actual Influence' that for the Hourly Paid Staff influence was distinct as well - and distinct from that of Foremen, who were mainly (but not exclusively) associated with the Hourly Paid. Table 5.51 shows clearly that that situation still exists, even now in dealing with Desired Distribution of Influence.

If we take Staff first, 9 of their 14 variables appear in 2 clusters - clusters 8 and 10 - where no other groups appear. Clusters 8 and 10 are **exclusively** Staff. Of the 9 variables in Clusters 8 and 10, 5 of them are issues which appeared in the exclusively Management Cluster 3 - Work Standards, Investments, Profit, Discipline and Financial Policy. Further examination of the table shows that on these issues Foremen and Hourly paid appear together in other clusters (Clusters 9, 13, 12, 1, and 11 respectively). Thus on those issues there is an Hourly Paid perception of (i) Management influence (ii) Staff influence, and (iii) Foremen

and Hourly Paid influence, as 3 conceptually distinct matters.

The 4 issues in Clusters 8 and 10 which did not also appear in Cluster 3 were Orders, Redundancy and Promotion and Recruitment. In the case of influence on Orders, the Management influence appears in Cluster 7 and that of Foremen and Hourly Paid in Cluster 11, which may allow for a similar, but weaker, claim for a corresponding perception of 3 distinct influence groups as discussed above. In the case of Redundancy and Promotion, however, there would appear to be 4 influence groups. In the case of Redundancy, Management appears in Cluster 1, Staff in Cluster 10, Foremen in Cluster 4, and Hourly Paid in Cluster 5. In the case of Promotion, Management appear in Cluster 7, Staff in Cluster 10, Foremen in Cluster 1, and Hourly Paid in Cluster 11.

The ninth issue - Recruitment - is slightly different, as while Staff and Hourly Paid influence appear to be regarded as distinct (appearing in Clusters 10 and 5 respectively) the influence of Management and Foremen appears together in Cluster 1. Thus on decisions about Recruitment there are, once again, 3 distinct groups of influence, but not as before (i.e. Management/Staff/Foremen and Hourly Paid), but rather Management and Foremen/Staff/Hourly Paid).

The remaining 4 issues - Work Pace, Cost Reduction, Safety and Transfers - appear in Clusters 1, 6, 2, and 7 respectively. The first 3 indicate that the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid are regarded as identical, with only Management not appearing. In the case of Transfers, however, there is a clear perceived consensus as all 4 groups appear.

Thus the Hourly Paid perception of Staff in relation to the Desired Distribution of Influence, is similar to that in relation to the Actual

Distributor - namely that like Management they constitute a distinct group. This is clearly true of the 9 variables which appear in Clusters 8 and 10. Of the remaining 5 variables 2 of them appear in Clusters 1 and 7 with all 3 other groups, 2 with Foremen and Hourly Paid in Clusters 2 and 6, and 1 with Foremen above in Cluster 4. The distinction, therefore, cannot be described as one which is as clear as that of Management. It is, however, a conceptual distinction evident only amongst Hourly Paid.

We saw in discussing the perceived influence of Foremen in relation to the distribution of Actual Variance, that they tended to be associated with Hourly Paid. Table 5.51 shows this association to be present in relation to Desired Influence, though to a slightly lower degree.

(a) 5 Foremen variables appear only with Hourly Paid (in Table 5.46 the corresponding number was 7) - Work Standards (Cluster 9): Financial Policy and Orders (Cluster 11): Profitability (Cluster 12): Investment (Cluster 13). Of those 5 only Orders did not appear in this group in Table 5.46 and Promotion, Recruitment and Discipline have disappeared from this group. These 3 issues now appear on Cluster 1 - Foremen's influence on Recruitment with that of Management; Foremen's influence on Discipline with that of Hourly Paid; and Foremen's influence on Promotion on its own. The strength of association between Foremen and Hourly Paid is, therefore, slightly less - but still apparent, and clearly stronger than the association of Foremen and Staff.

(b) Foremen and Staff only appear together, with no other groups, in Cluster 4, where there are Staff and Foremen's influence on Pay (both belong to the same bargaining unit (and Foremen's influence on Redundancy. Thus only 2 Foremen variables have a clear Staff association.

(c) A further 2 Foremen variables appear in Clusters 2 and 6 - but Hourly Paid also appear. Those clusters deal with Safety and Cost

Reduction, and as we have suggested before those Clusters indicate a dichotomy of Management influence on one hand, and that of the other 3 groups on the other..

(d) The remaining 5 Foremen variables appear in clusters where Management, Staff and Hourly Paid also appear. Foremen influence on Transfers appear in Cluster 7. As we suggested above this Cluster suggests a desired consensus on Transfers as the influence of all 4 groups appear in this Cluster. The remaining 4 variables appear in Cluster 1, where all 4 groups again appear - Foremen's influence on Discipline appears with that of Hourly Paid; Foremen's influence on Recruitment appears with Management; Foremen's influence on Work Pace appears with Staff and Hourly Paid.

There is, therefore, certainly a much less clear association of Staff with Foremen, in the perceptions of Hourly Paid than there was in the perceptions of Management or Staff. There is, furthermore, a stronger tendency to associate Foremen with Hourly Paid than with Staff - as we described already in considering Actual Influence.

Hourly Paid variables fall into 4 categories in Table 5.51 -

(1) Cluster 5 which contains only 3 variables, but all of which are Hourly Paid - viz, Pay, Redundancy and Recruitment. This may reflect their 'trade union attachment', as all 3 were areas on which there were strong negotiating rights - especially Pay and Recruitment (there was a Closed Shop among Hourly Paid workers). We can be less clear about Redundancy as at the time of our research there had not been a redundancy of any size for at least 15 years.

(2) Hourly Paid variables in clusters with Foremen variables. This accounts for a further 6 variables. Five of these appear in a cluster with the same Foremen variable - Work Standards (Cluster 9); Financial Policy and Orders (Cluster 11); Profitability (Cluster 12); Investment (Cluster 13). In all of these issues the Foremen and Hourly Paid variables appear together

in the same cluster. The 6th variable is Promotion as the Hourly Paid variable appears in Cluster 11 and the Foremen variable in Cluster 1.

(3) Two further variables which appear in clusters with Staff and Foremen but contain only a single issue - Cluster 2 on Safety, and Cluster 6 on Cost Reduction.

(4) The remaining 3 variables which appear in clusters with Management, Staff and Foremen - Cluster 7 where Hourly Paid influence on Transfers appears with that of the other 3 groups. We have suggested already that this indicates a desired consensus on Transferring employees from one job to another (i.e. that all concerned should agree with a particular employee should be put to work). Two Management variables (in addition to that on Transfers) appear in this Cluster. The final 2 variables appear in the largest and more complex Cluster 1 - Hourly Paid influence on Work Pace appears with that of Staff and Foremen (like a category 3 variable in this section), and Hourly Paid influence on Discipline appears with that of Foremen (like a category 2 variable).

Thus 9 or 10 of Hourly Paid variables emphasise a distinct influence of Hourly Paid and to lesser extent Foremen (the categorisation of Discipline is not clear). In the remaining 4 or 5 Hourly Paid and Foremen associated with Staff and Management - but more often with the former than the latter.

Table 5.51 has, therefore, suggested a development of our case so far, as did Table 5.46. In considering the data prior to Table 5.46, it had been clear that Management influence had a distinctive quality. The influence of the remaining 3 groups had, however, not been seen as being distinct from each other. In considering Hourly Paid data, however, it has become clear that there are 3 groups -

(1) Management (2) Staff (3) Hourly Paid and (frequently) Foremen. The role of the Foreman is not, however, as clear as for the remaining 3 groups,

as Foremen as well as being perceived by Hourly Paid to be associated with them are perceived also to be associated with Management and with Staff. This perhaps reflects on the one hand the traditional Shop Floor (Hourly Paid and Foremen): Office (Management and Staff) dichotomy on one hand, and the confusion about the role of Foremen in industry generally.

Tables 5.52 and 5.53 show the Factor Analysis of the Hourly Paid data on Desired Distribution of Influence. These tables do show once again the distinctiveness of Management influence. Factors 4, 5 and 8 are clearly Management factors. Factor 4 is largely a repeat of Cluster 3 - Work Pace is omitted from Cluster 3, and Recruitment and Promotion appear in Factor 4 having been absent from Cluster 3. Factor 5 repeats largely Cluster 7 - repeating the associations around Transferring employees and Promotion. Factor 8 contains only 2 significant loadings - Management influence on Safety and Work Pace.

Factor 3 appears to be mainly a Staff factor - containing 7 Staff variables, but 4 Management variables and 3 each of Foremen and Hourly Paid. It is, however, far from clear that this confirms - or even supports the argument of Staff as a distinct influence group. Any support provided by this Factor is certainly fairly small.

Factor 2 can also be considered a Factor which gives some small confirmation of the view of Staff as a distinctive group. This factor does have significant loadings on variables of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid (also one Management variable) - but it has to be observed that the signs of 7 of the 8 Staff loadings are the reverse of the Foremen and Hourly Paid loadings.

The support for the view of Staff as a distinct group from Foremen and

Table 5.53 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.52)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Safety	0	X	0	0
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	0	X	X	X
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Transfers	0	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	0	X	X	X
Recruitment	0	X	0	X
Promotion	0	X	0	X
Discipline	0	X	X	X
Investment	0	X	X	0
Financial Polixy	0	X	X	X
Orders	0	X	X	0
Profitability	0	X	X	X
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Safety	0	0	0	X
Pay	0	0	0	X
Cost Reduction	0	X	0	0
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Work Standards	0	X(-)	0	0
Redundancy	X(-)	X(-)	0	X
Recruitment	0	X(-)	0	X
Promotion	0	X(-)	0	X
Discipline	0	X(-)	0	0
Investment	0	X(-)	X	X
Financial Policy	0	0	X	X
Orders	0	0	X	X
Profitability	0	X(-)	0	0
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Safety	0	X	0	0
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	0	0	X	0
Redundancy	X	X(-)	0	0
Promotion	0	0	X	0
Investment	0	X(-)	0	0
Financial Policy	0	X(-)	0	X(-)
Orders	0	X(-)	0	X(-)
Profitability	X	X(-)	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Work Pace	0	0	0	X(-)
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	0	0	X	0
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0

Table 5.53 (contd)

Factor 5	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Safety	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	X	X	X
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Transfers	0	X(-)	X(-)	0
Work Standards	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X(-)	0
Orders	0	0	0	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Pay	0	X(-)	X(-)	0
Profits	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 8</u>				
Safety	X	0	0	0
Work Pace	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Recruitment	0	0	X	X
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Safety	0	0	X	0
Investment	X(-)	0	0	0
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Discipline	X	0	0	0

Hourly Paid, rather than as an amorphous single group composed of 3 sub groups, is not clear cut. The view of Management as a distinct group is, however, given further support by Factors 4, 5 and 8 which are either exclusively or dominantly Management. It is given additional support by Factor 1 which contains all 14 issues and in which all 3 other groups have significant loadings on nearly all issues.

Thus Tables 5.52 and 5.53 provide further support for the main view of Management influence being distinct from that of the 3 other groups. The Development of this, that Staff influence is distinct from that of Foremen and Hourly Paid is, however, less well supported by the principal Factor Analysis. How do these 2 views fare in a Varimax Rotation? The results are given in Tables 5.54 and 5.55.

The main view of Management as a distinct group is confirmed again by Factors 4, 8, 9 and 14 which are exclusively or mainly (in the case only of Factor 9) Management. The combination of issues in these factors is, however, very different from that of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis on Table 5.51 and the principal Factor Analysis of Tables 5.52 and 5.53. This though is explained by the difference in method as the original matrix, on which Tables 5.51-53 are based, has been rotated for Tables 5.45 and 5.55.

The argument that Staff are perceived as distinct from Foremen and Hourly Paid in terms of influence, is given greater support by the Varimax rotated matrix than by the original matrix. Table 5.55 shows this point very clearly in the first 2 factors. Factor 1 has significant loadings on 10 Staff variables, no other group having a significant variable. Factor 2 has significant loadings on 9 Hourly Paid variables and 4 Foremen loadings. These 2 factors point clearly to a perceived separation of influence of Staff on one hand, and Hourly Paid on the other, with the role of Foremen

Table 5.55 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.54)

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Cost Reduction	0	X	0	0
Transfers	0	X	0	0
Work Standards	0	X	0	0
Redundancy	0	X	0	0
Recruitment	0	X	0	0
Promotion	0	X	0	0
Discipline	0	X	0	0
Investment	0	X	0	0
Financial Policy	0	X	0	0
Profitability	0	X	0	0
<u>Factor 2</u>				
Pay	0	0	0	X
Transfers	0	0	0	X
Redundancy	0	0	0	X
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Promotion	0	0	0	X
Investment	0	0	X	X
Financial Policy	0	0	X	X
Orders	0	0	X	X
Profitability	0	0	X	X
<u>Factor 3</u>				
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	X	0	0	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	X
Work Standards	0	X	X	X
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 4</u>				
Cost Reduction	X	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
Financial Policy	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 5</u>				
Transfers	X	X	X	X
Discipline	0	0	X	0
Orders	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 6</u>				
Pay	0	X	X	0
Cost Reduction	0	X	X	0
Redundancy	0	X	X	0
<u>Factor 7</u>				
Safety	0	X	X	X
Work Pace	0	X	X	X
Pay	0	0	0	X

Table 5.55 (contd)

<u>Factor 8</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Safety	X	0	0	0
Transfers	X	0	0	0
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Redundancy	X	0	0	0
Promotion	X	0	0	0
Discipline	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 9</u>				
Work Pace	X	X	0	0
Pay	X	0	0	0
Investment	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 10</u>				
Recruitment	0	0	0	X
Discipline	0	0	0	X
<u>Factor 11</u>				
Recruitment	X	0	0	0
Discipline	0	0	X(-)	0
Financial Policy	0	0	0	X(-)
<u>Factor 12</u>				
Redundancy	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 13</u>				
Work Standards	X	0	0	0
Promotion	0	0	X	0
<u>Factor 14</u>				
Orders	X	0	0	0
Profitability	X	0	0	0
<u>Factor 15</u>				
Discipline	0	0	X	0

being less clear cut, as we pointed out above.

Factor 10 is another 'single group' factor - containing only 2 Hourly Paid variables - Recruitment and Discipline. These are issues on which their trade unions had strong negotiating rights - the the same could be said of Pay and Redundancy, which are not present. Thus precise interpretation of this factor is confirmed by what is absent rather than what is there.

Other mixed factors confirm findings of earlier analyses -

(i) Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Work Pace being perceived as identical - this appears in Factors 3 and 7 in Table 5.55 and in Cluster 1 in Table 5.51.

(ii) Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Safety being perceived as identical - this appears in Factor 7 in Table 5.55 and Cluster 2 in Table 5.51.

(iii) Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Cost Reduction being perceived as identical - this appears in Factors 3 and 6 in Table 5.55 and Cluster 6 in Table 5.51.

(iv) The influence of all 4 groups on Transfer ing employees being perceived as identical - this appears in Factor 5 in Table 5.55 and in Cluster 7 in Table 5.51.

Thus the main argument of this chapter - that Management influence is perceived as having a special quality has been confirmed in all groups - Management, Staff and Hourly Paid. It has been confirmed in 2 distinct types of analyses -

(1) by inspection of the Tannenbaum control tables of the first part of this chapter, and by the excerpts from the semi-structured interviews.

As we moved from one issue to another there were consistently 2 main findings (i) that the non-Management groups should ideally have more

than they have now (ii) that Management even in the desired position should remain the dominant group. The degree of change varied from one issue to another and from the perceptions of one group to another. The general findings have, however, remained constant throughout this Chapter - greater influence for non-Management groups, less hierarchy, but maintenance of Management control and therefore a maintenance of hierarchy.

The reason for this, which is clear from the excerpts from semi-structured interviews is that Management occupy a special role - they take decisions, in the same way a pipe-fitter fits pipes, an electrician does electrical work, a salesman sells, and a clerk does clerical work. In taking these decisions, however, they should ideally be subject to a greater degree of influence from non-Management groups than now - a point which generally Management themselves agreed with, as well as non-Management groups. Management influence, therefore, has a special quality in that their role - their competence - is in taking decisions.

The special quality of Management influence has been re-confirmed by the McQuitty Linkage Analyses and Factor Analyses in this section. Time and again we have seen Clusters or Factors composed only or mainly of Management, or composed of any group(s) except Management. These more powerful statistical methods have served to confirm the argument developed from the original basic analysis of the data, issue by issue.

In addition to that, the McQuitty Analyses and Factor Analyses have revealed that Management and Staff on one hand, and Hourly Paid on the other, appear to perceive hierarchy and the distribution of influence in different ways. The former see influence as being distributed between (a) Management, and (b) the 3 other groups largely as an amorphous mass. The latter see distribution of influence in a more elaborate way - (a) Management, (b) Staff, (c) Hourly Paid, with foremen mainly being

identified in this third category. This, however, is less pronounced than the distinctiveness of Management influence.

We shall now move on to consider data which confirms our argument in a third way. This next set of data deal with alternative organizational structures - in particular the possibility of employee representatives on the Board of Directors. As we shall see, faced with the possibility of an alternative organization, the role of management and hierarchy is not fundamentally challenged.

Representation on the Board?

This section deals with perceptions of alternative form of organizational structure. For reasons of economy, however we are unable to present all the data collected here. What we have done is to take particular issues which are representative, the remainder being presented in Appendix 3. In this section we deal with the perceived acceptability of various alternative forms of organization - various formats for determining policy issues: different forms of control of access to company information for employees: different forms of profit sharing. Other issues concerning the role and objectives of employee directors, as well as the perceived differences they might make in board decision-making are considered in Appendix 3.

While only these issues are considered in this the main part of the thesis, those which are contained in the Appendix, while dealing with different specific issues, follows the same structure of argument, and the same logic in the thinking of our respondents.

The first table in this section is Table 5.56 which deals with Management responses to whether they found the 6 alternatives in determining policy, acceptable or not. Perhaps not surprisingly, they did not find the first option acceptable - it is perhaps surprising that as many as 25% only found the idea of 'policy being decided by the Shop Floor and Unionised Staff alone' only acceptable. The second option - of Management and Unionised Employees have equal influence on policy - found more support, but was still clearly unacceptable. The third option - the same as the second, but this time allowing for all employees, whether unionised or not - found still more support, but was still found unacceptable/totally unacceptable by just over 50%. It is perhaps noteworthy that 32% of Managers found the second option acceptable/were neutral, and nearly 50% found the third option acceptable or were neutral, since these are in certain respects quite radical transformations - from a situation where there is no employee representatives at Board level, to one where the employees would have a 50% share in Board representation. There is, therefore, clearly a 'radical' (relatively) minority group in Management who do not find greater voice for their employees, unappealing.

It is, however, the 4th option which attracts far and away the greatest degree of support among Management, and as can be seen is the only option where more than 50% find the option Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. This option is the one clearly most consistent with the argument we have developed in this chapter - namely that Management should take the decisions, but subject to the influence of their employees.

Table 5.56

<u>Management</u>	<u>Totally Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally Unacceptable</u>
Policy Decided					
1) Shop Floor & Unionised Staff Alone	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	8 25%	24 75%
2) 50/50 by Management and Unionised Employees	0 0%	4 13%	6 19%	15 47%	6 19%
3) 50/50 by Management and all Employees, Unionised or Not	1 3%	7 22%	7 22%	12 38%	4 13%
4) By Management in Consultation with all Employees	8 25%	20 63%	1 3%	3 9%	0 0%
5) By Management in Consultation with Staff	0 0%	6 19%	3 9%	21 60%	2 6%
6) By Management Alone	5 16%	9 28%	1 3%	14 44%	3 9%

Table 5.57

Staff

Policy Decided					
1) Shop Floor and Unionised Staff Alone	1 1%	8 11%	7 10%	31 44%	24 34%
2) 50/50 by Management and Unionised Employees	5 7%	35 49%	14 20%	10 14%	7 10%
3) 50/50 by Management and all Employees, Unionised or Not	9 13%	28 39%	7 10%	22 31%	5 7%
4) By Management in Consultation with all Employees	15 21%	48 68%	2 3%	5 7%	1 1%
5) By Management in Consultation with Staff	1 1%	12 17%	9 13%	39 55%	10 14%
6) By Management Alone	1 1%	9 13%	7 10%	34 48%	20 28%

Table 5.58

Hourly Paid

Policy Decided

- 1) Shop Floor and Unionised Staff Alone
- 2) 50/50 by Management and Unionised Employees
- 3) 50/50 by Management and all Employees Unionised or Not
- 4) By Management in Consultation with all Employees
- 5) By Management in Consultation with Staff
- 6) By Management Alone

<u>Totally</u> <u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally</u> <u>Unacceptable</u>
10	21	5	11	1
21%	44%	10%	23%	2%
10	29	5	4	0
21%	60%	10%	8%	0%
4	15	7	19	3
8%	31%	15%	40%	6%
12	29	4	3	0
25%	60%	8%	6%	0%
3	6	8	24	7
6%	13%	17%	50%	15%
3	5	1	31	8
6%	10%	2%	65%	17%

The final 2 options attract much less support than the 4th option. Indeed it is interesting to note that the 5th option (which would give a privileged position to Staff over other non-Management employees) is less acceptable than the 6th option (which would have policy decided by Management alone). This clearly reflects perceived reality i.e. that special access to Management for Staff, would not be workable, and would have to be extended to Hourly Paid employees as well.

It may be suggested that Option 6 in fact describes the status quo - that it is Management who take policy decisions now without consultation etc. with anyone else. It should, however, be understood that this Option implies that policy decisions would be taken by Management without regard for anyone else in the Company. The presence of trade unions, and an extensive closed shop, renders that Option about as radical a change as Option 1. In terms of operating procedure, however, there is no direct consultation on many matters i.e. there may be negotiation on wages, consultation on working practices etc., but on many decisions (e.g. financial policy, investment decisions etc.) there is little/no even informal consultation. This is true even for Managers in their dealings with their Board of Directors, as is made clear in the first part of Excerpt 5.24. It is this Manager's view that there is a strict division of labour "they come up with the ideas and we're told what is required and on that basis they make the decisions.'

i.e. Directors develop ideas and take decisions, while Managers do the research etc. to establish the information which will make the decision to be taken.

It is his view, which he develops as this Excerpt progresses, that Managers should be able to consult with their Director for an effective exchange of information and views. This system of consultations should progress down the hierarchy with each Manager/Foreman meeting with his work group

to exchange views and information. It is, however, clear in Excerpt 5.24 that the respondent does not go along with the idea of employee representation on the Board. For this respondent participation is really a matter of communication - it is a means for information and views to be exchanged in a meaningful and effective way, but it should not change the hierarchy. Decisions are still to be taken by the Managers/Board. The influence which could be exerted by Hourly Paid/Staff employees would be solely in terms of the correctness of their view, not in terms of any formal rights of participation or representation. Furthermore that correctness (or otherwise) would be for Management to decide.

Thus the dominant Management view on Employee Representation would seem to be against formal representation, but in favour of greater communication within the Company to enable better decisions to be taken.

A similar view is implicit in the end of Excerpt 5.25. This is taken from an interview with a Director. Toward the middle of this Excerpt he describes the method of decision making in the Board as one of consensus, and avoiding taking votes. If there were employee representatives on the Board he makes clear that he would wish that to continue. Clearly worker directors are not, for him, a means to develop negotiating at Board level - faced even with a difficult decision (a redundancy) the expectation is that they would accept the majority (Management) view. Their role, for him, would mainly be to present employees' views.

The views in Excerpt 5.25 do represent a development on those of Excerpt 5.24, but they are not inconsistent with each other. Both regard employee participations as a vehicle to improve communication. For the manager in Excerpt 5.24 communication and participation mean effectively the same thing - for the Director in Excerpt 5.25 the latter is a formal mechanism to enhance the former. In both cases, however, the whole of what they

say is under-written by a kind of Sartrean 'good-faith' - that all views will be considered equally. This brings us directly up against Habences's thesis of ideal speech, and especially the first two conditions which we considered in the first Chapter -

- (a) that all participants have an equal chance to put forward their views, and
- (b) that all views can potentially be criticised effectively.

Clearly the two respondents in Excerpts 5.24 and 5.25 believe that the participative systems which they describe would fulfil these 2 criteria.

As we shall see this view is not shared by Staff, or Hourly Paid. We shall, however, subsequently see that while there is an expressed consciousness of this among Staff and Hourly Paid, there is little sense that this contravention of the first 2 conditions of ideal speech is located in the contravention of the last 2 conditions which apply to structure - and indeed we shall see a limited awareness of breach of the 2nd condition by an unconsciousness of inability to subject Management views to the same degree of criticism as those of Staff and Hourly Paid.

The views expressed by Staff respondents are shown in Table 5.57.

Like Management, Staff were not attracted to Option 1. The view that Company policy would be determined by Unionised Staff and Shop Floor was found Acceptable/Totally Acceptable by only 12% of Respondents, while 78% found it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. Certainly, relative to Management, it is more highly supported, but it is clear that for Staff this radical option is not supported.

Management did not find the second option acceptable either, but in the case of Staff 56% find the option of policy being determined equally by

Management and Unionised Employees, to be Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. There are, however, 24% of the Staff sample who find this option Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. While this second option is, therefore, on the basis of a crude theory of democracy by majority, acceptable, there remains a not insignificant minority who find it to be unacceptable. It is, however, absolutely clear that Staff views toward the option of equal representation in deciding on policy, are more favourable than those of Management.

It is particularly interesting to contrast the results for options 2 and 3. The difference between them is that the former refers only to unionised employees being represented in deciding policy, while the latter refers to all employees "unionised or not". This 3rd option is found Acceptable/Totally Acceptable by 52% - 56% found option 2 Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. While 38% found option 3 Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable - that figure for option 2 was 24%. Clearly, therefore, while the degree of support for option 3 is just about the same as for option 2, more respondents opposed it. Option 3, therefore, clearly polarises Staff views.

The relevant factor in this is clearly the question of union membership. We shall deal with union membership more fully in the next chapter, but at the moment it may be relevant to point to certain facts about Staff Union Membership in this Company -

- (a) not all Staff, below Management level, were union members - 14 of our 81 Staff were not union members,
- (b) certain depts/areas of work operated a closed shop amongst Staff e.g. most of the grades in Production Control operated a closed shop, and even in areas like Finance, away from the Shop Floor and thus less tradition of unionisation, the level of unionisation was markedly increased during the time of our research,
- (c) a Staff Association had until recently remained in existence, to which most non-unionised Staff did belong. In the late 1960s, the great majority

of Staff belonged to this association, but over the last 10-15 years this was gradually nibbled away at by the unions till the roles were reversed. Unionisation, as we shall see, was not for Staff an act of faith as it is for Hourly Paid employees - even for Staff who are union members.

The polarisation around option 3 really reflects a continued ambivalence on the part of Staff about union membership. For those who found this option acceptable, union membership was clearly seen as less important than the right of representation - on the other hand some of those who found it unacceptable/totally unacceptable union membership was more important than the right of representation.

The 4th option - Policy to be decided by Management in consultation with all Employees - was strongly supported by Management.

Table 5.57 makes clear an equally strong support by Staff, as 89% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. Once again the idea of Management as the decision-makers, and others as providers of information, is supported by the data.

It is, however, interesting to observe that Staff do not support the 5th option - that Management would set policy in consultation with Staff. Only 18% support this option by finding it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, despite the fact that this would clearly put them in an advantageous position in relation to Hourly Paid employees. The reason for this is the same as we put forward for Management - it is obviously not a feasible option. It simply could not be perceived as something which was going to work.

Not unsurprisingly Option 6 was not supported, indeed 74% found it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable, for reasons similar to those discussed in relation to Management, above.

How, therefore, did Staff regard participation? One view is expressed in Excerpt 5.26. For this Staff respondent the major policy decisions are taken by the Board of Directors (a view expressed by the Manager in Excerpt 5.24). This, he made clear, is a situation which could not really be changed. It is just something which is! This is not to say, however, that there is no role for participation, but, again like the respondent in Excerpt 5.24, the function of this would be communication. The main distinction between the respondents in Excerpts 5.24 and 5.26 is that for the former the participative structure would be less formal than the latter would care to see.

Another type of Staff view is expressed in Excerpt 5.27. The initial view of this respondent is that participation and decision-making are devalued by the company being part of a group, and because of the nature of the product. For these reasons decision-making in the firm can only operate within significant constraints. As we progress through the Excerpt, however, we find a key point of this respondent's view i.e. the role of expertise. For this respondent an important quality in the right to participate in decision-making is that one should possess the necessary qualities to contribute effectively.

The right to participation is not, therefore, a natural or inalienable right, it is contingent on your ability to make a contribution to coming up with the right answer. From this view, therefore, decision-making is a purely functional activity with no power qualities. From what follows in this Excerpt it is quite clear that the group which has the expertise is the Management. The fundamental restriction for Hourly Paid - and logically also for Staff- is that they lack the necessary expertise. Access to decision-making means possession of expertise. If someone among Hourly Paid or Staff has the necessary expertise/ability, they will make progress and get on to the Board anyhow.

In considering the views of this respondent, however, it becomes clear that what he has to say is internally consistent. The role of managers is to sell the product, organise its production etc. and to make the decisions necessary to achieve that in so doing they do not exercise their own choice, or at least not entirely. In taking decisions they must be aware of their masters at the group HQ and of the demands of customers. Management can only take decisions within these constraints - their qualification to do so is their expertise. The expertise of Staff and Hourly Paid lies in what they do - making the product, typing, writing reports etc. The expertise of Management is dealing with the Group, with customers etc. Thus each group has its own expertise, with appropriate decision-making requirements for each.

Access to decision-making is, therefore, not an issue about power (at most that is an effect of more fundamental conditions) or about natural rights. Decision-making is carried on in a way not unlike the demarcation lines of the Clydeside shipyards of 50 years ago. It is all a matter of expertise.

It may seem that Excerpt 5.27 is an anomolous view, and not one which would be commonly found among our respondents. It is certainly true it is not, as it stands, a common view, but as we have already seen, and shall see subsequently in this chapter, the possession of expertise is an important justification for having decision-making power.

A different Staff view is presented in Excerpt 5.28. In this Excerpt the respondent clearly regards major decisions as a managerial prerogative - indeed he actually uses these words in the Excerpt. Unlike the previous respondent, however, he does perceive a role for others besides Management - in particular that there should be consultation. The emphasis on consultation is the main feature running through this Excerpt. When a decision is to be taken it is clear from this respondent that participation would mainly be a matter of communication - that Staff and Hourly Paid would know what was

happening, and Management would be made aware of their views and would take them into account.

At the same time the expertise to take those decisions lies with Management, the same view as was expressed forcibly in Excerpt 5.27. Obviously this rules out any question of a majority of employee representatives. The number required would clearly only have to be sufficient (a) to establish what was happening (b) make Staff and Hourly Paid views clear.

A similar view is expressed in Excerpt 5.29. For this Staff respondent this is primarily a question of communication - or "representation" as he puts it. The role is purely to listen and to put forward Staff views. Indeed about 1/3 of the way into this Excerpt, the respondent explicitly rejects the notion that employee representatives should be a majority on the Board, and affirms the view that the role of representation on the Board should be purely to "watch and listen" i.e. communicate. Why should it be only a matter of communication? The function of representation would be "to stop rumours going around". Thus the views of this respondent go back logically and directly to the issues of the previous chapter, and the failure of the firm to communicate effectively with its employees.

The views of Staff on policy decisions, we saw in Table 5.57 were not altogether clear. Most support was for Option 4 - where Management would consult with all their employees - there was, however, significant support expressed for Options 2 and 3, where decisions would be taken equally by Management and unionised employees, or with all employees unionised or not (56% and 52% respectively found this Acceptable/Totally Acceptable). Option 1, in contrast, is hardly supported at all - only 12% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. Thus from Table 5.57 it seems clear that among Staff the right of Management to manage is, on the whole acceptable. There is no apparent motivation to usurp Management decision-making power. This

finding is 'fleshed out' by Excerpts 5.26 - 5.29, which all make clear that employee representation is a communication function - both upwardly (in the sense of employees putting their views to Management) and downwardly (in the sense of employees finding out what is going on). The perceptual basis for this is the differing expertise of Staff and Management. Individual Staff have their respective abilities, but the expertise of Management is to take decisions. This view came out very strongly in Excerpt 5.27, but was present also in the other Excerpts.

The views of Staff are, therefore, not so very different from those of Management. Management we saw also believed they should take decisions in consultation with other people who work for the company. The main difference is, as we have seen, one of degree - in particular how formal only such mechanism would be. Staff prefer a more formal mechanism, Management seek the flexibility which informality allows for.

Moving on to Table 5.58 we can see that the views of Hourly Paid workers are rather different. Option 1 was supported by only 12% of Staff, and was not supported at all by Management. Among Hourly Paid workers, in contrast, it is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable for 65%. Thus among Hourly Paid there is a majority who would find the 'radical' option of, effectively, workers control acceptable to them. This, however, is not to say that they do not recognise the difficulties of such a development. Toward the end of Excerpt 5.30 we introduce with this Hourly Paid respondent the question of Workers Control of the Company. The respondent suggests that while this may be workable in "a very small firm" for one this size (about 1,700) there was too much involved - in particular no decision would be taken - "a lot of talk".

Earlier on in the same Excerpt we discuss other forms of representation.

The respondent makes clear that employees should be involved - "know what's going on". In this respect this respondent (and the other Hourly Paid respondents we'll look at) have a similar concern to that of Staff and Management - they want to know what is happening i.e. for Hourly Paid, Staff and Management, the debate about worker participation is about communication, at least in part. The distinction between Hourly Paid and the other 2 groups, is that for Hourly Paid they actually want a vote at Board level. The Staff view was that, at Board level, they would simply take in the Management view, and respond with theirs. Hourly Paid actually want to 'record' their view - they want to participate fully.

In the case of the respondent in Excerpt 5.30, he clearly states the employees on the Board should have a vote. It is, however, significant that he believes that employee representatives should be a minority on the Board. This view - that employees should be a minority on the Board - is repeated in Excerpts 5.31 and 5.32, who opt for 3 and 2 respectively. Why do they find minority representation acceptable? The reason is that the main issue in Board level representation is not influence - it is, as with Staff, communication. In other words even if they lose out in a vote, they have at least seen and heard what is happening, which, in all the Hourly Paid Excerpts we have considered up to now, is an important issue.

Thus the apparently 'radical' Hourly Paid view is in fact rather less radical than a consideration of Table 5.5 might have suggested. The primary objective is communication - to know what is going on, and as the respondent in Excerpt 5.32 says "you would get information and you could always, as I said, make your point there".

Why are they less radical than may have seemed the case? A reason comes out in Excerpt 5.33, from a Shop Steward. Like the Hourly Paid respondents

we have considered so far, he believes in representation at Board level. The initial discussion centres on, once again, the communication aspect. Clearly, for this respondent, the opportunity to know what is going on is the most important aspect. Toward the end of the Excerpt however, it comes out that 'I don't think we should have a say at this stage'. There are 2 important implications of this statement, (1) he is clearly saying that, because of their 'ignorance of how the Company is run' worker representatives should have no vote - they don't know enough to deal with this, (2) in the future this may change - presumably when their 'ignorance' is remedied, in respect of how the Company is run.

Excerpt 5.33, we would argue, makes a significant point - one which is consistent with the control graph data presented earlier - that in the present mode of organisation the role of Management is dominant - and that this dominance originates in the special knowledge of Management (or the relative ignorance of others, following the logic of Excerpt 5.33). Hence, in Table 5.58 it is quite logical (and not merely 'conservative') that Option 2 should be more popular (policy equally decided by Management and Unionised Employees) and Option 4 most popular of all (policy decided by Management in consultation with all employees). It is not entirely, therefore, only whether an Option is acceptable or not - but also whether it is realistic. From the structure of Hourly Paid perceptions the role of Management is such as to make the less radical option 4, more realistic than the more radical option 1. Nevertheless, 65% do support option 1. The detail from Excerpts 5.30 and 5.33 do make clear the awareness of the problems of making Option 1 (workers control) work.

It is, however, important to make clear that this is not necessarily a wholly stable attitude. As we said above in discussing Excerpt 5.33 the deference to Management owes much to, in effect, the Managerial experience

of Management which the other groups lack. The structure of their attitude toward Management may change if that experience was not the monopoly of Management.

This 'dynamic' possibility is clear in Excerpt 5.34. The Shop Steward in this Excerpt makes clear his belief that as the experience of employee representatives at Board level develops, there will be a move toward an equality of voting numbers for employees at Board level. In this Excerpt we also discuss 2 further problems of employee participation.

A) The possibility of employee representatives growing away from their members (discussed in 'P. Brannen et al in Worker Directors Speak' in relation to BSC), or put another way, that as employee representatives develop the experience of Management necessary to operate at that level, that they will themselves become Managers. The respondent makes clear that his union is concerned about this problem but that he feels that an employee representative could not operate effectively without the support of his members/those he represents - if he was absorbed into Management this would presumably evaporate.

B) The potential difficulties of securing support in the event of disagreement between employee representatives and the rest of the Board. While the trust between Shop Stewards and their members is important, the respondent does make clear his awareness that it will be more difficult to gain support in relation to Board policy than for a wage rise, because the latter is "in front of their faces and its easily arguable". The relevance of Board policy decisions may be less obvious to members - who will still lack Management experience.

A final important issue from Excerpt 5.34 is to re-emphasise that the move to employee representation is, as it is put right at the end "years ahead".

Thus in considering Hourly Paid views on taking policy decisions we have identified a number of points:

- (i) unlike Staff and Management, Hourly Paid find Option 1 (the Workers Control option) acceptable - but, it appears, not realistic at the moment,
- (ii) that the communication function is important for Hourly Paid workers, as it was for Staff and Management,
- (iii) the role of Management is still seen as being dominant, because of their experience of managing, and in particular of taking decisions.

These points are all repeated in Excerpt 5.35 which is again from an Hourly Paid respondent. In the middle of this discussion we raise the question of effective workers' control with him. While it is interesting that he foresees benefits like making people work harder if they get the profits, it is significant that he perceives an important role for Management, even in a worker managed enterprise. Even in such an organisation there would still be a need for Management to take decisions.

In the first half of the Excerpt the issue of communication arises, and it is significant that he should say in relation to employee representation at Board level "I think it would be their decision really but they could let us know what they are doing". The importance ascribed to communication is consistent with the acceptance of a minority representation at Board level "You'd be able to express the workers' opinion on the Board".

The dominance of Management is made perfectly clear toward the end of the Excerpt, where we close the discussion on workers' control, by discussing (perhaps paradoxically) those decisions which Managers should be able to make on their own. Management, he believes, should be able to take decisions on "the running of the Company because they are the Management, we are the workers". This is certainly a more minutable view than in

Excerpts 5.33 and 5.34. It almost has a 'forever and ever. Amen' quality to it. It does, however, illustrate the problems of changing away from hierarchy that were hinted at in Excerpts 5.70 and 5.71. A clear reference point in Excerpt 5.35 is that there are Managers and there are Workers. While the respondent in Excerpt 5.35 may accord them more importance than the respondents in Excerpts 5.33 and 5.34, all of the Excerpts from Hourly Paid workers are predicated on the existence of there being Managers and Workers (or Management, Staff and Hourly Paid). The issue has been negotiating the relationship between the group. The issue in many respects has not been whether or not there should be hierarchy, but not on negotiating the conditions under which it will operate in the future.

Finally, on this point, it will be interesting to contrast the views of the 3 groups on the question of which of the options was acceptable or not. This is done in Table 5.59. From this we can see Options 5 and 6 are not acceptable to any group. Option 1 is acceptable only to Hourly Paid. Option 3 is acceptable to Staff, but not Management, while Hourly Paid are unclear. Option 2 is acceptable to Staff and Hourly Paid. Option 4, however, is supported by more than 50% of each group - 88% of Managers/89% of Staff/85% of Hourly Paid.

Thus while there are clear perceptual differences between the 3 groups there is one option which they agree is acceptable - that Management take decisions in consultation with all their employees. This, however, has to be understood against the background that -

- (1) the effect of introducing a measure of participation may alter the perceptions - indeed it seems likely that among Hourly Paid at least the development of experience of participation may raise their ambition.
- (2) given the existing perceptual differences on employee representation between the 3 groups, while there is agreement on option 4, there may be

important negotiation to be done at the margins - indeed the margin may have very sharp edges.

Table 5.59

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
Policy Decided			
1. Shop Floor Unionised Staff Alone	-	-	+
2. 50/50 by Management and Unionised Employees	-	+	+
3. 50/50 by Management and all Employees, Unionised or not	-	+	0
4. Management in Consultation with all Employees	+	+	+
5. Management in Consultation with Staff	-	-	-
6. Management alone	-	-	-
+ At least 50% find the Option Totally Acceptable/Acceptable			
- " " " " " " " " Unacceptable/Unacceptable			
0 Less than 50% " " " " " " Acceptable/Acceptable			
	or		

Control of Information

One of the 'sharpest edges' we have encountered so far, concerns the effectiveness of the Company's communications. In the previous chapter we saw very clearly that those below the level of Management felt they were not at all well informed by the Company. The possession of information is crucial to take part in decision-making effectively. One cannot participate in decision-making in ignorance of the appropriate facts. At the moment company information is restricted to Management - other than those among Staff responsible for its preparation (e.g. clerks in Finance and Accounting). To enable others to participate in decision-making would, therefore, require access to information to be widened. We, therefore, put to respondents 4 options which ranged from complete accessibility to complete Management control over information. The views

of management are shown in Table 5.60

Table 5.60

Management Option	<u>Totally Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally Unacceptable</u>
1. All Information available to all Employees	1 (3%)	3 (9%)	1 (3%)	20 (63%)	7 (22%)
2. All information available to all employees subject to Management veto	1 (3%)	18 (56%)	4 (13%)	8 (25%)	1 (3%)
3. Only information directly related to an employee's job to be available to him	0 (0%)	6 (19%)	7 (22%)	17 (53%)	2 (6%)
4. No information to be available to employees except what Management decide to make public	0 (0%)	2 (6%)	2 (6%)	17 (53%)	11 (34%)

This Table makes clear that Management do not find complete freedom of information to be acceptable - only 12% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while 85% find it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable, while 85% find it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. Option 2, which gives Management a veto on any information required by others, is acceptable - 59% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while 28% find it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. The other 2 options, which enhance Management control still further receive little support and can be regarded as being unacceptable, possibly because they are perceived as being unrealistic. Thus Management are prepared to give any information to their employees as long as they are able to retain a veto on this.

Table 5.61 gives the views of Staff. Similar to Management, Options 3 and 4 are regarded as Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable by more than 50% of the sample. Unlike Management, however, Staff find Option 1 to be acceptable in that 55% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. Thus, unlike Management, there is a significant view among Staff that there ought

Table 5.61

<u>Staff Option</u>	<u>Totally Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally Unacceptable</u>
1. All information available to all employees	8 (11%)	3 (44%)	7 (10%)	22 (31%)	3 (4%)
2. All information available to all employees subject to Management veto	1 (1%)	35 (49%)	14 (20%)	19 (27%)	2 (3%)
3. Only information directly related to an employee's job to be available to him	1 (1%)	19 (27%)	11 (16%)	36 (51%)	4 (6%)
4. No information to be available to employees except what Management decide to make public	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	6 (9%)	43 (61%)	22 (31%)

to be free access to information. Management support was for Option 2 - and this is supported by 50% of the Staff sample as well. It is clear, therefore, that Staff do not have an unambiguous attitude toward control over information. Some would support a Management veto on access, while as many oppose a veto and wish complete freedom of information.

The views of Hourly Paid are much more straight-forward in that 94% find Option 1 Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while for Option 2 the same figure is only 29%, as can be seen in Table 5.62. Once again Options 3 and 4 are not regarded as being acceptable.

Thus, if we take the 3 groups together there is an agreement across the groups that any information should be available to any employee. The issue which arises concerns the conditions on which that information should be made available, and in particular the possibility of Management control over access. The Management view is that they must have control, Hourly Paid view is that this is unnecessary. Staff are not really sure. This is made clear by Table 5.63.

Table 5.62

<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Totally Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally Unacceptable</u>
All information to be available to all employees	11 (23%)	34 (71%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	0 (0%)
All information to be available to all employees subject to Management veto	2 (4%)	12 (25%)	5 (10%)	24 (50%)	5 (10%)
Only information directly related to an employee's job to be available to him	5 (10%)	14 (29%)	2 (4%)	25 (52%)	2 (4%)
No information to be available to employees except what Management make public	0 (0%)	3 (6%)	5 (10%)	27 (56%)	13 (27%)

Table 5.63

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
All Information Available to all employees	-	+	+
All information available to all employees subject to Management veto	+	+(50%)	-
Only information directly related to an employee's job to be available to him	-	-	-
No information to be available to employees except what management make public	-	-	-

- Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable to 50% or more

+ Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 50% or more.

Two Excerpts discussed earlier illustrate this problem. In Excerpt 5.47 the Manager makes clear several reasons he sees as important in respect of security of company information - in particular the effect on the Stock Market valuation of the Firm if information was to become public. Excerpt 5.49, however, from a Shop Steward makes clear their awareness that if the type of situations described in Excerpt 5.47 was to come about that it would be bad news for everyone in the Company. From the Hourly Paid point of view access to information is about 'knowing what's going on'.

The results shown in Tables 5.60-5.62 produce an interesting contrast which emphasises the role of Management control. A summary is presented in Table 5.63, which like Table 5.98 adopts as the criterion of acceptability whether or not 50% or more find the option either Totally Acceptable/Acceptable, or Totally Unacceptable/Unacceptable. It can be seen in Table 5.63 that only Option 2 is acceptable to Management, but that only Option 1 is acceptable to Hourly Paid Staff find both Options 1 and 2 acceptable, but Option 2 is absolutely marginal and clearly Option 1 is more strongly supported.

This leads us to 2 conclusions on the views expressed -

- (a) that there should be access to information for employees - this is supported by all 3 groups,
- (b) the issue concerns the degree of control which Management should exercise over access to this information. Management clearly take the view that they must retain control, at least on some matters. The rationale for this is made clear in Excerpt 5.47. A counter to that argument is put in Excerpt 5.49.

It is, however, important to note that the principle of access is conceded -

the issue on which there is disagreement is procedural rather than substantive. Furthermore we would argue that, in view of our own perception of the Company's existing communications being much closer to Option 4, embracing Option 2 does represent a shift for Management.

Profit Distribution

Respondents were also asked about the distribution of Company profits.

As with the great majority of companies, this Company did not operate a profit distribution scheme. Any such scheme would be complicated by the Company being part of a group of Companies under common ownership, so that profit distribution would have to take into account not only employees, and shareholders of the parent Company but also the financial needs of the parent Company itself.

Thus as with the similar questions we have asked about decision-making and access to information, there are questions about a largely hypothetical situation. There was, at the time of research, a productivity bonus - which is monitored in some of the excerpts - but it was not explicitly profit sharing, and in certain respects was a means through the prices and incomes legislation of the time (1978).

The views of Management on how profits should be shared are shown in Table 5. 64 Options 1 (profits go entirely to the Parent Company), 5 (profits equally shared between Parent Company and Employees), and 6 (profits to go to Employees alone) were all clearly held to be unacceptable - specially option 6, though that is hardly surprising. It is also true that Options 2 (profits to go to Parent Company but with a bonus for Management) and 4 (profits to go to Parent Company but with a bonus for all employees negotiated with the trade unions) were also not acceptable (though less so than 1, 5 or 6). There are, however, aspects to be noted of Options 2 and 4.

Table 5.64

<u>Management</u>	<u>Totally</u> <u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally</u> <u>Unacceptable</u>
Company Profits					
1. All go to Parent Co.	2 (6%)	6 (19%)	0 (0%)	19 (59%)	5 (16%)
2. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for Management	6 (19%)	7 (22%)	3 (9%)	16 (50%)	0 (0%)
3. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for all employees, whose size will be decided by Management	3 (9%)	22 (69%)	2 (6%)	5 (16%)	0 (0%)
4. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for all employees, negotiated with Unions	0 (0%)	12 (38%)	4 (13%)	15 (47%)	1 (3%)
5. Shared 50/50 between Parent Co. and Employees	0 (0%)	6 (19%)	5 (16%)	15 (47%)	6 (19%)
6. Go to employees alone	0 (0%)	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	18 (3%)	12 (38%)

First of all Option 2. We have observed already that Management found options, in respect of decision-making, which favoured them, to be unacceptable. For instance, in Table 5.56 nearly the same percentage find Option 6 (Policy to be decided by Management alone) acceptable as find Option 2 in Table 5.64 acceptable. Indeed the distribution of responses is very similar across the range of these 2 questions. It would seem however that there is a significant group of Managers with relatively clear image of Management interest, in the sense that -

(a) this group finds options, which particularly favour Management, to be acceptable,

(b) the other group do not find those options acceptable - perhaps on the basis of moral principle (it could not be seen as 'right') - or on strictly pragmatic grounds.

Option 4 concerns the role of the unions, as while it allows for a system of profit sharing, there would have to be negotiation with the unions on this. Only 38% found this Acceptable, while 50% found it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. In contrast 78% found Option 3 (where the bonus would be decided by Management) Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, and 16% found it Unacceptable. The difference between the Options 3 and 4 is purely that in the former the bonus is set by Management - while in the latter it is negotiated with the unions, and this is clearly less acceptable. The importance of this is that it is quite clearly consistent with our discussions of access to information (see Table 5.60 above and discussion). Once again, therefore, while a principle is conceded, the need of Management to retain control appears apparent.

The concession of the principle of profit sharing comes out very clearly in Excerpt 5.36, with a Management respondent. This is a simple, straightforward argument that employees should share in the company's prosperity - but, while it does not come out in this Excerpt, with the need for Management control.

A more thoroughgoing view is put in Excerpt 5.37 where another Management respondent puts forward the view that the original shareholders should be bought out by the employees so that eventually it becomes 'the employees' Company'. Toward the end the underlying rationale of this view becomes apparent - it is motivational - that if you work for yourself you work harder. A similar view, but more strictly within the context of the present arrangements is Excerpt 5.38, this time from a Company Director. In this Excerpt there is a less direct relationship between profit sharing and effort. In excerpt 5.38 the Director is really looking for 2 ways - (i) a way through the wage restrictions of the then government, (ii) another means (as part of the 'bigger picture') of getting their

employees to equate their well-being with that of the Company.

In Excerpts 5.36 and 5.37 both put forward different views of profit sharing. The former involves more or less a new form of ownership, while the latter is very clearly within the existing structure. At the same time, they both have the same problem underlying them - employee motivation. In the former how to get employees to work harder, in the latter more co-operatively. In either case there are clear views for control of the firm.

We saw in discussing each of the decision-making areas in the control-graph data (Tables 5.1-5.25) that while Management consistently supported more influence for other groups, they, equally consistently, made clear that they as Management should be dominant. What we have seen from Management in discussing those Options (Tables 5.56, 5.60 and 5.64), is essentially a restatement of that view. Management are prepared to concede more decision-making influence, more access to company information and to distribute (at least some) profits to employees. Always, however, there is the condition that they, as Management retain control of the situation. In summary it could be said that what we have is a readiness to adjust the dominance of Management over the Company, but not to remove that dominance.

Views of Staff are shown in Table 5.65. Like Management, they also find Option 1 to be unacceptable - indeed the distribution on this option is very similar in Tables 5.57 and 5.61. They also find Option 6 unacceptable, as Management did, though very marginally less so. The similarities between Management and Staff do, however, end there.

Option 2 is even less acceptable to Staff than it was to Management. Among Managers 41% found this Option Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, the corresponding

figure for Staff is only 7%. Correspondingly, if we look at Option 5 among Staff 54% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while the figure for Management is only 19%. Taking those 2 Options together (2 and 5) indicates 2 features to Staff views:

- (i) that special treatment in favour of one group (Management) is not acceptable to the great majority of Staff - Option 2 shows that clearly.
- (ii) that Staff are less concerned than Management about the potential loss of Management dominance implied by Option 5.

Neither of these things is, we would suggest, surprising in itself. Furthermore it is not surprising in view of what we have discovered of Staff views up to now. Staff have shown less concern about Management dominance than Management itself has done - see for instance Table 5.61, where 55% of Staff find Acceptable/Totally Acceptable that there should be free access to Company information. At the same time the views of Staff - while certainly less orthodox than those of Management, in that they would reduce the dominance of Management to a greater degree than Management themselves would - they do display a degree of ambivalence. This could be seen again in Table 5.61 as while 55% supported option 1 (which mentioned no Management veto) 50% supported Option 2, which did allow for a Management veto. This ambivalence can be seen again in Table 5.65 in respect of Options 3 and 4. Both of these require a bonus to be paid, but in the former the size of bonus is decided by Management, while in the latter it is negotiated with the Unions. Option 3 is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 68% while Option 4 is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 63%. Thus while there is a significant procedural change between these 2 options the degree of acceptance among Staff (and indeed the distribution of responses) is very similar from Option 3 to Option 4. The divergence in these views is clearly seen in Excerpts 5.39 and 5.40

Table 5.65.

Staff	Totally Acceptable	Acceptable	Neutral	Unacceptable	Totally Unacceptable
Company Profits					
1. All go to Parent Company	2 (3%)	15 (21%)	8 (11%)	38 (54%)	8 (11%)
2. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for Management	0 (0%)	5 (7%)	11 (16%)	40 (56%)	15 (21%)
3. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for all employees, whose size is decided by Management	5 (7%)	43 (61%)	7 (10%)	13 (18%)	3 (4%)
4. Go to Parent Co., but with a bonus for all employees, negotiated with union	6 (9%)	38 (54%)	11 (16%)	14 (20%)	2 (3%)
5. Shared 50/50 between Parent Company & employees	4 (6%)	34 (48%)	10 (14%)	19 (27%)	4 (6%)
6. Go to Employees alone	1 (1%)	8 (11%)	13 (18%)	31 (44%)	18 (25%)

In the former the deference to Management is quite clear, from this Staff respondent. There are 2 important issues raised by Excerpt 5.39:

- (1) the explicit rejection of union involvement in negotiating a bonus, on that Management should be left to decided how to distribute company profits,
- (2) the issue of what happens if the Company was to make a loss. Would they be asked, he suggests, to make that up?

Excerpt 5.40 is a clear contrast to this. In the first place the idea that employees could be asked to make up a loss is explicitly rejected. This Staff respondent's view is quite clearly in relation to a share of the Company's prosperity. The ups and downs of commercial life are clearly a feature he finds difficult to accept.

In relation to the role of the union, the respondent in Excerpt 5.40 makes

clear that for him their participation is essential - if Management produced a figure of their own ('hush-hush') this would clearly not be acceptable to him.

Thus in these 2 Excerpts we have been able to illustrate the uncertainty among Staff taken as a group about the dominance of Management. Among some Staff this is perceived as a situation to be continued - but for others one which should be changed (i.e. the dominance of Management should be at least reduced). This uncertainty has been observed before among Staff - reflecting perhaps their intermediate status in the original hierarchy.

Further elaboration of Staff views on profit sharing - in particular the fact that the productivity bonus was based on a percentage of salary/wages - as given in Excerpts 5.41 and 5.42

As we pointed out already, the Company operated a productivity bonus - in part at least as a way through the then operative prices-incomes legislation. This gave employees an incentive in the form of a bonus of 8% of the salary/wages if a production target was achieved. Both the Staff respondents in Excerpts 5.41 and 5.42 argue that this is not an appropriate way of paying the bonus. In particular they call into operation the relationship between the effort expended and the reward received.

In the former Excerpt, the Staff respondent draws attention to what he calls 'bottlenecks' - what might also be called areas of particular stress, where a great deal of effort has to be expended by employees. In the latter Excerpt the argument is more generalised but of the same type. In Excerpt 5.42 the argument is the direct one, that the reward and effort are not necessarily equal. He does, however, develop this later on in the Excerpt where he argues that Shop Floor tradesmen are more valuable than many Staff

because they 'are the ones that are actually producing'. He does, however, state this as a personal view, acknowledging that that would not be a widely held view among Staff. (This respondent is, however, atypical in his Shop Floor working experience).

In terms of profit sharing, therefore, the idea of a bonus as a proportion of wages/salary does seem to encounter the problem of relating to effort - an across-the-board payment seems to be more acceptable. As we shall see this view is also held by Hourly Paid. It is, furthermore, equally clear that profit-sharing is regarded as a share in the success of the Company.

This sense of profit-sharing being a share of the company's success, echoes to some extent what was said by the Director in Excerpt 5.38 about securing an identity of employee and company well-being. What we have said does not rule out such a development - it does, however, indicate 2 obstacles -

(a) the fact the existing bonus is paid as a proportion of wages and salary - this may generate resentment in that the bonus paid to each individual may not reflect contribution to the profit figure,

(b) the determination of the size of the bonus is not, in the view of a significant proportion of the Staff, a matter which can be left wholly to the discretion of Management. A role for unions is clearly in their minds to represent their interests - Management, in this view cannot be allowed total discretion. Rather more, however, took the view that Management could be allowed discretion.

Thus the views of Staff on this matter are -

(i) ambivalent toward Management - almost equal proportions support Management being allowed discretion in determining bonus, and at the same time that the unions should be involved,

(ii) their attitude toward Management dominance of Company affairs is less

pronounced than the view taken by Management. While Management are prepared to make certain concessions, as we have seen from the beginning of this chapter Staff tend to look for rather more than Management are prepared to offer.

(iii) Staff do, however, clearly regard Management as the dominant group, and that this should continue. The differences revolve around the conditions for that continued dominance (will Unions be allowed to negotiate profit bonuses, will there be free access to company information, will policy be decided equally - or will Management take these decisions alone, perhaps taking employees' views into account).

The views of Hourly Paid are shown in Table 5.66. As with Management and Staff most Hourly Paid too find Option 1 Unacceptable - some 37%, however, find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. In other words more Hourly Paid find this Option acceptable than among either Staff or Managements. Like Staff and Management they also find Option 2 unacceptable - only 19% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. That, however, is nearly 3 times the proportion of Staff who found that Option acceptable.

The views of Hourly Paid, therefore, on Options 1 and 2 are similar to those of Staff, but perhaps surprisingly relatively more conservative than the Staff views.

If we look at Options 5 and 6, on the other end of the scale, we see that Hourly Paid views are less conservative than those of Staff. Among Hourly Paid the option of sharing profits equally between the Parent Company and the Employees (Option 5) is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 71% - 54% was the corresponding figure for Staff. Option 6, which gave all the profits to the employees was only Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 20% - for Staff the corresponding figure was 12%. Thus while Hourly Paid are relatively more conservative than Staff on Options 1 and 2, they are relatively less conservative on Options 5 and 6.

Table 5.66

<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Totally Acceptable</u>	<u>Acceptable</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unacceptable</u>	<u>Totally Unacceptable</u>
Company Profits					
1. All go to Parent Company	3 (6%)	15 (31%)	4 (8%)	19 (40%)	6 (13%)
2. Go to Parent Company but with a bonus for Management	2 (4%)	7 (15%)	5 (10%)	24 (50%)	9 (19%)
3. Go to Parent Company but with a bonus for all employees, whose size will be decided by Management	8 (17%)	23 (48%)	3 (6%)	12 (25%)	1 (2%)
4. Go to Parent Company, but with bonus for all employees, negotiated with Unions	15 (31%)	28 (58%)	2 (4%)	3 (6%)	0 (0%)
5. Shared 50/50 between Parent Company and Employees	8 (17%)	26 (54%)	5 (10%)	7 (15%)	2 (4%)
6. Go to employees alone	5 (10%)	5 (10%)	8 (17%)	24 (50%)	6 (13%)

Why should this be? In relation to Options 5 and 6, given our preceding argument about Staff, and our earlier findings about Hourly Paid views, we should not be surprised that Hourly Paid are less conservative than Staff on Options 5 and 6 (though Hourly Paid do find Option 6 unacceptable). The real questions, therefore, revolves around Options 1 and 2.

If we take Option 1 first, in many respects this option describes what happens now. The Company is, as we have pointed out, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent Company. Thus the profits made by the Company already go to the Parent Company. The lower degree of acceptance by Management and Staff may reflect a frustration that the Company profits may go elsewhere. The greater distance of Hourly Paid from the scene of that action may produce a greater pre-disposition to accept Option 1 (though like Staff and Management, they do find it unacceptable).

Option 2 does seem more of a paradox. It is not surprising that fewer Hourly Paid find this Acceptable/Totally Acceptable than Management (19% to 41% respectively), but the Hourly Paid figure is larger than that for Staff (7%). Why, therefore, do rather Hourly Paid find this Option - which clearly favours Management - more acceptable than do Staff. A reason is apparent in Excerpt 5.43. This Hourly Paid respondent makes clear in the second half of this Excerpt that in his view Management have special responsibilities - "Well a worker earns it but they're supervisory ... But they show good prospects of chasing jobs and that and getting them done." Thus for this respondent the Management role - organising, getting orders - justified a better deal for Management - though he does make clear that there should be a bonus all round. He would, however, accept a relatively larger bonus for Management, justified in his perception by their role. Thus the large acceptance of Option 2 (relative to Staff) may reflect the perceived importance for Hourly Paid of the Management role. This though does have to be understood as very much a minority position among Hourly Paid. Some 69% find Option 2 Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. It does, however, indicate yet again the importance of how the Management role is perceived for determining the attitude of other groups toward Management.

It is, therefore, of interest that the group which is physically closer to Management (the Staff) are relatively less willing in this case to accord Management a special status, than Hourly Paid who are physically more distant from Management.

An alternative to the view in Excerpt 5.43 is given by Excerpt 5.44. This Hourly Paid respondent consistently argues that any profit bonus should be paid equally, on the grounds that everyone in the firm makes a contribution. In other words if-following the excerpt - the guy who sweeps the floors didn't do that there would be "that amount of dirt" - just as if the Management

didn't chase orders etc. there would be no business. Everyone contributes in their own way - thus everyone should share equally in the profits.

The contrast in Table 5.66, between Options 3 and 4 once again takes us back to the issue of how much discretion Management ought to have in decision-making. Option 3 - which allows Management discretion - is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 65% of the Hourly Paid sample. Thus nearly 2/3rds are prepared to allow Management to set their bonus from the Company's profits, without any intervention by the union. The possibility of negotiation with the union is put forward by Option 4. This is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 89%. Thus a much larger proportion - nearly half as much again - prefer negotiations between Management and Unions in determining the level of bonus to be paid from profits. At the same time Option 5 - where profits would automatically be equally divided - is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 71%. Thus the most acceptable Option is 4, which allows for negotiation between Management and Unions, rather than acting unilaterally (3) or control wholly being removed from Management (5). Thus Management dominance is not rejected - but a guarantee of influence through union participation is seem to be desirable.

This point is endorsed in the middle section of Excerpt 5.45. For this Hourly Paid respondent the union should negotiate - or as he puts it "discuss" (which is an even 'softer' approach) - with the Company on this issue. A particularly interesting aspect of this Excerpt is that explicitly these negotiations/discussions should be fundamentally in the light of the company's profits/prosperity. Furthermore that profits should be retained and re-invested in the Company, if this is what Management want to do - but subject to the condition that this is actually done, which illustrates yet again that Management decisions can be wholly acceptable if done in consultation with their employees, so that 'they know what is going on'.

Another interesting point in Excerpt 5.45 is the question of how bonuses would be paid from profits. We put 2 possibilities - cash or shares. The respondent in Excerpt 5.45 makes clear he prefers cash, as shares would cause him to be 'worried out of (his) blooming wits'. Another view is, however, put in Excerpt 5.46. This Hourly Paid respondent, while still stating a preference for cash, would be prepared to hold on to shares "to see how they were going".

The two respondents do, however, argue that everyone should receive the same ... from the company profits. For instance in Excerpt 5.46 justifies this view by pointing out that if everyone in the Company was working together responsibilities would be shared, so profits should be equally shared. This causes us to return to an issue raised in Excerpt 5.38 where we discuss with a Director the role of profit distribution in running the Company. For the Director part of this concerns getting employees "equating their well-being with the Company well-being". Excerpts 5.45 and 5.46 suggest that while profit distribution may not get employees to work harder it would make for a "better relationship" (Excerpt 5.46). Thus the Management objectives with respect to motivation from profit distribution would seem practicable.

This, however, is not to say that Hourly Paid employees are unaware of the motivational aspect to profit distribution, and are not critical of it. The Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.47 is clearly aware of this, and critical of it. His 'alternative' is very different from the existing concept of the Company, as this involves running the Company for need rather than profit. The concept of profit distribution for this respondent is simply another means of Management exercising control - "a more relaxed, democratic way, if you like. Just another method". In that sense the Shop Steward and the Manager agree - though clearly they would disagree about the implication of that control. On the other hand, those Hourly Paid respondents we

discussed this issue with do not have the same perception of profit distribution. For them - indeed for most respondents in any group - profit distribution is a means of employees sharing in the prosperity of the Company, which is something they have contributed to.

There does, however, remain the issue of how this distribution should be determined. Table 5.67 presents a summary of these views for the 3 groups. Clearly Options 1, 2 and 6 would not be acceptable. Concentrating on Options 3-5 illustrates the nature of the problem. On the one hand both Staff and Hourly Paid find Options 4 and 5 acceptable. Both of these would severely restrict the discretion of Management in the issue - indeed Option 5 would more or less remove it altogether. Neither Option 4 nor 5 is acceptable to Management. All 3 groups are, however, prepared to accept Option 3, which gives Management discretion on the size of the profits to be distributed.

This table illustrates 2 important points about this section in particular and most of our findings in general.

(a) Management perceive that they must retain control. We have seen in many respects that Management are prepared to concede greater influence to Staff and Hourly Paid - but that they as Management must retain ultimate control.

(b) Staff and Hourly Paid, while seeking greater influence, have been prepared to grant to Management the status of the dominant group, but that should be subject to a guarantee of their influence i.e. that while Management may be dominant, that dominance should not be unrestricted. Hence we saw in Tables 5.65 and 5.66 that Option 4 was more acceptable than Option 3.

This raises directly how Staff and Hourly Paid influence would be used in a participative system. This issue is considered in the next section which

Table 5. ~~67~~

<u>Company Profits</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>
1. All go to Parent Company	-	-	-
2. Go to Parent Company but with a Bonus for Management	-	-	-
3. Go to Parent Company but with a Bonus for all Employees, whose size will be decided by Management	+	+	+
4. Go to Parent Company but with a Bonus for all Employees, negotiated with Unions	-	+	+
5. Shared 50/50 between Parent Company and Employees	-	+	+
6. Go to Employees alone	-	-	-

- More than 50% find Option Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable.
 + " " " " " Acceptable/Totally Acceptable

poses questions about the possible role of worker directors. Of particular relevance is that Management perceptions of how worker directors would operate (their objectives in particular) are rather different from those of Staff and Hourly Paid. Management concern about the participation of other employees at board level may be reduced by an awareness that Staff and Hourly Paid perceptions of what worker directors should be going are very similar to those of Management.

Empirical Conclusion

This section completes our work on perceptions of the organisation's decision-making, and (in the previous chapter) its communication of information to employees. The following have been the most important findings

- 1 From chapter 4 it is clear that employees informed in this company (though we would not suggest that the company, relative to others, is particularly bad), and that the further down the hierarchy one goes the more the more pronounced this becomes.
- 2 In most of the 14 decision-making areas we looked at the perceived level of participation/control exercised by this labour force outwith management was very low. We do, however, have to distinguish between those issues which had an immediate and directly perceived relevance for the individual, and those issues where relevance for the individual is more difficult to perceive. An example of the former would, fairly obviously be pay. Tables 5.1 - 5.5 show perceptions of a high degree of influence, especially for the hourly paid. An example of the latter would be Financial Policy, where the influence perceived as exercised by those below the level of management was very low indeed (eg 79% of hourly-paid said they exercised 'little influence' or 'no influence' -

see Table 5.14: 73% of staff gave the same responses to this question see Table 5.22). This type of finding is the same as that of Heller et al in 'What do the British want from industrial democracy'. They conclude "the total amount of involvement in decision-making at work is astonishingly low (Pg.20). Similarly, Rathkey concludes "there was little support for the view that a large degree of worker participations had already been achieved at shopfloor level (as put forward by Bullock). From a very broad definition of participations, the findings pointed clearly to a strong sense of lack of influence over shop-floor issues" - Participation and Industrial Democracy: the Shop-Floor View, pp138-139). Our findings are very much in the same direction as these. There is a low degree of influence exercised over-all by those below the level of management. We do, however, have one reservation in relation to Rathkey. We have found in this study that the more direct and obvious relevance an issue has for the individual, the greater the perceived influence. Conversely the less direct and more opaque the relevance of an issue, the less the perceived influence. So on shop-floor issues we found a greater degree of influence than on issues away from the shop-floor. Therefore while agreeing with the first part of Rathkey's conclusion (that little worker participations has been achieved) we do have reservations about the extent to which influence is exercised on shop-floor issues.

3 Heller et al conclude further that "there is little evidence that workers (or any other level of organisation) want to have a radically different degree of influence or control over decisions "(what do we British want from Industrial Democracy Pg.20). This was not what we found in this study. We found that consistently employees below the level of Management, and indeed Management, wanted to exercise a greater degree of influence than at present. Our findings are much closer to those of Rathkey who says "the study demonstrated a clear desire on the part of the shop-floor workers to have more say in

in decisions which affected their work and working conditions

"(Participation and Industrial Democracy: the Shop-Floor View, Pg 138.)

For instance, if we take up influence on Financial Policy decisions,

we saw ~~then~~ that 79% of Hourly-Paid perceived themselves

as having little or no influence. Similarly, 73% of Staff perceived

themselves to have little or influence. If we ask them, how much

influence they would ~~ideally~~ have, however, we found 12% of Hourly-

Paid say 'A Good Deal' and 54% say they should have 'some' (Table

5.24). The figures for Staff are 11% and 66% (Table 5.22). This

is simply one example of what happened as we moved from what respondents

thought did happen to what would happen in an ideal situation - the

influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid would increase.

4 Despite the fact that Staff and Hourly-Paid did desire a greater

degree of influence for themselves, it was consistently shown that

they would, even in an ideal situation continue to defer to Management.

Even in respect of Pay it is true that Management would continue to

be dominant - though it is admittedly marginal in the case of Hourly-

Paid (Table 5.4). On other issues - though still clearly work-related -

deference to Management is apparent (eg Work-Pace-Tables A3.25-A3.27/

Transfers from one part of the factory to another - Tables A3.34 -

A3.37/Promotions - Tables A3.39-A3.42/Discipline - Tables 5.12 -

5.15). Given these obviously and directly relevant issues to an

individual, even in an ideal situation there continued to be reported

a structure of influence in which Management would continue to be

dominant. This is supported by the data which follows on after the

control graph data.

5 The McQuitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis (Table 5.26

to Table 5.55) have a pronounced tendency to separate out Management

influence from that of other groups (This is what Gundelach and

Tetzschner found in Acta Sociologica 1976). In other words Management

influence - either actual or ideal influence - is perceived to be

different from that of the other groups. It is interesting that this is particularly pronounced among Staff and Hourly-paid ie they in particular perceive Management influence to have a special quality, more so than Management themselves, whose own view is more disparate.

6 The data on possible future structures (Tables 5.5~~6~~ to 5.6~~7~~) all emphasise the role of Management once more. We have seen that Staff and Hourly-Paid, in the control graph data, even in an ideal situation perceive Management as being the dominant group. Tables 5.5~~6~~-5.6~~7~~ clarify this situation somewhat. While more 'radical alternatives (eg equality of Management with others in decision-making) are acceptable, Management taking decisions in consultation with their employees is the most acceptable option for every group. This, we believe, illustrates a very important point - namely that while Staff and Hourly-Paid are prepared to accept a continued domination by Management, that acceptance is not unconditional. In particular, Staff and Hourly-Paid, as we saw, 'want to know what is going on'. This was quite clear when we discussed access to information. Table 5.101 shows that Hourly-Paid are not prepared to accept a system of access whereby Management have a veto. Staff can be seen in Table 5.100 to prefer a system of free access to one with a Management veto (though 50% do say it is acceptable). Management, on the other hand, are not prepared to accept any system of free access. Table 5.99 shows clearly they believe they must retain control of company information. In relation to distribution of profits, if a bonus was to be paid, Hourly-Paid would look to the union to negotiate this with Management (Table 5.6~~6~~): Management would prefer to set this themselves (Table 5.6~~4~~): Staff are pretty well indifferent between the 2 options (Table 5.6~~5~~). What all this shows, we would argue, is that (1) Management think they should remain dominant (2) this is acceptable, but subject to conditions on the part of Staff and Hourly-paid. What, therefore could these conditions be? We can sum this up as follows. Staff

and Hourly-Paid are prepared - indeed see as ideal - that Management should continue to take decisions (that, as we have pointed out already in this Chapter is the management function), but in taking decisions Management should be subject to the influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid. In other words, Management in taking decisions should take into account the interests, views and information of Staff and Hourly-Paid. This involves some kind of system whereby there can be 2-way communications between Management and, Staff and Hourly-Paid.

7 One type of system we considered was participations at Board Level (Tables A3.63 - A3.64). The views of Management about how this would work were fairly pessimistic - their confidence in the company would decline (Table A3.63), they believed that a Board with worker directors would run the company with fundamentally different objectives (Table A3.65). We pointed out, however, that this represented a misunderstanding by Management, as the data from Staff and Hourly-Paid indicated not only that their confidence in the Company could increase, but that they saw the role of worker directors in a way that was not so very different from the way Management thought the Company should be run. This is particularly clear in Table A3.64.

Thus, in conclusion, hierarchy is alive and well in this company. Management are dominant, and for Staff and Hourly-Paid this is a situation they think ought to continue. The continuation of Management is, however, subject to the conditions we referred to above ie, that while Management take decisions they do so with the views and interests of Staff and Hourly-Paid in mind. Even if there was to be worker participation of this type suggested by Bullock/Vredeling, the Staff and Hourly-Paid take the view that the purpose of this would be first of all to help make the Company more efficient before keeping them informed, or even protecting their rights.

Thus hierarchy can, subject to negotiation persist. We have shown that there is a basic attitudinal consensus on that. The negotiation of an operational consensus for the continuation of hierarchy is unlikely to be done without conflict - for instance there is a fundamental problem concerning access to company information, as we showed in the previous chapter, and again in tables 5.99 - 5.102. There may be exercises of power in the first two dimensions, as well as in the third dimension through the Lifeworld. There may be sharp edges and disagreements. Our fundamental point is, however, that there is a basic consensus about hierarchy's persistence - the conflicts, it appears to us are at the edges. The existence of hierarchy is guarantied by the Lifeworld, which we shall go on to establish in the next chapter.

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore perceptions of hierarchy in an organization (in this case an engineering firm in Scotland). In particular we have been concerned with the role played by management in the hierarchy, and the apparent acceptance of this role by those subordinate to them in the hierarchical structure.

Our argument this far has required that we use hierarchy in a wide ranging sense - thus

1) as a structure of an organization. For instance in the classical Weberian bureaucracy, the officials were ranked at successively higher levels, with successively greater degrees of power for each level. In this sense hierarchy is simply a feature of structure.

2) as perceived by those within the organization. It would in principle have been possible for us to have described in detail the organization of the firm, and in particular its hierarchy. This, however, would have been of limited value, since what was relevant for us was to gain access to, and to understand, the perception of those within the organization. It is also important to appreciate that their perception of hierarchy may not be the same as our own. Who is to say who is correct? Equally perceptions of the hierarchy may vary between groups (for instance Management and Hourly paid) and indeed within groups (for instance different respondents among the staff). What we have tried to do in this chapter is to show these perceptions.

3) as a mental construct against which employees determine their behaviour and assess others. It has been our contention that the perceived hierarchy is an important context in which employees decide how to behave, and what to do. Thus, the role of hierarchy is that its differential power structure is a consideration for employees in structuring their behaviour.

The question we have posed of hierarchy is why it is that this differential power structure is accepted by the employees of the company, at least in the sense that they do not challenge it. In other words we do not require that the employees do not actually have to positively endorse hierarchy. It is enough that the "acceptance" is not to challenge hierarchy. In fact, as we have seen, their acceptance does appear to have many positive qualities to it.

Our hypothesized answer to the acceptance of hierarchy - and thus to systematically different levels of power - has been through the power which operates through the structure of the Lifeworld. Hierarchy is itself, of course, a form of power, and to that extent it can be considered to be self supporting, since any challenge to the hierarchy's dominant group would not only have to overcome

a) the restrictions imposed by the Lifeworld, but also

b) the (conscious) power of that group.

These matters will be considered further in the next chapter.

chapter 6

CHAPTER 6

The purpose of this chapter will be

(i) to bring together and summarize the empirical results reported in the previous chapters,

(Ii) to synthesize these results in order to develop the theoretical model presented in chapter (1)¹. Our purpose in doing so will be to develop this to the level of an empirically derived model which has relevance both empirically and theoretically.

(Iii) to contrast our findings with other theory and empirical work, and in so doing to put our results firmly within the context of debate.

We shall therefore refer frequently to literature relevant to our subject. This is perhaps rather unusual, to have what could be seen as a literature review at the end, rather than at the beginning. It is however our view that it is more appropriate to review our results in the context of relevant literature. We hope the reader will bear with us on this matter.

SUMMARY OF EARLIER FINDINGS

First of all let us briefly review the findings we have already reported in earlier chapters. These fell into 4 categories.

(A) COMMUNICATION BY THE COMPANY TO ITS EMPLOYEES.

This was discussed in chapter 4, where we showed that the perceived quality of communication was related to the hierarchical position of the respondent. Put very simply, the closer one is to the top the company the more likely one is to assess the quality of communication favourably, whereas the lower one is in the hierarchy the less favourable is the assessment of the quality of communication. Basically those who were closer to the top were more likely to say that they were well informed, whereas those closer to the bottom were more likely to say they were badly informed - indeed on some issues, to say they were not informed at all.

We related this to the perceived trust people placed in the information they received from the company. These correlations showed quite clearly that the trust placed in information is related directly and significantly to the how well informed the respondent felt himself to be ie those who were best informed would place most trust in the information they received, while those least well informed - if informed at all - would put very little trust in what they were told, if indeed they trusted it at all ².

It should, however, be clear that this situation could be rationalised - for instance in excerpt 4.4 we present a discussion with a senior manager, who suggests that in relation to information on the firm's financial policy, the reason for secrecy was substantially commercial. This is a difficult argument to contradict, but on the other hand it can be maintained simply by virtue of confidentiality itself - it is difficult to be critical of something from which you are systematically excluded and kept in ignorance.

The Lifeworld can therefore provide meaningful rationalisations for perceived failure to communicate. In the above example commercial secrecy is defined as more important than candour. This is not to say that such rationalisations will not be challenged - excerpt 4.5 from a Shop Steward indicates this, as he argues that he and his members are just as trustworthy as managers. In other words that in his Lifeworld at least candour and commercial secrecy are not problematic, since he and his members (as employees of the firm) can be trusted with information of this type. Given the lack of movement on this, however, it is clear that the Lifeworld of employees outwith management accept this situation in practical terms at least.

This appears to be so, even in cases such as illustrated by excerpt 4.7, where an hourly paid employee suggests that management in the firm are capable of saying one thing and then doing another, and thus not just that he is badly informed, but actually misinformed. Or if we consider Excerpts 4.8 and 4.9 we can see the frustration caused by management not allowing upward communication, allowing employees to make their experience relevant in decisions about investing in new machinery. Even in such situations the hierarchy dominated Lifeworld continues to define such a situation as operationally acceptable, if not entirely so in value terms.

Hence we found in Chapter 4 a communication system which is perceived to be systematically biased, a communication system which systematically excludes employees as we descend the hierarchy, a communication system which is justified by hierarchy. The responses of our Hourly paid and Staff respondents suggests that on the one hand

a) they are not satisfied with the system of communication which operates, but

b) operationally it works - their dissatisfaction is not such as to do anything about it.

B) DECISION - MAKING.

We dealt with this in chapter 5. The perceived distribution of control over various types of decision was considered, and we also asked our respondents to indicate how they would, ideally like influence to be distributed over the types of decision specified. We found the following results:

(1) That over most types of decision Management are perceived to be the dominant group. Obviously we would expect this to vary from one decision type to another and this was the case in our work. We found that over those decisions which had the most obviously direct influence over a respondent's working life that the perceived degree of Management dominance was less than over issues where this influence was rather less obvious³.

(2) That when asked how they would like influence to be distributed ideally, we found that while there is a marked tendency for respondents to say that Staff and Hourly-Paid ought to exercise more influence, it is still the case that Management were seen as the dominant group. This finding is very clear as well as significant. What we have found is that for our respondents, even in an ideal situation, Management would remain the ultimate decision-maker, though there is a desire for those lower down the hierarchy to exercise more influence than now.

(3) This view that Management are the dominant decision-makers is confirmed for us by further statistical analysis. Using Factor Analysis ⁴ and McQuitty Linkage Analysis for supplementary analysis, we showed that for our respondents, Management influence is conceptually distinct. This could be seen in that clusters, and factors consistently contained either only Management variables, or only Staff and Hourly Paid variables. This indicates that Management are not only perceived as a distinct group (in a way that neither Staff nor Hourly Paid are), but also that this is quite systematic (ie that Management influence is not sometimes distinct, but is always seen in this way).

Where there is a mixture of variables they tended to be around the former group of variables of directly perceived influence ⁵. Thus the ideal situation, as things are at present, has Management perceived as the dominant group.

It is, we would contend, significant that there should be this degree of separation in the thinking our respondents - to some extent a kind of conceptual apartheid contained within the Lifeworld, not only of Hourly-paid OR Staff OR Management - but rather of all three simultaneously, creating a conceptual system within the firm. It appears to us that the Lifeworld defines the influence of Management on decision-making as a distinct, organizing relevance. This could be seen too in considering the acceptability of representation of employees at board level. This kind of consideration extends into the data on representation at board level. For management this is not the issue. Rather the issue is to enhance communications within the company - the perceptions of which we indicated above are not wholly favourable.

The conceptual apartheid we refer to can be seen in excerpt 5.27, from a Staff respondent who considers the right to participate being contingent on having the skills to make a technical contribution. Given that Management have the appropriate skills, but that by and large Staff and Hourly paid do not, it is logical given the structure of this Lifeworld that Management should take policy decisions.

Among Hourly paid too there is an emphasis on the importance of communication - one respondent (excerpt 5.30) refers to "knowing what's going on". Like Staff there is a high level of significance of expertise - that until other employees outwith the firm knew how the firm works they cannot operate on an equal basis with Management ⁶.

Hierarchy gives those at the top certain privileges which we showed to be justified by the Lifeworld definition of Management being perceived to possess particular forms of expertise. Even when we open up the possibility of changing hierarchy the same considerations loom large - the role of worker directors would be to make the company more efficient (table A3.64); a board with worker directors would be as concerned with making as many sales as possible as with providing good well paid employment (tables A3.65-A3.67); the most important role of worker director would be to make the company more efficient (table A3.69). Technical rationality clearly looms large in the Lifeworlds of ALL our respondents.

(C) JOB SATISFACTION.

This is dealt with in Appendix 6. We investigated this primarily as a possible explanatory variable (ie if job satisfaction is low this might explain, in a classical Marxist way criticism of Management, existing ways of taking decisions). But in fact, as we showed in this chapter, satisfaction is on the whole quite high, even though respondents were asked to assess their satisfaction against how they perceived the rewards of others (eg how satisfied are you with your working conditions compared to other Staff), and also to their ideal situation.

(D) THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA AND OTHER OUT - WORK EXPERIENCES.

These were dealt with in Appendix 7. Here we looked for other possible explanations for our findings (eg is it because of media influence that hierarchy is able to persist?). Our view was the media did not play a causal role, though it is probably supportive.

In this resume of our findings we have referred frequently to the role of our respondents' perceptions. We have indicated a thought system for our respondents - their Lifeworld composed of typicalities and relevances etc. We have shown that they think "this" rather than think "that". Now at this stage it may be acceptable for us to stop and say this is what we think - that their Lifeworld has a particular form. It has been our argument all along, however, that that is not good enough. We have argued that we have to press on to try to explain why they hold this set of perceptions rather than some other set I.e. why they think "this" rather than "that", why their Lifeworld is of this form and what implications this may have. A major explanatory variable we have employed to do this has been power.

Hierarchy is in itself an inherently power-laden structure - basically it is highly formalized power⁷ - and our respondents live with the reality of this every day. Thus it is not surprising that they should tell us that they see themselves as significantly of lesser power than Management or that our Management respondents should perceive themselves as being the dominant group. What may be surprising, however, is that this situation not only works, but that in an ideal situation with no prescribed constraints that our respondents should wish it to continue with only a few relatively minor amendments⁸.

It has been our contention that this dominance is a function not only of conscious power⁹, but also of an unconscious dimension of power. The significance of such unconscious power, on which the majority of our respondents operate, is that it does not allow the usurping of Management dominance. This is because it underlies a view (or Lifeworld as we shall go on to describe it) which defines decision-making as a Management task in the same way as fitting two pieces of pipe together is a fitter's task, doing electrical wiring is an electrician's, and selling is a salesman's job.

The power of Management is thus in an important way a reflected in the division of labour¹⁰, but is then endorsed by the unconscious dimension of power operating through the Lifeworld.

The power of Management is therefore critical for us in the analysis of our findings, but there is more to it than the mere possession of power. Power is of no value unless it is exercised, but as we shall see it is conceivable that neither side is aware of its exercise.

The role of power, we have argued is especially critical in the negotiation of reality within the company. Power is used not just to define what is going on - for instance for Management to define certain events as good or bad - but to conceive that definition in a context which is favourable to them. For instance if Management take a decision not to invest in new equipment, even if their employees disagree with this, Management still retain the advantage of the division of labour¹¹. In this they are supported by the media¹².

Thus, the perceived quality of communication/perceived distribution of actual and ideal control/the levels of job satisfaction do not develop in a social vacuum, but instead are constrained by the existence of hierarchy. But not only in its directly experienced form, but also in a more important sense, by virtue of its unconsciously experienced constraints.

This argument has led us to the development of the empirically derived model which we shall present and explain in the next section.

EMPIRICAL MODEL.

The model^(a) is built around 5 propositions which we have drawn from our empirical results. The 5 propositions are as follows -


(I) that Management occupy a special/privileged role in the organizational hierarchy¹³. Now this may seem like a fairly unremarkable proposal, because by virtue of the definition of hierarchy, (synonyms for which include caste, class, as well as the more obvious position and status), we would be surprised to find otherwise. But our point is rather more than this. We shall argue that Management occupy this position not merely by organizational arrangement, but by virtue of their own Lifeworlds and those of their employees. Management in other words occupy a special position by social definition, in this company at least.

Our research has, however, explored the parameters of this definition ie why is hierarchy accepted? Our findings indicate that the fundamental basis of hierarchy is their claim to technical legitimacy - and furthermore that technical legitimacy is ascribed to them by those below them in the hierarchy¹⁴.

Thus the role of Management is not only a matter of fairness/values directly, because as Habermas argues, it is the logic of technology which drives the value system on¹⁵. Nor is it even a matter of material reward. If for instance, the company was to hit hard times and conditions were to become significantly worse (redundancies, cuts in wages etc) it would not be this directly which would lead to any questioning of the managerial role, rather it would be the fact that hard times may lead to questioning of their technical competence¹⁶.

(Ii) The conscious and unconscious powers of Management. Again it is hardly remarkable to have found that the most powerful group in the company are Management. As we suggested in the previous section they are powerful by definition of their position in the hierarchy. Thus Management have formal control of the critical decisions taken in the company and to the extent which others participate in this process this is formally the decision of Management eg to allow discussions on redundancy. Of course it is clear that in the latter half of the present century Management have found their power beginning to be subject to constraints and that the statutory law has interceded to dilute their power in various respects relative to the "contract" position which existed under pure common law¹⁷ (eg the law on unfair dismissal¹⁸) but the formal legal position is that Management are the ultimate guardians of the property of the company, on behalf of shareholders.

Fig. 6.1



What is, however, more significant is not the visible power (to move employees from one job to another, to invest millions of pounds etc.) but the power which is less visible or disguised in other forms. Thus to be allowed to define situations in certain ways, to be able to interpret information in particular ways largely without competition, to be seen as the monopoly authority on decision-making for the company - all of these are much more effective forms of power, than the power to refuse admission to decision-making (eg to refuse to discuss a decision to invest in new equipment) because the exercise of this hidden (and as we have seen in earlier chapters, unconscious for both sides) power means that refusal is not necessary, because either no request is made, or Management's power to define leads relentlessly to a particular decision (eg to the extent that technological rationality is dominant, it renders more overtly social values more difficult to sustain in practice).

If we recall the ideal speech thesis of Habermas discussed in Chapter 1, then we can see that technical rationality is another source of power inequality as it provides Management with an inherent advantage in discourse¹⁹. In particular it means that there is a breach of the requirement for all to be equally able

"to put forward or to call into question, to ground or refute statements, explanations and so on, so that in the long run no assertion is exempted from critical examination"²⁰.

The force of technical rationality is such that it is quite clear that this cannot hold good, and as Lukes points out the real advantage of unconscious/hidden power (his third dimension) is that

"it can be used to prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognition and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they see it as divinely ordained and beneficial"²¹.

This, we would concur with Lukes is the most significant use of power, and we would point out that his description above corresponds in an almost identical way with our empirical findings. In other words it is a particularly effective use of power to conceal the degree to which power is unequally distributed.

(Iii) The Lifeworld and Negotiating Reality. Our research has shown how the reality of our subjects is a function of power - we have argued this point again in this chapter. We have argued that this is not a reality determined by equals, but rather that one side has advantages not open to the other - we might almost say the "dice are loaded" ²² .

The power advantages of Management means this reality, of advantage to them, can be sustained from a position of strength. Now that Management are in this position of power, this unconscious power serves to maintain their power. But as we have argued before, it is power which cannot be directly observed which is the most significant because through this unconscious power, Management's role appears to be natural/normal - even to Management (ie that even Management themselves are not fully aware of the extent of their own power, far less those below them in the hierarchy) ²³ .

The situation we have in mind is very like the one described by Morgan in his chapter entitled "Exploring Plato's Cave". He describes the metaphor in the following terms -

"organizations are psychic phenomena, in the sense that they are ultimately created and sustained by conscious and unconscious processes, with the notion that people can actually become imprisoned or confined by the images, ideas, thoughts and actions to which these processes give rise" ²⁴ .

There is, therefore, in our view a process of "confinement" - to use Morgan's metaphor- which works in such a way as to ensure the persistence of hierarchy and of the Management role by concealing from not only Staff and Hourly Paid, but also from Management, a significant and vital sign of their power.

If we look back into our research then we can explore this idea a little further. One of the most striking things about the semi-structured interviews was the apparently natural acceptance of the position of Management - to question their role in any fundamental way just did not seem pertinent.

This experience is also described by Stewart Clegg in "Power, Rule and Domination", as the process of reaching what he describes as "bed-rock" ²⁵. Now, it has become clear to us in conducting the research, and indeed in writing this, that we were questioning what, for our respondents, was completely taken for granted. But rather than ask them why they took this reality for granted - something they probably could not explain, and indeed something we could not explain if asked - what we did was to take another approach and explore the logic of this reality, which we have argued is based on technical rationality and the power which this creates for the Management of the company, both conscious and unconscious power.

It is, however, critical to appreciate that we do not seek to argue that our subjects played out some predetermined role in a play, with words written by somebody else elsewhere.

What we are putting forward is that our subjects can be seen as being entrapped in a system of rules which are such that they allow a degree of discretion for those involved, - while the ending of the play is predetermined (to continue the theatrical metaphor), the actors get to use their own words, and can to some extent determine how they get to the predetermined end. Operating according to a system of rules does not rule out the possibility of widely differing forms of behaviour

For instance if we look at the world of football, Inter Milan and Celtic both played football of very different forms in the 1967 European Cup Final - one very defensive while the other was attacking. The critical factor was that both played within the rules of the game. Rules do not necessarily create uniformity of behaviour - it is only when different forms of behaviour begin to contradict each other that there are real difficulties ²⁶.

Social life is often of such complexity that rules cannot be totally determining. In certain situations the reality may be so complex that rules cannot indicate to us with absolute certainty what we should do. We therefore have discretion or indecision about how to behave - but not total discretion, rather we are invested with a constrained discretion. Within these limits, however, we can determine our behaviour.

Thus for instance it would have been no more acceptable for Jimmy Johnstone to play the ball with his hand than it would be than it would be for shop stewards to criticize Management proposals on the grounds that Management are incompetent. On the other hand, it would not be unacceptable for a steward to criticize a Management proposal because it was to the disadvantage of his members. The latter is possible because it is consistent with the general rules which operate (ie that unions are there to represent the interests of their members, which was a view expressed by managers in our sample). Indeed such criticism is central to his role - it lies within the constraints we referred to above. The difficulty of the former example is that it goes outwith these constraints, and would be akin to a footballer playing the ball with his hand (unless he was the goalkeeper), or to put this within a Management context, he was a fellow manager. There are in other words certain behaviours which are legitimate for some, but not for others.

Within these constraints there can be conflict ²⁷ - but this is a constrained conflict as the form is a matter of tacit agreement between the parties ²⁸. For instance the role of football referee would be (more?) untenable if the two teams were not willing to play within the rules of the game. Likewise in social life there can be conflict, but it must be constrained otherwise we face the risk of undermining the entire relationship.

As we have argued above the Management role is supported by their claim to competence being acceded to by their employees. A challenge to this claim, and conflict around it would represent a significant change to the nature of the relationship between the two parties.

There can therefore be conflict, but it is of a constrained form, not posing a fundamental attack on Management. In such conflict Management are not even required to employ all of the power available to them-the power of which both sides are conscious will be employed as in any industrial dispute. What is missed, however, is that they will also use their unconscious power for instance to create certain definitions of the dispute and to preclude others.

It is, nonetheless, more efficient for Management to exercise their power in such a way that, as Lukes reminded us, they do not even have to use their power ²⁹. To the extent that technical rationality dominates, Management's role will be much more simple - more so than if, for instance, fairness played a more pronounced role.

Thus through a negotiation of reality the members of the organization can operate a working agreement of what is happening/to happen. This is not to say that they agree on every single thing - nor that they will necessarily all behave in the same way. Some degree of difference is quite possible. What is critical, however, is that how each of them behaves is not inconsistent with the behaviour/expectations of others.

Nor is the negotiation between equals - one side (Management) has several advantages over the others, not least of which is the fact that the others expect(know?)that they will come out on top. Thus while there may be differences and there may be conflict, these differences and conflicts are limited by the system of rules which operates to sustain hierarchy and the role of Management therein.

To call it a negotiation is perhaps to concede more freedom to the participants than is perhaps merited - but it would be too limiting to argue that they are merely actors in a play, as they have more discretion than that. Perhaps it would be more apt to describe it as a constrained negotiation, for instance in the sense that there is no negotiation about who plays the lead roles and the "bit" parts, as well as how the play will end. Nonetheless, as we shall see in the last part of this section it is a process which has important implications ³⁰.

(Iv) The final part of our empirical model relates to the specific content of our research, namely the perceptions held by our respondents of communication by the company and the distribution of control in decision making. What we have argued consistently is that this is a part of their constrained reality - thus Management are the dominant decision-makers/Hourly Paid workers can declare themselves satisfied with conditions clearly less good than those enjoyed by Management/communication is clearly on a hierarchical basis.

Yet while the fundamental point is the acceptance of the Management role in the hierarchy, there are still clearly conflicts at the margins ³¹ - complaints about the system of communication which can leave employees not knowing information that they should have known(eg about orders won);acceptance of Management as decision-makers, but a desire to share more influence over Management when they take decisions;and a clear desire to move toward Staff conditions of work by the Hourly Paid workers. Trade Unions would have little role if this was not the case.

All of this, however, takes place within a bounded reality. which endorses the Management role in the hierarchy and the power, both conscious and unconscious which goes with it.

These variables have been assembled to construct a model which is shown as fig. 6.1. The model is premised on the view that there are (to use Clegg's terminology) two circuits of power.

The first circuit reflects the power which Management possess by virtue of their hierarchical position. Hence their role in the hierarchy determines their conscious power. This is the power which is reflected in the answers to, for instance questions on how control is distributed.

The second circuit begins in the Lifeworld, which defines such Management's position in the hierarchy, and the conscious power it brings, as "correct" ³². This

- a) reflects the existence of such conscious power - we are born into it,

- b) simultaneously supports such conscious power through the interpretations it creates.

Hence the Management role in the hierarchy, and hierarchy itself is sustained not only by conscious power, but also by the existence of unconscious power originating in the Lifeworld.

We shall next go on to consider our discussion in the light of other published theories and research.

As we have argued above that our findings indicate the model which appears in the diagram over, logically we shall proceed through in the order it is structured. Thus we shall deal first of all with the role of Management, and in particular their role in the hierarchy.

ROLE OF MANAGEMENT

First of all let us consider who managers are. In Chapter 3 we presented brief biographical data on the managers in our sample. Looking more widely, however, who are the managers? It is suggested by Melrose-Woodman, in his sample of BIM members, that the average manager is

"a married man, somewhere between 46 and 55 years old. ...attended grammar school.....may have attended a technical college on a part-time or full time basis and gained an HND or HNC....by the time he was 17, he had entered into full time employment in a technical or clerical capacity and will have taken up his first managerial position between the ages of 25 and 35...(he) is currently employed in manufacturing in the private sector (and will) have between 1 and 10 people reporting to him directly...at the time the data was collected [mid 1970s] he was earning somewhere between £5000 and £10, 000....typically he has been with his present organization between 6 and 10 years or over 20 years" ³³ .

We can see in this description, certain similarities to our own Management sample, though as Melrose-Woodman points out later on "it is very hard to generalize about managers" ³⁴ .

This diversity of managers is a finding replicated in other studies Eg

" Managers as a group, were found to be neither homogeneous, nor in their principle characteristics, changing over time." ³⁵

or

" Perhaps the most striking conclusion about today's managers suggested by the foregoing reviews is their very considerable heterogeneity." ³⁶

The concept of the average manager is, therefore, one which we should treat with caution. Management seem to be most typified by their differences.

That, however, concerns only the biographical aspects of managers ³⁷ . What they actually do may point to similarities.

Mintzberg points out that managers spend more time in informal and verbal communication than in formal and written communication ³⁸. What, therefore, do they talk about?

Golding argues that underlying a great deal of Management talk is the

" control of workers by managers" ³⁹.

In his analysis of Management talk, Golding argues, that there is

" a basic underlying assumption (by managers) concerned with the control of workers by Management ", and that " domination is thus at the heart of the structure of organizationsSuperiority of those in control is manifested as representing a hierarchy of knowledge and expertise. " ⁴⁰

The similarity between Golding's argument and our own is striking. The logic of what the managers in our own sample, however goes further than in Golding's research. Our own sample did recognize the control they exercised, but this was always underwritten by technical necessity. In other words, while managers may see themselves as controllers within the business, the control they exercise is not an end in itself, but rather the means toward technical or business necessity. The control they exercise is not their control, but rather is always justified by technological necessity (for instance we quote a senior manager, in excerpt 5.17, who argues that it is not he - or other managers - who would make employees redundant, rather it is "the day the bank's wont give you any more money). Most important, however, is the extent to which subordinates acquiesce in, even if they do not share, the assumptions of Management control.

This issue is considered further by MacDonald ⁴¹, who quotes Edwards,

"The interests of workers and those of employers collide, and what is good for one is frequently costly for the other. Control is rendered problematical because unlike other commodities involved in production, labour power is always embodied in people, who have their own interests and needs and who retain their power to resist being treated like a commodity" ⁴².

Thus from this perspective the significance of control in Management talk is not mere chance, but rather is central to the Management role. This issue too is considered by MacDonald, in the two following points:

1) that given the ability of employees to resist, Management must consider how to secure their consent,

2) he quotes Hyman ⁴³ in suggesting that

"consent and cooperation are important in situations such as prisons and mental hospitals how essential they are in work organizations where a manager or supervisor cannot rely on the same enforced and unquestioned discipline which is normal in a prison or in the army" ⁴⁴ .

It is, however, important to acknowledge that considerations of this type - while clearly strategically significant - are not necessarily at the forefront of the mind of many managers, far less discussing them with each other (never mind researchers). These issues are without doubt critical, but our research suggests are largely taken for granted by managers - in other words they are part of the Lifeworlds of Managers. This is not to say that they treat labour relations as unimportant, but that consent was not questioned.

A view more similar to that found in our own research is given by Lawrence ⁴⁵. His data is composed of organization charts, different types of managers, meetings, reporting, discussion, touring the works, desk work, using the phone, etc. This, almost diarist approach, may appear to us to be rather superficial, but it is the aspect of the managerial role with which managers themselves are most familiar.

Nor it should be clear do Management recognize themselves as "Machiavelli-like", exercising their power over their subordinates. For managers, Management is work - it is a job. Studies like those of Mintzberg ⁴⁶, Glover ⁴⁷, or Lawrence ⁴⁸, all examine what managers do. But how do they think about their jobs?

This is taken up by Marshall and Stewart ⁴⁹ who examine

"the everyday practical reasoning of managers about certain aspects of their jobs". ⁵⁰

This study, which also commented on the biographical diversity of Management, revealed 3 perceptions of their role held by some managers - Job Analysis ⁵¹, Focused ⁵², or Holistic ⁵³.

The significance, from our point of view, of these findings is that for managers, their job is precisely that - a job. For the managers in our sample we have seen that their prime focus was on "getting things done". Consideration of issues like power and authority are secondary to the purely technical Management role.

Management for managers is, therefore, perceived as a technical not a political function. To question them about power is, given their perception, beside the point. It is his job " to get things done " - to get output produced, to sell output, to manage the finances of the company or whatever. He does not see himself principally, or even mainly as a "politician".

Similar findings are reported by Spybey ⁵⁴, who reports the presence of two types of manager in the woollen mills he researched.

These he described as traditionalists and proliferians. The former saw themselves as managers specifically in the woollen industry, while the latter saw themselves as

" the key specialization in the running of organizations, especially in terms of monitoring of financial investment"⁵⁵

Spybey shows that to whatever extent power is used by managers of either type, it is as a means rather than an end in itself ⁵⁶, and argues, with Kerr, that there is evidence of

" Management moving from a paternal or political orientation to a professional one ⁵⁷

While not wishing to disagree with Kerr or with any of the rest of the above, that this is how managers do perceive their role, we would argue that what Kerr describes as a "professional orientation" is only overtly less political and that its emphasis on technical objectives (Eg financial targets) is simply a gloss over what may be an even more political orientation than it may appear to be ⁵⁸.

During our own interviews with managers, we would occasionally get minor protests, based essentially on the view "why are you asking us about this? " - "are there not more interesting things to talk about/this is not an important part of my job/we (managers) are not powerful, we are only workers etc.". As we have already accepted above, we can only fully accept that this was a sincerely held view on the part of our respondents. Yet the literature on organizational decision-making points quite clearly to Management being a political process ⁵⁹.

Power in the practice of Management is obvious in this aspect of managerial life - in their decision-making. We have explored in this in the reputational tradition⁶⁰, but the literature on the involvement of Management using power in decisions is extensive, to say the least⁶¹. On the basis of published research it would be difficult to portray Management as a purely technical process. Taking Pettigrew's work as an example, we can consider Kenny (pseudonym for the Head of Management Services) as an example of the apparently technical manager, using his position to the advantage of his favoured contractor in a way which could only be described as a political manager⁶².

A different example of this is given by Wilson and Kenny⁶³, who point for instance to the way in which Management will use their managerial expertise as sources of power in both interdepartmental and intradepartmental decision-making. Their sample is however, composed solely of managers and how they perceive manifest decision-making and thus is not entirely like our own. They do, however, conclude quite clearly that power is a factor managers themselves perceive in decision-making, and that managerial expertise is seen by them to be the primary power factor⁶⁴. Power and Management cannot, therefore, be separated for the purposes of analysis.

We shall discuss power in more detail in the next section of our review but what we wish to argue here is that to the extent Management define their jobs in purely technical terms - even to themselves - attention is turned away from the power implications of the technical objectives which are set for them. Furthermore, since Staff and Hourly-Paid likewise define their jobs in technical terms, they collude in this dominance of technical rationality. Hence by defining work in technical terms and by emphasizing the technical objectives, our attention may be drawn from the power qualities and implications of the Management role.

Even on the basis of their apparently non-political, technical activities, however, we can still pose the question to what extent the Management role is inherently political? Lowe and Shaw⁶⁵ define bias as,

" the extent to which a forecaster adjusts his forecast due to personal interests and perceptions and independently of factors which might influence the actual result"

Thus through the exercise of bias, even technical objectives may incorporate elements of power (Eg Lowe and Shaw demonstrate that managers have an interest in biasing the annual sales target downwardly because achievement of sales forecasts were important in determining salary increments and promotions).

Even if we put what they do on a technical basis, Management cannot easily be divorced from the exercise of power. There are, moreover, a variety of ways in which the Management role disguises the exercise of power.

One respect in which this has become apparent is in the unionization of senior Staff employees (ie those just below the level of Management). There are sectors of companies which have become unionized since the late 1960's, where it would have previously have been unthinkable for the majority (or even any) of the employees to be union members. For instance, at an early stage in our research, the events leading up to and during the unionization of the supervisors in the company during the late 1960's was described to us by a long serving supervisor. The Management reaction at that time was to see it as a massive betrayal of trust in the company ⁶⁶. Since then, things have changed in two respects.

First of all, the directors and managers who saw unionization as a betrayal, have apparently come to accept a role for unions in the company (we have discussed this at several points above) ⁶⁷.

Secondly the density of unionization of the company since the late 1960's has grown, such that during the time of our research, all the employees in the finance dept. (with the exception of those whom we described as managers) became union members. The role of white collar unions in the company is quite extensive. It is, furthermore, important to keep in mind that this development of union density has spread beyond the shop floor/production areas of the company. It is not only supervisors, inspectors and draughtsmen who are union members, but Staff in areas beyond direct production (Eg finance, computing, sales, design etc.).

This has been commented on by a number of authors in the past ⁶⁸. Let us consider briefly the main findings of this type of research, and what they mean for us.

Frost⁶⁹ points to no fewer than 5 possible forms of managerial unionization -

1> professional associations: 2> integral or in-house associations: 3> separate professional or managerial unions: 4> white collar unions: 5> blue collar unions.

For our purposes the relevant forms of collectivization in the company are forms 2> and 4>. As we pointed out in Chapter 6 many Staff had previously been members of an in-house Staff association (Frost's 2>), but over the years various parts of the white collar employment had left to join a white collar union (Frost's 4>). The prominent unions were ASTMS, TASS (then part of the AUEW), and APEX. In addition there were white collar sections of blue collar unions (Eg MATSA which is part of the GMBATU). It was, however, clear to us that these sections of blue-collar unions were run quite separately from the main blue-collar part of the union, and indeed were this to have changed there may have been a transfer of members into the "independent sector", as white collar employees in this company were very aware (and very jealous) of their status relative to Hourly Paid workers. Hence we shall focus on types 2 and 4.

The objectives of Staff associations are described by Frost as

to foster a spirit of goodwill, mutual
dependence and trust.⁷⁰

The interviews we conducted with Staff association members convinced us that this describes their view of its role - to promote goodwill and trust within the company, but more importantly, they believed that this was a function which the trade unions could not perform. In their view the unions were an external force, with interests which did not always conform to the interests of the company. We have of course seen that this was not the view of the trade union members, but for the Staff association members this was an important reason for staying out of the unions.

As we saw in Appendix 6, managers who had stayed out of unions as a whole gave other reasons for not joining. In Table A 6.29 we can see that far and away the most important reason given by managers (44%) for not joining a union was that they saw no need for them to join. More significant, however, is tables A 6.26-6.27, where we can see that for about 90% of managers union protection was not something that they felt that they needed⁷¹. Yet as we found, white collar workers had become increasingly unionized. Why had this happened? For these workers, unionization was a response to

being outflanked insofar as manual
workers now have more direct and
comprehensive access to top Management
than they have themselves⁷².

Bamber's view of managerial unionization brings many echoes of the reasons given by white collar workers in our company as well. For those who joined unions, therefore, while there may have been the sort of concern which the remaining Staff association members felt about unions being external to the company, this was subordinate. The sense of threat from manual unions was enough to convince them into trade unionism.

Even managers complained about the developing power of Hourly Paid workers and their unions. For instance they would complain that shop stewards were better informed than they themselves, and that if they wanted confidential Management information they would ask a shop steward ⁷³.

Bamber gives additional reasons for unionization - but the most important of all for us must be the sense of relative deprivation of white collar workers. Faced with seeing their pay and condition differentials disappearing, joining a union was seen as one way to at least slow down the process of losing out to Hourly Paid workers.

For instance Bamber quotes a study done by the Royal Institute of Chemistry, which showed that between 1971 and 1974 the real differential between managers and manual workers had declined at a greater rate than before ⁷⁴. In an interview we carried out with a senior manager, when we discussed his views about how well/badly he was paid, he insisted on bringing in a similar study in the engineering industry so that we could see for ourselves how badly he was treated. Even among managers, therefore, there was a growing sense of insecurity, but not one which had developed to the stage where they felt they had to become unionized.

Unionization can therefore be seen as a response to a sense of deprivation - to the perception of losing out relatively to others who are already unionized ⁷⁵. This, however, as Weir, Frost and Bamber ⁷⁶ (among others) have pointed out, is not an easy step for Staff and Management in particular to take since, as our own sample pointed out joining a union may just not be appropriate.

One way out of this, as Weir suggests, is for unions to develop with a specifically managerial outlook - what he describes as radical managerialism - and indeed this may satisfy the obstacles pointed to in table A 6.29. It is however, salutary to observe that since the article was published there has been limited success by the unions in that direction.

Further, we would argue that our sample of Staff employees continued to identify mainly with managers - it should be easily recalled that attitudinally Staff were nearly always closer to Management than Hourly Paid workers were. Their union membership had not fundamentally altered their identification ⁷⁷.

One final point we wish to consider here, is what it is that Management and white collar workers wish to protect by joining trade unions. It is quite clear from our research that white collar workers were trying to protect their relative position to Hourly Paid workers - a position they saw as being under threat. The most obvious reward they tried to protect was their relative financial position, as well as other contractual rewards ⁷⁸. Yet at the same time we should not seek to see this as purely a defensive tactic by white collar workers. Another way to view this is to see it as a positive act on their part which has the objective of enhancing the position of white collar union members.

Joining a trade union is at least in part about enhancing one's power position. Even then, however, white collar unionization differs from blue collar, since as Frost points out that protest by managerial unions differs

the depth of Management's anti-strike feelings can frequently be seen in their willingness to agree to "no strike clauses" being written into collective agreements ⁷⁹.

At the time of our research however, while many of the Staff had begun to join trade unions, Management had not yet done so, though the symptoms were beginning to make themselves felt. Both groups, however, would have fitted within the general picture of being under threat. For many of the Staff this was the cause of their break with the Staff association and a different relationship with the company, but Management had not yet reached this stage ⁸⁰. At the same time we have to recognize that white collar workers, and managers in particular, are not natural union members, especially because, as both Weir and Frost point out ⁸¹, of their individualism. It could be argued that white collar unionism is a collective attempt to secure individual ends.

Unionization. we would argue for our sample, was at the same time a reaction (or in the case of Management a potential reaction) to a perceived loss of power, and an attempt to maintain that power. We do, however, have to observe that for Management, in our company, joining a union was not a step they had felt required to make. Their role as managers afforded them sufficient protection. As Frost points out,

having once decided on the nature of the goals to be achieved the form(s) of representation to be adopted will depend on the individual manager's perceptions of the most appropriate form(s) by which to achieve that particular goal or set of goals.⁸²

Hence we would suggest that for our sample of managers, given the goals they wished to secure, that union membership was not a strategy they saw as appropriate at the moment - though as we have pointed out, the seeds to do otherwise were present.

In particular, however, the movement of white collar Staff into unions cannot be disengaged from the exercise of power ⁸³. For Staff, as we suggested above, their union membership is a strategy to protect their position in the company, an important part of which is of course power ⁸⁴.

Let us move on now to consider another element of the practice of Management in organizations which has become increasingly significant in the literature over the last 10 years - culture ⁸⁵. This has been subject to a great many definitions ⁸⁶, which have been well summarized as

the way things are done around here ⁸⁷

Thus culture, as a store of attitudes, rules, beliefs etc. indicate to members of the organization what they ought to do and why. But as Ray points out

what is important is the articulation and channelling of the culture in directions which supply employees with guide-lines and which promote a system of strongly-held, shared beliefs.....(which) are perceived as helpful in achieving the goals of the corporate leaders. ⁸⁸

Culture is, therefore not entirely, as Deal and Kennedy suggest - how things are done here - culture is also as Ray points out, another form of control, which she suggests strongly resembles Etzioni's "moral involvement" ⁸⁹ in that the members of the company share a sense of mission.

Now, as she subsequently suggests, the image of culture which she puts forward in this article, based on Durkheim's ideas of morality, the sacred and the profane ⁹⁰, is a strong one for which there

is no persuasive evidence that the manipulation of (the) corporations' cultures really functions as a form of control ⁹¹

Or at least not at the moment. Ray does, however, point to other, less strong, forms of cultural control. These are described as

1) **Bureaucratic Control** where control is secured through the manipulation of reward, leading to loyalty on the part of the workforce, and (most important) to higher productivity. With the emphasis on techniques like Work Study, and Production Control, it is clear, impressionistically that this played a role in the Firm of our research.

2) **Humanistic Control** where control is secured by providing workers with a "satisfying" task or work group life, leading to a sense of loyalty on their part, again leading to higher productivity. While not so pronounced as was bureaucratic control, there was also a sense of this in the Firm, that workers should have a satisfying job, and as we saw in Appendix 6 perceptions were consistent with this.

The critical factor is, however, that culture is more than in Deal and Kennedy's view - that this is how we do things here. The nature of culture can have significant implications for the Management and the control of the company⁹². Culture is not a neutral concept, rather it is one which can influence the degree of authority possessed by Management.

The problem seems to be that the (largely American) writings on culture⁹³ tend to treat culture as if it were a consciously conceived part of the firm, when if we treat it in a more informal way, as the way things are done here - involving fewer strategic considerations - then we can see that every organization will have its own culture. This indeed is inevitable if we take Kirkbride's definition that it is the atmosphere of the company⁹⁴.

Writers on corporate strategy, like Mintzberg and Quinn, have argued that strategy may not be a consciously worked out product of the Management of the company. It may instead be something which emerges from the activities of the company⁹⁵. In a similar way the culture of the company may emerge in a less formal way than many of the writers have treated it.

In any case what the corporate culture writers have argued is that

the effects of culture should not be left to chance.⁹⁶

What we, therefore, wish to suggest is that culture

1) can significantly affect the course of events in a company⁹⁷.

2) can develop in a less formal way than much of the recent writing in this area may suggest,

3) is thus a source of power in the company for Management in the way described by Ray, but that it can operate qua power not only consciously, but also unconsciously. Let us look at two examples of this.

First of all Paul Kirkbride ⁹⁸ who considers the role of the personnel specialist in the context of corporate culture. One of the functions of personnel which he considers is their role in maintaining effective employee relations ⁹⁹. Kirkbride quotes Schuler ¹⁰⁰ in suggesting that bargaining with employees and settling their grievances are central to the personnel/human resource Management function, but the most important point for our purposes is that

culture affects the degree of conflict which is acceptable between the employer and employee and the methods of representation and resolution which are sanctioned. The corporate culture thus sets the ground rules and limits of permissible employee activity. ¹⁰¹

In this way, therefore, culture represents a significant source of power, in the way we have described above, but in particular in relation to the thesis of ideal speech, since it is quite clear from this that culture represents a very real source of restriction on "employee activity".

Likewise if we consider the formation of the employment contract, and its relation to culture, Kirkbride points to a very similar phenomenon. He quotes Torrington and Chapman

the contract for employment that is made between (employee) and the organization is individual but is reached within a framework for collective consent. There may be one or more collective agreements reached between representatives of the employees and representatives of the organization. These agreements give consent to a general framework of rules and guide-lines for the employment contract. ¹⁰²

Thus, the behaviour of employees is not only constrained within a set of rules whose implications are not fully clear, but the establishment of those rules takes place in a context whose power implications are not fully clear either (especially if we consider the previous quote, which points to the role of culture as a limitation on employee behaviour). Indeed we saw in our own research that the role of the union official is limited by what he can persuade his members to give him support on.

Hence the employees in negotiating their contract with Management and in their daily working lives are subject to the limitations of the same culture. Culture, therefore, not only is a factor in establishing the formal rules, but also is a factor in controlling the day to day behaviour within the company.

A further example is given by Gunz and Whitley ¹⁰³, who consider the role of culture in relation to the development of strategy in UK companies. They argue that the dominant practices for assessing and rewarding managers which determine whether they are appointed to senior posts in their company, influence how they view changes in the environment and react to them (ie whether a change is a threat or an opportunity depends on whether it brings promotion closer or further away). Of more significance, however, is as Gunz and Whitley conclude,

Once it matters what top Management groups do, then it matters how they think and make sense of the world. Their rationalizes become important factors in business-unit behaviour, market processes and macro-economic resource allocation and use. ¹⁰⁴

Thus the types of decision we identified earlier as being virtual managerial monopolies - investment, financial etc. - are also influenced by the culture of the firm, since the information which was salient for the Management in taking the decision is, at least partly determined by the culture of the company ¹⁰⁵.

This emphasizes a point we have already made - namely that Management, like others in the company are trapped in a structure of power ¹⁰⁶. In their strategic decision-making, Management behaviour is limited by the culture of the company in the same way as the behaviour of their employees is limited by its culture ¹⁰⁷.

We have considered Management and Managers from a number of points of view in this section. We have considered

a) who Managers are, and discovered that they are a diverse group - in this sense our sample are typical.

b) what they do - and argued that the exercise of control is central to their jobs, but that they do not necessarily think about their job in these terms, far less talk about the exercise of control, and indeed when they do they tend to do so from a technical perspective ¹⁰⁸. Indeed in their terms they are just doing a job, and acquiescence of others is generally assumed¹⁰⁹. This is not to say, however that they are not aware of their position and their need to protect it - that is what their unionisation (discussed in Appendix 6).

Hence we have a group within the Company who on the one hand are very much about control, yet do not appear to consciously recognize it - or at least do not think about it in power terms. What we require here is a concept which can bridge this fissure.

We would suggest that this can be done with Abrahamsson's Concept of "The Mandator Position"¹¹⁰, by which he means positions,

"strategic for decision-making on for instance distributional issues within the organization" (pg 39)

Abrahamsson contends in this article that it is not hierarchy per se (ie it is not necessarily the structure of hierarchy which is the problem) but rather the undemocratic character of hierarchical organizations which is the nature of the problem. Non-hierarchical structures, he points out, are for practical reasons non-feasible for large organizations,

"the restrictions for moderately-sized and large organizations (ie a few dozen or more) are such that if the principle of equality is observed, almost no one will be able to convey his message to the others, due to lack of time" (pg 46).

The implication of what Abrahamsson has to say, therefore, is that what we should be trying to do is to devise organizational forms which are democratic, and that the issue of whether or not they are non-hierarchical is secondary ¹¹¹.

This it should be observed is not inconsistent with the views of the managers we researched. Their focus was on getting their jobs done, on technical issues. More tellingly, however, Abrahamsson's view is also consistent with the views of the non-managers in our sample. Their view has been that the role of Management is a technical one, with specialist expertise, and indeed as we have shown this is the basis of Management legitimacy. The concern of those outwith Management is with the outcome of the use of that expertise - with what Abrahamsson calls "distributional" issues ¹¹².

Our sample would very likely concur with Abrahamsson's conclusion,

"schemes for re-designing organizations should be evaluated with regard to their allowance for majority control of mandator positions - since it is here that issues of distribution have to be resolved - rather than the reduction of hierarchy per se". (pg 51)

To place a focus on what managers do can therefore be enlightening, but our research would tend to suggest that ultimately it is the consequences of what Management do which is important for people in the firm ¹¹³. Hence dissent is more likely to centre on the consequences of Management action, rather than on the action itself (for instance that someone has been moved from one bay to another, rather than on why this happened).

Likewise the focus of desired change may well fall, as Abrahamsson argues, on the issue of controlling the mandator positions and on democratising hierarchy, rather than on doing away with the hierarchy itself. Hierarchy may well be technically necessary ¹¹⁴. As presently constituted however, in most organizations (and certainly where we did our research) it is undemocratic, and could be challenged for that reason.

Thus while much research has focused on what managers do, our research has tended to suggest that for those outwith the Management, what Management do is not at issue (ie the practice of Management as another job in the Company). Indeed, as we have argued, what they do is the source of their legitimacy. We have found that what may be at issue are the consequences of what Managers do. As we have suggested before, there is little evidence from our work that Staff or Hourly Paid want to be managers, or think they should be doing Management's job, or telling Management how they should do their job.

At the same time however, our research does support the ideas put forward by Abrahamsson since there was a strong emphasis on, for instance, Management taking the interests of Staff and Hourly Paid into account when they were taking decisions. Management would (and did) suggest that they already do this. The problem was that Staff and Hourly Paid did not see it this way. Abrahamsson's argument of democratising control of mandator positions is therefore supported by our data.

From this it is, therefore clear, that while much of the focus of research on the Management role has focused on what they do, we would argue,

a) that this ignores substantially the issue of the implications of what they do,

b) while their legitimacy may stem from what they do, a challenge to their position may come from the implications of what they do.

Either way however, whether we are concerned with doing away with hierarchy, or democratising the control of the mandator positions, we are still clearly talking about power¹¹⁵. In our preceding discussion much of what we discussed we would contend appeared on the surface to be power-free utterances or events, but are in fact highly relevant to the consideration of the existence, structure and use of power in organizations¹¹⁶. We shall, therefore, now consider the role of power.

POWER

We discussed the nature of power in Chapter 1, and this review will to some extent mirror that earlier discussion. We shall first of all consider (or reconsider) some definitions of power, before reaching again what is for us the major distinction in theories of power, namely whether

a) there is a recognition only of power where all, or at least one party, is aware of its exercise, and

b) there is a recognition that power may be exercised without any party being aware of this.

Thus as well as considering power in general terms we shall argue that recognition of the latter position is necessary to fully understand the role of power in hierarchy, since there are sources and forms of power of which even Management are unaware. In other words the power which Management exercise is greater than they are aware, and as we shall show, their power can not only be used in the event of a challenge to their hierarchical position, but that their power is such that a challenge - and a change to another form of organization - is not considered feasible by other groups in the organization. Hence moving to more democratic structures - and thus reducing the power of Management - is made more difficult by the power which Management already have.

Nature of Power

Let us begin this discussion with a few definitions of the phenomenon we have been dealing with. We set out our own definition in Chapter 1 ¹¹⁷, where the view we take of power is to set up as our standard of equality Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis. Power, however, as Dahl notes

is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast. ¹¹⁸

There are many definitions of power available to us. For instance,

The power of actor A over Actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can potentially be overcome by A. (R. Emerson ¹¹⁹.)

The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability rests. (M. Weber ¹²⁰)

the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, in as much as the former, as well as the latter, constitute in effect, a negative sanction. (P. Blau¹²¹)

the capacity of A to prevail over B both in resolution of manifest conflict and through affecting B's actions and conceptions about conflict or potential conflict. (J. Gaventa¹²²)

A exercises power over B by putting B in a position of getting him to do something that increases B's burdens. (W. Connolly¹²³)

The ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire (G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer¹²⁴)

The production of intended effects (B. Russell¹²⁵)

subsets of relations among social units such that the behaviour of one or more units (the responsive units) depend in some circumstances on the behaviour of other units (the controlling units). (R. Dahl¹²⁶)

In these eight different definitions the common quality among them, that we wish to draw to the attention of the reader, is that in every one of them, at least one of the parties (either the power holder or target) or both parties are aware of the exercise of power¹²⁷.

For instance if we consider Emmerson's definition, it is quite clear that A (as the power holder) must be aware of what he is doing - using his power to get B to do something, in spite of the resistance of B (who will likewise be aware of the exercise of power). If we consider Weber - that A can achieve his ends despite the resistance of B - then the situation is the identical¹²⁸.

These two definitions of power both mean that power holders and targets must be aware of the exercise of power. The same can be said for Blau, Gaventa and Connolly.

The remaining three definitions do, however, differ in this sense, since in those it is not necessary that both parties should be aware of the exercise of power. In these cases it is enough that one should be aware.

For instance if we consider Salancik and Pfeffer - who consider power to be the ability of those who have power to bring about their desired outcomes - it is possible here that the powerful will use their power in such a way that they achieve the result they want without the powerless being aware of the exercise of power. A similar argument could be put for Russell's definition.

In contrast if we take Dahl formulation it is possible that the relatively powerless could be trying to "second guess" the powerful as to what they really want in order to provide it to them. For instance in a promotion, candidates in advance of the decision may "suck up" to the boss. In this case the power holder may be unaware of the exercise of power - but the powerless are !

Thus of the eight definitions, we have suggested that in five of them both parties must be aware, and in the other three it is enough for at least one party to be aware of the exercise of power.

Now while much of this may be adequate for analysis of much of the data we have collected, it is not so for all of it. For instance the Emmerson definition is adequate for the analysis of perceived control over wages, since in the case of negotiating over wages both sides are conscious of the power they are trying to use against each other.

On the other hand this could not be said for control over investment or financial policy. In such cases, as far as both Management and non-Management are concerned this is only Management doing their job, and has no implications for the exercise of power. Nor could we use Emmerson's definition to explain that while Management decisions may be challenged, the right of Management to take those decisions is not challenged. The reason for this, we have argued already is Management's job rather than an exercise of power. In other words not only are non-Management unaware of the exercise of power (in the sense implied by Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis) but neither are Management themselves.

We need to look for another more appropriate definition which allows for the possibility that neither party is aware of the exercise of power.

In Chapter 1 we considered the definition used by Lukes¹²⁹ ,

**A exercises power over B when A affects
B in a manner contrary to B's interests**

The difficulty with this, as Bradshaw points out in his critique of Lukes, concerns specifying what B's interests are. Who is to say? Can the theorist make a judgement? Can B do so, especially if A is exercising power over him?

Moreover, as we pointed out in Chapter 1, Lukes is somewhat ambivalent about what he describes as the "third dimension of power". Consider the following

A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do.¹³⁰

How can power be exercised without the exerciser being aware of what he (it) is doing?... One may be unaware of what is held to be the "real" motive or meaning of one's actions. Or second one may be unaware of how others interpret one's action. Or, third, one may be unaware of the consequences of one's actions.¹³¹

Our dissent is not so much from the latter as from the former, since in this quote (taken from the Chapter where he defines his third dimension of power) it is difficult to see how both sides can be anything other than conscious of the power being exercised by A. Lukes' position is therefore too unclear to be useful. We need to look elsewhere.

Power is defined by Parsons in the following way,

Power is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organizations when the obligations are legitimised with reference to their bearing on collective goals.¹³²

It may seem surprising, given the position we have adopted so far, but this is a more satisfactory definition of power than any we have considered so far. Our main reservation¹³³ is the manner in which Parsons glosses over the process by which this legitimacy is secured, as it has been precisely how this happens which has been central to our study. Nonetheless unlike the definitions we have considered up to now, Parsons does allow for the possibility of power to be exercised without either party being aware of this. It would be conceivable that each considers what he is doing is what is legitimate or right in the circumstances.

A definition which is similar in this sense is given by Mintzberg

Power is defined in this book simply as the ability to effect (or affect) organizational outcomes¹³⁴

This definition while allowing for either party to be aware of the exercise of power, does not require either to be so, since as with the Parson's definition, it is conceivable that each is doing what they see as, for instance, technically correct in the circumstances.

Arendt provides the following definition of power:

Power corresponds to the human ability
not just to act, but to act in
concert¹³⁵

The advantage of Arendt's position, as with Parsons and Mintzberg is that it allows for the possibility that neither party need be aware of the exercise of power since they may act in concert without being aware of its exercise over them. There are, however, difficulties with this, since as Habermas points out we can characterise Arendt's position as being

the ability to agree upon a common
course of action in unconstrained
communication¹³⁶

The problem here, as Habermas suggests, is that there is little possibility of unconstrained communication in capitalist society. One reason for this, he suggests is that what he describes as "structural violence" is built into our institutions

"Structural violence does not manifest itself as force; rather unperceived, it blocks those communications in which convictions effective for legitimation are formed and passed on. Such an hypothesis about inconspicuously working communication blocks can explain, perhaps, the formation of ideologies; with it one can give a plausible account of how convictions are formed in which subjects deceive themselves about themselves and their situation...in systematically restricted communications, those involved form convictions subjectively free from constraint, convictions which are however illusory. They thereby communicatively generate a power which, as soon as it is institutionalized, can also be used against them." ¹³⁷

In other words the problem with Arendt's view is that it ignores the structural impediments to unconstrained communication and fails, unlike the Ideal Speech Thesis, to direct to us identifying these. Thus returning to Arendt's own definition of power, we could never be sure whether agreeing to a common course of action is the result of genuine consensus freely entered into, or through manipulation by the exercise of power.

Hence the problem with the definitions we have considered - Arendt, Mintzberg and Parsons - is that while they allow for the possibility that neither party is aware of the exercise of power, they do not direct our attention to the process through which power has so blended into the background that we treat it as "bed-rock" ¹³⁸. It fails to direct us to consider why

subordinates obey, not because the supervisor has the power to compel them to; rather they follow the reasonable instructions related to the control of their work behaviour because they expect that such work directions will be given and followed. In this way power becomes transformed into authority, and control can be exercised almost regardless of the balance of (conscious) power possessed by the interacting groups. ¹³⁹

We need therefore to be directed to the process through which power can be exercised without either party being aware of its exercise, which is what Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis does. We have to be directed to consider how "power comes to be transformed to authority and control can be exercised almost regardless". We need to be able to identify power which has become "bed-rock", but we also need to be able to explain how and why this operates ¹⁴⁰.

None of this, however, should be taken to mean that conscious power is of no consequence - for instance Burawoy for one presents evidence showing that workers will react to Management action which goes beyond the limits of their consent ¹⁴¹. But in certain respects the fact of power and its exercise is almost secondary to the development of the conditions of power being exercised unconsciously since this constrains the exercise of conscious power ¹⁴², which is an issue we shall take up subsequent when we consider the negotiation of reality and the development of "Plato's Cave" ¹⁴³.

What we shall go on to consider now are some examples of research in the first of the two traditions of power - where it is exercised consciously by at least one party.

Knowing Theories of Power

We suggested in our discussion of the various ways in which power has been defined that the common quality of, what we have described as, "knowing theories" is that at least one, and perhaps both parties are aware of its exercise. The work we shall consider in this section has this quality.

Outwith organizations there are numerous studies by Political Scientists of the exercise of power. This is the tradition of Dahl and Hunter, whose theories we considered in Chapter 1.

An instance of such work is William Gamson's "The Strategy of Social Protest" ¹⁴⁴, which is a study of various "voluntary groups" (protest movements) in the US between 1800 and 1945 ¹⁴⁵. He considers that strategies used by the 54 groups he studies, and why some succeeded while others failed. This is clearly a study where power is consciously and openly used by both parties. His analysis leads him to be critical of

a) [what he describes as] the collective behaviour explanation of protest politics and movements ¹⁴⁶

b) pluralist theories of power.

He criticises the collective behaviour explanation for putting an artificial distinction between

the politics of social movements and the politics of conventional groups and organizations - mainstream political parties, lobbyists and interest groups ¹⁴⁷

and suggests

In place of the old duality of extremist politics and pluralist politics, there is simply politics. The American Medical Association, and Students for a Democratic Society are nor different species but members of the same species faced with different political environments ¹⁴⁸

Putting this into the context of our own work, we can see that the dominant perspective held in the firm often reflected the view of the collective behaviour thesis. It can be argued that,

a) while if we consider an issue like pay there is only politics, but on the other hand

b) if we consider other issues - like investment - then we can see the kind of exclusion which Gamson refers to. For instance for employees to seek to influence decisions like Investment or Finance, would be portrayed as irrational by Management ¹⁴⁹. Moreover it is not unusual for wage claims to be described by Management as "irrational", or in terms suggesting this.

This illustrates one of the problems with the Collective Behaviour view since we have to consider not only the facts of exclusion or inclusion, but also the conditions on which groups are admitted to (what he calls) the "pressure system"¹⁵⁰. This is taken up in his critique of Pluralism.

Pluralism, as an alternative to Collective Behaviour, is portrayed by Gamson as suggesting

A more or less orderly contest carried out by the classic pluralist rules of bargaining, lobbying, logrolling, coalition formation, negotiation and compromise. The issue of how one gets into the pressure system is not treated as a central problem. ¹⁵¹

Pluralism thus considers only the insiders to the "pressure system", and how they manage their affairs ¹⁵². How some groups gain admission, while others fail to do so is not an issue for Pluralists ¹⁵³. Hence the excluded get short shrift in Pluralism as in the Collective Behaviour view¹⁵⁴.

"Resource Management" is counterpoised by Gamson as an alternative to "Collective Behaviour" and Pluralism. This suggests essentially that

Group conflict in its dynamic aspects can be conceptualized from the point of view of Resource Management. Mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals. ¹⁵⁵

Thus the discontented - those engaged in social protest - from this perspective are not irrational (as collective behaviour theorists may suggest), or ignored (as in Pluralism) but are simply using their resources as best they can, just as those within the system will do.

From the perspective of our own research, this is an interesting point of view. In any conflict it is clear that the participants must acquire resources - public support, money, etc. From Gamson's point of view we would expect the successful group in any conflict to have been that which was most successful in acquiring resources. This analysis is fine as far as it goes. There is, however, a similar problem to that discussed above - namely that it fails to take into account the conditions under which support is obtained (in other words that it will be easier for some groups to obtain resources than it will be for others, and to use them effectively). An example of this is given by Foster and Woolfson, that one of the problems of the stewards during the UCS work-in was that

the government line was generally carried, though not without some distortion by the BBC and the popular press.¹⁵⁶

What we are suggesting here is that while analysing resources used by groups may be an interesting approach to group conflict, it does not direct our attention to the ability of the group to obtain these resources in the first place and then to the degree to which they have the skills to use them. For instance if we go back to wages, it could be argued that there are two parties of more or less equal footing. But if we look a little closer then we can see that the structure is of one group (employees) seeking to enforce their demands on another group (Management), who have the capacity to decide whether or not/to what extent to accede to these demands. The situation is thus not so simple as whether groups are admitted, but depends also on the conditions under which this takes place.

The latter point - the use of resources - is particularly important, since it points to two further implications for our argument

1) the role of the manager is to manage resources - or to appear to do so, as Pfeffer and Salancik argue¹⁵⁷ but the role of other groups is more disparate. Management occupy a role in which the use of resources is central¹⁵⁸. For other groups - outwith Management the idea of managing resources is not easily absorbed¹⁵⁹.

2) the normative structure may prevent groups from using their resources in particular ways. For instance the UCS work-in can be seen as a watershed insofar as it pointed to the work-in and sit-in as forms of protest¹⁶⁰, as a way for workers to exercise their power¹⁶¹.

Put briefly, therefore the problem we have with Gamson is that his theory does not direct us sufficiently clearly to the possibility that "the game is rigged".

Another approach is taken by Maddison et al.¹⁶² who take an overtly political view of organizations. It may be objected here that it is obvious that they deal with conscious power, since they have set to consider, in effect the JRs found in many organizations. What we wish to deal with is whether, or to what extent they have asked all the questions which need to be asked of power.

Maddison et al. set out to consider the perceptions by (what we described) as Staff and Management on Power and Organizational Politics¹⁶³. They distinguish between these two conceptually related phenomena with the following analogy:

power may be thought of as similar to wealth, while influence processes (such as organizational politics) are similar to cash flows by which the wealth is accumulated or dispersed.¹⁶⁴

Their results, like those of Gamson, are consistent with our own in many respects. This is most so when they report that

when each manager was asked to define the term power, in nearly every case the manager said the term was synonymous with hierarchical level¹⁶⁵

That is a view which has come through very clearly in our own results -

a) when we considered communication it was apparent that the quality of this depended on one's hierarchical position (ie the higher one is in the hierarchy, the better informed one would feel oneself to be),

b) when we considered actual control, it was apparent that the powerful were generally those at the top of the organization. Even considering issues separately, in nearly every case it is clear that the higher one is in the hierarchy, the more powerful one would be perceived to be. (The obvious exception on this is wages, where Hourly-paid were perceived to be more powerful than Staff - which is related to the superior and longer term unionisation of the former.)

Reward too is hierarchically distributed (See appendix 6) - but most critically this is accepted, and it is on such issues that we begin to part company with Maddison et al., since their approach does not go far enough in our view.

If communication, control and reward are distributed on a hierarchical basis (ie the further up the hierarchy you are, the better you do on all of these), to put the question as bluntly as we can, why do those lower down the hierarchy accept this? Why is it that Managers can be better informed than Hourly-paid workers? There are of course numerous justifications which could be provided for this - needing to know (functional necessity) is the most obvious - but this does not explain why it is that this actually does work, and why such justifications are accepted.

Likewise, why should the majority of people working for a firm accept that a minority will be systematically better rewarded for their labour? These are issues which Maddison et al. do not take on board at all.

For instance we are told

it seems clear not only that the relationship between power and organizational politics described in the results of this study are consistent with the literature, but in addition that the particular form of power implied in these reports is consistent with "legitimate" power or authority as defined by French and Raven ¹⁶⁶ . ¹⁶⁷

The problem here is why is this power legitimate? What has led to it begin defined as legitimate, and how does it continue to be so defined?

It is useful to identify power as legitimate in the way of French and Raven, but this cannot be the last step - this only creates the issue, as we have said, of how and why this is perceived as such?

Likewise with Maddison et al., it is useful to identify the perceptions of organizational politics, but to do so is only the beginning not the end. For instance they quote Patchen¹⁶⁸ with approval. He shows that salience is related to the influence process, and to the amount of influence over a decision. Madison et al. develop this to contend that

In these (salient) areas, political activity are consistently high. ¹⁶⁹

The issue which this leaves out, is why are these issues are salient? What is that makes some issues salient rather than others? There may well be explanations as to how and why, but we need to pose the question. Maddison et al. fail to do so.

A wide ranging review of power is provided by Mintzberg in "Power in and Around Organizations"¹⁷⁰. Following Crozier¹⁷¹, Mintzberg suggests four bases of power:

- 1) control of a resource
- 2) control of a technical skill
- 3) control of a body of knowledge
- 4) legal prerogatives.

Clearly all or even one of these would provide any group or individual who possessed such qualities with power. Mintzberg's list does, however, beg a number of questions:

1') why is it that Management are accorded the right to make virtually unchallenged decisions over resources? For instance when we considered control over Investment decisions in Chapter 5, even considering "ideal control" this would remain a Management monopoly.

2') everyone in the organization has technical skills or some sort - no matter how humble - and on the shop floor, especially among the skilled men, there is a great awareness of levels of skill. Yet as we have shown, the skills of Management, even though they are not well understood are accorded special status by Staff and Hourly-paid ¹⁷². Why should this be?

3') as with 2' we can argue that everyone has power in this sense - so what is it that is distinctive about the body of knowledge of Management¹⁷³.

4') it is certainly true that Management (through company law) exercise power in this way. But this begs the question of why it is that the law is obeyed at all? For instance the UCS work-in was against the law, but even in this case the intention was to use the work-in as a device to enter into the same (legal) relationship with another employer and Management.

Hence while we would agree that Mintzberg's four bases of power lead to its possession, we would contend that they do not lead us to all the appropriate questions - for instance that it is all very well to point to law as a source of power for Management, which clearly is true. That, however, does not lead us to consider why it is that their employees obey this.

The explanation for this form of argument, we would suggest, becomes apparent later on in his book. In discussing the creation of the organization, Mintzberg says

But how can one person (the chief executive officer) convert policy into action? The whole game of power in and around the organization is played over one thing: the actions that the organization takes - the products it markets, the clients it serves, the equipment it buys, the people it promotes, the surpluses it distributes, the air it pollutes and the air pollution it reduces Organization means that all of this is beyond the capacity of one person. So the CEO must engage other people to take care of different parts of the process; in other words he must design an organization. ¹⁷⁴

Mintzberg goes on to explain that various types of employees will be hired - operators (to produce the product/service); middle line managers who form the chain of authority between the CEO and the operators; technostructure staff who will coordinate the activities of the organization (eg work study); Support Staff who will advise on specialist decisions and provide certain support functions (eg company lawyers, personnel staff etc.). Authority will be delegated to employees as required by the activities of the organization, which will be controlled by

a) personal control by the CEO and middle line managers

b) bureaucratic control - job descriptions, rules, regulations, standards of work output, etc.

The problem with this form of analysis is that it considers the organization purely from the perspective of the superior in the superior:subordinate relationship. The central issue in such analysis is how to maintain control of the organization, or one's subordinates. From such a perspective we tend to focus on areas of conflict, since it is in those areas that we are most conscious that control is at risk.

If, however, we turn the whole thing round, and instead of focusing on the superior and his perspective, and consider the subordinate then we begin to pose very different questions. Instead of lack of control being the issue, we begin to ask "why do I allow myself to be controlled?" or "why do I give my consent?", following Burawoy whose work we shall discuss below. If the subordinate is being controlled then it is not only issues of conflict which are important, but also issues where there is no conflict, since it is in these latter issues that the individual is being controlled and is giving consent.

Thus the problem with Mintzberg's analysis is that he concentrates on a particular side of the superior:subordinate power relationship. As such he considers only the issues of why conflict arises¹⁷⁵ and how it can be controlled or prevented, rather than explaining its absence. Yet this is not a problem for Mintzberg alone.

If for instance, we consider Braverman¹⁷⁶, and his analysis of the de-skilling of work, the structure there is similar difficulty. It is an analysis of how and why Management have introduced techniques of work study etc., what their objectives have been, and the consequences for workers of this process. The structure of this analysis is basically the same as Mintzberg's - the initiating point is with Management, and how they have sought to make their strategies succeed. It is less clear in Braverman's work why workers have (as by and large they have) acquiesced in job degradation and de-skilling. Braverman does not, however, consider this since it is not an issue for his analysis.

This, let us be clear is not to dispute Braverman's analysis, as far as it goes. The difficulty is that the analysis does not proceed far enough, and in particular does not treat as problematic the limits of the reaction of workers to de-skilling. Mintzberg assumes that subordinates will go along with the organizational arrangements. Likewise Braverman assumes they will be so demotivated and resentful of de-skilling that they will eventually be driven to take action against this. It would be our contention that we must treat these as assumptions to be proved. Our own research suggests that neither Braverman nor Mintzberg are entirely correct.

Thus the difficulty with the form of analysis used by Braverman, Mintzberg and Gamson is that by beginning the analysis from the position of the superior in the relationship we tend to focus on conflict and thus only on the conscious exercise of power¹⁷⁷, omitting consideration of the absence of conflict (other than to point to the success of the techniques which they have discussed in their work).

If, however, we take into account the perceptions of the subordinate then other data becomes relevant, and in particular the possibility that power is exercised not to resolve conflict, but to prevent it arising at all. This comes about because by considering why a subordinate goes along with the instructions of the manager, we are dealing with situations where the subordinate allows himself to be controlled - for instance that he acquiesces with the personal or bureaucratic control systems discussed by Mintzberg. This may not involve conflict - but as we have argued already¹⁷⁸, that does not mean that power has not been exercised.

Other examples of the conscious exercise of power are given by Nichols and Beynon ¹⁷⁹, who unlike the above, base their analysis on the position of the subordinate. In "Living with Capitalism", however, the focus remains on the issue of conscious power - in that the main focus of their research is on how the chemical process technology of the plant represents,

an immense waste of human potential...
locked up within capitalist factory
production. This experience
strengthened our central political
conviction that the need for a
fundamental restructuring of British
society is both a desirable and urgent
one.¹⁸⁰

In "Living with Capitalism", the authors' views of conditions in the plant is extremely critical ¹⁸¹, which raises the issue of why, if things are this bad, the workers continue to operate under such conditions? It is made comprehensively clear that the workers have deep grievances ¹⁸². Nichols and Beynon also give evidence of worker resistance:

a) sabotage - for instance one case where a worker followed the instructions of a manager, knowing that it would lead to production problems ¹⁸³,

b) resistance - trying to make the manager of foreman's job more difficult, or actively resisting (even in a small way, like telling a foreman to "fuck off"),

c) using the union or threatening to do so - for instance in one case threatening to walk off the job over a manning dispute. The threat of involving the union was sufficient to get the foreman in question to back down.

We found no specific evidence of (a) in our work - though this is not to say that it did not happen - but examples of (b) and (c) were in evidence ¹⁸⁴. For instance if a man was threatened with transfer, he might try to influence his foreman by threatening to bring in his shop steward ¹⁸⁵.

How did Management hold things together at Chem-Co? Nichols and Beynon report two main strategies:

1) recruiting "good shop stewards". For instance they report one foreman as saying,

A good shop steward is my friend. He's a good man to have on the plant. You see he knows the procedure; he knows just how far he can go and how far I can go. Oh yes, a good shop steward is my friend. He's an asset. ¹⁸⁶

Many of the managers and foremen whom we interviewed would have agreed with this, and indeed some came very close to saying more or less exactly that. One point of difference is, however that in our firm, not being a green field site but having well established unions especially among the Hourly-paid workers, there is not the same scope for Management to influence who became Stewards or Staff Union Reps. Nonetheless the notion of the good shop steward being central to industrial peace is one which our interviewees would share. Indeed if we consider Table A 6.34 (a) we can see that in every category from Management to Shop Stewards the view is expressed that the role of a good Shop Steward/Union Rep. is to make Management's job easier rather than more difficult. Indeed the strongest support for that (100%) comes from the Stewards themselves - and in no category is it ever less than 78% (Staff).

b) Management style - which at its height is about getting workers to comply without having to use force, or to even appear to be using their power. Nichols and Beynon give as an example of this a manager whom they call Edward Blunsen, who regarded himself as being like Edward Heath (at the time still PM, and still "Selsdon Man"). One of his favourite phrases, we are told was

its a hard world ¹⁸⁷

Nichols and Beynon suggest that in fact Blunsen played the wrong politician and that rather than "hard man" Ted Heath, the more appropriate management at Chem-Co was "crafty" Harold Wilson. Nichols and Beynon suggest that Management at Chem-Co

know the value of the empty phrase, the nod and the wink, the pat on the back, and the occasional kick in the balls. ¹⁸⁸

Now while this has echoes of Management in our firm, the style is not developed to anything like the same degree that Nichols and Beynon report in Chem-Co. Of course there were all kinds of arrangements, empty phrases, nods and winks and certainly kicks in the balls- but not to the same degree in Chem-Co, nor with the same degree of centrality it seemed to play there in Nichols and Beynon's view. Moreover nods and winks etc. were not limited to Management. This is a two way game which anyone could play - often for instance the kicks in the balls were between Staff and Hourly-paid.

Our differences with Nichols and Beynon are therefore matters of degree. There are, however, other problems which we have with their analysis:

a) it is apparent that disagreeable though things may be in Chem-Co, the thing still works, in the sense that in general workers do what Management tell them to do, Management remaining the dominant group. "Living with Capitalism" gives us no insight into the process whereby this happens and persists - or how or why the conflict does not escalate, or how and why events do not even develop to conflict more often. This originates in their focus being on the use of conscious power. The analysis followed by Nichols and Beynon emphasises issues where the Management and workers have consciously divergent interests, and thus where there is conflict (even if only at a cognitive level). Areas where there is no conflict or it is at a minimum are not regarded as significant ¹⁸⁹. In this way the role of conflict in the everyday life of the plant can be exaggerated.

2) the idea that the management function could be rotated ¹⁹⁰. The problem we would find with this idea is that if it was put to our sample of Hourly-paid and Staff employees - never mind the Managers! - it would be unlikely to find favour with them. This is so because of the "division of labour" which applies in their perceptions of work in the firm. Put most simply, this says "I join up pipes/ fill out forms (whichever), but he (the manager) takes decisions - that is what we are each trained for" ¹⁹¹. It may be objected that this reflects false or fragmented consciousness, but it is how it is (at least in our firm). Furthermore it does not, as we have, as we have shown, prevent our sample from being critical of Management, and expressing a preference for things to be different to how they are now - but this does not go so far as rotating the management function.

The more important of our reservations is the stress on areas of conflict, since by emphasising these we are led directly into conscious power. It is in areas of conflict that individuals and groups are aware of their power. This is by no means an unimportant stage in the analysis - indeed it will often be necessary. However, as we have suggested of Gamson, Mintzberg and Braverman, we have to go further than this. We have to consider why it is for instance, that conflict is fought out in this way - by way of illustration, following our point (1), why do workers not do more about their situation? we have contended that we can only begin to progress into such situations by considering not only areas of conflict (since we could say that workers put up with these conditions because they feel they lack the power), but also through considering areas without conflict, to begin to understand why workers allow themselves to be dominated in this way.

Hence the problem with the analysis of "Living with Capitalism" is not that it focuses on conflict - that as we have argued is necessary, but it is not sufficient. We have to go on to consider why the conflict is fought out in the way it is, why there is not more conflict, etc. Only by asking such questions can we begin to understand the basis of the persistence of Managerial hierarchy. Hence just as analytically important as areas of conflict are areas where employees allow themselves to be dominated without conflict.

Another piece of research similar to Nichols and Beynon, even if only in that it researched the same chemical works, is by Harris - "Power and Powerlessness in Industry" ¹⁹². In this book, Harris

gives an anthropological account of technology and "culture" in two ammonia-making plants. ¹⁹³

As such she employs the techniques of the anthropologist to an industrial situation in order to, as she puts it,

demonstrate the kind of insights that might be gained by studying an industrial situation to acquire data of an anthropological type and in their light examining theories about industrial relations. ¹⁹⁴

Using anthropological techniques she concludes that

the restrictions placed on managerial power by the unions' rights led to authority being negotiated directly between those exercising it and the men. Although a constant thesis of this essay will be that these negotiations sometimes included hostility to individual superiors, I finally argue that this did not constitute a rejection of managerial authority; rather its "legitimacy" was linked to this negotiation process. ¹⁹⁵

There is little we could find to argue with in this - indeed much of our own evidence is quite consistent with it. For instance, inevitably there is evidence of hostility toward particular managers or supervisors. We observed and were told informally of cases where lower management reached accommodations with the shop stewards as part of an on-going relationship between them ¹⁹⁶. This much we readily accept - the problem is that we find that Harris does not go far enough, omitting important question.

What is it, for instance, about this negotiation process which keeps the organization together? Why does it work? Her explanation emerges from a change in policy on "shift-fitters" which had been badly managed and led to conflict. The change had led to the plant losing its best fitter, but in particular led to,

a lot of people who were not normally ill-disposed to Management to question its wisdom and in part its legitimacy. ¹⁹⁷

In this course of events, and indeed generally, she goes on to tell us that

one vital ingredient to managerial success was still this good will ¹⁹⁸

and

It would after all not be so surprising if management overlooked the extent to which goodwill or consent affects productivity; with the exception of the recent work of Burawoy and those associated with him, it has often been underplayed in studies of industrial relations ¹⁹⁹

On the one hand this does begin to address the problems which we have identified in Nichols and Beynon's approach in that it does allow for the analysis of situations where conflict is absent. The problem with Harris is that having identified good will or consent as being resources for the avoidance or resolution of conflict, we would have thought that these were then variables to be explained. In our own study, we have found many examples of just this, indeed Management - even higher Management ²⁰⁰ - were just fully aware of the importance of good will and consent. What we have to do is to go on try to understand the source of this good will. Why should there be good will? Why do employees consent? Surely we cannot just take this for granted.

The problem with Harris's analysis is that while she points to a phenomenon which could make the place work - in contrast to Nichols and Beynon who are looking for the factors which should stop it working - is that there is no attempt to explain why workers give their good will and consent. For Harris it appears to be enough that they do.

An example of this is her data on the fitters in "ChemCo" ²⁰¹ is consistent with the "Joiner's Tale" in "Power, Rule and Domination" ²⁰². In both cases what we have are examples of workers critical of their Managers, and how the Managers have exercised their function. How can we explain this? Clegg, as we shall see, suggests that power operates in such a way as to provide us with particular understandings ²⁰³, while Harris simply takes these understandings for granted. The distinction we would draw between Clegg and Harris is that the latter uses concepts like good will and consent to understand the relative absence of conflict in the plant, and treats them as explanations in themselves. Clegg, as we have done, treats good will and consent as factors which also requiring explanation.

Another approach to consent and why it is given, is developed from Hunter's reputational model ²⁰⁴, by Stone ²⁰⁵. Following the "two faces of power" paradigm as set up by Bachrach and Baratz ²⁰⁶, which has led as we have seen to the paradigm of non-decision-making. Stone argues that the problem with this is that ultimately it is tied to a theory of power which deals only with

- a) securing or resisting compliance
- b) situations where A is against B
- c) situations where A is testing his will against B
- d) situations of actors bargaining from their positions of strength.

An alternative to this, Stone argues is to consider

competing capacities to occupy
strategic position (what I am calling
pre-emptive power) ²⁰⁷

Pre-emptive power, Stone makes clear, differs from
command power. Command power, he tells us

is illustrated by the kind of control
which corporate executives have over
resources in their firms ²⁰⁸

Hence command power is about A (a manager for
instance) getting B (an employee) to do as he wants,
overcoming B's resistance if necessary. Thus the
relationship in command power is a simple, dyadic
relationship which is context free, concentrating on the
ability of one actor to get another to do his will.

What Stone describes as pre-emptive power depends on
the need for the community (organization) to have a policy
setting function in order that it can make adjustments in
the light of changing conditions. The group which is able
to supply this function will be able to exercise pre-
emptive power, since by performing this function the group
will be able to

a) secure a fee for the provision of this
service,

b) set the terms for transactions between the
group and the remainder of the community

c) make some transaction forms more likely than
others

d) by selective withholding or giving of rewards
exercise a divide and rule strategy.

Stone considers in his argument the possibility that a
"dissatisfied public" will revolt, because of discontent
with the policy setting group. As he points out, however,
those organizing the revolt will have to face up to the
question of how it can replace the existing policy setting
group with another. So having organized your revolt you
have to be able to produce another policy setting group,
and as Stone goes on,

at this level there are few contenders
and even fewer viable alternatives ²⁰⁹

The role of policy maker, therefore, is one of
strategic power (as Stone says "it is like being able to
name trumps and play the game on your terms" - pg. 90), but
at the same time there is a need to possess the skills
required to play the role (following his analogy, you need
to be a skilled bridge player as well as being in a
powerful position).

If we bring his theory directly into organizations, then clearly the group exercising pre-emptive power would be Management - they make policy and claim the skills to be able to do so. Why, therefore, is it Management who occupy the policy making position? Stone says this is because they

can be displaced only by a coalition itself capable of bringing together enough interrelated and complementary positions of strength and mastery of resources to be able to exercise leadership authority ²¹⁰ .

It is here that we begin to dissent from Stone's argument, because of the degree of emphasis that it begins to place on conscious power. We said above that one of the sources of pre-emptive power for Management is their claim to possess the skills necessary to fulfil the policy making role. We do have to go further than this, however and recognize that

a) those below Management in the hierarchy concede this claim - indeed being perceived to possess these skills is an indication of Management,

b) those outwith Management also consider that they do not have the skills - so no challenge (of the type considered by Stone) could be mounted.

We would suggest, therefore, that the difficulty with Stone's view is that it does not consider the possibility that pre-emptive power (coming from the tradition of Hunter) has an unconscious dimension in the same way that the Dahl tradition does. This leads Stone to neglect, to an extent, what Habermas describes as "Structural Violence"²¹¹ - that there are unperceived blockages in communication.

Stone's view of Pre-emptive power is also resonant of another idea which we shall consider subsequent. Stone has argued that those in control of the policy making function will be able to exercise pre-emptive power, partly because of the difficulty of creating a substitute group to fulfil this function. There are certainly practical problems with doing this²¹² . An advantage which they possess is, suggested by Gaventa's argument that

continual defeat gives rise not only to the conscious deferral of action but also to a sense of powerlessness that may affect the consciousness of potential challengers about grievances, strategies or possibilities of change.
²¹³

We would argue that the learning process implied in this has two important aspects:

a) were workers to successfully challenge the Management role unsuccessfully then that failure would be an impediment to further challenges ²¹⁴

b) more importantly, through their experience of hierarchical organizations, Staff and Hourly-paid learn not only the dominance of Management, but also the "appropriateness" of Management's position. This too will militate against challenge being made to their role.

Finally Stone's argument is suggestive of Abrahamsson's concept of the mandator position, which is

strategic for decision-making on for instance distributional issues within the organization. ²¹⁵

Abrahamsson argues that the problem is not with hierarchy - indeed consistent with Stone's argument, he suggests that hierarchy in most large, complex organizations (and some - not least ICI - will be larger than many communities) is functionally necessary - but that we need to devise mechanisms to democratically control those in mandator positions. Thus we have the possibility of a twist to Stone's argument. Stone contends that we can only consider rotation of policy making groups ²¹⁶. Abrahamsson on the other hand takes the view that it is a question of the conditions under which Policy making takes place and ensuring that these are democratic.

Stone's view, we would suggest is a most interesting development of Hunter's reputational model, but like other theories we have considered in this section, it is restricted by its failure to take into account the possibilities inherent in unconscious power.

Hence in this section on consciously exercised power - "Knowing Theories of Power" - we have considered a wide range of theories and investigations. We have found them wanting in several respects:

a) the tendency to focus on conflict and omit areas of little or no conflict. By emphasising conflict to this degree, we lose sight of how the organization is able to function, as indeed usually they do.

b) that there is a failure to ask all the questions of power which should be asked - for instance Mintzberg points to company law as a support for the power of Management. However, while this may be so, as we ask above, how do employees come to consent to this ²¹⁷ ?

c) that by taking the perspective of the superior in the superior:subordinate relationship, the perspective of the subordinate is diminished (or omitted).

We need to go on to consider theories which allow for power to be exercised unconsciously. The mechanism which makes this possible, we will argue is the reality that has been negotiated by the participants, and we shall consider theories of reality before proceeding to consider unconscious power itself.

THE LIFEWORLD AND NEGOTIATING REALITY ²¹⁸

Our discussion so far has shown not only the obvious points, that

a) the role of Management is one which is extremely powerful and that

b) for Management power is a critical currency,

but has also suggested that Management as a function, and as an activity (in other words Management being Managers), is even more powerful than may have been imagined.

For instance, it is quite clear that Management have the (conscious) power to take and seek to enforce a decision (to buy new machines/to seek new markets/to move employees around from one job to another). It is likewise clear that employees may seek to resist these decisions, using whatever means they can (their own conscious power), for whatever reasons. Through their trade unions, they may seek to resist the introduction of new machines if, for instance, they believe that this may lead to redundancies. Or they may use less official means - for instance sabotage to "demonstrate" that the machines are no good ²¹⁹.

The point we have tried to make, however, is that what is not challenged is the right of Management to make such decisions. The objective of whatever form the industrial action took would always be to influence Management to take another decision - to get them to do something else. As we pointed out above, in considering Abrahamsson ²²⁰, the challenge to Management is most likely come from the consequences of what they do, rather than from what they do - not from the act of taking decisions, but rather from the consequences of decisions. Management are the decision-makers, and that quality yields them power which unconsciously sustains the power they derive from their hierarchical position, of which all are conscious.

What we propose to go on to consider now is how these beliefs, which yield Management the degree of (unconscious) power we have suggested they possess, comes about and can routinely be exercised ²²¹. We shall do this by considering the negotiation of reality, but in particular the power which emerges in this process.

We shall do this through a consideration of the theorists we considered in Chapter 1. We shall start from Schutz for whom power was not, at least explicitly, a significant variable. We shall then move on to consider the work of Habermas.

The issues to be considered are well defined by Thompson,

organizational structures and order are not unproblematical realities that exist independently of members' constructive interpretation and constant reformulation. The social construction of reality in organizations involves making shared and binding a "reality" made up of entities such as goals, rules and roles. ²²²

In other words what we shall consider here are the ways in which the members of the Firm are able to reach sufficient agreement about what is/ought to be happening for it to function as an operative System. If there is no such agreement then, as Mc Hugh tells us

failure of definition will cause failure of interaction. ²²³

Hence a successful negotiation of reality is essential for the on-going operation of the firm ²²⁴. First of all let us consider how Schutz describes this process.

SCHUTZ

In considering Schutz ²²⁵, we can return to the source of much of his inspiration - Husserl for whom the essential problem was

a) that the essential structures of the life-world (or the natural attitude, the constructs of common sense) cannot, and should not, be taken for granted, but are instead important subjects of study,

b) to establish how the life-world, in this sense is formed.

therefore, we then have to ask, how as individuals we come to acquire knowledge of the Lifeworld and how it is that the Lifeworld comes to be formed - to develop what Schutz describes as "the subjective stock of knowledge" ²²⁶.

These issues as we have seen in Chapter 1 ²²⁷ loom large in Schutz's thinking, and have been influential in our analysis. Nonetheless there is a need to critically assess Schutz's theory to assess its limitations ²²⁸.

First of all let us consider the positive aspects of his theory. We would suggest that the following are worthy of note:

a) his emphasis on "bracketing" accepted reality, which is taken from Husserl, and on questioning the natural attitude. This emphasises the importance of considering and taking into account not merely the attitudes of our subjects, but to consider the structures which underpin these attitudes. In other words we treat as problematic what our subjects treat as obvious, and investigate their structure ²²⁹. As we have argued before, it would be trivial to simply identify the attitudes towards hierarchy of our respondents, since what we want to know is why it is accepted. Only by treating it as non-obvious - which our respondents do not - can we begin to move toward understanding its basis, rather than just rationalisations for its existence.

b) the emphasis on social learning. We shall subsequently take issue with Schutz on his failure to give sufficient emphasis to intersubjectivity, since we would subscribe to Habermas's view that his theory is ultimately monodological ²³⁰. On the other hand it is important to observe the social origins of the knowledge employed ²³¹, and the processes through which it is acquired.

c) the analysis of the structure of the Lifeworld, and the process by which it is formed. Thus the emphasis on the different types of knowledge -

Basic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),

Routine or Habitual elements, and

Specific Component contents

is important for the conceptual categories they provide, but more importantly for pointing to the primacy of deeper levels of knowledge of which our subjects are not conscious.

d) the role which the Lifeworld plays in structuring our behaviour. The system of types and relevances allow us to interpret and behave within our social world. As we have pointed out, in Schutz's theory, relevances and typifications etc. only continue to be used to the extent that they prove to be successful. Hence if a type proves to be unsuccessful we would be likely to change or adapt it. Correspondingly, if it continues to be successful it is likely to continue to be used. Behaviour thus is grounded in a cognitive process, rather than just written off as "socialized" ²³².

e) the emphasis on the role of social givens. This makes the point that there are elements in the lives of individuals which "just are", they are simply accepted. For individuals in society this is how the lifeworld appears,

the Lifeworld is the unquestioned ground of everything given in my experience, and the unquestionable frame in which all the problems I have to deal with are located. ²³³

Corresponding to this Schutz emphasises the taken-for-grantedness of knowledge in the Lifeworld. We can draw attention here to the systems of relevance and types described by Schutz, and which we considered above, but the sum total is to create a "psychic prison" ²³⁴, from which escape is difficult ²³⁵.

f) that the knowledge and its transmission become institutionalized. In other words it is not only that knowledge comes to be taken for granted, but this knowledge is moreover able to persist because the methods for its transmission become institutionalized in society. The consequence is that this knowledge - the social stock - can continue to dominate over generations.

g) there is a social distribution of knowledge through the differentiation of general knowledge and specialised knowledge. There are three important points which come from this:

1) it points to the fact that we do not all have the same stock of knowledge, but that certain knowledge - specialised knowledge - is restricted to certain groups. Thus each specialty will have its own, more or less elaborated (though increasingly the former) stock of knowledge.

2) there is an increasing dominance of specialised stocks of knowledge

3) it points to power provided by the possession of specialised knowledge - but which through being a component of the Lifeworld will be largely unconscious.

h) the emphasis on taken-for-grantedness emphasises the value of Habermas's Idea Speech Thesis.

At the same time there are certain defects and shortcomings with Schutz's theory, and it is to these that we will now turn.

1) We entitled this section "Negotiation of Reality and the Lifeworld", and this points to one of our concerns with Schutz, since rather than a negotiation of reality, the emphasis in Schutz is more on acquiring a sense of reality. There is, consequently, little sense of negotiation, since even where there is consideration of "we relations" and "thou relations" the emphasis remains with the individual, rather than on the dyad (or greater) ²³⁶. Moreover, Schutz treats the parties to a relationship as if they were equals, which is by no means apparent ²³⁷. Thus to the extent this is not so, we have to introduce to the analysis the effects of any imbalance of power there may be between them ²³⁸.

2) there is we would argue a problem with the degree of homogeneity of consciousness implied in Schutz's theory. It would certainly not be true to say that Schutz's theory assumes that two people, with different biographies would necessarily adopt the same perspectives, or interpretations on a situation. Indeed as we pointed out in Chapter 1, Schutz would take the very opposite view ²³⁹. On the other hand if we are free to take our own individual view which may be different, what is it that holds society together - what is the glue, so to speak? This is not a trivial matter, since as Bernstein asks, what

influences the emergence, reproduction
and decline (of the structures of the
Lifeworld) ? ²⁴⁰

If we adopt a Laingian perspective on this - which would argue for the uniqueness of the individual Lifeworld ²⁴¹ - then we are obliged to develop theory to explain cohesion in society. This in turn requires recognition that the Lifeworld may act as a means of securing social cohesion and integration. Thus, while Schutz recognizes differences exist in the social distribution of knowledge, what this means can go much further than he allows for. Really his analysis stops at the point where it is apparent that different people know different things, and that this different knowledge can lead us to interpret the same fact in interpersonally different ways²⁴². In particular Schutz does not allow for the possibility that the social distribution is more than chance, or even a functional necessity. His analysis does not consider the possibility that the distribution of knowledge is a matter of social control ²⁴³.

3) for Schutz the knowledge which we have is the result of sedimentation of experience, filtered through the systems of relevance and typification which we have acquired at least partly from the social stock of knowledge. This much is fine, but as Bernstein argues,

the more one emphasises the role of history and the sedimentation of past experiences in shaping how an individual constitutes his social world, and the more one is aware of the mediation of groups and classes in these processes of constitution, then the more one requires a detailed analysis of the processes and determinants involved in the construction of different forms of social and political reality ²⁴⁴.

Really there is no attempt in Schutz's work to deal with issues of how it is that certain experiences sediment into our subjective stock of knowledge ²⁴⁵, while others do not ²⁴⁶. In Schutz's theory the process is one which is substantially at the level of psychology, but which never gets beyond that to consider the social issues ²⁴⁷. This is a problem which we can trace back to the essentially individual basis of the theory.

4) Schutz's theory is substantially descriptive. This is by no means a fatal criticism, but it does indicate the limitations of his position, and is a further source of the points we have made already ²⁴⁸.

5) Associated with the foregoing, it has to be recognized that Schutz's theory makes little attempt to deal with social and political reality. The processes which Schutz describes take these into account in only a very marginal way. It is certainly true to say that there is a discussion of the social stock of knowledge, but

a) the emphasis is ultimately on dealing with the problem that the individual really cannot be the source of all the knowledge he possesses. Even at the social level therefore the ultimate objective is Husserl's *solus ipse*.

b) the process by which the social stock forms substantially through a process of objectivation, and that social knowledge becomes institutionalized. We are not, however, told how these processes work, nor is there any reference to social institutions involved in making this work.

6) the emphasis on description, and on the level of the individual eventually has fundamental consequences for Schutz, in that his view of adequate explanation (the postulate of adequacy) can be argued to be deficient. For Schutz, an explanation must be understandable to the actor who has performed the act. This omits the possibility that the actor may not want to own up to the motivations for his act ²⁴⁹. Other mechanisms which may undermine Schutz's view are false consciousness, ideology, or even Habermas's (and the Frankfurt School) use of psychoanalysis for identifying repression ²⁵⁰.

7) finally there is no attempt in Schutz to develop a theory of power. Now, to some extent this is an unfair criticism to make, since it may be argued that he never set out to do this - that he set out to describe how we acquire our understanding of the world. This much may be true, but

a) the implications of working in the way he did have, as we have seen, had other detrimental consequences (Eg the postulate of adequacy, the implication that description is an end in itself etc.),

b) it does point to important limitations in his theory, and indicate to us that we have to look elsewhere for the problems which remain. It is to this that we now turn.

HABERMAS

We saw in Chapter 1 that we can develop, from a Habermasian perspective a Lifeworld which is not only a stock of ideas by which we make sense of our surroundings, and are enabled to act but is also, in an important way, about control ²⁵¹. As we pointed out there, in Morgan's "Images" the Lifeworld is a "Psychic Prison" ²⁵².

What we have now to consider is how it is that the cell door gets kept locked. Habermas, like Marx, sees capitalism as dominated by contradictions. The problem which Habermas sees continuing to exist for contemporary capitalism is, as McCarthy puts it,

how to distribute socially produced
wealth inequitably and yet
legitimately. ²⁵³

To understand how he sees this as being accomplished we need to keep in mind that for Habermas any explanation which is "one-sided" will be inevitably inadequate. What is meant by this is that if we

a) over-emphasize the Lifeworld then we exclude from adequate consideration issues of the Social System, and its maintenance and control - as Held puts it

investigations stay at the level of
commonsense or everyday knowledge of
social procedures ²⁵⁴

This is the very problem which we have identified in Schutz, as well as in Laing (though for the latter, the level of his analysis, being at the level of the individual/family would not expect to move to level of society) and have tried to correct in our subsequent analysis through introducing power to the Lifeworld.

b) on the other hand if we do not pay enough attention to the Lifeworld ²⁵⁵, and instead focus only on the Social System and its needs, then we forget that society, its rules and control procedures are accomplished through its individual members and their consciousness - the Social System is a human artefact.

What is needed, Habermas argues is an approach which integrates both the Social System and the Lifeworld to explain the maintenance of capitalism in general ²⁵⁶, and which we shall use to complete our explanation of the persistence of hierarchy.

It is clear that for Habermas

a) the Social System is important for the continued material existence of society, but

b) there has to be a balance between Social System and Lifeworld, since the latter is responsible for the cultural maintenance and reproduction needed for the continuation of the Social System.

The difficulty which he detects is that the Social System has come to dominate ²⁵⁷, and the Lifeworld is subordinate to the "systemic constraints of material reproduction" ²⁵⁸.

This comes about as a consequence of the following:

a) while rationality, as we have suggested above, can be, and has been, a positive force in the development of modern societies ²⁵⁹, it can also have disfunctional elements. One such fact is that with the development of rationality it becomes more possible for the parties to disagree and come into conflict. In traditional societies, where decisions were taken to be consistent with tradition (Eg the rules of the Church), rationality requires the selection of the objectively "best" means:ends relationship. In such circumstances while conflict is by no means inevitable, it is more likely than in traditional societies. Thus, Habermas argues, mechanisms are put in place to reduce the likelihood of such conflict. ²⁶⁰

b) the mechanisms which are put in place to reduce the possibility of such conflict are what Habermas describes as "delinguistified steering media" ²⁶¹. Their role is to direct behaviour without the need for communicative action, without the need for validity claims, and thus in such a way that the likelihood of conflict is reduced ²⁶². The mechanisms which Habermas describes as delinguistified steering media, are money and power. Through the entry of money and power to the Lifeworld as guides to behaviour appropriate for the needs of the Social System, the Lifeworld is, in effect, avoided. Behaviour then becomes strategic and oriented to the achievement of success, rather than communicative and oriented to the achievement of rational understanding. The ability of steering media to guide behaviour is such that they can develop increasingly complex structures, so that no one is able to take a comprehensive view of them, or to take responsibility for them ²⁶³.

c) while money is considered to be a form of steering media, the other which he refers to is power. This is developed in his discussion of Parsons ²⁶⁴. Here it is argued by Habermas that while power, like money, may be a steering medium it differs in that it does not circulate in society. Rather power

i) is attached to particular positions in organizations (the role of Management is a very general example) - indeed to use power at a social level requires organization ²⁶⁵

ii) requires on-going legitimation - in other words, it is routinely obeyed if perceived to be legitimate ²⁶⁶ .

Power, like money, is independent of (or "decoupled from") the Lifeworld, and thus its use is increasingly not subject to the norms of the Lifeworld, which has been replaced by Social System imperatives, now dominating the Lifeworld. Thus, the use of power can be justified by reference to Social System imperatives.

Such developments lead on to the colonization of the Lifeworld by the Social System. This comes about when Social System media of power and money begin to actually displace communicative forms of coordination. In other words, rather than action being determined by communicative rationality, it is determined by the needs of the Social System ²⁶⁷ , and by strategic rationality. This is where the Social System colonizes the Lifeworld by, giving rise to Structural Violence ²⁶⁸ .

Why, however, does the Social System begin to invade the Lifeworld in this way? The ultimate source for Habermas is class conflict, and the contradictions within the Social System. For instance if the economy is in crisis - or at least performing below its aspiration level - action is taken to remedy this and these remedies have impact on the Lifeworld.

The Lifeworld and the Social System are seen by Habermas as having an interchange relation to each other ²⁶⁹ . For instance, as employee the individual supplies labour to the Social System, in return for which he receives a certain level of reward, which will be judged as fair, or otherwise in the context of his Lifeworld ²⁷⁰ . So when the Social System is in crisis, it may be that the employee is required to accept lower rewards, and/or be required to put in more labour. Thus the Lifeworld, to the extent that colonization has proceeded, no longer reflects only communicative action, but rather strategic action motivated by Social System imperatives.

An example of this in Habermas's own work would be the development of technocratic consciousness ²⁷¹ . Habermas begins from Weber, who saw rationality as a developmental force in modern capitalism - extending the areas of life to which rational (as opposed to traditional) criteria of decision-making would apply. Habermas sees rationality as "Janus faced" (Habermas supra pg. 83), in that

It is no longer only a critical standard for the developmental level of the forces of production in relation to which the objectively, superfluous, repressive character of historically obsolete relations of production can be exposed. It is also an apologetic standard through which these same relations of production can be justified as a functional institutional framework. Indeed in relation to its apologetic serviceability "rationality" is weakened as a critical standard and degraded to a corrective within the Social System...(thus) the true motive, the perpetuation of objectively obsolete domination is concealed through the invocation of purposive rational imperatives. ²⁷²

Thus rationality can be distorted in Habermas's view (indeed the Ideal Speech Thesis describes the conditions for achieving a genuinely rational consensus), by the dominance of technology and science, such that decisions come to be made not on the basis of freely determined goals (Ie within the Ideal Speech Thesis) and thus, other than on the basis of the interests of mankind. Rather these decisions are taken on the basis of the interests of science and the development of technology - in other words the interests of technology and science appear to be of greater significance than the interests of mankind ²⁷³. Thus Habermas argues:

The immanent law of this progress seems to produce objective exigencies which must be obeyed by any politics oriented towards functional needs.....it can also become a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticized mass of the population, where it can take on legitimizing power. ²⁷⁴

Hence the role of technocratic consciousness can be to render unproblematic, decisions in the firm. For instance through its connection to economic growth, technocratic consciousness supports Social System needs by rendering such decisions unproblematic ²⁷⁵. Thus to the extent that the Lifeworld endorses technocratic consciousness, it has been successfully colonized by the Social System, and contributes to its effective operation.

Let us take as an example of this, what would happen in our firm, if we developed and introduced a system of collective decision-making (we might even call it industrial democracy), whereby decisions were no longer taken by Management, but were taken by all the employees (or their representatives) ²⁷⁶. What would be the consequence of this?

We would contend that while there may be improvements in the performance of the business ²⁷⁷ - for instance by improving communication both upwardly and downwardly (though on the basis of our evidence - Chapter 4 - there would be some doubt about the latter. We can however, let that pass, since it is not central to our argument at the moment). The problem for this experiment would be that at some point it would be brought up against the "realities" of contemporary capitalism - that the business has got to sell at the market price, that it has to show a certain return on capital and so on. Such realities might mean that even as a democracy the firm might be driven to take decisions based on Social System imperatives. We have already seen evidence of this in an interview with a Director, who arguing that redundancy was the last thing he would want to do, agreed that it would be necessary

the day the banks wont give you any more money. ²⁷⁸

Thus the Lifeworld becomes infiltrated with systems media, such that the operation of communicative action becomes increasingly difficult since individuals are no longer motivated to achieving understanding, but are motivated to achieving success ²⁷⁹. The Lifeworld thus becomes increasingly irrational, in Habermas's sense.

Evidence of this cited by Habermas is the tendency toward "juridification" ²⁸⁰. The examples which he tends to give of this mainly concern the increasing volume of legislation which applies to social security claimants. We can, however, discern a similar process in UK industrial relations, over broadly the last 25 years ²⁸¹.

We can see in the context of the exchange relations between Social System needs and Lifeworld needs that a purpose of the development of legislation since 1971 has been to motivate the employee to supply a greater aggregate of labour through increasing his/her non-pecuniary reward in this way ²⁸².

Extending this further, we may even see in demands for participation, a similar line of argument, since to the extent that the employee's non-pecuniary reward is increased by participation (Eg feeling more closely associated with his company, more political power producing a greater degree of loyalty), the purpose may be to secure a further increase in labour power - or more effective labour power, through securing agreement to new working practices, or improving communication ²⁸³.

In such ways the steering problems in the Social System can be diminished through such intrusions into the Lifeworld. On the other hand such an alteration to the exchange relationship may cause the Social System to be perceived as no longer legitimate in the eyes of the employee, and thus he may be no longer motivated to conform to its needs ²⁸⁴. It is through the possibility of this that Habermas does not take the essentially pessimistic view of Weber ("The Iron Cage"), or Marx (reification and alienation).

If Social System and Lifeworld were to be put into a more appropriate balance then the problems identified by Habermas, Weber and Marx could begin to be addressed. Hence the colonization of the Lifeworld by the Social System may begin to be reversed, and society reclaim control over its affairs through allowing for the full development of rationality, rather than the attenuated version which operates at the moment due to certain arrangements, rules etc. being placed beyond justification by the colonization of the Lifeworld.

An example of this, given by Habermas, concerns the role of labour in modern capitalism. From a Lifeworld perspective, Habermas argues, labour belongs to the producer (the labourer). From a Social System perspective, on the other hand, how the labour is used is determined not by the labourer, but by the imperatives of the Social System and its needs. The consequence of this is that while the worker does the work, he does so not according to his own needs or motivations, but according to the needs of the System. Labour, in this way becomes a commodity like any other to be used by the Social System. This is then institutionalized by the wage-labour system and the "normalization of occupational roles" ²⁸⁵, which substantially neutralize any impact of the Lifeworld (i.e. the process is guided by money and power, rather than rational consensus arrived at through dialogue) ²⁸⁶.

The second process which Habermas distinguishes is what he terms "cultural impoverishment", which in essence is a loss of meaning by social actors. This was a process which Weber saw as inevitable, but which Habermas believes can be reversed through the removal of Social System imperatives from communicative action and development toward full rationality. In other words the loss of meaning for social actors is caused by the restrictions placed on rationality by the Social System and its invasion of the Lifeworld.

Central to this is the differentiation of knowledge which Habermas sees taking place in modern society ²⁸⁷, as did Weber and Schutz ²⁸⁸. Weber saw this as inevitably threatening to meaning, but in Habermas's view this is not necessarily so.

Habermas argues that it is not differentiation of knowledge which is the problem (Ie the possession of specialized knowledge which I have but others, not in my specialty, lack). The difficulty, rather is located in that specialists develop their own forms of argumentation from which others are excluded. In other words the way in which specialisms and their exclusive forms of argumentation develop, breaches in the Ideal Speech Thesis ²⁸⁹. Thus the full operation of rationality and the use of specialised knowledge for the benefit of all, is prevented. In turn this introduces distortions to the Lifeworld.

We can see this taking place in our own data, since a major support of the management role in hierarchy is their claim to special knowledge and skills to which others do not have access ²⁹⁰. Moreover (and at least as important) we have to have regard to the fact that this claim is endorsed by the Staff and Hourly-Paid, to the extent that even in what they see as an ideal decision-making system, Management would continue to take decisions, though subject to the influence of others (Ie in a situation closer to the Ideal Speech Thesis, and thus to rationality).

The problem is not, therefore, one of a false consciousness, but rather a fragmented consciousness ²⁹¹, since the Hourly-Paid and Staff cannot fully comprehend Management (as an activity) and thus cannot be critical of Management and what they do. This in turn opens up the possibility of the Lifeworlds of our subjects being internally inconsistent. These issues are taken up by Blackburn and Mann ²⁹² and by Billig et al. ²⁹³

Thus we can explain the inability to challenge hierarchy by recognizing that we occupy a Lifeworld,

a) of which we are not fully conscious and thus not able to criticise ²⁹⁴. As we pointed out above, employees have no experience of organizational forms other than hierarchy, and thus have no point of reference to criticise it from the perspective of a workable alternative. Any move away from hierarchy must be, in a Lifeworld sense, a "leap in the dark".

b) which has been invaded by Social System imperatives which direct our behaviour according to money and power, rather than rationality, and so according to Communicative Action. Thus to the extent that hierarchy is associated with concepts like efficiency and profit, it is, in a Lifeworld sense, endorsed,

c) which has been culturally impoverished by the insulation of expertise, creating a fragmented consciousness, which is filled with inconsistencies ²⁹⁵. We have already quoted Purcell ²⁹⁶ who argues that,

a) management will seek to develop a facade of cooperation and partnership, which portrays conflict as unnecessary and indeed as irrational. (pg. 38)

b) to develop an image of managerial power based not on (legal) property and property rights, but rather on an authority located in their (claimed) technical expertise.

Thus, the fragmentation of the Lifeworld can be seen in management being able to claim concurrently partnership and authority.

The concept of the Lifeworld can, therefore, be seen to be central in explaining our empirical data. It is not, however, the Lifeworld as proposed by Schutz, in the tradition of Husserl. That is a Lifeworld for which description can be considered to be adequate - thus for instance we could have described the Lifeworld which our subjects occupied and left it at that.

We have, however, had to go further than this. What type of Lifeworld is it that our subjects occupy and how does it sustain itself? That it sustains itself is clear from the analysis of our data in the earlier chapters. The exact mechanisms have been clarified by our theoretical discussion. This has identified a number of mechanisms through which hierarchy is sustained:

a) The Lifeworld, as Schutz makes clear, sets horizons for social actors through its organization of knowledge into types and by setting themes, which we simply take for granted. The Lifeworld establishes a body of knowledge which as social actors we treat as "obvious", including past and present experience - which we have either learned at first hand, and/or through others (Eg teachers and parents). Future experience will confirm this knowledge, or to the extent that it fails to do so, may lead to adaption of the Lifeworld ²⁹⁷.

It is through the very obviousness of this knowledge that we can begin to see the implications of the Lifeworld beyond its description. The fact that knowledge is treated as obvious means that it is much less likely to be subjected to scrutiny, or questioned. It just "is", and to this extent the implications it has for power may not be identified ²⁹⁸. Hence the category of "manager" is learned, for instance in many cases in our firm, from parents who also worked for the same firm (See Chapter 3).

b) we can categorise its knowledge as basic, or routine or specific to a situation. The critical elements here are the basic and routine elements, since the former, organizing our knowledge, is prereflective, so that even if we do reflect on our knowledge we do so within the constraints of these basic, organizing elements. Routine structures, as we saw above, are elements of knowledge with which we are so familiar that we may not even be aware of using it at all. To the extent that these "organizing structures of the Lifeworld" act unconsciously, then again they are beyond criticism.

It is only by suspending belief in hierarchy (epoche) and treating it as non-obvious that we can begin to understand these foundations. Thus the category "manager" brings forward certain thematic relevances - that they are professional decision-makers ²⁹⁹.

c) the Lifeworld is colonized by Social System imperatives, which means that increasingly our actions are not governed by communicative action (and thus by rationality) but by the Social System steering media of power and money. Again because of the privileged position which the Lifeworld occupies, we are unconscious of this happening. Indeed, as we point out above, it is not only those outwith Management whose Lifeworlds are dominated by Social System imperatives, the Lifeworlds of Managers too are likewise dominated, and it may even be that their Lifeworlds have been even more extensively colonized than others outwith Management. Thus, when our Managers tell us that they are "only doing a job", and that it has nothing to do with power, this need not be explained away as false consciousness, or unwillingness to "tell the truth". It can instead be explained as part of their Lifeworld³⁰⁰.

d) our Lifeworld becomes "culturally impoverished" in the sense that there are certain areas of social life to which we do not have access. These are areas marked off as being areas of specialised knowledge ³⁰¹. As a consequence of this, others outwith Management in the hierarchy cannot have access to the knowledge for being a manager, and thus have no basis for being critical of it, other than the consequences of the application of this knowledge ³⁰².

e) as a consequence of the colonization and cultural impoverishment of the Lifeworld, Habermas predicts that it will start to show signs of the development of crisis-inducing pathologies ³⁰³. For instance social actors will show signs of anomie (rather than legitimately ordered interpersonal relations) and loss of meaning (rather than interpretive schemes which are fit for consensus) ³⁰⁴. So as a result of colonization and cultural impoverishment, the Lifeworld may cease to be able to support hierarchy in the future.

f) the impact of cultural impoverishment also has implications for our consideration of ideology. In our assessment of the role of ideology we were critical of work like that of Armstrong et al., or of Abecrombie et al. since it appeared to us that they were searching for more consistency on the part of their subjects than could in our view be reasonably expected ³⁰⁵. The work of Blackburn and Mann on the other hand pointed to the inconsistencies in the ideologies of a sample of workers ³⁰⁶. Billig et al. see such inconsistencies as the very stuff of social life ³⁰⁷.

Cultural impoverishment explains why we should expect inconsistency - because the Lifeworld is so patchy, with so many areas being mystified ³⁰⁸, and to the extent that this process of impoverishment has developed, we should probably expect "fragmented consciousness". Thus rather than being seen as politically biased we would expect TV news to be seen as neutral by social actors whose Lifeworld has been impoverished ³⁰⁹, since they have little to base criticism on, especially when the material in the news is socially at a distance from them (Eg TV news stories about industrial disputes in other industries of which they have no experience).

g) the Lifeworld, conceived in this way, also supports the view of power which we have presented. Since the Lifeworld is something of which we are substantially unaware, we can see that it is through the Lifeworld that unconscious power operates ³¹⁰. Thus as we have argued above, social actors the category "manager" appears to call forth the thematic relevance that they are professional decision-makers. Thus the power to take decisions does not have to be constantly re-won by managers, but is conceded to them by the Lifeworlds of those outwith Management- indeed taking decisions is expected of them, just as the managerial Lifeworlds expect to be able to take decisions ³¹¹.

The Lifeworld however, plays another role in power. We have seen clearly that Managers and employees get involved in disputes. During these disputes they will apply their power to each other - or threaten to do so. The role of the Lifeworld is to indicate ways in which it is legitimate to use your power. For instance during a strike it is a normal expectation that the employment relationship is effectively in "cold storage" and that as soon as the dispute is ended the relationship will be taken up again much as before. Hence during a strike it is unusual for either side to take any action which will threaten this relationship. For instance during the time of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) many companies did not take advantage of the relative weakness of the unions³¹². Likewise unions seldom take action which will have a long term effect on their relationship with the employers.

Power can be usefully considered as a "multi-layered" concept, with conscious elements (where we all know that power is being used - a strike for instance), but also with unconscious elements (which indicate to us ways in which we should/should not behave, or how to use our conscious power). These latter elements stem from our Lifeworld, identified through Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis, being norms, rules etc. which are not potentially subject to the type of criticism pre-supposed in Communicative Action.

h) Finally the Lifeworld we have conceived of supports the view which we developed of Managers. This suggested that Managers see themselves as "doing a job" in which control was important, but is purely a technical matter³¹³. Our research suggests that the exercise of control is taken-for-granted by our Managers, who did not see themselves as concerned with power far less as "politicians", but simply as people doing a job³¹⁴. Our analysis indicates, however that we cannot divorce their role from the exercise of power. It is imperative to appreciate that we are not arguing that they are lying or being misleading, rather the explanation for this paradox lies in their Lifeworlds. Their Lifeworlds define their work in the way they have described it to us³¹⁵. The Manager's Lifeworld on the basis of our data defines his work as purely technical and not political. This is substantially consented to by their employees, who again on the basis of our data do not appear to wish to share the work of Management - but on the other hand they are concerned with the implications of their decisions. Thus the concept of the Mandator Position³¹⁶, and exercising control over this appears to be consistent.

What we shall now go on to consider is how this view of the Lifeworld can be brought in to develop a more adequate theory of power, by allowing for consideration of the unconscious operation of power.

UNCONSCIOUS THEORIES OF POWER

Unconscious power is critical for our analysis of the data, since we have argued that Management power is, in an important way, sustained by power which not only their Staff and Hourly Paid are not aware of, but which Management themselves are not conscious of ³¹⁷, residing as it does in their Lifeworlds and entering into their social action, as Habermas puts it a tergo ³¹⁸. What we shall go on to do is to consider theories of unconscious power which may give us support in this.

The seminal view of unconscious power for us, as we pointed out, is Lukes ³¹⁹, and we will start this section by considering the use of his theory by Gaventa ³²⁰. This is a study of, as he puts it, the "hidden faces of power" in an Appalachian mining valley, questioning why the miners do not challenge the mine owners despite the degree of inequality between them.

Gaventa, at the start of the book, sets out very carefully and precisely his view of power, which as he says is derived from Lukes. He considers each of the 3 dimensions of power, giving empirical examples ³²¹.

There are, however, problems which Gaventa's work poses for us:

1) the reference to the interests of the weaker party (B). We considered the objections to this raised by Bradshaw ³²² on the grounds of having to show that the weaker party has considered a course of action but has decided against it. Gaventa contends that this is not necessary, and that the interest of the weaker party imputed by the observer is only a methodological tool

"for discovering whether power relationships are such as to have precluded the active and conscious choice by B about such interests, regardless of what the outcome of that choice would actually be" ³²³.

The difficulty we see in this is establishing what becomes of the role of interests. If we take Gaventa at his word, we might imply that it is B's interest to become a millionaire - if he does not behave in a way consistent with this, do we then go on to argue that this is caused by A and his power? Besides, as for instance March has argued ³²⁴ individuals may not be all that clear themselves about what their goals are, far less what is in their interest. Concepts like goals and interests, as debates on this matter have tended to show ³²⁵, involve significant degrees of ambiguity. This ambiguity, to the extent it exists in the social world of our subjects, has to be dealt with in analysis, but we would suggest they are better not to become central assumptions.

A further difficulty with interests is that different observers may impute different interests to the same group. There are of course many examples of this, but a good example is the difference in interests imputed to the workers at the Riverside plant by Nichols and Beynon in "Living with Capitalism" on the one hand, and by Harris in "Power and Powerlessness" on the other hand. Given that it is possible to avoid implying interests for the purposes of analysis, we would suggest we should, if possible³²⁶.

2) if conflict can be absent in the exercise of power - indeed power is used for the avoidance of conflict - on what criterion can we establish that power has been exercised. Gaventa, in discussing the distinction between "real" and "false" consciousness" says:

"Real" consensus implies a prior process of agreement or choice, which in a situation of apparent consensus may or may not have been the case. ³²⁷

Thus for there to be a real consensus there has to be a prior process of agreement or choice, which he goes on to tell us, has not been shaped or manipulated, has not been due to the exercise of power. But, how can we know this? How can we say this is a consensus arrived at with or without manipulation? Gaventa gives us no real criteria for establishing this ³²⁸.

3) It is not at all apparent from Gaventa whether A (the relatively more powerful) has to be ignorant of all this. For instance, he writes,

the development and maintenance of a generalized pattern of quiescence of B by A in situations of latent conflict will always be in A's interests. A will act to thwart challenges by B... ³²⁹

The problem with Gaventa, and also with Lukes, is that the 3rd dimension, we suggest, actually tries to deal with two types of power.

1) One type of power is where A uses his power (consciously) to shape the perceptions of B (subliminal advertising is one example, another propaganda as practiced, for instance by Goebbels.)

2) The other type of power is where it is so deeply embedded that neither A nor B are aware of it (ie power is unconscious for both parties).

We would contend that in fact the former would more appropriately belong as a particularly successful exercise of 2nd dimension power (in Lukes' categorisation), and that the latter is a different form of power (another dimension).

A further problem, even with the former is that proving its existence is not going to be straightforward in many cases. In some cases, as with Gaventa there will be public records etc to produce as evidence that it has been used. What do we do, however, is there is no such evidence? Do we expect the powerholders to "own up"? What do we do if they do not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as a way forward ³³⁰.

What we have done is to treat all parties as being unconscious of the full extent of power in the hierarchy and then used criteria for the existence of power ³³¹ to demonstrate that power has been/is being exercised. In the event that Management were to deny our findings, then the dispute would be based on the application of specified analytical criteria, not on judgement. Hence, we have found in our research that Management are not fully aware of their power - that they treat their decision-making as part of their job, just as Hourly-Paid and Staff do. It has been our contention that power can be exercised with both A and B unaware of the exercise of power.

There are, therefore, real difficulties with Gaventa's view of power, based on Lukes' original formulation of the third dimension ³³².

Another possible place to look for a more satisfactory view is in Michael Burawoy's "Manufacturing Consent" ³³³. Burawoy's view appears similar to our own.

1) He does not focus exclusively on the conflicts in the Management:Worker relationship, but shows as we have done that by analysis of points of consent that we can learn much of the Management:Worker relationship³³⁴.

2) He argues that workers become enmeshed in a system of rules, and that this system of rules secures the continuation of the hierarchical system (or making out game, in his study).

3) That the system of rules depends largely on events within the firm, and is little influenced by external consciousness.

This much is in common with what we have found. There are, however, certain differences between us:

a) Burawoy canvasses a much narrower range of matters (making out) than we do, but to a much greater depth. Burawoy poses the question of why it is that workers give their consent to work under the exploitative conditions set by Management. The question we pose is rather more wide-ranging - why there is consent within the firm, for its affairs to be run on a hierarchical basis? We are, therefore operating on different levels of analysis, as well as with different methods (survey and interview, rather than participant observer). These differences of method and analysis have to a large extent produced our different results. These difference have, however, cut Burawoy off from what we have found to be a rich source of data - namely the perceptions by Staff and Hourly Paid of the Management role "in the round", rather than the restricted portion which Burawoy focuses on.

b) more critically, as with Lukes, we do not think it is made at all clear by Burawoy whether the Management (the dominant partner in the relationship) is fully aware of the power they possess³³⁵. We have contended that not only workers, but managers as well are unaware of the full extent of the exercise of power, in particular unconscious power.

c) there are no criteria of what power is. As we suggested of Gaventa, what do we do if there is no tangible evidence (records for instance)? Do we expect the powerholders to "own up"? What do we do if they do not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as a way forward.

We have, however, progressed through this consideration of Burawoy in that we have found support for our idea of workers being enmeshed in a system of rules, although Burawoy does not in our view make clear to what extent Management are aware of their power.

The significance of rules, however, directs us on to another lead. This is Clegg's "Power, Rule and Domination" ³³⁶. Like Burawoy, Clegg presents a view of workers ensnared in an system of rules which makes the organization work. The system of rules amounts to what is described, following Wittgenstein, as a form of life which is:

what human beings say is true and false: and they agree in the language they use. This is not agreement in opinions, but in forms of life ³³⁷

Clegg means by this,

Behaviour glossed over by the phrase "form of life" indicates that it is behaviour which may be seen as the embodiment of actions oriented towards a standard or measure of activity, where activity may be taken to stand for any manifestation of beings in the world who can be constituted as theoretic actors (one who is responsible for one's acts, to be one who could have been held to have done otherwise). ³³⁸

Thus, with the concept of form of life what we are concerned with is not only what is done ("the mere surface display of behaviour", pg 36), but also with why that was done when there was the possibility of doing something else.

This, Clegg suggests,

through raising the problem of "why" by relating language to life, by stressing the interconnections of language games and form of life that a way out from the nihilism that has attached to our investigations of power..will be discovered. ³³⁹

Thus, relating this to what we have found, we could say that the form of life which exists for our subjects is one which says what is not challenged is the right of Management to make decisions. The objective would always be to influence Management to take another decision. Thus the form of life of hierarchy says that Management take decisions, ruling out other forms of life which may allow other arrangements to develop. Where, in all of this does power enter in, since what we have now is a particular view of how individuals rationalise what they do?

From the perspective adopted by Clegg, power enters in through an analogy between power in the rules of chess, and power in organizations,

Now if power is not something that condenses in a relationship and evaporates on its termination, what is it? To stay with the example of chess, one might say that it is a function of the relationship of pieces (units) to rules, in that rules invest a certain power in a piece, independently of its position on the board. ³⁴⁰

Hence in Clegg's view of things we cannot consider power adequately without considering the rules which operate. The rules, therefore become an important source of data and understanding, since the rules are themselves a form of power.

So, for instance, while people may interpret the meaning of a particular order in different ways, they will behave toward it in the same way,

because their individual enactments are guided by collectively recognized and publicly available rules: ³⁴¹

Weber gives as an example that economic activity is oriented toward scarcity of resources, but that in addition the individual will also orient himself toward "conventional and legal rules" ³⁴². In other words while the economic individual is aware of self interest, that is subordinated by him to the conventional and social rules to which Weber refers. The order created by these rules, Clegg points out becomes a system of domination ³⁴³. Power resides in the fact that individuals settle their behaviour relative to these rules.

There are, therefore, in Clegg's view two dimensions of power:

1) the first face of power is on those issues where decisions are to be made, such that the parties may employ their power against each other. For instance when a group of workers go on strike for higher wages, or to take an example from Burawoy, when workers find their area of discretion being eroded by Management. In these cases the parties - Workers and Managers - are using their power against each other

2) the second face of power deals with situations where the decisions have already been taken, or were never raised since they were seen as taken-for-granted. Rules in an organization are, in this sense, a form of power, since the members of the organization obey an order because it is consistent with the rules which apply in that situation. Hence the person who issues the order is, as with the Queen in chess, powerful.

If this is power. then the next question we have to ask is how do we identify it? It is fairly clear from Clegg that power is to be identified from what people say - his is a study where linguistics play a prominent role. In his discussion of this ³⁴⁴, he is extremely critical of Cicourel. The analysis proposed by Cicourel involves moving from the surface (what people actually say) to deep structure (the rules which speakers apply to give a meaning to what is said) ³⁴⁵. The problem with this is, as Clegg says,

In Cicourel's model speakers are free on the conversational market to exchange talk as formally equal members, because the focus is on the formal aspect of talk, rather than on the occasions that generate the necessity for any particular account, or the relation of the concepts of that account to particular forms of life ³⁴⁶.

Our reading of this suggests to us that Clegg means:

1) that the assumption of Cicourel that the market for speech is analogous to the economist's perfect market is not valid. We would agree with this fully, indeed we have made a similar argument already through Habermas's critique of Arendt's theory of power on the grounds that it ignores, what he calls "structural violence" ³⁴⁷. Cicourel's view, likewise treats speakers as if they are equal in the discourse. As the Ideal Speech Thesis suggests, however, this is a matter we must treat as problematic.

2) we must seek to penetrate the inner logic of the rules which move us from surface to deep structure. In particular, having established what these rules are, we cannot just stop there. In Clegg's terminology we must relate them to "particular forms of life" - in this case we must seek to understand utterances as theorizing about domination as a "good, sensible and intelligible practice" ³⁴⁸. In short, we have to analyse talk, looking for evidence of the legitimation of domination.

This analysis is carried out by Clegg on his data (eg the Joiner's Tale, Cooking the Books, Al the ideal Typist etc.). So for instance he argues in the section on the Joiner's Tale,

This hierarchical structuring, as the structure of power in the organization, is self-evidently axiomatic. Without this bed-rock assumption, one could hardly function as a normal, competent member of such an organization. ³⁴⁹

There is much we have in common with Clegg:

1) as Habermas suggests we should do, he locates his data in talk and in language,

2) rules are considered as an important source of power³⁵⁰,

3) the analysis of the rules used, located through the talk of his subjects, enables him to get beneath the surface of behaviour, to try to consider what ultimately supports it,

4) his analysis allows for the possibility in behaviour that it is theoretically possible for actors to have behaved otherwise, and to question why they did not do so,

5) finally, consistent with Habermas, he is critical of Cicourel's ethnomethodology, which treats speech as a free and equal market.

There are, however, certain problems with Clegg:

a) First of all, there are no criteria of what power is. We have suggested it is to be identified in language - but what language? How do we distinguish "power language" from "non-power language"? How are we to know that power is being exercised? As we suggested of Gaventa, what do we do if there is no tangible evidence (records for instance)? Do we expect the powerholders to "own up"? What do we do if they do not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as a way forward.

b) Clegg follows Weber in allowing conscious and unconscious power to fall within the same category. Thus:

Authority is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.³⁵¹

The difficulty this creates - and we have argued this in relation to Lukes and Gaventa - is that this "order" may be obeyed because,

i) the actor subject to the command knows he will (or expects to) be coerced if he does not obey the command,

or

ii) the actor issuing the command knows he can impose punishments on the other party if they fail to obey

or

iii) the actor subject to the command, as does the actor issuing it, regards the order as legitimate and thus obeys it.

The distinguishing property of (iii) is that only power in this sense would be unconscious. Yet all three would be consistent with Weber's original formulation ³⁵².

c) Clegg argues that positions are not important-

one might say it (power) is a function of the relationship of pieces (units) to rules, in that rules invest a certain power in a piece, independently of its position on the board. ³⁵³

The difficulty with this is instanced on the very next page of Clegg's book, where he points out that if a policeman disguised as a bystander, attempted to direct the traffic, that motorists would mock his attempts to do so. In other words the motorists would ignore him because, without his uniform, they would be unaware of his position. This is not to say that the rules are not important, indeed they are critical. The point we wish to make is that, following the analogy of chess, even a powerful piece like the Queen can be put in such an impossible position that even the rules cannot save her. It is not satisfactory to tightly couple rules and positions to this degree. An example of this is given by Nichols and Beynon in the case of John Baird, who was a plant manager at Chem-Co.

I said "Well let's all get down to this. Let's all pull together" sort of thing I think it was going really well but then I saw what an experienced shop steward could do. He said "Why haven't you negotiated with me on this? It's in the agreement. You must negotiate before you introduce any changes..." And I was saying there were a number of reasons why I hadn't negotiated, and I was listing the reasons. But I was trying to be reasonable. And the more reasonable I became the worse it got. And oh, he had a field day really. I really just didn't know how to cope with it. And I coped with it very badly. ³⁵⁴

The analogy we would draw here is between John Baird's experience with the steward, and a badly played Queen. In both cases despite the rules, they find themselves in positions of very little power. (In fact Baird had to get another manager to get him out of this spot) ³⁵⁵.

d) We have already approvingly quoted Clegg's chess analogy ³⁵⁶, but we would suggest that there are limits to it. It is useful to demonstrate the power of rules - but if we consider it further we can see it raises further questions. Most important is, why is it that the Pawns don't object to the advantages of the pieces behind them (ie Bishop, Queen etc)? Why should they be sacrificed so readily as part of the game? Why should they be so restricted in their movement compared to the other, more privileged pieces behind them? Obviously (I hope) this raises the issue of why Staff and Hourly-Paid accept their subordinate positions in the hierarchy. Clegg's analysis of this stops when he reaches (what he describes as) bed-rock - the form of life. He explains (on pg. 84) that to question hierarchy was to

risk censure of oneself..A self
indistinguishable from that of the fool
- one who labours the obvious. ³⁵⁷

We can sympathise with this as a practical problem of doing research - indeed sometimes, as we said above, we too had similar feelings. As the end of an analysis, however, this is not satisfactory. It is not satisfactory to conclude by saying hierarchy is accepted because it is the form of life, or the fundamental assumption. What Clegg does is to explore the operation of this form of life - how it functions ³⁵⁸ - but fails to consider adequately why it is effective, and why alternatives to hierarchy are neither considered nor pursued ³⁵⁹. It is apparent that hierarchy has a hold of the minds of workers - the question we need to consider is how this occurs. Clegg stops short of this ³⁶⁰.

e) It is suggested by Clegg that,

power is about the outcomes of issues
enabled by the rule of substantive
rationality which is temporally and
institutionally located. ³⁶¹

Our objection to this is that to use the concept of "substantive" rationality is too general and too vague. We have argued that the motive force behind the hierarchy is unconscious power ³⁶² - for instance, that the logic of technological advance can be used as an argument for almost any change in the social world.

Hence, Clegg's work has provided further advances for us, but in certain respects is still not adequate for what we require. Before going on to consider what we consider to be a more definitive position, let us briefly look back on the main conclusions of our discussion of power so far.

In discussing these theories of power, we have raised several questions. What we propose here is to summarise these as a number of, what we see as, the more significant issues.

1) we have to ask to what extent a situation is penetrated by power - as we asked of Gaventa, how far is the game rigged ³⁶³? We have argued that the game may be more rigged than some theories of power may be able to identify.

2) a comprehensive theory of power has to be capable of directing us toward both conscious and unconscious theories of power. Many (eg Mintzberg and Braverman) only deal with the former.

3) many of the theories we have dealt with have a tendency to deal with dyadic situations (or situations which can be reduced to this) in a one-sided methodology by analysing from the perspective of the more powerful element of the relationship. For instance by posing questions like, how A (the relatively powerful) can control the organization? By structuring the question in this way there is a tendency to focus on conflict, since where control is problematic conflict is often present. Another perspective which could be adopted, however, is that of B (the relatively powerless) and ask why it is that they consent - since in fact they usually do, at least to an extent for most organizations to work most of the time? If we focused on consent to a greater degree then we would begin to be able to consider the issue of why it is that hierarchy actually works, rather than on why it does not fall down ³⁶⁴. A more adequate theory of power would clearly direct our attention down both these paths ³⁶⁵.

4) We have associated hierarchy with power, but why is it that hierarchy works? We have identified, from our own research and from the works we have examined, several (to some extent overlapping) explanations:

a) the normative structure and rules of the organization sanction hierarchy

b) the good will there is for the hierarchy and the consent which there is to it

c) its legitimacy

d) its structural violence, which stands in the way of its exposure

e) the power of hierarchy just blends into the background, and becomes unnoticed as power.

The problem with each of these is that we are still left with the question of how and why each of them works. For instance what is it about the normative structure which supports hierarchy? why is there consent and good will? why is there legitimacy? what is it about the structural violence which protects hierarchy? why does the power of hierarchy blend into the background?

In other words, for each of these "explanations", we need to be able to provide an explanation as to why they are successful. It is obvious we could point to perceived legitimacy of the hierarchy to explain its persistence - but how did this legitimacy arise? what is it about the structure of hierarchy's legitimacy which allows it to continue to be accepted?

A more adequate theory of power would direct our attention to matters such as these.

5) we have seen in the work of Lukes, Gaventa, Burawoy, and Clegg an ambivalence about unconscious power. We have shown that they are not entirely clear about whether A is aware of the exercise of power³⁶⁶. This point needs to be clarified.

6) finally, and following on from (5), we need to lay down criteria which will enable us to identify power specifically in analysis.

In Chapter 1 we presented as the basis of a theory of power, Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis³⁶⁷. What we shall do here, is to consider some of implications of this theory, and to what extent it satisfies the conditions we have set out above.

From our discussion, therefore, there are two questions we have to ask -

1) what indications are there that power in this sense has operated, and in what ways?

2) to what extent does Habermas's ideal speech thesis satisfy the 6 requirements previously considered?

It will not, we imagine, astonish the reader to learn that our answer to both of these questions is positive. We would contend that our evidence in the previous Chapters has proved both of these points several times already. What we propose to do is to select from this a number of examples where power can be shown to have operated in a way of which all parties are unconscious as evidence of the former. We will then go on to consider to what extent Habermas's thesis does satisfy our requirements.

Let us take the first question first. We would contend that our findings in general are a clear indication that the answer to this must be affirmative. We have devoted the analysis in Chapter 5 (and its associated appendix) to the proposition that power operates in this firm in such a way that while there is awareness of the operation of power (ie Open Strategic Action) it also operates in such a way that neither party is aware of it (ie Concealed Strategic Action). Hence we have argued that there are areas where,

a) both sides are fully aware of their power, and that it has limits. Pay is only one example of this.

b) the operation of power is not perceived to operate by one or both sides. Investment and Financial Policies are instances where neither side is aware of power being exercised. 368

Concealed Strategic Action is apparent in Excerpt 5.21, where the view of the Hourly-paid respondent is that decisions on Financial Policy are the province of top Management, because,

they've got the
brains...(and)...they're qualified
people.

It is, however, important to understand that unconscious power does not operate only on Hourly-paid employees, or on Staff. It operates just as effectively on Management as well. An important implication of this is that Management can define otherwise an action/event we would classify as an exercise of power. Consider for instance Excerpt 5.17, which is from an interview with a senior manager. Toward the end of this Excerpt we move on to the question of Redundancy. This quite clearly is not an action to the taste of this particular manager. Thus,

the last thing you want to do is to
deprive another human being of his
livelihood.

The more important point, however, comes a few lines further on, where he is asked under what circumstances there would be redundancies. He replies

Where in fact the Company can no longer afford to keep them (those made redundant) employed...The morning the Banks won't give you any more money.

In other words this exercise of power - declaring a redundancy - is not an exercise of power at all from this perspective. Rather, it is the manager just doing his job - it is a technical function. The manager is no more powerful than the person who is made redundant.

Following our analysis we would argue that, like the Hourly-Paid respondent we quoted above, this manager is operating under unconscious power - strategic action, which in this case is concealed even from the person exercising the power.

From our discussion of unconscious power, defined in relation to the Ideal Speech Thesis, it is required that there should be a formal equality through each side having symmetrical opportunities to speak, and no constraints in the structure operating on either side.

For the Hourly-paid worker it is clear that he does not want to take decisions - Financial Policy, he perceives, is not an issue on which he can contribute. Hence the Ideal Speech conditions are not met because the Hourly-paid worker concedes his opportunity to enter into an equal dialogue about Financial Policies etc. - because he is constrained by his own values about how the organization and its hierarchy ought to work³⁶⁹.

Likewise for the Manager, the decision about Redundancy is not about power at all, it is question of when the banks cut off the money. We would suggest that this is a clear example of the operation of what Habermas calls technical rationality³⁷⁰. Thus the redundancy - and the arguments which might be put forward to defend it - are not arguments about the rightness of this exercise of power, but rather that the decision is required for reasons of technical rationality.

Both Manager and Hourly-paid respondent are dominated by this rationality. The Hourly-paid respondent says:

they've got the brains

so his deference is to Management as an implication of a technical imperative - that Management have the skills to take such decisions. In the same way the manager is dominated in determining when redundancy becomes necessary³⁷¹:

when the banks wont give you any more money.

To answer the first question, therefore, we would argue that indications of unconscious power can be seen in the utterances of the two subjects discussed here, since there is no symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts, and no effective equality of opportunity for the assumption of dialogue roles, as required by Habermas. The exercise of power is therefore hidden, but nonetheless real for all that.

We can now go on to consider the 6 questions we posed above. The first question required a more adequate theory of power to establish to what extent power has penetrated the situation. The critique of Dahl ³⁷² by Bachrach and Baratz ³⁷³ was on the basis that his theory, by concentrating on who wins in a decision situation, was not adequate since it did not allow for the possibility of power being used to keep interests/parties out of the decision situation. This is developed by Stone ³⁷⁴ through pointing out that a difficulty facing a group competing to replace a dominant group is that it must be able to supply the necessary policy making skills, which Stone argues, are in short supply. The struggle over power is not a simple conflict, but requires the aspiring group to possess the skills to be able to replace the currently dominant group.

The difficulty with these theories is that they operate only on the basis of conscious power - ie in situations where the parties are aware of

- 1) their own power,
- 2) the power of the other party, and
- 3) the conflict between them.

The snag with this, as we observed of Stone, is that it does not allow for the possibility that

a) that those below Management in the hierarchy concede their claim to pre-emptive power, and

b) that those outwith Management also consider that they do not have the skills - so no challenge can be mounted.

The essential problem is that this view of power does not allow for what Habermas describes as structural violence ³⁷⁵.

We therefore require a theory which enables us to consider power as an unconscious phenomenon. An example which has been appropriate in this discussion has been by Steven Lukes - "Power: a Radical View".

We have considered Lukes' theory at length, both in this Chapter and in Chapter 1, as well as a number of its empirical uses (eg Gaventa). The main difficulty we find with Lukes is that it is not clear whether only the less powerful are unaware of the exercise of power, or whether it is both the powerful and the powerless who are unaware of power being used. We have concluded in this Chapter that in Lukes' theory it is probably the former, and to that extent it is not adequate for the purpose of the present issue, because it does not suggest all the possible usages of power. Further it gives no indication of how we can identify the presence of unconscious power, even in this partial sense.

If this too is not sufficient, to what can we turn? We suggest that the answer is to be found in Habermas. He distinguishes between two types of social action:

- a) Communicative Action ³⁷⁶
- b) Strategic Action ³⁷⁷ . There are two sub-types of this:
 - i) Open Strategic Action ³⁷⁸ ,
 - ii) Concealed Strategic Action ³⁷⁹ This too has two sub-types:
 - A) Manipulation (or Conscious Deception) ³⁸⁰ ,
 - B) Systematically Distorted Communication (or Unconscious Deception) ³⁸¹ .

It is our argument, therefore, that Habermas's categories provide us with a theory of power which can indicate to what extent - the depth to which - power operates.

At its most superficial, power will be at the level of open strategic action, where both parties are aware of their exercise of power, through their action being oriented to success rather than to achieving understanding ³⁸² .

At a deeper level, power takes the form of conscious deception, involving one of the parties exercising their power in such a way that, while they are aware of its exercise, the other party is not (ie that while the powerful party is aware his action is oriented toward success, it is perceived by the less powerful to be oriented toward understanding - communicative action) ³⁸³ .

At its deepest level power takes the form of systematically distorted communication, whereby

at least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he is acting with an attitude oriented to success and is only keeping up the appearance of communicative action. ³⁸⁴

Thus the parties may think they are acting in a way oriented toward understanding for a rational consensus - or co-operative coordination ³⁸⁵ - but in fact for one of them at least, their action is oriented toward their own interests, rather than of the group as a whole, but he is unaware of this ³⁸⁶.

To put this into the context of a firm, Management and the other employees may see their behaviour as being oriented toward the good of the firm. But, even though neither Management nor other employees are aware of this, the Management action is oriented toward partial objectives rather than generalisable interests ³⁸⁷, supported by power of which neither side is fully aware ³⁸⁸.

So if we take decisions about Investment as an example, the image which both Management and other employees have taken is that this is purely a technical matter ³⁸⁹, for which only Management have the necessary skills ³⁹⁰. Thus Management are able, by definition, to take such decisions oriented toward only their own (partial) objectives. For there to be a fully rational consensus, which would be oriented toward generalisable interests, decisions on Investment would have to be,

a) open to the influence of all outwith Management as well ³⁹¹, and

b) subordinated to generalisable interests (including not only shareholders, but also employees) and thus no longer as a purely technical matter ³⁹².

If we take another issue, however, we can see how power has a structure which can be seen as "layered". Let us take decisions on Pay, which is an area which can certainly be described as Open Strategic Action, since the parties are quite consciously using their power against each other. This takes the form of,

a) a negotiating relationship, where each side is fully aware of the differences in their respective goals,

b) threats and intimidation - "if you don't give us this we'll go on strike" etc.

c) the use of power through the realisation of threats - eg industrial action.

This, therefore, is certainly an area where power is consciously used. Can we find any indication of the operation of other forms of power? We would argue that this is certainly possible if we consider the ways in which a dispute about pay would normally be conducted.

First of all there may be what Habermas describes as Conscious Deception - for instance the Union side may try to convince Management of the depth of feeling there is among their members on their wage claim. Correspondingly Management will try to convince the Union side of their inability to meet these demands.

Moreover there may be Unconscious Deception (or what Habermas calls Systematically Distorted Communication - where the distortion can be seen as originating in the system itself rather than with the participants). For instance,

1) seldom during a dispute about pay will the structure of the relationship between employer and employee be challenged. In other words the same relationship as operates in Investment decisions operates on Pay decisions. The distinguishing characteristic is that the employees recognize their own interests - but the relationship within which this is carried through remains the same.

2) the types of struggle used in Pay disputes seldom challenge the role of Management. Even in a strike it is fair to say, that on its completion both sides expect the old relationship to be restored - perhaps somewhat tarnished and torn but, nonetheless, structurally the same.

We would argue therefore that the manner in which Pay disputes are fought out reflects a form of power of which neither side is conscious, but which operates within the accustomed constraints of hierarchical power ³⁹³. In other words as well as Open Strategic Action, there may also be, but at a deeper level, Concealed Strategic Action. Furthermore there may be Unconscious Deception(Systematically Distorted Communication).

Power therefore can be seen to operate at a number of different levels. These levels may be linked - as the example about Pay makes clear ³⁹⁴. However, for the avoidance of doubt the linkages are, we would argue, by no means necessary. The example of Investment makes this clear, since in that case there was neither Open Strategic Action nor Concealed Deception, but only Systematically Distorted Communication ³⁹⁵.

Habermas can, therefore, indicate to us the depth, the extent to which, power has penetrated the situation to be analysed. It therefore satisfies our first condition.

Our second question - that a theory of power needs to direct our attention to indications of both conscious and unconscious power - can be dealt with rather more briefly. We have argued in relation to the previous question that one of the features of using Habermas's theory is precisely that it allows us to analyse power to the degree its exercise is unconscious ³⁹⁶. The theory, therefore, satisfies this condition as well.

Our third question dwelt on the proposition that many theories of power tend to deal only with conflict - indeed conflict is a condition for the exercise of power in Dahl's theory. We have argued, in common for instance with Lukes, that conflict is not necessary as power can be used most effectively, precisely to avoid conflict ³⁹⁷.

Once again we would suggest that this matter can be dealt with briefly, by reference to the argument put for the first question. It is quite likely that in situations of Concealed Strategic Action that there will be no conflict. If, for instance, there is Conscious Deception which is successful there will be no conflict - it may only be if/when the deception is discovered that conflict begins. For instance Goffman's work on fraudsters and "con-men" shows that it is only when their deception is discovered that conflict develops ³⁹⁸. Similarly with Unconscious Deception, as both parties perceive themselves as operating in Communicative Action, being oriented toward understanding - given this, conflict may well not be present there either ³⁹⁹. Hence Habermas's theory is well able to identify power in situations where conflict is absent, as well as present, and to demonstrate, even where there is conflict, that power can operate in deeper and unperceived ways.

Our fourth question contends that conscious power is not an adequate theoretical variable - ie that it is not good enough to say that this or that happens because of the power of which we are all aware. For instance, it is not really adequate to point to the power of the legitimacy of hierarchy and say that is why hierarchy persists - we need to explain what it is about its legitimacy that enables it to persist/continue. Likewise that we cannot just point to the good will it has - we have to ask how that came about. We can point to the structural violence of hierarchy to explain its continuation - but we have to ask why it is it is not seen through.

Let us take, for instance, consent and good will as examples of what we mean. These are central to the explanation put forward by Harris ⁴⁰⁰, but we have pointed out that she really treats these as self explanatory. One does not, however, have to be a Marxist to treat these as matters which must be explained. Likewise we cannot simply fall back on the normative structures and say that they are the cause of the phenomenon being studied - in our case why hierarchy is able to persist. If we stop our analysis at the stage where we argue that it is the normative structure which allows hierarchy to persist then we would fail to consider that:

a) the normative structure positively endorses the hierarchy,

b) the normative structure includes rules which define and endorse the role of managers as the decision-makers ⁴⁰¹, and that the Managers appear to work under the very same power (See above, Page 70).

The legitimacy of the hierarchy can be explained in similar terms.

Hence we would argue that the role of Habermas is to force us, through the Ideal Speech Thesis, to focus on:

a) not just the reasoning of individuals within particular groups, but also

b) how the reasoning between groups meshes together ⁴⁰² (eg the Management reasoning of their right to take decisions, is consistent with the reasoning of Staff and Hourly Paid on this matter). In other words it forces us to consider the situation we are analysing as a system rather than to consider groups individually (eg Management distinct from Hourly Paid). And additionally,

c) the "structure" of this reasoning. For instance, why do Hourly Paid not challenge the role of Management. The answer is to be found in the structure of their reasoning. How can they do so, as long as Management are seen as the people who have,

got the brains.

In this way, Habermas's theory addresses itself to our fourth question.

Our fifth question requires consideration of what we mean by unconscious power, since we have argued that there is ambivalence about it elsewhere (eg in Lukes), and argued that the Habermas theory of power is a more adequate approach to unconscious power. We have pointed out already that Habermas's concepts of

Structural Violence

Manipulation, but especially

Systematically Distorted Communication

direct us towards consideration and identification of unconscious power.

For the avoidance of doubt, we would argue that Lukes' theory appears to stop with Manipulation (ie where the less powerful party is unaware of the exercise of power over him, but the more powerful party is aware of exercising power). Gaventa's study of mining in the Appalachian Mountains is an instance of this and, as we have pointed out, his study draws extensively on the Lukes' theory.

The difficulty with Lukes will always be the possibility that not only the powerless, but also the powerful will be unaware of the exercise of power. As we pointed out above in considering the discussion of redundancy, the function of managers may be considered to be technical, by one or both parties. Habermas's theory directs our attention towards situations where the parties may not be aware of the exercise of power. If in such cases, the structure of the situation, and conduct within it, contravenes one of the conditions of the Ideal Speech Thesis, this would be taken to indicate the exercise of power, whether or not the parties are aware of it.

This really begins to answer the final question - the need for criteria to identify the existence of power. We have argued, immediately above, that the Ideal Speech Thesis gives us a "bench-mark" for absence of power - thus to the extent it is infringed we know that power operates. Habermas's theory, however, goes further than this, since

Open Strategic Action,

Manipulation,

Systematically Distorted Communication,

provide us with a set of categories of power. Certainly within each one there will be a variety of types of power (eg French and Raven's theory gives 5 instances of Open Strategic Action) - but each category is significantly different⁴⁰³. In the first, each party is aware of the exercise of power, while in Manipulation it is only one party (the Manipulator) who is aware. In Systematically Distorted Communication, in contrast, neither party is aware of the exercise of power.

In this discussion of Power we have considered many theories, and examples of research where Power, as a variable, has played a significant role. Some have been found more wanting than others. What we have shown, however, is that to exploit the explanatory potential of Power to its fullest, we have to consider the exercise of power not only in its conscious, but also in its unconscious form.

While the conscious exercise of power is reflected in the structure of the hierarchy, we have to go on to consider why it is that the hierarchy (and thus the conscious exercise of power) is perceived to be legitimate, and thus how it is that conscious power is able to operate⁴⁰⁴. We do not think it is enough to say that the exercise of power is legitimate because it is exercised by Managers who occupy that role and thus possess that power. We have to go deeper to consider what it is about management as a function which causes it to appear to be legitimate.

It has been our argument, which has been sustained by our own analysis as well as the six questions we have just considered, that this can be done through the use of Habermas's theory of power. This enables us not only to identify the conscious exercise of power (for instance, it is trivial but true to say that applying the Ideal Speech thesis to wage negotiations points to the exercise of power through "Open Strategic Action"). It also, as we have shown, gives us grounds for the identification of unconscious power⁴⁰⁵ - for instance the division of labour between Hourly-Paid and Management means that the former will, for instance, always defer to the latter in decisions about investment in a way they would not if it was a decision about wages.

What does this mean for the persistence of hierarchy? We would argue that it means,

- 1) that the persistence of hierarchy is located in a Lifeworld which is colonized and culturally impoverished, and which acts as an unseen, but critical form of power.

- 2) that the demand for participation in company affairs by its employees generally is restricted by the Lifeworld.

- 3) that the practices of hierarchy are substantially seen as legitimate by employees, though this does not exclude demands for change, but without threatening the organizational principles of hierarchy⁴⁰⁶.

This may appear to be a fairly pessimistic view to have come to, but that would be the wrong conclusion. If some form of participation were to be introduced, then it may lead to a reduction in the mystification of Management which other (non-Managers) experience, and to that extent it takes us closer to communicative action, and fully rational decision-making. Thus even a small step toward participation would be positive in this sense.

How far have we moved toward participation already? We shall complete our review by considering work which deals with this, in particular the problems which have been encountered, and which may be encountered in the event of any change toward greater participation.

INFORMATION AND CONTROL1

In this section we shall consider empirical material on perceptions of hierarchy, and in particular

a) how employees have perceived the quality of information which they receive from their employees, and

b) how they perceive, and their reactions to experiencing participation, and possible problems with creating a system of participation in their companies.

First of all, however, we shall briefly review our own empirical findings.

We have found that employees perceive themselves to be on the whole not well informed. More importantly, however, we have shown that

a) perceptions are hierarchically ordered - in other words Management perceptions are most approving, then Staff, and Hourly-paid have the least favourable perceptions - on any of the twelve areas of information which we examined. We can see, using McQuitty Linkage analysis that for Hourly-paid there was a single cluster, and for Staff, three clusters. This orientation extended to Hourly-paid taking a unidimensional orientation toward information such that for Hourly-paid, information would appear to be information more or less irrespective of its content. Staff vary in this only slightly - Management on the other hand appear to take a (statistically at least) more differentiated attitude toward information.

b) we could consistently relate the perceived quality of information ("how well are you informed about -----?") to the level of trust that employees would place in the information (how far do you trust information on -----?). In other words if an employee perceives himself to be badly informed on a matter, then he is unlikely to place much trust on whatever information he does receive.

It is important to consider why it is that employees appear to accept a situation where they often see themselves as badly informed about their place of work, particularly since this is a reality that they are prepared to work in.

Moving on to consider their perception of the exercise of control, and how it would ideally be exercised, we found the following:

1) in respect of how control is exercised, that perceptions were once again structured by hierarchy, in that Management were perceived by each group (Management, Staff, Hourly paid) as being the dominant group, then Staff, and then Hourly paid (though on certain issues this last finding did not hold consistently - for instance on control over the pace of work, Hourly paid saw themselves as having more control than Staff, though the Staff did not endorse this).

2) factor analysis indicated that control exercised by management was perceived by each group to be qualitatively different, in that factors which contained a Management control variable would contain only Management control variables. Similar Staff and Hourly paid variables did not have such monopoly in the factors in which they were significant. Management control would therefore, on this statistical basis, appear to be perceived as different. Moreover, the data obtained from subsequent semi-structured interviews confirmed this.

3) when we considered how control would ideally be distributed, we found similar results to those indicated in points (2) and (3) - in other words that even when control was ideally distributed

i) while Staff and Hourly paid would have more control than they have now, Management would continue to be the dominant group.

ii) Management control continues to possess a distinctive quality relative to other employees, as indicated by factor analysis.

Once again we would argue that we have to question why it is that Management control operates successfully, and indeed that it continues to do so even when the possibility of distributing control in an ideal way is raised ⁴⁰⁷. It has been our argument in the previous section that we can begin to understand and explain this by reference to the Lifeworld that is occupied by our subjects, and in particular the unconscious power implications that this creates.

The Lifeworld operates in such a way that it enables interpretation of reality, but it also sets horizons, and thus creates limits on understanding of reality, and other possibilities of reality. The structure of knowledge in our Lifeworld is, as we have seen composed of three levels - situational, routine and basic. The most important are routine and basic, since they are both prereflective and thus not usually amenable to conscious thought. Moreover the basic level organizes our knowledge into particular categories. Thus our expectations of a Manager are built into the manner in which we organize our social knowledge - in other words it is a matter of social knowledge (or common sense) that managers take decisions, and that taking decisions on matters such as investment or finance and so on, are matters for managers alone. This then becomes a matter of routine - it enters into our routine level of knowledge - and thus becomes a matter which we prereflectively accept without criticism ⁴⁰⁸. It would be only by becoming aware of such cardinal assumptions subjecting them to reflective criticism that the possibility of breaking with hierarchy would become a real prospect.

The Lifeworld is, however, not so easily fractured, since as we have seen through our consideration of Habermas, the Lifeworld is colonized by the Social System, so that not only is our experience of a dominant Management, it is reinforced by the justifications introduced into the Lifeworld by Social System imperatives, and by the fragmentation of consciousness. In other words, it is not just that hierarchy is sustained by the fact that no other alternative can be imagined, but also that the (colonized) Lifeworld gives positive justification for it indeed makes hierarchy appear to be inevitable ⁴⁰⁹.

Thus, through considering the Lifeworld in this way we can understand that while

a) differences in power can be - and are - perceived, and

b) there may be conflict between the different groups in the firm,

this is contained within, and restricted by fundamental assumptions made about hierarchy, which are basic to the Lifeworld which our subjects occupy.

In this way the nature and the basic structure of the relationship between Managers and their Staff and Hourly paid employees is not challenged even in circumstances as at present where there is a perceived imbalance in power between them, or when they are in conflict with each other. This occurs because the conscious rights and powers of Management are underwritten by the definition of the role of Manager and its contiguous relation to other grades of employment ⁴¹⁰.

What we shall go on to consider now is the means by which this has been considered in earlier research.

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

Much of the research on how companies do communicate with their employees ⁴¹¹ has focused on the disclosure of information in relation to the requirements of the Employment Protection Act 1975 ⁴¹², which requires disclosure for the purposes of collective bargaining ⁴¹³. With the exception of Health & Safety at Work Act, this is the only area where there is a statutory duty to disclose information to employees ⁴¹⁴.

On the whole, research tends to suggest that this development has not been as successful as was anticipated. There are several reasons for this which are considered below ⁴¹⁵, but it appears to us that a central factor for this is the structure (or sometimes the absence) of the dialogue. At the moment communication is not generally structured to accommodate employees -

- 1) it is subject to the absolute control of one party - management ⁴¹⁶
- 2) the form of information in which communication is conducted is not suitable for them.
- 3) it is carried on in a "language" they do not understand ⁴¹⁷

Hence the problem of communication is not simply whether or not employees get told things ⁴¹⁸. The difficulty is that communication in the form of disclosure is about allowing employees access to a system of communication which is built around the needs and objectives of Management ⁴¹⁹. Communication in the form of disclosure, therefore is not about management and employees talking to each other. They may talk, but not understand. Additionally the talk is not a dialogue ⁴²⁰.

Essentially this amounts to two problems:

a) the system of communication is controlled by Management ⁴²¹. What employees obtain from a system of disclosure would be determined by Management. This, as we showed in Tables 5.99 - 5.102, is a matter of potential conflict ⁴²².

b) the information obtained from disclosure is not only in a form which other employees may not be able to understand (most obviously the Hourly paid ⁴²³), but is in a form which is underpinned by the needs and objectives of Management and Shareholders ⁴²⁴.

This moreover undermines other reasons - besides statutory pressures - why companies communicate with their employees. For instance Hussey and Marsh ⁴²⁵ report that among firms who provide their employees with some kind of company report that the main reasons included "involving employees more deeply in company affairs", "encouraging more employee responsibility", "enable employees to understand the market situation better" ⁴²⁶. These will be frustrated to the extent that our argument concerning differences in Lifeworld holds good, since, at least some of, the information provided may not be interpreted at all, or not as management intended.

We have already indicated the difficulty which employees have in interpreting and understanding the information supplied to them. Thus even where firms are addressing themselves to the problems of communicating with their employees that the types of difficulties we have argued for cannot be easily resolved. Even where firms are seeking to communicate with their employees, we find that hierarchy intrudes - perceptions appear to be hierarchically ordered. The mechanism involved in this, we would argue, is the Lifeworld, and specifically the differences between those of different hierarchical levels, such that communication between the levels becomes problematic.

As well as research which has been done, this is an area in which there is a good deal of advice available, with a variety of organizations making known their views on how communication ought to be managed, what information ought to be disclosed, how, to whom and with what frequency. For instance the CBI in 1980 in "Guide-lines for Action on Employee Involvement" ⁴²⁷.

Surveying the literature on Communication shows it as an area on which there is a good deal of advice available⁴²⁸, but equally one with practical problems which suggest that it goes beyond finding the most suitable device. In particular we would argue, on the basis of our findings, for

a) putting a level of priority on communication which is appropriate to the expectations of the manager's employees, but also,

b) structuring the message in a form which can be understood by the recipient.

It is certainly true that our firm did not conform on either of these criteria, but even if they had done so, these by themselves would not have ensured a system of communication which was equal and power free. Rather satisfying these criteria would only have granted employees access to a system of communication predicated on hierarchy and the needs of Management and shareholders. This would only have furthered the level of systematically distorted communication ⁴²⁹.

Opening up communication would not, therefore, create equality - though it may create more equality (ie moving in that direction) ⁴³⁰. Equality can only be secured through dealing with the constraints of hierarchy ⁴³¹. We shall do this through considering work on control and participation, which considers the possibilities of modifying hierarchy.

CONTROL & PARTICIPATION.

This discussion will be in two parts.

a) First of all we shall consider our results in relation to the results of others conducting similar research

b) Secondly we shall consider literature considering more conceptual issues of participation and control in organizations.

Basically we shall argue in relation to the former that our research has produced broadly similar findings, though the analytical implications we shall draw are rather different. This will be developed in the latter part of this section, where we shall argue that many theories (and meta-theories) of participation embody conceptual problems.

We shall argue that there is insufficient consideration given to the problems of introducing industrial democracy, created by the Lifeworlds of employees. Specifically it appears to us that there is often insufficient attention given to

i) the problems of the unconscious power which Management possess

ii) the problems created by the structure of the Lifeworld -

a) the typified role of Manager

b) the fragmentation of consciousness.

Following this discussion we shall finish by considering the difficulties created for the introduction of industrial democracy by such problems. However it appears to us that this is made all the more difficult in that there appears to be no clear view of what is meant by industrial democracy, participation, or control, and that views on this vary ⁴³². Thus for instance, in a review of this area Marchington ⁴³³ quotes several definitions, some which focus on the process of decision-making, others on processes by which the participating parties influence each other ⁴³⁴. He also considers some relevant research, but concludes by quoting Walker

participation has no magic, but is rather an alternative form of enterprise organization which has its own problems of human interaction and relationships, as well as of operating efficiency. Participation does not remove problems, it changes their character. ⁴³⁵

It appears to us that Walker's conclusion is fine within its own limits, but we would argue that it begs as many questions as it answers. We would contend that introducing similar systems into different organizations appears to have produced differing results. The response to this appears to have been to develop greater conceptual clarity and purity in respect of introducing systems of participation. Looking elsewhere for the answer does not appear to have been a serious item on the agenda.

We would argue that to understand the confusion which Walker, Marchington, and others, attempt to deal can be understood through the vehicle of the Lifeworld. We have in fact referred to this problem earlier in this Chapter, with our analogy of Celtic and Inter Milan in the 1967 European Cup Final. The point we made there was that playing in the same system of rules (in this case, the rules of football), the two teams behaved differently. On the one hand Milan defended, while Celtic attacked. It appears to us that this analogy can be extended very easily into the participation debate.

Participation is a system, and as with all systems there are rules. The difficulty is of course that rules do not speak for themselves, but must be interpreted ⁴³⁶. So, even if the same system of participative rules were introduced into two different firms, the behaviour in each could be very different. Understanding the differences in behaviour will not necessarily be understood by seeking to develop greater conceptual clarity, but perhaps through appreciation of the differing interpretations of the rules, which is of course a matter for the Lifeworld. And as we have shown, the Lifeworld creates power advantages for Management,

a) some are formal advantages of hierarchy and the parties will be conscious of these

b) other power advantages, however, are unconscious, deriving from the Lifeworld.

Thus, while we would allow that the same system of participation may result in different forms of behaviour, the unconscious power, which is an implication of the Lifeworld, means that a fundamental challenge to Management will not result, without changes to the Lifeworld. What we shall go on to consider is how this happens, in the context of participation and control.

In our own research into perceived control we have used the "Tannenbaum Control Graph" method, so it would seem legitimate to begin our review by considering other results which have used this method. An example of this is Bowen's study of steel plants in the UK ⁴³⁷. This is consistent with our own findings in three respects ⁴³⁸

a) the dominant group in terms of the control which they exercise are perceived to be Management, at whatever level ⁴³⁹

b) in (what Bowen refers to as) a "preferred situation" ⁴⁴⁰ the perceived control of groups outwith Management would rise, but most importantly

c) despite this, local Ironhill Management would remain the dominant group. ⁴⁴¹

Moreover, if we compare the different issues from which Bowen obtained his data ⁴⁴², then we can see ⁴⁴³

a) that the areas on which the ("shop floor") respondents have ("actual mode"), and wished to have most influence in a preferred situation ("preferred mode"), were those closest to their own working situation ⁴⁴⁴ and correspondingly, that

b) those areas on which they wished least influence were those furthest from their own working situation ⁴⁴⁵.

Thus, Bowen's findings are broadly similar to our own ⁴⁴⁶, in that the dominant group are perceived to be Management, but that in an ideal situation there would be a move toward (but stopping short of) equality. Bowen goes on to observe that this indicates a need for changes in the existing arrangement of organizations. He argues that the kind of evidence he presents indicates the need for

formidable changes in the outlooks and strategies of both management and trade unions. These will include those aspects of industrial relations practices which merely allow management to propose and organised labour to oppose change. The overriding role of ordered industrial relations must be some acceptance of mutual responsibility and joint decision-making at board level and below. ⁴⁴⁷

The problem with this as a proposal - no matter the rational evidence and arguments produced in its support - is that it takes no account of the problems of moving in the direction Bowen argues for. The reason why no attention is paid to this problem is that there is no questioning of why - despite its flaws - the existing system continues to work. It is attractive to argue for "some acceptance of mutual responsibility and joint decision-making at board level and below", as Bowen does, but the difficulty remains as to how we move to this from the structures within which we operate at the moment ⁴⁴⁸.

We have shown in our own research the horizons which our respondents work within - the implications for decision-making of the role of manager for instance - and have given that theoretical underpinning in the sections immediately preceding this - through the role of the Lifeworld and its consequences for the operation of unconscious power. Using this we have shown the difficulty for employees of visualising a meaningful alternative to hierarchy ⁴⁴⁹. In other words the problem goes further than just that employees lack the authority/power to enforce an alternative to hierarchy. There is a further (and we would argue more potent) obstacle in that employees cannot readily imagine themselves participating in management.

Management, and in particular management as a set of activities including decision-making, is perceived as an activity which requires expertise which other employees lack but which Management are perceived to possess. Consequently decision-making is left to Management as a monopoly, ceded to them in recognition of their special expertise. What is left to employees is then to seek to influence Managers in the options considered in their decision-making - to influence them toward some, but away from others depending on the perceived interests of employees ⁴⁵⁰.

Hence participation, and the demand for more influence, we would argue on the basis of our empirical evidence and the preceding theoretical discussion, is not about securing any sort of entry to management for other groups below them in the hierarchy. Rather it is about seeking to secure greater influence over Management in their practice of management - about influencing Management in the decisions they take, rather than seeking to participate in the decision-making process. It is the failure to examine the perceptions of his subjects in sufficient depth which causes Bowen this inadequacy. For instance Bowen observes

Paradoxically the practice of participative management will increase the instability of industrial relations if there remains fundamental disagreement of the roles of management and labour in this process. ⁴⁵¹

We would go some way to agreeing with Bowen that participative management may at least vary the problems of Management, though not because of "fundamental disagreements concerning the role of management and labour". At the moment - with conventional hierarchy - in our firm there may be disagreements about the respective roles, but we would contend these are not fundamental. Rather we would argue that disagreements concern the margins of these roles (Eg a manager being perceived to overstep his powers to discipline, rather than a dispute about whether or not he has the authority to exercise discipline). It has been shown in our evidence that the right of Management to manage is not fundamentally challenged - any challenge is at the margins.

We would further argue that even if the kind of changes Bowen argues for were to be introduced that it would not be those changes in themselves which would cause problems to Management. Rather the development of any problems would be contingent upon changes to employee experience, and thus contingent to changes to their Lifeworlds. Thus, it would be our view, that it would not be structural alterations which would cause the kind of problems referred to by Bowen, but rather the changes to employee experience which this would allow. These experiential changes would affect the structures of the Lifeworld, and it is this which may lead to the problems Bowen refers to. For instance permitting employees to participate in Management - even if only at the margins - may begin to modify the view of employees that it is only Management who have the skills necessary to manage ⁴⁵².

On the other hand it is this very perception of Management as the sole possessors of such skills which may endow Management with more stability than Bowen indicates. The consequence of structure for behaviour is not direct but rather is through the medium of the Lifeworld. This is not made clear in Bowen's research.

Such considerations are, however, apparent from the work of Tannenbaum. It is argued that

the mere existence of participative procedures in an organization is no guarantee that the procedures will in fact provide a means for workers to exercise control. Participative schemes in other words may not be effective in achieving real participation. For example members may not have the skills, consciousness or will that they need to participate effectively; managers may resist and therefore prevent participation by employees ⁴⁵³

This proceeds in the same direction as our own. The problem is that the point having been made by Tannenbaum et al. (1), they are content to leave it at that. We would have thought that questions of why members lack the "skills, consciousness or will" to participate were matters worthy of further research. While the matter of skills is essentially a practical issue, whether or not one seeks to acquire the appropriate skills is related to consciousness and will - which may in turn be related to managerial resistance, even if in the form of arguments reasserting the Management monopoly of decision-making which would be contrary to employee participation. In turn such argument may influence employee consciousness. What we have sought to show here is precisely why - in our firm at least - the consciousness and will are lacking, as well as the necessary skills. In other words, it appears to us that the analysis in this case is deficient in that it stops short of seeking to understand (rather than simply to establish) the perceptions of workers toward participation.

On the other hand in this article there is further evidence consistent with our own. First of all Tannenbaum et al. (1), show that participation increases the total amount of perceived control in an organization ⁴⁵⁴. This is consistent with our own findings in Chapter 5, where we show that in an ideal situation, while those below Management would exercise a greater degree of influence there is no indication that Management would exercise less influence - indeed perhaps slightly more.

Secondly, Tannenbaum et al. (1), find as we have done, that while there is a demand for more equality in the organization this stops short of full equality, and that while the role of Management may need to be modified, it is not subject to fundamental challenge. ⁴⁵⁵ It is concluded

The preference stops short of complete equality with all groups indicating that managers should have more control than workers ⁴⁵⁶

In another article ⁴⁵⁷ Tannenbaum et al. (2) distinguish between

1) Indirect participation ⁴⁵⁸, where employees participate in their firm through a representative - worker directors would be an example of this. Through structures like Works Councils, Union-Management Steering Committees, Safety Committees, which are required of firms of varying sizes by Swedish law, a system of varying types of indirect participation exists in Swedish firms ⁴⁵⁹.

2) Direct participation ⁴⁶⁰, where each employee individually is able to participate personally in certain aspects of decision-making by the firm. This is not required by Swedish law, and thus is less common. For instance in some firms there are decision-making groups composed of all the members of a work group with their supervisor ⁴⁶¹. This is clearly a forum where issues of particularly direct significance to the employee and his work can be discussed - for instance transfers from one job to another, methods of work, etc. ⁴⁶².

We would argue that this distinction is apparent in our own evidence presented in our Chapter 5 ⁴⁶³. This showed that employees were more anxious to participate in such "direct" issues, but less desirous of participating in more the strategic issues, which would be more likely to be matters of indirect participation ⁴⁶⁴.

Additionally Tannenbaum et al. (2) find that it is direct participation which is most closely associated with employee commitment to the company and job satisfaction ⁴⁶⁵. The explanation which Tannenbaum et al. (2) give for this is related to distance - the closer the issue is on which the employee can participate, the more likely it is that there will be positive effects predicted. We would argue that this explanation is not adequate.

Certainly distance is relevant, but not by itself. Distance is relevant only through the Lifeworld. Our discussion of the Lifeworld suggests that direct experience is critical in determining the structures of the Lifeworld - a "we" rather than "thou" relation for instance. Hence we would explain Tannenbaum et al. (2)'s finding in that issues "at hand" (as Schutz would put it) are issues on which it is possible for employees to generally develop a sense of competence, and thus a sense that they can participate meaningfully ⁴⁶⁶. Then again, issues which are at a distance - strategic issues for instance - possess less of this quality for employees.

Thus as we move away from "issues at hand", employees have progressively less opportunity to develop such expertise, and thus less opportunity to develop a sense of competence, and the opportunity to participate in a manner which they regard as meaningful ⁴⁶⁷. Moreover, they are moving into an area which our evidence shows Management claim as their own, a claim which employees accede to ⁴⁶⁸. Thus the satisfaction to be derived from participation in strategic issues is diminished by

a) the effect of distance through the Lifeworld

b) the claims of Management to special expertise in this area to the exclusion of others.

Hence we would argue that the finding of greater satisfaction being yielded by participation in immediate issues is more adequately explained by our thesis ⁴⁶⁹.

Hierarchy cannot achieve this degree of power in itself - it is after all only an organization structure, which is not an inevitable feature of organizational life ⁴⁷⁰. What we have attempted to show, through the use of the Lifeworld and its associated structures, is the manner in which hierarchy has come to achieve this dominance ⁴⁷¹ and, as Thurley and Wiridenius point out,

If legitimacy can be assumed by managers, then their power is greatly enhanced. It will be possible to move quickly in emergencies and to plan decisive strategies of product development to guarantee survival against competition. ⁴⁷²

Hence we would argue that it is not just a matter that hierarchy is dominant ⁴⁷³ but that this dominance is a consequence of the structure of the Lifeworld which defines hierarchy thus, such that it is perceived as legitimate ⁴⁷⁴, and indeed as the only generally viable structure ⁴⁷⁵.

We have argued that moving toward more democratic structures is restricted by not only

a) the limitations imposed on employees by the horizons created by the Lifeworld, but also

b) the desire of Management to remain in a dominant position.

Our evidence in Chapter 5 indicates that not only are:

a) employees willing to continue to allow Management to continue to be dominant - though less so than now -

b) but also that Management wish to continue to be dominant.

This for sure is hardly a great surprise, since in the case of Management, if they were to be asked "do you want to want to continue to be dominant?", it would hardly be surprising when the answer is affirmative. This does, however, raise important issues for any company developments toward more democratic structures ⁴⁷⁶, as can be seen in our findings on the perceptions of industrial democracy.

If we consider table 5.59, which summarises various decision-making structures, it can be seen that the only structure found "acceptable" or better by at least 50% of respondents in all three groups (Management, Staff, Hourly paid), was

"Management to decide policy in consultation with all employees"

On the other hand 50%+ of Staff and Hourly-paid found acceptable of better

"policy being decided equally by Management and Unionised employees"

On the other hand only 13% of Management found this acceptable (none found it totally acceptable) but 66% found it unacceptable/totally unacceptable ⁴⁷⁷. Our evidence in this respect suggests that the path toward more democratic structures may not be entirely smooth, in that there are these real perceptual differences. At the same time, however, we have shown at least one structure - consultation - is acceptable to at least 50% of all groups.

At the same time there are clear perceptual differences between Management and their employees. This becomes all the more clear when we considered perceptions of what might happen if worker directors were to be introduced to the company.

Our conclusion was that Management took a fairly gloomy view on this matter ⁴⁷⁸, in particular that introducing worker directors would fundamentally alter the objectives of the firm - that the provision of good, well paid employment would become more important than making profits, and making sales become much less important (See table A3.65). We did, however, go on to show that this was not the view of Staff and Hourly Paid. Their perception was that sales and efficiency would continue to be important to a Board with worker directors (See tables A3.66 and A3.67), though the provision of good well paid employment would become more important than with the Board as presently constituted ⁴⁷⁹.

Yet the role of employee directors does not appear to be perceived negatively in other respects. For instance

a) it was widely agreed that the experience of employees would be valuable in company decision-making (Table A3.68),

b) that employees would take more interest in company affairs beside their own immediate work situation (Table A3.69), and that

c) the most important quality of a worker director would be to make the firm more efficient than at present (Table A3.70).

Thus in at least these three respects, there is considerable agreement between the groups on the role of worker directors. What, therefore, would be the problem with introducing at least more democratic structures, if not going as far as worker directors ⁴⁸⁰?

We have already hinted at a source of this, in showing that Management are concerned about the possible changes in company objectives which would result from the introduction of worker directors, and would be expected to resist for this reason if for no other ⁴⁸¹. There are, however, deeper problems on both sides.

We have shown already that, in general, employees do not want Management to cease being the decision-making group ⁴⁸² - though there is an expressed desire by those outwith Management that they should be able to exercise more influence than they do now ⁴⁸³. We have attempted to demonstrate why this should be from the perspective of those outwith Management.

Why, however, do Management want to carry on being, in this sense, the dominant group? To some extent this may be seen as a naive question, but it is one which, for uniformity, has to be posed ⁴⁸⁴.

An obvious reason may be argued to be self interest, though we did not explore this directly. Our reasoning can, however, go deeper than this. We have portrayed the Lifeworld of Staff and Hourly paid as defining Management as the professional decision makers. Our data in Chapter 5 suggests that this is true for Management as well. We show there that -

a) the statistical analysis, using factor analysis and McQuitty Linkage Analysis, showed that not only for Staff ⁴⁸⁵ and Hourly paid ⁴⁸⁶ but for Management ⁴⁸⁷ as well, the control exercised (actual but in particular ideal control) by Management was perceived as conceptually different from whatever control was exercised by other groups ⁴⁸⁸.

b) the interview data we have reproduced as excerpts points to Management perceiving themselves, and the control which they exercise as conceptually different. For instance if we return to Excerpt 5.17, which is a discussion with a Manager about the management of financial decisions, the Manager talks of

computation of figures, calculation of forms, filling in pieces of paper, the shop floor isn't qualified or employed to do that ⁴⁸⁹.

In the view of this manager, therefore, the work involved in financial decision making is work for Management to do, and not anybody else ⁴⁹⁰. If things were otherwise, this would be an infringement of the Management role ⁴⁹¹. Management see themselves as professional decision makers ⁴⁹², with the skills required to run the firm efficiently ⁴⁹³. This is not a role for anybody else ⁴⁹⁴ - other than in a consultative capacity (in the sense of providing information for further professional analysis) ⁴⁹⁵.

c) we have also indicated the problem of maintaining control for Management ⁴⁹⁶ in any participative or more democratic system. This can be seen in at least two pieces of evidence we present in Chapter 5 - Table 5.67, but in particular Table 5.63.

The former summarises data on how company profits ought to be allocated (See too tables 5.64 -5.66). For all the groups the first two options -

i) all profits to go to the parent company, and

ii) all profits to go to the parent company with a bonus for Management -

are not acceptable. Other more radical options were considered too-

A) all profits to go to the parent company with a bonus for all employees, negotiated with the unions.

B) Profits to be shared equally between the parent company, and the employees of the firm.

These are acceptable to at least 50% of Staff and Hourly paid, but not to Management. The most radical option that

"profits should go to employees alone"

was not acceptable to any group.

The only acceptable option to all groups was that

"profits would go to the parent company, but with a bonus paid to all employees, the size of which would be determined by Management".

Hence for Management the importance of retaining control is apparent from these figures ⁴⁹⁷. The principle of distributing profits among employees appears not to be the obstacle - rather the nature of the problem is whether (or to what extent) they as Management will be able to retain ultimate control over this ⁴⁹⁸.

The other side of this concerns Hourly paid and Staff, who are prepared, like Management, to accept a bonus whose size would be determined by Management.

a) For Staff, we can see from Table 5.65 that this is the most favoured option of all with 68% finding it acceptable or totally acceptable. On the other hand the option allowing the bonus to be negotiated with the unions is acceptable or totally acceptable to 63%.

b) If we consider the Hourly paid (Table 5.66) then we see that while 65% find acceptable a "bonus whose size would be determined by Management", even more - 89% - find acceptable the bonus being "negotiated with Management".

Hence the issue is not Management control itself - that appears to be accepted - for instance the idea that profits should go to employees alone finds support from only 20% of employees. The issue is, as we have argued above, the degree and "fine print" ⁴⁹⁹ of Management control ⁵⁰⁰. This can be seen even more clearly from the data in table 5.63 (which summarises data in tables 5.60 -5.62).

This table deals with control over access to company information. It shows that while for Staff and Hourly paid the proposition that "all information should be available to all employees" is acceptable, it is not so for Management. For Management the only acceptable proposition is that "all information should be available, but subject to a Management veto" - 69% finding that acceptable or totally acceptable. Among Staff exactly 50% find this acceptable or totally acceptable, but only 29% of Hourly paid find it thus ⁵⁰¹.

Hence this table follows the same lines as the data on worker directors, distribution of profits and (to a lesser degree) communication ⁵⁰². The general concept of moving toward such practices appears to be not unacceptable but,

1) it is clear that no group wants to displace Management - the objective is to secure, what is perceived (by whichever group we are considering) as an appropriate measure of influence on Management. There is, for instance, no majority demand for joint decision-making, for profits to be distributed to employees. In both cases the aspiration of employees is to be able to enter into dialogue with Management, so that in taking their decision Management are aware of the expectations etc. of their employees, and that these will be input for Management in taking their decisions ⁵⁰³

2) difficulty, however, remains with the exact conditions on which this would happen.

Establishing what these conditions would be is made more difficult because it is clear that Management and their employees have a less than full understanding of each other. For instance, as we have seen, the view that Management take of the objectives which a board with worker directors would pursue, does not correspond to their employees' view ⁵⁰⁴. The variance, on views of how a board with worker directors would act, is greatest between Management and Staff and between Management and Hourly paid, than between Staff and Hourly paid. This reflects there being no effective dialogue between the parties ⁵⁰⁵, which we have already argued is manifested by,

a) the conscious power of Management, which obstructs dialogue ⁵⁰⁶, and

b) the differing Lifeworlds of Management, Staff and Hourly-paid ⁵⁰⁷, and

c) the unconscious power of Management, originating in the Lifeworld, which impedes full dialogue (in the sense implied by Ideal Speech) ⁵⁰⁸.

Thus, as well as the conscious power vested in hierarchy, a major obstacle in introducing more democratic forms is that due to structures of their Lifeworlds, both those within and outwith Management are restricted by,

1) their inability to imagine the operation of such structures (Eg while there may be more equality in decision-making, it would always stop short of full equality) so that claims for more democratic structures are forgone,

2) their inability to agree on the form such structures should take (Eg should profit shares be determined by Management, or subject to Negotiation),

3) their inability to agree the conditions on which there should be movement toward such changes (Eg should Management have a veto on access to company information, or should there be some other system? ⁵⁰⁹).

The situation we have found, therefore, is not just that employees do not think in terms which would allow a challenge to Management and to hierarchy. We have found, rather, that employees think in ways which logically rule out such a challenge. For instance when our Lifeworld defines Management as the decision-makers, then challenging that position appears illogical. So for employees outwith Management the practice of management appears to be something of a conceptual "black hole", in that not only are they unclear about what happens in management (as an activity), but also their Lifeworlds fail to give them criteria for assessing Management, beyond their immediate work experience ⁵¹⁰.

In other words, while employees on the Shop Floor may be able to complain about the adequacy of a Manager in (for instance) working methods - which is a matter they have experienced, and for which the Lifeworlds provide them with relevances for interpretation ⁵¹¹ - this is much less so for assessing the adequacy of a Manager in taking strategic decisions, since in contrast their Lifeworlds provide them with little or nothing in the way of interpretational relevances on such a matter ⁵¹².

Hence, in the event that a particular Manager (or even team of Managers) appears less than competent as a strategic decision-maker, then, as we argued in relation to Ford and Baucus ⁵¹³, the particular Manager (or team of Managers) may be removed, but even that would not necessarily transform the Lifeworld to a degree which will lead to Hierarchy being questioned sufficiently for a challenge to be created ⁵¹⁴. It is necessary to appreciate that there appears to be a distinction between particular Managers on the one hand, and the practice of management on the other ⁵¹⁵. Conflict with, or even challenge to the former, does not necessarily lead to challenging the process of the latter.

Thus, we would argue that it is not that the employees of an organization have considered more democratic structures but rejected them - rather what we have shown is that their Lifeworlds render it impossible for such structures to be contemplated as realistic possibilities ⁵¹⁶. It is only through modifying such restrictions created by the Lifeworld that hierarchy and the dominant role of Management could be challenged ⁵¹⁷.

The present structure of the Lifeworld, therefore, restricts reasoning to structures based on hierarchy ⁵¹⁸ which yields an additional dimension of power to Management (Lukes' third dimension) ⁵¹⁹. It would only be by changing the structure of the Lifeworld that radically different structures could be introduced and work successfully ⁵²⁰.

What we shall go on to consider now is the extent to which the literature on participation and industrial democracy takes such issues into account. We shall argue here that the debate is held back by a lack of clarity concerning the present situation in organizations, from which changes in the direction of industrial democracy will have to be constructed. Specifically that there is a failure to take fully into account,

1) power ⁵²¹ and in particular the power which Management exercise unconsciously

2) the structure of the Lifeworld, and especially

i) the typified role of the manager

Ii) the colonization of the Lifeworld

Iii) fragmentation of consciousness

and the consequences that these have for creating change.

This in turn leads to lack of clarity of the likely direction of future change, other than as a priori arguments.

The former point is not always clearly understood. Poole for instance presents two models - one which is integrative another which is disjunctive ⁵²² but the expertise of Management, and its perception by employees, means that no matter which model we use, Management persistently have the advantage over their employees in that they are considered to have a special expertise in running the business, an expertise which is lacked by others ⁵²³. At the same time, however, Management require the cooperation of others in the firm - hierarchy as Cressey et al. point out is never complete ⁵²⁴. This means that on the one hand there is domination of the organization by a restricted group - Management - yet at the same time this same group claims partnership with the remainder of the organization ⁵²⁵.

We can see in this an analogy with the contradictory existence of Sarah Danzig ("The Leaves of Spring" - A. Esterson, Pelican 1972.), whose reality was so fractured by contradictions that she began to show signs of schizophrenia. ⁵²⁶

We do not seek to argue from this analogy that our sample display signs of schizophrenia, but it is part of Habermas's argument concerning the development of pathologies in the reproduction of the Lifeworld due to its colonization by the System in advanced capitalism, that psychopathologies may develop at the level of the individual ⁵²⁷. It is, however, a tribute to the level of domination which Management enjoy (though to which they too are subject), and the effectiveness of the Lifeworlds which they occupy, that

a) this contradiction goes substantially unnoticed, at least to the extent that the present situation certainly continues to operate, and

b) appears to be, on the whole, acceptable.

We would argue that to introduce a perfected system of industrial democracy ⁵²⁸ we have to take into account:

a) the present Lifeworlds, and

b) the domination which they lead to.

Simply to say that tomorrow employees will have the right to participate at board level may be doomed to justifying the arguments of those who argue against industrial democracy, and confounding those who favour it ⁵²⁹.

This, however, should not be taken to mean either that no move away from hierarchy and toward industrial democracy is possible ⁵³⁰. This is not the thrust of our argument. What we have shown are the difficulties of so doing. We shall now go on to consider how, up to a point, organizations could move toward industrial democracy.

We have argued that

a) if we distinguish between work issues which are more directly related to the work of the individual - work pace, methods, pay, discipline, etc. - and other more strategic issues - investment policies, sales policy, financial policy, etc. - that there is more demand for involvement in the former than the latter

b) that it is generally accepted - by Management as well as those outwith Management - that there should be more participation in decision-making by those outwith Management ⁵³¹.

c) that those outwith Management do not wish to replace Management as decision-makers. Rather they would contend that Management should consider the input they could potentially make to decisions (eg information on which machines to buy, how to improve designs, and so on ⁵³²), but always that the decision would be taken by the Manager ⁵³³. Management on the other hand were clearly concerned about maintaining their decision-making rights. Thus it appears to us that there is no fundamental problem, and that any problems of developing a more participative system are problems of detail than of fundamental principle. Thus, any problems would seem to us to be negotiable⁵³⁴.

Given this, therefore, how might such a system develop⁵³⁵? Maintaining the distinction between directly relevant and strategic issues, indicates a need for participation to develop at both of these levels. It is clear from our evidence and analysis that participation at the former level would be more relevant for employees, since it would take them into issues for which their Lifeworlds are suited⁵³⁶. It would involve matters for which they already have interpretational relevances (though this does not rule out the possibility that they would have to be developed further to deal with the wider range of issues they would come into contact with).

Hence a component of the system of participation would seem to us to be to develop participation at the level of the individual employee, and/or his work group. This, at shop-floor level might involve employees in designing new production techniques, having meaningful influence when new equipment is being chosen and so on. This form of participation would originate in the activities of the employees who participate ⁵³⁷. At the same time, however, this points to a need for them to participate at the strategic level as well ⁵³⁸.

This has the disadvantages that

a) their Lifeworlds as we have seen, are not well suited to this area of business,

b) it would involve indirect participation (ie participation by representatives - shop stewards for instance) rather than being direct. Hence there is the risk of the alienation of the representative from those he represents.

At the same time participation at this level would be functionally necessary for participation at lower levels⁵³⁹. Say, for instance, that a group of employees had decided that they would recommend to the company the purchase of new machines for their department, which would cost several million pounds. Unfortunately this does not fit in with the investment policy of the firm. This points to the ultimate permeability of the distinction we have drawn between these two types of issues⁵⁴⁰. It is certainly clear on the basis of our own research, and that of others referred to above, that this distinction looms large in the thinking of employees. It is not, however a watertight distinction in the context of company strategy. By participating at the level of their jobs, or their department (or in between), employees will eventually come into contact with strategic issues. For this reason some participation at board level seems worthwhile, while recognising that the immediate returns may be limited for the reasons we have discussed⁵⁴¹.

Moreover, by participating at board level, in however a limited way, the Lifeworld of those outwith Management can be expected to change through either actively participating in strategic management, or (to a lesser degree) by being represented in strategic management. The issues, experiences, etc. of involvement of decision-making at this level can enter into the Lifeworld through the vehicle of experience⁵⁴².

Hence participation may not achieve its fullest potential, unless the intrinsic problems of the Lifeworld are addressed. Thus as Chell argues,

The first practical step individuals must take in such a learning process is to become more conscious of their own behaviour in order to be able to change it. The next step is to know what needs to be changed. (supra)

It is only when employees outwith Management become aware of the limitations placed on them by their own Lifeworlds, that they can even begin to move toward participating equally with Management in their organizations. We would argue, additionally, that the outcome of legislation to introduce industrial democracy from the level of the board down will be restricted by the limits imposed by the Lifeworld.

To take this analysis further would require the kind of development which Bowles refers to when he argues that a

new set of social values and beliefs are beginning to emerge which will precipitate new ways of understanding, experience and ways of relating. In other words, a new form of mythology might be forming which may potentially create new conditions of freedom of human thought and action. ⁵⁴³

While not having any evidence to the effect that, as Bowles claims, there are new sets of social values and beliefs emerging, which will allow us to understand, experience and relate in new way, it is clear from our data and our argument that such change will be necessary for industrial democracy to progress toward full equality ⁵⁴⁴. For instance it would be necessary for beliefs about the role of the Manager to change - both for Managers as well as for those outwith Management - to enable Managers and employees to relate to each other on a more equal basis than now - if indeed these roles still exist, and it has not proved necessary to develop altogether new roles even to the extent of having different names. A similar argument is made by Leymann ⁵⁴⁵, who argues that

democratic behaviour is a personality variable which correlates strongly with experiences of identity. A democratic work environment cannot be organized unless a personality shaping pedagogic situation is also built into the plans for democratization. (pg. 112)

In other words democratising a workplace is not merely a structural/procedural matter, but that the identities of the participants - in the sense of how they define themselves - must be taken into account ⁵⁴⁶. We have attempted to illustrate the obstacles which exist here from the perspective of the Lifeworlds which they occupy. ⁵⁴⁷

This is not to say that we cannot move in the direction of more democratic organizations without changes to the Lifeworld, but it would be our argument that only a certain amount of progress would be possible. This progress would appear to be maximized by addressing not only "strategic participation" (at board level), but also by developing "work level" participation. The problem with this is as Tannenbaum et al. (2) point out

If legislators in countries like Sweden intend to achieve such effects, they may have to consider laws that encourage direct (our "work level") as well as indirect participation (our strategic level), although the formulation of such laws may not be easy ⁵⁴⁸

Thus while it may be easy to develop laws requiring a certain level of participation at board level for employees (for instance as with the Bullock report, or Mitbestimmung)

a) the degree of benefit - for either side - to be had from this is, in our view, limited:

b) the degree of benefit to be had from participation at the individual employee's work level is much greater (though the legislative difficulties would be much greater) since at this level the individual employee would be able to

i) maintain a sense of competence, which would not be possible at the strategic level, since his Lifeworld has developed out of this.

ii) be able to develop a clearer sense of control, since the effects of his initiatives would be potentially much more apparent than at the strategic level.

Hence a way forward may be to encourage developments at both "work" and "strategic" levels, such that as we argued above their experiences at each level gradually grow together⁵⁴⁹. The danger in this is, as we have argued, that the Lifeworlds of employees outwith Management come to be colonized in the same way as those of Management. While on the one hand the needs of the System would indicate that this is functionally necessary, by considering Habermas's argument, we can see that this is not necessarily so.

In "Theory of Communicative Action" he argues⁵⁵⁰ that there is an exchange relation between the Private sphere ("the institutional orders of the Lifeworld") and Economic System ("Media-steered subsystems"). Through this exchange, in return for provision of Labour power we obtain an income. This income is in turn used to purchase goods and services, which creates demand for labour power, to produce more goods and services etc.

Hence we lead two existences - one as a producer, the other as consumer. The more the consumer dominates the more our role as producer is subject to system imperatives as consumers demand additional benefits (better products, lower prices, higher quality, etc.). Hence, as producers, the market demands that we must be more efficient. As the Lifeworld is colonized by the system, so the market develops an image of increasing independence - in other words that it is an irresistible force which we cannot resist but can only obey. However, if the Lifeworld is able to reassert itself, so that the intrusions of the System can be stripped out allowing a fully rational determination of will, then the exchange between consumer and producer emerges as negotiable and subject to our potential control rather than as one determined by the forces of a market outwith our control.

We would argue, therefore that avoiding the danger of absorption of employee representatives into Management requires on the one hand that they are able to participate in Management, yet at the same time avoiding the colonization of their Lifeworlds by system imperatives. Yet if we consider the data from our own chapter 5 (when we consider the possibilities of employees being represented at board level) one of the constraints which Staff and Hourly paid put on themselves before considering it possible to participate with management on an equal basis is that "they should understand how the company works" (see excerpt 5.33). In other words Staff and Hourly paid can only consider equality at board level once their Lifeworlds have, in effect, been colonized by the System. Yet only through a Lifeworld free of system imperatives can issues can be determined fully rationally (ie consistent with the Ideal Speech Thesis) and only in this way can we have fully democratic organizations ⁵⁵¹.

Gustavsen ⁵⁵² suggests a list of criteria, toward which we should be trying to reform work, in order that a dialogue develop which will reduce the degree of domination in work ⁵⁵³.

It is clear that such conditions were not present in our firm in respect of decision-making, which as we have shown was largely a management monopoly - hence there was perceived to be very limited dialogue for exchange of points and arguments, far less considering the extent of equality, or rules for a dialogue to take place. Moreover as we point out above there are very real and important obstacles in the Lifeworlds of our respondents which stand in the way of such a development.

Likewise the similarity between the above conditions and the Ideal Speech Thesis is obvious - but as Gustavsen suggests

they are rudimentary and fairly open.
It is, however, possible to apply these
in actual reform work. ⁵⁵⁴

The difficulty is that, as we have shown, there are obstacles in evolving toward the type of situation which would begin to satisfy such conditions. Most notably the structure of the Lifeworld of those within and outwith Management represents a formidable obstacle. It would, however, be our argument that only by moving in the direction of Gustavsen's conditions (and/or the Ideal Speech Thesis) will the Lifeworld be changed - but in making such changes we must always be conscious of the impediment which the Lifeworld represents⁵⁵⁵. Democracy at work - to the extent it is possible - will only be achieved through many small steps, rather than a single giant step⁵⁵⁶. In other words changes toward democracy - no matter how limited - by developing a greater sense of competence will modify the Lifeworld, making further change appear desirable for the participants - though the danger, we have considered above, to which this may lead is to greater colonization of the Lifeworld of those outwith Management.

CONCLUSION

What we propose to do is to draw two sets of conclusions - one set at the practical level, and then a second set of conclusions which draw together the theoretical implications of this work.

Practical level

What our model has shown is that

a) management power is a function of their formal hierarchical position. Thus to develop a system of participation, and a more democratic system of decision-making in industry, would require modification of this hierarchical position. But,

b) the management position in the hierarchy is, we have shown, subject to an (unconscious) agenda, since the management role is associated with an image of competence in decision-making. This image is real for

i) management, who consider themselves as professional decision-makers - and that those outwith management are not ("they are not employed to do this"). Management are, however, prepared - indeed see this as proper - to concede more influence to those outwith management.

ii) those outwith management, who perceive managers as possessing the skills required to take strategic decisions and (though to a lesser degree) "work related" decisions. Thus, while this group wish to exercise more influence - and more influence than Management would appear (on the basis of our evidence) prepared to concede - the final say would still rest with Management. Management - even on this basis would retain control ⁵⁵⁷. To move beyond this, to a higher degree of equality, would require that employees "know how the company runs" - in other words that their Lifeworlds be colonized by system imperatives.

The issues which, seem to us, to emerge from this are

1) not whether forms of participation, and more democratic decision-making should be introduced, because there was agreement over all in every group that these things should happen, but rather the degree and form of participation (what we have referred to as the "fine print" ⁵⁵⁸)

2) the difficulties which the Lifeworld creates since

a) its constraints - through the definition of the management role

i) prevent management yielding influence beyond a point where their "competence" is restricted.

ii) prevent those outwith management seeking influence beyond a certain point, since they cannot go beyond what they perceive as the limits of their technical competence. This would certainly stop some way short of equality ⁵⁵⁹.

b) the possibility of a more wide spread colonization of the Lifeworld by system imperatives. By creating more equality in decision making, by creating more access to decision-making for those outwith Management, all that happens is that their Lifeworlds too are colonized by system imperatives. Thus the freedom which is created by participation and industrial democracy may be a freedom to obey system imperatives, rather than to fully conscious and rational decisions about the future.

Thus, only by being aware of this unconscious agenda can we attempt to move toward equality. Doing so we requires the assessment of alternatives against the rules of the Ideal Speech Thesis - or the criteria suggested by Gustavsen ⁵⁶⁰.

The objective would be to create not only

1) a formal (or structural) equality in decision-making (equal representation at board level for instance), but also

2) that while there may continue to be a managerial role, the influence and decision-making powers of management would always be potentially subject to requiring justification - "control of the mandator position" ⁵⁶ .

In other words the creation of democracy requires not only changing structures but changing Lifeworlds, such that those outwith Management are capable of challenging Management, and require them to justify their decisions morally, rather than simply in technical-rational terms. This capability would require not only the possession of appropriate skills, but also the awareness necessary to make use of them. These developments can only be forthcoming through changes in the Lifeworld.

Theoretical level.

At this level we have shown the limitation of purely conscious theories of power. Their main weakness is to fail to take into account the power which emerges from the reality which is negotiated by the participants (the Lifeworld), and the manner in which the reality which is negotiated. The power which develops in this way is largely unconscious - to the extent there is awareness of it, it is regarded as normal, and in no sense power. This position creates two problems:

a) how do we identify such situations? The Ideal Speech Thesis provides us with criteria to distinguish social action where power is exercised. Power identified in this way can be conscious and/or unconscious. Taking the management:employee relationship as an example, certain elements involve elements of conscious power - the power to hire and fire, take strategic decisions, and so on - but also unconscious power (intertwined with conscious power and its exercise) - the perception of management as being the only group with the skills necessary to take decisions, the perception of management as being the only group for whom it is appropriate to take decisions.

b) what is the mechanism whereby unconscious power operates? Several mechanisms have been proposed for conscious power - control of resources, physical coercion, etc. - but how does unconscious power operate, even if we can show, using the above, that unconscious power has operated? The mechanism we have proposed is the Lifeworld. Through the basic categories of knowledge which

i) organize our routine knowledge in use and,

ii) indicate the interpretational relevances which are appropriate in particular situations.

To the extent that the Lifeworld mechanisms ascribe certain powers to particular roles, then the exercise of that power will appear to be "natural" and be taken for granted, and may not even be understood as an exercise of power.

It is through the Lifeworld that the individual acquiesces in the full system of power - conscious and unconscious. Habermas argues (after Freud) that the individual is self repressed - and we have argued in a sense that this is true. However, through consideration of Laingian psychoanalysis we can see that how the individual perceives himself and others is reaffirmed in interaction and thus strengthened, even when this interaction is distorted. Hence, while we can analytically talk of a number of Lifeworlds (Management, Staff, Hourly paid etc.) we can only fully comprehend them by reference to each other (eg the Hourly paid Lifeworld by reference to the Management Lifeworld.)

Thus only by grasping the implications of

a) the interdependence of Lifeworlds for each other, and

b) the implication of the Lifeworld for the exercise of power

can we begin to understand the underpinnings of hierarchy in business organizations, and the obstacles thus created for moving toward more democractic organizations.

MAINTENANCE OF HIERARCHY

Alasdair McCormack Galloway

Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. to
the Glasgow Business School, August 1990.

(c) Alasdair Galloway, 1990.

Volume Two

Volume Two Contents

Appendix One	Footnotes to Chapter 1	1 - 71
	Footnotes to Chapter 2	72 - 80
	Footnotes to Chapter 3	81 - 88
	Footnotes to Chapter 6	89 - 296
Appendix Two	Bibliography	297 - 316
Appendix Three	Further Perceptions of Communication	317 - 340
	Further Perceptions of Control and Decision-making	341 - 394
	Further Perceptions of Worker Directors	395 - 410
	Interview Excerpts	411 - 477

Chapter 1 Footnotes

¹ By hierarchy we have in mind the form of organizational structure referred to by Fayol as

the line of authority in an organization which runs in order of rank from top management to the lowest level of the enterprise. (H. Fayol "Industrial & General Administration". International Management Institute. Quoted in J. Stoner and E. Freeman "Management [4th Ed] Prentice Hall 1989.)

We have in mind, however, not simply the structural principles of hierarchy, but more importantly the associated rights and powers associated with each level in the hierarchy, such that "top management" have more power and authority than "the lowest level of the enterprise".

² This form of organization has been considered critically from a number of sources, many of which will be considered here. For instance the function of the Bullock Committee (Lord Bullock "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy" Cmnd. 6706, HMSO 1977) was to recommend a system of worker participation in company affairs. See too Bowen P. "Social Control in Industrial Organizations". RKP 1976; Burawoy M. "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979; Cressey P., Eldridge J. and McInnes J. "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985; Edwards R. "Contested Terrain" Basic Books 1979; Emery F. & Thorsrud E. "Form and Content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969; Gustavsen B. "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479; ILO "Workers Participation in Decisions within Undertakings". ILO 1981; Semler R. "Managing without Managers". Harvard Business Review September-October 1989; Storey J. "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980; Tannenbaum A. "Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974.

Our aim will be to establish how and why it is that a system of organization of technically unequal power is able to persist.

³ This point is made by Husserl

The paradoxical interrelationships of the "objectively true world" and the "life-world" make enigmatic the manner of being for both. (E. Husserl "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology". Northwestern University Press 1970, pg. 131)

⁴ It is defined by Schutz as

the total sphere of experiences of an individual which is circumscribed by the objects, persons and events encountered in the pursuit of pragmatic objectives of living. It is a world in which a person is "wide awake", and which asserts itself as the "paramount reality" of his life. (A. Schutz "Phenomenology and Social Relations. University of Chicago Press 1970, pg 320).

We shall elaborate on this later.

⁵ This model is used to guide our research, but will be adapted as necessary in the light of results. This will be reported on in Chapter 6.

⁶ In this discussion of Schutz's work, we shall frequently refer to Schutz in the text, even though in many cases the work we are drawing on will frequently be "Structures of the Life World", published after Schutz's death, and co-written with T. Luckmann.

Schutz A. "Phenomenology and Social Relations". University of Chicago Press 1970.

Schutz A. "Collected Papers. Vol. 1" Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Schutz A. "Collected Papers. Vol. 2." Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Schutz A. "The Phenomenology of the Social World". Heinemann 1972.

Schutz A. and Luckmann T. "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974.

⁷ Habermas J. "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970.

Habermas J. "Legitimation Crisis". Heinemann 1976.

Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (1)", Polity, 1984.

Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity 1986.

Habermas J. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power". In S. Lukes (ed.) "Power" Blackwell 1986.

McCarthy T. "Translators Introduction to J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1". Polity 1984.

McCarthy T. "A theory of Communicative Competence" Philosophy of Social Science 1973..

McCarthy T. "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" 3rd Edition, Polity 1984.

Pusey M. "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987.

Roderick R. "Habermas and Critical Theory" MacMillan 1986.

White J. K. "The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas". Cambridge Uni. Press 1988

⁸ Laing R. D. "The Divided Self". Tavistock Publications, 1960.

Laing R.D. "Self and Others". Pelican 1966.

Laing R.D. and Esterson A. "Sanity, Madness and the Family". Tavistock 1964.

Laing R.D., Phillipson H. and Lee A. R. "Interpersonal Perception" Tavistock Publications 1966.

Esterson A. "The Leaves of Spring" .Pelican 1972.

Edgar D. "My Hero, R. D. Laing". "Independent" Magazine 3/6/89, pg. 62.

Friedenburg E.Z. "Laing". Fontana 1973.

Howarth-Williams M. "R. D. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for Sociology." RKP 1977.

Sedgwick P. "Self, Symptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974.

⁹ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974.

¹⁰ See Habermas J. "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970.

McCarthy T. "A theory of Communicative Competence" Philosophy of Social Science 1973..

¹¹ Schutz regards knowledge as

1) shared by social actors and which they take for granted

2) b) acquired through our social experience, either at first hand, or acquired through other forms of learning (eg education, from parents etc.), and as such is developed over time as we acquire and/or modify the content knowledge.

3) organized into three categories

i) Basic or Fundamental elements or structures,

ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,

Iii) Specific Component contents.

but with category three being the only one we are routinely conscious of. The first is responsible for organizing our knowledge and our use of knowledge. Category two involves skills which we have used so often, and are so familiar with we may not even be aware of using them - they may be "obvious". This creates the possibility of the very organizing categories which we use, being a source of unconscious power, since it may create, for instance one-sided norms which cannot be redeemed in communicative action.

4) as using knowledge determined by a system of relevances and typicalities, which indicate to us what type of situation we are in and the relative importance of its elements

5) where the knowledge which we employ is substantially drawn from a social stock of knowledge, and our use of it is limited by "social givens".

6) This (and especially the former relationship) is particularly important in Laing's work, as we have seen. It too creates the possibility of power, since

1) the social givens may explicitly involve power (eg the power of a policeman)

2) the social givens may create unconscious power, since, for instance, they may limit the right of some to speak in discourse.

f) where the social stock of knowledge will not be evenly distributed - there will for instance be specialised knowledge, which is not open to those outwith the specialty in question. This too creates the possibility of unconscious power since it will be difficult for others to question specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only limited access. To the extent that these are accepted in an uncritical way (which they normally will be) they create the possibility of unconscious power. An example of a typicality would be "a manager", and to the extent it accords that type of person certain powers, these may simply blend into the social horizon and appear to disappear.

Likewise the subjective stock of knowledge of individuals will vary inter-personally, since being drawn from our biographies (which will vary), the subjective stocks will differ. Hence we will each bring to a social situation, stocks of knowledge which to some extent will be inter-personally different. This too creates the possibility of unconscious power since it will be difficult for others to question specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only limited access.

g) where the Lifeworld, in aggregate defines our social horizons.

¹² The stock of knowledge is

What a person knows in toto..As a whole this stock is incoherent, inconsistent and only partially clear. It serves its purposes adequately as long as its recipes yield satisfactory results in acting and its tenets satisfactory explanations. By contrast, philosophical and scientific knowledge serves purely intellectual interests, and is subject to controls, principles of coherence etc.(A. Schutz "On Phenomenology and Social Relations". University of Chicago Press 1970, pg 319.)

Schutz and Luckmann suggest

All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous experiences of it, our own or those handed down to us by parents or teachers; these experiences in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference. (A. Schutz "Collected Papers. Vol.1" Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pg. 7).

¹³ Morgan G. " Images of Organization " Sage 1986.

¹⁴ For instance when we consider Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis we shall see that when its conditions are not satisfied, this creates the possibility that agreements reached have been the result not of the force of the better argument and rationality, but of the use of power - either conscious or unconscious (eg one sided rules operating during the negotiation to the advantage of one side, but not perceived as power by the other, or perhaps by either side). Thus it may be that the Lifeworld is "held together" in a social sense through power, and in particular that the Lifeworld does create horizons for us, which we are unaware of, but which define out of consideration other forms of social arrangements which may be seen as non-viable. Furthermore Habermas would argue that the Lifeworld has been invaded by Social System imperatives which direct our behaviour according to money and power, rather than rationality and Communicative Action. So to the extent that hierarchy is associated with concepts like efficiency and profit, it will be in a Lifeworld sense, endorsed.

Hence given the very obviousness of the Lifeworld, we can begin to see its implications going beyond mere description. The fact that knowledge is treated as obvious means that it is much less likely to be subjected to scrutiny, or questioned. It just "is", and to this extent the implications it has for power may not be identified. Hence the category of "manager" is learned, for instance in many cases in our firm, from parents who also worked for the same firm (See Chapter 3).

¹⁵ See above .

¹⁶ For instance Management may be able to make an argument to justify a particular decision they have made (for instance why Hourly paid can only have a 5% pay rise when they wanted 10%, or why new machines are being introduced, or why 200 Hourly paid and Staff are being made redundant, and so on), but we would argue that we have to proceed onward to identify why Hourly-paid and Staff accept or reject the Management argument. We shall argue that there is an inherent bias to the former, and that even when the latter comes about (for instance over pay) the process whereby Management take this decision is not what is challenged, rather it is the outcome of the decision. There may be challenge to outcomes, but there is a bias restricting challenges to the process whereby these outcomes are produced.

¹⁷ Schutz A. "Phenomenology and Social Relations". University of Chicago Press 1970, pg. 86.

¹⁸ Hence Schutz's description of the Lifeworld as being composed by a process of "sedimentation".

¹⁹ This has obvious connections with Psychological theories of cognitive dissonance. See for instance L. A. Festinger "A theory of Cognitive Dissonance". Row Peterson 1957.

²⁰ For Schutz's definition see above

²¹ It is suggested by Schutz and Luckmann (page 5 of "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974.) that we take for granted:

- a) the existence of others,
- b) that the environment of others is the same as your own and has the same meaning for you both,
- c) that you can enter into interrelations and have reciprocal relationships with others,
- d) that you can be understood by others,
- e) that there is stratified social and cultural world historically pregiven as a frame of reference for us all,
- f) the situation you are in, therefore, is only to a small extent created by yourself.

²² R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory" Methuen 1979, pg. 134.

²³ The stock of knowledge is

What a person knows in toto..As a whole this stock is incoherent, inconsistent and only partially clear. It serves its purposes adequately as long as its recipes yield satisfactory results in acting and its tenets satisfactory explanations. By contrast, philosophical and scientific knowledge serves purely intellectual interests, and is subject to controls, principles of coherence etc.(A. Schutz "On Phenomenology and Social Relations". University of Chicago Press 1970, pg 319.)

Schutz and Luckmann suggest

All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous experiences of it, our own or those handed down to us by parents or teachers; these experiences in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference. (A. Schutz "Collected Papers. Vol.1" Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pg. 7).

²⁴ Schutz and Luckmann suggest

It is built on sedimentations of formerly actually present experiences that were bound to situations. Inversely every actually present experience is inserted into the flow of lived experience and into a biography according to the set of rules and relevance found in the stock of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pp. 99-100.)

²⁵ Schutz and Luckmann suggest

All of my experiences in the life-world are brought into relation to this schema, so that the objects and events in the life-world confront me from the outset in their typical character - in general as mountains and stones, trees and animals, more specifically as ridge and oaks, birds, fish and so on. Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 7.

²⁶ Rogers points out, for instance, that it is part of Goffman's argument that

Moreover the actor can be completely taken in by his own act, his motives operating "naturally" in the course of "being himself" or "being involved". (M. F. Rogers "Goffman on Power". The American Sociologist 1977, pp. 88-9).

²⁷ This point is also recognized by Giddens, who states that Schutz sees the

actor's stock of knowledge (as) taken for granted as adequate until further notice: it is a totality of self evidences changing from situation to situation, being set into relief at any given time by a background of indeterminacy. (A. Giddens. "New Rules of Sociological Method". Hutchinson 1976, pp. 29-30)

²⁸ Schutz and Luckmann suggest,

I simply take it for granted that other men also exist in this my world, and indeed not only in a bodily manner..but rather with a consciousness that is essentially the same as mine. Thus from the outset, my life-world is not my private world but rather is intersubjective; the fundamental structure of its reality is that it is shared by us. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 4)

Hence, taking school as an example, I assume and behave as if everyone knows that it is wrong to talk in class, and that we are agreed on this. Hence if others behave differently (eg talk in class) then it is not just that they have behaved differently from my expectation, but that they have furthermore broken a rule of my Lifeworld. Schutz and Luckmann suggest,

In the natural attitude, I only become aware of the deficient tone of my stock of knowledge if a novel experience does not fit into what has up until now been taken as the taken-for-granted valid reference schema. Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 8.

In these circumstances my Lifeworld would have been developed (or re-explicated, see Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pp 11 - 12.) - my stock of knowledge represents solutions to the problems I have faced up to now, so when I face a situation for which it is deficient I must re-assess it. Hence it is argued by Bernstein,

If we were to freeze an individual's stock of knowledge at any given time, we would discover how his set of typifications is organized by a System of relevances. And as his situation changes, this system of relevances also changes. (R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social & Political Theory" Methuen, 1976, pg.147).

When I face a novel problem my existing stock of knowledge may be helpful, but may not be able to solve the problem on its own - consequently the Lifeworld has to be developed, which may be done through a "motivated interpretational relevance". This concept is discussed below. Thus I may come to recognize that, in certain circumstances, talking in class conditionally may happen - for instance if the teacher encourages discussion (officially in terms of formal rules), or if the teacher is very boring (unofficially in terms of informal rules).

²⁹ As we shall see below, this means for Schutz that since our experiences are likely to differ inter-personally, so our Lifeworlds, as a summation of these different collections of experience, are likely to differ inter-personally.

³⁰ Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pp 6.

³¹ This first category is, in effect the foundation of our knowledge of the Lifeworld. Schutz argues that these fundamental structures

do not enter into the grip of consciousness in the natural attitude, as a core of experience. But they are a condition of every experience of the Lifeworld and enter into the horizon of experience. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 104.)

Thus these elements, are as their title suggests, our foundations for knowing about the Life-world - they determine how we organize and categorize our knowledge. Schutz states these

consist of knowledge concerning the limiting conditions of all such (specific) experiences, a knowledge that is more or less automatically given along with every experience....Knowledge about the limit of inner duration, about the historicity and finitude of the individual situation within world time, about the limits of corporeality and about the spatial, temporal and social structures of experience, is the substratum of the determination of every concrete situation. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 135.)

There is a double status for this basic knowledge in that

a) they are part of our stock of knowledge, but also

b) determine the knowledge we acquire it, and how we understand it. For instance in talking of the system of relevances, which is a component of the basis stock of knowledge, Schutz says,

someone can say of himself "I know that such things don't interest me" (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 183).

Thus, because the relevance system directs us away from "such things", we pay little attention to them. The relevance structures are, therefore self prophesying - they indicate to us what is interesting and what is not, so we are interested in what they indicate are interesting and away from other things which are not. This self-prophecy will be important later in our discussion of Schutz.. This type of knowledge will be relatively invariant over an entire society (though he does suggest they may differ for a sighted person compared to a blind person). This is the system of themes and typifications which we shall consider in detail below.

³² Routine or Habitual knowledge - the second category - deals with areas which may at one time have been problematic to us, but which we have now solved on a once and for all basis Schutz describes these as

activities that have to a great extent lost the character of acts. I would indeed have to learn them, but the continuing realizability of the goals and the exclusiveness of the "means" that can be used has so often been confirmed, the skills on which they touch are so self-evidently obvious, that they have one a high degree of trustworthiness (and subjective certainty). (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg.107.).

The examples given by Schutz relate to physical situations - for instance the habituality of our bodies is shown by the trauma of loss of limbs and the reassessment which has to be made of bodily image in this situation. (On this point, see Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 106.) In this discussion situations are considered which may be better known to a wider range of people - where we have a tooth extracted, and at first explore this "hole" almost obsessively with our tongue, but then gradually come to terms with it, so that the "hole" is just as habitual as the tooth which was once there. Likewise certain skills which we have learned - walking for instance - become skills which we simply take for granted. They become matters of habit, and thus habitual.

This habitual knowledge extends into areas of even higher skill than this. For instance there is a distinction drawn between

a) useful knowledge, which is knowledge used to solve what were once problems, but which have now been solved so definitively that they are no longer problematical. The examples given include - playing piano, riding, and frying eggs. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 107.)

b) knowledge of recipes, which is knowledge which is applied over a range of situations, but which is automated. The kind of examples given by Schutz are a hunter reading tracks; a mountain climber orienting himself to changes in the weather, or a translator automatically translating phrases (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 107.).

³³ See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 105. This category is the knowledge of which we are conscious and aware. It may be very obvious to say so, but this is what we know about the Social world and particular situations within it. This knowledge will be specific to particular situations (eg knowing how to behave in particular circumstances), and may even vary across a society (eg that different categories of person may employ different stocks of knowledge in particular situations - so you may eat peas with a fork, another person with a spoon or a knife).

³⁴ Clegg uses a similar analogy in "Power, Rule & Domination". Our use of it here is not mere coincidence. We would argue that his use of the analogy is restricted and that he failed to

a) consider fully the implication of holding certain views, or knowledge (eg if a Police officer can hold up the traffic, what else can he do?)

b) progress to consider the deeper levels of knowledge which are essential in Schutz's theory.

35 This categorisation, and in particular the basic and habitual categories are of very great importance to our argument. But there are other elements to Schutz's theory and we shall consider these first, before returning to these unconscious elements of the Stock of Knowledge.

36 Schutz argues

Only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience. The greater part is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers. I am taught not only to define the environment, but also how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the system of relevances accepted from the anonymous unified point of view of the in-group. This includes ways of life, methods of coming to terms with the environment, efficient recipes for the use of typical means for bringing about typical ends in typical situations. The typifying medium par excellence by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted is the vocabulary and syntax of everyday language. (A. Schutz Collected Papers, Vol 1. Pp. 13-14)

Our purpose in this, fairly lengthy, quote is to draw attention to two points,

1) confirmation of the importance of experience as the foundation of the Lifeworld, though this can be at 2nd (or more) hand, or even be vicarious.

2) the importance of language in Schutz, which as we shall see is shared with Habermas.

37 These are basic (fundamental) structures. The former determines the importance ascribed to the different aspects of a particular situation (for instance that if we meet a Police Officer his powers of arrest are more important than the fact that he is wearing a blue suit). Taken together his system of relevances will determine priorities for the individual - though these will not necessarily be stable over time. Certain elements of the system of relevance will be determined by the individual - volitional system of relevance, but other elements will be imposed on him by society - social system of relevance. (See A. Schutz "On Phenomenology & Social Relations". University of Chicago Press, pp.321-2, and Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 119.)

Typicality organizes our knowledge in categories - or types (hence typicality) - which we see as "the same". An example of typicality given by Schutz concerns dogs. Hence if we see an animal of a certain shape etc. we can categorise it as a dog. Moreover if we were employed as a postman we may categorise dogs as friendly, or as dangerous etc. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 142 - 146.)

38 Typification is described by Schutz as:

disregarding those individual features in the typified objects. facts or events which are irrelevant to the problem at hand. In a certain sense it could be said that all objects falling under the same type are equal or at least deemed equal. For instance we think of people as Frenchmen or Germans, or Catholics or Protestants, aliens or neighbours, Negroes or Orientals, men or women...Each of these terms designates a type. (A. Schutz "Collected Papers. Vol. 2." Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. pg 239.)

In this, we can see how the system of relevances will arrange the system of typifications, since the role of the former being to define the problem, will determine for the individual what the appropriate information/typifications he requires to use. If the system of relevances defines a problem as involving, for instance, sport then our typifications concerning nuclear physics are unlikely to be relevant.

What are typifications? As the above quote makes clear they are basically categories of information. Using typifications we can treat categories of individual in the same way - we "know" what to expect of Frenchmen - randy gits who smell of garlic - or of Germans - authoritarians who walk funny and have even funnier moustaches - etc. Our stock of knowledge is, therefore, organized around a set of types or categories. These may be of types of person, as in the above quote, or they may be categories of recipe or solution - in this type of situation you do "x", and if a type works, then it may be used again. The more a type is used the more it is likely to enter into habitual knowledge, and to be used automatically.

This makes the important point, which runs through Schutz's work, that we do not hold information for nothing, or for its own sake. The possession of knowledge in Schutz, is always problem-oriented. Just as the system of relevances is ultimately oriented toward solving problems, we use typifications likewise. Hence we may have categories of problem solving solutions (eg if the lights go out, check the meter), but even a category called "Frenchmen" is potentially problem solving since it contains our information on how to behave toward a Frenchman. Schutz argues

The meaning contexts of determinations is established through the predominant thematic and interpretive relevances in the situation of acquisition acting in unison with the motivational relevances. From this it follows there can be no types as such, rather only problem-oriented types. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 231.)

See also Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 232.

Types can, however, vary in their degree of certainty for the user. For instance we would be pretty certain of a category which we call "dog", but perhaps not so certain of a category we call "diamonds". Types will be more or less definitive, and the more definitive they are, the more confidence we will feel able to put on them. Others will be less definitive and used with less confidence (eg a hypothetical interpretational relevance). Moreover a type may lose definitiveness if it does not deliver the expected consequences. Types at this level are described by Schutz as provisional. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 232-3.)

An important example of a system of typifications, which Schutz puts forward, is language. He argues, that language is at the same time a set of typifications (in its grammar etc.) which we acquire mainly through childhood, and also the medium through which other typifications are transmitted. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 233.) It is, however, noted that typification is primary, since language presupposes typification (eg that a certain sequence of letters has a certain meaning), and that pre-linguistic children can employ typifications (eg if I cry, my mother will come to me). Indeed it is mainly through language that typifications are transmitted.

Language, in so far as it provides us with the skills to interpret and to behave within our surroundings, also confines us to that interpretation. The link between this and the Ideal Speech thesis we consider obvious. Language provides us with themes and types which endow management with much of their power. It is certainly true to say that this power is consciously experienced - our own results indicate this most clearly. It is however, routinely experienced as legitimate, because this is what the types etc. we have acquired indicate to us that this is how it should be perceived. The management role is defined as having certain rights and duties. Moreover the themes and types indicate to us that Management possess special skills, and entitle them to take decisions from which others may be excluded.

This point is reinforced in his consideration of atypicality. Atypicality is anything for which there is not already a type or category available. Thus the difficulty in challenging the already defined Management role, in a world constructed around hierarchy, is that it is likely that there is no comparable type available in our individual stocks of knowledge. Of course it may be objected that Schutz goes on to point out that atypicality can be suppressed - which we have to do, since many common situations contain atypical elements.

We would, however, contend that the type "manager", and the themes it calls forth, are so fundamental that it is difficult to treat seriously alternatives. In any case the existence of non-hierarchical organizations is well documented - it is possible for other forms to exist. Kibbutzim are but one example. On the other hand attempts to introduce workers control in countries like Yugoslavia indicate the difficulties of breaking the grip of hierarchy in our life-worlds.

For the avoidance of doubt, we are not suggesting that no alternative to hierarchy is possible. Indeed if anything we would argue to the contrary. What we are asserting is that the pre-existence of hierarchy and management roles biases our Lifeworld and understanding toward the maintenance of hierarchy. This is not merely because of the greater degree of conscious power which management have (eg to hire and fire), but because the understanding which our Lifeworld gives us of the situation, is such that we not only think it legitimate to allow them to do so - subject to limits imposed by unions and the legal system - but also that it would be unintelligible for it to be otherwise.

³⁹ The system of relevances, applied to a situation will indicate to us that one thing is more important than another. For instance in "Structures of the Lifeworld", Schutz discusses the problem faced by someone entering a darkened room, and seeing what appears to be a coiled rope in the corner, but may be a snake (See pp.197 -223). Using the system of relevances he is able to work out that it is a rope and not a snake, but Schutz asks, why is he interested in that particular object at all - why not some of the other objects which are there as well. We can say that they do not interest him - but as Schutz recognizes this is not enough. We have to understand why they do not interest him This will depend on the system of relevances. There are a number of different categories in the relevance structure. They include,

1) Thematic Relevance - situations are categorised as involving a particular theme

2) Interpretational Relevance - situations have to be interpreted to establish which thematic relevance is appropriate (or most appropriate) in the circumstances.

3) Motivational Relevance - that we face a problem of how to act in a situation, and thus are motivated to dealing with it.

It is clear from Schutz's discussion of the systems of Relevance that they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. If we use the snake/rope example which Schutz describes we can see this. Thus a man enters a darkened room, and sees an object which he is unsure of in the corner,

a) is motivated to accurately identify its true nature,

b) employs his interpretational relevances to do so (eg inanimate objects don't move on their own), and comes to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence he has available to him (eg what he can see, smell etc.) that it might be a coiled rope, or it might be a coiled snake.

c) using thematic relevances he knows that if it is a rope he is safe, but if it is a snake then he is in danger.

d) this may lead him to use further interpretational relevances (eg ropes don't make hissing noises)

e) using the stock of knowledge in the category "snake", he may make a hypothetical thematic relevance - for instance "if it is a snake I should not pick it up, but I could poke it with a (long) stick".

f) he is then motivated to act in this way.

Each category of the relevance system, therefore does not stand alone, but are used in association with each other.

⁴⁰ Schutz points out,

Experiences which are not presented as problems requiring explication introduce no new elements of knowledge into the stock of knowledge. Also they do not change the relevance structures or elements of knowledge. In any case they do not change the determinations of the elements of knowledge in question. In contrast they confirm the typical applicability these elements of knowledge and confirm the efficacy of the relevance structures. That means that the determination of the affected elements of knowledge become more familiar and more unquestionable. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 226)

⁴¹ Alternatively where the situation is novel and has not been experienced before there will be a problematic situation, where the individual will have to have the knowledge imposed (ie be told what to do), or explore and experiment with the situation. See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 125.

⁴² The successful use of a typification or a theme is therefore important in Schutz's theory. But like all our knowledge what is success - what we can reasonably expect in a situation - is something which we learn. It too will be part of our stock of knowledge. Thus what you can expect in the way of reward etc. by working in a particular capacity will be learned. We would not expect for instance, to run a Jaguar, and live in a mansion if we worked as a clerk or a machine operator. They may, however, be realistic expectations for a Director of a large company. Our findings in relation to Job Satisfaction are consistent with this argument, since not only were our respondents satisfied with their employment relative to their reference groups ("how satisfied are you with your wages relative to others you know?" for instance), but even when asked if particular elements of their jobs would have to be improved to make their job ideal, there was surprisingly little demand for change. Contrast this - and what the implications might be for Schutz's theory - if "success" was not pre-defined for us in this way. Then if our aspirations knew no bounds at all, the clerk may become dissatisfied if he does not have a Jaguar and a mansion, and critical of the system of distribution.

⁴³ See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 243.

⁴⁴ Schutz points out,

the sedimentation of experience are indirectly and also socially determinable since they are based on the socially conditioned, subjective relevance structures... (and) the specific elements of knowledge...are not for the most part acquired through processes of explication, but rather are derived socially. (A. Schutz and T. Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 243.)

⁴⁵ Schutz points out that

the meaning structures of the everyday life-world, of the world of nature as well as of society are indicated and expressed in language along with the line of demarcation between these two provinces which can be shifted from one relative-natural world view to another. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 248.)

⁴⁶ Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 257.

⁴⁷ Schutz argues as follows,

the biographically modelled interpretational and motivational relevances which both partners "bring into" the we-relation cannot be identical, although they are sufficiently congruent with regard to the similar socialization of the partners for the determination and management of the situation. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 254.)

This has echoes of the point we made above, on page 8 concerning the differences in behaviour only becoming critical when they actually contradict each other

⁴⁸ Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 255.

⁴⁹ This point is made by Schutz as follows

It (subjective relevance system) is indeed extensively "socialized" and shows extensive, typical similarities with the subjective relevance systems of fellow men and contemporaries....But since the subjective relevance systems are biographically modelled, they naturally cannot be identical. They are the unique possession of the individual, and whenever the individual turns to his own relevances they appear to him in this uniqueness. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 261.)

⁵⁰ This is defined by Schutz as having a

"social" prehistory which contains "independent", as well as "empathic" and "socialized" interpretational and motivational relevances. The latter are derivations of the relevance structures predominant in the relative natural world view, structures which are filtered through a specific historical social structure. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 260.)

⁵¹ Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 260. This aspect of Schutz's theory may explain the difficulty encountered by Clegg (referred to on page 64), where he encounters "bed-rock" - see Clegg, "Power, Rule and Domination", pg. 84. The difficulty for Clegg, in Schutz's terminology, is that he has reached a "routine for mastering life" (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 260.) which the subject regards as obvious, and one which any educated adult will know about. This is certainly a problem, but as we have argued it really is only where the challenge begins. What we have got to go on to consider, is what this uncritical acceptance means. Having identified that it is as basic as this, and accepted uncritically does not solve the problem - it merely restates it in a more accessible form.

⁵² Schutz argues

the typical solutions to problems and the typical conditions under which a problem can be regarded as solved are socially derived, along with the typical determination of that which is problematic. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 261).

⁵³ This relationship is defined by Schutz as

face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other's lives for a short time. (A. Schutz, "The Phenomenology of the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 164)

We have considered this first, since it is the closest form of relationship which Schutz considers, but it is related to the "thou" relationship, since the "we" will emerge from the "thou", by the two parties being aware of the existence of each other. Thus if the observation is one-sided we would describe it as a "thou relation", but where the two parties are reciprocally aware of each other there is a "face to face" relationship, or a "we relationship". (A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World". Heinemann, 1972, pg. 168). This "we relationship" can again be differentiated into its own degrees of intimacy. For instance, even though we are aware of each other, we may

a) only look at each other, or

b) we may try to interpret each other's thoughts (eg by interpretation of facial expressions and other physical clues), or

c) we may tell each other our thoughts and consider them.

These demand interpretation of us, and as such would depend on our own subjective stock of knowledge.

⁵⁴ This orientation is described by Schutz as

the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence of the other person in the mode of the original self. (A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 164)

Thus, in this orientation we experience those others with whom we interact as "something in the world like me" Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 62. On the other hand, Schutz goes on to argue, we do not understand this other only as another man - but as a particular type of other man (eg a policeman, or postman, or student, or tax inspector, or manager, etc.). This therefore, like the "we" relation demands interpretation of us, and as such is drawn from the subjective stock of knowledge.

⁵⁵ This is described as where

I am not aware of the ongoing flow of the Other's consciousness. My orientation is not toward the existence (dasein) of a concrete individual Thou. It is not toward any subjective experiences now being constituted in all their uniqueness in another's mind nor toward the subjective configuration of meaning in which they are taking place. Rather the object of my They-orientation is my own experience of social reality in general, of human beings and their conscious processes as such (A. Schutz - "The Phenomenology of the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pp. 183-4).

Thus we are no longer involved in a situation where we are necessarily as one with the individual in terms of space or time. For a "they" relation the other individual does not even have to be present. To use Schutz's terminology, they may be "out of reach". Thus the "they" orientation is based on our objective social stock of knowledge (ie everyone knows that this category of person is like this).

⁵⁶ These should not be considered as discrete entities, but rather as major points on a continuum, with one shading into another. ("they (we and they orientations) may even be spoken of as two poles between which stretches a continuous series of experiences". A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 177 .) Thus, if we put this continuum into our own research site, and referring to the diagram showing its layout in Chapter 3, we would expect that the closest relationships to be within groups - in other words that "we relations" would be most intimate within particular groups. Less intimate we relations may extend across groups both horizontally and vertically. Thus there may be a "we relation" between a supervisor and some of the Hourly paid employees who work for him. On the other hand, given the physical distance between financial staff (who worked in the offices), and shop-floor employees, we might expect their relationship to be closer to the "they" end of the continuum. Other Staff - Production Control for instance - who are located on the shop-floor and whose work frequently took them out onto the shop-floor, would be more likely to have a "thou relation" with hourly-paid employees. Correspondingly managers whose work kept them away from the shop-floor (eg the Finance Director) be likely to have a "they relation" with hourly paid staff (indeed with production personnel in toto), whereas managers whose work was directly involved with production would be likely to have a closer relationship with shop floor employees, more like a thou-relation. Only those with thou relations can transform into a "we relation".

This has implications for Habermas's theory of communication, since it is only when there are conditions which satisfy the Ideal Speech Thesis that there can be a rational consensus. Thus in a "they" relation, there can be no rational consensus by definition, since there is no dialogue between the parties to such a relation.

⁵⁷ It is argued by Schutz that

to this encounter (with the other in the "we relation") I bring a whole stock of previously constituted knowledge. This includes both general knowledge of what another person is as such, and any specific knowledge that I may have of that person in question. It includes knowledge of people's interpretive schemes, their habits and their language. It includes knowledge of the taken-for-granted in-order-to and because-motives of others as such and of this person in particular. And when I am face to face with someone my knowledge of him is increasing from moment to moment. (A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 169).

Thus while there may be other modes of learning - at second or third hand for instance - the we relationship is an important source of extending our social knowledge - and of practicing its use.

⁵⁸ This of course begs a whole range of questions, which Schutz simply does not take on board. Basically our concern amounts to this. As we will argue, as with many theories of power - for instance of Gamson and Gaventa - Schutz does not consider the possibility that this is anything other than a "fair game" - or at least that everything is "up front". In other words, Schutz does not consider the possibility that Ego and Other are anything other than equals. Indeed it is a matter to which reference is made but is then passed over:

To what extent personal structure is influenced by long-term sociohistorical changes in the predominance of one or another type of social relations, or by the regular repetition of living we-relations in contrast to other sequences of social relations, is a question that must be left open at this point. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 72-3.)

The power of the participants is not, therefore, a matter of import to Schutz - his concern is with the acquisition of knowledge by the individual. To remedy this we shall, subsequent turn to Habermas, and in particular his use of communicative action, and the ideal speech thesis.

⁵⁹ See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 254.

⁶⁰ It is argued by Schutz that

one can seek the origin of the social stock of knowledge, more exactly, of the elements that form it, only in subjective experiences and explications. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 263.)

⁶¹ It is pointed out by Schutz,

Once we have established the fundamental priority of the subjective stock of knowledge, in contrast to the social stock of knowledge, we must stress that in its actual development things are otherwise. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 263.)

⁶² Schutz argues,

The social stock of knowledge contains not only "more" than the subjective, but also "more" than the "sum" of them. Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 264.

This point is developed later in our discussion of Schutz.

⁶³ By this Schutz means

the embodiment of subjective processes in the objects and events of the everyday Lifeworld. Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 264.

This takes a number of forms in Schutz's theory:

a) at the simplest level objectivation takes place by mere observation - by one person watching and learning from the behaviour of another. The example Schutz gives of this is where A is unsure whether water in a pot is hot or cold. He could make experiments to find out for himself, but by watching B put his hand in the water and then remove it quickly, having an expression of pain on his face transfers this knowledge from A to B. Of course this allows for the possibility, which Schutz recognizes that B could fool A - for instance knowing that A is watching he may only pretend that the water is hot, so the look of pain etc. are deceptive. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 264-267).

b) at a more complex level objectivation can be in the form of one party indicating to another that they possess information. An example which Schutz gives of this, is that A has not actually seen B putting his finger in the water, but he does see B blowing on, or rubbing his finger as if in pain. This would indicate to A that the water is hot. What matters now is not when B acquired this knowledge - it may have been some time ago. What is important for this objectivation is how the indications of knowledge are interpreted by the other. This too allows B to be deceptive - for instance to indicate special knowledge falsely (ie when he does not in fact possess it), or to exaggerate it, or to conceal it. Thus through interpreting B's signs, A is able to take over B's knowledge. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 267-271)

c) in this case objectivation is in the form of objects, rather than behaviour. An example of this, given by Schutz, is where A has got lost in the woods. He comes across footprints made by B, and by following them is able to find his way out. Hence by interpreting the results of B's behaviour, rather than the behaviour itself, and without even seeing B (or even knowing that it is B's footprints) A is able to achieve his purpose and find his way out. It is not, however, any object which falls within this category. It is required that they should

objectivate subjective knowledge and
convey it to others (Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pp. 267-271)

The three categories of objects are

1) marks (see Collected Papers Vol. 1, pp.308-310) - these can be interpreted for the message they give, and thus are similar to the next main category (d)

2) tools - for instance an archaeologist will interpret the use made of primitive tools

3) works of art - will be interpreted for the meaning they are supposed to convey to us.

Thus we can once again see the significance of the systems of relevance and typification, since if we take as an example a large office, with an expensive carpet etc., this does not speak for itself. Rather it must be interpreted through our typifications - for instance the relevance system "important man" may carry such connotations. This indicates that such objectivation allows for the possibility of deception - for instance that a relatively minor official puts into his office such signs to exaggerate his own importance.

d) social signs can be considered as objectivations of subjective knowledge. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 277 - 286). Important here is the possession of a common system of interpretation (eg language), since by using this, we can inform the other not only of problems but also of solutions - "you will come across a river which you can cross at this point" is the example given by Schutz (pg 280 "Structures of the Life World").

Once there is a common system of signs (like a language) then subjective knowledge can be translated into this system, and then re-translated into subjective knowledge. Translation in turn raises the issue of distance, since social signs may be created and interpreted by people who are very close, with A knowing how B is likely to interpret a sign, while B knows how A communicates, and (for instance) his objective in doing so. But A and B may be at great social distance, and may never meet - indeed they may not even be alive at the same time. The more true this is, the more the information transmitted by social signs can evade practical review by the recipient - who will not know what the sender is like, what his objectives are etc. Thus,

a) where information does not use social signs, it can be categorised readily (leaving deception to one side) as true or false.

b) information which uses social signs cannot be so readily assessed, because of the distance involved. It therefore becomes not only idealized, through being objectivated into the social stock of knowledge becoming a component of the relevance structure, and being true as such, but also anonymous.

Such knowledge will therefore, not easily be criticised, and because of its self-evident truth, we may not even wish to consider criticising it. This objectivation again opens up the possibility of deception, since as we have said, the informant will be anonymous, and the information idealized and as such taken for granted.

⁶⁴ This point is also considered in Berger and Luckmann "The Social Construction of Reality", Penguin 1967. They argue

The institutional world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single human institution. In other words despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it. (pg. 78)

⁶⁵ An example of a model of behaviour to be followed might be the model of behaviour of "a manager", who take decisions etc. See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg 286.

⁶⁶ An example given by Schutz is where B having solved a problem - where to cross a river - assumes that A has the same problem, and tells him of his solution. See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg 288.

⁶⁷ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg 290.

⁶⁸ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg 292.

⁶⁹ Schutz points out that

the earliest we-relations are typically determined by the structure of the kinship system. For the child the family is the first immediately experienced social reality. (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp 293-4.)

⁷⁰ It is suggested by Schutz

where solutions to socially relevant problems are precipitated as routine forms of acts, which in turn are bound to an institutionalized structure of roles, the transference of knowledge is then also typically institutionalized and routinely taken over by certain role-bearers. Thus there are teachers and masters, non-commissioned officers of development and officers in the province of religious, commercial and political institutions. (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp 294-5.)

Thus the transfer of knowledge has reached such a pitch of sophistication, and functional importance, that it cannot be left to chance. Not only is the process itself institutionalized but also there are specialized roles for the transference to be accomplished efficiently.

⁷¹ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 296.

⁷² Thus the need to confirm the rationality of a solution to a problem is ignored, so potentially better solutions are ignored by definition. The solution or arrangement in use is thus accepted uncritically. This may give us a possible reason for the acceptance of hierarchy - it works why change it? Management wisdom explicitly endorses this

if it ain't broke, don't fix it!

This may appear to be the answer to our question - why does hierarchy persist? The answer could be taken to be "well it works". That, however, as we shall show in our discussion of Habermas, is an inadequate answer since it fails to direct our attention to the conditions for hierarchy to be perceived to work.

⁷³ On the other hand, the possibility of the stock of knowledge being a form of social control is perhaps no less important than an inter-generational division of labour.

⁷⁴ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 301. The difficulty with Schutz's view is that it is purely descriptive, failing to allow for the possibility that the specialist will take advantage of his monopoly possession of specialist knowledge. See above, 109.

⁷⁵ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 305.

⁷⁶ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 306- 308. Schutz points out that

a) if everyone were to know the same then we would all have to face the same range of problems, since we acquire knowledge which is socially relevant to us.

b) the processes of objectivation and interpretation would have to be parallel for us all, otherwise, even to a small degree, we would acquire "different" knowledge.

c) our biographies would have to be excluded - or ignored - since they

i) will be different

ii) will thus induce us to interpret even the same information in different ways.

d) the possibility of accumulating further knowledge would have to be ruled out once we have acquired the "universal" social stock, since we can only retain so much knowledge and to acquire more would necessitate getting rid of some.

⁷⁷ A. Esterson "The Leaves of Spring". Pelican 1972

⁷⁸ See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 308-316. We have mainly concentrated on the second of the two sections - the complex distribution - since it appears to be more relevant.

⁷⁹ It is, however, made clear that it is possible for this general knowledge to become differentiated between different groups who share a common biography - an example given by Schutz is the Catholicism of rural populations, in contrast to the Catholicism of intellectuals. See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 314.

⁸⁰ In contrast to general knowledge, even of a differentiated form, this requires even further partitioning, so that specialized knowledge is not part of the social stock of knowledge which is available to the non-professional. This can be accomplished, Schutz points out, by requiring long learning processes, and through the imposition of role specific requirements of various kinds. There is therefore specialization in two senses:

a) the meaning structure of the specialty is specialized and restricted

b) the transmission of its knowledge becomes institutionalized, and specialized.

Schutz concludes (pg 314) that the specialty takes on the appearance of a career.

⁸¹ Schutz's observation has much in common with Habermas's concept of "fragmented consciousness", which we shall consider toward the end of this section.

⁸² That no person can take an overview of society as a whole, is similar to one of Habermas's concepts - the consequence of the development of Social System steering media to such a level of complexity that no person can have an overview. We deal with this in much more detail in our consideration of Habermas.

⁸³ The fact that differences in access to the social stock can be relevant for understanding the structure and operation of power is not a matter which is lost on Schutz

What repercussions this has for the social structures is a question of the greatest interest for the empirical sociology of knowledge. Here it can only be pointed out that knowledge can become more and more of a power factor in complex social distributions of knowledge. Groups of experts form one of the institutional catalysts of power concentration...A further epistemo-sociologically relevant possibility associated with the highly complex social distributions of knowledge is that some experts become socially, nearly completely invisible. (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 315.)

Hence it should not be argued that Schutz was unaware of the problem of power - but it is not developed further in his work.

⁸⁴ These are described by Schutz as "provinces" - see Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 315.

⁸⁵ Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 319.

⁸⁶ It is argued

the essential elements of the former (social stock) do not appear as such in the latter (the subjective). That is they do not appear at all as Objective social data, as aspects of the factual social structure, as "conventions", etc. Rather they are for the individual a taken-for-granted possession, a component of his subjectivity. The habits derived from the social stock of knowledge are his habits, the explicit elements of knowledge taken over from it are his knowledge, the relevance structures originating from it function as his motives and categories of explanation. (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 319, my emphases).

In this it becomes quite apparent how power can operate unconsciously - we absorb "habits, knowledge and relevance structures" without awareness of doing so. It is clear that the implications of so doing have to be analysed out.

⁸⁷ Schutz gives as an example of this the problems which a one-armed man is likely to have becoming a black-smith (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 322).

⁸⁸ Schutz gives as an example of this the existence of secret knowledge (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 322). This in certain respects is alluded to in our own findings, since to some extent the power of management, we have suggested, depends on their subordinates not really understanding it. For instance we have already discussed two views which can be taken of Management. One is the well ordered and rational view, of for instance Roland Christensen, John Argenti or Igor Ansoff. The other is the "emergent", ex-post, incremental (and generally messier all-round) approach of for instance Henry Mintzberg and James Quinn. If Management was understood as the latter rather than the former then the legitimacy of Management may be problematic. The fact is, however, that the kind of picture of Management, especially by those on the Shop-floor who are at the greatest distance, is one of not understanding it very much at all. We are almost reminded of religious rites, where the priest carries out religious acts which the lay people do not understand.

⁸⁹ This is certainly a feature of Management to the extent that not only is Management impenetrable to those outwith it, but also increasing functional specialisation means that different specialties of Management are increasingly impenetrable to Managers from other specialties. Power may be exercised as a result. For instance in a Company dominated, say, by accountants, one would require to have access to their specialty and its meaning structures etc. For those outwith Management altogether the problem is writ even larger. This is a phenomenon remarked on by Habermas also. See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2" Polity 1988, Chapter VIII part 2.

⁹⁰ If we accept Schutz's contentions that

i) we can only retain a certain volume of knowledge, and beyond that we throw off other less relevant/older elements,

ii) the knowledge we possess is driven by the problems we face,

then to the extent that our major problems are within our specialty (eg our job) we may begin to make space for the additional specialist knowledge we require by jettisoning portions of general knowledge, cutting back again on our ability to take a comprehensive social view.

⁹¹ We have made a similar point above, concerning Management, in that the different specialties of Management are increasingly separated (eg Personnel specialists and Management Scientists).

⁹² The system of classification goes further then merely whether someone is a good Manager, or a bad Fitter etc. The classification, Schutz points out is not related to the individual, but rather is related to the area of expertise itself - in other words that there is a rank order of different types of expertise, such that even a bad manager has more prestige than a good fitter.

⁹³ Likewise we can determine our own place in this system of classification/typification, and this will be an important influence on our own subjective self-image (eg street sweeper or brain surgeon).

⁹⁴ Much of Garfinkel's work is typical of this.

⁹⁵ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974.

⁹⁶ M. Crenson "The Un-politics of Air Pollution" John Hopkins Press 1971.

⁹⁷ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pp. 11-12. R. A. Dahl "The Concept of Power". Behavioural Science 1957.

⁹⁸ For instance where Management are unwilling to discuss an issue on the grounds that it is a "management prerogative".

⁹⁹ Bachrach P. & Baratz M. "Two Faces of Power". American Political Science Review 1962, pp. 947-952.

¹⁰⁰ For instance an attempt to do this in an industrial context, took place in 1977 after the publication of the Bullock report, when the EEF announced that it would oppose the bringing forward of a Bill to enact the proposals in the report, or anything similar.

¹⁰¹ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pg. 42.

¹⁰² Indeed as Cooper points out in "Death of the Family", we are from the very outset socialised into acceptance of its organizational structure, the parents being autocratic heads (D. Cooper "Death of the Family". Penguin 1972.). This happens without us ever realising that the interests of the family may diverge from our own - occasionally with tragic results, as Laing's work has revealed (On this see below, 25.).

¹⁰³ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pg. 24.

¹⁰⁴ It does have to be said, however, that Lukes does recognise this:

Crenson's analysis lies on the borderline of the two-dimensional and three-dimensional views of power. It is on the face of it a two-dimensional study of non-decision-making a la Bachrach and Baratz. On the other hand it begins to advance beyond their position (pg. 44)

Nonetheless it does not become clear in what respects Crenson's work is two-dimensional and in what respects three-dimensional.

¹⁰⁵ A similar situation could be said to exist with the Clyde Naval Submarine base at Faslane and Coulport. On the one hand there is the danger of nuclear accident and/or pollution, but on the other hand the bases are important sources of employment which may not be replaced in the event of the base closing.

¹⁰⁶ Bradshaw S. "A Critique of Steven Lukes "Power a Radical View". Sociology 1976, pp. 121-127.

¹⁰⁷ Lukes S. "A reply to Bradshaw". Sociology 1976, pp. 129-132.

¹⁰⁸ In this, as McCarthy points out

truth claims can ultimately be decided only through critical discussion and not through appeal to sense certainty: "truth belongs to the world of thoughts (Gedanken in Frege's sense) and not to that of perception.

T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" pg 307. In other words truth will be what we can agree it to be. Or as Habermas puts it

Facts are what statements (when true) state. They are not constituted since they are not entities in the world but correlates of propositions on the level of argumentative reasoning.

Quoted in D. Held "Introduction to Critical Theory" Hutchinson 1980, pg 341. However, as Habermas points out

Truth is not the fact that consensus is realized, but rather that at all times and in any place, if we enter into a discourse a consensus can be realized under conditions which identify this as a warranted consensus

Quoted in R. Roderick "Habermas and Critical Theory" MacMillan 1986 pg 85. Thus it is not the mere fact of consensus that we have to be aware of, but also the conditions under which that consensus was arrived at.

¹⁰⁹ This is substantially drawn from the discussion in McCarthy supra pp 306-307.

¹¹⁰ Hunter would have sympathy with the communication element of Habermas's work:

There appears to be a tenuous line of communication between the governors and the governed. (F. Hunter "Community Power Structure". University of Carolina Press 1953, pg 1.)

¹¹¹ The claims are:

a) that the statement is comprehensible in order that speaker and hearer can understand each other,

b) that the statement is true in order that the hearer is able to share the knowledge of the speaker,

c) that the speaker has expressed his intentions truthfully so that the hearer can trust him,

d) that the speaker's statement(s) are right in the light of existing norms and values

This can be found in J. Habermas "Communication and the Evolution of Society" Heinemann 1979, pp. 2-3.

¹¹² McCarthy supra pg 307.

¹¹³ Habermas argues

although it (the mediatization of the Lifeworld) comes about counterintuitively and cannot be easily perceived from the internal perspective of the Lifeworld, there are indications of it in the formal conditions of communicative action. (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.2". Polity 1987, pg 186. My emphasis)

It is therefore through the application of an external standard - like the Ideal Speech Thesis - that we can identify this exercise of power, and the possibility that "things could be different". In a similar sense, Hickson et al. observe of Tannenbaum's Control Graph technique

In theory, therefore, the distribution of power is open to deliberate variation. It could be more hierarchical or less so. (D. Hickson, W. Astley, R. Butler and D. Wilson "Organization as Power". In L. Cummings and B. Staw "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pg. 163)

¹¹⁴ Quoted in T. McCarthy "A theory of Communicative Competence" Philosophy of Social Science 1973. pg.140.

¹¹⁵ Habermas distinguishes between Communicative Action:

those forms of social interaction in which individuals tacitly and uncritically accept the norms, social practices and belief systems of everyday life

and Discourse:

thematizes and criticises the background consensus concerning belief systems, norms, values and ideologies taken for granted in every day life.

R. Roderick "Habermas and Critical Theory" MacMillan 1986, pg.82.

¹¹⁶ See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1" Polity Press, 1984, pg 333.

¹¹⁷ See footnote 259.

¹¹⁸ Gaventa's findings are good examples of these forms of, what Lukes calls, first (a i) and second (a ii) dimension, power.

¹¹⁹ This type of behaviour (lying, deceiving, manipulating etc.) is described by Habermas as follows,

Such communication pathologies can be conceived of as the result of a confusion between action oriented to reaching understanding and actions oriented to success. In situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied. This is the case of manipulation which we mentioned in connection with perlocutionary acts.

J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol.1 supra pg 332.

¹²⁰ This type of behaviour is described by Habermas as,

the kind of unconscious repression of conflicts that the psychoanalyst explains in terms of defense mechanisms leads to disturbances of communication on both the intrapsychic and interpersonal levels. In such cases at least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he is acting with an action oriented to success and is only keeping up the appearance of communicative action.

J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol.1 supra pg 332.

¹²¹ See pp. 333 fig. 18 "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.1".

¹²² T. McCarthy supra pg.306.

¹²³ As Held points out,

when it (the ideal speech situation) is clearly violated doubt can be cast on the genuineness of the consensus and the legitimacy derived from it.

Held, supra pg. 344.

¹²⁴ See above 19.

¹²⁵ See above, footnote 116 .

¹²⁶ J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg 126.

¹²⁷ Situation is defined as "a segment of the Lifeworld delimited in relation to a theme" J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg 127.

¹²⁸ J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg 126.

¹²⁹ It is pointed out

participants pursue their plans cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation. If a shared definition of the situation has first to be negotiated, or if efforts to come to some agreement within the framework of shared definitions fail, the attainment of consensus, which is normally a condition for pursuing goals, can in itself become an end. In any case, the success achieved by teleological action and the consensus brought about by acts of reaching understanding are the criteria for whether a situation has been dealt with successfully or not. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pp 126-7.)

¹³⁰ For Habermas the Schutzian Lifeworld too closely ties in with consciousness at the level of the individual, so in "Theory of Communicative Action", he develops further dimensions of the Lifeworld which go beyond the consciousness of the individual, to emphasise social integration and the culture of society and consider mechanisms for their maintenance. Thus in the Habermasian Lifeworld there are three dimensions, each with an associated maintenance process:

a) PERSONALITY which is defined as "the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity". (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 138). This emphasises interpretations and motivations of the individual and is maintained by processes of socialization

b) SOCIETY, which is defined as "the legitimate orders through which the participants regulate their memberships in social groups and thereby secure solidarity". (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 138). This emphasises the need for legitimacy, reciprocity etc. which is maintained by social integration.

c) CULTURE, which is defined as "the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world" (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 138). This emphasises the transmission of social knowledge, legitimations etc. (See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2" Polity 1987, pp. 140-142.), and is maintained by cultural reproduction.

Much of this is dealt with by Schutz- in the subjective and social stock of knowledge, but as Habermas goes on to make clear, the Schutzian analysis is one-sided, since

communicative action is not only a process of reaching understanding; in coming to that understanding about something in the world, actors are at the same time taking part in interactions through which they develop, conform and renew their memberships in social groups and their own identities. Communicative actions are not only processes of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is tested against the world; they are at the same time processes of social integration and socialization. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2" Polity 1987, pg. 139.)

This summarises many of the points we have made about Schutz's theory previously, but in particular that

a) the Lifeworld has to be understood not only at the level of the individual, but at a social level

b) the Lifeworld is not only about interpretation, but about socialization and integration - and thus potentially about control. Hence, if one or more of the maintenance processes breaks down, social control would be under threat (See J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 143, fig 22). For instance if

i) cultural reproduction was to break down, then there would not be production of the required meanings for the Social System to persist,

ii) if social integration was to break down we would expect the development of anomie,

Iii) if socialization broke down then in Habermas's scheme we would expect the development of individual psychopathologies.

The Schutzian analysis therefore takes the Lifeworld "as read", and this leads to its failure to take its analysis further. Hence it does not go on to consider what consequences follow from the content and structure of a particular type of Lifeworld, and why a Lifeworld should have the structure it does. This restrains Schutz's analysis from proceeding into the areas explored by Habermas (eg Ideal Speech, impact of the Social System etc.) and thus to the inadequacies indicated.

On the other hand Schutz's analysis of the Lifeworld, within these constraints, does provide a more detailed (a finer-grained) analysis of the elements of the Lifeworld, giving more detail than Habermas - who takes much of the detail as read anyway. (See J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, Chapter 6)

¹³¹ Schutz's theory, as we have seen, is expressed in terms of the "Lifeworld". The transition into Habermas, however, poses no difficulties since as Habermas points out,

basic features of the constituted lifeworld can be easily explained if we treat "lifeworld" as a complementary concept to "communicative action". (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg. 130)

For Habermas there are three important elements of Schutz's theory:

1) that social actors treat the lifeworld as unproblematic - that it is something which is just there, as something which we take for granted - "everyday communicative practice is not compatible with the hypothesis that everything could be different" (supra pg. 132).

2) that it is intersubjectively shared through the medium of language - "that the members of the lifeworld count themselves as belonging to the lifeworld in the first person plural" (supra pg. 131)

3) that the lifeworld is something which the social actor cannot get beyond - "we cannot grasp the limitations of a lifeworld that is dependent upon, and changes along with a cultural stock of knowledge that can be expanded at any time. For members the lifeworld is a context that cannot be gotten behind and cannot in principle be exhausted (supra pg 133).

¹³² Habermas argues that:

If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the social coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communications - and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement - then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of rationality inherent in communicative action(J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (1)", Polity, 1986. pg. 397)

This points to a fundamental distinction between the phenomenology of Schutz and Habermas's theory. In Schutz the emphasis is on the individual and his cognitive content. In Habermas, however, we have to get beyond consciousness to its use in the social world, which is articulated in speech. Thus the conditions - the structure - under which speech take place become critical.

¹³³ Indeed Habermas's own view of the Lifeworld refers to

collectively shared background convictions to the diffuse unproblematic horizon within which actors communicate with one another and seek to reach an understanding. The Lifeworld of a society or social group preserves and transmits the interpretive work of preceding generations (J. B. Thompson "Rationality and Social Rationalization: An Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action". Sociology 1984, pg 285.)

Thus, it can be seen clearly that Habermas's view of the Lifeworld is consistent with that developed by Schutz, as we have argued above. The distinction is that Habermas explores the implications of the Lifeworld for social action, in a way that Schutz fails to do.

134 Habermas defines this as

the ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding to embed a well formed sentence in relations to reality, that is,

1. to chose the propositional sentence in such a way that either the truth conditions of the proposition stated or the existential presuppositions of the propositional content mentioned are supposedly fulfilled (so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker)

2. to express intentions in such a way that the linguistic expression represents what is intended (so that the hearer can trust the speaker)

3. to perform the speech act in such a way that it conforms to recognized norms or to accepted self-images (so that the hearer can be in accord with the speaker in shared value orientations) (J. Habermas "Communication and the Evolution of Society", Heinemann 1979, pg 29.).

Thus what Habermas is asserting here is that Communicative Competence is required for the individual, not only to talk, but also to make connections with the external world which those with whom he interacts will be able to accept.

135 This is described by Pusey as

the medium through which speaking and acting subjects interlace their speech action. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987, pg. 79)

In other words communicative interaction is where social actors talk to each other, and specifically seek to reach consensus.

136 He points out

Consensus does not come about when, for example, accepts the truth of an assertion but doubts the sincerity of the speaker or the normative appropriateness of his utterance; the same holds for the case in which a speaker accepts the normative validity of a command but suspects the seriousness of the intent thereby expressed or has doubts about the existential presuppositions of the action commanded (and thus about the possibility of carrying it out). "(J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg. 121)

¹³⁷ It is important to understand the role played by rationality in Habermas's work. For Weber and Marx, the development of rationality had pathological elements for the development of society. For instance it is the development of rationality which lies at the basis of the Weberian "Iron Cage", and of the Marxist concept of reification. Habermas's view is that the problems which they identify originate in

the failure to develop and institutionalize all the different dimensions of reason in a balanced way. (T. McCarthy - "Translator's Introduction" in J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action", Polity, 1984, pg xxxvii)

As we shall see, Habermas takes the view that if the Lifeworld and Social System were in a more appropriate balance with each other then the Iron Cage could be avoided, and reification demystified.

¹³⁸ It is argued by Misgeld that

growth in practical communicative knowledge is needed in late capitalist societies if people living in these societies are to remain capable of making claims and beliefs problematic in discourse. These developments are required if people are to remain in possession of their critical capacities and to be able to act in the society on the basis of insight and argument. They are also needed so that people can be self determined, yet also cooperate in the arrangement of their social relations. (D. Misgeld "Hermeneutics versus Neoparsonianism". Theory and Society 1985, pg 63.)

¹³⁹ We have up to now used Ideal Speech simply as a benchmark. It will, however, become increasingly important to understand Habermas's view of the role of rationality as it develops in modern society (the relation between developing rationality and modernity). Habermas considers that as society develops from traditional to modern, it becomes increasingly differentiated, and increasingly rationalised. He does not see this as unambiguously bad - indeed he takes the view that since greater rationalisation opens up the possibility of a greater learning capacity, it can be progressive for modern society, since it allows for

a) the critical appraisal of traditional norms, practices and consensus

b) it allows for the development of a rational political will, conduct of life, which is not based on force but on free and equal discussion.

The purpose of the Ideal Speech Thesis, is therefore to measure the extent to which rationality is operating. He does of course recognize that in many aspects of social life rationality does not fully operate, and that in many situations the Ideal Speech Thesis is the exception. The problems are not with rationalisation in itself, the problems lie with the forms of rationalisation in modern society - for instance technological rationalisation.

¹⁴⁰ It is pointed out by McCarthy that

It seems clear that actual situations of theoretical discourse rarely if ever, even approximate this purity. ("The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" - T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pg. 309)

The ideal speech thesis, despite its unreality, can act as a "bench-mark" against which situations can be assessed for the absence/degree of power. In the model of pure communicative action there is an analogy with the Theory of Perfect Competition in Economics. In the late 1940's and early 1950's a vigorous debate took place within Economics concerning the usefulness of this theory. An important view is that of Andrews who says:

At the one level, perfect competition theory could be kept in all its details with a clear conscience, as a theory of perfection which could be used for the assessment of the condition of any situation which would be consonant with maximum economic welfare, and for the corresponding criticism of any divergent conditions in the actual world. (P.W.S. Andrews "On Competition in Economic Theory MacMillan 1964. pg.4)

Andrews is making three points here:

a) the theory of perfect competition is unrealistic.

b) despite that, it can be used for the assessment of any empirical situation. For instance to compare two, or more situations, and assess which one(s) diverge more from the purity of perfect competition.

c) divergence from perfect competition can be used to criticise real economic situations (eg to argue that the structure of a particular industry is against the public interest).

We would argue that pure communicative action can be seen in the same way. For instance, if we re-word Andrews,

At the one level, (pure communicative action) could be kept in all its details with a clear conscience, as a theory of perfection which could be used for the assessment of the condition of any situation which would be consonant with maximum (rationality), and for the corresponding criticism of any divergent conditions in the actual world. (my emphases)

For a rationally grounded consensus to arise it is required that the conditions of pure communicative action are satisfied - ie that validity claims are raised rightly and can be justified. In reality it is unlikely (though not impossible) that these conditions can be achieved. Nonetheless to the extent the model's conditions are not satisfied, we can question the rationality of any agreement, on the basis that it represents to some extent an exercise of power.

¹⁴¹ Habermas argues,

The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse.....Of course we cannot know a priori whether that appearance is a mere delusion - however unavoidable the suppositions from which it springs - or whether the empirical conditions for the realization (if only approximate) of the supposed form of life can practically be brought about. (J. Habermas "Wahrheitstheorien" pp. 258-259. Quoted in "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" - T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pg. 310.)

¹⁴² J. Habermas. "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970, pg. 372.

¹⁴³ M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987, pg. 70

¹⁴⁴ He argues in "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1" that

Anyone who systematically deceives himself about himself behaves irrationally. (Habermas supra, pg 21)

The role of psychoanalysis is to assist the patient to become aware of his irrationality through not only the reflection which is central to psychoanalysis, but also through the identification of reasons and grounds which point to his irrationality. This process is described by Habermas as "therapeutic critique" (supra, pg 21). The criticism which this has led Habermas to is considered subsequent.

Psychoanalysis is used in preference to the verstehen of Weber and Dilthey, or the hermeneutics of Gadamer (See Chapter 10 of "Knowledge and Human Interests" - J. Habermas), which, he argues, stop at the point of fully understanding the individual, lacking the emancipatory interest which he finds in psychoanalysis. Thus Habermas argues,

With his analysis of ordinary language, Dilthey only mentioned the limiting case of discrepancy between sentences, actions and experiential expressions. For the psychoanalyst, however, this is the normal case. (pg. 217)

and

The depth hermeneutics that Freud contraposes to Dilthey's philological hermeneutics deals with texts indicating self deceptions of the author. (pg. 218)

¹⁴⁵ The use of Freud is by no means unique to Habermas, as Freud's work has been prominent in the work of other Frankfurt School Theorists. For instance Horkheimer on authority ("Authority and the Family"), Adorno on prejudice ("Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda"), Marcuse on instincts ("Eros and Civilisation"), Reich on Fascism ("The Mass Psychology of Fascism") all drew, in a variety of ways, on Freud. See J. Habermas "Communication and the Evolution of Society", Heinemann 1979, pp. 70-71.

¹⁴⁶ As Pusey notes,

he (Habermas) has not the slightest interest in Freud's theory of instincts, in the theory of sexuality, or indeed in any other aspect of Freud's very positivistic social biology. The inspiration comes purely from the process and method of the therapeutic relationship. In this relationship we find the source of several of the seminal elements of the later theory of communicative competence and communicative action. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987, pg. 70. My emphasis)

¹⁴⁷ Habermas argues,

Psychoanalysis is relevant to us as the only tangible example of a science incorporating methodical self-reflection. The birth of psychoanalysis opens up the possibility of arriving at the dimension that positivism closed off, and of doing so in a methodical manner that arises out of the logic of inquiry. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 214)

The same point is made by Pusey who argues,

the patient learns to reflect on his or her own experience and in this way to reassimilate repressed material into consciousness and at the method's best to affirm a larger rational control over complexes of systematically distorted perceptions, responses, compulsions and inhibitions that lie at the root of the neurosis. In short, reflection is the social process through which irrationally impaired or broken communication is restored and rationally redeemed. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987, pp. 70-1).

This leads into the realm of unconscious thought, which cannot be analysed by, for instance, hermeneutic methods.

¹⁴⁸ Habermas argues that

suppressed interpretations and fragmented needs no longer need appear on the level of acknowledged cultural tradition and prevailing norms; rather they establish themselves behind the backs, as it were, of the acting subjects - as unconscious motives. They are still motives and that means they are action-orienting meaning. But now they act in the manner of external causes. (J. Habermas "On the Logic of Social Sciences". Polity 1988, pp. 185-6)

The role of psychoanalysis is to identify such repressions, and by making them conscious create the conditions for them being brought back within control, rather than appearing to be "quasi natural relationships" (Habermas supra, pg 186).

¹⁴⁹ J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 217. Habermas in Chapter 10 of "Knowledge and Human Interests" contrasts psychoanalysis with the work of Dilthey and others involved in hermeneutics. The difficulty which Habermas sees in hermeneutics, and the analysis of ordinary language, is that it is restricted to what the subject is conscious of. In contrast as Habermas notes, for the psychoanalyst having to go to the unconscious is normal. He observes,

The flaws eliminated by its (psychoanalysis) critical labour are not accidental. The omissions and distortions that it rectifies have a systemic role and function. For the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by the impact of internal conditions. The mutilations have meaning as such. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 217.)

This quote makes a number of points,

1) the role of psychoanalysis is to identify flaws (omissions and distortions)

2) the source of flaws in the individual are internal to him. We, therefore, by using psychoanalysis have to identify

a) what the source of the flaws are - why the Lifeworld produces such behaviour,

b) what causes such distortions?

¹⁵⁰ A number of criticisms have been made of Habermas in this respect. We shall consider some here:

1) Gadamer has been a major critic of Habermas's use of psychoanalysis questioning the relationship between the social theorist (as analyst) and social actor (as patient). Gadamer fears that the theorist (analyst) may come to dominate the relationship, and in effect impose his interpretation of the actor (patient) on the actor (See H-G Gadamer "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" in H-G Gadamer (Ed.) "Philosophical Hermeneutics". Berkeley 1976, pg. 42.).

The answer Habermas would give to this, would be to point out that all the theorist (as psychoanalyst) would have done, would have been to provide an analysis which indicates the sources of repression of the actor(s). Whether or not this explanation is valid would only be established if the actor(s) sees it as enlightening and makes use of it. In other words, the fact that the theorist regards his analysis as correct - and indeed even if other analysts agree that it is correct - the ultimate test is whether or not the actors who are the subject of the analysis find it enlightening and convincing, so that they make use of the analysis.

An example of this is given by Laing in "The Divided Self" (Tavistock Publications 1960). He considers a classical description of schizophrenia given by the 19 century psychiatrist, E. Kraepelin ("Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry." Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1905, pp. 79-80). Kraepelin describes bringing into a lecture theatre a young schizophrenic, showing signs of catatonic excitement - not responding to questions, screaming, and in particular "talking nonsense". In particular the patient is said by Kraepelin to have

understood all the questions (but) he
has not given us one useful piece of
information

While Laing accepts that the patient does show signs of catatonic excitement, and that everything he says can be interpreted to be nonsense, Laing shows that the patient's talk and behaviour can be interpreted as a dialogue between his (the patient's) parody of Kraepelin, and his own (the patient's) rebellious self. Laing instances one example of the patient's talk:

You want to know that too? I tell you
who is being measured and is measured
and shall be measured. I know all that,
and I could tell you, but I do not want
to.

This could be interpreted as "crazy" talk - and indeed was by Kraepelin. On the other hand it could be interpreted as the patient expressing his resentment at the form of interrogation he was being subjected to (in front of a lecture room full of students, attending to see a "mad man"). As Laing points out,

He probably does not see what it has to
do with the things that must be deeply
distressing him. But these things would
not be useful information to Kraepelin
except as further signs of the disease.
(R. D. Laing "The Divided Self".
Tavistock Publications 1960, pg. 31)

Hence in this case the patient, on Laing's interpretation, did not agree with the diagnosis of the analyst, and was making this clear (unsuccessfully) in his talk. Likewise if the patients (social actors) of Habermasian psychoanalysis do not agree with the analysis, they will presumably say so too, and reject the analysis.

A further interesting issue of this is that as Sedgwick notes

Kraepelin's interpretation of his patient's behaviour has been on record for decades in several countries as a classical case-note of psychiatry without anybody, apart from Laing in 1960, trying to revalue it. (P. Sedgwick: "R. D. Laing "Self, Symptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974. pg. 5)

The interesting facet of this is that the failure by generations of psychiatrists to appreciate this possibility, demonstrating how "knowledge" can exercise power by becoming "self evident" - in this case that (apparently) talking nonsense etc (apparently) indicates schizophrenia.

On a different, but related issue, we have to appreciate that Habermas's model of adequacy is rather different from the model of adequacy we found in Schutz. In Schutz's model the adequacy of explanation would be established within the terms of the existing Lifeworld, which, following the psychoanalytic analogy, is repressing the individual. For Habermas, however, in cases of unconscious repression it would be necessary to identify the sources of repression and thus to take the subject beyond the existing Lifeworld, by the demonstration of the sources of repression. (See above)

2) Another criticism is made by Giegel, who argues that "the revolutionary struggle is by no means a psychoanalytic treatment on a large scale" (H-J Giegel "Reflexion and Emanzipation" in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt 1971), pg. 247. Quoted in T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas", pg. 207.). Habermas's response to such criticism is to point out that the use of psychoanalysis is not to provide a model for political struggle, but only to provide an opportunity for enlightenment. In other words, the role of psychoanalysis will be to create the conditions of enlightenment such that the struggle, to which Geigel refers, is caused to begin. How that struggle is then played out would not be a matter for psychoanalysis, which is a component of the process of enlightenment. Thus,

The organization of action must be distinguished from the organization of enlightenment...Decisions for the political struggle cannot be first justified theoretically and then carried out organisationally. The sole possible justification at this level is a consensus attained in practical discourse among the participants who in the consciousness of their common interests and in the knowledge of the circumstances, predictable consequences and side-effects, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to take and with what expectations (J. Habermas - quoted in T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas", pg 211 my emphasis)

Thus, the role of psychoanalysis is to establish conditions for which rational (justifiable) conditions can be taken about the struggle, by identifying the sources and types of social repression which exist unconsciously. What those subject to such repression then do is not a matter which can be determined by the analyst.

3) Giddens is critical of the use of psychoanalysis by arguing that the conditions required for its use - for the patient to voluntarily to enter into treatment, for analyst and patient to have a common interest in the outcome, for the patient to be improved, for treatment to involve symbolic communication - are unlikely to be replicated in real social life. (See A. Giddens "Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory". Macmillan 1982, pg. 97) We can do no more than agree with a view that the relationship between analyst and patient will never be exactly paralleled in real life. Nonetheless there are, we would argue, equivalents which are both interesting and indeed obvious. For instance may the theorist (analyst) and actor (patient) not have a common interest in the outcome? May there not be symbolic communication between the theorist and actor - for instance during the former's data collection? As a method of social change, psychoanalysis, as Giddens argues, is not viable. This is not to say, however, that it is not a useful analogy, and that as such there are not important lessons to be acquired from it.

4) McCarthy has argued ("Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" -T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pp. 211 - 3) that it is required in psychoanalysis that

a) the patient should experience "suffering and desperation with their condition" etc., and wish to be released from it.

b) if the suffering of the patient disappears before the treatment is completed, then it will be for the analyst to reinstate it. The difficulty with doing this outwith the dyadic analyst:patient relationship can be quite easily imagined.

c) the patient is expected to resist the analyst (and in the light of the second point, who can blame him?), and it is expected that this will intensify as the treatment progresses.

The difficulty with this criticism is that it appears to ignore

i) the fact that Habermas is drawing an analogy rather than an exact parallel, and

ii) the fact that psychoanalysis and Habermas's social concerns are at quite different levels of analysis. What at the macro-social level would correspond to the "suffering and desperation" required at the micro-individual-small group level of psychoanalysis? Certainly, we would argue, it is unreasonable to expect parallel forms of behaviour at the social level. Nonetheless pathological behaviour has been identified in society, most notably and classically by Durkheim, in "Suicide" and "Division of Labour". Habermas points to the development of psychopathologies (such as anomie and alienation) as an indication of crisis when social reproduction processes are disturbed (See J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2", Polity 1987, pg 143, fig. 22.)

It is also pointed out by McCarthy in his introduction to Volume 1 of "Theory of Communicative Action" that when symbolic reproduction breaks down

there arise disturbances in the reproduction process and corresponding crisis manifestations: loss of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, confusion of orientations, anomie, destabilization of collective identities, alienation, psychopathologies, breakdowns in tradition, withdrawal of motivation. (T. McCarthy - Translators Introduction to J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1". Polity 1984, pg xxv).

Likewise the Marxian concept of Alienation indicates social pathology, even though Habermas is scathing of this:

In an extensively rationalized Lifeworld reification can only be measured against the conditions of communicative sociation, and not against the nostalgically loaded frequently romanticized past of premodern forms of life. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 342)

The difficulty with many of the criticisms is that, as McCarthy points out "perhaps we have taken it too literally" (T. McCarthy "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas". Polity 1986, pg 212.). We do have to keep in mind that when Habermas considers psychoanalysis he considers it only as an analogy, as we pointed out in quoting Pusey (above).

5) A further criticism by McCarthy of Habermas's use of psychoanalysis is that in Freud's psychoanalysis, the analyst has to "work through" the identified neurosis with the patient, assisting the patient to appreciate for himself the source/cause of his neurosis. As McCarthy asks, "What would correspond to "working through" at the political level?" ("Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" - T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pg. 212.). Again it has to be admitted that in terms of the practice of psychoanalysis, it is difficult to imagine any exact (or even anything which is not inexact) counterpart to this. Again, however, we would respond to this by remembering that

a) Habermas is drawing an analogy,

b) its purpose is to explain - not merely understand - the distortions in communication.

Essentially this is the same problem which Geigel identifies - but as with Geigel we have to recall that for Habermas, the purpose of psychoanalysis is to identify the distortions and give them explanation.

the theory that creates consciousness can bring about the conditions under which the systematic distortions of communication are dissolved and a practical discourse can then be conducted: but it does not contain any information which prejudices the future action of those concerned.....theory cannot have the same function for the organization of action of the political struggle, as it has for the process of enlightenment. (J. Habermas "Theory and Practice" - Heinemann, 1974, pg 39)

Its role then ends, having no role in the struggle itself. The role of psychoanalysis is only to identify the conditions which prevent rational decisions from being taken. It may be argued that this is too theoretically "pure" a position to adopt - too "laissez-faire". We would, however, agree with Habermas in "Theory and Practice" that

Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then be carried out organisationally. The sole possible justification at this level is consensusthere is no privileged access to truth. (J. Habermas "Theory and Practice" - Heinemann, 1974, pg 35).

¹⁵¹ On the other hand, the use of Freudian analysis has produced interesting results in organizational analysis. For instance, taking up the considerable influence which F. W.. Taylor has had on organizations, using Freudian analysis Morgan shows how Taylor's work was the product of

a disturbed and neurotic personality. His attempt to organize and control the world, whether in childhood games or in systems of scientific management, was really an attempt to control himself. ("Images of Organization" - G. Morgan. Sage 1986, pg. 205.)

The work of Bion, at the Tavistock Institute, by focusing on the unease associated with the death instinct experienced by children. A response to this is what he terms "fight-flight", through which a group will project its fears onto some kind of enemy. Whatever the enemy is (and it can be as wide as a competitor or a government regulation, or another organizational group), it personifies the unconscious persecution anxieties which the group experiences. The group is thus united, through the emphasis on fighting off this perceived enemy, but the difficulty is that the group may come to devote more time to doing this, than to rationally examining its problems. An example of this, given by Morgan, is that when Japanese cars first began to make serious inroads to the American car market, the manufacturers response was to define the Japanese as the enemy, and to concentrate on things like import controls, thus diverting them from the task of examining their own products.

A further example is Jaques who shows that "scape-goating" is a feature of union-management relations, such that one group will seek to define the other with bad images to project them as "the baddies" and themselves as "the goodies". Industrial disputes frequently manifest this type of behaviour (See "Images of Organization" - G. Morgan. Sage, 1986, pp 203-231).

Hence the role which can be played by Freud is a very real one. We are simply proceeding down a different path.

¹⁵² It is argued by Habermas

Psychoanalytic interpretation is concerned with those connections of symbols in which the subject deceives itself about itself. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests (2nd Edition)". Heinemann 1978, pg 218.)

The difficulty here is not the nature of the connections made between symbols by the individual, but rather that in Habermas's view of psychoanalysis, following on from Freud, the analysis is clearly at the level of the individual since the subject is deceiving "itself about itself", and it is difficult to see how the analysis can get beyond this to a higher (social) level.

He also argues, as we have seen above

The flaws eliminated by its (psychoanalysis) critical labour are not accidental. The omissions and distortions that it rectifies have a systemic role and function. For the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by the impact of internal conditions. The mutilations have meaning as such. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 217.)

The difficulty here is the reference to "the impact of internal conditions", suggesting that we are to look for the source of the problems within the individual. Now given that the Lifeworld must be internal this is obvious. We do, however, have to look beyond this - as we argued in relation to Schutz - for the causes of the (internal) Lifeworld problems.

Thus even as an analogy the use of Freud is defective. While the emphasis on the individual is not, in our view, unacceptable, it is important that there should be a connection out beyond the individual. If we fail to do so then the causes of the neurosis must be within the individual.

¹⁵³ It is argued by Giddens that Habermas's use of psychoanalysis means that:

the "domination" which the patient overcomes as a result of successful therapy is that of his or her own inner make-up, not the domination of others. (A. Giddens "Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory". Macmillan 1982, pg. 97)

¹⁵⁴ We have used Laing as the title of this section, and while we shall rely heavily on his own work we shall also refer in this section to others who have worked closely with him and can be seen to be in the same tradition. Those we would include as falling into that category would include David Cooper and Aaron Esterson.

¹⁵⁵ Laing defines schizoid as

an individual, the totality of whose experience is split in two main ways: in the first place, there is a rent in his relation with his world, and in the second there is a disruption of his relation with himself. Such a person is not able to experience himself "together with" others or "at home in" the world, but on the contrary he experiences himself in despairing aloneness and isolation: ("R. D. Laing - "The Divided Self". Tavistock Publications, 1960, pg 15).

For the avoidance of doubt, we are not suggesting that these are symptoms exhibited by our sample. Moreover, Laing himself does not believe in schizophrenia - or at least he believes that not all those diagnosed as such are in fact mentally ill. Thus

We reiterate that we ourselves are not using the term schizophrenia to denote any identifiable condition that we believe exists in any one person. ("Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing. Pelican 1970, pg 19)

¹⁵⁶ It is argued by Friedenburg that

what Laing insists on as the essence of his position is that the statements of those deemed to be mentally ill are by no means irrational, but sensible when viewed from the position of the person the patient has been. What the patient does and is makes sense from his point of view; even his nonsense serves strategic purpose of counter-mystifying the parents and hospital authorities who have devoted his life to mystifying him. ("Laing - E. Z. . Friedenburg. Fontana 1973, pg 11).

This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the patient has been sane all the time, and that the treatment has only been administered because of the family

Laing does not in the bulk of his work endorse the patient's view of things to that extent (but) he does lay himself open to misinterpretation of this kind. ("The Philosophy and Politics of Psychotherapy" - A. Collier. Harvester, 1977. pg. 54).

In other words, and in distinction to Freud, Laing seeks explanation and understanding of the patient not only within the patient but in the situation he/she occupies.

¹⁵⁷ "The Divided Self" - R D Laing, Tavistock Publications, 1960.

¹⁵⁸ "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970.

¹⁵⁹ "The Leaves of Spring" - A. Esterson, Pelican 1972.

¹⁶⁰ There were five members of the family - Mr Danzig (aged 56) and his wife (aged 50), Sarah (oldest child aged 23), son John (aged 21), and younger daughter Ruth (aged 15). "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 110.

This case concerns the mental illness of the elder daughter in the family - Sarah. Sarah was held to have first shown signs of mental illness at about the age of 17, when she began to stay in bed all day, getting up only at night to read the Bible. She began to lose interest in normal affairs, and lost her place at Commercial College. By the time she had reached 21 years of age her behaviour had become increasingly strange, as she claimed to hear voices on the phone, claimed that people on TV were talking about her. She began to make outbursts against other members of the family, and after one outburst stayed out all night. Following this she was removed to an hospital, where her she was observed to be listless, withdrawn and apathetic. She was however allowed to return to home, and took a job in the office run by her father. During this time, however, her bizarre ideas continued - others in the office did not want to work with her, they got hold of her letters and tore them up (she also claimed that this happened at home), she claimed the staff in the office were incompetent. Eventually she refused to go to work, lying in bed all day, once again only getting up at night to read the Bible. She also resumed attacks on her family, and following an outburst against her father she was again taken to hospital. It is at this stage that Laing and Esterson became involved.

In hospital her behaviour continued to be unusual' described by Laing and Esterson as "delusions and psychotic manifestations". ("Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 111.) She claimed:

- a) the hospital were holding back letters to her from her family, and not passing on telephone messages
- b) she was inhumanely detained by the hospital
- c) she feared never being able to leave hospital to return home
- d) her mother had only agreed to Sarah being put in hospital because she did not want her to leave home
- e) she feared her father, who was responsible for her being put in hospital.

Laing and Esterson then go on to show how these apparent "delusions and psychotic manifestations" can in fact be understood in the context of the situation she occupied in her family.

First of all there is the issue of her mail being intercepted, and phone messages not being passed on. As a result of their interview with the family collectively, but mostly separately, Laing and Esterson found that Sarah had been told by her parents and brother that they phoned every day, and left messages for her. In fact this was not so as no mail or phone messages had been intercepted as no mail or phone messages had been received. ("Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 111.). Thus this delusion, this evidence of her illness, can be understood in the context of her family,

Turning to now to her feelings about her father, Laing and Esterson demonstrate a similar explanation. Her brother while being supportive and sympathetic to Sarah in front of her, warned Laing and Esterson not to be fooled by her, and that when she agreed with them it was only to win sympathy to try to get out of hospital. Likewise her mother, whom Sarah also thought to be an ally, had told Laing and Esterson that if Sarah continued to be hostile to her father then she should be kept in hospital permanently ("Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 113.). When with Sarah, however she insisted that it was her father and brother who wanted her kept in hospital. Her father, on the other hand, supported Sarah only when she was not present - with his wife and/or son. He would not defend her when she was attacked by her mother and/or brother, or when he was alone with her. Thus her idea that it is her father who is against her, and her mother and brother who are her allies can be understood. Laing and Esterson conclude of the family that it

functioned largely through a series of alliances - mother and father; mother and son; mother, father and son. Sarah was left out. (pg. 122)

For instance, Laing and Esterson show evidence that Sarah was expected to fulfil rules which all the other members of the family broke, using their intra-family alliances for support. For instance, it was insisted that Sarah should observe the Sabbath (the family were Orthodox Jews), but the mother, with the connivance of the son did so without the knowledge of Sarah or Mr Danzig.

Likewise, John visited coffee-bars and restaurants etc. even though both he had been forbidden by their father to do so. But when Mr Danzig attempted to impose similar limitations on Sarah, John sided with him.

From my point of view when it comes to Sarah its not intrusion - when it comes to me it is intrusion. (pg 124)

If we go further back, to the problems experienced in her father's office, we can see how the analysis can operate there as well. She had gone to work in his office after her first breakdown. He had insisted that she should keep quiet about this, but it had leaked out among the rest of the staff, who began to gossip about her behind her back, though being pleasant to her face. Moreover being "the boss's daughter" did not help. Nor did the fact that she discovered errors being made in the office which she reported to her father. As a result, Laing and Esterson report, she was subject to subtle insinuations, which no one would confirm explicitly. When some of her correspondence was mislaid by another girl in the office, Sarah accused her of doing so deliberately. The girl, in response, made a remark which questioned Sarah's sanity. In a very upset condition she rushed to her father's office, seeking reassurance. The fact this was not forthcoming made her still more agitated, and having accused him of being a liar, and in collusion with the others, she left the office and never returned.

Thus what appears to be bizarre behaviour on the part of an individual, can be understood from the context of the situation which they occupy, even if they are not fully aware of all its facets.

¹⁶¹ "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1972, pg 23.

¹⁶² Indeed it is part of Laing's method to suspend belief in the schizophrenic diagnosis, and to seek to make sense of their behaviour, even if it appears to be senseless. See quotation (footnote 134)

¹⁶³ This is especially true in "The Leaves Of Spring" by Esterson.

¹⁶⁴ "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1972, pg 19.

¹⁶⁵ Esterson argues

Since persons are always in relation, one cannot study persons without studying the relations they make with each other. (The Leaves Of Spring - A. Esterson, pg. 217)

¹⁶⁶ Laing and Esterson argue,

We are concerned with persons, the relations between persons, and the characteristics of the family as a system composed of a multiplicity of persons. "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1972, pg 19.

¹⁶⁷ This point is elaborated in "Interpersonal Perception" - R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson and A. R. Lee. Tavistock Publications 1966. This deals with a model of interpersonal perception in which married couples are asked to make judgements about their partners in relation to their own relationship (ie how the husband feels his wife understands him as a person - how well/badly she may understand others is not measured.). This gives rise to a complex system of perspectives (how A sees B), meta perspectives (how A sees B seeing A), meta-meta-perspectives (how A sees B seeing A seeing B), and beyond. To the extent that these perspectives coincide, the better for the marriage in the view of Laing and his colleagues. We can, however see in this,

a) the possibility that communication may unconsciously go wrong. Thus, while Schutz may argue that we assume that the Other sees the situation in the same way as Ego, the assumption may be wholly false. Two individuals may see the same situation - and even one with the intimacy of marriage - in different terms. Yet the situation may be able to persist until the contradictions become too great. As Schutz and Luckmann argue

the biographically modelled
interpretational and motivational
relevances which both partners "bring
into" the we-relation cannot be
identical, although they are
sufficiently congruent with regard to
the similar socialization of the
partners for the determination and
management of the situation. (A. Schutz
and T. Luckmann " Structures of the
Lifeworld. pg 254)

b) the emphasis on the truth of communication. Thus it is better that Mrs A should regard Mr A as a wife-beating, good-for-nothing drunkard, if this is what he really is, than for her to regard him, wrongly as a well-mannered, caring husband. There are, therefore, certain connections with Habermas's ideas on communicative action, and distorted forms of communication. Thus a family which comes out of this test well is closer to communicative action, and to being able to take rational decisions about their future (together or apart). On the other hand a couple whose communication is distorted (perhaps even systematically distorted) are unable to take rational decisions - even if each thinks the other is wonderful.

¹⁶⁸ See P. Sedgwick: "R. D. Laing "Self, Symptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974. pg. 15)

The family had become a pseudo-organism to which they were now obliged to relate in a pattern of reciprocal rights and obligations. Through interiorizing the interiorization of the group-for-outside-others, the family as group praxis, as persons in relation, became process, an opaque object with laws and a being of its own. This family object they experienced as other than the praxis of the persons comprising it. ("The Leaves of Spring", pg 71, my emphasis).

Thus in this case the family felt themselves to be subject to certain forces (the need to be respectable religiously and socially) which were outwith their control, but were in fact a function of the goals Mr and Mrs Danzig had set for themselves. There is a likeness between this situation and the Lifeworld understanding of Management by Staff, and in particular by Hourly-Paid. For them, Management did not appear to be "praxis" - it did not appear to be fully understandable as the motivated actions of specific individuals. Indeed as we have pointed out already, the whole procedure of Management was something of a mystery for Staff and Hourly-Paid. It was something which just happened - in other words it was, in the Laingian sense, "process". There is a conceptual similarity between the Laingian concept of "process" and Habermas's "fragmented consciousness", since both rely on failure to understand.

¹⁷⁰ It is a (structurally) similar situation which Habermas deals with in his discussion of the Colonization of the Lifeworld, when Social System imperatives are uncritically accepted as inevitable, and not subject to control.

¹⁷¹ It is important to understand that not only the Hourly-Paid can be restricted by unconscious power. For instance the Hourly-Paid may see an Investment decision as process. But if they work through routine procedures which they do not question, for Management too the process may appear to them to be process, and thus largely a technical function with no overtones of power.

This same point is explicitly taken up by Esterson, who considers the Sartrean concept of "serial groups". Groups are termed this way because from the point of view of "the constituting agent", or the plan the group is designed to achieve, no member of the group differs from any of the others. Therefore an employee can be replaced by another similar employee. Most importantly, however, the serial group is always constituted by somebody/something external to the group for the achievement of something outwith the group (eg a corporate plan), which is something they will only be vaguely conscious of. ("The Leaves of Spring" - pg. 38).

¹⁷² " R. D. Laing" - A. Collier. Harvester Press 1977. pg 45.

¹⁷³ Laing gives the following as a definition of the unconscious

The unconscious is what we do not communicate, to ourselves or to one another. ("Self and Others" - R. D. Laing. pg. 32).

This raises the very important issue of exactly what is meant by "unconscious" and "the unconscious". The latter occupies a significant place in the work of Freud - it is the receptacle for the repressions, and other psychopathologies from which Freud's patients suffered.

Freudian psychology emphasises how human personality is shaped as the human mind learns to cope with raw impulses and desires. Freud believed that in the process of maturation these are brought under control or banished to the unconscious. The unconscious thus becomes a reservoir of repressed impulses and painful memories and traumas that can threaten to erupt at any time. The adult person deals with this reservoir in a variety of ways, engaging in various defense mechanisms to keep them in check (including repression, denial, displacement, fixation, projection, etc.). ("Images of Organization" - G. Morgan. Sage, 1986. pg. 206.)

By freeing them from these repressions etc., the mental state of his patients could, at least, be ameliorated. It is not, however, this which Laing is referring to in the above quote. Laing when he refers to the something which is unconscious is referring, as the above quote indicates, to something we do not communicate - in other words it is something we are not aware of. But where can this lack of awareness originate? We have seen before that Laing does not simply seek his explanation for the condition of the patient internally. He also looks outwith the patient to the family of which he is a member. Like any social group the family will have a structure. As Laing and Esterson say,

If one wishes to know how a football team concert or disconcert their actions in play, one does not think only or even primarily of approaching this problem by talking to the members individually. One watches the way they play together. (R. D. Laing and A. Esterson "Sanity, Madness and the Family." pg 21)

Thus we have to consider not only the individual consciousness of each member of the family but also the Social System of which they are a part. In other words, as well as consciousness we have to consider structure.

All of this creates the possibility of two, not unrelated, forms of unconsciousness:

a) the individual may not be fully aware of the Social System of which he is part. For instance, Sarah Danzig was not aware the fact that while her brother supported her in her presence, was highly critical behind her back (eg in interviews with Laing and Esterson). Thus in this case there is unconsciousness in the sense that John has not communicated fully with Sarah. Likewise to the extent there are one-sided rules operating in the Social System (eg a firm), the social actors may not be fully aware of this - for instance, to go on with Laing's football analogy, the fact the goalkeeper may use his hands within the penalty area may simply be accepted by the players uncritically. This is similar to the reference which Clegg makes to the position of a Queen in chess depending on the rules of the game, which creates a certain position for her

b) the individual may not be fully aware of his own consciousness. We have seen that in Schutz there are three component parts to our knowledge

Basic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),

Routine or Habitual elements, and

Specific Component contents.

We are, according to Schutz, only fully aware of the last component, as the other two are so basic that we use them without thinking and thus without being aware of using them. Thus in this sense there is unconsciousness in that the individual has not communicated fully with himself. This leads to the restrictions of our Lifeworld not being routinely recognized by social actors.

The advantage of the Laingian concept of unconsciousness is that while allowing us to consider the consciousness of the subject, it directs our attention to matters and influences of which the subject is unaware and which may influence the behaviour he exhibits.

¹⁷⁴ This is very close to Habermas's project as well. He argues

From the perspective of linguistic analysis, psychoanalysis appears as a hermeneutic exploration of unconsciously motivated behaviour. (J. Habermas "On the Logic of the Social Sciences". Polity 1988, pg 182.)

¹⁷⁵ A method for doing so is well described by Esterson ("Leaves of Spring", Chapter 17).

¹⁷⁶ Indeed if we consider Habermas's concept of "systematically distorted communication" at the micro-level of psychoanalysis, while the patient and the family are unconscious of the sources of the repressions and contradictions, according to Habermas it is in their distorted communication that these sources are to be located.

¹⁷⁷ For instance in the case of the Danzigs

1) the brother supported Sarah to her face, but when alone with the Doctors warned them not to be taken in by her. This is an example of Conscious Deception in the relationship between Sarah and John.

2) the father would not support Sarah when she disagreed with her mother, but in private would intervene on her behalf. What is especially important is that he would not intervene on her behalf because of the image of the type of father he felt he ought to be. (See "Leaves of Spring", pp. 113-4.)

178 It is argued by Sedgwick that the kinds of family relationships which Laing is arguing for (eg unlimited reciprocity) are extremely uncommon, and that the kinds of problems which he describes in his work are probably the norm. This points to another parallel with the Ideal Speech Thesis, since it too is unlikely to be found empirically. We would argue that the relationships which Laing is arguing for - like the Ideal Speech Thesis - can be considered as an analytical benchmark which we can use for the analysis of a situation. (See P. Sedgwick: "R. D. Laing "Self, Symptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974. pg. 25)

179 The use of Laing would allow Habermas to avoid the problems encountered through the use of Freud. We said above (footnote 120) that for Habermas

- 1) the role of psychoanalysis is to identify flaws (omissions and distortions).

- 2) the source of flaws in the individual are internal to him. We, therefore, by using psychoanalysis have to identify

- a) what the internal source of the flaws are - what it is in the Lifeworld which produces such behaviour,

- b) what causes these internal distortions.

What we have tried to show in this section is the manner in which Laing's work deals with these difficulties.

180 The introduction of Habermas's concept of Structural Violence (see above) would enhance Laing's analysis of the situation of his patient.

181 The playwright, David Edgar says of Laing

Most importantly his (Laing's) work gave flesh to the notion that individual relations can operate as a paradigm of social relations, and that the personal is both metaphorically and literally political. " ("My Hero, R. D. Laing" D. Edgar. Independent Magazine 3/6/89, pg. 62.)

182 In other words while we can seek to develop our understanding of our sample through not only considering their consciousness but their interaction in the Social System of which they are members, we have to go beyond this. For instance, having identified that the Hourly-Paid have a mental division of labour which accords to Management the right to take strategic decisions according to their criteria, we have to ask why it is they should hold that set of ideas.

183 "Theory of Communicative Action (2)" - J. Habermas. Polity 1986, pg. 136.

184 When asked how they think control should be distributed respondents may be limited by a basic element defining Management as "decision-makers". It is therefore possible that while others outwith Management may wish to exercise more influence, Management will remain the dominant group. Indeed this may be so basic as to be routine, so that the very act of (even appearing to) challenge it can appear to be absurd. See for instance S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination" Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975, who reports exactly this.

185 Basic and Routine elements are particularly important elements of the Lifeworld for Habermas, since they are components of which the individual is unconscious - they are

"what one prereflectively knows. If then the solidarities of groups integrated via norms and values and the competences of socialized individuals flow into communication a tergo, in the way that cultural traditions do, it makes sense for us to correct the cultural abridgement of the lifeworld" "Theory of Communicative Action (2)" - J. Habermas. Polity 1986, pg. 135.

Thus we have to consider not only what individuals and groups know and think. We also need to know how and why they have come to know and think in the way that they do. These basic (prereflective) elements are critical in this respect.

186 "Theory of Communicative Action (1)" - J. Habermas. Polity 1984, pg. 335.

187 It is pointed out by Morgan in his "Psychic Prison" metaphor, that

our imprisoned state prevents us from imagining and realizing alternative modes of existence. For claims that proposals for change must be feasible and realistic inevitably confine change to modifications of the status quo. ("Images of Organization" - G. Morgan. Sage, 1986. pg. 231).

188 Clegg (S. Clegg "Organization and Control" Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 545-562) argues, quoting Marcuse and Perrow, that

control is best achieved by employing agents that have rules and rationality built into them through educational socialization.

¹⁸⁹ Morgan (G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1988) shows the psychic prison analogy can have other features, in addition to those instanced above. For instance he shows that in securing organizational change, a change agent may have to

create transitional phenomena when they do not exist naturally. Just as a father or mother may have to help find a substitute for Teddy, a change agent must usually help his or her target group to relinquish what is held dear before they can move on. (pg. 222)

Thus, when change is immanent we cannot simply impose change - the group must be helped, in effect to expand (or change) the limits imposed by their Lifeworld. Thus developing a system of worker participation, or industrial democracy, would have to take into account the Lifeworld definition of Managers as "decision-makers".

Morgan presents several advantages which he claims are possible from this analogy:

a) it may disguise the extent to which what appears to be rationality is in fact no more than irrationality in disguise (pg 229). Morgan's perspective on this comes from Freud, but as we have shown, this is the very argument which Habermas, from his discursive theory of truth, would make also, since breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis give rise to decisions which are less than fully rational.

b) Morgan, referring to attempts to consciously manage meanings within organizations, points out that through the psychic prison metaphor, we can see how we all play a role in the construction of meanings which give rise to unconscious power - even if only in their enactment. (pg 230)

c) while Morgan concentrates on what we have termed the "unconscious" (the Freudian sense) he goes on to note that the metaphor can be extended to include all the ideological processes which function to produce and sustain unconscious power. (pg 230) It is in this specifically extended sense that we refer to Morgan's analogy.

¹⁹⁰ See Jimmy Reid "Reflections of a Clyde-built Man". Souvenir Press 1976.

¹⁹¹ Though as Mr Reid has demonstrated since, this is not to say that over time this cannot change.

¹⁹² R. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology in the non-skilled working class". In "Working Class Images of Society" - M. Bulmer [ed], RKP 1975, pg, 155.

¹⁹³ See for instance Weir D. " Radical Managerialism " : British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1976 pp 374-388.

¹⁹⁴ For instance

In the late 1960's there was a huge decline of dockers' jobs (on Merseyside) as industrial rationalisation introduced new cargo-handling methods. The dockers were resentful, but had to try for new work at the new car plants. They brought with them an enormous suspicion against management and bosses, born on their foggy, frozen morning dockyards. (J. McLouglin. "The Heritage of the Dockers". The Guardian 23/10/79. Our emphasis)

¹⁹⁵ Martin R. & Fryer R. "Redundancy and Paternalist Capitalism".

¹⁹⁶ P. McHugh "Defining the Situation". Bobbs Merrill 1968, pg. 37.

¹⁹⁷ For instance from working in other similar firms - though several of our sample have worked for the same firm all their working lives - or from earlier events in the firm.

¹⁹⁸ "The Leaves of Spring" - A. Esterson, Penguin 1972, pg. 12.

¹⁹⁹ See above. where we argue that the use of Freud by Habermas restricts attention on the role of interaction with others in the repression of needs.

²⁰⁰ For instance the Bullock report in 1977 could have led to this, Likewise the European Social Charter may yet do so.

²⁰¹ See for instance J. Child and B. Partridge "Lost Managers" Blackwell 1982.

²⁰² As for instance Maslow argues in his hierarchy of needs model - see A. Maslow "Motivation and Personality", Harper and Row 1954. This has of course been an influential model - see for instance D. McGregor "The Human Side of Enterprise", McGraw Hill 1960, C. Argyris "Personality and Organization Theory revisited", Administrative Science Quarterly 1973, pp. 141-167.

²⁰³ In practice the data collected in this respect added little to our findings, and have been included as an appendix to this document.

²⁰⁴ See Chapter 4.

²⁰⁵ See Chapter 5.

Chapter 2 Footnotes

¹ Our project is resonant of McHugh, who argues

I am asking whether the definition of the situation can be described, not by going outside of itself - not by calling it determined by constitutive rules, or socialization, or social structure - but according to its own motif. What sort of logic does it represent, not how is it caused. (P. McHugh "Defining the Situation". Bobbs-Merrill 1968. Our emphasis.)

² Thus we cannot consider respondents individually, or groups of respondents individually (eg how management think). We have to consider the firm as a pattern of interaction, and that the expectations for which each group presses will have effect on other groups. For instance employees demanding more open access to company information is not an issue just for them - it would depend on how management respond and behave towards this issue.

³ It sometimes appears to us, from much of the research which is carried out as well as the emphasis in many methodology text books and courses, that methodology historically had been based as a rule on the use of quantitative methods - generally on statistical techniques of varying degrees of sophistication and power. During the last 15 years, however, there has been a greater emphasis on qualitative techniques which pay greater attention to the dynamic nature of social reality - in other words its on-going quality as opposed to the "one-off" experimental orientation of the former. It appears to us to be important to recognise the distinction between these two types of method. To fail to do so undermines research, and it shall be our argument that it is necessary to consider the use of both sets of techniques, as appropriate to add weight to, widen and enrich our research.

The fundamental dichotomy between these two types of method of research, we would argue is most clearly apparent in the dominance of particular individuals as cult figures (eg Garfinkel's association with quantitative methods is somewhat limited). This difference can, however, be usefully employed for our purpose. Each, in our view, has its own part to play, and we shall not therefore be involved in polemicising for either school of thought, but instead to consider the principles of each, and their possible contributions.

This will require some statement of what we mean by quantitative and qualitative research methods in order that we can more adequately discuss their relative contributions and uses. Simultaneously we can make clear our methodological principles and their justification and aim in being used.

⁴ a) By social statics we have in mind, for instance the type of image which is held of the company at a particular moment in time. We can examine the salient aspects of this image (eg is it exploitative, what knowledge does it evidence, what kind of system of logic does it represent and so on. However, to consider this image at one point in time is not sufficient, since over time it is reasonable to expect that it will change. In what direction will it change? It has been our argument that the system of logic in the Lifeworld operates in such a way as to support hierarchy. To examine this at the level of empirical reality it is necessary that we examine its structuring as a social process.

⁵ b) It is here that what we have described as social dynamics becomes important. We have to be able to consider the use of knowledge as something which is on-going, to leave open the possibility that while the Lifeworld is as it is now that there is always the possibility that it could differ in the future. This would be the case if the system of logic in the Basic or Fundamental elements or structures of the Lifeworld were to be overthrown and replaced. To consider this we must consider the company, as McHugh puts it, "according to its own motif". We have to consider the implications of this system of logic for behaviour - for instance why does it persist, what could lead to it being changed? These are not static, but rather are dynamic issues.

⁶ On this point see W. Daniel "Understanding Employee Behaviour in Context", in J. Child (ed) "Man & Organization". Allen & Unwin 1973, and T. Watson "Sociology, Work & Industry", RKP 1980.

⁷ Each respondent was approached individually by the researcher personally - the firm was not involved in the approach in any way - and asked if he would mind coming for interview. It was explained that the interview would be concerned with his feelings about his job and the firm. In general there was no problem since most respondents had already heard of the project, either through their shop steward/staff union rep., or if at management level from a circular sent round by the Personnel dept. at the outset of the project (the negotiation of entry to the firm is described in the next chapter). Interviews were all conducted in private, in the firm's time, arranged where necessary with the respondent's superior. (The structure of the firm is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.)

⁸ See for instance H. Beynon & R. Blackburn "Perceptions of Work". Cambridge University Press 1972: J. Goldthorpe et al. "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour" Cambridge University Press 1968: G. Ingham "Size of Industrial Organization and Worker Behaviour". Cambridge University Press 1970: S. Parker "The Future of Work and Leisure", Paladin 1971: S. Parker, R. Brown, J. Child, M. Smith "The Sociology of Industry", Allen & Unwin 1977: W. G. Runciman "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice" Pelican 1967: C. Sofer "Men in Mid Career" Cambridge University Press 1970: D. Wedderburn & C. Craig "Relative Deprivation in Work" in D. Wedderburn (ed) "Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure". Cambridge University Press 1974:

⁹ In the previous chapter we argued that expectations were achieved in competition with others in the firm, but that the system whereby this happened was imperfectly competitive, in that it was structured to the advantage of some and disadvantage of others.

¹⁰ In contrast to the above, which is concerned with relative deprivation within the company, this is concerned with the relative deprivation associated with the wider social system. These questions therefore permit and encourage the respondent to break out from the constraints of the social system, whereas the former is predicated on their existence.

¹¹ In fact in only a few cases were there any ties at all. The size of the list could have made the task impossible, but in fact it appeared to be an operation done with a great deal of thought and the results reveal a great deal of consistency. This procedure provides data on the relative importance of each expectation to each group specified - for instance we may find one ordering for management and another for staff, while hourly paid have a third order again. Such divergence from our perspective is not a problem of method (ie the fact that different groups have differences in their ranking does not cast doubt on the method) , but rather a problem for theory (in that we have to consider what it is about their experiences etc. which lead to the group's ranking taking on the form it has), and therefore to consider its role in the system of experience, knowledge and logic which form the Lifeworld.

¹² In this way a measure was obtained of the adequacy of provision (satisfaction) not in isolation, nor in relation to some unidentified dimension known only to the respondent, but in relation to dimensions which in principle are known and matters of experience for the respondent - in relation to others in the firm, and in relation to the respondent's concept of an ideal job.

¹³ See for instance H. Beynon & R. Blackburn "Perceptions of work". Cambridge University Press 1972, chapter 5: and J. Goldthorpe et al. "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour" Cambridge University Press 1968, pp. 63-68: and J. Child and B. Partridge "Lost Managers" Blackwell 1982. On the other hand, as Nichols (T. Nichols "The British Worker Question", RKP 1986) points out, the supervisor may not be particularly well trained technically either. He argues

this research points to the limited
technical training of British foremen
(pg. 228).

In other words the assessment of supervisors is a matter of position - what may be good supervision from the perspective of those supervised ("man management") may not be good from a purely technical perspective.

¹⁴ This type of research has generally been carried on at lower levels in the hierarchy - shop floor, lower level white collar workers - but seldom amongst managers. Though this is not to say that managers are not unaware of this problem. More than one of our management respondents made clear that their view of the quality of their hierarchical superior would be a factor in deciding whether or not to stay with the firm. On the other hand, as Fox points out (See A. Fox "Beyond Contract". Faber 1975.) the managerial role is (in his terms) one of "high trust" and thus not perceived as being one which requires the closer supervision to which hourly-paid are subjected. Moreover the management role requires a high level of discretion, and thus is not easily amenable to high levels of supervision - though is not to say that high levels of supervision are necessarily warranted for hourly paid workers either. Indeed as Fox points out (See "Beyond Contract". Faber 1975, and "Man Mismanagement" [2nd Ed'n.] Hutchinson 1985.) too close supervision - leading to a perception of lack of trust by the supervised - may actually be counter-productive.

There is, however, no good reason why managers should not encounter similar problems, and expect similar qualities as those lower down the hierarchy.

¹⁵ See above, (?).

Discretion has tended to be considered to be a quality of more importance in work at higher levels of the hierarchy, but we would argue that there is no good a priori reason for this. Fox, for instance, has argued that low discretion in work produces disfunctional behaviour (See A. Fox "Beyond Contract". Faber 1975, pp. 103-113.). He does not, however, consider the possibilities that

1) discretion in the limited area of direct work experience may not be valued, if there is an inequality of power in the wider aspects of control of the firm. In other words will workers want discretion in their own limited area of the firm when they perceive that in wider areas of the firm they are powerless? Might they not regard the power within their own work area as an illusion?

2) the job carried out by an individual may appear to an outsider to be lacking discretion, but the individual may perceive himself to have a great deal of discretion.

¹⁶ See above, chapter 1, footnote 2.

¹⁷ See Bowen P. "Social Control in Industrial Organizations". RKP 1976.

¹⁸ These preliminary interviews are considered in the next chapter.

¹⁹ See Tannenbaum A. "Control in Organizations" McGraw Hill 1968, and "Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974.

²⁰ E. Jaques "Equitable Payment". Penguin 1967.

²¹ See above, 7.

²² This argument is consistent with the findings of Gundelach and Tetzschner (P. Gundelach & H. Tetzschner "Measurement of Influence in Organizations - Critique of the Control Graph method". Acta Sociologica 1976, pp. 49-63.) who point out that an index of scores over all areas for each group may not be legitimate, since there may be fundamentally different subjective attitudes on each decision-making area - for instance Gundelach and Tetzschner find that influence on financial matters (strategic issue) was fundamentally different from influence on matters like redundancy (work related), amongst a sample of shop floor workers in Denmark. In the latter case the workers expected their influence to be effective, and that their views would have a significant effect on the outcome, whereas in the former case they only wished to be informed about what was happening. This finding emerged from a factor analysis of their data which showed a number of decision-making areas formed a strategic cluster, while others formed a work-related cluster. Gundelach and Tetzschner argue therefore, that influence is contingent on the decision-making area in question, and that the legitimacy of a composite index for all areas is doubtful. This is a matter which can only be resolved by statistical tests which we have carried out on our own data, and will report on at the appropriate point.

Indeed this point has been recognised by Tannenbaum too:

In addition we examined how the distribution of control differs among different areas of decision-making, a question that has concerned many authors (Bartolke K., Eschweiler W., Flechsenberger D. and Tannenbaum A. "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 382)

It appears that there is a possibility, to which we have to be sensitive, that there are qualitatively different types of perceived influence. We would argue, however, that this is not a problem of the Tannenbaum control graph method, but instead one of theory and research. Our theory can embrace the problem of different types of influence, since it is set up to investigate the subjective supports of industrial hierarchy. The Gundelach and Tetzschner findings mean that we have to recognise that industrial hierarchy may not be uni-dimensional. Certainly the problem does not lack complexity, but at the same time it makes for a richer empirical reality to be investigated. As for research problems, these will be considered in the section on qualitative methods, in which we discuss the methods by which we can gather the data on the Lifeworld - its knowledge and the logic it employs - which constitute these as qualitatively different forms of influence.

It may be argued that this is merely to escape the problem posed by the inadequacy of Tannenbaum's method, and that we should seek the solution in more "powerful" and "sophisticated" quantitative methods. We would contend that such criticism would itself be and reflex and misconceived, since it does not consider the possibility that quantitative "rigorous" methods may not be where we should be looking to for our solution. For instance Gundelach & Tetzschner argue

the concept of the distribution of control and the distinction between perceived and desired influence seem in themselves to be so relevant that they should not be given up merely because more sophisticated methods of computation cannot be used (P. Gundelach & H. Tetzschner, supra, our emphasis.)

This position is echoed by Blackburn and Mann in relation to quantitative methods in general

It is now necessary to move on to other methods....The way forward does not lie with the traditional critic of the survey method, the omniscient narrator of most qualitative studies. We may suspect that the coherence of the story lies in the narrator's art rather than empirical realitythe research we now favour would make clear as does the survey method the nature of the investigator's stimulus as well as the worker's response and would add to that more persistent and explicit probing of possible structures of response. We need to know not simply the final result of whether workers are able to synthesize ideological contradictions but also the process by which they attempt to do this..... Whatever the approach the methods should be integrated to the theory and seem to be integrated. (Blackburn R.M. and Mann M. "Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working Class". In "Working Class Images of Society", M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975, pg. 156.)

Our methods to this end will be considered in the section on qualitative methods, but we wish to make clear here that

1) quantitative methods, though well accepted, cannot be used exclusively, given the dynamic nature of social reality,

2) qualitative methods must be methods of research, and not merely rules for narration.

We shall return to this problem in considering the transition from quantitative to qualitative methods, our use of qualitative methods and data, and in particular how data analysis is guided by the theoretical structure of Chapter 1.

²³ This method has been developed by Sherif and Sherif. See Sherif M. & Sherif C "Attitude as the Individual's own Categories". In Warren N. & Jahoda M. "Attitudes" (2nd Ed'n.). Penguin 1973, pp. 395-422.

²⁴ For instance before beginning our interviewing programme, we had agreed to allow management, staff union reps. and shop stewards to see the questionnaire to be used. The two shop stewards who assessed the questionnaire were intrigued by all the questions on control, access to information and so on, but in particular by our questions on what newspapers the respondent read. It was explained to them that newspapers were an important source of information, and thus of views. Both nodded in understanding, and then one of them said

Aye, that's very interesting, but the problem is the guys in here don't read much else than the racing section.

²⁵ In actual fact no respondent took us up on this open-ended offer, and thus there is no data to report.

²⁶ These questions will be important in that they face up squarely to the possibility of rejection of existing hierarchical structures, and in subsequent discussion of qualitative methods they will be employed to understand the non-rejection of hierarchy as a process, drawing on the logic underlying these views.

²⁷ A strong implication of this is that the more often one is exposed to a particular source or form of knowledge, the more relevant and used it will be. This begs the question of one's orientation to the knowledge - for instance if one is critical of a particular source (eg TV news), one may react by totally challenging its validity so that considerable exposure would not lead to considerable acceptance, but in fact the very opposite. This possibility was taken into account in our questions, in that respondents were not only asked for the frequency of their exposure, but also whether or not they perceived any bias in a particular source.

In any case mere frequency of exposure does not alone lead to acceptance of a particular view - we may all vary in the degree of exposure we require before it has use value for us. Our position on this is that the knowledge used to constitute the meaning structure by which we define and interpret reality will be contingent with that meaning structure - in other words where a particular item of knowledge manifestly is at variance with the Lifeworld, and its contents and logic, it will require more exposure for acceptance than another item which is consistent with the Lifeworld. Likewise knowledge which is acquired other than by direct experience (at second or third hand, or further) may not have the same degree of impact - for instance unemployment may loom larger in the Lifeworld if one has actually been in this position, than if not.

²⁸ These were adapted from Willener - See T. Burns (ed) "Industrial Man", Penguin 1972.

²⁹ See Glasgow University Media Group "Bad News". RKP 1976, and, Beharrel P. & Philo G. (eds) "Trade Unions and the Media". Macmillan 1977.

³⁰ N. Nie et al. "Statistical Package for the Social Sciences". McGraw Hill 1975, Chapter 23.

³¹ See Nie, *supra*, pg. 435.

³² G. Dalton "Men Who Manage". John Wiley, 1959.

³³ Permission was, however, usually forthcoming. Interestingly the higher we went in the hierarchy the more often respondents were unwilling to be recorded. This was especially true of senior managers. The exact reason was unclear, but there was a general sensitivity about being interviewed among managers. It should, however, be emphasised that not all managers refused to be recorded - only that proportionately more were unwilling than other groups.

³⁴ See A. Esterson "the Leaves of Spring". Pelican 1972 Chapter 17 *passim*.

³⁵ In both chapters 4 and 5, we refer to a number of excerpts - for instance excerpt 5.2, or excerpt 4.7. All such excerpts - which are relevant excerpts from semi structured interviews with respondents - can be found in Appendix 4 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 4, beginning 4.) or in Appendix 5 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 5, beginning 5.).

Chapter 3 Footnotes

¹ Since our research was completed the firm has been taken over by another holding company - again leaving it part of a much larger group, with the HQ being in London.

² Organizational Structure

The most remarkable feature of the firm's organizational structure is its legal constitution. Its control is organized around a local group company, subordinate to the parent holding company which has absolute control over it, but only exercises this on long term matters, tending not to interfere on day-to-day matters. Instead it maintains a watching function over the local group.

The local group contains within it:

the manufacturing division

the financial and commercial divisions

the marketing and sales divisions (which as we pointed out above are contained in a legally separate company).

The manufacturing division, during our research period, had direct control over:

1) Quality Control - inspection of goods inward, and the final product at various stages in its manufacture.

2) Production Control - including stock control and production planning.

3) Shipping - dispatching the final product (nearly always overseas).

4) Production, which is organized into two identifiable areas:

a) the engine works - where mechanical production and any electrical work is carried out.

b) the fabrication works - where the frames of the final product are made and assembled.

5) Personnel - this includes personnel administration, training and industrial relations (though managers had responsibility for this last item, with Personnel providing policy, advice and back-up where needed). Even though the personnel manager reported to the Manufacturing Director, the service was supplied to the entire firm.

The financial division exercises financial control and gives advice to all parts of the firm. In addition it is in charge of data processing. It is divided into sections dealing with

- a) management accounting, b) finance, c) auditing, d) data processing.

The divisions are, however, much less rigourously enforced and less apparent than in manufacturing, either spatially or in terms of social interaction (though this is less so for data processing).

The commercial division is responsible for:

- a) Purchasing - raw materials, semi-finished or finished parts.
- b) Assistance with financing contracts.
- c) Coordination of different divisions of the firm, but in particular finance, manufacturing and sales.

The problem of coordinating different parts of the firm exists in other companies as well, in that each function believes no one really understands them or gives enough account to their problems. This in our firm showed itself as a contempt for others - production engineers referred to accountants as "bean pushers", and one said he had never met a competent salesman. It does have to be pointed out, however, that this was not restricted to engineers, and that their feelings about others were fully reciprocated. This problem of functional loyalty - though not one we consider - we would suggest could be another manifestation of differing Lifeworlds and experiences, leading to restricted perceptions.

These three divisions, with the Group Managing Director's office and Central Services (internal mail, telephones, etc.) constitute the local group company. Its organizational form is shown in fig. 3.1, over.


As can be seen from the chart, the firm is organized along functional lines. The key roles appear to be those of Manufacturing Director and Finance Director, since only through them is there access to the Group Managing Director.

The Marketing and Sales Company is legally autonomous and has three different sectors -

- 1) a marketing and sales section, concerned with locating customers, researching their product needs, making tenders and securing contracts, and the provision of parts.

**TEXT BOUND INTO
THE SPINE**


Fig 3.1 - Organization Chart of Manufacturing.



Manager in
our sense

Group Managing Director

Chief of Finance



2) an operations section which provides the technical expertise required to make tenders (eg drawings, checking the feasibility of customer requests), providing drawings for each order, ensuring that orders are progressed through the Manufacturing division, coordination of the different elements of each order, and the installation of orders.

3) planning and development, which was responsible for forward planning of the structure and operation of the firm, in order to maximise future orders.

The organization structure of this part of the firm is shown in fig 3.2. As can be seen from this, the organization is again functional, but rather more complex than Manufacturing and Finance. The structure of the Marketing and Sales Company has the following significant features,


a) it is a separate legal entity having its own Board of Directors. Control is formally ultimately exercised by the Group Managing Director who is Chairman of this company. The extent to which this control was exercised should not be exaggerated since:

i) there was a good deal of rivalry between the Managing Director (Sales and Marketing) and the Group Managing Director, so that the former resisted the latter.

ii) the Group Managing Director had a fairly easy managerial style, and close control would have been out of character.

b) the Managing Director (Sales and Marketing) was also the Marketing Director - indeed selling was really his game. The product, however, requires considerable attention both during production - meeting customer requirements - as well as after production - installation presented constantly differing requirements. These areas were taken up by the Operations Director, and those subordinate to him. This gave the Operations Directory considerable power as it was not enough merely to be able to sell - indeed it could be said that selling the product was only the start of the firms' problems and it was the Operations Director who frequently had to solve these. This gave rise to further observable divisions - between those who worked in Sales and Marketing, and those in the Operations Division.

Fig 3.2 - Organization Chart of Sales & Marketing.



c) the existence of the Planning and Services Division, which formally served the firm, but in practice - through investigation, research and reporting - exercised a good deal of power in the firm, far in excess of the relatively small number who worked in this part of the firm. (For instance when - toward the end of our research period - the Manufacturing Director was relieved of his manufacturing responsibilities - leaving him with Personnel - it was widely believed that the Planning and Services Director was ultimately responsible, through his investigative responsibilities.)

d) the final important distinction between this part of the firm and the Manufacturing and Finance Division, is that Sales and Marketing had no formal link with any Hourly-paid workers.

In discussion with people in the firm, our view that the existence in law of two companies was an artificial device with limited practical relevance and even less justification was confirmed. The relationship between the two was that Marketing and Sales (henceforth Sales) won the order, which involved the presentation of detailed technical plans, liaising with the customer during production, and was responsible for final installation. Production was carried out in the Manufacturing and Finance Division, which in addition exercised financial control. Also overall policy was controlled within the Manufacturing and Finance Division since 7 of the 11 directors of the Sales company were board members of the local group. The board of the local group comprised 12, of which 8 were full time.

The firm, especially given its size, has a rather complex structure, made all the more so by the variability of the span of control - for instance the Shipping Manager had 25 people under him, but the Works Manager (formally his equal) had about 500 subordinate to him. In addition to this, communication could be a lengthy process, as departments often talked to each other only at managerial level. It could be said that this firm is an example of Burns and Stalkers' mechanistic form (Burns T. & Stalker G. "Management of Innovation", Tavistock 1961.), in that

1) authority was concentrated at the top of the firm,

2) work is functionally specialized,

3) interaction, in so far as work is concerned, was vertical - between superiors and subordinates.

We will show that authority is perceived as being concentrated at the top in our research findings (especially chapter 5). The functional specialization in the firm has already been indicated by our discussion of the firm's structure. The final condition - that interaction was vertical - was, at least in part, due to the geography of the place. For instance works staff worked near to the shop floor, but all other staff are in a suite of offices separate from the point of production. This can be seen in the plant lay-out, fig. 3.3.

The product began to be produced in Bays 5-9, where components were made and/or sub-assembled. These components were taken to Bay 1, where 4 or 5 units of the product would be assembled at any one time. The product itself is large - upwards of 10 tons, so cranes were used in each of the bays to move components or sub assemblies around the bay or from one bay to another. When the product was completed in Bay 1 it was lifted by crane on to a bogie and pulled to Bay 11 for testing. If test was unsuccessful, and the fault was more than minor (which could be remedied on the test stand) then it would be returned to Bay 1. If test was successful then the product was dispatched on a large transporter, usually to the docks.

Hence the plant was a good deal of movement - which management realised was not desirable, and could have been avoided in a custom-built plant. However, as we explained above (See above, 1.), the firm had inherited its facilities which had been constructed for the production of another product, and had been designed and built many years before. The view of the firm's management was that they were doing their best with what they had.

The offices of Finance, Sales and Marketing were adjacent, as shown in the diagram. Broadly Finance occupied the lower floor, while Sales and Marketing occupied the second floor. Finance did, however, have a limited presence in the Plant as time-keepers were responsible to Finance for the calculation of bonus earned under the bonus system. Also the Wages office was first left out of the exit marked "way out (2)", conveniently located for Hourly-paid employees who reckoned that their wages were short.


The geographical division and functional specialization was overcome, somewhat, by joint committees and occasionally personal initiative. This, however, appeared to be rare, and functional loyalty was almost tribal

³ Checkland has contended

TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE

Fig 2.3 Plant Layout



In one aspect after another Glasgow, it is argued, had the worst provision of any city in the United Kingdom - in overcrowding, in lack of bathroom facilities, in unemployment (especially males), in the low proportion of motor cars. (S. Checkland "The Upas Tree" Glasgow University Press 1975, pg 35.)

⁴ The following are intended to be indicative:

- 1) employment since 1945 has seldom been above 95%, compared with a UK national average of 98%.
- 2) during the 1980's the number of full-time jobs in the region declined by 100,000.
- 3) to keep unemployment down to 10%, the population of Strathclyde region has to decline by 25,000 every year. (Figures from the Strathclyde Regional Report 1986.)

In other respects things are even worse, since Clydeside performs worst on 6 of 11 indicators of social deprivation:

- 1) homes with more than 1-5 persons per room,
- 2) most unemployed, economically active males,
- 3) most unemployed, economically active females,
- 4) fewest cars per head of population,
- 5) most economically active, retired males,
- 6) largest proportion of the population 0-14 years.

On another three measures the area performed only second worst:

- A) homes with no hot water,
- B) homes with no bath,
- C) homes with no exclusive use of basic amenities.

We could enlarge on this, but our attention is to provide background data on the research site rather than to look at the deprivation of the area as such. (Indeed it does have to be recognised that during the latter part of the 1980's much has been improved in Strathclyde.) Nonetheless, the point which can be made with clarity is that the area is economically depressed and socially deprived.

What makes this all the worse is that it is not something new, but rather a condition which has existed for many years - during the 1920's unemployment in the area was never less than 14%, and never less than 25% in the 1930's. This type of social history has been recorded in "No Mean City", and the ballet "Miracle in the Gorbals". The area, however, has not been assisted by this condition, nor by the myth of "Red Clyde". The origins of this are not certain, but can be observed in the "40 hour strike" in 1919 and more recently in "the UCS work in" in 1971. Events such as this have led, as Checkland argues, to the view that

there can be little doubt that Glasgow and the west of Scotland have acquired a bad reputation in industrial relations which compounds the difficulties of the region. (See Checkland, supra. .)

This problem has been addressed at least in part by the revival of the Glasgow City Centre, and events such as "the Garden Festival" in 1988, and the "European City of Culture" in 1990. While initiatives such as this have diminished perceptions of the area as "Red Clyde", this will remain part of the overall tradition. Nonetheless there is a clear policy on the part of organizations such as the SDA, Strathclyde region and the district councils to change perceptions held elsewhere. This may be argued to be responsible for investments in the area and the development of new types of work (eg in electronics at IBM, National Semi-conductor, Compaq, etc.). Through success in this type of venture we may remedy the deprivations identified, by providing more and better paid work. Directly, however, "the Year of Culture" provides little other than a temporary increase in demand.

⁵ For instance when work in John Browns shipyard, on the Cunarder Number 534, was suspended in 1931 employees were quoted as reacting as follows:

Well if they'd had the work, we'd have been back there.

We are used to not having work - if there was no work there was no work. You just had to thole it. (Foster J. and Woolfson C. "The Politics of the UCS Work-in" Lawrence and Wishart 1986. pg 86.)

Such statements are hardly typical of Communist revolutionaries, and despite the levels of unemployment (eg in Alexandria in the Vale of Leven it was 37%) there was no direct action of an overtly political nature. Yet in the minds of many the "Work-in" in 1971 is typical of Red Clyde. Historically, however, this is the exception, and Red Clyde is more apparent than real - more a consequence of over reaction by those who know little of the area, than the consequence of typical behaviour.

⁶ This point is made both by Reid (Reid J. "Reflections of a Clyde-built Man". Souvenir Press 1976.) and McShane (McShane H. "No Mean Fighter". Souvenir Press 1976.).

⁷ See Checkland, supra 18, pg. 64.

⁸ For instance as with "Working for Ford" by Beynon, or the "Affluent Worker" studies by Goldthorpe et al.

⁹ Letter 21/11/1975.

¹⁰ Martin and Fryer make a similar point in "Redundancy and Paternalist Capitalism".

Chapter 6 Footnotes

¹ See Chapter 1.

² See above Chapter 4.

³ Examples of the former would include the exercise of discipline, safety, moving employees around the factory, and, most obviously, pay. Examples of the latter would include investment decisions, financial policy decisions, decisions influencing the winning of orders. Clearly the latter group are of great significance, but their effect is less direct on the individual, and thus is less easily perceived. See, for instance, excerpt , where we discuss with a shop steward the difficulty in getting his members to take action over an investment decision, compared to a pay decision by Management.

⁴ See above chapter 5.

⁵ See footnote 3, above.

⁶ As we shall argue below this creates the difficulty that taking on this understanding would expose the Lifeworlds of Staff and Hourly paid to the same level of colonization by system imperatives as Management, which may itself be an obstacle to the achievement of the Ideal Speech Thesis and equality.

⁷ It is argued by Clegg that for power to exist there must be organization (S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989, pg 17). It is moreover highly undemocratic, as Abrahamsson makes clear in "Form and Function in Organization Theory" Organization Studies 1985 pp. 39-53. See our discussion of this below.

⁸ Clegg argues in "Frameworks of Power" that

To be invariably told, rarely asked, infrequently consulted, and be expected not to participate in the formation of these collective goals is hardly a secure basis for obtaining commitment to these goals. (pg. 135)

This may well be so, but we should still need to reflect that in general it does appear to work!

⁹ And our subjects are highly aware of the exercise of power over them.

¹⁰ See " Power and the Division of Labour " - Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Polity Press 1986.

¹¹ It is pointed out that,

"It is the ability of top decision makers to provide plausible and viable interpretation that allows their continuation"

" Organizational Adaption to Performance Downturns " - J. Ford & D. A. Baucus. Academy of Management Review 1987, pg. 376.

¹² See our own *Appendix 7* (above), and in particular the section on the media. Also see a recent article on the presentation of industrial relations news on breakfast time t.v. news and in particular the 1984 miners' strike - "Reporting of Industrial Relations on Breakfast Time TV: Industrial Relations Journal 1987, by Clive Hutt. He concludes,

" Within this (presentation of industrial relations news) there are certain traits which do not appear unhelpful to the maintenance of traditional relationships between labour and capital and which could be construed as enhancing established norms and values. " (page 98).

¹³ See footnote 6.

¹⁴ The similarity between our findings and the ideas of Habermas about the increasing dominance of technical rationality should be fairly clear. For instance,

" The growth of technological control in society ultimately implies ", Habermas argues, "an entire organization of society: one in which technology, becomes autonomous, dictates a value system - namely its own - to the domains of praxis it has usurped ". Quoted by David Held in " Introduction to Critical Theory ", pg. 265.

¹⁵ This is not, of course, to argue that technical rationality is absolutely correct. It is a set of values which holds good as long as its fundamental assumptions (its world view) hold good. When/if this ceases to be the case - when assumptions like the role of efficiency/profit/technical expertise etc. get challenged by alternative standards (like fairness/equality, or by some other value set), then technical rationality will be in question. Jaques has provided an elegant defence of hierarchy (E. Jaques "In defence of Hierarchy". Harvard Business Review 1990, pp. 127-133). He argues

Managerial hierarchy is the only effective organizational form for deploying people and tasks at complementary levels, where people can do the tasks assigned to them, where people in any given layer can add value to the work of those in the layer below them, and finally where the stratification of management strikes everyone as necessary and welcome (pg. 133)

There are two problems with this argument:

a) first of all, on this basis, the existence of hierarchy is concerned with the achievement of a particular goal - we can only assess effectiveness in relation to some further objective. It is clear, we would argue, from Jaques's argument that this objective is technical efficiency. As we have argued above technical rationality is a set of values which will hold good only as long as its fundamental assumptions (its world view) remain unchallenged by some alternative standard. Thus the existence of hierarchy cannot be predicated only on the basis of efficiency, since it too, being a "value position", can be challenged and as such is shifting sand.

b) Jaques requires that hierarchy should "strike everyone as necessary and welcome". What we have shown in our empirical evidence, and will go on to elaborate in the theoretical argument which makes up the bulk of this Chapter, is that managers and employees regard hierarchy as inevitable, normal and technically right and not something which can be questioned with any more sense than challenging laws of nature. Consequently whether hierarchy is "necessary and welcome" is not a question which is asked. Rather hierarchy is simply accepted. Indeed this point is recognised, to some extent, by Jaques, who argues

What we need is managerial hierarchy that understands its own nature and purpose. (pg. 133)

That nature and purpose, as we have argued, is technical efficiency, which is a position which can be readily argued. The implication of following the Ideal Speech Thesis is that there should be equality such that

1) there is awareness of the role of technical efficiency in the organization of work; and

2) there can be a fully rational discussion and acceptance of technical efficiency as the basis for work organization.

¹⁶ The situation may, therefore, be more difficult than Ford & Baucus (supra) suggest. When things go wrong, they hypothesize that the top Management team will be replaced. What we are suggesting is that if things go sufficiently wrong, sufficiently often then it may be Management as a role which finds itself getting replaced.

¹⁷ This is in contrast to the situation which existed in the Clydeside shipyards, when men would be dismissed on the spot, with no legal redress.

¹⁸ The role of technical rationality is apparent too in decisions taken by Industrial Tribunals. For instance, the Tribunals have in many cases emphasized the role of maintaining efficiency in companies, as an important consideration in arriving at their judgments. Thus if we look at the law of unfair dismissal, which is supposed to be the floor of rights for the individual worker, we can see that these rights have been restricted by technical rationality. In one case, where employees had their shift system changed by their employer from five to six days per week, the tribunal held that, in dismissing their claim to have been made redundant,

" an employer is entitled to reorganize his business so as to improve its efficiency, and in doing so, to propose to his Staff a change in the terms and conditions of their employment: and to dispense with their services if they do not agree".

Johnson v. Nottinghamshire Police Authority, 1974. Quoted by Wedderburn in " The Worker and the Law ". 3rd. Edition 1986, page 266.

¹⁹ We can see connections between this and Hunter:

"There appears to be a tenuous line of communication between the governors of our society and the governed". It is a situation he abhors because it "does not square with the concept of democracy we have been taught to revere" (F. Hunter - Community Power Structure. Quoted in S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989, pg 8).

Hunter therefore links with Habermas's emphasis on communication and on democratic structures.

²⁰ " The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas " - T. McCarthy 3rd Edition, Polity, 1984, pg. 306.

²¹ " Power: a Radical View " - S.Lukes MacMillan 1974. pg. 24.

²² An element in this is Ideology. We have argued already in this chapter that the role of the media is essentially, in our view, an endorsement of the perceptions within the workplace. We have already indicated in footnote 11 research which points to the media (in this case breakfast time tv) playing a role in supporting what are described by Hutt as " traditional relationships". We have referred to various studies of the role of the media in Appendix 7, which we concluded, led us to the view that their role was to support the dominant role of Management.

Now, it can be argued that this type of research overstates the role of the media, and in particular that the messages in the media are more diverse than is supposed egboth Paul Foot and Alistair Burnett appear(though the latter somewhat more often). This may well be the case, but whether it is or not need not detain us here. All we have to argue is that the logic of the message on the media and its parameters are such as not to offend against the dominance of Management. Thus, for instance it may be acceptable to criticize individual managers/managements but not Management as such.

The role of Management is simply part of culture - and to the extent which it has been absorbed by our subjects it plays a supportive role in the relationship between Management and their employees.

²³ This, let us be clear, is not to say that Management are unaware of their dominance. Our results point quite unambiguously to the fact that they do. What we are suggesting is that while they may be aware of their 1st and 2nd dimension powers, they are not aware (or not fully) of their 3rd dimension power, and its basis.

²⁴ "Images of Organization " - G. Morgan pg. 199.

²⁵ Clegg reports in " Power, Rule and Domination,

" Nobody could offer any reason why organizations should be like that. We just knew that they were, and to question this was to invite suspicion of one's intentionsTo persist in asking questions with such obvious answers is to risk censure of oneself "

"Power, Rule and Domination", pg. 84.

²⁶ This point is recognized by Schutz who recognizes that two individuals are likely to interpret situations differently

In principle the same events, objects, etc. can consistently have a different meaning for each of the partners. (A. Schutz & T. Luckmann "Structures of the Lifeworld. Pg 254)

Only when the interpretations become contradictory will there be conflict. For instance, if an interpretational thematic relevance is used which suggests that one is attending a happy occasion, while the other uses an interpretational thematic relevance which says it is sad.

²⁷ And within this we can identify conscious power which theories constructed around this phenomenon can analyse.

²⁸ We would argue that such constraints depend on the existence and operation on unconscious power. The analysis of this is beyond the limits of many theories of power which deal only with power of which the parties involved are aware.

²⁹ It is for this reason that we would dissent from Clegg's conclusion that one dimensional power is the most economical form of power (See S.R. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989, pg 18). It is certainly true that for, what we have called, unconscious power into place can be very difficult and costly. On the other hand to the extent that this has been done successfully events move with an apparently effortless spontaneity.

³⁰ This is not to say that only those below Management operate within this "cognitive prison". Management too are constrained in a similar (though perhaps more advantageous) way. It is pointed out by Rueschemeyer that in 1862,

"a report for the Zollverein, the common market which in northern Germany preceded the unified empire, identified issues of control and difficulties with managers as a significant obstacle to the further growth of enterprises". From, "Power and the Division of Labour"- Dietrich Rueschemeyer, supra, pg 57.

Hence at the time of this report, when as Rueschemeyer points out, the owner-manager was beginning to be replaced by the professional manager, some form of control of Managers too had to be developed.

³¹ It would not have been possible for Huw Beynon, for instance, to have written "Working for Ford" if this were not true. But no matter how much conflict Beynon found at Hailwood, the fact remains that it did/still does produce cars under the direction of Management. The problem with the development of theory in the area of conflict/consensus is perhaps, that as a reaction to the work of those like Parsons who focus on consensus and treat conflict as pathological, we have tended to treat (workable) consensus as too obviously / easily explained, when in fact, as we have sought to show, it is in fact a most fragile flower.

³² In this way conscious and unconscious power are related. As the model indicates, both forms support the hierarchy, but the latter does so by the creation of perceptions which legitimate the hierarchy, and thus (within the constraints which organizational rules create) allows for the use of conscious power. In other words unconscious power makes legitimate the use of conscious power.

³³ "Profile of British Managers" - J. Melrose - Woodman, pages 8 -10.

³⁴ Supra, pg. 10.

³⁵ "Managers in Industry" - T. Leggatt. Sociological Review 1978.

³⁶ "Who are the Managers" - R. Mansfield, pg. 18. In "Managerial Roles and Industrial Relations" - edited by M. Poole and R. Mansfield. Gower 1980.

³⁷ There is however, an extensive body of research into leadership traits which suggests that we can predict/identify the leaders from the non-leaders by certain of their personal features. This has been reviewed in Alan Bryman's "Leadership and Organizations" RKP 1986 pp. 18 - 35; and more extensively in B. M. Bass "Stodgill's Handbook of Leadership", Free Press 1981, and R. M. Stodgill "Handbook of Leadership", Free Press 1974.

³⁸ "Nature of Managerial Work" - H. Mintzberg. Harper & Row 1973.

³⁹ "Establishing Blissful Clarity in Organizational Life" - D. Golding. Sociological Review 1980.

⁴⁰ Golding, supra. pg. 771. This is a concern of Habermas, that specialist groups may be able to exclude others from dialogue through their specialist knowledge to which others are not admitted. This gives rise to what he describes as "fragmented consciousness". See our discussion in "Lifeworld" section, and in J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1986. pg 355.

⁴¹ "The Role of Management in Industrial Relations"- D. MacDonald Journal of Management Studies 1985 pp. 523-544.

- ⁴² " Contested Terrain" - R. Edwards, Basic Books 1979, pg 12.
- ⁴³ " Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction" - R. Hyman, Mac Millan 1975, pg. 25.
- ⁴⁴ D. MacDonald supra pg 534.
- ⁴⁵ " Management In Action " - P. Lawrence. R.K.P. 1984.
- ⁴⁶ " Nature of Managerial Work ", Mintzberg, supra.
- ⁴⁷ " Nature of Managerial Work " I. Glover. Unpublished Report, City University, London 1977.
- ⁴⁸ Lawrence, supra.
- ⁴⁹ J. Marshall and R. Stewart " Managers Job Perceptions: Parts 1 and 2 ". Journal of Management Studies 1981.
- ⁵⁰ Marshall and Stewart supra pp 177 -178.
- ⁵¹ This was a perception which emphasized defined areas of responsibility and objectives, constraints, and delegation.
- ⁵² This perception emphasized the setting of various priorities (Eg production, customer satisfaction levels).
- ⁵³ This perception emphasized the significance of change and adaption.
- ⁵⁴ A. Spybey "Frames of Meaning for Managers" Sociology 1984.
- ⁵⁵ A. Spybey supra pg 555.
- ⁵⁶ See page 556.
- ⁵⁷ C. Kerr et Al. " Industrialism and Industrial Man ". Penguin 1973.
- ⁵⁸ In other words, while we explicitly do not see our management interviewees as in any way attempting to mislead - far less lie - we would argue that underlying what appears to them, and superficially to be, a non-political (in the sense of using power) role, is in fact a reliance on power to a degree that they are unaware.
- ⁵⁹ Alan Bryman concludes in "Leadership and Organizations"

It should be apparent by this juncture that there is evidence that it is difficult to distinguish leadership from kindred notions of headship, the exercise of power and authority, and Management. Moreover while various writers have attempted to forge distinctions they have often not been embodied in empirical research... ("Leadership and Organizations" pg 7).

More historically, it is pointed out by Stephen Marglin that

It is important to emphasize that the discipline and supervision afforded by the factory had nothing to do with efficiency, at least as this term is used by economists. Disciplining the workforce meant a larger output from a larger input of labour, not more output for the same input. (pg 248)

The notion of Management as a purely technical function is echoed in the following

in the competitive market economy, only least-cost methods are technologically efficient....Hence the factory must have been technologically superior to the alternatives. (pg 238)

Both "Origins and functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production". (From "Capital and Labour: a Marxist Primer" T. Nichols ed.)

The importance of these two quotes from Marglin's influential article, is that the latter demonstrates quite clearly how an emphasis on efficiency and technical rationality can divert our attention from the power elements of the managerial role. As is pointed out in the former quote from Marglin, Management is not about efficiency in the sense of securing more output from the same input (improving the input:output ratio), but rather is a means of securing more input from the individual employee through the domination which the early factories allowed, and which more modern Management techniques have refined and developed.

⁶⁰ See for instance- Floyd Hunter "Community Power Structure" University of North Carolina Press 1953: A. S. Tannenbaum "Control in Organizations" McGraw Hill 1968, and "Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974: P. Bowen "Social Control in Organizations" RKP 1976. Moreover our own work points clearly to managers themselves regarding themselves as powerful. This is most clear in their own answers to the questions on the distribution of control. While they may have seen the difference between themselves and other groups as smaller than perceived by others, even in the perception of Management themselves they were the most powerful group.

⁶¹ See for instance

D. Hickson et Al. "Strategic Contingencies Theory of Organizational Power" Administrative Science Quarterly 1971, pp. 216-229.

C. Hinings et Al. "Structural Conditions of Intraorganizational Power" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 22-44.

G. Kenny and I. Palmer "Individual Power Bases in Organizations" Management Forum 1980 :

G. Kenny and D. Wilson "Interdepartmental Influence of Managers" Journal of Management Studies 1984:

A. Pettigrew "Information Control as a Power Resource " Sociology 1972, pp. 187-204; and,

" Politics of Organizational Decision-Making" Tavistock 1973

J. Pfeffer and G. Salancick " Organizational Decision-making as a Political Process " Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 135-151.

S. Ranson et Al. "The Structuring of Organizational Structures" Administrative Science Quarterly 1980 :

G. Salancick and J. Pfeffer "The bases and use of power in organizational decision-making" Administrative. Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 453-473.

K. Walsh et Al. " Power and Advantage in Organizations" Organization Studies 1981:

H. Wilensky " Organizational Intelligence " Basic Books 1967. This list should be seen as a purely indicative, but random sample.

⁶² See Pettigrew supra 1972.

⁶³ D. Wilson and G. Kenny " Managerially Perceived Influence Over Intradepartmental Decisions " Journal of Management Studies 1985 pp 155-174.

⁶⁴ See Wilson and Kenny supra pg 171.

⁶⁵ E. A. Lowe and R. W Shaw "An analysis of Managerial Biasing". Journal of Management Studies 1968, pg. 306.

⁶⁶ See for instance Child J. and Partridge B. "Lost Managers", who discuss the process of unionization of supervisors in an engineering plant and in a food plant. In neither case was there the type of problem encountered in our company with the reaction of Management. They do however point out that

although the absence of overt Management hostility in either company to the development may have facilitated its (supervisory unionization) progress significantly. The importance of Management reaction has been emphasized by several writers. (pg. 176.)

⁶⁷ The point is made by Alan Fox that

for Management to concede collective bargaining and other means by which employees or their representatives can participate in making some kind of decisions may well strengthen rather than weaken their control" (Beyond Contract pg 208)

Thus to grant union recognition may well increase rather than diminish Management control. John Purcell notes that by its

ability and willingness to deal with the sort of issues which trade unions raise in negotiation ensures that in the eyes of employees it is a "reasonable" employer which makes it unnecessary, as far as they are concerned, to ask more fundamental questions ("A Strategy for Management Control in Industrial Relations": in "Control of Work"- J. Purcell and R. Smith [eds] MacMillan 1979

⁶⁸ See for instance -

G. Bamber " Trade Unions for Managers ". Personnel Review 1976 pp. 36-41.

D. Weir " Radical Managerialism " : BJIR 1976 pp 374-388.

P. Frost " Representation of Managerial Interest ": in "Managers in Focus" - M. Poole et Al (eds), Gower 1981.

⁶⁹ Frost supra pg 117.

⁷⁰ Frost supra pg 118.

⁷¹ This is in contrast to the evidence presented by Weir (supra) in his table 7 (pg 333) which showed that about 3/4 of all managers in his study held unfavourable views of trade unions.

⁷² D. Weir " Radical Managerialism ": a paper presented to the SSRC Seminar Group on Management Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations, May 1976. Quoted in G. Bamber supra pg 37.

⁷³ It is important for the reader to appreciate that this was not merely word play, as on more than one occasion we witnessed senior managers instructing junior managers to ask senior stewards for information.

⁷⁴ Bamber supra pg 37.

⁷⁵ This sense of being outflanked can be found among the Staff of our sample and is an important reason for their unionization. It has been reported in other studies as well, of supervisors, that they have a sense of responsibility but no power or control. See, for instance M. Burawoy "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979, and Child and Partridge, supra.

⁷⁶ See footnote 54.

⁷⁷ This is consistent with the finding of Child and Partridge. Thus

In terms of their attitudes at least, the bulk of these supervisors looked towards Management rather more strongly than they did in other directions. "The Lost Managers" pg 184.

⁷⁸ Child and Partridge argue

the dissatisfaction which supervisors expressed in their jobs was centred on status aspects, namely their pay relative to other groups, their opportunities for promotion and their benefits and privileges. Supra pg 197.

This replicates too Mercer & Weir 1972.

⁷⁹ Frost supra pg. 126.

⁸⁰ This is supported by Poole et Al. who found in their study,

"Managers' commitment to collective rather than individual means of representing their interests is strongly correlated with membership, and is the second most important variable in the multiple regression. (M. Poole et Al. "Why Managers Join Unions": Industrial Relations 1983, Vol 22, pg 440)

It should be recalled that at several points in this study, and in particular in Chapter 6, we have pointed to a strongly individualistic emphasis on the part of the managers in this study. Hence, following the Poole argument we should not be surprised they have not unionised.

⁸¹ See Weir pg. 325; and Frost pg. 124. Both supra.

⁸² Frost supra pg 120.

⁸³ Indeed it has been pointed out by Guest & Dewe that,

"it is dissatisfaction with involvement rather than with terms and conditions of employment that is more important." (D. Guest and P. Dewe "Why Do Workers Belong to Trade Unions". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1988, pg. 189.)

Keeping in mind, Chapters 5 and 6 our results are in the same mould as Guest and Dewe.

⁸⁴ This point is reinforced by Child and Partridge. Thus:

Supervisors generally took a pragmatic view of their trade union membership. This was seen as a necessity in order to safeguard and further their interests in times when these could no longer be assured by their employer. Union membership was directed primarily against the "company" and not against the middle managers, some of whom were members of the same union." The Lost Managers " pg 194.

⁸⁵ It is argued by Kirkbride that

the concept of organizational or corporate culture has in recent years forced its way to the forefront of the managerial and academic literature. So much so that the 1980s seem destined to be the "culture" decade.

"Personnel Management and Organizational Culture: A Case of Deviant Innovation?" - Paul Kirkbride. Personnel Review 1987 pp. 3-9.

⁸⁶ By Pettigrew as

an amalgam of beliefs, ideologies, language ritual and myth (On Studying Organizational Cultures. Administrative Science Quarterly 1979)

By Kirkbride as

the "atmosphere" of the organization, or the attitudes, feelings and beliefs of the employees. Supra pg. 3.

By Gunz and Whitley as

beyond preferences of individuals for growth or efficiency, to the collective system which generates, sustains and rationalizes ... preferences and beliefs. (" Managerial Cultures and Industrial Strategies in British Firms - Hugh Gunz and Richard Whitley. Organization Studies 1985 pp 247-273)

⁸⁷ Deal and Kennedy " Corporate Cultures ". Penguin 1988.

⁸⁸ " The last Frontier of Control " _ Carol Axtell Ray. Journal of Management Studies 1986 pp 287 - 297.

⁸⁹ Ray, supra pg. 291.

⁹⁰ See E. Durkheim "The Division of Labour in Society", "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life", "On Morality and Society".

⁹¹ Ray supra pg. 295- my note and emphasis.

⁹² This point is made by Alvesson, who points out that research into culture tends to treat culture

a) as if the culture of Management were the culture of the organization. Peters & Waterman (In Search Of Excellence) and Deal & Kennedy ("Corporate Cultures) are both criticised for this

b) as if it can only be considered in terms of its functional utility, rather than its relationship to the truth. For instance Peters and Waterman suggest that organizations should encourage their staff to think of themselves as "excellent", even though this is clearly statistically absurd.

c) as something to be described only in positive terms.

d) as something which is always consistent even if it is in fact full of inconsistencies.

See M. Alvesson "Organization Theory and Technocratic Consciousness". De Gruyter 1987, pg. 206-213.

⁹³ For instance A. Athos and R. Pascale "Art of Japanese Management": T. Deal and A. Kennedy "Corporate Cultures": T. Peters and R. Waterman "In Search of Excellence": C. Hickman and M. Silva "Creating Excellence".

⁹⁴ See footnote 68 above.

⁹⁵ See, for instance, Henry Mintzberg "Strategy Making in Three Modes" California Management Review 1973, pp 44-53: James Quinn "Strategic Change: Logical Incrementalism" Sloan Management Review 1978, pp 7-21.

⁹⁶ Ray, supra pg 289.

⁹⁷ If we assume that it is a matter consciously thought out, then it may have, as Kirkbride suggests, strategic value. Supra pg 6.

⁹⁸ Reference 68, supra.

⁹⁹ He says

It is difficult to separate the concept of "good" employee relations from notions of culture and climate as they are so interconnected.

Kirkbride supra pg 4.

¹⁰⁰ R. S. Schuler "Personnel and Human Resource Management". West 1981.

¹⁰¹ Kirkbride supra pg 5. My emphasis.

¹⁰² Kirkbride supra pg 6. D. Torrington and J. Chapman "Personnel Management": Prentice Hall 1979 pg. 10.

¹⁰³ Gunz and Whitley footnote 60 supra.

¹⁰⁴ Gunz and Whitley supra pg 271.

105 One example of this, from Japan is given by Kono (Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises) who describes how the corporate missions of Matsushita and Hitachi have led the two companies in different directions. The former has a much stronger consumer and market orientation than the latter, which tends to emphasize technology and (Japanese) national interest. (See pages 64-67) Thus the strategic decision-making in these two firms is dominated by different philosophies, which emphasize different types of information, and lead to different courses of action. To some extent, therefore, the decisions which are taken are predetermined in advance by the rationalizes, not of the managers (as Gunz and Whitley would have it), but of the culture.

106 A similar issue is considered by McNulty ("A Question of Managerial Legitimacy" Academy of Management Journal September 1975 pp. 579-588) who, having rejected property ownership rights as being the basis of managerial legitimacy, turns to Locke's definition of property.

"Every man has a "property" in his own "person". This nobody has any right to but himself....Whatsoever he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property" (Two Treatises on Government pp. 186-187 - quoted by McNulty pg 585.)

McNulty suggests that Locke argues that property rights are vested in the personal contribution of employees to the organization. From this there are the following implications:

a) different groups of employees (Eg managers) make contributions of different value to the business - in other words that the property rights claimed by managers originate in that they make the greatest/most valuable contribution to the company. Indeed there is support for this view from Shepelak ("Role of Self-Explanations and Self-Evaluations in Legitimizing Inequality" - Norma Shepelak. American Sociological Review 1987 pp 495-503), who argues that relatively advantaged people will justify their reward by reference to their own worth (Eg "I am paid more because I am worth more") and that they see this as fair and just. While we would not deny this - indeed our own data from Managers in Chapter 6 tends to support it - the point we would wish to make is that it can become a highly contentious issue in organizations having a high degree of internal interdependence, and while there is support for this view from Managers in Chapter 6, among non-Managers this is not so widely accepted.

b) this raises the whole question of what it is that Management do that is so valuable. If we take strategy making as our reference point, then there are two possibilities. One is a conventional approach which says that managers are highly skilled and rational decision-makers, analysing vast amounts of information to take optimal (or at least satisficing) ex ante decisions. This for instance can be seen in many of the conventional theories and models of Corporate Management (Eg Christenson, Ansoff, Argenti etc.). Another view is put by Pfeffer & Salancik who argue that

"Management action operates largely with and on symbolic outcomes, and that external constraints affect primarily substantive actions and outcomes in organizations" ("Management As Symbolic Action" - J. Pfeffer in Research in Organizational Behaviour Vol 3 1981, edited by Larry Cummings and Barry Staw).

In "External Control of Organizations" Pfeffer and Salancik argue that the Management role is largely symbolic - it is about appearing to have control over the environment. This shares much with the ideas of, for instance James Quinn, and Henry Mintzberg, both of whom regard Management as an activity which is less controlling than the conventional Strategic Management models would (Mintzberg argues in "Patterns of Strategy Formation" that while firms may go through the conventional steps to produce a strategy, what they actually do in practice may be different again). To the extent that Pfeffer & Salancik/ Quinn/ Mintzberg are more nearly correct, then that may tend to devalue the way in which Management are seen to make their contributions, and as we argued in discussing Ford and Baucus (above footnote 8), this may tend to produce questioning of the managerial role. (See J. Pfeffer & G. Salancik-"External Control of Organizations. Harper and Row 1978: J. Quinn - "Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism". Irwin 1980: Henry Mintzberg - "Patterns of Strategy Formation". Management Science 1978 pp 934-938.)

Hence, while not necessarily dissenting from Locke's idea on property rights- indeed there is no inconsistency with our argument - we do have to dissent from the McNulty's implication that the foundation of Management's legitimacy is their contribution (the value of what they do). We would contend that this is only by successful assertion and that thus their position is by no means certain since their claim may be contested by others in the organization, who also contribute.

¹⁰⁷ This point is also made by Pfeffer who points out that

"a manager might be said to be constrained by the demands of subordinates, peers and supervisors while at the same time influencing these other actors through his or her own behaviours and preferences" (pp 3-4 in Staw & Cummings supra).

Management is therefore, not a free field, but rather one in which managers too are subject to constraints on the ways in which they behave. This does not, however, diminish their power - indeed it is one of its most important features. They too are subject to Plato's Cave (See above footnote 24).

¹⁰⁸ We mean by this that they consider control from the point of view of getting a job done, which is consistent with our earlier argument about their views of Management as an activity, as a job. Control is not about domination or power - it is a purely technical function. This sanitized version of Management is considered further when we discuss Habermas.

¹⁰⁹ This is considered in "Domination, Justification and Self-Doubt" - Richard M. Merelman: Journal of Politics 1986, Vol. 48, pp. 276-300. Merelman concludes his review of Psychology literature by suggesting that there are,

"several perceptual, cognitive and motivational tendencies which generate group conflict and domination under even the most egalitarian initial conditions. Once empowered, dominant groups employ a second set of social-psychological devices - perceptual, cognitive, and motivational - in an attempt to justify their dominance to themselves".(Our emphasis) pg 297.

A similar, though more direct point, is made by Pfeffer in "Power in Organizations" Pitman 1981,

"The theory that efficiency considerations, bureaucratic rationality, or both, drive out power and politics, reassures those in or entering into the corporate world, that their success in rising through the ranks will be more a function of their marginal product than of their ability to diagnose power distributions and play politics. Inequality in outcomes becomes justified by the presumed decision-making processes which produce such outcomes" (pp. 12-13).

We would contend that emphasise the technical aspects of the manager's job is evidence of Merelman's conclusion, though not necessarily that our respondent's are conscious of this as this "justification" may simply be a part of the manager's subjective equipment, as Pfeffer points out.

¹¹⁰ B. Abrahamsson "On Form & Function in Organization Theory" - Organization Studies 1985, pp. 39-53.

¹¹¹ This shares certain similarities with Habermas's thought. In "Technology and Science as Ideology" (In "Toward a Rational Society" - Heinemann 1971) he takes issue with Marcuse's critique of contemporary science and technology. Marcuse argues (for instance, in "One Dimensional Man") that the emancipation of the human species would not only free it from the domination of science and technology, whose results are being used for the legitimation of the existing order, but emancipation would also lead to a completely new science and technology. Habermas, following his distinction between communicative action (interaction) and purposive-rational action (work) to which science and technology belong, argues that emancipation would not lead to a completely new science, as Marcuse argues. Instead through communicative action, science and technology would be rationally controlled and directed by the abolition of systematically distorted communication. Hence, in the same way Habermas argues that emancipation does not necessarily require the restructuring of science and technology but rather their rational control, Abrahamsson argues that hierarchy need not be abolished but rationally controlled.

¹¹² See Abrahamsson, supra, pg 50.

¹¹³ For instance, to take a very simplistic example, no one really cared how the sales Staff got the orders in - all that mattered was that they were won on a basis which would allow the firm to continue. It was not the process, it was the outcome which mattered.

¹¹⁴ See Abrahamsson, supra, who argues,

The organization generates its own inner transformations toward hierarchy. However law-like this statement may seem, it differs from Michels' iron law of oligarchy in a critical respect. The appearance of hierarchy is one thing: its use for illegitimate or oppressive purposes is quite another" (pg 49).

¹¹⁵ This point is recognized by Culbert & McDonough, who suggest

"(1) Trusting relationships are a necessary condition for the long-term effectiveness of any organization.

(2) The Human Relations people were right, communication skills and empathy are the keys to trusting relationships.

(3) But, before good communications leading to trusting relationships are possible, one first has to recognize the political forces that are inherent in the situation, and then one must deal skilfully with them"[my emphasis] ("Radical Management"- S. Culbert and J McDonough, The Free Press 1985 pg ix.)

It is their argument that Management, even participative Management, is about Managers using their (special) skills, and thus in our sense using their power.

¹⁰⁰ See Stephen Hill "Competition & Control at Work", who points out,

"It should also be borne in mind that all levels of managers have an interest in the preservation of managerial prerogative, because this affects the scope of their own jobs." (pg 84).

Hence in using their jobs as their explanations of what they do, Hill argues, Managers side-step the issue of power, because their very job definition is an expression of power. On this point see also Merelman supra.

¹¹⁷ Page 13.

¹¹⁸ Robert A. Dahl "The Concept of Power". Behavioural Science 1957, pg. 201.

¹¹⁹ R. Emmerson "Power Dependence Relations". American Sociological Review, 1962, pg. 32

¹²⁰ M. Weber "Economy and Society". pg. 53

¹²¹ P. Blau "Exchange and Power in Social Life" 1967

¹²² J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness", pg. 22.

¹²³ W. Connolly "The Terms of Political Discourse" pg. 88.

¹²⁴ G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer "Who Gets Power - and How They Hold On To It". Organizational Dynamics 1977, pg. 3.

¹²⁵ B. Russell "The Forms of Power" in S. Lukes [Ed] "Power". Blackwell 1986, pg. 19.

¹²⁶ R. Dahl "Power and the Control of Behaviour" in S. Lukes, *supra*, pg. 40.

¹²⁷ In this way we begin to deal with the problem considered by Knights and Roberts. They argue that

pluralist examinations of competing and conflicting claims for influence and control in organizations are begun from an initial assumption of a balance of power and a respect for the "rules of the game" that maintain the system in equilibrium. In this way much of what requires explanation is assumed: the hierarchical distribution of positions that represents the formal structure of an organization and is the medium and outcome of the actual exercising of power is left unexamined (D. Knights and J. Roberts "The Power of Organization and the Organization of Power". *Organization Studies* 1982, pp. 47-63). pg 48.

¹²⁸ It is pointed out by Spender that Weber defines power as

one person's ability to force another to specific actions in spite of that other person's wishes. (J. - C. Spender "Industry Recipes". Basil Blackwell, 1989, pg. 16)

Spender later goes on to question why anyone would accept even the (Weberian) rational-legal authority of another

Weber argues that bureaucracy is the purest rational-legal form of organization....But given our democratic commitment to personal freedom, we must consider why anyone would voluntarily accept another's authority. (Spender *supra*, pg 17)

It is precisely this inadequacy which requires us to go beyond Weber.

¹²⁹ In S. Lukes "Power: A Radical View". MacMillan 1974.

¹³⁰ S. Lukes, *supra* pg. 23.

¹³¹ S. Lukes, *supra* pg. 51.

¹³² T. Parsons "Sociological Theory and Modern Society" Free Press 1967, pg. 308.

¹³³ As well as the implications which Parsons draws from it - for instance that the power of A over B becomes merely a precedence in decision making.

¹³⁴ H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations". Prentice Hall 1983, pg. 4.

¹³⁵ H. Arendt "Communicative Power" in S. Lukes (ed) "Power". Basil Blackwell 1986, pg 64.

¹³⁶ J. Habermas "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Power". In S. Lukes (ed) "Power" . Basil Blackwell 1986, pg 75.

¹³⁷ J. Habermas "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power". In S. Lukes [Ed] - "Power", Blackwell 1986, pg 88.

¹³⁸ S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination". RKP 1975.

¹³⁹ J. Pfeffer "Power in Organizations". Pitman 1981, Page 6. (My emphasis)

¹⁴⁰ This latter point is where, we shall argue below, Clegg (supra) becomes inadequate.

¹⁴¹ He tells us

 this consent emerges only if Management does not arbitrarily dictate choices to workers - if for example transfers are always taken at the initiative of workers and through the bidding process. (M. Burawoy "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979, pg 120)

Biggart and Hamilton show that

 in order to be powerful an actor must limit acts of power to the norms of his or her role, or convince others that he or she is exercising power within the limits of the role....Interpersonal power is in important measure a matter of getting others to view one's acts of power as acts of obedience to one's role...This obligation to act within the bounds of one's role does not decrease as one assumes higher positions of authority; a role may grant more discretion in how it is enacted, but there are normative constraints to even the highest level positions. (M. Biggart and Hamilton G. "The Power of Obedience" Administrative Science Quarterly 1984, pp 540-549.).

¹⁴² A similar point is made by Gaventa when he suggests that power can be treated accumulatively. He suggests the movement to be from 1st to 2nd to 3rd. We will argue that this process in reverse (ie from 3rd to 2nd to 1st) can be equally important, if not more so. (See J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press 1980, pp 21-22)

¹⁴³ G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1986, pg. 199.

¹⁴⁴ W. Gamson "The Strategy of Social Protest". Dorsey Press 1975.

¹⁴⁵ He considers, for instance, the "Little Steel Strike" which began in 1937 against Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel and Youngstown Steel and Tube. The aim of the strike was to force recognition of the fledgling Steel Workers' Organizing Committee (SWOC). On May 26 of that year, a march of strikers toward the Republic Plant in Chicago was ordered to disperse by the Police. Within minutes of the order being given, 7 strikers were dead, 3 fatally wounded, scores wounded and 35 Police were injured. The Senate hearing into these events (the Lafollette Committee) found that none of the 10 dead were shot in the front (7 in the back, 3 in the side) and that the first shots came from the Police. Gamson concludes by pointing out that, first of all recognition was eventually secured by 1941, and that the union (now the United Steel Workers of America) dines with the President.

Other similar events/organizations considered by Gamson include the American Association of University Professors (which between 1914 and 1922 fought for greater academic freedom, and tenure to prevent trustees firing teachers for holding unpopular views): the National Union for Social Justice (led by the "radio priest" Father Coughlin, which during 1934-36 sought to mobilise working class Catholics, farmers and the unemployed to influence the government to inflate the economy): the American Birth Control League which attempted to secure greater acceptance of birth control and to influence legislation toward this: the American Federation of Teachers which mobilized teachers to achieve better working conditions for themselves: Christian Front Against Communism which between 1938 and 1942, again led by Father Coughlin, attempted to influence working class Catholics, farmers and the unemployed to influence the government to stay out of European conflicts, but was also anti-Communist and anti-semitic.

Some of these groups failed (Eg those involving Father Coughlin), others succeeded (Eg the steel workers), while others were effectively absorbed (the American Association of University Professors).

¹⁴⁶ In this tradition he locates E. Hoffer "The True Believer": A. Kornhauser "The Politics of Mass Society": E. Smelser "Theory of Collective Behaviour", which Gamson describes as "the most sophisticated statement of this theory". Gamson argues that the Collective Behaviour theory portrays the behaviour of many protest groups as irrational. For instance Smelser suggests that such groups are motivated by a "generalized belief" which

contains elements of magical thinking and omnipotence. "The proposed reform will render opponents helpless and will be effective immediately...Because of this exaggerated potency, adherents see unlimited bliss in the future if only the reforms were adopted. For if they are adopted, they argue, the basis for threat, frustration and discomfort will disappear"(Smelser "Theory of Collective Behaviour"). For all his sophistication then, Smelser retains a sharp distinction between the essentially 1 rational action of routine politics and the oversimplified "generalized beliefs" by which participants in mass movements are moved to act"(W. Gamson "supra, pg 132)

¹⁴⁷ Gamson supra pg. 132.

¹⁴⁸ Gamson supra pg. 138.

¹⁴⁹ But perhaps just as interestingly would be seen as irrational by the majority of non-Management employees.

¹⁵⁰ Gamson supra pg. 141, see below.

¹⁵¹ Gamson supra pg. 141.

¹⁵² Dahl's study of New Haven ("Who Governs?" Yale University Press 1961) is a classic of this kind, in that Dahl examines the decisions taken by the local authority, and identified those who had won and lost in decision-making. This, however totally leaves out those who could not even gain admission to the decision-making system, far less being able to lose.

¹⁵³ This quite clearly has echoes of Bachrach and Baratz's second dimension of power.

¹⁵⁴ See also Knights and Roberts, supra on this.

¹⁵⁵ E Oberschall "Social Conflict and Social Movements", Prentice Hall, pg 28: quoted in Gamson supra pg. 137.

¹⁵⁶ J. Foster and C. Woolfson "The Politics of the UCS Work-in" Lawrence and Wishart 1986, pg 413.

¹⁵⁷ J. Pfeffer & G. Salancik "The External Control of Organizations". Harper and Row 1978.

¹⁵⁸ This has similarities to the idea presented by Gaventa (J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press, 1981, pg. 255) that one of the signs of the third dimension of power is that the powerless become so partly because constant defeat creates a sense of powerlessness. In the same way observing Management as the decision-makers creates a sense of powerlessness.

¹⁵⁹ Foster and Woolfson quote Gerry Ross (Boilermakers Convener at John Brown's) in his description of the decision to go ahead with the work-in.

Many of the stewards could not grasp the significance of the work-in, including even we among the leadership, knowing we were making a decision of this nature, and we'd no position in the past where we could draw comparisons with such a situation. We did not understand....maybe Reid and Airlie did, what the actual decision meant, what complications we'd be confronted with, and how gigantic a step was necessary to make a success come out of it"(Pp 172-175)

This is not to say that the stewards did not have the skills to use resources - the organization which they set up during the work-in denies that as well as anything could - but the point we wish to make is that at the outset their experience militated taking this course of action.

¹⁶⁰ And was subsequent copied - Lee Jeans at Greenock, Lovable Bras at Cumbernauld, and Plessey at Bathgate.

¹⁶¹ To such an extent that the Employment Act 1982 extends in effect the English law of trespass to Scotland in cases of industrial dispute, to enable factory owners to obtain interdict in the event of a work-in or sit-in. See K. Miller "Plessey v Wilson". Industrial Law Journal 1982, pp. 115-117.

¹⁶² D. Maddison, R. Allen, L. Porter. P. Renwick and B. Hayes "Organizational Politics: An Exploration of Managers' Perceptions". Human Relations 1980, pp. 77-83.

¹⁶³ The same area has also been researched by

R. Allen, D. Maddison, , L. Porter, P. Renwick, and B. Mayes "Organizational Politics". California Management Review 1979, pp. 77-83. This deals with perceptions by a group of managers of the personal characteristics of effective political actors

D. Kipnis, S. Schmidt, and I. Wilkinson "Interorganizational Influence Tactics" Journal of Applied Psychology 1980 pp. 440-452. This deals with the strategies they used in getting their own way.

J. Pfeffer and W. Moore "Power in University Budgeting" Administrative Science Quarterly 1980, pp. 637-653. This shows how power can be used to predict budget allocations in a University. A similar issue is dealt with by

F. Hills and T. Mahoney "University Budgets and Organizational Decision-making. Administrative Science Quarterly 1978, pp. 454-465.

J. Pfeffer and G. Salancik "Organizational Decision-making as a Political Process" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 135-151.

G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer "The Bases and Uses of Power in Organizational Decision-Making" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 453-473.

H. Mintzberg "The Organization as a Political Arena" Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 134-154.

The common factor in all of this is that while the parties involved are aware of the exercise of power, there is no analysis of why it is that power gets used in this way.

¹⁶⁴ Madison et al., supra pg. 81. This is an interesting analogy for them to draw, since as we have pointed out before, shop stewards tend to think of their power in a similar way - like a bank account, such that they had a "balance of trust" with their members, which they "spent" in influencing them to certain acts, and if this led to a successful outcome then their balance would be topped up, or reduced if not.

¹⁶⁵ Madison et al., supra pg. 87

¹⁶⁶ J. French and B. Raven "The Bases of Social Power". In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds) "Group Dynamics".

¹⁶⁷ Madison et al., supra pg. 94.

¹⁶⁸ M. Patchen "The Locus and Basis of Influence on Organizational Decisions". Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance 1974, pp. 195-221.

¹⁶⁹ Madison et al., supra pg. 96.

¹⁷⁰ H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations". Prentice Hall, 1983.

¹⁷¹ M. Crozier "The Bureaucratic Phenomenon". University of Chicago Press 1964 and

M. Crozier and E. Friedberg "Actors and Systems" University of Chicago Press 1980.

¹⁷² Perhaps we should say here "because they are not well understood" they are accorded special status. This point will become more apparent in the following section when we consider Habermas's concept of fragmented consciousness, where we can consider Management as being accepted uncritically not because employees are unable to understand it (in the sense that it is too difficult or complex), but because Management skills etc. are areas of knowledge from which they are excluded, in that Management skills are, in effect, an "insulated" area of specialist expertise. See J. K. White "The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas". Cambridge Uni. Press 1988. pg 117.

¹⁷³ Moreover, as we have pointed out above, the Managerial knowledge is insulated, excluding other groups.

¹⁷⁴ H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations". Prentice Hall, 1983, pp. 114-115.

¹⁷⁵ In this respect see his discussion of Hirschmann, who argues in "Exit, Voice and Loyalty", that an individual has three basic options

- 1) he can leave - exit
- 2) he can stay and contribute as required - loyalty
- 3) he can stay and try to change the system - voice.

Mintzberg focuses most on the last of these - voice. It is clear that organizations would run much less smoothly than they usually do, if those who chose voice were to outnumber those choosing loyalty (albeit of an apathetic variety). By focusing on voice therefore, Mintzberg focuses on conflict and how that can be controlled, rather than on loyalty (in the sense used by Hirschmann) and how it arises. See Mintzberg supra, pg 23, and, A. O. Hirschmann "Exit, Voice and Loyalty". Harvard University Press 1970.

¹⁷⁶ H. Braverman "Labor and Monopoly Capital". Monthly Review Press 1974.

¹⁷⁷ Dahl, for instance, insists that there can be no exercise of power without conflict - and even the Bachrach and Baratz perspective requires that power is exercised consciously.

¹⁷⁸ For the avoidance of doubt we are not arguing that Mintzberg, or Braverman or Gamson are wrong, or that what they are saying is not relevant. Rather it is our argument that they consider only one view of the superior:subordinate relationship, analysing from the position of the former, and how that role can be made to work. Our argument would be that if we treat power as a feature of a relationship rather than an individual capacity, then to be adequate we need to consider both parties to the relationship, and thus the perspectives of both as a gestalt and not just one side.

¹⁷⁹ T. Nichols and H. Beynon "Living with Capitalism". RKP, 1977.

¹⁸⁰ Nichols and Beynon, supra pg vii.

¹⁸¹ Nichols and Beynon, supra pp. xi-xiv.

¹⁸² This is simply one of very many, but see for instance Pg. 86 where a worker relates the effects of too many "double shifts".

¹⁸³ Nichols and Beynon supra, pg. 139.

¹⁸⁴ Indeed there is evidence of (a) in reverse, in that Managers told us that sometimes when work was being inspected it would become apparent that it had not been done as instructed. But on further inspection it would become clear that in fact the way it had been done was better - in other words rather than sabotage there was evidence that employees would use their skills to improve on the job. There is, however, a difference between our site and Nichols and Beynon's, since ours was much more concentrated and limited spatially. The consequence of this was that it was much more likely than in Chem-co that the Shop Steward would know about the dispute at the time and thus would be more likely to be involved.

¹⁸⁵ See Appendix 5, section on transfers.

¹⁸⁶ Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 115.

¹⁸⁷ Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 119.

¹⁸⁸ Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 120.

¹⁸⁹ Though they do recognize that conflict was limited in its scope:

...in this most modern of corporations, where a determined effort is made to process everything, both managers and workers find themselves covertly negotiating the reality of corporate production. Conflict and antagonisms are contained beneath the surface by way of tacit understandings and unmentioned limits. (Nichols and Beynon, supra pg. 140)

And yet, as we argue in the main text, could it be otherwise? The fact is that things work at Chem-Co, Zap and Zap X get produced and sent out. Perhaps we need to understand how it is, that despite everything, this still happens.

¹⁹⁰ See Nichols and Beynon, supra pg. 70.

¹⁹¹ In any case we have to be clear about what we mean by the "Management function". Do we mean the analytical/organizational aspect of Management (getting information, scheduling, writing reports etc.) ? Or do we mean the decision-making function of Management? It would seem to us that Nichols and Beynon have the latter in mind, but is it realistic to disengage one from the other, since the latter often depends on the former. Our evidence suggests to us that this is the perception of Management held by our sample, and that realising this, and that they are not trained in the analytical Management skills, it is more effective for them to seek to influence Management decision-making through making representation, which makes clear the policies, decisions etc. which they will/will not accept. Hence non-Management employees focus not on the Management function, because they do not see themselves as having the necessary and skills (whereas Management do), but instead focus on the likely outcomes of Management actions.

¹⁹² R. Harris "Power and Powerlessness in Industry". Tavistock Publications 1987.

¹⁹³ Harris, supra pg. 1.

¹⁹⁴ Harris, supra pg. 3.

¹⁹⁵ Harris, supra pg. 106.

¹⁹⁶ This is the conclusion also reached by

W. Brown "A Consideration of Custom & Practice". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1972, pp. 178-184. and

J. W. Kuhn "Bargaining in Grievance Settlement". Columbia University Press, 1961.

It is also an example of Nichols and Beynon's "nods and winks".

¹⁹⁷ Harris, supra pg 108.

¹⁹⁸ Harris, supra pg 108.

¹⁹⁹ Harris, supra pg 232.

²⁰⁰ This to some extent contradicts Harris's view that it is lower Management who rely on good will. See pg. 108.

²⁰¹ See above.

²⁰² S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination". RKP 1975.

²⁰³ S. Clegg, supra, pg 155.

²⁰⁴ F. Hunter "Community Power Structure". University of North Carolina Press 1953.

²⁰⁵ C. Stone "Pre-emptive Power". American Journal of Political Science 1988, pp. 82-104.

²⁰⁶ P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Decisions and Non-Decisions". American Political Science Review 1963, pp 82-104.

²⁰⁷ Stone supra, pg 88.

²⁰⁸ Stone supra, pg 88.

²⁰⁹ Stone supra, pp. 89-91.

²¹⁰ Stone supra, pg 102.

²¹¹ See above.

²¹² Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" points to many of the practical advantages controlled by the powerful.

²¹³ J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press 1980, pg. 255.

²¹⁴ Indeed this is further argument for caution on the rotation of the Management role, suggested by Nichols & Beynon. The potential problem is that if workers (or a group of workers) were to occupy the role for a period of time, and be signally unsuccessful, then this may discredit the whole concept, and simultaneously reinforce the role of Management.

²¹⁵ Abrahamsson supra, pg 39.

²¹⁶ In this there is obviously commonality with Nichols and Beynon.

²¹⁷ Another example of this is an experimental study carried out by Zucker (L. Zucker "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence". American Sociological Review 1977, pp. 726-743). This put (experimental) subjects into one of three contexts to be influenced in estimating the position of a point of light (the Sherif autokinetic effect experiment) - they could be

1) subject to influence by an individual on the position of the light,

2) subject to influence through being members of an organization with others,

3) subject to influence through a member of the organization being given a particular office (in this case the Light Operator).

In each condition - as with the original Sherif experiment - there were confederates who would seek to influence the experimental subject in a particular way, so as to give wrong estimates. Zucker found that the most effective condition for influencing subjects was the third - where there was a "formal office". This condition would be closest to conditions of hierarchy and control by a "boss". This leads Zucker to conclude that

Any act performed by the occupant of an office is seen as highly objectified and exterior (Zucker supra, pg 729)

This is consistent with the theory of the Lifeworld developed by Schutz, who in his discussion of the development of Social Knowledge as opposed to the Subjective Knowledge of the individual, puts an emphasis on the objectification which takes place as the latter is transformed to the former. Moreover, Zucker's results are not inconsistent with our own since we have found that the role of Manager is imbued with "special qualities". The limitation of Zucker's results is that she does not seek to explain why the office holder should be peculiarly effective as an influence.

²¹⁸ The use of this title for this section is intended to draw to the attention of the reader, that while we shall spend the first part of this section on the derivation of the Lifeworld (which is ultimately individual), the latter part shall be more concerned with inter-subjectivity.

²¹⁹ This point is made by Walton in his article on Sabotage in S. Cohen and J. Young "Deviance", Pelican 1971.

²²⁰ See footnote 110, above.

²²¹ Simon has argued

The question of where political ideas come from is not only highly deserving of study, but also within the competence of our contemporary research techniques. I join Bill Riker in commending it to you as one of the truly exciting and significant areas of investigation in our field (H. Simon, quoted in A. Wildavsky "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation". American Political Science Review 1987, pg. 1)

222 K. Thompson "Organizations as Constructors of Reality (1)", in "Control & Ideology in Organizations" - G. Salaman & K. Thompson (Eds.) Open University Press 1980, pg 232.

223 P. McHugh "Defining the Situation". Bobbs-Merrill 1968, pg. 3.

224 As Buckley observes

Social order is not simply normatively specified and automatically maintained but is something that must be worked at, continually reconstructed. (W. Buckley "Society as a Complex Mechanism" in W. Buckley [Ed] "Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist", Chicago 1968. pg 497.)

225 In this discussion of Schutz's work, we shall frequently refer to Schutz in the text, even though in many cases the work we are drawing on will frequently be "Structures of the Life World", published after Schutz's death, and co-written with T. Luckmann.

226 See above, footnote 32, Chapter 1.

227 Se above, Chapter 1.

228 It is suggested by Schutz and Luckmann

By the everyday life world is to be understood that province of reality which the wide awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense. By this taken-for-grantedness we designate everything which we experience as unquestionable; every state of affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice. (A. Schutz and T. Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974. pp.3-4.)

The stress in this on the taken-for-grantedness of the Lifeworld shows the relevance of Habermas's claims in that

1) in the Ideal Speech Thesis every state of affairs is problematic until further notice and that

2) in interaction, however, we behave as if the Ideal Speech Thesis is true. If we did not - if we entered into dialogue every time - there would clearly be chaos. For instance if somebody wished you "good morning", might you ask "are you meteorologically qualified to be able to say that?"

There would be obvious difficulty if we did not behave in most cases as if the Ideal Speech Thesis is true. This in turn raises the issue of the implications if it is not in fact true, but this is concealed from us.

²²⁹ This point is made by Husserl

The paradoxical interrelationships of the "objectively true world" and the "life-world" make enigmatic the manner of being for both. (E. Husserl "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology". Northwestern University Press 1970, pg. 131)

²³⁰ See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1986, pg. 129.

²³¹ Habermas makes this point as follows,

The members of a collective count themselves as belonging to the Lifeworld in the first-person plural, in a way similar to that in which the individual speaker attributes to himself the subjective world to which he has privileged access in first-person singular. Communality rests, to be sure on a cultural stock of knowledge that the members share. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 131.)

²³² On the other hand, as we have argued above in footnote 399, this begs the issue of what is success, and why it should be defined in this way.

²³³ Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 4.

²³⁴ See G. Morgan "Images of Organization", Sage 1986, pp. 199-233. The "psychic prison" is one of the metaphors considered by Morgan. He describes it as joining

the idea that organizations are psychic phenomena, in the sense that they are ultimately created and sustained by conscious and unconscious processes, with the notion that people can actually become imprisoned or confined by the images, ideas, thoughts and actions to which these processes give rise. (pg. 199)

²³⁵ It is pointed out by Habermas that

as long as we do not free ourselves from the naive, situation oriented attitude of actors caught up in the communicative practice of everyday life, we cannot grasp the limitations of a life-world that is dependent upon, and changes along with a cultural stock of knowledge that can be expanded at any time. For members the life-world is a context that cannot be gotten behind and cannot in principle be exhausted. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 133).

This of course at the same time points to the major limitation of Schutz's theory - that he does not fully consider the causes of this, nor the implications its limitations have for society generally beyond the level of the individual.

²³⁶ This point is taken up by Habermas, who points out that Schutz, beginning as he does from Husserl, adopts an egological consciousness as the basis of the Lifeworld. Thus Schutz does

not get at the structures of the Lifeworld by grasping the structures of linguistically generated intersubjectivity directly; but rather in the mirror of the isolated actor's subjective experience. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 130).

²³⁷ Habermas makes a similar point of Arendt

One may regard the method by which Hannah Arendt develops her practical philosophy - a method reminiscent of Alfred Schutz's social phenomenology - as inadequate; but the intention is clear: she wants to read off of the formal properties of communicative action (or praxis) the general structures of unimpaired intersubjectivity. (J. Habermas "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power". In S. Lukes (ed.) "Power" Blackwell 1986, pg 79).

²³⁸ This point will be taken up more fully when we go on to consider Habermas.

²³⁹ Howarth-Williams has argued this point (M. Howarth-Williams "R. D. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for Sociology. RKP 1977, pg 181), but see Schutz and Luckmann, pg 254.

²⁴⁰ R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 158.

²⁴¹ See R.D. Laing and A. Esterson "Sanity, Madness and the Family". Tavistock 1964, pp 19-20.

²⁴² This point is taken up by Howarth-Williams, who uses a case in Laing's "Sanity, Madness and the Family" to show how the family of a girl, diagnosed as mentally ill, was controlled in such a way by her mother and father that she began to appear to exhibit symptoms of mental illness. In particular the parents consistently denied the truth of any statements she made, so that when she was found to be unable to exercise normal skills of perception etc., it was not that she failed to exercise them, but that because of the control exercised by her parents she actually did not have these skills to use. It may be argued that if Management, for instance, deny employees influence in the decision-making of their firms because they appear not to be interested or to have the necessary skills, then the employees will have no motive and no opportunity to develop these skills. Thus they can be excluded because they are not interested and not skilled. See M. Howarth-Williams "R. D. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for Sociology". RKP 1977, pg 183. We shall develop these ideas later on in this chapter.

²⁴³ In other words it does not allow for the possibility that the content of the social stock of knowledge plays a functional social role, through its substantive content and its influence on the subjective stock of knowledge. This is a point we shall take up later in considering Habermas's "colonization of the Lifeworld".

244 R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 161.

245 There is no attempt to consider the possibility that the content of the social stock plays a functional role for society.

246 His discussion of objectivation points to conditions which are necessary, but are certainly not sufficient for the transfer of subjective knowledge into the social stock. For instance do certain individuals - media personalities for instance - not have a greater chance of having their subjective knowledge enter into the social stock. Schutz's requirements are necessary - being generally accepted and being passed over the generations - but they do not, we would argue, on their own, explain the content of the social stock.

247 It is pointed out by Habermas

Communicative actions are not only processes of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is "tested against the world"; they are at the same time processes of integration and socialization. (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 130).

248 It is pointed out by Bernstein that

an interpretation of reality cannot be limited exclusively to discerning regularities among dependent and independent variables. (R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 156.)

Consequently, he goes on to argue

what is lacking in phenomenology is anything that could serve as a basis for critical evaluative judgements. What is worse, it turns this lack into a virtue - the presumed virtue of pure description. (R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 168)

249 For instance a problem with asking people whether they are satisfied with their jobs is that they are biased to answer in the affirmative, since if they say "no", then they are open to the response "well, why are you still here?".

250 We shall consider such mechanisms in the following discussion of Habermas, and of Laing.

251 Clegg (S. Clegg "Organization and Control" Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 545-562) argues, quoting Marcuse and Perrow, that

control is best achieved by employing agents that have rules and rationality built into them through educational socialization.

252 Morgan (G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1988) shows the psychic prison analogy can have other features, in addition to those instanced above. For instance he shows that in securing organizational change, a change agent may have to

create transitional phenomena when they do not exist naturally. Just as a father or mother may have to help find a substitute for Teddy, a change agent must usually help his or her target group to relinquish what is held dear before they can move on. (pg. 222)

Thus, when change is immanent we cannot simply impose change - the group must be helped, in effect to expand (or change) the limits imposed by their Lifeworld. Thus developing a system of worker participation, or industrial democracy, would have to take into account the Lifeworld definition of Managers as "decision-makers".

Morgan presents several advantages which he claims are possible from this analogy:

a) it may disguise the extent to which what appears to be rationality is in fact no more than irrationality in disguise (pg 229). Morgan's perspective on this comes from Freud, but as we have shown, this is the very argument which Habermas, from his discursive theory of truth, would make also, since breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis give rise to decisions which are less than fully rational.

b) Morgan, referring to attempts to consciously manage meanings within organizations, points out that through the psychic prison metaphor, we can see how we all play a role in the construction of meanings which give rise to unconscious power - even if only in their enactment. (pg 230)

c) while Morgan concentrates on what we have termed the "unconscious" (the Freudian sense) he goes on to note that the metaphor can be extended to include all the ideological processes which function to produce and sustain unconscious power. (pg 230) It is in this specifically extended sense that we refer to Morgan's analogy.

²⁵³ T. McCarthy - "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas". Polity 1984. pg 358. This also points to other differences with Marx.

a) Most importantly while Marx saw any crisis of Capitalism arising in the economic sphere, Habermas (though not denying that economic crisis would happen) sees the possibility of other forms of crisis - in the administrative (or rationality) system, in the legitimation system, and in the motivation system, as well as economic system - and that it would be as a consequence of crisis in one of these that would cause capitalism to fall. While Marx worked in liberal capitalism, the capitalism which Habermas deals with is much more organized (administered) and the state now plays a central role. The state will

fill in functional gaps in the market, the state intervenes in the process of capital accumulation. It heightens the productivity of labour through the production of collective commodities (material and immaterial infrastructure) and through organizing the educational system in general and scientific-technical progress in particular. ("The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" -T. McCarthy. Polity, 1984. pg 364)

b) price setting by the market has been replaced by administered price setting, over which the parties will negotiate - for instance the price of labour will be determined by the relative power of the unions and employers, rather than by the market directly.

Through the system of "political" wages, negotiated on the basis of wage scales, it has been possible - above all in the capital and growth intensive sectors of the economy - to mitigate the opposition between wage labour and capital and to bring about a partial class compromise. ("Legitimation Crisis" - J. Habermas. Heinemann 1976. pg. 57.)

The point which Habermas draws from this is that organizational principle of capitalism has changed from the time when Marx wrote. At that time the organizational principle was the relationship of wage labour to capital (Ie wages had to be kept sufficiently low to allow the development of capital. The organizational principle which Habermas now sees in capitalism is that the quasi-political distribution of the products of society, between labour and capital (still a relation of capital and wage labour), should continue to be seen as legitimate. While the "economy" remains, substantially, in private ownership, it now relies on an substantial state system which "administers" the economy in order to produce adequate economic growth. To pay for this system the state takes part of the generated private profit in the form of taxation. This is used by the state to

a) provide various services (education, welfare etc.) for the population,

b) manage the economy (through adjusting economic policies, providing subsidies, advice etc.).

c) support and maintain the ideology of the Social System (Eg Habermas's technocratic consciousness - see "Toward a Rational Society" - J. Habermas. Heinemann, 1971, pg. 111) in order to legitimate the Social System

What is necessary to the maintenance of the Social System is that the it is seen to be "legitimate" by the population. If it is not then they will not be "motivated" to conform to the Social System any longer.

Crisis is possible in any of the four systems. If there is a crisis in one system, then it is for the state to manage it, and prevent it from reaching the point where the Social System is in crisis - or, as Pusey puts it, when

"the condition of a society is hard up`
against its own survival limits" (M.
Pusey "Jurgen Habermas". Ellis Horwood
1987, pg. 92).

²⁵⁴ "Introduction to Critical Theory" - D. Held. Hutchinson
1980. pg 286.

²⁵⁵ White points out that

the notion of the lifeworld must be introduced in order to link action theory more convincingly with rationalization processes. This means judging not just how particular actions might be judged as rational, but how the rationality potential made available in modern culture is "fed into" particular actions and thus makes possible a "rational conduct of life" in general. ("The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas" - S. K. White Cambridge University Press 1988, pg. 97)

²⁵⁶ See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2" Polity 1987, pp 232-234. Thompson argues

Actions are not only embedded in the symbolic space of the lifeworld, but they are also organized into functional systems. Hence societies must be conceived simultaneously as system and lifeworld - or as Habermas summarily states "as systematically stabilized action-contexts of socially integrated groups. (J. B. Thompson "Rationality and Social Rationalization: An Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action". Sociology 1984, 0g 285)

²⁵⁷ Habermas argues

The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible the emergence and growth of subsystems whose independent imperatives turn back destructively on the Lifeworld itself. (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity 1987, pg 185.)

²⁵⁸ J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity 1987, pg 187.

²⁵⁹ Habermas is scathing of those who would look backwards to traditional society for a solution. He argues that we can only assess the condition of contemporary society in relation to

the conditions of communicative sociation (ie coordination)..(and) "not in relation to a nostalgically conjured, often romanticized past of premodern forms of life. (Quoted in S. K. White - "The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas" Cambridge University Press 1988, pg. 109).

²⁶⁰ See T. McCarthy - "Translator's Introduction" in J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1" Polity 1984, pg. xxix.

²⁶¹ These are defined as

steer(ing) a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values and above all in those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that on Weber's diagnosis, have become independent of their moral-political foundations. (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 154.)

²⁶² McCarthy refers to this process as

decoupling action in certain ways from yes/no responses to validity claims, these media neutralize the usual Lifeworld requirements for consensus formation (T. McCarthy - "Translator's Introduction" in J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1" Polity 1984, pg. xxix.)

²⁶³ International money markets would be an example of such developments.

²⁶⁴ J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987. See Chapter 7, part 2, but especially pp. 270-2.

²⁶⁵ This is considered by Purcell (J. Purcell "A strategy for management control in industrial relations". In J. Purcell and R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work". Macmillan 1979), who argues that

a) management will seek to develop a facade of cooperation and partnership, which portrays conflict as unnecessary and indeed as irrational. (pg. 38)

b) to develop an image of managerial power an based not on property and property rights, but rather on an authority located in their (claimed) technical expertise.

Both of these can be seen in our results. Management certainly regarded conflict as irrational - in that there was a claim by management that everyone in the firm was pursuing the same interest. Interestingly this claim was confirmed by other employees in the firm, though there may be dissent about how to achieve these "identical" ends - but no dialogue to resolve this. The latter argument is central to our own, and has been central to our discussion of the Lifeworld. As we shall see this is a powerful obstacle in the development of more democratic work organizations.

266 Habermas argues

power needs an additional basis of confidence, namely legitimation. (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987. pg. 270.)

It is apparent that there are forms of power which do not require legitimation - violence is the best example. However, for a stable and on-going exercise of power, legitimacy is necessary. For instance even if we take the most vile dictatorships - even Amin in Uganda - there was a need for him to be perceived to be legitimate by those who actually applied the terror. A better documented example is Nazi Germany. On this see F. Neumann - "Behemoth: the Structure and Practice of National Socialism". Victor Gollancz 1944, who shows how the Nazi terror depended on an organizational structure of such complexity that the Nazi party would have a "block warden" in each area (Eg in a block of tenements).

267 Habermas argues,

institutions are replaced by compulsory associations and organizations of a new type; they are formed on the basis of media that uncouple action from processes of reaching understanding and coordinate it via generalized instrumental values such as money and power. These steering media replace language as the mechanism for coordinating action. They set social action loose from integration through value consensus and switch it over to purposive rationality steered by media. (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (1)". Polity 1984, pg 342.)

In other words as the Social System begins to invade the Lifeworld, communicative action - and behaviours appropriate to it - are overwhelmed by strategic action, guided and motivated by power and money.

268 Structural Violence is defined by Habermas as

Structural violence does not manifest itself as force; rather unperceived, it blocks those communications in which convictions effective for legitimation are formed and passed on. Such an hypothesis about inconspicuously working communication blocks can explain, perhaps, the formation of ideologies; with it one can give a plausible account of how convictions are formed in which subjects deceive themselves about themselves and their situation...in systematically restricted communications, those involved form convictions subjectively free from constraint, convictions which are however illusionary. They thereby communicatively generate a power which, as soon as it is institutionalized, can also be used against them." (J. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Power" in S. Lukes "Power". Basil Blackwell 1986, pg. 88.)

Habermas argues that initially the System entering the Lifeworld does not alter it. When, however, the System begins to actively intervene in forms of social integration, while it continues to do so in a way which cannot be experienced by social actors, it begins to "instrumentalize" (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 187) the Lifeworld which until then has been communicatively structured, and thus oriented toward achieving rational understanding. The Lifeworld distorted by Social System imperatives now takes on instead

the character of deception, of
objectively false consciousness
(Habermas supra)

In this way the effects of the Social System on the Lifeworld remain hidden, but nonetheless critical. The Social System having infiltrated the Lifeworld begins to impose constraints on communication in the Lifeworld, such that

interrelations of objective, social and
subjective worlds get prejudged for
participants in typical fashion.
(Habermas supra)

In this way, matters which should be subject to communicative action - and thus to having to show justification- simply come to be passively accepted. Hence for instance, particular social arrangements may, in a Lifeworld, distorted in this way, come to take on the appearance of inevitability, and being unchangeable - indeed may even appear to have the status of natural laws. Our data has shown this to be substantially true of hierarchy in many respects - for instance decisions about Investment or Financial Policy - but not in all - most notably on issues like Pay, where employees take a more independent line. On the other hand even in such issues the Lifeworld is constrained. We have argued that even in Wage disputes, the fundamental hierarchical assumptions of the Management:Worker relationship are not challenged.

²⁶⁹ See J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pp. 318-331, esp. fig. 39.

²⁷⁰ Our own data - see Appendix 6 - suggests that our sample considered this exchange relationship to be acceptable.

²⁷¹ This is derived by Habermas from Weber's work on rationality (See "Technology and Science as Ideology" in J. Habermas "Toward a Rational Society" Heinemann 1971).

²⁷² Habermas supra, pp 83-85.

²⁷³ Habermas argues:

The quasi autonomous progress of science and technology then appears as an independent variable on which the most important single system variable, namely economic growth depends. Thus arises a perspective in which the development of the Social System seems to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress.
(Habermas supra, pg. 105.)

²⁷⁴ Habermas supra, pg. 105.

²⁷⁵ Pusey argues

Science and technology fuse together into a new productive force that reappears, not as something that is man/woman-made to serve us according to larger and freely chosen purposes, but rather as an independent variable of development - a notion that is now narrowed to mean the economic development facilitated by the State with no other purposes. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987, pg. 91.)

276 This might not be a pure example of the Ideal Speech Thesis, but it would be a move in that direction.

277 See for instance T. Cummings & E. Molloy "Improving Productivity and QWL". Praeger 1977. Especially Chapter 8.

278 See our Excerpt 5.17.

Another example of this is the study by Brian Barr and Ron McKay of the "Scottish Daily News", though we would accept that it failed for internal, as well as external reasons.

279 Indeed we might almost distinguish between managers and hourly paid, on the basis the Lifeworlds of the former have been comprehensively colonized by the Social System, whereas for the latter it is a process of mystification.

280 By this he means

the tendency toward an increase in formal (or positive written) law that can be observed in modern society ("Theory of Communicative Action (2)" - J. Habermas. Polity 1984, pg 357.)

281 Until the mid 1960's the dominant view of UK industrial relations was on of "laissez-faire", which meant that the state largely kept out of industrial relations. There were of course exceptions to this - health and safety, payment of wages etc - but in general employment rights were determined by common law and by collective agreements. Since 1971, however, we have had an unquestionable explosion in the volume of labour law, with three different phases of legislation.

(1) The Industrial Relations Act 1971

(2) The Trade Union & Labour Relations Act 1974

The Employment Protection Act 1975

The Trade Union & Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976

(3) The Employment Acts 1980, 1982, 1988,
The Trade Union Act 1984

The process goes back to the report of the Donovan Commission, which was set up by the Wilson government of 1964-70 to examine industrial relations and make recommendations for improvement. Much of the motivation for this was (what was seen as) a rash of wild-cat [unofficial] strikes, and also to remove obstacles to updating technology in UK industry. (This view we would suggest is substantially vindicated by the eventual White Paper - In Place of Strife - which, while holding out certain rights for trade unions and their members, was directed at dealing with these perceived problems.) The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was aimed at bringing the "unions under the rule of law", and as such set up a comprehensive Social System of legislation which administered rights to strike, rights to claim unfair dismissal, rights to union membership etc.. (The failure of this legislation is well documented in "The Limits of the Law" - B. Weekes et al. Blackwell 1976.) The incoming Labour government made the repeal of this legislation one of its first acts - but then replaced it with its own legislation, which had been part of the "social compact" which they had struck with the unions to secure wage restraint. The objective of this legislation was to set "a floor of minimum rights" for all workers, irrespective of their trade union membership or otherwise. Additionally the legislation created new rights for industrial action. For instance secondary action was made more simple by inducing breach of commercial contract being made immune by The Trade Union & Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976. This legislation was since been reformed by the Conservative governments since 1979. (As well as the Acts we have referred to which have dealt with a wide range of rights - claim unfair dismissal, redundancy, written statement of contractual rights, written pay statements etc. - other legislation has been brought forward which deals with other areas - Statutory Sick Pay, Statutory Maternity Pay, Health and Safety (through regulations brought in through the Health and Safety at Work Act.)

Thus an area which had been largely free of legislation has over the last 20 years been extensively juridified - a process which few seriously consider reversing, and returning to "laissez-faire". The consequence has been to some extent to make employers and employees more dependent on the law to control their lives. For instance in the case of the former, the ability to prosecute an industrial dispute is no longer merely a matter of the relative power of each side, but also of the present rights enshrined in the legislation and of its interpretation by the courts. For the latter, his ability to get his job back after dismissal no longer depends so much on the ability and willingness of fellow employees to take action to support him, but on the Industrial Tribunal System.

Indeed the legislation on unfair dismissal is evidence of colonization of the Lifeworld. Prior to The Industrial Relations Act 1971, dismissal could only be challenged on common law grounds, and even then usually only on the basis that the contract had not been terminated lawfully (Eg without the required notice). The reason for dismissal did not have to be justified by the employer. Since 1971, employers now have to give dismissed employees (who qualify - currently usually those who have worked for them for 2 years) a reason for the dismissal, and potentially to be able to show that it is reasonable at a Tribunal. We would indicate that this represents colonization in that the decision to dismiss, and whether it is fair is not to be determined in communicative action by the parties, but by outsiders in relation to general legal principles. Moreover, it should be observed that it is the Lifeworld of both the manager and employee which has been colonized by the juridification of dismissal. But why juridify this areas of life at all? One reason is that dismissals can provoke industrial disputes, which is disfunctional as far as the System is concerned. Moreover it is a means by which employment is made less unattractive, in that casual dismissal is now less likely. See J. Habermas - "Theory of Collective Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 349.

Why have we juridified industrial relations? A reason, as we suggested above is for Social System reasons - Donovan was appointed to find ways of preventing wildcat strikes. The law has, to varying degrees at different times and in different ways, attempted to prevent industrial disputes. (The present legislation attempts to do this, by making it more difficult to organize a lawful dispute. The 1974-79 law emphasised more removing the need for the dispute.) The legislation has, however, also been presented in terms of fairness to employees- which has varied over the years as well. The legislation can be seen, at least in part, as increasing the non-pecuniary rewards to employees (Eg creating a more secure job). Moreover it seems most likely that if there is to be a move toward some kind of industrial democracy (Eg EEC proposals) it will be through legislation rather than through the action of workers in companies.

²⁸² Habermas tends to talk of "income from employment" (See J. Habermas - "Theory of Collective Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 320, fig. 39). We think this is rather narrow, and would rather consider the worker being rewarded in other ways as well for his labour - a "reward package".

²⁸³ The differing reaction of German companies and UK companies to EEC proposals for worker participation is interesting in this respect, since the while latter tend to see such proposals as a threat, the former see them as a means to improve participation.

284 Habermas discusses such problems at length in "Legitimation Crisis". Here he points out that there are four possible crisis tendencies:

a) economic - whereby the economic system does not produce sufficient goods and services

b) rationality crisis - whereby the required quantity of rational decisions are not forthcoming

c) legitimation crisis - where the required motivations are not generated

d) motivation crisis - where social actors are no longer motivated to act according to the meaning system appropriate for the Social System.

These should not be seen as being discrete, as one can feed into another. For instance if the state does not produce sufficient rational decisions (a rationality crisis), then there may be an economic crisis, since the state manages the economy for the avoidance (or at least minimisation) of economic crisis. As a consequence of this there may be a legitimation crisis, leading on to a motivation crisis. The crises should, therefore, be understood as being at least loosely coupled.

285 J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 349.

286 Habermas considers that rising real standards of living, and certain current employment practices are designed to have the effect of making the work subjectively bearable (QWL would be an example of this). The costs of this are then transferred on to the consumer. This is certainly one form of transfer which is possible - to deal with problems in the control of labour, by transferring the problems into the consumer market. This, however can work the other way - that problems in consumer markets can be transferred across on to employment conditions, leading to stable (or even falling) real living standards, and poorer working conditions. Habermas tends to see immanent crisis in the former, but in our view this would be by no means certain.

287 What Schutz describes as Specialized Knowledge.

288 See above for our discussion of the distribution of knowledge in Schutz's theory of the Lifeworld.

289 This parallels the earlier argument about the development of rationality. Just as Habermas does not see rationality as an inevitable threat, but rather that it is how it has developed and been used in modern capitalism, he argues that the problem with specialist knowledge is how it has developed and been used in modern capitalism.

290 In this respect the development of a more coherent system of Management qualifications, which followed the publication of reports by Handy (C. Handy - "The Making of Managers" MSC: NEDC: BIM. 1987) and by Constable and McCormick (J. Constable & R. McCormick "The Making of British Managers" BIM: CBI. 1987) represents a further support for the managerial role, since then the position of manager is not sustained by mere assertion, but by a formal qualification (which to the extent that it does improve management performance serves the Social System not only by easing steering difficulties, but also by enhancing the material performance of the Social System, and thus increasing its legitimacy)

291 White argues

In advanced capitalism, this splitting off of expert cultures helps generate a "functional equivalent" for ideologies. The latter had to facilitate social integration in a positive way by providing some overall interpretive framework for core aspects of social life. Today, however, this function is performed negatively in the sense systematically hindering "everyday knowledge" from even reaching the level of articulation of an ideology....as the insulation of expert cultures grows so does the incapacity of the average individual to make effective use of the cognitive arsenal of cultural modernity. ("The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas" - J. K. White. Cambridge Uni. Press 1988. pg 117.)

292 An interesting study showing such fragmentation is by Blackburn and Mann (R. M. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working Class". In Working Class Images of Society, M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.) who consider the types of belief held by non-skilled workers ("lower working class", to use their description - pg 132). The study was aimed at establishing whether or not there was a consistent right-left ideological dimension in their attitudes (Ie whether their views had a consistent structure). Hence they pose relatively straightforward questions, like

Most decisions taken by foremen and supervisors would be better taken by the workers themselves (Anyone agreeing with this was deemed to be left wing)

All Management will try to put one over on the workers if they get the chance (Anyone agreeing with this was deemed to be left wing)

Managers know what is best for the firm and workers should do as they are told (Anyone agreeing with this was deemed to be right wing)

The worker should always be loyal to his firm even if it means putting himself out a bit. (Anyone agreeing with this was deemed to be right wing: see pp. 132-133.)

The questions posed, therefore, were entirely of an attitude survey style, and did not explore deeper aspects of the thinking of these workers. Their results, however, have three important aspects for us:

a) a variable which they describe as "generalised demands". (which is defined as

a composite measure of nine items expressing criticism of aspects of their generalised employment situation (pg 137.)

This variable they found was

the most important influence (on ideology), followed by job satisfaction (pg 140.)

This, we would suggest, is consistent with our own findings. We have argued that the legitimacy of the role of Management depends on their claim to special competence - but to the extent that employees become critical of "their generalised employment situation", the Management claim to special competence must become all the more difficult to sustain. For instance if our own sample were to be critical of their employment situation either generally or in terms of some aspect(s) Eg their job security (which they were not), then they may begin to question the competence of the Management whom they work for. Our findings are therefore not inconsistent with this part of Blackburn and Mann's work.

The mechanism which we have suggested already is that to the extent that the management of a company run the company unsuccessfully (so leading to poor conditions, redundancies, lack of opportunity for employees etc.) then their claim to special competence may then come under scrutiny. In other words, despite the colonization of the Lifeworld, employees may begin to be able to see through the mystification and question management's claim to special competence, which at the moment is acceded to more or less automatically.

b) Blackburn and Mann report that

the higher the jobs in his (the respondent's) personal experience, the more conservative the worker. (pg 144.)

While our two samples are not directly comparable - our own drawing on a much wider range of employees than only the unskilled working class - it is interesting that even with a restricted sample, what is in effect hierarchical position (or at least experience of it) can influence thinking in a systematic way. Our own research has shown not only that Management ideas differ from those of other employees (which is only to be expected) but also that ideology can be systematically related to hierarchical position.

i) satisfaction with company information was systematically related to hierarchy, since the closer to the bottom of the hierarchy one was the less satisfied one was with the information received from the firm.

ii) when we considered decision-making we found that, for instance Staff were less radical in their ideas than Hourly-Paid employees.

An interesting issue in this respect is raised by Thomas who argues that Weber stresses

the creativity of the human agent whilst simultaneously asserting the congruence of beliefs and interests. The relationship of interests or social position to belief systems is not causal but contingent, the connexions that are subsequently to be found between the two are not causal connexions strictu sensu, that is they are not deterministic. (J.J.R. Thomas "Ideology and Elective Affinity". Sociology 1985, pg.43)

Thus, according to Thomas, it would be Weber's argument that the beliefs which we holds are not determined by our class, or social position, but rather they are contingent on it. This is a position broadly similar to that adopted by Beyer, Dunbar and Meyer who argue,

Ideologies are sets of ideas that evolve out of specific social contexts; they cannot be understood unless one understands those contexts. (J. Beyer, R. Dunbar, A. Meyer "Comment: The Concept of Ideology in Organizational Analysis." Academy of Management Review 1988, pp. 483-489.)

This position is also supported by Thompson who argues,

the concern with ideology directs our attention towards the relations of domination which characterize the context within which symbolic constructions are produced and received. Particularly important in this regard is the study of those aspects of social institutions which endow particular agents or groups with power in systematically asymmetrical ways. (J.B. Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern Culture" Sociology 1988, pg. 371)

Thus in this view, it is not our position which determines our (or a group's) ideology, but that our position is the context within which ideology is worked out.

Our own position in our research has been to accept that the ideologies exist, and to consider the manner of their use, and their effects. However, our own view, on the origins of ideologies, is instanced very well by the above quotations. It can be seen in the above quotation from Thompson, the congruence with the Ideal Speech Thesis. This position is elaborated later in the text.

c) Blackburn and Mann find inconsistent views held by their sample

the ideology items do not logically interrelate, so it is quite possible for a worker to hold compatible views on different items which are ideologically inconsistent (pg 148.)

Their explanation of this is that pragmatism [Which they define as,

a response to the specific substance of an item (possibly inter-mixed with confusion) pg 148.]

is more important for the sample members than ideology. We have not ourselves examined the views of our sample in this degree of detail (partly because of the magnitude of the data set, which would arguably make it unreasonable to expect them to be consistent!). Our reason for picking up this finding of Blackburn and Mann is that it raises the issue of what we expect of ideology as an operationalised concept.

Lockwood has, for instance argued that working class consciousness can be conceived as composed of distinct sub-cultures - deferential, privatised and proletarian (D. Lockwood "Sources of Variation in Working -Class Images of Society". In Working Class Images of Society, M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975). This has been criticised by, among others, Mann (M. Mann "Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class". MacMillan 1973), and Daniel (W. W Daniel "Industrial Behaviour and Orientation to Work - A Critique" Journal Of Management Studies 1969). Part of the criticism centres on the argument that, as Blackburn and Mann put it,

it is unlikely that they (the working class) can develop insulated and cohesive sub-cultures of the kind posited by Lockwood. (pg 131.).

The point we wish to make from this is that Blackburn and Mann too have found that the person's ongoing situation is a greater influence on attitudes and behaviour than abstract ideological ideas, or even any need for consistency. This is common with our own findings, as we have shown how the working situation of our sample exercises a significant influence on their attitudes.

Blackburn and Mann's finding still leaves open, however, the issue of how this happens. After all if it is pointed out to us that we hold inconsistent views we will try to adjust in order to at least appear to be consistent.

This is supported by work on Cognitive Dissonance. See, for instance, Leon Festinger "A theory of Cognitive Dissonance", Stanford University Press 1957; or Barry Staw "Attitudinal and Behavioural Consequences of Changing a Major Organizational Reward", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, pp. 742-751.

How then can workers walk around with inconsistent ideas in their heads? We would contend that this is another finding which can be explained by the unconscious power (see the following section for an extended discussion of this), and the Ideal Speech Thesis.

It is suggested by Blackburn & Mann that,

We need to know not simply the final result of whether workers are able to synthesize ideological contradictions, but also the process by which they attempt to do this. (Blackburn and Mann, supra pg. 156)

Hence, Blackburn and Mann argue as we shall do that we need to know more than just the ideas that workers have in their heads, but that we also need to know how they get their - what the process is whereby they take on particular ideas. Their recommended way to do this is,

intensive though structured discussions
with individual workers challenging
them about contradictory lines of
thought

or

discussions among groups of workers in
which argument is encouraged (both pg
156)

Both ideas have played a role in our own methodology
(though not groups of workers) - but of more importance is
the structural similarity between these types of
methodology and the structure of the theoretical Ideal
Speech Thesis. Through methods such as these we can begin
to approximate its requirements, and experiment with the
ideas it produces.

If, for instance, in a dialogue one of the parties
breaks a condition for Ideal Speech (Eg the use of one-
sided norms) then it becomes possible that that party can
convince the others of the applicability of two views,
which could, otherwise, be said to be inconsistent. This
may be done consciously, but it may be that whether or not
there is consistency may not even have to be argued. This
may come about if the proposal is made by someone whom the
Lifeworld defines as appropriate to make such statements or
claims. In this way the inconsistency can be concealed and
sustained through such a process of unconscious power.

This is consistent with the view put forward by Mann
(Supra). He argues

where capitalism becomes hegemonic and
eliminates "archaic" institutions the
diversity of forms of organized
consciousness declines among both the
working and the employing classes,
leaving both groups dominated by
moderate, segmented, reformist
ideologies. (pg 39)

It is also consistent with another element of our
argument, that Management (Mann's employing classes) are
subject to the influence of unconscious power.

²⁹³ This issue of the consistency of ideologies is also
taken up by Billig et al. in "Ideological Dilemmas". (M.
Billig, S. Condor, D. Edwards, M. Gane, D. Middleton, A.
Radley "Ideological Dilemmas". Sage Books, 1988.
[Henceforth Billig et al.])

Central to their work is a distinction they draw between

a) "intellectual ideologies" They define this as

a system of political, religious or philosophical thinking and as such is very much the product of intellectuals or professional thinkers. (pg 27.)

What they have in mind at this level are the formal schemes of thought of professional ideological thinkers (Eg "the New Right")

b) "lived ideologies". By which they mean

"ideology as society's way of life..which includes what passes for common sense within a society" (Billig et al. pg 27.)

At this level what they have in mind is the thinking of ordinary people trying to get by in their normal every-day lives.

This distinction is central because while Billig et al. accept that the former may well be internally consistent and logical, the latter may not since the dilemmas which "ordinary people" face in their every-day lives may not allow them to do so. Billig et al. argue

Ideology is not seen as a complete, unified system of beliefs which tells the individual how to react, feel and think. Instead ideology and indeed common-sense are seen to comprise contrary themes. (pg 2.)

This can be seen in the work of Blackburn and Mann and their emphasis on pragmatism. They report

The ideology items do not logically interrelate, so it is quite possible for worker to hold compatible views on different items, which are ideologically inconsistent. For example he may seriously hold a "left" view on workers' rights to profits, and a "right" view on workers' control. (pg 147).

They then conclude

it seems clear that pragmatism, in the sense of response to the specific substance of an item (possibly inter-mixed with confusion) far outweighs ideology for our sample (pg. 148)

Both, it seems to us, are taking the view that people lead lives which can be confusing, and expecting them to be entirely consistent is probably expecting too much. Moreover, it is pointed out by Billig et al., that the confusions and paradoxes which we face are important for the development of our thought. They argue,

Without contrary themes, individuals could neither puzzle over their social worlds nor experience dilemmas. And without this so much thought would be impossible. (Billig et al. pg 2)

Thus to the extent that a thematic relevance lets us down, we would review this, identify the problem and develop another thematic relevance (This process is described by Schutz as follows

derivations of the relevance structures predominant in the relative natural world view, structures which are filtered through a specific historical social structure. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 260.).

Thus Billig et al. see the individual,

thinking, but within the constraints of ideology and with the elements of ideology. (pg 27.)

This is not inconsistent with our own argument up to now, but what we do wish to take issue with is what follows,

Thus ideologies in everyday life should not be equated with the concealment, or prevention of thought. (pg 27.)

The problem here, we would suggest, is that Billig et al. have fallen into the same trap of which they criticise others. They are critical (rightly in our view) of studies which expect of "lived ideologies" used by social actors should show the consistency of "intellectual ideologies". This is, we would agree, unreasonable in most cases. On the other hand, having shown that there is a greater disparity in thought than has been identified in many cases, and given (in our view) an acceptable explanation for this variation they then confuse

a) the degree of variation of thought which is possible, with

b) complete freedom to think - or at least with the avoidance of "concealment or prevention of thought".

This, in our view, does not by any means follow logically as we would argue that individuals may be allowed the freedom to think only within certain parameters. In other words the fact that, as Billig et al. have shown, ideologies are not uni-dimensional in their structure, but are rather more broadly structured does not prevent ideology operating in a constraining manner - as they themselves recognize|

thinking within the constraints of
ideology. (pg 27.)

While ideology allow a diversity of thought this is not to say that it cannot create limits. To the extent it does so means certain ideas do not get developed (Eg the ideologies we employ may define them as not relevant or important). Hence while ideology may be more diverse than may have been allowed, to the extent it imposes parameters on our thought, Which is accepted by Billig et al. For instance in discussing Education (pp.43-64), they point out that there are really only two competing ideologies - progressive and traditional. Thus it is less likely that ideas inconsistent with either ideology could emerge. Moreover, it means that the stock of ideas available to educationalists is restricted to the ideas coming from these two - even if the educationalists do draw on them in contradictory ways. In this way ideology becomes a form of power.

This is not to say that ideology cannot operate where power is a conscious. Many studies illustrate situations where ideology operates in situations where the participants are all aware of the operation of power. Let us consider some examples where ideology operates in situations of conscious power.

Amstrong, Goodman and Hyman ("Ideology and Shop-Floor Industrial Relations". Croom Helm 1981. henceforth Armstrong et al.) consider the role of competing ideologies in the context of the ongoing employment relationship.

They suggest,

whilst it may be true in the long run
and at the society wide level that
legitimation is ultimately
subordinate to questions of power and
interests, in the short run and at the
level of the workplace the means of
legitimation appear much more as a
"given".(Supra pg. 15.)

We do not wish to dissent from the initial part of this - that at the level of society, and in the long run, the ability to secure legitimacy depends on power. What concerns us is the extent to which they distinguish, or disengage short and long run, and the level of society and the work place. To the extent that claims for legitimacy compete at the level of the work-place, they do so according to rules - which Armstrong et al. go on to identify - but these rules are, we would suggest, a form of power in themselves, though as we have shown the parties are not necessarily and/or fully aware of this. It puzzles us that this point appears to have escaped the authors, since the short term is only a moment in the long term, and the role of power in the long term is acknowledged explicitly.

Thus the struggle to secure legitimacy in the short term takes place in the context of the longer term power structure. This is not to say, of course, that there is no possibility of change - that the dominant side will always remain so - but rather that the dominant side will always start off with an advantage. Thus it is difficult to see how we can disengage short term/work-place conflict over legitimisation from long term/societal power structures, in the way that Armstrong et al. appear to suggest., with success being attributed to the ability to secure legitimisation. The ability to do so, they tell us, depends on three factors:

a) the availability of legitimising principles in the culture of Managers and workers, which act as a constraint on the ability of either side to put forward ideas/justifications etc. depending on the availability of suitable principle(s). This in many ways parallels our own research, in that what we have tried to do is to identify the principles which legitimise Management's perceived right to take decisions etc.. In other words, success through ideology is dependent on our ability to select the more appropriate ideas. (In this respect we diverge from Armstrong, in that not only do we have to recognize that there is an advantage to Management in that the available stock of ideas tend to advantage them, but that the rules by which ideas are deployed are also to the advantage of Management. This idea is developed in the next paragraph, in relation to ideas of Structural Violence.)

b) the ability to mobilise legitimisation, both in convincing members, but also managers of the "correctness" of an argument. Armstrong et al. say,

while the mobilisation dimension (convincing the members) is a precondition for making rules, the importance of the tactical dimension (convincing the managers) depends very much on the balance of power. (Armstrong et al. pg 37.)

The difficulty we see in these is that they ignore at least part of the power structure - that element the parties are unaware of. Returning to the Ideal Speech Thesis we can see, using it as our bench-mark, that the environment_in which the Steward would have to mobilise legitimisation is even less equal than it would appear because of the procedural advantages accorded to Management.

This is similar to the arguments made earlier using the concept of Structural Violence. Habermas, it will be recalled, defines it as follows:

Structural violence does not manifest itself as force; rather unperceived, it blocks those communications in which convictions effective for legitimation are formed and passed on. Such an hypothesis about inconspicuously working communication blocks can explain, perhaps, the formation of ideologies; with it one can give a plausible account of how convictions are formed in which subjects deceive themselves about themselves and their situation...in systematically restricted communications, those involved form convictions subjectively free from constraint, convictions which are however illusory. They thereby communicatively generate a power which, as soon as it is institutionalized, can also be used against them." (J. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Power" in S. Lukes "Power". Basil Blackwell 1986, pg. 88.)

We would have preferred Armstrong et al. to have explored to what extent the ideologies restrict the action of Stewards, or the extent to which Managers have more principles available to them, than there are for Stewards. The analogy of the perfect market is relevant here, since while Armstrong et al. do not treat the market for ideas as perfect, we would contend it is rather more imperfect than they allow.

c) the ability to publicly legitimise our view. In other words the ability to convince others that what you are trying to do, or are proposing etc. is legitimate. Armstrong et al. give as an example a worker who objects to a new management rule but can find no publicly acceptable legitimising principle for his objection. Thus he is unable to mobilise his fellow workers behind him to protest about this new rule - they would not see it as "right".

The problem we see in this is that while, as Armstrong et al. argue, legitimacy can be contested, we cannot consider only the fact of success and failure - we have to explore why one group may be consistently more/less successful. This is similar to the criticism of Dahl by Bachrach and Barartz. Their view is that conscious power cannot be considered simply from the point of view of who wins and who loses - in other words to explain what has happened - but that we have to also consider the possibility that power is used to prevent things happening - for instance that power is used to prevent certain issues entering into the decision-making system. The problem with Armstrong et al. is similar in terms of the structure of their argument. They seek to identify situations in which legitimacy may be contested, but do not consider the form of the rules for this contest, and the possibility that the rules systematically favour one side over another (Ie Structural Violence again). This, as we have argued, involves a consideration of more than just conscious power.

This is not to say, however, that they do not consider the role that unconscious power can play. Later on in the book they say,

The unproblematic exercise of management power is founded in an ideology which confirms its legitimacy. Based among other things on... claims to special competence on the part of management. (pg 40)

They also quote Storey, who argues that what may appear to be a challenge to the power of Management is in fact an attempt to set limits on it (See J. Storey "Workplace Collective Bargaining and Managerial Prerogatives". Industrial Relations Journal 1976-1977, pp. 40-55.). The difficulty is that this is not followed up to an adequate degree in the analysis. The struggle of ideologies in Armstrong et al. takes place in a market which appears to be nearer perfection than we have found. Their view, we think, is suspiciously naive.

So how does ideology work in the view of Armstrong et al.? They give two main reasons for Management perceiving themselves to be legitimate:

a) the law itself through ownership, company law, contract of employment, the right to recruit and dismiss etc. The problem with this as a foundation, we have found is that our own sample of managers tended to see themselves as workers too. The role of the legal system was not to give them rights, but to give responsibilities and obligations. The law was not important for its connections to ownership.

b) functional responsibility. This is typified in the following:

You change tools when I tell you, not when Ken tells you. I'm responsible for production and he's not. (Armstrong et al. pg. 67.)

The problem with this is that this is precisely the point of management authority - a manager would have the authority to tell a worker when to change tools, but the issues are surely:

i) why he feels he has the legitimate right to do so? and

ii) why the worker obeys?

The deficiency with Armstrong et al's analysis is that it does not go into sufficient depth here. For instance,

Typically managers do not justify their decision-making prerogatives explicitly: they simply assume them. (Armstrong et al. pg 66.)

But, why do Managers do this, what is it about their thinking, and how do they get away with it? Questions such as these are not fully addressed in this analysis, rather it stays at the level of a description of the principles which are employed. These include

a) Consistency - that if, for instance, all workers are treated in the same way in the same circumstances, then that leads to legitimacy. So, to take one of their examples, two workers with equally bad time-keeping records should be treated in the same way. This, however, only gives us the justification, or the principle which the manager uses, but it tells us nothing of why/how the workers come to accept it. In this analysis consistency is a principle leading to legitimacy. Period.

b) Precedent - that a decision made in the past can be used in the future to justify/argue for a decision in the future. This is an even more difficult area. Even in the formality of the legal system, in any case there are likely to be several precedents available, and which one you argue for will depend on whether you are defence or prosecution. Thus in any dispute etc. what is to be taken to be the appropriate precedent? If the manager is to decide that, why should his judgement be accepted? In other words why particular precedents work is not addressed in this analysis.

c) Fairness - what this means depends as Hyman & Brough point on whether we mean fairness between managers and workers, or between workers (R. Hyman & I. Brough "Social Values and Industrial Relations" Blackwell, 1975.). In the view of Armstrong et al. the former is relatively unimportant. While discussing the form of a new bonus as part of a cost saving scheme, they report that the workers did not chose to question the company's share of the savings being 25%. While this may be remarkable in itself, it is no less remarkable than that the authors do not consider why this happened. (See Armstrong et al., pg 102). This contrasts to some extent with our own sample, who did give voice to a sense of unfairness. For instance the Shop Steward who complained of the lack of information, and that "some people just seemed to waddle about". Yet in practical terms this was accepted - even the Shop Steward only wanted to know, to be able to find out. Why was it accepted? For the reasons we have spoken of already - Management were the ones with the skills, experience and knowledge to be in charge. On the other hand the importance of fairness between workers is similar to our findings, most especially the perceived injustices on the part of Hourly- Paid workers in relation to their conditions of employment relative to Staff.

d) Relevance - that Management only exercise their authority in areas relevant to doing the job, or to employment. An example which they give is parallel to events in our own firm. This is where they describe the problem of one company to get (in their case) the girls to wear safety glasses in a hazardous area, because they were uncomfortable. Exactly the same thing happened in our firm, where it was very difficult to wear their safety glasses. This, however, points to another portion of our analysis - namely that while management (even in an ideal world) may have the perceived right to take decisions, Hourly-Paid and Staff would still resist if the outcome of these decisions was against their interests. In the case of wearing safety glasses, this was against their interests, since they were (are?) uncomfortable to wear, even for a short time, never mind all day. Hence while Management may have had the perceived right to take the decision (as decision-makers) they had the right to object to it. Now this points to further problems with Armstrong et al., since up to now we have considered areas where Management have won out, but now we come up against one where they do not - or at least not without appealing to other, different principles. On this see Armstrong et al. pg 105, where they tell of a foreman who gets his group to stagger their smoking breaks so that the manager does not come down to find all the machines off at once.

At the immediate level of course these requests are in the interests of the workers themselves but at another level they depend on the workers accepting the legitimacy of sparing HIS feeling.

Yes that is the question - but they never get round to giving an answer to it. We have ourselves found similar situations - for instance workers found drinking tea/coffee outside normal breaks would put it down, because in their view they recognized that they should have been working and were prepared to accept the authority of the manager/foreman to put them back to work. Why should Management have this power? Because they are the decision-makers -they are the ones with the task of running the company..

e) Humanitarian and Ethical Standards. This final category is in essence what is seen to be right in a moral sense. An example which they give is a situation where the lavatory cleaner was about to be sacked a week before Christmas. In this case the success of the steward was to postpone the sacking until the week after Christmas. All the principles we have considered up to now are essentially internal, or within the firm. This category involves bringing in from outside, a wider social code - basically doing the (moral) right thing. Perhaps we could ask why this does not happen more often - that is why workers do not employ such standards more than they seem to do? Once again this parallels our own work, which showed the acceptance of hierarchy to be substantially an internally (to the firm) generated phenomenon, with the world outwith the firm making little contribution.

The problem we have with these principles is that while we would concede that they do occur, and are used (indeed we have ourselves found similar -and in one case identical - events), there is no attempt made to establish why, or how they work. In effect what Armstrong et al. have done is to explore in some detail the way the game is played just now, rather than why we play it this way, and what the possibilities are for another game? Another example of similar research is from Kirkbride. (See Paul Kirkbride "Legitimising Arguments and Worker Resistance". Employee Relations 1988, pp. 28-31). He suggests that worker resistance can take two forms - where workers resist a management rule/decision, and where they dispute statements of management authority. The restriction is, however, that like for instance Dahl, Kirkbride restricts himself to situations of resistance, where there will be an awareness of conflict and power.

The difficulty with the position of these authors is that they focus on situations where there is awareness of the use of power. This type of position, as we have tried to show, does not exhaust all the potential explanatory potential of power. In particular it does not recognize that the power of ideology is

a) most potent to prevent the need to exercise power, for instance to convince employees that a particular union policy is extreme, and thus reduce the possibility of industrial action.

b) nonetheless effective when the above fails, because it may then be used to restrict the forms which the conflict takes, or to restrict the forms of exercise of power. McCarthy argues (following Habermas),

there is a tendency to sublimate social processes entirely into cultural traditions and to reduce sociology to the interpretation of transmitted meanings. If however culture is viewed in relation to the social, political and economic conditions of life, it loses the appearance of self sufficiency. It becomes evident that the traditional meanings can conceal and distort, as well as reveal and express these conditions. (T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas". pg. 183) My emphasis.)

The tradition which Armstrong et al. have worked in is the former, while we have worked through the latter (emphasised) tradition. Hence we would endorse the conclusion of Nichols and Armstrong in "Workers Divided",

they (the workers at ChemCo) were a divided workforce: that these men and women lacked solidarity; that they exercised only meagre control over their lives at work; and that their trade union and political consciousness were weakly developed. (T. Nichols and P. Armstrong "Workers Divided", Fontana 1976 pg. 211.)

However, while we may agree that,

these workers didn't act as fully conscious agents engaged in class struggle (pg 211)

we would not necessarily agree with the conclusion that,

the management did, whilst protesting to the contrary (pg 211).

since it has been our view that both Management and their employees are enfolded in the structure of ideas. In other words the thinking of Management is likewise restricted, so for example both Management and other Employees regarded Management taking decisions as right and proper (though not necessarily the extent to which Employees should be able to exercise influence).

The problem with this aspect of Armstrong et al.'s analysis is that ideology, and the role of ideas, is substantially just taken to be powerful - the fact that the workers are prepared to accept certain ideas gives Management power which is certainly true. A position such as this, however creates definite problems:

a) what is it about these ideas which makes them powerful? (We mean by this more than simply acceptance of the Management role, but rather the manner in which certain ideas yield power - Eg Management as decision-makers.)

b) how do they get absorbed or accepted - what is the mechanism? Why are they accepted? (The difficulty with much of the writing on ideology - and the source of much persistent criticism - is that it fails to show how the ideas are absorbed and accepted - they just are.)

Let us deal first of all with the former problem. We shall do so from the perspective of the Ideal Speech Thesis, which requires that the parties to a dialogue should be formally equal through

a) all the participants to the discourse having the same chance to speak,

b) all participants having the same chance to put forward, or call into question, or ground, or refute statements and explanations etc., such that no assertion is exempt from critical consideration,

c) all speakers being able to demonstrate to the others in the discourse their "good intent" - that all speakers will have the same chance to express their attitudes, feelings etc. so as to show that they are being truthful to themselves and to the others in the dialogue,

d) all speakers having the same chance to employ regulative speech acts (ie to command, oppose, permit, forbid etc) such that one-sided norms and privileges are ruled out, and formal equality can be practiced. (This is substantially drawn from the discussion in McCarthy supra pp 306-307.)

The role of ideology, in this context, is to act in such a way as to conceal the exercise of power. For instance ideology may sustain a rule which gives a party a greater opportunity to speak and hence violates the first condition. In ways such as this, ideology can function in such a way as make an exercise of power appear to be altogether natural. For instance Wiles argues that,

One of the most important general functions of ideology is the way in which it turns uncertain and fragile cultural resolutions and outcomes into a pervasive naturalism. (Paul Wiles "Learning to Labour". Gower 1977, pg. 162.)

Hence, with Wiles we would argue that a function of ideology is to make what could in fact be a contestable issue appear to be quite natural, and thus not requiring to be contested. It is, therefore, one of the most important functions of ideology to conceal - and to make to appear to be natural - systematically distorted communication, and in this way allow for unconscious exercise of power (Ie action in breach of the Ideal Speech Thesis) .

Habermas's critique of ideology is well expressed in the following,

how would the members of a Social System, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs if they could and would have decided on organization of social intercourse through discursive will formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society. (Legitimation Crisis, pg. 113).

in that ideology is precisely a critical barrier to such discursive will formation. Or as Pusey succinctly interprets Habermas,

ideology..reaches back into the very constitution of knowledge of society. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987.)

or ideology influences how we know what we know! This is similar to the position adopted by Thompson:

to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to sustain relations of domination. (J. B. Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 370.)

Thompson then goes on to instance the possibility that,

a system of domination may be sustained by being represented as legitimate, that is a system which is worthy of support. (Thompson supra, pg. 370).

This same issue is approached somewhat differently by Social Closure Theory .(See for instance, F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972: F. Parkin "Marxism and Class Closure". Tavistock 1979: R. Collins "Sociology since Midcentury". Academic Press 1981. R. Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988.) This is an approach which explicitly includes a role for power, and in particular a role for the power of ideas.

A version of Closure theory can be derived from Weber, who means by Closure,

the process of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders beneath it which it defines as inferior and ineligible. (R. Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988, pg 8.)

This clearly has connections to social action. For instance, Weber uses these ideas to consider the monopolization of markets - but the concept of Closure can similarly be applied to ideas and ideology. This sort of concept of Closure has been developed by Parkin, who points out that closure can take on either of two forms -

a) exclusion which involves the use of power downwardly by a dominant group to maintain their advantage and exclude others.

b) usurpation which involves the use of power upwardly to diminish the advantages of the powerful. (See F. Parkin "Marxism and Class Closure". Tavistock 1979.)

The problem here is that since usurpation will always be a possibility, we have to ask why do the subordinate groups/classes not actually exercise their power to at least diminish the power of the dominant group. There are several reasons given for this by Parkin.

An explanation lies in the existence of a number of different value systems. One such is the dominant value system (see F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 82 - 88) which is used by the dominant group in society or an organization, but so too may the subordinate group use it. This, as Parkin points out,

derives from Marx's celebrated statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas. (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pg. 82).

Following this value system requires that, for instance, the reward system is perceived to be morally correct, that dominant values define what is perceived to be "right" in culture, art, speech patterns etc. There is, however, an explicit role for power in all of this, since as Parkin points out,

moral and political rules hold sway (under the dominant value system) not because they are self-evidently "right", but because they are made to seem so by those who wield institutional power. (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pg. 84.)

As Lukes points out, the more completely the dominant class succeed in this way, the more completely they will prevent the development of conflict in the society/ organization etc. - the more the subordinate class defer to the dominant class, not just in terms of material reward but also ideological dominance the easier it will be for the dominant class to maintain their domination. It is argued by Lukes,

is it not the supreme and the most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (S. Lukes "Power: A Radical View". MacMillan 1974, pg 24.)

An alternative to this is what Parkin describes as the subordinate value system (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 88 - 96), which does not fully endorse the dominant value system, but rather adapts to it, so that while those who may use this value system are critical of the dominant value system they do not go so far as to actually reject it. Parkin suggests for instance

Trade Unionism could be said to stabilize the modern capitalist order by legitimizing further the rules and procedures which govern the allocation of resources. (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 91.)

Thus, while the subordinate class are exposed to the ideas of the dominant class, through TV and the education system etc., they do not simply adopt these ideas directly - as is so with the dominant value system - but rather they modify, or negotiate them - or as Rodman puts it, they

"stretch the value system", (H. Rodman "The Lower Class Value Stretch", Social Forces 1963. Quoted in Parkin supra, pg 92.)

especially in abstract situations (like attitude surveys). In action situations, however, they are more likely to employ a negotiated version - a more strongly subordinate system of values, rather than the adapted dominant value system of value stretch.

The final value system is what Parkin terms the radical value system (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 97 - 99.). The main attribute of this is that it does not attempt to accommodate the dominant system, but in fact denies its legitimacy altogether. Hence rather than promoting the view that, for instance, Management are/ought to be the dominant group it promotes the view of "the dignity of labour and accords the worker a position of honour" (H. Rodman "The Lower Class Value Stretch", Social Forces 1963. Quoted in Parkin supra, pg 92.). The radical value system, therefore, explicitly ruptures the dominant value system rather than trying to come to an accommodation with it as the subordinate system does.

Parkin argues, as we have found too, these three value systems are found to varying degrees among subordinate groups. Hence in a subordinate group we would expect to find elements of all three - Ie ideas which endorse the role of the dominant group (dominant), ideas which are critical of them without going so far as to actually reject dominant group (subordinate), and ideas which do reject the dominant group (radical).

We can consider the possibility of what would happen if one of the systems was to "run dry" (as Parkin puts it) - for instance what would happen if the radical system, or the dominant system were to cease to function (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 100 - 102.). Parkin suggests that if the latter were to come about then the subordinate value system would become increasingly important for the subordinate group. This may be so, but

a) it is by no means apparent that this is foregone

b) it is by no means apparent why it should happen that way.

We shall return to these questions later, but first we wish to consider another possible reason, given by Parkin for the absence of usurpation. This is the possibility that the subordinate group will use dual modes of closure (See R. Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988 pg 11.) - basically that part of the subordinate group will try to cope with its position not by challenging the dominant group but rather by subordinating another group. The examples he gives are white workers against blacks in the US and UK, and Protestants against Catholics in Northern Ireland. We too can provide evidence of this,

a) the consistent status consciousness of Staff against Hourly Paid. Indeed on certain matters Staff were more hostile to the Hourly Paid than the Management were.

b) the consistent status consciousness of Skilled workers against Unskilled workers, which manifests itself for instance in the jealousy with which wage differentials are maintained. One event we collected during the research happened while we were talking casually to a skilled worker, waiting for his labourer to come back with a particular tool for the machine. When the labourer (who was considerably older than the skilled man) came back he was told,

that's the wrong fucking tool. Go back
and get the right one.

When the labourer left to get the tool, we said to the skilled man,

"Do you always speak to him that way?".

He replied

"Yes, why shouldn't I? I'm skilled,
he's not". .

All of this we would not dissent from, but we do see a difficulty in that Parkin does not explain why the subordinate group accept their position. Certainly if the subordinate group employ a subordinate value system, they are unlikely to mount a serious challenge to the dominant group. This does not tell us, however, why they accept this value system in the first place, nor why they continue to accept it. Parkin, through dual closure gives us modes by which the subordinate class can cope, but this in itself is not an entire explanation.

To begin to explain this acceptance requires that we bring power explicitly into our consideration. Certainly Weber and Parkin bring in power, or allow for it to be brought in. The problem is that the power which they allow in is always conscious. (This is not to say that unconscious power could not be incorporated into this approach. For instance, Murphy argues that "neo-Weberian" closure theory requires a wider focus than Marxist theory in that it requires us to enlarge rules of closure from

rules of private property to other forms of monopolization and exclusion, such as credential, racial, ethnic, religious, gender, Communist Party monopolization and exclusion. [R. Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988 pg 61]

To the extent that these "other forms" come to blend into the environment, and take on the appearance of naturalness, or inevitability, then the unconscious power which they exercise could be even more effective than conscious power. The difficulty with Closure, as conceived by Murphy and Parkin is that the distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Power is not clear.

Moreover there is no indication of how to identify and distinguish each. Indeed it seems clear from their work that for Closure theorists this is not a problem. . For instance,

a) Parkin

moral and political rules hold sway (under the dominant value system) not because they are self-evidently "right", but because they are made to seem so by those who wield institutional power.(See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pg. 84, my emphasis.)

b) Weber (It is objected by Murphy that to claim that Weber's theory of power must involve resistance by the other party is to misunderstand Weber. (See R. Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988 pg 133.) For instance:

authority is characterized (by Weber) precisely by a lack of resistance, and is seen by Weber as a special case of power, the broader meaning of domination. (pg.133)

This may well be so, and we do not necessarily wish to dissent from this as far as it goes, but,

a) it is by no means apparent that we are not dealing with conscious manipulation, rather than the more demanding systematically distorted communication. In conscious manipulation it is essential for the dominant party to be aware of the exercise of power, but in systematically distorted communication neither is aware. It seems to us that systematically distorted communication goes beyond Weber.

b) in any case it is not fully apparent how authority works in Weber. Certainly appeals would have to be made to the legitimacy of authority - rational legal, traditional, charismatic - but even if we accept that one or more of these apply, it is by no means clear why the claim to legitimacy should be accepted in the first place and why it should continue to work. For instance it is all very well to say that Hitler exercised power because of his charisma. But what was about his personality that made him charismatic rather than, as Lord Bullock put it, "a bore in a bar". ["The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler". BBC TV April 21, 1989])

Capitalistic interests thus favour the continuous extension of the free market, but only up to the point where some of them succeed, through the purchase of privileges from the political authority or simply through the power of capital (M. Weber "Economy & Society" (Ed G. Roth & C. Wittich). Berkeley 1978, pg. 638.)

The view we take of power, in the context of ideas, is rather more thorough than that taken by any of the above authors. It appears to us that all of them take the view that ideas are accepted through the medium of power - i.e. that we use our power to put forward or to resist ideas. This much can certainly be true, and we would not wish to contest this. We do, however have a further view of power in the context of ideas.

It is surely important not only that people hold certain ideas, but also that we know

a) how they came to adopt these ideas, and

b) how they use these ideas.

In both cases to identify that certain ideas are held is important and indeed essential because they are the means through which power operates, but it is not adequate for our purposes. Ideas as well as being a function of power must be argued out and accepted by the relevant parties in the particular context.

For this to happen there must be rules and procedures (Eg rules of debate), and it has been our contention that the context and the rules operate as additional forms of power. Thus even if the results of the "debate" appears to be power-free, we would still want to consider the rules by which it is governed to establish whether it is in fact free of power. This deeper form of power is not included in the considerations of these authors.

In other words, to take an Industrial Relations analogy, ideology may be just as important procedurally as it is substantively - how the ideas which are held are generated and sustained may be just as significant as the fact that the ideas are held at all. Thompson reaches a similar conclusion when he points out,

we must focus on the space of transformation within which the meaning mobilized by media messages is transformed in the process of reception, serving thereby to sustain or subvert, to reinforce or undermine, relations of domination. (J. B. Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 380.).

Hence the rules by which ideas are negotiated - and the power implications of these rules - can be just as important as the fact that particular ideas are held at all. The shortcoming of the work done in ideology is that it does not progress this far. Hence while ideology can be and is employed in situations of conscious power, we would contend that it is not used to its fullest degree.

294 It is always possible, however, for such a clash to come about. This is well described by Dunbar et Al in a study of a clash of ideologies in an American Business School, where the faculty had decided to allow all its undergraduates to design their own course, with the faculty really only acting as consultants if things went wrong. This, fairly revolutionary approach was not challenged until a young academic was hired with deviant habits (at least for an American Business School) - taking off the door to his room and replacing it with a string of neckties; hanging a parachute in his room; staying with faculty families in return for cooking, organizing impromptu parties, organizing games for children and grown-ups. As a result he was investigated by the FBI, but even more seriously was quoted in a newspaper interview as saying "Traditional education is shitty". Following this the head of the School's Foundation and the head of the University Board of Trustees visited the Dean to tell him that, because of this faculty member's radical views, he must be sacked otherwise there would be no further financial support. Some three weeks later the member of staff in question left, and within five years the undergraduate course had reverted to normal. The implication of this example is that not only were the two sets of beliefs - the radical faculty on the one hand, and the heads of the Foundation and the University Trustees - different, they did eventually come to be in conflict with each other, and at that point a power struggle began. Had things been different - if changes in the Business School had not been so far-reaching, if the controversial faculty member had not been so controversial, or indeed if he had kept a lower profile, if the Foundation had been brought to accept the changes - things might not have got to this stage. This was, however, a case where the beliefs (or styles, to revert to the football metaphor) were not only contrasting, they actually did contradict each other. (See R. Dunbar, J. Dutton & W. Torbert "Crossing Mother: Ideological Constraints on Organizational Improvements". Journal of Management Studies 1982, pp. 91 - 108. Ideological struggle is therefore quite possible, and it is not our intention to deny this, but rather to point out that this does not exhaust all the possibilities.

295 This, we shall argue goes much of the way to dealing with the argument of Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, (N. Abercrombie, S. Hill & B. Turner "The Dominant Ideology Thesis", George Allen and Unwin 1980. (henceforth Abercrombie et al.). They contend that there is no successful dominant ideology (though there is an ideology of the dominant class), and that the working class, far from being absorbed by what Parkin would describe as the dominant ideology, or operating under a restricted subordinate ideology, actually have their own systems of ideology. So, we are told,

the inherent conflict of interests that exists between labour and management is visible to most workers. Indeed the relationship between men and management is based on power rather than authority, on low trust, on anomie and normative conflict. The rejection of managerial ideology sometimes may extend even to the rejection of the special competence claimed for managerial jobs or to a denial that managers have this quality if it is in fact required. (See Abercrombie et al. pg.146.)

For this they refer to S. Hill "The Dockers", who finds that the dockers do appear to reject the claim to special competence made by management (See S. Hill "The Dockers", Heinemann 1976, pp.114,150). A problem with this is that while Abercrombie et al. refer to Management, Hill actually refers only to Supervisors. Hence the "distance" between dockers and what Hill calls Managers is much less than the "distance" between our Hourly Paid sample and Management. It is less surprising we would contend that where the "distance" between groups is limited that the lower group takes the view that it could do the job of the superior group. Let us however accept the argument of Abercrombie et al. at its face value. We would suggest that even then it does not conflict with our argument. We have not argued that Hourly-Paid, or Staff cannot challenge the legitimacy of Management - what we have set out to do is to consider why they do not. We have tried to do so by pointing not only to the ideas which they hold, and also to the implications for power which these bring. What we would want to know of Hill's dockers is if they reject the claimed legitimacy of Management, how it is that the established system continues to work? We would suggest that the answers to this do not lie completely in their "self interest", but in the structure of their ideas and for instance why they perceive their self interest in this particular way.

Additionally Hill's findings could easily be consistent with Habermas's theory of crisis tendencies. Hill's finding that dockers reject the claim to special competence made by management could be said to be a Rationality Crisis (in that the requisite rational decisions are not forthcoming, in the view of the Dockers), or even a Legitimation Crisis (in that the requisite generalized motivations are not forthcoming, in the view of the Dockers). Certainly, however, there is no Motivation Crisis, since that would require there to be insufficient "action-motivating meaning", since the Docks do normally carry on (even in 1976). The questions we would want to pose concerning Hill's sample would be,

a) how the Rationality, and/or, Legitimation Crisis was produced - how it came about,

b) why they have not proceeded to a full-blown Motivation Crisis.

The situation in the docks, as described by Hill, is certainly not the image of work and industrial relations that we left our research site with. To say that the relationship of management and men was based on power, low trust, anomie and normative conflict is just not consistent with the data which we collected. Why should there be this disparity between us? We would suggest two reasons:

a) Our first reason relates to the interpretation of Habermas by Abercrombie et al. They say, of Habermas's concept of legitimation,

Habermas does in fact largely refer to legitimation as involving beliefs, particularly as held by subordinate classes...he speaks of the technocracy thesis as "a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticised mass of the population, where it can take on legitimating power". (See Abercrombie et al. pg.16.)

This is simply a misrepresentation of Habermas's position in two respects. First of all, as we have argued above, the effect of the technological consciousness is not to dictate ideology, but rather to put limits on possible ideologies. Secondly, as the following from "Technology and Science as Ideology" shows, it is quite consistent with Habermas's theory for there to be different forms of ideology adhered to by the different classes;

This means not that class antagonisms have been abolished but that they have become latent. Class distinctions persist in the form of subcultural traditions and corresponding differences not only in the standard of living and life style but also in political attitude. (J. Habermas "Toward a Rational Society". Heinemann 1971, pg. 109).

We would suggest that the defect in Abercrombie et al.'s analysis is that they fail to consider fully that, as they themselves would accept, Habermas does consider the structural conditions under which ideological struggles will take place. They say,

In Habermas's view there has to be some process which legitimates social systems...Habermas does not argue that the only mechanism of legitimation is an implantation of certain beliefs in the minds of social actors so that they "believe" in a particular set of social arrangement..In theory, for example, people could have any set of beliefs about parliamentary democracy; it is their participation in the institution which produces legitimation. [Abercrombie et al. pg.16.])

Thus, while the beliefs which people hold are critical we need to consider

i) the structural conditions under which these views are negotiated, and

ii) the behavioural implications of holding particular views (We would question much of the Abercrombie et al. thesis on the basis that if it holds good, why society should have the level of cohesion which it does.)

Therefore we would suggest that Abercrombie et al. - like many of the other authors on ideology concentrate only on the retention of particular ideas, and in particular fail to carry on to consider

1) the implications of holding these ideas,

2) the structures within which ideas compete for attention and recollection

In other words we have to consider not only what ideas are held, but the structure in which they are developed and maintained.

b) We would question whether Abercrombie et al. do not perhaps pose too formidable a question? They ask for instance,

Do subordinate groups believe in the dominant ideology?

Our view on this would be

i) No probably they do not - our research certainly indicates this. But this leads on to our next point

ii) In an exact sense (and it does seem to us that for Abercrombie et al. there does need to be a fairly high degree of precision) do they need to, and does it necessarily matter if they do not? (Abercrombie et al. may be an example of Wrong's "Oversocialised Conception of Man in Modern Sociology" American Sociological Review 1961, pp. 183-193?) We made this argument in above, where we pointed out, by analogy, that two football teams could play quite contrasting styles, but still be playing football (for instance Celtic and Inter Milan in the 1967 European Cup Final). Likewise for ideology, the dominant system is not harmed unless the competing ideologies actually contradict each other behaviourally. An important point is made by Schutz:

the biographically modelled interpretational and motivational relevances which both partners bring into the we-relation cannot be identical, although they are sufficiently congruent with the similar socialization of the partners for the determination and management of the situation. In principle the same events, objects, etc., can consistently have a different meaning for each of the partners. (A. Schutz & T. Luckmann "Structures of the Lifeworld. pg. 254).

Thus, it is quite clear from this that two parties to a situation may interpret a situation in different ways, but not so differently that the situation cannot proceed or be managed. There is, however still the issue of what happens when this breaks down - the situation cannot be managed - but Schutz is less than clear on this point. .

Let us say, however, that Abercrombie et al are right, and that we cannot explain social cohesion in terms of a dominant ideology. How then do we explain cohesion? (It is clear in their work that they accept the existence of social cohesion). Cohesion, they suggest, is maintained in other ways which are unrelated to the values and beliefs of subordinates as these affect social order and social cohesion. (Abercrombie et al. pg.154) Their main explanation for social cohesion relates to self interest. Thus, we are told,

Workers may perform their roles in the division of labour simply because this is necessary for the continued survival of the system on which they themselves depend. The integration of the system is in their own self interests. (Abercrombie et al. pg.154.)

We would not necessarily say this is wrong. One construction we could put even on our own findings - and putting it at its shortest - is to say,

well we think the management here know best, they're the ones who know how to take the decisions. So we just go along with that, because if we don't it might be bad for the firm.

In other words our own findings could be located within the view put forward by Abercrombie et al. But there would still be one question we would have to put. Namely, why is it that employees see their interests in this way? Why do they define their self interests in the way Abercrombie et al suggest - if indeed they do? Why should self-interest be so defined as to allow the perpetuation of Management and of Hierarchy?

To answer these questions must take us back to consider the ideas which workers carry about in their heads - ideology, even if only in a simple sense. Having considered what these ideas are, we then have to consider why they came to hold these ideas. There may well be other ways to do this, but we have argued that the Ideal Speech Thesis gives us a model for doing so, whereas Abercrombie et al. do not. They are content - like the ideology theorists they criticise - to stop their analysis at the surface and not to analyse in the depth necessary.

Bernstein's view of phenomenology is particularly applicable here,

There is frequently a lack of sharpness about the level and specificity of structures and what influences their emergence, reproduction and decline. (R. J. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory" Methuen, 1976, pg 160.)

The role of ideology we would argue, therefore, is not causal, but it is supportive of the system of power we considered in the previous section. It is argued by Eyerman, for instance, that

False consciousness perceives the world and organizes experience in a hierarchical way. Both in terms of power and authority, and as a ladder of success to climb, reality is conceived as a vertical structure which notches and steps. In work relations, such a structure emerges as a consequence of the internal labour markets previously described and runs not from "workers" to "bosses", but rather from low skilled to skilled, white collar and highly paid occupations. (R. Eyerman "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell 1981, pp 273-274)

In the way that Eyerman refers to low skilled and skilled, white collar and highly paid, we would recall the types of tension we found in our own data - the conflicts between Staff and Hourly Paid, the status consciousness by skilled toward the semi-skilled, etc. To understand fully how this system of power, supported by ideology, works we must consider how people make sense of their surroundings - or in other words their negotiation of reality. Our view of ideology is therefore what Alvesson describes as a

pejorative, negative or critical one. Ideology is viewed as beliefs and forms of consciousness that (may be) misleading, false or distorted. The distortion is of a systematic kind and rooted in social conditions. It has nothing to do with lack of information, coincidental mistakes or misunderstandings or with individual "private" peculiarities. (M. Alvesson "Organization Theory and Technocratic Consciousness". De Gruyter 1987. pg. 146)

We prefer to say "may be misleading.." in this definition, while Alvesson adopts the positive (Ie "are misleading"). A similar concept is discussed by Eyerman,

"False" in the sense that I use it here when referring to an individual's beliefs and consciousness about himself in relation to society is not the opposite of true, but rather a mistaken acceptance of a partial or limited perspective for the whole itself. Overcoming such partiality and limitedness, then implies a theory of the totality...some aspects of a person's beliefs and understanding about themselves must be correct, how else could he or she survive in society? ..A partial view of oneself and one's relation to society is false because it remains trapped in the correctness of appearance and cannot rise to thought concreteness, i.e. to the grasping of society's essential nature. (R. Eyerman "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell 1981, pp 279)

Hence in considering ideology we need to consider not only the holding of certain beliefs, ideas etc. We need to go on to consider the structure they have - what is it that makes them mistaken in their totality, and the implications of holding these views - what they prevent us from seeing or understanding. Hence we must take into account the process by which our subjects negotiate their reality. Habermas tells us,

In so far as the legitimations do not articulate the relations of force that they make possible, in so far as these relations are merely expressed in the legitimations, language is also ideological. (J. Habermas "Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method" in "Understanding and Social Inquiry" - F. Dallymar and T. McCarthy (eds) . Quoted in T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" Polity 1984, pg 183).

Following on from this it is clear, as Habermas suggests, that we must examine the use of language, and thus the construction of reality. However, as Eyerman points out,

As both Mead and Schutz stressed, something in a person's experience must become problematic for him to seek explanation beyond the familiar and the commonsense. (R. Eyerman "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell 1981, pp 285).

An adequate analysis of the negotiation of reality, it is apparent must involve a consideration of,

a) the role of power in all its configurations

b) the role played by ideas, and that some ideas are more powerful than others, and that the acceptance of certain ideas (Eg the technical competence of Managers in taking decisions) can have implications for further negotiation of reality.

²⁹⁶ J. Purcell "A strategy for management control in industrial relations". In J. Purcell and R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work". Macmillan 1979

²⁹⁷ This is similar to what Halaby (C. Halaby "Worker Attachment and Workplace Authority", American Sociological Review 1986, pp. 634-649) calls "the workplace authority approach", for which two features are described as central (See Halaby, pg. 635):

a) workers's behaviour can be considered to be a response as subordinates to the domination exercised by their managers. In other words whether they consent or resist, they do so in response to the domination of management.

b) the domination of management is sustained by normative codes which designate what is appropriate under the system of domination - thus it would be possible for a manager to "over-step" their limits of behaviour toward their employees.

This approach is clearly similar to our own, in at least as far as Halaby's argument is based on understanding how the domination of management actually works. Halaby, however, as supporting evidence develops an essentially historical argument - and at a high level of abstraction - of the domination exercised by American management. Associated with this is secondary analysis of the American Quality of Employment survey. Unlike our own research

a) there is no deep analysis of, for instance, the normative structures, which are central to Halaby's argument. Hence while Halaby has generality, our own approach has allowed the degree of penetration necessary;

b) there is no mechanism described to indicate how we move from normative structures to the behaviour of workers. The mechanism we have advanced is that of the (Habermasian) Lifeworld.

As Halaby observes,

There is virtually no research that systematically maps the nature and structure of beliefs regarding the proper exercise of domination in the workplace (Pg. 647)

²⁹⁸ As Knights and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power and Subjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558) point out the problem with the Schutzian position on the Lifeworld is that it treats social construction (the Lifeworld) as having liberating potential in itself, rather than seeing that it could - as we have shown it to do -

pose threats as well opportunities for emancipation (pg. 545)

Thus in considering the Lifeworld it is not enough merely to identify its structure - not enough merely to map it out - rather we have to proceed to consider its implications. What we have shown is that the Lifeworlds of our respondents and the structure of their Lifeworlds have profound implications for the exercise of power.

²⁹⁹ Knight and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power and Subjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558) illustrate the difficulty of changing the Lifeworld when they argue

the identity of the worker bears the contradictions of the institutions and social relations in which identity is constituted and solidified. Nonetheless the desire to conserve rather than challenge, everyday practices and values. Such desires may indeed prove problematical in the reproduction of capitalism - for example when managers seek flexibility through the restructuring of industries or working practices. But the capacity of the resistance fuelled by these desires to transform social relations in an emancipatory direction is, to say the least, debatable. (pg. 542)

In other words, though it may be ironic, the maintenance of the managerial role in the hierarchy, may owe (uncomfortably) much to the same mechanisms which were the despair of generations of managers seeking to do away with demarcation and such other (managerially inefficient) practices.

³⁰⁰ As Knights and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power and Subjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558) observe

although power is exercised over others, it is necessary to appreciate and theorise how those who are subjected to (and by) its truth effects are themselves active participants in the process through which power relations are reproduced.

In other words, what Kinghts and Wilmott argue here is very close to our own position. It has been our contention that employees themselves participate in the exercise of power over them by Management, in that by and large this is positively endorsed by their Lifeworlds. The Lifeworlds of Management too participate in and endorse the system of domination. This endorsement is not however, simply a matter of self interest - but in fact is seen by Management as the most technically appropriate system of organization.

301 This is an example of our point (a), in that Schutz identifies the existence of this phenomenon, which he describes as "specialised knowledge", but fails to go on to consider the implications which this has.

302 This opens up an analogy with Habermas's theory of crisis. There are, it will be recalled, four possible sources of crisis, in Habermas's theory - Economic, Rationality, Legitimation and Motivation. This theory is elaborated at the level of society by Habermas, but if we take it to the level of the individual organization it can be put to work also. Thus if Management (in the role of the state) fail to produce sufficient rational decisions, other employees may not be aware of this. They will however, become aware if as a result of this insufficiency of rational decisions the company goes into an economic crisis. This may result in lower rewards and/or more labour for non-Management employees. This may produce a legitimation crisis among the non-Management employees, possibly leading on to a crisis of Motivation which may include the replacement of hierarchy with another organizing principle. Now it does have to be said very firmly that we detected no sign of such developments, but Habermas's theory of crisis does indicate a possible way in which hierarchy may come to be replaced, and that an obstacle in the way of this happening is that non-Management employees have no basis for being critical of Management other than the extent to which the existing form of organization works or does not work.

303 The development of pathologies, as a consequence of disturbances of the personal Lifeworld are analysed by Laing in the work we have referred to above. laing's work we have argued is a better analogy of repression than that of Freud.

304 See "Theory of Communicative Action (2)" - J. Habermas. Polity 1988, pgs. 142-3.

305 R. J. Armstrong, J.F.B. Goodman "Ideology and Shop-Floor Industrial Relations". Croom Helm 1981 and N. Abercrombie, S. Hill & B. Turner "The Dominant Ideology Thesis", George Allen and Unwin 1980.

306 R. M. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working Class". In Working Class Images of Society, M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.

307 M. Billig, S. Condor, D. Edwards, M. Gane, D. Middleton, A. Radley "Ideological Dilemmas". Sage Books, 1988. (Henceforth Billig et al.).

308 This is another area where Laing gives a micro level analogy, since one of the problems faced by Sarah Danzig was precisely that certain elements of social reality were mystified to her by her parents and brother.

309 See the Appendix reporting on our findings of perceptions of the media.

310 Thompson accords this role to ideology

to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to sustain relations of domination. (J. B. Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 370.)

While we would not disagree with Thompson that ideology plays this role, our findings have pointed strongly to domination being maintained by factors less formal than ideology - for instance the experiences of the workplace and cognitive restrictions which it leads to.

311 The wider ideological elements of this are indicated by Storey, who suggests that one of the claims asserting the right of management to manage is that

managers alone have the knowledge to take the "right" decision. A logical element of the principle of the division of labour is that a specialist cadre is made responsible for coordinating the work of others and is responsible too for the specialist function of making decisions. (J. Storey "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980 , pg. 45)

312 See "The Limits of the Law" - B. Weekes et al. Blackwell 1976.

313 Cressey et al. conclude in a similar way in their study of partipative schemes

What is striking is the extent to which the process of management is not seen as a social process at all, but as an uncontroversial technical function: it is "just managing". (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge & J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press 1985, pg. 176)

³¹⁴ It is suggested by Vout, in discussing the development of management education in Britain between 1920 and 1950, that

Management thought was presented (by Fayol, Sheldon, Parker-Follett and Urwick) as a neutral coordinating force, a set of universal principles which could direct capital and labour towards good relations and efficiency. (M. Vout "The Schooling of Management in Britain". Paper presented to British Academy of Management, 1989, pg 13)

This publicly expressed view of Management (as an activity) is certainly supported by our sample of Managers, and (perhaps more importantly) substantially endorsed by the Staff and Hourly Paid samples as well. The ideas of these classical thinkers, considered by Vout in his paper and described by him as "Executive Training", appear to have percolated down - at least in general terms - to the level of the firm, its managers and employees.

³¹⁵ This definition points strongly to Abrahamsson's Mandator Position being an important concept in any development of worker participation, since this emphasises focusing on the implications of Management work, and exercising control over that.

³¹⁶ See Abrahamsson, above.

³¹⁷ Hickson et al. quote Robinson (J. Robinson "Economic Management - China 1972" Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute 1973) concerning a factory manager in China, who was purged during the Cultural Revolution,

When I was criticized by the workers I was aggrieved. Didn't I work hard, come early and leave late, carry out all my duties conscientiously?

Hickson et al. point out that what the manager had been unaware of was that he had very gradually come to dominate the entire organization. They quote King ("A. King "A Voluntarist Model of Organization". British Journal of Sociology 1977, pp. 363-374) in saying that the Maoist opposition to experts was the "dilemma of redness versus expertness". This is observed too, though in a wider context, by Salaman (G. Salaman "Towards a Sociology of Organizational Structure". The Sociological Review 1978). He argues that efficiency and rationality can be used inappropriately to justify the continuing domination of organizations by a minority of Managers and Management expertise (See Hickson et al. pg 155). Hickson et al. conclude

In this way (the use of arguments of efficiency and rationality), power as technique supports power as domination, with ideologies of efficiency buttressing, disguising or justifying organizational inequality. ((D. Hickson, W. Astley, R. Butler and D. Wilson "Organization as Power". In B. Staw and L. Cummings "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pg. 155).

³¹⁸ See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987 , pg 155.

³¹⁹ His own theory is considered by us in Chapter 1, where as it can be seen, it is found wanting in certain respects.

³²⁰ J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press 1980.

³²¹ In the 1st dimension he follows Polsby who suggests that power can be measured by

who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making. (N. Polsby "Community Power and Political Theory" Yale University Press, pg. 55.)

as well as Dahl's formulation. Gaventa suggests that between them Dahl and Polsby make three assumptions (See Gaventa supra pp. 5-8.):

a) people act upon their grievances,

b) the system is open, ie anyone can participate if they want to,

c) given that the system is open, then non-participation is in no way an issue worthy of study, since

"political silence would have to be taken to represent consensus" (See Gaventa supra pg. 7)

The difficulty with this position is that, Gaventa points out, it does not allow us to investigate why B does not behave in a way that he might otherwise do were he not powerless relative to A.

At least as important, however, is the critique of this view of power put forward by Bachrach and Baratz. This is the substance of the second dimension of power.

2nd dimension. Gaventa begins his discussion of this dimension by quoting Schattschneider,

absenteeism reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants. (E. Schattschneider "the Semi-Sovereign People" Holt Rinehart and Winston 1960, pg 105. Quoted in Gaventa, supra pg. 9.)

This, Gaventa points out, was later developed by Bachrach and Baratz to become their second face of power by which power is exercised not only in the decision-making process, but also in order to exclude certain people and/or issues from decision-making .

The difficulty with this position, albeit that it is an advance on the 1st dimension, is that while it includes

consideration of the barriers to action upon grievances, they (Bachrach and Baratz) equally maintain that it does not go so far as to include how power may affect conceptions of grievances themselves. (Gaventa, supra pg. 11.)

As Lukes points out, however, the fact there is no grievance cannot lead us to the view that there is a consensus - far less a genuine consensus (S. Lukes "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pg 24.). In other words, as we have suggested in the earlier section on conscious power, this approach does not ask all the questions. Just as we said that Mintzberg, Gamson, Braverman, and Nichols and Beynon all focused on conflict (or on managing it and minimising its effects), so

a) omitting consideration of situations without conflict, thus

b) missing out the consideration that power could be used to avoid conflict,

this approach goes in the same direction.

The solution to this lies, Gaventa tells us, in the 3rd dimension.

3rd dimension. Gaventa uses Lukes' own definition of the 3rd dimension,

A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests. (S. Lukes supra pg. 34. Quoted in Gaventa, supra pg 11.)

This style of power, Gaventa argues goes beyond what can be done in either of the other two approaches (See Gaventa, supra pg. 12.):

a) A may influence, shape or determine the very wants of B.

b) A may affect the very conception of issues of B.

c) there may be no observable conflict.

d) it allows for the variety of ways in which potential issues are kept silent, either through social forces, institutional practices or individual decisions.

In addition, Gaventa points out, these three dimensions of power must be seen as interrelated, in that the power in one dimension can be seen as supporting the power in the other two:

the dimensions of power and powerlessness may be viewed as interrelated and accumulative in nature, such that each dimension serves to reinforce the strength of another.....The power of A to prevail in the first dimension increases the power to affect B's actions in the second dimension, and increases the power to affect B's conception in the third. (See Gaventa, supra pp. 21-22.)

In this, Gaventa is supported by Pfeffer who argues,

power in use can provide those sub-units who possess power with the ability to acquire resources, which in turn are helpful in the maintenance of power. (J. Pfeffer "Power in Organizations". Pitman 1981 pg 304. See also pg 290.)

Both Gaventa and Pfeffer, therefore point to the "additiveness" of power.

If we consider this in relation to our own data, then we could suggest that since the management routinely take decisions - for instance in the first dimension what the pay rise should be, or in the second dimension that certain issues are non-negotiable - that this reinforces their power in the third dimension where their power (even though unconscious) is based on a division of labour which makes Management the decision-makers.

Gaventa gives empirical examples of the three dimensions of power. In the first and second dimensions the results fall clearly into one or other of the categories. Gaventa argues that first dimension, power was evidenced by a path-breaking (at that time - 1893) agreement on working conditions. This was achieved through the use of militant action by the miners.

The second dimension is evidenced by the events surrounding the possibility of land-slip, due to strip mining, onto the homes of a small, poor community, and the possibility of restarting mining. An example quoted concerns the case of Buffalo Hollow (pp 227-237). This is a small, very poor community of about 40 homes, threatened by the effects of strip mining nearby. This was causing a local mountain to begin to slide down the valley, to the extent it has slid onto the home of a retired miner and threatens the rest. This had been treated with quiescence,

One night it'll rain and we'll all be
washed away and destroyed. (pg 229).

The quiescence of the community changed when they had the opportunity to make a film about this problem which would by-pass the local Management and go direct to the absentee Company, in London. Faced with the evidence of the film and the threat of legal action, the local Manager appeared in Buffalo for the first time in many years, and the Company began to build dams to try to hold back the movement of the Mountain.

While this was going on, however, the strip mine operator, who had caused all the problem as a lessee of the company, applied to re-commence operations. As Gaventa points out,

the operator's previous record had been atrocious. Not only had he caused this damage, but he had then claimed to have gone out of business (apparently to avoid legal action against him) and he had, like the company, failed to respond to the citizens' previous complaints. Now he proposed to continue this time further down the hollow on land adjacent to that of the company (pp. 229-230).

The citizens of Buffalo had rights of appeal to two government bodies:

- 1) to the Commissioner of the Department of Conservation, who would hear complaints from any party concerning an application to mine.

- 2) to the Board of Reclamation Review, which had the power to overturn any decision by the Commissioner.

The community were unsuccessful in their approach to the Commissioner, since he had granted permission to mine in the minimal legal time, but more importantly he gave permission to the operator one day before he sent out the forms to the Community to enable them to make their protest.

The community therefore appealed to the Board of Review, in the hope that the Board would overturn the Commissioner's decision. Gaventa points out that in this litigation the community faced a number of problems:

- a) the community was able to employ a single lawyer to present their case. The state (the Commissioner) and the operator each had their own lawyers, backed up by technical assistants.

- b) the community was split by the operator:

- i) he visited the church in Buffalo Hollow (for the first time in years according to Gaventa- see pg. 236) and made a handsome contribution to the collection plate,

- ii) he took on a member of one of the key families in the litigation, and as a result they dropped out for fear of losing a relative his job.

- c) Gaventa argues that the collection of information was biased against the community:

- i) much of the information concerned the petitioners being described as "agitators", or having a negative "attitude".

- ii) the gathering of information by the "Experts" was carried out within an interaction and ideology biased in favour of the operator. For instance the State geologist visited the site in the company of the operator, and on a dry day. On the basis of this, he reported to the Board that there was little danger, little damage, and such as there was had been caused some 12 years before by another operator.

The community therefore faced considerable obstacles in addition to the formal ones, in presenting their case

Gaventa shows that:

a) the powerful mine owner used the system to his advantage,

b) the system operated against the powerless,

c) the community was significantly disadvantaged relative to the mine owner (eg he had several lawyers and technical specialists, while the community could only afford a single lawyer),

d) the mine owner deliberately set out to split the community,

e) the collection of information was biased against the community.

We found no particular instances of such a degree of formality, but it is clear to us that Staff and Hourly Paid could have experienced similar problems in the event of trying to make a challenge to Management. For instance, in dealing with documents like financial statements the professional assistance they would be likely to receive would be likely to be meagre [Gaventa's (a)]. The Staff and Hourly-Paid are split, and even within these two groups there are divisions which could be exploited [Gaventa's (b)].

For the third dimension, Gaventa suggests there are two indications of this operating:

a) the direct mechanisms of third dimension power - the legitimization of inequality, glorification of the dominant ways and values, the degradation of older values and culture.

b) indirect mechanisms - the continual defeat of the non-elite, which gives them a sense of powerlessness, and an inability to develop political skills.

The former of these two signs are clearly apparent in our own research - the power of Management is unmistakable. The latter, however, is less so, since, there were few defeats for either side to have learned from. As we have pointed out, the Staff and Hourly Paid were not seeking to displace Management, and the company was relatively strike free.

³²² See Chapter 1.

³²³ Gaventa, *supra* pg 29, my emphasis.

324 J. March "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the Engineering of Choice". Bell Journal of Economics 1978 pp. 587-608.

325 See for instance

Karl Weick: "The Social Psychology of Organizing" Addison-Wesley 1969, and "Cognitive Processes in Organizations", in Barry Staw (ed.) "Research in Organizational Behaviour Vol. 1" JAI Press 1979 It is Weick's argument that people tend to act first and then rationalize later.

Daryl Bem "Self-Perception Theory" in L. Berkowitz (ed) "Advances in Experimental Social Psychology" Academic Press 1972. Bem argues that we imply our attitudes (eg goals, interests) from what we do.

G. Salancik and M. Conway "Attitude Inferences from Salient and Relevant Cognitive Content about Behaviour" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1975 pp. 829-840. This suggests that our attitudes (eg goals/interests) depend on the information which has been made salient to us. So, for instance, if it was salient to a respondent that the interviewer wanted to hear about Management inefficiency or incompetence - or about their efficiency and competence - then Salancik and Conway would suggest this is what the interviewer is likely to get.

A similar point has also been made by Schutz. He argues,

For the act of attention presupposes an elapsed, passed away experience - in short, one that is already in the past, regardless of whether the attention in question is reflective or reproductive. (A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World". Heinemann 1972. pg 51).

326 Habermas has, for instance argued,

the only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests - in other words, knowledge that has taken a theoretical attitude.

J. Habermas - "Knowledge and Human Interests" Second Edition Heineman 1978. pg 301.

327 Gaventa, supra pg 29.

328 We shall go on to argue that this is a role which can be filled by Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis.

329 Gaventa, supra pg. 25.

³³⁰ This point is well made by, for instance, Wolfinger in his critique of Bachrach and Baratz, on the ground that the type of exclusion which they argued for could not be observed. As Clegg observes

Writers like Wolfinger accorded as much credence to the idea that there was something unobservable called non-decision-making as they might have done to the notion that there were fairies at the bottom of the garden.

See P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Two Faces of Power". American Political Science Review 1962, pp. 947-952

P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Decisions and Non-Decisions". American Political Science Review 1963, pp. 641-651.

S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power". Sage 1989, pg. 12.

R. E. Wolfinger "Non Decisions and the Study of Local Politics". American Political Science Review 1971. pp. 1063-1080.

This dispute points to the need to be able to produce positive empirical evidence and/or an analytical framework to produce positive evidence, rather than argue on the basis of absence. The debate between Lukes ("Power a Radical View) and Bradshaw (A Critique of Steven Lukes "Power a Radical View". Sociology 1976, pp. 121-127) demonstrates the same point. Lukes' theory requires essentially "negative" evidence (that the subjects do not act in the way that would be to their interest), and thus Bradshaw points out, it is possible that they had considered such action, but decided to reject it.

³³¹ Habermas's Ideal speech Thesis.

³³² Another example of research based on Lukes' view is "Shop Stewards in Action" by E. Batstone, I. Boraston, S. Frenkel (E. Batstone, I. Boraston, S. Frenkel "Shop Stewards in Action" Basil Blackwell 1979.). They argue that

a convener will have far less trouble and hence will achieve greater power if, instead of having to argue about issues or having to squash the issue initiative of others, he is able to develop a situation in which members see it as his right to decide what are problems and how they should be handled. Along with this he will be more powerful if he can instil into other members of the organization particular priorities and viewpoints, for example about Management and their behaviour, so that members act in the manner he desires without his active involvement in certain issues. In these ways the probability of conflict over the agenda of issues and the terms of the debate can be reduced (Lukes 1974, Crenson 1971). Accordingly, power is not to be discerned solely within situations of manifest conflict. (pg 9.)

³³³ M. Burawoy "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979.

Central to Burawoy's ideas is the idea that the labour process can usefully be conceived as a game in the sense that the piecework system becomes an object for them to outwit (ie making out), as a means of maintaining interest in what they are doing and thus to counteract the deprivations of work ("Can the satisfaction involved in playing the piecework game be preserved in our factories at the same time that the attendant conflicts are reduced" W. F. Whyte "Money and Motivation" Harper 1955 pg. 37. Quoted in Burawoy, supra pg 78.). This notion he points out is by no means new - it can be found, for instance in the work of Whyte (W. F. Whyte, supra.), Mayo (E. Mayo "Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation" MacMillan 1933.) and Roethlisberger and Dickson (F. Roethlisberger and W. Dickson "Management and the Worker" Harvard University Press 1939). Burawoy contends that these writers regarded such games as constructs of workers alone and in opposition to Management. To this he responds by quoting Crozier (M. Crozier "Comparing Structures and Comparing Games" in "European Contributions to Organization Theory"- G. Hofstede & M. Kassem. Van Gorcum 1976.), who points out that if the games of workers begin to threaten Management and

to take place without any check, the power struggle would bring paralysing conflicts and unbearable situations. (M. Crozier "The Bureaucratic Phenomenon". University of Chicago Press, 1964)

This leads Burawoy to argue that the game of making out cannot be seen as being carried on independently of Management and that indeed,

Management, at least at lower levels, actively participates not only in the organization of the game but in the enforcement of its rules. (M. Burawoy, supra pg 80.)

Thus Burawoy argues, as we have done, that Management and the other workers in the company are both involved in the same game (at least as a system of rules).

For Burawoy, the concept of the game is critical, yet it is still possible for the rules of the game to be matters of conflict:

The source of the game itself lies not in a preordained value consensus but in historically specific struggles to adapt the deprivation inherent in work and in struggles with Management to define the rules. (M. Burawoy, supra pg 82.)

and for the possibility that the game can change:

Once a game is established, however, it can assume a dynamics of its own, and there is no guarantee that it will continue to reproduce the conditions of its own existence. On the contrary, it is possible that playing the game will tend to undermine the rules that define it....one can ask..Under what conditions will the game's own dynamics undermine the harmony its also produces and so lead to a crisis?..Does making out sow the seeds of its own destruction? (M. Burawoy, supra pg 86.)

Workers, he argues, will continue to make out as long as there is,

a) neither too much nor too little uncertainty in making out, such that they feel they are exerting control over the production system (avoiding a legitimation crisis),

b) value in it for them (avoiding a motivation crisis),

c) profit can to be made by the company by allowing them to make out (avoiding a system crisis).

The fact that the workers participate in the game of making out "generates" consent to the rules of the game (M. Burawoy, supra pp 81-86.). Burawoy argues,

the game does not reflect an underlying harmony of interests; on the contrary is (the game of making out) is responsible for and generates that harmony. (M. Burawoy, supra pg 82.)

Moreover, he shows that the effect of external influences (ie experiences outwith the workplace) on perceptions is limited, and that:

variations in imported consciousness do not give rise to different relations in production;..imported consciousness mediates the translation of relations in production into activities, but only within narrow limits;..the mediating effects of such consciousness varies in accordance with position in the labour process, that is its effect is shaped by the labour process itself...(and) that the labour process at Allied is relatively autonomous. (M. Burawoy, supra pg 156.)

Burawoy, therefore, concludes as we have done on the basis of our interviews, that external sources play little part on consciousness within the firm.

334 For instance:

changes in the labour process and the rise of the internal market expand the choices of workers and thus constitute the basis of consent to degradation. However this consent emerges only if Management does not arbitrarily dictate choices to workers-if for example, transfers are always taken at the initiative of workers and through the bidding process and further if punitive sanctions are confined to the transgressions of the limits of choice.. (My emphasis) pg 120.

At this point Burawoy introduces an example perfectly consistent with our own data:

when restricted to violations of the rules that define the limits of choice, the application of force becomes the object of consent.

From our own data, in discussing discipline we found exactly this - that a persistent offender (whilst he may be represented by his union official) would not receive sympathy from those with whom he worked. Likewise, if we take up the issue of transfers, in our own firm, we identified examples of where Hourly Paid workers would object to a transfer from one job/bay to another if this was not carried out within the particular rules which applied there.

³³⁵ It is implied by Harris (Power and Powerlessness) that Burawoy suggests they are fully aware:

he (Burawoy) seems to have implicit faith in capitalist managements as omniscient and omnipotent.

She goes on to contrast this with a "non-Marxist" commentator (Anthony Jay - "Management and Machiavelli") who,

can comment caustically on Management ineptitude; (Harris supra 219).

Yet, in our view, Management ineptitude need not lead to its subversion, just as long as there is not too much ineptitude, as we argued in our discussion of Ford and Baucus (See above).

³³⁶ S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination" Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975.

³³⁷ L. Wittgenstein "Philosophical Investigations". Basil Blackwell 1968, para 241, pg. 226. Quoted in S. Clegg, supra pg 34.

³³⁸ S. Clegg supra pg. 35.

³³⁹ S. Clegg supra pg. 36.

³⁴⁰ See S. Clegg, supra pg. 49.

³⁴¹ S. Clegg supra pg. 61.

³⁴² M. Weber "Economy & Society" Bedminster Press, 1968, pg 33. Quoted in Clegg supra pg 61.

³⁴³ Walsh et al. suggest that Clegg argues that

It is not simply access to the decision arena that is important (as Dahl and Bachrach & Baratz would suggest) but also the ability to define the criteria that govern the way in which things are, and are not, to be recognized as issues. This predefinition of what can be decided constitutes what Clegg has termed domination. (K. Walsh, B. Hinings, R. Greenwood, and S. Ranson "Power and Advantage in Organizations". Organization Studies 1981, pg 136).

344 Clegg, supra Chapter 5.

345 A. Cicourel "Cognitive Sociology", Penguin 1973. Quoted in Clegg supra pp. 70-80.

346 Clegg supra pg 73.

347 See above footnote 135.

348 Clegg supra, pg 77.

349 Clegg supra, pg 90.

350 At the same time it is important for an actor to behave within the limits of his role if he is to remain powerful. This is argued by Biggart and Hamilton, supra.

351 Clegg, supra pg 58, quoting M. Weber Economy and Society pg 53.

352 We have considered this above (pg. 58). This issue is clarified by Habermas, who distinguishes between Systematically Distorted Communication (where there is unconscious deception), and also Manipulation (where there is conscious deception). See Figure 18 in J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1" Polity 1984, pg 333.

353 Clegg, supra pg 49. (My emphasis).

354 Nichols and Beynon, supra pg 102.

355 See also Astely and Sachdeva, alt. cit.

356 Clegg, supra.

357 Clegg, supra pg. 84.

358 See for instance the Joiner's Tale in "Power, Rule and Domination".

359 In contrast consider the following from "Legitimation Crisis" concerning "Organizational Principles",

Organizational principles limit the capacity of a society to learn without losing its identity. According to this definition, steering problems can have crisis effects if (and only if) they cannot be resolved within the range of possibility that is circumscribed by the organizational principle of the society. (pg 7)

Clegg's analysis ends when the "form of life" has been identified. We, on the other hand, would follow Habermas and contend that we have to go further, to consider the internal logic of the organizational principle, to identify the types of steering problem would lead to crisis - ie circumstances which go beyond the possibilities of the organizational principle/form of life. This follows from the Kantian philosophy which argues that any inquiry into human knowledge cannot be restricted only to the contents of human consciousness, since these have already been organized and interpreted in a particular way by the human actor, and to stop at the contents of human consciousness would only be to describe his cognition (though that is not to say that is not vital). There has to be, however, a further object of inquiry which is to try to understand the structure and logic of cognitive organization and interpretation. What we have done in our analysis is to seek out the factors which appear to support hierarchy as an organizational principle (Management expertise in decision-making has proved to be important in this respect). This has provided us with a means of understanding the conditions of its continuation, as well as the possibilities of its demise.

³⁶⁰ We would suggest that this stems from his analysis being rooted in Wittgenstein. It is argued by Thompson of Wittgenstein (J. Thompson "Critical Hermeneutics" Cambridge University Press 1981),

by emphasising the integral unity and self-sufficiency of discrete language games, the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is easily transformed into an a-theoretical pluralism. (pg 81).

The same problem afflicts Clegg, since he identifies language games (forms of life) which appear to just exist relative to each other. Language is a concept which can only be fully understood on an intersubjective basis. It is certainly individual as the means of cognition (especially if you like talking to yourself), but it has a further critical interactionist role which theories, like Wittgenstein's can ignore. Thus, while Clegg has, unlike Gadamer, taken on board that language can be a medium of domination, he has treated language monadically which restricts his analysis of power.

³⁶¹ Clegg, supra pg. 77.

³⁶² Some bases of this identified by Habermas are,

Technocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of an ethical situation but the repression of "ethics" as such as a category of life.

Quoted in T. McCarthy "Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" Polity 1984 pg 39. Taken from "Toward a Rational Society" Heinemann 1971. He continues,

Technocratic consciousness makes this practical interest (individuation and socialization through communication in ordinary language) disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our power of technical control.

Toward a Rational Society, pg. 113.

³⁶³ See above pages 300-302.

³⁶⁴ From those works we have considered an example of the former would be Burawoy's "Manufacturing Consent", and as an example of the latter Nichols and Beynon's "Living with Capitalism".

³⁶⁵ This is related to point 2, since in many cases the emphasis on A reflects attention to conscious power. It is, however, important to appreciate that our argument is not to concentrate on B, and leave out A. That would be the same error in reverse. We contend that we need to concentrate on both sides of the dyad. This is central to Habermas's thought, as Thompson observes in "Critical Hermeneutics",

communication is an intersubjective phenomenon that is not merely monologic but dialogic, and hence "communicative action is a system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action".

J. Thompson "Critical Hermeneutics" Cambridge University Press 1981 pg. 80. Quote from "Knowledge and Human Interests" Heinemann 1978, pg. 137.

Thompson further observes in a review of "Theory of Communicative Action" (in its original German version):

The first shift is from a teleological concept of action - that is as the successful pursuit of an agent's aims or desires - to a concept of communicative action which emphasises the interaction in which two or more subjects seek to reach an understanding concerning their shared situation. (John Thompson "Rationality and Social Rationalization: an Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action. Sociology May 1983. pp. 278-294) pg 279 Underline my emphasis - remainder by Thompson.

Thus, what Habermas contends is that we have to move away from how, for instance, A achieves his purpose to how A and B act together to the advantage of A.

³⁶⁶ Though it does seem to be clear that B is not aware

³⁶⁷ See chapter 1, pp. 15-31.

³⁶⁸ Consider the following as an example of this. It is required by the ideal speech thesis that all participants should have the same chance to employ communicative acts so that they can initiate and perpetuate a discourse. It is clear from our findings that for Staff and Hourly paid there are certain matters which are beyond their reach, and which consequently they cannot employ communicative acts to initiate and perpetuate a discourse. Even on an issue like Pay there are issues beyond their reach. For instance in Excerpt 5.8 we discuss with our respondent the issue of fairness in setting levels of pay

S Do you think there is a fair system? (of setting levels of pay)

R No I don't think its fair - I think it should be the company's books, as I said earlier, should be open. An d let's see what everybody gets.

S The management salaries

R You see, although I'm saying my wages, it's not just in this company. I mean. There's wages paid for lawyers and for the work they do and the money they get. I mean I'm underpaid, grossly underpaid OK. Other people might not see it like that but that is how I see it, you know. In the same respect with directors in here. I see some guys in here that just waddle about they don't appear to do anything. OK maybe I'm ignorant of the facts. I don't know what they actually do. They might work and the work they might involve quite a lot. It's out of sight what you don't see. What you see is they're getting quite a lot and they appear to do nothing.

S Right

R To me that causes unrest, dissatisfaction

S Right. You would like to see more openness?

R Aye. I think you would find people reasonable because it happens on the shop floor. You've got foremen, skilled men, labourers, toilet attendants. At the end of the day they all accept that the skilled man, if you like is due more money. There is that gap and they accept where the gap should be.

S Right

R But there is a gap between the Director and the labourer. He doesn't know what the gap is. He doesn't know what the job is that the Director does.

This point directly to an important breach in the ideal speech thesis, in that the requirement that each side is intelligible to the other is not satisfied, because of differences in access to information. Given this there can be no discourse. There are, moreover, situations where in no discourse can take place because in the view of management the restriction of access to information is appropriate, and that discourse would not be appropriate. For instance in excerpt 5.17 we discuss with a Director, certain issues in respect of financial planning.

S Obviously everybody in the company has got to, has a part to play in achieving the profitability of the company. Who would be involved in drawing up this plan? Obviously managers would. Would staff or the shop floor be involved in that, in actually drawing the plan up rather than implementing it?

R The shop floor wouldn't be involved in drawing it up. They are not employed to draw it up.

What the director seems to be arguing here is that drawing up a financial plan is just another function - like welding a pipe or filling out documentation for exports. Nor is this a view only held by Managers. For instance in Excerpt 5.21 (from an Hourly-paid employee) the same view of financial decision-making as just another function is apparent

S What about decisions on the company's financial policy? Who do you think decides on that?

R Oh top management.

S Why do you think that?

R Well they've got the brains again

S They've got the expertise to do it. Do you think its fair they should make that decision?

R I think so, yes. You don't get any workers qualified.

S. Should guys - should employees have any sort of input into it or should it be left up to management?

R Left to Management

It appears, therefore that there is a clear division of labour, which obstructs the satisfaction of the first condition of the ideal speech thesis, representing for management a source of power. A source of power, moreover, of which neither management nor others in the firm is aware. It just "is".

Additionally the above means that the thesis is broken in its second condition - that all participants should be able to call into question any explanation, interpretation or justification such that no opinion remains exempt from consideration or criticism.

Let us say, however, that condition 1 is satisfied - that any party can initiate discourse. Would this mean that condition 2 would be satisfied? No, it would not. Consider a situation where there is employee participation at board level - there are a number of employee directors. Our data on this suggests that for all sides (management, staff, and hourly-paid) the main function of this would be to enhance the quality of communication within the company. Decisions would continue to be taken by Management. Thus even if condition 1 was met, there is no proof, on the basis of our evidence from our Staff and Hourly-paid, that condition 2 would be met in any effective sense. Habermas argues (in "Knowledge & Human Interests", pg. 354)

in Wittgenstein and his disciples the logical analysis of the case of language always remained particularistic: they failed to develop it into a theory of language games.

It appears to us to be clear that management are winning the language game. Organization theory tells us that everyone in the organization has a function (see for instance H. Mintzberg "The Structuring of Organizations") and essentially the language game revolves around "function", and in particular the ability to so define functions so that on the one hand a function (eg management) has responsibilities sufficiently important to justify a high level of reward, but is performed out of sight of the vast majority of the organization. The final element of the definition is that no one else in the organization is capable of performing the function.

The third condition - requiring all the participants to be truthful - is broken too, we would argue. A difficulty with this concerns what we mean by truth? The waters around this are too deep and dark (not to say extensive) for us to deal with here. Our point is simply that it is clear that on certain matters, Management, Staff and Hourly paid are not agreed on what the truth is. For instance our discussion on pay shows that Management regard the unions as too powerful, while Staff and Hourly paid took the view that the gap between them and Management is overly large.

This does not mean that either side is lying. Held points out (D. Held "Introduction to Critical Theory")

it is Habermas's contention that conflict, competition and strategic action in general, as well as other forms of social action, represent derivatives of action oriented to reaching understandings; they are derivatives because they involve a suspension or putting out of play certain of its dimensions (validity claims) [pg. 332]

In other words, we may attempt to sustain a validity claim by means which are other than truthful. Does this happen, and if so, why does it happen? Such action, it appears to us, does take place, most clearly in relation to the first two dimensions of power. Industrial relations appear to be well populated with such behaviour - the threat of strikes, disputes over manning levels, tactical alliances and so on. In industrial relations what is true frequently depends on who you talk to.

The final condition of the thesis requires that each side recognises the legitimacy of the other to participate in the dialogue. It is clear from our data that this is not satisfied. While Hourly-paid and Staff recognise the legitimacy of the management function,

a) management do not correspondingly recognise the legitimacy of staff and hourly paid to participate in certain areas of company decision-making. But even more importantly

b) staff and hourly paid do not recognise their own legitimacy to participate in company decision-making. This point is well made in Excerpt 5.35, where the Hourly-paid respondent sums things up by saying

they're the management and we are the workers, and that the way it is.

We do not necessarily mean to imply by this that staff and hourly paid simply accept the role that Management would allot to them - our data suggests that they seek more than Management would offer. But our data is equally clear that hourly-paid and staff would not regard it as legitimate that they should participate equally with management in company decision-making.

Given the unconscious power which operates within hierarchy, suppressing any alternative, hierarchy can be seen to have a self-reinforcing quality - at least in part it sustains itself, and would thus be difficult to dismantle (for instance in developing more democratic forms of organization). As Habermas points out

the barriers to communication which make a fiction precisely of the reciprocal imputation of accountability, support at the same time the belief in legitimacy that sustains the fiction and prevents it being found out. (quoted by T. McCarthy in his introduction to "Legitimation Crisis", pg xv).

The legitimacy of hierarchy is precisely thus. The rules, norms, etc. of hierarchy represent at the same time a barrier to communication, and provide a legitimacy which allows hierarchy to continue without challenge or being contested. In other words to revert to the theoretical structure of the first chapter, the Lifeworlds of the employees produce and structure expectations about hierarchy, but the Lifeworlds itself is critically influenced by hierarchy. The fact of spending one's working life in a hierarchy makes formidable the imagination of a workable alternative. It is moreover important to realise that this is true not of Management or Staff or Hourly paid alone - but rather of them all. By no means should it be thought that what we have described is a management plot - rather it is a social artifact in which they all collude.

Management see the rights and obligations of their position in the hierarchy as natural, and indeed as essential for the efficient running of the company. While there may be disagreement at the margin, Staff and Hourly paid by and large go along with this. The support for hierarchy is therefore in an important sense, self-generating. The problems which may arise in moving away from hierarchy will be considered in the next section of this chapter on information and control.

³⁶⁹ This point is made by Brown, (R. Brown "Bureaucracy as Praxis" Administrative Science Quarterly 1978, pp. 365-382) who argues

Making decisions is not the most important exercise of organizational power. Instead this power is most strategically employed in the design and imposition of paradigmatic frameworks within which the very meaning of such actions as "making decisions" is defined. (pg. 376)

We would perhaps take issue with Brown in that our findings indicate that Management are likewise constrained by "paradigmatic frameworks", but our findings indicate that relative to the conscious exercise of power, its unconscious exercise is both more important and effective.

370 See above footnote 13, where Habermas's definition of technical rationality is given. See too footnote 17 for an example of an Industrial Tribunal operating under the same rationality, making an argument of very much the same form.

371 Thus when Managers, faced with an eager academic anxious to discuss the uses of managerial power, says that he has none, or very little, this does not mean that he is trying to conceal something (or get rid of the academic). It may mean that he genuinely perceives no power in his position.

372 See Robert Dahl "The Concept of Power". Behavioural Science 1957.

373 See P. Bachrach and M. Baratz "Decisions and Non-decisions" American Political Science Review 1963, pp. 641-651.

374 See C. Stone - "Pre-emptive Power" American Journal of Political Science 1988 pp. 82 - 104.

375 This is defined by Habermas as follows:

"Structural violence does not manifest itself as force; rather unperceived, it blocks those communications in which convictions effective for legitimation are formed and passed on. Such an hypothesis about inconspicuously working communication blocks can explain, perhaps, the formation of ideologies; with it one can give a plausible account of how convictions are formed in which subjects deceive themselves about themselves and their situation...in systematically restricted communications, those involved form convictions subjectively free from constraint, convictions which are however illusionary. They thereby communicatively generate a power which, as soon as it is institutionalized, can also be used against them." (J. Habermas - "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power". In S. Lukes [Ed] - "Power", Blackwell 1986, pg 88)

376 Where the validity claims can be rightfully raised, and redeemed according to the ideal speech thesis (See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 333.). Thus power is not present where there is true communicative action.

377 Where the conditions of the ideal speech thesis are in one way or another violated (See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 333.).

378 Where the parties are each aware of their power and their differing interests.

379 Where strategic action is hidden.

380 Where the more powerful party is aware of the exercise of power, but employs it in such a way that the less powerful are unaware. For instance he considers Goffman's work on "impression management" as an example of this (See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 94.). This type of power is recognized, albeit in a marginal way, by Bachrach and Baratz who speak of power as manipulation (P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice". Oxford Uni. Press, 1970, pg. 20.).

381 Where both parties are unconscious of the operation and influence of power (See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 333.). For instance the role of ideology is

a form of systematically distorted communication, one which functions simultaneously to disguise and defend the suppression of generalisable interests. (John B. Thompson "Critical Hermeneutics". Cambridge Uni. Press 1981, pg 135.)

Interestingly, this too is recognized by Bachrach & Baratz as well, in that they define authority as

agreement based up reason. (P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice". Oxford Uni. Press, 1970, pg. 20.)

The difficulty here is that it fails totally to take into account the possibility that reason - rationality - can be distorted in the ways examined by Habermas's theory .

³⁸² This is what we have described as conscious power, which is suggested by

studies...by which control over structural conditions is regarded as an outcome and not necessarily a determinant of subunit power. Having obtained a position of power, subunits will tend to use their power to gain control over structural conditions and organizational resources (eg. G. R. Salancik and J. Pfeffer "Who gets power and how they hold on to it". Organizational Dynamics 1977, pp. 3-21. J. Pfeffer "Power in Organizations" Pitman 1981). (R. Lachman "Power from What?" Administrative Science Quarterly, 1989, pg 231.)

Moreover it is pointed out by Edelman that

Force signals weakness in politics, as rape does in sex. Talk, on the other hand, involves a competitive exchange of symbols, referential and evocative, through which values are shared and assigned and coexistence attained. (M. Edelman "The Symbolic Use of Politics". University of Illinois Press, 1964, pg. 114)

Hence the use of open power is something which the parties would prefer to avoid - hence dismissal, strikes etc. we would expect to be the exception rather than the norm, and indeed this is the kind of situation we found in our firm. On the other hand when we turn to the second sentence in Edelman's quote, it would be important to consider whether the "competitive exchange" is one of perfect competition. It appears to us that the exchange within the firm could not be so described, with one party - Management - having advantages in respect of their structural position in the hierarchy, and in respect of the Lifeworld.

383 This is consistent with the work of Goffman. For instance his definition of control, it is argues by Rogers, includes

control as an effect, as when one has "control of" or "control over" perceptions. Control of people results from shaping their definition of a situation or determining what they perceive. (M. F. Rogers "Goffman on Power". The American Sociologist, 1977. pg 92.)

384 See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1986, pg 332.

385 See "The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas" - S. White pg. 40.

386 This is characterized by Walsh et al. (K. Walsh, B. Hinings, R. Greenwood and S. Ranson "Power and Advantage in Organization". Organization Studies 1981, pp. 131-152) who describe this situation as "Unthought Consensus" (pp. 142-4), which is a situation where

the parameters are accepted in an uncritical way without evoking any such positive response (pg. 142).

and that what is important is

not that individuals and groups accept particular values and the operative rules which express them, but that they do not reject them (pg. 143)

They quote Buckley as arguing that

We cannot rule out the possibility that for a large percentage of the actors in any social system, the norms are accepted merely as given conditions of action with little understanding of their origin or ideological justification, and with even less comprehension than they might otherwise. (W. Buckley "Sociology and Modern Systems Theory". Prentice Hall, 1967, pg. 196: and Walsh et al. pg 143).

Walsh et al describe the "unthought consensus" as a situation where

rules and procedures of the organization are accepted as given conditions of action and not questioned. (Walsh et al pg 143)

This is very similar to the empirical situation we have described. Walsh et al. however, then go on to argue

In such a situation groups and individuals are likely to express a generalized, unspecific dissatisfaction with their interest position, or to be apathetic.

Our evidence would suggest this to be a somewhat harsh judgement to make, and in particular the latter comment concerning apathy. Our evidence suggests that

a) employees in our firm (and to the extent that they are typical) are dissatisfied, but not to a degree that they are fundamentally critical of Management, in that they would significantly vary the degree of hierarchy. Rather, while they would wish to exercise a greater degree of influence, the decision-makers would continue to be Management.

b) there was certainly no evidence of apathy, in that our subjects appeared to have a strong influence in their firm - to the extent that we would conclude they were if anything frustrated by the lack of information (See our Chapter 4, and below in this Chapter on Control of Information) rather than being apathetic.

Walsh et al.'s argument that

Dissatisfaction will be inarticulate and erratic (pg. 144)

is not supported by our data.

387 See footnote 276.

388 We can see a similar approach to this in V. Rus "Positive and Negative Power". (Organization Studies, 1980, pp. 3-19). Rus argues that

Authority, therefore, does not mean the negation of resistance (which he equates with "negative power"), but its conditional legitimation....This peculiarly contradictory formation called authority, is a creation of equilibrium between induction ("positive power") and resistance without eliminating either one or the other...The relationship between induction and resistance is no longer a direct contradictory interaction; instead it is mediated by legitimacy (Rus supra, pp. 12-13)

There is much in this with which we can agree. Most especially the way in which the concept of induction (eg Management seeking to induce their employees to act in a particular way), and resistance (eg employees resisting the attempts of Management to behave in a particular way) are not defined away. This reflects nicely the firm in which we carried out our research, since though the two parties were not in open conflict, recourse to such action was an option which neither would rule out. As Rus observes the key to this is legitimacy, but where one point on which we part company with Rus is that he appears to see no need to consider the basis of this legitimacy, and how and why it persists. A further problem with Rus's position is that there appears to be no clarification by Rus whether the existence of legitimacy renders the operation of power unconscious. Our view has been that it does.

389 This reflects again Habermas's ideas on technical rationality.

390 For instance Gerry Ross, (Boilermaker's Convener at John Browns) is quoted as saying,

Many of the stewards could not grasp the significance of the work-in, including even we among the leadership, knowing we were making a decision of this nature, and we'd no position in the past where we could draw comparisons with such a situation. We did not understandmaybe Reid and Airlie did, what the actual decision really meant, what complications we'd be confronted with, and how gigantic a step was necessary to make a success come out of it"

³⁹¹ A difficulty in accomplishing this is made clear in Tannenbaum and Rozgonyi. They argue that hierarchy is functionally necessary to achieve coordination - but on the other hand they suggest there is considerable agreement that workers should be more involved through participation. The problem is that

hierarchy is partly responsible for the problems of motivation and attitude that call for participation but also seem to provide evidence that participation will not work. (A. Tannenbaum and T. Rozgonyi "Authority and Reward in Organizations". Survey Research Centre, 1986. pg. 243)

Hence a major impediment to moving toward a situation more consistent with the Ideal Speech Thesis is not only that hierarchy is not consistent with it, but that hierarchy produces evidence which can be used in the discourse to suggest that such change may not be a good idea.

³⁹² The Ideal Speech Thesis can therefore assist us to reveal areas where power has operated in way(s) of which we are not conscious. It should be emphasised that while it is oriented toward achieving understanding, it will not by any means suppress conflict. Indeed it would be a condition of Ideal Speech that any suppressed conflict would have to be brought to the surface and resolved. Hence we can employ the Ideal Speech Thesis and concur with Cressey et al. that

the concept of economic organization without conflict is absurd and implicitly totalitarian. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge & J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press 1985, pg. 175.)

³⁹³ Holmes ("Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable" - R. Holmes. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976) points to the structural disadvantage suffered by workers.

workers cannot give each other as much support as can the members of the professions...workers are usually employed by alien organizations where promotion means removal from friends and colleagues, removal from the union itself (Holmes pg. 56)

Hence the ability of workers to pursue their wage claims is further restricted in this way, of which again they are likely to be unaware.

³⁹⁴ Clegg on the other hand, argues that (as he puts it) the different "circuits of power" are separate from each other. See S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989. This appears to us to be unfortunate, in that

a) we are considering what is supposed to be a single variable, and for this to be differentiated into three distinct, independent sub-variables opens up the issue of whether we are talking about a single variable at all. Allowing for linkages between the (we would accept) different types of power diminishes this problem.

b) the different forms (or dimensions) of power can be shown - as we have - to interact with each other, supporting each other. To take a more general example, Bachrach & Baratz's critique of Dahl is rooted in the argument that the powerful can exercise their power by preventing certain issues being introduced into the decision-making system at all (second dimension power). Yet where does the power come from to do this? Why are these issues organized out of the system? It must be because either,

1) a decision has been taken by the powerful that this should be so (first dimension power), or that

2) it is not seen as appropriate by the powerless to press this demand (third dimension power).

Hence, in some cases at least, we can only fully understand the particular form, or exercise, of power by considering its linkages to other dimensions (or to use Clegg's terminology, "circuits") of power. Only by analysis to the level of unconscious power have we been able to understand the use of conscious power by the participants in the firm.

³⁹⁵ The reasons why Investment rather than Pay can be "carried off" by Management are suggested by Pfeffer (in J. Pfeffer "Management as Symbolic Action" in L. Cummings and B. Staw- "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pp. 1-52) He quotes Thompson and Tuden (J. D. Thompson & A. Tuden "Strategies, Structures and Processes of Organizational Decisions" in J. D. Thompson et al. "Comparative Studies in Administration". University of Pittsburgh Press" 1959) who argue that there are two elements of decision making

a) whether there is consensus about goals or values

b) whether there consensus about beliefs concerning cause-effect relations, or the organization's technology

Pfeffer argues that it is easier for Management to develop consensus about the latter than the former. Pfeffer advances three reasons for this:

1) the rationality which goes into technological decisions is not only a procedure, it is also a valued social ideal - indeed to be said to be lacking rationality would be held to be a critical statement. Values on the other hand are not subject to rationality - these are subjective matters of opinion, taste, etc.

2) definitions of technical situations are more flexible than preferences and values. Pfeffer suggests

We know what we like with more certainty than we know how to achieve what we like (pg. 15)

3) we can influence perceptions of cause:effect relations through informational social influence more easily than values etc. can be so influenced. Hence through their control of information Management can exercise influence over cause:effect perceptions of their employees

We would contend, however, that while Pfeffer is perfectly correct as far as he goes, there is further dimension to this process, which he omits because first of all he considers only Management, and not how this is "carried off" in relation to other employees, and secondly because he does not allow for the exercise of unconscious power. Doing so would lead to appreciation of

a) decision-making technicalities which those outwith Management appeared not only not to understand but also to perceive as a matter outwith their role, and

b) Management's role being seen as decision-makers

In this way it becomes clear why agreement about technical issues - especially at a distance from their task - and cause:effect relations is easier to accomplish than agreement about values. Not only are there all the advantages which Pfeffer points to, but in addition Management are regarded as the authorities on such matters - hence any competing views on cause:effect begin from this very disadvantage. Indeed as Pfeffer subsequent makes clear

Once a paradigm is established, it requires a great deal of disconfirmation and challenge to undo the established patterns of analysis, data collection and choice of activities (pg. 19)

Pfeffer here is using the well known Kuhnian argument concerning overthrow of dominant paradigms. We would contend, without being critical of this view that within organizations the problem goes deeper than just the procedural elements of decision-making paradigms. The problem the role of Management indicates is that paradigms not only can have a role as decision-making tools, but also as to who should be involved in taking the decision. The paradigm may, therefore, indicate not only how the decision is taken, but who should be involved in the decision-making process. We could change one or the other, but as we shall see below in our consideration of information it may be necessary to change both in order to move toward more democratic organizations.

³⁹⁶ It has been argued by John Thompson in "Critical Hermeneutics" that

no empirical interlocution is likely to accord with the model of pure communicative action. (pg 134).

We would argue that this is quite correct, but rather an unimaginative view of Habermas. For instance, if we go back to our re-wording of Andrews' view of perfect competition

At the one level, (pure communicative action) could be kept in all its details with a clear conscience, as a theory of perfection which could be used for the assessment of the condition of any situation which would be consonant with maximum(rationality), and for the corresponding criticism of any divergent conditions in the actual world.

(my emphases)

we can begin to see the applicability of the Ideal Speech Thesis as a "bench-mark" for the analysis of empirical situations.

³⁹⁷ Lukes argues:

Indeed is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?....The trouble seems to be that Bachrach and Baratz, and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict arising in the first place.

S. Lukes "Power: a radical View". MacMillan 1974, pg 23.

³⁹⁸ See E. Goffman on "fabrication", which is a strategy of influence which uses a variety of techniques including, innuendo, deliberate ambiguity, crucial omissions, lies and impersonation. (See "Presentation of Self in Every Day Life" Doubleday pp. 62,64).

Further, his emphasis on consent is perhaps indicated by the following, on false consciousness:

he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their real interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep. And I do not intend to provide a lullaby but merely to sneak in and watch the way people snore.

See E. Goffman "Frame Analysis" Harper and Row 1974, pg 14.

³⁹⁹ This is observed by Barlow (G. Barlow "Deficiencies and the Perpetuation of Power: Latent Functions in Management Appraisal". Journal of Management Studies 1989, pp. 499-517) in a study of Management Appraisal systems.

They (Management Appraisal systems) also legitimate power structures and exchange relationships in terms that are consonant with the rational-legal ideology of modern business organizations. Cardinal to this process are activities dedicated to the construction of belief systems which assure continued compliance commitment and positive effort on the part of participants regardless of how they fare in the contest for resources....As such they provide prescriptions which identify social purposes as technical ones (pg. 500)

In this sense the function of Management Appraisal is to motivate Managers to higher levels of performance in a way which conceals the power to which they are subject. Hence rather than being seen as a form of organizational control, Appraisal is perceived as reward for "technically good" performance. Barlow concludes

It (Management Appraisal system) mobilized power as a technique in support of power as domination. (pg. 512)

400 "Power and Powerlessness in Industry" - R. Harris. Tavistock Publications 1987.

401 Thus Pfeffer when he argues that

The activity of Management is viewed as making what is going on in the organization meaningful and sensible to the organizational participants and furthermore developing a social consensus and social definition around the activities being undertaken. Management involves more than labelling or sensemaking - it involves the development of social consensus around those labels and the definition of activity (J. Pfeffer "Management as Symbolic Action" in L. Cummings and B. Staw- "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pp. 1-52, pg. 21)

he does appear to ignore that employees acquiesce in this process. In other words that while Management have to accomplish this process, they are expected to do this by their employees, which will of course render the accomplishment of this task much easier.

402 We would contend therefore, that in a precise sense it is not necessary for paradigms to be shared - see for instance Pfeffer supra, pg. 21 - and that it is enough for the paradigms to coexist through not contradicting each other, and/or being in conflict. Thus with the division of labour it becomes likely that there will be a degree of drift from the Management paradigm, but this does not create difficulties unless the paradigms begin to conflict by requiring conflicting actions to be taken.

403 The need to consider power as a multidimensional concept has been recently emphasised by Lachman, who argues

power (which he defines as "the capacity of a subunit to influence the behaviour of other subunits - pg 232) should be considered as a multidimensional and abstract concept, with several observable manifestations, and it is only through these manifestations that power can be understood and measured. It is suggested that coping with uncertainty, nonsubstitutability and centrality be regarded as these tangible manifestations of power rather than either its sources or outcomes. In other words power is the capacity of a subunit to cope with uncertainty in inputs, to control information or to place itself in a central position in the work interaction networks. (R. Lachman "Power from What." Administrative Science Quarterly 1989 pg. 248.)

Lachman is dealing with another province of power - especially in that we are dealing with power in its unconscious form - but we would certainly endorse his conclusion on the multidimensionality of power.

404 It is argued by Knights and Wilmott that

as long as subordinates are relatively compliant, the extent to which the powerful are dependent upon them can be readily unacknowledged, if not entirely forgotten. (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power and identity in theory and practice". Sociological Review 1985, pg. 25).

405 Clegg observes

the ideal speech situation is thus the counter-factual by which real interests may be realized. Consequently power would consist of placing barriers which constrain others from realizing what their interests are in the structure of a situation. (S. . Clegg "Frameworks of Power". Sage 1989, pg 94).

406 This is consistent with the conclusion of Wall and Lischeron, who find in their study that the most that employees want to do is to influence managers by direct interaction within an accepted power structure. See T. Wall and A. Lischeron "Worker Participation". McGraw Hill 1977.

407 For the avoidance of doubt, we are not necessarily arguing that Management control ought not to work - or that Management control is necessarily bad - but rather that we should understand the conditions under which Management control operates. On the other hand, as Clegg observes (S. Clegg "Organizational Democracy, Power and Participation". C. Crouch and F. Heller (Eds.), "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983, pp. 3-34)

no fundamental need necessarily attaches to any historical conventional functional differentiation , nor one might observe, to its legitimation.
(pg. 5)

In other words, hierarchy is not inevitable and that thus we should be concerned with why it is justified, and perceived to be legitimate. As Blau & Scott (P. Blau & W. Scott "Formal Organizations". RKP, 1963) argue

One of the more enduring myths of administration is that a formal hierarchy of authority is essential for co-ordinating in complex organizations.
(pg. 183)

408 The data presented in Appendix Six on Job Satisfaction are supportive of this, in that poor working conditions may lead employees to become critical of Management. We have found in our firm that on the whole the employees are satisfied with their jobs and the rewards they receive. Hence the Lifeworld role of Manager as competent decision-maker is sustained by their experience of work - for instance relatively few had experienced redundancy, and even then not in this firm.

409 It has been argued on structural grounds that management is an inevitable component of organizations. For instance it has been so argued by Leblebici and Salancik (H. Leblebici and G. Salancik "The Rules of Organizing and the Organizational Role". Organization Studies 1989, pp. 301-325) who argue that

a well developed analytic definition of "an organization" must modify the Weberian definition by incorporating a sixth element: an organization is an associative social relationship characterized by an administrative or executive staff who are the agents of the relationship itself and are empowered to seek the continuation of the relationship. (pp. 322-3 my emphasis)

We do not intend to criticise the research which led to this conclusion - but rather to consider its perceptual framework. Leblebici and Salancik begin by considering the development of trade associations in the US, as entities which display the five characteristics required in Weber's definition of an organization. Their analysis of trade associations leads them to conclude that

The theoretical and empirical results provided here suggest that an organization as a unique type of corporate group consists of a diverse group of participants who may have conflicting interests that must be managed. (pg. 322 my emphasis)

The difficulty, as we have argued above, is with the omission of any consideration of

a) why the other participants consent to be managed?

b) the conditions on which such management will take place?

The argument about the role of Management does not end by showing that any

definition of organization must incorporate an additional element - the existence of the agent of the relationship. Whether these agents are called managers, paid staff or administrators, they are the agents of the relationship rather than the agents of the members or of the elected officials. (pg. 322)

Following, as Leblebici and Salancik do, the legal analogy used by Weber, any agency agreement - even if it is functionally necessary - has to be negotiated. It is not enough to say merely that it has been negotiated. We are then obliged to consider what type of agreement has been entered into and what does it mean for the parties, both now and in the future. Indeed Abrahamsson's "mandator position" (B. Abrahamsson "On Form & Function in Organization Theory" - Organization Studies 1985, pp.39-53.), as a means of describing the role of Manager, implicitly points to the structural significance of the role of Management. Doing so, however, only opens up the issue of the limits of the role of Managers, and the degree to which they should be subject to more democratic control by the employees of the firm. This, as we have seen above, is central to Abrahamsson's discussion, and more importantly, we will argue, consistent with our own findings - in other words that while the role of Manager is accepted, the issues which remain concern the degree of, and rules for, its control.

⁴¹⁰ In this way, as Storey points out

the dual reality of labour is that it is both dominated and yet also cooperative. (J. Storey "Management Control as a Bridging Concept". Journal of Management Studies, 1985, pg. 281)

⁴¹¹ Our efforts indicate that there is very little such research.

⁴¹² It has, however, been found by Jackson-Cox et al. (J. Jackson-Cox, J. McQueeny, J. Thirkell "Strategies, Issues and Events in Industrial Relations" RKP, 1987) in their research that communication by Management is not always prompted in this way. They argue (see page 197) that Managements do (though not always) communicate with the objective of

a) securing greater employee identification with the firm, and/or

b) moderating wage claims.

It would be hard for us to conclude on the basis of the evidence that we found that our firm was perceived to communicate on anything other than an ad hoc basis, and that, if the former was the objective (and we found no direct evidence of this being practiced - though some managers were aware of its importance and were looking "to do something"), this was not consistently pursued. Indeed our firm is at variance with the Jackson-Cox findings in that it was clear to us from informal discussion with its accountants that the Employment Protection Act requirements were ones which were taken seriously by the firm. At the same time distinguishing between information communicated to satisfy the requirements of the Employment Protection Act, and to moderate wage claims, will not always be easy.

⁴¹³ See the Employment Protection Act 1975, ss 17-21, and ACAS Code of Practice Number 2.

⁴¹⁴ There are of course other areas where disclosure must be made by companies - the duty to submit annual accounts is the most obvious. Another area where disclosure has to be made is in the event of Industrial Tribunal proceedings, since as a consequence of the Industrial Tribunal Regulations 1980, rule 4, a company would have to disclose documents to the applicant. We are, however, distinguishing between

1) these types of information, where

a) the former concerns essentially public domain information,

b) and the latter is specifically adversarial,

2) set against information disclosed to employees, at least notionally, for the purpose of reaching consensus.

⁴¹⁵ There are several reasons why this could be expected:

a) Lyall finds that on the whole the shop stewards to whom the information was disclosed lacked the skills to be able to use it effectively. (D. Lyall "Opening the Books to the Workers". Accountancy 1975, pp. 42-44.) He argues

shop stewards are not able to understand the implications of financial information. (pg 42)

For instance, having set a sample of 30 stewards 6 questions on financial decision-making, the success rate averaged 20%, varying from 0% to 53% (See Lyall supra, pp. 43-44.)

b) the legislation came into effect (1975) during a period of incomes policy, so that negotiations then would be dominated by the statutory norm, rather than the financial position of the firm, and/or to what extent it might be able to afford to pay more (See for instance P. Dair and T. Kynaston Reeves "Why Disclosure Could be a non Event". Personnel Management, January 1979 pp 24-27, 39, pp. 24-25.).

c) stewards often have unofficial means of getting to know much of what they need to know, and thus the statutory provisions were beside the point.

We have found clear signs of this in our company, with stewards having their own information system. See too P. Dair and T. Kynaston Reeves, supra, pg. 26. and Purdy (D. Purdy "The Provision of Financial Information to Employees", Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1981,) pg. 334. Cooper and Essex (D. Cooper & S. Essex "Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217) find that the most important sources of information for stewards were their union, and other stewards. After that came company accounts, and only then management information (see table 6, pg. 213) which is in disagreement with our findings. We found plant management to be an important source of information, though it does have to be said that this varied from one steward/union rep to another. For instance shop stewards representing manual workers tended to be better informally informed by management than staff union representatives were. Likewise younger/less experienced stewards felt themselves less well informed than older/more experienced stewards. Access appeared to be a function of time.

d) it is concluded by Jackson-Cox et al. (See J. Jackson-Cox, J. Thirkell, J. McQueeney "The Disclosure of Company Information to Trade Unions". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1984, pp. 253-273; and J. Jackson-Cox, J. McQueeney, J. Thirkell "Strategies, Issues and Events in Industrial Relations" RKP, 1987) that only in some companies does communication enter into an overall industrial relations strategy. In those firms which they describe as having an integrated approach to their industrial relations, the implications of successful communication for

- 1) control, and in particular

- 2) securing strong employee identification with the firm

are appreciated by Management. On the other hand in other companies there is an ad hoc approach by Management, so that information is communicated only intermittently and in relation to specific situations where the need for communication is clear and unequivocal (Eg a redundancy).

We would argue that it is clear from our evidence that our firm falls into the latter, ad hoc category. Indeed more than one Shop Steward, and Staff Union Rep. commented that notice of a briefing by Management was always a harbinger of bad news.

Moreover in practice it appears that few trade unionists have made much use of the statutory provisions. Dair and Reeves report in a study in East Anglia that

very few indeed of these firms were under pressure from their trade unions to provide information, nor, among those that were taking the initiative to supply information to employees was there any evidence that the disclosure legislation, which had recently come into force, was having any impact on their thinking. Supra, pg 25.

Stewards would indicate awareness of the statutory provisions, but that

i) they were content with the way in which management communicated with them at the moment,

ii) they did not trust management, and so what information they did get would have little credibility in their eyes.

iii) their members were really only interested in their wage packets, and that it was a "them and us" bargaining situation. (Dair and Reeves supra, pg 25.)

We would have to say that we have found elements of all three of these in our research. Most obviously we have evidence of lack of trust, in that those who were told least placed least trust in whatever they were told. We have, however, also shown evidence that informally the stewards (in particular the senior more experienced, and thus more trusted stewards) were kept informed by senior line management (see above) - though this would not always be visible to their members. Hence the distinction between Dair and Reeves' categories (a) and (b) might depend on the seniority of the stewards who were interviewed (and Dair and Reeves' study only interviews "stewards and local union officials", and with no other distinction). Finally, it is clear from Appendix One that emphasis is placed on "the wage packet" by employees, though we would be unwilling to draw the conclusion that because of this employees are never interested in communication by the company

Why therefore has this attempt to "open the books" not been as successful as might have been hoped? Certainly the environmental factors we have already referred to, have not helped. That, however, would be a superficial argument, and it is important to "dig deeper".

Lyall, and Dair and Reeves put forward the following,

1) Lyall argues that employees are aware of the possibility that management may distort the information which is provided. He instances one case, where Management manipulated the costs charged to each of two factories - one automated and the other labour intensive - so that the former showed the higher level of profit. Lyall goes on to observe

One finds in interviewing trade unionists that it is this sort of manipulation which can create a credibility gap between management and unions. (See Lyall supra, pp. 42-43)

2) Dair and Reeves observe that information is not disclosed for its own sake, by management - even by the more altruistic managements - but in order to achieve an end.

As Jones (D. Jones "Disclosure of Financial Information to Employees" IPM 1978) points out

To have access to information is to have access to a source of knowledge and knowledge itself is power. It is not surprising therefore that there has been some reluctance on the part of the majority of owners of companies and other organizations to disclose information.

We would not wish to dissent from this - another excellent example of information being a critical source of power in Management is Pettigrew's "Politics of Organizational Decision-Making" - but on the other hand if we wish to move toward more democratic forms of work organization then some degree of equalization of power is inevitable. Moreover for one party to have privileged access to information is quite clearly a breach of the Ideal Speech Thesis, and thus not only stands in the way of equality, but also of dialogue.

But most importantly they observe that the dissemination of information is always controlled by Management. This need not always be deliberate restriction of information. As we shall go on to argue, it may reflect the Lifeworld of the Manager - that certain types of information, the Lifeworld suggests, are for Management and could be of no relevance to others. Thus failure to disseminate may be seen as a purely technical or practical matter and not at all political. Moreover as Towers Cox and Chell argue

worker directors were distanced from their boardroom colleagues by non-access to informal information networks. (B. Towers, D. Cox, E. Chell "Worker Directors in Private Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29, pg. 31)

Thus restriction of information may reflect not simply the power implications of hierarchy, but also the more straightforward structural implications, in that employees of a similar grade and function are likely to interact with each other on a regular basis and to be in a position to swap informal information (which for instance Mintzberg shows in "the Nature of Managerial Work" is significant for managerial decision-making - H. Mintzberg "the Nature of Managerial Work" Prentice Hall 1972), and conversely that those who are of the different grades and functions are not - for instance full time executive directors, and worker directors. Our own evidence of reported interaction between different grades (shop floor, staff and management) was that such interaction was low, with members of the same grade tending to interact with each other rather than with other grades. Thus the opportunity for employees outwith Management to obtain informal information from Management was limited by the fact that their interaction with Managers was limited. An example of this is given by Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp. 353-387.) who reports that in ALMEX (in Sweden) one form taken by participation was for elected union stewards and management to make informal contact during their normal daily work. Similar interaction could be identified in our own firm, though on an even more informal basis, but as Gardell argues,

It is this more informal day-to-day type of co-determination which is the most important and proves strong position of the metal union in the firm (pg. 362).

Thus what employees know, or find out, is always the consequence of a management decision (See Dair and Reeves pg 26.).

3) Dair and Reeves observe that even if (b) did not apply it is unlikely that trade unionists would know what information to look for at all. They observe

Knowing the right information to seek is more important than knowing what one has a right to. This issue of knowing what is the "right" information is not altogether a simple one. (Dair and Reeves, p 39)

This, they point out is not just a matter of putting trade unionists or employee representatives on to training courses. More importantly the form of information is currently dictated by what is useful to managers, who are responsible to shareholders not to employees.

Moreover as Lyall points out stewards may lack the skills to be able to make much use of the information. Additionally the problem for proposals like that of Cooper and Essex of "opening the books" (D. Cooper & S. Essex "Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pg. 215) would be undermined by the form of the information there. Attempts have been made to address this by putting information in more "accessible forms". For instance Purdy (D. Purdy "The Provision of Financial Information to Employees", Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1981, pg. 331) reports that one company presented an annual report to employees in cartoon form to make it more understandable than the standard accountancy format. This certainly begins to deal with the skills problem, but does nothing about the purpose for which the information has been reported - in other words it only makes it more possible for employees to understand information which has been prepared for the purposes of management and shareholders. The information is from a dialogue to which they are not party.

⁴¹⁶ This can be seen in a study by Hussey (R. Hussey "Who Reads Employee Reports" Touche Ross 1979) who shows - just as we have shown that perceived quality of information and trust in the information are structured hierarchically - that the retention of reports is likewise hierarchically structured. He finds that 72% of managers report "still having" the most recent employee report, while 45% of unskilled manual still have their copies, though as Hussey points out this may reflect the fact that white collar workers having (perhaps) an office and (certainly) a desk, have a greater opportunity to do so. Again, however, the readership is hierarchical, with 55% of managers reading all of the report, but only 15% of unskilled workers doing so. Interest too appears to be hierarchical. Hussey and Marsh point to

the high level of interest claimed by managers, and the relatively lower levels of interest expressed by clerical workers, semi-skilled workers and in particular by unskilled workers. (R. Hussey and A. Marsh "Disclosure of Information and Employee Reporting". Gower 1983, pg. 116)

The importance of hierarchy is common with our own findings, as our own Chapter 4 demonstrates that Management, then Staff, then Hourly Paid

a) report greatest satisfaction with the information communicated to them by the Firm,

b) report greatest trust in the information communicated to them by the Firm. (See above, our table 4.15)

⁴¹⁷ In this respect the role of the Lifeworld becomes important, since as the reservoir of interpretive relevances, this means that if two individuals have significantly different Lifeworlds (as an Hourly Paid employee and senior Manager may well have) then they may interpret the same piece of information in quite different ways. For instance the senior Manager may be sending out information which he regards as important, but which the Hourly Paid employee defines as irrelevant - and thus he may report that he has been told nothing about the issue in question. We are not arguing that this undermines any argument about the adequacy of the volume of information made available by Management, or about access to it. This problem of different Lifeworlds and interpretive relevances is, however, quite consistent with this, and may exaggerate an otherwise existing problem. So for instance, the results reported in Chapter 4, that employees perceive themselves to be badly informed may reflect not only (or even necessarily mainly) an inadequate emphasis on communication, but instead a form of communication which one party does not (fully?) understand. In this way we can begin to understand the finding in table 4.1, whereby only one management/staff respondent felt that they gave inadequate attention to communicating with their subordinates. Given the other results, an explanation is to say that these respondents were overstating their own efforts, or being not entirely truthful. Another explanation is to say that, in terms of, for instance, the Management Lifeworld, the communication by Management to Staff and Hourly paid was adequate - but that it was not adequate in terms of the Staff or Hourly paid Lifeworld. The same argument can be applied to Staff. Thus the failure to communicate effectively may reflect not a lack of effort (or not only this), but an inability of the parties to communicate because of Lifeworld differences.

⁴¹⁸ A similar conclusion is reached by Lund, who reports that in a study of 3 major decisions in a small Danish firm which had employee directors, that they were simply overwhelmed by the facts and figures put before them, which were so far from their normal experience. As a result their input to the decisions was extremely limited. (R. Lund "Power and Indirect Participation" Organization Studies, 1980)

⁴¹⁹ This, of course, reflects the (organizational) structural advantages of Management. Astley & Sachdeva point out

Higher levels of the hierarchy therefore are characterized by a positive relationship between resource control and network centrality, rather than the negative relationship found at lower levels. (W. G. Astley & P. S. Sachdeva "Structural Sources of Intraorganizational Power: A Theoretical Synthesis". Academy of Management Review 1984, pp. 104-113. pg. 110)

Essentially what Astley and Sachdeva are arguing here is that Management are not powerful just because they are at the apex of the hierarchy, or just because they have control over the resources of the organization, or because they are at the "crossroads" of the communication channels (formal and informal) in the organization. Management, they argue, are powerful because they are all these things concurrently.

Additionally Astley and Sachdeva direct us to Offe, who points out that hierarchical position does not necessarily correspond to the importance of one's functional role. Offe distinguishes between

- a) task-status-continuous organizations in which formal authority and functional expertise do correspond and

- b) task-status-discontinuous organizations in which formal authority and functional expertise do not necessarily correspond. This type of organization, Offe argues is becoming increasingly prevalent, but which may not be perceived or not clearly so, given the

gradually evolving institutionalization of an organization. (D. Hickson, W. Astley, R. Butler and D. Wilson "Organization as Power". In B. Staw and L. Cummings "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pg. 190)

See Astley and Sachdeva, *supra*, pg. 107, and C. Offe "Industry & Inequality", Arnold 1978.

Astley & Sachdeva deal with power from a structural perspective, whereas our deals with the perceptions of organizational members. But accepting Astley & Sachdeva's argument of the structural advantages of Management, and Offe's argument of task-status discontinuity, we are left to ponder as to why this persists. It is this we have considered.

⁴²⁰ See also our discussion, above, concerning paradigm change requiring not only changes in how decisions get taken technically, but also changes would be required on who is involved in taking decisions. The control of information is, therefore, in an important way about

a basic aspect of the managerial prerogative that has proved extraordinarily difficult to break down. (TUC "Industrial Democracy". 1974, pg. 12)

The kind of information which the TUC (TUC "Industrial Democracy". 1974, pp. 32-33) argues employees ought to be given includes:

1) for all employees: the information which is sent to shareholders; the terms and conditions of their employment; a job specification; an indication of their employment prospects; access to their own personnel file. The second item was provided by the firm - at least to new employees, as a matter of employment law. The first, fourth and fifth items we know were not made available to employees in our firm - indeed employees learned of an order being won which guarantied their employment for two years, from the local evening paper!

2) for workplace representatives in addition to the above: manpower figures (number employed, turnover and absence figures, recruitment, training, redundancy and dismissals); earnings by different occupations. The former may have been found by shop stewards through a variety of means, but the latter certainly was not.

On the other hand the TUC does recognise that

enforced disclosure is hardly likely to be followed by meaningful discussion (pg. 34)

It is recommended by the TUC that the role of ACAS should be to conciliate between management and unions, as required on this issue. This confirms, we would argue, our view that information is not only important in respect of what is provided, but also in respect of the quality of the dialogue which follows.

⁴²¹ This is confirmed by Craft, who argues

the accountant is likely to continue to play a partisan role and will probably become increasingly involved in a number of support activities in collective bargaining. For example he will help prepare management and industrial relations staff for negotiations. (J. Craft "Role of Accountant in Collective Bargaining". Accounting, Organizations and Society". 1981, pg. 106)

⁴²² Hence while structures are important therefore - are there regular briefing groups, are employees immediately informed of significant events in the firm, etc. - no less important are the rules which govern these structures. For instance who controls access to information - do Management have a right of veto? Is the flow of information a way - do Management inform, and employees can then only advise, but not question? (See Purdy supra, for a discussion of the forms of structure used, and D. Wallace Bell "Industrial Participation" Pitman 1979, for the possible structures available to firms).

⁴²³ See Lyall, supra. It is also noted by Loveridge that

Blockages in Communication often emanate from differences in the frames of reference being used by the parties. Information may be offered but not recognized or accepted within the value context in which it is being offered (No better example exists than in the use of the term "profit"). Failure to recognize the pervasiveness and longevity of these differences may cause management to disappear into an endless spiral in which "solutions" serve only to make the perception of the "problem" seem more acute. (R. Loveridge "What is Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations" 1980, pg. 298)

Hence a proportion of the problem of communication may be that Management are, in their context terms, communicating with their employees. The problem with this may be that the terms and context used, may not be accessible to employees so that for them it is a message they do not understand, and thus its information is lost. We reported in Table 4.1 that, with a single exception, all Managers and Staff in the firm who had responsibility for a hierarchical subordinate, felt that they did all they could to keep them informed. The possibility that Managers and Staff who answered this question may, from their perspective, genuinely have been attempting to communicate may go some way to explaining why the evidence in this area should be so consistent. Thus despite the attempts of Management and Staff to communicate, the messages they were sending out were not being received as intended - or perhaps not even at all. Thus when we take into account the different Lifeworlds occupied by different hierarchical levels, it becomes apparent that failure to communicate may not entirely be due to Managerial silence, but partly be due to a genuine inability (on the part of both sides) to communicate with each other. The existence of this situation would, it should be noted, represent a breach of the Ideal Speech Thesis in that this requires a participant to be able to make him/herself understood by the other parties to the dialogue. The source of such situations, we would argue, is at least partially in the kind of fragmentation of consciousness which we considered in the previous section of this Chapter. This is supported by the observation by Towers et al. that

a mistake is made when the qualitative aspects of disclosure are relegated beneath the quantitative, that is where concerns with "how much" assume greater importance than concerns with "how well" information is used. (B. Towers, D. Cox, E. Chell "Worker Directors in Private Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29, pg. 22)

Hence in communicating with employees there has to be an emphasis on ensuring that the information is in a form which is accessible to them, thus creating the conditions for dialogue. Our own data suggests that employees in our own firm are doubly disadvantaged. We have shown the lower in the hierarchy, the less well one perceives oneself to be informed. Likewise those who perceive themselves to be badly informed put little trust in the information which they do receive. The sources of this we have argued in Chapter 4 are clearly hierarchical, but we cannot distinguish whether this is due to employees low in the hierarchy not being informed, or being informed but in a form they cannot understand, or both of these factors. It is, however, clear that both obstruct the development of dialogue in the organization.

⁴²⁴ It is argued by Cooper and Essex (D. Cooper & S. Essex "Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217) on the basis of the information needs of shop stewards report that

it seems that a reorientation of accounting information would be of benefit to potential users (pg. 215)

On the other hand this point does not always appear to be widely appreciated. Consider for instance the following from "Industrial Democracy" by the TUC (TUC, 1974).

The above information should normally be available from management control systems and should be a presumption that it will be made available. However, more information might be necessary. (Para 74, pg. 30)

The last sentence notwithstanding - and also the indication that it is questionable how far employees could understand such information - it is clear that in general the TUC view is that access to the management system of information equates with communication. It does have to be said that developments of the kind indicated in the quote would be a move toward better communication. However, it does have to be recognized that what the TUC are calling for is greater access to a system of Management communication, and thus a system of communication predicated on the existence of hierarchy - it would be a system of communication of what the top of the hierarchy are thinking and/or doing.

⁴²⁵ R. Hussey and A. Marsh "Disclosure of Information & Employee Reporting". Gower 1983.

⁴²⁶ R. Hussey and A. Marsh , table 7.2, page 61. On the other hand, these - essentially Management - aims can be understood from other perspectives. For instance, as Hussey and Marsh point out (table 7.3, pg. 63) "increasing employee involvement" can be understood from the perspective of the employee as "the company discharging its responsibility to its employees in respect of their right to know"; cultivating employee identification with the company" can be understood as "having a well informed work force", and so on. This raises the issue of the purpose of communicating with employees, but in particular (a) the values which underlie these purposes - for instance "having a well informed work force" could be understood (from a more skeptical perspective) as "having a well conned work force"; which leads to (b) the structure within which the communication takes place. We shall argue below that this is critical, and that in this respect there are two fundamental problems. First of all that because one party - Management - has control over the system for communicating with employees, that dialogue (in the sense of the Ideal Speech Thesis) is impossible. Secondly that because of Lifeworld differences, even where there is communication, the parties may not be able to enter into dialogue. Hussey and Marsh provide an example of this. The interviewer has asked the respondent whether or not he has understood the financial information provided in the company report to its employees. The respondent replies

Aye, I understand it.....but what does it mean? (R. Hussey and A. Marsh "Disclosure of Information and Employee Reporting". Gower 1983, pg. 121)

⁴²⁷ CBI "Guide-lines for Action on Employee Involvement". CBI 1980. This put forward 5 objectives in seeking to involve employees (pg. 6.)

1) to create a greater understanding of the contribution made by employees to the company in creating

i) wealth which is of benefit to the community at large, and

ii) a more efficient company and thus greater job security.

2) developing understanding involvement by each employee with his job and of its relation to, and dependence on other jobs in the company.

3) to ensure that all employees are aware of the reasons for major decisions which affect them, and of the factors taken into account by management in taking such decisions. Correspondingly to ensure that management are aware of the views of employees before they take these decisions.

4) to ensure that all employees are aware of the situation of the business.

5) to inform employees of the objectives of their company, and to allow discussion of these.

If we treat the first two of these as saying that employees ought to understand their own role in the company, and the role they play with others in developing its profitability, then we could argue, on the basis of our evidence, that our firm has not succeeded in doing this. That, however, would be something of a harsh judgement. From our evidence it is clear that particular groups of employees do have a meaningful level of understanding of the technology which they produced, and of the contribution of their group to its production. On the other hand, if we move on to the second part - the role of others - then the judgement would have to be rather more harsh, since it is clear that between the different groups there was a limited understanding of the contribution of others. Thus, it was made clear in Chapters 4 and 5 that Hourly paid often did not understand the role of Management, and while they may have had a greater understanding of the role of Staff, the further Staff got from the point of production the less this understanding became.

Moving on to the next three stated CBI objectives the judgement becomes even more unsympathetic.

Arguing for objective three would be extremely difficult. The thrust of our evidence in this respect is that for other employees, management was something which just happened. For instance even the announcement of a large order, creating two or three years of secure employment was "communicated" to Hourly paid and Staff employees via the local evening paper.

It does, however, have to be pointed out that this is not atypical. Clarke finds

At present efforts made by firms to communicate information of importance to workers are patchy. The survey made the connection with the inquiry referred to found that the commonest means were the notice board (94% of all respondents) and works or shop meetings (66%). Nearly three quarters of the firms surveyed made no special effort to inform their employees of the financial position of the firm. Over one half gave no attention to providing information about the order book, and half of them made no particular effort to provide information about the firm's productive achievement. (O. Clarke "Workers Participation in Management in Great Britain". ILO Research Series No. 58, pg. 12).

If we turn to the latter part of the objective, this is even more difficult to sustain in that

a) there was no mechanism for this to happen

b) an attempt to develop a production committee had degenerated to such an extent that the committee was known as the "pigeon shit" committee, since the non-Management group, feeling that Management were not paying attention to their views, ended up complaining about broken glass in the roof (hence pigeon shit).

Objective four is undermined by frequent references by shop stewards in particular, that the only time they were informed by the company about the situation of the company was when it was not doing well, and redundancies were possible.

Objective five - informing employees of the objectives of the firm - was not an activity which we found to be practiced in the firm through the means of the company newsletter. This, however, is indicative of communication in the company. The communication was erratic, superficial, but most importantly was consistently controlled by Management.

This is consistent with findings of Cressey et al. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) , who quote a manager as saying

I don't think its a bad thing at all, except in those areas where to reveal your strategy is to reveal your hand, and that in the commercial market at certain times would be suicidal. Therefore there is no simple answer. It would still have to remain the discretion of the company as to what it revealed. (pg. 35)

The authors continue

The emphasis was therefore on explaining to and informing the work-force about why the company was planning to follow a certain course of action, rather than seeing the course of action itself as negotiable.

We shall consider below the conceptual and practical difficulties that treating such issues as even negotiable would create.

We found no evidence that employees could insist on information - the information of the company was controlled by Management.

It is, however, clear that our firm was not exceptional. For instance Hussey and Marsh show that 78% of single establishment businesses did not issue their employees with an annual report (Hussey and Marsh table 8.2, pg. 69). The reasons for not doing so varied - confidentiality, information being misunderstood, employees not interested and the information being the business of the shareholder were the most important (Hussey and Marsh table 9.3, pg. 80). The forms of communication most widely used were house journals and notice boards (Hussey and Marsh table 8.5, pg. 71). Thus it would seem that firms generally do not keep their employees well informed. Hussey and Marsh argue

both managers/supervisors and employees were clearly dissatisfied with the level of formal management communication (Hussey and Marsh, pg. 90)

A study by Wilders and Heller show that where firms with a high level of information provision have (a) better management:worker relations, (b) a higher level of trust between the parties, (c) more employee satisfaction, (d) lower absenteeism and labour turnover (M. Wilders and F. Heller "Company Information to Employees". In A. Marsh and F. Heller (eds) "Employees, Trade Unions and Company Information, Research and Practice" Touche Ross 1981)

Thus while there may have communication in the firm, it could by no means be described as dialogue, which involves a two way exchange of information.

This is not to say that such issues are not considered. For instance Wilmot (R. E. Wilmot - "How to Really reach Blue Collar Workers". Public Relations Journal 1988, pp. 35-37) takes Management to task who are unwilling to communicate freely - that the problems of not communicating will not disappear by continuing not to communicate, that not answering employees difficult questions only leads to their frustration. He recommends that Management should establish from surveys etc. what employees want to know, and then to set about informing them suitably, and that employees should meet with their Managers and be able to question them about the decisions they have taken and why they have done so. The difficulty with this is that

a) the structure of the communication is still clearly from superior to subordinate within a hierarchical structure, in that the system is controlled by management - they would (presumably) arrange for the survey, lead the meetings etc. Moreover the access would be to a system of Management information which is designed to satisfy their needs (this point is developed below).

b) it could by no means be said to be descriptive of our firm.

The failure to establish two way communication is taken up by Drennan (D. Drennan "Are You Getting Through". Management Today August 1989, pp. 70-72.), who argues that it is essential for Management to establish a two way communication with their employees. This would appear to begin to establish dialogue, but as we shall see it is (in Habermas's terms) an unequal dialogue, and one which reveals the difficulty with communication in hierarchical organizations.

Drennan instances with approval a manufacturing business which had decided to try to improve its communications with its employees. To this end it went through several stages -

1) setting out goals, which would be constant (over the next 5 years), could be acted on by every department, and could be understood by every employee - broadly this was to

compete through superior customer
service; and to improve business
performance continuously. (pg 70.)

2) employees in groups and teams were then asked what they could do to contribute to the goals of the firm.

3) comparisons were drawn between the firms' products and those of its competitors; operators were sent to work on the production lines of its customers to see for themselves how their product was used. Changes were then made to the firm's product.

4) production groups began to set output and quality targets for themselves, which were monitored by the group.

Drennan argues, and we would not disagree. that this is a better system of communication. In particular, he says

Communications became meaningful and understandable to employees only when they hang from a clear overall purpose. Without it communications can be little more than a confusing collection of random information. (pg 70.)

This begins to indicate perhaps part of the reason why employees perceived themselves to be badly informed. If we consider table 4.1, we showed there that with one exception, all of our sample who had somebody working for them in a subordinate capacity, felt they were doing all they could to keep their subordinates informed. An obvious reason for this finding is that insufficient effort was put into communication to generate a higher judgement, and this would certainly be our judgement - in other words that communication was not given a high enough spot in the system of priorities.

Another explanation within reach is, however, that communication was in a language or form understandable to the sender, but not by the recipient. We have already considered this problem above, but Drennan adds a further dimension by pointing out that to be understandable it has to be put in an overall context which the employee can share in - in this case the overall objectives of the firm. Clearly, from Drennan's description there has been an increase in communication in this firm, but set against the Ideal Speech Thesis we can perceive systematically distorted communication in this, in that the dialogue is structured not by all the participants, but rather by one group - Management. The Ideal Speech Thesis, we would argue has been broken in that the system of communication which is operating has been set up by Management - basically it is they who have determined the objectives, and the system follows on from that.

Thus, even in the kind of situation which Drennan describes - where communication is actively sought - cannot be described as a system of equality, or even contributing toward this. Certainly Drennan identifies the difficulty of understanding as one of the major obstacles to effective communication. Other difficulties with communication are shown in his work, in that communication in this case is predicated on Management objectives - it is a system of communication established to facilitate the achievement of Management objectives. The communication system is one which is grounded in the existence of hierarchy.

⁴²⁸ In addition to the documents referred to above, Bell gives a comprehensive listing of the devices available to Management for communication with their employees. See D. W. Bell "Industrial Participation". Pitman 1979, pp 21-45.

⁴²⁹ As Hussey and Marsh (Hussey R. and Marsh A. "Disclosure of Information & Employee Reporting". Gower 1983) point out

Most discussions on "fairness", "truth", and "impartiality" in relation to decision-making have taken place within the company-shareholder relationship. Moved out of that setting some of the arguments appear even less tenable. Maunders has claimed that "to evaluate current and future practice in reporting to employees, it is therefore necessary to inquire into decision needs (pg. 124, our emphasis)

We would argue further that it is necessary to understand what underlies and produces these needs. This, as we have argued, is to be located in the structure and implications of the structure of the Lifeworld.

⁴³⁰ Marsden argues that:

consultation is an attempt to extend information exchange without making concessions over control ((D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of Employment Research Paper No. 4, 1978, pg. 44)

This is certainly true - nonetheless a successful system of consultation, which develops to the level of being a dialogue between Management and other employees, does represent a move toward equality (though still a long way from it), and further moves may develop from this.

⁴³¹ Bowen makes a similar point to this when he argues that

communication which is irrelevant to, or divorced from involving people and their occupational groups in departmental problem-solving and beyond will remain limited in its impact and effect. We argue for the extension of joint role-determination, for the balanced growth of workplace labour influence over work activities which workers themselves identify as significant, and in forms which permit some enlargement of inter-occupational communication. (P. Bowen "Social Control in Industrial Organizations". RKP 1976, pg. 248.)

⁴³² It is argued by Kiloh that

It is generally agreed that industrial democracy is a good thing, but agreement as to the meaning of the term, its justification, practical application and limitations is hard to find. What is proposed is intimately connected with why it is proposed and who is proposing it. (M. Kiloh "Industrial Democracy". in D. Held and C. Pollitt "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1986. pg. 14.)

⁴³³ M. Marchington "Responses to Participation at Work". Gower 1980.

⁴³⁴ Marchington, *supra*, pp. p-11.

⁴³⁵ K. F. Walker "Toward the Participatory Enterprise: a European Trend". *Annals of the American Academy* 1977, pg. 10. Quoted in Marchington *supra*, pg. 18.

⁴³⁶ To take another football analogy, for a player to be offside, he must, among other things, be "interfering with play". This is innevitably a matter of interpretation for the referee.

⁴³⁷ P. Bowen, *supra*.

⁴³⁸ There is, however, a variation in that Bowen's questions also included not only management "on site" (Ie in what he calls Ironhill) but also top and divisional management, which had no counterpart in our firm. Nevertheless, even if we treat top, divisional and Ironhill management as either single groups, or as a composite, makes no difference to the comparisons which we can draw with our data. A further difference, which does somewhat restrict the width of the comparisons which we shall be able to draw, is that Bowen did not obtain data from management (See Bowen *supra*, pg. 187, table 8.1).

⁴³⁹ It is, however, interesting that like our own group of Hourly-Paid workers, clerical workers (the closest there is in Bowen's categorisation to our category of Staff) are perceived to be of equal influence to the manual workers. See Bowen Tables 8.10 and 8.15. This was frequently perceived to be the case in our own research - but as we showed, Staff did not agree with this perception, consistently rating themselves more highly than Hourly-Paid. On the other hand Table 9.2 suggests that this was not perceived in the same way by Bowen's clerks who seem to see themselves as having broadly similar amounts of control as the manual workers. This is, however, a not entirely safe comparison since Bowen's category of "Clerk" is restricted in comparison to our "Staff" category.

⁴⁴⁰ Which we would argue is conceptually similar to our "ideal", and which Bowen uses interchangeably with "preferred" in any case.

⁴⁴¹ This is most true for local Ironhill management - indeed top and divisional management's perceived control would decline. This clearly indicates a degree of aversion toward these non-site management. This, however, was not a situation which we encountered in our own research, since non-site management were not perceived as an issue. See Bowen, *supra*, pg 198, table 8.10.

⁴⁴² Our own list, as we make clear in Chapter 2, was derived from this.

⁴⁴³ See Bowen, *supra*, pg 199, table 8.11.

⁴⁴⁴ Thus the top two items in the "preferred" mode were "safety", and "pay rates and bonuses" (with indices of 2.6 and 2.4 respectively). In the "actual mode" the top two were "work pace" and "safety" (each with indices of 2.0).

⁴⁴⁵ The bottom two in the "preferred" mode were "financial policy matters" and "purchasing new machines and equipment" (with indices of 1.6 and 1.4 respectively), and likewise for the "actual mode" (each with indices of 0.7).

⁴⁴⁶ We have, however, chosen not to integrate the perceptions over a number of areas into a single average, since as we have shown in our factor analysis, control in one area may not be conceptually similar to control in another. See too P. Gundelach and H. Tetzschner "Measurements of Influence in Organizations" *Acta Sociologica*, 1976, pp. 49-63.

⁴⁴⁷ See Bowen, *supra*, pg 248.

⁴⁴⁸ For instance Loveridge points out that the

adherence of writers like Fayol and Urwick to classical hierarchical forms and to a strict division of responsibility within their organizations, even when complemented by the Cadbury welfare philosophy of man-management, provides evidence of the manner in which the practising manager's desire for certainty and predictability was most expressed then, as it is now, in bureaucratic forms. (R. Loveridge "What is Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations" 1980, pg. 298)

Thus, not only, as we have shown already is the possibility of moving away from hierarchy limited by the inability of those outwith Management to mount a challenge, but also by the fact that such changes are unlikely to be ceded easily by Management.

⁴⁴⁹ Hanson and Rathkey (C. Hanson & P. Rathkey "Industrial Democracy: A Post Bullock Shop Floor View". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1983, pp. 154-168), show that there is a

high level of support for participation
at the workplace (pg. 158)

and that between 90 and 96% of their sample (from four firms) were in favour of "participation in decision-making at the workplace" (pg. 158, table 2). On the other hand it is clear from table 3 that

1) while 25-36% of their sample (four firms) wanted to participate in decisions about their own work AND working conditions and decisions about the company as a whole

2) 58-61% wanted to participate ONLY in their decisions about their own work and working conditions. (see table 3, pg. 158)

Hence the implication of their findings is that

a) while there is clear demand for participation,

b) there is significantly greater interest in participation in direct employment matters.

On the other hand, this begs the question of whether or not it is feasible to participate meaningfully only at this level, or whether "company decisions" do not restrict "direct decisions" to such an extent, that for it to be meaningful, participation must be at both levels, even if the latter is more appreciated by employees. We shall consider this later.

⁴⁵⁰ An interesting view of this is given by Marsden (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of Employment Research Paper No. 4, 1978) who argues that

The principle of "managerial functions" is not just a bold assertion by management, but an agreement between the union and management as to the function of the latter, (pg. 33)

In this sense, therefore, when a trade union seeks recognition from Management there is an implied recognition by the Union of the right of management to manage.

⁴⁵¹ Bowen, supra, pg 248.

⁴⁵² For instance Towers et al. find in their study that

the great majority of the worker directors were led to think of their board posts only in terms of the managerial perspectives that had underlain and later permeated the schemes. This last dimension of power was perhaps the most important of all since it ensured that the limitations upon the worker directors' power and influence were structural, that is they were written into the schemes from the outset. (B. Towers, D. Cox, E. Chell "Worker Directors in Private Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29, pg. 31)

This is quite consistent with the argument that we have presented here in that this would forecast that employee directors would indeed find it difficult to define their experience at board level in any other way, since they have no experience which would enable them to do otherwise. In this respect writing the constraint into the scheme is perhaps irrelevant. On the other hand experience of working at board level, to the extent that it modifies the Lifeworld may cause employees outwith Management to challenge the perceived Management monopoly of required skills. In this respect writing restrictions into a scheme for participation may again be irrelevant, since if the Lifeworlds of employees outwith Management change sufficiently, then such restrictions may be no defence.

⁴⁵³ K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A. Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 380. Henceforth we shall refer to this as Tannenbaum et al. (1).

⁴⁵⁴ K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A. Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pp. 381, 388-393.

⁴⁵⁵ K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A. Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, Figs. 1-3.

⁴⁵⁶ K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A. Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 393.

⁴⁵⁷ S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pp. 243-259. Henceforth Tannenbaum et al. (2).

⁴⁵⁸ This is considered by Fatchett (D. Fatchett "Industrial Democracy - the Prospects". Universities of Leeds and Nottingham, 1977, see pp. 15- 22) who defines indirect methods participation as including collective bargaining, consultation and worker directors, all of which are found by the author to be of limited value or that aspirations have run ahead of progress.

⁴⁵⁹ S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pp.245-6.

⁴⁶⁰ This is considered by Fatchett who defines direct methods participation as

those processes which operate through the individual worker and not through some system of representation. (D. Fatchett "Industrial Democracy - the Prospects". Universities of Leeds and Nottingham, 1977, pg. 14)

⁴⁶¹ S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pp. 246-7.

⁴⁶² This is illustrated by the following quote from Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) from a union official,

There are no rank and file demands for more participation. The main preoccupations of the shop floor are improvements in wages and conditions (pg. 29)

⁴⁶³ It is reported by Cressey et al. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) that managers in their survey were

far more favourable towards job based participation (pg. 33)

This repeats our finding - but in addition, as we have argued, this is so also for those outwith Management.

The distinction is also found by Clarke (O. Clarke "Workers' Participation in management in Great Britain". OECD), who found that most workers wanted more say on issues like wages, conditions of employment, discipline, but less on financial, commercial and technical decisions unless they were going to be directly affected (pg. 18).

It is a distinction also drawn by Gundelach & Tetzschner (Acta Sociologica 1976) who show, by using factor analysis that there are statistically significant between perceptions of control of different areas of work. It is also shown in another context by Enz (C. Enz "The measurement of perceived intraorganizational power". Organization Studies 1989, pp. 241-251) who shows that general measures of perceived power produce different results from issue specific measures.

⁴⁶⁴ This is also reported in Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp. 353-387.) who reports that workers wanted to make their demands on general issues through the union-board, rather than to do so directly or through their own work-group. Thus it is shown that on direct issues (Gardell describes these as "individual") - Rebuilding; Selection of new recruits for the work-group; Training; Planning material supplies; choice of machines, tools; Production volume - employees wanted to exercise influence through their work-group or individually. But on strategic issues (what Gardell calls "collective") - New appointments, Selection of Higher Managers, Finance and Investments, Production development - employees preferred to make demands through the union board. See Gardell, pg. 382, table 18.2. A similar conclusion is drawn by Dickson, who argues that

The scores on the participation composite show that most participation occurs with respect to departmental employee decisions. (J. Dickson "Participation as an Interaction, Communication and Influence Process". Personnel Review 1983, pg. 20).

A similar conclusion is reached by Poole who finds that

managerial control over the bulk of strategic decisions remains intact under disjunctive bargaining, although authority, power, and influence over a number of issues are more evenly shared. (M. Poole "Managers, Industrial Democracy & Control", in M. Poole & R. Mansfield "Managerial Roles in Industrial Relations", Gower 1980, pg.85)

Consistent with this it is argued by Ursell that both managers and stewards, in her study, felt that employees should have a "major say in redesign process" of their jobs. (See G. Ursell "The View of British Managers and Shop Stewards on industrial democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and Sons 1983, pg. 336).

465 They argue that

Members are likely to feel committed and satisfied first and foremost to the extent that they perceive themselves to personally have authority to make decisions; second, and in lesser degree, to the extent that they perceive their immediate work group to make decision, and hardly at all to the extent to the extent that they perceive that decisions are made by representative bodies in their company. Thus, the closer the participation is perceived to be with the respondent himself or herself, the more likely participation is associated with the effects predicted for it. (S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pg. 254, my emphasis)

Hence the argument put forward suggests that industrial democracy, in the form of participation at, say, Board level is not likely to be enough, because it appears to employees outwith Management that, while those involved in its operation may have changed, the system of control has not. This point is also made by Gardell.

the unions will soon run into the same problems found with the German Mitbestimmung and Yugoslav Self-Management, namely that they will be regarded by the rank and file as part of the control system of the company with neither the chance nor the interest in looking after the every-day working conditions of the members. (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pg.359)

To operate successfully then it appears that influence has to be distributed more widely than bringing in additional company directors, and that employees (Gardell's rank and file) need to have their own sense of being able to exercise control.

⁴⁶⁶ Gardell notes

The conditions for autonomy are related to self-confidence, inter-personal relations and a sense of responsibility. (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pg. 371.)

See too the discussion on pp. 373-379, where there is an elaboration of this in the context of a democratised workplace. It is argued that there will be changes in

a) employee identity, because in the new environment there is a developing sense of competence from the opportunity to the greater autonomy for work-groups - more technical skills are acquired, planning skills are learned, the group is able to participate at higher levels of the organization than before.

b) greater self-confidence due to greater autonomy

Such changes, and in particular the former, we would argue, clearly operate through the Lifeworld, in that through a more democratic work-place the employee is given the opportunity to develop a new identity through the changes in the activities that he is involved in, and by behaving in this way to learn to develop an interpretive relevance of himself as competent in such activities that he may previously have regarded as the monopoly of others.

⁴⁶⁷ A similar view is taken by Loveridge, who argues, that

It is unlikely that a desire for collective involvement in managerial authority will take precedence over more immediately attainable shopfloor goals (R. Loveridge "What is Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations" 1980, pg. 299).

⁴⁶⁸ Lammers et al. (C. Lammers, P. Meurs, T. Mijs "Direct and Indirect Participation in Dutch Firms and Hospitals". Organization Studies 1987, pp. 25-38) present evidence applicable to this in a study of Dutch firms and hospitals. They conclude that

By and large there is no evidence that shopfloor participation and co-determination via a Works Council are interdependent.....It stands to reason to surmise that a general sense of well-being due to direct participation leads workers in such settings to believe that their representatives at a higher level are also quite involved and influential with respect to a company wide issues. (pp. 34-35)

As well as pointing to the conceptual distinction between direct issues relating to the employee's own working situation, and indirect issues of a more strategic nature, the argument presented by Lammers et al. indicates that a more effective way of creating more democratic structures may be to develop them "bottom up" - in other words rather than starting by developing roles like workers directors, it may be more effective to develop democracy at work by beginning from the working situation of employees, and developing this to include increasingly organization-wide, strategic issues. This is an issue we shall consider at more length at the end of this chapter. This argument also finds support from FitzRoy and Kraft (F. FitzRoy and K. Kraft "Participation and Division of Labour: a West German Case Study". Industrial Relations Journal 1985, pp. 68-74). They argue that

formal or representative participation in any form which retains extreme DOL (Division of Labour) does not offer this potential (Gains in motivation, job satisfaction, better team-work). Herein too lies a major obstacle to the realisation of those co-operative gains. (pg. 70)

This is based on a study of two German Firms, one of whom - which they call firm X - introduced participation from the top, at the initiative of the manager/owner. The other firm - which they call firm Z - introduced participation as the result of an economic crisis. This resulted in work groups taking more control over their own work. The authors report that while the latter firm has prospered, the former has not, and has in fact gone into decline. For instance in Z, sales have risen, employment has grown, profits and profits shared to employees have grown, value added per employee has grown. On the other hand in X all these indicators have either declined or grown much more slowly. (Appendix, pg. 73). This leads them to conclude that

the incentive effects of worker participation are unlikely to be realised in centralised schemes involving only representation, or under traditional division of labour which impedes cooperation and cohesion of the workforce. The motivating effects of profit-sharing and horizontal monitoring (where in effect employees monitor their fellows' efforts) depend upon opportunities for interaction among workers to maintain a collectively efficient, co-operative response and apply peer group pressure against shirkers. In turn this is only feasible when work is re-organized and the extreme division of labour according to scientific management is abandoned. (pg. 73)

⁴⁶⁹ The consequences of experience of hierarchy on the Lifeworld can be further illustrated by the IDE International Research Group study of Industrial Democracy in Europe (IDE International Research Group "Industrial Democracy in Europe: Differences and Similarities Across Countries and Hierarchies" Organization Studies, 1981, pp. 113-129.). This study explores perceptions of hierarchy in 12 countries - all in Europe with the exception of Israel. Despite the variation in culture which would be anticipated in a study of this degree of generality, they conclude

Even if the political and economic environment institutionally reflected in de jure participation can significantly modify the hierarchical patterns in organizations, it apparently cannot dissolve the hierarchy itself. (pg. 124.)

They argue this on the basis of similar statistical evidence to our own. In particular that even at (what the authors describe as) the "desired" level of involvement, Management would remain the dominant group - a finding common to all 12 countries which they study (though there is variation in the degree of dominance from one country to another) [pg. 125, table 6.]. They finally conclude that in explaining variation in power, participation and influence too much weight may have been placed on contingency factors (personal characteristics of organizational members, technology etc.), whereas in fact

it is hierarchy which is most important
(pg. 128.)

While we would not dissent from this, it is important to point out that while the IDE group may have produced satisfactory statistical evidence for their explanation, they have not produced a mechanism whereby hierarchy can have the effects they claim. As with the Tannenbaum et al. (1) case we would assert that our explanation, based on the Lifeworld providing Management with an unconscious dimension of power, provides such a mechanism.

This is also shown very clearly in a study by Hanson and Rathkey (C. Hanson & P. Rathkey "Industrial Democracy: A Post Bullock Shop Floor View". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1983, pp. 154-168), who find considerable variation in perceived participation in four companies in the north of England. In one of the four companies, 77% of respondents reported "more than a very little participation" already existed in their firm. In the other three firms the relevant figure was 16%, 35% and 18% (See table 1, pg. 157). The explanation given for this was the management style in the four firms - the first firm (77%) were described as having

made a sustained effort to adopt a
participative style. (pg. 157)

On the other hand at least on of the others managed in a "more autocratic way" (pg. 156). The point we would derive from this is more than just that management style influences perceptions of participation. Rather the employees of the firm using the participative style, we would argue, would be aware of the degree of difference between their firm and others in the area. In this way they may be influenced to rate highly the level of participation in their firm because it is greater than normal in the area. On the other hand this same firm, and its practices, may not have been rated so highly in another country where general expectations of participation were higher (for instance west Germany or Sweden). Thus comparing perceived participation between companies/countries has to be performed mindful of the possible variation of expectations of participation which the respondents hold.

⁴⁷⁰ Marsden (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of Employment Research Paper No. 4, 1978) argues similarly,

Just as there is nothing inherently separable in the powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary in political constitutions, so there is nothing which renders a particular pattern of the division of control in industry inherently necessary. (pg. 3, our emphasis)

⁴⁷¹ Lund argues,

The fact that top management can more readily take the initiative results in them being in a position being in a position to carry through the employer's viewpoints i.e. to get workers to yield power. To counteract this sort of power it is necessary... to restructure the hierarchy and change legitimation of exerting initiative and similar leadership elements. (R. Lund "Indirect Participation, Influence and Power". Organization Studies, 1980, pg. 158.)

Hence it is apparent, we would argue, that to change hierarchy means more than just changing the structure - to change hierarchy has very significant implications for the structure of the Lifeworld - for instance for the justifications for action which it accepts as legitimate.

⁴⁷² K. Thurley and H. Wirderius "Towards European Management". Pitman 1989, pg. 100. My emphasis.

⁴⁷³ In the way the IDE group argue, for instance.

⁴⁷⁴ Lund finds that

value orientations in the investigated company and in society at large assume that the director is the initiating force, with the workers and their representatives waiting for a situation defined by management. This structure and value orientation appear to severely restrict workers' participation to comparatively impotent and unconstructive responses regarding what is, in any event happening. (R. Lund "Indirect Participation, Influence and Power". Organization Studies, 1980, pg. 156.)

We could ask at this point, "yes but why do workers and their representatives wait for Management in this way?", but Lund does go on to point out

This is an aspect which ought to be investigated further. (Lund, supra, pg. 156)

From an alternative perspective, it is argued by Scraton and South (P. Scraton & N. South "The Ideological Construction of the Hidden Economy". Contemporary Crisis, 1984, pp. 1-18) that

Discipline provides an anatomy of power which permeates throughout social formations. Its universal application is hegemonic in so far as it represents the backbone of legitimacy of political and ideological formations. Discipline has become the structural form of control of workers in their subservient authority relationship to management (pg. 310)

While agreeing with this, again the difficulty is that as with Lund there is no indication of the mechanism whereby this comes about.

⁴⁷⁵ This problem explains the observation, first made by Clegg that the role of trade unions is to be a "permanent opposition to management". See H. Clegg "A New Approach to Industrial Democracy". Blackwell, 1960. This view has more recently been repeated by Loveridge ((R. Loveridge "What is Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations" 1980, pp. 297-317), who argues

British experiences of steward involvement in formal management responsibilities, dating back to the productivity agreements of the 1960's, tend to confirm rather than show any significant modification to Clegg's view of the role of the trade union under liberal-pluralistic conditions as that of "permanent opposition to management". (pg. 301)

While it may be the case that, as Clegg and Loveridge both show, stewards and their members are unwilling to participate in Management, it surely appears necessary to go on to consider why this is so rather than merely accept that it is so.

⁴⁷⁶ This emphasises the argument that we cannot consider the likely effectiveness of participation, purely on the basis of what employees think, or want, or feel about it. We also have to take into account the views of Management. As Dickson argues, we cannot consider participation

without determining the level of value conflict inherent in the participation process (J. Dickson "Participation as a Means of Organizational Control". Journal of Management Studies 1981, pg. 161)

⁴⁷⁷ It was found by Ursell (See G. Ursell "The View of British Managers and Shop Stewards on industrial democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and Sons 1983) that 75% of stewards but only 35% of managers, in her sample, wanted equal powers on financial matters for worker directors (pg. 335). While the questions asked by ourselves and by Ursell are not directly comparable, in both cases we would argue that they indicate the gulf which exists between the Lifeworlds of Management and their employees. Another of Ursell's findings does, however, support our finding directly. It was found in her research that the majority (51%) of managers preferred to restrict the role of worker directors to an advisory function only (pg. 335-6).

⁴⁷⁸ This is found too be Ursell, (See G. Ursell "The View of British Managers and Shop Stewards on industrial democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and Sons 1983) who finds that Management are "generally more cautious" (pg. 338), taking the view that the main positive role of worker directors would be in reducing industrial conflict, and promoting and defending employee interests. (See table 17.4, pg. 339). It is also reported by Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) who conclude

This opposition (to worker directors) had several bases, but prominent among them were the anticipated detrimental effects that such an innovation would have upon the capacity of company boards to make decisions and thereby its impact on the efficiency of the business. (pg. 37)

Teulings (A. Teulings "A Political Bargaining Theory of Co-Determination". Organization Studies 1987, pp. 1-24) has found in Holland, with their system of Works Councils, that

in practice most Works Councils generally have no independent initiating and steering function in the managerial decision-making process, with regard to strategic decisions (pg. 16).

Thus, even with the powers of Works Councils - being autonomous of management, having extensive rights to company information (almost all company economic and financial information), and rights to advise management on a range of decisions including investment, takeovers, changes in the division of labour etc. - they remain largely responsive to Management. Interestingly Teulings reports (pg. 18) that in attempting to influence Management Councils are increasingly using external consultants, who presumably are more highly skilled in Management as an activity, and will be correspondingly have Lifeworlds more typical of Management.

⁴⁷⁹ Indeed much of the work on the consequences of participation on efficiency and profitability has tended to suggest that the effects are positive. For instance Rothschild-Whitt (J. Rothschild-Whitt "Worker Ownership in Relation to Control" in C. Crouch and F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983) argues that,

the transformation (of a business) to employee ownership carries with it the potential to enhance the motivation and commitment to the firm. The likely result is that costs caused by excessive turnover, absenteeism and waste will be reduced, while quality and productivity will improve. (pg. 396)

This is also reported by Cummings and Molloy (T. Cummings and E. Molloy "Improving Productivity and Quality of Working Life". Praeger, 1977) who argue.

democracy resulted in both high work effectiveness and member satisfaction.... while autocracy tended to create hostility, aggression and scapegoat behaviour; it also produced submissive dependence and a lack of individuality.... there was more group-mindedness and friendliness in democracy than under the other styles of management. (pg. 104)

Hence it can be suggested that the effects of greater democracy are rather more positive than seems to be anticipated by the management in our sample. On the other hand it is important that, as Cummings and Molloy argue later

Since increased rank and file decision making is contingent on managers giving employees greater authority, management must feel secure enough to allow individuals such freedom and responsibility. (supra, pg 119)

While the mechanism indicated by Cummings and Molloy suggests that ultimately control is retained by management, it is perfectly consistent with our argument that lack of confidence - due to Lifeworld structures - on the part of management is an obstacle to developing democracy in work organizations. Cummings & Molloy's argument quite explicitly and clearly emerges from an OD model of organizations, but their argument can be linked to arguments from other traditions. For instance Marchington and Armstrong (M. Marchington & P. Armstrong "The Nature of the new Joint Consultation". Industrial Relations Journal 1986, pp. 158-170) argue that effective consultation between management and employees creates

trust between the representatives of employer and employee (pg 167)

Thus security and trust on both sides appears to be a necessary condition for democratising work places. In this respect the Lifeworld makes this more difficult to achieve, since the Lifeworlds which appear to be occupied by Management define employees as not competent to participate in decision-making, and thus not to be trusted in this respect. Likewise the Lifeworlds of those outwith Management define Management as a group not to be fully trusted. For instance, the data presented in Chapter 4 indicates a clear perception of not being fully informed, while in Chapter 5 the perception is that while Management may be the decision-makers those outwith Management wish to be more involved so that their interests can be better represented, and by implication that Management cannot be trusted to do so.

Surveying the Economics Literature Weiermair (K. Weiermair "Worker Incentives and Worker Participation". Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 547-570) concludes that

the level of opportunistic behaviour is not invariable over time, and hence the static assumption of perfect rationality or perfect opportunism inherent in most neoclassical models ought to be relaxed. (pg. 560)

⁴⁸⁰ This becomes particularly puzzling when, considering not only our own theoretical position and our results, but also that as Chell observes (E. Chell "Political Perspectives and Worker Participation". C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983, pp. 487-504),

While the idea of worker director schemes may be thought to be radical, the practice has proved to be far from it. Worker directors have performed in a conventional, and to the managements in the firm concerned, acceptable way. (pg. 500)

Further, Purcell argues (J. Purcell "A Strategy for Management Control". In J. Purcell & R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work" MacMillan 1979) that

the development of industrial democracy involving more extensive consultations, and in some cases worker directors is a logical progression in the means of achieving and maintaining control (pg. 49)

In other words, to the extent that management can maintain their image of claimed technical skills, industrial democracy may actually be to their advantage.

481 Clearly to the extent that

a) if the changed objectives were at variance with those acceptable to the market, and

b) the Lifeworlds of the Management had been colonized by the System,

then such dissonance is inevitable. This finding is, therefore indicative of colonization of the Lifeworlds of Management, in the manner discussed in the above section on Negotiating Reality.

Fox argues

some of those who consign job enrichment to instant disparagement do so because they see it as in some way a relaxing of management control - a slackening of the which they take to be inevitable under capitalism.....To (this) point it cannot be stressed too often that top management's search for control in the fullest and broadest sense does not necessarily require an unchanging commitment to any particular system of work patterns and job structures. (A. Fox "Man Mismanagement" [2nd Ed'n.] Hutchinson 1985, pg. 136)

While, in terms of the empirical evidence Fox is correct, we nonetheless have to recognise that management may wish for affective reasons to retain their level of control - even if it would be more perceptive to yield a degree of discretion to their employees. Such developments are happening - as Fox continues

Already some company employees perform discretionary tasks on a computer in their own home, free of both immediate technical constraint and direct supervision. (Fox supra pp 136-7).

This degree of discretion could not be made available in our firm - for technical reasons it would be impossible for some (though not all) employees to work from home. Nevertheless this evidence does indicate that it is possible for Management not to seek to diminish their degree of control.

482 This too is found by Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) who quote an employee representative

I wonder if anyone's got the intelligence and education to do this. Directors have the knowledge, experience and expertise - that's their job. I wouldn't like to see this (discussion of company strategy) as a union role, you would have trouble finding somebody to do this....Is Joe Soap going to sit there and put in his tuppence worth as a clerk with the chief executive. (pg. 37)

⁴⁸³ This is found too by Hanson and Rathkey, who argue

shopfloor workers do want more say in workplace decision-making, particularly in task related areas and matters of manpower planning and work organization. However, they generally place limits on the extent of that involvement. The desire for more say falls far short of joint decision-making (C. Hanson & P. Rathkey "Industrial Democracy: A Post Bullock Shop Floor View". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1983, pg. 166)

A similar finding is reported by McInnes (J. McInnes "Conjuring up Participation". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1985.) who argues

They (Shop stewards) saw it (consultation) as an opportunity to gain information they could pass on to their members, raise grievances, press on management the distinct interest of the shop floor on issues such as job security and contribute knowledge of the reality of shop floor life to the management the decision making process. It could be summarised as the demand for management to manage "fairly". (pg. 102)

Hence on the basis of the evidence we have gathered, and that presented elsewhere by others, it would appear to be clear that whatever the level of demand for participation by those outwith Management, it does not extend to equality with the Management.

⁴⁸⁴ It is found by, for instance Emery & Thorsrud that

When people talk about industrial democracy they are usually referring to the sharing of managerial power, but when they come to the practice of industrial democracy they tend to assume that steps to increase the effective application of their independent power will automatically lead to a greater sharing of managerial power. In the cases we have examined there is no evidence that this happens. (F. Emery & E. Thorsrud "Form and Content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969, pg. 85)

On the other hand it is argued by Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978) that

since industrialists have been working for years to turn the present, often destructive, conflict in industry into a more positive and constructive relationship and have too often been unsuccessful, a more radical approach (industrial democracy) can hold attractions (pg. 288)

The problem in sustaining this view, is that it would appear on the basis not only of our own evidence, but also that which is presented by Elliot, that management are not enthusiastic about introducing schemes of industrial democracy and/or participation. We will argue, in what follows, that the reasons for this are locatable within the Managerial Lifeworlds. Hence while it may be that, as Elliot argues

there is no reason why management should not be able to accommodate the introduction of direct employee voice into their top-most deliberations (pg. 288)

management can see problems, other than the purely practical issue which Elliot indicates.

485 Tables 5.36 - 5.45

486 Tables 5.46 - 5.55

487 Tables 5.26 - 5.35

488 As McTiernan (M. McTiernan "Workers' Alternative Plans" University of Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations 1986) observes

If it is accepted that managerial powers and prerogatives are based upon their possessing, or being believed to possess some degree of technical superiority over their employees then an Alternative Plan which tends to reduce that superiority will be seen as a direct challenge to managerial power and prerogative, an attempt to lessen managerial legitimacy ((pg. 2)

489 It has been reported by Cressey et al. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) that

For managers, the work force as a whole lacked precisely those features which qualify management to reach policy decisions. They did not have the education and financial expertise to deal with such matters and would have required a tremendous amount of training to discuss such matters on equal terms. (pg. 32)

This repeats our own finding, but from this we draw a rather different conclusion. We would concur that "the work force" lack the education etc., but we would question whether it is only the lack of "education and financial expertise" which is the problem. We shall go on to argue that the activity of Management is a dialogue from which other groups are excluded on grounds other than only their lack of expertise. In particular we shall argue that the differences in Lifeworlds between Management and other groups is such that a full dialogue is not possible. The differences in Lifeworld are such that the entry into Management decision making by Hourly paid, would not only be, by analogy, an interference in an ongoing conversation - but it would moreover be a conversation that they could not understand. Training in "Management skills" (Eg reading a balance sheet, or Sales Forecast) would not of themselves remedy this obstacle (though in truth they would assist), but it would then be necessary for the those outwith Management to also absorb the interpretive relevances etc. which underlie these skills - in other words it would be necessary for the Hourly paid etc. to begin to take on the Management Lifeworld. The difficulty that this leads to, however, is that as we argued in the previous section, this Lifeworld is more deeply colonized by System imperatives. Thus by participating in Management, an effect may be to expose them to System Imperatives to a greater degree than at the moment. Hence by entering fully into the Management dialogue the assumptions which underlie it (the System imperatives) will not necessarily be revealed. Only by

- 1) changing Lifeworlds in such a way, could there be
- 2) greater freedom, and
- 3) movement toward a structure more consistent with the Ideal Speech Thesis, thus
- 4) creating a democratic work organization.

To develop participation by Staff and Hourly paid in the current world of Management is only to expose their Lifeworlds to the degree of colonization which we have argued is so for Management. The extent to which this can be perceived is well illustrated by Dowling et al.'s (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) conclusion that

it (participation) was regarded as a process that must contribute to the success of the business. As one divisional personnel manager said "Participation schemes have got to be viewed within the context of profit-making because this is still the essential thing." (pg. 26).

⁴⁹⁰ This is consistent with the conclusion which Clarke arrives at. He argues

many managers have seen integrated participation as a time-consuming nuisance - a threat to their own authority and to achieving the goals of the enterprise as they see them (O. Clarke "Workers Participation in Management in Great Britain". ILO Research Series No. 58, pg. 16.)

We would not argue that this is wrong - indeed we will go on to consider precisely these reasons established from our own data - but rather that it omits the perception that, for our Managers at least, participation would mean people doing inappropriate activities. Thus participation was not only wrong in the sense of challenging management authority or altering the goals of the enterprise - both of which are ultimately subjective - but was also wrong in the technical sense of requiring employees to participate in activities for which they had no expertise. At least as important, as we have shown is that employees endorse this.

⁴⁹¹ Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) find

Whichever form of participation management favoured they stressed that management must retain responsibility for decision-making (pg. 26)

⁴⁹² This point is made by McInnes (J. McInnes "Conjuring up Participation". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1985.) who argues

Managers saw consultation as a forum for explaining to the stewards why they took various decisions, especially ones that might be unpopular, and why the ability of management to take such decisions quickly and effectively was important. Their aim was to make the stewards understand why decisions were necessary and sometimes invite comment in how they could best be implemented and operated (pg. 102).

There are a number of aspects to this. First of all it should be observed that the function of consultation for participation is for Management to give explanations of decisions they had taken, and in this way to develop understanding of Management by the stewards. The function of participation is not dialogue, other than for stewards to advise Management on how best to implement the decision which Management have already taken. Participation, in so far as it exists, would appear to be basically a form of communication for Management, rather than a form of dialogue. This attempt to restrict participation in this way, and its implications will become an increasingly important part of our argument.

⁴⁹³ This is not to say that Management did not recognise that employees had a legitimate interest in other issues on which there would be consultation and/or negotiation. The distinction we drew above between issues which were basically job-related, and other issues which were of a more strategic nature, reflect this distinction, in that the former were areas on which there would be consultation and/or negotiation (pay and discipline would be examples of this), whereas the latter would not (investment and financial policy). This is suggested by Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) who quote a manager as follows,

They (the unions) are involved in all aspects of the business as it is. With all the issues open to negotiation they want to ensure that management sticks to agreements that are concluded between the two sides. Within these management has the right to manage as long as the agreements are adhered to. If management starts to act incorrectly then our workers believe they have the right to intervene. In this sense the workers do not want co-determination, but a right of appeal. (pg. 11, my emphasis)

First of all it is important to observe the emphasis of the right of management to manage, subject to the constraints of the collective agreements. Hence within these limits (which may vary in their width or narrowness) management would be free to behave as they see fit. Secondly, and more importantly, despite the manager's assertion that,

"They (the unions) are involved in all aspects of the business as it is."

logically, if there is no agreement between management and unions on a particular issue then the constraints referred to subsequent will not operate. Hence if there was no agreement on taking decisions about investment (or other strategic issues) Management's right to manage would be unfettered in such circumstances. For instance if such issues were perceived by shop floor workers as the province of Management, they would see no need to even try for an agreement.

⁴⁹⁴ Langer (E. Langer "Illusion of Control". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology", 1975, pp. 311-328) argues that

People are motivated to control their environment...The greatest satisfaction or feeling of competence would therefore result from being able to control the seemingly uncontrollable... (additionally) there is motivation to avoid the negative consequences that accompany the perception of having no control (pg. 323)

Hence, following this argument it would appear that for Management, there is a psychological danger in participation, in that it may cause them to appear to be less in control than under the present circumstances. Thus

The preference for the status quo is more than likely a function of the security it provides: it is seemingly controllable. (pg. 325)

Hence a problem with moving toward more democratic structures is that Management may develop a sense of insecurity because of the apparent diminution of their control. At the same time, those outwith Management may be discouraged from participating in it by their perception of having no control - or sense of competence - in it.

⁴⁹⁵ This view was emphasised by James Prior in his Guildhall Lecture in 1980,

It is vital that the encouragement and guidance on employee involvement of the kind given by major employer organizations should now be acted on throughout industry. It is the means to harness the talents and co-operation of the work-force in the common interests they share with management. (Granada Guildhall Lectures "The Role of the Trade Unions". Granada 1980)

There are a number of points to be observed from this. Most important is that the paradigm which underlies this suggests that through participation, workers and managers will be able to work together for their mutual benefit. Yet the schemes to which he refers ("major employer organizations") do not go beyond consultation, whereby the information and views which can be passed on through (effective) communication systems, and will then be input for managers to take decisions. For sure this is more democratic than the situation in many firms - including our own - but it would still be Management who have the monopoly of taking decisions. This is graphically illustrated by the following quote from a personnel director in a study by Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981)

participation from workers would help when deciding on the details of capital changes and plant investment. One example would be where workers' ideas and experience could be used to make sure that the best design features were built into a new machine or incorporated in a workshop layout. (pg. 25).

This makes our point very well, in that while in the first half of the quote, it is clear that the views etc. of workers would be input to the decision-making process, there would be no dialogue between workers and managers in deciding the design of the machine or the workshop layout. These would be decisions taken by Management.

⁴⁹⁶ See Loveridge, *supra* on this.

⁴⁹⁷ Even in a firm like Semco, in Brazil, which places a high emphasis on participation (see below), the proportion of profit which is distributed among the employees is fixed by Management at 23% of division profit. On the other hand Semler does point out the importance of ensuring that employees understand the connection between what their work, and the profits of the firm. (See R. Semler "Managing without Managers". Harvard Business Review September-October 1989, pg. 82.) This points to the problem of ensuring that the conditions for dialogue (as opposed to communication which may simply be one way) exist in any firm. Hence, we would question, exactly what is meant by Participation in the following:

participation is more likely when the organization has structured the framework for participation and retains management control. (J. Dickson "Participation as a Means of Management Control". Journal of Management Studies 1981, pg. 170.)

This kind of argument merely reinforces the argument of, for instance, Jain (H. C. Jain [Ed] "Worker Participation: Success and Problems". Praeger 1980), who argues that participative systems do not necessarily involve industrial democracy, or movement toward it. In practical terms this is demonstrably true - Dickson's findings are evidence of this. However, while we would accept that participative systems will vary in the degree to which they are democratic, any system which sets out not only to retain but to enhance management control cannot meaningfully be described as participative. It may be that they can properly be described as pseudo-participative, but if the purpose is to, at least, maintain management control then questions have to be raised about the authenticity of the participation allowed (which is terminologically correct) employees.

⁴⁹⁸ The conservatism of management on industrial democracy is shown by the evidence of Ford (UK) and Phillips to the Bullock Commission. Phillips for instance argued

this contributes to a "them and us" mentality, and is largely responsible for the implicit assumption in industrial relations that in every situation a conflict exists which can only be resolved by "antagonists".

Ford argued

the them and us division in Britain lies pretty deep....In the process (of Britain's economic development) it bred attitudes amongst working people of antipathy, not only to the men concerned, but also to the objectives of industry and all that it stood for. (both in J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978, pg. 100)

Thus in the view of two of the larger employers in the UK the possibility of developing industrial democracy is handicapped by the ingrained attitudes of (we would argue) both sides. Rather than stop there, we have argued that we have to consider how to "unpick" the attitudes identified by Phillips and Ford.

Yet, it has been argued in a recent article that for management to seek to maximise control may be irrational even in their own terms. Halaby and Weakliem (C. Halaby and D. Weakliem "Worker Control and Attachment to the Firm". American Journal of Sociology 1989, pp. 549-591.) argue that the primary mechanism in ensuring maximum attachment by the worker to his firm is what they describe as "match quality", by which they mean the extent to which the job uses the skills and abilities of the worker. They argue that if Management give workers a degree control this not only has advantages for employees, but also imposes costs (for instance the time spent in involvement in decision-making). Likewise for Management there are costs (loss of discretion for instance), but also advantages (in that workers are more strongly attached to the firm). Halaby and Weakliem conclude

The implication of this is that control should be subject to the same instrumental logic of systematic trade offs that governs sociological analyses of other job conditions. (pg. 586)

In other words control ought to be distributed with these considerations in mind - there will be a point where the costs and benefits of employee involvement for employees will intersect, and a point where the costs and benefits of employee involvement for managers will intersect. Ideally these intersections will be the same for both groups. This has commonality with Fox's observation of the opposition of certain unions (for instance the AUEW) to the Bullock Commission proposals on the grounds that, as Fox points out

Aloofness from any commitment to managerial policies was essential if the unions were to preserve their oppositional role. (A. Fox "Man Mismanagement"[2nd Edition) Hutchinson 1985, pg. 121)

Now it may be argued that this undermines the Ideal Speech Thesis, in that if the parties do not wish to proceed to full equality this renders the Thesis redundant. We would argue that this would not be so, for two reasons:

a) the Ideal Speech Thesis is no more than a bench mark. It makes no pretence to describe anything which does currently exist - nor we would argue necessarily to anything which might exist. It is an strong definition of equality, against which we can measure situations and assess the extent of their inequality, and identify the exercise of power - even where it may not be conscious for one party, or even for all parties.

b) Halaby and Weakliem contend that a cost:benefit analysis should be conducted to establish the appropriate degree of employee control. Yet this "appropriate" degree of control would be determined, ultimately, through the Lifeworlds of Management and their employees - "what is appropriate that I should give for this degree of influence?", "what is appropriate that we should require for this degree of influence?". The appropriate level of control would be subject to a strong degree of influence from the existing Lifeworlds - and is thus subject to significant influence from the existing structure of power. In this way movement toward greater equality (the conditions of the Ideal Speech Thesis) is restricted by the inequality of power which exists at the moment. Thus what employees may regard as appropriate now will be rather less than if their Lifeworlds were less dominated than the degree we have shown.

499 By this phrase we have in mind the precise rules which would establish the precise relative rights of Management and other employees.

500 Poole and Jenkins find that

1) employees, in firms which have started SAYE schemes for their employees in shares in their own firm, reckoned the rewards for themselves were adequate, but

2) that managers rather than themselves were the main beneficiaries (M. Poole & G. Jenkins "How Employees Respond to Profit Sharing". Personnel Management. July 1988, pg. 31)

Thus even where a form of profit sharing is conducted we can see difficulties precisely with control of the scheme. Thus, as we argue above, the difficulty is not with the principle of profit sharing as with how it is organized and controlled. Indeed the benefits of doing this efficiently are observed by Richardson and Nejad, who conclude

if management skilfully and successfully construct a culture of financial participation it is possible that they powerfully and cumulatively affect the performance of their organisation. (R. Richardson & A. Nejad "Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the UK - an Evaluation". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1986, pg 248)

Thus an, obvious, reason for Management to want to retain control over profit sharing is to ensure that the firm obtains the performance improvement which Richardson and Nejad report in their study.

⁵⁰¹ Indeed for Hourly Paid, another proposition - that only information applying directly to their job would be made available to them - found more favour than allowing a Management veto.

⁵⁰² It is argued by Semler that reforms in these three areas cannot be considered separately

Semco has three fundamental values on which we base some 30 management programs. These values - democracy, profit sharing and information - work in a complicated circle, each dependent on the other two. If we eliminated one, the others would be meaningless. (R. Semler "Managing without Managers". Harvard Business Review September-October 1989, pg. 77)

Semler's argument can be seen in that, for instance, genuine democracy would be impossible if some of the parties were systematically better informed than others - likewise genuine democracy implies that the parties are equally well informed. In this respect Semler's description of Semco - the firm he runs in Brazil - is an operationalised version of a structure which begins to approximate Ideal Speech. For instance

a) the firm was looking for a larger factory in order to expand and one particular site was preferred by Management (or counsellors and coordinators as they are known in Semco), but since the decision was to be reached by democratic vote and the workforce as a whole voted for another site, Management accepted this (pg. 78).

b) employees attend classes to

learn how to read and understand the numbers, and its one of their unions that teaches the course. Every month each employee gets a balance sheet, a profit and loss analysis and a cash flow statement for his or her division. (pg. 82)

This is not to say that Semco represents an example of Ideal Speech - we have already argued that it is difficult to imagine a working pure example. On the other hand it does show that movement in this direction is possible - though, while within the constraints of a journal article, it is difficult to assess this precisely, there is a strong sense of Management continuing to dominate.

⁵⁰³ This is resonant of the definition of participation provided by Wall and Lischeron (T. Wall & J. Lischeron "Worker Participation" <McGraw Hill 1977>):

Participation is not a unitary concept, but consists of interrelated elements which may be manifested in the decision-making processes of an organization in a variety of ways. Three elements central to the concept of participation are influence, interaction (where the parties in a decision process reach agreement by working together rather than through recourse to a balance of power based upon the exercise of sanctions) and information sharing (by which they mean sharing information relevant to the issue in question) (pp. 36-37)

What we have argued is that these three qualities are substantially absent from the relationship of the managers from their employees in our firm. We have shown that the quality of information communication is low, and that the degree of influence exercised by those outwith management is less than they would wish - and indeed less than even Management would wish. Moreover without these three qualities there can be no effective dialogue, and no meaningful participation. However, with the Wall and Lischeron definition we can see that participation is a continuum - ie situations can be described as more/less participative. Thus in developing participation toward greater democracy at work, we can consider the degree of participation according to these three criteria.

⁵⁰⁴ This has also been found by Hyman et al. (J. Hyman, H. Ramsay, J. Leopold, L. Baddon & L. Hunter "The Impact of Employee Share Ownership". Employee Relations 1989, pp. 9-16), who conclude their study of share ownership in two companies

Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from these two case studies is the divergence between management objectives and employee responses. Management objectives in each instance are presented in terms of attitudinal changes in employees. The time scale of this is often vague and certainly more oriented to the long run than for immediate benefits. Employees on the other hand, view the opportunity to participate in option schemes primarily in instrumental terms. They recognize the potential gains to be made and, if they can afford it, elect to participate. But in both companies it was only a minority who chose to do so (pg. 15).

This finding is consistent with our own - that employees and management understand things in differently. In the case considered by Hyman et al. the Management see share ownership schemes as a means of enhancing employee involvement with the firm. Employees see it as an opportunity to make a few bob. The situation we have considered is where Management and their employees foresee different consequences from having worker directors sitting on the board. The problem, however goes deeper than simply getting them to talk to each other, since due to Lifeworld differences they would not necessarily be talking about the same thing. It is necessary for the parties to begin to set the conditions where dialogue is possible, and if it is to be equal, a dialogue corresponding as closely as possible to Ideal Speech.

505 This is not to say that the parties cannot work together. For instance Richardson (P. Richardson "Courting Greater Employee Involvement Through Participative Management". Sloan Management Review 1985, pp. 33-44), concludes in a study of attempts by four firms to introduce different levels of participation - "from improving communication" to "treating employees as partners" (pg. 33) - that

the most surprising finding of the study will be the extent to which the union, workforce and management can agree and work together on what appear to be tough cost objectives. The successful companies... found that employees and unions understand the economic reality and are willing to accept fewer jobs as long as they are secure and as long as necessary terminations can leave with dignity. Those who remain can then have the pride in their contributions to the competitiveness of their operation. (pg 43)

From this there are two important points. First of all it provides evidence of Management and employees being able to attain sufficient understanding to be able to take the difficult decisions which Richardson considers. This, however, takes us to the second point which concerns on what basis this understanding was reached, and in particular whether what Richardson describes as participation may have been (in effect) cooption. We shall consider this problem below.

506 The conscious power of Management is clear from the data we have gathered on disclosure of information - which indicates that access to information is systematically structured - and the data on control which indicates that Management are perceived as the dominant group on every issue investigated.

507 This point - in relation only to managerial levels - is made by Poole

the distinction between director and manager, between personnel at different levels in the managerial hierarchy, and between "cosmopolitan" managers with skills anchored in the professional association and their more "local" counterparts in the line hierarchy may all be of fundamental importance in producing different social experiences which in turn engender variations in outlook and behaviour not least on the question of industrial democracy itself. (M. Poole "Managers, Industrial Democracy and Control". In M. Poole and M. Mansfield "Managerial Roles in Industrial Relations". Gower 1980, pg. 76).

Poole's argument is around a relatively limited area of employees in an organization - different levels of management - but the structure of our arguments are similar in that differing experience leads to differences of view.

⁵⁰⁸ Marsden (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of Employment Research Paper No. 4, 1978) presents evidence of West Germany which points in the same direction. He argues that

Had the TUC pressed (the Bullock Commission) for its original idea of parity representation on a supervisory board as part of its long term strategy of influencing the future demand for labour by influencing investment policy, it would probably have found that it gained little more than the West German unions. It would be hard to relate discussions at this level to normal shop steward bargaining because of differences of time horizon and lack of influence over the intermediate body, the management board, (pg. 56 our emphasis)

What Marsden reports finding in West Germany is that employee representatives found difficulty in relating their lives as workers to events in the (supervisory) board room, which we would seek to explain in the differences in Lifeworld of workers and directors.

⁵⁰⁹ It is shown by Whyte that a greater degree of equality has been created in Mondragon. Ursell, in a review, notes that Whyte shows that dominant social outcomes for the cooperatives are equality and the active participation of all members. It may be argued that Mondragon stops short of the conditions required by the Ideal Speech Thesis, but it does represent (Whyte's evidence suggests) a significant move in this direction. See W. F. Whyte & K. Whyte "Making Mondragon" ILR Press 1988. Also G. Ursell Review of "Making Mondragon" , Organization Studies 1989, pp. 594-597.

⁵¹⁰ Lane (T. Lane "Economic Democracy: Are the Unions Equipped?". Industrial Relations Journal 1986, pp.321-328) argues that

Trade unionists regardless of their office, have not normally and as a matter of practice concerned themselves with the logic of the enterprise. In the workplace this shows itself in an unconcern with the organization of production unless it affects health and safety, the ability to earn, the division of labour between skilled and other workers and the loss of jobs. Isolated instances apart it is not common for workers to express concern about what is produced and how. (pg 326)

From another direction, this is confirmed by Fligstein (N. Fligstein "Intraorganizational Power Structure". American Sociological Review 1987, pp. 44-58) who argues that the existing structure of an organization provides stability since

a) the existing structure in itself is a source of power, (eg for those at the top of the hierarchy) - as Fligstein puts it

what is in place will tend to stay in place (pg. 56)

b) the structure provides an organizational story which simplifies the world for the organizational actors (see Fligstein page 56) - we would argue that as well as simplifying the world it provides a "working" story of the world. Consequently, if we seek to move away from hierarchy toward greater democracy, another "story" would have to be provided, and as we have shown, it would have to be a story which seems to "work".

⁵¹¹ This point is also made by Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) who refer to perceptions by employees of

management inexpertise and inefficiency
when it came to decisions about
production. (pg. 40)

⁵¹² Such concerns are well illustrated in a quote from Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981)

It (participating in management decisions like Marketing, Investment etc.) might show up the limits of your capabilities, and you become dependent on what other people tell you because your out of your depth: you would simply nod your head without really understanding - maybe become a puppet because you don't want to be seen as not knowing or understanding these things. (pg. 38)

We would argue, however, that the problem goes deeper than just the skills which most employee representatives would lack - though the provision of these would be necessary. Skills have to be applied in context, with assumptions (interpretational relevances) being used. Just as Schutz discussed the problem of the man who doesn't know whether its a snake in the bag, Managers have to use interpretational relevances to indicate to them how to deal with a situation, which skills to use, how to use them, etc. Employee representatives would have to have access to these assumptions too, otherwise dialogue with Management would be restricted, and perhaps impossible.

⁵¹³ J. Ford & D. A. Baucus. Academy of Management Review 1987.

⁵¹⁴ This is not to say that such a challenge could not be mounted. Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978) argues in the context of the debate which surrounded the Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy that

part of the interest in industrial democracy has stemmed from a lack of faith among employees in the abilities of the management to manage. This has arisen against a background of poor management performance with a number of companies failing to cope with both large and small problems across a wide field stretching well beyond labour relations (pg. 98)

While the situation of the late 1980' and early 1990's is different from the time when Elliot wrote, the implication still holds good. Today the image of the professional manager is somewhat less tarnished than during the 1970's - but if management (as a function) are seen to fail to perform adequately, and thus fail to maintain the image of professional decision-makers, then the entire function could once again come under the threat which Elliot considered existed in the 1970's.

⁵¹⁵ Gronn argues (P. Gronn "Talk as the Work". Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 1-21) that educational research indicates that the domination exercised by a headmaster is only by virtue of the confidence of teachers, parents, and pupils in him or her (see page 1). Hence if a particular headmaster proved inadequate to justify their confidence, he would find it difficult to maintain his dominance. Our argument would go on to argue that if a succession of headmasters were to prove to be inadequate then the very role - as well as the associated domination - may come to be challenged.

⁵¹⁶ For instance, Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) argue

Many of the managers and trade union officials in the survey presented perceived the basic pattern of British industrial relations as being adversarial or oppositional in nature. They have grown up under this system, contributed to its maintenance and their typical ways of acting and thinking have been moulded by it (pg. 39)

⁵¹⁷ Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) argue

Ramsay (H. Ramsay, "Phantom participation: Patterns of Power and Conflict" Industrial Relations Journal 1980) suggests that the two most likely long term outcomes for participation schemes are either triviality in which discussion gets relegated to tea towels and toilets issues, or change of committee status where after a pragmatic management adaption, bargaining is allowed to take place within the participation machinery. (pg. 56)

We would argue that this is consistent with our own findings and argument since both situations referred to can be explained by a lack, or failure, of dialogue. Such a lack of dialogue could result in the former if the participants can only sustain dialogue at such a trivial level. The latter indicates that since dialogue has failed the parties have resorted to forms of behaviour which they know and are able to sustain.

⁵¹⁸ Clegg & Wall (C. Clegg & T. Wall "The Lateral Dimension to Employee Participation". Journal of Management Studies 1984, pp. 429-442) argue that communication difficulties do not exist only hierarchically, but that there is an equally difficult problem laterally in organizations, in that the influence which can be exercised by different lateral interest groups who have different objectives, values and rights has to be taken into account as well in trying to develop a system of participation in any organization. They argue that

precisely because these issues have not been anticipated and planned for, they provide stumbling blocks against which even a well-designed vertically oriented system will falter (pg. 430)

This issue is not one that our own research would readily have picked up, since by considering hierarchy we are inevitably drawn into the vertical dimension. Yet they do provide further evidence of the efficacy of Lifeworld as an important explanatory concept. If we say that the lateral groups were functional - Production, Marketing, etc. - then because of their different experience (professional training for instance) we would expect their Lifeworlds to be different, and to that extent that they would have difficulty in communicating. A number of examples of this arose in our own firm because of the inability of Production Staff and Management to communicate effectively with Financial Staff and Management. A related example is Spender's work on "industry recipes" (J-C Spender "Industry Recipes", Blackwell 1979) which considers the "recipes" used by Management to deal with uncertainty in strategic decision-making. This study used evidence collected from three different industries, and demonstrates that Management in these industries would find some difficulty in communicating clearly because of differences in their Lifeworlds.

This is of interest not only by pointing to problems for participation from other than hierarchy, but by pointing to the problem for achieving undistorted communication (Ideal Speech) created by the Lifeworlds which we occupy, since it is only by becoming aware of this, and the assumptions etc. which it involves that undistorted communication is possible. We have argued that this is an obstacle vertically (from the hierarchy) but Clegg and Wall show it is a lateral problem too.

⁵¹⁹ This leads to the possibility that, as Thompson (P. Thompson "The Nature of Work". MacMillan 1983) points out,

workers do not always need to be overtly controlled. They may effectively control themselves. (pg. 279)

Certainly it never appeared to us that the employees in our firm were subject to high levels of control. There were procedures like clocking in and out, work study, and so on, but Management were aware of the skills of their employees, and control was not so tight as to stand in the way of preventing these from being used. For instance managers in Production would tell of situations where shop floor workers would simply ignore the drawing supplied for a job, and do it their way based on their skills and expertise. Usually, we were told, it was the shop floor worker who was right.

⁵²⁰ McCarthy & Ellis consider certain relevant issues in "Management by Agreement" (W. McCarthy & N. Ellis "Management by Agreement", Hutchinson 1973). While they argue that

an increasing number of workers of all degrees of skill feel that traditional authoritarian power structures are no longer acceptable (pg. 89)

their solution to this is through the extension of collective bargaining such that

unions would have the right to seek to influence management policy in any area

and

what management would be committed to is providing reasonable explanations for policy decisions in these areas. They would also be committed to listening to union criticism and pledged to doing their best to answer it (both pg. 97)

There is much in what McCarthy & Ellis put forward that we agree with, especially their argument, which is consistent with our own data, that employees are seeking more influence on Management, and on a wider range of issues. Likewise it is clear that extending collective bargaining would represent movement toward more democracy. There are, however, problems which their argument will not deal with. In the first place, our own evidence suggests that it is unlikely that Management would voluntarily move in the direction that McCarthy & Ellis argue for - for instance that faced with union objections to their policies that Management would be pledged to doing their best to give a meaningful answer. More importantly, however, McCarthy & Ellis's argument does not allow for the difficulties of the Lifeworld, in that by extending collective bargaining in the manner they propose does not acknowledge the differences in experience, and associated differences in Lifeworld, which would stand in the way of dialogue between the parties. Certainly the McCarthy & Ellis thesis of extending collective bargaining would represent a movement toward greater democracy, but by not taking into account the Lifeworld differences they cannot recognise the difficulties which are thus created. Consequently, while the structures which they discuss represent a starting point for achieving more democratic structures in organizations, more radical structures would have to be developed subsequent to achieve even greater levels of equality. As Baumgartner et al. argue in relation to the German system of participation - Mitbestimmung -

there is little or no change in the capability to structure power relationships between workers and managers in enterprises, to restructure the production processes, the organization of production, or the distribution of its products, or to reshape the institutional context of production. Even highly developed self-management systems may fall far short of this standard (T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 209)

Nor do they take into account the possibility that, as Cressey et al. found

the schemes were operated at the discretion of management since there was no commitment by management to be bound by discussions. They insisted firmly that participation had to be subordinate to management's right to manage. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 164)

More radical structures, than suggested by McCarthy and Ellis, would necessitate attention to Lifeworld differences, and their possible dissolution - or at least a means of translating from one Lifeworld to another more effectively than appears to happen at the moment. As Baumgartner et al. conclude

workers as well as the public might develop new conceptions or working people (or at least their representatives) e.g. legitimizing their broader participation in societal decision-making. (T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 210)

⁵²¹ As Marchington points out even in participative situations

it is naive to assume sanctions are not used in participative interaction (M. Marchington "Responses to Participation at Work" Gower 1980, pg 10.)

522 Poole suggests that we can consider two categories of industrial democracy - integrative models (where the interests of management and workers are reconciled by the introduction of industrial democracy) and disjunctive models (where no such accommodation is seen as possible, even with industrial democracy). Poole argues

under integrative models of participation, the crucial bases upon which the successful exercise of power (and also, in large measure, of influence and authority depend) rest especially upon expertise and knowledge and above all control over information on technical, commercial and even personnel questions. Hence in these circumstances, the cession of extensive formal powers to democratically elected decision-making committees may amount to little in practice..... In contrast in disjunctive modes of participation rather different bases of power are marshalled. For instance in forms based upon trade union and shop steward systems, union representatives typically deploy numbers.. organization.. and various resources. Meanwhile managements correspondingly initiate actions based upon their crucial leverage over the enterprise organization, together with its financial resources and the right to provide or terminate employment. The upshot then is a continual struggle for power in an environmental context in which wider exigencies technical movements and normative beliefs and aspirations variously favour one party or the other. (M. Poole "Managers, Industrial Democracy and Control". In M. Poole and M. Mansfield "Managerial Roles in Industrial Relations". Gower 1980, pg. 80).

As we have argued above, the privileged access of management to information - technical, commercial or on personnel - would have to be varied in a democratically run enterprise, though, as we have shown, doing so would by no means be straightforward. But the central difficulty with Poole's argument is that he proposes, what can be argued to be, a false opposition, in that

a) if the model is integrative, then it is clear that the expertise of Management is, as Poole argues, critical, and this may nullify any move toward democracy.

b) even if the model is disjunctive, we would contend, the expertise of Management continues to be critical. Indeed we could consider as an example of a disjunctive model, the possibility of extending collective bargaining into areas from which previously it has been excluded. If we take investment as an example, then it would be possible for union/ stewards to use their numbers, organization, etc. against Management proposals. The problem is, however, that as we have shown, the stewards without access to privileged management information would have difficulty in negotiating with Management. Yet more difficult, however, would be the perceptions among stewards - and more importantly among their members - of managers as professional decision makers. In this way even with a disjunctive model, the expertise of management - and employee perceptions of this - play a significant role.

⁵²³ It is concluded by Emery & Thorsrud (F. Emery & E. Thorsrud "Form and Content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969) that

when we look at the behaviour of Norwegian boards, it becomes clear that although they share in the power of the board they find it very difficult to see how to use that power in ways that are in accord with the usual board purposes and at the same time make a direct impact on the working lives of their constituents. (pg. 83)

Yet what our data, and the theoretical discussion of this chapter have shown is that this is pretty much what we would expect, since given the differences in Lifeworlds the possibility of effective dialogue between board level employees and other employees is tenuous.

⁵²⁴ They point out

Management can never completely control the labour power it has formally purchased: some autonomy and initiative always remains with the work force. This means that it is desirable for Management to have some degree of common purpose with the work force, to ensure that this initiative is exercised in ways compatible with management's goals. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 159)

⁵²⁵ storey makes the same point in the following way,

In pursuit of these diverse objectives, management stresses both that it is a partner with labour (indeed often arguing that it is just another segment of labour) yet at the same time it stands separate from and over it. (J. Storey "Management Control as a Bridging Concept", Journal of Management Studies 1985, pg. 283)

⁵²⁶ For instance, Laing and Esterson show evidence that Sarah was expected to fulfil rules which all the other members of the family broke, using their intra-family alliances for support. For instance, it was insisted that Sarah should observe the Sabbath (the family were Orthodox Jews), but the mother, with the connivance of the son did so without the knowledge of Sarah or Mr Danzig. Likewise, John (her brother) visited coffee-bars and restaurants etc. even though both he had been forbidden by their father to do so. But when Mr Danzig attempted to impose similar limitations on Sarah, John sided with him.

From my point of view when it comes to Sarah its not intrusion - when it comes to me it is intrusion. (pg 124)

Metaphorically the situation of the employees in our study is similar, in that they are on the one hand told that they are "partners" in the enterprise, but on the other hand are systematically treated less favourably than Management (See for instance our data in Chapter 4 showing the hierarchically systematic way in which employees appear to be informed. Also see Appendix 6, where we show that while the employees are on the whole satisfied with the rewards which they receive from the firm, at the same time the hierarchically systematic distribution of reward is perceived to be legitimate.) This is observed too by Baumgartner et al. who argue

Employees are compelled to lead a double existence: outside their work they may enjoy considerable liberties, independence and self confidence, although their capacity to any significant degree is quite limited; in their place of work they are subject to strict authority and control, particularly those at the lower end of the hierarchy, and to forces of technological and social organizational change over which they have little or no control - in Touraine's phrase "dependent participation". (T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 182)),

and are dominated both consciously -

Cressey et al. for instance argue

Consultation was therefore a forum for management to promote an extremely unitarist view of the firm. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 165)

Hence even in what appears to be a participative procedure control is

a) maintained by Management (Cressey et al. go on to confirm that such consultation was purely advisory, and subject to Management's right to manage. See Cressey et al., pg. 165)

b) strengthened by the ability of Management to take advantage of such apparently participative situations to actually reinforce the existing Lifeworld.

and (we would contend, more importantly) unconsciously by Management. Batstone argues that

By laying down rules and procedures an attempt is made to create a largely taken-for-granted world for the participant such that his behaviour furthers the goals of those in control of the organization. (E. Batstone "Systems of Domination, Accommodation and Industrial Democracy" in T. Burns, L. Karlsson and V. Rus [Eds] "Work and Power" Sage 1979, pg. 252)

We would argue, however, that this system of domination extends to Management as well, and that indeed their Lifeworlds could be argued to be even more extensively colonized by system imperatives.

⁵²⁷ J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity 1986, pp. 140-145, esp. fig. 22.

⁵²⁸ It may of course be argued that seeking perfection is Utopian, and we would probably agree with this. On the other hand perfection appears to us to be a good measure, and thus we would suggest that schemes/models of industrial democracy can be assessed by how well they measure up to this standard. Batstone argues that complete democracy is impossible, but that what we have now is less than could be expected.

It may also be suggested that it is impossible to achieve a totally democratic form of industrial organization. A degree of hierarchy is inevitable for work has to be co-ordinated and skills and expertise will be differentially distributed among people. But even if one takes this point into account it can scarcely be argued that the experience of the "democratic" operation of industrial enterprises matches what might reasonably be expected. (E. Batstone "Systems of Domination, Accommodation and Industrial Democracy". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 250.)

⁵²⁹ The evidence of research into the experience of being a worker director indicates that the position is found to be very difficult. For instance Cressey et al. report

representatives would be least likely to have the expertise to deal with matters discussed, (at board level) yet would be most alienated from the workforce in their activities, and most hampered by the problems of boardroom and commercial confidentiality. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981, pg. 42.)

Baumgartner et al. argue that even in relatively well developed systems of industrial democracy, as in west Germany - Mitbestimmung - that

there is little or no change in the capability to structure power relationships between workers and managers in enterprises to restructure the production process, the organization of production, or the distribution of products, or to reshape the institutional context of production. Even highly developed self-management systems fall far short of that. (T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 209)

Yet why should this happen? Why do worker representatives not seize the opportunity to further the interests of their members at the highest level of the company? We would argue that this is due to employees having been schooled into Lifeworlds which provide Management with such a level of dominance that the consequences which Cressey et al., Baumgartner et al. have described (and they are merely instances) are probably inevitable. This is not to say that there are no structural obstacles. For instance Meacher (M. Meacher "How the Mandarins Rule". New Statesman 4/12/1980, pp. 14-15) instances a number of strategies which management can use to make the role of the worker director more difficult. For instance

a) "the expert ploy" where decisions are taken on the advice of (management) experts in particular areas - marketing, finance and so on.

b) "the fait accompli ploy", where decisions are taken between options derived by sub-committees (composed of managers), so that the worker directors can choose only between managerially approved options.

c) "the timing of papers ploy", where the worker director, because he is peripheral to the management information flow, often is much less well informed than others at board meetings

⁵³⁰ Indeed it can be argued that since greater initiative and cooperation is necessary to operate successfully in turbulent environments, precisely this kind of movement is necessary in any case. For instance the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (P. Lawrence & J. Lorsch - "Organization and Environment", Harvard University Press, 1967) and Burns and Stalker (T. Burns & G. Stalker - "Management of Innovation", Tavistock 1961) indicates precisely this, in that when the environment becomes turbulent - changing rapidly in unpredictable ways - firms are recommended to decentralise decision-making downwardly from the centre. This by no means is industrial democracy, but it does suggest,

a) a move away from rigid hierarchy,

b) control over decision-making being distributed more widely, and that more importantly

c) others outwith Management are being given the opportunity to take decisions which they may previously have been excluded from, and to develop a sense of competence in so doing.

Similarly the argument for Theory Z (W. Ouchi - "Type Z Organization: Stability in the Midst of Mobility". Academy of Management Review 1978, pp. 305-314) emphasises the importance of securing consensus, group loyalty, treating the employee like a member of the family, collective responsibility, etc. All of these, while certainly not being seen as forms of industrial democracy, do require a greater degree of participation by employees than would normally be found in organizations. The argument Ouchi develops is that this form of organization will become necessary for purely commercial reasons - in order that firms will be able to continue to compete and to survive in increasingly turbulent economic conditions and in the face of increasing Japanese competition.

⁵³¹ Our evidence points in general terms to the conclusion of Cressey et al. that the shop-floor and staff want

management to manage fairly in the sense of having regard to the interests the work-force. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 166)

At the same time we would agree with Cressey et al. that the creation of such a system would face very many, profound obstacles, requiring change outwith the organization as well as within. We would, however, argue that some at least of these obstacles reflect differences in Lifeworld, with consequential (but unseen) effects on the operation of power. For instance Cressey et al. argue that the schemes of participation which they studied

never reached the stage of taking decisions or reviewing jointly the range of information relevant to taking a decision. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 170)

We would argue that this is not really surprising since the Lifeworlds of our subjects indicated that Management saw themselves as "professional" decision-makers, a view substantially shared by their employees. Thus in the event of the type of participative scheme studied by Cressey et al. was to be introduced, there would be two obstacles to this:

a) the very proposal would offend the perception which Management have of themselves and of their employees in relation to decision-making, and

b) while employees outwith Management may have been given additional power which it would be in their interests to use, their perception of themselves and of Management in relation to decision-making would stand in the way of these new powers being used to anything like their fullest degree.

Hence given this, we would not be surprised to find participative schemes like those studied by Cressey et al. do not develop in the way forecast. This, however, does not mean that they cannot be successful. It does mean that they face obstacles from the Lifeworld which may not be easily apparent.

⁵³² This issue is considered by Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978), who argues

As far as individual workers are concerned, many British companies often seem to take too little positive account of their employees interests, whatever many industrialists and senior managers may claim. (pg. 283)

⁵³³ Hence we would argue that we can explain, as Storey has argued

it remains important to see how managers seek to legitimatize their superordinate position and their lines of action. (J. Storey "Management Control as a Bridging Concept". Journal of Management Studies, 1985, pg. 285)

We have sought to do this, not only by considering what Management do to sustain their control, but that through considering the Lifeworld we can understand why

1) Management seek to hold on to power, without reference to imputed Managerial interests;

2) employees accept Management power, because Managers are deemed to possess special qualities in decision-making which the employees perceive themselves to lack.

whether collective bargaining maintains ordered relations free of prolonged breakdowns and recurrent disruptions depends on there being (a) a high degree of congruence between the views of the two parties as to what categories of decisions are to be seen as negotiable and what as non-negotiable, and (b) a closeness between the claims, aspirations or policies of the parties with respect to negotiable issues sufficient to make possible those agreed compromises or syntheses which maintain uninterrupted working. (A. Fox "Man Mismanagement"[2nd. Edn.] Hutchinson 1985, pg. 157)

Taking the second point first, there had been no strikes in the firm - other than national stoppages - for at least 15 years. This suggests that the second of Fox's conditions was satisfied. We would argue that the first is also satisfied, given the degree of congruence of the views expressed in our data. This is reflected in the congruence of the Management Lifeworld, and that of other employees.

⁵³⁵ It is as much as we can do to point to the difficulties that stand in the way of more democratic organizations. We would, however, concur with Clarke (O. Clarke "Workers Participation in Management in Great Britain". ILO Research Series No. 58, pg. 16.) in arguing that

The precise form it (Worker participation) will take, and the effects it will have cannot at this stage be foreseen. (pg. 23)

⁵³⁶ Emery and Thorsrud argue (F. Emery & E. Thorsrud "Form and Content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969)

In so far as industrial democracy means more than extended negotiations and consultations, there is a need for the transfer of some real managerial power to the employees. It is difficult indeed to see how this sharing can be started at the top - at board level. If democratic participation is to become a reality it seems inevitable that it must be started at a level where a large proportion of employees are both able and willing to participate (pg. 86, my emphasis)

⁵³⁷ Emery and Thorsrud (supra), quoting Holter, argue that the majority of lower grade employees

(a) feel that they could cope with more responsibility in their daily work, and
(b) want more such responsibility (pg. 86)

⁵³⁸ A union official is reported by Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) as arguing that

People should be involved in the detailed decisions about how they should do their work and bottom-up schemes would help achieve this involvement(such schemes) are important in that they can help break down the managerial "right to manage" attitude (pg. 35)

Equally, however, we would argue that such schemes would help to break down the employee "only management can manage" attitude.

⁵³⁹ Fatchett argues

it is these decisions (on finance and strategy) which have profound implications for the individual workplace. (D. Fatchett "Industrial Democracy - the Prospects". Universities of Leeds and Nottingham, 1977, pg. 16)

⁵⁴⁰ In this respect we would have to dispute the argument put forward by Marsden, who suggests that the parties (Management, and those outwith Management) can

separate out groups of issues from each other via different forms of negotiation and consultative machinery so that changes in one will be less likely to affect the situation in others. (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Department of Employment Research Paper No. 4, pg. 6)

Given the system basis of organizations, eventually this distinction will begin to break down. Marsden himself uses the example of machinery, suggesting that while control of work methods, but that control of investment in new machines would be retained by Management. Ultimately, however, this distinction would break down for the reasons we have provided in the main text. Whether this would happen slowly or quickly cannot be forecast.

⁵⁴¹ The Industrial Participation Association suggest that it may take from 18 months to 4 years for employee directors to become fully effective ("Employee Directors and Supervisory Boards", 1973, pg. 13).

⁵⁴² For instance it is argued by Chell that

People can learn to cope with participative situations; to be able to reduce stresses and anxieties in themselves and others; to be able to know when to make requests and when to give commands and to whom and how to disclose information. The acquisition of such skills requires both a great deal of thought and practice since the skills incorporate both cognitive and affective elements. The first practical step individuals must take in such a learning process is to become more conscious of their own behaviour in order to be able to change it. The next step is to know what needs to be changed. The third stage is to find or put themselves in a position where behaviour change is a practical possibility. (E. Chell "Participation and Organization". MacMillan 1985, pg. 257.)

McLean (I. McLean "Mechanisms for Democracy". In D. Held & C. Pollit "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1989, pp. 135-157.) points out that

both Rousseau and J. S. Mill saw participation as good in itself....Participation it is said broadens the mind. It makes you see the other person's point of view. (pg. 142)

There are several important points which come from this:

a) by pointing out that the skills participation involves the affective and not only cognitive elements, reinforces our view that successfully introducing participation, especially at the strategic level, involves more than simply acquiring technical skills - learning how to read a balance sheet or a cash flow forecast. The fact is that the participators (whoever they may be) must feel able to participate on something which at least resembles equality.

Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp. 353-387.) argues that for participation to succeed it is necessary for workers to have

1) self confidence, by which he means

you feel confident about yourself, you know what you want; you feel you are able to do thing for yourself; you feel that you are not inferior to people higher up in the organization (pg. 374)

2) good interpersonal relations with other workers (see pg. 371)

3) a sense of responsibility by all the workers in a group. (see pg. 371)

4) appropriate identity - for instance of competence in relation to others (see pp. 373/4).

The necessity of all of these can easily be seen from the perspective of the Ideal Speech Thesis, since to

i) lack a sense of competence, or

ii) have poor relations with others,

will clearly obstruct the satisfaction of its criteria. At the moment - as we have shown - this would be lacking because of the interpretational relevances within the Lifeworld. It would, therefore require that these change - and this may be possible through experience of participation. There is, however, a further difficulty.

b) At this stage, given our present evidence, we would expect deference to Management on strategic issues. On the other hand, given that the experience of those outwith Management of strategic issues will be more direct, there may be changes to the Lifeworld. These changes may be such that deference to Management is reduced, and that the assumptions conventionally made by Managers in taking these decisions are brought out, and subjected to rational criticism.

It is, for instance argued by Rus that

the whole complex of participation is thus revealed as a self generating process, or rather as a self-reinforcing process. (V. Rus " Limited Effects of Workers' Participation and Political Counter-Power" In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 234)

Hence is Rus contending that participation can in effect be self developing, independent of even the socio-technical environment. A mechanism for this to happen would indeed through the experience of participation modifying the Lifeworlds of employees, such that the decision-making powers of Management became progressively subject to challenge. On the other hand the development of participation may only extend more widely than Management the colonization of the Lifeworld by system imperatives. Rus argues that the self-perpetuation of participation is independent of the socio-technical system. This may well be so. We would contend, however, that what is critical is the ability of Management to successfully manage the firm in its commercial environment, and thus to maintain an appearance of competence, and in this way legitimacy. A continuing failure to control the firm (or the system to take a wider, Habermasian perspective) would, we would argue, be disastrous not only for particular Managers (or Management teams), but for the entire organizational role of "Manager".

We have already argued, however, that the Lifeworlds of Managers are colonized by the System to a greater degree than those of other employees. Another possibility is, therefore, that the Lifeworlds of employees outwith Management are changed, but not in a way which leads them to be critical of Management, but rather in ways which lead them to be less so.

In other words, the possibility is that the Lifeworlds of those outwith Management come to be colonized in a way similar to those of Managers.

This kind of problem is indicated by Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker participation and Autonomy" in C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes", John Wiley 1983), who argues

the unions will soon run into the same problems found with the German Mitbestimmung and Yugoslavian self-management, namely that they will be regarded by rank and file as part of the control system of the company with neither the chance nor the interest of looking after the everyday conditions of the members. (pg. 359)

This is what may occur when employee representatives are co-opted or absorbed into the Board, rather than participating in its activities and discussions.

It is argued by Baumgartner et al.

past experience in industrialized capitalist countries seems to indicate that participation has been accompanied more by integration than by emancipation of workers. (T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 210, my emphasis.)

Cressey et al. consider a similar argument as what they describe as "incorporationist" analysis, by which they mean analysis which sees

management act(ing) largely as a cypher for market forces and that therefore industrial democracy schemes insofar as they only affect who takes decisions cannot alter what decisions will in fact be taken. This will really be determined by the logic of the capitalist system itself. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 162)

We would concur with Cressey et al's conclusion that this approach is not

an adequate analysis of power and authority in the capitalist enterprise (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 164)

but it may not always be correct to say, as Cressey et al. do, that it is not

a good guide to how management or employees actually define and pursue their interests(P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985, pg. 164)

It would be our contention that the kind of analysis presented by what Cressey et al. describe as incorporationists will not always be correct. At the same time, however, there is the danger that through the absorption of employees into the managerial Lifeworld, that precisely what they suggest may come about.

This points again to the need for the Lifeworlds of Management to change too. For instance that executive directors recognise that the role of employee directors would be to represent the interests and aspirations of employees in the running of the company, and that as such they are not standard board members with functions of primarily representing the shareholders.

Thus a different approach would have to be followed than that described by Ramsey (H. Ramsay "Cycles of Control". Sociology 1977, pg. 496), in that

a) participative schemes in the past have tended to be proposed by management as a means of heading off challenges to their authority,

b) the schemes proposed have tended to emphasise a unitary framework for the firm. While, ultimately the ideal speech thesis is oriented toward reaching understanding and agreement, this would not - as unitarism does - imply management dominance, but rather the dominance of the "best argument".

Only then can they move to Chell's third stage

to find or put themselves in a position where behaviour change is a practical possibility. (supra)

So as long as there is domination of employees by Management, through the vehicle of the Lifeworld, the possibility of employee participation, especially on strategic matters, will always be limited. Hence any proposals for the development of industrial democracy which is begun from the strategic level (as for instance the Bullock proposals did in 1977) must take into account the Lifeworld limitations which our research indicates.

For instance Dowling et al. (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D. Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) report a union official as arguing

If we shun participation today how are we going to get any experience of running industry (pg. 33)

This opens up the argument that changes contingent on participation at board level may only come in the longer term, for instance because changes in the Lifeworld are a long term matter.

The importance put on practicing Managers to possess qualities of leadership by Management authors (see for instance C. Handy "The Age of Unreason") is suggestive of this too, only from the Management perspective. In other words the observation by Handy of the importance of personal leadership qualities is a recognition that Managers cannot continue to manage simply through authoritative structures and commands issued on the basis of the legitimacy of their hierarchical position. Rather Managers must be able to secure legitimacy by, we would argue, maintaining the image of special (and peculiar to them) competence we have shown in this study.

⁵⁴³ M. Bowles "Myth, Meaning and Work Organization". Organization Studies 1989, pp.405-421. Pg. 416. Bowles defines mythology in a way consistent with Schutz:

The second function of a living mythology is to provide a set of ideas which incorporates the stock of knowledge existing at that time, which helps to provide an image of the universe and events experienced within it. (pg. 408)

Hence Bowles' view of mythology is similar to the Schutzian concept of Lifeworld, in that mythology, in the same way as Lifeworld, provides a comprehensive set of explanations for what goes on in our "universe". A distinction, however, between our own view of Lifeworld and Bowles' Mythology is that the latter does not, in our view, stress sufficiently the constraining qualities of Lifeworld/mythology.

⁵⁴⁴ Field's argument (R. Field "The Self Fulfilling Prophecy Leader". Journal Of Management Studies 1989, pp. 151-175.) concerning Self-fulfilling prophecy in the context of management has relevance for us here. Basically his argument is that

1) if the Management's prophecy is negative (say about employee participation), while the employee is positive the consequence is a self defeating prophecy (what Field describes as "the I'll show you effect").

2) if the manager is positive, but the employee is negative then again there is a self defeating prophecy (what Field describes as "the suppression effect").

3) if both are negative then there is a self-fulfilling prophecy - what Field describes as "the confirmed failure effect". We can see this in our own findings, in that both sides are pessimistic about the prospects for participation. Management are negative on the possibilities of participation, and use the restricted demand from employees as evidence for this. From the perspective of self-fulfilling prophecy, therefore, Management's pessimistic prophecy can be said to have produced a negative behaviour from employees.

4) alternatively the manager may make an optimistic and employees may be positive, thus producing a self fulfilling prophecy which he calls "the Pygmalion effect". (See fig. 1, pg. 153. Pygmalion was king of Cyprus, who fell in love with a statue of a woman, and because he treated the statue as if it were alive it became so. The live statue was called Galatea, and she and Pygmalion had a daughter, Metharme.)

Field considers a number of variables which may be involved in the production of the Metharme effect (By this he means a successful self-fulfilling prophecy - Metharme being the daughter of Pygmalion and Galatea.) For instance he considers the expectations which leaders have of the members of the organization. For instance if the leader holds strong beliefs then people are more likely to have strong expectations about him (See page 159.). Thus in the context of participation, Management holding expectations that participation would work could be expected to improve the prospects of it actually working successfully.

The extent to which leaders influence the self concept of the organizational members is also considered by Field. Using the work of Gergen (J. Gergen "Toward Generative Theory". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1978, pp. 1344-1360.) and Bandura (A. Bandura "Self Efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioural change". Psychological Review 1977, pp. 191-215.) Field argues that leaders could influence the self concept of members by providing them with a positive image of their future self. As we have shown, however, the Management view of employees is that their role is about right now, and there is little evidence of Management seeking to create a positive image of participation by their employees.

On the other hand, Field argues leaders should

**hold and communicate high expectations
for members and capitalize on small
positive expectancy increments (Field
supra , pg. 167.)**

As we have seen, however, this does not happen. We have indicated some of the reasons for this - not least of which is that for Management to adopt an optimistic prophecy, and possibly initiate a Metharme effect, would be contrary to their Lifeworld. Likewise for the employees to respond positively would be contrary to their Lifeworld.

⁵⁴⁵ H. Leymann "The Significance of the Learning Process underlying Democratic Participation" Economic & Industrial Democracy 1987, pp. 111-130

⁵⁴⁶ Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978, pp. 120-1) draws our attention to a similar problem when he considers the problems which arise when management have to move from "old-style conflict relationships" to "anything like full participation in decision-making". For instance when Leyland moved from piecework to measured day-work at its Cowley plant. Elliot argues that many of the problems associated with the change were caused by a failure to train line managers in sufficient management skills. We would argue, however, that in addition to the training necessary it would be necessary for there to be suitable Lifeworld changes. This is (albeit implicitly) recognised by Elliot when he argues that this is an example of

the problems that can ensue when one tries too quickly to clamp a participative system on to a bargaining system (pg. 121)

When a bargaining system is transformed to a participation, an essential condition is that there should be dialogue between the parties. We have argued that due to Lifeworld structures, dialogue is at best restricted.

⁵⁴⁷ Leymann suggests three models of industrial democracy (page 123):

a) a minimum version, where employees are able to exercise some choice and organization of the control mechanisms to which they are subject (eg working methods, payment systems, etc.). This is similar to what we have described as work-related participation.

b) power-sharing version where all employees, directly or through elected representatives, influence decisions on short and long term decisions. This is similar to what we have described as participation on strategic matters.

c) solidarity version where situations are created where the participants have a learning opportunity, changing attitudes so that mutual problems are solved in a spirit of solidarity.

This last model is the most interesting for our purpose, since, while Leymann tends not to consider the problems inherent in creating such a learning process, it is clear that such learning - to induce changes in the Lifeworld - are clearly necessary. For instance it may well be that the role of Manager, and what it means for Managers and for those outwith Management, is a primary obstacle in attempting to create more democratic organizations, and that a learning process changing this is necessary.

It is perhaps awareness of this - among other things which leads the CBI to argue

The CBI rejects the TUC proposals for compulsory union representation on boards of directors and calls instead for a flexible approach which would leave the appropriate form of participation to employees, unions and management in particular companies. (Industrial Relations Review and Report No. 124, March 1976)

The advantage of the CBI policy is that it allows for a high degree of flexibility, unlike the restrictions of the Bullock proposals. On the other hand its disadvantage is that it would retain control - at least initially - in the hands of management, since arrangements would have to be negotiated through each company.

As Leymann argues (page 127) for democracy to develop two conditions are necessary:

a) to change the structures of work organizations, in order to change the environment which we occupy, and to create dialogue directed toward more democratic decision-making,

b) to change ourselves through exposure to emotional learning, by creating dialogue directed toward changing personality toward more democratic behaviour leading to solidarity with fellow employees.

He concludes

There is an important need for competence learning within all those areas mentioned in the model - a competence learning open to all employees (page 127)

While whole-heartedly endorsing this, we would argue that it will first of all be necessary to address ourselves to existing Lifeworlds, and to the difficulties of "un-learning" that, for instance only Management are competent to be involved in decision-making, and other obstacles therein.

⁵⁴⁸ (S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pg. 255, my emphasis)

⁵⁴⁹ A proposal to introduce a form of industrial democracy was made by the SDP in 1985 (SDP "Democracy at Work", 1985). They argued that as well as participation at "works council" level (corresponding to what we have described as strategic participation) there should be a development of "comprehensive participation...providing for employee participation at all levels of decision-making" (pg. 4). This would be overseen by an Industrial Democracy Agency whose role would be to "assess participation agreements against guide-lines and options in a code of practice". (pg. 4) The agency would also provide training, support and advice on industrial democracy, and on drawing up participation agreements, which are defined as "an agreement among all sides of the organization on forms and methods of participation which give employees an effective voice in decision-making at all levels with a reasonable period of time" (pg. 15). The practical difficulties with this concerns what is meant by (1) effective, and (2) reasonable time. Given our evidence of the effect of the Lifeworld on management and those outwith management, it is certain that (a) they will not agree, (b) that neither side would aspire to the level of democracy implied by the Ideal Speech Thesis. Nonetheless a standing agency, with the role of encouraging the development of industrial democracy over as long a period as is necessary, would seem on the basis of our evidence to be a way forward. On the other hand, the limits of its powers and its objectives would be critical elements in all this. Equally, its progress would be limited by the willingness of the parties to develop in the direction of greater democracy, and thus by the structures of the Lifeworld.

⁵⁵⁰ J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2", Polity 1987, pp. 318-373, esp. fig 39, pg. 320.

⁵⁵¹ We are not arguing that such conditions can be realised empirically, rather we only wish to lay down the conditions for equality. By contrasting situations and circumstances with these conditions we can identify relative defects and indicate whether particular conditions are more/less democratic than others. At the same time there has been a good deal of misunderstanding of this position. For instance it has been argued by Clegg (S. Clegg "Organizational Democracy, Power and Participation" in C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983) that,

substantive ideals such as "non-distorted communication" cannot possible function in an organization which is task-discontinuous. Without a return to small scale communities, local technologies and energy sources it is difficult to see how our present mode of life can be supported other than through complex task-discontinuity. (pg 26)

While subsequent disclaiming both that task-discontinuous organization is necessarily either functionally necessary or morally defensible, Clegg, in our view, fundamentally misunderstands Habermas's argument. What Habermas contends with the Ideal Speech thesis, is not that we should return to "small scale communities, local technologies and energy sources", but that we should identify, through the use of the Ideal Speech thesis as a criterion against which we can assess empirical reality, the obstacles which make task-discontinuous organization appear to be inevitable. Habermas is not proposing how things should be different, but rather is proposing conditions under which it would be possible to consider how things could be different. Conditions, which apply at the moment are far from propitious for this - as Gustavsen (B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479) points out,

The creation of a rational dialogue around workplace issues can be seen as the bringing of the workers into a democratic dialogue of which they were never intended to be part, and at a time when the dialogue no longer exists. The prospects of democracy in working life are thus far (sic) bleak indeed. (pg. 472)

Clegg's misunderstanding is illustrated by his argument that the conditions for ideal speech would undermine the possibility of its existence since it would be so time consuming (page 27). We cannot disagree that ideal speech conditions (if they were achievable) would be very time consuming, which would damage the efficiency of the enterprise. It is pointed out, for instance by Williamson (O. Williamson "The Organization of Work", Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 1980, pp. 5-17), Alchian and Demsetz (A. Alchian & H. Demsetz "Production, information costs, and economic organization". American Economic Review 1972, pp. 777-795), and Weiermair (K. Weiermair "Worker Incentives and Worker Participation". Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 547-570) that

prevailing hierarchical structures are found efficient (Weiermair pg. 551)

Hence, it can be argued with conviction that in terms of theoretical efficiency hierarchy is more efficient than any other structure we currently are aware of. Thus, to move away from hierarchy is certainly to lose technical efficiency, as Clegg argues. Yet the purpose of ideal speech is different from this - to allow consideration of the hypothesis (and it is no more than that) that employees would be willing to take the time, and reduce the economic efficiency of their enterprise in order to take a more rational control of their own existence. On other hand it is argued by Cummings and Molloy (see (?)) that the introduction of participative techniques can lead to real increases in productivity. This is supported by King and Rodriguez who show that the degree of a manager's participation in the development of an MIS system (for strategic decision making) influences the perception he has of the worth of the system, illustrated by the fact that users who have participated in its design use the system more often than those who did not. (See W. King & J. Rodriguez "Participative Design of Strategic Support Systems". Management Science 1981, pg. 722).

It is argued by Williamson (O. Williamson "Transaction Cost Economics". Journal of Law and Economics 1979, pg. 233-261) that with higher standards of education and changing social values that maintaining management control in a traditional hierarchy will become more difficult, and thus expensive. Consequently participative forms, and other structures of organization - while theoretically less efficient - may become optimal in practical terms.

Moreover it is pointed out by McLean (I. McLean "Mechanisms for Democracy". In D. Held & C. Pollit "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1989, pp. 135-157.)

Opponents of direct democracy often dismiss it with a wave of the hand. "It can't be done. Decision-making would take far too long. Anyhow you can't discuss options at mass meetings". Now IT opens possibilities that were unsuspected only a few years ago (pg. 141)

In other words, through the means of (still developing) Information Technology, the conditions for the Ideal Speech thesis (condemned by Clegg as a potential cause of inefficiency) at least could be brought closer than now. Exactly how this would work would vary from place to place, but in so far as IT potentially makes information more widely available, more quickly, it is a consideration which merits consideration in removing obstacles to democracy at work. McLean gives as an example, a workers' cooperative, where it is proposed to distribute bonus payments in proportion to educational qualifications rather than length of employment. This, requiring a constitutional amendment, would have to be discussed at an AGM, which some may find difficult to attend, and others may not be bothered to do so. McLean argues that if enough computer terminals were sited in the workplace, then each member of the cooperative could register a vote on the issue with little trouble. This would not resolve all the obstacles to achieving Ideal Speech - but as we have argued it may well be that it is not achievable anyway. As McLean concludes, however,

Direct democracy with such groups is in principle feasible and new technology makes it easier. (pg. 153)

To the extent that IT allows movement toward Ideal Speech, therefore, it is a force for greater democracy - though not necessarily as much as we might like.

Thus, for the practical reasons we have considered - the practical improvements in productivity from participative forms of organization: the possibilities inherent in IT - Clegg's criticism of Ideal Speech, as a basis for organization is less penetrating than it may appear to be.

⁵⁵² B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479.

⁵⁵³ a) to create a dialogue during which there is exchange, points and arguments moving between the participants;

b) all concerned being admitted to the dialogue;

c) everyone being active in the dialogue;

d) all participants being equal in the dialogue;

e) the experience of all participants must provisionally be considered to be legitimate - though may be disproved in subsequent discourse;

f) it must be possible for everyone to develop an understanding of the issues in question;

g) all arguments put forward are provisionally legitimate - though may be disproved in subsequent discourse;

h) the dialogue should produce agreements which provide for further investigation and action. (B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pg. 474. This is similar to the argument advanced by Wall and Lischeron (See above Wall and Lischeron 331.)

⁵⁵⁴ B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pg. 475.

⁵⁵⁵ For instance Benelli et al. (G. Benelli, C. Loderer, T. Lys "Labor Participation in Corporate Policy-making Decisions: west Germany's Experience with Codetermination". Journal of Business 1987, pp. 553-575) argue

given the heated debate typically surrounding the issue we find little evidence that codetermination has any effect. This result suggests that employees are unable or unwilling to affect management decisions, possibly because they lack a common objective. (pg. 555)

Benelli argue that there is no statistically significant tendency for "co-determined firms" in Germany to exhibit a lesser rate of profit. They explain this by reference to an inability to agree on wealth maximization which would be to the benefit of employees (in the form of better working conditions, more job security, as well as wages - all of which would tend to depress profits), While not necessarily disagreeing with Benelli et al. that this is happening, we would suggest that an important mechanism for the failure of codetermination (to have the kind of effects they imply) is that the Lifeworlds of those involved do not allow for this - as with the Lifeworlds of our subjects.

⁵⁵⁶ It will require changes to the Lifeworld before we would be able to claim that there is

effective participation (which) means the ability of the representative to affect managerial decisions to influence and jointly control the decision outcome. (E. Chell "Political Perspective and Worker Participation". C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983, pg. 503).

Other than that we would argue that effective participation can be achieved other than through representative systems, and that direct systems are possible as well, we would concur with Chell's argument.

557 Our argument that employees outwith management lack experience of management issues - is supported by Storey who shows that while 54% of establishments had formal agreement to negotiate on speed of work, 66% on manning levels, 63% on discipline, 58% on job content, only 6% had an agreement to negotiate on investment policy. (See Storey J. "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980. pg 129 table 6.1). Storey concludes that

The daily fracas seems to lack a consistent pattern. It is difficult to interpret it as a concerted attack upon management prerogative. Indeed as our results show, there are a number of key strategic areas of management decisions, such as investment, pricing and type of product, which have only been rarely challenged (Storey J. "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980, pg 173).

558 This point is well described by Fox who argues

Management was saying in effect: "Contribute your constructive proposals, offer your opinions, advance your judgements - and then trust us to fashion the best policies in the interests of the company and all its members". But this was precisely what the rank and file felt unable to do. (A. Fox "Man Mismanagement [2nd Edition] 1985, pg. 117)

We might be somewhat less negative than Fox about the level of difficulty that the "rank and file" would have in trusting management. There is, however, a clear difficulty in that our results suggest that on the one hand - as Fox argues - management are trying to secure the trust of their employees, and that the employees do see management as the group with the skills to "fashion the best policies", but the problem remains of the conditions on which employees will put their trust in management to do this in "the interests of the company and all its members".

559 Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978) argues that

union officials might gain a different response if they went out and explained to their members that they had within their grasp the potential to take part in key decision-making that would affect their livelihoods in the future. (pg. 289)

Accepting this, we would have to ask why this has not yet happened. We would argue that the reasons are to be located in the structures of the Lifeworld, but Elliot - on the previous page - indicates a similar conclusion when he suggests that

any advocate of a worker director system will have to admit that such a move is something of a leap in the dark, especially since the result will, if it is successful, mean a radical change in industrial society. (pg. 288)

In other words the rank and file have not followed their leaders toward participation and democracy precisely because it is, as Elliot suggests "something of a leap in the dark".

⁵⁶⁰ See above Gustavsen

⁵⁶¹ See above Abrahamsson

appendix 2

•

Abercrombie N., Hill S. & Turner B. "The Dominant Ideology Thesis", George Allen and Unwin 1980.

Abrahamsson B. "On Form & Function in Organization Theory" - Organization Studies 1985, pp.39-53.

Alchian A. & Demsetz H. "Production, information costs, and economic organization". American Economic Review 1972, pp. 777-795.

Allen R. , Maddison D. , Porter L., Renwick P., and Mayes B. "Organizational Politics". California Management Review 1979, pp. 77-83.

Alvesson M. "Organization Theory and Technocratic Consciousness". De Gruyter 1987.

Andrews P.W.S. "On Competition in Economic Theory MacMillan 1964.

Arendt H. "Communicative Power" in S. Lukes (ed) "Power". Basil Blackwell 1986.

C. Argyris "Personality and Organization Theory revisited", Administrative Science Quarterly 1973, pp. 141-167.

Armstrong R. J. & Goodman J.F.B. "Ideology and Shop-Floor Industrial Relations". Croom Helm 1981.

Astley W. & Sachdeva P. "Structural Sources of Intraorganizational Power: A Theoretical Synthesis". Academy of Management Review 1984, pp. 104-113.

Athos A. and Pascale R. "Art of Japanese Management", Pelican 1982.

Axtell Ray C. "The last Frontier of Control". Journal of Management Studies 1986 pp 287 - 297.

Bachrach P. & Baratz M. "Two Faces of Power". American Political Science Review 1962, pp. 947-952.

Bachrach P. & Baratz M. "Decisions and Non-Decisions". American Political Science Review 1963, pp. 641-651.

Bachrach P. & Baratz M. "Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice". Oxford Uni. Press, 1970.

Bamber G." Trade Unions for Managers ":Personnel Review 1976 pp36-41.

Bandura A. "Self Efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioural change". Psychological Review 1977, pp. 191-215.

Barlow G. "Deficiencies and the Perpetuation of Power: Latent Functions in Management Appraisal". Journal of Management Studies 1989, pp. 499-517.

Bartolke K., Eschweiler W., Flechsenberger D. and Tannenbaum A. "Workers Participation and the Distribution of Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies". Admin. Science Quarterly 1982

Bass B. M. "Stodgill's Handbook of Leadership ", Free Press 1981.

Batstone E. "Systems of Domination, Accommodation and Industrial Democracy" in T. Burns, L. Karlsson and V. Rus [Eds] "Work and Power" Sage 1979.

Batstone E., Boraston I., & Frenkel S. "Shop Stewards in Action" Basil Blackwell 1979.

Baumgartner T., Burns T., and DeVille P. "Work Politics and Social Structuring Under Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979.

Beharrel P. & Philo G. (eds) "Trade Unions and the Media". Macmillan 1977.

Bell D. "Industrial Participation" Pitman 1979

Bem D. "Self-Perception Theory" in L. Berkowitz (ed) "Advances in Experimental Social Psychology" Academic Press 1972.

Benelli G., Loderer C., & Lys T. "Labor Participation in Corporate Policy-making Decisions: west Germany's Experience with Codetermination". Journal of Business 1987, pp. 553-575.

Berger P. and Luckmann T. "The Social Construction of Reality", Penguin 1967.

Bernstein R. "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory" Methuen, 1976.

Beyer J., Dunbar R., Meyer A. "Comment: The Concept of Ideology in Organizational Analysis." Academy of Management Review 1988, pp. 483-489.

Beynon H. "Working for Ford". Penguin 1973.

Beynon H. & Blackburn R. "Perceptions of work". Cambridge University Press 1972.

Biggart M. and Hamilton G. "The Power of Obedience" Administrative Science Quarterly 1984, pp 540-549.

Billig M., Condor S., Edwards D., Gane M., Middleton D., & Radley A. "Ideological Dilemmas". Sage Books, 1988.

Blackburn R.M. and Mann M. "Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working Class". In "Working Class Images of Society", M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.

Blau P. & Scott W. "Formal Organizations". RKP, 1963

Bowen P. "Social Control in Industrial Organizations". RKP 1976.

Bowles M. "Myth, Meaning and Work Organization". Organization Studies 1989, pp.405-421.

Bradshaw S. "A Critique of Steven Lukes "Power a Radical View". Sociology 1976, pp. 121-127.

Braverman H. "Labor and Monopoly Capital". Monthly Review Press 1974.

Brown R. "Bureaucracy as Praxis" Administrative Science Quarterly 1978, pp. 365-382.

Brown W. "A Consideration of Custom & Practice". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1972, pp. 178-184. and

Bryman A. "Leadership and Organizations" RKP 1986 .

Buckley W. "Sociology and Modern Systems Theory". Prentice Hall, 1967.

Buckley W. " "Society as a Complex Mechanism" in W. Buckley [Ed] "Modern Systems Research for the Behavioural Scientist", Chicago 1968.

Bullock Lord "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy" Cmd. 6706, HMSO 1977

Burawoy M. "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979.

Burns T (ed) "Industrial Man". Penguin 1972.

Burns T. & Stalker G. "Management of Innovation", Tavistock 1961.

CBI "Guide-lines for Action on Employee Involvement". CBI IPM 1978

Checkland S. "The Upas Tree" Glasgow University Press 1975

Chell E. "Political Perspectives and Worker Participation". C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983, pp. 487-504.

Chell E. "Participation and Organization". MacMillan 1985.

Child J. (ed) "Man & Organization". Allen & Unwin 1973

Child J. and Partridge B. "Lost Managers" Blackwell 1982.

Cicourel A. "Cognitive Sociology", Penguin 1973.

Clarke O. "Workers Participation in Management in Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain." Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29.

Clarke O. "Workers Participation in Management in Great Britain". ILO Research Series No. 58.

Clegg C. & Wall T. "The Lateral Dimension to Employee Participation". Journal of Management Studies 1984, pp. 429-442.

Clegg H. "A New Approach to Industrial Democracy". Blackwell, 1960.

Clegg S. "Power, Rule and Domination" Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975.

Clegg S. "Organization and Control" Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 545-562.

Clegg S. "Organizational Democracy, Power and Participation" in C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983.

Clegg S. "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989.

Cohen S. and Young J. "Deviance", Pelican 1971.

Collier A. "The Philosophy and Politics of Psychotherapy". Harvester, 1977.

Collins R. "Sociology since Midcentury". Academic Press 1981.

Constable J. & McCormick R. "The Making of British Managers" BIM: CBI 1987. D. Cooper "Death of the Family". Penguin 1972.

Cooper D. "Death of the Family". Penguin 1972

Cooper D. & Essex S. "Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217

Craft J. "Role of Accountant in Collective Bargaining". Company Information to Trade Unions". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1984, pp. 253-273.

Craft J. "Role of Accountant in Collective Bargaining". Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217

Crenson M. "The Un-politics of Air Pollution". John Hopkins Press 1971.

Cressey P., Eldridge J., MacInness J., Norris G. "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981.

Cressey P., Eldridge J. and McInnes J. "Just Managing". Open University Press, 1985.

Crouch C. and Heller F. [Eds] "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes", John Wiley and Sons 1983.

Crozier M. "The Bureaucratic Phenomenon". University of Chicago Press 1964.

Crozier M. "Comparing Structures and Comparing Games" in "European Contributions to Organization Theory"- G. Hofstede & M. Kassem. Van Gorcum 1976.

Crozier M. and Friedberg E. "Actors and Systems" University of Chicago Press 1980.

Culbert S. and McDonough J. "Radical Management". The Free Press 1985

Cummings T. and Molloy E. "Improving Productivity and Quality of Working Life". Praeger, 1977.

Dahl R. "The Concept of Power". Behavioural Science 1957,

Dahl R. "Who Governs?" Yale University Press 1961.

Dair P. and Kynaston Reeves T. "Why Disclosure Could be a non Event". Personnel Management, January 1979 pp 24-27, 39,

Dalton G. "Men Who Manage". John Wiley, 1959.

Daniel W.W. "Understanding Employee Behaviour in Context", in J. Child (ed) "Man & Organization". Allen & Unwin 1973.

Daniel W.W. "Industrial Behaviour and Orientation to Work - A Critique" Journal Of Management Studies 1969.

Deal T. and Kennedy A. "Corporate Cultures". Pelican 1984.

Dickson J. "Participation as a Means of Organizational Control". Journal of Management Studies 1981.

Dickson J. "Participation as an Interaction, Communication and Influence Process". Personnel Review 1983

Dowling M., Goodman J., Gotting D., Hyman J. "Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981.

Drennan C. "Are You Getting Through". Management Today August Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977.

- Edelman M. "The Symbolic Use of Politics". University of Illinois Press, 1964.
- Edgar D. "My Hero, R. D. Laing". "Independent" Magazine 3/6/89, pg. 62.
- Edwards R. "Contested Terrain" Basic Books 1979.
- Elliot J. "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978
- Emery F. & Thorsrud E. "Form and Content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969.
- Enz C. "The measurement of perceived intraorganizational power". Organization Studies 1989, pp. 241-251
- Esterson A. "The Leaves of Spring" .Pelican 1972.
- Eyerman R. "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell 1981.
- Fatchett D. "Industrial Democracy - the Prospects". Universities of Leeds and Nottingham, 1977,
- Fayol H. "Industrial & General Administration". International Management Institute 1930
- Festinger L. "A theory of Cognitive Dissonance", Stanford University Press 1957.
- Field R. "The Self Fulfilling Prophecy Leader". Journal Of Management Studies 1989, pp. 151-175.
- FitzRoy F. and Kraft K. "Participation and Division of Labour: a West German Case Study". Industrial Relations Journal 1985, pp. 68-74
- Fligstein N. "Intraorganizational Power Structure". American Sociological Review 1987, pp. 44-58.
- Ford J.& Baucus D. A. "Organizational Adaption to Performance Downturns " Academy of Management Review 1987.
- Foster J. and Woolfson C. "The Politics of the UCS Work-in" Lawrence and Wishart 1986.
- Fox A. "Beyond Contract". Faber 1975.
- Fox A. "Man Mismanagement" [2nd Ed'n.] Hutchinson 1985.
- French J. and Raven B. "The Bases of Social Power". In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds) "Group Dynamics".
- Friedenburg E.Z. "Laing". Fontana 1973.
- Frost P. "Representation of Managerial Interest ": in "Managers in Focus" - M. Poole et Al (eds), Gower 1981.

- Gadamer H-G "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection", in Gadamer H-G (Ed.) "Philosophical Hermeneutics". Berkeley 1976.
- Gamson W. "The Strategy of Social Protest". Dorsey Press 1975.
- Gardell B. "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pg. 371D. Hickson, W. Astley, R. Butler and D. Wilson "Organization pg. 298
- Gaventa J. "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press 1980.
- Gergen J. K. "Toward Generative Theory". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1978, pp. 1344-1360.
- Giddens A. "New Rules of Sociological Method". Hutchinson 1976.
- Giddens A. "Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory". Macmillan 1982.
- Glasgow University Media Group "Bad News". RKP 1976.
- Glover I. "Nature of Managerial Work". Unpublished Report, City University, London 1977.
- Goffman E. "Frame Analysis" Harper and Row 1974.
- Golding D. "Establishing Blissful Clarity in Organizational Life". Sociological Review 1980.
- Goldthorpe J. et al. "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour" Cambridge University Press 1968
- Gronn P. "Talk as the Work". Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 1-21.
- Guest D. and Dewe P. "Why Do Workers Belong to Trade Unions". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1988.
- Gundelach P. & Tetzschner H. "Measurement of Influence in Organizations - Critique of the Control Graph method". Acta Sociologica 1976, pp. 49-63.
- Gunz H. and Whitley R. "Managerial Cultures and Industrial Strategies in British Firms". Organization Studies 1985 pp 247-273.
- Gustavsen B. "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479.
- Habermas J. "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970.
- Habermas J. "Toward a Rational Society" - Heinemann 1971.

- Habermas J. "Theory and Practice" - Heinemann, 1974.
- Habermas J. "Legitimation Crisis". Heinemann 1976.
- Habermas J. "Knowledge and Human Interests" Second Edition Heineman 1978.
- Habermas J. "Communication and the Evolution of Society" Heinemann 1979.
- Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (1)", Polity, 1984.
- Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity 1986.
- Habermas J. "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power". In S. Lukes (ed.) "Power" Blackwell 1986.
- Habermas J. "On the Logic of Social Sciences". Polity 1988.
- Halaby C. "Worker Attachment and Workplace Authority", American Sociological Review 1986, pp. 634-649.
- Halaby C. & Weakliem "Worker Control and Attachment to the Firm". American Journal of Sociology 1989, pp. 549-591.
- Handy C. "The Making of Managers" MSC: NEDC: BIM. 1987.
- Hanson C. & Rathkey P. "Industrial Democracy: A Post Bullock Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29
- Harris R. "Power and Powerlessness in Industry". Tavistock Publications 1987.
- Held D. "Introduction to Critical Theory" Hutchinson 1980.
- Hickson D. et Al. "Strategic Contingencies Theory of Organizational Power" Administrative Science Quarterly 1971, pp. 216-229
- Hickson D., Astley W., Butler R. and Wilson D. "Organization as Power". In B. Staw and L. Cummings "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981
- Hill S. "The Dockers", Heinemann 1976.
- Hills F. and Mahoney T. "University Budgets and Organizational Decision-making. Administrative Science Quarterly 1978, pp. 454-465.
- Hinings C. et Al. "Structural Conditions of Intraorganizational Power" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp 22-44.

Hirschmann A. O. "Exit, Voice and Loyalty". Harvard University Press 1970.

Holmes R. "Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable". Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.

Howarth-Williams M. "R. D. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for Sociology." RKP 1977.

Hunter F. "Community Power Structure" University of North Carolina Press 1953.

Husserl E. "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology". Northwestern University Press 1970.

E. Husserl "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology". Northwestern University Press 1970.

Hussey R. "Who Reads Employee Reports" Touche Ross 1979.

Hussey R. and Marsh A. "Disclosure of Information & Employee Reporting". Gower 1983

Hutt C. "Reporting of Industrial Relations on Breakfast Time TV". Industrial Relations Journal 1987.

Hyman J., Ramsay H., Leopold J., Baddon L. & Hunter L. "The Impact of Employee Share Ownership". Employee Relations 1989, pp. 9-16.

Hyman R. "Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction". MacMillan 1975.

IDE International Research Group "Industrial Democracy in Europe: Differences and Similarities Across Countries and Hierarchies" Organization Studies, 1981

G. Ingham "Size of Industrial Organization and Worker Behaviour". Cambridge University Press 1970.

ILO "Workers Participation in Decisions within Undertakings". ILO 1981.

Jackson-Cox J., McQueeney J., Thirkell J. "Strategies, Issues Decision-Making". Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977,

Jackson-Cox J., Thirkell J., McQueeney J. "The Disclosure of Accounting, Organizations and Society". 1981

Jain H.C. [Ed] "Worker Participation: Success and Problems". Praeger 1980.

Jaques E. "Equitable Payment". Penguin 1967.

- Jaques E. "In defence of Hierarchy". Harvard Business Review 1990, pp. 127-133.
- Jones D. "Disclosure of Financial Information to Employees" IPM 1978.
- K. Thompson "Organizations as Constructors of Reality (1)", in "Control & Ideology in Organizations" - G. Salaman & K. Thompson (Eds.) Open University Press 1980, pg 232.
- Kenny G. and Palmer I. "Individual Power Bases in Organizations" Management Forum 1980
- Kenny G. and Wilson D. "Interdepartmental Influence of Managers" Journal of Management Studies 1984:
- Kerr C. et Al. " Industrialism and Industrial Man ". Penguin 1973.
- Kiloh M. "Industrial Democracy". in D. Held and C. Pollitt "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1986
- King A. "A Voluntarist Model of Organization". British Journal of Sociology 1977, pp. 363-374
- Kipnis D., Schmidt S., and Wilkinson I. "Interorganizational Influence Tactics" Journal of Applied Psychology 1980 pp. 440-452.
- Kirkbride P. "Personnel Management and Organizational Culture: A Case of Deviant Innovation?" Personnel Review 1987 pp. 3-9.
- Kirkbride P. "Legitimising Arguments and Worker Resistance". Employee Relations 1988, pp. 28-31.
- Knights D. and Roberts J. "The Power of Organization and the Organization of Power". Organization Studies 1982, pp. 47-63
- Knights D. and Wilmott H. "Power and identity in theory and practice". Sociological Review 1985.
- Knights D. and Wilmott H. "Power and Subjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989.
- Kraeplin E. "Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry." Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1905.
- Kuhn J. W. "Bargaining in Grievance Settlement". Columbia University Press, 1961.
- Lachman R. "Power from What?" Administrative Science Quarterly 1989.
- Laing R. D. "The Divided Self". Tavistock Publications, 1960.

Laing R.D. "Self and Others". Pelican 1966.

Laing R.D. and Esterson A. "Sanity, Madness and the Family". Tavistock 1964.

Laing R.D., Phillipson H. and Lee A. R. "Interpersonal Perception" Tavistock Publications 1966.

Lammers C., Meurs P., Mijs T. "Direct and Indirect Participation in Dutch Firms and Hospitals". Organization Studies 1987, pp. 25-38

Lane T. "Economic Democracy: Are the Unions Equipped?". Industrial Relations Journal 1986, pp.321-328.

Langer E. "Illusion of Control". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology", 1975, pp. 311-328.

Lawrence P. " Management In Action ". R.K.P. 1984.

Lawrence P. & Lorsch J. - "Organization and Environment", Harvard University Press, 1967.

Leblebici H. and Salancik G. "The Rules of Organizing and the Organizational Role". Organization Studies 1989, pp. 301-325

Leggatt T. " Managers in Industry " Sociological Review 1978.

Leymann H. "The Significance of the Learning Process underlying Democratic Participation" Economic & Industrial Democracy 1987, pp. 111-130.

Lockwood D. "Sources of Variation in Working -Class Images of Society". In Working Class Images of Society, M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.

Loveridge R. "What is Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations" 1980.

Lowe E.A. and Shaw R.W "An analysis of Managerial Biasing". Journal of Management Studies 1968.

Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974.

Lund R. "Power and Indirect Participation" Organization Studies 1976

Lyall D. "Opening the Books to the Workers". Accountancy 1975,

Maddison D. , Allen R., Porter L. ,Renwick P. and Hayes B., "Organizational Politics: An Exploration of Managers' Perceptions". Human Relations 1980, pp. 77-83.

Mann M. "Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class". MacMillan 1973.

Mansfield R. "Who are the Managers " In " Managerial Roles and Industrial Relations " - edited by M. Poole and R. Mansfield. Gower 1980.

Marchington M. "Responses to Participation at Work". Gower 1980.

Marchington M. & Armstrong P. "The Nature of the new Joint Consultation". Industrial Relations Journal 1986, pp. 158-170.

Marsden D. "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29

Marshall J. and Stewart R. " Managers Job Perceptions: Parts 1 and 2 ". Journal of Management Studies 1981.

Martin R. & Fryer R. "Redundancy and Paternalist Capitalism".

Maslow A. "Motivation and Personality", Harper and Row 1954.

Mayo E. "Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation" MacMillan 1933.

McCarthy T. "Translators Introduction to J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1". Polity 1984.

McCarthy T. "A theory of Communicative Competence" Philosophy of Social Science 1973..

McCarthy T. "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" 3rd Edition, Polity 1984.

McCarthy W. & Ellis N. "Management by Agreement", Hutchinson 1973.

McDonald D. "The Role of Management in Industrial Relations". Journal of Management Studies 1985 pp. 523-544.

McGregor D. "The Human Side of Enterprise", McGraw Hill 1960

McHugh P. "Defining the Situation". Bobbs-Merrill 1968.

McInnes J. "Conjuring up Participation". British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1985.

McLean I. "Mechanisms for Democracy". In D. Held & C. Pollit "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1989, pp. 135-157.

McNulty E. "A Question of Managerial Legitimacy" Academy of Management Journal September 1975 pp. 579-588.

McShane H. "No Mean Fighter". Pluto Press 1978.

- McTiernan M. "Workers' Alternative Plans" University of Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations 1986.
- Melrose - Woodman J. " Profile of British Managers " - BIM 1974.
- Merelman R.M. "Domination, Justification and Self-Doubt". Journal of Politics 1986, Vol. 48, pp.276-300.
- Miller K. "Plessey v Wilson". Industrial Law Journal 1982, pp. 115-117.
- Mintzberg H. " Nature of Managerial Work". Harper & Row 1972.
- Mintzberg H. "Strategy Making in Three Modes" California Management Review 1973, pp 44-53.
- Mintzberg H. "Patterns of Strategy Formation". Management Science 1978 pp 934-938.
- Mintzberg H. "The Structuring of Organizations". Prentice Hall 1979.
- Mintzberg H. "Power in and Around Organizations". Prentice Hall 1983.
- Mintzberg H. "The Organization as a Political Arena" Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 134-154.
- Misgeld D. "Hermeneutics versus Neoparsonianism". Theory and Society 1985.
- Morgan G. " Images of Organization " Sage 1986.
- Murphy R. "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988.
- Nichols T. "The British Worker Question", RKP 1986.
- Nichols T. and P. Armstrong "Workers Divided", Fontana 1976.
- Nichols T. and Beynon H. "Living with Capitalism". RKP, 1977.
- Nie N. et al. "Statistical Package for the Social Sciences". McGraw Hill 1975.
- Offe C. "Industry & Inequality", Arnold 1978.
- Ouchi W. - "Type Z Organization: Stability in the Midst of Mobility". Academy of Management Review 1978, pp. 305-314.
- Parker S. "The Future of Work and Leisure", Paladin 1971:
- Parker S., Brown R. Child J., Smith M. "The Sociology of Industry", Allen & Unwin 1977

Parkin F. "Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972:

Parkin F. "Marxism and Class Closure". Tavistock 1979

Parsons T. "Sociological Theory and Modern Society" Free Press 1967.

Patchen M. "The Locus and Basis of Influence on Organizational Decisions". Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance 1974, pp. 195-221.

Pettigrew A. "Politics of Organizational Decision-Making" Tavistock 1973

Pettigrew A. "Information Control as a Power Resource" Sociology 1972, pp. 187-204.

Pettigrew A. "On Studying Organizational Cultures". Administrative Science Quarterly 1979

Pfeffer J. "Management As Symbolic Action" in "Organizational Behavior" Vol 3 1981, edited by Larry Cummings and Barry Staw.

Pfeffer J. "Power in Organizations" Pitman 1981.

Pfeffer J. "Management as Symbolic Action" in L. Cummings and B. Staw- "Research in Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pp. 1-52.

Pfeffer J. and Moore W. "Power in University Budgeting" Administrative Science Quarterly 1980, pp. 637-653.

Pfeffer J. and Salancik G. "Organizational Decision-making as a Political Process" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 135-151.

Pfeffer J. & Salancik G. "External Control of Organizations. Harper and Row 1978.

Polsby N. "Community Power and Political Theory" Yale University Press.

Poole M. "Managers, Industrial Democracy & Control", in M. Poole & R. Mansfield "Managerial Roles in Industrial Relations", Gower 1980,

Poole M. & Jenkins G. "How Employees Respond to Profit Sharing". Personnel Management. July 1988.

Poole M. et Al. "Why Managers Join Unions": Industrial Relations 1983.

Prior J. Granada Guildhall Lectures "The Role of the Trade Unions". Granada 1980.

Purcell J. "A strategy for management control in industrial relations". In J. Purcell and R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work". Macmillan 1979.

Purcell J. "A Strategy for Management Control". In J. Purcell & R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work" MacMillan 1979.

Purdy D. "The Provision of Financial Information to Employees", Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1981

Pusey M. "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987.

Quinn J. "Strategic Change: Logical Incrementalism" Sloan Management Review 1978, pp 7-21.

Quinn J. "Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism". Irwin 1980.

Ramsay H. "Cycles of Control". Sociology 1977.

Ramsay H. , "Phantom participation: Patterns of Power and Conflict" Industrial Relations Journal 1980.

Ranson S. et Al. "The Structuring of Organizational Structures" Administrative Science Quarterly 1980.

Reid J. "Reflections of a Clyde-built Man". Souvenir Press 1976.

Richardson P. "Courting Greater Employee Involvement Through Participative Management". Sloan Management Review 1985, pp. 33-44.

Richardson R. & Nejad A. "Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the UK - an Evaluation". British Journal of Industrial Relations 1986.

Robinson J. "Economic Management - China 1972" Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute 1973.

Roderick R. "Habermas and Critical Theory" MacMillan 1986.

Rodman H. "The Lower Class Value Stretch", Social Forces 1963.

Roethlisberger F. and Dickson W. "Management and the Worker" Harvard University Press 1939.

Rogers M. "Goffman on Power". The American Sociologist 1977, pp. 88-89.

Rothschild-Whitt J. "Worker Ownership in Relation to Control" in C. Crouch and F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John Wiley 1983.

Rubenowitz S. , Norrgren F. , Tannenbaum A. "Some Social Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pp. 243-259.

Rueschemeyer D. "Power and the Division of Labour". Polity Press 1986.

Runciman W. G. "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice" Pelican 1967.

Rus V. "Limited Effects of Workers' Participation and Political Counter-Power" In T. R. Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power". Sage 1979.

Rus V. "Positive and Negative Power". Organization Studies, 1980, pp. 3-19.

Salaman G. "Towards a Sociology of Organizational Structure". The Sociological Review 1978

Salancik G. and Conway M. "Attitude Inferences from Salient and Relevant Cognitive Content about Behaviour" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1975 pp. 829-840.

Salancik G. and Pfeffer J. "The bases and use of power in organizational decision-making" Administrative Science Quarterly 1974, pp. 453-473.

Salancik G. and Pfeffer J. "Who gets power and how they hold on to it". Organizational Dynamics 1977, pp. 3-21.

Schattschneider E. "the Semi-Sovereign People" Holt Rinehart and Winston 1960.

Schuler R.S. "Personnel and Human Resource Management ". West 1981.

Schutz A. "Phenomenology and Social Relations". University of Chicago Press 1970.

Schutz A. "Collected Papers. Vol.1" Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Schutz A. "Collected Papers. Vol. 2." Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

Schutz A. "The Phenomenology of the Social World". Heinemann 1972.

Schutz A. and Luckmann T. "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974.

Scruton P. & South N. "The Ideological Construction of the Hidden Economy". Contemporary Crisis, 1984, pp. 1-18.

SDP "Democracy at Work", 1985.

- Sedgwick P. "Self, Symptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974.
- Semler R. "Managing without Managers". Harvard Business Review September-October 1989.
- Sherif M. & Sherif C "Attitude as the Individual's own Categories". In Warren N. & Jahoda M. "Attitudes" (2nd Ed'n.). Penguin 1973, pp. 395-422.
- Sofer C. "Men in Mid Career" Cambridge University Press 1970.
- Spender J-C "Industry Recipes", Blackwell 1989.
- Spybey A. "Frames of Meaning for Managers" Sociology 1984.
- Staw B. "Attitudinal and Behavioural Consequences of Changing a Major Organizational Reward", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, pp. 742-751.
- Stodgill R. M. "Handbook of Leadership", Free Press 1974.
- Stone C. "Pre-emptive Power". American Journal of Political Science 1988, pp. 82-104.
- Stoner J. and Freeman E. "Management [4th Ed] Prentice Hall 1989.
- Storey J. "Workplace Collective Bargaining and Managerial Prerogatives". Industrial Relations Journal 1976-1977, pp. 40-55.
- Storey J. "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980
- Storey J. "Management Control as a Bridging Concept", Journal of Management Studies 1985,
- Tannenbaum A. "Control in Organizations" McGraw Hill 1968.
- Tannenbaum A. "Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974.
- Tannenbaum A. and Rozgonyi T. "Authority and Reward in Organizations". Survey Research Centre, 1986. pg. 243.
- Teulings A. "A Political Bargaining Theory of Co-Determination". Organization Studies 1987, pp. 1-24
- Thomas J.J.R. "Ideology and Elective Affinity". Sociology 1985.
- Thompson J. "Critical Hermeneutics" Cambridge University Press 1981.

Thompson J. "Rationality and Social Rationalization: an Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action. Sociology May 1983. pp. 278-294.

Thompson J. B. "Mass Communication and Modern Culture". Sociology 1988.

Thompson J.B. "Rationality and Social Rationalization: An Assessment of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action". Sociology 1984.

Thompson J.D. & Tuden A. "Strategies, Structures and Processes of Organizational Decisions" in J. D. Thompson et al. "Comparative Studies in Administration". University of Pittsburgh Press" 1959.

Thompson P. "The Nature of Work". MacMillan 1983.

Thurley K. and Wiridenius H. "Towards European Management". Pitman 1989.

Torrington D. and Chapman J. "Personnel Management": Prentice Hall 1979.

Towers B., Cox D., & Chell E. "Worker Directors in Private Manufacturing Industry in Great Britain. " Department of Employment Research Paper No. 29,

TUC "Industrial Democracy". 1974

Ursell G. "The View of British Managers and Shop Stewards on industrial democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and Sons 1983

Ursell G. Review of "Making Mondragon" , Organization Studies 1989, pp. 594-597.

Vout M. "The Schooling of Management in Britain". Paper presented to British Academy of Management, 1989

Wall T. & Lischeron J. "Worker Participation" McGraw Hill 1977.

Walker K. F. "Toward the Participatory Enterprise: a European Trend". Annals of the American Academy 1977.

Walsh K., Hinings B., Greenwood R., and Ranson S. "Power and Advantage in Organizations". Organization Studies 1981.

Watson T. "Sociology, Work & Industry", RKP 1980.

Weber M. "Economy & Society" (Ed G. Roth & C. Wittich). Berkeley 1978.

Weber M. "Economy & Society" Bedminster Press, 1968,

- Wedderburn D. & Craig C. "Relative Deprivation in Work" in D. Wedderburn (ed) "Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure". Cambridge University Press 1974:
- Wedderburn W. "The Worker and the Law". 3rd. Edition 1986.
- Weekes B. et al. "The Limits of the Law". Blackwell 1976.
- Weick K. "The Social Psychology of Organizing" Addison-Wesley 1969.
- Weick K. "Cognitive Processes in Organizations", in Barry Staw (ed.) "Research in Organizational Behaviour Vol.1" JAI Press 1979
- Weiermair K. "Worker Incentives and Worker Participation". Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 547-570.
- Weir D. "Radical Managerialism" : British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1976 pp 374-388.
- White J. K. "The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas". Cambridge Uni. Press 1988
- Whyte W.F. "Money and Motivation" Harper 1955.
- Whyte W.F. & Whyte K. "Making Mondragon" ILR Press 1988
- Wilders M and Heller F. "Company Information to Employees". In A. Marsh and F. Heller (eds) "Employees, Trade Unions and Company Information, Research and Practice" Touche Ross 1981
- Wilensky H. "Organizational Intelligence" Basic Books 1967.
- Wiles P. "Learning to Labour". Gower 1977.
- Williamson O. "Transaction Cost Economics". Journal of Law and Economics 1979, pg. 233-261.
- Williamson O. "The Organization of Work", Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 1980, pp. 5-17.
- Wilson D. and Kenny G. "Managerially Perceived Influence Over Intradepartmental Decisions". Journal of Management Studies 1985 pp 155-174.
- Wittgenstein L. "Philosophical Investigations". Basil Blackwell 1968.
- Wolfinger S. "Non Decisions and the Study of Local Politics". American Political Science Review 1971. pp. 1063-1080.
- Wrong D. "Oversocialised Conception of Man in Modern Sociology" American Sociological Review 1961, pp. 183-193.

Zucker L. "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence". American Sociological Review 1977, pp. 726-743.

Appendix 3

i) Perceived Communication.

Table A3.1

How well informed does the company keep you about Safety matters?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	14 (44%)	19 (27%)	0	10 (21%)	4 (24%)
Quite Well	18 (56%)	40 (56%)	2 (29%)	18 (38%)	10 (59%)
Quite Badly	0	8 (11%)	3 (43%)	11 (23%)	2 (12%)
Very Badly	0	4 (6%)	2 (29%)	9 (19%)	1 (6%)

From this table it can be easily seen that while Management and Staff have clear majorities who are at least "quite well informed" (100% and 83% respectively) the majority for Hourly-Paid is much less, being only 59% who felt at least "quite well informed".

This data was collected in 1977, only 2 years after "the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974)" began to come into effect, so it could be argued that the Firm have not yet had time to organise properly in this respect - though with the appointment of 2 Safety Managers and the creation of a Safety Committee which (certainly) meets weekly and is (or so we are told by those members of it) extremely vigorous, it may appear to be doing so. There is, however, a major reservation in our minds as to the relative importance of Safety in the Firm since

(A) it is clear to anyone that safety legislation is being blatantly ignored by, for instance, Hourly-Paid failure to wear eye protection.

At the same time the eye protection is extremely uncomfortable to wear, since after a brief period of even mild exertion they steam up. The Firm, however, has made no attempt to introduce an alternative, to our knowledge.

(B) As we mentioned in Chapter 3 the product is extremely heavy (approximately at least 80 tons), but the Firm has developed the unfortunate habit of dropping them - once during our field work, and once, we believe, since then. The first occasion was put down to a defective sling, but it eventually transpired that the crane used was

inadequate for the weight. That it took an accident in which that no one was killed was due only to chance, does in our view, indicate, that while Safety may be important it is not important enough.

Given the awareness of this which exists on the Shop-floor, the grudging acceptance by the Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards becomes rather less surprising than it may otherwise have been. This attitude may be reinforced by a dominant Management view (particularly amongst those directly involved with production) that "everyone is their own Safety Manager" - in other words everyone ought to look after themselves, which was the very attitude of mind which the 'Health and Safety at Work Act' was supposed to replace. It has much greater emphasis on the role of the employer, as well as the employee, in maintaining safety in the place of work.

We should not like to give the impression, however, of a factory which was a death-trap - rather that the relative emphasis on different activities varied throughout the Firm, something which was not always to its benefit. Given the legislation which we have referred to we should perhaps expect employees to be confident of the information they receive on Safety. This, however, is not so, as in the 'Hourly-Paid', 'Shop Steward' and 'Staff Union Rep.' categories, 33%, 41% and 42% either do not receive any information on Safety (which is in fact illegal!) or do not place a lot of trust in it.

Table A3.2

How far do you trust the information you receive on Safety?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	15 (47%)	30 (42%)	0	13 (27%)	2 (12%)
Quite a Lot	17 (53%)	37 (52%)	4 (57%)	19 (40%)	8 (47%)
Not a Lot	0	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	10 (21%)	5 (29%)
Not at All	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	1 (6%)
No Information Received	0	0	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	1 (6%)

On this item of information therefore while the majority of employees do express satisfaction with what they receive from the Firm, there are a number who do not. This number is sufficiently large to show that the Firm is doing this on the theory perhaps it ought to.

(2) Information on the availability of Overtime. This item with the next 3 items we shall discuss - Pay, Recruitment and Redundancy - are items which unions, by virtue of the development of collective bargaining are able to exercise a good deal of influence, either directly, or indirectly.

Information on overtime has different relevance for the Manager and for the employee. In the case of the employee he wishes to know how much overtime he can expect in a week as soon as possible, in order that he can prepare for it (e.g. make the appropriate domestic arrangements).

In the case of the Manager he wishes this information to maintain his relationship with his own subordinates, as well as to be able to make appropriate arrangements for the work to be done. At the same time the trade unions in the Firm exercised influence in this respect by trying to ensure the 'normal' amount of overtime for the purpose of

maintaining their members' pay. The part played by the Unions in this respect should be kept in mind in considering this data.

Table A3.3

How well informed does the Company keep you about Overtime available?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	9 (28%)	15 (21%)	1 (14%)	21 (44%)	6 (35%)
Quite Well	7 (22%)	16 (23%)	3 (43%)	18 (38%)	7 (41%)
Quite Badly	0	6 (9%)	0	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	6 (9%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	2 (12%)
Not Relevant	15 (47%)	28 (39%)	2 (29%)	0	0

The least satisfied category on this item were the Shop Stewards, who if a problem arose on overtime, had to sort it out with the Foreman .

shop Stewards felt they should be more closely involved e.g. to ensure it was shared out fairly and that no one was discriminated against. Other than that no category reported more than 18% (Staff and Hourly-Paid) were badly informed to some degree or another. This is much lower than was true for the figures on Safety. Much the same holds true on how much the information is trusted.

Table A3, 4

How far do you trust the information on Overtime which you receive?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	13 (41%)	22 (31%)	3 (43%)	19 (40%)	7 (41%)
Quite a Lot	3 (9%)	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	20 (41%)	7 (41%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	5 (7%)	0	7 (15%)	2 (12%)
Not at All	0	2 (3%)	0	1 (2%)	0
No Info. Received	0	1 (1%)	0	1 (2%)	1 (6%)
Not Relevant	15 (47%)	28 (39%)	2 (29%)	0	0

Once again we find that those expressing sentiments among the Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards have been halved on the levels which we found held true of information on Safety.

(3) Information on Redundancy. This was rather a difficult item as there was no respondent who had been made redundant by the Firm in the past, or who had been with the Firm when there had been a redundancy, or could even remember there having been one, though there has been one since we finished our research work. To resolve this problem we employed events of the previous year when there had been rumours and warnings of redundancy if business did not improve. Fortunately business did improve and the threats were never carried out. Respondents, therefore, employed the Firm's behaviour at this time. In general, it can be seen from what follows, that it behaved fairly well in this respect.

Table A 3.5

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Redundancy?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	21 (66%)	22 (31%)	3 (43%)	11 (23%)	6 (35%)
Quite Well	8 (25%)	25 (35%)	2 (29%)	24 (50%)	7 (41%)
Quite Badly	2 (6%)	16 (23%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	2 (12%)
Very Badly	0	5 (7%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	2 (12%)

There are, however, still quite substantial minorities who say they are, to some extent, badly informed about Redundancy - Staff, 30%; Union Reps. 28%; Hourly-Paid, 25%; Shop Stewards, 24%. Thus even though the majority of each category say they are well informed, there are minorities of sufficient size as not to be unimportant amongst the non-Management categories.

Similarly when respondents are asked how far they trust this information, sizable, dissatisfied minorities appear.

Table A 3.6

How far do you trust the information you receive on Redundancy?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	24 (75%)	29 (41%)	3 (43%)	16 (33%)	8 (47%)
Quite a Lot	6 (19%)	21 (30%)	3 (43%)	15 (32%)	3 (18%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	8 (11%)	1 (14%)	6 (13%)	1 (6%)
Not at All	0	7 (10%)	0	5 (10%)	4 (24%)
No Info. Received	0	3 (4%)	0	5 (10%)	1 (6%)

From this table, it can be seen that among Staff 25% either receive no information, or did not place a lot of trust in what they did get. Among Hourly-Paid that figure was 33% and among Shop Stewards 36%. Even though this data is based on events which did not actually produce a Redundancy there are still figures indicating a system which is not perceived as being as efficient as it might be at communicating information on Redundancy to its employees. In spite of the fact nothing came of these events, the regulations on notification of impending redundancy in the 1975 Employment Protection Act, make this data of some concern.

These figures are more similar to those on Safety, rather than Pay or Overtime, and, therefore, given the influence which trade unions try to bring to bear to prevent redundancy in other Firms, this may be something of a surprise. On the other hand, the local union organisation in the Firm regularly deals with Pay and/or Overtime problems and is, therefore, practiced in these activities. In respect of Safety, however, the legislation is perhaps too recent for as much expertise as is desirable to be developed. Similarly for Redundancy - given the recent legislation (1975), and in particular the infrequency of Redundancy in our Firm, this particular local union organisation may lack expertise, relative to its expertise on Pay and Overtime problems.

(4) Information on Recruitment. The final item of information we suggested to be heavily influenced by the Union Organisation was Recruitment in so far as there is a Closed Shop among Hourly-Paid, and in certain parts of Staff close to the Shop-Floor e.g. in Production Control union membership is mandatory, but not in Finance. The data for this is very similar to Redundancy, as the following table shows.

Table A 3.7

How well informed does the Company keep you about Recruitment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	21 (66%)	20 (28%)	3 (43%)	7 (15%)	4 (24%)
Quite Well	8 (25%)	24 (34%)	1 (14%)	20 (42%)	9 (53%)
Quite Badly	3 (9%)	17 (24%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	4 (24%)
Very Badly	0	9 (13%)	2 (29%)	12 (25%)	0

Once again Management are much better informed than their subordinates - 37% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps., 44% of Hourly-Paid and 24% of Shop Stewards say that, to some extent, they are badly informed by the Firm on Recruitment. This inability has its origin in failure to inform subordinates about newly recruited employees starting and then just turning up. Where there is a post-entry closed shop (as in this Firm) this can be extremely volatile if the new recruit is not already a member of the appropriate union, or does not have a fully paid up card. The A.U.E.W. Convenor expressed annoyance quite frequently that employees unsuitable in this respect were recruited, putting the blame squarely on to Management for either (a) not ensuring the recruit was a member or eligible to be a member and/or (b) not telling him to bring his union card when he started. Both are clearly necessary to work in a closed shop.

The figures do not change very much when we consider the trust placed in the information received on Recruitment.

Table A3.8

How far do you trust the information you receive on Recruitment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	22 (69%)	28 (39%)	1 (14%)	17 (35%)	6 (35%)
Quite a Lot	9 (29%)	24 (34%)	3 (43%)	16 (33%)	8 (47%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	6 (9%)	1 (14%)	7 (15%)	0
Not at All	0	4 (6%)	0	4 (8%)	1 (6%)
No Info. Received	0	8 (11%)	2 (29%)	4 (8%)	2 (12%)

From this data it can be seen that 26% of Staff, 43% of the Union Reps., 31% of Hourly-Paid, and 18% of Shop Stewards say they receive no information, or do not have a lot of trust in what they do receive. Thus even though, given trade union interest in these matters, we may expect an adequate level of information we do not find this to be the case, and instead find minorities who are badly informed by the Firm. Even though the majority are well informed, these minorities are too large to be ignored, and in our view are the first indications of a system of communication not geared to either the needs or the expectations of the employees of the Firm. This shall become clearer as we consider other items of information.

(5) Information on Work Expected by the Company. This item was concerned with how efficiently the Firm instructed its employees and monitored their progress, and correspondingly warned them of any inadequacy they may show in their work (e.g. failure to work to the correct tolerance, failure to do what is expected in one's particular function etc.). In general, the Firm appears to fulfill this function rather well, but 20% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps. and 24% of Shop

Stewards say they are not well informed on this matter, as the following table shows.

Table A3.9

How well informed does the Company keep you about the Work Expected of You?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	10 (31%)	17 (24%)	2 (29%)	11 (23%)	4 (24%)
Quite Well	17 (53%)	38 (54%)	2 (29%)	31 (65%)	8 (47%)
Quite Badly	5 (16%)	8 (11%)	2 (29%)	5 (10%)	4 (24%)
Very Badly	0	6 (9%)	1 (14%)	1 (2%)	0

The problem which may arise as a result of this inadequacy is that employees may feel unfairly disciplined and/or even dismissed, because they have not been told their performance was not adequate. If, for instance, this went as far as an Industrial Tribunal, such failure on the part of the Firm may mean that the dismissal would be set aside as unfair.

The work a Firm expects of its employees may be an area of almost constant conflict, with the Firm demanding more of the employees than the employee feels he can reasonably be expected to do. For this reason when the Firm does supply this information the question of its acceptability, and the amount of trust placed in it, becomes very important. The following table sets out the data from this question.

Table A3.10

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	18 (56%)	24 (34%)	0	16 (33%)	4 (24%)
Quite a Lot	12 (38%)	26 (37%)	4 (57%)	27 (56%)	5 (29%)
Not a Lot	2 (6%)	12 (17%)	3 (43%)	4 (8%)	5 (29%)
Not at All	0	2 (3%)	0	1 (2%)	1 (6%)
No Info. Received	0	5 (7%)	0	0	1 (6%)

This information does seem to be acceptable to Management and to the Hourly-Paid - though marginally less so in the latter. Among the Staff, however, 27% either do not receive the information, or put little trust in it. Among Staff Union Reps. 43% say do not have a lot of trust in this information, while 41% of Shop Stewards say they either do not receive the information, or do not have a lot of trust in it. Given the potential for conflict in this area we should perhaps be less surprised at the results for the union officials who shall have wider experience of Management behaviour in this area, and may be naturally more distrustful than those whom they represent. The higher figure for the Staff may correspond to the less routinised tasks which they perform, in contrast to those of, say, the Hourly-Paid. At the same time, however, the Management too do not perform routinised tasks, and have at least as much freedom of action as the Staff. Yet they do not report the problems we found among the Staff. This, initially demonstrates a problem we shall return to subsequently - the bias towards keeping the higher levels of the hierarchy informed. This, we shall argue, is symptomatic of many of the Firm's employees' problems.

(6) Information received on Orders. To keep employees informed of the order situation of the Firm (the orders it has won, is trying to win, and how the efficiency of the Firm is affecting this) is supposed to be good company practice i.e. keeping the interest of the employees in the Firm. Amongst the employees there is a perceived need to be kept informed, largely as a result of 2 associated motivations.

(A) As an expression of their employment by the Firm i.e. they are the employees of the Firm, which, they feel, gives them a right to be informed about its progress.

(B) For the purposes of personal security, since if the Firm wins a large order/large number of orders, then that means security of employment for them.

This can be seen in Excerpt A3.i

Thus we have work-force interested in being kept informed about this item of information, but the final question in the quote did relate to something which actually happened, in front of our own eyes, early on in our field work. A large order had been won from abroad - yet the first the Staff and Hourly-Paid knew about this was in their evening paper or on T.V. news that night. The Firm, via their P.R. consultants, had informed the media before their employees. This sort of event leaves an impression on employees which cannot benefit their attachment to the Firm.

At the same time the Firm is in the market in which there is a good deal of uncertainty, as negotiations to win an order can be long and arduous, and can only be certain when the customer has actually signed the contract. In such a situation rumours of the type discussed above, can easily begin. We shall consider such problems later in this chapter.

Given these problems we should perhaps be surprised that, with a few exceptions, the Firm appears to keep its employees fairly well informed, though once again Management do appear to be better informed than the other categories.

Table A 3.11

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Orders?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	24 (75%)	33 (47%)	2 (29%)	18 (38%)	2 (12%)
Quite Well	5 (16%)	31 (44%)	4 (57%)	25 (52%)	12 (71%)
Quite Badly	3 (9%)	6 (9%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	3 (18%)
Very Badly	0	1 (1%)	0	3 (6%)	0

Amongst the Management the dominant response is that they are kept "very well" informed - this also holds true for Staff, though only just, and to a much lesser extent than Management. In the other 3 categories it is the next response - "quite well" informed - which is dominant, especially among the Union Reps. and the Shop Stewards. In general there does, therefore, seem to be a measure of satisfaction with the Firm in this respect, though satisfaction is clearly not equally distributed. This is, in part, due to the fact that the Firm may negotiate over an extended period for a particular order, and during this period rumours circulate around the Firm - "we've got it", "no we haven't", etc. - and given their position in the Firm Management are kept more up to date either formally or otherwise, about the order situation as time goes on. This is not, however, true for their subordinates who rely on rumour (which varies with each telling) and the announcement of an order which has actually been won. The view of the Management concerning this problem is that very often secrecy is absolutely vital for commercial reasons, but the view expressed by the work-force - occasionally forcibly - was that they were at least as trustworthy as the Board (using Sir Hugh Fraser's trial, then in progress, as an instance). The problem faced by employees is that while in general (not always!) Management inform them promptly whenever an order is actually won, in the intervening periods there is uncertainty as to

whether or not the Firm is winning sufficient orders to maintain employment. This is so even though the Firm has not had an enforced redundancy in 10 years. On the other hand whenever production begins to go through for stock (A.O.'s - Advance Orders) rather than for order, the warning signs, in their view, are there.

The problem of the Management, therefore, is to maintain commercial secrecy, but the problem of their Staff and Hourly-Paid is to obtain sufficient information to monitor their security. These two problems, it may seem, are not easily simultaneously resolved, but we shall return to this when we discuss communication within the Firm, in general.

The data on how far the information was trusted is presented below.

Table A3.12

How far do you trust the information you receive from the Company on its order situation?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	23 (72%)	44 (62%)	3 (43%)	19 (40%)	7 (41%)
Quite a Lot	8 (25%)	21 (30%)	3 (43%)	24 (50%)	7 (41%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	4 (6%)	1 (14%)	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Not at All	0	2 (3%)	0	0	0
No Info. Received	0	0	0	0	1 (6%)

While this information does appear to be trusted, it is apparent, once again, that the highest levels of trust are expressed by the Management. The difference in level of satisfaction is, however, less pronounced than in the previous table. This distinction may be due to the

occasional 'accident' when employees are only informed about an order, on T.V. or in a newspaper, and not by the Firm. In certain cases the view was put forward that when the Firm did volunteer information on the order situation in general, and not just that another order had been won, it was only when times were bad, and that this type of information was purely manipulative on the part of the Management. At the more basic level, when the Firm won an order it was more difficult to be manipulative as all departments ultimately knew how much of current production was for stock, and how much of it was for orders. If the Management did not announce an order it would quickly be known from the order numbers going through production that something was being held back - or else the 'grape-vine' would become that much more strident. In respect of information on orders being sought Management were much less forthcoming, except when times were bad, as we have said. Hence the information which was usually received could be fairly easily checked up on. The regular information, however, was not and the justification of this (and in other areas) and reactions by the employees, shall be discussed below.

(7) Promotion.

Amongst the Hourly-Paid there is a less well developed sense of career than was true for the Staff and Management. The latter in particular have positive expectations of career opportunity. We will also show that the system of promotion was not regarded as altogether fair. A fairly typical response was that promotions "just sort of appeared" and that it was "who you knew, not what you knew" that counted. Furthermore, it was felt that if you did a job particularly well you would never be promoted, because the Firm did not want to take you from that job. The

former responses are particularly important concerning information on Promotions. This would take the form of internal advertising of vacancies, but the complaints that (1) the person was already selected, or (2) that the notice was too late in being put up or not on all notice-boards, were heard. This is reflected in the following table.

Table A3.13

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Promotion?

	<u>Managment</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	8 (25%)	19 (27%)	1 (14%)	16 (33%)	3 (18%)
Quite Well	8 (25%)	19 (27%)	2 (29%)	17 (35%)	10 (59%)
Quite Badly	11 (34%)	19 (27%)	2 (29%)	6 (13%)	2 (12%)
Very Badly	3 (9%)	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	7 (15%)	2 (12%)

Amongst Management and Staff who are more 'career oriented' we find 43% of Management, 45% of Staff and 58% of Union Reps. to be, to some extent, badly informed about this item, whilst even among those categories who are less career oriented - Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards - 28% and 24% respectively are likewise badly informed. (see Chapter VI)

In respect of trusting this information the data is, for the Firm, rather better.

Table A 3.14

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	16 (50%)	26 (37%)	1 (14%)	17 (35%)	5 (29%)
Quite a Lot	9 (28%)	17 (24%)	2 (29%)	18 (38%)	8 (47%)
Not a Lot	4 (13%)	12 (17%)	2 (29%)	4 (8%)	3 (18%)
Not at All	1 (3%)	2 (3%)	0	5 (10%)	0
No Info. Received	0	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	2 (4%)	1 (6%)

Among the Management this table, taken with the previous table, shows that if the information is received it is trustworthy, and that the problem is not that the information is inaccurate, but that it is not communicated efficiently. This tendency is less pronounced within the other categories. Amongst Staff 38% either do not place much trust in the information or do not receive any. Amongst their Union Reps. this figure is 58%. It is 22% for Hourly-Paid and 24% for the Shop Stewards. Hence there are those whom, as we suggested, regard the system of promotion as rather less than it ought to be. Excerpt 4.3 illustrates one facet of this criticism.

This informant clearly regards his chances of promotion as very remote, not because of his lack of competence - but indeed for the reverse - because he is too good at what he does already, and, in his view the system is 'operated' to keep him there e.g. by declaring him medically unfit, or by employing strategies he confesses not to understand. Excerpt A 3.2 again from the Staff, is more detached in his criticism of the promotion system in the Company.

The informant in Excerpt ~~A3.3~~^{A3.3} while having a critical attitude - "it's who you know that matters a great deal in here" - but at the same time can still see the system is fair, if those in charge want to make it fair. The respondents we have considered up to now regard the system as fundamentally unfair and distorted, incapable, as it stands, of anything else. This informant believes it to be basically sound, if it was operated properly i.e. as the Director stated it was operated, in Excerpt ~~A3.4~~^{A3.4}.

The informants - the majority - who believe they are kept well informed and trust the information - for them the system of promotion - or at least the communication of promoted posts - is adequate, and not a charade in that certain-qualified-people are pre-excluded, or that someone already has the job, or that the selection is basically irrational. For the majority of respondents this was the case because they had no reason to believe otherwise, as Excerpt ~~A3.5~~^{A3.5} from an Hourly-Paid respondent makes clear.

In this case there is no doubt that the decision is straightforwardly one for "the men at the top". There is no criticism here in this view, because "it's up to them who they accept for the job, who's got the capabilities to do the job and the experience". We shall consider this more carefully in the next Chapter, on Decision-making, and in particular who decides on Promotion, but in this section we have shown both that certain respondents uncritically accept the Promotion system, while others regard it as intrinsically unfair. We cannot, however, consider this fully till that Chapter.

(9) Transfers. This item refers to moving employees to different parts of the factory. Usually this concerns the Hourly-Paid since the Shop-Floor is divided into 'Bays' (see Chapter III) and a Fitter, for instance, may be moved between Bay 1 (Final Assembly), Bay 5 (Pipe Shop) or Bay 12 (Test). It does, however, affect certain categories of Staff e.g. a secretary could be moved to any office (though only older, tougher, less attractive ones were placed in offices which meant going through the Shop-Floor).

The data we obtained on this is as follows:

Table A3.15

How well informed does the Firm keep you about Transfers?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	16 (50%)	15 (21%)	0	3 (6%)	3 (18%)
Quite Well	13 (41%)	27 (38%)	2 (29%)	14 (29%)	6 (35%)
Quite Badly	2 (6%)	21 (30%)	2 (29%)	11 (23%)	4 (24%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	8 (11%)	3 (43%)	14 (29%)	2 (12%)

Once again it can be seen that the Management are kept better informed than the other categories. Among Staff 41% are badly informed, among Union Reps. 72. say they are badly informed, among the Hourly-Paid 52% say they are badly informed, and 36% of Shop Stewards.

Insofar as the information received is trusted the position does appear to be a little better, as the following table shows.

Table A3.16

How far do you trust the information on Transfers?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	25 (78%)	34 (48%)	0	10 (21%)	0
Quite a Lot	6 (19%)	20 (28%)	2 (29%)	14 (29%)	2 (29%)
Not a Lot	1 (3%)	8 (11%)	3 (43%)	4 (8%)	3 (43%)
Not at All	0	1 (1%)	0	7 (15%)	0
No Info. Received	0	8 (11%)	2 (29%)	7 (15%)	2 (29%)

While there is an improvement on the previous table, still 23% of Staff, 72% of Union Reps., 38% of Hourly-Paid and 72% of Shop Stewards say they are either not informed about transferring employees, or they

do not place much trust in the information. Why should this be?

Among the Hourly-Paid, as we said, an employee can be moved from one bay to another, as Excerpt A3.6 shows. The most important point in this is that such a change can take place suddenly, without warning to the employee. In the case of this informant his objection to this is that he is moved away from the particular crane whose operation he knows, to one with which he has less experience. This individual will be a member of the G.M.W.U. who have a flexibility agreement with the Firm, so that the labourers in the Firm are at greater risk than others, whose unions do not have this agreement.

Excerpt A3.7 from a skilled Hourly-Paid informant goes into how this may be resisted. In this case the strategy is clearly to visit, with a good chance of success, given the effect of the A.U.E.W. (the informant's union) in resisting such action by the Firm. How such a decision is taken will be for the next Chapter, but the point has been made here that communication of such information is not adequate (see the previous two tables on this) and that such changes may be, in certain circumstances, unwanted by the person who is shifted, but that there can be resistance, successfully supported by the relevant union.

(9) Information on Work Study.

Many respondents in the sample had no contact at all with Work Study, since they were not themselves subject to its operation, or this function was totally divorced from it. Those who took this view are excluded from the following table.

Table A3.17

How well informed does the Company keep you about Work Study?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	7 (23%)	3 (10%)	0	4 (10%)	1 (9%)
Quite Well	9 (29%)	10 (33%)	1 (33%)	16 (39%)	2 (18%)
Quite Badly	12 (39%)	10 (33%)	1 (33%)	13 (32%)	7 (64%)
Very Badly	3 (10%)	7 (23%)	1 (33%)	8 (20%)	1 (9%)

While the distribution of responses reveals marginally less dissatisfaction, especially among the Hourly-Paid, and Shop Stewards, we must also note the, relatively high, level of dissatisfaction expressed by the Management, where 49% say they are either 'Quite/Very Badly Informed'. Even in the departments in which Work Study was particularly relevant the position is very similar e.g. 50% in Works say they are either 'Quite/Very Badly' informed, similarly 50% of Quality Control, and 44% of the Board of Directors say they are 'Quite Badly' informed.

Huw Beynon in 'Working for Ford' refers to the cartoon from the 'Solidarity' pamphlet 'What Happened at Fords' in which a worker is being asked by a Policeman whether the Work Study engineer, lying dead with the knife in his back "had the deadman any enemies? While we can regard this as a joke, it does indicate fairly forcibly the level of conflict associated with work study as a function within a firm. For instance, in our Firm we found an expectation amongst Staff in this section, much more strongly pronounced than in other sections, that their Manager would always back them up against others (e.g. Shop Stewards) - even though he may later criticise them in private. There was also an acceptance of the dislike which the function aroused e.g. previous friends walking by without speaking, but "If they don't like

me, and walk by me, then that is a reflection on how good a job I'm doing. Many Shop Stewards, and Hourly-Paid confirmed the view in Excerpt A3.8 from an Hourly-Paid informant which is typical and informative.

The most striking point of this is the way in which Work Study is itself effectively dehumanised e.g. the reference to the computer (which is not in fact used), and, related to this, the view that once Work Study have come to a decision it is, at best, very difficult to get anything done. Certainly a great deal of time is spent challenging Work Study e.g. in a casual conversation a Shop Steward reckoned to spend 60% of the time he put in as a Shop Steward fighting Work Study. The final sentence of the previous respondent makes clear, however, the attrition aspect of this struggle. This, contrasting with the self-contained attitude of the Work Study Staff, lends support to our view that this inability to communicate is related to the high level of conflict which this function attracts, and that on this occasion we are not concerned only with the (what we have found to be) normal failure to communicate on the part of the Firm, but is instead related to the rather peculiar position of the particular function. The Work Study department in our view had adopted a sort of mentality in which no more information than necessary should be given away - a view which applies not only to the Hourly-Paid, but to the Management as well. This mentality extends quite logically from the way in which the function is carried out, i.e. the unspeaking technician with stop-watch in hand. The following table reinforces this view, by

the numbers who say they receive no information, who feel they should, and the mistrust expressed by the Shop Stewards.

Table A 3.18

How far do you trust the information you receive on Work Study?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Completely	11 (35%)	7 (23%)	0	10 (24%)	0
Quite a Lot	9 (29%)	8 (27%)	1 (33%)	13 (32%)	2 (18%)
Not a Lot	7 (23%)	7 (23%)	0	10 (24%)	5 (45%)
Not at All	2 (6%)	2 (7%)	0	1 (2%)	3 (27%)
No Info. Received	2 (6%)	6 (20%)	2 (66%)	7 (17%)	1 (9%)

This is the view we would expect of information from a department which has cut many ties with the Firm at a social level e.g. while an informant from this area expressed the view that while he would not like it if he could not have a word with other Staff and manual workers because of his job, then he would regret it - but if that was how it was We indicated above that certain departments which one would expect to have good communications with Work Study because of interlocking functions, were, in fact, badly informed. A similar result holds good when we asked how far they trusted it - 36% of Works trusted it either 'Not a Lot'/'Not at All': similarly 33% of the Board: in Production Control 33% said they did not trust information from Work Study a lot, and 22% said they received no information at all.

(ii) Perceived Control Work Standards and Work Pace

As we have made clear already, this is a Firm where the average worker is highly skilled. In addition, as we saw in the previous Chapter, a significant proportion had been employed by the Firm for a considerable number of years. Because of this there was a noticeable craft tradition in the Firm - the workers were noticeably proud of this status as craftsmen. There was, therefore, a good deal of internalised, personal emphasis on maintaining work standards, as part of the maintenance of craft tradition.

At the same time there were external forces, from the Firm itself which attempted to exert control over work standards in the Firm. In particular there were separate Managers and separate Depts. for - Inspection, Quality Control, Production Control and Work Study (this last one we saw in the previous Chapter to be somewhat deficient in its

communication with other parts of the Firm).

Hence there was clearly an emphasis on Standard of Work from the different functions present in the structure of the Organisation.

There were, therefore, two forces operating to maintain the standard of work within the Company.

- (1) the internalisation of craft norms by the skilled manual workers
- (2) the external motivation from the various relevant depts in the Firm.

A relevant question which arises at this point is the effect each of these has on the other? In particular whether the latter has offended against the former - or whether the former is so strong that the latter has been an irrelevancy. Perhaps paradoxically we shall see that both are true.

Work Pace has been introduced here because while recognising that each is distinct in principle - hence asking the questions separately - they are crucially inter-related, in that if work pace is increased (i.e. time for a job is not) then work standards become, at least, more difficult to maintain. The above considerations, on Work Standards, therefore apply here as well. There is, however, an added importance to the role of Work Study in looking at Work Pace - because of their role in setting times for jobs for manual workers. As we saw in the previous Chapter, manual workers did experience quite severe difficulties here (See, for instance, Excerpt A3.8).

It may well appear from this discussion that what we have had to say

is only concerned with Management and Hourly-Paid - that there is nothing to say about the Staff role in these respects. As we shall see, however, this is not true. Staff are no less concerned than Hourly-Paid with maintaining the standard of their work, and with having sufficient time to do it in.

Management

If we look first of all at Work Standards on Table 43.19, then it is clear that Management see themselves as being in control of this, with the other categories playing a secondary role. So far as the Staff and Hourly-Paid roles are concerned, this is a position which they would like to persist. The role of the Foreman would, however, ideally be increased, according to the 'ideal' Management perception. The role of Management in setting Work Standards would, however, remain dominant.

If we look at Work Pace on table 43.24 this we can see a much lesser level of management control. In their perception of the existing situation control is equally divided between themselves and the Hourly-Paid. Foremen are seen as having slightly less influence than either of these 2 categories - and Staff as having much less. Going on to examine how they would like to be ideally distributed then the situation changes. Management would become the dominant category - though now with the Foremen having just slightly less. In this ideal distribution of control over Work Pace, Hourly-Paid would have rather less influence than either Management or Foremen, having only slightly more influence than Staff, whose influence would be much increased.

Clearly, therefore, Management are fairly satisfied with the position

Work Standards

Table A3.19 Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	21/23 66%/72%	5/7 16%/22%	11/17 34%/53%	7/7 22%/22%
Some	8/9 25%/28%	21/23 66%/72%	19/15 59%/47%	17/25 53%/78%
Very Little	3/0 9%/0%	6/0 19%/6%	2/0 6%/0%	8/0 25%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%

Table A3.20 Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	36/49 51%/69%	15/28 21%/39%	22/32 31%/45%	10/19 14%/27%
Some	27/19 38%/27%	43/38 61%/54%	38/35 54%/49%	31/33 44%/54%
Very Little	7/3 10%/4%	11/4 16%/6%	10/3 14%/4%	23/11 32%/16%
None	1/0 1%/0%	1/1 1%/1%	0/1 0%1%	6/3 9%/4%

Table A3.21 Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	5/4 71%/57%	1/4 14%/57%	2/4 29%/57%	1/3 14%/43%
Some	2/3 29%/43%	5/3 71%/43%	3/3 43%/43%	3/4 43%/57%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	2/0 29%/0%	3/0 43%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%

Table 43.22 Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	32/32 67%/67%	17/17 35%/35%	19/19 40%/40%	14/23 29%/48%
Some	12/13 25%/27%	22/25 46%/52%	25/27 52%/56%	20/20 42%/42%
Very Little	4/3 8%/6%	7/3 15%/6%	3/0 6%/0%	8/4 17%/8%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/0 2%/0%	1/2 2%/4%	6/1 13%/2%

Table 43.23 Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	13/10 77%/59%	2/3 12%/18%	4/6 24%/35%	4/8 24%/47%
Some	4/7 24%/41%	9/10 53%/58%	9/10 53%/58%	5/9 29%/53%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	3/1 18%/6%	3/0 18%/0%	6/0 35%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	3/3 18%/18%	1/1 6%/6%	2/0 12%/0%

Work Pace

Table A3.24 Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	15/25 47%/78%	3/15 9%/47%	12/24 38%/75%	15/18 47%/56%
Some	16/7 50%/22%	24/17 75%/53%	19/8 59%/25%	16/14 50%/44%
Very Little	1/0 3%/0%	5/0 16%/0%	1/0 3%/0%	1/0 3%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%

Table A3.25 Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	39/58 55%/82%	21/35 30%/49%	24/45 34%/63%	27/34 38%/48%
Some	27/13 38%/18%	32/34 45%/48%	40/25 56%/35%	31/32 44%/45%
Very Little	5/0 7%/0%	16/1 23%/1%	7/0 10%/0%	12/3 17%/4%
None	0/0 0%/0%	2/1 3%/1%	0/1 0%/1%	1/2 1%/3%

Table A3.25a Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	4/3 57%/43%	2/3 29%/43%	2/4 29%/57%	4/3 57%/43%
Some	2/3 29%/43%	3/3 43%/43%	5/2 71%/29%	2/4 29%/57%
Very Little	1/0 14%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	0/1 0%/14%	1/0 14%/0%
None	0/1 0%/14%	1/1 14%/14%	0/0 0%/0%	0/0 0%/0%

Table A3.26 Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	39/40 81%/83%	22/27 46%/56%	24/29 50%/60%	18/28 38%/58%
Some	8/8 17%/17%	20/17 42%/35%	17/18 35%/38%	16/18 33%/38%
Very Little	1/0 2%/0%	6/2 13%/4%	7/1 15%/2%	11/0 23%/
None	0/0 0%/0%	0/2 0%/4%	0/0 0%/0%	3/2 6%/4%

Table A3.27 Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	11/12 65%/71%	3/3 18%/18%	5/7 29%/41%	5/11 29%/65%
Some	5/4 29%/24%	9/9 53%/53%	8/9 47%/53%	7/6 42%/35%
Very Little	1/1 6%/6%	4/3 24%/18%	4/1 24%/6%	2/0 12%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/2 6%/12%	0/0 0%/0%	3/0 18%/0%

vis-a-vis Work Standards - though Foremen would ideally play a greater role - but in relation to Work Pace it is clear that Hourly-Paid are seen as having too much influence and that control should be restored to Management, aided by the Foreman and to a lesser extent Staff. This, however, should not be taken to mean that Hourly-Paid would have no role to play - rather that their role in setting Work Standards and control of Work Pace would be subject to Management control finally. This rather subtle position is discussed in Excerpt A3.9 in which this problem is discussed with a Board member.

Virtually from the outset he makes clear their reliance on the nature expertise of their employees. "I think we sometimes take quite a lot for granted. I mean if one was setting up attempting to build a (company product).....in the middle of agricultural land..... you'd find there was an awful lot of trade skills, manipulative skills that one takes for granted, one would need to expensively set out to train". Immediately after this, however, the argument changes direction - "fundamental manufacturing tactics , strategy and investment, then this is done at rather higher levels" i.e. the skill of the manual worker/Staff employee is assumed - but he must be told how to use it, he must be controlled. Hence the introduction of Work Study , which was introduced about 1971-72 (though because of union resistance it has never been introduced into their Fabrication plant), with the objective, as the respondent makes clear "of control..... of incentive". Once again, however, the argument moves in another direction "the people that are so well motivated and they equate their well-being in the Company to such a degree that one gets a reasonable output for a reasonable salary" i.e. because the employees can identify their own future with that of the Company, then they can be trusted to work effectively! Or can they? Later on we see "But

I think it is important that we do have accurate standards. So that we can control the business, recognise the business and recognise difficulties while there is still time to do something about it".

Hence the rule seems to be, to recognise the loyalty of company employees to secure decent work standards, and times for jobs - but that this has to be subject to ultimate managerial control. In the final analysis the work in the Company - with respect to standards and pace - either has to be acceptable to Management, or to be controlled by them. This line is nicely put by a Manager in Excerpt A3.10

This makes clear the need to discuss with one's subordinates the requirements on the dept. - but in the final analysis, the decision rests with the Management of the Company.

This does not mean, however, that all Managers are content with their position, as Excerpt A3.11 from a Manager indicates. Managers, therefore, experience this policy - that decisions which they feel should be taken by them are the monopoly of more senior people (eg Board Members). As we'll see, however, their subordinates - Staff and Hourly-Paid, experience the same restriction, except that their solution can be rather different, to expecting to be educated with taking decisions in this area, as the Manager clearly does.

Staff

Table A3.20 reveals a pattern of responses among Staff which shows, as was the case with Management, that Management are perceived as the dominant category in setting Work Standards. Similarly, as with

Management, the second category are Foremen. The differences are

- (1) the greater influence perceived for Staff themselves, compared to the influence they were perceived to have by Management
- (2) the lower level of influence of Hourly-Paid employees

If we consider their 'ideal' situation, then we see that the order of influence would not change, nor would the differentials to any significant degree - the only difference would be to increase the total amount of influence (i.e. all distributions would move more toward 'A Great Deal of Influence').

In relation to Work Pace, the ordering of categories is the same - major distinction resides in the fact that all categories are perceived as having more influence (both actually and ideally). One should hardly be surprised at this as it is clearly easier to exercise control over work standards than work pace - even if only negatively by high failure in Inspection.

The responses of Staff Union Reps are in something of a contrast to those of their numbers. Firstly in relation to Work Standards from Table A3.21. The dominant category is clearly Management for this group - but equally clearly, they believe that this is not a situation which should persist. The 'ideal' distribution for Management, Staff and Foremen having equal influence. The Hourly-Paid, in their perception ought to have less influence, but this only marginal.

From table A3.26 we can see Staff Union Reps. attitudes on Work-Pace. They share with their members the idea of the lesser gap in influence on this between Management and other categories, compared to Work Standards. Once again, however, as was shown in looking at views

on Work Standards, held by this category, the dominance of Management ought to be ended and replaced by an equality of influence between Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid, with Foremen having rather more influence than anyone else. As was the case with Hourly-Paid in the context of Work Standards, however, this too is marginal.

One source of influence on Work-Pace which has been shown to be a factor not directly controllable by even individual managers, is the influence of the volume of the work in hand, which is introduced in Excerpt A3.12 from a Staff respondent. He shows in this Excerpt the influence of the amount of work which has to cope with, in setting his Work Pace. In this Excerpt the respondent indicates how, given that a certain amount of work has to be dealt with in a certain length of time, one's Work Pace is more or less set for you. Even Management cannot resist this - "The Manager always asks us".

There is, however, the question of whether this is inevitable i.e. whether or not with better scheduling of production and work-flow would not eradicate the kind of difficulty which includes much of Excerpt A3.12. It can be seen in Excerpt A3.13 that there is this kind of problem - namely that because some Managers are "lax" and out-of-touch, the work is not processed as efficiently as it should be, because the organisation is not as efficient as it should be. This is a problem which he identifies as beginning with Management.

Hence we have seen 2 influences on Work Standards and Pace - the volume of work to be dealt with, and Management inefficiency. There are, however, others directly related to Staff themselves. In Excerpt A3.14 we can see that Work Standard is continuous - "the job's got to be done to such-and-such a standard, and that's it". Now it is

important to appreciate that he could reasonably have left the expressed view at that, but he goes on in the Excerpt to positively endorse the standard, and to express what is a job need, to feel that the work is being done properly i.e. that part of his job satisfaction is to attain the work standard, which has been established independently of him (eg by technical requirements). This idea of maintaining standards of work by personal commitment is central in Excerpt A3.16, in which the Staff respondent makes clear his own view of personal responsibility and commitment to getting the job done properly. For him what matters is to get his work through as quickly as possible - but note not just for his own benefit, but for everybody.

In both Excerpts A3.14 and A3.15, there is an absence of Management control - Standard and Pace of work are independent of Management, depending on the job to be done, and the volume of work in other cases. Despite the absence of direct Management control, the personal commitment is obvious. Indeed, going back to Excerpts A3.12 and A3.13, where there is Management control - it is that the inadequacy of Management that interferes with the standard of work which they feel personally committed to. Management control is, therefore, resented not only as such, but because of the damage it does to the standard of work which they are committed to, but prevented from achieving.

Interference may not always be perceived as coming from Management. Unionisation in the Firm is at a fairly high level - the Shop Floor is 100% unionised, being positively a closed shop, while among Staff employees there are areas where the closed shop operates (eg Production Control) - nevertheless the level of unionisation among Staff is lower at (a still substantial) 80%. Among the 20% non-unionised sector we find that pace and standard of work can be seen as being influenced

by the trade unions. This is seen in Excerpt ~~A3~~ 16.

As far as this Staff respondent (who was not a union member) sees things, Management can only operate within the constraints which the "dictates" of the closed shop will allow. Hence a job which should be done well cannot be, because the appropriate person cannot be employed because he won't join the appropriate union (When we consider the union role later, in more depth, we will see that this is not a typical view - but no less interesting for that).

Hourly-Paid

At the beginning of this section we pointed to a conflict, between, on the one hand the craft tradition of highly skilled manual workers, and on the other hand the influence of Management and Staff on Standards and Pace of Work via Management Techniques like Quality Control, Production Control and Work Study. The problem which appeared to us to exist was where these two sets of forces came into conflict eg where a job was to be done a certain way (eg on instructions from Quality Control) or in a certain time (eg from instructions by Work Study), such that the manual worker was in profound disagreement (i.e. he is told to do a job in a way he regards as inefficient, or likely to produce a poor standard of Work).

The situation we have described saw Management regarding themselves as in control of Work Standards - but to a lesser degree over Work Pace where the Hourly Paid influence is much greater. This perception is, broadly speaking endorsed by Staff Respondents. In relation to Work Standards the 'ideal' situation for Management would be virtually unchanged.

(though Foremen would play more of a role). On Work Pace, however, Management would wish to play a much bigger role, and this would involve Hourly Paid workers being subordinated to Management - and to Foremen in this area. Similar responses are given by Staff Respondents in both areas (though the role of the Foreman is given rather less emphasis).

Hence it would seem for Management and Staff the main intrusion by Hourly-Paid is not in Standard of Work, but in Work-Pace, and that ideally their influence on this would be relatively reduced. The implication of this, obviously being that manual workers would work more at a pace to be determined for them by Management and Staff, rather than at a pace they decided for themselves.

As we shall see, however, as far as Hourly-Paid are concerned, this is a situation which already exists - and, furthermore, that this is only at the expense of Standard of Work.

On Standard of Work, Hourly-Paid respondents, clearly regarded Management as being the dominant category (see table 43.12) - but if we look at their ideal situation then while every other category would retain their level of influence, Hourly-Paid would nearly double their influence. In consequence, while Management would still be dominant, Hourly-Paid respondents clearly wished more influence than they had, and more even than Staff or Foremen.

Their Shop Stewards take a very similar view - namely that Management are dominant, and should remain so. Similarly they believe that Hourly-Paid workers should possess more influence than they do at present - and like

28

their numbers, the Stewards take the view that this increased influence should take them to a greater level than other Staff or Foremen. The main observable difference between Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards categories, is that the latter would reduce, in an absolute as well as relative sense, the influence of Management over Standard of Work.

In this area, therefore, there is a clear conflict between Management and Staff on the one hand, and Hourly-Paid on the other. While the former seek to exert greater influence over Hourly-Paid worker, the latter wish the reverse (i.e. more influence rather than less, over the standards of work in the Firm).

A very similar situation persists in relation to Work Pace, as Table A3.26 we can see that the movement in relative influence between actual and ideal, is toward Hourly-Paid. Their desired change would be for them to exert more influence that they do at the moment. Management would, however, remain dominant - the change would be that Hourly-Paid would have an equality (more or less) with Staff and Foremen. This is slightly different from the views expressed by the Shop Stewards (Table A3.27). Here the movement again is toward greater influence by Hourly-Paid workers - but, unlike their members, the views of the Stewards are

- (1) While Management would be dominant - as for Hourly-Paid respondents - in the ideal situation for the Stewards, their dominance over Work Pace would be less marked.
- (2) Hourly-Paid would not be equal with Staff and Foremen - they would have a greater level of influence.

For both categories - Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards - the changes desired, by and large, are relative rather than absolute - they do not overturn the

existing structure or order of influence over either of these 2 areas. Rather they seek more influence for themselves - moving to equality with Staff and Foremen (at least among Hourly-Paid). There is, however, no challenge to Management being dominant. It would seem that any challenge is to the conditions of this dominance.

In particular, we shall now go on to show, the problem of Work Pace v Work Standard is a real one for Hourly-Paid workers. This is true for the respondent in Excerpt A3.17, who is Work Studied, i.e. he has a time given to him for each job, and his pay will depend on whether or not he beats that time (via bonus payments). This conflict is stated right at the start of the Excerpt - "Who decides that? (standard of a job)" - "Well I would say the bonus decides that".

Hence for this Respondent the conflict between a Work Pace set for him by outsiders, and the Standard of Work, is resolved by letting the former set the latter. In other words how good a job he does will be determined by the time he is given - if he can't earn his bonus by doing a good job, then he'll do it to the level which Inspection will accept, and that's that! Even if it does mean that the job is done less well than it might otherwise have been!.

In Excerpt A3.18 another Respondent indicates that earning bonus is not all that easy - and that once a time is set, because it is an average of what has been done, it is difficult to get it changed - "It must be yourself".

His solution is to abolish Work Study altogether, on the grounds that the job was done before Work Study was introduced, and that its effect has been to make poorer the standard of Work done. This point is made

by the Respondent in Excerpt A3.17, as well i.e. that if there was no Work Study there would be an improved quality of work. On the other hand, if there was no Work Study - and no times - there may be a disciplinary problem for Foremen. If there was no bonus system, people might evade their work - "they would have to go and dig some of the out of corners". This, however, is seen as part of the supervisory role - if someone isn't doing his work then it's for the supervisor to move him.

This may appear a rather utopian view i.e. if there were no times, people would work away, producing higher quality, and that the Foremen could (or should be able to) handle "the slackers". There is, however, a motivation besides money, which emanates directly from Work Standard - craft pride. Craft pride comes out clearly in Excerpt A3.19. This is an Hourly-Paid Respondent who, as he states, is not subject to times from Work Study. If the "disciplinary" argument for Work Study held then one could expect it to arise in this kind of work. Indeed, towards the end of the Excerpt, he actually does say "Well you know you² can be lackadaisical" - illustrating the point of Work Study and times, bonuses, Quality Control etc. Yet craft pride surfaces almost immediately - "It's only a matter of somebody coming up and saying "well that wasn't a very good job". In other words there is a certain standard of work almost 'built-in' to the craftsmen.

This point is illustrated again in Excerpt A3.20, again an Hourly-Paid respondent. For him, Work Standard, is determined by Management - "The Board-Room" - on the grounds that 'that's what they're there for'. At the end, however, there is again an endorsement of the idea of craft pride - "A good tradesman doesn't need to, he can do it himself?" - "Aye".

Hence for the Hourly-Paid we can see a view of themselves as being craftsmen (a view Management would endorse, since as one of the better paid firms in the area, they regard themselves as having certainly amongst the most highly skilled men in the area), but that this craftsmanship is inflicted by Managerial control - Work Study, times, bonuses, Quality Control, Production Control etc. From the Excerpts we have cited here it is clear that they believe that if these controls were removed, and they were left to get on with their jobs in their way, that quality would improve. That by allowing them to fully exercise their skill (both normally and mentally) a better quality of work would come forth. Hence we can better understand the different relative changes shown in tables A3.19 - A3.27.

For the Hourly-Paid worker his aim is to more fully exercise his skill in the ways we have suggested - he perceives he can do this only by exerting more influence himself. This, however, is not carried to the point of selfishness - it is recognised, on the whole, (the Stewards dissenting) that Staff and Foremen must play a role - that they have skills to offer as well. It is, however, the position of Management which is most interesting, as they would, in any situation, be the dominant group.

Conclusions

From this we would suggest that, as we have seen earlier in other areas, the objective is not to overthrow the hierarchy, but rather to amend it. The objective is not the overthrow of Management, as they will always be dominant. Rather the objective is to give Hourly-paid employees sufficient influence, that Management will be influenced by their ideas and wishes. On the other hand Management and Stadd, while

keeping Management dominant, would keep the Hourly-Paid in their position of subordinate influence to Staff. Thus we have a conflict - are Staff and Hourly-Paid to be equal?

This is, in many ways the manifest problem being played out now, but the more general problem really concerns the relative ordering of the different categories.

The hierarchy, therefore, is not under challenge - nor is the Management right to take decisions fundamentally. What is at issue is the relative ordering of the parties - in particular the degree of influence to be possessed over Management as they make their decisions. As we have seen before, and will see again, it is this ordering of influence which is under challenge - not the existence of an ordering. The differential of power is held to be right - it is the degrees of difference between the different hierarchical groupings which will be the major sources of concern.

Recruitment - Transfers - Promotion

in this section we shall be concerned with these 3 areas. They are being taken together because it can be argued that they have a meaningful relationship, being inter-related by the concept of 'career'. This has traditionally been the focus of attention only when we are considering Management, at least some, Staff. We shall see, however, that this is not altogether warranted, and that in particular Hourly-paid are very much concerned with the authority to Transfer employees between different jobs - and to a lesser extent, but more surprisingly, with Promotion itself.

Table A3.28- Recruitment - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	27/28 84%/88%	0/14 0%/13%	5/9 16%/28%	2/2 6%/6%
Some	4/4 13%/13%	12/14 38%/44%	17/18 53%/56%	6/13 19%/41%
Very Little	1/0 3%/0%	12/8 38%/25%	10/5 31%/16%	15/9 47%/28%
None	0/0 0%/0%	8/6 25%/19%	0/0 0%/0%	9/8 28%/25%

Table A3.29- Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	53/51 75%/72%	4/14 6%/20%	12/25 17%/35%	5/9 7%/13%
Some	17/20 24%/28%	31/38 44%/54%	43/37 61%/52%	20/33 28%/47%
Very Little	1/0 1%/0%	22/15 31%/21%	9/7 13%/10%	24/17 34%/24%
None	0/0 0%/0%	14/4 20%/6%	7/2 10%/3%	22/12 31%/17%

A3.30 Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	6/3 86%/43%	0/3 0%/43%	1/3 14%/43%	0/2 0%/29%
Some	1/4 14%/57%	2/3 29%/43%	3/3 43%/43%	1/4 14%/57%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	4/1 57%/14%	2/1 29%/14%	3/0 43%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	3/1 43%/14%

Table A3.31- Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	34/34 71%/71%	15/15 31%/31%	17/15 35%/31%	7/12 15%/25%
Some	7/8 15%/17%	19/22 40%/46%	24/24 50%/50%	9/22 19%/46%
Very Little	4/4 8%/8%	9/6 19%/13%	5/6 10%/13%	14/6 29%/13%
None	3/2 6%/4%	4/4 8%/8%	2/3 4%/6%	18/8 37%/17%

Table A3.32 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	15/13 88%/77%	4/14 24%/24%	4/5 24%/29%	6/9 35%/53%
Some	2/4 12%/24%	5/6 29%/35%	7/8 41%/47%	3/7 18%/41%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	3/3 18%/18%	4/2 24%/12%	6/0 35%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	5/4 29%/24%	2/2 12%/12%	2/1 12%/6%

(1) Recruitment

Before there can be any issue about a career in a Company, one must first be recruited - to be taken on. There, however, 2 issues in relation to Recruitment, as well as career (a) the Closed Shop which operates 100% amongst Hourly-Paid workers, and in some areas of the Staff (e.g. Production Control). (b) the level of unemployment in the area, which has consistently been higher than the natural average. The former, as we'll see, created largely procedural problems - most often recruiting employees in the wrong union/whose union card was not fully paid up - rather than problems of principle. The latter may have been expected to be used by Management as a source of pressure against their employees. In fact this did not happen - the policy was to recruit the best, the most skilled. This kind of policy does not lend itself to that kind of pressure or strategy!

Recruitment

Management responses of this category to the questions on Recruitment are shown in table A3.2g. This shows 2 things very clearly

(1) Control is perceived to be very firmly in the hands of Management.

In the light of Company Structure, Authority and Ownership this is hardly surprising. Companies where Management lack this control must be very rare (Fleet Street being probably the most noted exception). What is perhaps surprising is that the degree of influence exerted by the other groups is perceived as so small, indicating that for this Management at least, the Closed Shop, which permeates a substantial part of the Firm (and was growing), was not a problem.

(2) The Management wished to see this situation continue, though

Staff and Foremen may exert slightly more influence. There was, however, no doubt that Management saw themselves as the people who ought to dominate decisions on Recruitment in the Firm.

It would however, be inaccurate to suggest that influence in this area was equal in Management. It is not. It is concentrated very much in the hands of the Board of Directors in the Company. This point is made in Excerpt A3.21, where the (non-Director) Manager says precisely this, and in particular that how and why decisions are taken are outwith his experience - "I think its difficult to see exactly where the decisions are being made".

For this Respondant, however, this is just something to accept. For the Respondent in Excerpt A3.22 (again a non-Director Manager), however, the issue goes beyond the fact that it is the Board of Directors who take the decisions. For him there are a number of issues which have to be considered

- a) firstly the Panel have restricted recruitment, which means if there is to be additional people in one area, there may be fewer elsewhere.
- b) this redistribution has largely been left up to Management - "We're the in-betweens".
- c) if the decisions Management take are not correct then there will be serious consequences for the Firms - losses etc.

Hence what has happened is that the Board have taken a major decision - no new recruitment - but have left Management, below Board-level, to work out the consequences of their decisions. The influence over Recruitment has got to be seen in 2 ways

- 1) the influence possessed by the Board to say "no new people to be taken on without justification".

- 2) the influence within Management on how the employees they have are to be affected within the Company. For the Respondent in 5.23 this decision is taken on a rational basis - "to make the strongest case I could" - but as we shall see, their direct subordinates (Staff) do not always agree that this is so.

Staff (Recruitment)

Staff responses to the questions in this area are shown in Table A.3.29 and from their Union Repns on Table A3.30. Taking the former first, the distribution is very similar to what we have seen from Management, though with slightly more influence for other categories, both in 'Actual' and 'Ideal' situations. It is, however, clear that Management are perceived as being the dominant category, and that this situation ought to persist. If, however, we look at Table A3.30 we see that while Staff Union Reps share the view of their members, that Management are the dominant category in this area, this is not a situation they perceive as ideal. This makes them rather different from their members, who, as we've said, express no strong desire for the distribution of influence to change. Their Union Reps, on the other hand, express a desire for equality of influence between Management, Staff and Foremen - slightly less for Hourly-Paid. It would be very easy to describe this as political i.e. simply as part of a generalised critique by politically-motivated people, seeking to destroy Management power, as a goal in itself. This, however, would not be accurate. From the figures in Table A3.30 it can clearly be inferred that the present situation is seen by the Union Rep as less than ideal, and thus they are critical of Management. We can, however, go further than this, as they are critical of Management inefficiency.

We have shown in the previous section on Management that the level of Management below Board-level were critical of the Board's policy of non-replacement of leavers and non-recruitment without strong justification, such that people leaving were very often not replaced. For managers who regularly interact with Staff this poses not one, but two problems.

- 1) getting the same volume of work (or more) done by fewer people
- 2) coping with the strain this creates, not only for the Manager himself, but for the people in his dept. as well. This is a decision taken by the Board, but it is others who have to live with it in a day-to-day source.

Hence the Board policy on Recruitment has directly experienced effects for Staff. As we have seen, by and large, Staff have not, as a result of this policy, sought to change the way such decisions are taken.

There is, however, a further problem, which is described by a Respondent who is a Staff Union Rep., in Excerpt A3.23 This Excerpt illustrates the above failing - too few people to do too much work - but a further one as well. Inefficiency by Management when recruiting e.g. not publishing salaries, asking for an ONC when an HNC was required, too little effort to find suitable people. The only 'solution' to this failure by the Company to recruit the members which are actually required, is to let the work pile up - which in turn means they (Staff) get the blame, but at least they have drawn attention to the problem.

Hence, up to now, we have seen evidence of 2 identifiable 'influence-gaps' in the hierarchy

- 1) between Board members - and other Managers below this level. The

latter resolve this problem, as we've seen, by 'putting up cases' for extra people.

- 2) between "below Board-Level" Managers and Staff - Staff, however, cannot 'put up cases' - just let the work pile up i.e. their response, because of their position in the hierarchy, is less sophisticated. They - following Excerpt A3.23- find their cases are ignored, or not dealt with properly. Hence they resort to their final means - letting work go undone "We've done all we can - if you want more you'll have to find someone else" is what they appear to be saying.

Staff respondents, however, do not appear to take such a critical view of Management - see Table A3.29- and in interviews with Staff this is repeated. In Excerpt A3.24, with this Staff Respondent we have, in Stewart Clegg's phrase, 'reached bed-rock'. For him Recruitment is a Management function - and that is all "It's got nothing to do with us!".

For Staff, therefore, there is a much more passive and less critical attitude than is true for their Union Reps. The attitudes of these 2 groups are very different indeed. The former seek little or no change - the latter seek equality, and thus represent a challenge to the hierarchy. In other areas the Staff Union Reps have been more radical than their members, but more, up to now, more so than this.

Hourly-Paid

Like Staff and Management, we can see from Table A3.31 the Hourly-Paid perceive the Management as being the dominant influence. This is a situation which they appear to endorse since the change desired, looking at the 'ideal' figures, are more or less the same - though there would

be more influence for Hourly-Paid. Even this, however, it would still be Management who would still be very much the dominant category.

Table A3.32 gives the distribution of Shop Stewards' responses to these questions. This table has certain variations from the expressed attitudes of their members - Managers are seen as having more influence, as are Hourly-Paid, but Staff and Foremen have slightly less. There is, therefore, as with Staff and Union Reps a difference in attitudes, between Hourly-Paid Respondents and their Shop Stewards. The difference, however, is less striking, as unlike Staff Union Reps, the Shop Stewards continue like their members to recognise Management dominance ought to continue - though to a lesser extent than their members. Compared to Union Reps, the Shop Stewards are therefore less radical on this area. As with the areas we have examined up to now, the Shop-Floor view seems to be that Management are and ought to dominate - ought to take the decisions - but that other categories ought to exert more influence.

When we interviewed Shop Stewards and Hourly-Paid in more depth about Recruitment, there were a number of issues which were

- a) the role of the Union. We referred to this at the beginning of this Section - the operation of the Closed Shop. The role of this comes out clearly in Excerpt A3.25 The role of the 'Union Card' in this Excerpt - from a Shop Steward - is almost mythical (i.e. no union card = no work).

Nevertheless, as he makes clear, Management do respect this, and in our experience in the Firm, any problems in Recruitment of people without the right union card, were administrative hiccups, and in any case there were very few. It is, however, interesting to note that this Shop Steward does not even implicitly criticise Management. Like the Staff Respondent in Excerpt A3.24, it is Management who take the decision on

361

whether, and who, to recruit - his only concern is on whether they hold the right card.

This, however, was not, by and large, the concern of the Hourly-Paid union members. Their major concern, as Excerpts A3.26 and A3.27 make clear, is the reasoning on why particular people are recruited. The respondent in A3.26 refers to what he calls 'screening' i.e. what their part history has been. This process is endorsed by him on the grounds that it keeps out trouble-makers etc. The actual decision to recruit, however, is not one he believes that Hourly-Paid should take on themselves - it is for the Foreman to decide when more workers are required. At the moment, in his view, this decision is actually taken by Management, on the basis of information from Foremen. He believes, however, that the decision should be taken by the Foremen, and Management should simply fulfill his request as "they are the men on the floor and they know where the need is for men". Hence the decision would be taken at a lower level - but it would not be divided on to Hourly-Paid workers themselves. It is a Foreman's task.

The tensions are, however, reflected in Excerpt A3.27. In this, the respondent while making clear that the union would attempt to keep a job open, refers to the conflicting Management motivation - "to run the place on a shoe-string". Hence, while voicing the union objective of maximising employment for their members, the respondent identifies the Management objective of maximising efficiency in the Firm.

Clearly what is required is a compromise between these 2 conflicting forces.

What this section has tried to show is that while Management dominance

is endorsed all round, both Staff and Hourly-Paid employees seek to secure more influence for themselves. The objective, however, is not equality with Management, far less putting Management in a subordinate position. Rather the objective is to get Management to listen to them - to appreciate that the decisions they take as Managers have implication for the people who work for them. Indeed non-Board Managers have said the same thing about the Board - that the Board take a decision of non-replacement for people who leave, but then it is up to the non-Board Managers to live with that decision. What is required, therefore, is more examination on the part of the decision-maker on the implications of his decision - and thus more influence for those for whom the implications are most real. The decision would, however, still be taken by Management.

Transfers

As we indicated in Chapter III, the factory is laid out in a number of 'bays'. In each bay, work of a particular type is done e.g. in Bay One final assembly is carried out, while in Bay Six specialised pipework is done, in Bay Thirteen the product is tested. The activities done in each bay will require a mixture of skills. While manual workers do tend to remain in the same bay, at least over the medium term (with obvious exceptions like maintenance engineers), it may be that they have to move from one Bay to another. For instance if in final assembly in Bay One a piece of pipework had to be done urgently, a worker from Bay Six may be told to go to Bay One and do that work. From the point of view of the workers, so transferred, the move may have other implications e.g. moving him away from his workmates to others he knows less well, possible a feeling of victimisation (e.g. if the job was less good than the job he was doing) etc. In short, therefore, the

Table A3.33- Transfers - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	24/29 75%/91%	1/4 3%/13%	3/7 9%/22%	3/3 9%/9%
Some	7/2 22%/6%	17/21 53%/66%	26/24 81%/75%	11/21 34%/66%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	12/5 38%/16%	2/0 6%/0%	13/5 41%/16%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/1 3%/3%	0/0 0%/0%	4/2 13%/6%

Table A3.34 - Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	38/41 54%/58%	7/15 10%/21%	15/18 21%/25%	7/7 10%/10%
Some	25/24 35%/34%	28/46 39%/65%	35/48 41%/68%	20/41 28%/58%
Very Little	5/3 7%/4%	27/8 38%/11%	16/4 23%/6%	25/15 35%/21%
None	3/3 4%/4%	9/2 13%/3%	5/1 7%/1%	18/7 25%/10%

Table A3.35 Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	6/3 86%/43%	0/3 0%/43%	0/3 0%/43%	0/2 0%/49%
Some	1/4 14%/57%	4/4 57%/57%	4/4 57%/57%	2/4 29%/57%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	2/0 29%/0%	3/0 43%/0%	4/0 57%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	0/0 0%/0%	1/1 14%/14%

Table 43.36 Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	28%/23% 58%/48%	18/11 38%/23%	18/12 38%/25%	5/13 10%/27%
Some	14/16 29%/33%	20/23 42%/48%	19/27 40%/56%	19/26 40%/54%
Very Little	2/4 4%/8%	5/6 10%/13%	8/5 17%/10%	10/3 21%/6%
None	3/4 6%/8%	4/7 8%/15%	2/3 4%/6%	13/5 27%/10%

Table 43.37 Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	13/10 77%/59%	3/3 18%/18%	4/5 24%/29%	3/7 18%/41%
Some	4/7 24%/41%	4/5 24%/29%	12/11 71%/65%	7/8 41%/47%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	3/4 18%/24%	1/0 6%/	4/1 24%/6%
None	0/0 0%/0%	7/5 41%/2%	0/1 0%/0%	3/1 18%/0%

flexibility of the work-force indicated by transferring workers from one job to another, has implications not just for the productivity of the Company, but also for the perceived degree of control which the worker has over his environment. Indeed the two would seem to have inverse relationship.

While this introductory discussion has emphasised the portion of the manual worker, the issues may be no less important for staff workers e.g. transfer of a clock etc. from one dept. to another dept. Indeed we shall see that this is so.

Management

Table 13.33 indicates the degree of control which Management believe themselves to possess. It is clear from this table

- a) that Management perceive themselves as very much the dominant group
- b) any desired change in this position would be in the direction of a marginal increase in influence for other groups, but Management still being dominant. The change between 'actual' and 'ideal' influence indicates - as we have seen on other issues - that then below Management should have their views more considered than now, but it would still be Management who would take the final decision.

It is, however, interesting to note the distinction - however slight - of Foremen, in that a small number of Managers would like to see Foremen with 'a great deal' of influence. This reflects the functional position of the Foreman in the Company. If for instance, a job has to be done urgently in Bay One, it will be the Foreman in Bay One who will

be aware of it before the Management are. Hence, the relative dominance of Foreman over the Staff, and Hourly-Paid, reflects their strategic position in respect of any such process.

Staff

Tables ~~A3.34~~ and A3.35 give the views of Staff respondents, and their Union Reps to the issue of control over transfers. Clearly for Staff, Management are the dominant group - though rather less dominant than Management see themselves. On the other hand, the view taken by Staff Union Reps is that Management are very much the dominant category. Their view of Management, on how control over Transfers is distributed, is very similar to that of Management itself.

The 'ideal' situation for Staff would still see Management as the dominant category - but the influence of other categories would have been relatively increased slightly less for Hourly-Paid, than for Staff or Foremen). This category, therefore, repeats the usual pattern of Management dominance, but with greater influence for those below than in the hierarchy.

The authority of Management in this area is shown in Excerpt A3.28. For this Staff Respondent, while the initiative is taken by the individual employee, the final decision is one to be taken by the Management - "I suppose it will be the Manager that will make the final decision... ..(otherwise) you might have guys going into jobs they're not suited for".

The only exception to this situation is where there is redundancy in a dept. - then the union would become involved, to negotiate openings for the redundant workers elsewhere in the Company. With that exception

the decision-making role is to be taken Management clearly, for this respondent, it is Management who know least - who will know who is suitable. The decision will be taken, therefore, in the light of what is best for the Company.

Another side of this is, however, shown in Excerpt A3.29 This Excerpt, again from a Staff Respondent, reflects Management dominance. Like the previous Respondent it is Management who take the decisions - decisions taken in the light of what is best for the Company. Unlike the previous respondent, however, it is suggested in 5.30 that decisions may over-reflect what is best for the Company, and that in particular that this is done at the expense of the individual. The problem, as seen by this Respondent, is that if he applies for a transfer to another dept., his Manager will be told of this. If his Manager does not want to lose him, then he will not get his transfer. This, for the Respondent, means that he is held back - his career is affected by a Manager. Indeed it can be implied from this that this is more likely to happen to someone who is particularly good at their job - under these circumstances, in the scenario described by the Respondent, a Manager is more likely to want to hold on to a particular employee.

In Excerpt A3.29 therefore, the concept of what is good for the Company is a remarkably static concept. In many ways this described a situation in which change is something to be resisted. A more obvious meaning of 'best for the Company' is that each employee would be in the position at which he was most efficient. Instead it is almost as if the Company's internal labour market had been Balkanised - that there were barriers to internal marketing, of particular seriousness to more talented employees. The Company policy appeared to be that if you were good at what you did then there you stay. In terms of Company

well-being this clearly emphasises company politics rather than Company efficiency. We shall see similar perceptions when we look at promotion.

Before moving on to look at Hourly-Paid workers, it should be emphasised again, that among Staff and their Union Reps, while they would like to see their influence increase, decisions would still be taken by Management. Even in Excerpt 5.30 the right of Management to take the decision, on whether he should be allowed to move to another dept., is not challenged. What is at issue there is the role of his present Manager in vetoing any move the Management right to decide is, therefore, not at issue, what is at issue are the unreasonable (for the individual) obstacles to mobility.

Hourly-Paid

We sketched out at the beginning of this section how transferring Hourly-Paid employees could be a problem for them. Table A3.36 shows their views on influence on decisions in this respect - Table A3.37 shows the views of the Shop Stewards. Both Hourly-Paid and their Stewards, it can be seen from their respective tables, regard Management as being the dominant category. It is, however, interesting that, for both the Hourly-Paid, and the Shop Stewards, this dominance should be reduced - but with Management still as the dominant category. There is therefore, a movement toward equality in taking decisions on this issue, but stopping short of equality.

At the beginning of this section we sketched out reasons for this - these are illustrated in Excerpt A3.30 This Respondent is a craneman and his objection to being transferred to another bay, and therefore another crane, is that the crane is likely to be different, and that this will cause him to make mistakes in his work. Hence like the Staff

-

Respondent in Excerpt A3.29 what is best for the Company is not necessarily best for the individual. Indeed it may not even be best for the Company!

This, however, is not to say that Hourly-Paid employees cannot

- a) ask for and get a move if they want one, nor
- b) that if they were told to move that they could not successfully resist. In Excerpt A3.31 it is quite clear that these can be accomplished.

It is clear from the first half of Excerpt A3.31 that a worker can ask for, and get a transfer to another part of the Company if he wants one. It is, however, also clear in Excerpt A3.31 that this is a Management decision - "and its up to them, its a Management decision or a Foreman decision whether to give me a change or not" - a system he feels to be perfectly fair. This subordination to Management/Supervisory decisions is repeated in Excerpt A3.32 - if his supervisor has reason to move him, then he will go e.g. if his machine breaks down or if someone else was about and a job had to be done urgently, or if it was seen that he (i.e. the respondent) was incompetent on that particular machine. All of these would judgements to be made by the Company Management/Supervisors - and he is subordinate to that. For him, it is clear from the Excerpt, this is quite natural and normal - it is in the way of things, it is not power!

The general view amongst Hourly-Paid workers was, therefore,

- (i) that Management had the right to take decisions on transferring employees from one job to another,
 - (ii) but that the individual employee should be considered in all of this - but on the other hand the employee had a duty to fulfill the needs and requirements of the Company and its Management.
- 368

Promotion

For ambitious employees this will clearly be an issue of significant importance - but even for the unambitious it may still be important in so far as it is indicative of a fair and just management, or otherwise.

Management

Responses from Management are shown in Table 43.38. This Table illustrates 2 factors clearly

- 1) that Management see themselves as very much the category in control of this issue - a situation they clearly wish to continue
- 2) that while the other categories may exercise some more influence, any change would be marginal, with the possible exception of Foremen. This last point reflects a finding stated above - namely the functional importance of Foremen in respect of Hourly-Paid workers. While Management can decide promotion among Staff directly, in the case of Hourly-Paid workers guidance is required from Foremen, and thus their level of influence.

We saw above, in considering Recruitment, that Managers, below the level of the Board, exerted too little influence. In the case of Recruitment, this had taken the form of a freeze on new recruitment, and then leaving their Management to work out and deal with the implications of this policy. Excerpt 43.33 expresses identical views with respect to Promotion. For this Manager, while he has influence over who is/is not promoted, the real control lies at Board level. This is explained by him as an expression of lack of trust in Management, by Directors afraid to delegate as they fear lack of competence

Table 13.39 - Promotion - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	27/30 84%/94%	0/2 0%/6%	4/8 13%/25%	0/1 0%/3%
Some	5/2 16%/6%	14/18 44%/56%	14/18 44%/56%	7/13 22%/41%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	12/8 38%/25%	14/6 44%/19%	13/11 41%/34%
None	0/0 0%/0%	6/4 19%/13%	0/0 0%/0%	12/7 38%/22%

Table 13.37 - Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	60/48 84%/68%	4/9 6%/13%	7/23 10%/32%	3/3 4%/4%
Some	10/22 14%/31%	29/43 41%/61%	39/45 55%/63%	11/33 16%/47%
Very Little	1/1 1%/1%	25/15 35%/21%	20/1 28%/1%	28/22 39%/31%
None	0/0 0%/0%	13/4 18%/0%	5/2 7%/3%	28/13 39%/18%

Table 13.40 - Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	7/1 100%/14%	0/1 0%/14%	0/1 0%/14%	0/1 0%/14%
Some	0/5 0%/71%	1/5 14%/71%	1/5 14%/71%	1/4 14%/57%
Very Little	0/1 0%/14%	3/0 43%/0%	4/0 57%/0%	2/1 29%/14%
None	0/0 8%/0%	3/1 43%/14%	2/1 29%/14%	4/1 57%/14%

Table ~~A3.41~~ A1- Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	37/33 77%/69%	10/10 21%/21%	12/12 25%/25%	4/11 8%/23%
Some	7/11 14%/23%	30/22 63%/46%	32/27 67%/56%	8/20 17%/42%
Very Little	3/3 6%/6%	3/9 6%/19%	3/6 6%/13%	15/8 31%/17%
None	1/1 2%/2%	4/6 8%/13%	1/3 2%/6%	21/9 44%/19%

Table ~~A3.42~~ A2- Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	16/11 94%/65%	4/2 24%/12%	5/4 29%/24%	2/4 12%/24%
Some	0/6 0%/35%	10/9 59%/53%	12/22 71%/65%	2/12 12%/71%
Very Little	1/0 6%/0%	2/5 12%/29%	0/2 0%/12%	7/1 41%/0%
None	0/0 0%/0%	1/1 6%/6%	0/0 0%/0%	6/0 35%/0%

in their Management.

Hence while Table ~~A3.38~~ shows Management to be in control of Promotion decisions, the failure to delegate, which we have observed elsewhere, indicates real control to reside with the Board of Directors. Hence it would appear that while a Manager may take the decision, he does so under constraints established by the Board of Directors.

Staff and Staff Union Reps

Like Management both Staff, and their Union Reps, regard Management as being the dominant category. But while both wish to see Management control reduced, there's a very great difference in degree between the Union Reps and their members. Tables ~~A3.39~~ and ~~A3.40~~ show that while Union Reps wish to move to a situation very much like equality, their members desire for change is much more marginal. Hence, as we have seen before, Staff Union Reps have views more radical than these of their members, and certainly deviate more from their members views, than do Shop Stewards from the views of their (Hourly-Paid) members.

Table ~~A3.39~~ shows that while Staff would not accept Management as being dominant, that there should be greater influence for other categories - especially Foremen. This, it should be remembered, is similar to the view already expressed by Management i.e. that the influence of the Foreman should be rather more than either Staff or Hourly-Paid.

The problems which Staff experience in getting Promotion are clearly expressed in Excerpt ~~A3.34~~. For this Staff Respondent the problem did not express itself as a challenge to Management taking the decision - rather the problem was the arbitrary and unplanned way in which Management

took the decision. The Respondent does not challenge the right of Management to take Promotion decisions. What he does express is the unfairness when the decision is taken arbitrarily - no procedures, no training in how to interview, no use of standardised interview techniques - indeed he tells of his 2 promotion interviews when he was not even asked any questions.

It is in short the arbitrary use of Management power in this area which is challenged - not the use of that power itself. That is deemed to be legitimate.

Hourly-Paid

As with what has gone before, for the Hourly-Paid, and their Shop Stewards, it is Management who constitute the dominant group in decision on who is to be promoted. From Tables A3.41 and A3.42 it can be seen that the desired changes in distribution of influence would be to

- a) increase the influence of the Hourly-Paid over promotion decisions. The level of Staff and Foreman influence would be held more or less constant, though there is a slight decline in their distribution. Among the Shop Stewards there would be a decline in Staff, but not Foreman influence. The net effect of this is to create equality of influence - between staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid for the Hourly-Paid sample, - but only between Foremen and Hourly-Paid for the Shop Stewards, Staff having a lesser degree of influence.
- b) reduce the level of Management influence. It is interesting that while both Hourly-Paid and their Stewards create an almost identical pattern of responses in response to 'how much influence would Management ideally have over Promotion', the Stewards perceive the Management as actually having much more influence than the

Hourly-paid sample perceive them to have. It should however, be noted that the overall pattern of responses, for both Hourly-paid and shop stewards, implies no challenge to the right of Management to take decisions over promotion - even in response to the 'ideally' question Management are still the dominant group. This dominance may also be perceived in Excerpt ~~A3.35~~ - S'Who decides that (promotion)?' R 'Management'. For this Respondent, therefore, it is a Management decision as to who should be promoted. There is, however, still an element of fairness involved in all of this - whoever is promoted must have the qualifications to merit this promotion. Phenomena like favouritism or negotiation would clearly offend. Unlike Staff, however, this Respondent makes no reference to 'technical' criteria in selection for promotion i.e. the emphasis on procedure, training in how to interview the mentioned in Excerpt ~~A3.34~~.

For this Hourly-Paid Respondant, therefore, it is a Management decision, which is questioned only if "the chaps no got qualifications (so) it looks like as if somebody's spoke for him". As long as the person promoted is suitable to do the job then the Respondent goes along with the decision. Even if there are the problems referred to - absence of the appropriate qualifications - the Respondent is passive "just got to accept it".

Hence for the Hourly-Paid worker - and for his Shop Stewards - this is, and ought to be, a decision for the Management to take. Any change is, as we have seen before, in the direction of increased influence for the other categories i.e. that Management should take the decision, but beforehand there should be an exchange of information and views, so that the last decision can be arrived at. This, as we have

seen is true also of Staff. The Management view emphasises this really only for Foremen, though Staff and Hourly-paid would have more influence. The exception to this are the Staff Union Reps whose distribution of responses implies a move toward equality in taking decisions on promotion. They, however, appear to be the only category who hold this view.

In all 3 of these issues - Recruitment, Transfer and Promotion - the dominant view has been the same i.e. that, even ideally, Management would continue to take the decisions. The role of other employees would be secondary. We have interpreted this as meaning that their influence (Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid) would increase, such that they could make their views known to Management, and that this would be an input to the Manager, when taking his decision. Such a view has already been expressed directly by some Respondents (see for an example Excerpt A3.33). This view will however, be expressed more directly when we consider at the end of this Chapter specific alternatives to the existing system of decision-making, and in particular the possibility of worker directors.

Before that, however, there are still several other issues we have to deal with. The next issue is one of considerable importance in, as we saw in Chapter III, an area of high unemployment.

Redundancy

While unemployment in the locality is, and has been, high relative to the rest of the U.K., speaking to employees of this Company about redundancy was not particularly easy. As we stated in the previous Chapter, there had not been a redundancy in the Company in the previous 30 years. Hence much of what follows required us to invite the

Respondent to conjecture. While it may be objected that it does not reflect accurately the situation with respect to a Redundancy situation, what we shall present is (a) a reflection of perception of the power structure in the Company and (b) a description of employee views on what would happen if there was a redundancy declared by the Company, and hence how we would employers to react if a redundancy was to come about.

Management

The Management view on how influence would be/would ideally be distributed is presented in Table A3.4B. From this it can be seen that Management regard themselves as the most influential group on the event of a redundancy taking place. The distribution of response - both as actually perceived, and ideally perceived - are very similar to those we have already discussed above. In particular, while Management perceive themselves as dominant - and believe that this dominance would continue in an ideal situation - there is a, marginal, increase in the increase of the distribution for the other categories, especially Foremen, rather than Staff or Hourly-Paid.

It is, however, perfectly clear that Management believe, that in the event of a redundancy being declared, that they would be dominant in the course of events. The role of the other groups in the Company would be qualitatively different - to present their views etc., but Management would be most important. As we shall see, perhaps not unexpectedly this is not an attitude the other groups necessarily go along with.

Table A3.43- Redundancy - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foremen</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	22/23 69%/72%	8/8 25%/25%	5/9 16%/28%	10/9 31%/28%
Some	10/9 31%/28%	12/19 38%/59%	15/19 47%/59%	11/20 34%/63%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	9/3 28%/9%	10/3 31%/9%	8/2 25%/6%
None	0/0 0%/0%	3/2 9%/6%	2/1 6%/3%	3/1 9%/3%

Table A3.44- Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	60/49 85%/69%	4/17 6%/24%	7/20 10%/28%	10/19 14%/27%
Some	10/22 14%/31%	29/42 41%/59%	33/43 47%/61%	23/36 32%/51%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	27/8 38%/11%	23/6 32%/9%	23/12 32%/17%
None	1/0 1%/0%	11/4 16%/6%	8/2 11%/3%	15/4 21%/6%

Table A3.45- Staff Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	5/2 71%/29%	1/3 14%/43%	1/2 14%/29%	1/3 14%/43%
Some	2/5 29%/71%	2/3 29%/43%	3/4 43%/57%	2/4 29%/57%
Very Little	0/0 0%/0%	2/0 29%/0%	1/0 14%/0%	2/0 29%
None	0/0 0%/0%	2/1 29%/14%	2/1 29%/14%	2/0 29%

Table A3.46- Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	38/27 79%/56%	11/12 23%/25%	11/14 23%/29%	11/21 23%/44%
Some	7/17 14%/35%	20/21 42%/44%	21/21 44%/44%	16/22 33%/46%
Very Little	3/2 6%/4%	8/7 17%/15%	11/8 23%/17%	15/1 31%/2%
None	0/2 0%/4%	8/7 17%/15%	5/5 10%/10%	6/4 12%/8%

Table A 3.47-Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	16/9 94%/53%	2/2 12%/12%	4/4 24%/24%	7/10 41%/59%
Some	1/7 6%/41%	6/9 35%/53%	9/9 53%/53%	4/7 24%/41%
Very Little	0/0 0%	4/3 24%/18%	2/2 12%/12%	4/0 24%
None	0/1 0%/6%	5/3 29%/18%	2/2 12%/12%	2/0 12%

Staff and Staff Union Reps

We saw that in respect of Promotion decisions, above, and over other issues, Staff Union Reps. have deviated from the views of their members. In the issue of Redundancy, this happens again.

In Table ~~A3.45~~ it can be seen that among Staff Union Reps, the Management are deemed to be the dominant category. Their view of the 'ideal' situation is, however, very different, as then the dominant categories would be the Staff and the Hourly-Paid, with Foremen and Management having slightly less influence. The reasoning behind these attitudes is clear from Excerpt ~~A3.36~~ from a Staff Union Rep. In this he makes perfectly clear his reservations about the way redundancy is currently organised - the lemming - like rush toward redundancy payments and an (unseen) life of long term unemployment, exacerbated by the substitution of labour by capital equipment. In his, ideal and Socialist, alternative such considerations would not apply - profit and loss would only be one consideration - but also considered would be the conviction of the employees e.g. to stop overtime in order that nobody would lose their jobs. It is, however, recognised implicitly that the basic wage would have to be higher than now by using, for instance, money currently paid as unemployment benefit. It is, however, the last phrase which is most telling - "What you've got to do is to change people's thinking" - recognising an essentially individualistic way of thinking as dominant now, to be replaced by a more collectivist view e.g. that a is prepared to give up his overtime in order that b can keep his job and not be made redundant. The means to achieving this clearly require less emphasis on pure technical efficiency, and on financial criteria, and rather more emphasis on (in Marxist terms) 'human needs'. In other words at least, in relation to the profits and productivity in the Company, the people it employs ought

to count for rather more.

It could, however, be easily seen by comparison of Table ~~A3.45~~ (Staff Union Reps) to Table ~~A3.41~~ (Staff) that the Union Reps ideas were more radical than those of the people they represent.

Excerpt ~~A3.37~~ indicates that, despite this, the difference may be a lack of an perceived alternative to Management control over such redundancies. The Respondant in Excerpt 5.38, who is from the Staff, makes clear the inhumanity of a redundancy (e.g. reducing his section from 26 to 5 employees), and that alternatives to such drastic action should be considered. It is, however, clear from Excerpt ~~A3.37~~ in contrast to Excerpt ~~A3.36~~ that the Staff Respondent, frame of reference is inalienably hierarchial - his thinking is based on, at least a pragmatic, acceptance of hierarchy. The emphasis is certainly on fairness in what he says - but as he makes clear, the initiative lies with Management in the case - "the unions would try to push the number involved back". In the society we live, the worker is, for the Respondant in ~~A3.36~~, relatively powerless - "the trend in society is to invest in machines that'll do away with people". Only in a socialist society would there be any change in this - but it is clear that for him this is totally different from the society we have now - the 2 types of society have so meaningful relationship to each other in this Respondent's orientation.

Excerpt ~~A3.37~~ - from an Hourly-Paid Respondent - does, however, imply some sort of middle ground between the alternatives partial in Excerpt ~~A3.36~~. The Respondent in Excerpt ~~A3.37~~ while recognising the hierarchial position of Management, believes that by more discussion "an easier way"

than redundancy could be found - "Even a cut in pay".

It may well be objected that the Excerpt ~~A3.36~~ shows a more comprehensive and critical stance toward capitalism, but if we consider particularly tables ~~A3.44~~ and ~~A3.46~~ (Staff and Hourly-Paid attitudes on Perceived Control on Redundancy), it is clear that amongst these groups the attitudes in Excerpt ~~A3.37~~ are probably more typical, than these in Excerpt ~~A3.36~~. The dominant attitude appears to be that while both Staff and Hourly-Paid respondents want to feel they could exercise more control over a redundancy, the dominant group would remain as Management. Only amongst Staff Union Reps, (Table ~~A3.45~~), and Shop Stewards (Table ~~A3.47~~) is there any evidence of a desire to go beyond this, with both showing (only a slight) desire for Management to be less than dominant. It is interesting to observe that while Staff Union Reps would have Staff and Hourly Paid of equal influence (both greater than Management), the Shop Stewards mark Staff severely down, having much less 'ideal' influence than Management or Hourly-Paid. This is symptomatic of a conflict we have discussed above, between Staff and Hourly-Paid - particularly between their respective union officials.

Redundancy in view of the relatively high level of local unemployment, does pose a puzzle. Faced with what are, objectively, relatively poor chances of another job, it is a frequently remarked-on phenomenon that workers can be 'bought out' by redundancy payments. We can see from Excerpt ~~A3.38~~ (An Hourly-Paid Respondent) that in this Company things are much the same. The Respondent, even with 'first-in, last-out' posed to him, emphasises that the lure of a large redundancy payment would be sufficiently attractive to ensure that those to be made redundant would be the older, longer service man. Hence, at the end of the day, the role of the union - for this Respondent - is, in the first instance, is to protest, and perhaps reduce the number of jobs

377

TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE

to be lost, but eventually simply to get the best redundancy, payments possible. This clearly reflects the basic power structure - the central decision, to make x number of workers redundant, is taken by Management. It is only, relatively, at the margin - size of redundancy payments - that the union plays a role.

This is a condition we have seen already. Indeed it is the extent of Staff and Hourly-Paid influence at the margin which has been the most important feature of this Chapter. In looking at Redundancy we have seen the dominant influence - even in the 'ideal' situation - would still be in the hands of Management. The issue is the extent of influence which Staff and Hourly-Paid would have in an ideal situation. There is no clear wide-spread over-throw of Management authority, or hierarchy - though there is a minority who think in this way - the real issue is the extent to which Management are influenced by their hierarchical subordinates as Management take the particular decision. Management are the decision-makers. Any other situation is unimaginable, or at most, relevant only in another type of society which does not exist.

Orders and Company Profitability

As we mentioned in Chapter 3 this is a heavy engineering firm, which is part of a group of companies. These 2 facts have implications for this area

- 1) an order was not a frequent event - even in a good year only about 40 units of their product would be sold. Many potential orders were sought, but only a few were obtained. At the same time obviously, the gaining of orders was of crucial importance for employment - fewer orders meant fewer jobs. As we saw in the previous Chapter the Firm's 'grapevine' worked overtime on this, with contradictory rumours about whether or not an order had been won, sometimes circulating at the same time. Its importance for unemployment did mean, however, that decisions which could affect whether or not a particular order was won or not was of great significance.
- 2) the firm as part of a group was a profit centre. It was expected to stand on its own and make profits for the group as a whole - though it could expect support if this was required. Thus while profitability was perhaps not quite so crucial as it might have been for a Firm operating on its own, outwith a group, the pressures of the group meant that decisions which affected the profitability of the Firm were of great importance, as consistent losses, or poor profits could have meant being sold off to another company, or perhaps being closed down altogether.

Thus together decisions which affected the Firm's ability to win orders, and to make profits before - almost literally - life or death decisions (at least in a commercial sense).

Management

From examination of Tables A3.48 (Orders) and A3.53 (Profits) it is clear that the pattern which we have identified up to now, has largely repeated itself yet again. Namely

- 1) that Management see themselves as having the greatest amount of control, with the other categories playing a subsidiary role, and
- 2) that Management see that their control over these areas should continue, but with Staff and Foremen and Hourly-Paid playing a greater role (i.e. that Management should consult with non-Management employees, but that the final decision does lie with Management).

It is, however, interesting to note a variation in view between perceptions of Orders and Profitability. In the former the degree of control perceived by Management as being possessed by non-Management groups is rather less than in the latter e.g. 25% of Management see Staff and Foremen, and 31% of Management see Hourly-Paid employees as actually having 'A Great Deal' of control over decisions which affect the Profitability of the Firm. Whereas the same figures for Decisions which affect the Firm's ability to win orders are 3% (Staff), 6% (Foremen) and 3% (Hourly-Paid). While Management see themselves as having most control in each area, it is clear the control of other groups is seen as being more pronounced when decisions are being taken which affect Profitability, than when decisions affect the ability of the Firm to win Orders. Why should this be?

First of all let us consider why it is that non-Management employees are seen to play a role in the Profitability of the Company. In

Table A3.48 Orders - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	22(69%) 28(88%)	1(3%) 2(6%)	2(6%) 4(13%)	1(3%) 2(6%)
Some	9(28%) 3(9%)	14(44%) 22(69%)	8(25%) 16(50%)	7(22%) 16(50%)
Very Little	1(3%) 1(3%)	14(44%) 6(19%)	16(50%) 7(22%)	14(44%) 7(22%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	3(9%) 2(6%)	6(19%) 5(16%)	10(31%) 7(22%)

Table A3.49 - Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	52(73%) 63(89%)	9(13%) 14(20%)	6(9%) 13(18%)	4(6%) 11(16%)
Some	16(23%) 8(11%)	21(30%) 41(58%)	25(35%) 42(59%)	12(17%) 27(38%)
Very Little	3(4%) 0(0%)	30(42%) 13(18%)	28(30%) 12(17%)	26(37%) 23(32%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	11(16%) 3(4%)	12(17%) 4(6%)	29(41%) 10(14%)

Table A3.50 - Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	6(86%) 5(71%)	0(0%) 2(29%)	0(0%) 2(29%)	1(14%) 2(29%)
Some	1(14%) 2(29%)	1(14%) 5(71%)	2(29%) 3(43%)	0(0%) 3(43%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	5(71%) 0(0%)	4(57%) 2(29%)	5(71%) 2(29%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	1(14%) 0(0%)	1(14%) 0(0%)	1(14%) 0(0%)

Table 3.51 - Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	42(88%) 43(90%)	12(25%) 18(38%)	7(15%) 14(29%)	5(10%) 10(21%)
Some	6(13%) 5(10%)	21(44%) 23(48%)	15(31%) 22(46%)	8(17%) 22(46%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	7(15%) 4(8%)	15(31%) 9(19%)	14(29%) 11(23%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	7(15%) 2(4%)	11(23%) 3(6%)	21(44%) 5(10%)

Table 3.52 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	14(82%) 13(77%)	1(6%) 5(29%)	1(6%) 4(24%)	1(6%) 3(18%)
Some	3(18%) 4(24%)	7(41%) 8(47%)	8(47%) 12(71%)	7(41%) 12(71%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	6(35%) 2(12%)	4(24%) 0(0%)	2(12%) 1(6%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	3(18%) 2(12%)	4(24%) 1(6%)	7(41%) 1(6%)

Table A3.53- Profitability - Management

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	22(69%) 25(78%)	8(25%) 11(34%)	8(25%) 11(34%)	10(31%) 12(38%)
Some	10(31%) 7(22%)	16(50%) 16(50%)	16(50%) 16(50%)	13(41%) 15(47%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	8(25%) 5(16%)	8(25%) 5(16%)	7(22%) 3(9%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	2(6%) 2(6%)

Table A3.54- Staff

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	50(70%) 59(83%)	8(11%) 18(26%)	8(11%) 17(24%)	9(13%) 12(17%)
Some	20(28%) 12(17%)	35(49%) 42(59%)	35(49%) 46(65%)	24(34%) 37(52%)
Very Little	1(1%) 0(0%)	21(30%) 9(13%)	22(31%) 6(9%)	21(30%) 16(23%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	7(10%) 2(3%)	6(9%) 2(3%)	17(24%) 6(9%)

Table A3.55- Union Reps

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	7(100%) 5(71%)	0(0%) 3(43%)	0(0%) 2(29%)	0(0%) 3(43%)
Some	0(0%) 2(29%)	2(29%) 4(57%)	4(57%) 4(57%)	2(29%) 3(43%)
Very Little	0(0%) 0(0%)	5(71%) 0(0%)	3(43%) 1(14%)	4(57%) 1(14%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	0(0%) 0(0%)	1(14%) 0(0%)

Table A3.56 - Hourly-Paid

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	40(83%) 39(81%)	10(21%) 16(33%)	7(15%) 10(21%)	6(13%) 12(25%)
Some	7(15%) 9(19%)	20(42%) 27(56%)	12(25%) 26(54%)	10(21%) 26(54%)
Very Little	1(2%) 0(0%)	14(29%) 3(6%)	22(46%) 9(19%)	15(31%) 6(13%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	3(6%) 1(2%)	7(15%) 3(6%)	17(35%) 4(8%)

Table A3.57 - Shop Stewards

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>
A Great Deal	13(77%) 11(65%)	2(12%) 4(24%)	2(12%) 6(35%)	2(12%) 6(35%)
Some	3(18%) 6(35%)	8(47%) 8(47%)	7(41%) 8(47%)	3(18%) 10(59%)
Very Little	1(6%) 0(0%)	3(18%) 4(24%)	5(29%) 1(6%)	5(29%) 0(0%)
None	0(0%) 0(0%)	4(24%) 1(6%)	3(18%) 2(12%)	7(41%) 1(6%)

Excerpt ~~A3.39~~ A3.39 we are discussing the possibility of Profit-sharing with a member of the Board in the context of motivation of employees. While he explicitly rejects the idea that profit sharing would necessarily make any one individual work harder, it should ensure, in his view that "people (equate) their well-being with the Company well-being. It follows from that I think that if its reflected in more money when the Company is doing better it always fits this particular picture".

Thus within this Excerpt there is recognition that without the active co-operation of their employees the Firm would do less well (or, in other words, make less profit). In another part of the same interview he explicitly discusses the inter-dependence of the Company - "You've got to keep them all operating satisfactorily and effectively otherwise the thing stops." While this may be a rather negative type of control - that if their Shop Floor unions ceased their current level of co-operation with each other, and with Management, then the effectiveness of the Firm would be reduced (and profits reduced) - it is nonetheless control. The role of all the Firm in ensuring its level of effectiveness, is therefore recognised.

Why, though, should the influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid be rated less highly when we look at the ability of the Firm to win orders? After all if the order is to be won they must put in a good tender - that will depend on, at least in part, the manufacturing efficiency of the Firm. There is, however, a very clear conceptual decision for Management where winning orders is concerned. This can be clearly seen in Excerpt ~~A3.40~~ A3.40 from an interview with a Manager., For this Manager there are 2 aspects to orders

- 1) it is up to salesmen to win orders
- 2) manufacturing rely on salesmen to find work

Thus the ability to win orders depends on the ability to manage the sales force - the sales force mostly having Management status by the time a deal was being finalised. The role of the others behind the person/group from the Firm who were actually face-to-face with the potential customer, was to provide them with the necessary support. Their role, in other words, is conceptually subordinate to that of the person actually doing the selling. In consequence the high degree of inter-dependence which was so prominent in considering decisions which affect the level of profits, rather less prominent in these decisions which affect the ability to win orders, notwithstanding the fact that the degree of success in the latter is a crucial influence on the level of the former.

Staff and Staff Union Reps

It is clear that broadly speaking the same interpretation can be applied here as before. Namely, that for Staff respondents it is Management who exercise most influence in each of these areas (Orders, Tables ~~A3.49~~, and Profitability Table ~~A3.54~~), and that a situation where Management continue to exercise most influence ought to persist. The degree of change is that the Staff suggest that other categories ought to exercise more influence than they have in the past. As we have seen before, though, this stops well short of equality - the dominant group would continue to be Management in each type of decision. From Tables ~~A3.50~~ (Orders) and ~~A3.55~~ (Profitability) it is clear that Staff Union Reps share much the same view. The perception behind this is clear in Excerpt ~~A3.41~~ from a Staff respondent. . It is quite clear from this that "Selling (i.e. getting orders) is a Management job". The role of others is subordinate to this - but clearly still essential "If we didn't produce the work they wouldn't sell them". Hence there are 2 important attitudes in this

- 1) the responsibility for winning orders is one for the Management
- 2) the role of others in the Company is to back this up - to produce product which Management can sell.

It is, then, all the more surprising that by examining Table 5.52 it is clear that Staff see their own influence as being greater than that of Hourly-Paid workers - a situation which they perceive ought to persist. The difficulty here is that it could be argued that it is, after all, the Hourly-Paid workers who actually physically produce the product, with Staff performing various support (but nonetheless essential) services e.g. technical drawing, design, finance, inspection etc. Why should Staff be seen as exerting more influence on the ability of the Firm to win orders. An explanation, we would suggest, has unspoken in the final sentence of Excerpt A3.41. Underlying this sentence is hierarchy itself - "a Manager is in a position to see and understand more than me, thus I am in a position (as a Staff employee) to see and understand more than an Hourly-Paid employee". The perceptual basis of that final sentence is, in itself, hierarchial. For Hourly-Paid employees to be seen to have as much influence as Staff employees would clearly conflict with this.

Examination of other tables reporting Staff responses to questions on influence exerted have shown a tendency for Staff influence to be greater than that perceived for Hourly-Paid employees. What is interesting in particular about Table A3.49 is the degree to which this is true. Only in two other decision areas has the level of desired influence perceived by Staff for themselves had such a large difference when compared to the level Staff believe Hourly-Paid workers ought to have - on Promotion (Table A3.39) and on Financial Policy (Table 5.22). Thus of all 14 decision areas which we questioned Staff respondents on, only in these 3 is there a large discrepancy in the degree of influence

they believe they ought to have, and what they believe Hourly-Paid workers ought to have. On all of the rest - Work pace: pay: cost reductions: transferring employees: work standards; redundancy: recruitment: discipline: investment: decisions affecting profitability: decisions affecting the ability of the Firm to win orders: and as we shall see, on Safety - Staff perceive that there ought to be more or less equality between themselves and Hourly-Paid workers. Why should this be?

It is fairly clear that at least 2 of the 3 deviant decision areas are of significant strategic importance for the Firm (i.e. the ability to win Orders, and Financial Policy). It would, however, clearly be wrong to say that more of the rest are of equal strategic importance e.g. Profitability, Investment. Similarly Promotion decisions, without being unimportant, probably come some way down a list of important strategic decisions. It would not, therefore, be true to say that Staff are arguing for Hourly-Paid workers to be kept out of particularly important decisions.

To argue that way - what should we keep Hourly-Paid out of - is in any case to consider the problem the wrong way round. We can understand this paradox rather better if we approach it from the point of view of 'what should Hourly-Paid employees be included in because they have a contribution to make. The paradox as to why these 3 decision areas - Promotion, Financial Policy and Orders - differ from the rest, is explained by the inability of Hourly-Paid workers to make as effective a contribution as they could elsewhere. There are a number of reasons for this

- 1) when we consider Promotion what we are in effect talking about is a re-ordering of the people in the hierarchy of an organisation. To have capability is in conflict with the principle of hierarchy.

- 2) when we considered Financial Policy we saw that decisions in this area depended on the possession of special mechanical skills which even Hourly-Paid workers recognised they did not have.

Decisions which affect the ability of the Firm to win orders falls into these categories - on the one hand it is clear that the possession of special technical skills is necessary - but at the same time it is clear from Excerpt A3.41 that influence on Decisions which affect the ability to win orders is innately hierarchial, as we suggested above.

Looking at this another way, we could say that it is perceived that Hourly-Paid should have as much influence as Staff on the other 11 decision areas because they have a contribution to make, because

- a) of their (Hourly-Paid) special skills (e.g. Investment - to give advice on what is/is not a good machine), or
- b) simply because of their influence via their track unions (e.g. most obviously on Pay, but also on issues like Discipline).

Thus just as we have suggested above that Management claim influence because they possess special skills, we are arguing here that equality (or near equality) with Hourly-Paid workers is conceded by Staff in these areas of decision-making (11 of 14) where it is perceived that Hourly-Paid workers can make as effective a contribution as Staff can, but not, conversely, where it is perceived their contributions are unequal.

Thus we would put forward 2 major points

- 1) that Management could claim greater influence, and to be dominant in the Firm because they possess special skills which neither Staff nor Hourly-Paid workers possess. They also claim dominance precisely because they are Management. As we have seen

these claims are substantially and effectively conceded by Staff and Hourly-Paid.

- 2) that Staff and Hourly-Paid ought to be formally more or less equal in influence in most decision areas. We have suggested that for Staff this is contingent on the Hourly-Paid being able to make an effective contribution - something they are perceived to be able to do on 11 of the 14 decision-making areas which we have looked at. We have consistently seen a claim for equality by Hourly-Paid workers with Staff throughout this Chapter. This has frequently been on their ability to make a contribution (e.g. on Cost Reduction, purchase of new equipment - investment) - simply because they know by virtue of their work experience. Even more basically, however, there is a claim by Hourly-Paid workers to equality with Staff, as a matter of right. This claim to equality with Staff as a matter of right becomes all the more clear in the next Chapter - on conditions of employment and work expectations. The important conclusion we wish to make here, however - based on the 2 major points above - is that there is no significant tendency for hierarchial organisation to disappear, or be rejected. Its continuation, however, does suggest that it may continue in a somewhat modified form - in particular with a greater emphasis on
- i) claims to specific competencies, and
 - ii) greater emphasis on consultation

We shall subsequently elaborate on these points, but first we must finally discuss the remaining data on this decision-making area.

Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards

Among Hourly-Paid workers the results are similar to those which we have seen before for other areas of decision-making (Tables A3.51 - Orders,

and A3.56 - Profitability). It is the view of the Hourly-Paid respondents that Management have control of decisions in both these areas, and that this ought to continue. On the other hand while Staff have been seen as having more influence than they (the Hourly-Paid) do, but that there ought to be a greater equality of influence - such as we argued above.

Tables A3.52 (orders) and A3.57 (Profitability), however, show a more critical attitude toward Staff on the part of Shop Stewards. In particular in the former, the Stewards while accepting that Management do have, and ought to have, most influence in each area of decision-making, disagree with their fellow Hourly-Paid members, on the question of equality with Staff. It is the view of the Stewards that Hourly-Paid ought to have more influence than Staff. This has also been true in 5 other areas - Recruitment, Transfers Investment, Promotion Discipline. In the first 3, however, Shop Stewards draw a distinction between Staff and Supervisors - this in Recruitment, Transfers and Investment, while Hourly-Paid workers ought to have more influence than Staff, Foremen (Supervisors) ought to have more influence than Hourly-Paid workers. The obvious explanation for this is that in these 3 areas a Foreman is in a better informed position to exert influence, than any other member of Staff. There is, therefore, a clear meaningful distinction for Shop Stewards, between different categories of Staff - at least for these 3 areas. In the case of Promotion Stewards believe there ought to be more or less equality of Hourly-Paid with Staff having less influence than Hourly-Paid or Foremen and Foremen, so that the same explanation can be seen to hold - a distinction of Staff and Foremen, with the former having a lesser role to play.

In the decision in the areas of Promotion and Discipline, as well as Profitability, and in particular on Orders, the Shop Stewards are

saying that Hourly-Paid workers ought to have more influence than Staff - but still less than Management.

Why should this be? There are in fact a number of reasons

- 1) at least in the case of discipline and there was a clear special interest for Hourly-Paid workers - that in this area they had interests which no one else could/should represent, as the role of the union (and themselves as Stewards) was to represent their numbers (and thus exert influence) through disciplinary procedure.
- 2) there was a marked degree of tension between Hourly-Paid Unions and Staff unions. We shall see this clearly in the next Chapter on Conditions of Employment and Work Expectations, and in particular when we consider the role of unions in the Firm. This subordination of Staff to Hourly-Paid workers, may be an expression of this tension.

This latter reason - while trading on personalities and not being generalisable - is in fact extremely important on this question. The relationship of Staff and Hourly-Paid was not always an easy one. This is due partly to the personalities who were involved. It was, however, also due to a more fundamental reason, which was expressed frequently by Shop Stewards and Hourly-Paid. This had its origins in the ratio of Staff. Hourly-Paid in the Firm - which was rather more than one Staff to each Hourly-Paid worker. In the view of the Hourly-Paid this meant each of them was working to support 2+ employees - the Hourly Paid worker, and 1+ Staff employees in the Firm. This was a matter of resentment for Hourly-Paid employees who did not (could not) understand the function of the proliferating Staff - see for instance Excerpt 5.8 where a Shop Steward says "I see some guys in here that just waddle about". It was not uncommon

therefore, to find an attitude toward anyone not at the production end of suspicion as to how they justified their position in the Company.

The views expressed by the Shop Stewards in Tables A3.52 and A3.57 can thus be seen as an expression of this suspicion. The fact that it is not repeated by their members is due to the fact that they had less direct experience of union affairs, and of the tension between Staff and Hourly-Paid within the union structure in the Firm.

It should therefore, be clear that in decision areas of Profitability and winning Orders the hierarchy was subject to a more fundamental challenge by Shop Stewards than by their members. In view of their leading role it is perhaps surprising that we have not found this more often. It has to be remembered that in $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 14 areas we have looked at the Stewards have shown no great discrepancy from the views of their members, and have made clear that they believe that they should be equal with Staff. In 3 of the remaining 7 areas the greatest influence - apart from Management who dominate in all areas - is accorded to Foremen, and in 1, Promotion there is equality of Foremen and Hourly-Paid workers. In these 4 areas the discrepancy between Stewards and their members can be explained by Stewards distinguishing between Staff and Foremen - a distinction these members made less often. It is only in decisions on discipline, profitability and winning orders that Stewards express a desire for Hourly-Paid to have more influence than Staff, and thus to challenge the hierarchy at a still more fundamental level - though without challenge to Management.

Safety

This is obviously a very basic issue of working life - especially

in an engineering company like this, where at the point of production at least accidents could happen which could turn out to be serious. We have, however, already discussed other important issues - Discipline, Investment, Pay - indeed we could argue that all of the decision-making areas we have considered are important (though perhaps not life or death issues, as safety at work can be). It is not, therefore, because of any intrinsic importance that we have left Safety to be the last decision-making course which we shall consider individually. There are 2 reasons why we have left it until last

- 1) with the commencement of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 safety became - by law - a matter of joint decision-making. This Act brought into being (union appointed) (a) Safety Representatives to represent in a specialised way the interests of employees in respect of their safety while at work (b) powers for these Safety Reps - to inspect the work-place, to be able to make representations to Management (c) Safety Committees on which both Management and employees (via their Safety Reps) would jointly discuss and resolve safety problems. Thus with safety we have an issue in which it is a matter of law that there was to be, at least, a greater degree of equality between Management and other employees - if not complete equality. The role of hierarchy as a source of power for Management was, therefore, potentially devalued by the Health and Safety at Work Act - at least in the area of safety.
- 2) From Tables ~~A3.58~~ - ~~A3.62~~ which deal with responses to the series of questions on safety, it is clear that on this issue on the part of all groups a greater degree of equality was (i) perceived as actually existing, and (ii) desired to exist in an ideal situation, than for any other issue.

Examination of these Tables shows for Management the main increase in

S A F E T Y

Table A3.58 Management Responses

	Management	Staff	Foremen	Hourly-Paid
A Great Deal	17 / 24 53% / 75%	6 / 17 19% / 53%	11 / 21 34% / 66%	17 / 20 53% / 63%
Some	14 / 8 44% / 25%	23 / 14 72% / 44%	19 / 11 59% / 34%	13 / 12 41% / 38%
Very Little	1 / 0 3% / 0%	3 / 1 9% / 3%	2 / 0 0% / 0%	2 / 0 6% / 0%
None	0 / 0 0% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%

Table A3.59 Staff Responses

A Great Deal	42 / 61 59% / 86%	13 / 48 18% / 68%	26 / 54 36% / 76%	28 / 54 39% / 76%
Some	26 / 9 37% / 13%	34 / 20 48% / 28%	34 / 17 48% / 24%	25 / 15 35% / 21%
Very Little	2 / 1 3% / 1%	22 / 2 31% / 4%	10 / 0 14% / 0%	15 / 1 21% / 1%
None	1 / 0 1% / 0%	2 / 0 3% / 0%	1 / 0 1% / 0%	3 / 1 4% / 1%

Table A3.60 Staff Union Rep Responses

A Great Deal	3 / 5 43% / 71%	1 / 5 14% / 71%	1 / 4 14% / 57%	3 / 5 43% / 71%
Some	3 / 2 43% / 29%	2 / 1 29% / 14%	2 / 2 21% / 29%	3 / 1 43% / 14%
Very Little	1 / 0 14% / 0%	3 / 1 43% / 14%	4 / 1 57% / 14%	1 / 1 14% / 14%
None	0 / 0 0% / 0%	1 / 0 14% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%

Table A3.61 Hourly-Paid Responses

A Great Deal	27 / 47 56% / 98%	10 / 38 21% / 79%	16 / 40 33% / 83%	18 / 41 38% / 85%
Some	15 / 0 31% / 0%	21 / 8 44% / 17%	22 / 6 46% / 13%	16 / 6 33% / 10%
Very Little	4 / 1 8% / 2%	14 / 2 29% / 4%	8 / 2 17% / 4%	8 / 1 17% / 2%
None	2 / 0 4% / 0%	3 / 0 6% / 0%	2 / 0 4% / 0%	6 / 1 13% / 2%

Table A3.62 Shop Steward Responses

	Management	Staff	Foremen	Hourly-Paid
A Great Deal	12 / 17 71% / 100%	3 / 12 18% / 71%	3 / 14 18% / 82%	7 / 16 41% / 94%
Some	4 / 0 24% / 0%	6 / 4 35% / 24%	10 / 2 59% / 12%	8 / 1 47% / 6%
Very Little	1 / 0 6% / 0%	8 / 1 47% / 6%	3 / 1 18% / 6%	2 / 0 12% / 0%
None	0 / 0 0% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%	1 / 0 6% / 0%	0 / 0 0% / 0%

influence ought to be for Staff and Foremen - though the influence exerted by all groups ought to increase. This is particularly true for Foremen, as it is clear from Table A3.58 that their influence - Management believe - ought to be greater than that of Hourly-Paid workers. The group which Management believe ought to have most control, however, is Management itself. The implication of this is fairly clearly to re-assert the hierarchy. At the moment Management perceive themselves and Hourly-Paid workers to have most influence - then Foremen, then Staff. The Management respondents, however, believe that they themselves ought to have most influence, with Hourly-Paid workers having less than Management, and less than Foremen. (The relatively lower influence of Staff reflects a view that Safety is more of an issue at the point of production than where many Staff were employed e.g. as clerks/typists etc.) Thus the hierarchical ordering re-appears in Managerial views on how influence on safety decisions ought to be distributed. It should, however, still be observed that the level of influence of Hourly-Paid workers in particular is extremely high - higher than on any other issue we have considered. While the influence of Hourly-Paid is maximised on this issue, it is, however, still subject to hierarchical subordination by Management.

It does, however, have to be remembered that we found that safety in the firm was imperfect (perhaps an inevitable situation?). This was so in at least two senses -

(i) in respect of wearing safety glasses (or, it may be more accurate to say, not wearing them). We discussed this above when we considered discipline, and in the previous chapter on Communications. Excerpt 5.12, for instance, recounts the experience of a Staff respondent on the 'attempts' by Management to enforce company rules on safety glasses. The view of Management that greater influence was required does, to some extent, reflect the Management need to resolve the safety glasses problem - and similar problems with respect to safety.

(ii) As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the firm's product is heavy, and two accidents with cranes occurred during the research period. This episode is discussed with a Manager in Excerpt A3.42. Clearly, from this, before the Act came into force, the firm was a pretty average operation with respect to safety - perhaps better than some, but probably worse than others. Since the Act came into force, the Manager quotes the reduced accident and days lost figures as proof of the firm's increased emphasis on safety issues. Despite that, as we have said and raise with the Respondent, there were two accidents with cranes, with units of the product being dropped. As the Manager makes clear, the accident happened because they did not know the weight of the product (the Safe Working limit of the crane was prominently displayed) - but the implication of the Health and Safety at Work Act is that this should have been known, and should have been acted on before an accident came about. This raises two questions (a) whether or not this firm was discharging its obligations under the Act? This is clearly an important question, but not one which is relevant for our purposes. (b) How health and safety decisions come about? We shall explore this latter question when we consider the views of Staff and Hourly-Paid respondents.

Management, therefore, see themselves as being in control of this area - with Hourly-Paid. They believe that while all groups ought to exercise a greater degree of influence than now, that this should be done on a more hierarchical basis, with Management exercising the greatest degree of influence, than Foremen, than Hourly-Paid. Thus while this section began by talking about a greater equality here than in other areas of decision-making, the views of Management make clear that this greater equality is subordinate to the principles and needs of hierarchy.

Tables ~~A3.59~~ and ~~A3.61~~ make clear that such a view is shared by Staff and Hourly-Paid i.e. that while influence of all groups is increased (especially that of Staff), it is clear (i) that decisions on safety are already taken on a hierarchical, and (ii) despite an emphasis on increased influence for all groups, both Staff and Hourly-Paid believe this ought to be on a hierarchical basis, with the greatest degree of influence being held by Management. The only exception to this is the group of Staff Union Reps. whose view is that there should be equality of all groups except Foremen (see Table ~~A3.60~~). Even Shop Stewards (Table ~~A3.62~~) take on a hierarchical view of how decisions on safety ought to be taken.

At the moment safety decisions are influenced to a great extent by the unions within the firm. This point is made in both Excerpt ^{3.43} ~~A1~~ (from a Staff Union Rep. Respondent) and Excerpt ~~A3.44~~ (from a Shop Steward). In both of these Excerpts the role played by the unions in safety issues (e.g. hearing protection - Excerpt 5.59) is made quite clear, both in an advisory capacity (giving specialist advice on particular problems) and as a channel for making efforts to improve the level of safety.

It is, however, still the case that even in the area of decisions on safety - where by law this is supposed to be a partnership and equality - that Management are still dominant, a situation which few apparently wish to change.

The first question we asked specifically about worker directors was whether the respondent's confidence in the company would change if there were worker directors on the Board. The results appear in Table A3.43.

A striking aspect of this Table is that there is no category where at least 40% say their confidence would increase. The most favourable category are Hourly Paid, where 38% say their confidence would increase. Nevertheless even amongst Hourly Paid the modal response is to say that their level of

Table A3.63 "Do you think if there were worker directors here your confidence in the Company to take care of your interests would -

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Increase	2 (6%)	16(23%)	2(29%)	18(38%)	5(29%)
Stay about the Same	10(31%)	39(55%)	2(29%)	22(46%)	10(59%)
Be Less	20(63%)	15(21%)	3(43%)	8(17%)	2(12%)

confidence would remain about the same - 46% give that reply. That response is also modal for Staff (55%) and Shop Stewards (59%), with 23% and 29% respectively saying that their confidence would increase. Furthermore some 21% of Staff say that their confidence in the Company would be reduced if there were worker directors.

Table A3.63 does, therefore, suggest that worker directors are not seen as a panacea for their problems by Staff or even by Hourly Paid, though the latter do seem on the whole to be favourably inclined (there is a distributive skew toward increased confidence, whereas among Staff it is virtually a normal distribution).

It is, however, Management who are clearly against worker directors. Some 63% say their confidence in the Company would be less if there were worker directors. This is wholly consistent with what we have seen so far in this chaoter, concerning Management. While they are prepared to concede a greater degree of influence to Staff and to Hourly Paid, they have consistently been of the opinion that they must retain control. It is clear from Table A3.63 that worker directors represent an excessive dimunition of this control.

Equally it is clear, however, that worker directors are not, as we have said,

the panacea for Staff and for Hourly Paid. Table 5.107 does indicate they support worker directors more than Management, but their enthusiasm for participation at Board level is perhaps rather less than we might have expected. This finding is similar to that reported by Paul Dathkey in "Participation and Industrial Democracy" (chapter 7 passim), who concludes that in "the absence of major experiments (in industrial democracy) in the private sector, it is to be doubted whether widespread shop floor support for the idea will be obtained without the impetus of legislation". (p.95)

Given what we have seen of Staff and Hourly Paid views should we expect any further support for industrial democracy/worker participation among Staff and Hourly Paid? What have we found so far -

- (1) that they feel ill-informed, and would have the system of communication better organised (see chapter IV),
- (2) that they wish to exercise more influence in decision-making - though relatively more on issues closer to their own work situations (e.g. the demand for increased influence was greater on Pay than on Financial Policy - for Hourly Paid see Tables 5.4 and 5.24, and Tables 5.2 and 5.22 for Staff),
- (3) a constraint majored by Hourly Paid and Staff themselves, as this demand for greater influence, was that Management should remain in control. We saw already from the McQuitty Linkage Analyses, and Factor Analysis that Management influence was conceptually distinct from that of Staff and Hourly Paid. Earlier we saw in looking at the Graph data that even on an issue like Pay, it was still concluded by Staff, Staff Union Reps, and Hourly Paid, that Management ought to be the dominant category (see Tables 5.2-5.4). Only Shop Stewards took a different view - they suggested that Hourly Paid ought to be of equal influence to Management (see Table 5.5).

Thus the demand to change the structure of the organisation away from hierarchy toward equality is restricted to such an extent that the dominance of Management is not fundamentally challenged by either Staff or Hourly Paid.

It is therefore ironic that, as we saw in Table A3.63 that Management should see themselves as 'under threat' by workers directors. In this Company at least, however, any demand for worker directors is, for Staff and Hourly Paid, a means to greater influence, but not to challenge Management.

In essence, therefore, Table A3.63 develops further not a disagreement between Management and their employees - but rather a misunderstanding.

This misunderstanding is developed further in Table A3.64. In this table we present the results of asking respondents to put into rank order of importance 5 potential tasks for a worker director. The results are categorised into Management, Staff and Hourly Paid (Shop Stewards, and particularly Union Reps are numerically too small to give meaningful results.

An especially significant result of this Table, given the preceding discussion of misunderstanding, is that all 3 groups say that the most important task of a worker director is to "Help make the Company More Efficient", and then to "Work to Improve Company Relations". Thus over the 3 categories the first 2 tasks of a worker director are a matter of agreement. Indeed Management and Staff agree on the total ordering of all 5 tasks - there are, however, certain differences with Hourly Paid. Hourly Paid emphasise more strongly the importance for a worker director to "Protect Workers Rights", but the ordering of the other 2 tasks ('Keeping Workers Informed of Company Affairs' and 'Encouraging Participation in Company Affairs') is thereafter the same as for Staff and Management.

Thus Table A3.64 indicates a degree of agreement between those 3 groups on what a worker director should be doing - with the exception that Hourly Paid emphasise more strongly than either Management and Staff, his role in 'Protecting Workers Rights'.

Table ~~A3.64~~ What Do you Think is a Worker Director's Most Important Task?

Management

<u>Ranking</u>	Average	1	2	3	4	5
(1) Help make Company more efficient	1.8	20	7	0	2	3
(2) Work to improve Company relations	2.3	10	12	5	2	3
(3=) Keep workers informed of company affairs	3.2	0	5	11	14	2
(3=) Encourage participation in Company affairs	3.2	1	8	10	11	2
(5) Protect Workers Rights	4.4	1	0	6	3	22

Staff

(1) Help make Company more efficient	1.8	40	14	8	5	3
(2) Work to improve Company relations	2.6	9	25	24	8	4
(3=) Keep workers informed of Company affairs	3.3	7	13	11	26	13
(3=) Encourage participation in Company affairs	3.3	9	14	12	14	21
(5) Protect Workers Rights	3.9	6	3	14	19	28

Hourly Paid

(1) Help make Company more efficient	2.1	20	12	5	9	1
(2) Work to improve Company relations	2.8	9	12	11	11	4
(3) Protect Workers Rights	3.2	6	10	10	9	12
(4) Keep workers informed of Company affairs	3.3	6	7	14	9	11
(5) Encourage participation in Company affairs	3.6	6	6	7	9	19

Why, therefore, do Management emphasise their need to retain control when there is less disagreement, and more a misunderstanding between them, and Staff and Hourly Paid? There are several reasons for this.

(i) Management are probably, by and large, unaware of this, i.e. they are acting toward that which they perceive as real, even if incorrectly. The belief of Management of the objectives of Staff and Hourly Paid if there was worker participation is, in other words, incorrect.

(ii) We have seen already the belief by Management that too free access to information would not work (e.g. for commercial reasons), that Staff and Hourly Paid are not trained to take decisions at Board level. Reasons of this type justify for Management their continued dominance in decision-making. This reasoning, in isolation, can be defended - from our point of view, however, what is interesting is that Staff and Hourly Paid would probably concede much of this Management argument, in particular the latter part. In other words, we have seen already how Staff and Hourly Paid do not wish to usurp Management dominance. They do wish to be more influential - but not at the expense of removing Management from their role of dominant influence. If this was conceded, then the former point (on communication) would be closer to resolution, as a greater access to decision-making would not be possible without greater access to company information.

Would Management grant such access? We saw in looking at the options on access to information (Tables 5.99-5.102) that there was disagreement on the role of Management. Management took the view that they should retain a vote on information to be made available - Hourly Paid found this unacceptable and wanted complete freedom of access. Staff were ambivalent - 55% found complete freedom of access acceptable, while 50% found a Management veto acceptable. There is, therefore, disagreement on how access to company information should be controlled. Why do Management wish to retain control? One reason we have established is the argument of ensuring confidentiality.

This was particularly strongly put by a Manager in Excerpt 5.47 - but in Excerpt 5.49 this is challenged by a Shop Steward on the grounds that their interests are the same as the Company's. Or as he puts it "We're not going to stab ourselves or the Company in the back". What this suggests is that Management's view of Staff and Hourly Paid is that they have different interests from that of the Company, and would be more likely to 'leak' confidential information.

Statistically it is true to say that the more people who have an item of information, the greater the chance there would be of it being 'leaked'. The issue of Staff and Hourly Paid motives is, however, rather different. Impliedly Management may be saying that Staff and Hourly Paid are less able to be trusted with the well-being of the Company.

Two questions emerge from this -

- (1) are Management saying this?
- (2) are they correct in saying that?

The following 3 Tables assist us in considering these questions. All of them report the responses to 2 inter-linked questions. Respondents were asked to rank 5 company goals according to how they think (a) the Present Board would rank them, and (b) how a Board with Worker Directors would rank them. Management responses appear in Table A3.65. From this we can see that the 2 orderings are as follows:

Present Board	With Worker Directors
1) Making Profits	1) Providing good well paid employment
2) Making as many sales as possible	2) Making profits
3) Being as efficient as possible	3) Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing
4) Providing goodwill-paid employment	4) Being as efficient as possible
5) Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing	5) Making as many sales as possible

Table A3.65 Which Order would (a) Present Board put these goals, and
(b) a Board with Worker Directors?

<u>Management</u>		Average	Ranking	1	2	3	4	5
Providing good well paid employment	(a)	4.2	4	2	4	11	14	1
	(b)	2.0	1	16	7	5	3	1
Making as many sales as possible	(a)	2.4	2	8	14	2	4	4
	(b)	3.6	5	4	4	5	8	11
Being as efficient as possible	(a)	2.9	3	6	3	13	8	2
	(b)	3.3	4	5	1	11	9	6
Making profits	(a)	1.6	1	16	11	5	0	0
	(b)	3.0	2=	4	11	3	6	8
Keeping employees informed of how Company is doing	(a)	4.8	5	0	0	1	6	25
	(b)	3.0	2=	3	9	8	6	6

As we can see, in Management's view there would be fairly major changes in the objectives pursued by the Company if there were Worker Directors.

While making profits would still be an important objective, making as many sales as possible would decline significantly in importance (from 2 to 5) while providing good, well-paid employment would increase in importance (from 4 to 1). Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing would also become more important (from 5 to 2nd, equal with Making Profits).

These changes represent a fairly pessimistic view, for Managers, since the future well-being of the Firm does rely (as we explained earlier) on making sales through being efficient. The ordering of goals makes fairly clear a Management view that the worker directors would change the strategy of the Firm to the personal benefit of those they represented (good well paid employment, keeping them informed). As we shall see in Tables A3.66 and A3.67 this was not the view taken by Staff and Hourly Paid.

Table A3.66 gives the responses of Staff to this question. These orderings were -

Table A3.66 Which order would (a) the Present Board put these goals, and (b) a Board with Worker Directors?

<u>Staff</u>		Average	Ranking	1	2	3	4	5
Providing good well paid employment	(a)	3.3	4	9	7	15	33	7
	(b)	2.5	1	26	13	12	13	7
Making as many sales as possible	(a)	2.0	1	28	13	12	13	2
	(b)	2.7	2	16	19	14	12	10
Being as efficient as possible	(a)	2.9	3	9	17	27	11	7
	(b)	3.0	3	10	13	23	14	11
Making profits	(a)	2.3	2	23	22	11	9	6
	(b)	3.1	4	12	12	18	16	13
Keeping employees informed of how Company is doing	(a)	4.5	5	3	1	3	14	50
	(b)	3.7	5	6	13	7	17	28

Present Board

- (1) Making as many sales as possible
- (2) Making profits
- (3) Being as efficient as possible
- (4) Providing good well paid employment
- (5) Keeping employees informed of how the company is doing

With Worker Directors

- (1) Providing Good well paid employment
- (2) Making as many sales as possible
- (3) Being as efficient as possible
- (4) Making Profits
- (5) Keeping employees informed of how Company is doing

As we can see Staff and Management have a large amount of agreement about the present board of directors' objectives. The only difference in their rank orderings is that 'Making as many sales as possible' and 'Making Profits' change places - the other 3 are agreed on. It is when we move to how they think a Board with worker directors would order these objectives that the differences begin to appear. We saw in Table A3.65 that the Management view was that a Board with worker directors would emphasise the provision of good well paid employment, at the expense of efficiency and winning orders. As Table A3.66 shows clearly, this is not the view of Staff. Certainly 'providing good well paid employment' becomes the most important objective - but being efficient and making sales remain important objectives even for a

Board with worker directors (number 3 and number 2 respectively), 'Making profits' and 'Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing' would not be as important for such a Board in the view of Staff, as they were in the view of Management.

We argued above that Management seemed to take the view that Staff and Hourly Paid could use participation/industrial democracy to their own ends, rather than for the benefit of the Company. Table A3.66 does show that in the case of Staff this is not so - and that in particular the inter-dependence of their interest and of the Company is well understood.

Table A3.67 shows identical views on the part of the Hourly Paid. Their orderings were -

Present Board	With Worker Directors
(1) Making as many sales as possible	(1=) Providing good well paid employment
(2) Being as efficient as possible	(1=) Making as many sales as possible
(3) Providing good well paid employment	(3) Being as efficient as possible
(4) Making profits	(4) Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing
(5) Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing	(5) Making profits

An interesting contrast between Hourly Paid, and Management and in particular Staff is the relative orderings of 'Making profits' and 'Providing good well paid employment'. Among Management and Staff the latter was always preceded by the former (1, 4 and 2, 4 respectively), but among Hourly Paid they perceive in the present Board that 'Making Profits' is less important than 'Providing good well paid employment'. To understand a little why Hourly Paid should believe this, we have to understand that this Company, certainly at the time of the study and for many years before that, had been one of the better paying companies in the area. This, from the point of

Table A3.67 Which order would (a) the Present Board put these goals, and (b) a Board with Worker Directors?

<u>Hourly Paid</u>		Average	Ranking	1	2	3	4	5
Providing good well paid employment	(a)	2.9	3	8	12	8	19	1
	(b)	2.5	1=	15	10	8	13	2
Making as many sales as possible	(a)	2.2	1	17	14	10	4	3
	(b)	2.5	1=	10	16	13	3	6
Being as efficient as possible	(a)	2.7	2	11	9	17	7	4
	(b)	2.8	3	13	7	13	9	6
Making profits	(a)	3.2	4	10	9	6	8	15
	(b)	3.5	5	7	6	9	10	16
Keeping employees informed of how Company is doing	(a)	4.0	5	2	4	7	10	25
	(b)	3.2	4	3	9	6	12	18

view of Management (as one of them put it 'to pay in the upper quartile') was a quite deliberate policy to attract and retain a high quality labour-force - a reflection of the high technical skills required to produce the product. The fact that the Company did pay well had obviously not escaped the Hourly Paid in making this assessment (though we do not know their level of awareness of why the Company paid well).

Why did Management and Staff not take the same view as Hourly Paid? In discussing pay at the very beginning of this chapter, their salaries tended to be assessed by them in relation to what they could earn elsewhere. In other words they essentially saw things the other way round - that if they could earn more elsewhere, they would do that. Hourly Paid tended to see the Company as paying more than they could get in most other companies.

In other respects the ordering for the Present Board as perceived by Hourly Paid is very similar to that of the Staff and Management. Like Staff and Management the Hourly Paid believe the present Board place a high importance on Making Sales, and relatively little on keeping them informed about how the Company is doing.

Like Staff - but unlike Management - the Hourly Paid believe a Board with worker directors would place a high importance on 'Providing good well paid employment', and on 'Making sales' (these 2 are equal first), than 'Being as efficient as possible'. Thus Both Staff and Hourly Paid take a different view from Management of how a Board with worker directors would behave. Management, we saw, took the view that they would put the interests of employees first, at the expense of efficiency and sales. Tables A3.66 and A3.67 show that while Staff and Hourly Paid believe a Board with worker directors would put a higher importance on Providing good well paid employment, sales and efficiency would still be relatively important. Hourly Paid, like Staff, recognise the inter-dependence of company well-being and their own.

To return to the 2 questions we started out from in this section, it would appear -

- (1) that Management do suspect that Staff and Hourly Paid may be less able to be trusted with the well-being of the Company, but
- (2) they do not seem to be correct in that view in so far as Staff and Hourly Paid are aware of the inter-dependence of their interests and those of the Company.

Thus, while Staff and Hourly Paid would look to their representatives to provide them with 'good well paid employment', Tables A3.66 and A3.67 do seem to indicate a clear connection in their minds between getting orders and being efficient on one hand, and the provision of that 'good, well-paid employment' on the other. The view of Management, based on Table A3.65 is rather more pessimistic in that the view there seems to be that good well paid employment, profits and keeping employees informed would be more strongly emphasised than sales and efficiency, i.e. that the link we referred to between sales, efficiency and employment, would not exist.

This, however, is not to say that Management are wholly pessimistic about participation. The value of participation in the perception of Management is apparent in Tables A3.68 and A3.69

Taking Table A3.68 first this asks respondents if the experience of employees would be valuable for company decision-making, or whether their lack of decision-making experience would permanently disqualify them from a role in board level decision-making.

Table A3.68

Would you say -	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
(1) Experience of Employees be valuable in Company decision-making	24(75%)	55(78%)	6(86%)	35(73%)	14(82%)
2) Their lack of experience in decision-making would permanently disqualify them from playing a useful part in decision-making at Board level	8(25%)	14(20%)	1(14%)	12(25%)	3(18%)

This table shows quite clearly that in the view of most Managers employees do have a role to play in company decision-making - only 25% say that their lack of experience would be a permanent disqualification. The view of Management is in fact very similar to that of the other groups, though Staff Union Reps and Shop Stewards are rather more in favour of the view that 'employees' experience would be a valuable input than Management, Staff and Hourly Paid. The difference is, however, slight - and the members of Shop Stewards and in particular Staff Union Reps is too small to draw any conclusion. It is, however, interesting that once again the lay union representatives are taking a more strongly held view than that of their members. This, it should be remembered, happened very often in looking at the control graph data at the beginning of this chapter.

Table A3.69 shows the responses to a question on whether more interest would be shown in the Company if there was participation at Board level.

Table A3.69 If there was participation at Board level would personnel -

	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
1) Take a great deal more interest in the Company besides their own work situation	7(21%)	23(32%)	2(28%)	21(44%)	7(41%)
2) Have some more interest in the Company besides their own work situation	17(53%)	28(39%)	4(57%)	18(38%)	8(47%)
3) Have about the same level of interest as now	7(22%)	20(28%)	1(14%)	8(17%)	1(6%)
4) Have less interest	1(3%)	0	0	1(2%)	1(6%)

There is a very clear view being expressed in this table, that if there was participation at Board level, there would be more interest shown by employees in the affairs of the Company generally (as opposed to the employee's specific work situation). Management and Staff Union Reps. do perhaps hold this view marginally less strongly than other groups, in that more than 50% of each of these groups say there would be only 'some more interest', while among Staff, Hourly Paid and Shop Stewards the numbers saying 'a great deal more interest' are nearly the same as those saying 'some more interest' would be shown. That, however, is a marginal difference. It is quite clear that there is agreement that participation would create more interest in the Company.

Thus in looking specifically at worker directors we have seen that -

(1) Management in general takes a pessimistic view - their confidence in the Company would decline, they believe a Board with worker directors would fundamentally alter the objectives of the firm away from sales and efficiency toward providing good, well paid employment, profits and keeping employees

informed. Their view is not, however, wholly pessimistic - they do believe that employees would draw more interest on the company affairs, and that the experience of employees would be a valuable input to the decision-making in the Company.

(2) Staff and Hourly Paid would in contrast have more confidence in the firm if there were worker directors, they believe they would have more interest in the affairs of the Company and could make a valuable input to company decision-making. In respect of what such a Company, having a Board with worker directors would do, they agree with Management that it would give more emphasis to providing good well paid employment, but unlike Management they believe it would continue to emphasise sales and efficiency.

(3) That the Management view of what worker directors would mean is different in important respects from what Staff and Hourly Paid think it would mean. Particularly in Table ~~A3.65~~ Management can be seen to be saying that worker directors would not be good for the Company, in that the relative importance of temporary goals would change. In fact from Table ~~A3.66~~ and Table ~~A3.67~~. we can see that Staff and Hourly Paid foresee fewer changes in the relative importance of Company goals, the main change being in respect of providing good, well paid employment. In addition we have seen at various points in this, and the preceding chapter, that employees appreciate very strongly indeed the link between their employment and the ability of the Firm to win orders. Finally, on this point, we can see in Table 5.108 that Management and Staff see the role of the worker director in exactly the same terms, while the differences among Hourly Paid are not great (the relative importance of protecting workers rights).

Thus we can see that the pessimism of Management in respect of worker directors depends on a misapprehension about what Staff and Hourly Paid would expect a worker director to do. As we have seen in this section Staff and Hourly Paid would expect of a worker director pretty much what

a Manager would like him to be doing!

What sort of person would make a good worker director is suggested by Table A3.69. This gives the responses to a question on which is the most important quality for a worker director. With the exception of Staff Union Reps (who take no really clear view) more than 50% of every other group take the view that his most important quality would be to try to make 'the Company more efficient and competitive than it already is', which is consistent with the argument that we presented immediately above, that everyone in the Company took the view that what was required of worker directors was to help it to be more efficient and so win more orders, and thus create more secure, better employment.

Table A3.69 Which is the most important quality of a Worker Director?

	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
(1) Integrity	10(31%)	19(27%)	2(29%)	9(19%)	4(24%)
(2) A good negotiator	1(3%)	8(11%)	2(29%)	12(25%)	3(18%)
(3) An interest in making the Company more efficient and competitive than it already is	21(66%)	43(61%)	3(43%)	26(54%)	10(59%)

It is also notable from Table A3.69 that Management, Staff and Shop Stewards place relatively more emphasis on the integrity of a worker director than his negotiating ability. Certainly, any other finding would have been surprising for Management, and perhaps for Staff as well (though about 80% of Staff are unionised). It is, however, surprising that Shop Stewards should place even slightly more emphasis on integrity than his negotiating ability. This perhaps reflects a view

that the negotiating function should remain with them as shop stewards, and not go to the worker directors. That, however, is merely a suggested explanation. Hourly-paid, however, do emphasise the negotiating ability more strongly than integrity.

The significant result of this table is, however, to show yet again that worker directors are run by staff and hourly-paid as a means of making the firm more efficient and competitive than it already is - an objective management believe worker directors should pursue, but they they will not.

S. "Do you feel you should have to go to them, or should they supply you with the information on a regular basis?

R. Well, I feel this should be supplied on a regular basis for obviously the men are quite content, in fact they they they are going to get an order and they know they are going to be secure for another year or another two years. They'll not always have that problem at the back of their minds and they are obviously going to more efficient. But I feel put down on the Shop, it happens time and time again, "did we get that?" ... I mean there's an order on just now for () for 15 or 30. Now just $\frac{1}{2}$ and hour before I came up here a lad said to me "Did you hear we got it?".

I says "Well, no I actually didn't hear we got it." He says, "Well it's no actually finalised yet". I mean it goes on like this all the time, it goes about that they've got it and actually it hasn't been finalised and we don't know what the deal is, whether its 30 of one machine or 15 of another. But that's no official either. It's maybe that somebody's dropped it somewhere and somebody has picked it up and passed it on.

S. Do you think there is any way of getting over that? I mean where you get people worrying about their jobs?

R. Well, that's right, we know we are, we know for a fact that the Management are bidding for a big () order. We've no been told whether, at the end of the day, whether we've got it or whether we've got part of it or whether we've not got it at all. Whether

we've lost it. We've no been told that. Maybe it's at the stage they've no finalised it yet. I don't know, but there are rumours going about. I assume at the end of the day, which could possibly be a month or maybe two months later, they'll come and tell us they've got it. I feel if they got it today they should at least tell us next week or the week after. Put it into some form of words on a notice saying that, so many machines.

S. Rather than find out in the Evening Times?

R. Aye, that's right. Instead of the sort of press and T.V. saying the Firm () has got a big order, and we've never heard about it, you know. Oh, I think it helps to, the ... O.K. the Management see the workforce are interested in it. I would say there's no doubt about that. I mean, the men, I would say 99% of the men are interested in the product, interested in seeing the Company doing well."

Excerpt A3.2

- S. "What do you feel about promotion in the Company?
- R. Well the methods of selection are very arbitrary. I've been at two interviews, and I've never been asked a question by the people that are supposed to be interviewing me. But on that basis decisions are made. There's no set down procedure, there's no training about how to carry out an interview. But on the basis of a $\frac{1}{2}$ hour interview they'll decide whether you're the man for the job. But there are standard techniques for selecting people for jobs, and it should be these plus gut feeling that lets them decide."

Excerpt A3.3

S. "What about promotion from the shop floor to staff? How do you think the control of all that is distributed? Do you think it's a Management decision or what?

R. Well, what I think here is it's who you know, that matters a great deal, I think, in here.

S. Uhu.

R. That matters a lot. They write it up on a board maybe the opportunity 'applications can be handed to the Personnel'.

S. Right.

R. And things like that, and a lot of them go in for it and nobody gets it.

S. Do you think it's a fair system? For promotion.

R. Ah well I suppose if they want to, they're supposed to be looking for the best person.

S. Hm.

R. If they get a variety of people coming in, they're bound to pick somebody unless they've decided before."

- S. "What about promotion within the Company? Does the Company have a policy on promotion? Other than, you know, you advertise internally in the first instance and externally afterwards.
- R. Well apparently there is a policy that we use internal talent whenever we can
- S. Hm.
- R. That's paramount.
- S. Yea.
- R. Am. We try to identify talent, we try to identify um probable um eh (what's the word I'm looking for) probable end points, you know end jobs, appropriate situation.
- S. Hm.
- R. But I think we can do a great deal more about this. I think we could structure careers rather more um on the facts.
- S. Hm.
- R. I think as one gets higher up the organisation then of course you've got a much more definitive pattern of, likely pattern, for promotion, career developments, this sort of thing but I think we've got to extend it down the way a bit.
- S. Hm.
- R. Got to formalise
- S. What sort of criteria do you use in promoting people?
- R. Well I probably think the first one is that he's got to be outstanding in his current job. I think that's the first thing that draws attention to him.
- S. Hm.
- R. That in itself then leads and one looks at his qualifications, his background, his general experience um that's probably number two. Then number three is his character, his personality

S. Hm.

R. How he fits into proposed organisations. These three are the three major sort of factors.

S. How much is that see to the sort of decision?

R. At the end of the day it is 90% qualities of judgment. See to the if you like

S. Hm

R. But I think that's de-rating it a wee bit.

S. Hm.

R. There's a good deal of consideration and thought goes into this

S. Hm.

R. Because everyone's acutely aware now of how vital it is that you place the right people in the right jobs. It's so inflexible an arrangement that you can't undo it.

S. How about the sort of social aspects to promotion?

R. Do you mean are there any social bars to promotion?

S. If you like.

R. I think

S. Or social advantages?

R. I think, for example, in certain areas the social acts of a person are important. For example you take the sales marketing side. If you get a guy who eats all his food with a spoon, for example, he's scarcely an appropriate candidate for mixing with top level people you're trying to sell them a multi-million pound order. That sort of thing.

S. Hm.

R. That's the extreme example

S. Hm.

R. But if you take something like engineering and so on, if the bloke's a very talented engineer and can do his work, it's difficult to see anything else being an impediment to this.

S. Well if we took the case of promotion to the Board - there's a feeling that you don't get on the Board unless you've got a degree.

R. Well I think ah this in fact - you've got to relate it to age. I think in this day and age um there is nothing preventing a youngster taking a degree.

S. Hm.

R. Ten or fifteen years ago, it was a different matter altogether. Family pressures and economic pressures could prevent this. I think in this day and age a youngster coming up should have a degree if he's got the potential and the capability. There's nothing in my view that prevents him from doing so. If in fact he hasn't done so.

S. Hm.

R. Then it generates in my mind a question mark.

S. What do you mean by young - less than 30?

R. Yea.

S. What about Senior M - fairly Senior Managers of say about 40/45 age group?

R. I don't think a degree is an automatic disbarment. I mean if you get the guy who is extremely good at his job and doing a crashing good job.

S. Hm.

R. Um He obviously would be considered for the Board or any other appointment. It's not a total debar. It is a general proposition so I think that unless you have just reason for not having taken a degree, you should have it.

S. Aye.

R. Our particular Board certainly they're all Board people, they're all professional qualifed - or professional qualification. Um. I really think that's how it should be.

S. Hm.

R. Hm. And as I say, I think the younger people coming up I don't think this is an unfair screening requirement, if you like."

Excerpt A 3.5

S. "What about promotion? If somebody gets promoted who do you think decides that?

R. I think it's the men at the top who make the decision.

S. Works Management, Personnel Officer and that? Um. Do you think there should be more say from lower down than that or again should they make the decision?

R. I suppose it's up to them who will.

S. Hm.

R. Get promoted.

S. Why do you say it's up to them?

R. I think it's a Management decision.

S. Hm. Why is that?

R. Well, you see when there's promotions and you apply for the job.

S. Hm.

R. It's up to them who they accept for the job, who's got the capabilities to do the job and the experience."

S. "What about transferring people from one place to another, you know, say you get transferred from one bay to another - who decides that?

R. The Foreman I think and junior Management.

S. Do they just come along and tell you that you're moving?

R. Aye.

S. Do you think it's a fair system?

R. I don't think it's a fair system because a bloke can go in to a job in one part of the shop and be shifted to another - a different change altogether, a changeover, you know. The same with cranes. I get shifted about on cranes but the cranes all the controls are different. If you work on a crane for 10 years and you have the same handles but you go to another one the handles are on a different side, you're apt to make mistakes, you know.

S. Uhu.

R. They think the cranes are all rigged the same way.

S. Hm.

R. They just look into one crane and think they're all the same but they're all different.

S. Different side.

R. And if a bloke's content with the job he's got, he shouldn't be shifted about.

S. So what should they do about the system?

R. Well the way they shift people about there's maybe nobody for the job so they should start somebody else for the job.

S. Hm.

R. Cranemen's short.

S. Hm. They should take someone in to do the job rather than shift them about?

R. I think so."

Excerpt A 3.7

S. "What about transferring people from one bay to another? I mean if you were told you were being moved from the (A) shop to assembly, would you get any say in that or is it just up to your Foreman to say?

R. No, if I want a change, I can ask for a change and its up to them - it's a Management decision or Foreman's decision.

S. Hm.

R. Whether to give me a change or not.

S. Do you think you should have more sort of say in the matter? Less?

R. No, I think it's just a pretty fair way as it is.

S. Why would you say it was fair?

R. Well, in my experience if somebody has wanted a change they've got it all right.

S. If you want a change you can. O.K. what about the other way round? If they want to shift you and ...

R. I didn't want to go?

S. You didn't want to go?

R. Well, Id' just go and see the Shop Steward.

S. Hm. Would that work?

R. Aye. They tried to shift a boy in my department before but he didn't want to go so they got him kept."

Excerpt 43.8

R. "I've been up to Work Study a few times and going by them, it's like trying to get blood out of stone for even a minute.

S. Uhu.

R. They're not all the same.

S. Hm.

R. Just some of them are sort of

S. Do you think you should have more control over the bonus system than you've got?

R. Yes.

S. How it operates and all that?

R. Well, to start the way the times are they, well some of them, are good and some of them are bad, but the bad ones are, well, I'd like to get them all good.

S. Hm.

R. But still get the work out.

S. Right. How would you, I mean, if you objected to a time, who would you see about getting the job re-timed.

- R. Ah, it's not very easy sometimes because you've got a that's put into the computer.
- S. Uhu.
- R. Then they give you a percentage and you're supposed to make your bonus off. Sometimes it makes you wonder.
- S. Hm.
- R. For instance the job you used to get a couple of years ago had good times and the machines haven't changed any. It's only in the last couple - say the last two or three years - that the last times I've got have got a lot tighter.
- S. They've tightened them up?
- R. Yes, I don't know, possibly it's the man on the job that's just decided we'll try and push him a wee bit harder.
- S. Do you think it's fair that they should be able to do that? Do you have any comeback?
- R. Not to a great extent. I don't see what I can really do about it, because they just put the things out to the computer and they give you a percentage of that. There's not much you can do about it unless you just keep complaining all the time.
- S. Hm.
- R. Sometimes it gets you an extra couple of minutes.

- S. Do you think there should be some sort of procedure that you've got to agree the times?
- R. Oh, aye, we should be able to do that. In a way we've got that just now. If we've got a time and we don't think it's suitable, we complain about it.
- S. Hm.
- R. To try and get more pay but it's hard. They'll no give you very much.
- S. Like banging your head against a brick wall?
- R. Aye, well, after a while, I've been here for quite a while now, you just say och to hell you cann't be bothered for you know you're no going to get anywhere."

Excerpt A3.9

- S. What about control over the way the product is produced? How much do you depend on the expertise and the knowledge of the guys on the shop floor and of your staff?
- R. Well we have expertise plugged in at every level but I think we sometimes take quite a lot for granted.
- S. Hm.
- R. I mean if one was setting up attempting to build a company product such as we do for example, in the middle of agricultural land for example say and using fundamentally agricultural labour you'd find there was an awful lot of trade skills, manipulative skills that one takes for granted, one would need to expensively set out to train.
- S. Hm.
- R. So there's that and one clearly recognises the situation.
- S. Hm.
- R. I think this is true in all the various intermediate levels. They all apply their appropriate expertise as part and parcel of their sort of jobs. But if you're thinking in terms of the fundamental manufacturing tactics, strategy and investment, then this is done at rather higher levels. If in fact we think the case warrants it we call in consultants to this end..
- S. Hm. Ah. For instance you take the Work Study that you have down in the engine works, this requires the employee to work rather faster than he might do if there wasn't Work Study
- R. It's not very
- S. But if there wasn't Work Study - I didn't say as fast as he could. Do you feel that this has a cost for the Company in terms of quality?

- R. No. I think one's got to be realistic about the current situation. The current situation is this - we originally brought in Work Study, or this particular phase of Work Study, some what - five or six years ago.
- S. Hm.
- R. To try and establish some reasonably accurate standards on the product. This in fact was done with some works payments system generally in trouble. It wasn't universally applied.
- S. Hm.
- R. But a start was made and it covered certain areas in the company. Now all of these payments systems I think have got a finite life.
- S. Hm.
- R. They gradually compromise - they gradually whittle down - they lose the edge. I think one has got to be realistic about what they're worth.
- S. Hm.
- R. From the point of view of control. From the point of view of incentive, and I think most of them probably about three years is the limit, and I'm absolutely certain the one we've got here is not too relevant to Time Study now. I doubt very much if it's very relevant. I think the time has come where we've got to re-think the whole position.
- S. What sort of direction would you see it going? I mean the two, but in one direction so that it is the sort of piecework argument that you get the guys to work just as fast as they can. Then you've got the old salaried approach where the guy comes in and he gets paid whether he produces nothing or whether he works his tail off.
- R. Yea.
- S. Well these are two extremes and very general but what sort of direction would you see them going in? Or what direction would you like to see the thing going in?

- R. Ideally my point of view of course, the thing that we have, the people that are so well motivated and they equate their well being in the company to such a degree that one gets a reasonable output for a reasonable salary.
- S. Hm.
- R. Ah. I don't think there can be any doubt that that's the most attractive way. Now of course you can set about it in a number of different ways. You can introduce a profit sharing element.
- S. Hm.
- R. Various other sort of things. We're currently looking at that at the moment.
- S. Hm.
- R. Our consultants are looking at this. But I think, depending what sort of industry, certainly in our industry everything is sort of time studied to the nth degree and
- S. Hm.
- R. Individual piecework and so on I don't think is relevant.
- S. Hm.
- R. No longer relevant. But I think it is important that we do have accurate standards.
- S. Hm.
- R. So that we can control the business, recognise the business and recognise difficulties while there is still time to do something about it.

EXCERPT A3.10

- S. Who do you think controls the pace of work in the Company?
- R. I think that that is in the hands of us - the management ...
it is one of the management tools and it's up to us to see production is kept within the parameters that we set.
- S. Do you think you maybe push a little bit too hard?
- R. Well, a manager can always discuss with a section just what is a viable production rate for that particular section ... I can well imagine that there could well be a problem where things are left to the individual to make a forecast. That can be dangerous in a sense. But I would have thought it is a Manager's duty to consult with his people just what is required of them and discuss this and what the actual dept. has been set.
- S. Yes, I see. But in the final analysis, should management have overall control.
- R. Yes, it is a management function.

EXCERPT A3.11

- S. How do you think decisions about the amount of work to go through the firm are made?
- R. Oh well, an awful lot of responsibility for decision-making is left to the directors, but I feel that they don't delegate enough authority to make decisions. My experience is, an awful lot of managers, I don't think its through any fault of their own, but they have to go back to their immediate superior to have a decision made. You tend to find all the managers responsible to the same guy for the same thing. So one guy is taking an awful lot of decisions rather than delegated managers.
- S. Why are things like this?
- R. Hm. I think it's up to the directors to educate the managers to take decisions.

- S. Right. [What about the pace you've got to work at? Who do you think controls that or do you control it yourself? Or is it controlled.
- R. Controlled by the number of contracts we have and when they're supposed to be delivered.
- S. It's the volume of work?
- R. Hm.
- S. That controls it for you? Do you feel that you should have more control over it, or do you just have to go with that?
- R. We've got to accept that as it is although we've been asking for more personnel in our department.
- S. Hm.
- R. Just for the volume of the work. It's a problem.
- S. If you were able to have more of an input into the decisions that were made on to your volume of work and how many people are to be involved, would you have then more control over it?
- R. Could be.
- S. Do you feel that you should have more input into how your work is spread over a longer period? Or a long period?
- R. No - put it another way. The Manager always asks us.
- S. Hm.
- R. You know for the - what type of work how much overtime we want to work and things like that].

S. What about the pace at which people have to work? How's that determined?

R. Well again you've got organisational problems. If in a particular area of the Company, a Manager is lax, and he doesn't take an interest through his supervisors, and in their efficiency, then you get people just sitting about. You do your best to maintain a reasonably high level of efficiency, but when you see sections in the same dept., spend half the day picking their nose.....it sort of disillusion you. You see its not enough for a dept. head to sit there and think he's too high above what is going on at the ground - he should know what's going on at the ground level, through his own dept. managers, who in turn should know through their section leaders to operate an efficient section.....But it just doesn't happen.

Excerpt A3.14

- S. Your job means that you've got to work to contain standards - do Management have much to do with that?
- R. No not much, there's not a lot that they have to do about the standard I do the job too. I mean the job's got to be done to such-and-such a standard and that's it - in any case you want to do the job properly. If a job's worth doing its worth doing right first time. When a job's getting revved up being corrected or altered in some way all the time you lose all job satisfaction.

- S. What about the pace you do your work at? How does that get set?
- R. Ours is a fairly standard sort of job here.....youv'e got to be fairly steady. The kind of job I'm in, you've got to get staff in weekly. The quicker I get through the better it is all round.
- S. So your work pace is related to the volume of work?
- R. That's right.
- S. It's not dictated by Management?
- R. Oh no - they just expect you to get through it if its there.
- S. Are they ever unreasonable about this, you know if you have a big glut of work?
- R. Oh no.....I think they would give you somebody to give you a hand with it. There was a time I'd a big pile of stock - cards to get through. Well they asked me 2 or 3 times did I need a hand out. I told him no, I could manage it fine.

- S. How do you see the control over the work-pace? How do you think that's distributed?
- R. The Management call the shots. But only as well as they're able, with regard to sensibility and what they can get away with.
- S. Is this fair?
- R. It'll be hanged for worse. Once there's a closed shop in here the unions can dictate what sort of person you're going to get in here. You wont get people who have independent minds who'll say 'No, I don't want to join' He's got to become a sheep and join in. You get the wrong type straight away then when Management carry on and say 'Well you cannot employ him, because he wont join (Union A TASS). It doesn't matter whether its joining (Union A TASS) or (Union B MATSA) or anybody else. It's all the same.
- S. What would you like to see happen?
- R. Well, if I'm looking for somebody to do his own job, my job and my boss's job, then I'm looking for somebody of that quality. I don't want somebody coming down and saying 'youve got to join such-and-such a union. He might not want to join a union - but he has to join and if he does he's reduced to the mentality of a sheep.

S. What bout um work standards say a wee job you've got to do to such and such a standard.

R. Yae

S. Ah, who decides that?

R. Well I would say that the bonus decides that

S. Bon?

R. Hm. No the man that doing the job. You try, you're on bonus so you try to do that job as fast as you possible can.

S. Hm.

R. And you're going to batter right into it.

S. Hm.

R. You're no going to sort of say you should get a wee bit better finish on that.

S. Hm.

R. You're just going to do the job and, if it's good enough for Inspection, that's it.

S. Hm.

R. But you could've done it better, made a better job if you'd taken your time with it.

R. But again on bonus you're pushing it.

S. The tighter the bonus the less.

R. Yea.

S. What would happen if there was no bonus system?

R. Ahm.

R. You'd get better work. There would'nt be so much scrap.

S. Hm.

R. But then again if we didn't have that we would likely go back to piecework or something like that. You know the way we were before.

- S. Do you think piecework is better than the bonus?
- R. Well I'd just come in and there were men who had been maybe two or three years on the piecework, they all had experience on it but even at that time they were sort of eezy-ozie about it. They were in competition as far as the work went. They wanted the work done.
- S. Right.
- R. You've got to have a _____ but I think it's up to the gaffer. He's the man that tells you if you're no working enough. It's no up to a clock really.
- S. Hm.
- R. Your gaffer should know if you're doing your job right or no.
- S. Somw foremen might feel that if there was'nt bonus system they would have to go and dig some of the guys out of corners.
- R. Yes.
- S. Do you think that's true?
- R. Yes. True.
- S. So you need the bonus system to keep men at their machine?
- R. You need a sort of time on the job but the gaffer should be able to see who's doing it. If he's no doing his job then you just have to move him if he's no doing it right.
- S. Hm. What you really want them to do is something like best times on the job?
- R. Yes
- S. To get more quality and that?
- R. Yes that's right.
- S. If the times were slacker do you think that it would push up the quality or would the guys just sort of sleep on the job?
- R. No I think it would put the quality of the job up because you would take more time whereas just now if you take a cut you say that's no bad but it'll do.

S. Hm.

R. But if you had more time you would say och I'll take another cut and make it better.

Excerpt 3.18

- S. How easy is it to make the bonus? Do you
- R. You've got to work.
- S. It's pretty tight?
- R. Aye you've got to work.
- S. Do you - who decides this time? Work Study?
- R. Work Study comes down and you do a job and they time you when you're doing the job
- S. Right.
- R. And they say take the time of three men and they take the average of whatever time you took to do it then they cut it a wee bit maybe say you cut it a wee bit
- S. Hm.
- R. Then they give you a time for the job and you've got to do it in that time.
- S. Is it negotiable the time? You say this time's too tight.
- R. Well there's certain times for certain jobs so if you don't do it in the time somebody's already, well they people have already added the time out, well they say
- S. Hm.
- R. It must be yourself.
- S. That it's your fault it's not theirs?
- R. Well it's your fault.
- S. Um. Do you think the guts that are actually doing the job should have more say what the times are?
- R. Oh aye. I don't think they should have times at all.
- S. What sort of effect do you think this would have? I mean some of the Foremen might say that if you didn't have times you would have to go into corners and haul guys out to get them to work. Would you agree?

- R. I don't see that because before they had bonuses like that to get the job done, the job done just the same.
- S. Hm. It got done just as quick do you think?
- R. I think so.
- S. What about the work standard. Do you think the work standard is affected by timing the jobs?
- R. I think it has because you're hurrying to get the job done and you're looking at the clock.
- S. Aye.
- R. You've only been given so much that you're maybe just going to kind of skimp a wee bit.
- S. Stick it together the best you can in the time?

- S. What about the control you have over er the pace at which you work um how do you think the control over that is distributed?
- R. Well I thinks it's all right. They like you to do good work. To get the job done they give you time, well they don't give you time, they've got times.
- S. Hm.
- R. If your'e
- S. Exceeding
- R. That's right if they think you're exceeding the time, the charge-hand will come up and say that this job should heva been done.
- S. Hm.
- R. A wee bit quicker, but it's no, we don't get given times.
- S. You don't get timed?
- R. We don't get timed.
- S. You just work.
- R. Aye, just work.
- S. Um. There's no interference from anybody at all? As far as you're concerned.
- R. No.
- S. What about the standard you've got to do your work to - is that something you decide or is it something that's decided for you?
- R. It's something that's decided for me. The chargehand tells you various standards to which you do the work.
- S. Hm. do you feel that you should have more say about the standard?
- R. Well you know sometimes you can be lackadaisical.
- S. Uhu.
- R. It's only a matter of somebody coming up and saying well that wasn't a very good job.

S. Hm. That you feel you need
so to speak to keep the standard up?

R. Oh yes.

- S. Who decides the standard work has got to be done to ?
- R. I would expect it's the Board Room I suppose.
- S. Why do you think that?
- R. Well they're getting the money for the job. That's what they're there for.
- S. It's their job to specify?
- R. Aye.
- S. Um you don't feel that they are dictated to by.
- R. I suppose they will be
- S. Hm. Do you think the guys on the floor should be able to have some sort of input on that
- R.
- S. That he shouldn't need to be.
- R. Well some people do and other ones have just got to rely on themselves
- S. A good tradesman doesn't need to he can do it himself
- R. Aye

- S. What about Recruitment? Do you think that's over-centralised to?
- R. Certainly the policy of Recruitment is determined by the Directors. And it's unfortunate that at the moment we're going through a period of foreign recruitment - you know non-replacement without justification. I find its difficult to see exactly where the decisions are being made. I think again that the directors have a great deal of control over that. They have the major say in whatever happens. What areas are going to be expanded and so on.

Excerpt A3.22

S. What about Recruitment? Who do you think influences that?

R. In my experience, I have applied for extra people to my Manager, and he has said he has been thinking along similar lines. So he must have been thinking, watching the work-load. In a sense though, it's an easy thing to reflect upon, because there have been quite a few people leaving the dept. and not being replaced. The reason for that is outwith the Manager. There has been a restriction by the Board on further recruitment.

S. Has this mattered?

R. Well the shortage of labour has been highlighted, but its been left in Management's court to decide whether to recruit more people. The Board set the limit and have us to get on with taking the hard decisions.

S. Is this fair?

R. We're the in-betweens, obviously. It just depends how strong the case is. I would take it on myself to make the strongest case I could.....that I needed extra hands and to try to paint out the if we don't get these people. If the whole thing isn't handled properly then inefficiency creeps in, and its all a big loss.

Excerpt A3.23

R. It's not boring then.

S. Right.

R. But we have had a recent push.

S. Uhu.

R. The lad who works with me he's just done eight jobs in a row.

S. Hm.

R. And they've taken about two weeks each and not right.

S. You mean the jobs aren't right?

R. Aye.

S. THat you've been pushed too fast then?

R. Everthing's in a hurry.

S. Uhu.

R. On our backs all the time - work overtime.

S. Uhu.

R. Yet we've been trying to get assistance since last year.

S. Uhu.

R. Extra people in the department.

S. Hm.

R. We got one from, a good lad there from internal, and two applicants from in here from I accepted one, put an advert in the paper. The policy of the COmpany is not to disclose any type of salary

S. Hm.

R. We said the minimum qualifications was H.N.C. they published O.N.C.

S. Uhu.

R. So anybody with any thought of looking in the paper for a job sees O.N.C. required doesn't think they'll pay as much. I went back up to Personnel who said they would re-advertise.

S. Hm.

R. That was only three weeks ago. There's been numerous adverts in the papers from the Company but only one for ours.

S. Hm.

R. Yet we are pushed for work.

S. Right.

R. Well I should say pushed for personnel to do the work.

S. Hm. Why does that happen?

R. I don't know.

S. Do you mean that they don't listen to you?

R. I don't know who's pushing where. It doesn't seem any - the Company's getting a block

S. Uhu.

R. In the system. But the only way to prove the block is to let it happen.

S. Aye. To let the work go out late and not get done properly or something?

R. Then we start getting pounding from the

Excerpt A3.24

- S. What about Recruitment? How's that influenced?
- R. Oh, that's 100% Management. They know how many are needed
It's got nothing to do with us.

S. What about un recruitment if somebody's got who decides that?

R. Well management decides and you go and make sure that they've got a Union card.

S. Hm.

R. It's up to them

S. That's the one control that you've got where you can take it up.

R. Good old Union card.

If they don't have a union card it's up to them.

S. Uhu. Does the management respect that

R. The management respects that

S. As much as they should?

R. Aye

S. Um, what about recruitment - I mean who do you think decides about recruitment?

R. You mean if they're bringing men into the factory?

S. Hm.

R. I think Personnel's get a lot to do with that. I mean, I know one or two lads that have been brought back because I heard they're screening them before they bring them in now.

S. How do you mean screening?

R. To see what their past was like. Where they worked before and

S. Hm.

R. How they worked in that place and if they were troublemakers or something like that

S. Hm

R. They weren't going to get in.

S. Do you think that

R. I know the gaffer, the chief Foreman, told two buys that it would be likely that they would be able to be started in about a week. These guys never got started.

S. Hm.

R. That was the head Foreman that told them that. But they had to be screened.

S. Do you think it's a fair system the way they bring people into the Company?

R. Aye, I think it is. I can see their reason for no bringing in unemployed troublemakers and that.

S. Do you think there should be more say from the shop floor say? Or from

R. Do you mean people that they know?

S. Aye.

- R. Applying for the job and sort of saying he's a good guy given him the job?
- S. Or by saying look we need so many extra guys in this department.
- R. Aye. I think it all comes from head foreman. I'm no dead sure but I think he's the man that decides oh we'll need to get another labourer in.
- S. Hm.
- R. We'll need to get another turner in, or something like that and he goes and says to the management and they say OK and the Personnel advertises it and they interview the man.
- S. Hm. That information does go up from the Foreman but the management make the final decision?
- R. Yea.
- S. Do you think the Foreman should have more say in the decision? Or should he pass on the information to the Management to make the decision?
- R. Yea.
- S. Do you think the Foreman should have more say in the decision? Or should he pass on the information to the Management to make the decision?
- R. I think the men, I should say the Foremen, they're the men that should decide really.
- S. Uhu.
- R. Thet're the men on the floor.
- S. Uhu.
- R. And they know where the need is for men.

R. Well the unions specify that so many apprentices will be taken on in each trade. For unskilled though, they only work on wastage - people leaving, dying that sort of thing. If someone leaves the union to try to keep the job open and get someone into the job. Someone with personal connections very often. That shouldn't happen but it is a fact of life. Sometimes the union has a hard fight to keep a job open. Management'll say 'we'll run the place on a shoe-string'. Well that makes them look like good Management.

- S. What about transferring people in the Company? You know, moving them from one dept. to another. Is that a decision that Management take, or is it one there's negotiation about?
- R. Well, they advertise internally, so I suppose it's up to the individual to negotiate.
- S. So it's a matter for the individual?
- R. Yes.
- S. Nothing to do with the union?
- R. Not unless there were redundancies in one dept. The unions would negotiate openings in another dept. I suppose that would be quite a good set-up. I think that would apply
- S. But in general it would be the individual who would decide whether he will be moved about.
- R. I think it's up to the individual to apply as he sees it cropping up.
- S. Who do you think will make the final decision? Who's the most important in that - the Manager or the Individual?
- R. I suppose it will be the Manager that will make the final decision, whether or not the individual's suitable or not.
- S. Is that fair? Should people be able to move about more freely?
- R. I think it's pretty fair at the moment?
- S. Why fair?
- R. Well, they know the type of personnel they're looking for so you might have guys going into jobs they're not suited for.

- S. What about transferring people in the Company? Moving them from one dept. to another. Do management decide that?
- R. That's totally Management. I can go to Personnel and fill in a form to request a move to another dept. But that goes to my manager, saying I've applied to get a move. So the two managers get together and mine says he doesn't want to lose me. So it's not whether you're fit to do the job that decides whether you'll move. Or it could be there are say 3 other applicants for a job, none of them as good as you, but they'll take one of them because they're short-handed. It might be good for the company that sort of thing, but it holds the individual back. My manager shouldn't be told till the decision's taken.

- S. What about transferring people from one place to another, you know, say you get transferred from one bay to another - who decides that?
- R. The Foreman I think and junior Management.
- S. Do they just come along and tell you that you're moving.
- R. Aye.
- S. Do you think it's a fair system?
- R. I don't think it's a fair system because a bloke can go in to a job in one part of the shop and be shifted to another - a different change altogether, a changeover, you know. The same with cranes. I get shifted about on cranes but the cranes all the controls are different, If you work on a crane for 10 years and you have the same handles but you go to another one the handles are on a different side you're apt to make mistakes, you know.
- S. Uhu.
- R. They think the cranes are all rigged the same way.
- S. Hm.
- R. They just look into one crane and they think they're all the same but they're all different.
- S. Different side.
- R. And eh a bloke's content with the job he's got, he shouldn't be shifted about.
- S. So what should they do about the system?
- R. Well the way they shift people about there's maybe nobody for the job so they should start somebody else for the job.
- S. Hm.
- R. Cranemen's short.
- S. Hm. They should take someone in to do the job rather than

shift them about?

R. I think so.

- S. What about transferring people from one bay to another?
What - how do you think control over that is distributed?
I mean if you were told you were being moved from the pipe shop to pipe assembly would you get any way in that or is it just up to your Foreman to say?
- R. No if I want a change, I can ask for a change and it's up to them it's a Management decision or Foreman decision.
- S. Hm.
- R. Whether to give me a change or not.
- S. Do you think you should have more sort of say in the matter? Less.
- R. No I think it's just a pretty fair way as it is.
- S. Why would you say it is fair?
- R. Well in my experience if somebody has wanted a change they've got it all right.
- S. If you want a change you can go. OK. What about the other way round. If they wanted to shift you and
- R. I didn't want to go?
- S. You didn't want to go?
- R. Well I'd just go and see the Shop Stewart.
- S. Hm. Would that work?
- R. Aye. They tried to shift a boy in my department before but he didn't want to go so they got him kept.

- S. What about transferring people from day to day, from job to job - who do you think controls that decision?
- R. Well to me it's just the gaffer comes up if my machine breaks down and says I'm putting you round here.
- S. Hm.
- R. And that's it.
- S. Is that the only time you would be moved if your machine broke down?
- R. Yea.
- S. You wouldn't be moved from one machine to another?
- R. No. Well we might work the next machine too though it would be the same machine, if the job was in a hurry an' that and the lad wasn't in I would go on to it, if the job was in a hurry, the gaffer would ask me to go on there and do that job.
- S. Right. But you wouldn't be shifted from your machine to a different machine?
- R. No.
- S. Unless your machine was broken down?
- R. Unless it was broken down.
- S. Um.
- R. I suppose if they had a good reason they would do.
- S. Uhu. Do you think that the way they would do that would be a permanent move.
- R. Especially if you were making a right mess of your work or something obviously they would move you then and you can't crib about that.
- S. Hm. What could you do?
- R. Well obviously if you think you've been moved unfairly or something like that, for some reason but I can't think you'd be moved.
- S. Um.

- S. What about Promotion. How much influence do you as Manager have over that?
- R. Again, as a Manager, I do to a very small degree. But it's the Directors who seem to control what's happening. Again we're coming back to the point that the Directors are controlling too much and they just can't cope with it all.
- S. Should they be delegating more to their Managers then?
- R. I think so. The Managers should be trusted more. I think maybe that's another problem. The Directors have in the past managed to control the Company and all its internal matters. Now it's just getting too big for that to happen, but they're scared to let go of the reins to the Managers.
- S. Why are they scared? Do they think their Managers are incompetent or do they not trust them?
- R. I think it's a matter of trust really, but that's something which grows only as confidence grows.
- S. Do they think that Management aren't competent to take a decision, or do they think that a Manager would pursue his personal rather than company interest, or pursue his own ambitions rather than those of the Directors?
- R. I'm quite sure Management can deal with that. It's just that the Directors don't believe that to be the case. It's the old adage that I'm the only person able to do that job and not realising that there are others equally capable of doing the job.
- S. They don't realise how talented their Managers are?
- R. Possibly, possibly. I'd be in exactly the same situation if I owned by own business. I'd be a bit scared of letting go of that business to other people.

S. What do you think about Promotion here? How is that influenced?

R. Well it's pretty arbitrary - the means of selection are arbitrary.

I mean I've been at 2 interviews for a job that would have meant promotion, and I've never been asked a question by the people supposed to be there to interview me. But on that basis a decision's made. There's no set procedure, there's no training given on how to carry out an interview. But on that $\frac{1}{2}$ hour interview they'll choose a man for the job. But there are standard techniques for selection that you mark job candidates on using that, plus gut feeling gives you a way to select a man for the job. You've got to have someone who can work with the other people in the Dept. But it's all very arbitrary in here.

S. Who should take the decision then?

R. It should be up to the man who's in charge of the Dept. and if he's responsible to someone else he'll choose the man who gets the best results. But there should be clear cut procedures to see if the man's fit to do the job. I don't just mean on paper qualifications, but to see if he's got the right approach to be in charge of people. You've got to balance one against the other.

- S. What about promotion in the company - who do you think decides that?
- R. Management
- S. Do you think they should decide or as far as you're concerned?
- R. I think it's just a matter of, you know, personality.
- S. Hm.
- R.
- S. Do you think the guys
- R. Input to what?
- S. To make them more have more views to get promotion.
- R. I don't think so. I don't think this is how it happens as far as promotion is concerned. As long as the chap's got the qualifications It's only when the chap's no got qualifications it looks like as if somebody's spoke for him.
- S. Does that happen often?
- R. I've never known it to happen.
- S. Do you think that, I mean supposing you were needing a new chargehand in here, do you think the foreman or the Personnel would decide who the chargehand should be or should you get some say on who should get the job.
- R. Oh I suppose it's the foreman who decides who the chargehand should be.
- S. Hm or should you, the respondent's work group, decide who your chargehand should be rather than the foreman?
- R. The person who is most suitable for the job.
- S. Hm. It's left up to the foreman. What about a
- R. In fact his decision might no be right.
- S. Hm. What if it's no right should you have any comeback or do you just accept.
- R. Just got to accept it.

- S. What about redundancy the, do you think that you've enough influence there - I mean if there was to be one?
- R. Well I don't know about that. I think the union would have to be in on that a lot more than they are on some things.
- S. What do you think would happen?
- R. Ah, the Management would come along and say 'right, that's it you've no jobs and that's it, I mean you're out on the street aren't you. Whereas they've got a nice lump sum tucked away somewhere in the bank for future days.
- S. Well obviously you think that's wrong, but what would you like to see done to change it?
- R. There should be more discussion on the whole thing. I mean years ago, before I was here, I heard they cut back (Respondents Section) from 26 to 5. Now I mean that's drastic. There must be an easier way than that. Maybe not as far as the Management's concerned, but as far as the men are concerned. We should all be prepared, if the Company gets in a bad way, there must be plenty alternatives to mass redundancy that can be offered to the work force. Even a cut in pay. We'd have to compare all of the alternatives to see which is the best one.

EXCERPT A3-38

- S. What about redundancy? If there was to be a redundancy in the Company how do you think that would be decided?
- R. Ah. I think the ones that are in a number of years - well they're the first to go right away I think because they try to hold on to and then the ones that are near retiring - they want to get rid of them as well.
- S. Hm.
- R. Just keep chopping it down.
- S. Hm. It would be the oldest people that would go out?
- R. Yea. They would be near retiring I would imagine.
- S. It wouldn't be on "last in first out"?
- R. No, for they would need to pay the men money. I think it would be you know to try and save the Company, maybe
- S. To pay off the longer service blokes, would that not mean more money?
- R. The ones that were in the longest would get the most cash.
- S. Uhu. But if it were last in first out it would be the people that were in shortest
- R. And they would get
- S. Aye they would get least.
- R. Yea, they would get the least.
- S. So why would it be the oldest people that would get, you know the longest service people that would get paid off?
- R. Oh guys that are near retiring say och it's only another two years or something like that.
- S.
- R. After being in a long time.

- S. That redundancy possibly would help them?
- R. Aye.
- S. Um. Who do you think would decide on redundancy? The Management would obviously say we're having redundancies would the Union have any
- R. Do you mean what individuals would be going?
- S. Well would the Union resist the redundancies?
- R. I think they would try because they're always trying all over the country to do this. It seems to never sort of work. Maybe the Company keeps going for another year but then it still goes down.
- S. Hm. How would you know about that?
- R. Well just what I hear on the news and that. You know you hear that a firm that say, twenty years ago, spent so many million pounds is closing for definite and the fact it's closed they've no intention of opening it again.
- S. Hm. That story in the Daily Record last week.
- R. Yea.
- S. Do you think the Unions could do any better to try and stop it? Their resistance to redundancy?
- R. Oh no. I think they would be in there to get the best that they can for the men.

- S. We were talking about profit sharing as one part of improvement
- R. Well
- S. In the Company.
- R. It depends on the point of view. We've obviously got to find some sort of meaningful adequate appropriate
- S. Hm
- R. System of wage and salary payments over the next two or three years.
- S. Hm.
- R. I don't think we have one at the moment - messed around by the Government of course and have to more or less ad hoc each and every year.
- S? Hm.
- R. From our point of view, what we would like to do, we would like to be able to negotiate something meaningful, that would be meaningful and relevant over two or three years and that's what we're trying to find. Whether profit sharing, or whatever we're keeping an open mind on it.
- S. How much is the freerider problem?
- R. How much is the ?
- S. The freerider problem in your ideas on profit sharing in the works?
- R. The which problem?
- S. Freerider.
- R. Sorry I'm not following you. I'm not getting the drift.
- S. Well the idea of your profit sharing scheme is that everybody works a bit harder because if they work harder the Company

makes more profits and if the Company makes more profits, they get more money.

R. Oh aye. Ah.

S. So the freerider problem suggests that certain guys would say well if I don't work any harder the Company will still make more profits for everybody else will be working to try and get more money for the same amount of work.

R. Hm. I don't know really incentive from profit sharing is all that direct immediate or relevant. I think it's all part and parcel of the bigger picture. Um. I think the actual incentive is too remote from the point of view of individual motivation. I think for most individuals, obviously for some it would. No I think it's part and parcel of the bigger picture - the bigger picture that I talked about earlier on - the sort of people equating their wellbeing with the Company wellbeing. It follows from that I think that if it's reflected in more money when the Company is doing better it always fits this particular picture. I think you would be a bit naive to think it starts people working harder I don't think it does.

S. Hm.

R. But I think it could perhaps help more along the road to having people work more positively with you.

S. Hm.

R. That's the object of the exercise.

S. How much do you think you've already got that?

R. I think it's beginning to emerge in this particular Company. I think we got this by virtue of a few other Companies in the region were doing well, they were expanding - I think we got credit for this. I think there's some measure of this at the moment.

- R. What worries me very much is that I don't see any corresponding matching movement in the Trade Unions but it's got to come internally, I don't think it can be externally applied. I think they've got far too much fragmentation. I think there's far too much living in the past. I think they've still got 19th century ideas in some measure in the whole operation. I think they've got certain fundamental internal problems with robber barons, if you will.
- S. Hm.
- R. They've got vested interests in their own organisation structure and authority
- S. Hm.
- R. Um. This can only be resolved internally. I'm sure of that. I see no movement here and it worries me.
- S. You mean that the
- R. No it's not even as simple as that. It's so fragmented it's not appropriate I think for the - say the tail end of the 20th century.
- S. Hm.
- R. It's got to be infinitely more effective, infinitely more streamlined. I'm not suggesting for one minute that the fundamental role changes, it shouldn't
- S. Hm.
- R. That's not the point but the point is the way they go about it. The way they were organised. The way they're set up um it's a most unholy industrial mess if you like. The whole structure

- S. What do you mean by the way they're organised? Do you mean that the fact that there is a proliferation of Unions that you
- R. Yes.
- S. Can't see ten or eleven Unions being organised?
- R. Yes, and I think these very fragments often poses a lot of difficulty in industry. One problem causes a lot of needless strife for a needless problem.
- S. On the shop floor you face mainly two Unions, the A.U.E.W., and the Boilermakers, with the rest sort of tagging along.
- R. Well it's not really as simple as that because eh you've got first of all the indirect source of the Municipal & General Workers they're
- S. Hm.
- R. A fairly significant group. You can do nothing without cranemen and slingers and really you can't sort them out into various sizes because in a complex inter-related operation such as we've got you can't do without any section
- S. Hm.
- R. So as far as Man - they're all equally important from our point of view.
- S. Hm. Hm.
- R. You've got to in fact keep them all operating satisfactorily and effectively otherwise the thing stops.
- S. Even the likes of the patternmakers who've got what - about
- R. Oh yes.
- S. Twelve members.
- R. Well the patternmakers have but eh I mean you're not going to set them aside and pick off the weakest or something like that.
- S. Right.
- R. And eh but we are fortunate in here. I mean we've got the

patternmakers, the joiners and woodworkers and they all work in cahoot. I mean if there is no work or less work in one there's a fair amount of flexibility. That makes it all tolerable.

S. Hm.

R. But if you have the situation where each of those were standing very much on their Union rights and demarkation, it is a different picture altogether.

S. Hm.

R. But the fact is that we have a fair measure of flexibility in here and therefore we get around that particular example that you mentioned.

- S. What about problems getting orders? I mean it's not always been as good either.
- R. Well you see, it's very simple the Manufacturing Division need work. It's for the salesmen in the Sales Division to win orders to make sure that we get that work. The problems we have between the two divisions are really a problem of personality, rather than a problem of structure. It's a perceptual problem. Something might be minor to a salesman , but the same thing might be major for us in Manufacturing.

- S. What about the orders the Company's been getting? I mean things have gone pretty well recently. Who's had the most influence on that?
- R. Well there's been a lot of propaganda about that one. The Management have made sure they get the credit for these orders. But then they had the foresight to build advanced orders so that in the next year we captured the market because our prices were last year's prices. If we didn't produce the work they wouldn't sell them. Selling's a Management job. I can only look at my side of the work, whereas a Manager has an overall look at the whole set-up and he's the man to try to get the orders.

- S. What sort of changes has the Health and Safety at Work Act meant for (the Firm).
- R. Well, it's certainly had the effect more safety conscious than we were before the Act. We probably didn't pay enough attention to safety before, but then most companies were the same.
- S. Do you think things have really improved them?
- R. Oh yes, I would say definitely. The number of accidents, days lost and so on are all down.
- S. What about the accidents with the cranes then? You had a bad one last weekend when that unit was dropped.
- R. Well that's something we've got in hand. We didn't know we were using the cranes beyond their capacity, so we'll be bringing in new cranes which can lift the sort of weights which we require.

- S. Hm. Ah. What about your Union - how much has it improved conditions in the - for you?
- R. For us? Quite a bit. It arrowheads quite a few of the staff in here.
- S. Hm.
- R. And then the ways of getting me again 7p per hour for glasses.
- S. Right. You are getting paid that as well?
- R. Yes. Everybody who works in the works gets the 7p an hour.
- S. Hm, Ah. In terms of salary say, how much has the Union helped? Before Government legislation came in.
- R. I'm going quite a while back in thoughts. They gave us quite a few advisory
- S. Yea they get - their main function really for you has been the information that they give you?
- R. Yea. At the moment they are still fighting for a few of us on the test side of things because of the noise.
- S. Hm.
- R. The works were against the noise.
- S. Hm.
- R. In their fight they have had the whole end of the far end of Bay 12 there blocked off.
- S. Yea
- R. But what about all the people working inside?
- S. Hm.
- R. The noise level inside has increased because it is reflected.
- S. Hm. So what's the ?
- R. There's no dispensation given to anyone working in that area. If we get something, the workmen in that area will be bound to get it.
- S. Hm.

- R. But their Union's not following up at all.
- S. Hm. It's um - sort of would you term Bay 13? Is it extra payments or
- R. Well something like differential.
- S. You're looking for money rather than protection?
- R. No. First of all more protection for the ears.
- S. Just these muffs?
- R. Those muffs - they're not much good
- S. Hm. They stop you going completely deaf? They're not much use?
- R. They stop a bit, but we are talking about 120-130 decibels.
- S. Hm. True
- R. You should hear when we are firing 2 shafts that's the noisy monger.
- S. I wouldn't know if you were firing two shafts.
- R. You'd know by the noise
- S. Or whether it was three
- S. Um.
- R. Well put it like this they've had 90 odd decibels in a neighbouring shop when one of these is running.

- S. What sort of function do you think the Union plays in here?
- R. What sort of function do I think the Union plays in here?
- S. Yes, what sort of roles does it play?
- R. I think it plays an important role in respect of looking after the men's welfare and working conditions, hourly rate of wages, looking after any - how would you put it - injustices that may occur to the men, investigating circumstances and also playing a role where we see possible trouble arising from failings of Management or, on occasion, failings of men, we try and intervene and make it right.
- S. How much does the Management appreciate this?
- R. Well they don't pay us enough, let me put it like that.
- S. Well I mean the function of the Union, I don't mean it that other way.
- R. Well, I think that the Management, by way of the Government and by way of general outside pressures, everybody is beginning to realise that the Unions have a place, and a big place, in industry and should be playing a more important part than what they are and I think over the last few years they are beginning to play a more important part.
- S. What sort of Unions would interest you? Would you alter them?
- R. Well I would say in the area of the working conditions that workers and works fancy. Look, just to give you an example of a recent, this is over the last year or so, a couple of years, the safety angle, the workers are getting very interested and very serious about the safety situation which I think is good. But, their basic interest is to better their working conditions and their working wages and they are even going beyond that because there are policies being laid down and I think the Unions are beginning to play a full part as they should be.

S. How much has the increased interest helped the health and safety of workers? How much by the Unions themselves?

R. Well I think we are trying our best. I think we are doing not too bad but it is in its infancy just now. I think it is something that has only started and will take a couple of years before anyone really sees the fruits of their results - or their efforts I should say

MAINTENANCE OF HIERARCHY

Alasdair McCormack Galloway

Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. to
the Glasgow Business School, August 1990.

(c) Alasdair Galloway, 1990.

Volume Three

Volume Three Contents

Appendix Four	Interview Excerpts from Chapter 4	1 - 35
Appendix Five	Interview Excerpts from Chapter 5	36 - 137
Appendix Six	Job Satisfaction & Hierarchy	138 - 357
Appendix Seven	Media & Other Data	358 - 404
Appendix Eight	Tables 5.27, 5.29, 5.32, 5.34, 5.37, 5.39, 5.42, 5.44, 5.47, 5.52, 5.54	405 - 426

Excerpt 4.1

R. "Oh yes, I've got a completely different perspective than when I was on the Shop-Floor. When I was there I used to say 'Oh what the hell, they've got bags of money. They can pay me.' To be quite honest I used to skive a bit. I'm not saying I don't skive now - but I think I'm working a darn sight more than I did when I was on the Shop-Floor."

S. Why?

R. Well, when I was on the Shop Floor I was serving my time, and I think I've matured since then. But as well as that you hear a lot more when you're on the Staff .. unofficially. But you find these rumours materialise. I'm not saying I'm any better informed than the Shop-Floor, officially, but I am better informed unofficially."

B. "As far as I'm concerned every Manager has a right to introduce a Cost Reduction scheme, and as far as I know that information is passed on to an overall section, set up to look into cost reduction exercises. They look into the scheme and leave it to the Manager to report back about how it is working.

S. Hm.

R. I suppose it could be better, but at the moment it comes as far down as section leaders to report to a Manager what they would like to see in their section, but I, as an individual, have never been asked about my opinion about how we could save here and there, but it's possibly a matter for the Cost Reduction section.

S. Hm.

R. I suppose all sections could put forward something or other. I mean the Shop-floor especially should be involved, because the productive side, there are the guys who can do something in improve efficiency. Not that I mean there's a lot of inefficiency there, but the man there has a more tangible effect on his environment."

Excerpt 4.3

S. "What about cost reduction, you know the Company's trying to reduce its costs?

R. I don't know much about that at all.

S. Is there ever anything about that on the shop floor?

R. Nothing.

S. What if they introduced some sort of system, do you ever hear anything about it?

R. No, we never hear anything about costs at all."

Excerpt 4.4.

S. "Ah, what about communications of information from your department? Purely communications outwith the department to the shop floor and to the staff in other departments, are they as satisfactory as they should be?

R. Well, what do you mean by communications?

S. Communications about profit and loss well, talking or putting out "bumph" for want of a better word. Ah, is that as satisfactory as it should be? Or, do you feel that you should be telling them more - or less?

R. In fact if we were telling them more or less it would change what we are doing so obviously I've got to say no to that question.

S. Hm. Ah, if there was a demand for that sort of information would it be accessible to employees?

R. Yes.

S. If they wanted it?

R. When I held this thing with 75 Managers at the end of every session I said "O.K. there is what the Company produces at the moment, not all of you get these pieces of paper, what piece of paper do you want?

S. Hm.

R. As a result of that two things happened. One, a guy who wasn't getting part of the basic set said "Oh, I would like that piece and that piece" so we arranged that next morning, and equally, somebody said, "Look instead of, in addition to those five pieces the Company produces could you also produce a sixth piece about X." We started to arrange for X to be produced. So we are open to suggestions on these sorts of things. We don't know all the answers.

S. Is there any information that would be almost subject to the 'Official Secrets Act'?

R. Yes. Profitability at this time of the year would be inclined to have a dramatic effect on the share price of the Company.

S. Hm. Ah.

R. Which if we were to release at the moment - if people were to know at the moment what the profit and loss of the Company was that would depress, if that were to leak out, it would have a bad effect on the Stock Market, it would affect all sorts of things. So, obviously, one would have to be extremely discreet about using that information.

S. How does that...?

- R. I mean if I were at a party and a chap says to me "How's (the Firm) doing?" I'm not going to say they are making huge profits or huge losses.
- S. Yes.
- R. Because it would affect, it could go on to someone, and equally therefore that one should not spread this sort of information around because it could be used in a fashion, unconsciously, which was to the detriment of the Company.
- S. Hm. How much security would you have to impose on that sort of information? You know, would you feel that you would be able to release it to the Shop Stewards on condition that they don't leak it themselves? Or to Staff Union people?
- R. It depends, it depends how far they want the information and what they are going to use it for.
- S. Hm.
- R. If a guy says to me "I want to know the profits of the Company for A, B and C reasons" and those reasons are valid, he would be told them.
- S. Hm.
- R. But if in fact there is no real reason for it, why do it? Why run the risk of exposure?

S. Hm. In protection of the members' interests, what's a valid reason?

R. Well, in protection of the members' interests what is in the employment of a Company is in fact Managers have been appointed in that Company to be responsible for certain aspects of it, hopefully of running the Company in the interest of the members.

S. Yes.

R. So I don't see in fact how disclosure of information or a desire to obtain it necessarily means that if that desire or that request be denied it wasn't in the interest of the members of the Company. It could be the right thing to be done at a particular point of time."

Excerpt 4.5

S. Who should have the right to control that sort of meeting? Should you be able to demand information that they are not giving you or should they only give you what they are prepared to give.

R. Well, we should be able to demand any information and ask any questions on all the things we spoke about there and they should be wanting to give us all the information. It shouldn't be a case of, you know, it shouldn't be a case of them not wanting to give it. They should be coming forward with all the available information. If people have information to give you and they don't give you it its wrong.

S. What about confidential information?

R. Well, O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the factory is to our interests.

S. Right.

R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going to have a take-over bid and that could possibly be against our interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain assurances that if they did take over the place what would not happen.

- S. What about, I mean an example that was given to me the other day there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company as of time of moment you would results, this could have serious effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that information
- R. Somebody would have to know that we work in this factory and we're not, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company well it puts us in a better position. I think we should know that. At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might be available, but, at the same time, I have also got to say that the Company, when doing that, could also put forward their reasons of what they are doing with the money. You see what I'm getting at? Now we are talking about an expansionist situation in this factory. This is what we are looking for. That kind of thing should be getting put across to us. The facts. It is when they hide the facts that they might be doing themselves harm.
- S. The argument that they could not pass on confidential information to you, the Shop Stewards, isn't because you would shoot your mouth off.
- R. All I'm saying is that a Board of ten or twelve Directors, or twenty or thirty Directors are most honest than twenty or thirty shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it would be the other way about as has been proved time after time after time.

S. Why do you say that?

R. Well you've got a Board for instance, yesterday S.U.I.T.S., just to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting to sell it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them. That's what I'm saying".

Excerpt 4.6

- R. But there again it's going back to what to ask and how they go - they could give you information and they readily do it on occasions. It just means nothing.
- S. What do you mean - it means nothing?
- R. They give you facts and figures but unless you have other facts and figures to go along with it it's sort of means nothing.
- S. They just give you part of the gen?
- R. The likes of, every year there's a - what do you call it -
- S. A balance sheet. Yes, Profit and Loss Account.
- R. O.K. you read up and down it but unless you know how to interpret it you just don't know how the Company's position is. We then have to take it back to our legal side.
- S. But this is the fault of the Company or the fault that you lack the expertise to.....
- R. I would say it's both, that's how I would think although we should be allowed in and have meetings at Board level. When the Board's meeting, we should be there representing. I mean, why shouldn't we be? You know.

Excerpt 4.7

S. Do you think they give you as much information as they should do?

R. No, I think it's quite bad the information.

S. What sort of areas do they.....

R. Well they say, for instance, that they can't give us a rise because they've got this coming and this coming.

S. Hm.

R. And the next thing you read that they've made huge profits.

S. Yes.

R. And things like this that they've never told you about.

S. Right. What sort of information should they be giving you? That you don't get.

R. Well, just general information - how they're doing and that.

Excerpt 4.8

S. Do you think some people might say that the shop floor lack sort of expertise to make that sort of decision - do you think that's true?

R. I think in some respects I do but then again when I think we have two machines in there and I was told that it was higher Management that decided to buy them. Those machines were hardly worked at all.

S. Hm.

R. You know and it was higher Management that bought them in.

S. Right.

R. They made the decision to get them.

S. Hm.

R. What I mean is if they had asked, if they had just went and consulted the Foreman and that what kind of machines would be best.

S. Hm.

R. Instead they went out and bought these machines without saying to anybody.

S. Hm.

R. And they're a white elephant.

S. And they don't work?

R. Not much. Well they're working now ans that's the first time in the last..... They've been in, they've been lying round the factory since they came in and that's before the last holiday.

Excerpt 4.9

R. "New machines - some of them in our eyes are bad.

S. But do they need that sort of decision as well?

R. Oh, they've got to do that.

S. Do you think you should be involved in that?

R. I think some of the people in the workshop area should be.

S. Hm.

R. That have experience on the type of machines

S. Hm.

R. These two Cincinnati machines they got in - a waste of money

S. Universal borers?

R. No they do everything

S. Hm.

R. No, they're horizontal borers. Top of Bay 9.

S. Yes

R. Numerous troubles on them.

S. Hm.

R. There's one like the capstan head that does numerous jobs by tape control. They never work. They've had trouble with them since ever they got them."

Excerpt 4.10

S. The plan might be to introduce X new machines on the floor.

There are a large number of guys in this Company with very long service who have possible developed a considerable amount of expertise in this particular job.

R. If you take that particular example they, in fact, would be.

I wouldn't like to say that they are consulted. I can't give you the answer to that. The proposal for capital expansion comes up to us from the manufacturing division. You would have to ask the manufacturing division how far they consulted with the individual workmen who have been working that same type of machine for the last twenty years. I don't know the answer to that but I can say to you in fact decisions, for example, about the Rank Xerox - we've just spent over £150,000 for the Rank Xerox - the operators played a part in that. Well they say "this is a hellish thing to use and this is a good thing to use" so they would play a part in that.

S. . Yes.

R. Their views would be taken into account. I don't know how far in that situation.

S. Right. How would they be taken into account? Would you have a formal meeting with them or just go and ?

R. Just chat.

S. Chat.

- R. Formal meetings are a pain in the foot for everybody's embarrassed to begin with.
- S. Right.
- R. So you just go up and say "which would you suggest?".
- S. Right.
- R. What do you want to do?
- S. Right.
- R. Formality of it puts everybody under pressure. puts everybody in a situation where they are reluctant to express his views. I mean you talk about brainstorming. One of the reasons why brainstorming, I would suggest, has failed in the past is the fact that what happens is "We are going to have a brainstorming session so would you please all come into my room at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and all sit round the table." It's so bloody artificial. It's unbelievable to get effective brainstorming. The only effective brainstorming you get is where five guys would have to be sitting round the table and we say "O.K. let's look at this particular point."
- S. Hm.
- R. Then you really get a contribution.
- S. Do you ever feel that the people below you might have ideas that they don't pass on up?
- R. Yes.
- S. What would you say was the source of that and why?

R. Why do they not pass it on up?

S. Yes, why do they not pass it on up?

R. Hm. For the same reasons as I wouldn't pass it on up because in fact they may not be absolutely certain if it is a valid idea and are reluctant to put it forward until such times as they really feel confident about it.

S. They don't want to look stupid?

R. That's right. I'm exactly the same way, with my Managing Director. I've got a few ideas which I'm not willing to put forward to him at the moment because I'm not sure that they are right, and I'm not going to put forward a half-baked idea at the moment".

Excerpt 4.11

S. "What do you think of the communications in the Firm?

R. It gives nothing to its employees, it's extremely poor.

S. Why do you think this is?

R. Because they don't have any communication between the Management and the employees.

S. Why is there no mechanism for this?

R. Well, there are faults on both sides, I'm sure - I'm not really sure we need a mechanism for the men on the Shop-Floor.

S. Do you think they're not really interested?

R. I'm not sure that he would be all that interested, though having said that the man on the Shop-Floor is interested if we sell a large number of units, because that makes his job more secure. But it's absolutely ridiculous if a person working here can hear about an order on the radio long before he hears about it from the Management, even though they've known about it for 2 or 3 months.

S. Why do you think the man on the Shop-Floor is not interested?

R. He is interested in small things which affect him directly - like £2 off a pair of industrial boots.

- S. But what about higher level information?
- R. I can't really see him being all that interested, and if they are I'm not sure they go to the right people for it.
- S. Would they get it if they wanted it?
- R. Yes, I think the Company would give it to them if they wanted it. I don't think the Company would go out and say "we are prepared now to give you all this information". What the Company would say is "you tell us the information you want and we will tell you".
- S. Can the Shop-Floor trust this information?
- R. Yes, I would think so.
- S. You can make a Company appear to be almost anything if you juggle the books long enough, and if you're sufficiently disreputable?
- R. No, I don't think that applies to this Company. A very smart C.A. could maybe paint a different picture, but at the end of the day we don't have anyone as smart as Cooper Lybrand. I don't think that applies at all. Any information they want I am sure they would get it. If the Convenor said 'Could you tell us what our profit forecast is this year?' we would give it to them. We would give it to them, but say 'Could you please keep it quiet'. They would trust the Shop Stewards and Convenor here that far.
- S. What about really confidential information?

- R. Well, they've got to remember we're part of a group, and that the group have carried us for years I heard the other day that they were talking about company insurance, talking about a new contracting-in/contracting-out, and the men down there wanted to know how much money the Company saved, and if the Company saved this amount of money, with the money saved instead of getting 2 years life insurance, could they not get 3 years. There's nothing confidential about that, it's something the men should know. They can take it up and negotiate it from there. The Company said, "that's the savings we make", but we have a 2% surcharge on National Insurance and we can't afford it. If the men want it, they get it. But there's no free hand-out of information.
- S. Can you trust the information you get?
- R. I don't take everything at face value.
- S. Well how would you make that sort of judgment?
- R. Well, if it looks reasonable and you can follow a pattern, and doesn't deviate too much from the norm, then that information is reasonable. Don't forget you don't get one piece of information - you get lots of pieces of information which you can link one with the other. If you've got something which is way out, you've got to check it.
- S. Do you think the Company should change its policy on how it disseminates information?

R. They should really have a daily information sheet posted on the notice board and as far as that notice board provides daily information, it could issue executive orders for work to be done from that sheet, or about matters of policy. I also think the newsletter is appalling, it's one of the worst magazines I have ever seen. Compare to the Shell Oil Company in getting somebody professional. You have got to bring it to people's attention. I'm not saying there should be a naked woman on the front - but in next month's you'll see a picture of somebody who's retiring, and 3 pictures of (Managing Director S) and 2 pictures of (Managing Director C).

S. Do you think it's policy or is it just a sin of omission?

R. It's a sin of more ignorance - they just don't know.

S. Consciously?

R. Oh no, quite unconsciously.

S. Is it just something which doesn't overly concern them?

R. No, it doesn't concern them. Once they've produced this limpid document, they've made the effort - you can blame (the Company) who product it. It's just unprofessional.

S. How would you change the information system?

R. Well, you have a newsletter which doesn't help to get rid of the 'we and them' attitude, it doesn't get anybody involved at

all, and as such it doesn't give offence to anybody, and since it doesn't give offence to anybody it's absolutely blood dull.

S. Nobody reads it?

R. People do read it - they look to see if there's a picture of big Fiona in it for a change and then put it in the waste-paper basket."

Excerpt 4.12

- S. "The way the communications are organised, the guys you represent are supposed to be informed by their foremen on certain things. Does this happen?
- R. Quite a lot of times it doesn't happen.
- S. Tell me how it doesn't happen.
- R. Well, just a failure of lack of communication from up above.
- S. Does any of this information not get to the foremen or does it get to them but they don't bother to pass it on?
- R. I think it is half and half. Quite a lot of the information doesn't come to the foreman and the half that does come to the foreman sometimes I don't think the foremen bother their arse putting it through to us. Or to the men, I should say.
- S. Many of them say they are too busy.
- R. It could possibly be. Or they don't think it important enough and then you are coming back to the attitude.
- S. Apathy.
- R. That's right. Not only apathy but they're only them.
- S. Right. The status is wrong.
- R. Oh there's no doubt about that ...

- S. If you don't get information from a foreman, who would you go to?
- R. Me as a Shop Steward or what?
- S. As a Shop Steward.
- R. If I didn't get information from the foreman that I felt I was due getting and I had already approached the foreman, I would go to my Convenor and go above the foreman and try and get the information from somebody else.
- S. Through the Works Manager say?
- R. Yes, that's right. Or, as they do in here, you'll find that most of the Shop Stewards just go to Manager I or whoever they can get a grip of.
- S. Is there a bloke
- R. Or their Head Foreman I should say.
- S. Is there one place that lacks communication to channel where there seems to be a particularly strong blockage or is it just a general thing through the staff and the management?
- R. I would say it is just a general thing. I wouldn't say it was in any one area.
- S. In all cases?

- R. I think it is something that people need to get used to, people need to live with and get used to the fact that it's got to be done, some people are not accepting it.
- S. What sort of information do you think you should be getting?
- R. Everything appertaining to the work, the factory workload, conditions, orders, jobs, sub-contracting. Everything.
- S. In a sense, anything to do with the Company appertains to your job eventually.
- R. Well, we had a period of time in here when people were talking about takeover bids, that included the higher Management, where at a meeting with Shop Stewards they did not deny it. As a matter of fact lent themselves to the suggestion that it would be there but they were very much in similar position to that we were in. They appeared not to know even higher than the Directors in here. So you've got that kind of situation. I think we should know everything that's going on. Don't forget people can come in here - you know this place is thriving just now say in respect of orders - in another six months you could find that somebody's "Oh this work is going away down to England and this place is closing for some mysterious reason or a take-over bid". Things like that. That's what I mean when we should know everything that may affect our livelihood or our jobs.
- S. Do you think the should be organised getting that information to you.

- R. I think it would need to come down a Government decree first of all. An Act of Parliament and then it should be organised on a continuous basis just the same as safety is organised. It should be something that is worked into the system so that people do it as second nature.
- S. You would have some sort of committee like you have for Health and Safety? A committee who could meet regularly and be briefed.
- R. Well O.K. I'm not going to say its necessary to meet regularly.
- S. Who would if you don't make it regularly?
- R. When you say regularly, they would have to ask - once a week? Once a month I would say, aye.
- S. Once a month say.
- R. Once a month I would like meetings like that. Anything that is liable to affect the Company. Orders for instance, lack of orders, failure of orders.
- S. Who should have the right to control that sort of meeting? Should you be able to demand information that they are not giving you or should they only give you what they are prepared to give.
- R. Well, we should be able to demand any information and ask any questions on all the things we spoke about there and they should be wanting to give us all the information. It shouldn't be a case of, you know, it shouldn't be a case of them not wanting to

give it. They should be coming forward with all the available information. If people have information to give you and they don't give you it its wrong.

S. What about confidential information?

R. Well, O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the factory is to our interests.

S. Right.

R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going to have a take-over bid and that could possibly be against our interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain assurances that if they did take over the place what would not happen.

S. What about, I mean, an example that was given to me the other day there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company as of time of moment you would results, this could have serious effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that information

R. Somebody would have to know that we work in this factory and we're no, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company well

it puts us in a better position. I think we should know that. At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might be available, but, at the same time, I have also got to say that the Company, when doing that, could also put forward their reasons of what they are doing with the money. You see what I'm getting at? Now we are talking about an expansionist situation in this factory. This is what we are looking for. That kind of thing should be getting put across to us. The facts. It is when they hide the facts that they might be doing themselves harm.

S. The argument that they could not pass on confidential information to you, the Shop Stewards, isn't because you would shoot your mouth off.

R. All I'm saying is that a Board of ten or twelve Directors or twenty or thirty Directors are more honest than twenty or thirty shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it would be the other way about as has been proved time after time after time.

S. Why do you say that?

R. Well you've got a Board for instance, yesterday S.U.I.T.S., just to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting to well it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them. That's what I'm saying.

- S. How does this, I mean there is a possibility that some time in the future the Government is going to decide to impose some form of information distribution on British companies. How would that sort of communications network relate to that?
- R. Communication? What communications - there's no communications network.
- S. If there was to be a plan to give you all the information you want do think that would be better or worse than having some sort of participation at Board level?
- R. We're going to have participation in work. We should have participation with Boards and Management at work level."

Excerpt 4.13

- S. "What about information in the Company? Do you think what they give you is really adequate?
- R. Well in my line, Management is pretty good. But generally information does not come down from the Board to the Managers, and it can't go any further than that very well.
- S. Why do you think the board would restrict information?
- R. I don't think its intentional, it's just lack of experience. It's still a fairly young company and I think some of the people at that level don't have experience of a company this size.
- S. What sort of information do you pass on down?
- R. Well, any information that is circulated for general release is passed on, which can, in some instances, affect the future of the whole Company. We get told about all the contracts that have been signed. That's passed on - everybody's got to know what's happening here.
- S. Do you think that's done quickly enough, I mean people found out about some contracts in the Evening Times?
- R. That's right It's kind of difficult to think about things like that. There's general information comes round.
- S. Do you tell your people everything you know?
- R. I try to.

- S. Do you ever hold things back?
- R. Well there are certain things I've got to hold back. For instance, I was involved in wage negotiations last October-November. Well obviously I could not pass that information on.
- S. Why could you not pass that on?
- R. Well, I was working on information that was of such a nature that it could not be released at that time.
- S. Why not?
- R. It could not be released because it was subject to negotiation with unions, and it couldn't be released before the unions were told about it.
- S. You had to tell the unions before you told anybody else?
- R. Well that's the way the system works. We discuss things with unions, and they go away and think about it, and then come back to the negotiating table. It would be unfair to give them the advantage of knowing what we are up to.
- S. Before the negotiators found out?
- R. That's right.
- S. What would be unfair about telling 'the troops' before the negotiations?

R. Well, it wouldn't be unfair to tell 'the troops' in principle, and get some feedback on what they thought. But for them to know what was going to be offered by the Company, and be able to preempt the whole thing. That's just not the way you would operate. In other words you would have trade union negotiators coming to the table, knowing what was going to be offered.

S. It's almost a war situation?

R. Yes. The Management come to the table with one offer. The unions have their own offer, and then it's just a matter of negotiation till they meet somewhere in the middle. It's like a game of chess."

- S. "Is there any particular type of information which the Board tend to hang on to?
- R. I probably did the Board a slight injustice earlier on, when I said they're not experienced at the level they're operating on. It's maybe true to a certain degree, but I do give them the benefit of knowing a hell of a lot more than we do. What they're doing is what I was doing with the wage negotiations. They can't pass things on for security reasons, or they can't pre-empt certain situations. But there are things like the introduction of new products, to see what the general feel was from the employee point of view. They wouldn't get any information on the market, but internally they might get some feed-back. There are things which just happen, and there doesn't seem to have been any chance to discuss it with the Staff or the Managers. Especially the Managers because there's a great deal of experience and professionalism within the Management but they don't get allowed to have any feedback from directors.
- S. . They're not allowed to exercise their professionalism?
- R. Yes, they're not allowed to get involved in some of the things they could get involved in."

Appendix 5

Excerpt 5.1

- S. How do you feel about how you're paid in the Company?
- R. Well, compared to other managers here - doing work no less demanding than mine, no less responsible and so on - I'm quite dissatisfied.
- S. Why?
- R. Well you see it's because I've been in here 3 or 4 years now, and what they can pay me is held down by the Labour Government's incomes policy. People are joining the Company, doing no less responsible work, but being paid £800 a year more than I get. That's the fault of the govt. - and of the trade unions, because well they're calling the shots aren't they?

Excerpt 5.2

S. Who do you think has most influence on Pay?

R. Well ... one would tend to say it's the work-people, because they're always in asking. I suppose they're the ones with the control since it's always them who start it off ... the management never come down ... management will say there will be a 10% increase, and then the workers say they don't want it, they want 20%. I tend to think unions get organised in the area and decide they want a minimum wage of such and such a week, and then its left to them to negotiate with Management. But I would like to see a system where Management get down at a set time every year and discuss salaries ... and discuss salaries on the basis of profitability and the cost of living outside.

Excerpt 5.3

- S. Who do you think influences what you get paid - you know, your salary?
- R. Well I mean the union goes in and it shouts for as much as possible and management shouts for as little as possible, and what we get is somewhere in the middle.
- S. Do you think that's how things should be?
- R. In this firm anyway the unions are pretty level-headed, so they don't ask for anything extortionate. Or at least we don't get it. And we're all reasonably happy with what we do get, so I think the management play ball with us that way.
- S. Yes I see. But do you think that's a fair system?
- R. Well maybe not exactly, because management have more power because they can decide their own pay. They can give themselves whatever they see as reasonable, and that'll be higher than a compromise would be. So that gives them much more power in distributing the total wage bill.
- S. Do you think anything could be done about that?
- R. Oh, that's a situation you would have a hard time changing ... as the company stands you would have to change the whole company structure. And the structure of management. We would have to have workers on the board - but then you would have a boss and somebody to work under them.

Excerpt 5.4

- S. How do you think a pay rise has been decided on?
- R. Oh that's Management. Management have the control. They're the ones who'll decide whether or not you'll get an increase or not. They'll be advised by their section leaders or manager, whether a man is justified an increase by the amount of work. You could start here in a job and over the years the job starts to get bigger and bigger. This is where you find some managers are very lax. They must see some jobs are getting bigger and bigger, but they're singing dumb about it, because it means going to somebody higher up and suggesting an increase in salary there, because of the amount of work that the man's doing.
- S. Do you think the unions should have more say?
- R. I would think so in a case like this. If you decide to do something, all you can do is approach the union to approach management on your behalf. But I wouldn't want the unions to get too much control. That would be a bad thing.
- S. Why?
- R. Well, they would start to demand too much and put your job in jeopardy. I mean this happened all over the country. You know as well as I do that the unions have put a lot of firms to the wall ... you've got to have men realistic enough to know when to stop pushing. What I would like to see here is a referendum, where you have Personnel and Management on one side, and the unions on the other. Well they could sit down and analyse the payroll, and they'd be able to say "How come this bloke's getting so much and this other bloke who's doing the same or more is getting less?" Because I think in spite of (a union) there's still a lot of this going on. There are some sections where there's only one man doing a job in a section and they call him the chief (job title).so how

can he be the chief (job title) Chief over what? Over himself?
You can only make a chief when you've got 2 or 3. Somebody's
bound to get extra money for being a chief (job title)."

Excerpt 5.5

- S. What about um decisions on ah how much people get on behalf of a pay increase? Some people say that Unions control wage rises. Who do you think controls the decisions as regards that.
- R. Well generally speaking, I think their level of increase nowadays is negotiated more between the Government and the TUC than any other particular body um I don't think there is very much room for manoeuvring in the present system.
- S.
- R. Hm.
- S. How would you like to see wage negotiations carried on by the unions as such?
- R. I think under present circumstances that some sort of incomes policy must be implemented by a government. I think that we, as a country, would go very sadly wrong with free collective bargaining. Certain pressure groups in the country, such as the miners, I think they would fare better than anyone else and at the moment I think that there must be some sort of fixed income policy but within that framework I think there should be um more room for manoeuvre.
- S.
- R. For the individual and perhaps the Company should say well OK you have 5% fixed mandatory, perhaps 5% to be spread over department which could help remove certain anomalies.
- S.
- R. Anomalies which have been created incidentally um before present restrictions were implemented um people in this Company, person A earning more than person B by virtue of the fact that person A joined after person B and that at this moment the Company is unable to say to person B, well OK we know that person A is getting more than you for a few days he joined after you but there is nothing

we can do under the present circumstances so um that's part of the increase and in such an anomaly perhaps some part could be used to reward.

Excerpt 5.6

- S. What about the control you've got over your pay? I mean who controls that? The union, yourself or the management?
- R. Management
- S. How do they do it?
- R. Negotiations between the Management and the shop stewards.
- S. Uhu
- R. Then it's taken back to the men
- S. Yea
- R. It's up to the men whether they accept it or don't accept it.
- S. What if they don't accept it? Do you think the management have too much control over that? Or the union too much control?
- R. I don't think anybody should have too much control over their wages.

Excerpt 5.7

- S. What about the decisions on pay, how do you think control over that is distributed, you know between the board, the management and staff and so on?
- R. I would think that it's the shop stewards that do our talking for us with the Management and they come back and tell us what's happening.
- S. Who do you think controls the system - the unions or the management that control it or is it a bit of both?
- R. Aye it's a bit of both.
- S. Do you think any one side's dominant?
- R. Aye I think the management must be dominant a wee bit.
- S. On what side?
- R. I can't really see them letting the Shop Stewards run the factory really.
- S. How do the management dominate?
- R. If you do it their way they'll give you what you're asking for. You know that before you go in.
- R. So you're asking for more than you really want because you know they're not going to be giving you it.
- S. Hm.
- R. 'Because you know they're no going to give you it - there's no much you can do about it. They expect you to drop it.
- S. So you've got to push them to
- R. Aye
- S. Get what you want?
- R. Aye.
- S. Do you think the end result is closer to your aim or closer to their aim?
- R. You didn't really know what their aim is. Obviously they don't want ever to give you all that much.

- S. In other words they offer you less than you've asked for but it's somewhere between
- R. They don't really tell you. You think you've got a good deal out of it then they turn round and say that was good we got away with that, you know.
- S. Aye, Do you think there should be some sort of change in the negotiating system?
- R. I think ours is a pretty good system really. As I say we've got a good management, they give us good conditions and all that. They're doing no bad.
- S. Do you think it's a fair system that you've got in here?
- R. I would say it's fair.

Excerpt 5.8

- S. You said earlier on that you weren't satisfied with the sort of differential between you and the Management. How do, I mean take the whole sort of wage bill of the Company, this is divided up between staff, shop floor and management. Who do you think controls how that is divided up?
- R. I would say it's probably the parent company of the group. I don't really know, but I would say, obviously in other companies up and down the country, and I would say that it's along the line that they would pay a Director such and such, pay a labourer such and such.
- S. Hm.
- R. Eh, and I think these are the people
- S. Do you think that's
- R. There would be slight flexibility, I would think. Whereas up here this we can pay him a wee bit more and give him a wee bit less.
- S. Right.
- R. If they accept, who's to know?
- S. Right. Do you think there's a fair system?
- R. No I don't think it's a fair - I think it should be the company's books, as I said earlier, should be open
- S. Hm.
- R. And let's see what everybody gets.
- S. The Management salaries.
- R. You see, although I'm saying my wages, it's not just in this company I mean. There's wages paid for lawyers and for the work they do and the money they get, I mean, I'm underpaid, grossly underpaid O.K. Other people might not see it like that but that's how I see it, you know. In the same respect with directors in here. I see some some guys in here that just waddle about. They don't appear to do

anything. O.K. I'm maybe ingorant of the facts. I don't know what they actually do. They might work and the work they do might involve quite a lot.

S. Hm.

R. It's out of sight. What you don't see - what you see is that they are getting quite a lot and they appear to do nothing

S. Right

R. To me that causes unrest, dissatisfaction.

S. Right. You would like to see more openness?

R. Aye. I think you find people reasonable because it happens on the shop floor. You've got Foremen, skilled men, semi-skilled men, labourers, toilet attendants. At the end of the day they all accept that the skilled man, if you like,

S. Hm.

R. Is due more money than them.

S. Hm.

R. There is that gap and they accept where the gap should be.

S. Right.

R. But there is a gap between the Director and the labourer.

S. Hm.

R. He doesn't know what the gao is. He doesn't know what the job is that the director does. He doesn't know what is involved in it.

S. Right.

R. Just as an example, this is what I mean. We should know more details of what the job is and what it entails.

S. What about the decisions themselves?

Who should be involved in that?

R. Well, I would think it should be the management and unions. They are involved, if you like, at the shop floor level.

S. Right

- R. The management and union are involved to get the proper level for the job.
- S. Hm.
- R. They're no involving Tom, Dick and Harry up here.
- S. Right.
- R. As I said earlier, they're getting things that appear to be willy-nilly for nothing and appear to be over and above what is stipulated by law. This has been going on for years since these laws came in.
- S. Aye. There should be some sort of company.
- R. Aye. They're getting them that way, that way, this way and that way. It appears, I cannot prove it, but it appears that way on the top. How the hell do they get it and there's getting a wee bit unrest The people are always asking the question.

Excerpt 5.9

- S. What about deciding on pay rises - who do you think decides that?
- R. I think it's the shop stewards that do that here.
- S. Hm
- R. They go for the pay rise and give them a figure and then come back to us to say what they've got.
- S. Right
- Who decides that thing that you go for - you know you go for so much?
- R. Mainly the shop stewards.
- S. Is there any input from the people they represent - from the membership?
- R. They come back - I think they put in for what they think reasonable you know.
- RS Uhu
- R. I don't think the workers have anything to do with it.
- S. They just say at the end of the day whether it's acceptable?
- R. Absolutely.
- S. Do you think the management have enough control over that sort of thing?
- R. Eh. You mean with the unions?
- S. Hm.
- R. I think they do. I think they work well together in here.
- S. Hm
- Do you think it's a fair system or should it be changed in any way?
- R. Well it could be changed for some jobs could be paid more.
- S. Uhu
- R. Not just a flat rate all over. Everybody getting the same money,
- S. Who do you think should be paid more?

- R. Well the more experienced blokes maybe on machines and that.
Tending their own machines and even cranemen
- S. Hm.
- R. A fellow on an 80 ton crane and one on a ten ton crane getting the same money
- S. Hm.
- R. But the one on the 80 ton crane he's doing a more technical job.
- S. He's got more experience?
- R. More to do
- S. More responsibility?
- R. Aye more responsibility
- S. But they don't recognise that on that?
- R. No.

Excerpt 5.10

- S. What about Discipline? How do you see that?
- R. Managers each control that in their own area.
- S. Do you think other employers - below Management level - should have more say?
- R. No I don't think so. I don't think they need any more than they have now. Their rights are well taken care of. In practice, I would say, we probably go to the opposite extreme. Things are maybe too lenient if anything.
- S. Why do you say that?
- R. Well, we treat people like adults, but sometimes certain things are allowed to go too far, and they're not treated with the proper respect by managers. Its maybe because of a fear of the unions. In my own area, not just myself but other managers in this area, things are pretty tightly controlled.
- S. You've got things organised as they should be?
- R. Well yes, the system is there to ensure that things work properly, but there are a few deviations from it.
- S. But employers rights are pretty well protected?
- R. Yes, I would say so.

Excerpt 5.11

- S. What about discipline? What sort of problems does that pose?
- R. Well, the new legislation is going to require additionally specialised people to act in an advisory capacity.
- S. Do Personnel not do that already?
- R. Personnel should be more involved than they are now. The problem is that they're too theoretical rather than practical.
- S. Why?
- R. Oh to some extent because of their role.....but partly because of the nature of the animal.

Excerpt 5.12

- S. Hm. Ah. What about discipline in the Company? What is the discipline in the Company like?
- R. I don't know much about it.
- S. It's not something that affects the staff.?
- R. Oh yes. There was the bit in the boiler works. The manager level got the sack.
- S. Hm. Ah. Does the disciplinary system seem to have more to do with the shop floor, the hourly paid workers rather than the staff?
- R. Could be. I don't know what goes on there neither.
- S. Yea.
- R. I've seen the Works Manager go round and pull up a lot of people occasionally.
- S. Hm.
- R. For not wearing glasses on the shop floor.
- S. Hm. But is this something that's intermittent? Is it consistent
- R. Very intermittent.
- S. It's not consistent? Ah. Should it be consistent?
- R. Well I think so. Every Union representative got a leaflet to hand to his members.
- S. Hm.
- R. Saying the various stages of discipline that would be taken for people not wearing glasses.
- S. Hm.
- R. I've never heard of one of them being implemented.
- S. So there's no point?
- R. There's warnings if their caught once, twice, three times. Suspension of money for say a fortnight if they're cuaght more than three times without glasses.

S. Hm. Doesn't work at all?

R. Never works at all.

Excerpt 5.13

- S. What about discipline in the Company? What is the discipline in the Company like? Is it Management who have most influence on that as well?
- R. Oh aye, a great deal I would say?
- S. All of it, more or less?
- R. Aye more or less all of it, I would say so.
- S. Is that fair, do you think the individual or unions should have more say?
- R. I think its pretty fair as it is. I mean I think the individual should act responsibly. It is a personal thing as well, but its up to the Management to maintain it I suppose.
- S. If someone steps out of line.
- R. I don't suppose they could dismiss anybody without consulting the unions. I suppose they've got to give the individual a warning, maybe several warnings about his future conduct.
- S. Is that fair? Or should they be able to sack you without warning like they could a few years ago?
- R. No, I wouldn't say that was fair. I would say its a pretty reasonable system they've got just now, giving a man warnings like the system they operate just now.

Excerpt 5. / 4

S. What about discipline in the Company? What's it like?

R. That'll vary from one manager to another. In (my area) its fairly slack compared to other jobs I've been in.

S. What do you look for from a Manager in this respect then?

R. Oh well I mean there's things going on in there which shouldn't be allowed to go any further, that should've been hit on the head 2 years ago. I'm just talking about a Manager being reasonable and expecting his work-force to toe the line. There are people coming in late, people taking time off, people supposed to be ill and they're no ill and people know they're no ill, and the Manager does nothing about it.

S. What is a strict Manager then?

R. I wouldn't care if a Manager is trict as long as he's fair.

S. How do you see fairness?

R. If he's strict with one section and no with the other two. He has to be strict right across the board. If your'e a worker and you're doing your job you don't have to worry what kind of manager you've got, because he can't find fault with you. But he would find fault with the ones who were'nt doing the work properly, and that would be an insult.

Excerpt 5.15

S. How is discipline controlled in the Company?

R. That's completely up to the Manager you have. Officially he's only got a little authority. Officially I could get away with murder, but the personality of the Manager could intimidate you into being disciplined. If you get an easy-going guy you could walk right over the top of him. It is entirely up to the kind of Manager you've got. It's a fight between personalities. If you let him just shove you about, it just your tough luck. But if you stand up for your rights, you're well on the way to enjoying your work. Like I said officially you can get away with murder, but it might not be to the advantage of your career.

S. What about your Manager?

R. My Manager is a strict disciplinarian in the Office. At times he's a wee bit rough, but he gets the work out, he does his job. Other offices are sadly lacking in that, because the wrong man is in the supervisory job. That kind of man should be changed.

Excerpt 5.16

- S. Right, Do you think there is a problem of discipline in the Company?
- R. There's always a problem of discipline. I would say there's a minor problem in this Company.
- S. Hm. In what sort of respect?
- R. Och, you have your problems with men, I would agree, with rules and their to abuse the rules to the extent that they overdo it. Eh, is this the sort of line you were talking about?
- S. Hm.
- R. O.K. these men, there is a procedure and eh it's this man who's for whatever reason, reported by the Forman, the Union's brought in it and it's proved to be satisfactory - the man is out of order - then he's given a warning. He's then given a written warning and if it happens again, a suspension and then, if it happens again and the Unions agree that the man is out of line and out of order, then the man is paid off.
- S. Right.
- R. I think that's right. I think - I don't think the Unions should support men like that - the likes of a man that is maybe going to come in maybe two days a week or three days a week and has got a job outside and he's reported about it, brought up about it and the Union - as far as I was concerned, why should he be in a bloody job?
- S. Right.
- R. Because he's doing somebody else out of a job but if this continues he's given a, as I say he goes through the procedure. At the end of the day that man should be given his lot.
- S. Right. Would you represent him?
- R. I would represent him, aye .

- S. But you would accept the fact that he was really doing wrong?
- R. If he persisted, aye. If a man struck a Foreman.
- S. Right.
- R. And he continually abused the Foreman and struck the Foreman, although I think we was wrong I would still plead that he should get his job
- S. Right.
- R. And give him another chance but at the end of the day, if it is that he's been given all warnings and went through the proper procedure, and I know for a fact within myself that the man is wrong, then that man we would be better rid of him.
- S. Right. The potentially gives you that sort of procedure to go through. Some people feel that it allows the Unions to be unreasonable. Companies cannot sack anybody in the Union.
- R. That's right - to put it bluntly. The Foreman cannot - it used to be that the if the Foreman didn't like your face - get rid of him. He'd just say 'Your for the bag' for some wee stupid job that he maybe wasn't satisfied with but which maybe was satisfactory but he just used it as an excuse to bag the man, and he was just simply bagged.
- S. Hm.
- R. And there was no - that was it and the man was out of the door the minute the Foreman said he was out of the door.
- S. Aye.
- R. But id doesn't happen in that fashion. A Foreman hasn't got the right to bag you.
- S. Right

- R. The Foreman has only got the right to report the man. It is then brought up in front of the Stewards and the man and the case is talked over and, if the case is proved, the man isn't sacked, obviously it depends if it's stealing or something serious - he could be sacked - but it's got to be discussed with the Steward or the Convenor or the Union.
- S. Right.
- R. And the man - and the Management. So an individual cannot bag the man. I think that's right.
- S. Right. Are the Unions reasonable over it?
- R. Oh aye. I think the Unions should be reasonable in every case.
- S. Hm.
- R. What do you mean by reasonable?
- S. That's what I was going to ask you? What do you mean by reasonable? What would you mean by reasonable?
- R. Well, I don't think it's right that a Foreman, or a Manager, or somebody in authority should just be able to say to a chap "You're bagged for that".
- S. Hm.
- R. In other words, it's just his opinion and his opinion only. I think the Union should have a say or the man should be properly represented. Why shouldn't he be?
- S. At the end of the day though, I mean it's up to the Management to decide whether or not the guy goes that's went through the procedure.
- R. That's right.
- S. Ah, if they take it right through the procedure and the Management still decided to sack him, would you go against that?
- R. Well it depends on, you know, depends on the case, it would depend on what the Union in the factory thought about it. You see if it was a case that I thought the man was unfairly dismissed

at the end of the day I would say "I'll take the case to the Works Committee" and if even, the Works Committee agree, even take it to the District and national level and get him represented in that fashion. But you could take it further, although at the end of the day the man might be out of the door momentarily. You could, if you and the Union representative in the factory thought it was a justifiable case, you could take it further.

S. Hm.

R. But if the Union representative in the factory feels that the man is out of order and a bloody nuisance

S. Hm.

R. They would agree with the Management then.

S. The procedure in itself isn't all, it is how it is operated that really matters?

R. Oh aye. I mean if there is a procedure there and people are just going to roughshod over it and not represent the man properly, then the man's in for a war deal. So it depends on who's implementing the procedure. If you've got to support him. If you've got a properly organised Union that the man's in to represent him, I don't see that the man's got a problem if the man has not done wrong.

Excerpt 5.17

- S. What about the development of financial policy? How much has this developed within the finance department itself? How much has it taken into account the interest and concerns of other departments?
- R. Well, if you come back, if you come back to what is the financial policy of the Company, the financial policy of the Company, if one is to be brutal about it, must be to improve and develop the return of capital value of the Company, and the return of capital value of the Company is dependent on the performance of the department.
- S. Aye.
- R. And it is all one big massive plan to create that return capital value.
- S. Aye.
- R. So therefore in fact, if you are going to improve it, the only way you can do it is in fact by talking to, and involving every department.
- S. Aye, that sounds right.
- R. Fine. Effectively at the beginning of every year when we make up a Company plan, every department is involved in it at that stage. Every department's plans are assessed and if in fact the final answer is not acceptable then in fact we go back down and say look you do that can you change that? So, therefore, in fact they have a very free hand in developing Company policy.
- S. What would happen if, as you say when you don't get the right answer, you go back to the department and say can you do such and such, what would happen if they say no we can't?

- R. Well, nobody can ever say no. It is an impossibility to say no. They will say no unless you do this, so then the responsibility is with the Board to say "Am I prepared or am I not prepared to do X"? If in fact the Board is not prepared to do X the department is off the hook because it says "I can do, I can make my target, I can improve my performance, if you allow me to do this, if you give me these amounts of people, or if you give me these amounts of money". It is then up to the Board to say "I am prepared to do", or "I am not prepared to do it". The Departmental Manager has made his case, said that's what I want. He's in the clear.
- S. Is there ever, what I mean there's a fairly obvious strategy there that you ask for the impossible.
- R. No, you don't, you can't ask for the impossible.
- S. Well, the very difficult.
- R. No. No. It's not as black and what as that, Alistair. Nobody is going to say "Right, next year chaps we are going to double our profits and you've all got to work to double the profits". Life in Companies is not as black and white as that.
- S. Right.
- R. What you say in O.K. we'll try and improve our business. We'll try to develop into new areas; we'll try to become a better Company. It might very well be that, um, there's an investment of £100,000 which won't pay off for 5 years. But, if you went down to your Managers, and said talking in terms of impossible targets, what chance to do you all have with the number of people in your department to make a hell of a good profit, people would just laugh at me. No credibility whatsoever.

- S. Obviously everybody in the Company has got to, has a part to play in achieving the profitability of the Company. Who would be involved in drawing up this plan? Obviously the Managers would. Would the staff or would the shop floor be involved in that, in actually drawing up the plan rather than implementing it?
- R. The shop floor wouldn't be involved in drawing it up. They are not employed to draw it up.
- S. Hm. Given the bare interests of the Company in your existence, and that means given the present arrangements, some sort of return of capital, ah, would you say that it would be arguable that they should be involved in drawing it up? Do they have a contribution to make?
- R. They have a contribution to make but, when you say drawing it up, what you mean by saying drawing it up is in effect that. It is computation of figures, calculation of forms, filling in of pieces of paper which the work force, the shop floor isn't qualified or employed to do that.
- S. Well, for instance, the sort of thing I had in mind is part of the plan might be to introduce X new machines on the floor. There are a large number of guys in this Company with very long service who have possibly developed a considerable amount of expertise in this particular job.
- R. If you take that particular example they in fact would be. I wouldn't like to say that they are consulted. I can't give you the answer to that. The proposal for capital expansion comes up to us from the manufacturing division. You would have to ask the manufacturing division how far they consulted with the individual workmen who have been working that same type of machine for the last twenty years. I don't know the answer to that but I can say to you in fact decisions, for

example, about the Rank Xerox - we've just spent over £15,000 for the Rank Xerox - the operators played a part in that. Well they say "this is a hellish thing to use and this is a good thing to use" so they would play a part in that.

S. Aye.

R. Their views would be taken into account. I don't know how far in that situation.

S. Right. How would they be taken into account? Would you have a formal meeting with them or just go and ?

R. Just chat.

S. Chat.

R. Formal meetings are a pain in the foot for everybody's embarrassed to begin with.

S. Right.

R. So you just go up and say "which would you suggest?".

S. Right.

R. What do you want to do?

S. Right.

R. Formality of it puts everybody, puts everybody under pressure, puts everybody in a situation where they are reluctant to express his views. (Thank you very much). I mean you talk about brain-storming. One of the reasons why brainstorming, I would suggest, has failed in the past, is the fact that what happens is "We are going to have a brainstorming session so would you please all come into my room at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and all sit round the table. It's so bloody artificial. It's unbelievable. To get effective brainstorming, the only effective brainstorming you get is where five guys would have to be sitting round the table and we say "O.K. let's look at this particular point".

- S. Hm.
- R. Then you really get a contribution.
- S. Do you ever feel that the people below you might have ideas that they don't pass on up?
- R. Yes.
- S. What would you say was the source of that and why?
- R. Why do they not pass it on up?
- S. Yes, why do they not pass it on up?
- R. Ahm. For the same reasons as I wouldn't pass it on up because in fact they may not be absolutely certain if it is a valid idea and are reluctant to put it forward until such times as they really feel confident about it.
- S. They don't want to look stupid?
- R. That's right. I'm exactly the same way, with my Managing Director. I've got a few ideas which I'm not willing to put forward to him at the moment because I'm not sure that they are right, and I'm not going to put forward a half-baked idea at the moment.
- S. With your subordinates do you ever get the impression, do you ever feel that there's anything in the idea that they think well it's his bloody job, I'm not employed to do it?
- R. I've never got that impression. I've never encountered that.
- S. To go back to financial policy and drawing it up, ah, if there is some sort of participation by employees going on the Board, at some point your'e going to get guys from the shop floor coming up and talking about your financial, the Company's financial plan. What sort of contribution do you think they could make?
- R. I don't know because I haven't seen them make it yet, so I really don't know.

- S. What sort of contribution do you think they could potentially make?
- R. (not jusy now thank you). I really don't know.
- S. Given their lack of expertise in financial matters, ah, would you say that that might make them a liability?
- R. Not necessarily.
- S. Why do you say, not necessarily?
- R. Well, when you say a lack of expertise, I mean a lack of expertise is because one is dealing with it on a day to day basis.
- S. Hm.
- R. That is how you develop expertise.
- S. Hm.
- R. But, if somebody, I mean, you reverse the situation. I'm talking about an engineering problem . I just say, from a common sense point of view, why do we use a stainless steel piping instead of ordinary piping because it seems to me much more expensive to use stainless steel piping, can we not use that? An engineer will then talk in terms of tolerances and densities and so on and so forth but my contribution is worth while.
- S. Hm.
- R. But it is not as well expressed as an engineer's. It doesn't necessarily mean it is not worthwhile.
- S. Hm. Ah. what about communications of information from your department. Purely communications outwith the department to the shop floor and to the staff in other departments, are they as satisfactory as they should be?
- R. Well, what do you mean by communications?
- S. Communications about profit and loss well, talking or putting out "bumph" for want of a better word. Ah. is that as

satisfactory as it should be? Or, do you feel that you should be telling them more - or less?

R. In fact if we were telling them more or less it would change what we are doing so obviously I've got to say no to that question.

S. Hm. Ah. If there was a demand for that sort of information would it be accessible to employees?

R. Yea.

S. If they wanted it?

R. When I held this thing with 75 Managers at the end of every session I said "O.K. there is what the Company produces at the moment, not all of you get these pieces of paper, em, what piece of paper do you want?

S. Hem.

R. As a result of that two things happened. One, a guy who wasn't getting part of the basic set said "Oh I would like that piece and that piece" so we arranged that next morning, and equally, somebody said, "Look instead of, in addition to those five pieces the Company produces could you also produce a sixth piece about X". We started to arrange for X to be produced. So we are open to suggestions on these sorts of things. We don't know all the answers.

S. Is there any information that would be almost subject to the Official Secrets Act?

R. Yes. Profitability at this time of the year would be inclined to have a dramatic effect on the share price of the Company.

S. Hm. Ah.

R. Which if we were to release at the moment - if people were to know at the moment what the profit and loss of the Company

was that would depress, if that were to leak out, it would have had a bad effect on the Stock Market, it would affect all sorts of things. So, obviously, one would have to be extremely discreet about using that information.

S. How does that

R. I mean if I were at a party and a chap says to me "How's the Firm doing?" I'm not going to say they are making huge profits or huge losses.

S. Aye.

R. Because it would affect, it could go on to someone, and equally therefore that one should not spread this sort of information around because it could be used in a fashion, unconsciously, which was to the detriment of the Company.

S. Hm. How much security would you have to impose on that sort of information? You know, would you feel that you would be able to release it to the Shop Stewards on condition that they don't leak it themselves? Or to Staff Union people?

R. It depends, it depends, how far they want the information and what they are going to use it for.

S. Hm.

R. If a guy says to me "I want to know the profits of the Company for a, b and c reasons" and those reasons are valid, he would be told them.

S. Hm.

R. But if in fact there is no real reason for it, why do it? Why run the risk of exposure?

S. Hm. In protection of the member's interests, what's a valid reason?

R. Well, in protection of the members' interests what is in the employment of a Company is in fact Managers have been appointed in that Company to be responsible for certain aspects of it,

hopefully of running the Company in the interest of the members.

S. Aye.

R. So I don't see in fact how ah disclosure of information or a desire to obtain it necessarily means that if that desire or that request be denied it wasn't in the interest of the members of the Company. It could be the right thing to be done at a particular point of time.

S. Aye. Ah. As I understand Company law at the moment, the onus on the Directors is to safeguard the interest of the shareholders, it doesn't make any mention of the employees. Ah. How much regard, what sort of distribution of regard is there for the shareholders and for the employees? I mean at certain points there may be that an action, a legal action to safeguard the interests of the shareholders may be in conflict with the interests of the employees.

R. Well

S. Obviously with

R. Well, if you look at the Companies' Act, there is a copy of it there, it's written in black and white, and, you know, when you discuss these sort of issues you turn to that piece of paper and say under Section 192 it says ".....". We are all human beings.

S. Hm.

R. The last thing anybody would want to do is to deprive another human being of his livelihood.

S. Hm.

R. You're not going to take decisions and say "Great, I'm going to be able to sack somebody. Great, I'm going to be able to declare redundancies." The last thing you want to do.

- S. Hm.
- R. What do you want to do is develop a viable Company which in fact is keeping people in employment. You know, if you start looking at the woods and wood you would never do anything. It's all human beings in a Company.
- S. Hm. What I was getting at was not so much Managers wanting to sack people, I'm quite sure that that sort of animal is these days very rare, if not extinct.
- R. Well, I hope so.
- S. What I was thinking about where there was conflict between possibly laying off 200 guys and maintaining some level of profitability or keeping them on and perhaps not making a profit in a particular year.
- R. I would think that because all Managers and Directors are human beings they would always be pre-disposed towards keeping people on.
- S. Hm.
- R. They would only be really, in the final analysis, pushed to do anything other than that.
- S. What sort of circumstances would push them to that point? How serious would things have to be?
- R. Where in fact the Company can no longer afford to keep them employed.
- S. How do mean by afford?
- R. The morning Banks won't give you any more money.
- S. Aye. When the Banks have said "No more"?
- R. Uhu. When that happens you can't keep them on.
- S. Aye. What if the Company is actually making a loss but the Bank was still prepared to carry?

R. I can't answer that question.

S. Hm.

R. Because it is a hypothetical question. If you gave me what would happen - if you gave me a particular situation with all the pros and cons and so on and so forth - let me try and give you a simple answer to that. If in fact we felt that the business was going to improve we would try and struggle on through.

S. Hm.

R. If in fact the market had gone away, as it has done with the off-shore, there are just no off-shore orders, it would be crazy to keep it going. But if in fact you just said "I've got to sell things at a loss at the moment".

S. Right.

R. O.K. you say "Let's struggle through" because you know that in two years time we are going to start making profits again. We are going to start to be viable again. So, we'll suffer for a couple of years, we'll lose money for a couple of years but, if the market's gone, the Company's gone.

Excerpt 5.18

- S. What about investment policy? Is that the same sort of thing? Investing in Machines?
- R. Well seeing with their cash flow at the moment they are investing a heck of a lot.
- S. Hm.
- R. New machines - some of them in our eyes are bad.
- S. But do they need that sort of decision as well?
- R. Oh they've got to do that.
- S. Do you think you should be involved in that?
- R. I think some of the people in the workshop area should be.
- S. Hm.
- R. That have experience on the type of machines.
- S. Hm.
- R. These two new Cincinnati machines they got in - a waste of money.
- S. Universal borers?
- R. Oh they do everything.
- S. Hm.
- R. No they're horizontal borers. Top of Bay 10.
- S. Aye.
- R. Numerous troubles on them.
- S. Hm.
- R. There's one like the capstan head that does numerous jobs by tape control. They never work. They've had trouble with them since ever they got them.
- S. But if you were represented at Board level it would just be mainly to inform the Board about things that they ought

to know about or getting to know about?

R. Yea.

S. But should they, the representatives at Board level, should they have any sort of say?

R. Well it could be say a rep, say two or three people from the Union side going on a Board meeting.

S. Hm.

R. And they could opt one say, or even two to go with them.

S. Hm.

R. For backup.

S. Hm.

R. Somebody that's got the right idea of what's required at that meeting.

S. Hm.

R. It could be a help to everyone.

S. Yea.

S. What about confidential information?

R. Well, O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the factory is to our interests.

S. Right.

R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going to have a take-over bid and that could possible be against our interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain assurances that if they did take over the place what would not happen.

S. What about, I mean an example that was given to me the other day there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company as of time of moment you would results, this could have serious effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that information

R. Somebody would have to know that we work in this factory and we're no, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company well it puts us in a better position. I think we should know that. At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might be available, but, at the same time, I have also got to say that the Company, when doing that, could also put forward their reasons of what they are doing with the money. You see what I'm getting at? Now we are talking about an expansionist situation in this factory. This is what we are looking for. That kind of thing should be getting put across to us. The facts. It is when they hide the facts that they might be doing

themselves harm.

S. The argument that they could not pass on confidential information to you, the Shop Stewards, isn't because you would shoot your mouth off.

R. All I'm saying is that a Board of ten or twelve Directors, or twenty or thirty Directors are more honest than twenty or thirty shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it would be the other way about as has been proved time after time after time.

S? Why do you say that?

R. Well you've got a Board for instance, yesterday S.U.I.T.S. just to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting to sell it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them. That's what I'm saying.

Excerpt 5.20

- S. Um. What about decisions that affect the Company as a whole, such as affect the Company for next year? Major policy and such like, Management policy, basic profit?
- get orders or for obtaining new customers. How do you think control's distributed there?
- R. That's a decision that's handled by the Board of Directors. I don't see any way in which that - in which that could be changed really.
- S. Should there be some sort of participation by employees in these decisions? I mean in you think it's desirable?
- R. I think it would be desirable, to some extent.
- S. To what extent?
- R. The fact that eh perhaps there should be some representation.
- S. What sort of benefits would this bring?
- R. I think the Board would generally be more feeling that class would level. There are certain problems, there are certain areas, certain ways in which a few improvements could be made within the Company which er I would find very difficult to put it over perhaps to a person who could reasonably be expected to have any influence.
- S. So you would say that mainly there is a information to the hierarchy - the Board Room?
- R. Yes, I think that um within this Company there are one or two things which could happen which would make for a more profitable firm.

Excerpt 5.21

- S. What about decisions on the Company's financial policy? Who do you think decides on that?
- R. Oh top Management.
- S. Why do you think that?
- R. Well they've got the brains again.
- S. They've got the expertise to do it. Um. Do you think it's fair that they should make that decision?
- R. I think so yes. They're qualified people. You don't get any workers qualified
- S. Should guys - should employees have any sort of input into it or should it just be left up to the Management?
- R. Left to the Management?
- S. Left to the Management, because of their experience.

Excerpt 5.22

- S. What about such as financial policy and investment - who do you think makes these decisions?
- R. Management.
- S. Why do you think they do it?
- R. Because they're people that are managing it.
- S. Hm.
- R. It's up to them.
- S. They're the guys with the responsibility? Do you think it's a fair system that they are allowed to make that decision entirely on their own?
- R. Hm.
- S. Why would you say that?
- R. Because that's their job to and see how things are going.
- S. Do you think anybody else could make some sort of contribution?
- R. Not really unless they knew the way things were working.
- S. Hm. That nobody else knows the way things ?
- R. No.
- S. Work.
- R. We only know what the Management tell us.
- S. If you had the information do you think it would be best still be left up to the Management?
- R. Aye.
- S. Why do you think it would be best?
- R. Well it's just a Management decision I think. I mean personally I wouldn't know anything about that at all.

Excerpt 5.23

- S. What about the decisions about financial policy? Who makes these decisions?
- R. I don't know anything about finances. I never hear anything about that.
- S. Who is it in the Company that you think makes the decisions?
- R. It would be the Management really. I think the Management would be used to the money thing I would imagine. To say how the money would be spent.
- S. Why would you say that?
- R. Because they are the ones, well the first thing, they've
- S. They control it?
- R. They control the money .
- S. Do you think it's a fair system that they hold control of the money of the Company?
- R. They're more in a position to really know how much they've got. We don't know how much they've got. They know how much they've got and how much to spend.
- S. Right.
- R. And the way to spend it.
- S. If you had that information about how much money the Company had then you'd be able to help them make their decisions?
- R. Oh yea. You could, if it was a workshop decision, you could ask them for new machines - better conditions and that.
- S. Do you think you should get the information to help make that sort of decision.
- R. Well I would like to know.
I think it would
Though I don't really know.

S. Um. How they

R. The Management needs a lot of money to expand it.

S. Your'e not told that - how they make that sort of decision?
Do you think, some people might say that the shop floor lack sort of expertise to make that sort of decision - do you think that's true?

R. I think in some respects I do but then again when I think, we got two machines in there and I was told that it was higher Management that decided to buy them. They machines were hardly worked at all.

S. Hm.

R. You know and it was higher Management that bought them in.

S. Right.

R. They made the decision to get them.

S. Hm.

R. What I mean if they asked, if they had just went and consulted the head Foreman and that what kind of machines would be best.

S. Hm.

R. Instead they went out and bought these machines without saying to anybody.

S. Hm.

R. And they're a white elephant.

S. And they don't work?

R. No much. Well they're working the now and that's the first time in the last They've been in, they've been lying round the factory since they come in and that's before the last Clydebank fair.

S. Hm.

R. They've been in about a year and a half they've been in and thr men

S. Trying to get the work off them?

R. Aye.

- S. How is it, do you think, that policy is set in this company?
You know, financial policy, how to try to win orders and so on.
- R. My impression of the whole concept here is that it's extremely well organised. The sales and marketing side seem to be well organised, with people all round the world looking for orders, chasing up orders, whatever it might be. It does seem to be well organisation, and the bigger the company gets, the more experienced the people get.
- S. Do you think the Management - people like you - have enough say in that?
- R. Well it's the directors who determine what the policy will be, and the managers are told what to do, rather than allowing us to have some sort of feed back to them.
- S. You mean there should be some sort of dialogue?
- R. Yes, so as to determine what the policy should be
- S. What about your side of the Company?
- R. Yeh - the set up is we have a director, a , myself and 2 or 3 other managers. We all have our own jobs to do and various projects are delegated and you can see from their projects what the directors are trying to do. I would say things seem to be quite tightly controlled.
- S. They don't delegate at the policy-making stage?
- R. Yes, they come up with the ideas and we're told what is required and on the basis of that they make the decisions.
- S. They don't pick your brains?
- R. Oh yes .. but it's only right that they make the decisions. But it would be interesting to talk the whole thing over before they're left to make the decision, just for a feeling of more involvement.
- S. How far down the company would you take that? To the Management level or to the Employee Representatives as well?

- R. The sort of thing we've been talking about, I don't see any reason for the employees to be involved.
- S. So it would only be the management?
- R. Yes.
- S. How would you structure that?
- R. I don't see any, as far as (our) side is concerned, change to the hierarchy. But what I would like to see are regular meetings with the managers and the director to sit down and discuss various things. He could tell us where the company is going and we'd get the chance to come back with various ideas about how we see it.
- S. How often would you do this? Once a month or something like that?
- R. Yes something like that, but certainly on a regular basis with some carry-forward from previous meetings.
- S. With the whole Board.
- R. No, even just with (our director) and he can tell us what's being said at board meetings and where the company's going ... well certain things that are said at Board meetings. Obviously he can't tell us everything. But he should tell us where he sees us going, what he wants us to do, and give each of the managers a chance to discuss that and put forward their ideas.
- S. Should consultation like that go all the way down the line, or be restricted to Management?
- R. Uh, Yeh, I'm not for a minute suggesting the guys on the shop floor have no good ideas to come forward. But if the directors were to spend all their time discussing things with the guys on the shop floor, they wouldn't get any work done. I'd certainly think the place would be then for the Managers to have a discussion with their guys and have some feed back and to make sure the information gets back to the Director level.
- S. What about Employee Reps. on the Board.

- R. Yes, I think that's a good idea when you're talking about the nationalised sector, but if you're talking about a small concern which the majority of companies in this country are, then it's the entrepreneur whose interest is in the Company. It's his Company it's his money, so therefore it's up to him what he wants to do. Where it's a rationalised concern, then the guy on the shop floor has as much interest in the Company as the Directors, who are all government appointed men, then by all means employees should have some reps at board level.
- S. But in a private company where the directors own or represent the owners
- R. Normally the directors are shareholders.
- S. That would normally exclude employee representatives?
- R. I think the owners should be allowed to decide who should be on the board, who should represent them. If they want somebody from the shop floor that's fair enough.
- R. What if an Act was introduced, would it be justifiable?
- S. I think it would be ... I haven't read Bullock thoroughly ... but I don't disagree with the idea, provided it's restricted to a certain size of company. If it's nationalised, fair enough. If it's ICI level, which is more or less nationalised, once again that's fair enough. But when you get down to the small private Company then I don't think there should be involvement at all.
- S. How small is small? Is (this Company) small?
- R. Yes I would include it as small though the () Group is a large organisation. You couldn't just answer that question though. You would have to sit down and look at each Company, at each organisation and decide which one would qualify and which one would npt. It could be done by number of employees. II mean the whole point of worker representatives is the communications thing. The bigger the Company the more remote the guy on the shop floor is from the

guy who is making the decisions at the top level. The whole thing is to short-circuit that and make sure the guy on the shop floor is being kept up to date. But a smaller company shouldn't have that problem. It's only the big companies, where guys are turning up for work, and they don't know who the hell they're working for, so they've got no interest. The whole idea of nationalised industries is economies of scale - that's the basis of the whole thing - but in actual practice they're making colossal losses and I'm sure it's because of this attitude by the employees - by everybody. They're working for the government - but they don't know who the hell they are working for.

S. You don't see worker participation as a means for employers to influence decisions as they are taken. For you it's more a communications thing?

R. No ... OK there should be some dialogue, a chance for the guy on the Shop Floor to put forward his sort of idea, which again would give the guy on the shop floor some sort of satisfaction. w

S. But this would only be in larger companies?

R. No, that sort of situation should exist in smaller companies as well but I don't think we need anybody on the Board. But again someone on the shop floor should be able to come to a Director or a Manager and put his ideas forward. We're all equal after all. We shouldn't be classifying some people as Shop Floor and others as Directors.

S. In a company as small as this one, would a guy from the shop-floor or a number of them be able to influence a decision.

R. I think this company is still small enough for that to happen, for somebody's voice on the shop floor to be heard.

S. But does that happen?

R. Yes, I think it does happen in some areas. An awful lot of people aren't interested in (the Company), even though they're working here.

Others are very interested in (the Company's) future. Those who are, can be heard.

S. Why do you think some people aren't interested?

R. I don't know. I suppose it's just human nature. They're prepared to turn up for work, but they're not interested in the Company's future prospects. They're only interested in their own

S. That's not restricted to here, though, they'd be the same wherever they worked?

R. Oh, yes.

- S. What's your view on employees being represented at Board level - do you think it's a good thing or not?
- R. Oh well now, I have no objection to employee representatives on the board, as long as he is a Company Director and all that means, and not just an employee representative. He cannot have it both ways. He would have a legal obligation to see that the Company is run properly. He must join in all aspects of the business. If he was on the Board he would have to act in a responsible way. But if he was only an employee representative he would be biased towards them. Obviously that would always happen to some extent, but he must never take it to excess. He must always behave in light of the company position.
- S. What sort of representative would you like to see? Would it be a Trade Union official, or a Company employee?
- R. I would prefer it if he was a company employee. He would be an insider and have more appreciation of the company.
- S. What type of employee would you like to see on the Board then?
- R. So one could overnight become Management. Indeed it would be a bad thing if that was ever to happen as he must keep the respect of his members, or he would be branded as a Management man. Obviously he would have to be of intelligence, but not necessarily academic. We would have to look for the opportunity to find the right people. A lack of education doesn't mean a person would not be a good director. Qualifications are fine, but experience and a balanced view are also required.
- S. Where do you think you'll get people like that?
- R. Well, even at the lower end there are still leaders, and some of them potentially could be directors. For instance Jimmy Reid could go on the board of any company and be a success.

- S. How many employee directors should there be, or what sort of proportion of the Board should they constitute?
- R. No, I don't want to get involved in numbers and in voting, because in this Company we either agree unanimously, or else those who disagree respect the consensus. If we had a situation of equal number of employee directors, and existing directors, there could be a confrontation, which would mean we would have to start putting things to the vote and that would lead to disharmony. No, I would rather prefer to see a small board with 2 employee representatives whose views would be respected.
- S. Yes, I see. That sounds very well, but suppose there was a difficult decision to make - say making x hundred redundant.
- R. Well, if it was necessary that there should be a redundancy, if we take the experience of (an associated company), the facts were put to the unions that there was no market left, and they accepted the inevitable. If we had employees on our board, I think they would probably behave in the same way. They may have their own views on delaying the redundancy, or trying to retrieve the situation. But Management would try to hang on as long as possible anyway. Thus Management is recognised for having as its first objective security of employment. Redundancy would always be our last resort.

- S. Um. What about decisions that affect the company as a whole, such as affect the company for next year? Major policy and such like, Management policy, basic profit?
- get orders or for obtaining new customers. How do you think control's distributed there?
- R. That's a decision that's handled by the Board of Directors. I don't see any way in which that - in which that could be changed really.
- S. Should there be some sort of participation by employees in these decisions? I mean do you think it's desirable.
- R. I think it would be desirable, to some extent.
- S. To what extent?
- R. The fact that eh perhaps there should be some representation.
- S. What sort of benefits would this bring?
- R. I think the board would generally be more feeling that class would level. There are certain problems, there are certain areas, certain ways in which a few improvements could be made within the Company which er I would find very difficult to put it over perhaps to a person who could reasonably be expected to have any influence.
- S. So you would say that mainly there is a information to the hierarchy - the board room?
- R. Yes, I think that um within this company there are one or two things which could happen which would make for a more profitable (the Company) um.

Excerpt 5.27

- S. What about decisions that affect the Company as a whole? How much do Management influence them?
- R. Management here has no control over the future, because of the nature of the Company, because we're selling a product with a definite end-life. All the time now, more efficient machines are being developed, and the line the Company will take them will be determined by those lines. There's no way the work-force have any influence on what we make.
- S. What about other things, like Investment decisions, or about Financial Policy?
- R. The Shop-Floor have little say. The only say I think the Shop-Floor would have is, say, on a very sophisticated machine which would cut-back on manpower. The Shop-Floor might raise it through their union if it was keeping their bonus, or cutting their bonus. Other than that I can't see them having much say. We haven't done anything.
- S. Should they have more input since they have expertise?
- R. Yes, if they have expertise. If a man with expertise comes along and says, I've read about this new machine in a trade journal and if I had one I could turn out 3 times as much, then I'm sure the Management will listen to him. Whether they will buy it is another question, after the suggestion has been made the question of cost is opened up - can we afford it, and we be using that machine. I don't think the man on the Shop Floor has an awful lot to say.
- S. Should there be a formal mechanism so that they could communicate their views, try to exert influence on decisions?

- R. No I don't think so. I could understand a formal mechanism in a car plant where there is working along certain lines and parameters. But in (this Company) the people are guided by common-sense. Very often Management find they're actually made an improvement but never said anything about it. The guys have gone ahead and dont it
- S. Shouldn't they get something for that?
- R. Shouldn't the man be given a reward? Yes he should be given a reward, but he probably hasn't even asked for it. He's done something more efficient and he's quite proud of it.
- S. What do you think of this idea that workers should elect the Board?
- R. I quite agree? Especially if the workers put as much into the Company in the way of pounds, shilling ans pence as the shareholders do.
- S. Do the Employees not invest their lives in the Comapny?
- R. No they haven't put their lives into the Company, They've depended on the Company for part of their lives. They're dependant on somebody who's invested in the Company for their lives.
- S. Would worker directors make any difference to things?
- R. Not a little but this Company is run from London and I don't see how you're going to get workers from here on to (The Group) meeting down at Westminster. The Business of (the Group) is conducted by investment and there's a fair amount of political lobbying, so the only thing they could do to themselves up here would be to cut their own throats.
- S. If the company was hired off from the Group then?
- R. This Company would only be hired off from the Group if it joined another Company, because it is not big enough to exist on its own next year though it could have last year.

S. If there were workers on the Board, what sort of representation should they have?

R. The Board makes decisions with regard to Investment. The London Board allows the Directors of this Company a certain amount of freedom, but still keeps financial control of Investment. The money from this Company is ploughed back into the large group and dispersed. You can't buy shares in (the research site Company)., If you can't buy shares in this Company then we're talking about conditions again. Anything they want to change they can change locally, and therefore we're going back to conditions and they can change anything locally with regard to conditions at the present moment the machinery's there. Its probably better machinery than if you start at the Board-room. Suppose an Hourly-Paid worker wants a change in his conditions, he'll find it easier by going to his shop convenor who can do it by going straight-through (the Personnel Manager), who can make a straight yes or none and it would go straight back to that worker. If it wasn't improved it could get through to the Board, but I think it is far easier to get an answer straight out at the beginning. I don't really see workers making a great difference in contribution if they're on the Board. No way. Find me a Shop-Floor worker who could come up and make a suggestion, or an improvement, and go to EGCD to get credit to make a sale. They haven't got a clue. The same workmen could certainly make a contribution to getting more efficiency out of a machine. But not a big decision on the Board.

S. What if they got a Board-level experience?

R. Yes, I would go along with that. Except what do we ask the Workmen to do on the Board? Are we going to ask them to make a decision and vote outwith their mutual capabilities. If you have

an Hourly-Paid worker, or Staff who is capable of that type of thought he can get on the Board anyhow.

S. If you've got the talent you'll rise to the top?

R. Yes.

S. Some people say there are deliberate obstacles to that happening

R. That isn't true. Three years after I joined the company (S) joined as Senior Staff and now he's a Director. (P) is a director - (P) happened to be there - but there's no reason why a person from the shop-floor who becomes an installation engineer or a station manager shouldn't take over (P's) suit. There's nothing to stop them.

S. Should Management consult with other employees, before taking decisions?

R. No, because what kind of decision should they consult on. Look at investment, there are very few chances to invest - about £1 million a year over the last 5 years. Management will only invest if it has a purpose and that purpose must be clearly defined before they invest the money. Only the directors can see the purpose which is to build different (the produced) or more (the product) or bigger (the product) and that decision doesn't really come from Management, it comes from the customer who wants something. If the customer says to us 'we want some (the product)', there's no point in us going to the Shop-Floor and saying 'wer'e going to build some (the product), what do you think? We only make something to sell something. If the customer says he wants them by such and such a date, we've got to say we need them by such and such a date. If you're saying do we say to the workmen 'are you willing to work Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday nights so we can get

this out and sell the customer that', then you can go to the Shop Floor and ask them if they're getting to do that much work, and Management know that.

- S. Should Management be able to take decisions on their own then?
- R. The Board only makes a decision. It can get an idea from the Shop Floor and if it goes all the way through then the Board can make a decision. Because the Company runs reasonably well, it doesn't signify there's a decision that we'll do such and such tomorrow. The directors talk about things to each other, and to their Departments right down into the nitty gritty, and then come back and feed it into the decision which is made.
- S. Management make the decisions only on what they think, not on what the employees think?
- R. The Director of Electricity in Mexico tells Mr. (C) he would like so many machines, and Mr. (C) does his best to provide these machines. The Director of Electricity in Mexico doesn't fly over here and call a mass meeting of hourly-paid workers and say 'I want some machines, what do you think of that lads?' It's a chicken and egg situation.
- S. Well, what about something like redundancy then?
- R. Redundancy would only be taken in consultation with the workers, and even then the Board can't make that decision. If you're talking about (this Company) and the Directors say 'right we want 300 direct redundancies', no way can they make 300 direct redundant.

- S. What about important decisions - who do you think take them?
- R. That's mainly Management.
- S. Why do you think that? Could the unions not exert more control? Why do they accept so much?
- R. Well, as I said, there is a certain amount of that - the unions do exert some influence on some things. There is influence from the union side regarding working practices, staffing levels and things like that, but mainly I would say it's a management thing.
- S. So on the kind of thing you've mentioned, the unions might set parametres, but the final decision would be taken by Management?
- R. Yeh.
- S. Do you think you as employees should have a bigger input to that?
- R. I think there should be a certain amount of, not individual but perhaps union say into it. But I think it is still a management prerogative.
- S. More a case that Management ought to consult rather than employees having a final say?
- R. Yes.
- S. What about the idea of having workers on the board? Do you think that would be a good thing?
- R. I think it would have a certain amount of advtanges. We would possibly get more information on what's going on than we have at the moment. Though we do get a certain amount now, but we don't have it totally.
- S. Any other advantages - or disadvantages.
- R. I don't think there would be any disadvantages.
- S. Some might say that the Staff and the Shop Floor aren't scaled to taking decisions at board level, because they lack experience, and the education needed.

- R. Well, of course, there is only one way to get the experience, and that's to get the experience.
- S. What about the members? Should the workers have a majority on the board?
- R. I don't know if that would be a totally acceptable thing.
- S. Why not?
- R. They could run riot in my opinion. You could maybe get some right hot-heads and end up running the place on to the rocks as it were.
- S. So that Management would have to act sort of like an anchor?
- R. Yes, that's about it.
- S. Do you think Management have got the right to make decisions on their own?
- R. They should always do some consulting with the unions or the individuals concerned. I think there should be some consultation along the line. Especially where it comes to redundancies or wage increases.
- S.. What about higher level matters - you know, like Investment, or getting Orders? Would they have to consult them, or should they be allowed to act as they want.
- R. I suppose if it comes to orders if they're getting them, the work-force doesn't really bother who does it.

- S. What about decisions which affect the whole company then?
Who takes them?
- R. That's all with top Management, isn't it? I don't think even the unions have much say in that, although possibly they should have
- S. Why?
- R. Because the unions are here to represent the men's interests and it's in the men's interests to make sure these people are doing their job correctly. If they have the ability to know that the men are doing their job correctly.
- S. Should decision-making structures be changed?
- R. Well let's take a top union man's there - a convenor or somebody like that - he should be able to sit with these people, and listen.
- S. Should he have a watching brief say?
- R. I don't know if even the convenor would have the ability... but if he could hear what they have to say he could take it to people. After all there are people in the union who are fairly well up. But I'm talking about district or national level. They're in a position to decide about this ...
- S. They would have to have the knowledge to know.
- R. ... but he would have to have the ability to absorb what these people are taking about.
- S. If he had this ability, should people like this be in the majority on the board?
- R. No, I don't think so
- S. or equal representation
- R. You must have the Board
- S. Or should there just be people there to watch and listen?
- R. Uh Huh
- S. Would that be effective?

- R. There's a possibility it would stop any rumours going around. You begin to say things to the horse's mouth, I mean he's actually sat in at the board meeting. As you pointed out earlier the management can say whatever they like because there's only Management at the meeting
- S. You don't think the board would arrive at decisions before the board meeting
- R. Oh aye this could well happen. I mean this is all politics in management isn't it.
- S. Would something like this be effective? Would Management want to make it work? Or would it be a charade?
- R. It could well turn out like that
- S. Would Management behave like that, from what you know of the Management here?
- R. I don't know a great deal about the Management right enough. We only know what's on the () side.
- S. From what you see of them
- R. No, I think they're fairly straight here.
- S. If they decided to do something like that they would try to make it work?
- R. They're pretty genuine. Uh huh.

- S Do you think er there should be representatives of the employees sitting on the Board? Do you think that would be right?
- R. I would think they should be able to know what's going on.
- S. Uhu.
- R. And tell us the story about the decisions they make.
- S. They would keep you informed?
- R. Informed, yea.
- S. On what was happening? Do you think they should have a sort of say in the decisions that are made? Should they have a vote?
- R. Oh I think they should have a vote.
- S. Do you think there should be as mant of them as there are of the
Directors?
- R. No. I don't think so. I mean no as many.
- S. Less than?
- R. Less.
- S. Than them? Um. Do you think it would pay the Company to do that? To have that sort of representation?
- R. Ah. I'm no sure about that. I mean it's possible that what they would hear would upset everybody else.
- S. Hm.
- R. Then that causes a wee bit of animosity an that.
- S. How do you mean?
- R. Well, around about here just now possibly a lot wouldn't like then we would be hearing them.
- S. Right.
- R. And it could
- S. Cause some animosity?
- R. Aye.
- S. To the Board?

R. No, towards the Shop Stewards aye against us the Board

S. The Board aye. Do you think this is a better system than say the Management just consulting with their employees?

R. Yea I think it would be.

S. What sort of advantages would it have over consultation?

R. They're in there and they're in the discussion.

S. Uhu.

R. Well when the Management come to them it's usually only maybe just the one man that comes and says they've decided on this.

S. Uhu. That with consultation they would listen to what you have to say then go and and maybe ignore it?

R. Yes.

S. Um. Would the guys that represent you on the Board would they be able to keep up with the Board of Directors?

R. Well I think the Union would watch who they'd pick for the job.

S. Do you think it would be somebody from within the Company? You know say a Convenor or a Shop Steward or would it be someone from the Union hierarchy, a Union delegate or somebody?

R. I think it should be somebody within the Company.

S. Uhu.

R. Oh well if you let the Management bring someone it. You know they would be on their side right away.

S. Right, but I mean should it be a Delegate say of the Union?

R. Oh aye.

S. An appropriate official?

R. That's brought in? Aye.

S. Would that be better than someone from within the Company?

R. Aye. He would be representing the men.

S. Hm. Would he do as good a job as somebody that was actually from the Company like a Convenor, somebody like that?

R. I don't know.

- S. You doubt it?
- R. I doubt it. Yea.
- S. Why?
- R. Well you sit with the higher Management and that he's up with the crust. If he got a higher job himself he would be seeing their point of view more than
- S. Differing?
- R. Differing yea
- S.
- R. Yea
- S. What about the idea of the workers controlling the Company themselves, you know that of employees ought to control the Company themselves?
- R. Yea.
- S. Do you think that's workable possibility?
- R. Uhu. Maybe in a very small firm it would be no bad but I don't think that for a firm this size, too much, too many men and too much at stake.
- S. Aye. What sort of do you think there would be.
- R. Well the decisions that would have to get made I think. I don't think there are men, on the shop floor I mean, to make the decisions that would need to be made.
- S. Hm. You would - there would be too much talking going on about the decisions being made?
- R. Aye, a lot of talk.

- S. What about Management consulting employees - do you think that would be a - that would be a desirable thing?
- R. I think it could be. It has advantages.
- S. Would it have as many advantages as sitting up on the Board?
- R. No. I think you would have the best advantage in the Board Room.
- S. If you got people in the Board Room they should have - should there be as many people representing the employees as there are Directors just?
- R. No. Not so many.
- S. Just one or two?
- R. Three anyway.
- S. Ah. Um. Why would you say consultation would be less good than actually being represented on the Board?
- R. Well when you're around a board table and arguments crop up and that then I think you're better round the table.
- S. That you're in a better - the employees are in a better position?
- R. I think so.
- S. Hm. Do you think the Management have any rights to make decisions on their own without consulting employees?
- R. I think so.
- S. In what sort of area?
- R. Well it depends on eh - what was that question again?
- S. Do you think the Management have any rights to make decisions on their own without consulting employees?
- R. I think id the decisions have got to do with the Company I think the Management is the best way to do it.
- S. Where decisions depend on their expertise - they've got the right to make it on their own, but if it affects you
- R. Well they'd need to bring the shop floor into it.
- S. They've got a right to and you direct them.

- S. What about workers sitting on the Board with the Board of Directors? I mean employees not just the guys from the shop floor but staff as well. Would any use come from that.
- R. Could be
- S. What sort of use?
- R. Well you'd know how financially how what sort of things
- S. Hm.
- R.
- S. Do you think it would give you any more information than the information you get just now? In what sort of way?
- R. Well, financially how it's placed. How the orders are going and when they are getting them.
- S. Are you not getting this information just now?
- R. Well we do but not - only when they're getting them.
- S. Not on a regular basis?
- R. Well, they give you it when they've got orders.
- S. Hm.
- R. They usually give you it when they're looking for orders. They actually can withhold information which might not be suitable.
- S. Hm.
- R. To put out at the present time.
- S. That they have people sitting on the board here
- R. You've to to them for the information - to issue a statement.
- S. Um how many do you think - do you think the employees should be represented equally with the shareholder Directors or just a minority of employee Directors?
- R. It depends on how many shareholders there are.

- S. Well, I mean you could say there was 10 Directors on the Board at the moment
- R. They could have a proportion of men 2 men on the Board of Directors
- S. Which would be in the minority. Should they have any say in making decisions, which is when the Company is going to take a vote should they make a vote.
- R. Yes, I think they should be able to make votes.
- S. Able to make their voice heard. Do you think it would be reasonable given that they are the minority?
- R. They could always give their opinion.
- S. Yea. At least they'd have written down what they had said even if they'd made their point. What if their motion reached disagreement at that level how would it be resolved?
- R. Well, you would get information and you could always, as I said, make your point there.
- S. Hm.
- R. It's the way a lot of people feel the same way.
- S. Hm. If there was a dispute would you want to take it through the Board and resolve it there or would you want to take it through the normal sort of employee department channels?
- R. Through the Board.

- S. What about workers sitting on the Board? Do you think that's a good idea?
- R. Aye. I think it's an extremely good idea.
- S. What sort of advantages do you think it would have.
- R. Not to take decisions. Not to take decisions at this stage. For the obvious reasons we have just been talking about. Eh. We would be knowledgeable, we would know all the runnings of the Company.
- S. Aye.
- R. Eh. Everything would be - the information would be there at our fingertips if we required it.
- S. Right.
- R. Eh. We'd be in at the nitty gritty when the decisions are made and we could be there to put the membership point of view.
- S. Mm
- R. I.e. of your Union representatives point of view, and how they feel about certain things and how you think they would feel about certain things and eh you could always come back to get really back to the membership and bring it back to the Board Meeting, and before they make decisions which might be, at the end of the day, silly decisions or decisions that are going to bring unrest to the work force, they could be brought to the table and then could be ironed out and when the decision is made, they are taking into consideration what might be the outcome on the shop floor.
- S. What about a failure to agree?
- R. Aye, but what I'm saying I wouldn't, at this stage, being ignorant of how the company is run, the ins and outs of it, I don't think we should have a say at this stage. I think we should be involved in and our thoughts taken into consideration.

- S. You listen to them?
- R. That's right.
- S. But they may possibly listen to you and
- R. That's right.
- S. But as far as your suggestion, if they chose to ignore them that's up to them?
- R. Yes, that's right. At the end of the day. But then we are in a position to give a true picture and a factual picture to the membership.
- S. In the communications line?
- R. Aye.
- S. As far as you're concerned.
- R. Communications is the Personnel at the moment. They sit up here. There's the Personnel and there's us and the communication goes to Personnel who then relays it to us.
- S. Hm.
- R. I feel that we should be more in with more information eh and, if you like, involve ourselves in decisions in the Company and be participating in decisions of the Company although we are not actually making their decisions.

- S. If there was to be a plan to give you all the information you want do you think that would be better or worse than having some sort of participation at Board level?
- R. We're going to have participation in work. We should have participation with Boards and Management at work level.
- S. How should that be organised?
- R. Oh, it would take better brains than me to organise it but it should come down, you know, just along the same way they've got. Are you talking about the organisation or the information?
- S. The organisation.
- R. Well, it would take better brains than me but surely industry is in such a manner, nationalised and private, in such a manner that it wouldn't be too difficult to organise that. I mean, I wouldn't know how to go about it or anything like that. I imagine there are better people, better people, better trained. In the Union, by the way. People in the Union can do these things.
- S. Full-time officials and so on.
- R. Yes, that's right. They've got a deeper knowledge of it.
- S. If there was to be a at floor level, would you want equality with the present Directors, equality of numbers?
- R. I would say yes.
- S. Why would you say that?
- R. Equality in everything gives you a fair say on the Board. A fair chance.
- S. For this equality, would you want equality of the shop floor vis a vis the present Directors or equality of yourself plus the staff?
- R. Well, I'd say that I count the staff the same as other workers and if the workers had to get a thingummy, well the staff would be on it

as well. I would say yes to that, on that basis.

S. Would you say that boys, as employees, should be on the Board of Directors.

R. Yes that's right.

S. Should they have voting rights?

R. I would say yes to that. We are going away ahead you know. We're looking away ahead in the future, aren't we?

S. If you had voting rights, do you think the average trade unionist would be able to survive in that sort of atmosphere?

R. They wouldn't know. I agree with you there. I've got to come back again to the education and information situation and we are talking about fulltime Union officials. Say you've got a work of 2000 or 3000 men and you were going to start, it would be a gradual buildup. People would have to go in and be absorbed in that type of atmosphere and get absorbed in that type of thought and to gain a knowledge of what they are dealing in and what they're doing. You know, that's going to take a long time. But, the ultimate situation must be a 50/50 basis.

S. The employee representatives would have to learn how to get by at Board level.

R. Oh aye, there's no doubt about that. Then that's already, I think there are some sort of schools being arranged for that.

S. Oh aye.

R. I'm not going to say to you that. I've got to say that our Unions as far as we're concerned, you're talking really about the

S. Bullock report.

R. The Bullock report, Our Union is not too favourably looking at the Bullock report just now because, again we've got to come back to the society that we're in, which isn't going to change tomorrow.

S. Once these guys, your employee representatives, go to get this

experience working with Management, do you think they might start to grow away from their members?

- R. No doubt about that. That's the fear in our Union. I think it is a credible fear. I think it's a distinct possibility.
- S. How do you think you could avoid that?
- R. I don't know. I don't know You're going to have to try and pick out real, true, honest people and even then you're still going to hope and trust. You're not going to - I couldn't answer that, you know. It is a difficult one. But then, at the end of the day, with Convenors and Shop Stewards you've always got to come back down and get support for what you want to do. I mean, a Convenor, people talk about Convenors having a lot of 'yesmen', it's just not true, this doesn't happen and somebody can say that that's your scheme. Like we get holidays and somebody says that's your holidays that you're choosing. But no it's a matter of voting and then after the Shop Stewards talk about it and decide, you still have to go to the men and convince the men that this would be in their best interests so you're going to get no one man that can, but they can obviously help influence the situation especially if they are the ones that are on the Board.
- S. If you were either being represented at Board level or receiving much more information from the Company than you are at the moment and they changed their word or policy or they took evasive policy you did not agree on, how then would you find it easy to convince the membership to, in the last resort, to come out on strike over it.
- R. I think you would find it very, very, very difficult, very difficult. You would need to have a real change of climate, everything before you could get to that stage. You are talking away years ahead. But that's the position people are working to. Not necessarily to come out on strike but to have the say so and

influence to be able to show the men that such and such is not going to be helpful. That change of policy is not going to be helpful to the men in this area.

S. What do you think the obstacles to that are?

R. Well the obstacles are always profit. Multi-nationals. The shifting their jobs down from here to England because, and no argument about it. It's better suited. But then life cannot be like that. You know, you cannot have - you all cannot be - it's all suitable the way Britain is going just now for every industry to be located in the south east of England but it cannot happen so people are going to have to have social works and social situations. We are already beginning to talk about them and people are going to have to realise that that's how life is going to be. Either that you're just going to have your four or five million unemployed. There is no doubt about it because the way things are going just now in the world, everything is being automated. Everything is being classed in such a manner that you're either going to have to go down to the 35 and 39 hour week or going to have the million unemployed.

S. Right. What do you think the obstacles are in getting the guys to come out and support you in that sort of policy.

R. Well it would depend on your previous actions and your previous way of working whether the men trusted you. Are you talking about a Convenor or a Shop Steward?

S. Shop Stewards.

R. Shop Stewards as a body trying to get men to come out on strike because of a situation that there has been a change of policy on the work on the Board.

S. Yes.

R. I think it would be very, very difficult but I think, at the end of the day, you might just manage it because the men trust the

Shop Stewards but then how long that trust, how long that's going to remain.

S. More difficult say than getting them to come out on strike for a wage rise?

R. No. It would be easier to get them out on strike for a wage rise for that's in front of their faces and it's easily arguable. It's there in front of them.

S. They understand.

R. It's more easily understood and with the information that you've got you can explain it away. It is going to be very difficult for somebody say that's had five or six years teaching under Trade Union or wherever night school or day school to sit on a Board and then he comes down and tries to explain how the situation, by the change of policy on the Board, reflects on the men and get the men to come out on strike because of his thoughts. It's going to be a hard job getting Shop Stewards never mind getting the men.

S. It's going to be hard because it is not easily understood?

R. I think that's an acceptable situation.

S. Somebody will need to work towards with the Union.

R. Oh you're going away years ahead. I think the Bullock report is years ahead.

- R. We only know what the Management tell us.
- S. If you had the information do you think it would best still be left up to the Management?
- R. Aye.
- S. Why do you think it would be best?
- R. Well it's just a Management decision I think. I mean personally I wouldn't know anything about that at all because
- S. You lack the knowledge and the information to take that sort of decision. What about the idea of um people representing the employees at Board level? Do you think that would be more favourable?
- R. I think somebody should be up there to see what's happening.
- S. Hm. Who do you think this somebody should be? Should it be Shop Stewards or
- R. Shop Stewards.
- S. A fulltime delegate, say?
- R. Well a full time kind of Shop Steward.
- S. It should be somebody who actually works in the Company or somebody?
- R. Somebody from the shop floor.
- S. Hm. Um. Should there be as many of them as there are of the present Directors or should they be in the minority?
- R. I think they should be in the minority because it's a Management thing again.
- S. Should they have any say in the decisions that are taken?
- R. I think they should be able to give their opinion and
- S. Hm.
- R. Say what they think about the problem.
- S. They should have a vote say?
- R. Hm.

- S. If it comes to a vote they should be able to say that's what we think?
- R. Hm.
- S. But you mean that since they're a minority they could be out-voted? Um. What would the main sort of function be? Would it be to make sure that there's information going in both directors or that you were
- R. They'd be information as well
- S. Yea. You would
- R. You'd be able to express the workers' opinion on the Board. How the workers feel.
- S. Right. That you would know what they were doing and they would know what you were feeling. Um. Do you think this would be better than a consultation? Management asking you what you think?
- R. No really.
- S. It wouldn't be a better system than consultation?
- R. What do you mean?
- S. Well instead of having people actually representing you on the Board Management would just and ask what you think about such and such a change and then they would go away and make the decisions entirely on their own?
- R. I think it would be their decision really but they could let us know what they are doing.
- S. Hm. That the two are really kind of similar to your mind. Uh. What about the idea that the workers ought to have some control of the Company? That they ought to own it and run it in their interests? Do you think that would work?
- R. I suppose it would as well.
- S. What sort of benefits would it bring?
- R. Well you'd be working for, if you reap the profits as well,

you'd be working more or less for yourself wouldn't you?

S. Hm. What change is that going to bring?

R. It might make some people get a wee bit more industrious.

S. They would work harder say?

R. Could aye. If you're reaping the profits.

S. Um.

R. If you're getting larger wages.

S. Do you think there would be any problems in running the Company that way?

R. I suppose there would be because eh lack of knowledge.
You need the Management to

S. You need the Management to make certain decisions for you?

Do you think the Management and the workers would be able to work together? If they owned the Company rather than someone else getting the profits?

R. I think they could.

S. Why do you think they would work together in these circumstances?

R. For you're working for each other then aren't you? It's not one against the other.

S. You're working profitably?

R. Working profitably yes.

S. Do you think the Management have any right to make decisions on their own?

R. Hm. Some decisions.

S. What decisions?

R. Well the running of the Company because they're Management, we are the workers as it is just now.

S. Right.

R. So managerial decisions are up to them isn't it?

S. They're the ones that have been educated?

R. I wouldn't say that but they're the Management and we are the workers and that's the way it is.

- S. What about profit sharing - do you think that sharing at least some of the Company's profits with your employees would be a good idea?
- R. Yes, I think it would. The work-force should have a share in profits. There should be high earnings in manufacturing if the company is prosperous.
- S. How would you arrange this? How would you distribute the profits, by giving them shares, or by bonus payments, or what?
- R. Either of these ways would be acceptable as far as I am concerned

- S. What about distribution of profits to employees? How do you think that should operate?
- R. Again, I think that's ideal. Again with a small company. Well the whole cycle starts off with a small company, the company grows, when it gets to a certain size it can be rationalised That should really be what happens in the long run. What I would like to see is the original shareholders being gradually bought out by the employees so that the employees own the company. In these circumstances the larger the company the more the employees benefit, the more interest they take. They're the shareholders they're the directors, they take all the decisions. They don't have the capital to originate the concern but they will have eventually through time.
- S. Would something like that work?
- R. I don't see why not. I think it would be the answer to a hell of a lot of problems.
- S. What would happen to the shareholders' money?
- R. That would move on to other businesses.
- S. How would this company raise money?
- R. Well there would be no reason why we couldn't go out again to the Stock Market, issue more shares. Or go to a bank or wherever we could raise the cash
- S. What would happen to shareholders in a minority position? Would the shareholders not just leave?
- R. No, there would have to be guarantees written into the thing.
- S. Protected, the way minority shareholders are now?
- R. Yes.
- S. Would employees be interested in shares? Or would they rather be in a position they are now where they get paid?

R. I don't think they'd be interested in the Company if its future was in doubt. I think a Company of the nature of (this one) would prosper, because you'd come in in the morning and get your jacket off and get on with work rather than sitting around gaffing to people. There must be a hell of a lot of time lost through that. I get involved in it as well. Everybody does. But if you were working for yourself, as I'm sure most people would want to, to get some satisfaction, the Company would benefit in the long run. We could take 1/4 of the costs off in the manufacturing of our machines. We'd be a hell of a bit more competitive and that would just help the circle. More orders just get healthier as time goes on. That's what's wrong with nationalisation. It's lovely. We've got capital investment which the government can provide. But we seem to have lost something on the employee relationship side of it. We just don't seem to be producing the stuff as competitively as we should. Mainly because of this lack of enthusiasm.

- S. We were talking about profit sharing as one part of improvement
- R. Well
- S. In the Company.
- R. It depends on the point of view. We've obviously got to find some sort of meaningful adequate appropriate
- S. Hm.
- R. System of wage and salary payments have the next two or three years.
- S. Hm.
- R. I don't think we have one at the moment - messed around by the Government of course and have to more or less ad hoc each and every year
- S. Hm.
- R. From our point of view, what we would like to do, we would like to be able to negotiate something meaningful, that would be meaningful and relevant over two or three years and that's what we're trying to find out. Whether profit sharing or whatever we're keeping an open mind to it.
- S. How much is the freerider problem?
- R. How much is the?
- S. The freerider problem in your ideas on profit sharing in the works?
- R. The which problem?
- S. Freerider.
- R. Sorry I'm not following you. I'm not getting the drift.
- S. Well the idea of your profit sharing scheme is that everybody works a bit harder because if they work harder the Company makes more profits and if the Company makes more profits, they get more money.
- R. Oh aye. Ah.

- S. So the freerider problem suggests that certain guys would say well if I don't work any harder the Company will still make more profits for everybody else will be working harder to try and get more money for the same amount of work.
- R. Hm. I don't really know incentive from profit sharing is all that direct immediate or relevant. I think it's all part and parcel of the bigger picture. Um. I think the actual incentive is too remote from the point of view of individual motivation. I think for most individuals, obviously for some it would. No I think it's part and parcel of the bigger picture - the bigger picture that I talked about earlier on - the sort of people equating their wellbeing with the Company wellbeing. It follows from that I think that if it's reflected in more money when the Company is doing better it always fits this particular picture. I think you would be a bit naive to think it starts people working harder I don't think it does.
- S. Hm.
- R. But I think it could perhaps help more along the road to having people work more positively with you.
- S. Hm.
- R. That's the object of the exercise.
- S. How much do you think you've already got that?
- R. I think it's beginning to emerge in this particular Company. I think we got this by virtue of a few other Companies in the region were doing well, they were expanding - I think we got credit for this. I think there's some measure of this at the moment.
- S. How much does it rely on the fact that you are doing well?
- R. Almost totally, I think. I think if um I think that's the first and major breakthrough. I think it's got to be consolidated and got to be worked at a good deal harder against the time when we

may have periods when it is difficult.

S. When things - if things do get difficult do you think things would move back?

R. It's difficult. The rate of progression would obviously be decreased. I don't know whether we would actually move back but certainly I think it would be very difficult to progress effectively against that sort of background. I don't know that it would definitely go back. You see I think it's the sort of thing that takes quite a long time to develop for all sorts of special
a bad history, not particularly in this
Company but in general terms.

S. Hm.

R. I think it takes - no I think one's talking about a considerable number of years to get a break even situation where people are really prepared to think in terms of the Company

S. Do you think this emanates from the experience they've had in this Company or in other Companies?

R. No I can only talk for this Company. I would have thought it was largely in this Company.

- S. What about profit sharing? What's your feelings about that?
- R. I think it's a good idea. It gives us more money. But if I was a manager I'd fight against it.
- S. Why do you say that?
- R. Well as I said it suits me, but it's not right, because you're paid to do a job. Being paid out of profits is OK, but what happens if the company was to make a loss. Are they going to ask us for the money?
- S. If there was to be a bonus paid, how would the size of bonus be decided?
- R. Oh it's up to them to decide on the size of bonus. The unions would have to negotiate on this point. But this would involve the union in the affairs of the Company. That wouldn't be a good thing.
- S. Why not?
- R. I believe in the capitalist system Management might make a decision to put more money into the Firm, but as they do that they give us a more secure job.

- S. What about distribution of profits? What do you feel about that?
- R. That seems quite acceptable to me.
- S. What if there were to be loss.
- R. You mean would we take a drop in wages. Oh no I don't think they would have much job with that.
- S. What benefits would come from profit distribution, to the Company?
- R. I suppose the production rate would go up if there was a carrot as well as a stick.
- S. Would wage demands be moderated?
- R. If it was guaranteed, I think it could possibly. But if it was up and down - one year a bonus, the next year there's not - I don't think it would have a great deal of effect.
- S. Would it affect how you see the Company. Would it be seen as less exploitable?
- R. I would say so ... yes ... mm mm ... I think it would do worker/management relations a bit of good if there was such ascheme.
- S. Would workers trust the Management profit figure?
- R. I don't know if this is true, but is there not some kind of scheme whereby the Company have got to let the unions see the books. I think in the light of that they would trust it. In the fact that somebody else could see the books. But if it was all hush-hush, I think they would be suspicious.

EXCERPT 5.41

- S. What about profit sharing? Do you think that's a good thing?
- R. Yes, I think it's a good thing, but it's a hard thing really because it could cause a certain amount of unrest. It's quite a fair and simple way they've implemented it in this Company. Right across the board one gets 8% of salary. Where it's based on output the dangers here are where the bottlenecks are happening. Where someone may feel he has put in his pound of flesh and he's relying on someone else to take it that but further and in the end you have a bottleneck.
- S. How does it seem to work here?
- R. Here it seems to be taken well. The proof of the whole thing will be at the end of the financial year when we get the final part of the bonus that's been withheld. At the moment we're slightly down on the target figure because of bottlenecks.
- S. Generally though - taking it wider than this scheme - do you think profit sharing is good?
- R. If a company is profitable, viable in all respects, it is a good thing to share out part of the profits. It's a good thing rather than being labelled an engineer and that you work in Scotland and that the rate for an engineer in Scotland is £x. I believe in a good company, and if it's run well, people should be paid as part of it, and not be influenced by outside nor cause any resentment to outside. Only that Company, if it's doing badly, can answer for itself. But if a Company is doing very well then people should be recognised and be part of it.

- S. What about profit distribution? Would that affect the relationship of employees to the firm?
- R. They've already done that with the productivity bonus, but that was more or less a hand-out.
- S. I mean if they made say £10 million next year, some of that would be distributed amongst the employees. Would that make any difference to the attitude of employee toward the Company.
- R. You think, would the employees look more kindly on the Company?
- S. Yeh right, we're working for ourselves.
- R. Money opens doors always. If they start to hand out money without anybody having to work harder to get it they're going to look at it as a handout. They're going to be quite appreciative.
- S. Would they work harder for it?
- R. I don't think they'd be asked to work harder for it.
- S. Would they be prepared to work harder for it, since at the end of the day they would see the results of it?
- R. You mean to increase the profits the following year. Oh yes, that's always an incentive isn't it.
- S. How should the profits be distributed amongst the employees?
- R. This would be the problem: The difficulty is in this organisation we've got so many grades of staff. You've got junior staff, you've got senior staff. Well the senior staff is a complete conglomeration. It goes from blokes who are sitting next to you, he's senior staff, to top management. So there must be grades within that surely. But every time something like this comes out, like that productivity bonus, it was based on your salary. We would rather have seen it as a thingummy right across the board because the bloke at the next desk to me, he's no working any harder, but he's going to get more money because he's classified

as a senior staff man. Supposing they had agreed on £500 to every employee. But the way it's worked out some of the men on the Shop Floor who are doing most to increase productivity are getting less than some of the Staff. The higher your salary, the higher your productivity bonus, and that's all wrong.

If you were entitled to a productivity bonus they should have made it a straight figure right across the board.

S. Some might say white collar workers should get less than Shop Floor who are the ones who make the product.

R. I would say that too, even against myself.

S. How would you justify it?

R. I think the men on the shop Floor are the ones that are actually producing. We assist them, but the assistance is not all that desperate. They would still get on with the job. There are some staff down there who do assist them, progress clerks and that, but we seem awful far removed from productivity bonus. We're only (respondent's job) we're only () something that's happened.

S. How would white collar staff react if they got a smaller bonus than the Shop Floor?

R. Personally I think that would be fair

S. How would others react?

R. I don't know. I don't think they would accept this at all. But I would think it is fair. But it depends on who we're talking about on the Shop Floor. I would suggest only the tradesmen like - skilled men - but labourers would be classified the same as we are. They're only assisting. We're only a service.

S. What about Staff engineers?

R. That's a bit tricky. But I think the fairest way is a single figure right across the board. OK the men at the top's going to equal, but what are they doing extra to earn more than I'm doing

to get a productivity bonus. There must be some guys are the top whp earn more than £1,000 on the productivity bonus. But they didn't do any more to earn that than I did, or even somebody who's even lower paid than me. I think in a case like that TASS slipped up. TASS shouldn't have accepted a percentage. They should have went for a payment right across the board. Those senior grades are getting all this extra money and doing nothing to earn it. Half of them don't even earn the money they're getting in senior grades. That's only my opinion.

- S. What about profit distribution? Do you think it would be a good idea if the Company were to distribute its profit amongst its employees or some of its profits?
- R. I think so.
- S. How do you think this should be done?
- R. Through a bonus just to show
- S. Uhu. Should that be a percentage of everybody's pay or a lump sum for everybody, you know.
- R. A lump sum. Same for everybody I think, you know.
- S. Should it be that the Managers get more than the shop floor should?
- R. No. I don't think so. Well.
- S. Some people might say that they've got more responsibility.
- R. Well everybody on the shop floor, you know.
- S. Hm.
- R. Maybe engineers, crane men and labourers.
- S. Right. They should all get the same.
- R. There should be no differential the same as the last time. They should be the same I think, because it's the one effort, I think.
- S. Right. What about the Management should they get more than anybody?
- R. I think they do expect to get more.
- S. Why?
- R. They've earned it.
- S. What way did they earn - in what sort of way?
- R. Well a worker earns it but they're supervisory.
- S. Hm.
- R. But they show good prospects of chasing jobs on and that and getting them done.

- S. Right. What do you, do you think this would make any difference to the way people look at the Company, you know, employees regard the Company?
- R. Aye it would make a difference I think.
- S. In what sort of way?
- R. Well a Company that gives the workers good wages or bonuses will
You talk to your mates outside about
it and they
- S. Would they work harder?
- R. Oh you work harder if you knew there was a bonus at the end of the day.
- S. Hm. If you knew you were going to get part of the profits, you would work that much harder?
- R. OK.

EXCERPT 5.44

- S. What about the idea of all profits being distributed?
How do you think the profit should be distributed to do this?
- R. I think they should be distributed equally.
- S. Everybody should get £50 or, hopefully, more than that?
- R. Hopefully more.
- S. Hm. Do you think everybody deserves as much as everybody else?
- R. Yes.
- S. There aren't some people who do more for the Company? Would you say the Managing Director does more than the guy who sweeps floors?
- R. Well, if they guy didn't sweep the floors there would be that amount of dirt.
- S. Hm. But would that make a contribution to the Company?
- R. Everybody makes a contribution.
- S. Well OK. That's fine.

EXCERPT 5.45

- S. Do you think - what about the idea of the profits being distributed amongst the employees? Do you think that's a good idea?
- R. Oh aye I always think it's a good idea to get money in.
- S. How do you think it should be distributed?
- R. I think everybody should get the same you know, even staff and that. There shouldn't be any
- S. Everybody should get a hundred quid?
- R. Everybody should get £100.
- S. Or something like that. Do you think you should get the cash in your hand or should you get shares in the Company?
- R. No I think it would, well I'd like the cash in my hand and then I would know I've got it.
- S. Hm. Would it make any difference to the way you feel about the Company if you had shares in it?
- R. Oh you would be worried out of your blooming wits if you but you would be worried even if you
- S. Hm. Do you think you would work harder if you owned them?
- R. No, I don't think so. It wouldn't make any difference.
- S. Why do you think no?
- R. I don't think it would even though you've got the shares.
- S. I mean actually if you own the Company you're working for yourself.
- R. I don't -
- S. How do you think the rate of bonus should be negotiated then?
just for example.
- R. I think they should be going with what obviously the Company have got, you know financially.
- S. Right. How much is the main problem?
- R. Yes

S. Who should decide the size of the bonus you get out of the profits? Is it the Management themselves, the owner or should it be open to the Unions?

R. I think it's up to the Union to discuss it. They know how

S. Uhu.

R. How

S. How much the Company's got?

R. Got, aye.

S. What if the Management said well we don't want to distribute these profits we want to keep it to re-invest next year, say?

R. Em. As long as they did re-invest and they were

S. to what the Unions say?

R. Yea.

S. OK then we've got £50,000 and we're going to invest

R. So much.

S. So much. OK thanks very much.

EXCERPT 5.46

- S. Right. Um. What about if the profits were distributed - do you think that would make any difference to the way people regard the Company, their relationship with the Company?
- R. I think it would
- S. Why?
- R. Well instead of them getting all the profits and us getting a small share, if it was evenly distributed.
- S. Hm.
- R. It would make a better relationship I think.
- S. You mean you would be working for yourself to some extent.
- R. You'd be bettering your own profits instead of bettering their profits.
- S. Right. How should the profits be distributed if there was - how do you think they should be distributed - what sort of system?
- R. Eh. well evenly.
- S. Everybody should get
- R. So much. We're all just doing a job aren't we?
- S. Some people might say that the Management have more responsibility than you. You know, if the worst comes to the worst right you've just jiggered (a job) ah but if (the M.D.) or somebody makes a mistake it could the firm, does that justify him getting more of a bonus.
- R. If we were working together it wouldn't just be (the M.D.'s) decision. It would be
- S. Everybody's decision?
- R. It would be more or less everybody's decision.
- S. What about if the Company was just run exactly the same only the guys got profits - share of the profits? no change in the bonus scheme.

- R. Ah I suppose the Management would need to get a wee bit more than use. That way.
- S. It still makes a differential as at the moment. Um. How do you think profits should be paid? Should you have to have cash, cheque in your hand or should it be used to buy shares - they can issue - everybody gets five shares in the Company?
- R. I would say cash and it's up to yourself what you do.
- S. Right. What would happen if they did give you shares? Would you sell them?
- R. I'm not sure.
- S. Cash in your stake? What would you do?
- R. I'd hang on to them I suppose. I have no knowledge of shares. I suppose I'd hang on and see how they were going.
- S. Right. If it was going quite well you'd hold on to them?
- R. Hold on to them for a while.
- S. Well OK. Thanks very much.

- S. What about profit sharing? What do you think are your profits sharing drawbacks?
- R. Well, again you've got to come back to the situation where your - the establishment that you're in. What do you mean by profit sharing? Do you mean that someone says that there's £2,000,000 profit for John Browns. £1,000,000 is going to go for betterment in the factory, more jobs, etc. etc. and another £1,000,000 on wages. Half a million on extra wages and half a million going to go to the shareholders. Is that the kind of thing?
- S. What would your alternative be?
- R. Well the alternative could be you're going to have to go into a non-profit making society; the word 'profit' runs through every strata of society. You're going to have to go into a non-profit making society, if there is one exists.
- S. The Company should aim just to break even?
- R. No. The Company is there to give a service. No, I'll give you an example. When is it ever the ambulances that fly from the Orkneys and the Shetlands to bring people down to Glasgow for operations and that, that is never going to make a profit but you cannot do without that service. Years ago it had to be done by boat and by trains and things like that but by they are the kind of services, that's what I mean. Just services and that's what you are going to have to get people to work for to get an equality and unification. You are going away into another society when you are talking like that.
- S. Right what about guys owning shares in the Company?
- R. That's happening just now in that sort of society we're in. It will be years and years before that but changed it will be but I don't expect we'll be here to see it. It must come.

- S. Including me?
- R. Including you. I don't think you'll be here to see it either but it must come. Everything is forcing in the world as it is today, everything is forcing going that way. Everything is going that way today. I think we've got a Government that is the only alternative. There is no alternative just now. The Government that we've got in just now and any other Government just now would create a lot more unemployment.
- S. If employees were given shareholdings either on an basic or given shares, do you think it would change their attitude to the Company?
- R. It might. I couldn't answer it all the same. I've never been involved. There is a lot of bonus sharing in I.C.I. and quite a number of other Chemical Unions and that. They were the first ones along with one or two engineering places but I have never been involved and I've no idea how it would work.
- S. Some people seem to think that they would go along with it so far, the idea being that if you had shares in the Company you would work harder to make more profits.
- R. The idea being just the same as the blokes who have spent £15,000 and £20,000 on a house on a mortgage will be less liable to listen to strike action or stoppages or anything like that purely on the basis, and rightly so, that they've got interest to keep up. When I say rightly so that's their special interest and that's how you get the profit sharing ideas that's coming in. Well, I'd just rather have it higher wages.
- S. Right. Do you think that profit sharing is anti-Union more or less?
- R. It's another method. It's another method of winning their point another way. That's all. A more relaxed democratic way, if you like. Just another method.
- S. Not as ruthless as a big stick.

R. They've got away from that to a certain extent but that can always come back any time they feel like it. You've had examples of that.

Appendix 6

At the end of Chapter V we stated that hierarchy could be regarded as being at least partly self-supporting i.e. that the power (in the sense of the 3rd dimension) which surrounded it was an important factor in its persistence. We suggested, tentatively, that failure by the hierarchy to provide sufficient rewards to fulfill employees' expectations could undermine the power of hierarchy - conversely providing these rewards could be regarded as reinforcing the power of the hierarchy. It is this latter voice which we shall consider in this *Appendix*

We shall consider this issue from the perspective of a set of job-related items which have traditionally been used in job satisfaction surveys. The set comprises 9 items - wages/salary: job security: job variety: supervision: working conditions: trade union organisation and activity: promotion: control of own working environment: workmates. This set of items was selected after a comprehensive review of the relevant literature.

The extent to which employees express satisfaction with these items indicates the extent to which the Firm as a hierarchical form of organization has been successful in fulfilling their expectations.

First of all, however, we considered the rank ordering of importance of these 9 items for our respondents. The average position of each item is shown in TableA6.1.

Table 46.1 Rank Ordering of Importance

<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
(1) Job Variety & Interest	Salary	Job Security	Wages	Wages
(2) Salary	Job Variety & Interest	Salary	Job Security	Job Security
(3) Job Security	Job Security	Job Variety & Interest	Working Conditions	Job Variety & Interest
(4) Promotion Prospects	Control own Work Environment	(Working Conditions (Union Org'n (& Activity	Job Variety & Interest	Working Conditions
(5) Control own Work Environment	Working Conditions		Workmates	Workmates
(6) Freedom from Supervision	Promotion Prospects	Workmates	Control own Work Environment	Union Org'n & Activity
(7) Working Conditions	Freedom from Supervision	Control own Work Environment	Union Org'n & Activity	Control own Work Environment
(8) Workmates	Workmates	Freedom from Supervision	Freedom from Supervision	Freedom from Supervision
(9) Union Org'n & Activity	Union Org'n & Activity	Promotion Prospects	Promotion Prospects	Promotion Prospects

In administering this part of the questionnaire respondents were allowed to 'tie' 2 or more items, if they found it impossible to differentiate between them, but this was only accepted after attempts by the respondents to break the deadlock. It was, therefore, very much a final option, in the face of some discouragement from ourselves.

From table A6.1 the importance of money is made fairly clear, being most important for Staff, Hourly Paid and Shop Stewards, and second for Management and Union Reps. This has clear connotations of the instrumental view of the 'Affluent Worker' studies of 20 years ago. (J. Goldthorpe et al "Affluent Worker" 3 Vols). In this work instrumentalism is described as being an attitude whereby "work is regarded as a means of acquiring the income necessary to support a valued way of life of which work itself is not an integral part ... their involvement in the organisation which employs them is primarily a calculative one .. (hence) the ego-involvement of workers in their jobs - in either the narrower or wider sense of the term - is weak ... Consequently workers lives are sharply dichotomised between work and non-work. Work experiences and relationships are not likely to be carried into 'out-plant' life". Given the relative importance of money throughout all categories, it may appear that these relative orderings represent such an instrumental attitude, whereby work is not in itself an end, but only a means to some other, non-work, end. We shall, however, argue that this is not in fact the case - that such an interpretation would be grossly over-simplified to such an extent as to produce considerable distortion. What we shall argue is that while income is important (a) that it is not of such importance, either to the extent that employees will accept whatever the Company hands down, or (b) that, in the minds of our respondents the level of importance they do place on income is not unreasonable, but fits in with their other, complex aspirations, and should be seen as pragmatic, rather than instrumental, in so far as we cannot, simple-mindedly, say that their aims are of work, or non-work, but cannot be both. Rather we must take account of their perception of their situation, and in that we shall see that they take account of their social position,

and, observing that they must work to earn a living, aim to satisfice on a range of expectations of which income is only one expectation and that they have other expectations of work. That this should be so is not altogether surprising since, on reflection, while the results reported by Goldthorpe may be an accurate reflection of the situation which prevailed in Luton, though we would question this, there is no good, convincing reason why the mid 1960's attitude of Luton should be reflected in the late 1970's attitudes of West Scotland. Nor is there any good reason why workers, and managers, should not shop around for a job which provides a mixture of rewards which matches most closely an ordered set of priorities, as Goldthorpe et al point out themselves in their study. The crucial point here is that there is no reason why these priorities should be exclusively non-work, so that work becomes in itself merely a means to secure these non-work priorities.

We do not, therefore, seek to deny the importance of money - to do so would be completely unreasonable, both in terms of consistency with our data, as well as in presenting a reasoned explanation - but it is only one of a range of aims. This is made completely clear in the Excerpt A6.1 from a Staff respondent.

This respondent is fairly typical of the orientation to work found in this Firm at all levels which certainly places money in an important position, but also looks for a measure of personal satisfaction from working for the Firm. We cannot, therefore, as Daniel reminds us, regard the workers' life as coming to a halt at the entrance to the factory (i.e. that only work experience is relevant). Rather the worker has a life to lead both within and outwith work, and may trade one off against the other (e.g. less satisfaction within work, for

more satisfaction outwith work - as the Luton study showed), but (1) they will only do this so far - our sample, as we suggested, will not take whatever Management had down purely for money (2) the law of diminishing returns may well apply to such a process of adjustment i.e. if we imagine 'units of dissatisfaction', £1 may compensate for the first unit, but it may take £2 to compensate for the next unit, till a point is reached where money simply will not compensate for further discomfort.

We must, however, have regard for the situation which the respondent perceives himself to be in. It may be that this satisficing (B. Cyert and J. March "Behavioural Theory of the Firm") takes place at a lower level than is perceived as ideal e.g. the respondent in ExcerptA6.1 suggests that he is apathetic about his job because he does not own the Firm, in a co-ownership sense. Recognising this, however, he still seeks to derive other forms of satisfaction from his job than merely his salary. It may be, as Goldthorpe et al suggests that their sample took as the solution of their problem of downward mobility, the highest paying job they could find, virtually irrespective of all else, but we find little or no trace of this in our sample. Instead what we have are sets of not altogethr simple priorities, in which money is important - but so are other aims. These sets of priorities, we shall argue, reflect their perception of their social situation and its possibilities (and lack of them). It is against such a background that we must understand the orderings of TableA6.1.

From TableA6.1 it is clear that Salary/Wages is an important item in all 5 categories. In ExcerptA6.1 we saw the importance of interest in his job for that member of Staff. The item 'Job Varierty & Interest' is for Management, the most important item, for

Staff it is second most important, for Staff Union Reps. and Shop Stewards it is third most important, and for the Hourly-Paid it is fourth. From, for instance, Fox's 'Beyond Contract' it should hardly surprise us that job interest is important to Management, nor even that it is important as it appears to be for the Staff and their Union Reps. It is, however, somewhat more surprising when we find it to be so important among the Hourly-Paid. This, we shall suggest, is consistent with our view of a pragmatic orientation adopted by our respondents.

By a pragmatic orientation towards work we are thinking of an attitude of mind which is essentially practical, and puts first those items which are (1) most important and (2) perceived as attainable and therefore subject to power considerations - both conscious (i.e. what can be won or neglected) and unconscious (i.e. what is not seen as a legitimate or attainable objective - or not even considered at all). Hence Management do not value trade union organisation, because it is not perceived as important. Promotion, on the other hand, is not important to the Hourly-Paid because, as we shall show, they frequently regard it as something which is out of their reach, and by definition not relevant for them.

In relation to 'Job Variety and Interest' it is not necessarily that Hourly-Paid do not regard it as important. It is, in part, the recognition that, given their situation, other items are more accessible (e.g. Wages). It is not that it is unimportant - it is, for instance more important to them than their trade union (which is 7th, compared to 4th for Job Variety and Interest).

It would, therefore, be wrong to argue that 'Job Variety and Interest' is important only to Staff/Management in the same way that it would be wrong to argue that money is only important to the Hourly-Paid. Indeed below we shall argue that differences in job satisfaction between white and blue collar workers in this sample are not of significant size. Consider for instance the fact that 3 items appear in the first 3 places in 4 of the 5 categories - Job Variety and Interest: Salarly: Job Security. Only Hourly-Paid exclude Job Variety and Interest from their 'top 3' - and in their case it is 4th. There is, in other words a remarkable similarity in the ranking of the most important items.

This is a position which poses more problems than merely saying that all those items which appear low down on each listing are not important. In certain cases this is probably the case, e.g. Union Organisation and Activity for the Management. We cannot, however, presume that this will always be so, e.g. Supervision is something which Hourly-Paid expect to have as part of their work, and that they shall never be free of it, so consequently it is reasonable that they should place it low on their system of priorities.

Our findings from Table A6.1 are, therefore, that these orderings are essentially (1) pragmatic in that what is not attainable is not highly rated, nor is whatever can be taken for granted, or is deemed irrelevant, and (2) maximisation of a multi-item satisfaction function i.e. no one item is the sole key to understanding our respondents in the way money was used in 'The Affluent Worker' studies.

Let us consider each item in the light of this, and the figures shown in Table AG.2

(1) Wages This item, as we have already suggested, is on considerable importance to all categories - the highest average ranking being 1.71 (Union Reps), the lowest being 2.56 (Management). In relative rankings (Table 6) this item is never lower than second (Management and Union Reps.), and first for all other groups. We have, however, argued that this, although an important motivator and means of attachment, cannot be said to have the overpowering influence suggested by 'instrumental orientation'. As well as money, therefore, our respondents seek other forms of satisfaction from their work i.e. they have expectations other than money.

(2) Job Security There is much less agreement across the groups on this item than on Wages/Salary. The highest average ranking is 1.29 - among Staff Union Reps - and lowest for Management (4.03). Why should there be this degree of difference among employees of the same firm? Part of the answer can be seen in tables 6.3 and 6.4 which show the experience of redundancy and unemployment among the sample.

Table 6.2 Rank Averages and Standard Deviations

	<u>Management</u>		<u>Staff</u>		<u>Union Reps</u>		<u>Hourly-Paid</u>		<u>Shop Stewards</u>	
	Average	Standard Deviation	Average	Standard Deviation	Average	Standard Deviation	Average	Standard Deviation	Average	Standard Deviation
Wages/Salary	2.56	(2.84)	2.85	(4.87)	1.71	(0.83)	2.1	(3.96)	2.18	(2.66)
Job Security	4.03	(4.42)	3.48	(7.17)	1.29	(0.83)	2.96	(5.42)	2.41	(2.75)
Job Variety & Interest	2.09	(3.28)	3.35	(5.84)	4	(1.52)	4.52	(5.45)	4.29	(2.77)
Freedom from Supervision	5.78	(3.59)	5.73	(5.85)	6.43	(2.62)	6.69	(4.67)	7.18	(2.36)
Working Conditions	6.34	(3.53)	5.37	(4.99)	5.86	(2.86)	3.67	(4.48)	4.35	(2.99)
Union Org'n & Activity	8.56	(2)	7.93	(5.23)	5.86	(3.27)	6.38	(6.06)	5.35	(2.45)
Promotion Prospects	4.31	(3.46)	5.7	(7.94)	7.57	(1.67)	7.44	(5.99)	8.29	(2.56)
Control Own Work Environment	4.34	(4.64)	5.1	(5.41)	6.29	(1.55)	6.1	(3.84)	5.88	(2.61)
Workmates	6.81	(3.19)	6.07	(5.43)	6	(2.24)	5.15	(3.98)	5.06	(3.15)

TableA6.3 How often have you been made redundant?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Never	26 (81%)	43 (61%)	6 (86%)	33 (69%)	12 (70%)
1 - 5 times	6 (19%)	28 (39%)	1 (14%)	14 (31%)	4 (24%)
More than 5 times	0	0	0	0	1

TableA6.4 What experience do you have of Unemployment?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
None	27 (84%)	48 (68%)	4 (57%)	26 (54%)	8 (47%)
Less than 5% of Working Life	5 (15%)	22 (31%)	3 (43%)	21 (44%)	5 (29%)
Less than 10% of Working Life	0	1 (1%)	0	1 (2%)	4 (24%)

Experience of unemployment was defined as the proportion of working life the respondent had spent in unemployment (e.g. if 1 year of a 20 year working life had in total been spent as unemployed, that would be 5%).

TableA6.4 suggests an almost hierarchical experience of unemployment - Management have least, Staff have rather more, and Hourly-Paid most of all - and, interestingly the Shop Stewards and Staff Union Reps. have more experience of unemployment than those they represent (Precisely why this is we have no really clear idea). We cannot, however, say the same of redundancy. TableA6.3 again shows that experience of redundancy varies across the groups, but the group with least experience of redundancy are the Staff Union Reps. Among this group 86% have never been made redundant - a figure lower than that for Staff (in contrast to their relative experience of unemployment) and lower even than that of Management.(though only just). The Staff experience of redundancy is perhaps surprisingly high,

as 39% had been made redundant between 1-5 times during their working lives. This figure is higher even than for the Hourly-Paid. Why should Staff be the most affect group? Some reason for this can be found in the biographical data presented in Chapter VII.

In Table/3.3 it can be seen that rather more Staff have less service with the Firm than other groups do. The modal length of service of Staff is less than 5 years (58% of Staff) while for Management it is 6 - 10 years. The Hourly-Paid sample's modal length of service is also less than 5 years, but is less pronounced than among Staff (40% have less than 5 years, 33% beteen 6 - 10 years).

In Table 3.4 we also found that Staff were much less likely to have worked for the Firm when it was still part of the larger enterprise - only 27% of Staff, compared to 56% of Management, and 58% of Hourly-Paid, 57% of Staff Union Reps, and 65% of Shop Stewards had worked for the Firm at that time.

As we explained in Chapter III the Firm has a number of qualities which are important to us in considering the level of redundancy among Staff relative to other groups.

A) it began to produce and sell a new product in 1967 - they required new skills in the Company, in areas other than Manufacturing. The skills required of Staff would therefore change after 1967, requiring recruitment of new/additional Staff. Hence the fact that proportionately fewer Staff had worked for the Firm as part of the larger enterprise.

B) The Firm had a remarkable history of stable employment. As we discussed in Chapter III the Firm adopted a deliberately high wage policy relative to other local firms to attract and retain the high quality labour necessary to produce to product. An implication of this is that the Firm would as far as possible a redundancy which would involve giving up its high quality labour. Indeed between 1967 and the time of our research there had not been a redundancy in the Firm. This all has 2 implications.

(i) Those with least service would, by definition, have worked at one time for other companies who would perhaps have adopted a different employment policy. These would disproportionately be Staff.

(ii) Given the stability of employment, which existed at the time of our research, those with long service with the firm would have little experience of redundancy/unemployment. These would mainly be Management and Hourly-Paid. Furthermore that stability (the remote chance of redundancy), plus the fact the Company paid well, would obviously make the firm attractive in the labour market i.e. joining this firm would be very much a conscious decision, reflecting the importance of job security and high wages (See for instance G. Ingham - Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour).

Job security is, therefore, important not because the respondents saw their jobs as insecure - but because this was a quality which they valued.

(3) Job Variety & Interest. This item declines in order of importance as we move down the hierarchy - being most important for the Management, only second to Staff, third to Union Reps. and Shop Stewards, and fourth for the Hourly-Paid. Clearly, therefore, it is something which is important to all categories, but more so to the former than the latter. If we examine the data in Table A6.2 we can see just how much more important it is for Management than for any of the others, and excluding Union Reps. and Shop Stewards, there is greater unanimity (as measured by the size of Standard Deviation) among Management, than among Staff and Hourly-Paid. Job Variety & Interest, therefore, is of greatest importance to the Management in the work they do, but we cannot move from saying that because Management have an average score of 2.09 that they value Job Variety, to saying that because Hourly-Paid have an average of only 4.52 they do not value Job Variety. What we would rather say is that Hourly-Paid in particular (as well as the other categories) would value variety and interest in their work, if they could get it. Indeed we shall present data subsequently which shows that the Hourly-Paid perceive the lack of freedom and variety in their work, and that, given the opportunity to achieve this would do so - the problem is in so far as they perceive the lack of realism of such an aspiration.

(4) Freedom from Supervision. This item is not particularly highly valued by any category, varying from 5.73 for Staff to 7.18 for Shop Stewards. Amongst white collar workers generally there is a greater degree of freedom in work, in so far as one is not subject to constant checking to ensure vigilant performance or detailed instruction (as Hourly Paid are by Work Study), but even the Managing Director of our Firm was

monitored in respect of his performance. The hierarchical principle, therefore, applies to all in the hierarchy, but to different degrees. To expect no supervision at all, therefore, is, in the present context, an aim which is not attainable. At the same time, however, the different levels of employee are not subject to equal amounts of supervision, and it is, therefore, not unreasonable that we should find that this item is not equally valued by all categories, since these differing levels of supervision are effectively institutionalised, with 'normal' levels being established for various categories - and even within categories (e.g. the semi-skilled on piece-work may be more closely supervised than the craftsmen on measured day work).

(5) Working Conditions. This item is of most importance to the Hourly Paid, whose average is 3.67, while it ranks rather lower for Shop Stewards (4.35), Staff (5.27), Union Reps (5.86) and Management (6.34). At the same time we should remember that in relative terms it is third, fourth, fifth, fourth and seventh respectively, so that difference in importance to each category shows clearly that conditions have less relative importance as we ascend the hierarchy. We cannot take from this that the further one ascends the hierarchy that working conditions become increasingly less important, as to say this would imply that a senior Manager would be prepared, for instance, to work in conditions which are extremely unpleasant. To suggest that would clearly be absurd. Rather what this indicates is that there are certain working conditions which a Manager feels able to take for granted (e.g. that he will have an office, adequate staff for his work needs, a secretary etc.). The implication of this is that he feels so secure in this expectation that Working

Conditions simply cease to be problematic for the Manager. In contrast to this among the Hourly-Paid, Working Conditions are still an item of quite considerable importance, in that Working Conditions are still a marginal item. By this we mean that conditions for the Hourly-Paid in Firms in which they may work vary over a considerable range of acceptability and non-acceptability. The Manager in contrast to this has an expectation of more uniform conditions as he moves between Firms, and thus has security in this score, which is denied to the Hourly-Paid in that

- (1) if they change firms, they have lesser certainty than
Management of acceptable conditions, ..
and/or
- (2) their conditions in their present Firm are on the margin
of acceptability but in their perception, they see that
they may be able to change this (i.e. it is a matter
where there is a consciousness of power to be exercised)

Both points are expressed by a Shop Steward in Excerpt 46.2 in that the importance of other firms is emphasised, and the need to improve conditions in the Firm is made clear.

In Excerpt 46.2, the respondent makes clear a number of points

1) conditions in the Firm are not satisfactory. He suggests this in relation to 2 particular aspects - the canteen facilities, price of meals.

2) it is clear that conditions elsewhere are a point of reference for this comparison. By elsewhere we mean 2 things and other (similar) factories (b) conditions enjoyed by other grades in this firm. The firm used 5 canteens (canteen facilities were supplied by another neighbouring firm) - Directors: Management:

Senior Staff: Junior Staff: Hourly-Paid - with conditions being hierarchically graded (e.g. in each of the first 3 canteens there was waitress service).

It could be argued that this represents an optimistic orientation toward the future - in the sense that the respondent is looking to improvements taking place. In that sense it is true that it is optimistic. More importantly, however, it can be said to be determined orientation toward the future, i.e. the awareness that these were issues on which power can reasonably be applied with a chance of success, and is therefore another example of what we have described as a pragmatic orientation toward work. This view in Excerpt 6.2, therefore, is a function of the perception of the situation of the entire firm and the place of the Hourly-Paid in that. It is related, therefore, to their views on other aspects of this work, as well as their views on the position of the firm. Their aspirations with respect to their working conditions represent not only what they want (and as we shall see later in this Chapter, Hourly-Paid are dissatisfied with their working conditions), but what they can realistically expect (i.e. what can the firm 'deliver,' and what can we negotiate from the firm?). Their attitude is, therefore a combination of what the Firm can do, what they have the power to negotiate from the Firm, as well as the conditions they would actually like.

Another important point in all of this is that the Shop Stewards orientation is also collective (i.e. better conditions will be won by union members working together). In Excerpt 6.3 we discuss with a Management respondent, the same question of satisfaction with Working Conditions.

An apparent feature of ExcerptA6.3 is that the respondent has working conditions which he regards as satisfactory, and that furthermore he expects that in the future his conditions will continue to be satisfactory. Especially important, from our point of view, is the difference in strategy to be pursued in the event that conditions were unsatisfactory.

While the Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.2 puts his strategy in collective terms, the Manager in ExcerptA6.3 puts his strategy in absolutely individual terms. Such things are, for him, a matter between the Managing Director and himself, not the Managing Director and others in a similar position to himself. Furthermore the criterion against which he estimates his worth to the Firm (and thus what he should be paid, what his conditions should be) depends on how effectively he is doing his job for the Firm. There is, in his mind, a clear exchange relationship between himself and the Firm - he should not expect more than his worth, and similarly they should not pay him less than his worth. In the event of the latter coming about the matter would be one for him to take up as an individual, not through a collective organisation. This is clearly in distinction to the Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.2, whose criteria are rather less well defined, but seem to include comparisons to other similar companies and other employees of the Firm. The perspectives of the 2 respondents are clearly very different.

This does give further support to our argument about the 'pragmatic' orientation of respondents. Managers, as can be seen in TableA6.1, put 'Working Conditions' relatively low in their rank order (7th). This should not be taken to mean they are unimportant (the respondent in ExcerptA6.3 stated he would leave if they became unacceptable),

but rather that Managers *expect* acceptable conditions. They are simply 'taken-for-granted', unlike, say, promotion which - even for Manager - is an uncertainty. Staff and Hourly-Paid do not, however, have the same degree of certainty about their Working Conditions. Hence its higher rank ordering (5 and 3 respectively).

6. Union Organisation and Activity. The low ranking of this by Management can hardly be regarded as a surprise, since unionisation of management grades is only in its earliest stages, and has not as yet penetrated our own Firm, though some Managers who have worked as Hourly-Paid, at the outset of their career, have kept on union cards secretly. It would, however, be very unlikely that they should use this membership, and for the Manager in this firm unions are organisations to which their employees belong, which they must accept and respect (although they do this to varying degrees). For the Manager, therefore, from their own point of view, unions are not relevant when they judge whether a job will be good or bad. Given the lack of Management unionisation, for them, unions are simply not seen as relevant.

Amongst the Staff, however, unions again are not rated very highly. This is rather more of a surprise since at the time of our field-work Staff unionisation was increasing, with the senior Staff grades in Finance joining A.S.T.M.S. Among Staff Union Reps. its rating is equal 4th with Working Conditions (5.84) - its highest relative ranking. Among Shop Stewards it is given its highest score - 5.35 - but this only puts it 6th in their ordering. Among Hourly-Paid it is rated 7th (6.38). Can we take from this that the "Clydeside Reds" have been de-radicalised to such an extent that

their attachment to trade unions has been severely weakened? This would be a conclusion which would be as far from the truth as could possibly be.

We saw that on the previous item Management took "Working Conditions" for granted. This, we shall argue, is equally true of the attitude taken toward Trade Unions by the categories other than Management. Trade unionism, in this Firm, is not an end in itself - rather it is a/the means to the end of improved conditions, higher wages etc. Among the Hourly-Paid this is overlaid by a sense of solidarity, and awareness of collective action as a tradition and not merely as a means to an end, which is much more pronounced than among the Staff. Especially among those Staff who had no shop-floor experience (e.g. Clerks in Finance) the sense of tradition in their unionism was clearly lacking.

The orientation toward trade unionism, therefore, is not to devalue it but instead to regard it as a means to an end - but a means, which given its power and acceptance by all parts of the Firm (however caused, and however genuine), gives it a sense of taken-for-grantedness, in that its existence need no longer be questioned or subject to doubt. Rather it is now part of the social setting within which action takes place by right, and need no longer fight to be recognised. Even amongst Management this much is clear, as Excerpt A6.4 from a Senior Manager shows.

Excerpt A6.4 indicates that even among Senior Management trade unionism was simply taken-for-granted. It was something which was there, about which they could do little even if they wanted to.

The indication from Excerpt A6.4 is that they did not want to be rid of trade unions. Indeed the respondent is very positive "absolutely necessary and legitimate". This, however, is quite independent of his personal views - as we shall see later trade unionism is not a solution for Managers (this is implicit in the discussion of Excerpt A6.3). By 'taken-for-granted', for the avoidance of doubt, we mean that trade unions are accepted as part of the administrative structure of the Firm e.g. if the Management wanted to have a redundancy they would (and after our research was completed, did) consult the unions as a matter of course. This is quite independent of Managers' personal views about trade unions.

Similarly among Staff and Hourly-Paid this 'taken-for-grantedness' should only be taken to imply that trade unions are something which are just 'there' - they are part of the landscape.

Certainly the trade unionism of Hourly-Paid and Staff will not always be the same (e.g. among the latter the sense of tradition in particular, and of solidarity appeared to be less well developed than among the former). Certainly some individuals or groups may exhibit some degree of hostility toward trade unionism, a particular trade union (e.g. among Staff TASS was not especially popular among members of other Staff unions), or a particular trade union official. None of that, however, undermines the argument that trade unionism was a part of life in this Firm - in the same way as supervisors, or pay-day on a Thursday - it was, as we said 'taken-for-granted.' It is perhaps ironic that trade unionism too has a form of 3rd dimension power.

7) Promotion Prospects. This is an issue we have raised already in the previous Chapter, on decision-making. That indicated that Management were firmly in control, which was a situation respondents felt ought to persist. In this Chapter we shall consider promotion from the perspective of a work need and the degree to which this is satisfied by the Firm.

Among Management it is clear that this is an item of some importance. Table A6.1 shows that among Managers it is 4th in their average rank order of importance, with an average of 4.31 (see Table A6.2). This indicates that promotion is a much more important issue for Management than for any other group. Among Staff it is 6th, the average being 5.7, but with a standard deviation of 7.94, which suggests it is of valuable importance across the Staff sample. Among Hourly-Paid, Shop Stewards and Staff Union Reps. it is last in their rank orderings. A typical attitude, particularly on the part of Hourly-Paid, on being asked about promotion prospects was "well, I've not got any". It was common to find among the Hourly-Paid a well developed sense of *fatalism* about promotion as being something they could not aspire to. Such an attitude also existed in pockets of the Staff sample - as we suggested above the attitude to promotion among Staff can be seen, from the standard deviation, to be highly variable. Thus many Quality Control Staff promotion was marked 8th, among Foremen and Prod'n. Control staff it was marked 7th. Away from the shop-floor, among Finance staff and Sales staff it was ranked at 4th - the same as Management.

Why then do those at or close to the shop-floor (i.e. Hourly-Paid, and Staff close to the point of prod'n.) put each little emphasis

on promotion, compared to Management, and Staff at a distance from production? We would argue there are several reasons for this

1) the sense of hopelessness we referred to above. This is more than a circular argument. Certainly it does not explain *why* the attitude to promotion originated, but once it does originate it does give some explanation as to why those close to the shop-floor devalue, or avoid, promotion. Once one feels that a cause is hopeless (in this case being promoted) avoidance becomes a much more likely strategy.

2) Associated with this sense of hopelessness - perhaps a variation on this - was a perception that if one did a job particularly well the Firm would deliberately refuse promotion in order to retain that employee in that job. One Hourly-Paid respondent had worked at the same machine for 10 years. He put his failure to be promoted to a Staff job down to the 'fact' he was too good at his present job, so that is he was promoted they would, in effect, lose him. A similar view was expressed by Staff. One respondent, being asked about his promotion prospects, said "In my job, nil. Anybody who does their job all right they stay in. But what chance have you got. We feel of promotion, if you do the job wrong you're promoted out of it. It seems to be the policy here."

3) Particularly among the Hourly-Paid, there is a view that to seek promotion, especially to Foreman, is to turn against your mates. This view is expressed by an Hourly-Paid respondent "You see to be a gaffer I think you have to be a kind of a bad one, you know to get respect. You need to be kind of bad to get respect if you're a gaffer. You know, kind of frighten the men."

4) As we saw in *Appendix 3*... especially among Staff the decision on promotion is sometimes seen as arbitrary and unfair - that there were no procedures, no trained interviewers, no use of standard interviewing techniques. In a not dis-similar vein Hourly-Paid indicated their sense of perceived unfairness about the promotion without any apparently rational or just system - "if the chap's no got qualifications it looks like as if somebody's spoke for him."

Thus there are these 4 specific criticisms against the promotion system, which gives us insight as to why it is so unimportant to Hourly-Paid, and (to a lesser and more variable extent) to Staff. What they seem to come down to is - that promotion is something which for many of our respondents is not for them. It is not something which they regard as being attainable by them - thus they categorise it as being less important to them than it is to Management. For Management (and Sales and Finance Staff) on the other hand it does appear to be attainable.

A final issue, specifically with Staff, is why attitudes to promotion should vary depending on the proximity to production. A tentative explanation can be suggested by developing an argument raised in discussing recruitment in the previous Chapter. There we saw that gaining employment in the Firm was relatively easier if one had a friend or relative already in employment there i.e. through personal contacts. This can be seen as a simple extension of the traditional shipyard hiring practice of foremen taking men on in pubs, or through existing employees i.e. through the foreman's personal contacts, as hiring agent. This practice now continues through an existing employee going to the personnel

office and 'speaking for' a friend/relative seeking employment. If the role of personal contacts extends into promotion - and given the tradition it is more likely to do so on the production side - then promotion may be determined not through a rational system of roles/procedures, but through personal contacts. This would be consistent with a view that promotion depended less on "what you know, rather than who you know."

(8) Control of Own Work Environment. As is apparent from Tables A6.1 and A6.2 this is relatively more important for Management and Staff than for Hourly-Paid. Management rank this as 5th, with an average ranking of 4.34; while Staff rank it as 4th, with an average ranking of 5.11. (Thus role that this item is relatively ranked more important by Staff, but Management give it a numerically higher average). Hourly-Paid rank it as 6th, with an average of 6.1.

It is interesting that Hourly-Paid should rate this less highly than Staff and Management, in view of the fact that the Firm was selected because the work it did was generally interesting to its employees. Given that we may be surprised that Hourly-Paid should rank the Control of their Work Environment as low as 6th, when in an interesting job one may anticipate resentment at outside interference (i.e. loss of control of one's own work environment). We would, however, suggest that this is indicative of the pragmatic orientation we have referred to above. It is intrinsic to hierarchy that one cannot control one's work environment - there will always be, at least, the 'loss' to 'interfere'. Thus control of one's own work environment is not attainable, other

than a limited sense. Given the skill level of employees of this firm they could exercise some control within the boundaries of their job but not of what enters in across these boundaries. Even within the boundaries of the jobs they do there is still loss of control from Work Study, bonus systems etc. (This problem was indicated in the previous Chapter when we discussed Work Standards). Generally speaking Management and Staff were not subject to practices like Work Study. Thus, that they rated the Control of their Work Environment more highly than Hourly-Paid indicates only that they could expect to be able to exercise more control than Hourly-Paid. The rating of this factor therefore reflects the extent to which it was perceived as being attainable. It, therefore, reflects the hierarchical distribution of power within the organisation. Both in the sense of conscious power - in the judgement one makes about how much one can expect - and unconscious power - in the view one has about what one can and cannot expect (i.e. that power structures one's expectations, and also power will be used to negotiate on the distribution of resources to fulfill these expectations).

(9) Workmates. This item is of more importance to the Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards, both of whom give it a relative rating of 5th and relative ratings of 5.15 and 5.06 respectively. The item is, therefore, more important than for Management and Staff who rate it only 8th, with average ratings of 6.81 and 6.07 respectively, while the Union Reps. rate it as 6th with an average rating of 6. In discussing trade unionism we discussed the greater sense of solidarity among the Hourly-Paid, than amongst either Staff or Management. This tradition of solidarity,

as opposed to white collar individualism is the source of the variation in the importance of this item to the separate categories.

It is, however, arguable that agreeable workmates are an important source of satisfaction to the Hourly-Paid workers generally because of the restricted satisfaction which they can attain from their work which, some would argue, is intrinsically disinteresting and alienating so that one can only survive with the support of one's mates. Eynon's study in Ford Hailwood reveals such a situation on the 'Wet-Deck' where the Hourly-Paid made their work bearable by their social activities within and outwith work. In other functions the task is of sufficient interest to make this unnecessary, e.g. Management are expected to have a higher interest in their work than their subordinates. If we examine the data by dept. then we find this item to be rated least in Finance, Production Control and Works dept. (8th in each case), then by Board of Directors and Sales (7th), then by Foremen & Quality Control (6th). It is, however, rated less highly by the Skilled Hourly-Paid, than by Labourers (5th and 4th respectively). Hence amongst the white collar (non-Hourly-Paid) respondents the picture is not entirely clear, but if we look at the Hourly-Paid we find the Skilled sample rate Workmates as an item lower than Job Variety and Interest (5th to 3rd), while the Labourers rated them in reverse (4th for Workmates and 6th for Job Variety & Interest). Given that we selected the Firm precisely because the extent to which the work done was disinteresting was minimised we should perhaps be less surprised that there is little difference in rating between the Skilled and Staff & Management categories on Job Variety & Interest (Skilled rate Job Variety as

3rd, while Staff & Management categories rate it first once, second three times, third three times, and fourth once), but there is a pronounced difference when we consider the Labourers (who rate it only sixth). Hence for the Labourers there does seem to be reason to believe that Workmates are a compensation for lack of interest in the job itself. Given the structure of a labourer's work in basically boring occupations - cleaning up, assisting skilled men by fetching tools etc., moving semi-finished products around - we should not be altogether surprised by this.

The orientation to work which we have suggested that these results indicate is one which we have described as pragmatic. It is pragmatic in that the rank ordering of items reflect 3 things.

(a) those items which are 'out-of-reach', are ranked low e.g. we have argued that Hourly-Paid rank 'Promotion Prospects' last because they can see no practical possibility of achieving promotion. Hence they avoid promotion - it is not important to them

(b) those items which are 'taken-for-granted' also tend to be ranked fairly low. For instance in the case of Management 'Working Conditions' were ranked lower than for other groups in the Company. It could not be said that their working conditions were particularly luxurious. Equally it could not be said they were not an improvement on the conditions of other employees. Management *expect* a certain standard of working conditions. It is not a matter they expect to have to expend a great deal of effort in 'getting right'. We have made a similar argument above the Hourly-Paid attitude to their trade union. They take it for granted - they expect it to be there. It is not an issue.

(c) Those items which were an issue - those items which were attainable, but could not be taken-for-granted. The most obvious example of this among the items we have looked at are Wages/Salary. The real value of wages over time cannot be taken for granted - they have to be negotiated, and thus a certain standard of living is attainable. Promotion Prospects was an item which was attainable for Management (but not for Hourly Paid) but again it was not something which could be taken for granted. It is items like these which are the more important items.

This, however, does not involve denial of the intrinsic importance of certain items (e.g. Wages/Salary is clearly important in itself). What we seek to do here is to draw attention to the extent to which work expectations can be influenced by power, and thus, for instance, why Promotion has an importance which reflects hierarchical structure.

At certain points we have in passing been critical of Goldthorpe and Lockwood's instrumental orientation, but the ordering shown on Table 4.1, we have argued, does not represent an instrumental orientation to work, despite the emphasis laid on salary/wages. On the contrary, we have argued, it is part of a perfectly reasonable strategy given that money can be used to achieve satisfaction outwith work, as Goldthorpe et al suggests. We cannot, and have not, gone on to imply that this means that employees will do anything, and suffer every sort of deprivation, to this end. Rather this ordering represents a pragmatic orientation to work in which (1) the highest rated items are those which are important and perceived as attainable, and (2) the lowest rated items are those which are regarded as unimportant, or unattainable,

or can simply be taken-for-granted. 'Salary/Wages' clearly fulfils the former category, while 'Union Organisation & Activity' fulfills the latter for Management as unimportant, and for Hourly-Paid as taken-for-granted, while 'Freedom from Supervision' is unattainable (to varying degrees) for all categories, as we have suggested.

We can, however, go further in our critique of the notion of an instrumental orientation to work, since Goldthorpe et al extend their argument to say "it may be assumed that under conditions of full or near-full employment, the taking or retaining of industrial jobs will regularly involve some form of *choice* as between different patterns of reward. Thus it is likely that there is a fairly general tendency in operation for the labour forces of particular enterprises to become to some degree homogenous, in terms of their members' orientation to work, as a result simply of processes of self-selection. Men with a certain order of priorities in regard to work will tend to be found together in employments which offer the best opportunities for achieving the returns of which they have given the highest value. It may then be argued that in *any* attempt at explaining and understanding attitudes and behaviour within modern industry, the probability at least must be recognised that orientations to work which employees hold in common will need to be treated as an important *independent* variable relative to the in-plant situation." (8) Our point of disagreement with this can be seen by inspecting the standard deviation figures on Table 6.2 which for each category vary as follows.

(1) Management - from 2 (Union Organisation and Activity) to 4.64 (Control of Own Work Environment).

- (2) Staff - from 4.87 (Wages/Salary) to 7.94 (Promotion Prospects).
- (3) Union Rep. - from 0.83 (Wages/Salary and Job Security) to 3.27 (Union Org'n and Activity).
- (4) Hourly-Paid - from 3.84 (Control of Own Work Environment) to 6.06 (Union Org'n and Activity)
- (5) Shop Stewards - from 2.36 (Freedom from Supervision) to 3.15 (Workmates).

Given standard deviations of these orders of magnitude of a 9 point scale, it should be apparent that even within each category respondents work for the Firm for widely differing reasons, and to argue for homogeneity, even within categories, is simply not tenable in the light of these figures. This data shows instead that respondents from the same category work for the Firm for widely differing reasons, and that in consequence (a) any conclusion of homogeneity would be mis-placed, (b) the Firm, given that our respondents retain their employment with the Firm, is capable of offering a variety of rewards to its employees. This is consistent with our view that our respondents seek to maximise a complex subjective expectations function which includes not one item, but a number of items, which they seek to simultaneously satisfy. In so doing they may recognise the possibility of a trade-off of one item against another, but in so doing the law of diminishing returns applies in so far as increasing satisfaction on one item will only be chosen for decreasing items of satisfaction on other items. Thus, for instance, we should not expect our respondents to suffer any deprivation as long as they are paid for it.

This variability within categories has the further important implication that we can expect on an individual basis a good deal of overlap between individuals among Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid. In other words within the sample we will find examples which are deviant from the above general discussion where we took each sample as a whole. Hourly-Paid were said to place a greater emphasis on Wages/Salary than Management, who emphasised their Job Variety and Interest. Given the magnitude of the standard deviations it is clearly possible to find Managers who put Wages/Salary above Job Variety and Interest (and thus be typically Hourly-Paid) and Hourly-Paid who put Job Variety and Interest above Wages/Salary (and thus be typically Management).

The 'typical' Management/Staff/Hourly-Paid employee is therefore purely a figment of a statistical imagination. The details of Table A6.1 and A6.2 point to a general trend. The standard deviations in Table A6.2 suggest that the extent of deviation are so large that to go beyond discussion at the level of a general trend would be to exaggerate beyond what is sustainable.

Thus unlike Goldthorpe and Lockwood's Affluent Worker and his instrumental orientation, we are not suggesting a Pragmatic Worker in the sense of a single set of qualities (e.g. an emphasis on Wages/Salary). Rather we have suggested that the Pragmatic Orientation of our sample reflects the attempt to assess the social situations within which they establish and try to achieve their expectations. We have shown that the categories do this differently - each has its own unique ordering. Furthermore even within each category orderings will vary from one to another, as we pointed out. (Overtime we may expect orderings to vary as well).

What this section has shown is

(1) that different people work for this Firm for different reasons even in the same category and (2) most importantly that the orderings between categories vary as well, if we remove individual differences by the means of an arithmetic average.

Job Satisfaction

This section is concerned with the expressed degree of satisfaction by our sample with these 9 aspects of their i.e. whether their expectation of the firm are being frustrated or fulfilled. We argued in Chapter 1 that the more expectations are frustrated, the more likely is a challenge to the hierarchical principle of the organisation's structure. We argued in Chapter 5 that a failure by Management to provide sufficient resources could undermine the legitimised, and un-challenged authority of Management. The objective of this section will be to consider the degree of satisfaction among the firm's employees, and thus to explain the absence of challenge to hierarchy which we detected in Chapter 5. Thus we may provide empirical support for the theoretical model in Chapter 1.

First, however, there is a methodological point which has to be discussed. items, and consider the implications of this knowledge and pattern of use.

To measure satisfaction requires that it be referred to something. To say 'are you satisfied with your salary?' has no meaning, as one can only be satisfied relative to some measure, which can only remain implicit in this question. Given our concern with hierarchy we made use of the 3 main hierarchical categories - Management,

Staff and Shop-floor (i.e. the Hourly-Paid - this title was used less often in the Firm) - and each respondent was asked to assess his satisfaction on each item relative to what he perceived as the provision of that item to each category. In this way we sought to bring out those items on which there was strong internal conflict on provision of resources to meet expectations e.g. the Hourly-Paid dissatisfied with their conditions of work compared to those provided for Management may create doubts about knowledge which implies the acceptability of hierarchy.

We also measured satisfaction of each respondent on each item, without the constraint of remaining within the existing Firm. At the same time to ask for the degree of satisfaction creates 2 problems

- 1) it lacks definition, as we argued earlier
- 2) to relate satisfaction to anything within the present system ties the respondent to the present system, and we ended the first Chapter by stating that our analysis would start out from a position wherein hierarchy was assumed, theoretically, not to exist in order to develop our understanding of how hierarchy is sustained in the minds of our respondents. Given this we need to employ a measure which does not entail this implication. By using the question "how much would this item have to be improved to make your job ideal?" we avoid problems such as the fact of broadly similar treatment for particular grades of employee (e.g. 'the going rate' will be very similar in a particular trade especially within an area, and even throughout the country,) so that the respondent by using this form of questioning is free to express his degree of satisfaction outwith the system i.e. to suspend his belief in hierarchy

and hierarchical reward. Hence, as well as the interview information from the second-stage interview, there shall be for each items a measure of satisfaction.

- 1) relative to the existing hierarchical system
- 2) relative to the ideal of each respondent

The first aspect we shall consider is (1) Wages and Salary

(1) Wages and Salary

We measured satisfaction in relation to Hourly-Paid, Staff and Management. The results are shown in Tables 6.5 - 6.7.

Table 6.5 - How satisfied are you with your wages/salary in relation to the Shop-floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	3 (9%)	7 (10%)	1 (14%)	10 (21%)	0
Satisfied	15 (47%)	37 (52%)	2 (29%)	28 (58%)	13 (77%)
Dissatisfied	9 (28%)	21 (30%)	4 (57%)	6 (13%)	3 (18%)
Very Dissatisfied	3 (9%)	4 (6%)	0	4 (8%)	1 (6%)

Table 6.6 - How satisfied are you with your wages/salary in relation to the Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	3 (9%)	8 (11%)	2 (29%)	4 (8%)	0
Satisfied	16 (50%)	39 (55%)	1 (14%)	26 (54%)	6 (35%)
Dissatisfied	8 (25%)	20 (28%)	4 (57%)	10 (21%)	9 (53%)
Very Dissatisfied	3 (9%)	2 (3%)	0	5 (10%)	0

Table 6.7 - How satisfied are you with your wages/salary in relation to the Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very satisfied	0	2 (3%)	0	4 (8%)	0
Satisfied	16 (50%)	39 (55%)	3 (43%)	24 (50%)	9 (53%)
Dissatisfied	5 (16%)	15 (21%)	2 (29%)	8 (17%)	4 (24%)
Very Dissatisfied	2 (6%)	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	8 (17%)	1 (6%)

If we examine each category separately, we find the following

(1) Management. While a majority of Management say they are satisfied/very satisfied in relation to others, there are not insubstantial numbers who say they are not satisfied - 37% say they are dis-satisfied compared to the Shop Floor workers, 34% compared to Staff and 22% compared to other Managers. That level of dis-satisfaction among Managers is perhaps surprising. Why should about 1/3 of Managers say that compared to others in the Company they are not satisfied with their salaries? Excerpt 6.5, from a Director, is instructive in a number of ways.

A. In the latter part of the Excerpt there is a clear emphasis on the squeezing of differentials since 1970, and the loss of real earnings for Managers. Much of the cause of this is clearly the successive periods of incomes policy during the 1970s - 1972-1974: 1975-1979, as well as the greater success of trade unions during this period. The focus of discontent was, however, clearly on incomes policy and the labour government. Many management respondents in answering these questions said they were satisfied with their salary, but on the proviso that it was under existing circumstances (i.e. of incomes policy) and that they would never tolerate such a situation under normal circumstances. The clear

implication of this was that this was not a free choice by the Company, but rather that the Company was constrained by the legislation. Indeed the Company was trying to find ways round this, by offering 'reward packages' which did not fall within the scope of incomes policy e.g. in 6 cases, Managers were appointed to the Company board (in fairly junior capacities), given company cars (Austin Princess), and fairly substantial wage rises (since they had been promoted). This strategy - which was extended to other managers - would go some way to resolving the problem discussed in the middle of Excerpt A6.5 i.e. to retain capable managers without creating wage anomalies. It would also be seen, at least by Managers, as a reward for loyalty to the Company.

A small diversion on this point is to consider the reaction of other groups in the Company to this development of reward packages for Management. For Staff and Hourly-Paid such activities must provoke emotion. A manager getting a Company car or a seat on the Board must raise, in their minds, the issue of whether Management don't get enough already, given what they do (this emerges fairly clearly in Excerpt 5.8 by a Shop Steward, who suggests that some Managers 'just waddle about' - others aren't aware of their function - and that salaries should be no more of a secret than wages - something we drew attention to in Chapter 4 from our experience of drawing a sample of Staff and Management, since we could not be shown pension records). To some extent, given the 'confidentiality' of their salaries, Management are caught in a problem of their own construction. The fact is that Hourly Paid and Staff can only guess at what Management are paid. To the extent that their guess is an overestimate, the Company 'giving Managers cars' can only induce a sense of resentment (see Excerpt A6.11 on this point). Yet it is unlikely that Hourly Paid/Staff workers would be aware of the problem the Company has in retaining its most able Managers. The emphasis on confidentiality therefore, creates a 'Catch 22'

for the Company - as long as there is confidentiality there is ignorance and lack of understanding , but if they abandon confidentiality they offered a strong arm amongst Managers in the Company.

B. The second important point in ExcerptA6.5 is the emphasis on conditions of employment being essentially an individual matter i.e. that it is a matter of negotiation between himself and the Group Chairman. He makes clear that if the deal on offer was not to his satisfaction, then he would try to negotiate an increase, or leave the Company and go elsewhere. This point is raised also in ExcerptA6.6. with a Director.

The emphasis in ExcerptA6.6. is clearly intensely individual - that at his level (Board) one ought to be able to look after oneself. This stands contrast with the much more collectivist attitude held by Hourly Paid in particular. The Director, in ExcerptA6.6, quite clearly rejects any question og negotiation - it is a matter of discussion - as well as any question of industrial action - if one does not like it one gets out. This is clearly distinct from the view on wage negotiations which are held by Hourly Paid workers, and increasingly by Staff, i.e. that it is a collective matter, involving if necessary collective action. The issue here is not that one is right and the other wrong, but rather the observation that Management occupy, in this respect at least, a different 'life-world', particularly in relation to Hourly Paid workers. The implications for meaningful communication - and the consequences of distortion - are fairly obvious once Management perception is so different from that of other employees.

(2) Staff. Among this group there are only minor variations in expressed satisfaction, as the comparison moves from one group to another. The largest variation is the increase in non-responses as we make a comparison with Management (2% for Hourly Paid, 3% for Staff, 17% for

Management non-responses). This reflects again the emphasis on confidentiality of Management salaries, referred to above.

There are, however, a number of observations which can be made about Staff perceptions of their salaries. First of all, on any comparison about 60% say they are satisfied/very satisfied with their salaries, compared to others in the Company.

On the other hand their Union Reps do appear to be slightly less satisfied, as 57% say they are dis-satisfied compared to Hourly Paid, and to other Staff, which one half of those responding to the question, in relation to Management, say they are dis-satisfied. The number of Staff Union Reps is, however, fairly small (7), so too much weight should not be placed on their. On the other hand this more critical stance by Union Reps is fairly consistent on other matters besides pay.

Another important aspect of Staff perception of pay is one which is not clear from Tables A6.5 - A6.7, is their concern at the erosion of their differential with respect to Hourly Paid workers. In this they clearly are similar to Management. This point is made very clearly in Excerpt A6.7 from a Staff Union Rep. There are a number of important points made here.

(i) The erosion of differentials - and the expressed fear that in 'a few more years they will go ahead'.

(ii) The defence of a Staff differential by reference to qualities which Staff possess - qualifications (HNC etc.), responsibility (its Staff who give Hourly Paid instructions). The issue taken up with this respondent is one, which as we shall see, is put forward by Hourly Paid workers. In particular Hourly Paid workers would argue that they have qualifications (they have served an apprenticeship), they have responsibilities (often doing work of considerable value) - and that in

any case some Staff don't have qualifications or all that much responsibility (typists and clerks come in for particular attention). The Union Reps' response to this is 2-fold (a) not all skilled men are all that good i.e. just as there are variations among Staff, there are variations among skilled men, (b) that the payment of skilled men ought to reflect that - at least it ought to reflect the level of experience of a skilled man. Whether or not a 'solution' of this type would resolve the Staff:Hourly Paid differential is not a question we want to address ourselves too, as it would be conjecture on a very complex problem. The point we wish to make here is that the perception of Staff and Hourly Paid is drawn on the same 'life-world'. The 2 groups develop their different perceptions on fundamentally the same 'life-world' (or "the total of all circumstances to be selected and defined by our autobiographical situations" - Alfred Schutz, 'Reflections on the Problems of Relevance', p.136). Staff, in contrast to Management, approach this on a collectivist basis - unlike Management for whom any difficulty is for the individual to sort out. Indeed we could argue that the unionisation of staff has involved their migration from the individualist world of Management, to the collectivist world of the Hourly Paid. This point shall become more apparent if we discuss the role of trade unions.

The role of trade unions on wages is discussed with a Staff respondent in Excerpt A6.7. Underlying this is the realisation by Staff that their differential with Hourly Paid workers had been diminished - some Foremen told of realising that they were being paid less than those they supervised. This led to a gradual unionisation of Staff in the Company - a process which also happened in other Companies at much the same time. During our field work union density rose to about 80% of Staff - the major area of Staff which had not been unionised was the level immediately below Management (e.g. Section Leaders).

In effect, therefore, Staff have adopted the strategy of the Hourly Paid in securing wage increases - "I don't think I would have got the rises I did get if it hadn't been for the union pushing for results". (ExcerptA 6.8). A closely related issue, however, is the extent to which Staff have also adopted Hourly Paid attitudes. The solidarity of the manual union and its members is traditionally very strong (i.e. that union advice is seldom ignored), and we shall see below that the role of the Union among Hourly Paid workers in this Company is very significant. The independence of Staff - their individualism - surfaces in ExcerptsA6.9 andA6.10.

In ExcerptA6.9 from a Staff member it is made clear that while the union plays a role - it provides 'guide-lines' - the final decision on what to do is very much for the individual. Even in ExcerptA6.10, from a Staff Union Rep, the main function of the Union is the information which it provides. There is, in other words, an important distancing from their Union by Staff, which would not be typical of Hourly Paid workers generally and is dis-similar to the relationship of Hourly Paid workers to their trade union in this Company.

Thus, while Staff may have moved in the direction of Hourly Paid workers on this matter, and may share certain strategic practices which are collectivist, there remains a strongly individualist element in their attitude.

This point is emphasised in ExcerptA6.11 where we discuss with a member of Staff, the comparisons he makes to assess his salary. For this respondent the most important comparison is what somebody else in another Company would get for doing the same sort of work he does (on this case, an accountant). His comparison is, therefore, market-based i.e. what the labour market offers for his type of labour.

There is an interesting contrast which can be drawn between this and what is said in ExcerptA6.5 by a Director. Our Staff member in ExcerptA6.10 has a comparison in relation to the market, while the Director in ExcerptA6.5 compares his salary to 'what (he) had done in the past' (ExcerptA6.5). In other words the Staff member justifies his worth by what the market thinks he is worth as an accountant, whereas the Director justifies his worthy by what he has done for the Company. The view of the Director is, therefore, more individual (more personal), whereas the view of the Staff member is more market-hand (and thus more impersonal).

Another problem which arose with Staff is their frustration with government incomes policy - a matter discussed also with Management. The problems Staff encounter are identical to those discussed with Management (a) the rises they get are less than they feel they deserve, (b) when a new member of Staff joins the Company to replace someone who has left it will be at a higher rate of pay, to attract the right calibre of person. This creates resentment for those who remain, who find themselves working for less than the new entrant. One informant claimed he was doing the same job as a newly recruited member of Staff, but for £800 per year less. Even if the story is untrue, it does indicate a strength of feeling.

Thus Staff occupy a kind of ambivalent position on this issue. In certain respects there are very clear echoes of the Management attitude of individualism, yet strategically they have moved clearly in the direction of Hourly Paid by becoming unionised.

3. Hourly Paid. There is among Hourly Paid a distinction between their comparison internally (i.e. with other Hourly Paid) which shows 79% to be satisfied very satisfied (TableA6.5), and their comparison with

Staff and with Management which shows 62% and 58% respectively to be satisfied/very satisfied (Tables A6.6 and A6.7) - or put another way 38% and 42% respectively say they are dis-satisfied, or very dis-satisfied. What is the nature of this dis-satisfaction?

First of all let us look at Management. Excerpt A6.12 discusses the relative pay of Management and Hourly Paid workers, with a Shop Steward. For this respondent an important comparison is with the Directors and top Management - or 'the man in the top seats' as he puts it.

His dis-satisfaction is not so simple as that Management get more than Hourly Paid workers, but rather the size of the gap between the 2 groups, and in particular that given what Hourly Paid workers like himself put in to the Company, and what Management put in, the difference in his wages and their salaries is too great. There is also an expressed resentment at 2 issues we have raised earlier on in this Chapter:

- (a) the secrecy about Management salaries.
- (b) evasion of incomes policy by providing Management with rewards not available to others (e.g. company cars).

Clearly, therefore, there would be difficulty for Management and Hourly Paid to maintain a dialogue on this issue since they start from fundamentally different precepts. For instance we took up the issue of confidentiality of Management salaries and the provision of company cars with some of the Managers who had received cars from the Firm.

The cars remained the property of the Company, but were for the exclusive use of the particular Manager. This use is taxable, and in the view of this Manager he was paying for it this way. In any case, in his view, the Company ought to supply him with a car as he had to travel on behalf of the Company. The most important point,

however, was that he regarded this as purely something between himself and the Company, and certainly nothing to do with any other employees of the Company. This directly contradicts the view expressed by the Shop Steward that he would only assume or guess what a Manager earned - a Manager would argue that no employee has a right to know what he earns. But, the Shop Steward would retort, you know our rates, you know our hours so you know everything about us that we don't know about you. The motivation to have equality of opinions is to ensure that the affairs of the Company are carried on fairly and with equity.

Thus as we have argued above, in this respect Management and Hourly Paid occupy fundamentally different 'life-worlds', making assessments of relative worth on different criteria.

Tables A6.6 and A6.7 do, however, illustrate another point which has to be discussed, namely that Shop Stewards are apparently less dissatisfied with their wages compared to Management salaries than compared to Staff salaries (30% and 53%) respectively - though both are distorted by non-responses). Why should Shop Stewards take this attitude? An explanation is apparent in Excerpt A6.13 from a Shop Steward. There are several reasons put forward by the Shop Steward as to why the differential between Staff and Hourly Paid is unfair - but they all come down to the fundamental assertion that Staff and Hourly Paid ought to have the same conditions. The example of the 'young lady who has just been a year and a half in the place should get a week more holiday... than a man who has been 49 years in the place' may or may not be true, but has reached almost the status of a legend and may as well be true (a week after this interview a B.L. steward told the same story on a BBC current affairs programme, except she had been with the Company 6 months, it was sick pay rather than holidays, and the man was her father who had been with BL 35 years). There is, however, an

important distinction between Staff and Hourly Paid, and Management and Hourly Paid - namely that in the former a dialogue is possible. In the case of Management and Hourly Paid each approaches this issue in such a different way that a dialogue is, at best, unlikely.

The possibility of a dialogue between Staff and Hourly Paid is made clear in the latter part of this Excerpt, where we take up with the Shop Steward some of the issues which emerged in ExcerptA6.7 with a Staff Union Rep. In ExcerptA6.7 it was argued by the respondent that Staff being paid more was justified, among other things, by the experience of Staff being reflected in their higher wages. The response of the Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.13 is to question the extent to which doing a job for a long time makes one a better worker (though that is rather at odds with the legend of the girl in the Company a year and a half and the man with 49 years service). In the view of the Shop Steward, when an apprentice has finished his time, he is a skilled man and is not necessarily any better/worse than a man with 49 years experience. In his view there are only 'skilled men', who are worthy of reward as 'skilled men'. Experience is not a measure of ability.

The major issue for the Shop Steward is, however, not with Staff generally. The extra pay of draughtsmen and foremen is not the major issue - it is other Staff conditions they aspire to. Clearly, therefore, there is a conflict - but the important point we want to make here is that dialogue is possible between Staff and Hourly-Paid, in contrast to Hourly-Paid and Management. In the former it is a conflict of criteria - to use the analogy of the ideal speech thesis, it is question of the better argument. In the latter, however, dialogue is not possible because (a) of confidentiality/secretcy of Management salaries (b) the fact that Management assessment is

individualistic, while Hourly-Paid make a collective assessment, thus there is a fundamental incompatibility. Differentials are not, however, the only issue raised about wages.

As we have seen Management assess their worth by how much they feel they are due as individuals and their contribution to the Company. Staff make the same assessment by looking at job adverts in newspapers. There is evidence of Hourly-Paid behaving similarly to Staff, though somewhat less formally. This point is discussed in Excerpt 6.14 with an Hourly-Paid respondent.

This Excerpt indicates that rather than using the (relatively) formal means of looking at papers, Hourly-Paid do make a similar assessment of their wages to that done by Staff, but through social interaction - "word gets around ... just talking to people in other factories." The consequential perception that they are well-paid, relative to other similar companies in the area, is likely to induce the relatively high degree of satisfaction in table 6.5, which shows that 79% of Hourly Paid are satisfied/very satisfied, while 77% of Shop Stewards say they are satisfied (both relative to other Shop-Floor workers). In fact the Company, as a matter of policy, does pay well, relative to other firms in the area.

As we have seen it is knowledge (albeit of an uncertain truth) of what others in the Firm receive which induces dissatisfaction. This knowledge of internal differentials is used more widely by the Shop Stewards than by their members, who tended to emphasise the less formal knowledge gained by interaction with friends in social gatherings. (Indeed among the very small numbers of Managers who had made their way through the Firm from the Shop-floor this was still done e.g. for one Manager the crucial-place for such a judgement was the golf-course - or,

more accurately, the club bar). This differential use of knowledge is reflected in the results for Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards, especially TableA6.6.

Table 6.8 'How much would your Wages/Salary have to be improved to make your job ideal?'

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Much Improved	11 (34%)	13 (18%)	2 (29%)	18 (38%)	10 (59%)
Improved a Bit	18 (56%)	45 (63%)	5 (71%)	22 (46%)	7 (41%)
Right Now	2 (6)	13 (18%)	0	8 (17%)	0

It has to be kept in mind that this data was gathered at the end of the 1970's - after 6 years of nearly continuous incomes policy of one kind or another. The main surprise is, therefore that as many as 23 people said that their jobs gave them wages/salaries that were right as they are. This, it has to be kept in mind, is a fairly severe comparison we are using - what would make your job *ideal*. On the other side it is not surprising that the great majority over all categories wanted some degree of improvement in their wages to make their job ideal. At the same time it is suggestive that the Company does pay relatively well, that the modal consumer in all cases other than the Shop Stewards, is that wages/salary would have to be improved a bit to make the job ideal. There would appear, therefore, to be relatively little dis-satisfaction with wages/salaries. That, however, has to be understood against the background of the following points

(i) the comparisons which are routinely made tend most often to be like-with-like (e.g. Hourly Paid compare themselves with Hourly Paid in other Companies). There could be difficulties if comparisons come

to be routinely made across groups e.g. if Hourly-Paid began to compare themselves to Management. The difficulties between Hourly-Paid and Staff to a significant extent originate in Hourly-Paid aspiring to Staff conditions. The present situation of material, like-with-like comparison is therefore consistent with the present hierarchical system of reward. The possibility of change in that reward system has been considered most by Shop Stewards. Development of this, both in terms of outwards to Hourly Paid generally, and in the sense of developing a rationale for an alternative non-hierarchical, or rational (in the sense used by Kaberences as emerging from an ideal speech situation) is likely to produce a crisis of hierarchy as a system of organisations.

(ii) In addition the point should be understood that these levels of satisfaction/dissatisfaction are not in any sense permanent, but can only be understood as contingent on existing circumstances. The level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction is dependent on the knowledge available to the respondent and the manner in which this is used. Should this knowledge change (e.g. that our Firm maintains its wage while others surge ahead) then we may expect a change in the judgement expressed. This much should be readily apparent. What may be less obvious is that if we presume the knowledge of each individual to be less than complete, then by using additional knowledge (i.e. additional to what is used at present) the judgement may equally change because of the use of this additional knowledge and/or a change in the manner of the use of existing knowledge which the additional knowledge brings about (most obviously if Management salaries were more widely known, they may be a change on the part of the rank-and-file Hourly-Paid in the direction of the attitude expressed by Shop Stewards).

It is implicit in the Staff use of 'media advertsing' knowledge and Hourly-Paid use of 'social interaction' knowledge that these judgements, enshrined in tables A6.5-6.8 can never be final and that they will be subject to constant checking in the ways we have described. This does not express any form of conflict, it merely expresses the 'form of life' led our respondents. Excerpt A 6.15 illustrates that while there is satisfaction at the moment, there is constant monitoring of the situation with respect to their wages - in terms of other Firms and their standard of living. It can not be assumed that this satisfaction is any way constant.

Job Security

As we point out in Chapter 3, the area where the Company is located has a long history of relatively high unemployment. Given this socio-economic context one might be led to expect that there would be a strong emphasis on Job Security on the part of our respondents. Responses to the questions on this item appear in Tables A6.9 - A6.11

TableA6.9 - How satisfied are you with your Job Security in relation to the Job Security of (other) Shop-Floor workers?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	3 (9%)	13 (18%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	3 (18%)
Satisfied	28 (88%)	55 (78%)	6 (86%)	36 (75%)	11 (65%)
Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	0	3 (6%)	3 (18%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	0	0	0

TableA6.10 - How satisfied are you with your Job Security in relation to the Job Security of (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	5 (16%)	15 (21%)	1 (14%)	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Satisfied	26 (81%)	52 (73%)	5 (71%)	34 (71%)	13 (77%)
Dissatisfied	0	4 (6%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	2 (12%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	0	0	0	0

TableA6.11 - How satisfied are you with your Job Security in relation to the Job Security of (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	4 (13%)	10 (15%)	2 (29%)	3 (6%)	3 (18%)
Satisfied	27 (85%)	57 (80%)	5 (71%)	35 (73%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	0	3 (4%)	0	9 (19%)	1 (6%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	0	1 (2%)	1 (6%)

Tables A6.9 - A6.11 show a high degree of Management satisfaction with their Job Security, relative to any other group in the Company. There are, it is true, variations across the Tables but these are fairly minor. The important observation is that no Manager who responded to this question, said that he was dis-satisfied with his Job Security. What we have to consider is why Management feel they have this degree of perceived Job Security? There are a variety of reasons for this

(i) the order book of the Company was at a very high level. At the time of our field work employees were being recruited, there was no question of redundancy.

(ii) Management felt, as a result of their impression of redundancies taking place elsewhere, that they had relatively greater security than other groups in the Company - i.e. in the event of a redundancy they would be little affected if at all.

(iii) the Company had a reputation for not declaring redundancies recklessly. Many respondents when they were asked about redundancy said they could not re-call such an event in the Company, while those who could remember were talking about events 25 years earlier. Indeed Management policy was to avoid redundancy until absolutely necessary. Excerpt A6.16, from a Director, makes this point clear.

The Director makes clear the position of the Company right from the start by stating that redundancy is the last thing the Company wants. Perhaps more significant, however, is the passage which follows where we put to him the conflict of maintaining profitability and avoiding 200 redundancies. His initial response is to repeat the view expressed at the beginning of the Excerpt - that the Company - or more particularly the Managers and Directors - are all human beings and would prefer to keep people on. It is only after this that we establish at what point a redundancy would be declared - when the Company

could no longer afford to keep them on, or more particularly "The morning the Banks won't give you any more money." Thus while the Company may be composed of human beings, in the final analysis it is technical rationality which is dominant. It still does, however, have to be emphasised that, as he makes clear at the end of the Excerpt, for this Director this would only be in the *Final* analysis, "If in fact the market had gone away", otherwise they would carry the losses until the market for their product improved, or the Banks said 'No more money.'

Clearly, however, the 'Bottom Line' of Job Security is technical rationality. This appears only to be common sense. If there is no money (because the Banks won't lend any more) to pay the wages, what else can Management do? Clearly, not much. The importance of his point is highlighted by the following quote from Theory and Practice

"Yet even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from practical questions: therefore a peculiar danger arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of technical questions without, however, departing from the level of reflection of a rationality confined to the technological horizon. For them no attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of the citizens concerned with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical" ("Theory and Practice" - J. Habermas, pg. 255. Quoted

in "Restructuring of Social and Political Theory" - Richard Bernstein pg. 187). In other words while for the Director in this Excerpt the technical rationality of the banks saying 'No more money' is the 'Bottom Line', as Hakermas points out here this involves transporting what is a technical rationality uncritically into the social and political issue of control of human destiny. Only where there is either

- (i) a national consensus on such an act, would this be stable. For a national consensus the dialogue must allow for consisting with the theses of what speech
- (ii) a less than rational consensus because of distorted communication would be inevitably unstable as it would not reflect 'truth'

Given that the former condition does not apply in present circumstances we are, therefore, led to argue that

(a) whatever consensus exists over redundancies at the moment (even if only in the sense of those made redundant going along with it, even if attitudinally they dissent) is the result of the same distorted communication we identified in the previous Chapter, and in this case the uncritical acceptance of what is a technical rationality into what is also a social and political question.

(b) that the apparent consensus is ultimately unstable, such that if the intrusion of technical rationality is understood as such, rather than as inevitable, the instability may become manifest rather than theoretical.

Finally, on the issue of Management perceptions of job security, we pointed out that job security is perceived to depend on the order situation of the Company. We identified in Chapter 5 that Management were perceived as having most influence on decisions which affected the Company's order situation, and that in Chapter 4 Management were consistently the least informed group in the Company. Two implications follow from this

- (i) given that they are least informed, Management are least placed to assess their job security
- (ii) to the extent that their decisions really do influence the ability of the Company to win orders, they can act in a significant way on their job security

(2) Staff and Union Reps

From Tables 46.9 - 46.11 it is clear that Staff attitudes on this are very similar to those of Management i.e. they see themselves as satisfactorily secure compared to others in the Company. While it is true that some Staff express dis-satisfaction, whereas as Managers did this, the numbers are very small - 9 compared to Managers, 6% compared to other Staff and 5% compared to Hourly-Paid. On the other hand, relatively more Staff than Managers say they are very satisfied with their Job Security. The distribution, therefore, differs slightly, but as with Management, Staff appear to feel their Job Security is satisfactory. The same view is apparent on the part of their Union Reps.

It does, however, have to be kept in mind that Staff do not occupy as strategically important a position as Management

(1) they are not, in terms of their individual positions in the organisation hierarchy, , as well placed to comprehensively assess the position of the Company as Management are. This point comes out clearly in Excerpt 6.17 from a Staff Respondant. In this Excerpt the connection between his Job Security and the ability of the Company to win orders is explicitly made at the beginning of the Excerpt. His insight into the system of winning orders is, however, rather vague - "the firm has, I think, a fair record of expansion of success". This respondant is senior Staff, in a dept. quite apart from Sales/Marketing. He has a deep knowledge and understanding of his own dept - but the activities of other dept. are quite foreign to him. Certainly he can come to his own view - but that will be based on, as he confesses, what has already happened. The whole process "seem to be on a fairly disjointed fashion". This stands comparison to Management, who being closer to the top of the hierarchy, and as we saw in Chapter 4 better informed, can make an on-going assessment. Staff are consequently in a position of relatively greater uncertainty in assessing their Job Security. The lack of security for Staff - indeed for anybody in the Company - is apparent in Excerpt 6.18, again from a Staff respondant.

For this respondant the connection between orders & Job Security is quite clear - as is the possibility that no orders means no jobs. For this respondant, therefore, the logic of the Director in Excerpt 6.16 is probably technically acceptable. Nevertheless the end of Excerpt 6.18 is significant, because at the time of our field-work, the Company was doing well - it was winning orders. The acceptability of the Director's logic may have been reduced by a heightened Job Insecurity.

(2) Staff do not have the same degree of influence over decision-making, as we saw in Chapter 5. Thus they are obliged, in this sense, to adopt a passive view toward their Job Security - it is something which just happens, over which they have relatively little influence. Management, in contrast do take the decisions which affect orders won or lost (or they are perceived to do so), thus Management can directly influence their Job Security - for Staff their Job Security is an implication of these Management decisions.

We raised earlier the issue of how Staff might respond if their Job Security was reduced because the Company was unable to win orders. Given the preceding analysis there would seem to be 2 possible Staff response. One response might be to adopt a critical attitude toward Management and to call into question their legitimacy to take these decisions, since they weren't working out. From what we have seen this seems unlikely, so the alternative response - to accept reduced Job Security & Redundancies if times get bad - seems more probable. This is apparent in Excerpt 6.19 from a Staff respondent who makes clear that he is 'reasonably happy (that he) could get another job elsewhere? This attitude - the ability to find alternative work in the area - was more often expressed by the professional people in the Firm e.g. Staff engineers, accountants, etc. There was a noticeably greater confidence in these people that if it did come to the point where the Firm was to make them redundant they could find work elsewhere. Thus, apart from purely personal/emotional ties to the Firm, the importance of the security of one's job becomes that much less. The less certain one is that an alternative will be available the more important it becomes to keep the job one has. The spirit of the Staff is summed up in this respect by this "They're quite human in here -

we're about the best paid, and there had only been one pay-off in 25 years".

(3) Hourly-Paid & Shop Stewards

There is again an apparently high degree of satisfaction on the part of Hourly-Paid workers with their Job Security. Tables 46.9 - 46.11 show that about 80% of them at least say they are satisfied/very satisfied with their Job Security. Their Shop Stewards have a similarly high degree of satisfaction. It is, however, interesting that the dis-satisfaction which is expressed is hierarchical - only 6% say they are dissatisfied in relation to other Shop Floor workers, but in relation to Staff the figure is 19%, and in relation to Management it is 21%. On the other hand among Shop Stewards the change is apparently in reverse as 18% of them say they are dissatisfied with their Job Security in relation to other Shop Floor workers, but in relation to Staff & Management the figure is 12%. The figures among the Stewards certainly are small (e.g. the change among the Shop Stewards represents 1 person), and the only explanation which we can suggest is a feeling that in the event of a redundancy, it would be them (the Shop Stewards) who would be dealt with more heavily than their numbers. We are, however, unable to put forward any additional evidence to support this. It is only an inference.

Returning to the Hourly-Paid data, we can see that they do see themselves at greater risk than other groups, though they do express satisfaction overall. It does, however, still have to be observed that

- (a) the comparison ascends the hierarchy, the degree of satisfaction does decline
- (b) Hourly-Paid are less satisfied than Staff & Management with their Job Security

Why should this be? We asked respondents 2 questions about their labour market history. First of all we asked them, 'how often they had been made redundant. The results of this are shown below in TableA6.12.

Table 6.12 What experience have you had of being made redundant?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Never	26(81%)	43(61%)	6(86%)	33(69%)	12(71%)
1-5 times	6(19%)	28(39%)	1(14%)	15(31%)	4(24%)
More than 5 times	0	0	0	0	1(6%)

Thus only 1 person - a shop steward - had been made redundant more than 5 times, and more than 60% of every category had never been made redundant. While Management had had less experience of redundancy than either Staff or Hourly-Paid, there was little difference between Staff & Hourly-Paid in their experience of redundancy. Indeed Staff had slightly more experience, though their Union Reps were comparable to Management in experience of Redundancy. The consumer we seek is clearly not in TableA6.12.

We also asked respondents about their experience of unemployment. They were asked how long in total, over their working life, they had been unemployed. This was then expressed as a proportion of their working life, since someone of 60 has had more opportunity of unemployment than someone of 20. The results of this question are shown in TableA6.13

TableA6.13 How long in total have you been unemployed, except
for those times you have been outside the labour market?

	Mgt.	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Steward
Never	27(84%)	48(68%)	4(57%)	26(54%)	8(47%)
Less than 5% of working life	5(16%)	22(31%)	3(43%)	21(44%)	5(29%)
Less than 10% of working life	0	1(1%)	0	1(2%)	4(24%)

There are 2 points to note about this Table

- 1) no one had been unemployed more than 10% of their working lives
- 2) This table is not wholly consistent with TableA6.12 since unemployment is not necessarily preceded by redundancy e.g. school leavers, leaving armed forces, leaving previous employment voluntarily.

We would, however, argue that this Tables does demonstrate why Hourly Paid are more concerned about their job security, since (i) they have been unemployed more often than Staff or Management - 54% of Hourly Paid have never been unemployed, for Staff 68% have never been unemployed and 54% of Management.

(ii) as a group - partly as an implication of the above - Hourly-Paid have more experience of unemployment than Staff or Management.

This insecurity is illustrated in ExcerptA6.20, from an Hourly Paid respondent. For this respondent his Job Security is quite clearly

associated with 'the amount of work coming through'. In this respect he is clearly similar to the Staff respondent in ExcerptA6.18 who draws the similar comparison between Job Security and the through-put of work. Indeed this is the basis of the logic of what the Director says in ExcerptA6.16. There are, however, important differences between this Hourly-Paid respondent, and Starr of Management.

(a) neither Staff nor Management refer to a redundancy of the magnitude referred to by this Hourly-Paid respondent - from 26 in his trade, down to 4.

(b) a sense that there should be a 'better way' than redundancy - 'they should have more job security - but at the same time attached to fatalism - 'but its a way of life'

Given the greater biographical experience of unemployment, the somewhat greater awareness of Job security among Hourly-paid is, therefore, not surprising. It is furthermore compounded by the fact that, as we pointed out in Chapter 3, this area has been one of relatively high unemployment for many years. The workers in this Company, while only a minority have experience of redundancy and unemployment are part of a wider social structure where these things are not uncommon. This can be seen in ExcerptA6.21, again from an Hourly-Paid respondent.

This respondent is clearly aware of the hazards to his job security, and the importance of continuing to win orders. In this respect he is no different from all the other respondents we have quoted on Job Security. At the end of the Excerpt we ask how he would assess his job security. For him an important factor is his perceived Job Security against that of his father in another Company. In other words, given that this Company operates in one area of high unemployment, workers could come

to take up an attitude of concern that that should not happen to them, since if they lose their present jobs they may find difficulty in getting another job. In contrast Staff appear to take a fairly optimistic view of getting alternative work.

This, however, can cut both ways. As employees of a Company with a strong order book, and which does not declare redundancies readily, one could draw a favourable comparison between this company, and others in the area. This would lead to an attitude of satisfaction with one's Job Security. An attitude of this type is apparent in Excerpt#6.22 from an Hourly-Paid respondent.

For this respondent insecurity is simply not an issue, because 'they're quite secure with their orders'. It is however, also apparent that he has been given no reason to feel insecure in the past, and has no reason to be as far into the future as he wants to see. The point at the end where he says 'You see I served my time in here. I've been here all my life' is also significant, since as we saw in Chapter 3 in Table 3.3, 28% of Hourly-Paid had been with the Company more than 10 years, and 60% more than 5. There is, on other words, a fairly high degree of stability in the Company, which will clearly contribute positively toward attitudes on Job Security. As we see in the dominant view coming Hourly-Paid is of satisfaction with their Job Security - though less so than for Staff or Management.

This is not to say, however, that a critical attitude is not possible, even amongst those who are apparently satisfied with their Job Security. This is apparent from Excerpt#6.23 from an Hourly Paid respondent.

This respondent is satisfied with his present level of Job Security. He is satisfied with 'how (the Company) 've progressed in marketing, selling them? He does, however, identify one area of concern - the fact they are a one-product Company. The problems of a single product are widely discussed in Business Strategy textbooks so his argument is not original. What is significant is that this is an Hourly-Paid respondent talking, and his argument is critical of Management's professional decision-making - precisely the source of their legitimacy we identified in the previous Chapter. What appears, therefore, to be quite mundane (especially given a familiarity with renewed wisdom in business strategy) is in fact a very dangerous attitude for Management were it to become widespread, is it would challenge a fundamental aspect of their legitimacy - their role as professional decision-makers.

Given what has gone before, we should expect that Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards would seek a greater improvement in their Job Security than the other categories. Table 6.14 confirms this.

Table 6.14 - How much would your Job Security have to be improved to make your job ideal?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very much Improved	2 (6%)	3 (4%)	0	7 (15%)	6 (35%)
Improved a Bit	12 (38%)	22 (31%)	3 (43%)	13 (27%)	4 (24%)
About Right Now	18 (56%)	46 (65%)	4 (57%)	28 (58%)	7 (41%)

It is amongst Hourly-Paid, and in particular the Shop Stewards, that we find the largest percentage of those who wish their Job Security to be 'Very Much Improved' (they constitute 72% of those giving this

response, but only 36% of the total sample). The Hourly-Paid are, however, less concerned than their Shop Stewards on this evidence, as only Shop Stewards deviate significantly from the proportion in each category who say their Job Security is about right. We should remember that the Shop Stewards tend to be older than the average for the sample, and in consequence for them the hiring and firing practices of many of the firms in the west of Scotland (particularly, as we said, in the shipyards) and real experience, and not just something in books or old newspapers.

(3) Job Variety and Interest

This has been an area of considerable effort by academic researchers, and the surveyors of consultancy techniques, over the last 20 years. From one direction has come a group emphasising the importance of job satisfaction for employees in the sense of actually liking what they do. A notable form of this has been the 'Quality of Working Life' movement in the U.S. which emphasises the need to re-design jobs to improve job satisfaction (see for instance Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman "Effects of Job Redesign: A Field Experiment" in Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1973). Coming in the other direction is the work inspired by Braverman; 'Labor and Monopoly Capital' which argues that the relentless search for greater efficiency in capitalism means that work is being increasingly fragmented and rationalised.

To ensure a focus on the organizational structure in as a hierarchy, rather than on the immediate situation of the employee, we excluded, as explained in Chapter 3, any Company which used a technology which would have inevitably produced the effects described in the Braverman inspired literature (e.g. even though there

was only one car plant in the area when the initial approaches were made, we did not approach it). The type of Company we looked for was one which and a technology which could potentially provide an interesting and varied job for its employees. Whether the job was seen in this way by the employees was, of course, the open question, but the technology, as described in Chapter 3, did have a potential for providing interesting and varied work.

To what extent their jobs were seen as providing interesting and varied jobs, compared to the jobs of others, is shown below in Tables 6.15 to 6.17.

Table 6.15 - How satisfied are you with the Variety and Interest in your job compared to that of (other) Shop-Floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	20 (63%)	31 (44%)	1 (14%)	7 (15%)	2 (12%)
Satisfied	9 (28%)	32 (45%)	4 (57%)	32 (67%)	14 (83%)
Dissatisfied	1 (3%)	7 (10%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	1 (6%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	0	0

Table 6.16 - How satisfied are you with your Variety and Interest in your job compared to that of (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	15 (47%)	20 (28%)	1 (14%)	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Satisfied	16 (50%)	44 (62%)	4 (57%)	38 (79%)	11 (65%)
Dissatisfied	0	5 (7%)	1 (14%)	5 (10%)	4 (24%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	1 (14%)	0	0

TableA6.17 - How satisfied are you with your Variety and Interest in your job compared to that of (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	15 (47%)	16 (23%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	3 (18%)
Satisfied	15 (47%)	43 (61%)	4 (57%)	37 (77%)	8 (47%)
Dissatisfied	1 (3%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	7 (15%)	5 (29%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	0	1 (6%)

(A) Management

From these tables it is clear that there is little dissatisfaction for Management with respect to the Variety and Interest in the work which they do. In relation to Hourly-Paid, and other Management, only 3% say they are dissatisfied in each case - which is, as the Tables show, only 1 respondent of the Managers who replied to these questions. The remaining 97% say they are Satisfied/Very Satisfied. It is, however, noteworthy that the distribution does vary between Management and Staff on one hand, and Hourly-Paid on the other. In the former case there is, more or less, an equal split between those who are satisfied, and those who are very satisfied. In the latter, the modal reply (about $\frac{2}{3}$ of those who say they are satisfied/very satisfied) is 'very satisfied. This suggests that Management and Staff jobs are perceived by Managers to offer more variety and interest than jobs done by the Hourly-Paid.

Thus we can say of Managers that (a) they find their jobs offer them the sort of variety and interest they expect (b) they perceive themselves as doing better in this respect, with Staff, than the Hourly-Paid.

How, therefore, do Managers perceive their work. An interesting view is given by a Director in Excerpt A6.24.

These 2 particularly important points to observe of this Excerpt (1) the relationship between his work and his leisure activities clearly put this Respondent in the category described by Parker as 'Extension' ('Work and Non-Work in Three Occupations' - S.R. Parker Sociological Review 1965). For the Respondent there is no clear demarcation in his work interests and leisure interests - he states that the latter led him into the former. It is equally clear that he is involved with his work to a high degree. This indeed was a fairly common feature of Management in the Company - there did appear to be a significant commitment to the Company among Management. (It did, however, appear to extend into Staff and Hourly-Paid - but we shall deal with that later). The difficulty with Parker's model is that some jobs do not give a readily apparent extension into leisure (e.g. the Sales Director did not run a market stall as a hobby on the side).

(2) The relative importance of the job satisfaction of employees is also relevant. Having discussed the relationship of his work and leisure he moves on to discuss the satisfaction to be had from being 'part and parcel of Senior Management of a successful Company'. Toward the end of the Excerpt we raise with him directly whether the Company does enough to ensure the job satisfaction of its employees. His response to that is no - but this is underwritten by the need to 'get one's priorities right'. By this he means (i) the economic condition generally - 'one has to work very hard to provide jobs at all' (ii) the 'load' on the Company (at this time the order book was at an all-time high). Employee satisfaction, therefore, has to take

its place in the order of priorities. Two points in turn have to be noted about this (a) it is Management who decide on the order of priorities - it is Management who decide whether the load on the Company, or economic conditions generally, mean that attention to employee satisfaction has to be delayed (b) taking just the two conditions referred to by the Director - general economic conditions, and the 'load' on the Company - we would argue that there are 2 things which can never be achieved in a final sense. They will always precede job satisfaction for employees in the Management order of priorities. (We shall elaborate on this point, below, when we discuss Working Conditions).

(b) Staff and Union Reps

While there is a higher level of dissatisfaction than among Management - 11% say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied in relation to Shop-Floor workers, and 10% in relation to other Staff, and 15% in relation to Management - there is, on the whole a high level of satisfaction expressed by Staff. In all cases, more than 80% say they are satisfied/very satisfied. Among Union Reps. the level of satisfaction is only slightly less than among their members - 71% say they are satisfied/very satisfied over all categories.

Staff do derive a form of satisfaction from their work, which is similar to that of Management. This point is made clear by the respondent in ExcerptA6.25.

It is clear at the outset that this respondent is satisfied with the type of work he is doing. From his point of view the most

important aspect is clearly the variety of job to be done - there's something happening all the time and it's interesting." It does, however, have to be said that no Staff made the connection between work and leisure, in the way of the Director in Excerpt A6.24. The discussion of Job Variety and Interest with Staff did not stray into leisure as it did in that case.

Contrary to the view of the need for variety expressed in Excerpt A6.25 is that expressed in Excerpt A6.26. This Excerpt focuses on something of a blind-spot of the Q.W.L. movement, which seems to imply that employees need variety in their jobs to develop as individuals. As we have tried to show in this Chapter employee needs do vary, even with a well-defined group of employees. The main point of Excerpt A6.26 is that not all employees seek variety, rather they may look for order as in this case. The reasoning underlying this is quite clear - his previous job, as a junior, had taught him to be methodical, and that had been brought forward by him into his work as a clerk. Thus 'Job Variety and Interest' may mean different things to different people - for one member of Staff, it may mean 'something happening all the time', while for someone else it may mean 'a routine'.

It is also noticable in Excerpt A6.26 that the Respondent has been able to impose himself on the job - he has introduced a method to a job which, at first sight, appeared 'topsy turvy'. This ability to impose oneself is revealed more strikingly in Excerpt A6.27, again from a Staff respondent.

This Excerpt illustrates how an employee can take a job 'which initially appear to be uninteresting, and transform it to become

a job which does interest him. It does, however, have to be observed that he must have the necessary discretion - the degree of freedom - to accomplish that. In the case described in ExcerptA6.27 his 'strategy' was to develop as his own areas in the Company's business which nobody else was doing but which (a) interested him (b) gave him a unique expertise in the Company. It is, therefore, important to observe that the perception of variety and interest in their job, is not necessarily a passive process i.e. of the Staff giving their opinion of the amount of variety and interest which is structured into a job. Rather, as ExcerptA6.27 shows the variety and interest there is in a job depends on how much variety and interest the individual is able to bring into it - or is allowed to bring into it. The content of his job, this reflects a degree of self for this member of Staff, as was true also for the Director in ExcerptA6.24. As we shall see, however, the ability of Hourly-Paid to accomplish this is much more *restricted*. In Managers, and, to a lesser extent, for Staff the degree of variety and interest in their job is an active process (i.e. the job is what they make it), but for Hourly Paid the degree of variety and interest is passive (i.e. the job depends on the decisions/needs of others).

This need to be personally creative is repeated in ExcerptA6.28 which is again from a Staff respondent.

In this Excerpt the need to feel personally creative - "I don't want to come in at 8.30 and leave at 10 to 5 and feel I've done nothing" - is clearly central. At the same time 3 points have to be understood in relation to this

(a) Not all Staff felt this way. This is shown by Excerpt A6.29 where the Staff respondent makes clear that the fundamentally interesting factor in his job is that it pays better than any other he thinks he is likely to get. (In this sense, a sort of white-collar Affluent Worker).

(b) The ability to develop interest and variety in their work by Staff would clearly increase levels of satisfaction by them on this item. We have seen at various points (e.g. Excerpts A6.26 - A6.28) their ability to do so. As we shall see in the next section this was a much more uncertain possibility for Hourly-Paid.

(c) This assessment is much more intensely personal than the assessment of Wages/Salary, or even Job Security. In the former one can make comparisons to the Wages/Salary of friends, while in the latter case cost of judgement can be made in relation to the number of orders the Company was working on. Job Variety and Interest depends much more heavily on the individual and his needs. As we have seen, the needs of individuals even within a well-defined group, can vary. Thus the fact that one's friends (for instance) say a particular job is good/bad in this respect, is not necessarily a guide for the individual in the same way as being told it pays £x per week, and that there is 3 years work in the Company.

(1) Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards

It can be seen from Tables A6.15 - A6.17 that Hourly-Paid do have a lesser degree of satisfaction than staff or Management. The evidence of this is not in the number who are dissatisfied, though that proportion is greater than among Managers and comparable to the

proportion of Staff who are dissatisfied. The difference between Hourly-Paid on one hand, and Staff and Management on the other, is the consistently lower proportion of Hourly-Paid who say they are 'very satisfied' compared to Staff or Management (See Tables A6.15 - A6.17). Shop Stewards appear to be even less satisfied than their members on this issue. Why should this be?

One reason, which we discussed in the previous Chapters, is lack of control on the part of Hourly-Paid workers. We can see this in Excerpt A6.30 from an Hourly-Paid worker, who operates a C.N.C. machine.

It can be seen in this that the satisfaction he derives from his job varies from time-to-time - perhaps not from one day to the next, rather from one fortnight to the next. The same variability is apparent from Excerpt A6.31, which is again from an Hourly-Paid worker. This respondent's variability is clearly over a lesser time period - but he shares the common feature of varying satisfaction with his job over time.

These 2 Excerpts can be compared with Excerpts A6.26 and A6.27 from Staff respondents with interesting results. In both cases these Staff respondents had moved into jobs which gave them little interest and variety. Their solution was to impose themselves on the job - to create their own, work-based interest and variety. In the former (A6.26) it was by creating a routine, to give order, where there had seem to be chaos, while in the latter, the respondent searched out interesting tasks. This route is not pursued by either Hourly-Paid respondent. For their satisfaction depends on others - on whether the Foreman gives you a 'good job' to do, for the respondent in Excerpt A6.30, or

the part of the Shop-Floor the respondent in ExcerptA6.31 is working in. In both cases satisfaction is, as we suggested above, a passive process - it depends on decisions made by somebody else. In neither case is there any apparent attempt - or desire - to impose oneself on the job and to exercise control over it, as Staff have been able to do.

This inability to exercise control over the work they do can, however, have other effects on satisfaction, as ExcerptA6.32 shows. For this respondent, who is a Shop Steward, there is dis-satisfaction with the work he has to do. The dissatisfaction is, however, rooted in the fact that the work he has to do is not, in his eyes, properly organised. This respondent works as a patternmaker - making wooden 'patterns' for metal castings. His complaint is that the work they do is not co-ordinated properly - that patterns are not repaired so that they have to be replaced, or they have to be repaired very quickly, so that a costing can be made. In his view this is a Management problem - it is for Management to co-ordinate with the foundry, so that his work can be organised properly.

This has certain similarities to 'The Joiner's Tale' in Stewart Clegg's 'Power, Rule and Domination', where the joiner criticises the Management for their failure to organise work properly. In that case, the point being made by the joiner was that production was being adversely affected by Management inadequacy. This point comes out clearly in ExcerptA6.32 as well. There is, however, another dimension, namely that the inadequacy of Management is perceived as affecting the respondent - their inability to organise work effectively is diminishing the satisfaction he derives from his work. There are 2 important points from this, which we have made in other

contexts elsewhere in this Chapter.

i) given what we have seen of Staff, they may have taken action to *accomplish* this on their own initiative (see especially Excerpt/6.26). This however, would be a difficult thing for Hourly-Paid to accomplish. If we stay with the context of Excerpt/6.32, it is hardly in the power of the respondent to take himself off to the foundry to see what needs to be done. The position of Hourly_Paid is, as we have said, passive, i.e. they must respond to the decisions of others.

ii) the respondent in Excerpt/6.32 does clearly attach the cause of this inadequacy to Management - it is their fault that the work is not organised properly and that in consequence he finds he is frustrated in his work. This, as we have pointed out before, is dangerous for the Management role for 2 reasons.

- a) it is not just that the respondent is dis-satisfied, but that he traces this dissatisfaction back to Management in his perception.
- b) the fact he traces this back to Management may begin to cast doubt on their role as legitimate decision-makers.

The role of Management in the interest Hourly-Paid take in their job is absolutely central to Excerpt/6.33

The respondent, who is a Shop Steward, makes clear his interest in his work, but goes on to describe how he was discouraged from his interest by Management. Clearly in terms of what, for instance, the QWL movement is trying to accomplish there is room for improvement. It is equally clear, however, that the nature of his discouragement is consistent with the role played by the Hourly-Paid. If Hourly-Paid

did 'take an interest' as he and others may have tried to do then they are no longer 'passive' - they would begin to adopt an 'active' role in the structuring of their work role. One also recalls the views of the Director, quoted at the beginning of this section (Excerpt A 6.24) who says that employee job satisfaction is a priority, but only once the economic situations has improved and 'the load had come off' the Company. We questioned at that point the degree of commitment that that Director had to enhancing the satisfaction of his employees in the work they do. In many ways what we have seen since then tends to be consistent with that - Staff have enhanced their job satisfaction, while Hourly-Paid are unable to, and indeed are discouraged from doing so.

In understanding this it may help to consider variety and interest within the Firm as a zero sum concept. If we look at what the Director had to say about the variety and interest he derived from his job (Excerpt A 6.26) we can see that, given the existing structure of the Firm, this satisfaction he derives, must implicitly depend on the control of subordinate others. If variety and interest at work is to mean more than the introduction of novelties, or more extension of a still highly routinised task so that it takes longer to get bored but still bored all the same, it must mean a slackening of control in the Firm. This, however, represents a basic threat to the hierarchial principle, but if we look at tables A 6.15 - A 6.17 satisfaction among the Hourly-Paid relative to any group is never less than 82% (to themselves), 85% to Management and 89% to Staff. In general the Hourly-Paid, as well as the Staff, and the Management are satisfied with the variety and interest they have in their work. There is boredom from time-to-time, but this, it is felt, is balanced by the interesting jobs, or is neutralised by some other factor, e.g. pleasure in seeing the finished product (Hourly-Paid), or money (Staff). It is amongst the

union officials - both Hourly-Paid and Staff, that there are wider ideas about variety and interest at work, and as we saw from the previous Shop Steward, an awareness of a need to take an initiative in the job, and to impose oneself on the job, to be involved in it, as the Management, and certain Staff do.

This is reflected in TableA6.18 which reports responses to how much their Job Variety & Interest would have to be improved to make their job ideal.

TableA6.18 - How much would your job Variety and Interest have to be improved to make your job ideal?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very much improved	0	12(17%)	2(29%)	8(17%)	2(12%)
Improved a bit	5(16%)	19(27%)	2(29%)	19(40%)	7(41%)
About right now	27(84%)	40(56%)	3(43%)	21(44%)	8(47%)

From the point of view of Management, this is quite clear cut - some 84% say the variety and interest in their jobs is 'about right now'. The level of satisfaction then follows a hierarchical pattern, with Staff having rather less satisfaction than Management, and Hourly-Paid less than Staff. This is consistent with the preceding analysis.

Further analysis of the data does, however, reveal another aspect of this issue - that the degree of satisfaction can vary within a particular group. For instance, 12 Staff respondents say the variety and interest in their jobs would have to be 'very much improved' to

make their jobs ideal. Of this 12, 7 are from the Sales Dept., which is a heavy over-representation. The same tendency is apparent among Hourly-Paid workers. Among the skilled workers 38% say their variety and interest is about right, and 48% say it should be improved a bit. Among the unskilled the figures are 57% and 26% respectively i.e. it appears the unskilled are slightly more satisfied in this respect than skilled Hourly-Paid workers. Why should this be?

It is perhaps surprising that the figures should work out like this, when after all it is the skilled man who does the (whatever) investing work there is to do, while the unskilled man cleans up, fetches parts and materials, drives and loads cranes etc. It may however, reflect a stronger expectation for variety and interest among skilled workers, and a correspondingly weaker expectation among the unskilled. This tends to be confirmed by Excerpt 6.34 from an unskilled, Hourly-Paid respondent.

At the outset, it is made clear that the work he actually does is 'pretty boring at times', but that one of his greatest interests is in seeing the finished article going out of the factory (this particular respondent operates in the 'Bay' where the product goes through its final tests). Hence, as well as using his skill, he finds interest in activities which are not specifically related to his task. In contrast to this, all the other respondents we have looked at in this section have emphasised only the particular task which they perform. Other Labourers to whom we talked similarly brought in non-specific aspects of the work situations e.g. the support and friendship of workmates was an item which was frequently mentioned. In other words since there is little or no interest in the work they do, unskilled workers transfer their attentions to their work situation.

This is not a strategy which has proved necessary in any other category.

Even among skilled manual workers there was the opportunity for variety and interest in their work, which was something they looked for, and appreciated. Nevertheless, it has also been apparent that different occupations have differentially structured opportunities for variety and interest. For instance within the Hourly-Paid category there is a difference between skilled and unskilled work such that those who do the latter have apparently given up on the work itself yielding satisfaction and have instead transferred their attention to their work situation (i.e. the context in which they do a boring job). More importantly, however, it is clear that these differences are to a large extent systematic rather than random. Management, as we might have expected, have greatest satisfaction from the variety and interest in their work. Next came Staff - but as we saw they did have to work at it - they had to make an effort to make their job as interesting as they might like. The distinction between Staff and Hourly-Paid is that Staff appear to have the discretion to do this, whereas Hourly-Paid do not. Indeed, following Excerpt A6.33 it would appear they are positively discouraged from doing so.

Thus we can see that the apparently subjective issue of Job Variety and Interest cannot be divorced from the hierarchical structure of the Company, since the degree of variety and interest in one's work, and the opportunity to seek and develop this, depends to a large extent of the position one occupies in this structure.

(4) Working Conditions

In this respect the Firm faced two particular difficulties (A) the Firm had inherited premises which had been designed for the production of another (though not dissimilar) product, (B) extension of their existing premises was made difficult by having the River Clyde on one side, and the main road in the area on the other. As we shall see, however, attitudes to the Firm's provision of working facilities were not entirely uniform.

The data on this item are shown in tables A6.19 - A6.21.

Table A6.19 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions compared to those for (other) Shop-Floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	7 (22%)	17 (24%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	0
Satisfied	18 (56%)	46 (65%)	6 (86%)	30 (63%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	5 (16%)	7 (10%)	0	8 (17%)	4 (24%)
Very Dissatisfied	1 (3%)	1 (1%)	0	6 (13%)	1 (6%)

Table A6.20 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions in relation to those of (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	4 (13%)	8 (11%)	1 (14%)	1 (2%)	0
Satisfied	22 (69%)	47 (66%)	4 (57%)	20 (42%)	7 (41%)
Dissatisfied	4 (13%)	12 (17%)	2 (29%)	18 (38%)	8 (47%)
Very Dissatisfied	1 (3%)	4 (6%)	0	9 (19%)	2 (12%)

Table A6.21 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions in relation to (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	3 (9%)	7 (10%)	1 (14%)	1 (2%)	0
Satisfied	24 (75%)	41 (58%)	4 (57%)	22 (46%)	9 (53%)
Dissatisfied	2 (6%)	18 (25%)	1 (14%)	12 (25%)	5 (29%)
Very Dissatisfied	2 (6%)	4 (6%)	1 (14%)	13 (27%)	3 (18%)

(A) Management

It is clear from these Tables that Management are in general satisfied with their Working Conditions. About 80% say they are satisfied/very satisfied with their Working Conditions in relation to others in the Company. This was, however, in certain respects surprising since Management conditions were not always all that good. An example of this was the office of the Managing Director which (a) had no carpet (b) had a small window which looked out on to the Wages Office. Disgruntled employees would occasionally rap this window on their way out of the Wages Office, in order to distract him from his work and remind him of their presence. Other Managers did point out, however, that this was how the Managing Director chose to have his office, so that they could not complain about the 'luxury' of his office compared to their own. Other Managers had ventilation shafts going through their office, while for some an 'office' was a partition between one desk and another. This was not, however, universal - other Managers did have the trappings one associates with the successful Manager. It does, however, have to be understood that Management conditions generally were not what one may have expected. Much of the cause of this goes back to the premises they occupied, and in recognition of this Managers did accept these conditions. This attitude is well expressed by the

Dissatisfaction in this Excerpt is quite clearly submerged by his recognition that in the circumstances which face the Company the conditions he has are the best he is likely to get. In this respect the data is similar to that for Wages and Salaries. In that case there was dissatisfaction, but it was directed at incomes policy, rather than at the Company - the Company was perceived as helpless, or doing what it could in the circumstances. In the same way, while they may see their conditions as less than satisfactory, the responsibility is on the premises, rather than on the Company which since it is building a new office block.

(B) Staff and Union Reps

Staff and Union Reps are clearly satisfied with their working conditions in relation to those of Hourly-Paid workers - only 11% say they are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. It is in relation to Management and other Staff that there appears to be more significant dissatisfaction - 31% and 23% say they are dissatisfied in relation to each of these groups respectively. Further analysis shows that this dissatisfaction is concentrated in 2 areas

(i) Sales - 16% say they are dissatisfied, and 18% are very dissatisfied with their conditions in relation to other Staff. In relation to Management, 21% are dissatisfied, 13% who are very dissatisfied.

(ii) Quality Control - 33% say they are dissatisfied in relation to other Staff, none were very dissatisfied. In relation to

Management, 25% are dissatisfied and 8% very dissatisfied.

Sales and Quality Control did indicate a more critical attitude than other Staff toward their condition - in particular in relation to other Staff conditions. Why should this be? We shall have to look at each group separately.

First of all Quality Control. They were located in a single storey wooden building, located in the middle of the shop-floor (it was known as 'The Ponderosa' because it did resemble a ranch house). The majority of Staff, it is true, were located away from the shop-floor - but on the other hand, Quality Control were by no means unique e.g. Work Study, the Govt Dept., the Works Management office were all located on the shop-floor. One distinction between those other Staff groups and Quality Control is that in Quality Control there was a high proportion of clerical staff, whereas in Work Study etc., staff tended to be almost entirely of a technical nature. It may be that the dissatisfaction of Quality Control Staff reflects the dissatisfaction of non-technical Staff at being located on the Shop-Floor.

Among Sales Staff there were two dominant themes - one from each of the groups which constituted the Sales Department. This, as we saw in Chapter III provided a full sales and marketing service to customers - this involved selling the product and to do so required showing that this Firm could do better (or cheaper) than any other and resolve any technical problems he may have. This meant two different types of Staff being in the same department - (1) design engineers and draughtsmen whose job it was to resolve the problems introduced by the customer (2) Sales Staff - mostly ex-engineers - whose job it was to convince the customer the order

ought to go to his Firm. Both groups brought out two different problems. The former were concerned with physical problems in themselves. ExcerptA6.36 from a Sales Staff respondent is typical.

In fact we missed an interview with this respondent in February because his union had decided to stay out because the heating had broken down during the night. This interest is purely in the physical conditions offered by the Firm, and their effect on his person. The latter group - while discussing this - went further, to condemn the Firm for its own inadequacies and failure to see the effect of this on their employees and consequently on the performance on the Firm. The following is typical of this.

This group did not only condemn the Firm and its inadequate provision of conditions, but in contrast to the former group, who used personal knowledge (the effect of the conditions upon themselves), they chose to emphasise the effect of these inadequate conditions upon the performance of the Firm.

This relates back to the analysis of Redundancy, at the end of the Hourly-Paid section, and ExcerptA6.23 in particular, where an Hourly-Paid respondent is critical of Management policy. We suggested then that for Management this could be a dangerous attitude since it focuses on a significant source of their legitimacy. The Sales Staff respondent in Excerpt 6.37 is saying something rather similar to this. What he is saying is not just that he does not like his working condtions (e.g. that he dislikes the colour the walls have been painted), but that the conditions he must work in -

those conditions he has been given by Management - operate to the detriment of his efficiency and therefore to the efficiency of the Company as a whole. This goes right to the heart of Management legitimacy - that they deal with the efficiency of the Company through their skills as professional decision-makers. If it becomes apparent that their professional decisions do not produce efficiency, then the Management role may be subject to a degree of threat.

This is not to say, however, that Staff are generally dissatisfied. As the data in Tables A6.19 - A6.21 show they vary from a low of 68% satisfied/very satisfied (in relation to Management Table A6.21) to a high of 89% (in relation to Shop-Floor workers Table A6.19). What we have done is to draw attention to the problem areas which exist, and to suggest how they could develop. On the whole, however, there is a high degree of satisfaction - even if it is under-written by a realisation of the physical constraints of the Company premises, as with the Management respondent in Excerpt A 6.35. A similar view is expressed in Excerpt A6.38 by a Staff respondent, which is fairly typical of the satisfied majority.

(c) Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards

Among this group there is much more evidence of dissatisfaction than among Staff and Management. Only in relation to other Hourly-Paid is there a majority who say they are satisfied or very satisfied (71% - Table A6.19). In relation to Staff 57% say they are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied, and 52% in relation to Management.

The dissatisfaction which Hourly Paid, and their Shop Stewards feel is clearly seen in Excerpt A6.39.

For this Hourly-Paid respondent there are a whole list of complaints - nowhere to leave their own clothes, nowhere to wash up, powdered soap. In his case the comparison is quite clearly with Staff who, in his view, do a less dirty job but have better washing facilities, and somewhere to put their own clothes while they work. He, however, sees no prospect of remedying this.

In this respect he is unlike the Shop Steward we quoted in ExcerptA6.2, who while he identified similar problems to those discussed in ExcerptA6.39 was quite determined that there would be - would have to be - the type of improvements which were required.

In that they both identify Staff conditions as the target, both the respondents in ExcerptA6.2 and A6.39 hold similar views.

In this respect they re-call the discussions on Pay (above), where Hourly-Paid suggested that the distribution of rewards - the differential - between Staff and themselves was not equitable. (See, for instance ExcerptA6.12). The discussion on Working Conditions simply echoes this. In effect Hourly-Paid are saying 'Look, we all make a contribution to the Company, why are they (Staff) systematically better treated than we are?

Hourly-Paid do, however, face 2 difficulties in this

- (a) as we saw in dealing with Pay, Hourly Paid are not fully aware of Staff conditions. Staff salaries are 'confidential'. Similarly about 50% of Staff are located in a part of the Company Hourly-Paid seldom see as it is apart from the Shop-Floor. Thus any assessment Hourly-Paid make of Staff conditions is to that extent conjective
- (b) Staff are likely to resist attempts by Hourly-Paid to equalise different conditions. This was seen above in discussing Pay, and

the conditions of this conflict will be discussed more fully shortly when we examine the role of trade unions in the Company. In ExcerptA6.40 there is a discussion with a Director about the relationship of Staff and Hourly-Paid conditions.

In this Excerpt, the Director makes clear his awareness - and indeed sympathy for - the aspiration of Hourly-Paid in this respect, "there will have to be differentials but it shouldn't automatically be staff and manual ... It's got to be based on the skills, the contribution to the Company." This is, of course, substantially what Hourly-Paid would argue. The Director does, however, identify some of the difficulties in moving to such a position - most obviously that having equalised holiday entitlement for Staff and Hourly-Paid, the former are now seeking restoration of their differential in this respect.

The major point, however, is to observe the sympathy which there is for the views of Hourly-Paid. Nor was this an atypical view. Managers often used descriptions like 'disgusting' and 'quite ridiculous in this day and age' in discussing Hourly-Paid conditions. Management, therefore, are aware of the problem. So why not do something about it?

A number of answers could be given to that, some of which we have already observed

- (a) Practical difficulties - the size, location and structure of the premises
- (b) 'Political' difficulties - Staff would resist any such movement

A more fundamental answer concerns the place this problem occupies in the priority list of Management. We saw in ExcerptA6.24 that the

Company realised that more could be done to enhance the job satisfaction of their employees, but that this could not be done until "the load came off" the Company. This, it has to be appreciated is a completely open statement - when will the load ever come off? At this time the Company has a full order-book - if there are few orders is the 'load off', or is it now redundancy that takes priority? Similarly with Working Conditions - the Director is clearly aware of the problem, he sympathises with the argument concerning the relative Working Conditions of Staff and Hourly-Paid - but the time scale is no more determinate than "a number of years".

This is, without doubt, a difficult situation for any Management to deal with, but the most important aspect to observe is the structure of the dispute. Neither Staff nor Hourly-Paid can do more than try to exert influence via their trade unions and try to negotiate over time a solution to this problem. Only Management can make a decision - only their position in the hierarchy gives them access to the possibility of directly resolving this.

This is observed by a Shop Steward in Excerpt A6.41. We raise with him certain Management's problem in dealing with this, in that the premises pose difficulties. His argument concentrates on 2 things

(1) a trade-off between the needs of the Company (to have machines in the premises) and the needs of their manual employees (showers, lockers, conditions, etc.).

(2) his observation that Management are "dragging their heels".

It is additionally, interesting to observe that part of the frustration he experiences originates in Management's failure to keep their employees informed - if Hourly-Paid were involved, and shown the specific difficulties they may adopt a more understanding

attitude.

Given what we have said about Working Conditions it would perhaps be surprising if respondents were not seeking significant improvements in their Working Conditions. This is confirmed by TableA6.22 which concerns how far Working Conditions would have to be improved to make the job ideal.

TableA6.22 - How much would your Working Conditions have to be changed to make your job ideal?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Much Improved	9 (28%)	14 (20%)	2 (29%)	21 (44%)	8 (47%)
Improved A Bit	13 (41%)	31 (44%)	2 (29%)	12 (25%)	7 (41%)
About Right Now	10 (31%)	26 (37%)	3 (43%)	15 (31%)	2 (12%)

There is clearly some dissatisfaction on this issue - about as much as with Pay (TableA6.8) - but more than on Job Security (TableA6.14). It can be seen that, as we might expect from our discssion, Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards are looking for the greatest improvement - nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ say thattheir Working Conditions would have to be 'Very Much Improved'. Even among Management, Staff and Union Reps. there is, however, a degree - though to a lesser extent than among Shop Stewards - of dissatisfaction, as 41% of Management and 44% of Staff say their Working Conditions would have to be improved a bit.

Basically, therefore, the results on TableA6.22 are pretty much what we would have expected from the preceeding discussion. It is, however, perhaps a little surprising that so many should say their Working Conditions are 'about right now'. Leaving the union officials to one side, about 1/3 of each category say thsi. This is particularly surporsing for Hourly-Paid. Why should 31% of Hourly-Paid say their working conditions are about right now? A clue to this is given in ExcerptA6.42 from a Shop Steward.

This respondent is apparently satisfied with his Working Conditions - when asked this question directly he says they are "very good". Why should he say this? There are a number of reasons. One important reason is that if they find something wrong, the Management are usually quite happy to resolve that and get something done about it". More important, however, is the fact that the respondent in ExcerptA6.42 predicates his view on present conditions and making them workable. Others we have considered (e.g. ExcerptsA6.39 andA6.41) are predicated on a future of improved conditions i.e.their view is based on an alternative more desirable Working Conditions to be achieved in the future. This ability to think on the basis of alternative possibilities to the present are important for the development of an alternative to hierarchy.

The ends are, however, less significant than the means.. For instance in all cases improved conditions are perceived as something to be negotiated - in other words Management will take the decision. Even the critical stance of ExcerptA6.41 does not challenge hierarchical principal. Only when the legitimate right of Management to take decisions is challenged - as in ExcerptA6.23 which concerned Job Security and the need for an alternative product - is hierarchy subject

to challenge.

It may be, of course, that if those aspirations are frustrated then there may be a 'feed-back' process (i.e. if Management refuse to grant the Working Conditions Hourly Paid seek, then Hourly-Paid may begin to question the legitimacy of the Management role). We have little evidence of this happening.

(3) Promotion

We saw on the first section of this Chapter, where we examined the ordering of these items, that Promotion was of a widely varying degree of importance. For Management it was fourth, for Staff it was 6th, while for all other groups it was last. The arithmetic averages tend to reinforce this - for Management the average was 4.31, for Staff 5.7, for Union Reps it was 7.57, for Hourly Paid 7.44 and for Shop Stewards 8.29. There is, however, variability within the groups, as we discussed above e.g. the Standard Deviation among Staff is 7.94, and among Hourly-Paid it is 5.99. There is within these 2 groups, therefore, widely differing opinions on the importance of Promotion, though the dominant opinion is that it is not important - especially among Hourly-Paid.

Among those groups where Promotion is not perceived to be a significant aspiration, we may, therefore expect a high degree of satisfaction since if expectations are low they are that much more easily satisfied. The following Tables seem to confirm that view.

Table 46.22 How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects in relation to those of (other) Shop-Floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	6 (19%)	8 (11%)	0	2 (4%)	0
Satisfied	20 (63%)	49 (69%)	5 (71%)	35 (73%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	4 (13%)	10 (14%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	4 (24%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	1 (6%)

TableA6.23 - How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects in relation to those of (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	5 (16%)	5 (7%)	0	1 (2%)	0
Satisfied	22 (69%)	53 (75%)	5 (71%)	34 (71%)	13 (77%)
Dissatisfied	3 (9%)	11 (16%)	1 (14%)	10 (21%)	3 (18%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	1 (6%)

TableA6.24 - How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects in relation to those of (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	3 (9%)	6 (9%)	0	1 (2%)	0
Satisfied	22 (69%)	52 (73%)	5 (71%)	34 (71%)	14 (82%)
Dissatisfied	5 (16%)	11 (16%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	2 (12%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	1 (6%)

(4) Management

Among Management, while there is a small pocket of dissatisfaction (between 9 and 16%) Management do predominantly say they are satisfied with their Promotion prospects. On what basis are Managers judged when seeking Promotion? We discuss this with a Director in ExcerptA6.43.

For him Promotion is largely a matter of development of the individual employee - of identifying those who are already doing well in what they do, and moving them on to another, higher level.

Thus the criteria which he emphasises are (i) doing an outstanding job already (ii) qualifications and experience (iii) how he fits in. These are probably fairly general criteria for promotion in any organisation. There are, however, a number of problems associated with them in this organisation.

(1) What does 'doing an outstanding job already' mean? How outstanding? How do you measure this? It is a matter of personal judgement, which indeed the Respondent recognises. There are, however, 2 affects of this (a) the subjective aspect leads to the system of promotion being viewed as involving favouratism (b) as we shall see among Staff & Hourly-Paid, there is a feeling that if you do an outstanding job then you will not be promoted since the Company would then have lost your skills in that position.

(2) while qualifications and experience appear to be objective criteria - 'has an HND and 10 years with the Company', that sort of thing. There is however, a subjective element to it, in that to do a particular job what qualification is needed (e.g. an ONC or an HND or a degree) and how much experience in what particular areas, and how far can experience be substituted by qualifications (or vice versa). In other words, if one suggests that the promotion game is less than fair to all in it, this subjective element may lead one to suspect that the requirements for a job are adjusted as required to suit the successful candidate i.e. first select the successful candidate, then look for the criteria that will justify his promotion. That is perhaps more cynical than the view held by Managers in the Company, but those views which were critical of the promotion system did appear to be in that direction. Managers, for instance, suggest that one had no chance of a seat on the board without a Degree, and that that was merely a device to benefit those who were favoured.

As becomes evident in the Excerpt, all the existing board were graduates, but it is the Director's rationale for this that first of all any young manager (less than 30) ought to have a Degree as there is no longer any bar to this other than ability. For the older managers, he suggests, not having a degree is not an automatic disqualification, and if they are "doing a cracking good job" then they will be rewarded. The attitude of certain Managers towards this was extremely critical, and supported by the composition of the existing Board.

(3) What does 'how will he fit in' mean? We raise this with the Respondent when we discuss 'social bars to promotion? In this section his argument rests on the possession of certain skills being necessary in certain senior positions (e.g. not eating all one's food with a spoon, if one has to mix with top-level people in making sales). It is, however, not a problem if these social skills are not necessary to do the job. Managers also took a critical view of this criterion. This - and to some extent the preceding problem of qualifications - is taken up in ExcerptA6.44 from a senior Manager. The board was clearly largely made up of the 'older type of manager' referred to in this Excerpt. Thus the Promotion system is employed to maintain the dominance of a certain type of Manager on the Board of Directors, in his view.

As we have seen previously in this Chapter, and in earlier Chapters, the board of directors were not always fully informed about what was happening in the Company. Their senior Managers suggested this was because they did not want to be involved in 'nitty-gritty', failing to appreciate that this 'nitty-gritty' adds up to the 'big picture' they are interested in. This led

Managers to maintain the board's collective fantasy, by telling them what they wanted to hear- and avoid telling them what they didn't want to hear. In return they anticipate 'reward' - in terms of promotion as a reward there was a feeling that the stated criteria were manipulated to sustain the dominance of the type of Manager and consequently frustrate their ambitions e.g. that the requirement to have a Degree (which did have currency among Managers, whether accurate or not), was simply being used as a device to keep them off the board. Similarly the criterion of having to 'fit' in would be used to secure the same ends.

Two final points are necessary in the section

i) Management are, on the whole, satisfied with their promotion prospects. What we have done here is to analyse the ways in which the promotion system could be manipulated - and was manipulated in the views of Management below board level. The major conclusion is, however, of their awareness and understanding of this manipulation - not that it has led to dissatisfaction, when quite clearly it has not

ii) As we shall see, similar complaints are made by Staff, and to a lesser extent by Hourly-Paid.

(b) Staff & Union Reps

Table A6.22 to A6.24 show that among Staff there is a comparable level of satisfaction to that of Management - though perhaps marginally lower. Their Union Reps do express a lower degree of satisfaction, but again as with Staff generally there is an apparent

satisfaction with Promotion prospects . Once again, however, we do have to take into account their expectations in assessing their level of satisfaction. ExcerptA6.45 is indicative of this.

We discussed above 3 promotion criteria - how well the candidate is doing his existing job/qualification and experience/fitting in. The first two of these are flatly contradicted by this Staff respondent. The first one, he suggests, is not applied - indeed the reverse is true, if you do a job well you stay in, because as he points out later, they don't want to lose you. The second is contradicted because while his health qualifications were the justification for turning him down for promotion (he is a diabetic) he claims to know of 2 others working in the same area, both of whom are in even worse health.

Thus for this respondent it is not a matter of understanding the promotion system. His difficulty - and the cause of his resentment - is that he does understand it, and perceives it as a game which is less than fair - played with a loaded dice, or marked cards, or whatever. In other words he sees it as a process which systematically favours some and acts to the detriment of others, including himself.

This concept of promotion as being like a game, but a systematically unfair one is repeated in ExcerptA6.46, again from a Staff respondent.

Promotion, he says, is not for him, because of his age, so he would appear to be a disinterested spectator. For him promotion is largely a question of, as he puts it "shifting job titles and bodies

and shuffling them round", and as a means to achieve some other end e.g. there had recently been a member of promotions on to the board, and the respondent suggests that this was only to give these Managers other jobs to do (Another explanation was that it was a means round incomes policy). Clearly for this respondent, promotion lacks the objective qualities attributed to it by the Director quoted at the beginning of this discussion. The more we look, therefore, the less it appears that the views expressed by him are supported by other Managers or Staff. For them it appears to be about something else. Most importantly, from the point of view of those hoping to be promoted it does not appear to be concerned with personal development.

Clearly for Staff, where there is dissatisfaction, the system is perceived as not working as it should. Not in the sense that it only works properly if one is promoted, but in the more general sense that the criteria of an objective promotion system do not appear to be working - indeed the criteria set out by the Director do not appear to be used, having been contradicted by the experiences set out in the above Excerpts.

We have, it should be re-called, observed this before. In Excerpt A3.15 a Staff respondent describes the selection system as "arbitrary", which in many respects summarises the criticisms which Staff have made of it. The problem with promotion for disaffected Staff is that they see the whole system of promotion as loaded against them. It is not simply that the rules appear to be variable - but that the rules operate to the benefit of some and against others (e.g. in favour of those with a degree and against those who have not) to achieve some objective which they do not perceive as

legitimate (e.g. to maintain the dominance of the 'old type of manager')

Again, however, it is important to appreciate that the majority of Staff said they were satisfied with their Promotion Prospects. ExcerptA6.47 illustrates the view of one member of Staff who appears satisfied with his promotion prospects.

This respondent clearly does not see promotion as in any way guaranteed, but it is clear that his view of the system of promotion is very similar to that of the Director, since he states at the end, that he believes his chance of promotion depends on (i) his performance in his existing job (ii) his length of service and his qualifications - in other words he follows the first 2 criteria laid down by the Director for determining promotion. Those whom we have seen to be dissatisfied however, have always found their view on attitudes or experience which contradict one or more of the Directors 3 criteria.

The satisfaction of the respondent in ExcerptA6.47 would, therefore, seem to originate in him sharing the same perception as the Director. The dissatisfaction of other respondents on the other hand originates in their view of the system being different. In particular that the rules either are not what they are formally supposed to be - the need to be doing one's job well is seen as 'a kiss of death' as it is believed to keep one in that job. Or that the rules serve some other objective e.g. using qualifications to keep certain people off the board. In particular there appears to be criticism based on the rules being flexible - the respondent in ExcerptA6.46 spoke of it being like 'electing a Pope' in that the successful candidate just appeared, which was beyond the

understanding of other Staff. This gave rise to the feeling that the procedure was, in effect a 'Right of Passage' for the successful candidate who had been, more or less, pre-selected, to give it some form of rationalisation. Precisely how or why things happened like this they were not very sure. They, were however, sure that this was a procedure they could not control, and which was not perceived as fair and equal for all.

1) Hourly-Paid & Shop Stewards

It is apparent from tables A6.22 and A6.24 that there is rather more dissatisfaction among the Hourly-Paid than among Staff - about 1/4 of Hourly-Paid are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied, compared to less than 1/5 of Staff. There is, therefore, slightly more dissatisfaction among Hourly-Paid, but once again we have to appreciate that the great majority say they are satisfied - over 70% on any comparison.

Where dissatisfaction was expressed the reasons tended to be very similar to those given by Staff. Monitored particularly frequently was a denial of the view that doing a job well led to promotion. One Shop Steward echoed almost word for word the view of the Staff respondent in Excerpt A6.45. This Shop Steward had worked on the same machine for 10 years, and during that time had applied for 3 Staff jobs. He was unsuccessful each time, because, he claimed, he was too good at the job he was doing.

Even amongst those whose expressed attitude is satisfaction, the reasoning is not entirely positive, since many of those who said

they were satisfied with their Promotion Prospects had in effect opted out. This could be seen by the number of respondents who when asked about their Promotion Prospects said "well, I've not got any" , and declaring themselves to be satisfied. Promotion was simply not objective for many Hourly-Paid workers. The reason why can be seen in ExcerptA6.48 from an Hourly-Paid respondent.

This respondent worked in a group of about 2 dozen highly skilled workers. The only viable prospect of promotion for him - and his fellow workers - is for their foreman to leave and in his view that seems unlikely. This may appear to be rather restricted, but in fact in this Excerpt he mentions the 2 main forms of promotion for an Hourly-Paid worker - to become a Foreman, or get into the drawing office. In both cases the chances of either were rated as fairly slim since there were relatively few openings for the former, and competition from better qualified people for the latter. Thus, given the absence of a serious prospect of promotion they opt out, and, as he puts it at the end, "just accept it".

So for many Hourly-Paid who say they are satisfied with their Promotion Prospects it is because they believe they have none. This orientation was not, however, much in evidence other than among the Hourly-Paid.

We have seen, so far that the promotion system discussed with the Director in ExcerptA6.43 is perceived by Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid to be a fiction - that doing well can be a bar to promotion, that having a degree is really a question of 'fitting in'. The system is not perceived as fair. Among Management and Staff this has led to resentment. Among Hourly-Paid the response has been to simply opt out. For this group promotion is simply not

an objective, though there are those Hourly Paid for whom it is an ambition and for them there is resentment as for Staff and Managers. The distinction between Hourly-Paid and the other groups is that for them there are relatively few avenues to promotion - becoming a foreman or a draughtsman are the 2 main ones. Indeed in certain Staff areas these are limited promotion prospects (Groups for whom this would be true would be typists, and people in data prep in the computing dept., which could explain the large standard deviation among Staff in TableA6.2).

Otherwise resentment was an important reaction to the promotion system. This is reflected in TableA6.25, which shows the results of the question 'How much would your Promotion Prospects have to be improved to make your job ideal'?

TableA6.25 - "How much would your Promotion Prospects have to be improved to made your job ideal?"

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Much Improved	0	10 (14%)	2 (29%)	7 (15%)	4 (24%)
Improved a Bit	15 (47%)	22 (31%)	2 (29%)	12 (25%)	1 (6%)
About Right Now	17 (53%)	39 (55%)	3 (43%)	29 (60%)	12 (71%)

It is true that for the majority in each category, excerpt Staff Unions Reps, Promotion Prospects are about right. It does, however, have to be observed that these figures do show high proportions who suggest that their Promotion Prospects would have to be improved. The implication of this Table would appear to be therefore, that while there is a high degree of satisfaction,

there is a high degree of dissatisfaction which is nearly as great. This discussion has revealed at least some of the reasons behind that dissatisfaction.

6) Trade Union Organisation & Activity

The questions we posed so far have all concerned satisfaction with particular areas of employment (e.g. 'how satisfied are you with your wages/salary compared to shop-floor workers?') Since all of the Management, and about 20% of Staff were not union members it did not seem to make much sense to ask questions about the trade unions in this way i.e. to ask somebody who is not a union member whether they are satisfied with their trade union. It became apparent at an early stage in our field-work that the primary function of the track union was perceived to be the protection of members against inequitable treatment. For instance when staff first began to become unionised in the late 1960s much of their motivation had been to protect themselves from losing what they saw as their justified differential relative to Hourly-Paid workers. Consequently questions in this section will be around the issue of protection, viz Do you feel you need the protection of a union more/about the same/less than Hourly-Paid/Staff/Management? The following tables give the results of these questions.

Table A6.26 - "Do you feel you need the protection of a union more/about the same/less than (other) Hourly-Paid?"

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
More	1 (3%)	9 (13%)	1 (14%)	9 (19%)	3 (18%)
About the Same	2 (6%)	38 (54%)	6 (86%)	36 (75%)	13 (77%)
Less	28 (88%)	24 (34%)	0	3 (6%)	1 (6%)

Table A6.27 - "Do you feel you need the protection of a union more/about the same/less than (other) Staff?"

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
More	0	4 (6%)	0	22 (46%)	4 (24%)
About the Same	2 (6%)	57 (80%)	7 (100%)	24 (50%)	13 (77%)
Less	29 (91%)	10 (14%)	0	2 (4%)	0

Table A6.28 - "Do you feel you need the protection of a union more/about the same/less than (other) Management?"

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
More	0	30 (42%)	4 (57%)	32 (67%)	11 (65%)
About the Same	20 (63%)	33 (47%)	3 (43%)	15 (31%)	5 (29%)
Less	11 (34%)	8 (11%)	0	1 (2%)	1 (6%)

(a) Management. It is clear from the first 2 tables dealing with Hourly-Paid, and Staff that Management see themselves as not requiring the protection of a trade union - 88% say they need protection of a union less than the Hourly-Paid do, and 91% say they need the protection of a union less than Staff. The protection of a trade union was not something which Management felt they needed. This raises the question of why they felt this.

We approached this by asking why they were not union members. The answers are shown in the following table:

Table 6.29 - Why are you not a member of a trade union?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1) Could not be bothered	2	6%
2) See no need to join	14	44%
3) Have never been approached	1	3%
4) No union available	2	6%
5) Not applicable for a Manager	3	9%
6) Not representative of Managers	5	16%
7) Political objection	3	9%
8) Do not trust unions	1	3%
9) No response	1	3%

Some 8 reasons are given, but nearly half (44%) are because the manager could see no need, and indeed the first 5 which between them are 68% of the reasons are not negative toward trade unions. Only in the last 3 is there a positive objection to trade unionism (political/not representative/do not trust unions). It would not, therefore, be wholly true to say that managers objected to trade unionism - rather they saw it as unnecessary for them. In particular, as we have seen already, management felt they should be able to look after themselves as individuals without having to rely on collective strength. We have shown that in relation to wage negotiations, management felt that their salaries ought to reflect their worth to the company and that if they disagreed with that assessment, the only path open was to leave. Their attitude on trade unions is logically related to this.

This, however, was perceived as not necessarily holding good in every single case into the future. Some managers - especially

the younger ones - expressed the view that at some point in the future Management might have to get unionised. This view is shown in ExcerptA6.49.

The trend within the Company is certainly in this direction, since during our field-work Senior Staff in Finance joined ASTMS, having been non-union previously. Breaking into Management would, however, be a significant development for unionisation in this Company.

Thus Management not being in a trade union reflects more a perception that their existing means of dealing with the Company is satisfactory, rather than political objection.

The two other issues also emerged in our discussion with Managers about trade unions.

a) the perception by Managers of the ultimate identity of interest between the company and the trade union.

b) the role of trade unionism in their daily activity

The general issue of trade unionism in this company is discussed with a senior manager in ExcerptA6.50. The opening statement by the respondent could even have come from a Shop Steward - 'to represent the interests of their memebers'. The following development does, however, point to a rather different image of trade unionism than we shall find among Hourly-Paid workers, as for this respondent there is no conflict between the interests of the employers (as union memebers) and the interests of the Company. It is clear that for this respondent the interests are synonymous since if the company ceased to exist there would be no jobs and the issue of relative interests

would be of no consequence.

There are, therefore, important points to observe in this excerpt, in particular that (i) the role of the union is unambiguously to represent the interests of its members (ii) that the interests of Company and union members are synonymous. Consequently any disagreements are around what is in the best interests of all.

[This evokes echoes of Alan Fox's discussion of 'high trust' jobs in 'Beyond Contact' in which negotiation on the basis of differing interests is ruled out, and instead any difference is a matter for mutual problem-solving. For this Senior Manager it is clear that Company Union relations are high trust in this sense]

At a more day-to-day level the same issue is discussed with another manager in ExcerptA6.51. This manager had come into the company as a draughtsman, and over the years had been promoted to his present position, managing his own department. Consequently his background was a union background. More important than that however, is that for him dealing with a union means dealing with a collectivity, rather than a collection of individuals. Once again the issue of identity of interest is raised. For him 'good union people' work for the 'good of their numbers of the good of us all - me and their members', the 'idiot union people' can be shown up. Clearly the distinction between 'good' and 'idiot union people' is to some extent a matter of judgement. The important point in this Excerpt is that for this Manager trade unionism is a positively accepted (indeed wanted) part of his daily work.

A similar point is made by a Director in ExcerptA6.52. It is

clear from this that the unions are quite positively part of the Company for this respondent as their role in representing their members is not only seen as legitimate but also as necessary. To this extent, therefore, the views expressed here are similar to those expressed in ExcerptA6.51. His view does become rather more critical in the second half of the Excerpt. It is, however, interesting to observe that his criticism is still consistent with what we found in ExcerptA6.51, since there one of the union roles was to make the Management role easier. Essentially the criticism expressed in ExcerptA6.52 is that because of the out-of-date union structure (as he sees it) which has led to a proliferation of unions in this Company, the Management role is made rather more difficult, rather than easier as it would be with say 4 unions rather than the 12 they have to deal with.

It is, however, clear that Management in this Company have come to terms with trade unionism, regarding it as 'necessary and legitimate' (A6.52), rather than being overtly hostile toward it. Trade unions appear, therefore, to be an accepted part of the landscape for Management in this Company - indeed positively accepted. The reasoning behind this - its cognitive foundation - is that the interests of the Company and of the unions are synonymous. This point is well made in ExcerptA6.50.

The two issues, of identity of interest, and the role of the union in the Company, while being conceptually distinct are as we have seen cognitively linked for management since the former is the basis of the latter. In terms of long term strategy this

cognitive link is interesting. The development of 'company unions' has been noted by, for instance W. Brown, in that Union members and officials, it is argued; now owe more loyalty to fellow employees and Company than to other members of their union employed by other companies. It is argued that this development goes back at least as far as the 1960's when Joint Shop Stewards Committees became more common. This perceived identity of interest between the Company union and the Company is clearly a similar development. Whether one is caused of the other (i.e. does management perception of identity of interest cause them to foster 'a company union', or does the development of a 'company union' lead to a perceived identity of interest) is not a matter we can take on here as we simply do not have the data. It is clear, however, that (i) the two processes do have much in common, and (ii) the perception of trade unions as 'legitimate and necessary' with identical interests does give Management a motivation to try to draw the unions within Company more closely into the Company - in short to attempt to create a company union.

It is important to note, however, that this positive acceptance of trade unionism by the Management has not always existed. During the late 1960's, when Staff first became unionised in the Company, the Management response was one of considerable hostility. Acceptance has, therefore, taken time.

One final point to be observed about Management attitude towards trade unionism. On the one hand Management have, as we have seen, placed some emphasis on their own individuality. In

discussing trade unionism for their subordinates it is conformity which is emphasised. This surely re-makes the point shown in the Tables at the beginning of this section i.e. that trade unionism was something required by other groups - but quite definitely was not a Management requirement.

(b) Staff and Union Reps

This group have much more variation in their responses to this question than did Management. It would seem from Tables A6.26 to A6.28 that Staff believe they have more need than Management to be in a union, but less need Hourly-Paid. The distribution of responses does, however, vary between departments. For instance in those areas closest to Hourly-Paid the proportion who think they have more need of union protection than Hourly-Paid is greatest. Thus, 40% Foremen, 27% of Works Staff and 22% of Production Control, say they have more need of union protection than Hourly-Paid. On the other hand, nobody in Quality Control, 5% of Sales Staff, and 11% of Finance Staff say they have more need of union protection than Hourly-Paid. In relation to Management, however, there is much more similarity as most depts. vary by a maximum of 7% from the overall staff average of 42% who said they reached more union protection than Management. The only exception to this is Works Staff as only 9% of them say they need more union protection than Management.

Thus the perceived need for union protection is greater than among Managers (as we would have expected given 80% unionisation of Staff) but less than Hourly-Paid (which again we may have expected given the role played by hierarchy). It is, however

interesting to observe that there is a variation among Staff, and that the greatest perceived need for union protection is amongst those Staff groups physically closest to Hourly-Paid. As we shall see this proximity to Hourly-Paid is important in understanding the development of unionism amongst Staff (e.g. why Finance were among the last group of Staff to become unionised).

We do, however, have to consider 2 groups of Staff - those who have not joined a union, and those who have. We shall deal with the former first.

In fact, in our sample there were 14 of 71 Staff respondents who were not union members. They were asked why they had not joined a union. Their responses are given in the following Table.

TableA6.30 - Why Are You Not A Member of a Trade Union

	<u>Number</u>
Could not be bothered	2
See no need	8
Not appropriate	1
Political objection	1
Other	<u>2</u>
Total	14

This, in many respects, echoes the earlier Table on Management reasons for not joining a Trade Union. In particular it is clear here that the motivation for not being a union member is not fundamentally political. It is, rather, one might say pragmatic in that rather than being motivated not to join, they perceive no motivation to join a trade union, i.e. there is no

particular obstacle, but neither is there any particular need to be a union member.

Any need to be a union member appears to be dissolved by 2 factors, as we shall show, (i) a belief in their ability to protect themselves as individuals (ii) that any difficulties can be resolved by using the purely internal Staff Association.

The former point is succinctly put by the respondent in Excerpt A 6.53. For this Staff respondent he does not need to become a union member because of his own perceived worth i.e. that given his qualification, ability and experience etc his position with respect to the Company is, as he puts it 'reasonably secure'. Thus given the power which his personal qualities, he feels, creates he does not require the power of a trade union behind him.

This point is made in a rather more detailed way by the respondent in Excerpt A6.54. Toward the end of this Excerpt we see much the same reasoning as in Excerpt A6.53 i.e. that given his work performance and abilities he has not required to have a union behind him. There is, however, another dimension to the reasoning in Excerpt A6.54.

The additional reasoning concerns the nature of trade unionism. About half-way through this Excerpt we discuss with the respondent his reaction to being forced to join a trade union. His response to this is to say that he would not object as long as "they're clean cut ... moderate." At the end of the Excerpt we reach another aspect of this argument which is rather more negative toward trade unions. In the last 3 sentences the role of the individual is emphasised, and it is clear also that for this respondent that one's

salary/wages ought to be a reflection of one's worth to the company. These two things are quite antithetical to trade union membership which philosophically depends on acceptance of collectivism and the collective negotiation of wages and conditions - or as the respondent puts it "the thing about being in a union ... is that there must be levelling."

Consequently despite his view that whether or not he would join a trade union would depend on "what kind of union", we would suggest that other elements of his thinking are logically inconsistent with trade union membership in that there are severe difficulties in reconciling individualism and collectivism. ExcerptA6.54 therefore is an important illustration of non-membership of trade unions.

The role of the individual is emphasised again in ExcerptA6.55, but this time in a way rather more overly hostile toward trade unionism, and in particular the closed shop. The objection to the closed shop is basically that expressed previously in ExcerptA6.54 - the problem of 'levelling', though in ExcerptA6.55 the argument is in terms of "he's got to become a sheep and join in". It becomes clear during our discussion with this respondent that his objection is not fundamentally to the political persuasion of any trade union. His objection is to individuals being refused the choice of trade union membership, since in a closed shop membership is obligatory.

Thus once again the individualism is apparent, since in this respondent's view the objection to the closed shop is that individual choice is removed thus, in his view, reducing everyone to "the mentality of a sheep".

Thus the objection to trade union membership is not, as we have seen fundamentally because of the political stance of trade unions. The objection appears to be due to the philosophical conflict of collectivism and the individualism and free choice which they prize. Political objections may be a consequence of this philosophical conflict i.e. I as an individual may not choose to become a member of a trade union because I think the leadership is too left wing. It does have to be understood, however, that in the perception of our respondents that would be a consequence of their individualistic philosophy.

The second relevant factor we referred to was the Company Staff Association. This body had existed in the Company for some time but as Staff had become progressively unionised over a period of 10-15 years (from the late 1960's early 1980's) it had become too small to play what Management regarded as a worthwhile role in the Company and had been formally disbanded, though informally what was in effect 'a rump' were consulted by Management as 'non-aligned Staff'. The role of the Staff Association as discussed with a leading member of the Staff Association in Excerpt A6.56.

The 2 factors we have discussed up to now - belief in individual ability, and resolution of problems through the Staff Association - are both apparent in this Excerpt. In the second half of the Excerpt, the question of his ability and contribution to the Company is raised as justification for his salary, and increases in salary. It is quite clear from this that it is the respondents view that his salary is a reflection of his own merits - or as he puts it "my salary level is perhaps more determined by qualification, experience and scarcity value". For him, therefore, his income is

is not a matter of collective strength but of individual ability and merit.

We also discuss with this respondent the role of the Staff Association, and we shall return to that directly. At this point we shall consider another issue arising from Excerpt A6.56 - the Closed Shop. This issue arises in 2 parts of this Excerpt. It arises firstly toward the beginning of the Excerpt. At this stage there are 2 objectives for this respondent - i) the lack of flexibility which it creates, in that wage increases etc are 'across the board' rather than being a reflection of merit, ii) the loss of self determination, in that employees would be obliged to join a union in a closed shop rather than being able to freely chose (a point graphically made in Excerpt A6.55). At the end of the Excerpt this issue arises again, this time in the context of the respondent being obliged to join a trade union because of a closed shop agreement. It is clear from this that his views on trade unions are not as negative that they would out-weigh his joining a trade union to protect the standard of living of his wife and family. This point is reinforced at the very end of the Excerpt where he indicates that he would join a trade union - even without the compulsion of a Union Membership Agreement - if he felt his salary etc was falling behind those to whom he compares himself. As we shall see it is precisely this view which has led Staff into trade unions already.

The other issue raised in this Excerpt is the role of the Staff Association. The views expressed here are hardly surprising, given the prominent role played by the respondent in the Staff Association.

What is interesting is to consider his views on its role in relation to the views of Staff union members on the role of their trade union. His justification of the Staff Association is on 2 grounds - a) flexibility - this really goes back to the issue of wages/salaries reflecting individual differences of merit, which we have already discussed. This, he argues, is lost when trade unionism enters in, with 'across the board' wages increases, b) his second argument is that the Staff trade unions do nothing which the Staff Association did not already do, in the way of 'ironing out any problems'. Given this, the awareness of 'external pressure' is perceived as not being worth the cost. We discuss this with the respondent at the beginning of the Excerpt and he makes clear there his concern about being drawn into disputes between the Company and other groups in the Company (eg the Company and Foremen), and the pressure exercised from without to follow national union policy. As we shall see shortly, this latter concern is also shared by Staff union members. Before going on to this, however, we wish to re-emphasise that this non-union group are not trade union members for reasons which are not entirely based on 'deeply-held personal conviction', though they are closest to this in arguing against the closed shop on grounds of freedom of choice. Their perception is, however, to a large extent pragmatic, for instance most clearly when the respondent in ExcerptA 6.56 argues that the unions do little which the Staff Association did not do in the past, and that bringing in the trade unions was at the expense of losing flexibility.

The unionised group is, as we have pointed out, by far the largest - about 80% of Staff are union members. Why has the majority group become union members? One straight-forward reason is given in ExcerptA6.57.

This is very much the typical image of trade unionism in popular culture - that one must be organised with one's fellow workers to be able to resist the Management which is itself organised, ie in order that Staff can be organised to face organised Management. This clearly involves a relationship much more strongly based on actions of conflict than we have seen amongst Management and Staff so far. In this view the role of trade unionism is to raise the chances of success on the (inevitable?) conflict with Management. Previously the emphasis has been on 'ironing out any problems'. We shall return to this point shortly.

A similar, but more detailed justification is given by the respondent in ExcerptA6.58, who is now a clerk with Staff status, but previously had worked on the shop-floor.

In certain respects this is almost the 'mirror image' of Excerpt A 6.56, as his opening discussion of 'you're getting 5/- but don't tell anybody' is part of the flexibility of the respondent in ExcerptA6.56. For the respondent in ExcerptA6.58 however, a group of individuals is not viable to resist management - it is only through collective means that Staff can get justice from Management. It is this type of view which is reflected in TablesA6.26 -A6.28, as they show quite clearly that Staff perceive themselves to be in more need of union protection than do the Management. Some 42% feel they need the protection of a union more than Management, while 47% feel they have the same need. This contrasts when the comparison is to Staff, as 80% say have the same need as other Staff of union protection. This group has clearly more or less divided in two when the comparison is to Management.

Staff, who have joined trade unions have done so partly because of the disadvantage they perceive themselves to be at in their individual relationship to Management. The attitude we have considered up to now is based on the view that the relationship of Staff and Management cannot be carried on any longer on an individual basis. This, however, is by no means the whole story, as is clearly shown in ExcerptA6.59.

This is a discussion with a Staff Union Representative. The initial discussion dwells largely on the issue we have already discussed, ie the Staff relationship with Management, which he discusses in the context of the level of premium payments and time-off for working on public holidays. Another crucial issue enters in, however, toward the end of the first half of this Excerpt, when the respondent makes clear his unhappiness at the hourly-paid AUEW convenor wishing to be present at every meeting of TASS (then a section of the AUEW), because he represents "different areas altogether". In what follows we can see quite clearly the fears of Staff being over-taken by Hourly-Paid in terms of pay and conditions. This, however goes much deeper than the issue of differential conditions between Staff and Hourly-Paid. The issue of the differences in conditions was extremely complex once each group held the other to have an advantage (eg in ExcerptA6.59 the Staff respondent suggests that Hourly-Paid have got ahead in holidays - as we have seen already, Hourly-Paid feel at a disadvantage on sick pay etc). Since each group has different conditions, which one is ahead depends on how their separate conditions are weighed up against each other. The major difficulty, though is that the two groups have fundamentally

different perceptions. This is shown very clearly in Excerpt 6.59 in discussing votes on when a holiday should be taken. For the Staff respondent the votes of each group for each alternative should have been added together, to establish which was more attractive to both groups collectively, eg if for A there were 50 votes and for B 35 votes among Staff, and 40 and 50 respectively among Hourly-Paid, then alternative A would have been chosen. Hourly-Paid unions, however, preferred to use the 'block-vote' method, which meant that since they voted for B by 40 to 50, then all their 90 votes would go for B, while all the Staff's 85 votes would go for A.

There are well-rehearsed arguments to be made for either method, but 2 important points have to be noted from this -

- a) each group - Staff and Hourly-Paid - have adopted perceptual positions which fundamentally differ, but where each can be given a justification
- b) we have to be aware that in the Works area Staff are out-numbered by Hourly-Paid. Thus, using the 'block vote' Staff will always be outvoted - only by bringing both groups together can Staff reasonably expect their chosen alternative to succeed.

It could be argued that these 2 points are not un-related, ie that Staff and Hourly-Paid hold their views on voting because of the power it potentially creates for them. The inference is clearly there, but we have no direct proof of this.

Thus, for Staff, unionisation is a solution to the problem they perceive of the erosion of their advantage in conditions by manual workers and their trade unions. The solution to this problem (at least for 80% of Staff) has been to join a trade union and to

negotiate as a collective body with Management, rather than as individuals.

Two general points have been implicit in our discussion so far, which have to be emphasised.

1) There is a distinction to be drawn between non-union Staff and unionised Staff, which is very similar to the distinctions drawn by Allan Fox in 'Beyond Contract'. There he discusses the distinction between high and low trust relations. One of the elements of these 2 types of relationships is the approach to differences between the parties. In a high trust relationship a difference is a mutual problem to be solved by the parties, but in a low trust relationship it is a matter to be negotiated by the parties. The former is clearly the position of the non-union Staff - see for instance Excerpt 6.56 where the respondent refers to 'ironing out any problems'. The Staff Union Rep's position in Excerpt 6.59 is much more one of negotiation as a means of resolving problems, and consequently he is much closer to a low trust relationship, in Fox's terms.

2) Despite the fact 80% of Staff are members of national unions, their orientation was remarkably internalised to the Company. This point is made very clearly in Excerpt 6.60. His membership of the union is not in doubt, since for him it is primarily for protection of his job security. Equally it is very clear that anything outwith the company is irrelevant to this Staff respondent. The union - in this case TASS - is relevant only for what it does within the company. Indeed it almost appears that for this respondent the national union is almost a nuisance, and that

procedurally the Staff Association would have done almost as good a job as the national union. Equally it is clear that Staff have left the Staff Association for membership of trade unions. It may be that the decline of trust between Staff and Management indicated in the differences in approach to resolution of problems, which we discussed above, may have been partly responsible for the demise of the Staff Association. It is, however, interesting that the emphasis on the internal working of the trade union which we have found among Staff, does have an echo with Hourly-Paid, as we shall see.

Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards

Trade unionism, is, of course, more deeply rooted among Hourly-Paid workers. Indeed it is among the highly skilled type of manual worker employed by the Company that trade unionism, in the form we know it today, began, eg engineers. The deep-seatedness of their trade unionism was very well exemplified in an informal conversation with a convenor of a manual union in the Company. We were discussing the (then) increasing unionisation of Staff employees. During the conversation the Respondent said "I don't know how these people in the Staff can bear to work beside non-union people."

To avoid any misunderstanding of this statement, it is important to appreciate that the respondent was not making a 'political' statement. He was not, for instance, saying that Staff ought not to work beside non-union people - though he may have believed that. The point he was making was that, given his perception, he really could not understand - he was genuinely bewildered - that anyone could work

beside somebody else who was not in the union movement.

More specifically, however, besides the aspect of tradition referred to, why do Hourly-Paid become trade union members? One reason is that there is a closed shop in force among Hourly-Paid workers. While it is a post-entry shop it is still the case that to be employed as an Hourly-Paid worker, one must be a member of the appropriate union - AUEW, Boilermakers (as was), EEPTU, UCATT etc.

On an individual level, however, why do they become union members. What does the individual member of the union see in union membership? This is discussed with an Hourly-Paid respondent in ExcerptA6.61.

For this respondent being a union member is a matter of, as he puts it, 'protection' against management in order to maintain and improve his working conditions, wages etc. For him, being in a collective group is more of an advantage in dealing with management than trying to negotiate individually. This notion of collectivism runs through this Excerpt from start to finish, and it is quite clear that for this respondent the collective, and the protection which it gives to the individual, is much more salient than the concept of individual merit and worth which were emphasised by Staff. The need for individual protection - rather than the need to promote individual advancement - is clearly more significant for Hourly-Paid, which is consistent with our observations about promotion. Generalising somewhat, the orientation of Hourly-Paid to the future is more collectively defensive than we find among Staff, while the orientation to the future among Staff is more individually proactive than is true

of Hourly-Paid.

Hourly-Paid, therefore, appear to be ready to submerge the interests of the individual, in favour of collective security.

The process by which the union protects its members is discussed with a Shop Steward in Excerpt A6.62. The notion of protection is widened in this Excerpt, as it is clear from the outset that for this Shop Steward the union is more than a fire service, ie that the union does more than simply take up difficulties which have arisen, but that they also take up a positive attitude on how things ought to be within the Company. This is discussed within the context of health and safety. Since the Health and Safety at Work Act came into force, the law has sought to emphasise that health and safety hazards ought to be identified in advance. The Shop Steward suggests in this Excerpt that "the workers are getting very interested and very serious about the safety situation". There is, therefore, a sense of becoming proactive - which, we said above, is more true of Staff. It does, however, have to be observed that this increasing interest in safety among Hourly-Paid workers, is clearly in a collective, and not an individual, context.

The work of the unions within the Company is, therefore, two-fold. Firstly to deal with difficulties and problems as they arise, but also to participate in the policy-making of the Company with the objective of enhancing the working lives of their members.

This latter point is extremely important, but it is crucial not to read too much into what the Shop Steward is saying here. He identifies at the end of the Excerpt that Managements authority has

has been eroded, but this situation is much too complex to be dealt with by saying that management are powerless, and unions and workers are powerful. What we are discussing here are significant, but nonetheless small changes in the structure of power.

As we observed in the previous Chapter, there is a desire among Hourly-Paid workers to exercise more influence on policy-making in the Company. It was, however, quite clear that there was no significant desire to replace managerial authority, ie while Hourly-Paid to exercise more influence on policy, making policy was perceived to be a function which ought to be performed by Management. This comes out again in Excerpt A6.63, again with a Shop Steward.

In this we discuss the difficulties there would be in getting union members to take industrial action over company policy. It is quite clear for the respondent that this would be much more difficult than getting them to come out for a wage rise, because "that's (the wage rise) there in front of their faces and it's easily arguable."

Indeed, he suggests later on, to get Shop Stewards to try to take action of policy-making at board level, because as this Shop Steward points out, what happens at the level of the Company board is beyond the limits of their knowledgeability, as we saw in Chapter 5. Only if the issue is clearly and directly going to affect them (eg a wage rise or a redundancy) is there sufficient understanding to support action. Their proactiveness is, therefore, limited not only by their perception of how decisions ought to be taken, but also by their awareness of how decisions are taken.

Their awareness is, therefore, an important constraint for the union in influencing their working lives.

Another important influence, however, is the limit of support of the union by its members. This becomes apparent in ExcerptA6.64. For this Hourly-Paid respondent his union membership dues have perceived limits - "I'm no a union man". Indeed his principal reason for being a union member is the closed shop.

Given perceptions of this type one can well appreciate the difficulties referred to by the Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.63.

ExcerptA6.64 illustrates quite clearly the perceptual limits of union membership. Earlier Excerpts have demonstrated the reasons for union membership (eg security, wages, conditions etc), but what we want to explore here is the boundary of union membership (ie the extent to which the union can call on the loyalty of its members). We have already established some of the limits from ExcerptA6.63 as the Shop Steward made clear there that issues of no immediately apparent relevance (eg financial policy) would not exert such a strong call on the loyalty of his members than another issue of immediately apparent relevance (eg a wage increase) - though he did feel he would be successful even in the former case, though with much more difficulty. From ExcerptA6.63 it is, therefore, clear that the role of the union is contingent on the nature of the issue concerned. In the case of issues on which the union has been traditionally involved (wages, redundancies, discipline etc), which are immediately apparent, the role of the union is significant in the perception of its members. This point is made again, in a general way, by an Hourly-Paid respondent, in ExcerptA6.65.

For this respondent the union has been 'learned' - it has, over time, entered into his stock of knowledge, such that it is now perceived by him as an organisation which is more capable of bargaining than he is for himself.

It has, however, been apparent that this is limited to certain immediately apparent issues. Indeed this is consistent with our findings in the last Chapter, as there we showed that on issues like financial policy, investment etc - those whose relevance is least immediately apparent - it was perceived to be particularly appropriate that decisions on these issues should be a matter for Management. The perceived influence on issues like wages etc. by Hourly-Paid was much greater.

Thus the role of the union is primarily to bargain on day-to-day issues like wages. The difficulty of this is, of course, that decisions of long term strategy (eg investment) can eventually determine decisions at a more immediate level (eg redundancy). That is a much more complex issue which is not central to this discussion. In the longer term, however, it is important to be aware of this connection.

Even at a day-to-day level though, what is the limit of union membership? We can get some measure of this by the degree of involvement of members in union affairs. We took two measures of involvement - i) frequency of attendance at union meetings, ii) time devoted to discussion of union matters.

First of all let us consider attendance at union meetings

Table A6.31 How often do you attend meetings of your Union?

	<u>Staff</u> (Union Members)	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Often	22 (39%)	7 (100%)	31 (65%)	16 (94%)
Often	15 (26%)	0	9 (19%)	1 (6%)
Half of Them	2 (3%)	0	0	0
Seldom	12 (21%)	0	5 (10%)	0
Never	6 (11%)	0	3 (6%)	0

This shows clearly that Hourly Paid attend union meetings more frequently than do Staff who are union members, though the tradition of unionisation amongst the former is, of course, much longer so habit of attendance is more likely to have developed among them. Nevertheless attendance does not of itself necessarily indicate great interest in the affairs of the Union. For instance one day we met one of the convenors of an Hourly Paid union, who was extremely angry about the conduct of a recent meeting he had just organised to elect a Shop Steward for one section. In particular he was upset as more votes were cast (on a show of hands) than the number of people present. His view was that "these bastards down there'll no take it seriously. Well they've just elected a right bam-pot and they're going to get what they deserve."

This lack of deep interest in the Union is indicated further by the following table:

Table 6.32 How much time do you spend discussing union matters with your colleagues/workmates?

	<u>Staff</u> (Union Members)	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Great Deal	0	3 (43%)	7 (15%)	6 (35%)
A Lot	10 (18%)	4 (57%)	13 (27%)	4 (24%)
A Little	27 (47%)	0	21 (44%)	7 (41%)
Hardly Ever	20 (35%)	0	7 (15%)	0

This table shows that 59% of Hourly-Paid talk about union matters 'a little/hardly ever', while for Staff the comparable figure is 82%. Neither is indicative of a very high level of interest - indeed even among Shop Stewards some 41% suggest that they talk about union matters only a little.

From all this it would appear that there are a number of conclusions which can be drawn from this

- i) the union plays a significant role for its members in negotiating their relationship with the Company
- ii) the role of the union in doing so is widely accepted in the Company generally, including Management. Perhaps one of the penalties of this is that the union appears to have gone into the background of Company affairs. It is accepted generally, and consequently appears to have slipped from the fore-ground of the perception of its members, eg one of the complaints of a number of Shop Stewards is that while they would like to stand down, they cannot as no one would take their place. In one case, a Shop Steward did refuse re-election but when, after three months, no one came forward to fill the post he agreed to be put forward.

Membership of trade unions does, therefore, have defined boundaries even among Hourly-Paid workers. The evidence we have collected does tend to support the view that leaders of unions do have to persuade and act within acceptable limits, rather than simply lead expecting to be followed.

We have shown in previous Chapters, however, that it is felt that the influence of those below Management ought to be increased. The following table, which reports responses to a question on whether the unions ought to be stronger or less strong, does tend to support that.

TableA6.33 - How much stronger would you like to see the unions in this Firm?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Much Stronger	1 (3%)	7 (10%)	1 (14%)	6 (13%)	4 (24%)
Stronger	3 (9%)	13 (18%)	3 (43%)	15 (31%)	3 (18%)
Right Now	22 (69%)	44 (62%)	3 (43%)	27 (56%)	10 (59%)
Less Strong	5 (16%)	5 (7%)	0	0	0
Much Less Strong	1 (3%)	2 (3%)	0	0	0

This table shows clearly that the union is an accepted part of this Company, as no more than 19% of any group (in this case Management) wanted to see the unions weakened. In general the implication of this table is that, if anything, the role of the unions ought to be stronger. Among Staff and Management this is less emphasised than for the other 3 groups in the Table. These figures are consistent with our argument of the previous Chapter i.e. that those below Management ought to exercise more influence, but that this was

not to mean that they would take decisions as this was a Management role.

Finally, we considered the role of the Shop Steward or Union Rep. in respect of the effect these officials had on the role of Management. As the following Table shows very clearly, it was strongly felt that a 'good' Shop Steward would make Management's easier. Indeed it is, perhaps, notable that the groups who felt this most strongly were (a) Shop Stewards, and (b) Management.

TableA6.34 (a) - Does a good Shop Stewart/Staff Union Rep. make Management's job easier or more difficult?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Easier	30 (94%)	55 (78%)	6 (86%)	41 (85%)	17 (100%)
More Difficult	2 (6%)	16 (23%)	1 (14%)	7 (15%)	0

Thus within this Company we have what is, perhaps a remarkable degree of agreement about the role of trade unions. While Management do not appear to feel that they require to be union members, they do seem to positively accept the role of trade unions for Hourly-Paid, and for Staff. Between these two groups, however, there is, as we have seen, a degree of friction concerning appropriate relativities between them, as well as the nature of any relationship between the 2 groups.

A notable feature of perceptions of trade unionism which appears to be common across Management, Staff & Hourly-paid, is its emphasis on the internal union structure. It is not surprising that internal union affairs should be given more emphasis than national union affairs, given the immediacy of the former. What is notable, however, is

the degree of emphasis. For Management, acceptance of the role of trade unions is on the contribution the unions can make to the running of the Company. Not greatly surprising perhaps that Management should think this way. For Staff, however, it was clear that the union nationally was in many respects more a nuisance than a help. Even among Hourly-Paid workers the national union was very heavily written down in comparison to the emphasis on its role on internal matters to the Company. All of this tends to support the view of, for instance, Brown of a trend toward, in effect, company unions (in Brown, W. (Ed) Changing Contours on British Industrial Relations).

(7) Supervision

This function in a firm involves monitoring what is done by than of whom one has charge. Frequently, in previous research, this has been a control variable, but this assumes that only the constant, day-to-day personal supervision is relevant for the respondent. It does not take into account the possibility that while the supervisory function has attained an equilibrium, the hierarchical function has not i.e. that while the function and role of the supervisor is adequate within the existing (hierarchical) form of organisation, it is contingent on this form of organisation continuing - as we shall show that we found in the Firm. In general, the orientation toward supervision was one of acceptability, with diverse individuals having diverse reasons for disliking their supervisor. This extended from the Labourers to rivalry on the Board. While the great majority found their supervisors acceptable, however, this, as we suggested, is contingent upon the existing hierarchical structure, which, as we have shown in preceding Chapters is in need not of structural alteration, but of procedural alteration,

and a widening of its communication channels. For the moment, however, we shall be concerned with structural perceptions of supervision in the Firm.

TableA6.35 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared to that of (other) Shop-Floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	9 (28%)	16 (23%)	3 (43%)	4 (8%)	2 (12%)
Satisfied	20 (63%)	46 (65%)	3 (43%)	34 (71%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	2 (6%)	8 (11%)	0	8 (16%)	1 (6%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	2 (12%)

TableA6.36 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared to that of (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	9 (28%)	15 (21%)	3 (43%)	3 (6%)	2 (12%)
Satisfied	19 (59%)	46 (65%)	3 (43%)	35 (73%)	10 (59%)
Dissatisfied	2 (6%)	9 (13%)	0	6 (13%)	3 (18%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	2 (12%)

TableA6.37 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared to that of (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	6 (19%)	9 (13%)	2 (29%)	2 (4%)	1 (6%)
Satisfied	19 (59%)	54 (76%)	4 (57%)	38 (79%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	5 (16%)	5 (7%)	0	5 (10%)	2 (12%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	2 (12%)

(a) Management. Among Management the distribution of responses in respect of both Hourly-Paid and Staff is almost identical, with only 6% being 'Dissatisfied.' The least satisfied response is, in fact, in respect of other Management - but even here the level of 'Dissatisfied' is only 16%. It is, however, interesting that the lowest level of satisfaction should be expressed in comparison to other Managers. Much of this is due to frustration by some senior Managers with the Board; as ExcerptA6.66 from a senior Manager illustrates.

This Manager expresses dissatisfaction with his superior on 2 grounds - (1) failure to be interested in the nitty-gritty (i.e. his problems); (2) failure to take his advice as a professional Manager - for which he paid by effective demotion. Those Managers who did express dissatisfaction did so on the basis that their superior does not exhibit adequate ability - it is clear from the above that the failure of this respondent's supervisor to do so, resulted in his disenchantment with his superior.

Few Managers suggested that in this respect they were dissatisfied - but as we have seen there is a strong tendency for Managers to say that if they are dissatisfied and can do nothing to resolve this then their option is to leave. The Manager in ExcerptA6.67 appears to look for the same qualities - and to have found them for now. He does, however, add to this the view that he would leave if he no longer got this from his superior.

Hence we should not be surprised at the level of dissatisfaction expressed by Management. This is consistent with what we have seen up to now, which can likewise be explained by the

Management strategy of leaving if a particular aspects of their job is unsatisfactory. Furthermore senior Managers whose direct inter-face was with the Board remedied any incapacity by the Board by their own professionalism. This was particularly true in one dept. where the junior Managers admired their direct Manager very much indeed, but had scarcely disguised contempt for the Board.

(b) Staff and Union Reps. The Staff responses reveal a considerable measure of satisfaction with their supervision-- and as we can see the same holds true for their Union Reps. The level of dissatisfaction for Staff is at its peak - 14% either 'dissatisfied'/'very dissatisfied' - but making the comparison to Hourly-Paid the figure is 12%, and to Management it is 8%. Hence, there is little dissatisfaction, in these comparisons, expressed by Staff to their Supervisors. The same argument can be applied to the Union Reps. only 14% of whom are 'very dissatisfied' with their supervisor in comparison to Hourly-Paid, Staff and Management.

What, therefore, do Staff expect from their supervisors? This is dicussed in ExcerptA6.68:

This is very similar to what we found amongst Management i.e. that what was important was the professional managerial relationship, and in particular, how well it worked. We found among a small number of senior Managers that there was frustration (see excerptA6.66), but for the majority this was not so (see excerptA6.67). For this Staff respondent he has achieved what he regards as an adequate professional relationship with those who supervise his work. This,

however, can only be a means to an end i.e. this professional relationship is the means by which he is able to exercise his professional skills. If he were kept less well informed, for instance, his ability to operate would be that much more restricted. In excerpt 6.66 for instance, the Manager complained his director had not taken action in 1976 - hence his own ability to perform was restricted, and his response was to transfer all of the responsibility for any inadequacy on to the Director, thus protecting his own professionalism.

Even where the supervisory relationship is over - laid with a personal basis this need to exercise one's skills - even of a relatively low order - is still important, as is illustrated in ExcerptA6.69.

The emphasis here has shifted slightly is so far as the need for the 'boss' to be technically competent is mentioned. The difference is, however, only of emphasis. In this excerpt the respondent looked to his boss to handle any problems which may arise. His job is of a routine nature, and his skill is to operate this routine. The supervisor is, for him, the means to ensure the routine continues unobstructed. In excerpt 6.68, on the other hand, this was largely left unsaid - but all the same the rapport which he valued with his supervisors was to exercise his professional skill in the same way as the respondent in excerptA6.69, only at a higher level, involving, for instance, more uncertainty. In excerptA6.68 the respondent emphasised his rapport with his supervisor - but this was on a professional basis so if the supervisor was not technically competent then the relationship could not be

satisfactory. We have seen in excerptA6.69 that the professionalism of the supervisor was accepted. This did not always happen, as excerptA6.70 from a Staff respondent illustrates.

The inadequacy, for the respondent, is fairly easily seen - he is an electrical engineer, and his supervisor is a mechanical engineer. In excerptA6.68 we saw that the respondent had a relationship with his superior which was adequate professionally. The different skills of the respondent in excerptA6.70 makes this virtually impossible. Hence he is left pretty much to himself - in terms of any difficulties he finds with the equipment and with other departments. His supervisor, it is clear from this, fulfills for him no function at all.

Other Staff find their supervisors inadequate in some respect, but none as comprehensively as the example we have just considered. The following is an instance of a member of the Staff whose problem lies in the different perception of the job held by him and his supervisor.

Unlike the respondent in excerptA6.70, this respondent does not explicitly deny the professionalism of his supervisor, it is his particularly inefficient, uncommunicative and old fashioned form of professionalism which causes him frustration. Clearly, unlike the respondent in excerptA6.68 there is no adequate relationship² on the basis of profession, because, in the view of this respondent (1) their perceptions of the profession are fundamentally different (2) his supervisor allows avoidable inefficiency to continue.

The most important quality for the Staff is, therefore, the professionalism of the supervisor, in order that he may facilitate the work of his subordinates, and in order that they may communicate

about work, and those problems which they may have with it. We saw that this was not always so - both from the tables A6.35 - A6.37, and from excerpts A6.69 and A6.70 leading to expressions of dissatisfaction.

(C) Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards. The level of dissatisfaction in these categories is rather higher, and the level of satisfaction correspondingly lower than for either Management or for Staff. The lower level of satisfaction is seen in the much lower proportion of Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards who say they are 'very satisfied' than Staff or Management. The number who say they are dissatisfied or 'very dissatisfied' is also higher among the Hourly-Paid and the Shop Stewards than for any other category or any comparison.

Despite their relatively lower level of satisfaction the Hourly-Paid and the Shop Stewards are, on the whole, satisfied in comparison to any other groups - 79% and 83% respectively compared to (other) Shop Floor : 79% and 71% compared to Staff : 83% and 77% compared to Management.

What, therefore, did the Hourly-Paid look for from their supervisors?

Excerpt A6.72 is illustrative.

The respondent refers to his previous Companies where, he suggests, the supervision is bad, because "they're actually breathing on top of you". This is unsatisfactory because of the state of anxiety it induces in the respondent, and the lack of trust being put in him by supervision being as close as he felt it was - "You've got to have trust in the person who is doing the job or you'll never get it done right." This contrasts with his present Firm where

"they leave you to get on with the job".

Hence for this respondent what is important is that he is left to get on with his job, and as we saw among Management, and among Staff, to exercise the skills which he has. The following respondent, also from the Hourly-Paid, seeks the same qualities, as the respondent in excerpt A6.72 i.e. to be left to get on with the job, and exercise his particular skill. He also wishes to be able to go to his supervisor if he has any problems - just as the Staff respondent did in excerpt A 6.69.

At the same time however, the supervisor is not seen as absolutely good - "You need to be kind of bad to get respect if you're a gaffer you know kind of frighten the men" : I think there's a lot of gaffers chancers." This, however, in his view is justified, as he sees that not all those around him are "willing to do a wee bit like I do". Leaving aside the question of whether the respondent is as willing to work as he appears to suggest, it is interesting to note that the random justice which in many ways was typical of the Clyde in the past should still be seen as justified to get the employees to work. Amongst the older respondents a previous Works Manager, who merely had to appear on the Shop Floor - complete with his white gloves - to strike terror into those there, is still remembered with a feeling which is not so far distant from fondness.

Certainly senior Shop Stewards in particular, but even among the works management, recognise that the dismissal procedures of the Employment Protection Act are no bad thing. This owes its origins to those times when it was not unheard that a certain Foreman would dismiss men merely to 'ginger up the rest of the squad'. As we have suggested those practices have more or less

gone, but as we have seen in ExcerptA6.73 they are still suggested by the behaviour of Foremen.

In the view of the respondent in ExcerptA6.74 this historical behaviour has not in fact disappeared.

His view is that the supervision is generally poor because foremen spend too little time facilitating the work which his men have got to do - as a source of advice, ensuring parts and tools are where they should be etc - and too much time on paper-work and 'trying to get at people they don't think are doing their job' ie trying to exercise disciplinary powers they no longer have, unofficially. Since they no longer have the powers to discipline employees - this power resides with Works Management and Personnel - the Foremen are occasionally put in the position of at least stretching the truth or telling a selection of the facts, or of losing face by not backing up a threat. Occasionally they simply lose face through lack of Management support. Near the beginning of our field-work an Hourly-Paid employee on night -shift was caught (for the third time) sleeping. His union did not dispute that he was sleeping, and initially were not going to dispute his dismissal - after 3 warnings for misconduct the penalty is dismissal. The Foreman involved was told this would be the penalty imposed. Yet within 24 hours it was reduced to one week's suspension and being brought back to day-shift (and losing his night-shift payment). In the eyes of the Foreman in this part of the Firm this was typical lack of Management support. The union's change of stance is, however, interesting in this respect, as the employee was regarded by the Foreman and certain Managers as "a right nuisance", and the view of the union was that as he had finished his work for the shift he was

entitled to sleep if he wanted to - and as others were doing as well. This is the problem for the Foreman, as his role has been progressively reduced. Not only has he lost most of his disciplinary power, but much of the technical side of his job has been removed, eg by Work Study. The Foreman, therefore, is trying to sustain an illusion of long ago. As one senior Manager put it.

"Foremen fail to realise their position in the world has changed."

The Hourly-Paid view is that they look for technical assistance from their supervisors, and to be enabled to get on with their jobs. We have found this to be true for Management and Staff as well. It may be that this role represents a point for development for the role of Foreman in the future, but the important point for our purposes is that the supervisory role is, on the whole, accepted in its existing entirety, and where it is rejected it's rejected not in total but in terms of remaining disciplinary practices, and it is not a rejection of hierarchy based on technical knowledge, but is a rejection of hierarchy based on arbitrary authority.

In all categories we have found, therefore, that the supervisory role is accepted. Amongst Management the qualities sought from a supervisor that (1) they should be able to communicate effectively (2) be able to learn from the supervisor (3) be able to exercise their skills. Amongst Staff we found the qualities of a supervisor which were valued most were (1) that the supervisor be professional ie capable of assisting those who work for him (2) that the individual Staff be able to exercise their particular skill (s). Among the Hourly-Paid a supervisor was expected (1) to leave his men to get on with their work and exercise their skill (2) to ensure that

they are able to do so by, for instance, ensuring that all the parts are available.

In all categories, therefore, there was stress laid on the need to allow the employee - whoever he was - to exercise the skill he had. This, in general, was done by the Firm. Amongst Staff and Hourly-Paid there was also an expectation that the supervisor was the person one expected to go to if there was a problem, and who would facilitate the work which one was doing. Hence there was still a dependence on the supervisor - his superiority was to this extent still respected.

The clearest objection to the classical supervisory role was the use of arbitrary authority - though as we saw in Excerpt 6.73 it could be felt that this was a necessary part in the relationship with those who worked for him.

The most important point of this section are the similarities of the different categories in what qualities they look for from their supervisors. At the same time we found most satisfaction with the existing role among the Management, and least among the Hourly-Paid - as we have found in all other items. This is reiterated in the following table which gives the results from the question "How much would your supervision have to be improved to make your job ideal?"

Table 6.35 - "How much would your supervision have to be improved to make your job ideal?"

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Much Improved	1 (3%)	4 (6%)	1 (14%)	6 (13%)	2 (12%)
Improved a Bit	4 (13%)	19 (27%)	3 (43%)	10 (21%)	4 (24%)

Right Now 27 (84%) 48 (68%) 3 (43%) 32 (67%) 11 (65%)

Among Management there is easily the largest proportion who say their supervision is alright as it is - 84%. The Staff, Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards have broadly similar distributions of responses of this question, with Staff being marginally more satisfied with existing supervisory practices. The Union Reps. are least satisfied, on the basis of these figures, but excluding them about 2/3 or more of each category says that their supervision is "right now". This table shows, therefore, that supervision is meeting the expectations of the Firm's employees in most cases - though as we have seen in the various excerpts by no means all.

We went on to ask more detailed questions about supervision, which appear in the following tables ~~A6.35 - A6.41~~ and which as we shall see generally reveal satisfaction with various aspects of the supervisory role.

Table A6.36 - Generally speaking is your superior as a supervisor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Good	12 (38%)	20 (28%)	1 (14%)	8 (17%)	3 (18%)
Good	15 (47%)	34 (48%)	1 (14%)	25 (52%)	6 (35%)
Neither Good nor Bad	4 (13%)	15 (21%)	3 (43%)	13 (27%)	6 (35%)
Bad	1 (3%)	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	0	1 (6%)
Very Bad	0	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	1 (6%)

From this table it is clear that, as we would have expected from the previous data, the Management are most satisfied - 85% saying their

supervisor was 'very good'/good'. Among Staff this figure is 76%, 69% among Hourly-Paid and 53% among the Shop Stewards. For the Union Reps. it is 28% who say their supervisor is either 'very good/good', and for this category the median response 'neither good nor bad' is modal, as it is for Shop Stewards with the response 'good'. Only among these two sub-categories is there more than a very small percentage who say their supervisor is 'bad/very bad'. Among Union Reps. this figure is 28%, and 12% for Shop Stewards - it is 3% for Management, 2% for Staff and 4% for Hourly-Paid.

For the major categories supervision does appear to be satisfactory in this respect, marginally less so for Shop Stewards and rather more so for the Union Reps., so that again we see that the union officials are more critical than their members - especially among the Staff rather than Hourly-Paid.

Next we asked a series of questions concerning the technical side of the supervisory role. First of all -

TableA6.37 - Does your supervisor give you enough freedom to do your job?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Too Much	3 (9%)	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	0
About Right	25 (78%)	64 (90%)	5 (71%)	42 (88%)	16 (94%)
Too Little	4 (13%)	2 (3%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	0
Far too Little	0	2 (3%)	0	0	1 (6%)

For most of the sample it is clear that the freedom their supervisor gives them to do their jobs - which was a feature important in all categories - is 'About Right'. It is, however, interesting that the category in which there is the largest proportion who say they have 'too little' freedom is Management. We did, however, point to a failure by the Board to operate efficiently with their Senior Managers on occasions, producing frustration for Management. With the exception of Management, and of the Staff Union Reps., there is no other category in which the proportion who use the response 'Too Little' or 'Far too little' exceeds 6%.

This should not be a surprise, as the Firm was selected on the basis that its technology permitted considerable freedom to its employees. Supervision, is, however, about the provision of guidance to subordinates when this is necessary. This came up frequently in the excerpts we have presented (see, for instance A6.69, A6.73 - of for a situation in which guidance is perceived to be missing, see A6.70). The data in table A6.38 shows the extent of satisfaction in this respect.

Table A6.38 - Is your supervisor a good source of guidance when you need it?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly-Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Always	11 (34%)	32 (45%)	2 (29%)	14 (29%)	3 (18%)
Usually	13 (41%)	22 (31%)	0	17 (35%)	6 (35%)
Sometimes	6 (19%)	14 (20%)	3 (43%)	14 (29%)	6 (35%)
Seldom	2 (6%)	2 (3%)	2 (29%)	2 (4%)	0
Never	0	1 (1%)		1 (2%)	2 (12%)

Only among the Union Reps. is there a sizeable minority who say their supervisors are seldom sources of good advice - 29% - though 12% of Shop Stewards say their supervisors are never sources of good advice. Among the major categories, however, the proportions who use the 2 lower responses - 'Seldom' and 'Never' are extremely low - Management 6%, Staff 4%, Hourly-Paid 6%. There is a minor difference in the distributions, as for Staff 'Always' is modal, while for Management and Hourly-Paid it is 'Usually' which is modal.

Concerning those last 2 groups, the Management is skewed toward 'Always', while among the Hourly-Paid there is no skewing. This would indicate Staff, on the whole, to be more satisfied than Management, and Management, on the whole to be just more satisfied than the Hourly-Paid. Any difference, is, however, marginal, though expected on the basis of what we have shown already. Namely

- (1) there is a measure of frustration among Management, concerning their relationship with the Board
- (2) the Hourly-Paid have consistently been least satisfied of the major categories in the items we have considered. The difference has seldom, however, been major, and again, in this case, is not major.

Another side of being a good source of guidance, for a supervisor is to appreciate any problems which one's subordinates may have. The data from this is in table A6.39.

Table 46.39 - Does your supervisor appreciate any problems you may have with your job?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Well	11 (34%)	33 (47%)	2 (29%)	15 (31%)	3 (18%)
Quite Well	18 (56%)	28 (39%)	3 (43%)	29 (60%)	11 (65%)
Quite Badly	2 (6%)	8 (11%)	1 (14%)	3 (6%)	1 (6%)
Very Badly	1 (3%)	2 (3%)	1 (14%)	1 (2%)	2 (12%)

On this item, with the exception of Staff, all categories are modal on the 'Quite Well' response. For Staff the modal response is 'Very Well', which was chosen by 47% of Staff respondents. This table seems to indicate, in this respect that there is little dissatisfaction with supervision, though a few more selected the negative responses than was true of the previous table - Management 9% -6% : Staff 14% - 4% : Hourly-Paid 8% - 6% : Shop Stewards 18% - 12%. The only exception to this was the Staff Union Reps. among whom 28% said their supervisor appreciated their problems with their jobs 'Quite Badly'/'Very Badly', and in the previous table the same number (2 - difference due to rounding up) said their supervisor was seldom a source of guidance - the distribution does indicate rather less satisfaction on the former than on the latter, however.

Nevertheless the levels of dissatisfaction with supervision in there, basically technical aspects, were not strongly pronounced at all. The next table explores how supervision was perceived on a personal basis. We have already seen that supervision is assessed on its technical

merits, and indeed it has been suggested that it was a disadvantage for supervision to be 'too nice'. (See excerptA6.ε8, for instance). At the same time, there must be a personal relationship though it need not extend as far as friendship - indeed it is not likely to - but if there is a personal conflict this can be as disruptive as a technical conflict. The responses to this question are shown in tableA6.40.

This table reveals a considerable amount of satisfaction, as in no category do fewer than 70% say their supervisor considers them as a person as well as how they do their job 'Always'/'Usually' - 75% of Management, 76% of Staff, 71% of Union Reps., 73% of Hourly-Paid, 70% of Shop Stewards.

TableA6.40 - Does your superior consider you as a person as well as how you do your job?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Always	7 (22%)	28 (39%)	1 (14%)	13 (27%)	6 (35%)
Usually	17 (53%)	26 (37%)	4 (57%)	22 (46%)	6 (35%)
Some of the Time	8 (25%)	9 (13%)	0	9 (19%)	3 (18%)
Seldom	0	5 (7%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	0
Never	0	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	2 (12%)

Correspondingly the negative responses are chosen only by a minority - no Manager uses 'Seldom'/'Never' : 11% of Staff : 8% of Hourly-Paid : 12% of Shop Stewards : only among the Union Reps. are these responses and more than this, as 28% of this category use these responses.

Despite this it seems clear that supervisors in the Firm meet the expectations of their subordinates. Indeed we have seen up to now that the supervisors for the majority of our respondents in all aspects of their job, meet the expectations of those who work for them.

We have, however, only examined the relationship with the respondent as essentially passive, but if the respondent takes the initiative, and breaches the hierarchy, by putting ideas to the supervisor, who is supposed to supervise the respondent. This is broken if the respondent puts an idea up to the supervisor. Such a question was put to our respondents, and is shown in tableA6.41.

TableA6.41 - Will your supervisor listen to what you think about a job?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Yes. He listens and takes it into consideration	28 (88%)	59 (83%)	3 (43%)	35 (73%)	9 (53%)
Yes. He listens but does not take it into consideration	4 (13%)	10 (14%)	4 (57%)	12 (25%)	7 (41%)
Doesn't listen	0	2 (3%)	0	1 (2%)	1 (6%)

The first response - what we could call 'the true-team response' in which the respondent and his supervisor both contribute to solutions to problems - is modal in all categories, except Union Reps. For Union Reps. what we could call 'the pseudo- team response' is modal, but it should be noted that a significant number of Shop Stewards selected

this response as well. On this question the union officials are more critical than their members. It should, however, also be noted that in the major categories the 'true-team response' diminishes as we descend the hierarchy, being chosen most by Management (88%), then Staff (83%), then by Hourly-Paid (73%). If we look at this more closely we can see that even within the Hourly-Paid this trend continues, as the following table shows.

TableA6.42 - Will your superior listen to what you think about a job?

	<u>Skilled</u>	<u>Labourers</u>
Yes, he listens and takes it into consideration	31 (74%)	13 (57%)
Yes, he listens but doesn't take it into consideration	9 (21%)	10 (44%)
He doesn't listen	2 (5%)	0

On this item it is clear that the Skilled are more satisfied than the Labourers, as in the former the 'true-team response' is modal, but in the latter it is the 'pseudo-team response', indicating that in this, albeit limited area, the Skilled believe their influence is real, but the Labourers believe their views to count for very little.

Two departments revealed a degree of deviance from the Staff and Management score, as Quality Control and Production Control accounted for 7 of the 14 Staff and Management who selected the 'pseudo-team response', despite both departments being less than 20% of the Staff and Management samples. Both departments had 33% of respondents selecting this response - the Skilled Hourly-Paid had only 21% - and

the next Staff department was Sales who had 16%. In one department the cause of this may have been the personality of the Manager, who was known throughout the Firm for his dominating manner. In the other case the cause may have been lack of leadership as at this time the department had no Manager.

In this respect, therefore, we see in a more pronounced way the diminution of satisfaction as we descend the hierarchy, since most satisfaction is found at the peak of the hierarchy - amongst the Management - and this declines as we descend the hierarchy, being lowest among the Labourers, though as we saw Production and Quality Control, both were exceptions to this. At the same time, however, even on this item, on the whole there was satisfaction with supervision in this respect, with the exception of the union officials, and in particular the Union Reps.

Hence, it appears that supervision, with the exceptions we have looked at does satisfy the expectations of their subordinates. This, however, does not show this conclusively, as these questions, for their validity, require implicit acceptance of the authority structure of the supervisory relationship ie that the respondent's satisfaction could not be increased by extending the control the individual has over his own work - and conversely reducing the control of the supervisor. The extent of satisfaction with existing control, and the desire for change in this respect, is the subject of the next section.

(8) Control of Work

This section to some extent goes over the ground covered in the previous Chapter, but on a much more restricted basis. In this section we are only dealing with the preceived control which the respondent has over the job he himself does, ie his own work.

This section followed the same pattern as those which have gone before. We began by asking respondents to gauge their satisfaction in relaation to that of other categories.

TableA6.43 - How satisfied are you with your control of your work environment compared to (other) Shop-Floor?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly- Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	11 (34%)	15 (21%)	1 (14%)	4 (8%)	0
Satisfied	17 (53%)	45 (63%)	4 (57%)	37 (77%)	13 (77%)
Dissatisfied	3 (9%)	9 (13%)	2 (29%)	6 (13%)	4 (24%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	0	1 (2%)	0

TableA6.44 - How satisfied are you with your control of your work environment compared to (other) Staff?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly- Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	9 (28%)	11 (16%)	1 (14%)	1 (2%)	0
Satisfied	19 (59%)	50 (70%)	5 (71%)	35 (73%)	11 (65%)
Dissatisfied	3 (9%)	9 (13%)	1 (14%)	12 (25%)	5 (29%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	0	0	0	1 (6%)

TableA6.45 - How satisfied are you with your control of your work environment compared to (other) Management?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly- Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very Satisfied	6 (19%)	7 (10%)	1 (14%)	2 (4%)	0
Satisfied	20 (63%)	50 (70%)	3 (43%)	36 (75%)	12 (71%)
Dissatisfied	5 (16%)	9 (13%)	3 (43%)	10 (21%)	3 (18%)
Very Dissatisfied	0	2 (3%)	0	0	2 (12%)

(a) MANAGEMENT. In this category, on the basis distribution, they are most satisfied comparing themselves to the Hourly-Paid - only just more than when compared to Staff. They are least satisfied when making the comparison to other Managers, but as we can see from the table the difference between tableA6.45 and tablesA6.43 andA6.44 is not extreme, and the category is, in general 'Satisfied'/'Very Satisfied' (87%, 87% and 82%).

(b) STAFF. This category are most satisfied compared to other Staff, and least satisfied compared to Management, but in the former comparison

86% say they are 'Satisfied'/'Very Satisfied', and in the latter, 86%. Hence the difference between the two is not very great at all, and over all the comparisons the relative stability is the most striking feature. Among the Union Reps. there is rather less satisfaction shown - most obviously compared to Management. This, however, is not inconsistent with what has gone before, as this sub- category has been most critical of the Firm.

(c) HOURLY-PAID. This category is least satisfied in relation to Staff, and most satisfied in relation to other Hourly-Paid. The difference in the number who say they are either 'Satisfied'/'Very Satisfied' between the former and the latter is 75% to 85%, so that once again we can see that satisfaction is similarly distributed in each comparison. Of the main categories, however, it is again, this one which has the greatest number who are 'Dissatisfied'/'Very Dissatisfied', which has been typical on every item in this Chapter. At the same time, as we have seen the majority of the category are satisfied with the Firm in this respect. This is not really surprising as it was an important reason for selecting the Firm. Nor is there a difference between Skilled Hourly-Paid and Labourers.

Among the Shop Stewards, there is a greater level of dissatisfaction - 24% in relation to other Hourly-Paid, 35% in relation to Staff, 30% in relation to Management, say they are 'Dissatisfied'/'Very Dissatisfied'. This, again (1) is not a typical as Shop Stewards do tend to be more critical of the Firm than their members, but (2) the majority of Shop Stewards still describe themselves as

'satisfied'.

Respondents were also asked how the control they had of their work would have to be improved to make their job ideal?

Table A6.46 - How much would your control of your work environmnet have to be improved to make your job ideal?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
Very much Improved	1 (3%)	3 (4%)	1 (14%)	5 (10%)	3 (18%)
Improved a Bit	11 (34%)	34 (48%)	2 (29%)	13 (27%)	7 (41%)
About Right Now	20 (63%)	34 (48%)	4 (57%)	30(63%)	7 (41%)

Clearly in all categories, therefore, greater control over work is sought in all categories. Fox, on the other hand, in 'Beyond Contract' suggests that Management and Staff roles are high discretion - but the implication of this table is that it is those with the most discretion already in their work role who seek more. We find this to be true on the Shop-Floor as well, as the following table shows.

TableA6.47 - How much would your control of your work environment have to be improved to make your job ideal?

	<u>Labourers</u>	<u>Skilled</u>
Very Much Improved	2 (9%)	6 (14%)
Improved a Bit	4 (17%)	16 (38%)
About Right Now	17 (74%)	20 (48%)

Hence it is those with the relatively high discretion roles who seek more control of their work, since the Staff in particular seek more control of their work - relatively more than do Management, and much more than Hourly-Paid as a whole. In the Hourly-Paid category, however, we find that it is the Skilled worker, who has more discretion than the Labourers, who seek more control of their work - a proportion twice as large as that of the Labourers seeking more control of their work. It seems to be the case, from this data, that those who have not experienced control of their own work situation do not value such control - and conversely those who have this experience do place value on it. This confirms the finding earlier that Skilled Hourly-Paid put 'Job Variety and Interest' higher in their ordering of items than Labourers did.

The final questions in this Chapter were concerned with task choice as a component of controlling one's work, ie that the ability to choose which task will do is an exercise of power over one's work environment. TableA6.48 which shows how much say respondents felt they had in task choice, and how much they would ideally have, shows how perceived powerlessness in this respect increases as we descend the hierarchy - only 6% of Management say they have no say, 23% of Staff, and 44% of Hourly-Paid. Furthermore if we compare the 2 parts of each group's

replies we see that the demand to have more say is much more powerful outwith the Management category - particularly among the Hourly-Paid and the Shop Stewards.

There are, two particular points which we can make about this table (1) of the major categories - Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid - the modal category in 'How much influence (on choosing the task you are involved in) would you ideally have' the modal category, for Management, is 'Great Deal', but for Staff and Hourly-Paid it is 'Some', ie the next point down on the response scale. This, as we have seen is quite consistent with the data in the preceding Chapters.

(2) despite the fact that there is clearly greater say required in selecting one's task ("the gaffer just gives you the job, and you get on with it") the supervisory role is, as we have seen, apparently quite acceptable.

Table 46.48 -

Table 6.48 -

How much say do you have in choosing the task you are involved in?
How much would you ideally have?

	<u>Management</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Union Reps.</u>	<u>Hourly Paid</u>	<u>Shop Stewards</u>
None	<u>2 (6%)</u> 1 (3%)	<u>16 (23%)</u> 2 (3%)	<u>0</u> 0	<u>21 (44%)</u> 5 (10%)	<u>10 (59%)</u> 2 (12%)
Very Little	<u>2 (6%)</u> 0	<u>19 (27%)</u> 3 (4%)	<u>3 (43%)</u> 0	<u>12 (25%)</u> 2 (4%)	<u>4 (24%)</u> 0
Some	<u>10 (31%)</u> 10 (31%)	<u>24 (34%)</u> 41 (58%)	<u>1 (14%)</u> 3 (43%)	<u>9 (19%)</u> 26 (54%)	<u>2 (12%)</u> 8 (47%)
Great Deal	<u>18 (56%)</u> 20 (63%)	<u>12 (17%)</u> 25 (35%)	<u>3 (43%)</u> 4 (57%)	<u>6 (13%)</u> 15 (31%)	<u>1 (6%)</u> 7 (41%)

CONCLUSIONS

This Chapter has led to 3 important categories of finding, which we shall briefly draw to the attention of the reader.

First of all it should be observed that for different categories of employee, different aspects of work had different levels of importance. For instance for Management & Staff, Promotion was more important than it was for Hourly-Paid workers. On the other hand trade unionism was more important for Hourly-Paid workers than for Management or Staff. We suggested that variations of this type represented different perceptions of their power by different groups. Thus, for many Hourly-Paid workers, Promotion was not perceived as a viable prospect so it was not emphasised. On the other hand being a trade union member was not perceived as being necessary by Managers for their position in the Company, so it was not emphasised. The relatively low ranking given by Staff reflects their rather ambivalent attitude on trade unions which we discussed above, in that while being a majority trade union group their orientation was still strongly internal to the Company, and more individualist than was true of Hourly-Paid workers.

At the same time, it is important not to over-state the difference between groups, since as we showed at the beginning of this Chapter the standard deviations within groups are so large that the group responses overlap, ie that among Hourly-Paid, for instance, there are individuals whose orderings are more typical of Management, and vice versa. It is, therefore, important to observe that groups are not homogeneous.

If we consider Promotion as an example then we can see the importance of this. If all Hourly-Paid did not perceive Promotion as important to them, then there may be insufficient 'volunteers' for promotion into roles like Foremen.

Similarly, while we have emphasised the differences between groups it is important to remember that there were similarities, eg for all groups Wages/Salaries, Job Security and Job Variety were important aspects of work, though the precise order did vary.

Secondly it is significant that on every aspect except Wages/Salary, satisfaction varied hierarchically, ie Management were most satisfied, then Staff, then Hourly-Paid. Only on the one issue of Wages/Salary were Hourly-Paid more satisfied relative to other groups. It does, however, have to be remembered that the research was carried out during a period of incomes policy, which appeared to create greater frustration on the part of Staff, and Management in particular. On every other aspect of work there was a systematic difference in satisfaction which reflected the hierarchical structure of the organisation.

Thirdly it is important to observe the sources of the information used by respondents to make their judgements. Two sources appeared to dominate--

(i) their past experience - it appears that the level of satisfaction in the past is a sort of base-line for respondents, ie if conditions became worse than before they would express dis-satisfaction - or conversely if conditions improve over time they are satisfied.

(ii) information from similar others, ie information from those whom they perceive to be sufficiently like them for a comparison to be drawn. Thus, for instance, an electrician may compare his wages etc., to a friend who works as an electrician in another firm. If his wages are at least as good as these of his friend, then he is likely to express satisfaction.

An important common feature of both of these sources of information is that both are of hierarchical origin - his past experience are of hierarchies, and are also likely to work in hierarchies. It is unlikely, therefore, that either source would lead to a challenge to hierarchy. On the other hand it is also apparent that there is an expectation of improvements in the future. This was particularly clear on working conditions which it was quite conciously anticipated would be improved in the future. Failure to satisfy these expectations in the future could pose a greater difficulty in the future than current information.

The final issue we wish to consider here, is whether all this could support a challenge to the hierarchical organisation of the Company. We discussed in the last Chapter, Habermas's ideas on the development of crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism. We saw there that "conflict concerning action orientated to institutionalised norms arises only when the consensus governing the distribution of opportunities for satisfying needs breaks down" (D Held - Introduction to Critical Theory pg 346). It is apparent from the data we have presented in this Chapter that there is not a significant level of such

conflict. It would appear from our data that our respondents are, on the whole fairly satisfied with their jobs. Indeed, as we have mentioned already, the Firm saw itself as a 'good-paying' employer. On this basis, therefore, no challenge to hierarchy appears imminent.

On the other hand, Habermas suggests that at such a time (ie when the consensus about the distribution of opportunities breaks down) that strategic action is likely to be initiated. We have seen, it should be re-called, an extension of union-membership among Staff in this Company. The nature of the relationship between Company and employee has therefore increasingly moved on to a collective, and bargaining basis. Thus, it could be argued, there is an element of strategic action proceeding to develop between the Company and its employees, which reflects a decline in consensus, and correspondingly a move toward crisis.

In the same section of 'Legitimation Crisis'(pp 113 - 114) Habermas points to a third requirement for the development of such a crisis - an appropriate consciousness within which these events are interpreted. It is apparent from what we have said in this and the preceding Chapters that the consciousness of the Company's employees is not appropriate for a challenge to the existing system of hierarchy. Why is this so?

We would suggest several reasons for this. One reason concerns the word 'consensus' itself. Very often consensus is discussed as an 'either/or' concept, ie there is consensus or there is conflict. As we discussed in the previous Chapter this is not necessary in our view, ie there is a gap between perfect consensus and conflict. We would

suggest that while there may not be perfect or absolute consensus on the distribution of opportunities, the imperfections are not so great that conflict has developed to a level where system crises is immanent.

Indeed the degree of consensus is probably such (ie the level of satisfaction with their jobs is such) that the system is if anything supported by the distribution of opportunities.

Other reasons for the failure to challenge hierarchy were discussed in the previous Chapter. One other reason was, however, suggested in the theoretical model presented in Chapter 1 - the role of the media (ie that TV etc, so manipulate their consciousness that any challenge to hierarchy is ruled out). It is to this question that we turn in

Appendix 7.

Excerpt A6.43

- S. "What about promotion within the Company? Does the Company have a policy on promotion? Other than, you know, you advertise internally in the first instance and externally afterwards.
- R. Well apparently there is a policy that we use internal talent whenever we can.
- S. Hm.
- R. That's paramount.
- S. Yea.
- R. Am. We try to identify talent, we try to identify um probable um eh (what's the word I'm looking for) probable end points you know end jobs, appropriate situation.
- S. Hm.
- R. But I think we can do a great deal more about this. I think we could structure careers rather more um of the facts.
- S. Hm.
- R. I think as one gets higher up the organisation then of course you've got a much more definitive pattern of, likely pattern, for promotion, career developments, this sort of thing but I think we've got to extend it down the way a bit.
- S. Hm.
- R. Got to formalise.
- S. What sort of criteria do you use in promoting people?
- R. Well I probably think the first one is that he's got to be outstanding in his current job. I think that's the first thing that draws attention to him.
- S. Hm.
- R. That in itself then leads and one looks at his qualifications, his background, his general experience um that's probably number two.

Then number three is his character, his personality.

S. Hm.

R. How he fits into proposed organisations. These three are the three major sort of factors.

S. How much is that see to the sort of decision?

R. At the end of the day it is 90% qualities of judgment. See to the if you like

S. Hm.

R. But I think that's de-rating it a wee bit.

S. Hm.

R. There's a good deal of consideration and thought goes into this.

S. Hm.

R. Because everyone's acutely aware now of how vital it is that you place the right people in the right jobs. It's so inflexible an arrangement that you can't undo it.

S. How about the sort of social aspects to promotion?

R. Do you mean are there any social bars to promotion?

S. If you like.

R. I think.

S. Or social advantages?

R. I think, for example, in certain areas the social acts of a person are important. For example you take the sales marketing side. If you get a guy who eats all his food with a spoon, for example, he's scarcely an appropriate candidate for mixing with top level people you're trying to sell them a multi-million pound order. That sort of thing.

S. Hm.

R. That's the extreme example.

S. Hm.

R. But if you take something like engineering and so on, if the bloke's a very talented engineer and can do his work, it's difficult to see anything else being an impediment to this.

S. Well if we took the case of promotion to the Board - there's a feeling that you don't get on the Board unless you've got a degree.

R. Well I think ah this in fact - you've got to relate it to age. I think in this day and age um there is nothing preventing a youngster taking a degree.

S. Hm.

R. Ten or fifteen years ago, it was a different matter altogether. Family pressures and economic pressures could prevent this. I think in this day and age a youngster coming up should have a degree if he's got the potential and the capability. There's nothing in my view that prevents him from doing so. If in fact he hasn't done so.

S. Hm.

R. Then it generates in my mind a question mark.

S. What do you mean by young - less than 30?

R. Yea.

S. What about Senior M - fairly Senior Managers of say about 40/45 age group?

R. I don't think a degree is an automatic disbarment. I mean if you get the guy who is extremely good at his job and doing a crashing good job.

S. Hm.

R. Um He obviously would be considered for the Board or any other appointment. It's not a total debar. It is a general proposition so I think that unless you have just reason for not having taken a degree, you should have it.

S. Aye.

R. Our particular Board certainly they're all Board people, they're all professional qualified - or professional qualification. I really think that's how it should be.

S. Hm.

R. Hm. And as I say, I think the younger people coming up I don't think this is an unfair screening requirement, if you like."

Excerpt#6.44

"The professional managers differs from the older type of manager because the older type of manager is there because of his father. The professional manager is there because of his ability" - Senior Manager.

Excerpt 6.45

S. "What about promotion in your job?"

R. In my job .. Nil. Anybody who does the job all right they stay in it.

S. Hm.

R. But what chance have you got. We feel of promotion. If you do the job wrong, you're promoted out of the job.

S. Hm.

R. Hm. It seems to be the policy here.

S. Ah.

R. I've applied for a few other jobs in this Company.

S. Hm.

R. For various reasons we got none of them.

S. What sort of reasons do they give?

R. Well, I was asked by the Installation to go on to their group, who are generally on commission.

S. Yea.

R. I was turned down because "medically unfit".

S. Hm.

R.

S. Hm.

R. The Manager across there has two men in a worse condition than me working for him on site as workmen. I've had a lot of experience nearly thirty years now.

S. But ah.

R. I mean in the department where I am at the moment no one leaves unless they got out of the Company.

S. Right. They don't want to lose you so to speak, unless they absolutely have to - take your cards and go?

R. Hm.

S. Ah.

R. The chance of promotion, as I say, are practically nil.

S. I mean there are guys who are promoted within the Company if you take

R. That's one of the bad parts of it."

- S. "How important are your prospects of getting promoted?
- R. I've got no interest in that whatsoever. I'm too old.
- S. How does it seem to you that they promote people here?
- R. Well, it's a bit like when they have to elect a new Pope ... you know the bloke that's going to get the job just sort of appears. We don't know how or why it should be him, and not somebody else. In any case the only real promotion that takes in this company is in shifting job titles and bodies and shuffling them round in the sales and marketing division.
- S. What about making (A) a director?
- R. They were bound to have been there anyhow - these directors have been created to give them other jobs. The real directors of the Company are still (M), (T), (C), (S) and (D), mustn't forget dear old (D). One gets the opinion they still regard the others as sub-directors."

Excerpt A6.47

- S. "What about promotion? What's your prime
- R. Again um at my own level there is no guarantee. I cannot say, I cannot expect other people to say that if you do a fair job for 18 months say you will be considered for something else. It doesn't really work that way.
- S. Hm.
- R. Em. Again I must relate future promotion prospects to success or otherwise in the Company. If the Company continue to expand, then there is a reasonable chance that my department will expand
- S. Hm.
- R. In which case I would like to think about
- S. Hm.
- R. Promotion. In view of the fact
- S. What sort of criteria would you use in terms of promotion.
- R. Um. Possibly I think um by the sort of job I do in relation to the work and the to handle.
- S. You mean how well you do the job?
- R. How well I do it and how em how much of it there is to do.
- S. Hm.
- R. Em I wouldn't - if I were only having one or two purchase requisitions every day I would obviously perhaps spend more time, perhaps even do a better job in progressing those requisitions
- S. Hm.
- R. So, you know, my performance must be measured against my requirement - what I'm asked to do per day or per week so

obviously my performance depends on

S. Do you have any sort of idea how well you've done in

R. Yea. Yea my performance is in the Company number one, number two and possibly my - my length of service with the Company, perhaps in some small way, perhaps my qualifications might again have some small bearing."

Excerpt 6.48

- S. "What about the promotion? What satisfaction is there to that on the shop floor, you know, the prospects of promotion?
- R. Oh there doesn't seem to be any prospects.
- S. Is that something that bothers people or do they just accept it?
- R. Just accept it. Granted the Mana, the Foreman that's in just now, he was taken from the shop floor so you can't really tell. He would maybe need to take up a new post or retire and he's got a long way to go.
- S.
- R. Uhu you've got to apply for the Management jobs and it's up to your qualifications whether you got it.
- S. Right. Do you think there's enough openings in the Company for promotion? Do you see it?
- R. Well, as far as people in my trade are concerned, there's no really much chance of promotion unless they're promoted to the building shop.
- S. A staff job.
- R. There's no really many staff situations in here
- S. Uhu.
- R. Other than up in the drawing office.
- S. Aye.
- R. Because mostly people in my trade are experienced at either reading engineering drawings or, being at day release when they were apprentices, doing engineering drawings.
- S. Aye. Um.
- R. But you'll find out that there are more engineers because eh it's part of their job.
- S. So there aren't enough opportunities for promotion. Is that a source of concern to people or do they just accept it?

R. They just accept it."

Excerpt#6.49

- R. "Senior Managers may join unions at some point in the future. Indeed I've had my chaps in here and told them privately that they ought to join. That it's the coming thing, because it is the best way to protect our position in the future. In any case Managers are natural leaders, the trade unions are losing their best leaders because Managers aren't in unions.
- S. Do you not think there would be a conflict of loyalty if Management were to get involved?
- R. There's no conflict in Germany, though we would need to have some practice in Britain, they've been doing it longer than us."

Excerpt A6.50

- S. "What do you think is the place of the Trade Unions in the Company?
- R. To represent the interests of their numbers.
- S. Do you think there's ever a conflict between that and the interests of the Company?
- R. No, there is no conflict with the Company. Because their interests are always those of the Company.
- S. What about a redundancy? Are the interests of the Company and those of the union members the same then?
- R. Even in a redundancy the interests are the same, because without the redundancy, without shedding labour the Company would close and everybody would lose their jobs, and those who leave first get first redundancy payments."

Excerpt A6.51

S. "What sort of place is there for unions in your department?

I mean it's not a traditional union area.

R. Well, be careful there, because I came up through the drawing offices and I ran an engineering department and by the way I came up through the drawing offices and I was a member of TASS. I only gave up TASS when I got into Management, so I've always been used to unions, and from where I sit I would rather deal with union members than non-union people.

S. Why do you say that?

R. Well niggers in the wood-pile, you know. I think the way things are going, industry in general would be better dealing with unions.

S. Why are you happier to deal with unions?

R. Well you either get the good union people, or the idiot union people heading them right OK. Well good union people you can gauge them, you know how to take them. You know they are either coming for the good of their members, or for the good of us all - me and their members. The idiots you can show up, given time. You know who they are, and you know how to get them."

Excerpt A6.52

- S. "What sort of place do you see the Trade Unions having in the Company? What sort of role do you see them playing?
- R. Oh an absolutely vital role representing the workforce.
- S. Hm.
- R. No doubts about it whatsoever ahm
- S. Do you think that's a legitimate role?
- R. I think it's absolutely necessary and quite legitimate, yes.
- S. Hm. Do you think they play it as much as poss - as much as they should do? Do you think it's as fully developed as it ought to be or should it
- R. Trade Unions?
- S. Yes.
- R. No I don't think so. I think this is one of the fundamental problems. I think eh, particularly this last year or two, a lot of the legislation ahm has dragged most companies into
- S. You mean
- R. What?
- S.
- R. All these sort of things I think has made fairly effective progress there. I think a lot of companies have been dragged, some of them struggling and screaming.
- S. Hm.
- R. Into the last quarter of the twentieth century and I think that's a good thing because if you look at most of the legislation it makes it a bit more difficult, some of it is overdone, but by and large, by and large it's merely bringing the worst of the sort of cowboys up to the sort of best company sort of practice.

- S. Hm
- R. And I'm for it. What worries me very much is that I don't see any corresponding matching movement in the Trade Unions but it's got to come internally, I don't think it can be externally applied. I think they've got far too much fragmentation. I think there's far too much living in the past. I think they've still got 19th century ideas in some measure in the whole operation. I think they've got certain fundamental internal problems with robber barons, if you will.
- S. Hm.
- R. They've got vested interests in their own organisation structure and authority.
- S. Hm.
- R. Um. This can only be resolved internally. I'm sure of that. I see no movement here and it worries me.
- S. You mean that the
- R. No it's not even as simple as that. It's so fragmented it's not appropriate I think for the - say the tail end of the 20th century.
- S. Hm.
- R. It's got to be infinitely more effective, infinitely more streamlined I'm not suggesting for one minute that the fundamental role changes, it shouldn't.
- S. Hm.
- R. That's not the point but the point is the way they go about it. The way they are organised. The way they're set up um it's a most unholy industrial mess if you like. The whole structure.
- S. What do you mean by the way they're organised? Do you mean the fact that there is a proliferation of Unions that you

R. Yes.

S. Can't see ten or eleven Unions being organised?

R. Yes, and I think these very fragments often poses a lot of difficulty in industry. One problem causes a lot of needless strife for a needless problem."

Excerpt A6.53

S. "Why do you feel you don't need to be in a union?

R. I don't feel I need the security of a union behind me. I've got reasonable qualifications and I can use that too if things come to it here where I'm out of a job, I feel reasonably secure."

Excerpt A6.54

- S. "Why do you feel you don't need to be in a union?
- R. I tend to be an individual, and if I have to fight for anything I fight it myself.
- S. Have you ever felt it might be to your advantage to join a union?
- R. Well, I have never had to be in the position of having to join a union. Although that's not to say I haven't been asked.
- S. Did you resist when you were asked?
- R. Resisting is really too strong a word - there has never been any arm-twisting.
- S. What if there was?
- R. Then I would resist it. But it all depends on what kind of union I've nothing wrong to find with them, providing they're clean cut moderate.
- S. Have you ever felt you've lost out by not being in a union? You know in the way of pay rises and that?
- R. I've been fortunate in that as an individual, I've always received rises rather than having to ask for them. In the drawing office days, I did have to ask, and it was a question of looking up my time-keeping, what was my behaviour like, and all this carry on I've never had to battle for an increase. No, I wouldn't say there's been any disadvantage. The most important thing to me is that I'm an individual, actually. The thing about being in a union in an office is that there must be levelling, and that may warp my mind in as far as there is collective bargaining. And I've always been a section leader or a Manager."

Excerpt A6.55

- S. "Do you think it's fair Management should control the pace at which people work?
- R. They'll be hanged for worse, because once there's a closed shop the unions can dictate what sort of person you're going to get in here. You won't get a person of independent mind who'll say 'No, I don't want to join' - he's got to become a sheep and join in. You get the wrong type straight away. Then Management carry on and say "Well you can't employ him, because he won't join TASS. It doesn't matter whether it's joining TASS or joining MATSA.
- S. Is this anything to do with trying to halt any trend toward independence by the Shop-Floor?
- R. No, the Shop-Floor have their independence already. Where I can see the changes coming are in the dictatorial attitudes against the Staff. The Staff will lose its independence and become dependent on the union and union policy. It's a bad thing that if you run a closed shop. If I'm looking with somebody who can be trained to do his job, my job and my bosses' job, I'm looking for somebody of a certain quality. I don't want somebody coming down and saying he's got to join such-and-such a union. You might not want to join a union - but he has to join, and if he does join then he's reduced to the mentality of a sheep.
- S. Is it the political persuasion of the unions that turns you against them?
- R. I don't care if TASS is right or left wing. A union has to do a job for its people. What I'm saying is that once you say to someone, you've got to join a union, or you don't get a job in

this factory, once you say that you're reducing him to he's got to join, a norm I don't want everybody to conform and you've forced him to conform to that rule. Nobody can show his independence, except within the union.

S. Well a lot of people are in unions? Are they all sheep?

R. Yes .. OK when the Duke of Edinburgh and the First Sea Lord join ASTMS, I'll go along with that argument. Are you going to suggest that Lovell of Jodrell Bank should join a union? If you say nobody can join the AUEW without having done a craft apprenticeship - that you're protecting your craft - I'll go along with that, but if you say anybody can join the AUEW then you've sacrificed the craft part. If you've got a CA you've got somebody who belongs to a professional body. They won't let anybody in. Let's talk about TASS - technical and supervisory. They go out recruiting, and they've got all the draughtsmen in. Are they really technical ... are they supervisory? No way.

S. Well TASS was the draughtsman's union.

R. So they recruited typists is she technical? - never - doubt it. Is she supervisory? - certainly not. ASTMS - Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff - there's not a Manager (in here) who's in that. Does away with one letter Foreman yes, but not one Manager. If they say right we're only going to have Managers in ASTMS, they would join ASTMS. They're not going to join with anybody who really ought to be in the GMWU - the floor-sweepers union.

S. Is the union not a means to equalise the power relationships to the employer?

- R. Yes I would go along with that. But the thing about this closed shop is that it brings in 2 nullifying things - once you've got to join, what was once an individual choice has been made a condition, and that is something I don't like. If a man joins and somebody has persuaded him to join TASS, let him join TASS, but don't let him join if someone has said persuade him by saying if you don't join TASS then we won't work with you. They ought to be able to persuade people.
- S. You'd be in favour of them having a choice?
- R. You must have and if you're employing somebody, then you want that somebody to have a choice."

Excerpt 46.56

- S. "What distinction do you see between being a member of a Senior Staff Association and being in a Union?
- R. Well I feel that the Senior Staff Association had some of, most of the advantages, I felt it was able to talk to Management um to discuss things in a reasonable manner without having to to have Union backing um official Union backing, I felt that we got on well enough with the Senior Staff Association.
- S. Is it the external interference of the Union that you object to, say for instance if you were a member of the Senior Staff section of ASTMS that you would feel dictated to by Clive by Clive Jenkins?
- R. To some extent, yes, I feel that there's always a chance of some sort of external pressure which I don't think I would welcome. Plus also em (what was I going to say)
- S. How do you mean external pressure? Do you mean external to the Firm or do you mean external to the senior staff of the Firm? Because there are a lot of people in say ASTMS like Foremen or junior staff. Is it becoming involved in their disputes with the Management that um puts you off?
- R. Yes I would, I would say, I would say both actually. I also feel that em to be in a Union to negotiate as one body would tend to lose some flexibility um. I feel that this isn't necessarily the fault of the Unions but I feel that present Company, eh present Government policy means that wage levels are negotiated between the Government and Union.
- S. Hm.
- R. And there is absolutely no room under the present system for

flexibility um for example for merit increases.

S. Hm. That - for the individual?

R. For the individual. Obviously if I consider I've done a better job than others there's no way this can be reflected by increased emolument. In fact I think the same would extend to buyers. And then again I think there are people in the Company in Senior Staff positions um in other divisions of the Company who do much less than my Department.

S. Who do you think in terms of volume of work in terms of contribution to the Company?

R. Well, generally?

S. Generally.

R. Well generally in terms of contribution to the Company and I feel that there's very little - once we all become part of the Union, Senior Staff whatever but you know there is no way we can say look we know that other people in other parts of the Company are being paid more for doing what we can gather is roughly the same sort of supervising job um we can't say to them we think perhaps our job should be regarded if you like.

S. Um.

R. I think that once we're all in one Union we'd tend to lose some flexibility.

S. Do you think

R. Um. Going back I'm not explaining myself very well, two reasons. That basically is the first reason - lack of flexibility, and the second reason is that I think we had adequate machinery beforehand through the Senior Staff Association.

- S. You had this flexibility before?
- R. Yes. Well we had more flexibility and it seemed to work to me without too many problems then and I didn't see the necessity to disband.
- S. How would you feel if the Company operated a
- R. Closed shop? Closed shop for staff? I think it would be a very, very bad thing. I think it would be a very, very, sad reflection, the way things are going generally if this in fact happened.
- S. For the reasons that you have given?
- R. For the reasons I've given also perhaps em I think, you know, to continue the conversation on a higher I think to ban someone because he doesn't want to belong to a Union would be the same thing as banning someone through a religious belief or something like that. I think you get involved in a very, very discrimination here. Of course I really think that once you become as inflexible as that then this is where you find yourself in trouble.
- S. Hm.
- R. Of course um there's also self determination which you would lose. I think.
- S. People who are in a Union might say that people out the, the Unions exists to carry on the collective struggle, if you like.
- R. Hm.
- S. Of the employee vis a vis Management and that people who aren't members of a Union um are opting out of the struggle but still reap the benefits of it. At the end of the day they still get the wage rise whether they are members of a Union or not.

- R. Yes. OK but again it's freedom of choice. I don't object to people being in Unions ahm and so I don't think people should object to my not being in a Union. As regards salary, I can only say that the Company pays me for doing a job of work which is going to get done whether or not I am in a Union, therefore the Company would find it very, very difficult to discriminate on that basis.
- S. Yea but I think that
- R. I think not to my belief in Union or otherwise.
- S. Right my argument is that um non-Union members get the benefits of Union activities without bearing the cost. Direct costs by paying Union subscriptions, the less frequent costs some sort of industrial action, in order to get the benefits without bearing the cost.
- R. I don't think this is the benefit of being or not being in a Union. I think this is for the benefit of um increased productivity or certain vital profit which enables the Company to grant a wage increase. There are - I know they don't I don't equate the work that's being part of a Union.
- S. Hm.
- R. Also perhaps ah another point is that we do have still, a Senior Staff Association if you like, consisting of a body of what they call non-aligned members and the non-aligned members can approach Personnel Department and iron out any problems.
- S. Hm.
- R. As I have personally done on one or two occasions.
- S. Hm.
- R. So that er I really don't think that they have negotiated if you like anything that I might have negotiated myself.

- S. Hm.
- R. Can I say this one other point? Am. Again I think that rises at the moment, OK my last increase was 10%, um which was in line with um Government guide lines and I think it was something that would probably been offered irrespective of Union membership.
- S. Hm. Do you think that you would have got what you have got whether you were a member of a Union or not?
- R. Yes I do. Although, I must be fair, I think perhaps a productivity agreement was
- S. Hm.
- R. Perhaps negotiated between Union and Management.
- S. Hm.
- R. Which may or may not have arisen in its present form.
- S. Ahm. Do you think that the conditions in the Company would be as they are today without the activity of the Trade Unions? Or do you think they would be less good - or better?
- R. I think the salary levels
- S. Hm.
- R. Particularly of the engineering workers.
- S. You mean shop floor workers?
- R. Shop floor people, boiler makers, fitters etc. These are negotiated at national levels and I think these national levels have been reached by Trade Union involvement, and I think rightly so.
- S. Hm.
- R. And I think, in my position, my salary level is perhaps more determined by qualifications, experience and scarcity value, you could put it that way.

- S. So you would think that whether the Union has probably benefitted the shop floor, the staff
- R. To a much lesser extent.
- S. They would accomplish more or less what they have accomplished in the Unions?
- R. Yes, I think so.
- S. Um.
- R.
- S.
- R. No I understand and frankly it's a subject that I don't feel too strongly about. If, at the end of the day, someone came along and said to me "You have to be in the Union otherwise you can't work for the Firm" well there is no way that my wife and family would suffer because of some sort of
- S. Hm.
- R. and I would join the Union.
- S. You're not going to martyr yourself?
- R. I'm not going to martyr myself for something I don't believe in. I would join the Union but, at the same time, I would like to think there would always exist some freedom of choice.
- S. Hm.
- R. Which I could exercise.
- S. Hm.
- R. Also I - if the Company offered me terms which were less than equivalent to non-Union members or if I thought I was being particularly hard done to then I would think again, but at the moment this hasn't happened, and I've no reason to."

Excerpt A6.57

S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a Trade Union?

R. I think that as an individual you've got to organise yourself against organised Management."

Excerpt 6.58

- S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a union?
- R. Well, the clerical side of industry has always been unprotected. If you were on the Shop-Floor and you had a trade, then you knew how much the man beside you makes. But that's impossible for Staff - even if you're in the TASS union. But at least it safeguards you a bit. I mean I've worked in offices where there's been no union, and I can see the difference here. I've worked in offices where the boss would come up and say 'you're getting 5/- but don't tell anybody'.
- S. How important is the union to you?
- R. Well, I'm 57 now, but I always felt that if you're in a union, you're going to get a certain amount of justice. A union is about the most important thing you can get. If you're a member, you're a member and that's about it.
- S. Do you feel the Management ignore you?
- R. If it's just a collection of individuals you're just not going to bother so much about them, it's only the fact you've got so many, and the fact that recently our members have swelled. We must be in the region of 85% union membership.

Excerpt A6.59

- S. "Why do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
- R. Because too much between people. Some people are very forward in getting rises
- S. Hm.
- R. Like
- S. Hm.
- R. People don't understand work. The operators want one collective bargain to knock back the works as well as the individuals.
- S. Should there be differentiation between
- R. Large differentiation
- S. the same thing. Is that the principal reason for coming into the Union?
- R. Well it also covers you in the various backings.
- S. Uhu.
- R. I mean to ask for references. Right methods and wrong methods to do.
- S. Hm. How important is the Union to you?
- R. Well at the moment they've got everything we have been trying to get.
- S. Hm.
- R. We have to go to a Union level to negotiate.
- S. Right.
- R. Some of the things the Management have argued will have to go to higher levels.
- S. Right. Right you've got to use the Union to resist the Management?

- R. Yea.
- S. Um. How does the how does the Union operate for you?
What does it do for you?
- R. The last thing we had to grumble at was working Easter Monday.
- S. Hm.
- R. The works turned round and said they would pay us time and a half and a day off. Agreement between TUC and CBI is double time and a day off.
- S. Hm.
- R. Well Christmas Day in England, New Year's Day in Scotland and Easter Monday. The awkward part here is that the works have decided not to take Easter Monday as a bank holiday. They're going to take it later in the month.
- S. Hm.
- R. Which makes the staff out on a limb.
- S. Right. So what did the Union do? How did the Union, as a body, help you?
- R. It started about three years ago. We've had arguments every year but this time and a half from the Management, we could not argue direct with them with nothing for backing so we went to the Branch level, found out a copy of the document, to present to the Management. The Chairman of this Company and also the Chairman of the CBI.
- S. Hm.
- R. So, if they had agreed on one thing and weren't applying it in their own works.
- S. Hm.

R. It would I think have been detrimental to the CBI side.

S. Right. So the Union gave you the information?

R. They gave us the information and the backing.

S. Hm.

R. Because the TUC side of it made the agreement. Not just one Union.

S. Right.

R. So, if they weren't going to pay the proper rates, it wouldn't just be one Union it would be all Unions affected.

S. Hm. So the Management knew that you had outside backing?

R. Oh yes. And inside. All the Unions inside would back as well.

S. Hm. What about do they get time and half or double time?

R. They were told the same - time and a half.

S. And how were they paid?

R. They were paid double time.

S. Paid double time. Ah

R. Just by that push.

S. From your Union or from their Union as well?

R. Yes, we instigated it

S. Hm.

R. But we've got the joint Staff Union who have meetings now and again.

S. Right.

R. To eh go through the normal procedures.

S. Hm.

R. As soon as we threaten them with the CBI instructions.

S. Hm.

- R. They just turn round and say right then it's double time.
- S. Hm. What sort of relationship does your Union have as regards traditional Union what sort of relationship do you have with each other?
- R.
- S. Well what
- R. At the moment the area Union representative for TASS which is part of the AUEW is who is an hourly paid man, he wants to get in on every meeting where a union representative of TASS is taking place in a meeting. We don't want him.
- S. Why?
- R. How can an hourly paid man fight for senior staff positions? Different areas altogether.
- S. Hm. Some people might say that you're all employees, that you all contribute to the Company.
- R. Yes. I agree with that.
- S. It's just a fact that you get paid, you get a salary and he is hourly paid?
- R. Yes, we get a standing wage, they don't. It's different contracts.
- S. Hm.
- R. Of employment.
- S. Hm. Should you not be moving towards the same contract?
- R. Well we have. We agreed for the same holidays.
- S. But at different times?
- R. Yes but that wasn't supposed to be implemented until next year. But the works have now, with a separate agreement with the works Management got

- S. Yea
- R. So it's this year the thing works.
- S. Hm.
- R. Now works, being the majority of people in the factory, is taking more holidays than staff already have.
- S. Hm.
- R. Which is one of the differentials we had before. You know taking, statutory holidays, the fixed, say at the fair, and then we could have discretionary holidays when we liked.
- S. Right. Would it not be feasible for the staff Unions and the shop floor Unions to sit down and agree among themselves what holidays they take then present the situation to the Management?
- R. Because the works won't agree.
- S. How do you know that?
- R. We've already tried, for the September week.
- S. Hm.
- R. What happened was we, each Union was told to take a ballot vote by it's own members for which weeks we put forward.
- S. Hm.
- R. Four or five weeks.
- S. Hm.
- R. The majority of the works they said voted for the September week. Well it was allocated last year.
- S. Uhu.
- R. But all the staff, the majority went against that week, because their children weren't on holiday. They were on holiday the following week.
- S. Hm.

- R. So we wanted to see the difference between people
- S. Hm.
- R. The works wouldn't have it. They said, our's is a block vote so many counts all for that one week.
- S. Hm.
- R. We approached various people on the shop floor who said we don't want that week.
- S. Hm. Ah. What about your Union - how much has it improved conditions in the - for you?
- R. For us? Quite a bit. It arrowheads quite a few of the staff increases in here.
- S. Hm.
- R. And then the ways of getting me again 7p per hour for glasses.
- S. Right. You are getting paid that as well?
- R. Yes. Everybody who works in the works gets the 7p an hour.
- S. Hm. Ah. In terms of salary say, how much has the Union helped? Before Government legislation came in.
- R. I'm going quite a while back in thoughts. They gave us quite a few advisory sessions.
- S. Yea they get - their main function really for you has been the information that they give you?
- R. Yea. At the moment they are still fighting for a few of us on the test side of things because of the noise.
- S. Hm.
- R. The works were against the noise.
- S. Hm.
- R. In their fight they have had the whole end of the far end of Bay 12 there blocked off.

S. Yea.

R. But what about all the people working inside?

S. Hm.

R. The noise level inside has increased because it is reflected.

S. Hm. So what's the ?

R. There's no dispensation given to anybody working in that area. If we get something, the workmen working in that area will be bound to get it.

S. Hm.

R. But their Union's not following up at all.

S. Hm. It's um - what sort of would you term Bay 13? Is it extra payments or

R. Well something like differential.

S. You're looking for money rather than protection?

R. No. First of all more protection for the ears.

S. Just these muffs?

R. Those muffs - they're not much good.

S. Hm. They stop you going completely deaf? They're not much use?

R. They stop a bit, but we are talking about 120-130 decibels.

S. Hm. True

R. You should hear when we are firing 2 shafts that's the noise monger.

S. I wouldn't know if you were firing two shafts.

R. You'd know by the noise.

S. Or whether it was three.

R. Um.

S. Well put it like this they've had 90 odd decibels in Woolworths when one of these is running."

Excerpt 6.60

- S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a union?
- R. Oh, for job security. That's number one. But I don't think the union I'm in just now, TASS, does anything an internal union couldn't do. I mean, I think the subs we pay don't do any good for me at all. It's all national and external stuff that our money goes for.
- S. Is the union not really important to you then?
- R. Yes, the union certainly is important to my working life. Though that's not the national union, it's not done a great deal for me. But the union internally it has done a lot. Wages, conditions, holidays - it's improved all of these without too much bother. You know, without too much strike action. By going about it in a reasonable manner."

Excerpt A6.61

- S. "Why do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
- R. I think it safeguards you.
- S. Protection?
- R. Protection wise aye.
- S. Against who or against what?
- R. Against conditions, against money, everything.
- S. How do you mean against - against bad conditions?
- R. Bad conditions. If you're all together and if you're fighting for something, you've got a better chance if you're all together than if you were just singular.
- S. Right. Who would you be fighting against?
- R. Management I suppose.
- S. Hm. Um.
- R. And working conditions.
- S. You would be fighting against the conditions and they would, they would for you?
- R. Laid down, uhu.
- S. They'd try to minimise them?
- R. Well, if you weren't happy with the conditions
- S. Yea.
- R. And there was a few of you that wasn't happy with the conditions you could do something about it if you were all more or less together.
- S. Right. That
- R. But if you were just singular
- S. That you need the collective strength to give you this protection against, against the Management?

R. Uhu.

S. Am. Now how important is it to you to be in a Union?

R. Just personally do you mean?

S. Hm.

R. Just that they can do the things I said.

S. Yea. How important is it?

R. Very important.

S. Very important. Is it something you just accept?

R. I suppose you do just accept it.

S. Is it something

R. Well for a start - you son't get a job in here unless you are in the Union.

S. Yes it's a closed shop. Yea. To that extent it's a fact of life. It's something that you've

R. Aye well it's a good thing as well, because

S. Yes.

R. If you've served your time and

S. It gives you protection?

R. It gives you protection for a job.

S. Right. Is it to you more a means to an end rather than an end in itself? You don't value the Trade Union Movement in itself it's something that will accomplish something for you?

R. I suppose it is that'll accomplish something.

S. It's more that than something you feel you ought to belong to?

R. I think it's a good thing to belong to it.

S. Right. Because of the because of what it will achieve for you?

R. Because we're the workers and we need to belong to something. Something that will some kind of committee or

something, you know.

S. You need to belong to some sort of working class movement?

What is it that the Union does for you? I mean I know that you say that it protects you against conditions and so on but how does it actually do this?

R. Just safety in numbers. This is it as far as I'm concerned.

S. It's collective strength?

R. It's collective strength. If you don't like something you could get your Shop Steward to do something about it.

S. Hm. Is it as effective as it might be?

R. I suppose it is.

S. Do you feel it is too effective? Some people might say that the Unions are too strong - that they run the country and not the Government. Do you feel that they're that strong?

R. No I think they're pretty strong but I don't think they need any more for the working man.

S. Hm.

R. The workers need support.

S. You mean that they're only strong if they need to be?

R. Well see I personally don't bother too much about it but

S. Hm.

R. You see well if there's any trouble I can go to my Shop Steward and he can see what he can do about it you know.

S. It's not something you think about every day it's just that you like to know that it's there?

R. Well I know it's there you know

S. For you to use if you need to use it?

R. Yes.

S. Um."

Excerpt 46.62

- S. "What sort of function do you think the Union plays in here?
- R. What sort of function do I think the Union plays in here?
- S. Yes, what sort of role does it play?
- R. I think it plays an important role in respect of looking after the men's welfare and working conditions, hourly rate of wages, looking after any - how would you put it - injustices that may occur to the men, investigating circumstances and also playing a role where we see possible trouble arising from failings of Management or, on occasion, failings of men, we try and intervene and make it right.
- S. How much does the Management appreciate this?
- R. Well they don't pay us enough, let me put it that way.
- S. I mean the function of the Union, I don't mean it that other way.
- R. Well, I think that the Management, by way of the Government and by way of general outside pressures, everybody is beginning to realise that the Unions have a place, and a big place, in industry and should be playing a more important part than what they are and I think over the last few years they are beginning to play a more important part.
- S. What sort of Unions would interest you? Would you alter them?
- R. Well I would say in the area of the working conditions that workers and works fancy. Look, just to give you an example of a recent, this is over the last year or so, a couple of years, the safety angle, the workers are getting very interested and very serious about the safety situation which I think is good. But, their basic interest is to better their working conditions and their working wages and they are even going

beyond that because there are policies being laid down and I think the Unions are beginning to play a full part as they should be.

- S. How much has the increased interest helped the health and safety of workers? How much by the Unions themselves?
- R. Well I think we are trying our best. I think we are doing not too bad but it is in its infancy just now. I think it is something that has only started and will take a couple of years before anyone really sees the fruits of their results - or their efforts I should say.
- S. Do you ever feel that the Management would like to do without you.
- R. Do without Unions? That's always the feeling there's no doubt about that. No doubt about that at all but then you would have to go back. I would have to add a rider to that. I would have to go back to ten, fifteen, twenty and thirty years ago, they would not mind it so now but they might be on a stickier wicket because I think that men are a wee bit more sensible, if you like, and they would never get away with the things they got away with ten, fifteen years ago over the last eight or nine years. What they got away with then prior to Unions really taking a grip on society.
- S. Do you think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority?
- R. I think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority. I think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority."

Excerpt A6.63

- S. "If you were either being represented at Board level or receiving much more information from the Company than you are at the moment and they changed their word or policy or they took evasive policy you did not agree on, how then would you find it easy to convince the membership to, in the last resort, to come out on strike over it.
- R. I think you would find it very, very, very difficult, very difficult. You would need to have a real change of climate, everything before you could get to that stage. You are talking away years ahead. But that's the position people are working to. Not necessarily to come out on strike but to have the say so and influence to be able to show the men that such and such is not going to be helpful. That change of policy is not going to be helpful to the men in this area.
- S. What do you think the obstacles to that are?
- R. Well the obstacles are always profit. Multi-nationals. The shifting their jobs down from here to England because, and no argument about it. It's better suited. But then life cannot be like that. You know, you cannot have - you all cannot be - it's all suitable the way Britain is going just now for every industry to be located in the south east of England but it cannot happen so people are going to have to have social works and social situations. We are already beginning to talk about them and people are going to have to realise that that's how life is going to be. Either that you're just going to have your four or five million unemployed. There is no doubt about it because the way things are going just now in the world, everything is being automated.

Everything is being classed in such a manner that you're either going to have the millions unemployed.

S. Right. What do you think the obstacles are in getting the guys to come out and support you in that sort of policy?

R. Well it would depend on your previous actions and your previous way of working whether the men trusted you. Are you talking about a Convenor or a Shop Steward?

S. Shop Stewards.

R. Shop Stewards as a body trying to get men to come out on strike because of a situation that there has been a change of policy on the work on the Board?

S. Yes.

R. I think it would be very, very difficult but I think, at the end of day, you might just manage it because the men trust the Shop Stewards but then how long that trust, how long that's going to remain.

S. More difficult say than getting them to come out on strike for a wage rise?

R. No. It would be easier to get them out on strike for a wage rise for that's in front of their faces and it's easily arguable. It's there in front of them.

S. They understand.

R. It's more easily understood and with the information that you've got you can explain it away. It is going to be very difficult for somebody, say that's had five or six years teaching under Traee Union or wherever night school or day school, to sit on a Board and then he comes down and tries to explain how the situation, by the change of policy on the Board, reflects on the men and get the men to come out on

strike because of his thoughts. It's going to be a hard job getting Shop Stewards never mind getting the men."

Excerpt 6.64

- S. "Um. Now you're in a Union?
- R. Yes.
- S. Why do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
- R. Well eh it's the policy of the Company that you've got to be in a Union.
- S. Hm. Do you think you get any advantages by being in the Union?
- R. Just the advantage of ah negotiating for rises or that, there's nothing else bar if you go on strike you get a bit of strike benefit.
- S. Hm. Now you feel the main thing is that they negotiate on your behalf?
- R. Aye.
- S. Um. Could you negotiate yourself if there wasn't a Union? Do you think you could do
- R. Well some people could you know. I suppose I could.
- S. Hm. How important is it to you being in a Union?
- R. How do you mean important?
- S. Well is it something that's important to you in your work?
- R. No it's no. It's just I'm in the Union and that's it.
- S. It's there
- R. I'm no a Union man. I don't go to meetings
- S. Hm.
- R. Take part in anything."

Excerpt 6.65

S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a Union?

R. Well, when you're all together, er more people, you know one voice isn't much good. I think you need

S.

R. Yes.

S. At what point did you feel that you needed to be in a Union?

R. When I came out at first I didn't see much real need for it, you know, but as time goes on I see what they can do for you, you know speak for you and the men know all about it, other Shop Stewards and that.

S. Uhu they've got knowledge that

R. They know

S. You don't

R. Yea.

S. That you don't have?

R. I don't have.

S. So what sort of thing is it that the Union does for you?

R. Doing in the most part you know bargaining and things like that."

Excerpt 46.66

- S. "Are the Board really as badly informed as it seems to me, sometimes?
- R. Probably its even worse than it seems to you. You see they've got no interest in the nitty-gritty - what goes on down here, with what I've got to do. They're too busy with their big pictures, but they haven't got the inclination to see that my nitty-gritty affects this, and what its going to mean for them.
- S. But do you tell them as much as you should?
- R. No, probably if I'm being honest we don't inform them effectively, because it doesn't suit us - or else they don't want to know if its a problem.
- S. Are the lines of communication in the Firm too long?
- R. Well that all depends. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. We talk a lot about communication in here, but we don't do much about it. You know there's anything up to 6 levels of communication in this place. But I don't think everything should be passed on up. Authority ought to be delegated to the proper level. It ought to be, but it's not properly established in this Company. You'll get a problem dumped on you by your Director, and he'll make it clear it's up to you to solve it - but if it suits him he'll be nosing around, interfering. And that's all the worse because some of the Board don't know what's going on in this place - often because they simply don't want to know.
- S. Why?
- R. I don't know - can't be bothered, frightened to get involved. I mean look at (a Director). He didn't take the action he should have in 1976, and now he's paid for it. I mean

(another Senior Manager) used to go and tell him regularly at that time that we needed to do this and that. But he would never listen, and eventually we just shrugged our shoulders and said 'it's up to you, you're the boss.'

Excerpt A6.67

- S. "What sort of things do you look for the Company you work for?
R. I look for interest in a particular job and I look for respect.
S. That you respect them and they respect you in return?

R. I'm not so much worried about their respecting me. Ahm.

We all think in fact that if we do our job properly that the guy above will respect us. We don't go about consciously thinking he must have respect for me but I find it important, as far as I am concerned, that in my history I have left Companies immediately I feel that I'm not learning from the guy above."

Excerpt A6.68

- S. "What do you look for in your supervisor? What qualities do you look for?
- R. The guys in charge of me are my immediate boss, () and (a director), and I have quite a lot of communication with them. They pass on staff to me, to delegate and so on. That's the criteria I use. The communications I have with them, and the manner in which I get on with them.
- S. How do you get on with them?
- R. Hm. Very well.
- S. On a personal basis?
- R. Well, not socially - just personally in here. We don't visit each other's houses, or meet socially or anything like that, but we get along while we're at work.
- S. So there's a difference between the personal and the professional. What is important to you is how you get on with them professionally?
- R. Yes, there's a good feed-back. There's a good rapport."

Excerpt A6.69

- S. "What's the supervision like in here?
- R. In my situation it's good, because I know the bloke I work with. I knew him from a previous job. I know that he knew his work.
- S. What sort of qualities do you look for from him?
- R. This job can be fairly complicated : especially in the first few months, and you need somebody that can watch over you. It's all up to the supervisor. If he can train his squad to a fairly high degree he's got no problems after that. You always look for the man to assist you if you hit something that's completely foreign to you, or completely new to you. On the costs side there's always something that's going to crop up which no one has ever seen before and you look for higher-up to to get you out of that. And to do it in the simplest way. Everybody can get out in a very complicated way. You're always looking for the man to have the experience to get you out in the simplest way.
- S. What about the personal basis?
- R. Yes, it's good in here. But it has to be a mixture of this and of experience. It's no use having an easy-going boss if he can't get you out of difficulties."

Excerpt 6.70

- S. "What kind of supervision do you get then? What's the supervision like?
- R. None.
- S. Why? Why is that?
- R. Well there's two of us working on electrical panels.
- S. Hm.
- R. The Manager for our department is mechanical, who supervises the test results and mechanical problems with one of the mechanical test engineers.
- S. Hm.
- R. As far as electrical work is concerned he is lost.
- S. What happens if you hit a problem that you yourself can't?
- R. We've got to go for outside assistance. Outside the department.
- S. Right. What about
- R. Design, things like that.
- S. Hm.
- R. Or go to the vendors.
- S. Right. What sort of thing would you be looking for from your Supervisor to be a good supervisor?
- R. Somebody that knew the job.
- S. That would
- R. Vis a vis electrical.
- S. That would be the only, the basic thing you would be looking for?
- R. It would be the major thing. Somebody that could describe something in terms you would understand.
- S. Hm. Ah. What else would you look for from him or would

- that be that - the fact that he knows the job?
- R. Well somebody that would back you if you found the fault and started arguing with people in other departments.
- S. Right. Do you ever feel too closely supervised?
- R. No. We're never supervised.
- S. Hm.
- R. We're well aware of the fact that nobody would ever say a word.
- S. Do you feel - have you ever felt too closely supervised in the Company?
- R. No. It has always been the same.
- S. Ah. Is it the same in every - all departments.
- R. On the staff side no. There are one or two departments where they are watched quite closely.
- S. Uhu.
- R. The most of their jobs relate to a desk or drawing board. Well ours is anywhere in the factory or outside the works at different places.
- S. Uhu.
- R. We have the use of private 'phones - we're always following up panel procedures.
- S. Hm.
- R. So it's more or less up to yourself."

Excerpt A6.71

- S. "How do you judge your supervisor?
- R. Mostly that I've got an easy work-flow, and I get good results.
- S. Is it inadequate in any way?
- R. I like to think that when I do a job and do it correctly and send it out, then that's it done. But seemingly it's not, because 2 days later somebody tells me it's all changed and I've got to re-call it, and re-do it, and send it out again. This can go on three or four or five times. You see we do drawing we call 'reving' them - that's when you alter it. We find jobs that are only a month old and there's five or six 'revs' on it. Not through mistakes, through alterations. This might not be our management - it might be the management of our suppliers changing their goods. I judge that as bad supervision somewhere when it's happening to such an extent.
- S. What about the personal side of supervision?
- R. On the personal side - relationships are fair.
- S. Are there any problems?
- R. Well, there's no real communication between me and my supervisor. He doesn't seem to want to know what we think and to a certain extent we don't want to know what he thinks. I think there's quite a wall there. Another thing is that at college I've been taught newer techniques, but when I come in here I'm forced to go back to older techniques which are quite visibly not as efficient. But we're not allowed to use the techniques we've learned. The Company spends all that money sending me to college. I come in here with all I've been taught and I'm told to throw it all out the window and start again. They want to keep it to the old ways."

Excerpt 46.72

- S. "What about the supervision you've got? How satisfied are you with that?
- R. I'm satisfied.
- S. What do you judge that against? What do you think a good Supervisor is?
- R. A good Supervisor - well I've been in places that supervision is terrible. You know, they're actually breathing on top of you. Now I don't know how you feel, you know, about somebody leaning over you while you're working.
- S. Hm.
- R. As far as I'm concerned, it annoys you, because you've always got that feeling in case you do something wrong.
- S. Hm. They're going to jump on you?
- R. Aye they're going to jump on you.
- S. Um. Do you ever feel that when that happens that they don't trust you?
- R. Well it is the way I look at it. There's no trust in your, you know, capabilities.
- S. Um.
- R. You've got to have trust in the person who is doing the job or you'll never get the job done right.
- S. Yea. Um. What is the supervision like in here? They supervise to what extent?
- R. Well, they leave you to get on with the job.
- S. Hm.
- R. They give you a chargehand who tells you what to do and leaves you to get on with it.
- S. Yea.

R. Which is good.

S. And they just come and check it at the end?

R. Check it."

Excerpt A6.73

- S. "What about the supervision you get? How's that?
- R. It's all right, you know.
- S. What do you get?
- R. The gaffer just gives me the job and you just get ahead and do it the best you can.
- S. Hm.
- R. If you come up against any problems you go and see him.
- S. Right. And he'll tell you what to do?
- R. Well you'll say to him maybe the best way you think to do it and he'll say to you.
- S. Hm.
- R. Or else he'll just tell you what to do.
- S. Right. If you've got no
- R. If you've got no problems you just carry on and the job gets done.
- S. What sort of qualities do you look for in a Supervisor?
- R. I think somebody that's kind of fair - somebody that's fair to me.
- S. In what sort of respects?
- R. Well he's not on your back all the time, he knows that if he gives you a job you'll do it.
- S. That you want to be trusted?
- R. Aye you can be trusted aye you want him to give you a job and then that's it done, you know.
- S. Right. And do you feel that you get that?
- R. Some gaffers you do and some you don't.
- S. Am. In general.
- R. You see to be a gaffer I think you have to be a kind of bad one

- you know to get respect. You need to be kind of bad to get respect if you're a gaffer you know kind of frighten the men.
- S. Hm. Hm.
- R. They let them think they can but they don't.
- S. Hm. Hm.
- R. You know, you know what I mean?
- S. Aye, aye, sort of dancing about on one leg after
- Are most of them like that?
- R. I think there's a lot of gaffers chancers. A lot of them are chancers you know.
- S. Are there any ones that are more like that than others? Is it the older ones that are like that more than the younger ones or the other way round?
- R. No I wouldn't say so I think it's just about even.
- S. Just a random sort of thing? It depends on the bloke.
- R. Just depends on the bloke and depends on yourself as well.
- S. Hm. What does it depend on?
- R. Well a lot of guys aren't willing to do a wee bit like I do.
- S. Hm.
- R. It's up to individuals but, if the gaffer treats you all right, well I think you should treat him OK.
- S. Hm. Um. What about the variety in your job? The work that you've got to do - do you find it interesting?
- R. Aye it's quite interesting but at times it can be boring depending where you're working at the time.
- S. Right.
- R. I mean when we're doing welding down the shop - in the shop, the pipes just come off the table and we build them up
- S. Right.

- R. Well you're standing at a bench all day and you're welding these pipes all day.
- S. Hm.
- R. And you're just welding.
- S. Right.
- R. You know all the time
- S. Uhu.
- R. But if you're out on the assembly you only go to one job and you're maybe giving somebody a weld and then somebody over the other end of the shop wants a weld so you're away down there
- S. Moving about?
- R. In a different position you know that's
- S. Makes it more interesting?
- R. A bit of variety there."

Excerpt 6.74

- S. "What about the Supervisors in the Company? What is your impression of the supervision? Here, in general.
- R. In general, very poor.
- S. In what sort of respect?
- R. Well, I think they concentrate all their time, most of their time, on paperwork and trying to do some of the workers down, trying to get at people, using their own particular position for getting people they don't think are doing their job. Well some of them could be doing a good job. I don't think they are - they're not progressing the work the way they should be. Their time doesn't seem to be spent going to groups of men that are working on jobs, seeing how they are getting on with their job and progressing their job from there.
- S. How much is that a throwback to the bowler hat days?
- R. I think it is a continuation of the bowler hat days. You know it hasn't really changed a great deal in here.
- S. How much has the fact that since then, with the development of Management Services and Work Study and so on, to some extent has reduced their lowly foremen? How much has that
- R. I would agree that the Work Study and that kind of development has reduced the role of the foreman sometimes to a negative role, sometimes to a disciplinary role, which is all wrong. The man should be in there for his ability in the job and his knowledge of the job and his knowledge and helping people progress jobs through the factory. They are not being used and applied in that manner in here.
- S. What sort of role should a foreman have?

- R. A foreman should have the role of getting out, being able to go to groups of men or individual men who are working on groups of jobs or individual jobs and helping them, advising them on their job, seeing how they are getting on in their job, checking on their job, seeing if they are, for instance we have a situation in here where we are getting what is known as kit marshalling and we find that you could go round there just now and send a man for a kit he wouldn't get a complete kit. These kind of situations he's losing time in having to go and hunt up certain parts of that kit and I think these things should be done by the foreman seeing that the kit is there fully and delegating other people whose job it is to get the kit there to do their jobs and then to see that the man gets the full kit and goes and does his job.
- S. The role of the foreman ought to be to facilitate the guy's production?
- R. Aye, that's right.
- S. How does that relate to the role of the Shop Steward then?
- R. The role of the Shop Steward isn't to stop the bloke producing or to help him produce, one way or the other. All the inter-man is to make sure that the man doesn't get put upon or the man is fully aware of his rights and that there is nothing untoward occurring that would go against the principals of the Trade Union or the principals or the dignity of the person doing the job."

Appendix 7

Appendix Seven:

This Appendix is composed of 4 sections, whose main relationship is that none of them fitted well into any of the preceding 3 Chapters of empirical data. The issues we shall raise are as follows.

- 1) The role of the media on the perceptions of respondents, in particular the role of TV news and current affairs, as well as newspapers in forming opinion.
- 2) The perceived nature and experience of the locality.
- 3) Reported interaction by respondents both within and between categories.
- 4) A series of questions, which explore in a general way much of the ground covered up to now, but this time using the Semantic Differential method. This is to establish to what extent our earlier results are accurate.

By the end of this Appendix we shall have explored all the elements of the model presented in Chapter 1.

Role of the Media

We have argued already that there is a sufficiently high level of consensus in the Company that the type of system crisis, referred to by Habermas, has not developed here. During the 1970's the failure of such tendencies to manifest themselves led some researchers, and theorists, to consider the role of the media ie that crisis in the capitalist system was being restrained by the influence of the structure of the information presented by the media but for the influence of TV news and current affairs programmes, the working class would be more likely to rise up and overthrow capitalism as a whole. For our purposes, it could be argued, that it is the role of the media which, in part also

It would be useful, at this stage, to briefly re-call the theoretical argument which underlies this approach. Probably among the best known researchers in this tradition are the Glasgow University Media Group, in 'Bad News' and 'More Bad News' who examined the presentation of TV news over a 6 month period (January - June 1975), and in particular the presentation of strikes.

They begin by pointing to evidence which suggests that TV news is regarded as more objective than news in the press, by most people eg they quote BBC audience research which shows that 75% of those for whom BBC news was their main source of news, regarded the BBC as the most accurate and trustworthy source of news. Similarly 59% of those for whom ITN was their main source of news, regarded ITN as the most accurate and trustworthy source. For those who took most of their news from newspapers, the corresponding figure was 27% (Bad News pg 3). As the Media Group point out, however, trust is not impartiality, and this appears to have diminished. They quote figures which show that while 62% regarded the BBC as impartial in 1962, only 47% took the same view in 1970.

TV news is, therefore, clearly a potent instrument. That, however, is already well known, and is well established and recognised in the legislation which governs the operation of the BBC, and the IBA. Both are required to ensure that there is a balanced presentation of news. It is, however, argued by the 2 authorities that to achieve this balance for everyone in every broadcast is probably impossible, given the differentiation of society.

This is a significant point in the Media Group's argument, because

what they seek to analyse out of the presentation of TV news is not overt bias, but rather the effect of routine (and apparently neutral) news practices. Their conclusion was that "routine news practices led to the production of bad news" (More Bad News' pg xiii). Why do they come to this conclusion?

They came to this conclusion for 2 main reasons

- a) the presentation of news involves, inevitably, the selection of facts, and their news cannot be a perfect mirror image of reality. Since certain facts are given more prominence than others some distortion is inevitable.
- b) their analysis indicates that the selection of facts consistently follows a code which supports the status quo - For instance in 'One-Dimensional News' (in 'Trade Unions and the Media') Beharrel, Philo & Hewitt illustrate this by pointing to the assumptions, they suggest, are employed to put together a news story eg that 'normal production' in a car plant is strike free, that production stoppages are caused generally by strikes. They also point to the consistent argument that inflation is caused by high wage settlements, according to the presentation of news on TV about inflation. Their argument is not necessarily that these views are necessarily false, but rather that no alternative was presented, or not presented with the same force or frequency (eg that Britain economic difficulties could be due to inadequate investment, rather than just to high wage settlements and inflation). They argue that a dominant message prevails in the presentation of TV news or as they quote "The content of news and the manner in which it is organised thus embodies a specific way of understanding the social and industrial world" (pg 21).

The problem, therefore, is not one of simple bias - or to take an analogy with discrimination - it is not a matter of direct discrimination, whereby the perpetrator is quite conscious and clear of what he is doing. Rather it is a matter of indirect discrimination whereby the process is largely unconscious, both on the part of the journalists and the viewer. It is, however, no less important for that since "communicative power is about the right to define and demarcate situations. When we look at cultural power ... we mean the power to typefy, transmit and define the 'normal', to act agendas ... one must see the news as reflecting not the events in the world 'out there', but as the manifestation of the collective cultural codes of those employed to do this selective and judgemental work for society" (Bad News pp 13-14).

This point is also made by Cohen & Young (The Manufacture of News). "Just as the slogans on the Paris walls (in 1968) represent a created image of society, so the mass media are in the business of manufacturing and reproducing images. They provide the guiding myths which shape our conception of the world and serve as important instruments of social control" (pg 12).

Thus, from our perspective, the significance of the media generally - TV and newspapers - is its role as an 'instrument of social control' involved in the maintenance of hierarchical organisations. The role of the media, therefore, is to act as a source of meanings which serve to support and maintain hierarchy, from this perspective.

There is, however, a caution in 'Power, Class & the Media' by John Westergaard (in J Curran et al 'Mass Communication & Society'), "The

impact of the media cannot be read straight off from the content of output. People read, hear and see selectively. They pick out, adapt and translate from what is before them, to fit in with orientations set in their minds beforehand: they 'decode' messages of television, radio and press by codes which will differ in some respects and may well differ in many, from those used by the broadcasters and journalists who first 'encode' the messages. So there can be, and is, resistance to media 'persuasion', yet the truth of that in no way rules out media influence" (pg 111).

Westergaard, therefore draws our attention to an important distinction which we must be aware of - that the production and reception of news are separate processes conducted by separate groups. Thus the 'message' put in the news by the journalist may not be the 'message' received by the reader/viewer. Reflecting this our research addressed itself to 3 issues.

- i) to what media did respondents expose themselves, and how often?
- ii) what was their perception of those media, and in particular was there any perceived ideological bias?
- iii) how extensively does this information appear to be used, and if so, how is it used by respondents to interpret events around them.

There are clearly theoretical issues outstanding, but this seems an opportune point to begin to introduce our empirical data, and we shall return to theory subsequently.

We began by asking respondents about their viewing habits.

Responses to questions on TV news are presented in tables A7.1 and A7.2.

From table A7.1 it is clear that at least 70% watched one or both of the news broadcasts 'most days' (more than 5 days per week). It is perhaps, interesting to observe that

a) Staff respondents had more intensive viewing habits than Management or Hourly-Paid. The latter, however, had a particularly difficult problem in that when they worked overtime - Tuesday and Thursday nights till 7.30 - this ruled out 2 TV news broadcasts. Thus the 33% of Hourly-Paid who say they watch both broadcasts most days, must do so every day they can. (ie those days when they do not work overtime)

b) Staff Union Reps and Shop Stewards have more intensive viewing habits than their members. Since they may act as 'ideological leaders' of their members, their consumption of TV news raises 2 possibilities, either (i) they have been incorporated into the dominant ideology reproduced by the media, or (ii) they have resisted this ideology. If the former, their 'leadership' of their members may be another form of social control. The data in Table A7.2, however, does tend to suggest the latter.

In this table we report the responses to questions on the perceived political bias of TV news. From this it is clear that Shop Stewards and Union Reps have a more critical attitude toward TV news than other groups - 44% and 43% perceive it to have a right-wing bias. On the other hand more than 50% of every group perceive the news to be politically neutral - especially Staff & Management. Very few indeed perceive news to have a left bias.

Table 7.1

How often do you watch TV news

	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Evening & Late News Most Days	31%	42%	86%	33%	59%
Evening or Late News Most Days	47%	27%	0	44%	12%
Evening or Late News at least 4 days week	13%	18%	14%	10%	12%
Evening or Late News between 1-3 days week	9%	10%	0	10%	12%
Never/Hardly Ever	0	3%	0	2%	6%

Table 7.2

Do you feel it adopts a Political stance

	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Far Right	0	0	0	9%	0
Right	15%	23%	43%	28%	44%
Not slanted politically	81%	74%	57%	58%	56%
Left	3%	3%	0	5%	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0

Thus especially for Staff & Management, but less so for Hourly-Paid, Union Reps and Shop Stewards, the argument of the sort presented by the Media Group would thus far appear to be supported since most of our respondents appear to regard TV news in the terms which it sets for itself - that its presentation of news is neutral and balanced.

We supplemented this with questions about their viewing habits of the regular news 'magazines' on TV at that time (1977) in Table A7.3.

The last 2 programmes - Newsday and Tonight - were watched by relatively small numbers, especially the former, and the 2 'local news' programmes - Scotland Today and Nationwide - had rather variable viewing figures, with between 20-40% watching one of them at least 4 days per week. Quite clearly, however, these programmes are watched less often than the main news broadcasts which emphasises its significance yet again.

In Table A7.4 amongst those who watch these programmes at least 1 day per week, we explore their perceived political bias. The main conclusion to be drawn from this table is that while the tendency is still predominantly to perceive the presentation as neutral this is less pronounced than for TV news eg if we take Nationwide nearly 1/3 of them who watch, regard it as having a right-way bias, which again reinforces the importance of TV news.

Table A7.5 gives responses to questions on how often respondents watched certain weekly current affairs programmes. As in Table A7.3, viewing is variable eg 'World in Action' appears to be watched rather more often than average while 'Ways and Means' is watched rather less often. It is again observable from this Table that Staff Union Reps

and Shop Stewards watch more intensively than other groups.

TableA7.6 reports responses on perceived political bias in these programmes. Once again the dominant response is that there is no political bias, though there appears to be slightly more perceived bias in these programmes than in news broadcasts. This is especially true of Panorama, which had a clearly perceived right wing bias, even amongst Management.

Thus, if we look at consumption of news and current affairs broadcasting it appears (i) TV news is more important than current affairs/ local news programmes (ii) TV news is predominantly perceived to be politically neutral, and to a greater extent than current affairs programmes. Current affairs programmes are, however, still predominantly perceived to be politically neutral.

The dominant perception of news and current affairs as politically neutral is significant since it is consistent with the claim made by those who make TV news and current affairs programmes. At the same time it is consistent with the thesis that TV news by appearing to be neutral supports the maintenance of hierarchical organisations by re-inforcing the dominant code through which our respondents perceive reality. On the other hand the more widespread perception of some respondents that there is bias in certain current affairs programmes is consistent with Westergaard's argument that 'there can be, and is, resistance to media persuasion'.

We shall attend to these issues shortly, but the final piece of media data are TablesA7.7 andA7.8. The former asks respondents how often

TableA7.3

How often do you watch TV News

	Manage ment	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Scotland Today					
Every day	13%	24%	43%	29%	29%
4 days a week	3%	10%	0	10%	6%
1-3 days a week	6%	14%	14%	19%	29%
Never/Hardly ever	78%	52%	43%	42%	35%
Nationwide					
Every day	13%	18%	29%	17%	24%
4 days a week	13%	16%	0	6%	12%
1-3 days a week	53%	30%	29%	23%	29%
Never/Hardly Ever	22%	37%	43%	54%	35%
Newsday					
Every day	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
4 Days a week	0	0	0	0	0
1-3 Days a week	16%	6%	0	13%	12%
Never/Hardly Ever	84%	94%	100%	85%	88%
Tonight					
Every Day	9%	10%	0%	4%	18%
1-2 Days a Week	28%	28%	29%	25%	18%
Never/Hardly Ever	63%	62%	71%	71%	65%

Table A7.4

Do You Feel It Adopts a Political Stance? (Absolute Numbers)

<u>Scotland Today</u>	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Far Right	0	0	0	1	0
Right	1	4	1	7	3
Not Slanted Politically	5	25	3	15	8
Left	1	5	0	5	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	25	37	3	20	6
Nationwide					
Far Right	0	0	0	2	0
Right	3	14	0	7	5
Not Slanted Politically	21	28	4	13	6
Left	1	3	0	0	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	7	26	3	26	6
Newsday					
Far Right	0	0	0	0	0
Right	1	2	0	4	1
Not Slanted Politically	4	2	0	3	1
Left	0	0	0	0	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	27	67	7	41	15
Tonight					
Far Right	0	0	0	1	0
Right	3	6	0	6	4
Not Slanted Politically	8	21	2	7	2
Left	1	0	0	0	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	20	44	5	34	11

Table 7.5

How Often Do You Watch These TV Current Affair Programmes?

Weekend World	Every Week	Most Weeks	Seldom	Never
Management	3%	3%	25%	69%
Staff	4%	10%	25%	61%
Union Reps	14%	0%	29%	57%
Hourly Paid	4%	15%	27%	54%
Shop Stewards	18%	12%	35%	35%
World in Action				
Management	0%	19%	59%	22%
Staff	7%	21%	49%	23%
Union Reps	43%	14%	29%	14%
Hourly Paid	6%	40%	33%	21%
Shop Stewards	18%	18%	47%	18%
This Week				
Management	0%	9%	41%	50%
Staff	6%	10%	49%	35%
Union Reps	0%	29%	29%	43%
Hourly Paid	6%	17%	27%	50%
Shop Stewards	12%	0%	59%	29%
Ways & Means				
Management	0%	9%	31%	59%
Staff	1%	7%	16%	76%
Union Reps	14%	0%	14%	71%
Hourly Paid	2%	4%	15%	79%
Shop Stewards	6%	6%	12%	76%
Panorama				
Management	0%	31%	53%	16%
Staff	1%	14%	39%	45%
Union Reps	14%	14%	29%	43%
Hourly Paid	2%	10%	29%	58%
Shop Stewards	6%	12%	29%	53%

Table A7.6

Do You Feel It Adopts a Political Stance?

(Absolute Numbers)

Weekend World	Management	Staff	Union Reps	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Far Right	0	0	0	2	0
Right	0	6	1	5	4
Not Slanted Politically	8	17	2	13	7
Left	2	5	0	2	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	22	43	4	26	6
World in Action					
Far Right	0	0	0	0	0
Right	3	8	1	8	6
Not Slanted Politically	17	40	4	86	8
Left	5	7	1	4	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	7	16	1	10	3
This Week					
Far Right	0	0	0	1	0
Right	2	12	1	7	4
Not Slanted Politically	12	31	3	10	8
Left	2	3	0	6	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	16	25	3	24	5
Ways & Means					
Far Right	0	0	0	0	0
Right	1	3	1	2	3
Not Slanted Politically	10	14	1	8	1
Left	2	0	0	0	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	19	54	5	38	13
Panorama					
Far Right	0	0	0	4	0
Right	11	12	1	5	7
Not Slanted Politically	15	24	2	9	1
Left	1	3	1	2	0
Far Left	0	0	0	0	0
Never Watch	5	32	3	28	9

often they read particular newspapers. From this it is clear that the Daily Record is the most widely read newspaper by Hourly-Paid(81% read it every day), while for Management the most widely read paper is the Glasgow Herald(53% read it every day). For Staff the most widely read paper is also 'the Daily Record', but only 41% read it every day, while 17% read the Herald, and 18% read the Daily Express.

There are, therefore, 2 dominant papers - The Daily Record, and the Glasgow Herald the former is predominantly a paper for them at the lower end of the Anarchy, while the latter is more significant for them at the upper end of the hierarchy.

In tableA7.8 we consider the political stance of these newspapers. If we take the Daily Record first, we can see that for Management and Staff it is perceived as left politically - which is probably how the Daily Record perceives itself, since it fairly consistantly supports the Labout Party(usually its right wing). More surprisingly perhaps, as many Hourly-Paid perceive the Daily Record to be Right/Far Right, as perceive it to be left. Equally surprising is that as many perceive the Sun to be left or Far Left, as perceive it to be Right or Far Right. There does appear, therefore, to be a surprisingly wide variation of perception of these 2 papers by Hourly-Paid respondents.

The Glasgow Herald and Daily Express are, however, more insistentlly perceived to be Right politically, though more so by Management and Staff than by Hourly-Paid. While this is rather surprising, the Hourly-Paid sample is small(only 6).

We can draw 2 conclusions from these tables :-

- 1) newspapers appear to represent an important source of news, with

Table A7.7

How often do you read

1) Daily Record

	Every Day	More than 4 days/week	Between 1-3 days/week	Never/ Hardly Ever
Management	13%	3%	3%	81%
Staff	41%	10%	16%	34%
Hourly Paid	81%	6%	0	13%

2) Glasgow Herald

Management	53%	6%	28%	13%
Staff	17%	9%	20%	55%
Hourly Paid	4%	6%	2%	88%

3) Daily Express

Management	6%	3%	13%	78%
Staff	18%	7%	10%	65%
Hourly Paid	21%	2%	2%	75%

4) Sun

Management	0	0	6%	94%
Staff	4%	0	10%	86%
Hourly Paid	17%	6%	17%	60%

5) Others 'In Absolute Numbers)

	Every Day	More than 4 days/week	Between 1/3 days/week
Management	8 (Scotsman 3 Times 4 Daily Telegraph)	0	3 (All Daily Telegraph)
Staff	6 (2 Daily Mail 2 Daily Mirror 1 Daily Telegraph 1 Morning Star)	2 (1 D. Telegraph 1 Morning Star)	19 (3 Daily Mail 4 Daily Mirror 2 Scotsman 2 Guardian 3 Times 4 D. Telegraph 1 Morning Star)
Hourly Paid	4 (2 Daily Mail 1 Daily Mirror 1 Morning Star)	2 (Daily Mirror)	8 (1 Daily Mail 3 Daily Mirror 1 Guardian 3 Morning Star)

Table A7.8

Do You Feel This Newspaper Adopts a Political Stance?

	Far Right	Right	Not Slanted Politically	Left	Far Left
1) Daily Record					
Management	0	0	0	6	0
Staff	1	8	9	28	1
Hourly Paid	3	13	10	16	0
2) Glasgow Herald					
Management	0	21	6	1	0
Staff	3	20	8	1	0
Hourly Paid	0	2	4	0	0
3) Daily Express					
Management	0	5	1	1	0
Staff	1	20	1	3	0
Hourly Paid	2	6	4	0	0
4) Sun					
Management	0	1	1	0	0
Staff	0	1	6	2	1
Hourly Paid	1	6	5	6	1

with the great majority reading a newspaper every day.

ii) The bias in newspapers is more clearly perceived than in TV. news and current affairs programmes.

The question we have to proceed to now, is what all this means for the theory we considered already.

The influence of the media can but be considered by recognising that its influence depends on 2 factors.

1. The Production of News. This aspect has been considered from 2 perspectives (a) by subjecting the product to detailed analysis. We have already considered the analysis of the Glasgow University Media Group. Beharrel, Philo & Hewitt etc., who argue that the media purvey a dominant message through the way in which news stories are presented. This point is made clear by Walton & Davis in 'Bad News for Trade Unionists' (in Beharrel, & Philo et al - 'Trade Unions & the Media') who argue, "we believe there is no simple conspiracy at work". The media is too complex and media personnel too varied for the notion of a 'right wing plot' or deliberate manipulation to hold water as a complete theory of how the media works' (pg.125). Rather it is the process and rules used by TV journalists which give rise to the distortion which the Glasgow group claim to have identified, as 'one-sided interpretations of events (which) constitute a dominant view'. The dominant view, with its unspoken assumptions, encloses the professional view of the journalist reporting a story. Thus a journalist doing his/her job is acting as a support of the status quo by reinforcing this dominant view. There is, however, an alternative form of analysis - to analyse the production of news and not just the news itself.

(b) the analysis of production. We shall consider 2 writers on this matter - Philip Schlesinger 'Putting Realisty Together' and Tom Burns 'The BBC'

Schlessinger's study 'examines the practices and ideology which lie behind the making of the news by Britain's most prominent broadcasting organisation (the BBC)' (pg11) as an observer of the newsroom this is a completely different methodology from that employed by the Media Group et al whose approach is 'from the outside looking in', whereas Schlessinger (and the others whom we'll consider here) are 'insiders looking out'. From this, the criticism of Schlessinger in 'More Bad News' appears rather misplaced. They suggest "these works (like Schlessinger) do little but regurgitate professional notions of production" (footnote pg.479) and that their failure ... has in their inability to relate their conclusions regarding the nature of broadcast institutions to what those institutions actually produce" (pg.409) This seems somewhat harsh when one considers what Schlessinger actually does say.

One of the aspects of BBC news he investigates is the corporate ideology of BBC news. He suggests that central to this ideology is its claim to be impartial, in that it is 'institutionally detached from the conflicts of British society and.... is independent of all interests' (pg.163), and that production of news stories is only "a set of technical routines... to secure an undistorted picture of reality" (pg.164) He concludes "the BBC's news is legitimated (as) the product of a community of disinterested and honest". (pg.164).

Schlessinger, however find this view - which in many respects is the image of news production elaborated in other works - wanting in several respects. First of all that the impartiality it lays claim to "can only have a meaning in the context of an existing act of values" (pg.164) In the case of BBC news, he argues, that set of values is 'the consensus'. Thus the BBC in its news broadcast does not, as it claims, simply present the facts - rather it also works in such a way as to

assist in maintaining the level of consensus in society. The commitment to consumers, he points out, has important implications. In particular it leads to "a depreciation of radical forms of action, their characterisation as violent and irrational and obscures any understanding of why these should occur." (pg.168), and he then proceeds to make similar points to those made by the Media Group - that the BBC is committed to a particular view of society which it reinforces through the way in which views is structured and presented.

This he argues, is largely inevitable since news does not select itself, but is rather the product of judgements concerning the social relevance of given events and situations based on assumptions concerning their interest and importance' (pg.164). Thus news cannot simply be a collection of facts, but instead must be facts ordered by a particular point of view. News, as Schlessinger points out, is "a cultural product which embodies journalistic, social and political values. It cannot be, and certainly is not, a neutral, unpolitical or totally objective perception of the real world" (pg.165). What are these values? According to a 'young radio reporter' he quotes 'The Corporation's view is middle class liberalisation. Strikes, Communists, Black Power, Fascists are all bad. Social Democrats and Tories are good' (Schlessinger pg.166).

Essentially therefore, Schlessinger makes similar points to those made by the Glasgow University Media, that the BBC (on Schlessinger's case) is biased in favour of consensus and the status quo. Schlessinger, however, makes more transparent that this bias is not conscious bias, but is a product of working assumptions i.e. it is the product of the value system of the broadcasting institutions, and their obligation in law, to be impartial, once by being impartial they support the existing

existing social and economic order.

This view is echoed by Tom Burns in 'The BBC: Public Institutions and Private World' He suggests that "the distortion(identified by the Glasgow Media Group) arises not from 'media stereotypes' of trade unionists and car workers, but from a coherent set of attitudes, expectations, truisms and commonplaces which television journalists must *explain* to their audience in order to communicate with it "(pg.203).

Thus in terms of production of news, whether analysed from the perspective of producing news (Schlessinger, and Tom Burns) or from the perspective of the product (Glasgow University Media Group) the conclusions appears to be the same i.e. that there is a bias in the presentation of TV. news in favour of *consensus* and the status quo. There is, however, a difference in the causal mechanism behind this. For Schlessinger and ~~Burns~~ the reasons are to be found in the kind of institution which the BBC is, its role in society, and in routine journalistic practices. The reasoning of the Media Group often seems precheated on something more sinister, though the Media Group in their writings often come to similar conclusions to these of Schlessinger and Burns.

The crucial point, for our purposes, is that TV news also appear to be biased in favour of the status quo(and therefore in favour of hierarchy) What effect does this seem likely to have?

We must first of all re-call the caution of Westergaards, referred to above, and not simply assume that our respondents, perceptions will likewise be distorted by the distorted news which they consume. It does, however, appear on the basis of our data that this is largely what has happened since for most of them, TV news and most current

current affairs programmes were perceived as politically neutral. It would seem therefore, that the bias of TV presentation goes largely unnoticed - certainly to a greater extent than the bias of newspapers.

The problem of the effect of media bias has been concluded in an interesting way by Stuart Hall, with his concepts of 'Encoding and Decoding' ('Encoding/Decoding' in 'Culture, Media, Language', S.Hall et al eds.) Like Westergaard, Hall argues that the message interpreted by the receiver of the media message may not be identical to the message sent by the originator of the message (e.g. a journalist). Hall suggests 3 positions from which the process of de-coding media messages can be accomplished.

Hall discusses the following 3 positions (pp.136-138).

- (a) Dominant-Hegemonic Position, where the viewer in effect does read the message "straight off from the content of the output", to go back to Westergaard. The viewer, as Hall puts it, 'operates inside the dominant code' (pg.136); the viewer interprets the message as intended by the journalists and therefore swallows the message whole and uncritically.
- (b) Negotiated Code or Position. In this case while there is a recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant code, there are also within the negotiated code 'adaptive and oppositional elements' (Hall pg. 137). The dominant code, Hall argues, is allowed to define wider and more abstract matters, but the more immediate matters which are of direct influence to the individual are negotiated within this dominant code. The example given by Hall is that while the dominant code secures legitimacy for wage restraint generally, 'in the national interest', this 'may have little or no relation to his/her willingness to go on strike for further pay' (pg.137)

(c) Oppositional Code. Here the viewer is fully aware of the dominant coding of the media message, and is able to re-define it to an alternative code of his/her own e.g. Hall suggests re-defining 'national interest' as 'class interest' (pg.138).

We would suggest that the evidence of previous Chapters points clearly to respondents having a 'Negotiated Code or Position'. For instance while the incomes policy then applying was generally accepted, we have seen in these earlier Chapters (especially five and six) that there were oppositional elements to this attitude.

It is clear that there is no well developed Oppositional Code in this Company. The credence of earlier chapters and of this Chapter both point to that. While the evidence is less clear, we would argue that the complete acceptance of the legitimacy of the prevailing order is lacking in too many respects for us to be able to argue that there is a 'dominant-hegemonic position'. Rather the evidence of earlier Chapters points consistently to an on-going effort to find an accommodation within a dominant value system to which they accord legitimacy generally, but for which in certain situations and in many respects they have significant reservations.

It is our contention, therefore, that the data of tables A7.1 - A7.7 in particular, but the tables of this Chapter so far in general, point to a 'Negotiated Code' being employed by our respondents in their consumption of media information. Given this, the effect of the media is reduced since its effect would be to reinforce a general social consensus - for instance that 'wage claims should be moderated as part of the fight against inflation' - but that, within their own situation they may behave in a way inconsistent with this consensus - for instance go on strike for a rise above 'the norm' (It is perhaps ironic, that if

if we refer back to (Chapter 5's) section on 'Wages/Salaries', this would apparently be most true of Management!) Corresponding to this, there may be a legitimacy accorded to the right of Management to manage generally, but a challenge to this within particular situations. Thus, if we take the evidence of the Glasgow Media Group, the support given to Management by the presentation of industrial relations news may sustain the legitimacy of Management in general, but not necessarily in the position of this Company, or at least not in every respect.

The role of the media is to some extent developed by this since we cannot, as Westergaard says, 'read straight off from the content of output'. There is a process of negotiation before implications are drawn from media information, which will have the effect of the media message being modified in certain respect by respondents.

How will this happen? A clue is given by McQuade in 'The influence and effects of the Mass Media' (in J. Curren et al. etc. - 'Mass Communication and Society') He points out that when the media reports 'sensational' or very significant news (e.g. the assassination of Kennedy in 1963) that people do not just mutely accept what the media tells them - but rather look for independent 'confirmation from other media or other trusted personal sources' (pg.86)

One source of modification may, therefore, be as McQuade points out 'other trusted personal sources', among whom we can probably include workmates. This is confirmed by excerpt A7.1.

This Excerpt is relevant for two main reasons. First of all the respondent draws attention to the role of discussion of media information. From the discussion of the Vietnam story, it is clear

clear that information is not passively received, but is discussed by his members in the workplace. Indeed later on in the Excerpt he suggests that in fact the bias in TV presentation may be counter-productive since, he suggests that their awareness of presentational bias makes his members more likely to challenge the type of society we live in. Equally, at the end of the Excerpt, he argues that when his members are aware of the bias in the presentation of industrial relations news. All of this excerpt tends to further support our intention of a 'negotiated code' being employed to interpret RV news.

The excerpt is also relevant because this is the only respondent who in the 55 uni-structured interviews we carried out ever referred to media information directly. In conducting these interviews, as we said in Chapter 2, our intention was to elaborate with respondents their views on certain matters. While one objective of this was to establish the supporting information of these views, to prompt sources of information would have been invalid. We followed the policy of an open-ended 'Why do you say that' rather than a directive 'Do you say that because of what you see on TV'.) To choose the latter may lead the respondent to expound ideas which he does not have. Basically we have to avoid the charge that we have 'primed' the respondent.

This failure of respondents generally to mention TV news or newspapers as sources of information or ideas is consistent with some anecdotal evidence we collated at an early stage in the research. As part of our access to the Company, we agreed to submit the questionnaire to the union representatives, as well as Senior Managers in the Company. When we met with the 2 Shop Stewards who had examined the questionnaires, they had no objection to any of the questions. They did, however want to know why we wanted to know how often people watched TV news,

news, read certain newspapers, and whether the presentations appeared to be biased? We ran through a quick presentation of the ideas of the Glasgow Media Group. They looked thoughtful for a moment, then one of them said 'Aye that's all very interesting, but the problem with it is that the most of the guys here don't get past the racing section'. In other words, if somebody reads a particular newspaper or watches a particular news broadcast, they may do so for what appears to be pretty important reasons for our purposes (e.g. to get a good racing tip, or watch Anna Ford).

This point is also made - previously - by Gouldner (The Dialectic of Ichology & Technology) whom he argues that 'the mode of consciousness likely to compete with ichology among the masses may not be more rationalism but less, not a higher rationalism but a lower(...). The critics of ichology overlooked the fact that, when ichology faded, it need not be replaced by something more rational, but by something that they - as Enlighteners - might regard as regressive and irrational (pg.170)

In other words the role of the media may be largely trivial, and its real function may at first be to act as a diversionary side show. This may be either unintentional or - as in the case of media like 'the Sun' and 'the Daily Star' - quite deliberate. In any case it would appear to be important not to take the media too seriously. We shall, subsequently, emphasise the importance of media information, but it is important not to over-emphasise the role of the media.

This lesson is hardly new. Gouldner quotes a study by Lazarsfeld et al. from 1944, which paints out that 'the effect of the media(is) rather small. People appeared to be much more influenced in their political decisions

decisions by face-to-face contact... than by the mass media generally" (pg.150) This classic finding is consistent with what we have argued up to now i.e. that while the media is important, others are more significant. These include the role of experience in the work-place, the role of one's fellow workers and their ideas. Following on from Hall's idea of a negotiated code, we have to keep in mind that the codes operate through a logic of the individual's particular situation i.e. the media messages are interpreted through the individuals experience. Rather than the message being read off directly and then defining reality, the message is compared to and clarified by reality.

Nonetheless, it has been the clear lesson of the earlier chapters that our respondents are firmly rooted in the status quo and persistence of hierarchy. They may not like this state of affairs, and may wish to modify it, or at least *modify* certain of its effects. They do not, as we have seen, wish to challenge or to fundamentally undermine it. Given this the role of the media is clear. It is, as Gouldner points out, that 'To a large extent, the media operate by strengthening dispositions already developed by other social forces' (pg. 150). Their role lies, therefore, not in causing individuals to have certain ideas - rather it is the role of the media to support individuals in holding these ideas. From the point of view of why hierarchy persists therefore, the significance of the media is that its information is so structured as to be consistent with and thus support, the experience of hierarchy of our respondents. Their attitude towards hierarchy and the associated legitimacy of management is primarily structured by their experience of the Company and of work - but the role of the media is to confirm the correctness of this for them. This like their acceptance of hierarchy, their concentrations toward the media is an exercise of unconscious power. While we have the strong version

ion

version of media bias, the findings of Schlessinger and of Burns, both within the BBC., point to bias as a natural function of the institution and journalistic practices. Our evidence suggests, however, that respondents are often (but not always) unaware of this - and thus unaware of the power exercised over them.

Hence even if the role of the media is supportive rather than casual it is still in that *sense* a matter of power. Like the maintenance of hierarchy itself therefore, it is consistent with our theoretical discussion of power, and in particular of unconscious power.

Experience of the locality

The company operates in west central Scotland, which is an area with its own distinctive history. The inhabitants of the area are as distinct as the Brummie. or the Geordie. or the Cockney. Thus while it shares many qualities with other parts of the UK. this area has particular differences.

Especially notable of the area is the historically high level of unemployment. McPhail points out in 'A Short History of Dunbartonshire' that the industries of Clydeside and particularly Dunbartonshire - ship-buildings, coal mining, textiles - were heavily hit by the Depression"...Shipyards closed down never to re-open. Beardmore's at Dalmuir(which at one time employed as many as 10,000 workers) shut down in 1930 and McMillan's at Dumbarton in 1931. In the same year work on a new giant Cunarder (No.534 on the books of John Brown's shipyard) was stopped: and for 3 years the half built ship rested on the stocks, while thousands of Clydebanks men and women remained idleIn December 1932, 37 per cent of them registered at the Alexandria Labour Exchange were unemployed "(pg.115). While since 1945, this

this situation has improved, the area has persistantly been one of high unemployment relative to the rest of the country. Checkland points out in the *Upas Tree* that while unemployment in Britain as a whole, immediately after 1945 averaged 2%, in the west of Scotland it averaged 3-3.5%(pg.46)

Given the significance of unemployment for the area, we focussed on the extent of this experience for our respondents. First of all, however, how long have they lived in this area? To what extent are they native, or newcomers? The answer to these questions is in TableA7.9.

TableA7.9

How long have you lived on Clydeside

	Management	Staff	Union Reps.	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
All your life	50%	66%	77%	65%	86%
More than half your life	19%	23%	12%	21%	0
More than one quarter of your life	6%	6%	6%	8%	0
Less than - do -	25%	6%	6%	6%	14%

This shows clearly that for the majority of respondents - 65% of the whole sample - Clydeside has been their home for the whole of our lives. 'Immigrants' are, therefore, a statistical minority. Though it is clear (1) that they are more represented among Managers than in

any other group (2) Union Reps and Shop Stewards are slightly more likely to come from Clydeside than their numbers. Staff and Hourly paid are, however, largely from this area. For only about 10% of the sample as a whole, therefore, Clydeside has been their home for at least 1/4 of their lives of this 10%, nearly one half are Managers, which does distinguish this group.

Moving on to unemployment itself, we took 2 measures (i) how much of their working lives had been spent in unemployment?

(ii) How often they had been made redundant

The answers to the first question are shown in TableA7.10. This

This question expresses their unemployment as a proportion of their working lives. We followed this practice since 2 years unemployed in a working life of 3 years is more significant than in a working life of 30 years. This required us to exclude time spent out of the normal labour market(e.g. in the armed forces as conscripts, or during 1939-45).

There are two things clear from this table.

- (1) Experience of unemployment is distributed hierarchically. Management have least experience, than Staff, then Hourly-Paid.
- (2) given the level of unemployment in the area, the experiences of unemployment is perhaps rather less than we might have expected. It does, however, have to be re-called that this company is, as a matter of policy 'good payers' to attract the most skilled workers. These are workers whom we would expect to find alternative employment relatively easily.

TableA7.10

How long in total have you been unemployed(except for those times you were outside the Labour Market)

	Management	Staff	Union Reps.	Hourly Paid	Shop Stewards
Never	84%	68%	57%	54%	47%
<5% of working life	16%	31%	43%	44%	29%
<10% - do -	0	1	0	2%	24%
<25% - do -	0	0	0	0	0
<33% - do -	0	0	0	0	0
>33% - do -	0	0	0	0	0

If we move on to TableA7.11 we can see that experience of redundancy is also limited, as nearly 70% of the sample as a whole have never been made redundant. Unlike employment, this is not distributed in a hierarchical pattern, since staff appear to have more experience than other groups - 39% have been made redundant during their working lives. Once again, however, Management are least affected of the 3 man groups

groups, but the experience is again, less than we might expect e.g. Blackburn and Mann. in their Peterborough sample found nearly half had experienced 'voluntary moves' (pg.238 'The Working Class & the Labour Market').

Table A7.11
What Experience Have you had of Being Made Redundant?

	Never	1-5 Times	More Than 5 Times
Management	81%	19%	0
Staff	61%	39%	0
Hourly-Paid	69%	31%	0
Staff Union Reps.	86%	14%	0
Shop Stewards	71%	24%	6%

Given the background of the area, therefore, our sample would appear to be relatively privileged, having less experience of unemployment and redundancy than we might have expected. There remains nonetheless, the social milieu of the area. 'Red Clydeside' is frequently used to describe this area, a description which Checkland argues has the area has 'acquired a bad reputation in industrial relations' (pg.57). The dominant attitude we may expect from an area like this is of conflict, and that this perception, based on conflict, will colour attitudes on attitudes generally.

We attempted to measure this by asking 2 questions - one on society generally, the other on the company - which asked them to say whether their perception was based on class (and on conflict) or was more harmonious. The results of these 2 questions is shown in Table A7.12 and A7.13. In each case the 1st response is found on class and on conflict - found pro

Taking Table A7.12 we can see that for most of Management and staff

staff their perception of society is based on the relatively harmonious image of 'people doing various jobs', but among the other groups, the class found proportion is endorsed more often. In table A7.13, however, Staff endorse the conflict-band perception - that they receive the company as Managers, Staff and Shop-Floor workers. They are joined in this by their Union Reps, and by Hourly-Paid (though only just). Management again emphasise the more harmonious option - and interestingly so do Shop Stewards.

This issue has been received by Ramsay in 'Firms and Football Teams' (British Journal at Industrial Relations 1975). He points out that answers to this type of questions have varied considerably from one study to another e.g. Willmors study of French steel workers ('Payment System in the French Steel & Iron Mining Industry') showed 28% of the sample held a harmonistic attitude, while 69% held a conflict attitude. Goldthorpe & Lockwood ('The Affluent Worker') on the other hand, find results which are more or less the reverse, as 67% of their sample agreed the firm was like a football side, while 28% felt 'employers and ~~us~~ ^{we} were on opposite sides? They also found variation of attitude from one group to another, a finding repeated by Welderburn & Crompton (Workers' Attitudes & Technology). Ramsay, however, casts doubt on the whole approach in a number of grounds.

(A) that a respondent may hold differing views depending on the context of the question e.g. he may hold a consensual view in the control of society generally, but a conflict view in the contract of his own workplace.

B) A respondent may endorse an apparent consensual view (e.g. 'that good teamwork is to everyone's advantage'), which could be interpreted as an endorsement of consensus - but as Ramsay points out it is not altogether clear that the respondent is endorsing consensus, or is

is simply endorsing the need for the firm to be co-ordinated to get things done in other words if a respondent says that the firm is like a football team does he mean that it is internally unified (a strong version) or only that it is co-ordinated to accomplish its activities (a weak version). He cautions that 'we need to distinguish between acceptance of a consensus ideology expresses as a generalised statement, and its more frequent rejection in the concrete circumstances of an actor's own experience' (Ramsay pg.397).

To deal with this objection, our two questions make the context clear. The first question is in the context of society in general (a social image), while the second question is in the context of the Company (the company's name was used in asking questions).

Table A7.12 has a number of noteworthy features

(A) that as many Managers - 44% - see society in class terms, slightly more than for Staff. This may reflect origins, since we knew, informally, that many of the Managers had reached their present position - even on the Board - by ascending the hierarchy (e.g. at least 3 had started as apprentice draughtsmen)

(B) as many Hourly-Paid - and their shop Stewards - the dominant view is one of a class structured society.

Table A7.13 is even more surprising. To repeat, the context of this question was quite clearly the Company and not, for instance, 'Industry in General' (as in Goldthorpe & Lockwood et al) This table suggests only 2 groups take a pronounced view. To Managers the dominant view was that the Company was thought of by them in turn simply of people with contributions to make to the Company. This is a relatively consensual view, imaging the Company in such a way that everybody's contribution was important in that if a job is not done - or not done properly - the Company as a whole suffers. It implies, therefore, an

an attitude of amorphous equality within the Company with an emphasis on co-ordination (after Ramsay). The alternative view - that the Company is divided into 3 identified groups - is one which implies conflict rather than consensus. It was the dominant view of Staff Union Reps.

It is probably not surprising that these 2 groups should hold the dominant views. What is, perhaps, surprising is that the other 3 groups - Staff, Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards - should all be divided nearly equally on these 2 alternative views of the Company. This represents a very real parallel set of attitudes on the one hand, as we have suggested in previous chapters, there was an awareness of inter-group differences, especially between Staff and Hourly-Paid. At the same time, given the emphasis on the high levels of skills possessed and unexercised at all parts of the Company, it is not surprising that included contributions should also be stressed.

Our conclusion on this state of affairs echoes that of Blackburn & Mann, "it seems clear that pragmatism (...) far outweighs ideology for our sample" ('Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working Class' pg. 148). While it goes too far to say that in our sample pragmatism has outweighed ideology, among Staff, Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards, it is clear there is a real division between on the one hand a pragmatic alternative, which emphasises specific contributions to the Company, and on the other hand, the more ecological 'Manager, Staff and Hourly-Paid?

Most importantly, however, our sample do not in general appear to be typical of the image of Red Cycle. Their experience of Redundancy and Unemployment is less than we might have expected, given this level of

of unemployment in the area, and their images of their Company are less ichological than we might have expected of 'Red Clydesiders'. Indeed even their image of society is less oriented to conflict than could have been anticipated.

Interaction & Communication.

The fundamental basis of the 'ideal speach'thesis is that there should be communication, since the thesis describes a discourse of such perfect equality that its result is truth. In this section we report on questions we asked respondants about the pattern of their communication

In particular we asked them how often they 'saw ans spoke to in a typical week' a manager, or someone from the Staff or someone from the Shop-Floor? The responses to these questions are reported in Table A7.14 (Management responses), Table 7.15 (Staff Responses) and Table A7.16 (hourly-Paid responses). (By spoke to', for guidance, we meant more than 'hello or a trivial conversation, but I would not necessarily be about work).

It is most noticable that individuals interact most often with others of their own group i.c. Managers with other Managers, Staff with other Staff, Hourly-Paid with other Hourly-Paid. This is probably not surprising given the nature of the work which people did. The pattern was given further emphasis by the eating arrangements in the Company since each group had it own dining room (one for Managers, ove for 'Senior Staff', one for 'Junior Staff') or canteen(for Hourly-Paid).

There are, however, certain more notable features

(A) the number of Hourly-Paid who hardly ever speak to a Manager is

TABLE 7.14
MANAGEMENT

How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk To

	(a) Another Manager	Someone on Staff (b)	Someone from Shop floor (c)
At least 20 times/Week	88%	66%	16%
15-19 Times/Week	6%	13%	0
10-14 - do -	3%	9%	16%
5- 9 - do -	3%	13%	16%
Less than 5 - do -	0	0	53%

Table 7.15
STAFF

How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk To

	(a) A Manager	Someone also on Staff (b)	Someone from Shop Floor (c)
At least 20 Times/week	37%	92%	38%
15-19 - do -	9%	0	4%
10-14 - do -	13%	6%	3%
5- 9 - do -	9%	1%	17%
Less Than 5 - do -	34%	1%	38%

Table 7.16
HOURLY-PAID

How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk to

	(a) A Manager	Someone on Staff (b)	Someone else from Shop-floor (c)
At least 20 Times/Week	0	67%	77%
15-19 Times/Week	0	6%	6%
10-14 - do -	0	8%	8%
5- 9 - do -	8%	10%	4%
Less Than 5 - do -	92%	8%	4%

is perhaps surprisingly large, since 92% say they speak to a Manager less than 5 times per week. The data in Table 7.14 to some extent disputes this, since 16% of Managers say they speak to 'someone from the Shop-Floor' at least 20 times per week, but since this could be a Shop Steward it would still mean very limited communications between Managers and the great majority of Hourly-Paid workers given the lesser 'social (and physical) distance' from Management it is a little surprising that Staff report such little interactions with Management (34% say they speak to a Manager less than 5 times per week - Table 7.15). The pattern of Staff interaction with Management is very similar to that of the pattern of Staff interaction with Hourly-Paid.

(b) Among Staff and Hourly-Paid 'out-group' communication is limited. Even though 67% of Hourly-Paid say they speak to somebody from the Staff at least 20 times per week, this would usually be their Foreman. Out-Groups' communication was relatively more common among Management. This is probably because of (i) their wider range of contacts, given their role in the Company e.g. the role of Works Manager, inevitably involved interaction with Staff and Hourly-Paid (ii) regular interaction with a limited range of Staff or Hourly-Paid (e.g. the Personnel Manager) would regularly see the convenor of Shop Stewards.

The picture which emerges, therefore, is one of little out-group communication. People communicated only seldom with others from outwith their group. It is certainly the case that much of this is structural (e.g. job demands, eating arrangements) and that the physical structures of the Company was also partly responsible (e.g. as we explain in Chapter 3 many Staff - Finance, Design, Marketing etc - are located in offices at a distance from the Shop Floor such that interactions was improbable unless demanded for work reasons). On the other hand the physical structure facilitated interaction in other respects (e.g. the structure of the Shop-Floor was such that there was a common passage

passage for access to all areas of this part of the Company) - but our impression was that this did not encourage interactions. This is confirmed by the data in TableA7.16, especially interaction with Management.

We must conclude, therefore, that interactions and communication was limited in the Company.

Semantic Differential Data.

This data is directed into 4 sections -

- (1) Perceptions of the Company - TableA7.17
- (2) Perceptions of Management - TableA7.18
- (3) Perceptions of Staff - TableA7.19
- (4) Perceptions of Shop-Floor Workers -TableA7.20

Taking the Company first (TableA5.17), we deal with several issues, but on all of them there are variations from one group to another. Thus, while the Company is generally perceived as efficient (or at least more efficient than inefficient), Hourly-Paid tend to emphasise this more than Staff who emphasise^{it} more strongly than Management. This is in one sense *surprising* because Management are, after all, the group with formal responsibility for ensuring the Company's efficiency. One may have expected them to overstate this *efficiency* but in fact they rate this less than either of the other 2 groups. This way reflect (i) the greater professional training of managers, such that they have more stringent lists of efficiency than other Staff or Hourly-Paid, and (ii) the more comprehensive information possessed by Management, as well as the wider view available to the.

Assessments of the future security of the Company likewise vary between groups, in the way referred to above. This may be for the reasons al-

Table A7.17

Company							
Efficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Inefficient
Management	3%	31%	31%	25%	9%	0	0
Staff	10%	28%	35%	21%	4%	1%	0
Hourly-Paid	29%	25%	19%	15%	10%	2%	0

Company							Insecure
Secure future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7Future
Management	6%	47%	38%	9%	0%	0%	0%
Staff	16%	38%	25%	10%	6%	4%	1%
Hourly-Paid	25%	33%	15%	19%	6%	2%	0%

Company							Dominated
Free of	1	2	3	4	5	6	7by Parent
Parent Co.							Company
Management	3%	31%	31%	19%	13%	0%	3%
Staff	11%	21%	20%	24%	13%	10%	0%
Hourly-Paid	8%	27%	15%	8%	25%	8%	8%

Company							Only Important as
Looked on with affection	1	2	3	4	5	6	7source of
by Employees							Income
Management	3%	16%	38%	25%	13%	3%	3%
Staff	6%	16%	18%	25%	14%	16%	6%
Hourly-Paid	17%	8%	17%	23%	17%	6%	13%

Company							Bad firm
Good Firm to	1	2	3	4	5	6	7to work
work for							for
Management	22%	56%	19%	3%	0	0	0
Staff	35%	30%	28%	4%	3%	0	0
Hourly-Paid	44%	31%	10%	6%	4%	2%	2%

Table 7.18

Management

Honest with Employees	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Dishonest with Employees
Management	10%	53%	25%	6%	0	0	0
Staff	17%	27%	27%	18%	8%	1%	1%
Hourly-Paid	23%	27%	15%	19%	4%	6%	6%

Management

Fair to Employees	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Unfair to Employees
Management	22%	56%	19%	3%	0	0	0
Staff	16%	32%	27%	18%	6%	1%	0
Hourly-Paid	27%	23%	21%	10%	10%	4%	4%

Management

Hard on Employees	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Soft on Employees
Management	0	0	6%	53%	38%	3%	0
Staff	0	7	18%	37%	24%	13%	1%
Hourly-Paid	8%	13%	15%	46%	13%	4%	2%

Management

Authoritarian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Liberal
Management	0	3%	9%	28%	44%	13%	3%
Staff	0	6%	20%	45%	17%	13%	0
Hourly-Paid	17%	19%	17%	25%	21%	2%	0

Management

Should be prepared to do Whatever is needed By the Company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Should only do whatever is strictly Necessary in Their Jobs
Management	34%	50%	16%	0	0	0	0
Staff	23%	28%	31%	10%	7%	1%	0
Hourly-Paid	35%	19%	19%	15%	10%	0	2%

Management

Committed to Company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 Uncommitted to Company
Management	28%	50%	13%	6%	3%	0	0
Staff	24%	41%	20%	10%	3%	3%	0
Hourly-Paid	40%	31%	19%	4%	2%	2%	2%

Table 7.18 Contd...

47.18 Contd.

Management

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Divided among- st themselves
United Management	3%	16%	44%	25%	9%	0%	3%	
Staff	16%	20%	20%	23%	13%	4%	6%	
Hourly-Paid	29%	23%	21%	6%	6%	10%	4%	

Management

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Lazy
Hard Working Management	19%	41%	25%	13%	3%	0	0	
Staff	24%	29%	25%	14%	6%	1%	0	
Hourly-Paid	21%	40%	19%	13%	6%	2%	0	

Management

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inefficient
Efficient Management	0	25%	38%	34%	3%	0	0	
Staff	13%	24%	35%	18%	6%	3%	1%	
Hourly-Paid	21%	27%	27%	15%	6%	6%	2%	

Management

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well-Paid Management	0	19%	31%	28%	16%	6%	0
Staff	18%	32%	30%	10%	4%	1%	0
Hourly-Paid	31%	27%	27%	8%	2%	2%	0

Table#7.19

Staff

Hard-Working	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Lazy
Management	9%	25%	34%	28%	3%	0	0	
Staff	11%	23%	44%	16%	6%	1%	0	
Hourly-Paid	19%	23%	21%	27%	2%	6%	2%	

Staff

Efficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inefficient
Management	3%	22%	31%	38%	6%	0	0	
Staff	10%	20%	48%	13%	10%	0	0	
Hourly-Paid	23%	17%	29%	15%	10%	6%	0	

Staff

Well Paid	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Badly-Paid
Management	6%	38%	31%	16%	9%	0	0	
Staff	7%	28%	30%	25%	9%	0	1%	
Hourly-Paid	21%	23%	35%	13%	4%	2%	2%	

Staff

Well Treated by Management	1	2	3	5	5	6	7	Badly Treated by Management
Management	16%	34%	41%	9%	0	0	0	
Staff	10%	31%	34%	17%	7%	1%	0	
Hourly-Paid	21%	2%	35%	8%	4%	0	2%	

Staff

Honest with Management	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dishonest with Management
Management	13%	19%	41%	22%	6%	0	0	
Staff	13%	24%	34%	27%	1%	1%	0	
Hourly-Paid	17%	25%	23%	25%	6%	2%	2%	

Staff

Honest with Shop-Floor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dishonest with Shop-Floor
Management	13%	34%	31%	19%	3%	0	0	
Staff	13%	41%	23%	20%	4%	0	0	
Hourly-Paid	17%	17%	33%	10%	15%	4%	4%	

Staff

Should be Prepared to do Whatever the Company Needs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Should Only Do Whatever They Have to Do In Their Jobs
Management	22%	31%	31%	13%	3%	0	0	
Staff	27%	30%	27%	10%	3%	4%	0	
Hourly-Paid	31%	21%	17%	8%	10%	2%	10%	

A7.19 Contd.

Staff

Committed To Company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Uncommitted to the Company
Management	6%	16%	47%	19%	13%	0	0	
Staff	10%	27%	3%	20%	4%	4%	0	
Hourly-Paid	27%	29%	19%	13%	10%	2%	0	

Staff

Have Excessive Authority to do their Jobs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Have Too Little Authority to do their Job
Management	0	9%	19%	59%	9%	3%	0	
Staff	1%	9%	18%	42%	20%	9%	1%	
Hourly-Paid	13%	15%	27%	29%	10%	2%	4%	

Staff

United	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Divided Among Themselves
Management	6%	22%	19%	28%	13%	13%	0	
Staff	11%	20%	25%	16%	20%	7%	1%	
Hourly-Paid	19%	21%	27%	10%	10%	8%	4%	

Staff

Trusting to Management	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Suspicious of Managment
Management	0	13%	34%	16%	31%	6%	0	
Staff	7%	6%	28%	21%	20%	17%	1%	
Hourly-Paid	15%	17%	27%	21%	13%	4%	4%	

Table 7.20

Shop-Floor

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
United Management	13%	41%	19%	13%	9%	3%	3%
Staff	18%	30%	17%	11%	13%	9%	0
Hourly-Paid	31%	27%	19%	10%	10%	2%	0

Divided Among
Themselves

Shop-Floor

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well Paid Management	3%	59%	25%	13%	0	0	0
Staff	20%	37%	28%	9%	1%	3%	0
Hourly-Paid	13%	25%	31%	10%	2%	2%	6%

Badly Paid

Shop-Floor

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Efficient Management	3%	25%	38%	31%	0	0	0
Staff	11%	23%	38%	16%	11%	0	1%
Hourly-Paid	27%	25%	33%	10%	2%	0	2%

Inefficient

Shop-Floor

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hard-Working Management	3%	19%	44%	25%	3%	3%	0
Staff	11%	11%	44%	24%	4%	3%	1%
Hourly-Paid	25%	29%	29%	13%	4%	0	0

Lazy

Shop-Floor

Should be
Prepared to
Do Whatever the
Company Needs

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Management	16%	16%	34%	19%	13%	3%	0
Staff	17%	24%	30%	16%	6%	9%	0
Hourly-Paid	33%	27%	15%	4%	13%	4%	4%

Should Only Do
Whatever Is
Necessary for
Them to Do In
their Jobs

Shop-Floor
Committed to
Company

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Management	3%	9%	50%	19%	16%	3%	0
Staff	9%	7%	28%	32%	11%	11%	1%
Hourly-Paid	23%	21%	23%	10%	10%	6%	6%

Uncommitted to
Company

Shop-Floor

Honest to
Managers & Staff
Management
Staff
Hourly-Paid

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Management	3%	31%	25%	31%	3%	3%	0
Staff	9%	11%	31%	30%	16%	3%	0
Hourly-Paid	23%	25%	2%	13%	6%	2%	2%

Dishonest to
Managers & Staff

Table 47.20 Contd.

Shop-Floor

Trusting to Management & Staff	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Suspicious of Management & Staff
Management	0%	16%	25%	28%	22%	6%	0	
Staff	1%	7%	14%	25%	28%	17%	6%	
Hourly-Paid	6%	17%	23%	15%	19%	13%	8%	

Shop-Floor

Well Treated by Supervisors	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Badly Treated by Supervisors
Management	6%	25%	28%	38%	0	0	0	
Staff	13%	23%	32%	20%	7%	3%	0	
Hourly-Paid	19%	27%	23%	17%	8%	0	6%	

Shop-Floor

Well-Treated by Management	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Badly Treated by Management
Management	6%	28%	41%	19%	3%	0	0	
Staff	13%	24%	32%	18%	3%	4%	3%	
Hourly-Paid	17%	25%	21%	10%	15%	4%	8%	

Paid, and (ii) the more comprehensive information possessed by Management, as well as the wider view available to them.

Assessments of the future security of the Company likewise vary between groups, in the way referred to above. This may be for the reasons already discussed, in particular the latter. We have referred in Chapter IV to the Company's inability to keep its employees informed. In that respect while employees were aware that the Company had a record order book at this time, they were unaware that much of this had come about as a result of record world demand for the product such that competitors were unwilling to compete for the orders won by the Company. (We learned this informally from a contact in the Sales division). This information - obviously - was only available to a restricted number of (Management) people. Therefore, the assessment of the Company's security into the future, was made on the basis of different information.

We next raised the question of the Company's relationship to the parent group. While the view of Management in particular is that the Company is relatively free of Parent Company Domination, Hourly-Paid are rather more sceptical. Staff tend more toward Management's view than that of the Hourly-Paid. Why should Hourly-Paid differ? One reason may again be relative ignorance - this is the least well informed group as Chapter IV makes clear. It may also be (though this is conjecture) that Management may 'hide behind' the Parent Company e.g. 'Yes, we would like to do this, but the group won't let us.'

The next 2 sections can be usefully taken as one. It is clear that all groups regard the firm as a good one to work for. If we compare these responses to a similar question in 'the Affluent Worker' studies, they are remarkably good. The Affluent Workers regard their Companies as

'Better than Most' 41 (of 101)

'About Average' 56 (" ")

'Worse than Most' 4 (" 101)

(Source 'Affluent Worker' Studies Vol. 1, pg. 72, Table 28).

If we equate our responses 1-2 as Better, 3-5 as 'Average' and 6-7 as 'Worse' then the comparative figures are

Better	78% (Management)	45% (Staff)	75% (Hourly Paid)
Average	22% (")	35% (")	20% (" ")
Worse	0 (")	0 (")	4% (" ")

Clearly, therefore, our respondents take a very good attitude toward the Company. While neither our respondents, nor the 'Affluent Worker' respondents regard their Company as 'Worse than Average', our respondents much more often regard their Company as better than average. Certainly the 2 sets of data are not directly transformable, but the comparison does indicate the strength of feeling among our respondents.

Why do they regard it as a 'good firm to work for'? We have seen in Chapter VI that in terms of the jobs they do, their conditions, wages etc. there is quite a high level of satisfaction. The previous section of Table 47.17 taps into another dimension of their relationship to the Company. In this section we are trying to establish for how many of the respondents, their relationship is

an emotional one (they have an affection for the Company), or the relationship is more pragmatic - in effect a cash nexus (only important as a source of income). From this section it is clear that among Hourly Paid there is a real difference of opinion, with a fairly even spread of responses - 42% take responses 1-3 (emphasising an emotional element), while 36% take responses 5-7 (emphasising a cash nexus), with the remaining 23% taking the 'neutral' response 4. Probably not surprisingly, therefore, the nature of the relationship varies from one person/group to another.

The size of the group which on the whole has an affection for the Company may be explained by the stability of employment in the Company, as indicated by Chapter 3, since for a proportion of Hourly-Paid, this Company has been their working lives.

A similar situation applies to Staff - 40% take responses 1-3, 36% responses 5-7 and 25% response 4. Among Management affection appears more significant than for Staff or Hourly-Paid, as 57% take responses 1-3, but 19% still take the income oriented responses 5-7, and 25% the neutral response 4.

Thus while about 25% in each group take the neutral response 4, rather more Managers (57%) say the Company is looked on with affection by its employees, than do Staff or Hourly-Paid (40 and 42%), for whom the income oriented responses are more powerful than for Managers.

There are, therefore, significant numbers taking each view in all 3 groups (though Management do understate the income

oriented view), suggesting an inter-personal, rather than inter-group variation in view on this matter. It is clear that the hierarchical element is limited on this issue, in that the views of Staff and Hourly-Paid are very similar.

Moving on to Tables A7.18 - A7.20, many of the questions were repeated for each group. Before we consider these 'common questions' we'll chat with some of the specialised questions.

In Table A7.18 we deal with how Management treat their employees in the first 4 sectors. Focussing on the first 2 these raise the questions of how 'honest' and 'fair' Management are to their employees. While, not surprisingly, Management rate themselves more highly than Staff and Hourly-Paid rate them, it is still true to say that Staff and Hourly-Paid do mostly regard them as both honest and fair. For instance, 5% and 71% of Hourly-Paid see them as Honest and Fair (taking responses 1-3), while the comparative figures for Staff are 71% and 75%. Clearly this is a well-disposed assessment of Management.

It stands contrast to a similar question reported by Begnon Blackburn (in 'Perceptions of Work'). They asked their production workers given the chance the Management at Gourmets would put one over on the workers'. Agree 176 (of 297), Disagree 107 (of 297), Don't Know 14 (of 297). Thus approximately 60% of this sample reckoned their Management 'would put one over on' them, given the chance. This suggests they would not be regarded as fair, and certainly not as honest, by their employers.

Clearly, therefore, Management in our Company are well regarded in this respect.

We also posed questions about the exercise of discipline in the Company - whether Management are Hard or Soft on their Employees, and are Authoritarian or liberal. Amongst Managers themselves, their view is that, if anything they are probably 'Soft on Employees' though the model response is 4 (i.e. neither hard nor soft), and that they are 'Liberal' rather than 'Authoritarian'. Staff on the whole agree with this assessment, though not to the same degree (25% reckon Management are hard, and 26% reckon they are authoritarian). Hourly-Paid are even more different since 36% say they think Management are hard rather than soft and 53% think Management are authoritarian. There is, therefore, a hierarchical element in this, with Management taking the most favourable attitude toward themselves, with Staff being less favourable and Hourly-Paid still less favourable suggesting that Management are authoritarian in particular, and regard them as harder than Management see themselves.

The remaining questions we posed of Management we also asked of other groups, as we shall discuss them too as we proceed.

We asked about the limits of obligation to the Company by asking whether Management/Staff/Hourly-Paid 'should be prepared to do whatever is needed by the Company' or 'should only do whatever is strictly necessary in their jobs?' The former implies a much more open obligation to the Company than the latter. If we take Management first, their view of themselves, is that their obligation is very open as all their responses are in 1-3. This is a much more demanding assessment of Management, obligation than the assessment made by Staff or Hourly-Paid. While

for both these groups it is clear that they think that Management 'should do whatever the Company needs', their assessment is less demanding than that of Management. This, however, is a matter of degree, and it is certain that Management are perceived as a group who should do whatever the Company requires of them.

The same question posed of Staff and Hourly-Paid reveal similar responses. For Staff and for Hourly-Paid there is a clear expectation that they will 'do whatever is needed by the Company'. This is true irrespective of which group is doing the assessment or being assessed. Further, interestingly, each group tends to overstate its obligation to the Company i.e. Management's obligation is assessed as greater by them than Staff and Hourly Paid, Staff's obligation is assessed as greater by them than by Management and Hourly Paid, and Hourly-Paid's obligation is assessed as greater by them by Management and Staff..

Then commitment in this case to the Company is certainly more open than closed by all groups. Not surprisingly when we look at commitment directly, we find that there is a high level of commitment to the Company by all groups, irrespective of who is doing the assessment. Management, however, are perceived by all groups to be most committed to the Company. This serves to confirm our findings on to what extent employees should be prepared to do whatever the Company requires.

Perception of Unity and Division within groups tended to suggest that groups were seen by others as fairly united - certainly more united than divided. Staff unity was perhaps regarded as most fragile (Table A7.19) as about 25% of all groups saw them as

divided, which is rather more than for Management and Hourly-Paid (though 22% of Staff saw Hourly-Paid as divided). On the whole, however, groups are seen as fairly united.

Perception of how hard working and efficient each group is suggest

- 1) that all groups are seen as hard working; with only very small percentages (never more than 10%) saying any group is lazy. This is true irrespective of who makes the assessment
- 2) assessments of efficiency are, however, relatively more critical. While, again, only very small percentages actually say any group is inefficient, the distribution of responses for all 3 groups, suggest that efficiency is less than effort in these assessments.

It is, nevertheless, true to say that groups are perceived as efficient and hard working. The former assessments are consistent with the assessment of the Company's efficiency (see Table A7.17).

Finally, for Management, we asked respondents to assess whether each group was well/badly paid. From Chapter VI it will be recalled that while, on the whole, there was satisfaction with wages and salaries, this was subject to an understanding by the respondents of the constraint on the Company incomes policy. If we look at Table 5.18 we can see that Management believe they are, on the whole, 'well paid' - but Staff and Hourly-Paid suggest that Management are even better paid than they think. Indeed in each case a group's assessment of its wages/salaries is more critical than the assessment of the group by the other groups i.e. groups think of themselves as less well paid than others think of them. Indeed this is especially true of Management, who it will be recalled from *Appendix VI* were most exercised about incomes

policy.

We asked whether Staff and Hourly-Paid are well or badly treated by Management? Not surprisingly Management reckoned they treated each group well. While the responses of Staff and Hourly Paid are slightly more critical (e.g. 27% of Hourly-Paid take responses 5-7, suggesting they are badly treated, but only 3% of Management take this response), it is clear that both groups believe they are well treated by Management.

We also asked whether Shop-Floor workers are well or badly treated by supervisors. This question showed that, as for Management, Supervisors were perceived as treating Shop Floor workers well. While Hourly-Paid workers are more critical than Staff or Management, the numbers are fairly small (especially relative to the former).

These 2 sections, therefore, suggest that authority is exercised on the whole, in an acceptable way in the Company. This is consistent with the evidence on whether Management are authoritarian and on how they exercise discipline. Indeed, if we recall the evidence from Chapter V on control, this may help to explain why even 'what control' did not subvert Management authority, since if it is perceived to be exercised in an acceptable way it removes one cause of its potential demise.

Associated with this is whether Staff have enough, or too little authority to do their jobs. In this case there is a division of view. On the whole Management take the view that the authority of Staff is about right (not surprising since it is Management who give them their formal authority). While the modal response of Staff

and Hourly Paid is that Staff authority is neither too much nor too little, there is a significant view by Hourly-Paid that they have too much authority (55% give responses 1-3). This emphasises again the question of context since for Hourly-Paid workers, the exercise of Staff authority (in the person of the foreman) will be more direct and visible - and frequent - that the exercise of Management authority. This, however, flies in the face of other research which suggests that one of the difficulties of the supervisory role is that they feel they have too little authority (see for instance J. Child and B. Partridge 'The Most Managers').

We also questioned the honesty of Staff and Hourly-Paid. It will be recalled that Management were perceived as honest and this is generally held to be the case for Staff and Hourly-Paid. Staff are seen by at least 65% as honest to Management and to Hourly-Paid - though Hourly-Paid take a more critical view than Management of Staff honesty. Shop-Floor honesty toward Management and Staff is, however, perceived rather more critically. While 77% of Shop-Floor workers think they are honest to Staff and Management, only 51% and 59% respectively share that view.

Finally we deal with trust and suspicion. Staff see themselves, and are seen by Management, as generally neither trusting nor suspicious. Hourly-Paid workers, on the other hand, rather tend to see Staff as trusting Management rather than being suspicious of them. This may reflect the historical closeness of Staff and Management relative to Hourly-Paid and Management. The rather ambiguous view by Staff and Management may reflect the disintegration of this since the late 1960's, with white collar unionisation.

Shop-Floor workers - like Staff - are seen by Management and Staff as neither trusting nor suspicious of Management and Staff. The responses of Hourly-Paid workers are, however, rather indefinite, with no clear view being apparent, which suggests a strong personal or disparate dimension on this attitude, rather than a group view being taken.

The picture of 'trust' in the company is, therefore, rather indefinite, which may reflect difficulty with the whole concept of trust. On the other hand, given its centrality to the definition of 'ideal speech' it does suggest and reflect the existence of difficulties with communication in the Company - especially the ambiguity of Staff's trust in Management, since if there is an inadequacy of trust it creates obstacles to force communication in the Company.

What sort of image does this data develop? While in certain respects the image has negative, or critical qualities (for instance, the trust which hourly-paid workers have in Management or Staff) it has more positive qualities. Thus, the Company is seen as quite efficient, with a secure future, and is seen as a good company to work for (to a remarkably high degree). While for a significant proportion this is a 'cash nexus', for a larger proportion their involvement with the Company appears to be emotional rather than cash passed.

Management are seen as honest and fair; it was felt Management should do whatever the Company required - and likewise for Staff and Hourly-Paid. While there will clearly be conditionality and limits to this, which the question does not assess, it is still an indicative

of a high level of commitment to the Company, which is confirmed by a subsequent question which measures commitment itself. The Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid groups are perceived as united, as hard working (though assessed efficiency is more critical, slightly) and well paid (though groups overstated how well paid other groups felt they were).

Staff and Hourly-Paid felt they were well-treated by Management, and Hourly-Paid by their supervisors.

The only remaining negative aspects are that (i) the perceived levels of trust are rather indefinite (ii) there are reservations about the exercise of discipline by Management, and the authority of Staff was felt to be, if anything, excessive by Hourly Paid.

On the whole, however, the image is remarkably positive, both as an assessment of the Company, and in terms of inter-group assessments. This data tends to confirm the message of Chapter VI i.e. that the employees of the Company are generally satisfied with their employment. It also tends to suggest that inter-personal relations are soon as good - Management are honest and fair, people are well treated etc. On the other hand it is significant - in view of what we have had to say in Chapter IV, and especially Chapter V that the major reservations expressed in this section concern the exercise of authority by Staff (by Hourly Paid) as well as the Managerial exercise of discipline, and reservation about trust.

We would argue, therefore, that this data supports, and lends weight to analysis of previous Chapters.

Conclusion

The data presented in this *Appendix* like the data of *Appendix VI* have in common that their role has been explanatory of the data in Chapter V (actual and ideal control) and Chapter IV (perceptions of communication). Both of these Chapters revealed criticism of the Company - control was not perceived as ideal, and there were clear implications that it should be re-structured: communication was perceived as really very bad in certain respects. Yet this criticism was constrained. Even though control was not ideal, even under ideal control there would still be an inequality of power. Management would retain control - even if only in the last analysis.

We suggested in Chapter V that this reflected a perceived - and deeply rooted - division of labour i.e. we join pipes together, they take decisions. In this sense Management occupy a privileged position in the Company i.e. there is an unconscious exercise of power on-going which is perceived as largely natural and is not perceived as power in any sense by them. Management are perceived to possess a special skill (decision-making) which justifies and legitimises the position they occupy in the Company.

The subsequent data of *Appendix VI* lends weight to this, by indicating why this situation is not subject to challenge. This *Appendix* indicates high levels of satisfaction with their employment by our respondents. Add to this (i) the econometric differential data we have just considered, which indicates a generally positive image of the Company (ii) their experience of redundancy and unemployment, which is relatively less than could be expected in this area (iii) the role played by the media, which we argued tends to reinforce the frames of meaning

worked out in the work-place. We would argue, for instance, that it is going too far to say, as Howard Davis does in 'Beyond Class Images' (see page 109) that perceptions of the Company and of Management are dominated by the media. It is too easy to suggest that because people employ 'dominant media themes' that this only reflects the media. It must also reflect the reality of the work-place which, as we have indicated in earlier Chapters, it does.

Given all this, therefore, the question could be argued, to have changed from 'Why no challenge?' to 'Why bother?' While it may be argued that under different circumstances (e.g. of equality) that employees could achieve a higher level of job satisfaction (undid Maslow's concept of self actualization would suggest that they would) our data indicates that under present arrangements they are, on the whole satisfied, and are supported and maintained in this by (i) their on-going experience of satisfaction (ii) the structure of the media information they consume. The question of a challenge to hierarchy therefore has to consider why - in the perceptions of over respondents - they should challenge hierarchy?

Our data suggests few reasons. This is not to say, however, that they are none. We have seen an uneasiness about the distribution of control in the Company, a dissatisfaction about how well (badly really) they are informed by the Company, as well as reservations about discipline and authority in the Company. Added to this, inter-group interactions is restructured in the Company to an extent and in a way which cannot be explained fully by structure above. There are, therefore, criticisms made - there are negative aspects. Development of these could produce a challenge to hierarchy. Further,

the uneasiness with control is consistent with the challenge to authority of all types which has developed since 1945. We may, therefore, expect this to develop, even independently of events in the Company. Similarly even the commercial environment may act against hierarchy e.g. Toffler argues in 'the Adaptive Corporation' that 'effective decisions today must be taken at lower and lower levels within the organization. Demands for participation thus do not flow from political ideology, but from a recognition that the system, as structured today, cannot respond efficiently to the post-changing environment' (pg. 122).

Thus while we have shown a situation which on the whole is favourable to the persistence of hierarchy - even the criticism of it is, as we have said, constrained - there are negative elements. There are 'the seeds of its own destruction.'

with current affairs and watching. I think there is a number of people keep interested in them. More than you would have got if there had been no and it's also on the shop floor as well.

S. Do you think the current affairs programmes put bias on them?

R. I would say the answer to that is yes, for obvious reasons. You are living in a society just now that the media is controlled by a capitalist society so it must be biased and the nature of the establishment is such that people don't even know that they are presenting a biased programme at times. They think it is an actual programme. You've got, for instance - could I go on on that one?

S. Sure.

R. You had a situation last night on TV where a fellow defending, telling teachers to leave the Queen's photograph alone. They had spent £4,000. But they are people that talk about other places spending £4,000 to go and see how the sewers work in Japan or the sewers work in the Soviet Union which is at least educational. What can be educational £4,000 worth of photographs of the Queen. This is what you get.

S. When the guys on the shop floor watch these biased programmes, whether consciously biased or unconsciously biased, it doesn't really matter, when they watch them what sort of reaction does it have? I mean, does it confirm their view that this sort of society is right and real and so on, or does it make them challenge it?

R. I think it helps make them challenge it. It helps make them challenge it. You get the occasional programme, and I am only quoting from recent times again, that stirs me up whether it be for a period of time or for all time I don't know. I feel as if

I always had the attitude. The programme a fortnight ago on the National Health Service and the Health Service in America - it made me - the Daily Express put it in a very nice light, the Daily Express correspondent the next day, after he had seen the two of them, says "When I go into my doctor's tonight, I'll not count the number of people that's waiting in the waiting room in front of me, I'll count my blessings that we have a National Health Service." That while it is not perfect by any means, my God it's a million times better than any you will ever get in America. No doubt about that and that's the kind of programme that makes people think. That kind of programme sticks. I think that kind of programme sticks the same as the Vietnamese one stuck a bit for everyone.

S. What about programmes that take down the Union movement? I mean these programmes appear from time to time.

R. Oh, aye, OK. They also delude people and you are talking about the establishment putting over anti-Union programmes. They also delude people but then again you are getting the biased attitude coming over to the thingummy. You get the people presenting cases from Unions what they think are the bare situations of that case which, outwardly, people would think was stupid but, when you look into the situation, there is a lot more in it. You know, but people don't look into it, they are just presented with the bare facts. We've had situations of that in here. When you look at the bare facts of the situation, you say to yourself there's something wrong there but then only Union officials would go into it deeper. But they are only presenting the frontage and then it gets taken away.

Table 5.27 Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Actual Influence

Asterisks indicate significant loading

	Variance Explained 12.9% Significance Required 0.417 FACTOR 1	Variance Explained 11.1% Significance Required 0.4207 FACTOR 2	Variance Explained 9.6% Significance Required 0.4246 FACTOR 3	Variance Explained 8.3% Significance Required 0.4286 FACTOR 4	Variance Explained 7.6% Significance Required 0.4307 FACTOR 5	Variance Explained 6.2% Significance Required 0.4369 FACTOR 6	Variance Explained 5% Significance Required 0.443 FACTOR 7	Variance Explained 4.4% Significance Required 0.4457 FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
AR106	-0.03033	0.08973	0.09010	0.31183	0.48660*	0.07884	0.10551	0.58631	0.00370	0.16310
AR107	0.36834	-0.00954	0.43359*	0.07819	-0.24344	0.33483	0.04996	0.21690	0.17707	0.34920
AR108	-0.00628	0.16940	-0.42884*	0.09439	-0.47133*	0.23657	0.33456	-0.02933	0.22838	0.30166
AR109	0.13008	0.19551	-0.70731*	0.03763	-0.17177	0.07065	-0.11837	-0.04300	0.13156	0.03446
AR114	-0.36515	0.51469*	-0.17205	0.33133	0.17047	0.06483	0.33315	-0.11642	-0.09889	-0.09874
AR115	-0.12256	0.55452*	0.41819	0.22600	-0.10866	-0.04400	0.27858	-0.11026	0.11705	0.04533
AR116	-0.34530	0.61356*	-0.10391	0.35860	0.20351	-0.25174	-0.01221	0.01571	-0.03513	-0.06035
AR117	-0.04303	0.58012*	-0.20763	0.15132	-0.07289	0.48060*	-0.28426	0.00884	-0.25252	-0.04613
AR122	0.18407	0.41612	0.38377	0.34327	-0.11747	0.24672	0.05489	0.13941	-0.15571	-0.14394
AR123	0.57024*	0.29185	0.02716	0.16165	0.40113	0.12320	-0.05634	0.09001	-0.34758	-0.28151
AR124	0.59043*	0.43793*	0.12798	0.10891	-0.10068	0.30092	-0.00696	0.02140	-0.36023	-0.20524
AR125	0.38631	0.23638	0.09825	0.02592	0.38069	0.29637	-0.10975	0.12870	-0.39794	-0.23985
AR130	0.00788	0.00909	0.26342	-0.34137	0.41332	-0.02667	0.27191	0.32518	0.18030	0.01130
AR131	0.30080	-0.11226	0.50633*	-0.07484	0.26404	0.37413	0.12820	0.23201	0.14157	0.22827
AR132	-0.06341	0.02368	0.34608	-0.04315	0.64302*	-0.03350	-0.28186	0.25411	0.13528	0.24192
AR133	0.01763	-0.08438	0.35033	-0.06199	0.12627	-0.01139	-0.28226	0.59035*	0.08478	0.10341
AR138	-0.13405	0.53824*	-0.22788	-0.66700*	0.06423	0.23365	0.03642	-0.00576	-0.16551	0.18920
AR139	0.03541	0.41163*	-0.05744	-0.78354*	-0.10353	0.27102	-0.17656	0.03902	-0.08624	0.07309
AR140	-0.02279	0.56120*	-0.22041	-0.70342*	0.04204	0.09206	0.05772	-0.06440	-0.09595	0.17177
AR141	0.15747	0.45893*	-0.09624	-0.67798*	-0.21816	-0.00184	-0.03575	0.05568	-0.14429	0.26005
AR146	-0.04773	0.38272*	0.01099	-0.05810	0.08124	-0.15148	0.56422*	0.30021	-0.06155	-0.20105
AR147	0.41286	0.51860*	0.12343	-0.19374	-0.10126	0.01769	-0.17866	0.18185	0.34179	0.00087
AR148	-0.14149	0.12666	0.26603	0.18220	0.46166*	-0.26237	-0.00162	0.08231	0.37435	0.05286
AR149	0.20380	0.25029	-0.05667	0.14360	0.15276	-0.59215*	-0.11940	0.40600	0.03055	0.24801
AR156	-0.36260	0.02734	0.36317	0.13910	0.21727	0.21069	0.17791	0.06103	0.10466	0.07777
AR157	0.59659*	-0.01290	-0.42520*	-0.29828	0.36545	-0.15215	0.16565	-0.19060	0.20803	-0.15058
AR158	0.55360*	-0.02672	-0.25096	-0.34975	0.32259	-0.16714	0.36978	-0.09410	0.24324	-0.00004
AR159	0.51322*	-0.03612	-0.38158	-0.33513	0.39216	-0.17827	0.12747	-0.25788	0.22837	-0.00652
AR164	0.08374	0.13652	0.06392	-0.28502	0.35482	-0.21611	0.59506*	0.19964	-0.31454	0.01567
AR165	0.32038	0.08467	0.41416	-0.09261	0.27253	0.13962	-0.32549	0.05700	0.22287	-0.25088
AR166	0.42211*	0.27680	0.12990	-0.19961	0.23421	-0.00185	-0.30019	-0.07156	-0.18207	-0.00260
AR167	0.83370*	0.01084	-0.04900	-0.14511	-0.00353	-0.08870	-0.12938	0.04217	-0.04918	0.00250
AR172	-0.25896	0.33225	-0.16426	0.46374*	0.21487	0.00614	0.08285	0.02435	-0.13058	-0.00707
AR173	0.40764	0.02011	0.60742*	0.13651	0.10092	0.12393	-0.07082	-0.37100	0.13578	-0.01491
AR174	0.42943*	-0.08241	0.00945	0.38406	0.37755	-0.19555	-0.12632	0.05268	0.07479	0.29782
AR175	0.65980*	-0.00608	0.26664	0.20358	0.02723	-0.29727	0.13113	-0.35733	0.19801	0.11477
AR180	-0.11688	0.51827*	-0.17873	0.29250	0.25887	-0.34251	0.23876	0.10717	-0.10658	0.22712
AR181	0.24072	0.21102	0.25240	0.01472	-0.25576	-0.50160*	-0.27086	-0.15562	-0.05473	-0.06502
AR182	-0.08376	0.40115*	0.21187	0.18085	0.01954	0.01593	0.48635*	-0.27750	0.17246	-0.04701
AR183	0.32396	0.25397	-0.11053	0.05696	-0.21188	-0.73240*	-0.08890	-0.06811	-0.16145	0.07456
AR188	0.15793	0.19352	0.54586*	0.14303	-0.26937	0.13217	0.01825	0.44715*	-0.10178	0.26746
AR189	0.29913	-0.03583	0.54126*	-0.25417	-0.19443	-0.04479	-0.11443	-0.14363	0.07794	-0.02211
AR190	0.22108	-0.30892	0.21792	-0.01057	-0.29456	-0.14706	0.00209	-0.02314	-0.35814	0.46860*
AR191	0.43102*	-0.23967	0.15228	0.19045	-0.08074	-0.32721	0.09092	-0.14155	-0.24188	0.38083
AR196	0.31506	0.23950	0.39812	-0.00785	-0.14577	0.21317	0.30689	-0.23720	-0.03590	0.03047
AR197	0.58211*	-0.32793	0.13875	0.01737	-0.45067*	0.11619	0.22651	0.20101	-0.13043	-0.24387
AR198	0.62305*	-0.30259	0.09812	0.01310	-0.31381	-0.10206	0.43157	0.29546	0.00658	-0.12452
AR199	0.61320*	-0.35194	0.14177	-0.04832	-0.28899	-0.23012	0.25928	0.26808	0.01145	-0.16207
AR204	0.02260	0.64782*	0.38136	0.04147	-0.11322	0.20047	0.00292	0.02344	0.19720	0.20451
AR205	0.36679	-0.05595	-0.09969	0.34215	0.40910	0.36133	-0.06466	-0.14350	-0.18079	0.14017
AR206	0.33792	-0.20654	-0.31848	0.35713	0.38329	0.38191	-0.01846	0.00564	-0.25764	0.30759
AR207	0.29480	-0.38796	-0.40116	0.25581	0.37106	0.28158	-0.15653	-0.08500	-0.08741	0.27264
AR212	0.12197	0.63985*	0.23605	0.08686	-0.22121	0.15517	-0.10470	0.07220	0.14335	-0.21831
AR213	0.44177*	0.44662*	-0.35461	0.33693	-0.10808	0.20498	-0.10019	0.00148	0.32453	-0.15494
AR214	0.47985*	0.38722*	-0.38966	0.33687	-0.23179	0.09647	-0.17667	0.02443	0.18846	-0.08014
AR215	0.43181*	0.21726	-0.55020	0.32721	-0.13620	0.12702	-0.17273	0.19861	0.14147	-0.09544

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14	FACTOR 15	FACTOR 16
06	-0.06175	-0.15289	-0.26726	0.19113	-0.01805	-0.09695
07	-0.02443	0.24207	0.15090	0.14904	-0.14980	-0.08554
08	0.23910	0.11656	-0.17676	0.18648	0.09767	0.03839
09	0.30593	0.05637	0.03444	-0.12286	0.01033	-0.15260
14	0.16525	-0.06927	0.27107	-0.11377	-0.00532	0.02941
15	0.22496	0.05289	0.19562	0.27015	0.03732	0.10875
16	-0.06414	-0.12222	0.31417	0.04773	-0.05604	-0.03400
17	-0.06192	0.15460	0.05927	0.10797	0.19170	0.14071
22	-0.11318	-0.41762	-0.26549	-0.21333	-0.04890	0.06433
23	-0.02726	0.20715	-0.08918	0.16290	-0.19714	-0.06875
24	0.16081	0.09190	0.04887	0.05571	-0.12153	-0.13885
25	0.16403	-0.04843	-0.22051	0.26097	-0.07992	0.10660
30	-0.30316	0.10386	0.07175	-0.01196	0.25842	0.05354
31	0.05531	0.04531	0.32516	0.26809	0.08679	0.04019
32	0.27455	0.04949	0.04171	-0.05901	0.00104	-0.20365
33	0.19068	0.10665	0.16591	-0.14526	0.01655	0.18548
38	-0.04628	-0.03554	0.07005	-0.18390	0.12731	-0.00624
39	0.12406	0.13027	0.03995	-0.04446	-0.03664	0.06532
40	-0.00566	-0.12003	0.04115	-0.17320	0.05086	-0.07520
41	0.12626	-0.03663	-0.00001	-0.19630	-0.17923	0.05422
46	-0.24793	0.23022	0.03052	0.08103	-0.20382	-0.04554
47	-0.37777	-0.12504	0.06609	0.15569	-0.15699	0.05034
48	0.12395	-0.14418	-0.08010	0.23111	-0.43971	0.22389
49	0.28023	-0.15287	-0.06792	-0.19870	-0.07107	-0.07763
56	-0.31585	0.32616	-0.17938	-0.00999	0.17520	-0.01755
57	0.01224	0.04148	-0.03922	0.11209	0.04900	0.01315
58	0.15877	-0.10003	-0.19190	0.10295	0.08971	0.01745
59	-0.09902	-0.04802	-0.09264	0.21494	0.09239	0.14179
64	-0.01206	-0.23721	0.16925	-0.06419	-0.12675	0.16880
65	0.21184	0.11581	-0.04368	-0.15718	0.24853	-0.11122
66	-0.23716	-0.07393	-0.26637	0.16874	0.35965	0.01308
72	-0.05813	0.08497	-0.07859	-0.02182	-0.18351	-0.14227
73	0.22169	-0.15704	-0.01467	0.08736	0.47499	0.01161
74	0.09135	-0.19443	0.00007	-0.07457	-0.01418	-0.02329
75	0.10677	0.11688	-0.18567	-0.26181	0.18006	0.21627
80	0.05870	-0.08262	0.18804	-0.21155	-0.08342	-0.06852
81	-0.23207	0.01987	-0.05068	-0.21415	0.06500	-0.24965
82	-0.04529	0.50545*	0.15584	-0.01555	-0.00995	0.14355
83	-0.13139	0.33315	-0.11955	-0.15886	0.08715	-0.01859
88	0.11762	0.14559	-0.16285	0.16152	-0.00483	-0.01667
89	-0.07040	0.17386	-0.17275	-0.22190	-0.22911	0.18050
90	-0.35258	-0.34612	0.31172	0.07797	0.06541	-0.18868
91	-0.22537	-0.10680	0.10049	0.16877	0.15300	0.38614
92	-0.07952	-0.20946	0.09962	0.23592	0.09088	-0.42441
93	0.51610*	-0.17711	0.03043	0.02283	0.09651	0.09069
94	0.11095	0.07569	0.04975	-0.07466	0.14082	-0.03018
95	0.08429	0.08118	0.06001	-0.09788	0.14512	0.07305
96	0.01655	0.09979	-0.03217	-0.22117	0.04762	-0.05349
97	-0.13664	0.03902	-0.40819	0.05329	0.01157	-0.14934
98	-0.09498	0.28875	0.39129	-0.03062	0.00912	-0.10608
99	-0.12743	0.04050	0.00860	0.03511	-0.06912	0.15034
100	-0.08746	-0.03102	-0.16751	-0.23016	-0.16864	-0.02964
101	0.12595	0.13855	0.10249	0.06478	0.03631	-0.05761
102	-0.19700	-0.10819	0.10321	-0.08156	-0.05083	0.05772
103	-0.19744	-0.17625	0.06734	-0.06949	0.07849	0.20832
104	-0.10297	-0.14441	0.18820	-0.20281	0.12198	0.10255

Variable marked thus *
are significant in that factor
using the Burt-Banks Formulae
for Significance for Inclusion
at ~~0.001~~^{1%} (See Dennis Child
"Essentials of Factor Analysis"
pp 45-46, and 97-100)

Table 5.29 Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Actual Influence

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
AR106	-0.13307	0.22499	-0.16782	-0.34246	0.03193	-0.19993	-0.46600*	0.20004	0.08154	0.44021
AR107	-0.14218	0.21033	0.05531	-0.38195	0.11658	-0.06160	-0.04266	0.31667	-0.01587	0.66490*
AR108	0.09545	0.10495	0.11886	-0.05526	-0.23347	-0.08452	0.05439	0.15696	-0.02086	0.82647*
AR109	-0.16569	-0.06109	0.16279	0.08389	-0.21062	0.09157	0.10210	0.30622	-0.13945	0.54871*
AR114	0.18628	-0.31931	0.05837	0.10866	-0.15412	-0.00296	-0.16014	0.12703	0.49665*	0.03478
AR115	-0.56352*	-0.19191	-0.04383	-0.27592	0.18592	0.26097	-0.14587	0.02110	0.14915	0.20737
AR116	-0.00327	-0.53093*	-0.03140	-0.05475	-0.02402	0.24646	-0.19084	0.27783	0.45540*	-0.09099
AR117	-0.17169	-0.23562	0.13206	-0.13462	-0.15864	-0.69482*	-0.05714	0.25733	0.09092	-0.02969
AR122	0.38963	0.08818	-0.01762	-0.18344	-0.11043	-0.29161	-0.37023	0.38761	0.08354	-0.23040
AR123	0.04072	0.06264	-0.04993	0.29549	0.05908	0.16736	0.17288	0.15245	0.17295	-0.08804
AR124	0.34397	0.27734	0.20031	0.14804	-0.01957	0.15197	-0.11325	0.25847	0.09069	0.09555
AR125	0.08080	-0.02602	0.04735	0.08679	0.12205	-0.08855	0.12029	0.01851	0.00294	-0.06711
AR130	-0.18560	0.10031	0.13611	-0.05034	0.50434*	-0.10970	0.27543	-0.11148	0.25747	-0.26985
AR131	0.28095	0.12617	-0.03813	0.16686	0.76756*	-0.18771	0.06202	-0.08559	0.07305	0.06804
AR132	0.03527	-0.30224	0.00603	0.13502	0.64087*	-0.07021	0.01597	-0.28456	-0.12346	-0.16584
AR133	-0.07097	0.13341	0.02050	-0.03981	0.69738*	0.04688	-0.26172	-0.03876	-0.06561	-0.11452
AR138	-0.08784	-0.17219	0.94564*	0.00226	-0.00641	-0.06109	0.07549	0.02862	0.09929	-0.00758
AR139	-0.00122	-0.04148	0.88806*	-0.13160	0.15338	0.08636	0.04919	-0.03132	-0.08791	0.09105
AR140	-0.00594	-0.15188	0.93203*	-0.09014	-0.06340	-0.03777	0.19140	0.05016	0.11704	-0.01587
AR141	0.11298	0.04220	0.87882*	-0.13024	-0.03333	0.09596	0.03845	0.03352	0.07635	0.10727
AR146	-0.13165	0.09820	0.07846	-0.12680	-0.00344	0.13079	0.03795	0.00827	0.76922*	0.05577
AR147	0.09751	0.00220	0.25227	-0.27256	0.26028	0.11569	0.13101	0.61660*	0.10813	0.00221
AR148	0.21955	-0.53366*	-0.37418	-0.20917	0.31823	-0.06041	0.16942	-0.05379	0.28259	-0.03906
AR149	-0.02788	0.00863	0.01236	-0.10169	0.16021	0.18799	0.04753	0.11236	0.12338	0.01103
AR156	-0.03992	-0.14279	-0.15095	0.07138	0.18093	-0.07612	-0.18674	-0.21540	0.06222	-0.07384
AR157	-0.05082	0.13481	0.09180	0.14797	-0.03969	0.04693	0.89252*	0.16005	0.03697	0.01548
AR158	0.08700	0.21907	0.12195	-0.01504	0.01226	-0.14422	0.88079*	0.00052	0.07811	0.10018
AR159	-0.05063	-0.01994	0.08585	0.10084	-0.03026	0.01022	0.93495*	0.13202	-0.01448	-0.00662
AR164	0.04827	0.12073	0.25235	-0.01478	0.07735	-0.17669	0.25551	-0.20202	0.71968*	-0.25195
AR165	0.22557	0.14675	0.02069	-0.05567	0.46518*	0.06850	0.11120	0.05241	-0.38733	-0.29706
AR166	-0.02120	-0.03838	0.23342	-0.04776	0.07382	0.14887	0.30694	0.15274	-0.31732	-0.25657
AR167	0.07783	0.37293	0.11260	0.18392	0.01309	0.16407	0.33488	0.24296	-0.10310	0.01116
AR172	0.00126	-0.23595	-0.12265	0.02940	-0.02483	-0.05765	-0.08692	0.10932	0.02161	0.09312
AR173	0.71305*	0.04355	-0.16425	0.02731	0.15170	-0.06422	0.07668	0.04942	-0.22118	-0.29571
AR174	0.13889	0.09172	-0.26615	0.40951	0.18109	0.11847	0.24742	0.13017	-0.22921	-0.08591
AR175	0.62537*	0.25455	-0.19614	0.20502	0.00112	0.19326	0.31429	0.19780	0.03082	-0.17343
AR180	-0.11066	-0.22399	0.08318	0.15952	-0.18977	0.13762	-0.02846	0.15198	0.42140	-0.03718
AR191	0.16412	0.13015	-0.01580	-0.05686	0.02540	0.88251*	-0.04491	0.04333	-0.03599	-0.11083
AR182	0.39760	-0.02956	0.02438	0.00967	-0.16971	0.17789	0.03775	0.03696	0.32663	0.03820
AR183	0.02126	0.09540	-0.02963	-0.20636	-0.27229	0.65076*	0.21330	0.01800	0.03716	0.13702
AR180	0.71752*	0.00458	0.05805	0.13984	-0.19581	0.18226	-0.28174	-0.05010	-0.10258	-0.05637
AR189	0.28163	0.14386	0.08956	-0.23360	0.20088	0.00301	-0.01877	0.14307	-0.06391	-0.39638
AR190	0.08446	0.22639	-0.03051	0.11305	0.02737	0.14585	-0.08501	-0.09780	-0.07576	-0.01652
AR191	0.14622	0.20623	-0.22390	0.16393	-0.09526	0.08321	0.10553	-0.13393	-0.02860	0.05963
AR196	0.78527*	0.23793	0.14353	-0.12362	0.08146	-0.08650	0.05077	-0.07000	0.01762	0.12740
AR197	0.12133	0.88580*	-0.11091	-0.00839	0.02075	-0.00967	-0.03084	0.08132	-0.05893	0.08024
AR198	0.10064	0.89329*	-0.15313	-0.01117	0.10697	0.00936	0.17370	0.08914	0.15028	0.09628
AR199	0.04042	0.85916*	-0.14732	-0.03392	0.04102	0.06426	0.14412	0.04244	0.04304	-0.05722
AR204	0.34487	-0.20368	0.22500	-0.27593	0.04435	-0.01407	-0.17985	0.18358	-0.05434	0.18903
AR205	0.07780	-0.02311	-0.11691	0.83078*	0.20087	0.07190	0.04706	0.15079	0.01249	-0.00715
VAR206	-0.09130	-0.05903	-0.16535	0.75009*	0.01763	-0.23447	0.11440	0.15649	-0.04459	0.13178
VAR207	-0.08223	0.05834	-0.17494	0.71755*	-0.19634	-0.44158	0.24217	0.03845	-0.05811	0.08157
VAR212	0.37632	-0.10408	0.27644	-0.10857	0.24538	0.25707	-0.24822	0.29308	0.00866	0.30344
VAR213	0.10706	-0.01313	-0.01644	0.10956	-0.08220	0.02224	0.11034	0.88991*	0.03271	0.14109
VAR214	0.05567	0.06675	-0.00032	0.06049	-0.13991	0.10404	0.08804	0.90030*	-0.06692	0.12210
VAR215	-0.15201	0.17821	0.01202	0.22413	-0.05443	0.00987	0.05461	0.83806*	-0.05483	0.11605

FACTOR 11 FACTOR 12 FACTOR 13 FACTOR 14 FACTOR 15 FACTOR 16

06	0.23202	0.18412	0.13020	-0.01355	0.13400	0.22030
07	-0.07399	-0.07329	-0.04164	-0.23198	0.08987	0.02511
08	-0.04939	0.10124	-0.18089	0.17390	-0.11673	0.06378
09	0.05116	-0.29994	0.00202	0.16401	-0.02581	-0.26764
14	-0.00647	-0.00292	-0.04864	0.53908*	-0.15517	-0.23124
15	-0.08246	0.17481	0.04239	0.28865	0.03664	0.00362
16	0.15357	-0.01037	-0.01049	0.37150	0.07677	-0.15889
17	0.22357	0.00200	0.15281	0.30861	0.00415	0.10559
22	0.19023	0.23951	0.41545	0.09043	0.00337	0.10694
23	0.05472	0.05134	0.03470*	-0.06333	0.02241	-0.14823
24	-0.05034	-0.05055	0.20130*	0.02210	0.12439	-0.15508
25	0.00905	-0.05547	0.08137*	0.08846	-0.10518	0.04617
30	-0.03748	0.42022	-0.07211	0.01110	0.02337	0.06562
31	-0.20925	0.09139	0.15324	-0.04786	0.19996	0.14763
32	0.39784	0.04935	0.11115	0.01656	0.06444	-0.24335
33	0.26133	-0.08185	0.01798	-0.09264	-0.19587	0.05382
38	-0.06850	0.10319	-0.00204	0.13226	-0.03828	-0.01037
39	-0.17286	-0.04629	0.14608	-0.15747	-0.14057	-0.04744
40	0.02547	0.04345	-0.00905	0.05520	0.05205	-0.06116
41	0.16614	-0.11455	0.04259	-0.22804	-0.03396	0.07172
46	-0.00638	0.33226	0.14773	-0.04076	-0.04396	-0.11053
47	-0.00543	0.18534	0.18673	-0.37269	0.20216	0.05985
48	0.30528	-0.01895	0.05957	-0.21754	-0.17069	-0.01024
49	0.87515*	-0.16367	0.01937	0.05190	0.07475	-0.04481
56	-0.15203	0.68929*	-0.05730	0.06348	-0.09720	0.00298
57	0.01368	-0.09531	0.13411	-0.07412	0.01024	-0.13515
58	0.17393	-0.02053	0.08766	-0.02267	0.02689	-0.03438
59	-0.00710	-0.03928	0.07049	-0.08852	0.04353	0.08896
64	0.17738	-0.08520	0.10050	0.10465	0.00435	0.21144
65	0.04427	0.13657	0.26067	0.02763	-0.04255	-0.35009
66	0.04790	0.26063	0.48425*	0.07848	0.23201	0.22433
67	0.20139	-0.08800	0.37208	-0.41705	0.22895	-0.03497
72	0.11655	0.09587	0.11516	0.81422*	-0.03844	-0.01963
73	-0.02273	0.07201	0.16288	-0.11178	0.19592	-0.02497
74	0.55921*	0.13537	0.05454	0.09301	-0.14637	0.15679
75	0.24012	-0.06033	-0.10194	-0.17262	0.29969	-0.04878
80	0.50238*	0.38199	-0.04525	0.28308	0.19558	-0.10986
81	0.04750	0.04811	-0.00001	-0.20301	-0.00491	0.03019
82	-0.06898	0.64880*	-0.07822	0.16522	-0.12261	-0.20629
83	0.44638	-0.09432	0.13232	-0.03050	0.17445	0.11944
88	-0.01678	0.31951	0.04997	-0.30139	-0.05521	0.21818
89	-0.25271	-0.00890	-0.06109	-0.26557	0.60070*	0.14387
90	-0.02250	-0.08722	-0.08976	-0.08323	0.22176	0.85600*
91	0.22520	-0.10135	0.03684	-0.01920	0.80221*	0.23582
96	-0.04489	-0.08462	0.18997	0.24173	0.01450	0.02627
97	-0.13680	-0.12304	0.15343	-0.06641	0.07211	0.04682
98	0.05409	-0.04499	0.00948	-0.06096	0.03481	0.12642
99	0.16858	-0.03385	-0.00054	-0.23937	0.07937	0.01582
04	0.14552	0.64791*	0.24571	-0.07148	0.10687	-0.04142
05	-0.16582	-0.00275	0.21754	0.09054	0.15151	-0.10230
06	0.03950	-0.04045	0.28607	0.03300	-0.03134	0.27076
07	0.18474	-0.00962	0.04990	-0.10451	-0.06015	0.05426
12	0.06684	0.22086	0.13153	0.07004	0.10044	-0.08139
13	-0.00531	0.04056	0.12330	0.00286	-0.01983	-0.16478
14	0.05950	-0.04104	0.10820	0.07662	-0.02588	0.08163
15	0.12120	-0.17628	0.03044	0.16127	-0.05326	-0.05256

* indicates
significant loading.

Table 5-32

Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Desired Influence

	Variance Explained 12.5% Significance Required 0.417 FACTOR 1	Variance Explained 11.6% Significance Required 0.4207 FACTOR 2	Variance Explained 8.5% Significance Required 0.4246 FACTOR 3	Variance Explained 7.9% Significance Required 0.4266 FACTOR 4	Variance Explained 6.9% Significance Required 0.4327 FACTOR 5	Variance Explained 6.3% Significance Required 0.4369 FACTOR 6	Variance Explained 5.6% Significance Required 0.4413 FACTOR 7	Variance Explained 4.4% Significance Required 0.4457 FACTOR 8	Variance Explained 4.1% Significance Required 0.4504 FACTOR 9	Variance Explained Significance Required 0.456 FACTOR 10
VAR110 Management Self	0.00178	0.11905	-0.38385	0.31102	0.19720	0.58801*	0.24866	0.12409	0.17216	0.27923
VAR111 Staff	0.25230	0.33168	-0.32230	0.43584*	0.50199*	0.26876	-0.20646	0.06290	0.01830	-0.18151
VAR112 Supervisor	0.22628	-0.00200	-0.34354	0.47117*	0.11906	0.42220	-0.01617	0.02261	0.19488	-0.03497
VAR113 Shop Floor	0.56756*	0.04853	-0.28684	0.19719	0.26311	0.33430	-0.40054	0.21279	0.02472	-0.33606
VAR118 Management Peer	0.56756*	-0.22961	-0.18752	0.09807	-0.15076	-0.07554	0.45347*	-0.08153	0.07167	0.00330
VAR119 Staff	0.50883	-0.29461	-0.46100*	0.03093	0.30432	-0.32593	0.15032	0.20941	-0.02306	0.18533
VAR120 Supervisor	0.49248	-0.40609	-0.33474	-0.09210	0.02361	-0.11209	0.20066	0.12541	0.17595	0.17601
VAR121 Shop Floor	0.49104	-0.28252	-0.36094	-0.05662	0.28359	-0.19446	-0.04636	0.38196	0.11777	0.30097
VAR126 Management Peer	0.64788	-0.46791*	-0.03482	-0.17161	0.14341	0.11790	-0.01629	-0.01551	-0.19545	0.25665
VAR127 Staff	0.73283	0.41811	-0.06332	0.05002	-0.20641	-0.08775	0.11961	-0.10232	-0.27515	-0.16711
VAR128 Supervisor	0.62347	0.18047	-0.30183	0.00367	-0.28457	0.00501	-0.01496	-0.05402	-0.30636	-0.03079
VAR129 Shop Floor	0.53409	0.04415	-0.29681	0.09777	-0.34479	0.15427	0.03900	0.16006	-0.29551	0.01030
VAR134 Management Peer	0.70790	-0.50107*	0.18541	-0.02598	0.15744	0.18499	-0.03580	-0.16622	0.03169	0.03344
VAR135 Staff	0.71003	-0.22442	-0.11280	-0.39974	0.06710	0.06352	0.13835	-0.04667	-0.22688	-0.24829
VAR136 Supervisor	0.70790	-0.19573	-0.23655	-0.26587	-0.05502	0.05213	0.17372	-0.13189	-0.23080	-0.35760
VAR137 Shop Floor	0.45341	-0.22442	-0.11280	-0.30974	0.06710	0.06352	0.13835	-0.04667	-0.22688	-0.24829
VAR142 Management Peer	0.49160	0.47574*	0.25075	0.57590*	0.00872	-0.14660	-0.14168	-0.17392	0.16891	-0.17312
VAR143 Staff	0.54201	0.33078	0.31886	0.50189*	0.05078	-0.04387	-0.20054	0.05952	0.36455	-0.17601
VAR144 Supervisor	0.54460	0.52013*	0.20501	0.48121*	-0.04852	-0.08307	-0.06884	-0.19746	0.12082	-0.05195
VAR145 Shop Floor	0.14949	0.50987	0.28287	0.53165*	-0.10357	0.05622	-0.11827	-0.00734	0.25496	-0.03018
VAR152 Management Peer	0.64764*	-0.34908	0.33044	-0.07758	0.16523	0.47250*	0.09273	-0.33964	-0.07996	-0.04984
VAR153 Staff	0.30116	-0.12655	0.15552	-0.07883	0.29025	0.14416	-0.43786	-0.11840	-0.15747	0.12961
VAR154 Supervisor	0.21153	-0.07740	-0.19815	-0.44542*	-0.25341	0.47374*	-0.25886	-0.13003	-0.06180	0.28024
VAR155 Shop Floor	0.03516	0.15588	-0.25058	0.15814	0.01139	0.23617	-0.46200*	-0.35501	-0.38525	0.25170
VAR160 Management Peer	0.60170	-0.16243	0.19094	-0.23738	-0.00825	0.05227	0.54631*	0.52900*	0.13335	-0.38197
VAR161 Staff	0.59404	0.35976	0.16249	0.23062	0.43354*	-0.32947	0.06388	0.10084	-0.04848	0.07470
VAR162 Supervisor	0.50231	0.16328	0.07354	0.27261	-0.54977*	-0.21483	0.03427	0.24529	-0.04043	0.20185
VAR163 Shop Floor	0.07250	0.30000	0.01474	0.13930	0.58337*	-0.19559	0.07915	0.29547	-0.09319	0.25165
VAR168 Management Peer	0.24481	-0.43567*	0.10618	0.45552*	-0.07508	0.09074	0.21779	-0.32028	-0.08423	-0.08757
VAR169 Staff	0.53431	0.21826	0.40260*	-0.07398	-0.04501	0.06411	-0.28974	0.42144	0.32321	-0.02293
VAR170 Supervisor	0.53431	-0.11774	0.42541*	0.09928	-0.34337	0.03989	0.04533	0.05049	-0.07573	0.15280
VAR171 Shop Floor	0.14330	-0.55460*	0.28537	0.07831	-0.10178	-0.12614	-0.29135	0.16449	-0.00816	0.06604
VAR176 Management Peer	0.23770	-0.06255	0.51915*	-0.16397	-0.08547	-0.15356	0.29920	0.00703	0.27497	-0.17842
VAR177 Staff	0.30687	0.29416	0.57328*	-0.40655	-0.09852	0.17498	-0.26165	0.26250	0.08276	0.02777
VAR178 Supervisor	0.51800*	0.36027	-0.12767	-0.35318	-0.09452	0.41462	0.02900	-0.23217	0.14500	-0.01054
VAR179 Shop Floor	0.29040	0.51800*	0.35923	-0.15892	-0.11031	0.15322	0.04579	-0.05942	0.01470	0.07055
VAR184 Management Peer	0.45132*	-0.28296	-0.39542	0.15428	0.06056	-0.30899	0.00628	0.04536	0.05414	0.10377
VAR185 Staff	0.43018	0.13717	-0.16557	-0.30502	-0.16925	-0.02273	0.48271*	0.10172	0.31469	-0.29625
VAR186 Supervisor	0.43449*	-0.22417	-0.11056	-0.29814	-0.26174	-0.10186	-0.16215	-0.02666	-0.02053	-0.20634
VAR187 Shop Floor	0.23089	0.18390	-0.28030	-0.14427	-0.13006	0.17949	-0.36455	0.02915	0.41646	-0.09916
VAR192 Management Peer	0.18587	-0.08588	0.44235*	-0.56533*	0.21908	0.14002	0.11445	-0.17049	0.26634	0.25333
VAR193 Staff	0.14389	-0.23717	0.24486	-0.01550	0.38904	0.08140	0.10252	0.47251*	-0.39972	-0.26389
VAR194 Supervisor	0.13763	-0.12311	-0.33402	0.04733	0.49660*	0.03820	-0.02435	0.20826	0.03626	0.30875
VAR195 Shop Floor	0.12560	0.11991	0.13872	-0.02234	0.45103*	0.33676	0.00071	0.55560*	-0.23911	0.00268
VAR200 Management Peer	0.16411	0.63280*	0.22692	0.31286	0.04427	0.01908	0.40339	-0.00807	0.02850	0.19083
VAR201 Staff	0.27686	0.61014*	-0.02029	0.25093	0.20767	0.28698	0.36451	0.07218	-0.02371	-0.04879
VAR202 Supervisor	0.17403	0.66984*	0.09077	0.33510	0.18929	0.22072	0.46741*	-0.18207	-0.02957	-0.03100
VAR203 Shop Floor	0.54606*	-0.35027	0.26679	-0.12142	0.02980	0.36701	0.40999	-0.01837	-0.04513	0.00561
VAR208 Management Peer	0.27512	0.40287	-0.01591	-0.30545	0.26578	-0.00610	0.12343	0.05538	0.08128	0.27962
VAR209 Staff	0.48085	0.47674*	-0.34276	-0.18501	0.27457	-0.28573	0.18502	-0.14805	0.41736	-0.06438
VAR210 Supervisor	0.60372*	0.60372*	-0.22113	-0.05179	0.25682	-0.12709	0.09625	-0.20728	0.30583	-0.04798
VAR211 Shop Floor	0.44147	-0.11384	0.51635*	-0.12988	0.01597	-0.13843	0.14513	-0.22835	0.28253	0.13424
VAR216 Management Peer	0.28467	0.28467	0.25533	-0.10293	0.27830	0.02053	0.14882	-0.25205	0.12226	-0.02565
VAR217 Staff	0.41185	0.41185	0.16105	0.06036	0.49500*	-0.09684	-0.04686	-0.04686	-0.17561	0.03662
VAR218 Supervisor	0.18473	0.53538*	0.10530	0.17389	0.50526*	-0.55532*	-0.17580	-0.08638	-0.19308	-0.00504
VAR219 Shop Floor					0.42395*	-0.52723*	-0.17245	-0.17000	-0.18394	-0.07235

	Variance Explained 3% Significance Required 0.46 FACTOR 11	Variance Explained 2.9% Significance Required 0.465 FACTOR 12	Variance Explained 2.6% Significance Required 0.4704 FACTOR 13	Variance Explained 2.2% Significance Required 0.4755 FACTOR 14
VAR110	0.19667	0.16496	-0.04439	0.05934
VAR111	-0.18982	0.03338	0.11779	-0.00798
VAR112	0.06517	0.51749*	-0.18007	-0.11364
VAR113	0.02598	0.37095	0.07595	-0.00292
VAR118	-0.33091	0.09417	-0.12549	0.03260
VAR119	-0.22802	0.18452	-0.17766	-0.08457
VAR120	0.16758	-0.02138	-0.11983	0.10172
VAR121	0.08526	-0.01526	-0.03722	0.12519
VAR126	0.27632	-0.10268	0.01914	0.00353
VAR127	0.09984	-0.05012	-0.14315	-0.03453
VAR128	-0.18281	-0.23150	-0.02191	-0.09302
VAR129	-0.24505	-0.15372	-0.05982	-0.06514
VAR134	0.00406	-0.07192	-0.11558	-0.30790
VAR135	0.02816	0.00487	-0.15857	-0.04039
VAR136	0.17466	-0.01564	-0.00410	0.06579
VAR137	0.02016	0.00487	-0.15857	-0.04839
VAR142	-0.02340	0.00431	0.03892	0.09341
VAR143	-0.03292	-0.16097	-0.11566	0.10249
VAR144	0.06029	-0.07966	0.11434	0.15658
VAR145	0.04081	-0.14183	0.00543	0.15346
VAR152	-0.21122	0.02999	0.29448	0.14063
VAR153	-0.14541	-0.06973	-0.18680	0.24010
VAR154	-0.03937	0.11472	-0.08731	0.14123
VAR155	0.01477	-0.21438	0.21150	0.18985
VAR160	0.06034	-0.07063	0.01578	-0.04308
VAR161	0.15082	0.05588	0.09054	-0.02567
VAR162	-0.01384	-0.02401	0.16014	-0.02924
VAR163	-0.01322	-0.01414	0.16153	-0.06740
VAR168	-0.14142	-0.02321	0.24428	-0.36503
VAR169	-0.16066	-0.03342	-0.13992	0.05980
VAR170	0.61111*	0.14072	-0.09041	0.16285
VAR171	-0.08037	0.16636	-0.08052	0.05306
VAR176	0.09873	0.09673	0.20896	0.30467
VAR177	-0.07484	0.04217	0.13680	0.12713
VAR178	0.46970*	0.09787	0.21108	-0.01300
VAR179	-0.18104	0.41484	0.20062	-0.23181
VAR184	0.07092	0.31752	0.44589	-0.01595
VAR185	0.09324	-0.20892	-0.06109	-0.21127
VAR186	-0.30923	0.25837	0.18058	0.23599
VAR187	0.09712	-0.17137	0.01999	-0.43833
VAR192	-0.21008	0.08280	-0.01569	0.04918
VAR193	-0.05081	-0.05251	0.30083	0.09935
VAR194	0.00875	-0.34963	0.18654	-0.17973
VAR195	0.07658	-0.17922	0.32678	-0.04157
VAR200	-0.09832	0.13421	0.02746	-0.03674
VAR201	0.02089	-0.12491	-0.20836	0.12228
VAR202	0.01337	-0.16371	-0.12416	-0.00270
VAR203	-0.06805	-0.07041	-0.09422	0.12272
VAR208	-0.11508	0.00092	-0.17368	-0.14203
VAR209	-0.04916	-0.26860	0.17924	0.23971
VAR210	0.00785	-0.09661	-0.00281	0.13430
VAR211	-0.25893	-0.05994	0.25251	-0.07642
VAR216	0.30390	-0.02441	0.19684	-0.23358
VAR217	0.04674	0.28375	-0.11531	-0.06766
VAR218	0.09000	0.15969	-0.04651	-0.04234
VAR219	0.18900	0.01648	-0.00354	0.00024

Table 5.34

Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Desired Influence

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
VAR110	-0.16246	-0.08843	-0.10224	0.48207	-0.33056	-0.03319	0.09030	0.06148	0.34432	0.03536
VAR111	-0.01687	-0.07404	0.15108	0.38327	0.22027	-0.17283	0.27722	0.13215	0.08428	0.31088
VAR112	0.03366	-0.00440	0.17386	0.22142	-0.09417	-0.04723	0.00090	-0.07974	0.14396	-0.16470
VAR113	0.21737	-0.04103	0.15013	-0.04906	0.10563	-0.15246	0.13117	0.04479	-0.00330	0.28243
VAR118	0.47391	0.31034	0.27894	0.12244	-0.14843	0.19670	-0.16628	0.18054	0.26332	-0.24354
VAR119	0.20388	0.07961	0.03236	-0.15377	0.19210	-0.02303	-0.12905	0.05513	0.70187	-0.08150
VAR120	0.44215	0.13655	0.24147	-0.10019	-0.10534	0.04587	-0.09778	0.23051	0.64980	-0.10358
VAR121	0.20666	0.10779	0.13145	-0.17392	0.08993	-0.04670	0.00489	0.18667	0.80514	0.13232
VAR126	0.42878	-0.01784	0.18556	-0.15491	-0.05901	0.22035	0.22408	-0.10155	0.45233	0.17378
VAR127	0.53652	0.50299	0.03166	0.36738	0.28702	-0.07550	0.08855	0.05337	-0.10419	-0.07708
VAR128	0.61761	0.56582	0.06066	0.18124	0.00700	-0.07962	0.30600	0.03548	0.10006	-0.00455
VAR129	0.53215	0.57100	0.07463	0.15919	-0.21399	-0.11212	0.19272	-0.08966	0.16183	0.06232
VAR134	0.40086	-0.09727	0.44305	-0.07479	-0.04217	0.43764	0.04522	-0.27177	0.24105	0.02111
VAR135	0.89100	0.04121	0.05350	-0.03423	0.06393	0.20222	-0.04122	0.04550	0.16032	0.07757
VAR136	0.89638	0.11646	0.13093	-0.01515	0.01483	0.02689	0.01620	0.21927	0.04809	0.08900
VAR137	0.89100	0.04121	0.05350	-0.03423	0.06393	0.20222	-0.04122	0.04550	0.16032	0.07757
VAR142	0.08839	0.08038	0.94637	-0.12268	0.09088	0.04581	0.02356	-0.03022	0.01398	-0.03479
VAR143	0.03323	0.05532	0.93901	0.03285	0.03021	0.02392	-0.08694	-0.04274	0.11246	0.02144
VAR144	0.17090	0.13775	0.90485	-0.11029	-0.01124	0.09983	0.11936	0.03753	0.10313	0.00392
VAR145	0.04715	0.22212	0.08449	0.07838	-0.08116	0.06704	0.05693	-0.01652	0.09372	0.02303
VAR152	0.19198	-0.27116	0.27769	0.00249	-0.27460	0.55165	0.25307	0.03294	-0.22532	0.25054
VAR153	0.42513	-0.05637	0.35712	-0.00782	0.21675	0.24589	0.50847	-0.09674	0.22475	0.08877
VAR154	0.37341	0.05718	-0.23131	-0.14502	-0.39081	0.23949	0.46541	0.00207	0.09419	-0.16520
VAR155	0.00862	0.09510	0.03340	0.07260	0.02145	-0.14240	0.90993	0.00060	-0.01561	0.10019
VAR160	0.17283	-0.03887	-0.05278	0.07265	-0.24505	0.05733	-0.78161	0.07703	0.00047	0.36181
VAR161	0.11493	0.83954	0.20992	0.13244	0.27844	0.00381	-0.03893	0.09911	-0.05486	-0.07737
VAR162	0.07801	0.92048	0.25808	0.02552	-0.00601	-0.00411	0.01529	0.03376	0.08509	-0.00553
VAR163	0.06077	0.95059	0.01933	0.05922	-0.02176	-0.01346	0.00227	0.03546	0.07524	-0.00656
VAR168	0.00061	0.05289	0.49187	-0.01431	-0.15700	0.25190	-0.01969	-0.25370	-0.16749	0.04684
VAR169	-0.13960	0.19493	0.20193	0.04029	0.06030	0.20394	-0.18185	-0.07865	-0.04834	0.12914
VAR170	0.12142	0.33440	0.29845	0.00746	0.00636	0.11889	-0.05384	-0.16837	-0.03420	-0.05048
VAR171	0.06778	0.49163	0.07001	0.26920	0.27392	0.17601	0.18604	-0.05462	-0.13689	0.04307
VAR176	0.22064	0.04026	-0.06644	-0.10548	-0.15656	-0.19202	-0.17655	0.68781	0.15704	-0.08796
VAR177	-0.01584	0.21807	-0.07645	-0.05174	0.04265	0.42287	0.02076	0.02675	-0.25352	0.27759
VAR178	0.22577	0.06862	-0.27940	0.21468	-0.08899	0.22795	0.20656	0.35157	-0.16370	0.00178
VAR179	0.01928	0.45156	-0.20447	0.16483	0.20799	0.59192	0.01145	0.03552	-0.33945	0.01333
VAR184	0.04948	0.26366	0.13631	-0.37918	0.10807	-0.00079	-0.00756	0.36112	0.33711	0.08584
VAR185	0.31302	0.14120	0.07761	-0.18127	0.05522	-0.11564	0.02170	0.14520	-0.01185	-0.03953
VAR186	0.46795	0.23803	0.10712	0.46897	-0.08515	0.12234	0.08617	0.31246	-0.10706	-0.02782
VAR187	0.15325	0.17976	0.03509	-0.00861	-0.07230	0.01727	0.08167	0.09832	0.09814	-0.07877
VAR192	0.11614	-0.19307	-0.04455	-0.03134	-0.01087	0.81540	-0.01530	0.13945	0.08981	-0.06269
VAR193	0.24056	-0.05069	0.13183	-0.06173	0.09827	0.06571	-0.16077	-0.09035	0.05487	0.82400
VAR194	-0.11305	-0.10064	-0.02275	0.08196	0.01634	0.02681	0.21649	0.03801	0.69705	0.34867
VAR195	-0.02247	-0.00574	-0.10209	0.20926	0.03112	0.08872	0.00950	-0.09057	0.18466	0.86036
VAR200	0.15952	0.19932	0.20405	0.12627	0.05338	0.70033	-0.22831	-0.04805	0.06153	0.06315
VAR201	-0.04444	0.10175	0.01440	0.89629	0.15019	0.03307	-0.07575	0.00544	-0.10493	0.12519
VAR202	0.11046	0.12944	-0.03233	0.89042	0.15611	0.06721	0.02852	0.15004	-0.04699	-0.00989
VAR203	-0.03517	0.24402	-0.05217	0.89135	-0.00327	0.04942	0.03335	0.07908	-0.17246	0.05389
VAR208	0.28115	0.02232	0.29823	-0.00480	0.09161	0.54698	-0.08182	-0.15984	0.47212	0.02246
VAR209	0.03373	-0.03254	-0.01612	0.24983	0.29356	0.17728	-0.04712	0.73051	0.08627	-0.00352
VAR210	0.25426	0.04677	-0.08099	0.35226	0.30940	0.04200	0.11751	0.62206	0.19611	-0.15613
VAR211	-0.00455	0.39351	-0.12914	0.33945	0.21483	0.23185	0.17352	0.54778	0.04318	-0.15173
VAR216	0.16696	-0.06539	0.32022	0.08107	0.28084	0.62080	-0.08773	0.03418	-0.03642	0.18012
VAR217	0.14045	0.06118	-0.02220	-0.00099	0.90699	0.24245	-0.02795	0.00362	0.12502	0.02131
VAR218	0.01421	0.06583	0.00146	0.07891	0.95756	0.03773	0.07900	0.05084	0.06730	0.05431
VAR219	-0.06061	0.07273	0.01914	0.20792	0.91632	-0.13019	0.14651	0.11415	-0.05199	0.04023

FACTOR 11 FACTOR 12 FACTOR 13 FACTOR 14

AR110	0.56465	-0.11886	-0.03438	0.19626
AR111	0.56385	-0.00086	0.18044	-0.34677
AR112	0.88425	-0.09947	0.04901	0.03302
AR113	0.78142	0.16591	0.21882	-0.05219
AR118	0.09539	-0.15600	-0.18646	-0.26294
AR119	0.22588	-0.13085	-0.13651	-0.31936
AR120	0.06291	-0.04113	0.03170	0.17410
AR121	0.13394	0.12609	0.02895	0.04155
AR126	-0.05557	-0.09048	0.01919	0.33441
AR127	0.00906	0.01666	0.12215	0.07920
AR128	-0.03283	-0.02881	0.21164	-0.19915
AR129	0.08705	0.02545	0.08516	-0.21907
AR134	0.03251	-0.11235	0.23065	0.03997
AR135	0.02131	0.02888	0.10770	0.04804
AR136	0.05568	-0.11760	0.09218	0.16684
AR137	0.02131	0.02888	0.10770	0.04804
AR142	0.11574	-0.10488	-0.05886	-0.00864
AR143	0.06723	-0.20333	0.13563	-0.02383
AR144	0.02857	-0.14431	-0.07419	0.11444
AR145	0.07750	0.09935	0.04833	0.11089
AR152	0.03872	-0.09408	-0.19471	-0.02645
AR153	0.06306	0.43104	0.02252	-0.03495
AR154	0.16397	0.29761	0.10401	0.15858
AR155	0.03918	-0.05735	0.05369	0.02873
AR160	-0.12689	0.06548	-0.04355	0.05669
AR161	-0.03408	0.05638	0.06831	0.19861
AR162	-0.03153	0.06172	0.04494	0.07160
AR163	-0.05956	0.08241	0.05892	0.07121
AR168	0.02149	-0.61593	-0.05022	-0.14982
AR169	0.00118	-0.72329	0.22150	-0.04723
AR170	-0.03002	0.12877	-0.12446	0.78199
AR171	0.25364	0.53999	0.15653	0.02858
AR176	0.11964	-0.14536	-0.04577	0.05422
AR177	-0.09126	0.66300	0.14068	0.13100
AR178	0.21351	-0.00175	0.39408	0.51914
AR179	0.26591	0.16012	0.11357	-0.02760
AR184	0.30925	-0.42088	-0.10017	0.00953
AR185	0.02217	0.33942	0.76850	-0.00769
AR186	0.13001	0.18920	-0.08597	-0.18469
AR187	0.19055	0.10249	0.87987	-0.02369
AR192	-0.16917	0.31793	0.00109	0.00273
AR193	0.01189	0.04930	-0.24628	-0.05382
AR194	-0.02684	-0.18805	0.22664	-0.13071
AR195	0.10029	0.13886	0.07068	0.04249
AR200	-0.12892	0.06242	-0.21701	0.10771
AR201	0.08795	0.17547	-0.07027	0.03630
AR202	0.06575	-0.11431	0.02558	-0.03179
AR203	0.15368	0.07157	-0.10489	-0.02379
AR208	-0.04714	0.10397	0.00205	-0.01717
AR209	-0.28630	0.16155	0.21172	-0.09218
AR210	0.06787	0.09362	0.30311	-0.08156
AR211	0.03162	-0.05349	0.29356	-0.29191
AR216	-0.11932	-0.15293	0.22572	0.34625
AR217	0.03507	0.13541	-0.06867	-0.00254
AR218	0.01151	0.06292	-0.01389	-0.03110
AR219	-0.05281	-0.01177	0.04704	0.02624

Table 5.37
Factor Analysis of Staff Perceptions of Actual Influence.

11/17/77

	Variance Explained 20.1% Loading Required 0.306 FACTOR 1	Variance Explained 7.8% Loading Required 0.3108 FACTOR 2	Variance Explained 7.6% Loading Required 0.3137 FACTOR 3	Variance Explained 6.1% Loading Required 0.3166 FACTOR 4	Variance Explained 5.3% Loading Required 0.3196 FACTOR 5	Variance Explained 4.8% Loading Required 0.3227 FACTOR 6	Variance Explained 3.9% Loading Required 0.3259 FACTOR 7	Variance Explained 3.5% Loading Required 0.3293 FACTOR 8	Variance Explained 3.2% Loading Required 0.3326 FACTOR 9	Variance Explained 3.1% Loading Required 0.3362 FACTOR 10
VAR106	0.30906*	0.12089	0.03986	0.10112	0.13798	0.36259*	0.06035	-0.09527	0.33659*	0.26891
VAR107	0.21480	0.34750*	0.39370*	0.15830	-0.18386	0.29368	0.29032	-0.12243	-0.04301	0.26323
VAR108	0.44486*	0.50306*	0.25218	0.09300	-0.09905	0.09165	0.11044	-0.02048	0.24807	0.13847
VAR109	0.26987	0.32272*	0.60948*	0.12725	0.03466	-0.14044	-0.04057	-0.19548	0.13821	0.01749
VAR114	0.29700	0.17311	0.06611	0.17534	-0.24774	0.23158	-0.07871	-0.00684	0.16466	0.05241
VAR115	0.00445	0.50645*	0.06582	0.36650*	-0.01472	-0.15303	0.11634	-0.18821	0.35198*	0.13112
VAR116	0.35451*	0.34499*	0.13741	0.31647	0.03046	-0.41802*	0.07677	-0.04095	0.21423	0.18490
VAR117	0.12021	0.21217	0.42760*	0.30572	0.33284*	-0.28422	-0.17548	0.21810	0.02038	0.13901
VAR122	0.27105	0.07488	-0.49650*	-0.11886	0.41689*	0.32176	-0.07190	-0.06828	-0.03619	-0.00177
VAR123	0.20747	-0.34023*	0.07616	-0.05229	0.31230	0.45721*	0.30039	0.01355	0.11536	0.11398
VAR124	0.43154*	-0.43282*	-0.07095	-0.13866	0.17546	0.05045	0.14883	0.21741	0.14698	0.33398
VAR125	0.24374	-0.25465	0.46930*	-0.05953	0.46069*	0.03770	-0.27363	0.02021	0.23389	0.14105
VAR130	0.04619	0.27402	-0.17945	0.37180*	0.22672	0.24755	-0.08516	0.17031	-0.22087	-0.14433
VAR131	0.48578*	0.48483*	0.15579	0.08674	-0.29447	0.30715	0.09820	0.14592	-0.14699	-0.03430
VAR132	0.50462*	0.37795*	0.31410*	-0.03479	-0.09975	0.24599	0.07079	0.07956	-0.10255	-0.22259
VAR133	0.50747*	0.40354*	0.38300*	0.16208	-0.09195	0.11377	0.05204	0.05310	-0.04909	0.06637
VAR136	-0.05159	0.18134	-0.24587	0.28605	-0.07138	0.10661	0.16412	0.34917*	0.17421	-0.21541
VAR139	0.45865*	-0.07500	0.10671	-0.07042	-0.30477	0.40442*	-0.05122	0.18777	0.23111	0.33790*
VAR140	0.49054*	-0.00311	0.02048	0.03388	-0.15612	0.31045	-0.20966	0.27050	0.36226*	-0.10590
VAR141	0.51035*	0.31249*	0.38220*	-0.04785	0.03588	0.11211	0.14624	-0.10981	-0.18969	0.12679
VAR146	0.36025*	0.34706*	-0.22100	-0.53245*	0.15773	-0.10364	0.10944	-0.00574	-0.09459	-0.02635
VAR147	0.45593*	0.37420*	0.06001	-0.54760*	0.17066	-0.05042	0.11687	0.07854	0.05483	0.01121
VAR148	0.41373*	0.16183	0.00039	-0.61490*	0.33753*	-0.27893	0.14507	0.03736	0.09449	-0.07430
VAR149	0.31545*	0.19218	0.28161	-0.53907*	0.22967	-0.15299	0.22405	0.04190	0.07697	-0.16784
VAR156	0.34733*	0.25222	-0.32602*	0.03849	0.29818	0.04053	-0.13473	0.09832	-0.37783*	-0.20494
VAR157	0.59173*	-0.06991	-0.06230	-0.19202	-0.19142	0.15210	-0.20683	-0.30467	-0.11981	0.08257
VAR158	0.56728*	-0.22274	-0.10953	0.14850	-0.29007	0.10977	-0.25872	0.01200	-0.02190	0.22150
VAR159	0.33998*	-0.10443	0.46380*	0.03122	0.26534	0.30510	0.41035*	-0.23002	-0.17446	0.24859
VAR164	-0.00090	0.11016	0.22172	0.22044	0.21321	0.08803	0.56762*	-0.06002	0.13448	0.11877
VAR165	0.62331*	-0.05009	-0.17254	-0.21813	-0.37750*	0.19669	-0.08318	-0.30026	0.10092	-0.04803
VAR166	0.64954*	-0.00845	-0.22230	-0.28960	-0.03699	0.20912	-0.16148	0.04596	0.20659	0.19711
VAR167	0.50795*	-0.11252	0.31476*	-0.04820	0.03092	0.29161	-0.14798	0.21701	0.14381	-0.30633
VAR172	0.23022	-0.00264	-0.20153	0.16276	0.32981*	0.40970*	-0.01974	0.39511*	0.03882	-0.16773
VAR173	0.59984*	-0.27705	-0.26194	-0.18944	-0.29446	-0.14770	0.04446	-0.22540	0.01962	-0.01181
VAR174	0.67069*	-0.12444	-0.11127	-0.21744	0.14041	-0.05227	-0.02785	0.20904	0.17364	0.03468
VAR175	0.48130*	-0.36850*	0.37038*	0.03600	0.16321	-0.05730	0.13059	0.11744	-0.23786	-0.13569
VAR180	0.24594	-0.00550	-0.29794	0.22343	-0.15932	-0.01397	0.23180	0.56240*	-0.24135	0.33948*
VAR181	0.65341*	-0.02108	-0.11835	0.14073	-0.06279	-0.05400	0.34535*	0.06650	-0.10392	-0.29705
VAR182	0.48764*	-0.13752	-0.10505	0.19354	0.23687	-0.04018	0.20254	0.40073*	0.09421	-0.07400
VAR183	0.37221*	-0.31753*	0.38240*	0.35169*	0.10262	-0.10250	0.19549	-0.12320	0.33938*	-0.14499
VAR188	0.26404	-0.08402	-0.34786*	0.25577	0.56548*	0.04637	-0.10031	-0.31084	0.22252	0.02593
VAR189	0.67621*	-0.03521	-0.14376	-0.02248	-0.17686	-0.05834	0.21691	-0.30472	-0.17118	-0.16198
VAR190	0.62093*	-0.19797	-0.05238	-0.09423	0.12013	0.38750*	0.32304	-0.25688	0.11153	-0.01786
VAR191	0.41012*	-0.06185	0.31594*	0.08654	0.13120	-0.27280	-0.20066	0.06337	-0.03418	0.36030*
VAR196	0.39137*	-0.05963	-0.57030*	0.11107	0.17555	0.00123	-0.10168	0.10366	0.26832	0.16225
VAR197	0.73010*	-0.23159	-0.18924	0.05891	-0.22405	-0.12083	0.12354	-0.03527	-0.08429	0.06805
VAR198	0.66569*	-0.28438	-0.09552	0.02117	0.00817	-0.06228	0.06087	0.07731	-0.12158	0.25656
VAR199	0.52600*	-0.31139	0.34032*	0.04917	0.20875	-0.10733	-0.12718	0.13704	-0.15153	-0.06194
VAR204	0.19891	0.34674*	-0.35601*	0.32441*	0.30937	-0.02266	0.12213	-0.08470	-0.05021	0.05924
VAR205	0.44780*	-0.13543	-0.13641	0.44653*	-0.13537	-0.12545	0.08976	-0.27415	0.21845	-0.30245
VAR206	0.56425*	-0.42190*	-0.12454	0.34297*	-0.22203	-0.24496	0.06105	0.00140	0.09276	0.10129
VAR207	0.33769*	-0.40091*	0.08727	0.40065*	-0.05273	-0.29244	-0.31439	0.02494	0.09617	-0.06068
VAR212	0.25468	0.24542	-0.47709*	0.36346*	0.36333*	0.04591	-0.09961	-0.06373	-0.14144	-0.16022
VAR213	0.56532*	0.49990*	-0.20784	-0.07139	-0.24552	-0.26310	-0.12675	-0.04894	-0.14635	-0.00214
VAR214	0.56180*	0.38208*	-0.14537	-0.10529	-0.13511	-0.31512	-0.25504	0.08990	-0.26024	0.21779

Variance
Explained 2.86
Loading
Required 0.3398
FACTOR 11

Variance
Explained 2.57
Loading
Required 0.3436
FACTOR 12

Variance
Explained 2.49
Loading
Required 0.3470
FACTOR 13

Variance
Explained 2.19
Loading
Required 0.3515
FACTOR 14

FACTOR 15

FACTOR 16

R106	0.15411	-0.30824	-0.03378	0.22643	0.08098	-0.04315
R107	-0.11490	0.06990	0.07044	-0.03501	0.18404	0.02484
R108	0.00538	-0.34045	0.16158	-0.10281	0.05983	-0.05240
R109	-0.10943	-0.04500	0.34543	0.04371	-0.11349	-0.15591
R114	<u>-0.57462</u>	0.14006	0.09534	-0.17758	-0.00798	-0.13299
R115	0.01701	0.33437	-0.28340	0.20759	-0.06153	0.09450
R116	0.10725	0.02066	-0.33478	0.12768	-0.09391	0.04494
R117	-0.06033	0.10474	<u>-0.35749</u>	0.04793	0.02513	0.10798
R122	-0.07304	-0.12429	-0.08042	-0.10542	0.08466	-0.03837
R123	-0.03566	0.22535	-0.15438	-0.10146	0.15046	-0.02816
R124	0.12086	0.21363	0.03368	0.00649	0.16328	-0.19021
R125	-0.05092	0.18063	0.17618	-0.01423	0.03491	-0.10406
R130	<u>-0.45272</u>	0.27974	0.10588	0.01705	0.05041	0.18815
R131	-0.12563	0.16572	0.03987	0.01126	0.05034	-0.20481
R132	-0.13861	-0.15567	-0.08572	-0.09032	0.00504	-0.23472
R133	0.01041	-0.00669	0.06543	-0.17472	-0.16374	0.09828
R138	-0.27801	0.26540	<u>0.36203</u>	0.29360	0.01381	0.04762
R139	-0.14017	-0.05260	-0.19775	-0.01910	0.11740	0.15672
R140	-0.07747	<u>-0.34400</u>	0.00085	-0.06506	0.02413	0.10353
R141	0.28637	-0.07598	-0.18783	0.22190	-0.04736	0.04042
R146	0.08249	0.15872	0.28991	-0.14248	-0.05971	0.21543
R147	0.19488	0.23857	0.03386	0.04122	0.11602	-0.06234
R148	0.09037	0.04584	-0.06509	0.05070	-0.02526	0.01423
R149	0.06411	-0.09377	-0.04233	-0.09746	-0.27950	-0.06379
R156	0.14937	-0.05982	-0.25024	-0.13975	0.03771	0.19014
R157	-0.11246	<u>0.35950</u>	-0.01120	0.12876	-0.10888	0.14816
R158	-0.13336	-0.05367	-0.14061	0.10921	-0.17215	0.12929
R159	-0.16982	0.09909	-0.01660	0.02717	0.13331	-0.08551
R164	0.02454	-0.21784	0.12731	-0.05341	0.02012	<u>0.51445</u>
R165	-0.02071	-0.01114	-0.09476	0.04454	-0.29493	0.04722
R166	0.11236	-0.13349	-0.01199	0.21142	-0.15920	0.04679
R167	0.14188	0.15679	-0.07150	-0.07075	-0.25566	-0.01745
R172	0.09891	-0.04390	0.22143	0.04134	0.16281	0.10701
R173	0.07453	-0.11748	0.11374	0.13022	0.12178	-0.09765
R174	0.04827	-0.22834	-0.04017	0.25930	0.00610	0.13378
R175	0.16306	-0.01423	0.17394	0.17341	-0.14767	-0.05183
R180	0.00854	-0.04989	0.06588	0.01836	-0.02026	-0.00119
R181	-0.09542	0.15961	0.02184	0.03632	-0.17522	0.03840
R182	-0.00908	-0.09947	-0.16928	0.12816	0.18164	-0.27482
R183	-0.01805	-0.07880	0.15266	0.24077	-0.20128	-0.06746
R188	-0.15204	-0.01602	0.04256	-0.02123	-0.07097	0.02462
R189	-0.14997	0.08155	-0.12002	0.13456	0.18897	-0.00672
R190	-0.02032	-0.14578	0.02591	-0.10076	0.16293	-0.05963
R191	-0.25731	0.03135	0.05586	0.23215	0.29329	0.18267
R196	-0.15328	0.09878	0.21658	0.09533	-0.09783	-0.09423
R197	-0.18340	0.18155	-0.07190	-0.15852	-0.02886	0.01394
R198	-0.22927	0.08077	0.10657	<u>-0.35460</u>	-0.01494	0.23309
R199	-0.22906	0.01548	-0.07972	<u>-0.39438</u>	-0.01692	0.00190
R204	-0.22923	-0.07063	-0.04973	-0.14846	-0.30586	-0.23725
R205	0.24553	0.03142	-0.13656	-0.24217	0.20167	-0.09693
R206	0.14938	-0.03541	0.13098	-0.10486	0.05499	0.05243
R207	0.28267	-0.01239	0.16953	-0.12297	-0.09498	0.01181
R212	0.03650	-0.10455	0.00799	0.05029	-0.15590	-0.13388
R213	0.03929	0.04569	0.03408	-0.01231	-0.22747	-0.12962
R214	0.02073	-0.03770	0.07910	-0.05163	0.04140	0.03897
R215	0.01990	-0.13830	0.14387	0.05250	0.18407	0.10770

Table 5.39

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Staff Perceptions of Actual Influence

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
R106.	0.35638*	-0.07289	-0.04686	0.23906	0.09365	0.02608	0.03955	0.22241	0.23248	-0.07534
R107	0.72712*	0.03494	-0.06267	-0.13849	0.14392	-0.07550	-0.07640	0.02800	-0.03219	0.12662
R108	0.61918*	0.10516	0.15945	0.13610	0.00996	0.27487	0.28346	0.03830	-0.04231	0.14734
R109	0.48538*	-0.01827	0.11312	-0.00193	0.26655	-0.04330	0.31107	-0.28346	0.30498	0.20821
R114	0.27701	0.12592	0.00596	-0.04578	0.01921	0.11863	0.02711	0.03205	-0.02705	0.06370
R115	0.21505	0.05459	-0.00494	0.10967	-0.04802	-0.11086	-0.03470	-0.14432	-0.17362	0.00502*
R116	0.13637	0.18588	0.10286	0.10139	-0.06620	0.00737	0.20115	0.09123	0.07960	0.78748*
R117	0.07553	-0.12100	-0.01185	-0.01129	0.31768	0.05534	0.17813	0.06705	0.13911	0.68138*
R122	-0.01837	0.05894	0.18696	0.61825*	0.11164	0.15952	-0.08500	0.10960	-0.21207	-0.22371
R123	0.10020	0.18369	0.11731	0.09029	0.44090*	0.15989	0.61153*	0.18842	0.06262	-0.07446
R124	-0.11420	0.28266	0.23586	-0.01549	0.43773*	0.05554	-0.24763	0.53370*	0.08898	-0.05449
R125	-0.04087	-0.05694	0.15595	0.01800	0.79753*	0.10913	-0.00485	-0.05322	0.22932	0.06525
R130	0.05047	-0.12002	-0.05537	0.22844	0.00299	-0.06459	0.05522	0.05487	0.06624	0.06746
R131	0.80140*	0.02175	0.08910	0.00571	-0.02915	0.13453	0.06570	0.12111	0.02116	0.06207
R132	0.71092*	0.06229	0.19760	0.07947	-0.01914	0.34479*	0.06522	-0.05568	0.16933	0.01200
R133	0.61499*	-0.05028	0.13269	0.02022	0.05180	0.15704	0.18766	0.01445	0.18654	0.22334
R138	0.09009	-0.06928	-0.11334	0.11710	-0.12164	0.07518	-0.01113	0.14253	-0.02807	0.00848
R139	0.25737	0.17196	0.00439	-0.15924	0.02134	0.73470*	-0.12115	-0.05403	-0.00847	-0.05729
R140	0.18251	0.06571	-0.02441	0.08817	0.08433	0.78320*	0.15482	0.11885	-0.02992	-0.05927
R141	0.12487	0.15323	0.13472	-0.17170	0.21254	0.12443	-0.14444	0.12233	0.56221*	0.10414
R146	0.08555	0.00244	0.74477*	0.12158	-0.04991	-0.12042	0.21777	0.01903	-0.13001	-0.19150
R147	0.24600	0.07329	0.80705*	-0.04300	0.15684	0.01599	0.07469	0.06245	-0.08316	0.06667
R148	-0.05444	0.11130	0.87091*	0.05723	0.07428	0.06590	0.07625	0.01757	0.03907	0.00603
R149	0.14107	-0.05374	0.76154*	-0.00699	-0.04597	0.14566	-0.03522	-0.11833	0.21299	0.04724
R156	0.02872	0.04820	0.20032	0.39725*	-0.12218	0.12129	0.19172	0.08681	0.01951	0.02688
R157	0.13691	0.10442	0.15127	0.01060	0.21318	0.00020	0.04837	-0.00072	0.07120	-0.00496
R158	0.01017	0.09002	-0.21572	0.11362	0.03035	0.29781	0.14433	0.28000	0.10431	0.08623
R159	0.29582	-0.10711	-0.11482	0.06754	0.75062*	0.02648	0.06865	-0.12651	0.18837	0.00003
R164	0.13229	0.00137	0.01261	0.00659	-0.07582	-0.00800	-0.18216	0.00167	0.09669	0.13765
R165	0.14638	0.17367	0.16258	0.09712	-0.14525	0.29715	-0.01120	-0.10845	0.06132	-0.05509
R166	0.01558	0.00121	0.33853*	0.20363	0.09080	0.41510*	0.11262	0.24622	0.01970	-0.01622
R167	0.15973	-0.04647	0.21213	-0.03320	0.21560	0.52222*	-0.14029	-0.08510	0.34772*	0.04940
R172	0.06222	0.19895	-0.03991	0.47676*	0.22527	0.07505	-0.07864	-0.25803	0.04865	-0.23520
R173	-0.03935	0.55820*	0.17144	0.00593	-0.05856	0.10653	0.17183	0.13807	0.14475	-0.20231
R174	-0.10449	0.18286	0.30799*	0.14267	0.13286	0.47735*	0.18326	0.31736	0.21714	0.06875
R175	-0.00845	0.15014	0.14960	-0.10577	0.24433	0.10114	-0.03259	0.15107	0.81504*	-0.00709
R180	0.12627	-0.01156	-0.08472	0.04401	-0.20381	0.00307	0.08314	0.80922*	0.06709	-0.00869
R181	0.22526	0.36529*	0.22009	0.18343	-0.19401	0.13842	-0.07380	0.14001	0.39879*	0.08443
R182	0.02669	0.37437*	0.11973	0.28553	0.07419	0.33364*	-0.08578	0.51210*	0.21310	0.14419
R183	0.14952	0.17746	-0.13517	0.04656	0.09542	-0.08228	0.01060	-0.00200	0.86222*	0.03866
R188	-0.12121	0.14087	0.03196	0.77410*	0.24917	0.00717	0.00815	-0.10846	-0.05637	0.14690
R189	0.27046	0.58882*	0.15893	0.09221	-0.06170	0.03431	0.01781	-0.00015	0.18398	0.03098
R190	0.00261	0.71050*	0.36165*	0.15211	0.07075	0.01072	0.07584	0.10201	0.21378	0.04501
R191	0.03624	0.29074	0.07488	-0.10638	0.32205*	0.26321	0.37870*	-0.17164	0.34648*	0.15453
R196	-0.17993	0.13573	0.07380	0.53683*	0.12635	0.10048	0.08650	0.34830*	-0.11394	-0.00820
R197	0.13923	0.49226*	0.07088	0.07790	0.02173	0.06905	0.00895	0.29874	0.14095	0.03887
R198	0.08113	0.30980	0.09609	0.10753	0.24522	0.06558	0.09074	0.30834*	0.10487	-0.10363
R199	0.11177	0.21763	0.07149	0.02531	0.40986*	0.21383	0.06772	0.10555	0.33647*	-0.00748
R204	0.21286	-0.00325	0.00941	0.75108*	-0.17287	-0.13625	-0.00850	0.11816	-0.01429	0.18667
R205	0.04495	0.77037*	-0.16880	0.17901	-0.06962	0.16901	-0.02325	-0.11900	0.08427	0.18133
R206	-0.11090	0.58267*	-0.16992	0.00748	0.04630	0.11156	0.15961	0.33652*	0.27232	0.04457
R207	-0.27321	0.30890	-0.24095	0.00601	0.18200	0.13178	0.30660	0.06094	0.38171*	0.09432
R212	0.01091	0.05269	-0.03517	0.76551*	-0.13748	0.00768	0.14595	0.05218	0.11296	0.06732
R213	0.38712*	0.34267*	0.28526	0.10314	-0.12750	-0.04370	0.53394*	0.11002	-0.15897	0.11615
R214	0.24229	0.09448	0.27082	0.09494	-0.02917	-0.05826	0.64643*	0.27573	-0.05319	0.10188
R215	0.18004	0.10645	0.20456	0.09432	0.21044	0.23133	0.74865*	0.00030	0.03017	0.17212

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14	FACTOR 15	FACTOR 16
R106	0.18643	-0.02054	-0.32766	0.13415	0.39625 *	0.14467
R107	-0.01596	0.02294	0.01046	0.07770	-0.07922	0.28262
R108	-0.23800	0.18743	-0.07169	-0.04044	-0.07771	0.26407
R109	0.36967 *	0.13023	0.09156	-0.08466	0.04630	0.10385
R114	0.13402	0.74730 *	-0.04962	0.09384	-0.08199	-0.04878
R115	0.01163	0.11728	0.21005	0.09318	-0.11825	0.09592
R116	-0.06351	0.07846	-0.08071	0.04683	-0.00298	0.06499
R117	0.15356	-0.13902	-0.10709	-0.22434	0.18193	-0.00576
AR122	0.23312	-0.10427	-0.11874	0.12564	-0.08220	-0.01294
AR123	0.12770	-0.01305	-0.04452	0.11294	0.02029	0.12523
AR124	-0.06921	0.15150	0.00435	0.16406	-0.03799	-0.05929
AR125	-0.16409	0.09733	0.00689	-0.06096	0.11108	-0.01027
AR130	0.69543 *	0.39282 *	0.21251	-0.10510	-0.08647	0.07418
AR131	0.13736	0.07682	0.19798	0.19598	0.00032	-0.18017
AR132	0.03254	-0.04852	-0.08049	0.01617	0.07291	-0.16654
AR133	0.05059	0.20476	-0.03978	0.13957	0.22844	0.18479
AR138	0.04057	-0.04893	0.83262 *	-0.06040	-0.06216	0.03619
AR139	0.13165	-0.03940	0.10231	0.27683	0.06601	-0.04098
VAR140	-0.08537	0.11643	0.01550	0.15949	0.03815	0.07655
VAR141	0.08809	0.06348	0.36924 *	0.29033	-0.17669	0.09127
VAR146	0.16057	0.05341	0.11436	0.22652	0.11164	0.15071
VAR147	0.12603	0.08714	0.03493	0.10553	-0.11496	-0.08602
VAR148	-0.01041	-0.11859	-0.07718	0.06086	-0.01272	-0.03035
VAR149	-0.17070	-0.02779	-0.17033	-0.05233	0.15588	0.00043
VAR156	0.63434 *	-0.07323	-0.19255	0.06404	0.11320	-0.05368
VAR157	0.12274	0.01248	0.04595	0.81479 *	0.02907	-0.09915
VAR158	-0.01706	0.01642	-0.08197	0.67555 *	0.06451	-0.05878
VAR159	0.06536	-0.08113	-0.26212	0.23268	-0.01007	-0.08025
VAR164	0.01067	-0.05375	0.02304	-0.22808	-0.01141	0.84901 *
VAR165	-0.12077	0.14131	-0.09686	0.77073 *	0.00073	-0.08514
VAR166	-0.08664	0.16262	-0.08611	0.55678 *	-0.22139	-0.00728
VAR167	0.13137	0.29312	0.05067	0.18156	0.22734	-0.16638
VAR172	0.24769	0.12207	0.06374	0.11728 *	-0.25341	0.25571
VAR173	-0.15076	0.04754	-0.05047	0.49106 *	-0.17211	-0.08770
VAR174	-0.02408	-0.07038	-0.03266	0.29496	-0.15238	0.07741
VAR175	0.02433	0.06062	-0.02860	0.08400	0.06766	0.00771
VAR180	0.11333	0.03009	0.12687	0.07514	0.07076	0.04796
VAR181	0.14010	-0.02413	0.27903	0.31407	0.21785	0.00092
VAR182	0.07197	-0.09799	0.10126	-0.13351	-0.06895	-0.18728
VAR183	-0.03224	-0.06856	0.00177	0.07768	0.04388	0.07430
VAR188	0.00724	-0.01605	0.06633	0.09467	-0.00276	0.16102
VAR189	0.13160	-0.22580	0.02045	0.48749 *	-0.06798	-0.06650
VAR190	-0.20764	-0.09418	-0.13869	0.14452	0.07273	0.14669
VAR191	0.15629	0.35362 *	0.23568	0.00389	0.07062	-0.02935
VAR196	-0.13032	0.10141	0.34336	0.30303	-0.01483	-0.05143
VAR197	0.00780	-0.02882	0.03242	0.56199 *	0.32307 *	-0.06496
VAR198	0.02084	-0.04532	-0.04926	0.45301 *	0.48920 *	0.22871
VAR199	0.04487	-0.12380	-0.20247	0.06499	0.59100 *	-0.05084
VAR204	-0.06177	-0.03670	0.02694	-0.00837	0.18077	-0.04801
VAR205	0.11030	0.32766	-0.02620	0.06052	0.10222	-0.03859
VAR206	-0.08472	0.27093	0.01055	0.29451	0.16279	0.12084
VAR207	-0.03574	0.42409 *	-0.01044	0.08153	0.24010	-0.03736
VAR212	0.25012	0.05843	0.07081	0.00816	-0.05077	-0.10796
VAR213	0.14223	0.04992	0.02960	0.25544	-0.05319	-0.23563
VAR214	0.11777	0.02678	-0.09996	0.31982	0.09666	-0.10820
VAR215	0.11028	0.03061	0.00567	0.09155	0.00597	-0.14824

Table 5.42.

Factor Analysis of Staff Perceptions of Desired Influence

	Variance Explained 20.9% loadings Required 0.308	Variance Explained 10.5% loadings Required 0.3108	Variance Explained 6.2% loadings Required 0.3137	Variance Explained 5.3% loadings Required 0.3166	Variance Explained 4.9% loadings Required 0.3196	Variance Explained 4.4% loadings Required 0.3227	Variance Explained 3.8% loadings Required 0.3259	Variance Explained 3.8% loadings Required 0.3293	Variance Explained 3.6% loadings Required 0.3326	Variance Explained 3.1% loadings Required 0.3362
	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
VAR110	0.28086	0.16242	0.27681	0.59548	0.13180	-0.12632	0.09148	0.25603	-0.18870	0.19893
VAR111	0.43388	0.03547	0.43623	0.47735	0.01008	-0.21632	0.17036	0.28778	-0.24357	-0.14206
VAR112	0.41973	0.14086	0.37773	0.25051	-0.05841	-0.18599	0.33925	0.17555	-0.35436	-0.09768
VAR113	0.33303	0.03813	0.41480	0.24688	-0.13170	-0.42598	0.20861	0.17835	-0.21620	-0.25833
VAR118	0.04225	0.52087	-0.08584	0.03426	-0.04341	-0.15149	0.13312	-0.04927	0.02408	0.13526
VAR119	0.52192	0.09812	-0.19288	-0.15255	-0.45625	-0.18557	0.27593	-0.25620	-0.09238	0.11246
VAR120	0.60900	0.05067	-0.15213	-0.07216	-0.18405	-0.13729	0.27207	-0.47528	-0.07613	0.02405
VAR121	0.53731	0.00791	-0.20887	-0.17574	0.45701	-0.15666	0.30358	-0.11050	0.11046	0.05142
VAR126	0.00215	0.59207	-0.09779	-0.03376	-0.18422	0.18961	-0.06393	0.25731	-0.06489	-0.08178
VAR127	0.34356	0.15366	0.52613	0.21439	-0.16064	0.09277	0.00863	-0.04343	0.54369	-0.11377
VAR128	0.30544	0.25121	0.51616	0.13832	-0.28803	0.32088	0.04394	-0.01567	0.42184	-0.11172
VAR129	0.18266	0.24379	0.20616	0.38723	-0.38878	0.26952	0.13517	-0.18075	0.44282	-0.16787
VAR134	-0.13112	0.60680	-0.12483	-0.03737	0.21899	0.16991	-0.00786	-0.08400	-0.12497	-0.15771
VAR135	0.32260	0.48899	0.58172	-0.50634	-0.10116	0.07205	-0.13374	-0.16907	-0.14738	-0.17041
VAR136	0.30633	0.47945	0.31589	-0.47689	-0.05777	0.09199	-0.18358	-0.15881	-0.16502	-0.16171
VAR137	0.27487	0.00292	0.36602	-0.41337	0.03304	-0.01083	0.01335	-0.16155	-0.32670	-0.05370
VAR142	-0.00290	0.48651	-0.19067	-0.03925	0.22087	-0.12584	0.27783	-0.26807	0.27316	0.35718
VAR143	0.30339	0.00008	0.29767	-0.28784	0.19278	-0.21262	0.11210	0.02871	0.34293	0.09810
VAR144	0.11496	0.35478	-0.08186	-0.26435	0.32795	-0.16376	0.41952	-0.04381	0.31028	-0.00065
VAR145	0.31217	-0.11267	0.28631	0.30416	0.19743	-0.04406	0.07087	-0.07316	0.08335	0.59860
VAR152	0.18142	0.47100	-0.14817	0.08356	-0.21198	0.19855	-0.14400	0.00962	-0.21614	0.36655
VAR153	0.54862	0.19742	0.37703	-0.12837	0.18105	-0.26778	0.36046	0.00142	-0.09711	0.07610
VAR154	0.48837	0.04091	0.30760	-0.11505	0.35015	-0.27064	-0.30366	-0.07132	0.00538	0.05341
VAR155	0.59830	-0.11452	0.15832	-0.07770	0.10202	-0.18665	0.08138	0.05520	-0.20773	0.25892
VAR160	0.10064	0.45310	-0.13234	0.28009	0.51915	0.11746	-0.11385	-0.19802	0.06627	0.01657
VAR161	0.59901	-0.18877	0.00184	0.13957	0.25191	0.13526	-0.14807	-0.24302	-0.01633	-0.06830
VAR162	0.50402	-0.05339	-0.07516	0.26825	0.20724	0.21428	-0.01418	-0.46133	-0.12967	-0.05099
VAR163	0.33204	-0.20500	0.26088	-0.05149	0.43574	0.41850	0.12973	-0.06647	-0.15640	-0.03016
VAR168	-0.21108	0.43500	0.01975	0.09452	-0.09420	-0.16786	-0.34627	0.10870	0.41762	0.29917
VAR169	0.69849	-0.11522	-0.04708	0.00410	-0.06521	0.02557	-0.16198	0.16703	-0.01384	0.09091
VAR170	0.63551	-0.05440	-0.04417	-0.07040	0.13975	-0.20189	-0.18891	0.30880	0.13192	0.04710
VAR171	0.34924	-0.40231	0.25052	-0.33157	0.15762	0.36235	0.05900	0.30762	0.13798	0.18592
VAR176	-0.00288	0.68061	-0.21607	0.07847	0.22111	-0.08632	-0.31900	0.08922	-0.06801	0.14977
VAR177	0.51819	-0.09307	-0.28920	-0.09896	-0.36842	-0.19593	-0.20208	0.23166	0.02375	0.09049
VAR178	0.45515	0.09196	-0.47714	0.17129	-0.17101	-0.11778	0.15586	0.22417	0.03570	0.08548
VAR179	0.34668	0.50850	-0.10403	-0.14100	-0.21196	0.24764	-0.13074	0.19221	-0.08176	0.27367
VAR184	-0.08108	0.55086	0.00548	-0.07775	-0.08954	0.24550	-0.13359	0.34137	-0.15667	0.08160
VAR185	0.63216	0.35391	-0.21766	-0.13609	-0.13512	-0.07914	0.14261	0.06049	0.00555	0.05781
VAR186	0.56507	0.41542	-0.04189	-0.20021	0.24600	-0.07145	0.15968	0.24971	0.21329	-0.15819
VAR187	0.45314	0.00718	-0.02856	-0.34169	0.24602	0.16237	0.20139	0.26840	0.03046	0.02424
VAR192	-0.15376	0.41765	0.02601	0.29968	-0.07399	0.31157	-0.00161	0.14941	0.03428	-0.16843
VAR193	0.75413	-0.06722	-0.21327	-0.03909	-0.03530	-0.11194	-0.20259	-0.01537	0.06956	-0.26327
VAR194	0.64215	0.01679	-0.28085	0.16918	0.09242	-0.11314	-0.16908	0.04697	0.19797	-0.26238
VAR195	0.40227	-0.30786	-0.17625	0.32203	0.10317	0.35767	-0.01018	0.25925	0.13538	-0.07139
VAR200	0.05240	0.37570	-0.13295	0.00260	0.26590	0.15599	0.34356	0.07307	0.04876	-0.14799
VAR201	0.69459	-0.24213	-0.24594	0.08322	0.01295	-0.15392	-0.17591	-0.04807	-0.01634	-0.21376
VAR202	0.68154	-0.23624	-0.30728	0.15191	0.16582	0.00092	-0.22509	-0.01946	0.06655	-0.21977
VAR203	0.58935	-0.44091	-0.11527	0.12176	0.19589	0.17262	0.02757	-0.03013	0.00722	-0.10278
VAR208	0.06870	0.57373	-0.10331	0.07304	-0.08910	0.35197	0.10586	0.35455	-0.02503	-0.05335
VAR209	0.64923	0.21512	-0.09014	-0.05770	-0.31190	0.17250	-0.17835	-0.14007	-0.16473	0.07537
VAR210	0.62506	0.12826	0.21372	0.18855	-0.20833	0.18572	-0.31403	-0.25376	-0.00625	0.11007
VAR211	0.46723	-0.07048	0.14128	0.10986	-0.08041	0.48477	0.06727	-0.12972	-0.10467	0.27954
VAR216	0.00497	0.49926	-0.40383	0.33119	0.23386	0.20480	0.02401	-0.16053	-0.10401	-0.04478
VAR217	0.79050	0.10388	-0.20410	-0.03675	-0.10064	-0.04300	0.02970	-0.01703	-0.02422	-0.02933
VAR218	0.73613	0.04126	-0.26106	0.19238	0.02916	0.03813	-0.05153	0.09776	-0.01007	-0.00409
VAR219	0.68591	-0.23246	-0.10536	-0.00662	0.08900	0.25652	0.33095	0.03593	-0.05495	0.12202

Variance Explained 2.6% of Variance Explained 2.4% of Variance Explained 2.1% of Variance Explained 2.0% of
 Loading Required 0.3348 Loading Required 0.3436 Loading Required 0.3470 Loading Required 0.3470
 FACTOR 11 FACTOR 12 FACTOR 13 FACTOR 14 FACTOR 15

110	-0.01262	-0.02626	0.20140	0.13557	0.06576
111	0.08010	-0.10192	0.12562	0.04482	0.08581
112	0.03707	0.05802	-0.08100	-0.10045	0.08624
113	0.00938	0.00699	-0.10969	-0.03753	0.15287
118	0.31609	0.43145	0.24421	-0.02897	0.04138
119	0.10510	0.02011	0.05207	0.21939	-0.00894
120	-0.00232	-0.05168	-0.02032	0.13795	-0.12020
121	0.04538	-0.02514	-0.01889	0.10888	-0.10028
126	0.17040	0.26580	0.05421	-0.21503	-0.29379
127	0.18084	-0.06699	-0.17776	0.12274	-0.02214
128	-0.02113	-0.00176	0.13743	-0.01357	-0.05441
129	-0.06335	0.06375	-0.00413	-0.00946	-0.02616
134	-0.03484	0.04420	0.16459	-0.12237	0.09575
135	0.03112	-0.11856	0.13044	0.09430	0.09484
136	-0.02476	-0.16234	0.19465	0.14718	0.10281
137	0.01733	0.09536	0.13308	-0.14279	0.09608
142	0.20408	-0.06225	0.10320	-0.01751	0.13677
143	-0.00854	0.05148	-0.20582	-0.33713	0.22580
144	-0.14902	-0.01875	-0.07773	-0.14342	0.15264
145	-0.06413	-0.14027	0.13456	0.06783	-0.02226
152	0.12948	0.15989	-0.11002	-0.12164	-0.05573
153	-0.04388	0.10949	-0.06912	-0.07211	-0.18025
154	-0.14966	-0.13179	-0.10972	0.11455	-0.33254
155	-0.28355	0.10970	-0.20992	0.05598	-0.19530
160	-0.00807	-0.17088	-0.12536	-0.07339	-0.07691
161	0.39264	-0.13644	-0.30739	0.11589	0.11974
162	0.22391	0.02560	0.14040	0.20976	-0.07206
163	0.31583	0.26886	-0.12625	0.11066	-0.00790
168	-0.02584	0.20740	0.08154	0.17405	0.24529
169	0.44807	-0.08798	-0.03880	-0.02268	0.03238
170	0.11881	-0.05763	0.11511	0.01300	-0.24894
171	0.14159	-0.04371	0.01399	0.02220	0.01797
176	0.11783	0.10302	-0.01617	0.07179	0.12976
177	0.26027	-0.23143	-0.22620	-0.05976	0.15520
178	-0.15608	-0.19631	0.13475	0.08983	-0.06926
179	0.10964	-0.00213	-0.05091	-0.00000	0.27820
184	-0.10932	-0.33459	-0.06906	0.27353	0.06482
185	-0.17760	0.13771	-0.20600	0.23344	0.06505
186	-0.05622	-0.01150	-0.08792	0.07872	0.02478
187	-0.18387	0.23121	0.00045	0.13369	0.09267
192	-0.14560	0.27004	-0.33908	0.20136	0.10403
193	-0.08866	0.05097	0.04908	0.08585	-0.07261
194	-0.05969	0.21167	0.16760	-0.04002	-0.11501
195	-0.10324	-0.04410	0.10051	0.04415	-0.06798
200	0.18722	-0.50168	0.08071	-0.16114	-0.00512
201	0.02744	0.02105	-0.00528	-0.06068	0.28468
202	-0.07930	0.01558	0.20056	-0.04236	0.20325
203	-0.04462	0.16635	0.25507	0.08864	0.18647
208	0.13875	-0.02003	-0.02399	-0.08026	-0.25446
209	-0.13073	-0.00082	-0.06644	-0.12178	0.10363
210	-0.23138	-0.13679	0.12708	-0.14485	0.01859
211	0.34739	0.07661	-0.00288	-0.21383	0.09061
216	-0.14525	-0.21828	-0.26730	0.08106	0.09535
217	0.03080	0.01022	-0.09878	-0.26677	0.00956
218	-0.19890	0.04254	0.04087	-0.20020	-0.05824
219	-0.00807	0.03870	0.04138	-0.15280	-0.12227

Table 5.44

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Staff Perceptions of Desired Influence

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
R110	0.10108	0.72600*	-0.10586	0.16486	0.00111	-0.07379	0.01327	0.09505	-0.23454	0.10543
R111	0.17973	0.88449*	0.04111	0.02962	0.06176	-0.01707	-0.01404	0.18280	-0.08758	0.03792
R112	0.04738	0.78466*	0.12650	-0.02114	0.11246	0.15998	0.12339	0.03038	0.15755	-0.00219
R113	0.10708	0.77799*	0.11519	-0.12714	-0.03429	0.11086	-0.06978	0.09713	0.16543	-0.13370
R118	0.01335	0.11862	0.11609	-0.02457	0.10105	0.20738	0.41920*	-0.03943	0.13406	-0.09391
R119	0.15357	0.07234	0.15960	-0.08834	0.03659	0.85440*	0.03965	0.03007	-0.04290	0.01351
R120	0.25390	0.04000	0.15713	0.09772	0.20411	0.77203*	-0.11252	0.05074	0.05767	-0.05848
R121	0.21882	0.01703	0.03633	-0.11549	-0.06793	0.77131*	0.05081	0.14554	0.10302	0.09465
R126	0.00745	-0.01896	0.15880	0.04728	-0.08800	0.00438	0.82601*	0.05015	-0.01595	-0.04895
R127	0.03316	0.18876	0.09455	-0.01583	0.14242	0.04046	-0.01634	0.85170*	0.11844	0.02456
R128	0.02613	0.13652	0.25046	-0.02051	-0.03731	0.01249	0.13604	0.83711*	0.02344	0.09826
R129	0.09259	0.04281	-0.14490	-0.03365	0.03756	0.15453	0.03655	0.76235*	0.01042	-0.11674
R134	0.03962	-0.08572	0.31516*	0.43384*	-0.04451	-0.12785	0.32429	-0.13942	0.06508	-0.06730
R135	-0.01672	0.02996	0.90984*	0.04409	0.01162	0.14068	0.09203	0.14307	0.06701	0.07135
R136	0.02634	0.00065	0.89614*	0.10553	-0.02885	0.10781	0.04918	0.10252	-0.01981	0.10470
R137	-0.03787	0.17556	0.74267*	-0.05788	0.11097	0.08421	0.16392	-0.10661	0.21480	-0.00210
R142	-0.12993	-0.10825	0.03011	0.40110*	0.03697	0.25125	0.03458	0.01004	0.31843	-0.00846
R143	0.09684	0.08735	0.13060	-0.09581	0.05329	-0.01197	-0.10385	0.15024	0.76861*	0.08026
R144	0.00211	-0.03127	0.08429	0.31280	-0.10951	0.15066	-0.01710	-0.00918	0.67007*	0.19686
R145	-0.06929	0.26592	-0.10463	0.08124	0.12468	0.05800	-0.26971	0.14710	-0.03070	0.14512
R152	-0.05215	-0.01522	0.00014	0.14923	0.05814	0.18074	0.50771*	-0.07500	-0.07905	-0.12948
R153	0.26719	0.14162	0.31601*	-0.19197	0.07656	-0.01448	0.07235	0.13177	0.20581	-0.03818
R154	0.19735	0.09711	0.22673	0.08120	0.10295	0.02746	-0.13933	0.02911	0.04752	0.04505
R155	0.16674	0.27232	-0.00157	-0.07452	0.11709	0.26704	-0.07335	-0.18902	0.17083	0.23751
R160	0.11937	-0.01788	-0.01311	0.68147*	0.16420	-0.13164	0.08360	0.00650	0.11953	-0.17130
R161	0.34943*	0.04558	0.00604	0.10786	0.69581*	0.11743	-0.12360	0.12521	0.01708	-0.02074
R162	0.34005*	0.04464	0.05633	0.24696	0.63204*	0.25649	-0.10655	0.10784	-0.22189	-0.04185
R163	0.05626	0.09487	0.04900	-0.09303	0.81731*	-0.13105	-0.00777	0.00644	0.05694	0.36568*
R168	-0.08441	-0.13266	0.00583	0.00872	-0.31798	-0.15960	0.04116	0.20170	0.01662	-0.07426
R169	0.41456*	0.16901	0.06117	-0.04238	0.31379	0.18250	0.13353	0.08977	-0.00504	0.11941
R170	0.48711*	0.13719	-0.00230	-0.04257	0.01135	0.10955	0.14306	0.03245	0.03255	0.24938
R171	0.03401	-0.04738	0.03887	-0.24930	0.26404	-0.13025	-0.05196	0.12907	0.12322	0.61720*
R176	0.05927	-0.00930	0.18688	0.42231*	-0.04942	-0.11504	0.32116	-0.19320	-0.00677	-0.11101
R177	0.35222*	0.04100	-0.00738	-0.04176	-0.10031	0.32102	0.05189	-0.02620	0.06175	-0.04567
R178	0.41507*	0.13459	-0.21231	0.26006	-0.31220	0.43887*	0.10543	-0.03837	-0.09879	0.19757
R179	0.18610	-0.06829	-0.06719	-0.26419	0.11501	0.04130	-0.18614	-0.07710	-0.09343	0.28137
R184	-0.25786	0.04474	0.31480*	0.44190*	-0.32330*	0.17170	0.24131	0.02713	-0.24821	0.24298
R185	0.30187	0.10501	0.16587	0.17014	-0.06369	0.55646*	0.14018	-0.00150	0.18259	0.26226
R186	0.33391*	0.15421	0.22043	0.30780	-0.03859	0.18332	0.19549	0.11634	0.39628*	0.39110*
R187	0.19152	0.06664	0.13031	-0.00715	0.11241	0.19545	0.00024	-0.08536	0.10406	0.03509
R192	-0.12631	0.07876	-0.05420	0.23191	0.00163	-0.13260	0.28127	0.23170	-0.06616	0.09623
R193	0.74609*	0.02377	0.13933	-0.01428	0.05003	0.30021	-0.01007	0.07505	-0.01707	0.00623
R194	0.80826*	0.04956	-0.06067	0.02548	0.04997	0.14923	0.14132	0.11000	0.03500	0.04872
R195	0.39948*	-0.23419	0.04360	-0.09422	0.02905	-0.00760	0.02508	0.02453	-0.02146	0.58818*
R200	-0.03032	0.09383	0.10956	0.63479*	-0.01095	0.00611	0.19091	0.08038	0.19737	0.12461
R201	0.76022*	0.13955	0.04737	-0.01939	0.15374	0.16641	-0.20901	-0.05116	0.09616	-0.03177
R202	0.87236*	0.04734	0.00196	0.07546	0.12689	0.03117	-0.18146	-0.00648	-0.01607	0.10106
R203	0.63988*	0.11341	-0.07392	-0.12377	0.33411*	0.04293	-0.25840	0.01305	-0.06270	0.33531
R208	-0.06128	0.06806	0.06462	0.32980*	-0.07640	0.01835	0.72183*	0.16352	-0.05298	0.16788
R209	0.30889*	0.09614	0.41485*	0.00387	0.03044	0.28353	-0.12897	0.15457	0.01184	-0.05636
R210	0.38512*	0.09195	0.31622*	0.07229	-0.00584	0.11623	-0.03394	0.35543*	-0.13134	-0.14930
R211	0.16317	0.04886	0.06873	-0.03238	0.12879	0.06993	0.01090	0.15934	0.03794	0.17981
R216	0.10053	-0.03000	-0.04375	0.81484*	0.04140	0.08489	0.10245	-0.05740	-0.03222	-0.10439
R217	0.55024*	0.12755	0.11017	0.08218	0.09043	0.38417*	0.20824	0.02164	0.27503	-0.00671
R218	0.66075*	0.15254	-0.06715	0.15199	-0.01148	0.20624	0.17607	0.01470	0.08132	0.09843
R219	0.36910*	0.12980	-0.11243	-0.00024	0.29889	0.31162	0.10829	0.01745	0.15709	0.37349*

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14	FACTOR 15
AR110	0.30615	-0.06592	0.19674	0.12918	-0.13365
AR111	-0.03039	0.06029	0.01996	0.19679	-0.06936
AR112	-0.10951	0.01684	0.12847	0.04510	0.07002
AR113	-0.11375	0.05680	-0.09935	0.08851	0.13332
AR118	0.58874*	-0.18016	-0.08707	-0.13140	-0.06447
AR119	0.06704	0.11317	0.05188	-0.00510	-0.04708
AR120	-0.06686	-0.03836	0.14016	0.10333	-0.06045
AR121	-0.04486	0.17735	0.02231	-0.00159	-0.04904
AR126	0.12364	-0.05430	-0.02708	-0.02096	0.07068
AR127	0.10950	0.10203	-0.05583	0.18719	0.01636
AR128	0.00708	-0.02581	0.18011	0.03517	-0.05858
AR129	-0.05466	-0.07979	0.17340	-0.14648	0.17084
AR134	0.18360	-0.27913	-0.00583	-0.20587	0.03803
AR135	0.03139	0.03544	-0.00018	0.13046	0.00525
AR136	0.04978	0.01572	0.00978	0.12899	-0.00609
AR137	0.03865	-0.10078	0.14972	0.09198	-0.04834
AR142	0.55179*	-0.12335	-0.01144	-0.08799	-0.32646
AR143	0.04845	0.17790	0.09451	0.25750	-0.02662
AR144	0.11714	-0.21336	-0.08308	0.00506	-0.04084
AR145	0.27295	0.04289	0.44156*	0.34610	-0.31896
AR152	0.29414	0.21090	0.57240*	0.04037	0.12513
AR153	0.14930	0.06050	0.08364	0.70730*	0.00091
AR154	-0.05718	-0.01048	0.01483	0.81912*	-0.05203
AR155	-0.11243	0.00492	0.32804	0.56761*	0.08979
AR160	0.16460	-0.15277	0.03920	0.25955	-0.01677
AR161	-0.07095	0.32556	0.02078	0.22473	0.05383
AR162	0.02584	-0.06833	0.15118	0.07169	-0.05480
AR163	-0.13488	-0.00740	0.10906	0.06305	0.02049
AR168	0.75455*	0.05047	-0.05531	0.07974	0.18897
AR169	0.04371	0.58863*	0.04025	0.16280	-0.16992
AR170	0.04213	0.25598	-0.08021	0.48564*	-0.23165
AR171	-0.16767	0.32752	0.15546	0.12087	-0.20435
AR176	0.56250*	0.05947	-0.06329	0.12788	0.17372
AR177	-0.00953	0.76895*	-0.03340	0.06507	0.01099
AR178	0.03340	0.15129	0.07586	0.00269	-0.08479
AR179	-0.09811	0.61004*	0.31279	-0.12462	-0.04046
AR184	0.09171	0.22861	0.01599	0.02424	0.20954
AR185	0.15499	0.11426	0.11575	0.16288	0.35099
AR186	0.07925	0.03352	-0.14291	0.23983	0.10500
AR187	0.04641	-0.07276	0.03056	0.08628	0.19008
AR192	0.12019	-0.12211	0.03102	-0.14013	0.64690*
AR193	-0.08174	0.11148	-0.01411	0.25257	0.00535
AR194	0.07384	-0.06931	-0.03456	0.19408	0.02006
AR195	-0.24143	0.12688	0.08918	0.01297	-0.14082
AR200	-0.14907	0.02529	-0.14559	-0.17976	-0.35479
AR201	-0.03703	0.28397	0.05868	0.00874	0.06426
AR202	-0.00563	0.11807	0.11647	0.01669	-0.04024
AR203	-0.04060	-0.01432	0.20218	-0.08376	-0.07618
AR208	0.00319	0.04594	0.00385	-0.05489	0.04460
AR209	-0.02121	0.24655	0.49114*	0.11494	0.14687
AR210	0.01260	0.11217	0.58292*	0.23226	-0.04535
AR211	-0.11908	-0.00247	0.00994*	-0.01111	0.05317
AR216	0.05832	-0.04752	0.15413	-0.06992	0.28424
AR217	-0.08314	0.26553	0.23964	0.12300	-0.02375
AR218	-0.05433	0.08769	0.34689	0.17493	0.00125
AR219	-0.23638	0.07035	0.38310*	0.04315	-0.20440

Table 5.47

Factor Analysis of Hourly-Paid Perceptions of Actual Inflation

	Variance Explained 21.7% Significance Required 0.3460	Variance Explained 10.4% Significance Required 0.3491	Variance Explained 7.5% Significance Required 0.3523	Variance Explained 6.7% Significance Required 0.3551	Variance Explained 6.1% Significance Required 0.3591	Variance Explained 4.4% Significance Required 0.3626	Variance Explained 4.2% Significance Required 0.3662	Variance Explained 4.0% Significance Required 0.3699	Variance Explained 3.6% Significance Required 0.3737	Variance Explained 3.5% Significance Required 0.3775
	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10 Variable
VAR106	0.18577	0.28091	0.54733	0.15425	-0.25134	0.21557	0.04873	0.22988	-0.10657	0.14159
VAR107	0.15733	0.32064	0.39959	-0.00001	-0.47441	-0.44346	0.19980	-0.19670	-0.04376	0.03991
VAR108	0.12163	0.23874	0.49493	-0.03970	-0.47616	0.22212	0.25287	-0.04984	-0.30988	0.14565
VAR109	-0.13814	0.15525	0.62268	-0.12546	-0.19402	0.35549	0.10415	-0.09416	0.02236	0.19477
VAR114	0.12075	0.52275	0.13641	0.46691	0.16356	-0.37343	0.11062	-0.28910	-0.03793	0.02695
VAR115	0.24178	0.36322	0.25493	0.12562	0.17351	0.11212	-0.12744	-0.28551	-0.07298	-0.29318
VAR116	0.03850	0.48624	0.17301	0.14192	0.44091	-0.02716	-0.11598	-0.19124	0.01087	-0.22653
VAR117	0.41868	0.35205	0.20933	-0.10084	0.34217	0.29759	-0.24926	-0.27037	-0.18984	0.09614
VAR122	-0.08509	0.15072	-0.10023	0.43440	-0.14698	0.57371	0.00915	0.33405	0.25701	0.04031
VAR123	0.39480	0.16849	-0.12746	0.49318	-0.05948	0.25723	0.52406	-0.06747	-0.08901	-0.18422
VAR124	0.35906	0.08473	-0.09199	0.43603	0.14611	0.41777	-0.50136	0.01277	-0.13001	-0.08425
VAR125	0.35006	-0.08628	-0.05167	0.28140	0.06873	0.07295	-0.03179	-0.25847	-0.30665	0.37009
VAR130	0.12113	0.19663	0.38022	0.19851	0.42019	0.11177	-0.13201	0.07912	0.36102	0.19264
VAR131	0.56197	-0.03340	0.21559	0.47260	-0.10721	-0.00635	0.06331	0.12343	-0.18982	-0.36423
VAR132	0.47110	-0.04850	0.04677	0.43490	-0.23384	-0.29849	0.06050	0.28422	-0.38806	-0.16734
VAR133	0.71514	0.18508	-0.04844	0.04089	-0.08931	0.01395	0.11069	0.27705	-0.13452	0.13517
VAR138	0.03246	0.29114	0.05193	-0.13206	0.47715	0.30516	0.49859	-0.14730	-0.14666	-0.11141
VAR139	0.31391	0.04032	0.10022	-0.20971	0.54542	0.27212	0.45122	0.07061	-0.24315	-0.17004
VAR140	0.34981	0.07804	-0.08784	-0.31692	0.56230	0.10378	0.14597	0.23927	-0.36678	-0.15366
VAR141	0.36206	0.43387	-0.36103	-0.10260	0.36950	0.27271	0.27193	0.13226	-0.15341	0.00547
VAR146	0.26903	0.47278	0.04783	0.30367	-0.20233	-0.01196	0.02462	-0.10937	0.27577	-0.25538
VAR147	0.64411	-0.51614	0.08452	0.24152	0.07270	-0.03777	0.03093	0.03970	0.14158	-0.08979
VAR148	0.66312	0.06869	0.09755	-0.17479	0.20104	-0.22620	-0.04295	0.35845	0.03871	-0.07873
VAR149	0.43072	0.28950	-0.19784	0.09714	0.28201	-0.15451	-0.22157	0.53280	0.13577	0.11509
VAR156	-0.08362	0.11067	0.24363	0.06928	0.49428	-0.06721	0.12659	0.10282	0.43035	0.30830
VAR157	0.64117	-0.45599	0.28906	0.16206	0.19244	-0.10477	0.01582	-0.06641	0.14373	-0.13482
VAR158	0.41973	0.35668	0.29308	-0.05653	0.09846	-0.20325	-0.33287	-0.15606	-0.14105	-0.36381
VAR159	0.38021	0.27843	-0.16638	-0.22151	-0.30429	-0.02189	0.15390	-0.29904	0.31406	-0.34921
VAR164	-0.16110	0.23900	-0.23464	0.38510	0.13542	-0.13815	0.41710	0.16631	0.05305	-0.15664
VAR165	0.56852	-0.56158	0.20880	-0.00302	0.04783	0.08907	0.13296	-0.10100	0.12838	-0.22676
VAR166	0.30036	-0.10036	0.50022	-0.38152	-0.21106	-0.05049	0.07707	0.02930	0.17327	-0.24574
VAR167	0.62035	0.37732	-0.09495	-0.11939	-0.05457	0.11137	-0.04410	-0.04603	0.31889	-0.08887
VAR172	0.00110	0.42442	-0.26240	0.26801	-0.00527	-0.07865	0.55710	-0.05847	0.27090	0.03234
VAR173	0.52281	-0.64805	0.12155	0.22087	0.13599	0.07801	0.23127	0.07840	0.09369	0.05070
VAR174	0.51028	-0.27055	0.08871	-0.29068	0.07374	-0.20914	-0.03495	0.15512	-0.00915	0.15433
VAR175	0.60012	0.20108	-0.22499	-0.17784	-0.14205	-0.11568	-0.10732	0.14738	0.18654	0.14888
VAR180	0.11577	0.44799	0.33345	0.25481	-0.27252	0.38300	0.30403	0.04887	-0.00022	-0.01439
VAR181	0.65289	-0.50120	0.26459	0.11546	-0.10406	0.15137	0.07011	-0.08381	0.12489	0.00625
VAR182	0.45645	0.05579	0.53144	-0.24153	-0.04741	-0.17234	-0.14176	0.39210	-0.14358	0.00993
VAR183	0.46646	0.20824	0.43158	-0.30797	0.02891	0.05169	-0.14212	0.06485	0.12546	0.22715
VAR188	-0.06934	0.23879	0.13219	0.48911	0.06569	-0.28547	0.14426	-0.10041	-0.17570	0.30100
VAR189	0.65427	0.48874	-0.05596	0.20426	-0.03167	0.01228	0.18631	-0.14371	-0.07157	0.22946
VAR190	0.64581	0.24445	0.04020	-0.18132	-0.29138	-0.22343	0.02345	0.21778	-0.08200	0.00174
VAR191	0.68043	0.29938	-0.06122	-0.27360	-0.10369	-0.10616	0.09190	0.04967	-0.08176	0.12957
VAR196	-0.10259	0.22882	-0.25331	0.43330	-0.23736	0.31613	0.04711	0.36013	0.21013	-0.19895
VAR197	0.65164	-0.38202	-0.40240	0.28381	-0.08544	0.17422	0.07235	-0.16754	-0.05265	0.05881
VAR198	0.73966	0.06826	-0.31175	0.13321	-0.18734	0.07283	-0.01962	0.22870	-0.05702	0.17338
VAR199	0.60152	0.12557	-0.47720	-0.20338	-0.28785	-0.08891	0.09730	-0.19704	-0.00367	0.06548
VAR204	0.05372	0.33144	0.19854	0.43743	0.28270	-0.33076	-0.10402	-0.13152	0.07729	0.29528
VAR205	0.65193	-0.44488	-0.07906	0.20819	0.16810	-0.00960	0.00005	-0.27622	-0.05607	0.15420
VAR206	0.67170	0.32319	-0.31124	-0.07922	-0.18279	-0.10420	-0.08379	-0.18803	-0.21531	0.12889
VAR207	0.62320	0.29974	-0.34466	-0.17031	-0.10256	0.13302	-0.05130	-0.23220	0.04440	0.21890
VAR212	0.16083	0.04777	0.37706	0.13471	0.01081	0.01408	-0.05375	-0.07266	0.28539	0.17071
VAR213	0.72775	-0.49639	0.01445	0.08904	0.06466	0.02612	0.08779	-0.10930	0.14088	-0.12097
VAR214	0.73162	0.15933	-0.15315	-0.23711	0.02036	-0.08526	0.01037	-0.07121	0.20968	-0.05583
VAR215	0.69950	0.24964	-0.17375	-0.31420	0.11054	0.10745	-0.03536	-0.14435	0.23436	0.04389

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14
VAR106	-0.18274	0.15290	-0.35704	0.03738
VAR107	-0.04857	-0.19624	-0.01492	-0.00625
VAR108	-0.12381	-0.17627	0.01870	0.01305
VAR109	0.00034	0.26036	0.31309	0.02271
VAR114	0.01163	0.11588	0.04650	-0.10531
VAR115	0.16951	-0.21743	-0.36468	0.20471
VAR116	-0.16711	0.40363	-0.08512	-0.19764
VAR117	-0.18009	0.07076	0.11349	0.07438
VAR122	-0.08915	-0.11055	-0.04646	-0.17491
VAR123	0.04246	-0.13156	0.10053	0.01124
VAR124	-0.12082	0.08033	0.13288	-0.10445
VAR125	0.10029	0.16480	-0.38107	-0.04165
VAR130	-0.08977	-0.19307	0.11615	-0.31702
VAR131	-0.02075	-0.02355	0.06912	-0.10312
VAR132	0.10416	0.01816	0.08065	-0.10987
VAR133	0.19000	0.14057	0.00466	-0.09235
VAR138	0.22232	-0.04484	0.02014	-0.10333
VAR139	0.15477	-0.17973	0.10078	0.08160
VAR140	0.16891	-0.10864	0.11582	-0.17045
VAR141	0.07225	0.14868	-0.10985	0.09982
VAR146	0.28428	0.18536	0.01496	0.10633
VAR147	0.01714	0.11186	-0.06082	-0.23366
VAR148	-0.00458	-0.06432	-0.05615	-0.16630
VAR149	0.05551	0.09522	-0.11134	0.19263
VAR156	-0.34019	-0.06850	0.11956	0.17729
VAR157	-0.11042	-0.09670	0.15784	0.05520
VAR158	-0.22564	-0.20334	0.06359	0.13389
VAR159	0.24671	0.30606	-0.06452	-0.12660
VAR164	-0.17866	0.12916	0.09358	0.42988
VAR165	-0.06340	0.21083	-0.07573	0.18463
VAR166	0.06204	-0.01129	0.20483	-0.03842
VAR167	0.01927	0.07920	0.21354	0.02451
VAR172	-0.20904	-0.19596	-0.12999	-0.16572
VAR173	0.00581	-0.04793	-0.01268	0.14328
VAR174	0.22351	0.06517	0.00588	-0.23348
VAR175	0.13993	0.01716	0.20639	0.00706
VAR180	-0.12957	-0.11297	0.10011	-0.17603
VAR181	0.14737	0.02466	-0.13111	0.07755
VAR182	-0.01194	-0.03735	-0.02421	0.25572
VAR183	0.19050	0.30800	-0.08232	0.11461
VAR188	0.13403	0.15362	0.17554	0.18430
VAR189	-0.17540	0.10075	0.01051	-0.13314
VAR190	-0.26079	-0.06306	-0.11274	-0.07489
VAR191	-0.21161	0.23566	0.00791	-0.03494
VAR196	0.07905	0.04909	0.02229	0.12198
VAR197	-0.00332	-0.09780	0.02334	0.01202
VAR198	0.10173	-0.08241	0.05120	0.07406
VAR199	0.14386	-0.01747	0.12246	0.11673
VAR204	0.28625	-0.10222	-0.06566	-0.02051
VAR205	-0.13808	0.01322	0.20153	0.13475
VAR206	-0.08285	-0.25921	0.04385	0.08713
VAR207	-0.00834	0.00051	0.18333	-0.03903
VAR212	-0.60441	-0.39431	-0.03542	0.06806
VAR213	-0.08801	0.03462	-0.06440	-0.00664
VAR214	-0.25284	-0.22044	-0.22419	0.06326
VAR215	-0.15657	-0.11049	-0.22234	-0.02223

Table 5.52

Factor Analysis of Newly-Paid Perceptions of Desired Influence.

	Variance Explained 20.6% Significance Required 0.3460	Variance Explained 12.5% Significance Required 0.3491	Variance Explained 8.7% Significance Required 0.3523	Variance Explained 6.9% Significance Required 0.3557	Variance Explained 5.5% Significance Required 0.3591	Variance Explained 4.7% Significance Required 0.3626	Variance Explained 4.3% Significance Required 0.3662	Variance Explained 3.8% Significance Required 0.3699	Variance Explained 3.5% Significance Required 0.3737	Variance Explained 3.0% Significance Required 0.377
	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
VAR110	-0.05381	-0.13194	0.13229	0.06533	-0.38440	0.34704	0.15687	0.30209	0.37014	-0.25728
VAR111	0.35119	0.07162	0.48194	0.00468	-0.23959	0.29001	0.31388	0.16499	0.22867	0.23694
VAR112	0.21974	0.32654	0.17841	-0.31583	-0.31864	0.06114	0.31191	0.33718	0.05975	0.42380
VAR113	0.32489	0.41125	0.21567	-0.33817	-0.34272	0.09004	0.23167	0.28553	0.08761	0.36039
VAR118	0.09298	-0.14910	0.10225	0.32375	-0.19829	0.09702	0.29210	-0.52653	0.29712	0.20925
VAR119	0.48448	-0.08162	0.55935	-0.20031	-0.03400	-0.02372	0.08844	-0.30622	0.02568	0.05094
VAR120	0.59379	0.29933	0.41181	-0.16243	-0.18698	-0.28994	0.01087	0.01907	0.09235	-0.00329
VAR121	0.49478	0.18959	0.59958	-0.36107	-0.06864	-0.06984	-0.06797	-0.04012	-0.20398	-0.01501
VAR126	0.20345	-0.26794	0.63214	0.13586	-0.05000	0.12158	-0.10668	-0.35960	-0.01900	0.20349
VAR127	0.41679	-0.10973	0.02536	0.32260	-0.30379	-0.37928	-0.49340	0.28837	0.27531	0.10918
VAR128	0.45771	-0.25526	0.00482	0.34243	-0.25506	-0.09095	-0.40714	0.35582	0.05119	-0.01663
VAR129	0.40068	-0.60262	-0.00251	0.01926	-0.14668	0.21893	-0.10169	0.19606	-0.11803	0.19897
VAR134	0.18796	-0.25975	0.36813	0.53208	-0.27359	-0.13987	0.10672	-0.14477	-0.29523	-0.23118
VAR135	0.57201	-0.42123	0.26645	0.00549	0.02597	0.10961	-0.25359	0.06834	-0.12904	0.03551
VAR136	0.66060	-0.22807	0.20939	0.02494	-0.01962	0.16817	-0.36199	0.11943	-0.27658	-0.04604
VAR137	0.65678	0.12476	0.06196	-0.17590	0.04671	0.27534	-0.15391	0.10087	-0.30483	-0.18102
VAR142	0.12221	0.02170	0.07641	0.30932	0.70065	-0.30132	0.16723	0.16901	0.00837	0.24813
VAR143	0.54349	-0.23991	0.01574	-0.07662	0.41585	-0.43270	-0.01902	-0.07702	-0.01335	0.03024
VAR144	0.62945	-0.04954	0.09936	-0.03350	0.44861	-0.47557	-0.03203	-0.04310	-0.17509	0.07295
VAR145	0.38149	-0.52230	0.07491	-0.02416	0.58614	-0.11596	-0.13005	0.01102	-0.02322	-0.11548
VAR152	0.14892	-0.33477	0.00098	0.45500	0.07329	0.34806	0.26195	0.26341	-0.02322	-0.11548
VAR153	0.64897	-0.54109	-0.12994	-0.22170	0.11563	0.17758	0.20087	-0.06770	-0.12336	-0.08852
VAR154	0.62652	0.12741	0.36274	-0.25754	0.14507	0.17197	0.11283	-0.21054	-0.06276	-0.03506
VAR155	0.50779	0.23474	0.14212	-0.28490	0.33489	0.38614	-0.18923	-0.12862	-0.04768	0.13726
VAR160	0.23507	-0.37757	0.45003	0.09956	0.51319	0.24821	0.04403	-0.11534	0.19614	-0.07746
VAR161	0.51164	-0.57252	-0.38533	0.14245	-0.05143	0.06736	-0.15559	0.17014	0.16195	0.10000
VAR162	0.49112	-0.43501	0.08884	0.48923	-0.24861	-0.03083	-0.32166	0.14244	0.25562	0.04786
VAR163	0.38764	0.61392	-0.13071	0.22386	-0.02058	0.30285	0.00892	0.02152	0.12631	-0.03109
VAR168	0.01395	0.00992	0.11431	0.41040	0.20946	0.38555	-0.33114	-0.27170	-0.10207	0.14553
VAR169	0.59366	-0.57450	-0.31935	-0.16009	-0.07460	-0.10974	-0.00511	-0.07220	0.19713	0.09561
VAR170	0.33941	-0.00603	0.20960	-0.00333	-0.11676	-0.28631	-0.01011	-0.16020	0.56479	-0.26500
VAR171	0.35085	0.53071	-0.21992	-0.02627	0.05442	0.20967	0.23009	-0.07444	0.37924	-0.25322
VAR176	0.14307	-0.25582	-0.07641	0.42958	0.49824	0.24019	0.07835	0.19102	0.08411	0.21169
VAR177	0.50395	-0.57576	-0.22818	-0.28530	-0.00120	0.16995	-0.05913	-0.08747	0.14239	0.02233
VAR178	0.34042	-0.12505	0.43175	-0.29480	-0.07194	-0.04544	-0.34594	-0.03348	0.18747	-0.06661
VAR179	0.52358	0.52425	-0.02000	-0.07111	0.11347	0.24851	-0.03308	-0.12522	-0.06636	-0.13920
VAR184	0.18530	-0.14544	0.31246	0.48018	0.06355	0.10813	0.28396	0.26050	-0.01198	-0.28732
VAR185	0.63616	-0.55333	-0.18393	-0.26781	0.02932	-0.01557	0.18004	0.03547	-0.03100	-0.12258
VAR186	0.68397	0.10305	0.16608	-0.03240	-0.09623	-0.47652	0.09726	0.16150	-0.02374	-0.29302
VAR187	0.44023	0.23399	0.25015	-0.30163	0.05028	0.20670	0.19417	0.22247	0.16178	0.39525
VAR192	-0.01367	0.20811	0.24572	0.36083	-0.24469	0.14532	0.25147	-0.27731	-0.06173	0.08822
VAR193	0.44023	-0.47426	0.44736	-0.15449	-0.13030	0.08239	0.17578	-0.01292	-0.18575	0.01030
VAR194	0.45826	0.48592	0.10759	0.22546	-0.13237	-0.08541	-0.06099	-0.04756	-0.14844	-0.15746
VAR195	0.34408	0.63089	-0.26001	0.24562	-0.08274	0.05628	0.02069	0.01813	-0.25260	-0.09208
VAR200	0.10511	-0.10292	0.27209	0.46848	-0.10238	-0.10028	0.20170	-0.01156	-0.31971	-0.10918
VAR201	0.70099	-0.30524	-0.45899	-0.11676	-0.00192	-0.01906	0.09563	-0.01802	0.01284	0.08572
VAR202	0.66273	-0.45043	0.26515	0.23900	0.00043	0.05048	-0.05190	-0.08760	0.05142	0.12788
VAR203	0.45091	0.38790	-0.37765	0.31631	0.02971	0.15642	0.05054	-0.18208	0.01933	0.23274
VAR208	0.14765	0.19880	0.14430	0.09162	0.25457	-0.37352	0.35107	0.36335	-0.13020	0.18454
VAR209	0.60409	-0.23631	-0.52377	-0.10854	-0.08982	0.14555	0.11493	0.08378	-0.30705	0.02434
VAR210	0.56862	0.44254	-0.22392	0.28135	-0.03726	-0.17676	-0.00433	-0.06902	0.00748	0.06249
VAR211	0.23436	0.55666	-0.40200	0.17769	0.00686	-0.01207	0.06858	-0.24580	0.00356	-0.11916
VAR216	0.10542	-0.20498	0.58651	0.36300	-0.22131	-0.09391	0.39501	0.04845	-0.10540	0.18039
VAR217	0.55841	-0.47680	-0.37301	-0.09360	-0.19747	-0.03612	0.23401	-0.02501	-0.18078	0.00633
VAR218	0.67742	0.14113	-0.28626	0.27260	0.07056	-0.33333	0.07911	-0.16502	0.12503	-0.05830
VAR219	0.54227	0.28751	-0.31273	-0.01355	-0.13201	-0.06192	0.11396	-0.14386	0.22154	-0.13331

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14	FACTOR 15
VAR110	-0.03824	-0.33161	0.07936	0.04853	-0.00101
VAR111	-0.03111	0.00284	0.12941	0.24337	0.19141
VAR112	0.12626	0.05419	-0.05202	-0.15582	0.09336
VAR113	0.02315	-0.18042	-0.12074	0.12732	0.16590
VAR118	-0.15550	-0.07860	0.08250	0.00768	-0.19520
VAR119	-0.16971	0.20229	0.11613	-0.10177	-0.03488
VAR120	0.00985	-0.18586	-0.09534	-0.01352	-0.05451
VAR121	-0.13846	-0.12019	-0.05874	0.11673	0.17222
VAR126	0.09416	0.06470	-0.06014	-0.15387	0.12172
VAR127	-0.06472	0.01675	0.20542	-0.00637	0.06321
VAR128	0.03408	0.01569	0.24008	-0.06662	0.00450
VAR129	-0.26622	0.04688	-0.14561	0.15131	0.02335
VAR134	-0.11415	-0.04086	-0.01871	-0.02340	0.17712
VAR135	-0.22438	-0.03700	-0.15947	-0.31919	-0.00537
VAR136	-0.05754	-0.15082	-0.11518	-0.25300	-0.04353
VAR137	-0.02657	-0.11309	-0.12241	0.18137	-0.08461
VAR142	-0.10093	-0.08206	0.00306	0.08826	0.12448
VAR143	-0.27722	0.12746	0.15706	0.01605	0.09125
VAR144	-0.19649	-0.03024	-0.00072	0.12317	-0.03400
VAR145	-0.08517	0.09221	0.14916	0.21634	-0.12159
VAR152	-0.31252	-0.14015	-0.02065	0.10346	-0.12528
VAR153	0.00866	-0.10859	-0.03386	-0.01389	-0.13171
VAR154	0.09411	-0.26928	0.05127	0.01957	-0.17914
VAR155	0.16619	-0.16332	0.07167	-0.27017	-0.11477
VAR160	0.17916	0.02387	-0.06258	-0.04427	0.07914
VAR161	-0.09797	0.02186	-0.03244	0.06713	-0.06068
VAR162	-0.10392	0.05045	-0.15201	-0.04356	-0.27220
VAR163	-0.08746	0.13643	-0.06989	0.13650	-0.09921
VAR168	0.04542	0.13041	-0.27217	0.22487	0.11598
VAR169	0.09305	0.09046	0.03306	0.07312	0.07999
VAR170	0.12789	-0.00170	-0.33137	0.17283	-0.13026
VAR171	-0.24543	0.20590	-0.09281	-0.04496	-0.11194
VAR176	0.29799	-0.16555	-0.02463	-0.03845	0.17232
VAR177	0.10293	0.26616	0.07543	0.08238	0.08084
VAR178	0.36364	0.17259	0.16294	0.16271	-0.01022
VAR179	0.10491	0.29053	0.14416	0.10015	-0.09283
VAR184	0.20616	0.20866	0.04554	-0.08987	0.09756
VAR185	-0.02232	0.12822	-0.00700	-0.04593	0.08244
VAR186	-0.10184	0.04970	-0.00528	-0.05828	0.07078
VAR187	-0.16502	0.25450	0.08229	-0.21265	0.13618
VAR192	-0.42057	-0.07663	0.31565	0.04950	0.08380
VAR193	0.07029	-0.04751	0.24549	0.21290	-0.03031
VAR194	0.20528	-0.17644	0.24984	0.27875	-0.09805
VAR195	0.06545	-0.00368	0.32780	-0.10215	-0.02775
VAR200	0.26574	0.21337	-0.12338	0.17067	0.25079
VAR201	0.05279	0.09144	-0.15228	0.11331	0.08883
VAR202	0.03884	0.11185	0.00470	0.04395	0.11771
VAR203	0.09708	0.19533	0.13520	-0.27251	0.01010
VAR208	0.09247	0.27982	-0.02488	-0.18182	-0.22941
VAR209	-0.01790	0.09516	-0.09405	0.02553	-0.05152
VAR210	0.09405	-0.13860	-0.28079	0.00800	0.07040
VAR211	-0.09204	0.01777	-0.20098	-0.18634	0.24059
VAR216	0.29461	0.06960	-0.05932	-0.05315	-0.43833
VAR217	0.01234	-0.10891	-0.13341	0.02304	-0.06900
VAR218	0.10968	-0.30913	0.05007	-0.06351	-0.00195
VAR219	0.19648	-0.36484	0.15428	-0.19980	0.22433

Table 5-54
 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Hourly-Paid Perceptions of Desired Influence.

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7	FACTOR 8	FACTOR 9	FACTOR 10
VAR110	-0.07362	-0.18794	0.01588	-0.11057	-0.00666	0.02081	0.02116	0.79408*	-0.03188	0.22109
VAR111	0.03341	0.00891	0.13501	0.17116	0.00456	0.10746	0.72769*	0.22860	0.34518	0.20666
VAR112	-0.00425	0.12730	0.07067	-0.10184	-0.07878	-0.02901	0.80642*	-0.08587	-0.09006	0.07573
VAR113	-0.00532	0.17388	0.16232	-0.10646	-0.03494	-0.02215	0.90831*	-0.07018	-0.06617	-0.00672
VAR118	0.06161	0.11310	-0.02060	-0.01279	-0.05954	-0.02674	-0.02923	0.03035	0.81615*	-0.10264
VAR119	0.11015	-0.05118	0.54397*	0.10966	0.24105	0.00582	0.17884	-0.18562	0.38711*	0.32204
VAR120	-0.02143	0.21181	0.50997*	0.10691	0.22121	0.13974	0.40226*	-0.21000	-0.02208	0.01841
VAR121	-0.03212	-0.02816	0.67799*	0.17161	0.25038	-0.01497	0.44915*	-0.22357	-0.02697	0.13962
VAR126	-0.00810	-0.11983	0.55085*	0.30792	0.04464	0.12988	0.09321	0.02707	0.39399*	-0.08056
VAR127	0.11020	0.12371	0.00766	0.02864	0.05219	0.88613*	0.10776	0.01735	0.05527	-0.01265
VAR128	0.22686	0.05462	0.10046	0.16640	0.02333	0.88415*	-0.04186	0.03952	-0.06442	-0.03531
VAR129	-0.09333	0.51238*	0.17904	-0.10168	0.06322	0.17269	0.47310*	-0.17301	-0.10928	0.15425
VAR134	0.00180	-0.03980	0.19339	0.76553*	0.01492	0.20487	-0.10081	-0.07830	0.34253	-0.06132
VAR135	0.36335*	-0.11031	0.64433*	0.10021	0.13180	0.40059*	-0.01865	0.04588	0.05864	0.08961
VAR136	0.32364	0.07188	0.73295*	0.13177	0.01929	0.43377*	-0.01173	0.04103	-0.10933	-0.00684
VAR137	0.32945	0.26397	0.57518*	0.04463	0.01136	0.07414	0.14439	0.01074	-0.23870	0.13680
VAR142	-0.09474	0.07355	-0.06922	0.08728	0.78235*	-0.05663	-0.01835	0.43002*	-0.03753	-0.14434
VAR143	0.37571*	0.01850	0.14114	-0.07884	0.81987*	0.14646	-0.02630	-0.33775	0.13585	0.06581
VAR144	0.26829	0.12993	0.30273	0.02493	0.79851*	0.08799	-0.05749	-0.02220	-0.03115	0.02501
VAR145	-0.15735	0.41510*	0.25559	-0.15307	0.62749*	-0.07570	-0.01289	0.02026	-0.20906	0.13094
VAR152	0.22367	-0.07126	-0.01770	0.21320	-0.02200	0.17691	-0.04655	0.46300*	0.27843	0.13414
VAR153	0.82656*	-0.04401	0.40622*	0.01072	0.05638	-0.06563	-0.05645	0.18141	0.08926	0.06204
VAR154	0.17216	0.19910	0.71841*	-0.06141	0.11487	-0.15737	0.19850	0.13000	0.13851	0.05838
VAR155	0.07853	0.33968	0.71010*	-0.34711	0.03598	-0.05443	0.07659	0.22931	-0.08383	0.04397
VAR160	0.09854	-0.18733	0.30141*	0.17751	0.19934	-0.06450	-0.12807	0.58801*	0.13579	0.12301
VAR161	0.74358*	0.00304	-0.05233	-0.07454	0.07243	0.48498*	-0.08881	0.16200	0.06147	-0.04748
VAR162	0.08120	0.25506	0.14016	0.06719	0.01309	0.73278*	-0.00480	0.01513	0.14876	0.00843
VAR163	-0.08541	0.70372*	0.02445	-0.08839	-0.04326	0.09659	0.18606	0.05654	0.00880	0.26588
VAR168	-0.11880	0.17270	0.14231	0.16841	-0.02373	0.06610	-0.15605	0.15827	0.08659	-0.17242
VAR169	0.85695*	-0.01126	-0.00027	-0.03867	0.13911	0.21055	0.00436	0.00023	0.08208	-0.04235
VAR170	0.07175	0.06654	0.07537	0.05506	0.06576	0.12766	0.03966	0.00358	0.05879	0.10232
VAR171	0.01725	0.62428*	-0.04433	-0.23388	-0.00578	-0.11430	0.07232	0.04780	0.06969	0.56600*
VAR176	0.15834	0.11017	-0.02832	0.12748	0.17661	0.07531	-0.05828	0.75200*	-0.03817	-0.27567
VAR177	0.81703*	-0.09651	0.08564	-0.07523	0.00287	0.12459	-0.02682	0.05467	0.04170	0.16988
VAR178	0.09951	-0.18228	0.34635	0.02926	0.01539	0.25936	0.13230	-0.04402	-0.10595	0.12113
VAR179	0.05991	0.61754*	0.25968	-0.04407	0.04215	-0.05758	0.07103	-0.05728	-0.09327	0.37214
VAR184	-0.00329	0.03970	0.01007	0.61916*	-0.01581	0.14612	-0.00997	0.44800*	0.03409	0.26457
VAR185	0.85620*	-0.06831	0.20003	0.10664	0.14715	0.03337	0.00469	0.04202	-0.01631	0.21311
VAR186	0.22380	0.23080	0.26510	0.33165	0.38550*	0.22959	0.15401	-0.19853	-0.12945	0.26746
VAR187	0.06603	0.17849	0.31162	0.06231	0.03001	-0.01851	0.24760	0.11465	-0.11879	0.77800*
VAR192	0.01882	-0.14866	0.00724	0.28394	0.00075	0.08829	0.01138	-0.00102	0.77955*	0.03540
VAR193	0.85011*	0.00901	-0.04487	0.00945	-0.04510	0.01605	-0.01262	-0.00456	0.08903	-0.08375
VAR194	-0.10995	0.52209*	0.20664	0.21414	0.06047	0.16081	0.11789	-0.05906	0.00117	-0.08381
VAR195	-0.09725	0.76637*	0.03655	0.06632	-0.02397	0.09309	0.01237	-0.09087	-0.06281	0.07047
VAR200	0.03901	0.01086	-0.02933	0.83892*	0.01049	-0.00566	-0.01208	0.03674	0.00929	-0.06056
VAR201	0.86317*	0.27809	0.03104	-0.00306	0.16049	0.07059	0.00285	-0.00677	-0.07431	-0.02621
VAR202	0.19302	0.81614*	0.06562	0.01918	0.18120	0.19140	0.16687	-0.02714	-0.00135	0.03171
VAR203	0.14247	0.82416*	-0.02146	-0.07647	0.03512	0.10491	-0.01299	0.01563	0.13485	0.01320
VAR208	-0.09066	0.09149	-0.05643	0.11808	0.44154*	-0.05119	0.16411	0.00441	-0.20558	0.12492
VAR209	0.82233*	0.28421	0.08795	0.01318	-0.02923	0.03379	0.02450	-0.09872	-0.13996	0.02229
VAR210	0.09910	0.74049*	0.10548	0.11410	0.17681	0.11496	0.14473	-0.05703	-0.11550	-0.21257
VAR211	-0.04455	0.78671*	-0.06396	0.03070	0.01460	-0.15312	-0.05656	-0.13307	-0.07040	0.04754
VAR216	0.07257	-0.08469	0.12049	0.36566*	-0.06219	0.08314	0.14675	0.06204	0.30035	-0.15674
VAR217	0.85267*	0.05923	0.10957	0.10345	-0.02845	0.01652	0.02463	-0.07171	0.05570	-0.14044
VAR218	0.31190	0.62623*	0.11485	0.07182	0.30932	0.16184	-0.08892	0.09342	0.09010	-0.23523
VAR219	0.24072	0.64795*	0.11834	-0.04219	-0.05065	0.03813	0.11879	0.12034	0.03163	-0.09707

	FACTOR 11	FACTOR 12	FACTOR 13	FACTOR 14	FACTOR 15
VAR110	-0.11206	0.08319	-0.18003	-0.10387	0.11632
VAR111	0.08012	0.05609	0.11073	0.00563	0.14944
VAR112	-0.14818	-0.08015	0.08354	0.26457	-0.14961
VAR113	-0.09491	0.08399	-0.03600	-0.00616	0.06163
VAR118	0.05401	0.20886	0.00615	0.12456	-0.05351
VAR119	0.00682	0.11377	0.26789	0.09654	-0.03292
VAR120	-0.25717	0.34447	0.02760	0.09015	0.13564
VAR121	-0.03745	0.12215	0.06904	-0.18379	0.16727
VAR126	0.23755	0.07683	0.33328	0.06154	-0.22589
VAR127	-0.01584	0.05598	0.10373	-0.08910	0.02037
VAR128	-0.07625	-0.05999	0.08034	0.00639	0.07928
VAR129	0.25011	-0.07259	-0.27672	-0.05362	0.15901
VAR134	-0.05716	0.02696	-0.16393	-0.01058	-0.01182
VAR135	0.07308	-0.02439	-0.12166	0.02483	-0.27612
VAR136	0.04370	-0.07273	-0.11323	0.01049	-0.06002
VAR137	0.14494	0.01907	-0.15923	-0.08380	0.34966
VAR142	0.05747	-0.06104	-0.10525	0.10718	-0.05290
VAR143	-0.05288	0.03113	0.14265	-0.01571	-0.11066
VAR144	-0.08025	0.21893	-0.00586	0.02089	0.10075
VAR145	0.17393	-0.00654	0.05587	0.06479	0.37471
VAR152	0.12406	-0.08638	-0.52742*	0.08814	0.10353
VAR153	-0.06720	0.03699	-0.06303	0.07221	0.05147
VAR154	-0.09051	0.15723	0.11611	0.07401	0.27903
VAR155	0.05952	-0.13104	0.23352	0.04884	0.02163
VAR160	0.22719	0.15758	0.27452	0.04823	-0.12387
VAR161	0.10227	0.06222	-0.11250	-0.01238	-0.07133
VAR162	0.15683	0.32298	-0.15104	0.22119	-0.01553
VAR163	0.25047	0.09593	-0.13206	0.04064	0.21156
VAR168	0.73554*	-0.01212	0.03615	-0.13885	-0.02638
VAR169	-0.05797	0.17205	0.22893	-0.05807	-0.10062
VAR170	-0.05395	0.87437*	0.14162	0.02492	0.01544
VAR171	0.00605	0.27974	-0.14771	-0.00110	0.01553
VAR176	0.18193	-0.14712	0.04722	0.09747	-0.14351
VAR177	0.13043	0.03884	0.33029	-0.08790	-0.06483
VAR178	0.05330	0.25863	0.02610*	-0.00920	0.22129
VAR179	0.17030	-0.02446	0.22044	0.06846	0.32655
VAR184	-0.01528	-0.00153	0.03634	0.28535	-0.00656
VAR185	-0.13408	0.05325	0.05242	-0.00386	-0.09838
VAR186	-0.39516*	0.28954	-0.04047	0.05855	0.07181
VAR187	-0.19439	0.05518	0.05902	-0.04082	-0.03328
VAR192	-0.00369	-0.21392	-0.15259	-0.11096	0.03561
VAR193	-0.12498	-0.17145	0.02038	-0.02896	0.25805
VAR194	-0.13160	0.09249	0.08016	0.02449	0.59033*
VAR195	-0.19346	-0.29903	-0.02988	0.07489	0.29454
VAR200	0.14774	0.03425	0.06122	0.12665	0.05693
VAR201	0.04910	0.12386	0.00681	-0.02914	-0.06213
VAR202	0.11945	0.03794	0.06497	-0.02083	0.06190
VAR203	0.06354	-0.20739	0.12494	0.18408	-0.13730
VAR208	-0.13252	-0.06654	-0.04261	0.65623*	-0.06100
VAR209	0.04500	-0.16366	-0.19817	0.07570	0.03993
VAR210	-0.01069	0.27599	-0.14121	0.02429	-0.01765
VAR211	-0.03739	0.06955	-0.15682	-0.19374	-0.21250
VAR216	-0.01784	0.13995	-0.00272	0.75640*	0.08725
VAR217	-0.14110	0.06145	-0.19314	0.08037	-0.01355
VAR218	-0.36009	0.27114	-0.01357	0.00945	0.07367
VAR219	-0.50662*	0.15726	0.12936	-0.21768	-0.00968

Text cut off in original

TEXT BOUND INTO

THE SPINE