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BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC 1889-1930

by

Olympia Cable

Submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
to the University of Glasgow,
1976.

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Unlike the Imperial and post-1930 periods in Brazilian history, the first Republic (1889-1930) for a long time attracted little attention. In recent years however there have been attempts to reappraise the way in which the political, economic and social system of the first Republic functioned. This thesis contributes to the study by looking at the twelve presidential elections between 1889 and 1930.

For students of political systems, that of the first Republic is of special interest. The Republican politicians of São Paulo evolved a unique system of political control - the política dos governadores (politics of governors) - an informal understanding between the states and the Federal government that in return for compliant Congressmen, the authority of the incumbents in the states would be sustained by the Federal administration. Whilst maintaining the trappings of a liberal democratic system enshrined in the Constitution - in the form of regular direct elections - it enabled a minority elite landowning oligarchy to continue in power in the states, whilst at national level the regional interests of the coffee economy were assured. This detailed study of presidential elections throws some light on the way in which the política dos governadores operated.

The presidential elections were a focal point of national politics. The Presidency was of central political importance during the period. Although the Constitution of 1891 had instituted a Federal Republican form of government with extensive state autonomy, it had also given the Federal government the right to intervene in the states. This together with the inability of the majority of the states to manage their internal affairs, made the Presidency the key to controlling the states. The Republicans had also discarded the parliamentary form of government of the Empire in favour of a Presidential system and despite the nominal separation of powers, the dominance of the executive over the legislative and judicial

branches was soon apparent. The subordination of Congress was further institutionalized by the política dos governadores. As Congressional approval of the President's nominations to the Supreme Federal Tribunal - Supreme Court - also became a formality, the compliance of the Judiciary which was responsible for deciding on the constitutionality of executive policies, was likewise guaranteed. The Presidency was in addition the major source of economic decision making affecting the states; monetary affairs were the exclusive preserve of the Union, and it was also allocated the major sources of revenue. Not surprisingly the succession question often dominated the second half of a President's term in office affecting his administrative programme. One former President, Campos Sales, noted that the elections were the "axis on which national politics revolved".

This thesis tries to answer the following questions: What factors influenced the selection of candidates? How was the support of a majority of states obtained for a Presidential and Vice-Presidential nomination every four years? Why were opposition coalitions sometimes formed to contest the majority ticket, and how were the opposition candidates in turn selected?

This thesis also looks at some areas that have received little serious attention: the composition and powers of the Nomination Conventions and the election manifestos published by them and their candidates; the conduct of election campaigns, and the use of fraud, violence and political repression in contested elections. Finally, the election data are for the first time analyzed in detail.

Chapter One first looks at how the political system operated within the states and then at the varying political influence of the states within the Federal system. A study of electoral statistics and of electoral returns not only confirms the conventionally held view that the corrupt political practices of the Empire continued in the states after 1889, but has

also provided a more comprehensive picture of how the electoral machinery was controlled by the coronéis in the municípios (the bosses at local level) and by the oligarchs in the state capitals.

Part II of Chapter One classifies the twenty states according to their ability to influence the election of Presidents. Taking the Republican period as a whole, a threefold classification rather than the more usual twofold classification of states is supported: first, the dominant states São Paulo and Minas Gerais; second, the intermediary states Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco; third, the remaining fourteen satellite states. The Federal Capital is considered as a separate category.

Part III examines the factors that enabled the dominant states to secure the selection and election of their candidates and presents a model of the way in which political control at national level was achieved.

Chapters Two to Ten deal with the Presidential elections in chronological order. It has been asserted that regional rivalry dominated Presidential elections. However Chapters Two to Four show that this was not an issue in the first three elections (1891-1902). Regionally this was the period of paulista hegemony in national politics, the ruling elite of other states being concerned only to secure their position internally during this period. Chapters Two and Three examine the ideological differences which dominated Republican politics and the Presidential elections of 1891-1898. Chapter Four looks at the way the ideological conflict was resolved with the institutionalization of the política dos governadores and how the system was operated by the President to secure his successor in 1902.

Regional rivalry first became an issue in the Presidential elections of 1902 and as Chapters Five to Ten show, except for the election of 1910, regional conflict was the dominant factor in the elections from 1905 to 1930.

It is generally believed that in the regional competition for the Presidency the two states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais worked together, their mutual interest in the coffee economy making them natural allies. It is also maintained that the alliance was founded on a rotation of the Presidency between the two states. Though it is not always specified when this co-operation was initiated, it is assumed that it was the outcome of the Convention of Taubaté in 1906. However Chapter Five argues that regional rivalry and opposition to paulista hegemony assured Minas the Presidency in 1906 and that, as it happened in that year, São Paulo was politically weakened by the internal schism over the issue of coffee valorization - price support for coffee - and was forced to surrender its claim for a fourth Presidential term in return for a valorization scheme. This thesis also argues that the election of a mineiro President in 1906 brought a new policy orientation to the Republic.

Chapter Six also shows that there was no attempt to impose a paulista President at the next election (1910) as would have been expected if the principle of rotation had been established at Taubaté, neither in fact were regional interests a major factor in this Presidential contest as has been asserted by those who argue that Marshal Hermes was a candidate of Rio Grande do Sul. Chapter Six looks at the three major conflicts that dominated the election of 1910: first, the struggle for power between the Federal government and Congress; second, the bid for the Presidency by the radical military officers; third, the organization under paulista leadership of the civilista opposition coalition and its campaign against the military candidate.

A new finding of this thesis is that the ruling elite of São Paulo did eventually promote a formal Pact with that of Minas Gerais during the manoeuvrings over the Presidential ticket for the 1914 election. Chapter Seven examines the way the two states arrived at the Pact of Ouro Fino of 1913, which recognized the need for the two states to co-operate to preserve

their interests and how it succeeded in its aims.

However, as Chapters Eight to Ten show, after 1914 and until 1929, this alliance only nominally took the form of rotating the Presidency between the two states. In practice, a successful rotation took place only in 1926 when a paulista President succeeded a mineiro. The rapid economic and demographic growth in São Paulo resulted in a growing animosity towards the paulistas particularly amongst the mineiros who were anxious to maintain political predominance. There was however limited political co-operation between the two states, though this was due less to their common economic interests than to the fact that the paulistas after 1905 and until 1926 were more interested in defending their economic interests and the political status quo than in acquiring the Presidency for their state. As a result Minas dominated national politics from 1914-1926 with the tacit support of São Paulo.

The close study in this thesis of the manner in which Presidential nominations were arrived at has led to another significant conclusion. Until 1902 São Paulo alone amongst the states had been a serious contender for the Presidency and a decision in favour of a paulista was arrived at by a few states without controversy. After 1905 other states claimed the Presidency and their inability to unite in 1910 had led to the endorsement of a military candidate. After 1910 and until the 1922 election, the predominant concern of São Paulo in particular to maintain the status quo resulted in protracted negotiations to secure a consensus Presidential ticket that would prevent a seriously contested election.

Except for the decade of the 1920s, students of the first Republic have generally ignored the opposition at Presidential elections. Yet as this study shows, there was a significant opposition from the earliest years of the Republic. Chapters Two and Three examine the candidates and campaign of the opposition radical Republicans between 1891 and 1898. Chapter Four shows that the campaign for liberal reform was begun as early as

1901 by the dissidência of São Paulo who endorsed their own Presidential ticket for the 1902 election. Chapter Six argues however that contrary to popular belief this campaign was only partially taken up by the civilista candidate Rui in 1910. Although he conducted for the first time a spirited campaign appealing to urban electors to vote for a liberal civilian government, the campaign was obscured by the fact that the civilistas depended primarily on the backing of the ruling state oligarchs of São Paulo and Bahia. The lack of political independence of the urban voters from the ruling elite is also evident from their failure to respond to the attempts of Rui and liberal Congressmen to organize a genuine national Liberal Party that would contest the Presidential election of 1914 (Chapter Seven).

However the post-war economic and social problems and the political crisis created by the disastrous election ticket of 1918 with two aged and dying men, did lead to widespread dissatisfaction and doubts about the ability of the existing, ruling elite to deal with the new problems. Chapter Eight argues that the election of 1919 was particularly significant because new economic and professional pressure groups took the initiative for the first time in the succession question endorsing Rui as the popular candidate. Although he failed to get the nomination of the ruling state elites who feared that his programme for reform threatened their own position, Rui ran his own opposition campaign. It was notable in two respects: first, for his appeal to the literate working class and the adoption of the first comprehensive social welfare programme which shows that the working class had already become a political force to be reckoned with. Second, for the large percentage of votes obtained by Rui as the opposition candidate, although the ruling elite had attempted to defuse the political crisis by adopting a respected politician from the little north-eastern state of Paraíba as the candidate of the political elite. The oligarchs were obviously no longer able to satisfy the interests of a significant section of the electorate. But although the

dissidents began to demand greater political participation they could not challenge the oligarchs in power either through the ballot box or by violence, as successive elections and unsuccessful revolts of the 1920s demonstrated. The dissidents became politically important only when the ruling elites of the major states were divided at Presidential elections.

Chapters Nine and Ten show that regional rivalry was still the dominant issue in the elections of the 1920s. Indeed the emergence of a new generation of Republican politicians little known nationally, and dependent entirely on the power of their states to bolster their claim to the Presidency sharpened the regional conflict. However a study of the manner in which Presidential candidates were nominated in the 1920s shows that succession politics no longer relied on consensus as in the post 1910-1919 period. São Paulo which had previously supported consensus amongst states now felt powerful enough to have candidates imposed. This led to the most bitterly contested elections of the Republic.

An important feature of the Presidential elections of the 1920s was the renewed attempts of the military to influence the nomination of candidates. It is argued in Chapter Nine that the general dissatisfaction in the armed forces which manifested itself over the succession question of 1922 was primarily professional and directed at the person of the official candidate, Artur Bernardes. It is also argued that the revolt of the tenentes in 1922 was spontaneous and that they were forced to assume a revolutionary role largely as a result of the reactionary and uncompromising policies of the Federal governments of the 1920s.

The question of what ultimately brought about the end of the first Republic continues to be debated. This thesis supports the view that the revolution of 1930 was brought about by a political crisis caused by increasing imbalances in the institutional structure. First, the balance of power between the Union and the states had further shifted in

favour of the President, particularly after 1922. Second, the regional disparities in economic resources and demographic strength and therefore of political power had widened; by the 1920s the major northern states had fallen even further behind the southern ones. Third, the relationship amongst the southern states was changing; São Paulo, already a dominant state in 1889 by reason of its economic position and political organization, was further strengthened as the size of its electorate neared that of Minas Gerais; Rio Grande do Sul, which had also enjoyed overall growth was by 1930 claiming the Presidency for itself.

Chapter Ten argues that the political crisis that arose over the nomination of a Presidential candidate in 1929 began effectively in 1926 when a strong paulista candidate was elected to the Presidency for the first time since 1906. The power of the Presidency backed by São Paulo became evident when the incumbent President succeeded in securing the support of the majority of state governors for another paulista President in 1930 despite the opposition of two major states: Minas and R.G.do Sul. This Chapter also argues that the opposition Aliança Liberal led a rebellion in 1930 not because of its failure to win the Presidential election but because the incumbent President contravened the most important principle of the Republic, namely the inviolability of the autonomy of the dominant states (by denying recognition to the Congressional candidates of two state governors who had opposed him). But although the aim of the Aliança Liberal was essentially to restore the institutional status quo, Chapter Ten shows that the Republic was doomed by the general disillusionment with it, caused not only by the political conflict but also by the economic and social crisis of 1929-1930.

This thesis has led to three major conclusions: first, whilst Presidential politics between 1891 and 1901 were dominated by ideological differences, after 1905 and until 1930 regional rivalry became the major issue. Second, there were three distinct phases in the

process of selection of candidates during the Republic that coincided with the changes in the balance of power between the states: the hegemony of São Paulo 1893-1905; consensus politics of 1913-19; the imposition of candidates from 1921-1930, in 1922 and 1926 by São Paulo in alliance with Minas Gerais; in 1930 by São Paulo and the incumbent paulista President.

Third, the theory of rotation of the Presidency between São Paulo and Minas does not offer a valid basis for the real distribution of power nationally during the Republic. The pattern that has emerged as a result of this study is as follows: 1889-1894 military power backed by Republican civilians amongst which the paulistas were a dominant factor; 1894-1905 hegemony of São Paulo; 1905-1914 again a complex period during which various states, Pinheiro Machado and his PRC and the military vied for power; 1914-1926 dominant mineiro influence with the tacit support of São Paulo; 1926-1930 São Paulo regains national control.

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THE STATES OF BRASIL 1889-1930



CHAPTER ONE

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 1889-1930

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to set out the way in which the political system operated during the Old Republic, and provides the frame-work within which the presidential elections were held. Chapter One is divided into three parts: the first looks at the distribution of political power within the states. The second is concerned with the varying degrees of influence of the states in the Federation. The third looks at the mechanics of presidential elections.

In Part I electoral statistics and electoral returns at Presidential elections are analyzed to test the conventionally held view that the political practices of the Empire continued after 1889. It looks at the effects of the extension of the suffrage on the electorate, the manner in which the coronéis manipulated the electorate at município (local) level and how the coronéis in turn were controlled by the oligarchs who ruled in the state capitals and made the decisions for the states.

Part II examines the assertion generally made by writers of this period that the states fall into two categories according to the level of political influence they were able to exercise in the Federation. First, the dominant states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais and second, the remaining eighteen states. This view has already been challenged by Joseph L. Love in his study "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930", which shows that R.G. do Sul had a more important role in national politics than hitherto ascribed to it. Part II is a comparative study of the states and the variables examined - demographic strength, levels of economic development, state revenues and internal political cohesion - are those that determined the influence of the states in national politics.

Part III presents a model of the way in which the dominant states were able generally to ensure the nomination and election of their presidential candidate. The pattern of control has emerged from the detailed study of presidential elections themselves. Part III looks first at the instruments of control, the ability to intervene in states and determine the certification of congressional elections, and second, control over the certification of the presidential election itself.

PART I: The Distribution of Political Power within the States

1. The Limitation on Political Rights

One of the more note-worthy aspects of the Republican Constitution of 1891 was its preoccupation with the liberalization of the political system. The titled aristocracy and all privileges were abolished, Church and state were separated, government by elected representatives and local autonomy guaranteed and the franchise extended. The Emperor was replaced by a President who was to be chosen by direct elections held every four years and a number of restrictions were attached to the provisions for his election to lessen the possibility of dictatorial government. The six year term of office proposed in the draft constitution was reduced to four; re-election of the incumbent for a consecutive term was prohibited; all members of his immediate family were also debarred from standing. The same restrictions applied to the Vice-presidency.¹

However there was a contradiction between the desire for liberalization and the limitation on the right to vote. Fraudulent elections had aroused major criticism of the political system of the Empire. The franchise qualifications and the electoral regulations of

¹ Brazilian Constitution of 1891, Articles 41(3), 43. In Herman G.James: "Constitutional Development of Brazil" (Carnegie Institute Publications, 1923).
"Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana". (Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1890/91), vol.1, p.97,420,453 debates on eligibility, term in office.

1892 and later amendments were especially designed to prevent its recurrence. The Republican Party had been pledged to universal adult male suffrage; but in the Constituent Assembly the majority, led by Rui Barbosa, who had built his political reputation on the successful defence of direct elections implemented by the Lei Saraiva in 1881, argued that the inclusion of illiterates, the politically uneducated masses, would lead to electoral fraud. Only the small and largely ineffectual positivist group under the leadership of Rio Grande do Sul challenged this view, arguing that illiterates and beggars were not the only ones incapable of exercising political rights responsibly and defended adult male suffrage.¹ But the Constitution finally settled for a limited franchise of literate males over 21.²

The detailed draft of the electoral procedure that appeared in January 1892³ gives a better indication of the intention of the Republic to secure genuinely free elections. A nominally secret ballot was adopted. The composition of the commissions for registering potential voters and of electoral boards to supervise elections was specified in minute detail; the times and places for holding elections were clearly set out. Provision was made for the opposition to supervise elections and a special judicial Commission of Petitions was set up to receive complaints.⁴ It was specified that certain infringements of the electoral procedure would automatically nullify the election in the area concerned, and a system of penalties ranging from fines of 100 milréis to 1000 milréis and prison sentences of up to four years could be incurred.⁵

¹. For a discussion on the franchise see "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana". Vol 1 and 2 Dec.-January passim.

². Brazilian Constitution of 1891: Article 70.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional". (Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1892). January 1892. Law No.35. January 26, 1892

⁴. "Diário do Congresso Nacional". January 1892: Chapter III, Articles 31-38 of the Electoral Law of January 1892.

⁵. Ibid., Chapter XII, Articles 114-118; Chapter XIV and XV, Articles 121-137.

To prevent fraudulent registration, a complex and onerous procedure for the registration of potential voters was adopted. An applicant not only had to submit a written application for registration giving details of his name, age, address and profession together with documentary evidence, the signature of two witnesses, finger-prints, a photograph, evidence of Brazilian citizenship and proof of residence in the município for more than a year, but he was also required to personally hand in his application to the commission of registration. Since this commission sat in the centre of the município and then for only two months in the year, this latter requirement presented obvious difficulties for potential voters not resident locally. But the applicant's presence was thought necessary as he had to demonstrate his literacy to the commission by filling in the electoral register. Only after completing this satisfactorily would he be issued with his voter's card.¹

Throughout the Republican period the electorate remained small. The statistics for registered voters show that in 1910, halfway through the Republic only 4.9% of the total population were registered voters.² By 1930 the numbers had risen to 7%.³ The low level of literacy effectively limited political rights to a minority of the population. Despite the concern for better and more widespread education facilities which had resulted in the creation of a Ministry of Education in 1891, education at the lower level continued to be poor. Primary and secondary instruction was left in the hands of the states and was generally ignored, particularly in states with limited resources. Statistics for literacy compiled by the authorities during the Republican period are crude as they are based on the numbers of registered school children over various periods. But they do provide a

¹. Ibid., Chapter III, Articles 15-18.

². Brasil Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Directoria do Serviço de Estatística: "Estatística Eleitoral da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil." (Rio, 1914) p.244.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional". May 1930, p.545.

rough indication of the general level of literacy. A comparison of literacy data in three separate years shows that whilst literacy for the population as a whole increased from 15% in 1872 to 23.5% in 1900, it actually dropped by 0.9% to 22.6% in 1920. A comparison of adult literacy only for 1900 and 1920 shows a small increase of 0.4% from 34.7% to 35.1%.¹ Hence the low level of electoral registration: as the table below shows, the percentage of the registered adult male population in 1920 showed a negligible increase over a twenty year period. (We shall see later that the coronéis often expanded their electoral clientele by encouraging the registration of illiterate peasants. However the inclusion of illiterates is offset by the deliberate exclusion from the voter registration of literate males known to be political opponents of the coronéis in power.)

| Year | Adult male population over 20 years of age | Total number of registered voters | % |
|------|--|-----------------------------------|------|
| 1900 | 3,944,675 (approx.) | 791,541 (1905) | 20.6 |
| 1920 | 6,168,682 (approx.) | 1,305,826 (1922) | 21 |

Sources: Population data Werner Baer: "A industrialização e o Desenvolvimento Econômico no Brasil." (Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio 1966) p.245

Appendix 3.

Voter Registration data for 1905: Brasil Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Directoria do Estatística: "Estatística Eleitoral ..." (Rio 1914).

For 1922 in: "Diário do Congresso Nacional", May 1930, p.546.

¹. In Livro do Centenário da Câmara dos Deputados 1826-1926. (Rio de Janeiro, 1926 Imprensa Nacional) Article by Deputado Dr Julio Afrânio Peixoto: "Cem annos de ensino primário" Chapter 8, pp.461-526. Statistical data pp.479, 485, 498.

As a result of the limitation of the franchise to literate adults, political rights after 1889 continued to be enjoyed only by a minority elite, just as it had been during the Empire. Neither in fact did this exclusion of the majority prevent fraudulent electoral practices as it was hoped. Incumbents in office at all levels blatantly ignored constitutional and electoral provisions in an attempt to sustain themselves in power. The relatively limited electorate was a crucial factor for the continuation of the patron-client relationship between those in power and the electorate and it ensured the survival of the coronéis in the municípios after 1889.

2. Coronel Control

It has been noted above that one of the major concerns of the Republican Constitution and of electoral regulations was to prevent fraudulent elections, but in fact the fear that the monarchists would be returned to power at the first election after the coup d'état of 1889, had already led the Republican provisional government to re-establish the coronel system. The Republican Party had been electorally insignificant in the Empire. At the last elections to the Imperial General Assembly they had succeeded in returning no more than half a dozen representatives. Although the newly enfranchised literate voters were expected to form a political base for the Republic, the majority of states did not have a Republican Party to mobilize the voters. The provisional government (the Council of Ministers, Nov. 1889-Jan. 1891) feared that if free elections were allowed, the Imperialist parties who had controlled the electoral machinery before the Republican coup, would simply return their supporters to the Constituent Assembly. The Council of Ministers therefore decided that the first

elections would have to be manipulated by the Republicans.¹ Initially it was suggested that the Federal treasury should make funds available to the interventors appointed to run the states, to enable them to buy votes. The solution that was finally incorporated in the Regulamento Alvim² which regulated elections to the Constituent Assembly, was that proposed by the Minister of Justice, Campos Sales. Interventors would simply be directed to abolish existing município councils and to appoint loyal intendentes (prefects) who would control elections at the grass roots.

Thus the coronel continued to survive. To what extent new men were appointed as prefects or existing coronéis, who were willing to shift their allegiance to the Republic had their positions confirmed in the municípios, has not been ascertained by research. In Rio Grande do Sul, the only state for which a serious study has been published so far, Joseph Love has shown that former coronéis belonging to the Imperialist Liberal Party were unceremoniously replaced by appointees of the Republican Party.³ However Rio Grande do Sul was a special case noted for its doctrinaire Republicanism. Elsewhere existing coronéis seem to have been accommodated. But even where new men appeared, their social origin would appear to have remained pre- dominantly the same. In Rio Grande do Sul for example, coronéis still came from ranching families.

¹. João Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório: Copias authenticas dos protocollos das sessaes secretas do conselho de ministros desde a proclamação da República ate a organização do Gabinete Lucena, acompanhado de importantes revelações e documentos." (Officinas Graficas do Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 1952) pp.55-7.

². Regulamento Alvim Decree No.511 of June 23, 1890 discussed in "A Década Republicana", edited by Visconde de Ouro Preto (Companhia Typ. do Brasil 1899-1901, Rio de Janeiro). Article by Barao de Paranapiacaba: "Eleições", Vol.III pt.VIII, pp.151-277.

³. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal. 1971) p.40. For other works on coronelismo in the Old Republic see Eul-soo Pang: "The politics of coronelismo in Brazil: The case study of Bahia 1889-1930" (University of California, Berkeley, unpub.PhD dissertation, 1969). Victor Nunes Leal: "Coronelismo, enxada e voto: O município e o regime representativo no Brasil"(Rio, 1948). Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz: "O mandonismo local na vida política brasileira (Da Colônia a Primeira República): Ensaio de sociologia política" (São Paulo, 1969). Edgard Carone: "A Primeira República (1889-1930): Texto e contexto" (São Paulo, 1969) pp.67-95, and "A República Velha: Instituições e classes sociais" (São Paulo, 1970) pp.249-266 passim. J.Love: "Political participation in Brazil: 1881-1969" in Luso-Brazilian Review VII. 2/12/70, pp.3-24.

The returns for Presidential elections show that under the coronel traditional electoral practices continued.¹ The coronel was the local representative of the Republican state party which normally comprised those in power at different levels. His duty was to deliver the votes for the candidates of the ruling elite in the state capital. Control over the local administration including revenues and appointments enabled the coronel to have an electoral clientele. The newly enfranchized were also absorbed into the spoils system. This process was facilitated by administrative decentralization at município and state level, which had expanded public employment. Local revenues had also increased. For example, the município's percentage of the national budget had risen from 2.5% in the last years of the Empire to 15% after 1889.² A good proportion of this went to pay for an increased number of government employees.

The system was successful as long as the electorate remained small. The relatively small numbers of voters in most municípios allowed them to be absorbed into the spoils system. In 1910 for example, over 36% of the municípios contained less than 500 voters, another 28% had below 1000 and only 6% over 3000.³ One of the severest critics of the Republic, Barão de Paranapiacaba, argued in his article on elections written ten years after the Republican coup, that it was not the landed class but the public servants who determined the course of elections.⁴ It was they, he wrote, who were fighting for their

¹. The most invaluable primary sources of information about electoral practices within the states have been the electoral returns for the contested Presidential election of 1910, 1922 and 1930. See: "Diário do Congresso Nacional. Apuração da Eleições de Presidente." (Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro 1910) 2 vols, "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May-June 8th 1922; May 1930; pp.299-334.

². Orlando M.Carvalho: "Política do Município (Ensaio histórico)" (Rio, 1946) p.165.

³. Derived from voter registration published by Brazil Ministério da Agricultura ... "Estatística Eleitoral da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil" (Rio, 1914).

⁴. "A Década Republicana." In Vol I Part I. Comparing unfavourably the financial situation of the Empire with the Republic, the Visconde de Ouro Preto argued that increased payments to the "bureaucratic clientele" was one cause of the problem. Whereas in October 1889 the total annual salaries of public employees in the Federal Capital amounted to 1.631: contos, by 1899, he asserts, it had risen to 17.754: contos.

livelihoods - either to maintain jobs or to obtain one. But as some impoverished state governments, particularly of the north-east, found it increasingly more difficult to pay their employees' wages, sometimes being months in arrears, political instability followed.

In addition to his clientele, the coronel's control over the electoral apparatus - the commission for registering voters, electoral boards and the tabulation of undisputed votes, gave him an ample opportunity to maximize the votes for his candidates. The commission for registering voters was theoretically supposed to comprise four of the highest taxpayers in the município and three representatives chosen by lot from the município Council.¹ In practice the commission usually comprised all the coronel's nominees.

Their duty was to register only loyal supporters of the coronel. Contested elections at all levels resulted in a massive upswing in registration. Paid agents would be sent to the rural interior to recruit illiterate peasants as potential voters, in return for a day's free board.² Many recruits found the terms favourable enough to register a number of times under assumed names.

The most serious fraud was perpetrated at the election itself by the electoral boards. These were supposed to comprise any five electors of the município individually nominated by separate groups of at least 30 electors.³ This electoral board presided over all elections for three years and was reappointed before every fresh election for the National Congress. The commission for registration together with state judicial representatives presided over the organization of the electoral boards. But as both groups comprised political appointees of the majority faction, the electoral boards were fixed in favour of the

¹. "Electoral Law of January 1892" Chapter II Articles 3-11. Although later electoral reform made the state Judiciary responsible for supervising the organization of the electoral bodies, the system continued to operate as before since judicial officers were also political appointees. See "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Nov.5, 1904 and Dec. 27, 1916 for amendments in the electoral regulation.

². For examples of this and other fraudulent practice see Chapter Six.

³. "Electoral Law of January 1892" Chapter VII Articles 62-69.

coronel's men. A large percentage of complaints by the opposition at elections was over the illegal organization of these boards. In the Presidential elections of 1910 for example, the 'Civilistas' listed between a quarter and two-thirds of all elections in the north and north-eastern states in particular, as being held before such illegally constituted electoral boards.

The block vote delivered for the candidate backed by the coronel, came from his clientele, the so-called 'voto de cabresto' or herd-vote. There is no evidence to show that these people were reluctant to vote as instructed by their patrão (patron). There was, in any case, little opportunity to assert independence at the polls. Elections were held in sections comprising 150 to 250 voters each with its own electoral board.¹ There were no official ballots and voters were expected to bring their own ballot slips completed and sealed in an envelope. Sometimes coronéis distributed ballots already completed and sealed to their supporters. Since elections were conducted under the close supervision of the coronel's men, there was no opportunity to substitute ballot slips.

Electoral returns show that coronéis frequently resorted to other methods of fraud to increase their candidates' votes, particularly in a contested election. Fraudulent practice is evident for instance in the suspiciously high polls recorded in many municípios. Detailed polling data is not available for many states in the first seriously contested Presidential election of 1910, but in the state of Para, in 17 of the 33 municípios for which figures are available, polls of over 85% were recorded and in 10 others, the numbers voting were over 70%.² Other states, particularly of the north and north-east, show similar percentages. In his lengthy protest over the fraudulent elections, the civilista candidate, Rui Barbosa, wrote: "In the zone of the sertão, where communications are difficult, where

¹. "Electoral Law of January 1892", Article 26(a), 74, 75.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional: Appuração da Eleições de Presidente", Rui's Memoranda Vol.2, p.271.

many electors have to travel long distances to vote, moreover an area given to drought and to horrors of famine and misery, where one would expect a low poll, the turn-out was extraordinary; in many sections the numbers polling were higher than the numbers of registered voters."¹ Similar turn-outs were obtained in the other bitterly contested Presidential election in 1922. The 'official' Presidential candidate Artur Bernardes received 58,027 or 10% of his total votes from municípios where the poll was above 85%. But his opponent Nilo Pecanha also obtained 52,367 or 14% of his votes in similar circumstances (Table IX/4, p.327). The bico de pena, pen-nib, that is forging the signatures of electors on the electoral list, was the most usual method of maximizing votes. In their protests the opposition would list whole columns of signatures on recording lists at the election, which they claimed had been written by one hand.²

In municípios where the authority of the incumbent coronel was challenged by a rival backing different candidates, intimidation and coercion were common. Local police and armed capangas (political thugs) working for the coronel would be placed outside polling booths to prevent the opposition from voting. Where the opposition was powerful and capangas inadequate to deter them, it was found more convenient to hold elections in a different building or on another day from that officially designated. Sometimes the opposition so deprived would conduct its own election. Thus duplicate returns were sent for certification. Often these elections were no more than a contest between rival sets of false papers. Bahia and Rio de Janeiro provide excellent examples of this in the 1910 election. Some 69 sections in the third and fourth electoral districts of Bahia, and 50

¹. Ibid., Vol.1, P.55.

². Diário do Congresso Nacional: "Appuração da Eleições de Presidente." 1910 Vol.1, pp.498-500.

Recording list. This was the list signed by all those who had voted. Its purpose was to check the signature against that on the electoral card carried by the voter.

sections in Rio de Janeiro made duplicate returns.¹ Both states had powerful opposition factions.

In the tabulation of votes, the coronel in power in the município and in alliance with those in control in the state capital had the advantage. The tabulation of undisputed ballots was carried out by the electoral boards immediately after the conclusion of polling. The ballot box would be unlocked, ballots individually opened by the presiding officer and the name of the candidate on it read out, whilst the recording clerk recorded the vote.² It was not unusual for the presiding officer to read out the name of his own candidate when the vote was in fact for the opponent. At the end of the tabulation, provided the result was not disputed, ballots would be destroyed leaving no evidence to prove that there had been a fraudulent count. Where the results of disputed ballots were concerned, certification of valid votes in national elections was decided by the National Congress. In the case of Presidential elections ballots cast for the candidate backed by the majority coalition of state parties would be favoured.

Since it was the job of the coronel in power to minimize the votes for the opposition, it is not surprising to find that in large numbers of municípios, the opposition would poll below 15% of the total vote cast. If for example, in the 1922 Presidential election, all the elections where this happened were to be disqualified, the votes of both the candidates would drop by almost two-thirds (Table IX/4). As the opposition at Presidential elections increased, so too did the repression. The fact that candidates of the dominant party in the state always won was openly recognized by both political factions in Congress in the 1930 election. They noted that of the 1,115,377 votes received by Júlio Prestes, only 93,942 came from the states that had opposed him. Whilst Getúlio Vargas

¹. Ibid., Vol.1, p.503,524.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional: Apuração de Eleições de Presidente 1910" Vol.2, pp.522-530.

also obtained only 163,424 of his 782,636 votes from states where the dominant party favoured Júlio Prestes.¹

The study above shows that political control in the municípios was exercised by the coronéis. However they were themselves dependent for their position on the governing elite in the state capitals. The coronéis were allowed to dispense local patronage as long as they were able to deliver the votes in all state and national elections to the candidate endorsed by the ruling state elite. Although in most states dissident coronéis at odds with the governing faction in the state capitals did exist, they were tolerated because by themselves they were largely ineffective in state and national politics. The dominant political influence in the states was exercised by the oligarchs who ruled in the state capitals.

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21, 1930 p.536.

3. State Oligarchies

Political parties were at a primitive stage in most states and political power was vested in a tiny elite group¹ whose powers rested largely on landed wealth. In the less politically developed states of the north, north-east and central west, the political elite usually comprised the incumbent governors and one or two political bosses who often represented the state in the Federal Congress or were members of the Federal government with ministerial posts. In São Paulo and Minas Gerais, where the Republican parties were institutionalized on a more permanent basis, the elite also included the Executive Committees of the Parties. It was these elites that took the political decisions for their own states including the selection of candidates for office both at state and national level.

In the selection of presidential candidates, the key figure in the states were the incumbent governors, since it was they who ultimately controlled the electoral machines responsible for delivering the votes through their power of appointment of the coronéis in the municípios.

¹. In his synthesis of the political system of the Old Republic, Edgard Carone has classified the oligarchs that controlled the various states into two categories: first the tightly knit oligarchs dominated by a family or a small faction and where state politics were conducted in their specific interest. Second, the broader based oligarchs of the more developed states where the interests of the various regional and family factions were subordinated to the interests of the state as a whole. See Edgard Carone: "A República Velha. (Instituições e classes sociais)." pp.267-285. Few works on internal politics in the states during the Republic exist, besides the study by J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930." Much of the information on the subject is derived from biographies of leading state politicians of the time. See for example: Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco: "Um estadista da República (Afrânio de Melo Franco e seu tempo)." 3 vols. (Livreria José Olympio Editôra, R. de J. 1955). Antonio Gontijo de Carvalho: "Estadistas da República." (São Paulo, Revista dos Tribunais, 1940). José Maria dos Santos: "Bernardino de Campos e o Partido Republicano paulista: subsídios para a história da República." (José Olympio, R. de J. 1960). Soares Júnior Rodrigo: "Jorge Tibiricá e sua época."; 2 vols (Nacional, São Paulo, 1958). Eul-soo Pang: "The politics of coronelismo in Brazil; The case of Bahia 1889-1930." op.cit. Tinoco, Brígido: "A vida de Nilo Peçanha." (José Olympio, R. de J. 1962). Tolentino, José: "Nilo Peçanha: sua vida pública." (A.Martins, Petropolis n.d.) João de Pôrto Costa: "Os tempos de Barbosa Lima." (Concórdia Recifé, 1966); "Os tempos de Rosa e Silva." Vliveiros, Jerônimo de: "Benedito Leite; um verdadeiro Republicano." (DASP, R. de J. 1960). Edgard Carone: "A República Velha. Evolução Política", op.cit. Warren Dean: "The Industrialization of São Paulo 1880-1945." (University of Texas Press, Austin and London 1969)P.35 *passim* the Coffee elite.

Another crucial factor that made the incumbent governors the key figures in the states in the selection of presidential candidates, was their ability to influence the final certification of the Presidential election through the states congressional representatives, the bancadas or benches.¹ The Constitution had given the National Congress the authority to certify all Federal elections including the Presidential election. Even before the institutionalization of the 'política dos governadores' in 1900, the incumbent state governor had been able to secure the election of his nominees to Congress. After 1900, the control of the state governor over his bancada was consolidated. Even in Minas Gerais and São Paulo where incumbent governors although leaders of the state Republican Parties, did not exercise autocratic powers over the party, the actual list of candidates for congressional elections seems to have been drawn up by the incumbent governor.² Opposition groups in all states were systematically denied their fair share of representation in the state and national legislatures, despite the Lei de Rosa e Silva of 1904 and the electoral amendments of Senator Bueno de Paiva in 1916, intended to allow minority representation for the opposition.

The following strongly worded protest to the National Congress made in 1905 by the opposition faction of R.Grande do Norte, is an example of the power of the governors and the coronéis to stifle opposition³ in the states. In the protest the opposition described the

¹. This name was derived from the fact that the congressional representatives of each state sat on a separate bench in the House.

². Levindo Coelho: "Depoimento de um velho político mineiro" (Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, II July, 1957) pp.117-8 for example describes selection of candidates in Minas Gerais. A more serious attempt to analyze recruitment in Minas Gerais for the Federal Chamber of Deputies has been made by David V.Fleischer: "O Recrutamento política em Minas 1890-1918." (Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1971). His study shows that after the institutionalization of the Republican party, the PRM became the new channel for recruitment. Chapters III and IV passim. The study also supports the popular view that lawyers predominated. They comprised on average 40% of the deputies in this period. The second highest category belonged to other liberal professions 29.8%, not including teachers which formed the third important group 7%, and other public servants 4.6%, p.34 Table 4. J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" pp.77-82.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional", September 1905.

methods employed by the state government to prevent them from taking advantage of the Lei Rosa e Silva to organize the opposition on a state-wide basis and from contesting the next election. They asserted that the printing press of both their newspapers, the Diário da Natal and Gazeta do Comércio, were destroyed when they published a 'Manifesto' to the opposition calling on them to organize for the next election; supporters of the opposition who qualified for a place on the commission for registration of voters were excluded and they and other opponents of the state government were not even allowed to register. Municípios actually controlled by the opposition, were subjected to new taxes on industry and commerce. The opposition claimed that these taxes were specially designed to cripple business and force them to end their rebellion. Many industrialists and merchants did in fact after this publish telegrams in the 'official' government newspaper, promising political support for the government and withdrawing from the opposition.

The study of electoral statistics and electoral returns supports the conventionally held view that despite the Republicans' theoretical commitment to liberalization of the political practices, the system in the states operated in the same way as it had done during the Empire. The exclusion of illiterates limited political rights to a tiny minority but it did not prevent electoral fraud. Rather the existence of a small electorate was the crucial factor in the survival of coronel power in the municípios, based fundamentally on the patron-client relationship. With the 'herd-vote' and control over the electoral machinery the coronéis were able to manipulate the election in the municípios. The real power in the state however was exercised by the state oligarchs who governed in the state capitals. Their ability to deliver the majority of the state vote through the coronéis, and to influence the certification of the election through their bancadas in Congress, made the pre-electoral bargaining amongst the states the crucial stage in the election of the President. At this stage

however, all states did not have the same influence. Their political importance naturally varied with the size of their electorates, the voting power of their bancadas, their internal political cohesion and their ability to defend their autonomy. To this we now turn.

PART II Inequalities of Political Power between the States

This section looks at the disproportionate influence of the states in the Federal system. The variables examined are first, demographic differences and their influence on congressional representation and electoral weight of the states. Second, the levels of economic development of the major states and the revenue they enjoyed as a result. Third, the effect of state expenditure on two factors influencing the state's political position: the state militia necessary to protect the state's autonomy, and education which led to a higher percentage of the state population being enfranchized. Fourth, this section examines briefly the internal political organization of the states and its effect on their internal political stability.

1. Population Differences

The Republic inherited gross disparities in the distribution of population in the former provinces ranging in 1890 from 9,282 in Mato Grosso to 3,184,099 in Minas Gerais, that is 0.6% and 22.2% respectively of the national total. The Republican Constitution of 1891 did not redefine the boundaries of the Imperial provinces. Only their status had been raised to that of states and they were given greater independence and responsibilities. The weaker provinces would in any case have opposed an attempt to amalgamate them to form more equal and viable units. In the Constituent Assembly called to promulgate a constitution for the Republic, only one young deputy, Epiácio de Pessôa, from the little

north-eastern state of Paraíba protested, and warned of the undesirable political and economic consequences that would result from the great disparities amongst the states.

Indeed one of the political consequences was already evident in the Constituent Assembly. The draft Constitution had established the principle that the Senate represented the states and consequently each state was given an equal representation of three Senators, but the Chamber of Deputies had proportional representation by population as in the USA, one deputy being elected for every 70,000 people. However, unlike in the United States, the Brazilian Constitution had reserved to the Lower House the initiative in important legislative spheres, including fiscal matters and in other politically important matters, like the certification of elections or constitutional revision, the two Chambers acted jointly. Thus the states with smaller populations and hence smaller bancadas in the Chamber of Deputies were at a serious disadvantage. The table below shows that 64.6% of the population of Brazil in 1890 was concentrated in six major states,¹ and even though the electoral regulation of 1892 doubled the minimum representation for a state from two to four deputies, the disparities in the size of the bancadas were great. The most powerful bancada of Minas Gerais had 37 deputies. At the other extreme were the nine states which had the minimum representation allowed; together, they had fewer congressmen than Minas Gerais.

¹. Table showing the distribution of population in the 6 major states in 1890 and as a percentage of total

| Minas Gerais | Bahia | São Paulo | Pernambuco | R.G.do Sul | Rio de Janeiro | All other states |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|------------------|
| 3,184,099 | 1,919,802 | 1,384,753 | 1,030,224 | 897,455 | 876,884 | 5,040,698 |
| 22.2% | 13.3% | 9.6% | 7.2% | 6.2% | 6.1% | 35.4% |

Note: All calculations here and elsewhere are only approximations.

Table showing the number of Deputies for each state in the Chamber of Deputies:

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|--------------|----|------------------|----|
| Amazonas | 4 | St.Catharina | 4 | Federal District | 10 |
| Espírito Santo | 4 | Sergipe | 4 | R.G. do Sul | 16 |
| Goiás | 4 | Paraíba | 5 | Rio de Janeiro | 17 |
| Mato Grosso | 4 | Alagoas | 6 | Pernambuco | 17 |
| Paraná | 4 | Maranhão | 7 | Bahia | 22 |
| Piauí | 4 | Pará | 7 | São Paulo | 22 |
| R.Grande do Norte | 4 | Ceará | 10 | Minas Gerais | 37 |

Note: No redistribution was made to meet population increases throughout the Republican period, as the Constitution required, as this would only further distort the disparities between the states.

It was a common complaint in Congress that the five most populous states together had a majority in Congress.

In Presidential elections too, the most populous states naturally had a higher percentage of the vote. In 1902 for example, the first Presidential elections when all the states voted, 61.2% of the votes were cast by the six major states and by the 1930 election, their percentage had increased further to 70.5% of the total. As would be expected, the ruling elites of the states which controlled larger electorates and bigger congressional bancadas wielded greater influence in Presidential politics.¹ In fact, the relatively small bancadas and electorates of the many small states effectively prevented any but the six major states from effective participation in the selection and election of the President.

Amongst the latter states however it was not just demographic factors which determined their political influence. Ultimately it was the level of economic development which was important. It affected for instance the ability of a state to maintain a high level of

¹. In effect those who had argued for the indirect election of the President by states on the basis of proportional voting had won. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana", Vol.I, p.421 passim; Vol.II, p.33 passim.

literacy and hence have a high percentage of voters in the population. An even more important point was that it determined the ability of the states to have adequate state militias capable of defending their autonomy against Federal intervention.

2. Levels of Economic Development between Major States

Referring to the economic disparities between the states in Brazil, an Englishman wrote in January, 1893: "If, as we are assured, Rio de Janeiro is the eyes and head of Brazil, the states south of Rio including São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, may be likened to her body and legs, and the immense northern states to a fine head of hair or to a broad-brimmed brogdingnagian hat: it is the southern states which carry her along, the northern states are mainly decorative."¹ The writer should have also included Minas Gerais with the southern states. Although its growth rate did not equal that of São Paulo or Rio Grande do Sul, it was second to São Paulo in the total value of production during the first Republic.

The problem of economic dualism in Brazil² with only one part being actively involved in the national economy has persisted to the present day. The above quotation shows that by the late nineteenth century the economic domination of the eastern and southern states was already a fact, and had overtaken the north-eastern sugar region.

Here however we are concerned not with the economic regions but more specifically with the political units, the states within them, and in particular with the major states which were politically influential. This has posed some problems. The economic and geographical regions do not coincide with the political units. Whilst the data are available for the regions, there is little by way of comparative statistics for the states,

¹. The Fortnightly Review LIII (January, 1893 London). Article titled Politics and Finance in Brazil by an Englishman p.87, quoted in J.F.Normano: "Economic Brazil" p.138.

². Jacques Lambert: "Os Dois Brasis" (Brasiliiana 335, São Paulo 1967). J.F.Normano: "Economic Brazil".

particularly in the first half of the Republic. Below¹ is a rough regional classification in which economic and political divisions coincide. This classification is used in the rest of this thesis.

In the absence of more precise long term data of agricultural and industrial production per state, population changes within the states have been used as an indicator of economic trends since those interacted with demographic factors: economic growth being both a cause and effect of labour migration and thus of population levels.

TABLE I/1

Changes in the Percentage of the National Population in the Major States 1872-1930

| Year | E Minas Gerais | | NE Bahia | | NE Pernam- buco | | S São Paulo | | E Rio de Janeiro | | N Ceará | | S R.G.do Sul | |
|------|----------------------|------|-------------|------|-----------------------|------|----------------|------|------------------------|------|------------|------|-----------------|------|
| | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. | Col. |
| | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 1872 | 24% | 1 | 13.6 | 2 | 8.3 | 3 | 8.2 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 7.2 | 6 | 4.5 | 7 |
| 1890 | 22.2 | 1 | 13.3 | 2 | 7.2 | 4 | 9.6 | 3 | 6.1 | 6 | 5.6 | 7 | 6.2 | 5 |
| 1900 | 20.7 | 1 | 12.2 | 3 | 6.8 | 4 | 13.0 | 2 | 5.4 | 6 | 4.9 | 7 | 6.6 | 5 |
| 1910 | 19.1 | 1 | 11.2 | 3 | 6.7 | 5 | 14.7 | 2 | 5.4 | 6 | 4.8 | 7 | 6.8 | 4 |
| 1930 | 18.5 | 1 | 10.4 | 3 | 6.2 | 5 | 16.0 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 7.4 | 4 |

¹.

- (a) The northern region comprises the states of Amazonas to Rio Grande do Norte.
- (b) The North-east includes the states from Paraíba to Bahia along the coast. The two major states of this region are Bahia and Pernambuco.
- (c) To the eastern region belong Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and the Federal District. The two major states here are Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.
- (d) The southern region includes São Paulo, Paraná, Sta.Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul. São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul are the big states of the south.
- (e) Goiás and Mato Grosso form the West Central region.

To most politicians of the period concerned with regional disparities there were only two regions, the north (i.e. Espírito Santo and the states north of it) and the south (including Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and the states south of them).

Note: Column 1 shows the percentage of the national population in different years in each of the six major states.
Column 2 ranks states according to their demographic weight at various intervals.

Source: Table compiled from population data for 1872 taken from "The Empire of Brazil at the Universal Exhibition of 1876 in Philadelphia" (R.de Janeiro 1876. Typographia e Lithographia do Imperial Institute Artistico) p.89.

For other years: Werner Baer: "A Industrialização e o Desenvolvimento Econômico no Brasil", p.251.

Table I/1 shows that in the period between 1872 and 1930, the southern states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul enjoyed the fastest growth whilst Minas Gerais maintained its demographic pre-eminence, the gap between it and São Paulo was closing fast by 1930.

Production for the export market was as in the Empire the most dynamic economic sector. Coffee was the dominant export crop. By 1839 São Paulo's coffee exports had overtaken those of Rio de Janeiro,¹ and by 1920, 45% of the total national production was concentrated in São Paulo. Minas Gerais, which was second in coffee production after 1889, accounted for only 12% in 1920 and Rio de Janeiro for 9%. On the other hand the economy of R.G.do Sul, the second most dynamic state, continued to be based chiefly on livestock, but it underwent a complete transformation in the period under review. From being a largely subsistence economy, the state became the "granary of Brazil". In addition to exporting livestock products, charque (dried meat) and cowhides, the state also became important for the export of crops: wheat, maize, beans, rice and fruit.²

¹. Ten-Cel Geraldo de Menezes Côrtes: "Migração e Colonização no Brasil" (Livraria José Olympio Editôra, 1958, Rio de Janeiro). Graph p.29 coffee production by states.

². J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930". See index under economy.

The state of Minas Gerais had a less dramatic growth rate. It also had a more mixed economy. Coffee was produced for export in the south-eastern region of the state. In addition dairy products and other perishable consumer goods were marketed to the new commercial centres along the coast. These two occupations partly reversed the economic decline that the state had suffered since the end of the mining boom after the late eighteenth century. Though the state was still the richest in mineral deposits, these were largely unexplored in this period.

The other three major states were economically less prosperous. With the opening of new coffee plantations inland, the coffee boom enjoyed by Rio de Janeiro in the middle of the century declined after 1880. In 1882 at its peak the state was producing around 2,500,000 sacks of coffee. But by 1890 production dropped by 1 million sacks.¹ The two main crops of the north-east, sugar and cotton, continued to be relatively unimportant in the national exports. Brazilian cotton suffered from competition of American long staple cotton, sugar from the discovery and increasing consumption of beet sugar in Europe after the turn of the nineteenth century. Although sugar production increased with the technological innovations it underwent with the usinas centrais controlled by capitalist partnerships, replacing the inefficient family sugar-mills, the engenhos, the increased yields were consumed locally. Moreover, production of both cotton and sugar in the north-eastern states faced serious internal competition. In 1920 Minas Gerais was producing 30% of the nation's sugar, Pernambuco 11%, São Paulo and Bahia each 7%, São Paulo became the main cotton producer accounting for 28% of national yields by 1920, Pernambuco which was second yielded 17% and Bahia only 5%.²

¹. See footnote 1 on previous page (p.22).

². "Recenseamento do Brasil Vol.III (2a part)" pp.246-335. Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Directoria Geral de Estatística (R. de Janeiro, 1925).

Cocoa was the only other commodity of the north-east which enjoyed any real prosperity; the rapid increase in cocoa exports after 1890 from 3,500 tons to 53,000 tons in 1920 led many to believe that Bahia, where 96% of the exports were concentrated, would enjoy a similar boom as the coffee region. But the expectation was not fulfilled and after 1920 exports dwindled as a result of competition from West Africa. Even in its most prosperous period cocoa comprised less than 5% of the total national exports.


The southern and eastern states also became the centres for new industrial enterprises. By 1907, after the Federal District which contributed 33% of national industrial production, São Paulo and R.G.do Sul were the most important industrial centres contributing 16.5 and 14.9 per cent of the national production respectively.¹ Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais which came next in importance were far behind, contributing 6.7% and 4.8% respectively.

The 1920 census further showed how great the economic disparities between the major states had become. The table below compiled by Joseph Love, from the value of agricultural and industrial production provided by this census shows these disparities in total if not in per capita terms.

¹. Ivan Pedro de Martins: "Introdução a Economia Brasileira" (Livraria José Olympio Editors R.de Janeiro, 1961) p.105 derived from the Industrial census of 1907.

TABLE I/2

The Combined Value of Agricultural and Industrial Production of the States 1920



Source: Joseph L. Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.111.

The above brief comparative survey of the economic situation in the states at the end of the Empire and during the Republican period shows that São Paulo had the most dynamic economy followed by Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais. Republican organizations had been strongest in these provinces since it was felt that the Empire, dominated by the provinces of the north-east and east, had been slow to respond to the needs of the expanding economies particularly their need for credit facilities and labour. Consequently the Republican Constituent Assembly of 1891 was dominated by the states with the most advanced economies, and they were able to dictate a Republican system to their advantage. This is most evident in the distribution of sources of revenue between the Federation and the states and the degree of autonomy accorded to the states.

3. Revenue Sharing and Federalism

To the Republican state organizations who founded and helped to establish a Federal

system, the control of adequate financial resources by the states was of major concern. As a result of their demands, the Constitution conceded that 45% of the total revenues collected should be retained by the states.¹ This reallocation represented a 60% increase over the revenue the provinces enjoyed under the Empire.

However the allocation of sources of revenue between the Union and states which was devised chiefly by São Paulo, benefited primarily the dynamic economies. The Union was allowed to keep the revenue collected from indirect taxation; the most important of which were import taxes, the circulation tax (mainly stamp duty) and the consumption tax.² The states on the other hand, retained all the returns from direct taxation. Since there was no income tax, their main sources of revenue was the tax on production (mainly agriculture), and real estate. The economically poorer states suffered a two-fold disadvantage. Their own revenues were to be based on agricultural and industrial output of which they had proportionally less, while they lost to the Union their most lucrative source of revenue - import duties. An examination of the budget of 1889-90, the first Republican year, for four major states for which figures are available,³ shows that, whereas the import tax comprised

¹. Constitution of Brazil February 24, 1891 Articles 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 in Herman G.James: "Constitutional Development of Brazil".

². Budget for 1889-1890

| States | Total revenue collected (contos) | Tax paid out to Union | Balance left for state |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| São Paulo | 19,580 | 8,656 | 10,924 |
| Pernambuco | 10,959 | 8,823 | 2,136 |
| Bahia | 9,928 | 7,598 | 2,330 |
| R.G. do Sul | 5,823 | 2,997 | 2,826 |

Source: Table derived from revenue data in Diário do Congresso Nacional: "Anais da Primeira Constituintes Republicana." p.28 of appendix.

Note: Separate statistics for Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro are not available, since both states used the Federal District as the trading port. But João Camillo de Oliveira Torrês in his "A Formação do Federalismo no Brasil." (Companhia Editôra Nacional, São Paulo, 1961) gives revenue for Minas Gerais minus import tax as 10,312 contos p.208.

3. J.F.Normano: "Economic Brazil." Chapter V pp.120-160. Union revenue during the Republic, particularly 145-7 including Table.

82 and 75 per cent respectively of the total revenues of Pernambuco and Bahia, the percentage for São Paulo and R.G. do Sul was only 45 and 50 per cent respectively. Thus the revenue sharing arrangement was regressive in its effect on the states.

In the Constituent Assembly between December 1890 and January 1891, the debates over the financial clauses showed the latent hostility and varying needs of the states.¹ The two major north-eastern states demanded that in addition to the direct taxes the states should also be given 10% of the indirect taxes collected. This proposal however did not go far enough for the poor and drought-stricken states of R.G. do Norte, Ceará, Paraíba, Sergipe and Alagoas which wanted at least 20% of the import tax and also special provisions to be made for poorer states to be helped by the Union. On the other hand R.G. do Sul was concerned mainly to limit Union interference in the states to a minimum. As a result of these diverging interests, São Paulo was able to maintain the initial formula which satisfied its particular situation so well.

Under the Republic the disparities in state revenues were great. Table I/3 (page 29) shows that with the reallocation of the revenues, the finances of São Paulo and Minas Gerais in the first year of the Republic more than doubled and that R.G. do Sul remained stable. All other states suffered a loss. The differences in state revenues persisted throughout the Republic. In 1920 for example the share of each of the major states of the total state revenues was as follows:

¹. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana." December 29, 1890 -February 18, 1891 passim.

TABLE I/4

Revenues of Major States in 1920

| Total revenue of states | 399,584 contos | 100% | % Population |
|-------------------------|----------------|------|--------------|
| São Paulo | 137,484 | 34.2 | 16.0 |
| Minas Gerais | 56,189 | 14 | 18.5 |
| R.G. do Sul | 34,300 | 8.5 | 7.4 |
| Bahia | 29,362 | 7.2 | 10.4 |
| Pernambuco | 25,907 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 21,471 | 5.2 | 5.0 |

Source: "Livro do Centeário da Câmara dos Deputados 1826-1926."Chapter VIII

Derived from statistics 499-506.

One consequence of the failure of the Constitution to provide adequately for all the states of the Union was that a constant unofficial tariff war was waged between them. Another was a frequent resort to foreign borrowing by the states, which was permitted by the Constitution. Their frequent inability to repay these debts later led to threats of foreign intervention. A third and politically important outcome was that only some states were able to take advantage of the autonomy conceded by the Constitution.

TABLE I/3

A Comparison of State Revenues in 3 Separate Years

| States | 1 1872 | 2 1888-89 | 3 1889-90 | 4 Balance of (3)-(2) |
|--|-----------|--------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| 1 São Paulo | 2,540 | 4,149 | 10,924 | + |
| 2 Pernambuco | 2,512 | 2,822 | 2,136 | - |
| 3 Bahia | 2,172 | 3,218 | 2,330 | - |
| 4 R.G.do Sul | 1,702 | 2,834 | 2,826 | + |
| 5 Minas Gerais | 1,652 | 3,474 | 10,312 | + |
| 6 Pará | 1,534 | 3,995 | 3,117 | - |
| 7 Maranhão | 831 | 716 | 226 | - |
| 8 Ceará | 812 | 1,062 | 502 | - |
| 9 Paraíba | 797 | 524 | 168 | - |
| 10 Alagoas | 773 | 674 | 294 | - |
| 11 Paraná | 728 | 923 | 468 | - |
| 12 Sergipe | 698 | 800 | 135 | - |
| 13 Amazonas | 575 | 1,981 | 629 | - |
| 14 Piauí | 347 | 237 | 101 | - |
| 15 R.G.do Norte | 319 | 399 | 83 | - |
| 16 Sta.Catharina | 311 | 366 | 309 | - |
| 17 Espírito Santo | 300 | 903 | 251 | - |
| 18 Mato Grosso | 167 | 246 | 119 | - |
| 19 Goiás | 148 | 191 | not available | |
| 20 Rio de Janeiro and Federal District | 4,322 | 4,399 | not available | |

Sources: Table compiled from data taken from the following sources:
For 1872: "The Empire of Brazil at the Universal Exhibition of 1876 in Philadelphia", p.87.
For 1888-89: Diário do Congresso Nacional: "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana." December 13,1890 p.167.
For 1889-90: Ibid., p.28 of Appendix.

4. Fiscal Inequality and State Spending

Two political spheres in which wealthy states were privileged were in their ability to have effective state militias and to spend on education. How did the level of state revenues affect each of these?

a. State Militias. The Federal government would intervene in the states to force political compliance. Intervention was carried out by the Federal army, and only states with sufficiently large, well equipped and organized state militias could deter intervention. In making a comparative assessment of the military strength of the states one is faced with the lack of any real research. Whilst the statistical data most often quoted¹ gives the size of the forces, it does not say much about their effectiveness, the extent of their training or the type of equipment; nor do the statistics take into account the irregular forces under the coronéis.

There is no doubt however that throughout the Republican period, São Paulo had the most efficient and best equipped state force. São Paulo² had successfully opposed in 1890-91, the suggestion that state militias should be administered by the Federal government. The paulista Republican Party had begun to build up its force immediately following the coup of 1889 for defence both against internal and external enemies. In 1906 when the state lost control over the Presidency, it hired the services of a French military mission to modernize its force. Its example was only later followed by the Federal army. The paulista militia played a significant part defending state autonomy in 1891 and 1911-1912. Any suggestion of Federal intervention was met by mobilization of state forces and threats of the state separating from the nation.

¹. Directoria do Serviço de Estatística: "Força policial militar 1908-1912" (Rio 1914) pp.4-5. Directoria Geral de Estatística: "Relatorio" (Rio 1921) pp.39-40. Directoria Geral de Estatística: "Relatorios" (Rio 1930) p.199.

². Paul Manor: "La place et les rôles des Militaires dans la Société Brésilienne sous la première République 1889-1919" (Unpublished thesis Jerusalem, Johanan Ben Zakny Str. Israel) pp.232-245.

Although R.G.do Sul had a smaller active state militia than Minas Gerais and Bahia,¹ on balance it was probably more effective. Its advantage lay in the discipline, organization and experience it had acquired in defending the state in the early years of the civil war. Certainly in the revolt of the Aliança Liberal in 1930, the gaúcho state forces were given a more important role than the mineiro militia.² The forces of the other three major states were poor and generally on a lower level of organization. Although numerically large as in Bahia, they were a "rag-tag army of underpaid and underfed men"³ and also badly equipped, usually with old-fashioned and obsolete rifles. They were inadequate even to defend the ruling state elites against their internal opponents.

After the first Republican decade, the development of militias in the larger states meant that intervention in São Paulo, R.G.do Sul and even Minas Gerais would involve the Federal government in a major political upheaval and military undertaking. During the Republican period, Federal forces⁴ were roughly equal to the total number of state troops; the majority of the latter being concentrated in the three major southern states - São Paulo,

¹. Size of active State Militias of Four Major States

| State | 1909 | 1917 | 1928 |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| São Paulo | 3,508 | 8,618 | 7,622 |
| Minas Gerais | 2,502 | 2,976 | 4,111 |
| Bahia | 2,126 | 2,200 | 3,153 |
| R.G.do Sul | 1,552 | 2,528 | 3,212 |

Source: See footnote 1 on previous page (p.30).

In the various surveys of the Brazilian military organization the British Foreign Office representatives described only the paulista and gaúcho state militias as effective. See for example: "Foreign Office Diplomatic Reports," F.O.371 May 1907 and 1922, File No.185.

². It would appear that the main deterrent to Federal intervention in Minas was not so much its state militia, as the numerical strength of its large and united bancada in Congress and the obvious reluctance of Presidents to challenge it, that is until 1930 when the mineiro politicians were in any case divided

³. Eul-soo Pang: "The Politics of Coronelismo in Brazil", (op.cit.), p.171.

⁴. In 1909 both the state and Federal armies had just under 20,000 personnel. By 1917 the total number of state forces was greater than the Federal army being roughly 28,000 and 21,000 respectively. It was only in the 1920s that Federal forces overtook the size of state forces and by 1930 it had about 40,000 personnel, some 10,000 more than the total number of men in the state militias. See graph in J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.255. Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371 Report August 1908, May 1909, File 605; 1922, File 7185.

Minas Gerais and R.G.do Sul. Since the Federal army was divided into seven garrisons spread over the country, only part of the national forces could be deployed at any one time. Hence Federal governments until 1930 shied away from military involvement in the three major southern states.

The effective participation of these states in national politics was substantially due to their effective militias which was financed by their growing economies. Education, another sector which benefited from this growth, also had significant political consequences.

b. Education. Since literacy was a requirement for voting, states which spent more on education, had a correspondingly higher percentage of the population registered as voters. Expenditure on education in 1920 shows great variations in levels, as the table below (section 1) indicates:

TABLE I/5

Expenditure on Education in the Major States in 1920

| Section I | | | Section II | |
|--|------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| States | Revenue states contos) | of Expenditure (in Primary cation | on Per Edu- capita spending | % of Budget |
| São Paulo | 137,484 | 23,218 | 5.05 | 16 |
| Minas Gerais | 56,189 | 6,385 | 1.09 | 11 |
| R.G.do Sul | 34,300 | 4,097 | 1.88 | 12 |
| Bahia | 29,362 | 1,450 | 0.44 | 5 |
| Pernambuco | 25,907 | 776 | 0.36 | 3 |
| R.de Janeiro | 21,471 | 2,403 | 1.54 | 9 |
| Of all states including Federal District | 466,637 | 59,570 | 1.94 | 12 |

Source: Livro do Centenário da Câmara dos Deputados 1826-1926, op.cit.,

Chap.VIII. Derived from statistics pp.499-506.

Note: 1000 milréis = 1 conto

However, Section II of the table also shows that in the allocation of state resources, education did not have the same preference in all states. Whilst an average of 12% of all state budgets was allocated to education, twelve states spent a lower percentage on it, the lowest being Bahia and Pernambuco.

As Table I/6 shows, in 1900 only seven states and the Federal District had a literacy rate at or above the national average. In 1920, when the national average rose to 35.1% it had actually fallen in thirteen states.

TABLE I/6

Table showing Adult (over 15 years of age) Literacy in 1900 and 1920 by States

| States | 1900 | 1920 |
|--------------------|------|------|
| 1 Federal District | 63.0 | 74.2 |
| 2 R.G.do Sul | 46.9 | 55.5 |
| 3 Amazonas | 41.7 | 38.5 |
| 4 Pará | 41.3 | 41.8 |
| 5 Espírito Santo | 40.6 | 35.4 |
| 6 Mato Grosso | 36.7 | 41.5 |
| 7 Sta.Catharina | 36.5 | 41.6 |
| 8 Paraná | 35.4 | 40.0 |
| 9 Maranhão | 34.6 | 22.8 |
| 10 São Paulo | 34.3 | 41.5 |
| 11 Minas Gerais | 34.1 | 31.2 |
| 12 Rio de Janeiro | 31.9 | 35.5 |
| 13 Sergipe | 30.0 | 22.8 |
| 14 Goiás | 28.9 | 23.0 |
| 15 R.G.do Norte | 28.9 | 26.4 |
| 16 Bahia | 28.6 | 27.0 |
| 17 Ceará | 28.4 | 27.2 |
| 18 Pernambuco | 27.8 | 25.3 |
| 19 Alagoas | 26.7 | 21.2 |
| 20 Paraíba | 26.3 | 19.8 |
| 21 Piauí | 25.7 | 18.7 |
| National Average | 34.7 | 35.1 |

Source: Derived from statistical data in Livro do Centenário da Câmara dos Deputados 1826-1926, Chapter 8 pp.485 and 498.

TABLE I/7

Percentage of the Population in each State Registered as Voters in 1910, 1922 and 1930

| States | 1910 | 1922 | 1930 |
|--|------|------|------|
| Pará | 10.8 | 4.8 | 6.4 |
| R.G.do Sul | 7.9 | 7.0 | 12.4 |
| Paraná | 7.5 | 4.7 | 10.3 |
| R.de Janeiro | 6.5 | 5.5 | 8.4 |
| Minas Gerais | 5.9 | 5.3 | 8.7 |
| Sta.Catharina | 5.7 | 4.1 | 7.9 |
| Goiás | 5.5 | 2.4 | 3.4 |
| Espírito Santo | 5.4 | 3.8 | 7.4 |
| Piauí | 5.6 | 2.3 | 4.1 |
| Mato Grosso | 5.3 | n.a. | 5.6 |
| Maranhão | 4.8 | 3.7 | 5.4 |
| São Paulo | 4.7 | 3.7 | 8.1 |
| Ceará | 4.5 | 4.8 | 7.7 |
| Pernambuco | 4.5 | 2.7 | 4.1 |
| Bahia | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.5 |
| Paraíba | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.6 |
| R.G.do Norte | 3.6 | 2.9 | 3.6 |
| Amazonas | 3.6 | 2.0 | 4.5 |
| Sergipe | 3.1 | 3.6 | 5.2 |
| Alagoas | 2.8 | 2.2 | 3.0 |
| Federal District | 2.8 | 6.1 | 9.6 |
| % of National Population registered as voters | 5.2 | 4.3 | 7.5 |

Sources: For 1910: Directoria do Serviço de Estatística "Estatística Eleitoral" p.245.

For 1922: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 1922, p.795.

For 1930: Ibid., May 1930, p.545.

Note: In 1922, the national percentage of registered voters had fallen. This was because under the Electoral reform of 1916, the existing register was scrapped and a new one started. Not all had reregistered by 1922.

Table I/7 on page 35 shows how this affected the percentage of the state population registered in the states. The correlation between literacy levels and voter registrations is clear in the majority of cases. There are some significant discrepancies though: one is São Paulo where despite high literacy rates, the voter registration fell below the national average until 1930. This was because of the large number of literate foreigners¹ it contained who did not participate in formal politics until the late 1920s. The Federal District had a similar experience. Its low voter registration in 1910, however, was mainly due to deliberate political repression by the Federal authorities as will be seen in later chapters.

The political implications of these differences in voter registration is clear if an examination is made of them for example in the major states - as noted in Table I/7 the paulista electorate reflected its real potential only in 1930.

TABLE I/8

Table showing the Numbers of Registered Voters in 6 Major States and as a Percentage of the Total National Electorate

| Year | Minas Gerais | | São Paulo | | Rio Grande do Sul | |
|------|--------------|------|------------|------|-------------------|------|
| 1905 | 179,128 | 22.6 | 80,636 | 10.2 | 82,776 | 10.5 |
| 1910 | 266,081 | 22.5 | 160,494 | 13.3 | 116,515 | 12.0 |
| 1922 | 314,813 | 24.2 | 164,234 | 12.6 | 153,825 | 11.9 |
| 1930 | 645,521 | 22.2 | 516,651 | 18.0 | 367,782 | 12.7 |
| Year | Bahia | | Pernambuco | | Rio de Janeiro | |
| 1905 | 73,441 | 9.3 | 48,146 | 6.7 | 45,115 | 5.7 |
| 1910 | 99,935 | 8.3 | 64,220 | 5.3 | 71,539 | 6.0 |
| 1922 | 122,631 | 9.5 | 58,756 | 4.6 | 86,517 | 6.6 |
| 1930 | 227,694 | 7.8 | 117,171 | 4.0 | 167,999 | 5.8 |

Sources: Directoria do Serviço Estatística: "Estatística Eleitoral" (Rio, 1912)

1905: pp.39, 117, 157, 187, 197, 234

1910: Ibid., p.244

¹. Anuario Estatístico do Brasil Ano V (1944) pp.1307-8. Of the 3 million immigrants who entered Brazil between 1827 and 1939, 2,300,000 went to São Paulo.

1922: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 1922, p.795

1930: Ibid., May 1930, p.545.

5. Internal Political Cohesion in the States

In addition to a healthy economic base internal political unity was essential for a state to participate effectively in Presidential politics.¹ Again it was in the states where economic advances were being made that political organizations were most developed. In São Paulo, Minas Gerais and R.G.do Sul the interest of the state was placed above factional or group interests. Stable and permanent Republican parties were established. Throughout the Republican period these parties controlled state politics. Even so these states were not free from internal dissension. Differences within the Republican parties of São Paulo (1905-1912) and particularly Minas Gerais (1889-1897, 1909, 1929) adversely affected their position in national politics during these periods. In R.G.do Sul, the presence of a disciplined opposition party similarly weakened the state in national politics until 1929 when the two parties united to form the Frente-Unica.

None of the other three major states had permanent parties that lasted throughout the Republic and as a consequence suffered from factionalism, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro were subject to frequent internal schisms which divided their national bancadas and electorates. As a result the position of the ruling elites of these states was undermined nationally and Bahia for example had a much less significant role in national politics than the size of its bancada in Congress and its electorate warranted.

¹. For references on internal state politics see page 14, footnote 1.

Conclusion

From what has been said in Part II of this chapter about the disparities in demographic size, economic growth, state revenues and state expenditure and internal political stability amongst the states, and taking the Republican period as a whole it is possible to group the states into three. At one extreme there were the fourteen states with small electorates and weak representation in Congress and hence little political influence within the Federation. At the other extreme there were the two states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Their large electorates, powerful and united bancadas and their ability to defend themselves from Federal intervention gave these states the greatest weight in Federal politics. Then there were the four states in an intermediate position: Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and R.G.do Sul. The first three states however owed their prominence to the past and were in decline during the Republican period. R.G.do Sul, on the other hand, was on the ascendancy and after 1910 it had greater influence in the Federation than the north-eastern states.

PART III

This section is concerned with the mechanics of Presidential election, the process by which candidates were nominated and the election ratified, and how the dominant states were able to manipulate the political system nationally to secure the endorsement and election of their candidates.

1. The Process of Nomination

Since state governments were able to deliver the votes for their candidates, the crucial part of the elections was to arrive at a ticket endorsed by the majority of state governments including at least half of the major states which controlled the biggest electorates. It is

obvious from the conclusions in Part II on the great disparities between states that this was one crucial factor in narrowing the field of potential contenders amongst the states for the Presidency. It entirely eliminated the fourteen smallest states from the race. Although all the remaining six major states had ambitions to provide the Presidents, only São Paulo and Minas Gerais were large enough and enjoyed sufficient internal political cohesion to attract the support of the majority behind their candidates. As Table I/9 (a) shows these two states provided all but three of the Presidents during the Republic. Two others were army officers.

Moreover these two states were not always competing for the Presidency. In the first decade of the Republic, until 1902, Minas Gerais was unable to participate fully in national politics because of internal political problems. After 1906 and until the 1920s São Paulo was more concerned to maintain political stability and Federal aid for coffee than to hold the Presidency. This enabled Minas Gerais which was more aggressive in its determination to dominate the Presidency, to do so. Between 1902 and 1926 Minas provided three Presidents and five Vice-Presidents.

In addition to the ascendancy they derived in the nomination of Presidential candidate from their large electorates and united bancadas, the dominant states were also able to force compliance from the majority of other states through their control first over the Congressional Commission for certifying the result of the Congressional elections and second, over the incumbent President and hence the power to intervene in states to overthrow uncooperative state governors.

TABLE I/9

Presidents and Vice-Presidents from 1891-1930 with State of Origin

| Year | (a) Presidents | State | (b) Vice-Presidents | State |
|------|------------------------|--------------|--|------------------------|
| 1891 | Deodoro da Fonseca | Army officer | Floriano Peixoto | Army officer |
| 1894 | Prudente de Moraes | São Paulo | Manoel Victorino | Bahia |
| 1898 | Campos Sales | São Paulo | Rosa e Silva | Pernambuco |
| 1902 | Rodrigues Alves | São Paulo | Silviano Brandão (died) | Minas Gerais |
| 1906 | Afonso Pena | Minas Gerais | 1903 Alfonso Pena Nilo Peçanha | R.de Janeiro |
| 1910 | Hermes da Fonseca | Army officer | Wenceslau Bráz | Minas Gerais |
| 1914 | Wenceslau Bráz | Minas Gerais | Urbano Santos | Maranhão |
| 1918 | Rodrigues Alves (died) | São Paulo | Delfim Moreira (died | Minas Gerais |
| 1919 | Epitácio Pessoa | Paraíba | 1920 Bueno de Paiva | Minas Gerais |
| 1922 | Artur Bernardes | Minas Gerais | Urbano Santos (d.1922) 1922 Estácio Coimbra | Maranhão Pernambuco |
| 1926 | Washington Luís | São Paulo | Fernando de Mello Vianna | Minas Gerais |
| 1930 | Júlio Prestes | São Paulo | Vidal Soares | Bahia |

Note: Although the President in 1919 and the Vice-Presidents in 1914 and 1922 came from Paraíba and Maranhão respectively, they were put forward and selected by the major states as compromise candidates.

Instruments of Federal Control

a. The Certification Commission. The Republican Constitution of 1891 had given Congress the right to certify Congressional elections. Whilst the election of candidates in uncontested seats was automatically certified, and they took their places when Congress convened, certification of disputed seats was left to the Certification Commission for the

two Houses. The composition of this body depended on the President of the Chamber of Deputies in the last Congressional session¹ since he presided over the Certification Commission and nominated the other members to it. The key post of President of the Chamber was normally occupied by the representatives of the most powerful bancadas, Minas Gerais and São Paulo, and although sometimes representatives of other states were elected to the post, they were always nominees of the dominant states and controlled by them. The only exception, as will be seen in Chapters Five and Six, was in 1905 and between June 1909 and 1912 when Rio Grande do Sul through Pinheiro Machado exercised a dominant influence over the Certification Commission, but even so, it was with the tacit support of at least one of the dominant states.

The power of the dominant states to control the election of Congressional representatives of the majority of states, provided them with an opportunity for arriving at a mutually acceptable arrangement over the Presidential election. Congressional elections were held every three years after 1891 and frequently they coincided with negotiations over a presidential nomination. Thus the states which controlled the certifying commission made it clear that only endorsement of its Presidential candidate would assure state governors of recognition for their Congressional slates.

The states most vulnerable to control through the Certification Commission were either the smallest whose protests could most easily be ignored or those major states whose electoral slates were strongly contested by powerful minority factions. In fact, the almost total political insignificance of the weaker states at national level is evident in the practice of the powerful states nominating their own 'carpet-bagging' representatives to fight congressional seats in the 'satellite' states. Amazonas, for example, complained in 1921 that

¹. This was only after the procedural changes brought about by President Campos Sales in 1900. Until then the Certification Commission was chaired by the oldest congressmen in the previous session. See Chapter Four.

of its four deputies not one was a native of the state.¹ In fact 'satellite' states had generally accepted their secondary status in the Federation and had settled for Federal support of the incumbent state ruling elites in return for compliance at the national level. For most of them, under constant pressure from internal rivals whom they were unable to contain, much depended on judging correctly the future balance of power in the Federal capital. The 'satellite' states would as a rule, only change alliances if the national balance seemed marginal and unstable. The threat of non-certification of congressional bancadas was usually sufficient to silence potential opposition of even some of the major states as for example R.G.do Sul in early 1909 and again in 1929 as we shall see.

b. Intervention Another method of ensuring the support of the governors of a majority of states for a Presidential candidate of the dominant national group was through Federal intervention or threat of intervention in the states to depose non-compliant incumbents in favour of another and more amenable faction. Article 6 of the Constitution had specified four conditions under which the Federal government could interfere in state matters. The two clauses most important in practice were² "to maintain the Federal Republican form" and "to re-establish order and peace in the states at the request of the respective governments".

The first had probably been intended to prevent monarchists in the states from establishing governments loyal to the Emperor. However, the clause was never amplified

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional." September 1921 and passim debates during campaign for Presidential election of 1922.

². The other two clauses were to defend the country against foreign invasion and in the event of an inter-state war.

and as a result was a useful instrument for controlling states.¹ The most common excuse for interventions was following a contested state election (either for the renewal of the state legislature or for governorship). A rival faction in the state encouraged by the Federal government would contest the election against candidates of the incumbent governor. Both sides would claim victory, sometimes convening two legislatures or executive authorities in the state capital. The Federal government would then, at the request of the opposition faction, intervene in its favour. Intervention or the fear of it was an important means of securing the support of state governors for a candidate.

The power of intervention had been reserved exclusively to the President by the Constitution and this raises the important question of the role of the incumbent President in the selection of his successor. It has been noted earlier that the Constitution and the política dos governadores had made the Presidency the key to control over the political system of the Republic. However, the basis of the President's power rested essentially with the dominant states São Paulo and Minas Gerais, and the support of at least one of them was an indispensable condition for him to exploit the potential powers of his office. Incumbent residents manipulated the Presidency primarily for their states and their power began and ended with their state. This point is illustrated in 1909 and during 1919 to 1922, as will be seen. Not even the military could secure the Presidential nomination without the support of at least one of the dominant states. However having stressed the fact that Presidents acted primarily in the interest of their states, it must also be emphasized that on the question of nominating Presidential candidates, no incumbent President not even of one of the

¹. Despite the importance of interventions there has been no serious research into the subject. The majority of interventions during the period seem to have been carried out at the request of incumbents in power. The interventions discussed here however are those connected with Presidential elections. "Documentos Parlamentares (Intervenção nos Estados)." (Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro) 13 vols however provides information of most interventions carried out during the period.

dominant states São Paulo and Minas could impose a successor on behalf of his state without the support of at least half of the other major states.

The Vice-Presidency and Political Patronage

The offer of the Vice-Presidency,¹ other political posts in the Cabinet and economic patronage in the case of the more important states, helped to cement their support for a particular candidate and to create a consensus of state interests. The Vice-Presidency was often the most important office for this purpose, particularly as the endorsement of a candidate of the north or north-east for this post went some way to appeasing the critics of a regional hegemony by São Paulo and Minas Gerais. (Even here however the dominant position of these states is evident in the fact that Minas held the Vice-Presidency for four out of the eleven times. See Table I/9 (b)). The appointments to Cabinet posts indicate more clearly how other major states were won over to successive Federal administrations dominated by one or other of the dominant states. The regional analyses of appointments to Cabinet posts carried out by Joseph Love² show that in the first half of the Republic when São Paulo exercised hegemony over the Presidency and required the co-operation of the two electorally most important states, Minas and Bahia, natives of these states held Cabinet posts for the most number of years. After 1910 however, it was R.G.do Sul which had to be appeased and its representatives dominated.

The dominant factors ensuring the cooperation of the majority of state governors over the selection of a presidential ticket were first the great disparities in political strength

¹. The Constitution had provided that the Vice-President should deputize for the President during his absence, and if he died or retired half-way through his term in office, the Vice-President completed the remaining period. This situation in fact occurred a number of times during the Republic and as we shall see, sometimes had far-reaching effects on national politics. Until 1903, the Vice-President also presided over the Senate and used the position for political manipulation.

². Joseph Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" *op.cit.*, p.123.

of the various states, making São Paulo and Minas Gerais the only real serious contenders amongst the states for the Presidency, second the use of two instruments of Federal control at national level, the certification commission for Congressional elections in Congress and the power of intervention in states to ensure the compliance in particular of weaker states. Third, the use of political and economic patronage in the case of the other major states.

The states were the real political units of the Republic and it was they who were the major factor in Presidential politics. However the military was also a significant force in Brazilian politics at this time, and although the majority of the officer corps accepted the civilian governments after 1894, and preferred to limit the role of the military to that of a moderator in times of real political crises, a section of the officer class was hostile to the oligarchic political system and attempted to influence the selection of Presidents.

In the selection of a President the consent of the majority of state governors, including that of the major states, was first obtained for a particular ticket. This was done usually by private negotiations between state governors through their chief representatives in Congress, the 'leaders' of the bancadas. Although all the factors favoured a paulista or mineiro candidate,¹ the selection process was by no means straightforward. Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro attempted to influence the choice of candidates. Internal rifts within the two dominant states or rivalry between these two states and military intervention in Presidential elections, sometimes further complicated the selection. In such cases negotiations would continue until a majority ticket emerged. Only then would a national nomination convention be convened to officially ratify the decision and draw up a programme for its candidate. Later the 'official' candidate - endorsed by the incumbent President and the majority of states, would read his own election manifesto at a

¹. Within São Paulo and Minas Gerais the pattern for selecting candidates for the Presidency was well established. He was always an important figure in the state party and usually he was the incumbent state governor.

banquet attended by leading politicians and businessmen. Campaigns were conducted only when the 'official' ticket was seriously contested as in 1910, 1919, 1922, and 1930. In such cases the opposition coalition would usually select its own candidates in the same way as the majority faction but their programme would be read at a public meeting and would be populist in approach. However, the 'official' candidate was always guaranteed final victory. As Table I/10 shows, he never lost.

TABLE I/10

Table showing the total number of Ballots certified by Congress at Presidential Elections, the number of Votes obtained by the Official Candidates and as a Percentage of the Total Vote Cast

| Year | President | | | % | Vice-President | | | % |
|------|---------------|------|-------------------------------|------|----------------|------|-------------------------------|------|
| | Total cast | vote | Vote official candidate | | Total cast | vote | Vote official candidate | |
| 1894 | 342,161 | | 290,883 | 85 | 327,347 | | 266,060 | 81 |
| 1898 | 459,836 | | 420,286 | 91 | 452,562 | | 412,074 | 91 |
| 1902 | 646,249 | | 592,039 | 92 | 639,165 | | 563,734 | 88 |
| 1906 | 294,375 | | 288,285 | 98 | 291,934 | | 272,529 | 94 |
| 1910 | 627,239 | | 403,867 | 64 | 625,518 | | 406,012 | 65 |
| 1914 | 580,801 | | 532,017 | 92 | 577,973 | | 556,127 | 96 |
| 1918 | 394,532 | | 390,810 | 99 | 388,773 | | 386,297 | 99 |
| 1919 | 403,560 | | 286,373 | 71 | 192,414 | | 191,842 | 99.7 |
| 1922 | 784,591 | | 466,877 | 59 | 778,187 | | 447,595 | 58 |
| 1926 | 690,570 | | 688,528 | 99.8 | 688,338 | | 685,754 | 99.7 |
| 1930 | 1,838,335 | | 1,091,709 | 59 | 1,808,790 | | 1,079,360 | 60 |

Source: 'Diário do Congresso Nacional' June 22, 1894; June 28, 1898; May 23,

1902; June 20, 1906; July 27, 1910; July 1, 1914; June 6, 1918; July 9, 1919; June 8, 1922; June 9, 1926; May 21, 1930.

Certification of Elections

The Constitutional provision for the Certification of the Presidential elections guaranteed the victory of the candidates endorsed by the majority of state governors. The power to certify Presidential elections was reserved to the National Congress¹ (both the Houses sat together for the purpose), and the congressional bancadas of the states behind the 'official' candidate were able to secure their nominees to the executive board (mesa) of the House, which was responsible for presenting the final report on the electoral returns from the states to the House.² This report biased in favour of the majority candidate, was then voted on in the House at a single reading. In a closely contested election, the coalition of majority states in Congress were able to vitiate the results in favour of their candidate either by refusing to exclude votes improperly cast for their candidate or by unjustly invalidating ballots cast for the opposition.

Conclusion

The study of electoral data relating to Presidential elections have confirmed the conventional view that the ruling elite in the state capitals were the effective powers in the state. However, an examination of the role of the states in national politics and particularly in Presidential elections has suggested that three rather than two categories of states existed:

¹. "Constitution of Brazil February 1891" Art.47.

². The procedure for the certification of Presidential elections was set out in the "Electoral Law of January 1892" *op.cit.* The 'mesa' comprised the Vice-President of the senate as chairman and the first and second secretaries of each chamber as secretaries. In the study of the electoral returns, the 'mesa' was assisted by 5 congressional commissions, each comprising 6 members chosen by lot from those present. Each commission studied the returns from a group of states and submitted a report to the board within 5 days. See "Electoral Law of January 1892" Articles 14-16

first São Paulo and Minas Gerais who alone were able to provide Presidential candidates. Second, the secondary states Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, which tended to exercise independence on the succession question. Third, the fourteen 'satellite' states, which generally supported the dominant national political faction.

One case that has not been considered so far in this chapter is the Federal District. Although it was allowed representation in Congress on the same basis as the states, and also to participate in Presidential elections, the fact that its executive was headed by a Prefect appointed by the incumbent President, has led writers on this period to classify it with the satellite states. The study of Presidential elections that follow has shown, however, that despite the protection those in power in the Federal District enjoyed from the incumbent President, they were unable to control the majority of the electorate.¹ In contested Presidential elections, it was the faction out of office which succeeded in winning the majority for its candidates.

This chapter has tried to present the state basis on which Presidential elections primarily revolved during the Old Republic. However whilst this was true for the majority of elections, it is not relevant to the first Presidential contest. The major political force in this election was the military, which having led the successful coup d'état of 1889 that toppled the Empire, had assumed political power. Except for São Paulo the states were in an upheaval as various factions fought for control within the states. It was this factional power struggle which dominated the first Presidential election, and it is this conflict and its ideological basis that is the subject of the next chapter.

¹. This suggests that coronéis were not able to control the electorate as in the states. The Federal District of course had a much higher level of literacy, double the national average (Table I/6), and its electorate would appear to have been more independent. A comparative study of electoral behaviour in urban and rural areas in this period however still remains to be done.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1891 AND

1894

Introduction

It has been customary to interpret the conflict that surrounded the Presidential election of 1891 as a military/civilian struggle for power. Even recent studies¹ have tended to emphasize this controversy. Chapter Two attempts to argue however that although at a certain point the military/civilian schism dominated the election, the Presidential contest reflected primarily an ideological conflict over the direction of the Republican regime. This interpretation has emerged from a study in particular of the debates in the Constituent Assembly, the record of the meetings of the provisional government and memoirs.

This chapter analyses the ideological controversy in terms of three main factions; the 'historic' or pre-1889 Republicans who were themselves divided into two groups, the radicals and the moderates who differed on the question of a third group the adesistas or former monarchists. The chapter examines first the indirect election of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca in 1891 in the Constituent Assembly, and second the direct election of Prudente de Moraes in 1894, in the context of these ideological divisions.

¹ See for example June E. Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (Columbia, S.C., 1969). John Henry Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (Princeton University, Ph.D., 1973. Xerox University Microfilms. Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA)

1. The Candidature of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca

The provisional government¹ set up after the coup d'état of November 1889 which toppled the Empire, had decided that the first Republican President would be elected indirectly by the Constituent Assembly after it had promulgated a Constitution for the Republic. When this body met in November 1890, it was obvious that the acting President, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca was the popular candidate for the presidency. His support came from both military and civilian groups.

Politically the most significant force behind Deodoro was the military, since it was they and in particular the army, which had become the dominant political force after the November coup. There were two basic reasons why Deodoro had the endorsement of the armed forces. First, he had led the struggle of the officers in defence of their rights during the so-called Military Question² in the 1880s, and it was largely the failure of successive Imperial Cabinets to recognize these demands, that had led Deodoro to head the coup that toppled the Empire. The election of Deodoro as the first President of the Republic was generally regarded in the forces as necessary to legitimize his action and as a mark of approval for what he had done.

For example, one General Mena Barreto, stationed with the garrison in R.G.do Sul, drew up a manifesto in which he stated the intention of the officers to secure the election of

¹. On November 15, 1889, a military rebellion under Marshal Deodoro overthrew the Imperial government and exiled the Imperial family to Portugal. A provisional government was set up with Marshal Deodoro as acting President and a seven-men Council of Ministers including leading civilian and military Republicans who had master-minded the coup. A Constituent Assembly was convened a year later to promulgate a Republican Constitution. The Assembly was also to elect the first President of the Republic. The Republican Party had had little electoral support during the Empire, and the Council of Ministers doubted their ability to control a second direct election to ensure the victory of a Republican for the Presidency.

². Briefly the 'Military Question' was the dispute between the Imperial Cabinets of the 1880s and the armed forces over their right to participate as a group in politics. For a discussion of the conflict and in particular Deodoro's role in it and the coup that followed as a result see Charles Willis Simmons: *"Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Dom Pedro II"* (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1966) pp.26-116. Raimundo Magalhães Júnior: *"Deodoro a Espada contra o Império"* (Companhia Editora Nacional, São Paulo, 1957) vol.II

Deodoro because "No one more than he deserved to be the first President".¹

Another reason for Deodoro's support in the armed forces was that they wanted to continue in power, and Deodoro was the ideal candidate of the military, since he alone was able to command the loyalty of the majority of the senior officers. The military had enjoyed many benefits as a result of their control over the provisional government.² Not only had their salaries increased by 50%, the size of the forces doubled from 13,000 to 25,000 and officers loyal to the Republic promoted, but officers had also been appointed to run the majority of states and to a number of administrative posts. A civilian proposal that would have made all officers on active service ineligible for elected posts was quickly forgotten when the Military Club, an organisation set up in 1887 to defend the rights of the armed forces, protested.³ Some officer-governors in the states made it clear that civilian politicians aspiring to represent the state in the Constituent Assembly, would only be included on the congressional slate if they pledged their vote in the presidential election to Deodoro.⁴

But Deodoro's support did not come only from the military. He also had the backing of civilians. Civilian state governments who were appointees of Deodoro, as in Minas, Pernambuco or Rio de Janeiro, or at least depended on him for their survival in the states, were expected to vote in his favour. This meant in fact all state governments except that of São Paulo, where the state Republican party had been powerful enough to gain control of the state and by judicious conciliation with the adesistas had succeeded in

¹. R.Magalhães Júnior: Ibid. (op.cit.) p.213.

². June E.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (op. cit.) Chapter II, p.43 passim.

John H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (op.cit.) p.199 passim and Appendix 2.

³. 40 of the 206 deputies and 14 of the 63 senators elected to the Constituent Assembly were officers. For military opposition to their exclusion from political office see J.E.Hahner (op.cit.) p.50. For a detailed analysis of the composition of the military group in the Assembly see J.H.Schutz (op.cit.) p.217 passim.

⁴ "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" (op.cit.) Vol.I, p.451.

consolidating its position peacefully. One state government, that of R.G.do Sul dominated by 'historic' Republicans, had publicly endorsed the candidature of Marshal Deodoro as early as July 1890.¹ Here the Republican party was not powerful enough to establish its control without Federal support, and Júlio de Castilhos, leader of the gaúcho Republican party, had arrived at an understanding with the Marshal. The gaúcho bancada had undertaken to vote in favour of his candidature in return for the appointment of Castilhos Lieutenant-governor of the state.

Another civilian group that publicly favoured Deodoro were the adesistas. These were the former monarchists who, after a feared monarchist counter-coup did not materialize and it became obvious with the exile of the Imperial family to Portugal, that the Republic was an accomplished fact, were anxious only to return to power.²

The overwhelming support for Deodoro amongst civilian politicians was evident in the Constituent Assembly³ dominated by civilian congressmen. One of its first actions was to form a commission to congratulate the Marshal on his achievements in the past year. Not only were all the decrees of the provisional government ratified, but the Assembly voted to limit its own activities to drawing up the Constitution, whilst the provisional government retained full legislative powers until the promulgation of the Constitution.

2. Opposition to Deodoro

Support for Deodoro however was not unanimous. He was opposed by the radical faction

¹ J. L. Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) p.42.

² "Regulamento Cesário Alvim", No. 511, June 23, 1890. The first electoral regulations, the Regulamento Cesário Alvim, had tried to ensure that the Constituent Assembly would comprise only those known to support the Republic. Acting state governors were instructed to draw up the complete slate of candidates for the election; electors were further required to vote for a complete slate, thus guaranteeing the exclusion of individual monarchist opponents. Even before the publication of this regulation, however, newspaper columns had been filled daily with the names of former monarchists swearing allegiance to the Republic.

³ "Anais da Primeira Constituents Republicana" Vol.I, November 11-20, 1890.

of the 'historic' or pre-1889 Republicans both in the army and amongst the civilians.¹ The radical like the moderate 'historic' Republicans were both committed Republicans, but they differed after the coup over the treatment of the adesistas - the post-1889 Republicans. Whilst the radicals wanted to exclude them from power, the moderates believed in conciliation. The Jacobin tendency amongst the radical Republicans became apparent following the overthrow of the Empire.² Imperial emblems in the Federal capital were destroyed and the trial of the Imperial family demanded.

The army wing of the radical Republicans comprised the positivist group which centred around Benjamin Constant, Professor of Mathematics at the Escola Superior de Guerra.³ They were mainly younger officers who, whilst students of Constant, had been influenced by his teaching. Constant derived his positivism from the French political theorist Auguste Comte. He accepted Comte's theory that there were different stages in progress, that a Republican system was a step forward in the march to progress and hence the overthrow of the monarchy was unavoidable and indeed necessary for progress. However unlike the orthodox positivists,⁴ Benjamin Constant did not accept the

¹. There were much deeper divisions between the civilian moderate and radical wings of the 'historic' Republicans during the 1870s and 1880s. Whereas the moderates wanted a Federal Republic based on liberal democratic principles and the achievement of a Republic through the ballot box, the radicals were generally influenced by the positivism of Auguste Comte and believed in a centralized dictatorship and a Republic instituted by revolution. Although the radicals won on this latter issue, the Republic being proclaimed as a result of a coup, it was the moderates' view that prevailed in the institutional organization of the Republic. The surprising fact is that except for the orthodox positivists, the Positivist Apostolate, the radical Republicans became preoccupied with the question of the adesistas and despite their earlier commitment to a centralized dictatorship did not fight for its implementation in the national Constitution after the coup. The civilian radical Republicans of R.G.do Sul however adopted a positivist Constitution for their state. For analyses of the ideological differences between the 'historic' Republicans see George Boehr: "From Monarchy to the Republic. A History of the Republican Party of Brazil 1870-1889" (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1951) Chapter VIII.

². Tobias Monteiro: "Pesquisas e depoimento para a história" (Rio de Janeiro, 1913) p.275.

³. A biography of Benjamin Constant, his life and political ideas see Raimundo Teixeira Mendes: "Benjamin Constant" (Rio, 1913), J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (op.cit.) p.117, 201 passim.

⁴. The Positivist Apostolate did in fact present Marshal Deodoro with a draft of a positivist Constitution shortly after the coup but Deodoro was opposed to it. This draft is published in "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana", Vol.I. Appendix 1, pp.3-21.

institutional framework laid down for a Republic, in which the essential features were a centralized dictatorship, government by referendum and a legislature whose function was strictly limited to financial matters. Instead Benjamin Constant and his disciples favoured a liberal democratic system within which they believed material progress was possible. In this respect their ideas were similar to those held by most Republican and monarchist critics of the Imperial system¹ who had been demanding more representative government since the 1860s and which Marshal Deodoro and the provisional government after 1889 wanted, at least in theory, to implement in the Republic. Where Benjamin Constant and his followers clashed with Deodoro was over the question of the adesistas. The positivists argued that if the adesistas were incorporated in the power structure of the Republic, they would re-establish the corrupt and anti-liberal practices which they had favoured under the Empire.

The second group of anti-Deodoro Republicans were the civilian radical wing of the 'historic' Republican Party in Minas, Pernambuco, Pará, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia.² The most powerful civilian group of radical Republicans was the Republican party of R.G.do Sul, but as noted earlier they had come to an agreement with Deodoro. Besides the ideological reason for their opposition to the adesistas, the civilian radical Republicans in the states had also a practical reason for opposing the incorporation of the adesistas in the Republic. None of them had succeeded in organising powerful Republican parties before 1889³ and they could only be sustained in power with the help of the Federal government. The inclusion of the former long established monarchist Liberal and Conservative parties

¹. See for example João Camillo de Oliveira Torres "A Democracia Coroada. Teoria Política do Império do Brasil" (Editôra vozes Limitada. Petrópolis, RJ. 1964) p.285 passim.

² "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana", Vol. I and II. Debates December 1890, January 1891, especially Vol.I, pp.141-2, 430, 480.

³ For the organisation of Republican parties in the states before November 1889 see George Boehrer: "From Monarchy to the Republic" (op.cit.)

would simply mean that they would re-assert their dominance in the states.

However Deodoro did not support the radical Republican view. He was himself an adesista, that is not a Republican by conviction, and until he led the successful revolt, he had been a prominent member of the Imperial Conservative Party.¹ His political appointees tended to be former military and political colleagues on whose loyalty he could depend. In any case, the 'historic' Republicans, as noted, were themselves divided over the treatment of the adesistas. The oldest and most powerful Republican state party, that of São Paulo, the PRP (Partido Republicano Paulista), whose vested interests were not in jeopardy, emerged as a moderate wing anxious to incorporate the adesistas and to secure the new regime peacefully. In their state, former monarchists were invited to join the PRP.

The paulistas' primary concern was for political stability and to ensure a smooth transition from the Empire to the Republic so that their coffee exporting economy would not be jeopardized. This economy depended heavily on European immigrant labour and foreign investment and loans for development of infrastructure, particularly railroads, and political instability threatened both. Moreover unlike the Republican parties of other states, the PRP was able to absorb the former monarchists in the state rather than be overcome by them. The PRP, the oldest state party established in 1873, had developed into an efficient and powerful organisation and had set up branches in most municípios before the coup. Hence it was able to assert its control over the state after 1889.²

Disagreement over nominations was the source of the bitterest conflict between

¹. The best critical study of Deodoro, the man and his political career, has been written by C.W. Simmons: "Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Pom Pedro II" (op.cit.)

². Whilst the PRP continued to consolidate its power within the state by organizing a state militia to defend state interests, its bancada in the Constituent Assembly were concerned primarily to push through Congress a Republican Constitution which gave extensive autonomy to the states so that São Paulo could promote its own regional economy and enjoy its revenues without the restrictions it had suffered under the Empire, See José Maria dos Santos: "Bernardino de Campos e o Partido Paulista" (op.cit.)

Deodoro and the radicals soon after the setting up of the provisional government. Deodoro clashed with Benjamin Constant, the Minister of War, over his appointments in the army.¹ Constant had begun promoting large numbers of younger officers with Republican convictions, for "services rendered in the proclamation of the Republic". On the other hand, Benjamin Constant and Aristides Lobo, the Minister of the Interior and another radical Republican, opposed Deodoro's nomination of adesistas to important political posts, as for example to the governorships of two major states, Minas and Pernambuco.² But although the Ministers intervened personally to secure the nomination of 'historic' Republicans to these states, they were unsuccessful. Instead when Aristides Lobo resigned his portfolio in protest over Deodoro's preference for former monarchists, the President appointed the mineiro, Cesário Alvim, a prominent Liberal of the Empire, to the politically important post of Minister of the Interior. This led the positivist officers to openly criticize the President's policies.³ An intense personal animosity developed between Deodoro and Benjamin Constant. On one occasion a heated dispute over the appointment of a minor public functionary in Rio Grande do Norte during a Ministerial meeting, ended with the two men drawing their swords. Both had to be physically restrained by their colleagues.⁴

In the Constituent Assembly representatives of the civilian radical Republicans who had failed to come to power in their states after the Republican coup, as in Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, united to oppose Deodoro. Amongst their most outspoken members were Anibal de Falcão and Barbosa Lima of Pernambuco, Aristides Maia and Astolfo Pio of Minas Gerais, Nilo Peçanha, a twenty-three year old

¹. J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (op.cit.) p.211. Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" pp.367-369.

². Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" Chapter XXVI p.219 passim. A.A.de Mello: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.I, p.207.

³. R.Magalhães Júnior: "Deodoro a Espada contra o Império" Vol.II, pp.193-198.

⁴. Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" pp.139, 259-263, 383-385.

Republican from Rio de Janeiro, and César Spinola de Zama of Bahia. Two other leading anti-Deodoro Republicans, Demétrio Ribeiro and Antão de Faria, came from R.G.do Sul. Both had broken away from their state Republican party after it endorsed the candidature of Deodoro for the Presidency.

Benjamin Constant's own political influence in the military declined after May 1890, when Deodoro transferred him from the Ministry of War to the newly created Ministry of Education, Post and Telegraphs. From September until his death in the following January, serious illness removed Constant from any political activity. However his political followers in the military acquired new leaders in General José Simeão de Oliveira and Admiral Custodio de Melo. General Simeão had originally been appointed by Deodoro as interventor in Pernambuco, but he had been removed after a period of political chaos that followed in the state. Although General Simeão had been compensated with his appointment as Adjutante-general, he went into opposition. He joined the radical Republicans of Pernambuco whom he represented as Senator in Congress. Custódio de Melo, the other leading military opponent of Deodoro, was politically very ambitious. He had become involved in the internal politics of Bahia but had been unable to make much headway because the state was dominated by Deodoro's brother, General Hermes da Fonseca. Instead Custódio de Melo joined the opposition faction in Bahia and was one of its deputies in the Constituent Assembly.¹ Under the leadership of General Simeão and Admiral Custodio de Melo the civilian and military wings of the radical Republicans became united.²

The Constituent Assembly was the focus for military and civilian radical opposition to Deodoro after November 1890. They attempted to curb the acting President's

¹. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Vol.1, pp.430,448.

². 11 of the 40 officers who were deputies in the Constituent Assembly were positivists.

powers, censured his policies and at every stage tried to discredit him. However the anti-Deodoro radical Republicans were a weak minority.¹ The most powerful civilian radical Republican group, that of R.G.do Sul had as noted, come to an understanding with Deodoro in May. Even with the support of other disgruntled politicians in the House, the radical opponents of Deodoro at first only succeeded in obtaining 25 to 40 representatives, less than one-fifth of the House behind them.

The overwhelming pro-Deodoro mood of the Constituent Assembly suffered a reversal only after mid-January 1890, when the President accepted the resignation of the Council of Ministers comprised entirely of long-term Republicans active in the plot against the Empire, and appointed the Baron Lucena to form a new Cabinet. The issue that provoked the resignation was in itself sufficient to discredit the President.² The Council of Ministers were opposed to the President's concession of a contract for the construction of the Port of Torres in R.G.do Sul to Trajano de Medeiros, a personal friend and a monarchist. The appointment of the prominent monarchist Baron Lucena, who was said not to have even publicly renounced his allegiance to the Empire, to head a new Ministry was an open provocation of the radical Republicans. Lucena was yet another of Deodoro's friends with whom he had earlier served in R.G.do Sul. Lucena, who had been given the task of forming the cabinet, compounded the political crisis with the radical Republicans by appointing only one 'historic' Republican - Dr Justo Chermont, founder of the

¹. In any case only 150 of the 268 representatives in the Constituent Assembly were actually 'historic' Republicans, the rest being adesistas. See Max Fleuiss: "História Administrativa do Brasil" (São Paulo, 1922) pp.454-455. David V.Fleischer in his "O Recrutamento político em Minas 1890-1918" Table II p.47 an analysis of the composition of mineiro deputies in the Constituent Assembly, gives seven different party affiliations. Only 42.1% belonged to the Historic Republicans. In Pernambuco party representation in the Assembly had been decided on the bases of the strength of the party. The Historic Republicans had 5 representatives, Conservatives 6, and Liberals 7.

². Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" pp.295-300. The relationship between the President and his Ministers had of course never been very smooth as is evident from the record of their deliberations in the "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" e.g. p.68, Chapter VI, p.79-106, Chapter 38, pp.281-288

Republican Club in Belem, Pará, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All the others were adesistas, and at least one other appointee, Councillor Tristão de Alencar Araripe, the new Minister of Finance, had been an aristocrat of the Empire.

The new Cabinet caused general apprehension even amongst the moderate Republicans of São Paulo. Baron Lucena was a northerner from Pernambuco and it was feared that he would try to restore the regional balance of the Empire in favour of the north.¹ One issue which showed the concern of the Lucena administration with the interests of the north and which aroused opposition from the coffee region and supporters of industrialization and modernization of the country, was the commercial treaty that was signed with the United States.² Under the Salvador de Mendonça - Blaine Treaty, the Brazilian Foreign Minister had secured an agreement which lowered tariffs on Brazilian sugar, rubber and coffee entering the United States in return for similar favourable terms for American industrial products imported into Brazil. The treaty was obviously intended for the benefit of the sugar exports since, as the paulistas argued, whilst sugar faced competition (from the Caribbean) coffee and rubber had a virtual monopoly of the world market and its sales were guaranteed. The treaty was also opposed by those who wanted Brazil to develop its own industries. Nilo Peçanha for example accused the government of Lucena of continuing the policies of the Empire that had resulted in a "Brazil impoverished by taxes, bled through loans and humiliated by treaties".³

For the radical opponents of Deodoro the Lucena Ministry offered a splendid

¹ Jerônimo Viveiros in his book "Benedito Leite" (Rio 1960) writes of the efforts that were made in the north, soon after the November coup, to form an alliance of northern states to defend their regional interests. Baron Lucena then governor of Pernambuco was amongst those involved.

² "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Debates on the treaty February.

³ Ibid., February 11.

opportunity for an attack on the government and for winning new support.¹ Deodoro was accused of being more concerned with promoting the interests of his friends than those of the country. He was blamed for the resignation of the last Ministry. The opposition argued that the Republican Ministers had had no choice but to resign over the matter especially as the Port contract was given to a former monarchist who "cried over the fall of the Empire". The new Ministry was pejoratively termed the "Ministry of Courtiers" and the Republicans alleged that the future of the regime was being decided by the "enemies of yesterday". The controversial treaty with the United States also offered the anti-Deodoristas the opportunity to try to end the powers of legislation which the Constituent Assembly had earlier given the provisional government. They argued that this power had been specifically intended for the Council of Ministers and that the Lucena Ministry would have to seek a new mandate from the House. In particular the radicals demanded that the trade agreement should be debated in the House before it was ratified and obtained support for this motion from half the Congressmen. The growing unpopularity of Deodoro was evident in the hostile attitude of some of his former supporters. Sampaio Ferraz, who until recently had been chief of police of the Federal District, accused the President of "bringing turmoil and panic to the Republic and sacrificing the interests of the Nation".

Thus it can be seen that there was growing disenchantment with Deodoro. Whereas initially, when the Constituent Assembly met, he had succeeded in obtaining overwhelming endorsement for his policies in the House, by the end of January 1891, the radical Republican group of anti-Deodoristas were able to attract almost half the House in their motions of censure against the acting President.

¹. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" January 20 - February 24, 1891.

3. The Campaign to Prevent the Election of Marshal Deodoro President

a. The Candidature of Floriano Peixoto

The radical Republicans took the opportunity that the increasing alienation of Deodoro in the House offered, to mount a campaign to prevent his election as the first Constitutional President. César Zama for example in an emotional speech alleged that the grave problems of the country in the last fourteen months had resulted from the incompetence of the President and questioned his ability to be the nation's head.¹ Soon afterwards Nilo Peçanha asserted in Congress that anyone who voted for Deodoro would "have to share the blame for the future disturbances and errors of the government".² His speech received loud applause.

The radicals also played down Deodoro's part in bringing about the Republic, and tried to deny him the title of founder of the Republic and hence the right to be its first President. The occasion for the new interpretation of the November coup was presented by the death of Benjamin Constant on January 22. Two days later Aristides Lobo proposed in Congress that a National Pantheon be set up and that Constant's body be the first to be buried there as the "Founder of the Republic and a Symbol of the Greatness of the Republic".³ In a further speech commemorating him, Demétrio Ribeiro and César Zama named as founder of the Republic Benjamin Constant, the students of the Military school and Floriano Peixoto who had been Adjutante-General at the time of the coup and "without whose cooperation", César Zama maintained, "no Republic would have been possible".

The death of Benjamin Constant however had deprived the radicals of an obvious rival Presidential candidate to Deodoro and they were now faced with the problem of finding an alternate candidate, who was acceptable both to the armed forces and to the civilians in the Constituent Assembly, a task that proved impossible. Their first choice fell on Floriano

¹. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Vol.II January 1891, p.625, January 21, p.429 passim

² Ibid., February 6, 1891.

³. Ibid., Vol.II January 24, 1891 p.625.

Peixoto because he was the most likely political rival to Deodoro in the army.¹ There was no reason in January 1891 to put Floriano ideologically in the same camp as the radical Republicans. Although some sources have claimed that Floriano held Republican sympathies as far back as the 1870s,² he in fact remained a member of the Imperial liberal Party until the day of the Republican coup.³ Then as Adjutante-General in charge of the Military Headquarters in the Federal District, he had sealed the fate of the Empire by refusing orders to fire on the rebels, joining them instead. Deodoro obviously thought him a reliable ally and had appointed Floriano to replace Benjamin Constant as Minister of War in May 1890. Three months later, following the resignation of Rui Barbosa, Floriano was appointed Provisional Vice-president and deputy to Deodoro. But Floriano during his office in the Ministry of War did not identify either with Deodoro or his opponents. In the final crisis between the Council of Ministers and Deodoro, Floriano stayed away from the Federal capital and it was only after the other Ministers had resigned that Floriano supported their action and was thus saved from the opprobrium that fell on the 'Courtier' Cabinet of Baron Lucena.

Floriano himself remained enigmatic over his candidature, neither publicly refusing or accepting the nomination. In private he intrigued both with the Deodoristas and their opponents. The leading organizers of the pro-Floriano campaign in the army were General Simeão, Custodio de Melo and the positivist officers. The latter succeeded in securing Custodio de Melo president of the Military Club.⁴ Anti-Deodoro statements followed from the Club and the Escola Superior de Guerra. Rumours that Deodoro was planning to shut

¹. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (São Paulo, 1908) pp.62-63. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Vol.II January 24, *passim*.

². See for example J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (*op.cit.*) p.117.

³. For a political biography of Floriano Peixoto see Artur Vieira Peixoto: "Floriano, Memórias e Documentos" (Rio, 1939).

⁴. R.Magalhães Júnior: "Deodoro o Espada contra o Império" (*op.cit.*) Vol.II, pp.301-302.

down the Club gave an added impetus to the opposition's campaign.

But although the positivists succeeded in controlling the Military Club and Military schools, Floriano's candidature did not arouse enthusiasm either in the armed forces or amongst uncommitted civilian groups in the Constituent Assembly. Deodoro continued to have the support of the majority of the armed forces, since his policies in no way clashed with the interests of the military. In any case Floriano did not enjoy the same reputation or popularity as Deodoro.

In the Constituent Assembly too, the anti-Deodoro faction was confronted by a larger and equally vociferous pro-Deodoro faction. This included besides Deodoro's own relatives and other senior officers¹ also civilian representatives of Paraíba, Minas, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and other states who relied on the President for their position in the states. The pro-Deodoristas refuted accusations of the President's incompetence. They cleared him of responsibility for the resignation of the Council of Ministers and the appointment of Baron Lucena to form the new Ministry. They accused the Council of Ministers of irresponsibility in abandoning their posts which had been "confided to them by the Nation". Deputy João de Siqueira for Pernambuco claimed that the Council of Ministers had itself advised Deodoro to invite Lucena to head the new Ministry.² The Republican Ministers denied the allegation, but in a letter of February 15, Césario Alvim, the former Minister of the Interior, accepted responsibility for advising the President³ in this sense.

¹. Of the 40 officers who were Deputies and 14 officers who were Senators in the House, 43 were not positivists. See J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (op.cit.) p.217. See also pro-Deodoro debates in "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" January 21, 1891 passim, February 2, 1891 passim.

². Dunshee de Abranches: "O Golpe de Estado: Actas e Actos do Govêno Lucena" (Oficinas Gráficas do Jornal do Brasil, R.de J. 1954) p.60.

³. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Vol.III, February 17, 1891 passim.

Ultimately the prospects of any candidate opposing the acting President in the election depended on São Paulo, the most powerful group in the Constituent Assembly. As noted earlier the paulistas' strength derived from their long established Republican Party which had come to power in the state peacefully after the November coup, and which had since been consolidating its position. In the Constituent Assembly the paulistas with their united and large bancada and their clear policies easily established their dominance.¹

But most of the paulista political leaders did not support the radicals' campaign to prevent the election of Deodoro. Though committed Republicans themselves, the paulistas, who had achieved their fundamental aims, political control of the state and an extensive Federal system, now wanted to consolidate the Republic without further political upheaval, and they believed that this could be achieved only by conciliating the adesistas. Moreover the paulistas ascribed Deodoro's autocratic behaviour to the fact that he was a military man and the election of Floriano, another officer, was equally distasteful. If they had to make a choice between two military men, they preferred Deodoro who at least had the backing of the majority of the army.² The candidature of Deodoro had also been endorsed by the Navy,³ and Admiral Wandenkolk who had served as Minister of the Navy in the first Council of Ministers, had been adopted as the Vice-Presidential candidate to run with Deodoro. On January 26, the paulistas privately decided to end the growing agitation over the presidential contest by throwing the weight of their state behind the Deodoro/Wandenkolk ticket.⁴

¹. For example they secured the election of the paulista Prudente de Moraes to preside over the Constituent Assembly despite the fact that his opponent Saldanha Marinho was the most prestigious Republican. See "Anais da Primeira constituinte Republicana" Vol.I, November 21, p.73 passim.

². Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) pp.62-63.

³. R.Magalhães Junior "Deodoro a Espada contra o Império" (op.cit.) Vol.II, p.300.

⁴. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) pp.62-63.

b. The Candidature of Prudente de Moraes

It was clear at the end of January, that the radical Republicans could not win the election with Floriano Peixoto. After deliberations between the leaders of the radical Republicans, General Simeão, Custodio de Melo, Demétrio Ribeiro and Astolfo Pio in which Floriano joined, they decided that their only chance of preventing the election of Deodoro was to put up a civilian candidate from São Paulo, who would ensure the support of the state and hopefully also of other civilian bancadas.¹ Their choice fell on Prudente de Moraes, partly because as President of the Constituent Assembly he had won general respect for his skillful chairing of the debates on the Constitution and partly because, as the only prominent paulista politician who was expected to accept the nomination to run against Deodoro. Unlike a number of the other leading paulista Republicans who were prepared to tolerate military rule, Prudente was a strong opponent of military rule, and Deodoro's muzzling of the press and connivance in the assault on the offices of the unrepentant monarchist press 'A Tribuna Liberal' by army officers in November 1890, had resulted in an antipathy towards him from some civilian politicians.² Prudente though one of the leaders of the PRP had not attended the meeting of the paulista politicians which had decided in favour of the candidature of Deodoro.

This decision in favour of Prudente was not an attempt by the radicals to exploit the growing civilian dislike of military rule.³ An alliance with the anti-military civilian elements could not be in the ultimate interest of the positivist officers. Rather their choice demonstrates the extent of their opposition to Deodoro and also that an alliance with the

¹. R.Magalhães Júnior: "Deodoro a Espada contra o Império" (op.cit.) Vol.II, p.300.

². For the opposition aroused by press censorship, see Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e Actos do Governo Provisório" (op.cit.) pp.281- 288, Chapter 38. "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" Vol.I, pp.141-2, Vol.III, February 2 passim.

³. J.E.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (op.cit.) Chapter VI, p.110 passim describes the growing civilian opposition to military rule.

paulistas provided them with their only chance to defeat him at the election. However to avoid a military backlash and prevent the contest developing into a civilian/military conflict, the radical Republicans agreed that Floriano would run as the Vice-Presidential candidate on the same ticket with Prudente.

Although this new move to involve São Paulo in the anti-Deodoro campaign was not well received by most paulista politicians, in the end the paulista Republican party endorsed the candidature of Prudente to avoid a schism in the state party. A special delegation of four of the eminent paulista Republicans¹ - Campos Sales, Bernardino de Campos, Paulino Garcia and Alfredo Ellis - unsuccessfully appealed to Prudente not to accept the nomination pointing out the disastrous consequences for the country and the state of a contested election. If Prudente won, they said, the country would be faced with a civil war, if he lost, Deodoro would take reprisals on the state. Prudente however argued that to withdraw would be to submit to military intimidation, and he offered to refuse the nomination only if the paulistas made public their disapproval of Deodoro by abstaining in the elections. But the others did not think that this would avert intervention in the state.

The political strength of São Paulo was evident as soon as the PRP officially endorsed the Prudente/Floriano ticket on February 20. This decision united the majority of the 'historic' Republicans against Deodoro but it was the paulistas who now assumed leadership of the opposition campaign. In the Assembly the new development created a great impression.² Unlike the radicals, the paulistas were acceptable to both Republicans and adesistas and there was little doubt that the civilian politicians would like to have the military back in the barracks. It was calculated that already between a quarter and a fifth of the Constituent Assembly were firmly in favour of the opposition slate and the possibility of

¹. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) pp.66-70.

². "Anais da Primeira Constituintes Republicana" Vol.III, February 20, 1891 passim.

Prudente actually winning was placed high.

However the opposition had little time in which to canvass for support from the state bancadas since the Constitution was due to be promulgated on February 24, and the Presidential election was to be held the following day. The radical Republicans meanwhile continued the anti-Deodoro pressure in the Constituent Assembly appealing to the bancadas not to vote for him. Once again they spoke of his inability to govern. Barbosa Lima summed up for the opposition, "the moment is grave", he said, "we need to choose a citizen capable of making the Republic and exercising government ... we cannot vote for President of the Republic General Deodoro da Fonseca".¹

The ploy of the radical Republicans to form an alliance with the paulistas to combat the election of Deodoro however, was only partly successful. On the one hand, as has been shown, the opposition's campaign had gained greater strength since the endorsement of the Prudente-Floriario ticket. On the other hand, it led to the feared military backlash which was to lead to the victory of Deodoro.

4. The Threat of Military Imposition of Marshal Deodoro

As noted earlier, not only was it known that Prudente was an opponent of military rule, but it was also obvious that the enthusiasm his candidature aroused in the predominantly civilian dominated Constituent Assembly was because they preferred a civilian government. Not surprisingly therefore, the reaction in the barracks to his candidature was hostile. Only a minority in the army, the positivist Republicans in the Military Club, the Escola Superior de Guerra and the Escola Militar continued to support the opposition and stated their intention not to "interfere in the elections and to defend legality".² For the majority of the officers the

¹. Ibid., February 23, 1891.

². Nelson Werneck Sodré: "História Militar do Brasil" (Civilização Brasileira Rio, 1968) p.165.

adoption of Prudente de Moraes was seen as an attempt to turn the contest into a simple military versus civilian issue and as an insult not only to Deodoro but to the armed forces itself.

Neither did the inclusion of Floriano on the same ticket as Prudente prevent the political conflict from degenerating into a military/civilian schism, as the radical Republicans had hoped. Floriano began publicly to associate with the pro-Deodoro officers whilst allowing his name to remain on the opposition's slate. Floriano hoped that he would emerge as a conciliation candidate. Senior officers who planned a coup if the Marshal was defeated at the elections had visited Floriano in his home in the município of Palmeiras in Rio de Janeiro state to confer with him.¹ They had agreed that they would only accept another military man, Floriano himself, as an alternative Presidential candidate. When the confused bancada of Ceará asked Floriano which way they should vote, he advised them to support Deodoro. Floriano was rewarded for his "loyalty". Asked who should be supported as his Vice-Presidential candidate, Deodoro allowed his supporters in Congress to decide between the two candidates contesting the post, Eduardo Wandenkolk and Floriano Peixoto,² but indicated his own preference for Floriano.

It was clear that even if Prudente won in Congress, he would not be allowed to assume office. For example Colonel Antonio Carlos de Silva Piragibe threatened that if Deodoro was not elected Congress would be dissolved and the Marshal acclaimed with bullets. Deodoro himself was reported to favour a revolt if defeated.³ Preparations for a coup were in hand. Police and army officers known to be opposed to Deodoro were

¹. Campos Sales: "Da propaganda à Presidência" p.74 footnote.

². Ernesto Sena Deodoro: "Subsidios para a História" p.23. Copy of letter to Deodoro February 6 from his brother Paulino de Fonseca and Deodoro's reply February 7 on the subject.

³. Silveira Peixoto: "A Tormenta que Prudente de Moraes venceu" (Guiara Limitada São Paulo 1942) pp.56-62. Custodio José de Melo: "O Governo Provisório e a Revolução de 1893" (Edição postuma Brasileira Volumes 128 and 128A) Vol.1 pp.46-8. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda a Presidencia" pp.72-3.

transferred to posts outside the Capital. It was arranged that troops would be ready to surround the Congressional buildings, dissolve the Assembly and install a dictatorship under Deodoro. Others were prepared to take to the streets and assume control of key buildings.

Confronted with the certainty of either a military revolt or Federal intervention in the state, two paulista leaders, Campos Sales and Francisco Glycério attempted to find a compromise that would end the military/civilian rift and avert a contested election. They suggested that Prudente run as Vice- Presidential candidate on the same ticket as Deodoro, but whilst Prudente still refused to be intimidated by military threats, the radical Republicans who had throughout opposed Deodoro for ideological reasons were not prepared to accept any compromise that allowed him to continue in the Presidency.¹

Since they could not prevent the crisis, Campos Sales on behalf of São Paulo held a meeting with military opponents of Deodoro on February 24, the eve of the election, to make plans to defend the government should Prudente be elected.² They agreed to swear him in immediately and to install the government. The anti-Deodoro army officers were to prepare the troops that they commanded to defend Congress, whilst Admiral Custodio de Melo would be ready with the few naval ships loyal to him to fire from the harbour should there be a rebellion.

The opposition however were under no illusions of their inability to defend the government if the armed forces revolted. Dunshee de Abranches, the journalist who had travelled from Maranhão to Rio to follow political events, gave this description of the mood in Congress and Rio on February 24: "the eve of the congressional session was agitated and gloomy ... the most terrifying rumours circulated and the general conviction was that the Revolution would spread from the barracks to the streets if Marshal Deodoro's candidacy did not

¹. Dunshee de Abranches: "O Golpe de Estados Actas e Actos de Govêno Lucena" pp.67—8

². Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" p.73. Custodio José de Melo: "O Govêno Provisório e a Revolução de 1893" Vol.I pp.50-1.

emerge victorious." Later in the artillery barracks where he spent the night, he observed that "everything had been prepared to begin firing ... the congressional palace would have been razed"¹.

5. The Election of Marshal Deodoro and Floriano Peixoto

When the constituents met on the next day, the officers in the Assembly had come dressed in their uniforms prepared for action. The corridors and galleries were thronged with armed soldiers and police.

The opposition however were prepared to defy this show of strength. Speaking on behalf of the opposition, Quintino Bocayuva presented a motion for the approval of the House, It stated that the Brazilian people had requested that Benjamin Constant the founder of the Brazilian Republic be presented as "the perfect model of virtue for all its future presidents".² The motion which was obviously intended as a criticism of Deodoro was approved by the House, a fact which demonstrated how much Deodoro's position in Congress had weakened since the Constituent Assembly met just over two months ago.

However when it came to the election, the military threat succeeded. When the result of the count was announced Deodoro had obtained 129 votes, Prudente 97. But it was Floriano who had really won the day. He polled 153 for the Vice-Presidency some 23 more votes than Deodoro. Admiral Eduardo Wandenkolk his rival, who had stood on the same ticket as Deodoro obtained only 57 votes.

¹. Dunshee de Abranches: "Actas e actos do Govêno Lucena" pp.67-72.
². "Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana" February 25, 1891.

TABLE II/1

| For President | Votes | | For Vice-President | Votes |
|--|-------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|-------|
| Military (Army) Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca (official) Prudente José de | 129 | Military | Floriano Peixoto (opposition) | 123 |
| Moraes Barros (opposition) | 97 | Military (Navy) | Eduardo Wandenkolk (official) | 57 |
| Military (Army) Floriano Peixoto | 3 | | Prudente de Moraes Barros | 12 |
| Joaquim Saldanha Marinho | 2 | Military (Army) | Antonio Carlos da Silva Piragibe | 5 |
| José Hygino Duarte Pereira | 1 | Military (Army) | José de Almeida Barreto | 4 |
| Blank ballots | 2 | Military (Navy) | Custodio José de Mello | 1 |

Source: “Anais da Primeira Constituinte Republicana” Vol.III, pp.306-7.

Although the Presidential contest of 1891 had ended as a military/civilian struggle for the Presidency, the political agitation over the election had ideological origins. Military and civilian radical Republicans opposed Deodoro's policy of appointing adesistas to important political posts and led the campaign to prevent his election to the Presidency. However the radicals were unable by themselves to put up a strong contender to the Presidency and formed an alliance with the most powerful civilian political force, the Republicans of São Paulo, although they were themselves moderate Republicans favouring conciliation with the adesistas. The endorsement of the civilian candidate Prudente led to a military reaction. However this military/civilian dimension to the conflict did not end the underlying ideological differences. The radical Republicans regarded the high percentage of the votes obtained by Prudente and Floriano as their triumph, and Barbosa Lima described Deodoro's election a pyrrhic victory. His words proved prophetic. Deodoro remained in office only nine months.

6. The Historic Republicans Come to Power November 1891

The radicals continued their alliance with the moderate Republicans of São Paulo after the election but it was São Paulo which continued to lead the opposition coalition in Congress against Deodoro. This radical/moderate alliance was possible because the question of the adesistas pushed aside since the military/civilian schism, continued to be shelved. The conflict between Deodoro and his opponents in Congress after the election centred around the question of state autonomy. As expected Deodoro had intervened to depose the governors of the states which had opposed his election. Amongst those to suffer was the government of São Paulo which did not yet have a strong enough militia to deter intervention. But Deodoro was not able to determine the composition of the first National Congress since it comprised the former Constituent Assembly which simply reconvened in May after the recess. It was in Congress that all those who had opposed the election of Deodoro regrouped under the leadership of the paulista bancada. They formed a loose coalition and called themselves the Constitutional Republican Party - PRC. Their aim they said was "to defend the Constitution and particularly state autonomy against the violence and personalism of the President".¹

All efforts at conciliation failed. During the four months of bitter conflict that followed, the President resisted² the attempts of the PRC to limit his powers and to make the executive responsible to Congress. Finally on November 3, as the stock market collapsed after two years of financial instability,³ Deodoro dissolved Congress and

¹. The organization of the PRC is described in: Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (Distribuidora Freitas Bastos, 1932).

². For a detailed treatment of the Deodoro/PRC conflict see C.W. Simmons: "Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Pom Pedro II" (op.cit.). R. Magalhães Júnior: "Deodoro a Espada contra o Império" (op.cit.) Vol. II. E. Carone: "A República Velha: Evolução Política", p. 39 passim. Dunshee de Abranches: "O Golpe de Estados ..." (op.cit.). "Diário do Congresso Nacional", May 1891-November 1892.

³. J. Pandiá Calógeras: "A política Monetária do Brasil" (Companhia Editôra Nacional, São Paulo 1960) chapter XIV, pp. 216-38 deals with the financial crisis of the period.

proclaimed a dictatorship. But it lasted only for 21 days. The President gravely ill could not face the civil war that threatened as the civilian Republicans of São Paulo, Pará, and the Federal District and military opponents of Deodoro prepared to rebel against this dictatorial act and to defend the Republican Constitution of 1891 with arms. The President resigned handing over to the Vice-President, Floriano.

With Floriano in office, the historic Republicans finally came to power. Floriano's opportunism during the 1891 election conflict which won him the Vice-Presidency has been noted. After the dissolution of Congress, Floriano had openly sided with the PRC and participated in the preparations for a revolt,¹ probably because he had not expected Deodoro to resign and hand over the Presidency to him. Now in the Presidential office he ended Deodoro's dictatorship, and Congress and the Constitution were reinstated. The new Ministry included the leading opponents of Deodoro. General Simeão became Minister for War, Admiral Custodio de Melo the Minister for the Navy. The paulistas preoccupied chiefly with the financial crisis demanded and obtained the Ministry of Finance for the paulista "Rodrigues Alves. A notable administrator of the Empire, and known and respected in financial circles abroad, Alves was expected to inspire confidence in the financial recuperation of the country. Despite the fact that he was an adesista, the radicals did not oppose his appointment.

7. Floriano in Power November 1891 - November 1894

In the Presidency Floriano attempted to assert his political independence from São Paulo and to organize his own political base in the states through the army and the civilian radical

¹. Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) p.81.

Republicans,¹ so that he could push through his policies of industrialization and ensure the continuation of the military in power. He had had an opportunity to cultivate some support in the Army when he was Minister of War between May 1890 and January 1891 and we have already noted how Floriano avoided alienating the armed forces during the military/civilian conflict of February 1891. Although Floriano's latter alliance with the PRC against Deodoro led some staunch pro-Deodorista officers to oppose Floriano and there were uprisings in garrisons stationed in Guanabara Bay, Santa Cruz and Laje, they remained a minority group and Floriano was able to suppress the opposition easily. Once in office Floriano deposed the state governors who had supported Deodoro's coup and replaced many of them with military officers.²

Of the civilian factions Floriano identified with the radical Republicans. It was the only alternative to an alliance with the paulistas. We have also noted earlier that since the death of Benjamin Constant, both the radical civilian and military groups had begun to look on Floriano as a leader and he had initially been their candidate for the Presidency. Floriano's sympathy with the doctrinaire Republicans was evident shortly after he took over the Presidency. Jacobin anti-monarchist reaction which had been kept in check by Deodoro, now

¹. Floriano's many shifts in political allegiances and his inscrutability has led him to be described as a Sphinx. He was obviously very ambitious and his overriding concern was to be always on the winning side, but once in power he had a programme to see through. Like other reforming officers Floriano believed in the need to develop the country through industrialization and he thought that this could be achieved only by the military. However the paulistas whose own prosperity rested on the coffee economy were the biggest obstacle to both military rule and to industrialization. Floriano probably did not feel powerful enough to continue Deodoro's military dictatorship and had his own position legitimized by Congress. But he tried to build a power base in the states through the army and the civilian radical Republicans. Since Deodoro had resigned before a civil war had developed seriously and the officers forced to take sides, Floriano did not have to deal with a seriously divided army. From April 1892 to the end of his period in office, he had little trouble from it. Only 45 officers in active service defected to the opposition during the civil war. For analyses of Floriano's political views and his position in the army see A.Vieira Peixoto: "Floriano, Memórias e Documentos" Vol.I, pp.97, 126 passim, J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" p.237 passim. B.Nícia Vilela Luz: "A luta pela industrialização do Brasil (1808-1930)" (Difusão Européia do Livro, São Paulo 1961) p.169 passim Floriano help for industry; p.73 passim views of his Minister of Finance positivist Serzedelo Correa.

². J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1394" pp.237-42 passim.

re-emerged with a vengeance. When the death of the Emperor in Portugal in early December 1891 led to monarchist reunions in the Federal District and elsewhere to pay their last tributes, the Jacobin outrage in the Federal Capital was intense. They formed the "Clube Tiradentes", named in honour of the 18th century Republican hero of Minas Gerais, and lists of suspected traitors to the Republic were drawn up.¹ Simultaneously mobs attacked the offices of newspapers like the 'O Jornal do Brazil' and 'Brazil' on December 16 and 17, which had expressed sympathy for the Emperor, and forced them to hoist Republican flags.² Floriano did not curb the violence. He was himself engaged in attempts to bring the radical Republicans to power in at least two states, Minas Gerais and R.G. do Sul. In R.G. do Sul, Floriano aided the reinstatement not only of the Republican state party, but also of their positivist Constitution without any concessions to the former Liberals of the Empire. It was this support for the doctrinaire Republicans together with the ruthless repression of all opposition irrespective of civil and political liberties, that made Floriano in the eyes of the positivist Republicans the strong leader that they favoured for the Republic.

However, in the end Floriano failed to organize an independent political base. Despite his efforts in their favour, the radicals were no more successful under Floriano in achieving their major objective to bring radical Republicans to power in the states, than they had been under Deodoro. Even in Pernambuco and Minas Gerais, where a significant Republican faction existed, their hopes were frustrated. In Pernambuco,³ Alexander José Barbosa, the young army officer whom Floriano appointed to form a new government, proved an unreliable ally. He not only succeeded in destroying the radical Republicans and paving the way for the return of the former Imperial Conservative party to power, but also

¹. "A Década Republicana"(op.cit.) Article by Conselheiro Silva Costa: "Direito Privado" Vol.2 Section 6, pp.255-78.

². "A Década Republicana" (op.cit.) in article by Dr Carlos de Laet: "Press" Vol.2, Section 4, pp.69-187.

³. João de Pôrto Costa: "Os tempos de Barbosa Lima" (op.cit.)

joined the conspiracy to overthrow Floriano in July 1893, when the government was faced by revolts in the south and in the Navy. In Minas Gerais,¹ Floriano gave up the attempt to bring the radical Republican faction to power, when the mineiro state government threatened to rebel. Instead he supported the revival by the radicals of a long-existing separatist movement in the southern region of the state; but they failed to achieve their ends. It was only in R.G.do Sul² that Floriano succeeded in reinstating the positivist government of Castilhos, which had been deposed by the state opposition faction in November 1891.

But the state proved to be a political liability in the short term. The brutal repression of the former Liberals which resulted in the exodus of 10,000 refugees to Uruguay between June 1892 and February 1893 sparked off a civil war in the state in February 1893³ which soon engulfed the whole southern region including Sta.Catharina and Paraná. Floriano's failure to prevent the repression also led the majority of the Navy to join the revolt against the government.⁴ The civil war in the south and the naval revolt occupied the army from July 1893 until the end of Floriano's term in office. It not only prevented the Federal government from any serious political manoeuvring which would strengthen the position of the radical Republicans and the army, which would in turn enable Floriano to put his policies into practice, but it increased his dependence on the paulistas and allowed them to assume political leadership during 1893.

Throughout Floriano's period in office the paulistas were the real arbiters of the political situation. Floriano's decision to end Deodoro's military dictatorship and return to Constitutional government effectively placed him in the power of the paulistas who

¹. A.A.de Melo: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.1, p.217, 226 passim.

². J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp.48-53, 60.

³. For a history of the Civil war in R.G.do Sul and the south see ibid., p.60 passim. Custodio José de Melo: "O Governo Provisório e a revolução de 1893" (op.cit.) Vol.II.

⁴. The Naval Revolt is dealt with in Dunshee de Abranches: "A revolução da armada e a revolução Rio Grandense" 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, M. Abranches 1914). E.Carone: "A República Velha: Ecolução Política" pp.80-128.

continued to be the major force in Congress. It was the paulistas who decided to see Floriano through the first term in office¹ and persuaded the majority in Congress to vote in favour of the motion. The paulistas feared that in the prevailing political polarization and the uncertainty over Floriano's reactions if he had to hand over power, another election would only exacerbate the existing political crisis. As the first revolts against the government broke out in the garrisons stationed in Guanabara Bay, Santa Cruz and Laje, the paulistas were behind the successful motion which gave Floriano full emergency powers to deal with the crisis. They also secured by 118 to 83 votes in the lower House, the adjournment of Congress until May 1892 to prevent confrontations in the House with the opponents of the government.²

But the paulistas would not endorse all Floriano's actions particularly those which threatened their economic interests or that provoked political confrontation. In May 1892 they blocked in Congress Floriano's measures intended to promote industry.³ In July against the wishes of the government, and in an attempt at political conciliation, the paulistas also succeeded in getting Congress to vote in favour of an amnesty for all those who had taken part in the anti-Floriano demonstrations.

However with the outbreak of the Civil war in the south and the Naval Revolt in 1893, São Paulo again threw its full weight behind Floriano. One reason for this was that the naval rebels attempted to overthrow the paulista state government itself. Another reason was that the São Paulo Republicans were opposed to the aims of the rebels; whilst some demanded Constitutional revision in favour of a parliamentary system,⁴ a form of

¹. The Constitution had specified that new elections had to be held if a President left office before completing half his term.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" January 22, 1892.

³. J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (*op.cit.*) p.244 *passim* gives an account of Floriano's unsuccessful attempts to promote industry.

⁴. "O Paiz" July 5, 1893 article titled Partidos Politicos.

government opposed by many paulistas who believed it was incompatible with a Federal system, other rebels stated that their aim was to overthrow the Republic itself and restore the Empire.¹ In Congress the paulistas secured new emergency powers for the Federal government, and the state of São Paulo provided men, arms and finances for the conduct of the war² against the rebels in R.G.do Sul and the Navy.

8. São Paulo assumes Political Leadership through the PRF - 1893

The continuing preoccupation of the Federal government and the armed forces with the civil war in the South provided the paulistas with an opportunity to organize a coalition of state bancadas in Congress through which they could assert political control and in particular determine the Presidential succession to Floriano in 1894. It has been stated earlier that the PRP had achieved its major objective, extensive state autonomy, and were now concerned to consolidate the Republic and secure political and financial stability. However Floriano's deliberate partisan policies in support of radical Republicans and his tolerance of Jacobin sentiments had led to political polarization and a civil war which, as we have seen, was jeopardizing the Republic itself. The partisan conflict threatened to continue during the next administration also as pro- and anti-Floriano factions attempted during 1893 to influence the 1894 Presidential election. Whereas the Florianistas were agitating for a Constitutional amendment that would allow Floriano to be eligible for a second term,³ his opponents demanded that he sanction Article 5 of the electoral regulations of 1892, that specifically stated that a Vice-President who succeeded to the Presidency was ineligible for re-election

¹. E.Bradford Burns: "A Documentary History of Brazil" (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967) Proclamation of Admiral Saldanha da Gama of December 7, 1893 pp.302-3. Joseph Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" pp.61, 71, footnote.

². Hélio Silva: "1889: A República nao Esperou o Amanhecer" p.225 copy of letter from governor of São Paulo to Floriano.

³. "O Paíz" (Rio de Janeiro) April 2, 1893.

for a consecutive term.¹ The paulistas' major occupation was to choose a civilian successor who would guarantee an end to political confrontation, secure political stability, balance budgets, and promote a laissez-faire economic policy that would favour exporting interests.

To achieve this objective the paulistas attempted to organize a non- ideological party that would unite all the ruling state elites and all the existing minority factions in a coalition to defend the Republican Constitution of 1891 (the document that assured paulista interests).

But the coalition could only succeed if the Federal government did not oppose it. Hence the PRF left the organization of the party to the paulista Francisco Glycério, who not only had close links with the radical Republicans, but who, as majority leader in the Chamber of Deputies, was the government's spokesman in the Lower House which required him to marshal the bancadas behind the government's policies. At the same time however, Glycério invited the anti-Florionistas who were then contemplating the organization of their own party committed to a parliamentary system,² to join the majority coalition and "to fight from within (the majority coalition party) for the proper execution of the Constitution ... and if necessary to suggest reforms later if experience still showed the need for change."

Although Floriano could not have approved the proposed national party which was primarily intended to end military rule, destroy the radical Republicans and favour

¹. "O Paíz" May 25, 1893.

². The outspoken anti-Florionistas comprised firstly, dissident factions particularly in Bahia, Paraíba and R.G.do Sul who had suffered politically as a result of Floriano's state appointments, and secondly, liberal elements opposed to Floriano because of his disregard of civil and political rights and his ruthless repression of all opposition. These groups argued that the Presidentialist system put too much power in the hands of the President, and they were now agitating for Constitutional revision in favour of a parliamentary system which would make the President responsible to Congress. In July 1893, parliamentarists were planning to form a disciplined party to fight for a parliamentary system, but because of their numerical weakness they eventually joined the PRF. On the parliamentarist movement see "O Paíz" July 5 and 24, 1893; "Political Reunion"; "O Estado do São Paulo" São Paulo, July 7, 1893.

agricultural exporting interests, he could not intervene either to prevent it. With the civil war raging in the South, the Federal government could not afford to antagonize São Paulo. The paulistas therefore, despite the initial poor response from the majority of state governors who feared retribution from the Federal government,¹ established the Federal Republican Party - PRF in July 1893.²

9. The PRF's Presidential Slate

The main function of the PRF was to endorse a Presidential ticket for the 1894 election. Whilst the indirect election of 1891 had enabled ideological factions in the Constituent Assembly to have an important role in that election, the direct elections in 1894 and in subsequent elections shifted the power of electing Presidents to the states. The PRF regulations for the organization of the Nomination Convention further underlined this fact. The Convention was to comprise of two representatives from each state chosen by their respective Congressional bancadas.³

However it was the state government that decided which candidate the state would support, its delegates at the Nomination Convention merely ratified the choice formally.

There was no dispute as to who should be the PRF's Presidential candidate; the paulista

¹. At the first meeting to launch the party held at the end of July only 19 Senators and 55 Deputies, one fifth of those invited to represent their states attended. Amongst the major state governments not represented were Minas Gerais, R.G.do Sul and Rio de Janeiro. The meeting was dominated by São Paulo and Bahia. See "O Estado do São Paulo" July 11, 30, 1893. "O Paiz" July 29, 30, 1893.

². Detailed plans for the organization and functioning of the party were adopted: the PRF was to be organized on a state basis in a four tiered system. The most important body was to be the National Convention in which the states were to be represented by two delegates each, on the basis of state equality. This principle was accepted on the insistence of the northern and north-eastern states. The National Convention was to be the decision-making body. Its members were to be re-elected every three years. The Convention would meet twice a year in May and September and would be represented in-between by a permanent seven men commission elected by the Convention from amongst its members. It was to act only in an advisory capacity. The delegates to the National Convention were to be elected by the state Conventions which met in the state capitals and comprised representatives from every município where a local branch of the PRF was to be organized. See "Partido Republicano Federal: Preliminares de organização. Discussão de programma, instalação e deliberação da Convenção Provisoria, apresentação das candidaturas Presidenciaes, appuração e proclamação da eleição presidencial, instrucções." (Rio, 1895)

³. Ibid.

Prudente de Moraes who had contested the election in 1891 against Deodoro was expected to be unanimously endorsed. But the Vice-Presidential nomination was contested by Pará and Bahia whose respective candidates were Pais de Carvalho and Manuel Vitorino.¹ The fourteen states which attended the PRF Nomination Convention in January 1894 ratified the Prudente/Manuel Vitorino ticket.² Pará lost the Vice-Presidential nomination by one vote.

If elected both the candidates were pledged to support the manifesto of the PRF.³ Prudente and Manuel had been members of the seven men committee that drafted the party's programme. It was essentially rhetorical in style and conservative in sentiment and again underlined the fact that the PRF was basically the instrument intended to assure paulista interests. The programme reiterated the intention of the PRF to defend the Republican Constitution of 1891 from any form of revision. Another of its major planks was to ensure "the rule of law and respect for authority", to maintain political stability, since as noted, without stability the country could not attract European immigrant labour, foreign investments and financial loans on which the coffee economy depended. The PRF was also opposed to any government intervention in the economic field as had been favoured by supporters of industrialization, and instead the party pledged itself to support private enterprise and by implication the agricultural exporting economies. A third important point in the party's manifesto was its support for financial stability and its intention to ensure balanced budgets which would restore the confidence of foreign financiers and encourage European immigrant labour. Finally as a concession to minority factions and liberal elements, the PRF promised to fight for free elections and for the provision of greater

¹. João Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes. Homens e fatos do início da República" (Livraria José Olympio Editôra, Rio de Janeiro, 1973) pp.11, 62.

². The seven states which did not ratify the election slate were: Major States: Minas Gerais, R.G.do Sul, Rio de Janeiro. Subsidiary: Amazo- zonas, Sergipe, Mato Grosso, Paraíba. See "O Estado do São Paulo" January 23, 1894

³. "O Paíz" July 29, 1893; "O Estado do São Paulo" July 30, 1893.

education facilities, but since the former conflicted with the interests of the elites, they presumably had no intention of seeing it implemented.

The political significance of the PRF lay in the fact that by early 1894 it united the majority of the ruling state factions into a coalition which had endorsed an entirely civilian slate to contest the election in March. Moreover the Presidential candidate was a noted moderate Republican of São Paulo. The PRF however carefully abstained from defining its position on any divisive issues: the future political role of the military, the treatment of the adesistas and of the rebels in the South and in the armed forces.

10. Floriano opposes the Candidature of Prudente de Moraes

Floriano was opposed to the PRF's attempts to secure the election of a civilian and in particular of Prudente de Moraes who was both anti-military and opposed to the doctrinaire Republicans. But Floriano was not in a position to mount a serious campaign in favour of an alternative candidate. Both the civil war in the South and the Naval Revolt had spread by the end of 1893. Floriano was facing opposition from the majority of the Navy whilst the rebels in R.G.do Sul had succeeded in overthrowing the positivist government of Julio de Castilhos and were marching into the neighbouring states of Sta.Catharina and Paraná. There were also threats of rebellion in the north, including from Pernambuco during the second half of 1893.¹

Nevertheless Floriano attempted to get the officer-governors whom he had appointed to endorse the candidature of Lauro Sodré,² a former army-officer and currently governor of Pará. Sodré who had been a student of Benjamin Constant and had served as

¹. J.do Pôrto Costa: "Os tempos de Barbosa Lima" (op.cit.)

². Tobias Monteiro: "O Presidente Campos Sales na Europa com uma introdução e cinco retratos" (F.Briquet e Cia., Rio de Janeiro, 1928) Lii. "Jornal do Comércio" January 31, 1895 interview with Sodré.

his secretary when Constant was Minister of War, was an ideal candidate for the radical Republicans and the army. But the attempt failed when Sodré refused to run and no other suitable military candidate emerged. Floriano also appealed to Francisco Glycério, leader of the PRF, to drop Prudente in favour of another and more radical paulista candidate. In a letter to Glycério, Floriano wrote:¹ "It is true that Prudente has performed great services for the nation. He is a Historic Republican and merits all from the Republic, but he ought not to preside over the destinies of the country in the next four years. Under him I foresee a persecution of our friends. You too will suffer." Floriano went on to suggest two other paulistas as preferable alternatives. Rangel Pestana and Gabriel de Piza, both of whom had favoured involving the military in Republican politics during the 1880s. Piza was also said to have positivist leanings. Glycério however remained loyal to the PRF.

There was in fact little that Floriano could do by himself to block Prudente's election. The radical Republicans in the states who had led the opposition to Deodoro's election in 1891 had virtually disintegrated. In Pernambuco, as noted earlier, they had been destroyed by the officer-governor José Alexandre Barbosa: in Minas Gerais the radicals were demoralized after their continued failure to gain office in the state, whilst the positivist government of R.G.do Sul had been overthrown in the civil war and was in any case in no position to participate in national politics. Although Floriano had great support amongst the urban elements particularly in the Federal District who continually demonstrated in favour of his policies and campaigned to make him eligible for a second Presidential term, real power in elections lay with the state governors who controlled the electoral machines, as seen in Chapter One.

¹. Silveira Peixoto: "A tormenta que Prudente de Moraes venceu" (op.cit.) p.101. José Maria dos Santos: "A política geral do Brasil" (op.cit.) p.334. A.V.Peixoto: "Floriano, Memórias e Documentos" (op.cit.) Vol.1, pp.205-6.

Secondly the armed forces who had secured the election of a military man in 1891, had since been weakened as a political force as a result of the civil war between the Navy and pro-Deodoro army faction on the one hand, and Floriano and his supporters on the other. The schism had also adversely affected its professional competence. Rapid changes of personnel, particularly in the senior officer ranks had taken place. Within the forces there was a growing opinion in favour of military retirement from politics. In July 1893 one General Solon presented a motion in Congress which would make military men in active service ineligible for elected or nominated non-military posts;¹ but the civilian politicians were too nervous of military opposition to see it through in the House.

In the absence of an obvious candidate, the lack of enthusiasm in the forces, and the disintegration of the radical Republicans in the states, Floriano was in a weak position to oppose the candidature of Prudente. Moreover as the civil war in R.G.do Sul was followed by the Naval rebellions and threats of rebellion in the north, during the second half of 1893 Floriano had to fight for his own survival.² There were rumours that Floriano would use the worsening military situation in the first months of 1894 to postpone the elections due on March 1. However, he could only do this with the co-operation of São Paulo. By the end of January the rebel forces in the South had overrun the states of R.G.do Sul, Sta.Catharina and Paraná. Only São Paulo stood between them and the Federal Capital. The paulistas like most other civilian politicians believed that to postpone the elections would only lead the opposition to greater efforts to depose Floriano. The governor of Minas Gerais Afonso Pena for example, urged Floriano³ "not to impede the holding of the elections or give any pretext to those who supposed the Presidential election would be prevented". Moreover it was not likely that the paulistas would cooperate with Floriano to

¹. "O Paíz" July 23, 1893.

². Edgard Carone: "A República Velha. Evolução Política" (op.cit.) p.115 passim.

³. J.E.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (op.cit.) p.142.

postpone the elections which would keep him in office indefinitely. In the end the Federal government lifted the state of emergency in all but the three southern states of R.G.do Sul, Sta. Catharina and Paraná to allow the elections to be held.

11. The Election of Prudente/Manuel Vitorino 1894¹

The first direct national Presidential election was uneventful. There was no organized opposition slate and no military candidate. Despite his known opposition to Prudente Floriano had not asked state governments to abstain from voting for the PRF candidates, and in all the 17 states and the Federal District where elections were held state governments directed the coronéis to deliver the votes to Prudente who obtained 84.3% of the total votes cast. Except for the state of Pará which fielded its own Vice-Presidential candidate José Pais de Carvalho, the PRF's choice Manuel Vitorino received the support of the other states and polled 81.3% of the national vote cast for the Vice-President.

TABLE II/2

Results of Presidential Elections of 1894 certified by Congress

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|-------------------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|
| <hr/> | | | |
| Prudente José de Moraes | | | |
| Barros | 290,883 | Manoel Vitorino Pereira | 266,060 |
| Afonso Pena | 38,291 | José Luís de Almeida Couto | 31,819 |
| José Césarío Alvim | 3,719 | José Pais de Carvalho | 21,160 |
| Rui Barbosa | 3,718 | Gaspar da Silveira Martins | 2,467 |
| Blank votes | 5,550 | Blank votes | 5,841 |
| Scattered | various | Scattered | Various |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” Ano VI. No, 22, June, 1894.

¹. Source for election data; “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 1894, pp.211-24.

Although dissident factions in a number of states voted for their own candidates, these were politically insignificant. The largest dissident vote came from Bahia, where 34% of the vote was cast for the mineiro governor Afonso Pena, Internal dissensions in Bahia resulted in a very high poll. Twenty-seven per cent of the total number of ballots cast for the Presidency in the country came from Bahia. São Paulo and Minas Gerais who cast the next highest percentage of the national ballots accounted for only 11% each. Other states where there was a significant percentage of dissident votes for another candidate were Maranhão (18%), Sergipe (16%), Minas Gerais (13%), Paraíba (11%) and Alagoas (10%).

If the dissident vote proved anything, it was the local basis for its grievances and the discontent with the ruling factions of their respective states. The failure of the state dissidents to unite is evident in the lack of coordination between the various candidates they fielded as is evident from Table II/3.

TABLE II/3
Distribution of Votes in States

| States | For President | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|------|--------|
| | Prudente de Moraes | Afonso Pena | Cesário Alvim | Rui | Others |
| Amazonas | 4096 | | | | 2 |
| Pará | 13332 | | | | |
| Maranhão | 12772 | | | | 3429 |
| Piauí | 11058 | | | 365 | |
| Ceará | 17815 | 21 | | | |
| R.G.do Norte | 10606 | 127 | | 782 | |
| Paraíba | 1458 | | | 2255 | |
| Pernambuco | 16899 | 850 | | | |
| Alagoas | 8409 | | | | 943 |
| Sergipe | 4971 | 617 | | | 787 |
| Espírito Santo | 5061 | | | | 32 |
| Federal District | 5741 | 134 | | | |
| Bahia | 61748 | 32112 | | | |
| Rio de Janeiro | 25829 | 19 | | | |
| Minas Gerais | 33064 | 4812 | 3719 | | |
| Goiás | 4641 | | | | |
| Mato Grosso | 3742 | | | | |
| São Paulo | 38719 | 10 | | | |

For Vice-President

| Manoel Vitorino | Paes de Carvalho | Silveira Martins | Almeida Couto | Others |
|-----------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|--------|
| 4095 | | 2 | | |
| 54 | 13292 | | | |
| 12477 | 3559 | | | |
| 10979 | | | | 185 |
| 17811 | | | | |
| 10693 | 774 | | | |
| 14424 | | 2400 | | |
| 15903 | | | 1210 | |
| 8394 | | | | 1045 |
| 4410 | | | 1959 | |
| 4698 | 272 | | | |
| 4198 | | | 73 | |
| 55371 | | | 36695 | |
| 25417 | | | 71 | |
| 31863 | 5040 | | | |
| 4628 | | | | |
| 3694 | | | | |
| 36937 | | | | |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 1894, pp.211-24.

Conclusion

The election of Prudente as President signified an end to the five years of effective military rule. The majority opinion in the armed forces favoured turning over the Republic to a civilian government. But the civilianization of the Republic was primarily a triumph for the Republican party of São Paulo. With its clear aims, pragmatic approach, and most of all the organizational and leadership qualities of its chiefs, the paulistas offered to most state governments a more stable alternative for a government than the military.

On the ideological level, the election of Prudente was a victory for the moderate 'historic' Republicans of São Paulo and for the adesistas. By allowing all factions prepared to support the Republican Constitution of 1891 to join the PRF, the paulistas had enabled the former Imperial Conservative and Liberal parties in many of the states to return to power. The radical Republicans had lost the ideological battle. They had been a weak and diffuse minority and even when they controlled the Presidency through Floriano, they had been unable to build an effective power base in the states. Although some radical elements in collusion with Floriano plotted to prevent the inauguration of Prudente by reviving the military/civilian conflict,¹ the plot was never put into practice and Floriano quietly left the Presidency at the end of his term in office. However, the ideological conflict was far from over as we shall see in the next chapter.

¹. It was intended that pro-Florianistas in Congress would lead an opposition to military demands for higher salaries and for an expansion of the armed forces, whilst in the garrisons Florianist officers would ferment opposition to Congress and the civilians. See Manuel Vitorino Pereira: "Manifesto Político" (Ty de Carlos Jeep E.Cia 1898, São Paulo) p.26.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RADICALS IN OPPOSITION TO THE ADESISTAS AND THE MODERATE REPUBLICANS

1894-1898

Introduction

Chapter Three examines the continuing ideological conflict during the Presidency of Prudente de Moraes. In particular it looks at the struggle which developed within the PRF in 1897 and tries to argue that the schism in the party was provoked not by the moderate Republicans of São Paulo, as is generally believed, but by the former Imperial Conservatives in the northern states. This chapter also tries to show that contrary to the existing view, the schism in the PRF did not end the ideological conflict, and it looks at the regrouping of the radical Republicans and their opponents the adesistas and moderate Republicans during 1897 to contest the Presidential election of 1898.

1. The PRF Fails to Control the Radical Republicans

The PRF, the non-ideological coalition party organized by the paulistas and which united all factions behind the Republican Constitution of 1891, failed to end the ideological conflict. The PRF had not stated its position on any controversial issue but these could not be ignored after Prudente assumed the Presidency in November 1894. The most pressing problem confronting Prudente was the continuing rebellion in the South and of the Navy. Floriano had eventually succeeded in defeating the rebels, but no peace settlement had been concluded, and during 1895 new attacks were being launched in the South. The radical Republicans elated by Floriano's victories during 1894, named him the saviour of the Republic, and demanded that his policies should be continued by Prudente. They opposed any conciliation with those who had participated in the anti-Floriano rebellions and wanted the army and patriotic

battalions to be kept permanently mobilized against new counter-revolutionary uprisings. However the paulistas, as stated earlier, essentially favoured a conciliatory approach. They believed that the Republican victories in 1894 had finally consolidated the Republic, that the country was now in need of political stability, and that this could be achieved only by a policy of appeasement towards the rebels. Moreover the paulistas were anxious to end the war because it was a heavy drain on financial resources. During his first year in office¹ Prudente obtained a general amnesty for all those involved in the 1892-95 rebellions and for all other political prisoners. Press censorship was lifted and all political freedoms restored, even the re-establishment of pro-monarchy clubs and newspapers was tolerated.²

From the first, the President's policies were bitterly opposed. The groups that defended the doctrinaire radical Republican line after 1893 however had changed somewhat since the earlier Republican years. The anti-Deodoro radical Republicans of 1891 had comprised two main groups, first the civilian radical wing of the 'historic' Republicans and second, the positivist army officers. After 1893 there were three distinct radical Republican groups, one in the states, the second in the Military schools and third, the Jacobins in the urban centres.

Whereas Deodoro had faced the most serious opposition from the positivists in the army, it was the pro-Floriana state governments which, through their representatives in Congress, were the greatest problem to Prudente. In the last chapter it was noted that the radical Republicans in the first Congress of 1891 had been politically weak because they had represented only the minority radical 'historic' Republican factions, mainly in Pernambuco,

¹. For a survey of Prudente's administration see Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" Chapter IV, p.125 passim. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha: (Evolução Política)" (*op.cit.*) p.135 passim. J.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (*op.cit.*) p.149 passim. Silveira Peixoto: "A tormenta que Prudente de Moraes venceu:" J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (*op.cit.*) pp.71-2.

². "A Década Republicana" article by Dr Carlos de Laet "Imprensa", Vol.II, pt. IV, pp.69-187.

Minas, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, which had failed to come to power during Deodoro's Presidency. Except for the positivist Republican party of R.G. do Sul which was reinstated in January 1893 after a Federal supported coup d'etat in the state,¹ the radical 'historic' Republicans disintegrated as a political force after Floriano also failed to bring them to power. The new defenders of the radical Republican line after 1893 were those state governors in R.G.do Sul, Sta. Catharina, Paraná, Amazonas, Piauí, Ceará, Paraíba and Rio Grande do Norte who owed their appointment to Floriano. Except for R.G.do Sul they were not doctrinaire or even 'historic' Republicans but they feared that a reversal of Floriano's policies would jeopardize their own position in the state.²

The second source of radical Republican opposition to Prudente were the Military schools in the Federal District. However the influence of the positivist officers declined after 1894. With the civilianization of the Federal government, the armed forces had lost control over the central instrument of political control. Moreover after 1894 the majority of the military officers were opposed to the active involvement of the armed forces in politics and the numbers of active officers holding political posts declined rapidly.³ The positivist officers also lacked a leader in the military after Floriano's departure from office, since ill-health confined Floriano to his bed until his death in June 1895. As a result the radical officers expressed their opposition mainly on issues directly involving the military⁴ - as for example the appointment of an anti-Floriano Commander in 1895, the transfer of arms from the Military school in the Federal District to the garrison in R.G.do Sul in 1897, the rebellion at Canudos, 1896-97. Moreover their rebellion at such times only served to show that they were a small minority in the

¹. J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.52 passim, 60.

². See for example Alcindo Guanabara: "A Presidência Campos Sales 1898-1902: política e finanças" (R.de J.Laemmert e Cia. 1902).

³. J.H.Schutz: "The Brazilian Army and Politics 1850-1894" (op.cit.) P.257.

⁴. See for example J.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (op.cit.) p.149 passim.

army, and they were easily contained by the disciplinary action of the government.

A third and potentially more volatile source of opposition was to be found in the urban centres, particularly the Federal District and São Paulo City, where there were strong Jacobin sympathies. So far there has been no research carried out in this area, but what evidence has been found indicates that except for a few small and short-lived Jacobin Clubs there was no organized Jacobin movement as such.¹ 'O Jacobino', the Jacobin newspaper founded in September 1894 and irregularly published until 1897 by Diocletiano Martyr, a retired army officer turned journalist, described its supporters as a "handful of sincere and loyal Republicans"². However 'O Jacobino' also claimed to speak for the "oppressed" and to be a "supporter of the proletariat". The fact that it was said to have sold over a million copies in the three years that it was published indicates that it enjoyed support not just from the proletariat, but from the literate middle and lower middle class urban residents.

The 'O Jacobino' was noted for its extreme Republicanism, nationalism and concern for social issues. It was a great admirer of Floriano's hard line Republican policies³ and soon fell out with Prudente who was accused of being a monarchist stooge. The 'O Jacobino' also exploited the growing discontent in the cities caused by both rising unemployment and the cost of living during the 1890s to whip up xenophobia, particularly against Portuguese nationals*. Although it was the devaluation of the milréis as a result of the easy money policies of the provisional government which was largely responsible for the

¹. The "O Jornal do Brasil" September 13, 1897 however did record the establishment in February 1896 of a Jacobin Party, the "Partido Republicano Nacional" by a group of civilian and military Jacobins in the Federal District. But their aim of organizing branches in the states was never fulfilled and the party seems to have fizzled out after 1897.

². "O Jacobino" (Rio de Janeiro) No.1, September 13, 1894.

³. A poem titled Jesus and Floriano went:

O great hero and angel of victories,
You (Floriano) saved your country and ascended
No one in Brazil has risen so high,
Nor went to his grave with such glory.

See "O Jacobino" (Rio de Janeiro) No.1, September 13, 1894.

increase in the prices of imported staple goods which included basic foodstuffs,¹ the fact that the retail trade in the cities was controlled by the Portuguese led them to be blamed. They were accused of "speculating in food" and of monopolizing everything at the expense of the Brazilians. The Portuguese were also accused of being monarchists and of bringing the monarchy to Brazil. In its manifesto² 'O Jacobino' demanded the prohibition of foreign employees in all branches of public administration and the armed forces, the limitation of retail commerce only to born Brazilians, the prohibition of landholding by foreigners and an end to naturalization. In addition to its Republicanism and nationalism, 'O Jacobino' also had a programme for social reform: compulsory primary education, laws against monopolies, a curb on rents, consumer co-operatives for staple foods, pensions for all workers in state employment, homes for old people and orphans, houses of correction to end vagabondage and pauperism and the prohibition of lotteries and gambling. Although the term Jacobin was generally applied by contemporaries to include all civilian and military radical Republicans, in its social concern and its extreme nationalism, 'O Jacobino' and the urban sectors it claimed to represent stood apart from other radicals.

Politically however, it was not the continuous and virulent criticism from the radical press ('O Jacobino', 'Fôlha da Tarde', 'A República', 'O Tempo' amongst others) and from their unorganized supporters in the cities, or the isolated and minor revolts in the Military schools which concerned the President so much as the opposition within Congress. The política dos governadores, the understanding between the state governments and the President for mutual co-operation had not yet been institutionalized. Since neither Prudente nor the PRF, the government's party in Congress, reassured state governors who had been appointed by Floriano of their position, they opposed all the President's measures which

¹. Nícia Vilela Luz: "A luta pela industrialização do Brasil" (op.cit.) footnote 27, p.72.
². "O Jacobino" No.1, September 13, 1894 Manifesto of the Jacobins.

reversed Floriano's policies. Even those Floriano appointees who had joined the PRF when it was formed in 1893-94 as for example Amazonas, Ceará, Piauí, R.G.do Norte, Paraíba, attacked Prudente's policies in Congress.¹

This conflict eventually during 1897 alienated Prudente from the PRF itself. In his first three years in office, Prudente did not attempt to interfere personally in Congress to ensure a majority for the government's policies. This was left to the paulista Francisco Glycério who continued as leader of the majority coalition party of state bancadas - the PRF, which had been responsible for securing Prudente's election to the Presidency, Glycério faced a difficult problem.² On the one hand he had to secure a majority in Congress behind the President's policy of civilianization and conciliation with the rebels in the South, on the other hand he had to prevent the alienation of the pro-Florianistas in the PRF which would lead to a schism in the party. There was a real threat of a radical Republican opposition party forming in Congress under the leadership of Rio Grande do Sul, which had not joined the PRF, Since the death of Floriano, Julio de Castilhos had emerged as the new leader of the radicals. If this happened, political polarization on ideological lines would crystallize and the PRF would have failed in its aim of ending ideological confrontation. Moreover Glycério, who had come to enjoy considerable political prestige as a result of his leadership of the PRF, feared that he would lose his authority in Congress. Glycério therefore tolerated the radical wing within the PRF and did not attempt to impose party discipline on them.

But Glycério was able to control Congress only so long as Prudente was in office.

In November 1896 however, the Vice-President Manuel Vitorino was left temporarily in

¹. The best account of the conflict within the PRF in Congress is to be found in the memoirs of João Dunshee de Abranches: "Come se faziam Presidentes (Homens e fatos do início da República)" (op.cit.) Pt.I.

². There is no serious study of Francisco Glycério or the PRF, see however general political history of the period, FN 1, p.94.

charge of the Presidency whilst Prudente was on a three months sick-leave. The Vice-President openly supported the radical Republicans¹ and Glycério was no longer able to control Congress which became dominated by the radicals. The outbreak of a rebellion in Canudos in Bahia in November 1896 also served to justify the long-standing criticism of the radicals that President Prudente's policies of conciliation and demobilizing the patriotic battalions were jeopardizing the safety of the Republic. The Canudos revolt was easily interpreted as an attempt at restoration of the monarchy, the half-literate mystic Conselheiro Maciel condemned the Republic as ungodly and predicted the second coming of King Sebastian of Portugal. The failure of both the Bahian state forces and the Federal army to crush the rebellion also gave some credence to the radicals' assertion that this was no simple backland revolt of the impoverished sparked off by local grievances, but a monarchist plot supported by foreign forces.² As news of the defeat of yet another Federal army expedition to Canudos reached the Federal Capital in early March 1897, Jacobin mob violence erupted in the streets,³ whilst radical Republicans in Congress and the army began plotting with the Vice-President to prevent the return of Prudente to office.⁴ It was only Prudente's secret return to the capital and resumption of the Presidency that prevented his deposition.

The ideological conflict had thus widened under Manuel Vitorino. In Congress, the army and the Federal District, Jacobin opposition to anything remotely connected with the monarchy was so intense by early 1897 that their view could not be reconciled to the policies of toleration favoured by Prudente. Moreover under the Vice-President the radical

¹. Manuel Vitorino Pereira: "Manifesto Político" (op.cit.) p.46. Hélio Silva: "1889. A República não Esperou o Amanhecer" (op.cit.) letter of Prudente to Bernardino de Campos, p.251-2. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha: Evolução Política" (op.cit.) p.148 passim.

². "Diário Oficial" (Rio de Janeiro) March 24, 1896. Prudente found it necessary to send a telegram to state governors to assure them of the government's ability to contain the monarchists.

³. "Jornal do Comércio" February 10 passim - March 9, 1897.

⁴. Hélio Silva: "1889. A República não Esperou o Amanhecer" (op.cit.) pp.251-4. Letters of Prudente to Bernardino de Campos written in January 1897. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Come se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) Pt.1, p.26 passim.

Republicans had become ascendent and it was obvious that Prudente could only contain them after his return to office if he isolated the radicals as a minority faction and imposed his own authority in Congress.

2. The Disintegration of the PRF

It was the adesista governments particularly of the major northern states Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro who now rallied around the President in Congress in an attempt to isolate the radicals. It has been noted in the last chapter how the PRF by allowing all factions willing to endorse the Republican Constitution of 1891 to join the party, had enabled the former Imperial parties to return to power in many states. In the majority of instances it was the former Imperial Conservative parties that had been out of power when the Republican coup took place and had escaped disintegration in the internecine struggle for political control between 'historic' Republicans and the Imperial Liberal party that followed, who were able to come to power in 1893 and to consolidate their position in the states.¹ This was the case for example in Maranhão, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. Although these conservatives had endorsed the Republican Constitution, they continued to oppose reformist programmes as they had done during the Empire and they were bitterly opposed to the radical Republicans.

Regional and personal ambitions were other factors besides ideological differences, for the conflict that arose within the PRF during 1897.² The northern states under the leadership of Pernambuco had been anxious to maintain the dominant position they had enjoyed under the Empire. In 1890 under the leadership of the Liberal politicians of the Empire and after 1893 under that of the Imperial Conservative politicians, Pernambuco had

¹. See for example: J.de Pôrto Costa: "Os tempos de rosa e Silva" (op.cit.) Jerônimo de Viveiros: "Benedito Leite: um verdadeiro Republicano" (op.cit.) pp.22-23.

². J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Come se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) Pt.I, p.8 passim, 26, 65, 130, 142.

been trying to organize a regional alliance of northern states - the 'Bloco do Norte' to defend their regional interests. The political boss of Pernambuco and leader of the state's bancada in Congress, Francis Assis Rosa e Silva, also had ambitions to replace Francisco Glycério as majority leader in the House and to end the regional hegemony of São Paulo.

The rift in the PRF that Glycério had feared would be caused by the radicals and which he had tried to forestall since 1894, was now brought about by the adesistas. They were confident of the support of the President who had become totally alienated not only from the radical Republicans but also increasingly hostile to Glycério, who had failed to curb them during the President's absence from office.

The adesistas had an opportunity to strengthen their position in Congress in the Congressional elections held in December 1896 and which were certified during March and April of 1897.¹ Adesista state governments attempted to exclude candidates of dissident state factions at the election and to ensure the certification of the entire government slate in Congress. Since the Congressional representatives of dissident groups in adesista controlled states automatically aligned themselves with the radical Republicans, their exclusion weakened the radicals in Congress.²

With the position of the adesistas in Congress strengthened in May 1897 following the certification and relying on the support of the President, Pernambuco went on to challenge Glycério's authority in Congress and eventually to isolate the radicals in the House. Since 1894 a PRF convention held annually with the reopening of Congress in May had given Glycério as party leader a mandate to make all appointments to the Congressional

¹. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Come se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) pp.23, 26 passim.

². It would appear that Glycério failed to realize the motive of the adesistas during the certification. According to Abranches, the radicals warned him that Pernambuco intended to destroy the PRF and they had suggested that Glycério should allow one third of the seats in Congress to be held by the dissident state factions, so that should a schism occur in the PRF the radicals would be assured a majority in the House. See above reference, p.27.

Permanent Committees. However when on May 14, 1897 the PRF convention attempted to follow the established procedure, the Pernambucans objected and walked out in protest.¹ This open rejection of Glycério's leadership by Pernambuco was a serious blow to his prestige; Pernambuco had since 1894 been recognized as one of the more powerful bancadas in Congress² and Rosa e Silva had been elected to the important post of President of the Chamber of Deputies since 1894.

Two weeks later on May 26, the adesistas seized the opportunity offered by Prudente's successful handling of the army mutiny in the Escola Militar da Praia Vermelha to isolate the radical Republicans in Congress and force Glycério to take sides either with the President or his opponents.³ In the event Glycério side-stepped the issue but the election of the President of the Chamber of Deputies that followed became an open attempt by the President and the adesistas to destroy the PRF and gain control of Congress. Prudente personally appealed to the state governors for their support in securing the election of his candidate, the Bahian Artur Rios who stood against Glycério himself - "A victory for Glycério", he wrote, "would mean an incitement to new revolts", Prudente and the adesistas won by a narrow majority as a result of the paulista state party's decision to support Prudente

¹ "Jornal do Brasil" (Rio de Janeiro) May 15, 1897.

² Ibid., April 26, 1897 "A semana Política".

³ J.J.Seabra a deputy for Bahia and a long-time anti-Florianista, moved a resolution that Congress appoint a committee to congratulate the President for "safeguarding the order of the Republic and the authority of the Constitution." Glycério avoided the trap by arguing that the motion suggested a vote of confidence in the government and was opposed to the Presidential system of the Republic. He was supported by 84 votes to 60 in the House. However the substantial minority vote encouraged the adesistas to continue the fight to isolate the radicals. The new President of the Chamber of Deputies Artur Rios, a Bahian deputy, who had voted in favour of the Seabra motion now handed in his resignation since, he said, he no longer represented the view of the Congressional majority. Determined on a showdown opponents of Glycério campaigned for the acceptance of the resignation and in the vote that followed in the House won by eight votes (79/71). The new elections for the President of the Lower House now became an open contest for ascendancy between the two sides, Artur Rios was put forward by the adesista pro-government faction whilst Glycério stood as the candidate of the PRF supported mainly by the radical Republicans, See "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 28-June 3, 1897, "Jornal do Comércio" May 27, 28, 1897.

against Glycério and the PRF.¹ Minas Gerais remained neutral as it had done in all the national political conflicts since Floriano's period in office.²

The successful election of Artur Rios to the Presidency of the Chamber demonstrated that Glycério and the radical Republicans had lost control of the House and the political balance was in favour of the President and the adesistas. The PRF coalition formally disintegrated at the party's convention on June 22. During the meeting³ Glycério launched into an attack on the government. He asserted that by interfering in the internal affairs of Congress - i.e. over the election of the President of the Chamber of Deputies - Prudente had contravened the Constitution which had established the separation of powers and hence the independence of Congress from executive control. But the delegates of the majority of states protested and withdrew, leaving behind only a rump PRF comprising representatives of the state governments of only six small states: Amazonas, Piauí, Ceará, Pará, Paraíba and R.G.do Norte.

Thus in mid-1897 the civilian politicians were divided into two ideologically conflicting factions.⁴ On the one hand there was the pro-government faction which comprised two main groups. First the adesistas including the state governments of three major states: Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro and six minor states: Maranhão, Sergipe, Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Goiás and Mato Grosso. Second, the moderate 'historic'

¹ The conflict between Prudente and Glycério had divided the paulista bancada in Congress almost equally between the two. Prudente appealed personally to the state governor Campos Sales for support in the election. Sales at first attempted to reconcile the two paulistas and suggested a conciliation candidate for the Presidency of the Lower House. When Sales failed, he decided to support Prudente whose conciliatory policies he had endorsed and united the PRP behind the President and the adesistas. Critics of Sales later accused him of selling out to the adesistas in return for the Presidential nomination in 1897. See C.Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" p.150 passim,

² Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" (Belo Horizonte, Oficial 1958), Letter Silviano Brandão to Bueno Brandão June 9, 1897 p.136.

³ "Jornal do Comércio" June 23, 1897.

⁴ For the alignment of the states after the schism in the PRF see J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes..." (op.cit.) Pt.II. "O Livro Verde".

Republican state party of São Paulo. On the other hand there was the minority anti-government faction comprising the state government of one major state: R.G.do Sul, and eight minor states: Amazonas, Pará, Piauí, Ceará, Paraíba, R.G.do Norte, Paraná and Sta.Catharina. Minas alone remained uncommitted.

The victory of the adesistas in Congress in June 1897 marked their second successful attempt to seize control over national politics since the Republican coup that had toppled them from power. The first was in January 1891 when Deodoro appointed his 'Courtier' Cabinet. In 1897 however the adesistas were able to assert their dominance over the radicals only as a result of their alliance with the moderate 'historic' Republicans of São Paulo, and it was the paulistas who held the political balance.

3. The Organization of the Partido Contração and the Partido Republicano

The schism only served to exacerbate the factional conflict. After the determined manner in which the adesistas had fought to isolate them, the radical Republicans in Congress were convinced that they were going to be totally eliminated by the adesistas. The Presidential elections due in 1898 took on a new significance as both sides now prepared to secure the election of their own candidate to the Presidency, Co-operation between the two sides seemed impossible and the election would decide the fate of the two factions, and whether the adesistas or the radicals' was to survive.

The radicals in Congress were the first to begin organizing their party. One June 23, the day after the decisive schism in the PRF, the rump decided to try and capture the majority parties of the states and Glycério instructed those present to convoke an extraordinary meeting of the executive committees of state parties and to get them to repudiate both the government of Prudente and the state governments which supported

him.¹ Predictably they failed. State parties were controlled by state governors. Even Glycério, a key figure in the paulista Republican Party made little headway with the PRP; instead he was expelled from its central executive.² Undaunted, the radicals now began organizing a national opposition party with branches in all states with the co-operation of the dissident state factions. Glycério launched his own campaign to establish an opposition party in São Paulo by publishing a letter to the paulistas in the state newspaper. In it, he justified his breach with Prudente whom he accused of not carrying out his election pledges to protect the Republic and the Constitution. Glycério maintained that the amnesty to the rebels had jeopardized the regime and that the President, by soliciting a motion of confidence in Congress and interfering in its elections had acted unconstitutionally. He called on the paulistas to join the opposition and to defend the Constitution.³

The new national radical party which was organized in the following weeks adopted the name of Partido Concentração or the PC - literally the Majority Party, claiming to represent the majority of the Republicans. Like the PRF before it, the PC was also a coalition party, comprising the ruling state parties of R.G.do Sul, Santa Catharina, Paraná, Piauí, Paraíba, and R.G.do Norte and the dissident factions of the other states, including a powerful opposition group in Rio de Janeiro and Pará and minor ones in other states. In Congress Glycério acted as leader of the PC.

In its manifesto⁴ the PC described itself as the party of true Republicans whose aim was to defend the Constitution of 1891 and national interests from destruction by the 'personal' faction of the President. The manifesto paid a special tribute to the contribution

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" June 24, 1897.

"Jornal do Brasil" June 24, 1897.

². "O Estado de São Paulo" July 10, 11, 19, 1897, Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda a Prisão" (op.cit.) pp.155-7,

³. "O Estado de São Paulo" July 14, 17, 1897.

⁴. Ibid., July 17, 1897.

which the armed forces had made to the Republic and defended their right to a say in the political affairs of the country. But the PC was careful to disassociate itself from the anti-clericalism of the Jacobins. The manifesto welcomed the Papal Legation to Brazil although the 'O Jacobino' had been campaigning against it.¹

Meanwhile the pro-government forces had also been organizing their own party and defining their manifesto. The government party was launched in August at a large gathering in the Federal Capital attended by over 200 delegates from the states.² There could be no doubt that the pro-government forces were in the majority. They comprised the governments of four major states: São Paulo, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro and the governments of nine minor states including Ceará and Pará, who had deserted the radical Republicans shortly after the schism. The main concern of the majority faction was to refute the claim of the PC to be the true Republican Party and so the pro-government faction chose to call themselves the Republican Party - PR. Like their opponents, the PR also pledged themselves to defend the Constitution of 1891, state autonomy and the separation of powers. Their other commitment was to maintain law and order and financial stability. The official PR newspaper in the Federal Capital was 'O Debate'. Its editor, Paulino Soares de Souza Júnior, was a Congressional deputy for the Federal Capital. Two other PR representatives were also co-opted as sub-editors - Benedito Leite, leader of the Maranhão state party and the leader of its Congressional bancada and Severino Vieira of Bahia. The government newspaper however was outclassed by the numbers and popularity of the established radical newspapers like 'O Paíz', 'O Jacobino' and 'A República'.

The striking fact that emerged from the manifestos of the two parties, the PC and the

¹. Although there had been little opposition to the separation of Church and state carried out by the Republic and which was to remain one of its real achievements, there was a strong Catholic sentiment in the country and anti-clericalism had little popular support.

². "Jornal do Brasil" August 9, 1897. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) p.132 passim, organization of pro-government faction.

PR, was their similarity. The issue over which the schism had occurred, the election of a President to the Chamber of Deputies, had personalized the conflict, the struggle for control over the House being fought between Prudente and Glycério. Moreover Glycério who had assumed leadership of the radical Republican faction was himself no doctrinaire Republican and was now anxious to prevent his minority party, PC, from acquiring a reputation for radicalism which would permanently condemn it to a minority status. The selection of a Presidential candidate for the PC that followed brought out the differing views between the doctrinaire Republicans and the pragmatists within the PC.

4. The Succession Question

a. PC Candidates: Lauro Sodré - Fernando Lobo

The Partido Concentração (anti-government party) took the first steps in early October 1897 to secure its Presidential candidate. The party's Nomination Convention held in the Federal Capital was attended by two delegates from each state party and dissident faction affiliated to the party.¹

A major disagreement developed between the doctrinaire Republicans and the more pragmatic delegates anxious primarily to assure the victory of the PC Presidential ticket.² The doctrinaire view was put forward by the delegates of R.G.do Sul. They argued that the country was in need of a hard line Republican who would ensure the country a strong Republican government in the next administration and they suggested Julio de Castilhos, governor of R.G.do Sul as the ideal candidate in this respect. Castilhos' candidature had also been endorsed by other extreme radical Republican groups. The Military Club had elected him an Honorary President of the Club and had indicated him as their favoured candidate for

¹. "A Federação" October 6, 1897. "O Estado de São Paulo" October 9, 1897. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) p.67 passim.

². "Jornal do Comércio" October 10-13, 1897.

the Presidency.¹ The Jacobin National Republican Party² and later in October the orthodox positivist organization, the Central Positivista likewise endorsed his candidature.³ However the pragmatists were totally opposed to Castilhos. Glycério for example argued that the PC could only win the election with a candidate who was sympathetic to conciliation with other factions and he affirmed that the choice of Castilhos would be a political disaster. Glycério proposed instead that the PC should endorse Quintino Bocayuva who, whilst a convinced and prestigious Republican himself, also had a reputation as a political moderator.⁴ But Bocayuva was unacceptable to the doctrinaire Republicans and the convention was deadlocked.

A third candidate Lauro Sodré (Floriano's choice in the 1894 election) was suggested by moderates as an alternative to Bocayuva. But the Castilhistas were adamant and so it was agreed to hold a secret ballot to decide the issue. Three separate ballots had to be held before Sodré obtained a majority over other candidates and Castilhos' faction agreed to support him at the election.⁵ But the atmosphere was charged⁶ and the nominations for the Vice-Presidential candidate had to be postponed for a later date.

The Vice-Presidential candidate for the PC was chosen at the end of October. This time the meeting was not publicized. Fernando Lobo, a 'historic' Republican of Minas Gerais was adopted. He had an overwhelming majority of delegates in his favour against

¹. "O Estado da São Paulo" June 15, 1897. "Jornal do Comércio" June 16, 20, 1897.

². "Jornal do Brasil" September 13, 1897.

³. "O Paíz" October 31, 1897.

⁴. Quintino Bocayuva, a native of Rio de Janeiro was a founder member of the National Republican Party of 1870 and chiefly responsible for drawing its Manifesto and editing its newspaper "A República". He had been one of the three civilians who had actively participated in the coup of 1889 and had served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the provisional government. As a journalist and editor especially of "O Paíz" Bocayuva had been a staunch defender of the military. On the other hand he was skillful at conciliating political differences. He had been chief architect of the alliance between the positivists and the liberal Republicans during the 1870s and 1880s.

⁵. "A Federação" (Pôrto Alegre) October 6, 1897.

⁶. Shortly after the PC Nomination Convention there was an assassination attempt on the life of Lauro Sodré. Whilst the PC accused the pro- government faction of complicity, the latter maintained it was the work of a Castilhista. See Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) Footnote pp.140-141.

his rival Francisco Sá of Ceará (38/4).¹ Lobo had been closely associated with Floriano. He had served first as Floriano's Minister of Foreign Affairs, but was later transferred to the politically more important post of Minister of the Interior and responsible for political control of the states. But the primary reason for the selection of Fernando Lobo lay in the fact that he was a mineiro, and it was hoped that this would attract Minas Gerais to support the PC's ticket. Thus the PC's ticket which emerged at the end of October, presented two 'historic' Republicans for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections.

The October convention of the PC had the distinction of being one of the two instances during the Republic when the candidates were actually selected by the convention delegates. But the disagreements had strained the unity of the party. When Glycério sent a telegram to Castilhos expressing the hope that their friendship and political solidarity would continue, Castilhos publicly criticized the overture as arrogant and high-handed.² However the choice of Sodré was by no means a defeat for the doctrinaire Republicans, Sodré was a known positivist himself and had been closely associated with Benjamin Constant.

b. The Partido Republicano Candidates: Campos Sales - Rosa e Silva

Meanwhile the Republican Party (the pro-government party) had been negotiating their own slate. Whilst the adesistas would have liked to select their own candidate, they were not powerful enough to do so without the co-operation of São Paulo. The paulistas however would accept only a 'historic' Republican and moreover expected the PR to nominate a candidate from São Paulo. President Prudente, leader of the PR, was known to favour paulista Bernardino de Campos, a leading state politician and also a close friend and political confidant of Prudente. But it was Bahia, anxious to influence the selection and to ensure the

¹. "O Paíz" October 31, 1897.

². "O Paíz" October 15, 1897.

state a prominent position in the next administration, which took the initiative in proposing the candidature of Campos Sales, the incumbent state governor of São Paulo for the PR Presidential nomination.¹ The selection of Campos Sales was assured when other leading paulista politicians showed their preference for him and the state government of Rio de Janeiro agreed to endorse his candidature. With the Presidential nomination of the PR assured for a 'historic' Republican, the pro-government faction felt it could conciliate the adesistas with the Vice-Presidency and this was offered to Pernambucan Rosa e Silva, the most prestigious adesista politician in Congress. Prudente accepted the decision of the PR chiefs and the party remained intact.

The rubber stamp convention of the PR met on October 10 in the Chamber of Deputies and unanimously voted in favour of Campos Sales. Rosa e Silva was less popular obtaining 28 votes whilst Leopoldo Bulhões of Goiás proposed by his own state and backed by a few northern delegates received eight votes.² Three others received one vote each.³ Thus Campos Sales a 'historic' Republican and Rosa e Silva, an adesista, were adopted as the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the PR.

It was a powerful ticket designed to maintain the dominance of the Republicans whilst conciliating adesistas. Moreover Campos Sales was more acceptable to the doctrinaire Republicans than Prudente had been, since Sales whilst opening the Republican Party to the adesistas continued to oppose any concessions to committed monarchists and had been highly critical of Prudente's toleration of monarchist organizations. On the other hand, the candidature of Rosa e Silva whilst assuring the adesistas also ensured regional co-

¹. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes ..." (op.cit.) p.30 passim, 67, 239-250.
Castro Sertório: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.)

². "Jornal do Brasil" October 11, 20, 1897.

³. Ibid. These were: Ubaldino do Amaral Fontoura of Paraná
Justo Chermont of Pará
Assis Brasil of R.G.do Sul

operation between the northern bloco and the coffee region in the election.

4. Election Manifestos and Prospects of the two Parties

With the PC's efforts to stress moderate Republican views and the PR its commitment to Republicanism, albeit conciliatory to the adesistas, there was little difference between the manifestos that the two parties drew up and to which their candidates were pledged if elected. The real reason for the opposition of the radical Republicans to the pro-government party, the PR, emerged in the preamble to the PC's manifesto. In it the radical Republicans accused the PR of being controlled by the "conservative elements of the Empire which had systematically opposed all liberal reform" in the past fifty years, and of trying to reintroduce the corrupt practices of the Empire into the Republic and seeking to exclude the progressive elements, the 'historic' Republicans from office. But the programme that the radicals then went on to outline was in no way more progressive than that of the PR. For the most part both parties reiterated the programme which had been outlined by the PRF in 1894:¹ the defence of the Constitution of 1891 with the proviso to ensure its proper functioning in regard to both the separation of powers and the autonomy of the states; to maintain law and order; to foster financial stability and economic growth.²

The campaign debates that were held in the press of the Federal Capital and in Congress were also sterile. Argument raged not over future policy, but over the political conflict since 1894.³ Each party held the other responsible. The PR accused the PC of

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" January 4, 5, 1898. Manifesto of the Partido Concentração. J.Dunshee de Abranches: "Como se faziam Presidentes ..." p.113 passim; 250 passim. "Jornal do Brasil" October 20, 1897. Manifesto of the Partido Republicano.

². The manifesto of the pro-government faction was not endorsed by all members of the PR executive. A quarter of the delegates demanded that the PR endorse a programme for Constitutional revision which would allow amendments to be made to the 1891 Constitution on such questions as tax distribution between the Union and states, but they were overruled.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June-October 1897.

inhibiting the administration by its extremism and of fostering anarchy. The PC on the other hand directed its criticism mainly at the President, Prudente was accused of acting unconstitutionally by 'soliciting' a motion of confidence and by interfering in the internal affairs of Congress (over the election of the President of the Lower House). He was further accused of not honouring his election pledge to defend the programme of the PRF whose candidate he had been and of organizing a personal faction - the PR, a party without a very distinct Republican ideology.

It soon became clear that the candidate of the government faction, the Partido Republicano, would poll the most votes at the election. They had the support of the majority of the state governments and the vote for the opposition in the states would be further scaled down through government control of the electoral machinery. Moreover the differences within the Partido Concentração had undermined the morale of the opposition and it was not certain that Julio de Castilhos would co-operate to give a big vote in R.G.do Sul to Lauro Sodré.

But it was not adequate to win most ballots, the certification of the winner depended on control over Congress. The certification of the 1898 Presidential election was expected to be fiercely contested. The alignment of forces in Congress did not reflect the real strength of the government factions in the states. Almost a hundred deputies and Senators in Congress supported the opposition Partido Concentração against an equal number of committed PR Congressmen. An important minority including Minas Gerais consistently abstained refusing to take sides in the conflict.¹

¹. The knife-edge situation in the House was evident in the deadlock that lasted for six weeks in September and early October over the certification of the election of a deputy to fill the vacancy that had occurred in the bancada of Maranhão, following the death of one of its members. The report that gave the candidate backed by the government faction a majority of 444 votes was finally certified in the Chamber of Deputies by 95 votes to 93. There were 24 abstentions. See "Diário do Congresso Nacional" September-October 17, 1897.

One factor operating in favour of the PC was the government's continued failure to end the rebellion at Canudos in Bahia, Jacobin agitation expressed through the PC was kept alive by the unsuccessful commanders like General Artur Oscar, who wrote to opposition politicians and newspapers alleging that his failure was due to the great skill and modern equipment of the rebels who were supplied by outside forces. The government's inability to end the revolt, its alliance with the adesistas and its toleration of monarchists' organization, led the Jacobins to suspect Prudente's sympathies. By August 1897 he was being openly accused of involvement in a monarchist attempt to overthrow the Republic and there were continuous threats to the President's life.¹ Instead of pre-paring for the elections, the PC politicians in the Federal Capital began to plot with army officers and leading Jacobins for a counter-revolt.

But the PC's advantage was short-lived. On November 5, Marcellino Bispo, a mestizo soldier from the north attempted to assassinate the President. Though Prudente escaped, his Minister of War was fatally wounded in the affray that followed. This was used to weaken the PC. Despite the immediate denial by the opposition politicians of any part in the assassination attempt, they were nevertheless held responsible. On November 6, the day after the event, the mood in Congress and the Federal District was decidedly anti-PC. In the Senate,² Rui condemned the Vice-President Manuel Vitorino for failing to be present to preside over the House on that day and to voice his horror of the plot. Rui pointed out that had the assassination attempt succeeded, the Vice-President would have had most to gain. When a majority in Congress decided in favour of a vote of censure on the Vice-President, the PC members hastily withdrew from the House. In the streets the former anti-monarchist demonstrations were replaced by violent anti-Jacobin ones. After the funeral of the

¹. J.Hahner: "Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898" (op.cit.) p.175 passim.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" November 6 passim 1397. "Anais do Senado Nacional" November 6, 1897.

Minister of War, Marshal Bittencourt, mobs attacked the newspaper offices of 'O Jacobino', 'A República' and 'Fôlha da Tarde'; a similar attack was made on the offices of 'A Nação', Glycério's newspaper in São Paulo City.

More serious for the opposition was the indictment of complicity in the assassination of leading members of the PC and several officers following a police enquiry. Amongst those accused were the Vice-President, Pinheiro Machado, Francisco Glycério and the editor of 'O Jacobino', Diocletiano Martyr. At his trial later on, Marcellino Bispo named the above amongst the conspirators.¹ He claimed to have had secret meetings in the Military Club with the same officers who had been involved in the earlier uprisings of the Military School with the aim of removing Prudente from office. The weapons, Bispo alleged, had been provided by Diocletiano Martyr and both Manuel Vitorino and Glycério had known of the plot.

Whatever the truth behind the assassination attempt, Prudente used it to weaken the PC, Congress voted to allow the President to declare a State of siege for 30 days in the Federal Capital and in Niteroi.² It was prolonged until February 23, a week before the Presidential election was due. Despite Congressional immunity, a number of PC leaders were arrested, amongst them the Vice-President and Pinheiro Machado. Francisco Glycério with several others went into hiding. The Military Club was closed and retribution followed in states like R.G.do Sul, which supported the PC.³

The President's repression of the PC effectively ended any hope the opposition had had of a respectable showing at the Presidential election. Fearing intervention, two state governments that of R.G.do Sul and Sta.Catharina withdrew their support for the

¹. Vicente Neiva: "Atentado de cinco de Novembro. Relatório do Dr. Vicente Neiva lo delegado auxiliar e diversas pecas do inquérito." (Imprensa Nacional Rio de Janeiro, 1898).

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" November 12, 1897 and January 31, 1898.

³. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" pp.92-93.

opposition ticket. However neither state capitulated entirely to the President's faction. In a manifesto published in the official state newspaper 'A Federação', the Republican party of R.G.do Sul stated that the candidacy of Campos Sales, the candidate of the pro-Prudente Partido Republicano, was not "worthy" of the votes of the gaúchos because it had not been put forward by the "people" but by the President. In the circumstances R.G.do Sul decided that "despite the personal qualities of the candidate" the state would abstain from voting.¹ This decision was also endorsed by Sta.Catharina. With the defection of R.G.do Sul and Sta.Catharina and the disappearance of its leaders in Congress, the election ticket of the PC was seriously weakened.

The withdrawal of R.G.do Sul's support for the PC candidates following Presidential intervention in the state, is a good example of how ideology, even in the case of the most doctrinaire, had to be sacrificed to ensure political survival. It is also an example of the inbuilt authority of the Presidency and its effective use in 1897 to influence Presidential elections and to weaken opposition to the 'official' slate.

5. The Election

As a result of the Federal government's action against the PC after the November assassination attempt the electoral strength of the opposition was uncertain. Two state governments including the electorally most powerful R.G.do Sul and Sta.Catharina had withdrawn. The remaining five state governments - Amazonas, Piauí, R.G.do Norte, Paraíba and Paraná - behind the PC did not publicize their electoral intentions after November 1897. Moreover the victory of the candidates of the PR, the pro-government faction was assured, since with a number of PC Congressmen in prison or in hiding and the bancadas of R.G.do

¹. "A Federação" Manifesto a Nação, February 1, 1898.

Sul and Sta.Catharina abstaining in the certification of the elections, the government majority in the House was certain.

The extension of the state of siege in the Federal Capital however showed the government's continued apprehension of opposition here and on election day itself the majority of electoral booths particularly in the first district, the city centre, remained closed. As a result the poll in the Federal Capital was a low 15%. In some other states too, where the opposition was expected to continue, pro-Federal state governments resorted to extensive fraud. In Bahia for example, the state recorded a 70% turn-out, although in many municípios the opposition had abstained; in other states abstention by the opposition reduced the poll below 50%. In Minas Gerais, where the state government had consistently favoured a neutral stand in the national politics, only a 32% poll was recorded.¹

When Congress certified the results of the election, Campos Sales and Rosa e Silva the candidates of the Republican Party, were allowed over 90% of the votes for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, as the Table below shows.

TABLE III/1

Results of Final Certification

| President | Total Vote | Vice-President | Total Vote |
|---------------------------|------------|----------------------------------|------------|
| Manoel Ferraz de | | Francisco de Assis | |
| Campos Sales (PR) | 420,286 | Rosa e Silva (PR) | 412,074 |
| Lauro Sodré (PC) | 38,929 | Fernando Lobo Leite Pereira (PC) | 40,629 |
| Julio Prates de Castilhos | 621 | Luís Vianna | 1,859 |
| Others | various | Others | various |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” Ano X no.7, June 28, 1898.

¹. Source election results: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” Ano X no.7. May-June 1898, pp.61-99.

Campos Sales however did not win a majority in all the states.¹ The governments of the two southern states, R.G.do Sul and Sta.Catharina, abided by their decision to abstain in the election and only the pro-Federal government minority factions in these states voted. The governments of two other states, R.G.do Norte and Paraná continued their support for the PC candidates and delivered 65.5% and 54.3% respectively of the state vote to Lauro Sodré. In a few other states also the candidates of the PC obtained a significant opposition vote. In Pará it was 39% of the state vote, in Goiás 22%, Espírito Santo 18%, Maranhão 15%. But in São Paulo, Glycério's home state, Lauro Sodré obtained only 6% of the state vote as a result of the state government's repression of the opposition. Altogether the PC candidates obtained some 38,929 votes. The generally poor showing of the PC or an opposition candidate in the majority of states as in Ceará, Sergipe, Mato Grosso to name only the worst examples, showed the tight control of the electoral machinery by the state governments.

¹. Table III/2, p.114.

TABLE III/2

Votes Received in the Presidential Elections of 1898 by the Two Main Contenders for the

Presidency and Vice-Presidency Distribution by States

| States | For the Presidency | | For the Vice-Presidency | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| | Campos Sales | Lauro Sodré | Rosa e Silva | Fernando Lobo |
| Amazonas | 2,029 | 23 | 2,027 | 26 |
| Pará | 16,927 | 11,137 | 17,216 | 10,849 |
| Maranhão | 17,618 | 2,710 | 17,655 | 2,751 |
| Piauí | 17,992 | - | 17,988 | - |
| Ceará | 28,290 | 10 | 28,077 | - |
| R.G.do Norte | 4,168 | 7,927 | 4,169 | 7,911 |
| Paraíba | 19,359 | 934 | 30,292 | 778 |
| Alagoas | 12,680 | 194 | 12,693 | 160 |
| Sergipe | 5,471 | 50 | 5,085 | 287 |
| Espírito Santo | 9,037 | 2,015 | 8,948 | 2,109 |
| Federal District | 6,043 | 370 | 5,497 | - |
| Bahia | 98,062 | 3,071 | 94,204 | 3,177 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 29,331 | 118 | 29,060 | 128 |
| Minas Gerais | 50,510 | 1,355 | 48,426 | 3,153 |
| Goiás | 7,916 | 2,292 | 7,729 | 2,224 |
| Mato Grosso | 5,516 | 2 | 5,516 | - |
| São Paulo | 50,588 | 2,484 | 50,328 | 2,502 |
| Paraná | 4,419 | 5,281 | 4,317 | 5,169 |
| Sta.Catharina | 354 | - | 3,372 | - |
| R.G.do Sul | 2,865 | 31 | 2,281 | - |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 2-28, 1898.

The election results showed the overwhelming strength of the pro-government party, the PR. It also showed that the Partido Concentração though seriously weakened had not been destroyed and retained some support in Congress. During the certification of the election in Congress, spokesmen for the PC accused the government faction of fraud and repression. Campos Sales was criticized for not handing office to his deputy whilst elections for which he was standing were being conducted. He was said to have prejudiced the outcome at the polls in São Paulo in his favour. The Federal government came in for heavier attacks. Paulista deputy Galeão Carvalhal denounced the authorities for "systematically persecuting all the Republican elements" and accused Prudente of bringing about the bankruptcy of the Republic "with its liberties vilified, its army humiliated, its

Parliament virtually silenced, with its immunities unconstitutionally destroyed and its sovereignty debased."¹ The PC's opposition to the government increased when Prudente ignored appeals for the release of imprisoned Congressmen and the reopening of the Military Club. In Congress the radical minority consistently voted against the majority on most issues and disassociated themselves from any motions in favour of the government, frequently withdrawing from the Chamber as a show of protest.² The Republican Party meanwhile was equally determined to continue the division after the election and to annihilate the PC in all states and in Congress. Their immediate concern was to assure their dominance in the next administration. Thus the conflict between the two ideologically motivated factions, the PR and the PC, threatened to continue in the next administration.

The above detailed study of the 1898 Presidential election has shown the continuing struggle for power between the radical Republicans and the adesistas. This struggle had begun during 1890 and 1891 when civilian and military radical factions had opposed the election of Marshal Deodoro. Neither the radicals nor the adesistas however were powerful enough by themselves to control the election. The political balance was held by the moderate 'historic' Republicans of São Paulo. The alliance of the paulistas with the radicals tipped the balance in their favour and brought them to power in November 1891. But the paulistas who had opposed control of the national government by the adesistas of the north were not anxious to maintain the radical Republicans in power either and in 1893 organized the PRF coalition of all ideological factions and through it secured the Presidency for their own state in 1894. The coalition however failed to end the ideological differences between the radicals and the adesistas. Instead the PRF disintegrated in 1897. This time however the paulistas allied with the adesistas and in the 1898 Presidential election the paulista/adesista

¹ . "Anais do Senado" pp.93-96, May 1898.

² . "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Debates in October 1898 in particular.

ticket won. Although the radicals had emerged as a weak minority, both they and the adesistas prepared to continue the ideological conflict in the next administration. Their future however depended on the attitude of the new President Campos Sales and of São Paulo state.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSOLIDATION OF THE REPUBLIC. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1902

Introduction

It has been generally acknowledged that Campos Sales consolidated the Republic with the política dos governadores. Chapter Four examines his electoral manifesto and memoirs and tries to show how Campos Sales operated and institutionalized the política dos governadores to end ideological conflict and to secure the election of his successor to the Presidency in 1902. Chapter Four also, for the first time, looks at the Dissidência and its attempts to put forward a Presidential candidate pledged to liberal reform in 1902.

1. Campos Sales rejects both Congressional Parties

In Chapter Three we saw how the political elites of the states who had united to form the PRF split in 1897 and regrouped into two opposing parties, the radical Republican Party - the Partido Concentração, PC, and the moderate Republican and adesista Party, the Partido Republicano, PR. The new paulista President, Campos Sales, was the candidate of the PR and they, expecting to dominate Federal politics, prepared to annihilate the radical Republicans.¹

Campos Sales however was unwilling to continue the partisan conflict that had dominated the Republic since 1890.² Although he was the candidate of the PR, Campos Sales did not support some of its views particularly on the central question of state autonomy - (Prudente had been demanding greater Federal control over the

¹. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" pp.230-1.

². Ibid., pp.163-4, 225 passim.

states) and he wished to govern independently of the party. The new President also wanted political harmony in Congress so that he could deal with the country's economic and financial crises, and this meant that his government had to conciliate with the PC.

Even before his election, Campos Sales had in his election Manifesto of October 31, 1897 defined his political attitudes and outlined what could be his government's priorities if elected.¹ His Manifesto had been read at a political banquet to a select group of leading businessmen in São Paulo City, but it had not aroused serious interest despite its publication in the press. The subsequent assassination attempt and victimization of the Partido Concentração had also occupied the attention of the politicians. But it was in fact the most important document to emerge from the election. In it Campos Sales set out his fundamental political and economic beliefs. It was on these bases that he consolidated both the political and economic life of the Republic. A closer look at it is therefore relevant here.

In his election Manifesto, Campos Sales rejected the parties that had been organized since 1889,² the PRF and its successors the PR and the PC in which he had never been directly involved, and reiterated his allegiance to the Historic Republican Party and the Manifesto of 1870, whose two salient institutional principles, a Presidential and Federal system, had been incorporated in the Constitution of February 24, 1891. He was opposed to any revision of the Constitution to establish either a parliamentary or a centralized system, and maintained that Presidentialism and Federalism were the twin pillars of the Republic. The political conflicts since 1889, he argued, were a result not of faulty institutions, but of the failure to interpret

¹. "Manifesto do Dr Campos Sales lido no banquete que se realison em São Paulo a 31 de Outubro 1897" (São Paulo, 1897).

². Ibid., pp.10-19.

them correctly. In regard to Presidentialism, he defined his idea of the Presidency in its relationship to the ministers on the one hand, and to Congress on the other. He was against the practice of collective ministerial responsibility as a hangover from Imperial days and insisted on the direct and personal responsibility of the President for all administrative decisions and an individual relationship between the President and each department. Although in regard to Congress, Campos Sales asserted his belief in the separation of powers, he also implied at the same time the domination of Congress by the Executive: he stated that the President must clarify and direct legislation and that Congress should express the general policy of the President. In office he was to subjugate Congress entirely to the President. On Federalism, the second pillar of the Republic, he strongly opposed any attempts to limit state rights and to tamper with Article 6 of the Constitution. In short, Campos Sales intended to allow the states to get on with governing themselves whilst the President directed Federal matters.

A paulista, Campos Sales' main concern was to put into effect financial and economic policies to benefit the coffee export economy of his state. Sales also belonged to the traditional 19th century liberal economic school of thought with its commitment to free trade and private enterprise and he believed that governments should be concerned solely with maintaining financial stability. Thus he was critical of the protectionist policies of the early Republican governments and the 'paper money' policies they had resorted to, to promote industrial and agricultural development. The financial chaos that this had resulted in combined with political instability were also against the interest of the coffee economy which, as has already been stated, relied on European immigrant labour and foreign investment to provide

infrastructure and loans for the expansion of the coffee trade.

In his Manifesto, Campos Sales emphasized that the priority of his government would be to stabilize the country's finances by carrying out a comprehensive deflationist policy.¹ He also promised to end the earlier protectionist policies and to re-establish the country's International relations with Europe to encourage capital investment and immigration. As President-elect, Campos Sales had demonstrated the seriousness of his intentions, undertaking a trip to Europe to negotiate a loan which would be the basis for achieving financial stability.² The policies Sales planned to put into effect were expected to be highly unpopular, and would require the cooperation of all political factions to be successful.

2. Campos Sales' Political System - the Politics of the Governors³

In office, Campos Sales bypassed both the political parties in Congress, the Partido Republicano and the Partido Concentração. To assure his government of reliable support in Congress, free of factional or ideological constraints, he formed direct and personal alliances with the governors of three major states: São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia.

¹. Although the deflationary policies Sales outlined were contrary to the interests of the businessmen, those present at the banquet did not raise any objections to the platform. See "Manifesto do Dr Campos Sales ..." p.19 passim.

². Rothschilds in London had agreed to a loan and a moratorium on debt repayments, in return for the President-elect undertaking to put into effect austerity measures including a squeeze on credit, an increase in taxes and a cut in public expenditure. On his inauguration Campos Sales appointed Joaquim Martinho, a native of Mato Grosso, as his Finance Minister. As Minister of Industry in the previous government, Martinho had opposed liberal monetary and protectionist policies and published a report in which he made a strong case for "a return to sound economic principles" and outlining deflationary measures which would consolidate the country's finances. For a review of the financial problem in 1898 see Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" pp.167-202.

³. The most useful primary source for the politics and administration of Campos Sales is his own candid memoirs: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) Chapter VI, p.205 passim. Other useful secondary sources are: Alcindo Guanabara: "A Presidência Campos Sales" (Laemmert & Cia. R.de Janeiro, 1902). A more recent and critical study is found in Francisco de Assis Barbosa: "A Presidência Campos Sales" (Luso-Brazilian Review V.I.1968) pp.3-26.

The most important of these Federal/state alliances for the President was that with the governor of his native state São Paulo, since a President's home state always formed the basis of his authority in Congress. Campos Sales had intervened personally and successfully in the gubernatorial elections of São Paulo to secure the election of Rodrigues Alves¹ who was sympathetic to the President's political and financial programme. Together Campos Sales and Rodrigues Alves were able to influence the composition and direction of the Executive Committee of the PRF and the states congressional bancada. After São Paulo, the President considered Minas, which had the largest congressional bancada, as the most important Federal unit. Four months after his inauguration, Campos Sales personally visited the mineiro governor Silviano Brandão, and the two men arrived at a mutually advantageous understanding. Prudente when President, had interfered in internal mineiro politics in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Republicans of the southern region in Minas from electing their candidate Silviano Brandão as state governor.² Campos Sales promised to end Federal interference in internal mineiro affairs. In return the governor of Minas, who had his own programme for consolidating the state's internal political system and re-generating its finances, undertook to support the Federal government in Congress. With Luís Viana, governor of Bahia, the President already had a cordial relationship - Viana had been responsible for nominating Sales Presidential candidate. Political ties were strengthened when the President appointed the Bahian Severino Vieira as Minister of Industry in his Cabinet. It was the only entirely political appointment made by the President. In Congress, the combined bancadas of São Paulo, Minas and Bahia, which together comprised 40% of the Lower House, provided the Federal

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo" September 8, 1901.

². Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República. (Afrânio de Melo Franco e seu tempo.)" (Livraria José Olympio Editôra R.de Janeiro, 1955) Vol.I, p.307 passim.

government with a solid and reliable political base.

A politically significant consequence of these private understandings between the President and two of the more important states which had formed the PR, São Paulo and Bahia, was that it ended the hopes that the PR had had of continuing as an independent and dominant political faction in Congress during the Presidency of Campos Sales. Moreover the President was anxious to win over the Partido Concentração to his administration. In R.G.do Sul for example, he reversed Prudente's unfavourable economic and political measures¹ and in Rio de Janeiro, he allowed the radical Republican faction of Quintino Bocayuva and Nilo Peçanha to come to power in the state.

Another important result of Sales' political alliances was that it effectively ended the chances of a northern block consolidating in Congress to counter the influence of the coffee region. With the election of the Pernambucan Rosa e Silva, the self-appointed leader of the northern states, as Vice-President, these states had a real opportunity of establishing their influence in Congress since the Vice-President presided over the Senate. But this possibility was destroyed by the President who, to counterbalance the influence of his adesista Vice-President, promoted - with the assistance of the paulista, mineiro and bahian bancadas - leading politicians of the PC, Pinheiro Machado and Nilo Peçanha, to important Congressional posts. In addition, Campos Sales intervened directly in Pernambuco to weaken the influence of Rosa e Silva in his native state.²

¹. Joseph L,Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (*op.cit.*) pp.94-5.

². The opportunity for intervention came in 1901 when the Federal Inspector of Finance discovered the embezzlement of some 190,000 \$ contos from the state's Treasury. Amongst those involved was the nephew of the state's governor, a protege of the Vice-President. The incident is recorded by Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" Chapter X, pp.333-39 and "Jornal do Comércio" August 10, 1901.

Campos Sales' authority in Congress however depended essentially on his understanding with the governors of the three major states: São Paulo, Minas and Bahia and the support of their bancadas in Congress. It was this alliance with the governors which ended the conflict between the adesistas and radical Republicans. In 1900 he went one step further when he institutionalized his political system and extended the alliance between the President and the state governors for reciprocal political co-operation to include all states.

The institutionalization was the President's answer to the threat of the reorganization of the PR and PC to contest the Congressional election of 1900 on party lines. The dissidents out of power in the states were particularly anxious to contest the elections on the old ideological lines. The plan was for minority factions in the states to present an alternative slate to that of the party in power, to claim victory at the polls and to leave the parties in Congress to certify the slates of their respective sides. The consequence of such a contested election could well be the formation of duplicate Congressional bodies. In any case it would revive the former ideological conflict in Congress and interfere with the government's financial policies and force the President to decide in favour of one party. To avert the impending crisis, the President introduced a new criterion for certification of Congressional slates. Instead of each party certifying the slate of only its side, the certification committee would be required to support the slate of the state government in every case, irrespective of its former ideological allegiance; for example whilst in Maranhão and Bahia the slate of the Republican Party would be successful, in Paraná and Sta.Catharina the Partido Concentração would be the winners. To ensure the success of the scheme, the President with the support of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia pushed through two

important changes in the regulation.¹

The recognition of the authority of the incumbent state governments in the states in return for their cooperation with the President in Congress became known as the política dos governadores - politics of governors. It effectively ended the old ideological conflict between the radical Republicans on the one hand, and the moderates and adesistas on the other. Establishment parties welcomed the changes that would allow them to consolidate their position in the states. The President's political contrivance was ineffectually challenged by only a minority of paulista Republicans led by the former President Prudente de Moraes,² who were opposed to the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive at the expense of the legislature. For the President the política dos governadores guaranteed state autonomy in local matters, whilst at Federal level the President was assured of a cooperative Congress. Thus the twin pillars of the Republic - Federalism and Presidentialism - were achieved. Although Campos Sales had not created an entirely new system, former Presidents had reached understandings for mutual cooperation with individual state governors, his contribution lay in institutionalizing the system and extending it

¹. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" pp.236-250.

- (a) The first regulation effectively put the President in control of the credentials committee which certified the Congressional elections. The composition of the committee was determined by the presiding officer who appointed its members. Hitherto this post in the new session had been temporarily held by the oldest member of the Chamber. But this method had the great disadvantage in that it produced uncertainty. The amendments introduced by Campos Sales changed this. It made the President of the Chamber in the previous session the temporary presiding officer in the new legislature. Since the President of the Chamber almost always supported the Executive, the credentials committee would in fact be organized by a nominee of Campos Sales and in future by other Presidents of the Republic.
- (b) The second amendment ensured that only candidates belonging to the majority state faction would be recognized by the credentials Committee. It stated that the vote of the successful candidates should be certified by a majority of the município councils of each Congressional district. Since state governors had a mutual alliance with most município councils, only candidates favoured by the establishment would be certified. Thus the election of the candidates of the state governors was doubly guaranteed: by the certification in the states and by the credentials committee in Congress, but in the latter case only so long as the state government supported the President in Congress.

². Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) pp.160-170 passim.

to include all states.

3. The Succession Question. The President nominates his Successor.

The Rodrigues Alves - Silviano Brandão Ticket

As in the case of other political issues during his Presidency, Campos Sales became personally and directly involved in the selection and election of his successor and the política dos governadores assisted this. The President's main concern was to secure a candidate who would continue both his Constitutional principles and his financial programme which had already begun to have effect.¹

Two paulistas seemed suitable candidates, Bernardino de Campos and Rodrigues Alves. But as newspapers were then circulating stories of the former's dubious financial dealings² and his candidature could prove embarrassing, he was dropped in favour of Rodrigues Alves. Alves was above all noted for his financial expertise and conservative sympathies.³

However the candidature of Alves posed many problems. Until now an essential qualification for prospective candidates was that they should be 'historic' Republicans, but Rodrigues Alves had been a prominent politician of the Conservative Party and a Councilor of the Empire. Secondly, he was being nominated

¹. By 1901 the value of the milréis had appreciated to 11.11/16 from 7.3/16 in 1898, and the government was able to begin repayments of debts due in that year. See J.Pandiá Calógeras: "A política Monetária do Brasil" (Companhia Editôra Nacional 1960) p.412.

². "Jornal do Comércio" in its edition of May 11, 1905 gave a detailed account of the charges levelled against him since 1901 and which were revived in 1905 when Bernardino de Campos was again a likely candidate.

³. He had been appointed twice as Minister of Finance in the government of Floriano and Prudente to deal with the financial crisis, but political circumstances had not allowed him to see through the deflationary policies he recommended. Later as Federal Senator for São Paulo, he had wholeheartedly supported the Funding Loan and as governor of São Paulo he was the main prop of the administration of Campos Sales. For a biographical study of Rodrigues Alves see: Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" vols 1 and 2 (Livraria José Olympio Editôra R.de J.1973)

by the President and this could be expected to intensify the resentment already aroused by the President's manipulation of the Congressional elections. Thirdly, he would be the third paulista in the Presidency since 1894 and as noted, Pernambuco had already introduced the regional issue into national politics with its efforts to organize a northern block.

The President decided to seek support secretly from the three states which had so far formed his political base.¹ Early in November 1900, he consulted the Executive Committee of the PRF and received paulista approval for his candidate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, a native of Minas, was sent to Belo Horizonte, capital of Minas, to press for the support of governor Brandão. But Brandão would accept another paulista only on condition that the Vice-Presidency went to Minas. The President himself was willing and after Campos Sales personally wrote to the state governor of Bahia, Severino Vieira, he not only accepted the Alves/Brandão ticket, but also undertook to persuade some of the governors of the northern states to endorse the candidates. The President also sent the leader of the paulista bancada, Alvaro de Carvalho, to Paraná and Sta.Catharina to seek support of their governors. Confronted individually with a state already agreed to by the more influential governors, the weaker ones, as expected, fell behind it.

Four states initially rebelled against the paulista-mineiro ticket: R.G.do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Maranhão. Castilhos, the positivist governor of R.G.do Sul, objected to Rodrigues Alves on doctrinaire grounds, arguing that his election would be "the first step towards the restoration of the monarchy". But

¹. Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" pp.365-393, Pp.371-373, letters Sales to Vieira of Bahia and reply; pp.373-388, letters between Sales and Rodrigues Alves on his candidature. João Piratininga: "Política Paulista" pp. 21-26 letter dated July 20. 1901 to João Piratininga from Campos Sales explaining why he chose Rodrigues Alves and how he obtained his endorsement by the states.

Castilhos himself refused to stand as an alternative candidate, although his name had been proposed by former radicals.¹ Instead he considered abstaining as he had done in 1898, but by August 1901 he submitted under pressure from the leader of the gaúcho bancada Pinheiro Machado.² In Rio de Janeiro the opposition was led by Nilo Peçanha who was now leader of the state's bancada in Congress. He suggested that his state should "honour its own favourite son" Quintino Bocayuva for his "Republican services" to the nation. But he failed to carry the majority in Rio de Janeiro who argued that they risked Federal reprisals.³ Pernambuco and Maranhão objected to the domination of the slate by the southern states and refused to endorse the candidates.

But on balance, the President had managed the campaign for his candidate very successfully and by August 1901, the Alves/Brandão ticket had been accepted by eighteen state governors and the Federal District; only Pernambuco and Maranhão continued to oppose it. Moreover Campos Sales had neutralized the military by allowing the Military Club, shut since 1897, to be reopened. In its statute of September 1901 the Club reiterated its intention to keep out of politics and to encourage instead an interest in technical and professional matters.⁴

In the Senate Pinheiro Machado with the leading Senators of most states met to organize the National Nomination Convention which would formally ratify the decision of the state governors. At the meeting, Pinheiro Machado appealed to all

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" September 19, 1901.

². Machado had become enthusiastic over the President's candidate after he was offered the opportunity to preside over the National Nomination Convention, which would formally ratify the choice of Rodrigues Alves. This could provide Machado with a chance to secure an important position in Congress during the next administration. With Castilhos however Pinheiro argued that R.G.do Sul, which feared another Federalist attack, could not expect Federal assistance if the state rejected Rodrigues Alves. See Campos Sales: "Da Propaganda à Presidência" (op.cit.) J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp.97-99

³. "Jornal do Comércio" August 20, 1901.

⁴. Ibid., January 18, 1902.

state ruling parties and dissident factions to overcome their differences and rally around the Constitution and the government.¹ The meeting voted that each state send two delegates to represent the state. The commission which the Senators appointed to supervise the Convention was notable chiefly for comprising both former radicals and adesistas. The Convention itself, which met on September 20 and was attended by 38 delegates - a Senator and a deputy for each state, except Pernambuco and Maranhão - was notable for the absence of representatives of any dissident state factions. After formal speeches the candidature of Rodrigues Alves for the Presidency was ratified by all but one delegate from Rio de Janeiro, who voted in favour of Quintino Bocayuva. Silviano Brandão obtained the unanimous endorsement of all thirty-eight delegates.² The manifesto drawn up for this official convention pledged its candidates to defend the Constitution and the institutions of the Republic and to continue the policies for financial stability.

Following the precedent established by Campos Sales, the Presidential candidate, Rodrigues Alves, read his own platform in October,³ this time at a banquet in the Cassino in the Federal Capital attended by businessmen and politicians. In his programme, Alves dispelled the fear of state governments whose candidate he was, that he would submit to the growing pressure for Constitutional revision, particularly to ensure minority factions in states' political representation - denied them by the política dos governadores - and to redress the balance of revenue distribution in favour of the Union. Rodrigues Alves argued that the Constitution had already provided for minority rights and all that was required was freedom for electoral registration and voting. Although on the distribution of revenue Alves agreed that this

¹. Ibid., August 13, 1901.

². "Jornal do Comércio" September 20, 1901.

³. "Correio Paulistano" (São Paulo) October 24, 1901, Platform of Rodrigues Alves.

could have been better shared, he was unable to support reform since the existing system was especially advantageous to his own state São Paulo, and instead he maintained that the Union already had adequate resources. Rodrigues Alves emphasized that he would continue the política dos governadores institutionalized by Campos Sales. Federal politics, he said, depended on a perfect understanding with state governments, so that the rights of each side were respected and there was mutual cooperation.

Like Campos Sales, Rodrigues Alves stated that the first priority of his government, should he be elected, would be to continue the programme for financial stability which, he said, was already beginning to show results with the rise in the exchange rate of the milréis. The final success, he emphasized, would only be achieved when they had restored the gold base of the currency. But, despite the need for restrictive monetary orthodoxy, the candidate also showed his concern to end the economic depression and to make some concessions to the businessmen particularly in industry; he assured them that there were signs that the situation was improving as the export trade revived, and promised that the Federal government would make an indirect contribution to economic recovery by expanding transport, facilitating immigration and renovating the Federal Capital. More direct aid however, he insisted, must remain the concern of the states.

In effect, as could be expected from a candidate nominated by the President and endorsed by the ruling state elites, Rodrigues Alves' platform undertook primarily to continue the financial programme of Campos Sales and maintain those in power in the states.

4. Other Contenders for the Presidency. The Dissidência and the Ubaldino de Amaral - Justo Chermont Ticket

As noted earlier, Campos Sales' emasculation of the independence of Congress was opposed by a group of paulista Republicans led by Prudente, already hostile to the President because of his efforts to control the internal politics of São Paulo,¹ They asserted that the política dos governadores contradicted "Republican faith" and "the promises of propaganda", "the doctrines of liberty preached to the people" and warned of the "great evils which would befall the country". Their major concern was the gradual concentration of power in the hands of the Executive at the expense of the legislature, the consolidation of oligarchic rule and the exclusion of political minorities. In São Paulo they had been campaigning unsuccessfully for revision in the state constitution that would prevent these tendencies. The schism that had threatened the PRF took place in September 1901, In a Manifesto to the Republicans of São Paulo, the dissidents announced their intention to form a disciplined state and national party to campaign for constitutional revision that would restore the Liberal principles of the Republic. The party intended to put up its own candidate in the 1902 Presidential election.² The opposition state party was formally established at the end of October and plans for the organization of a national party on a similar basis to the PRF were drawn up.

The dissidents argued that they were the old State Republican Party which had become corrupt. They defended their right as Republicans to put forward a programme for Constitutional revision pointing out that article 90 of the Constitution

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo" September 8, 1901. Why there was a dissension in the Republican Party of São Paulo over state politics.

². "O Estado de São Paulo" September 7, 1901. September 8, 1901 "O Manifesto aos Republicanos de São Paulo", September 10, 19, liases for the organization of the Party.

of February 24 had itself provided for revision. After some discussion they rejected the name Liberal Democratic, Regenerative or Nationalist for their party, fearing that these might give an impression of commitment to more radical change; the Party was simply known as the Dissidência (Dissidents).¹

The main concern of the Dissidência's programme² was first to take the decision-making powers away from the Executive, where it had become concentrated and to put it in the hands of a wider section of the political representatives in Congress and the state legislatures. Second, they wanted to prevent regional hegemony and third, to ensure civil and political rights. They intended to achieve these aims by Constitutional amendments. The Dissidência proposed that:

- The President should be elected by the National Congress
- The Vice-Presidency should be abolished
- Government Ministers should be required to defend their policies and be made accountable to Congress
- The total number of Deputies should be reduced and Congress sit for longer periods to function more effectively
- Article 6 of the Constitution, which dealt with Federal intervention in states, should be spelt out to prevent abuse by the President, and further, that Congress should have the power to decide on the cases that arose, and the state involved should have the right to present its case in Congress
- The number of Congressional representatives for a state should not exceed a sixth of the total number of Deputies
- Civil and political rights should be guaranteed by an impartial and efficient

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" November 2, 1901.

². "O Estado do São Paulo" November 6, 1901 Platform of Dissidência.

Judiciary, greater electoral freedom, proportional representation for minorities and the provision of more and better education facilities to raise literacy and to enfranchise a larger proportion of the adult population

Although the Dissidência were anxious not to be labelled radical, the reform they proposed would in fact, if implemented, curb the power of the Executive and the oligarchs in the states, and result in a radical change in the Republic's political system.

But the efforts of the Dissidência to organize a national opposition party met with no success. One of their more promising allies was Assis Brasil, brother-in-law of Julio de Castilhos. He had left the Republican Party of R.G.do Sul after it adopted a positivist constitution, and had become interested in organizing a national opposition party. Prudente de Moraes, now leader of the Dissidência, wrote to Brasil inviting him to join them, but Brasil was then abroad and nothing came of it. Eventually, the Dissidents' only committed ally was the opposition faction in Paraná; other opponents of the Federal government, like Pernambuco and Maranhão and dissident factions in other states, were interested only in a temporary coalition to present a united front to the government and an opposition slate at the Presidential election. But they were not prepared to endorse the revisionist platform of the Dissidência.

The Dissidência also failed to unite with other groups behind an opposition Presidential slate. Although the ruling party of Rio de Janeiro had endorsed the candidature of Rodrigues Alves and Silviano Brandão in the National Convention in September, they decided to withdraw when it appeared that they might be able to unite with Pernambuco, Maranhão, the Dissidência and minority factions of other states to present Quintino Bocayuva as an alternative Presidential candidate. But

although some members of the Dissidência were anxious to endorse Bocayuva's candidature, Prudente and other leaders of the Dissidência insisted that they should present their own candidate committed to their revisionist programme. Thus when the Dissidência held its own Nomination Convention to select its Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in São Paulo in January 1902, the state governments of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Maranhão and the dissident factions of most other states did not send any delegates. The Dissidência had invited all municípios to send one delegate to the Convention¹ and of the 71 that attended almost all were from São Paulo and Paraná. Two candidates were proposed for the Presidency, Quintino Bocayuva and Ubaldino de Amaral, Ubaldino, a 'historic' Republican from Paraná was a prominent Republican politician who had served on the Supreme Federal Tribunal and as Prefect of the Federal District when Prudente was President. In the secret ballot, the Convention voted by 46 to 19 votes in favour of Ubaldino for their Presidential candidate. For its Vice-Presidential candidate the Dissidência adopted Justo Chermont of Pará who had already been indorsed by Pernambuco and Maranhão.

The decision of the Dissidência to endorse Ubaldino de Amaral rather than Quintino Bocayuva meant that the party had a weak candidate, supported by minority factions in only two states, São Paulo and Paraná, to contest the Presidential election and with little hope of making any impact at the election.

5. The Election of 1902

In the end the 'official' slate supported by the President and the majority of state governors, was confronted by a weak and disunited opposition. Pernambuco and

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" January 24, 1902.

Maranhão had finally decided in favour of supporting Rodrigues Alves for the Presidency, but of presenting a Vice-Presidential candidate from the north. Altogether three Presidential candidates were presented to the election in March. Rodrigues Alves endorsed by 19 states and the Federal District, Quintino Bocayuva put forward by Rio de Janeiro and Ubaldino de Amaral, candidate of the Dissidência. There were two Vice-Presidential candidates: Silviano Brandão, the official nominee, had the backing of eighteen states and the Federal District, and Justo Chermont, endorsed by the state governors of Pernambuco and Maranhão and by the Dissidência.

For the first time since the Republic, all the states participated in the Presidential election on March 1. Almost 200,000 more votes were cast in the 1902 election than in the previous one. The increase was also partly a result of the high poll in Minas Gerais where the numbers voting almost trebled as the state, its internal political situation consolidated, began to participate more fully in national politics.

As the Table below show the official ticket won an overwhelming majority. Rodrigues Alves received 93% of the votes for the President.

TABLE IV/1

Certified Result of the Presidential Election of 1902

| For the Presidency | | For the Vice-Presidency | |
|------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| Candidate | Votes | Candidate | Votes |
| Francisco de Paula | | Francisco Silviano de Almeida | |
| Rodrigues Alves | 592,039 | Brandão | 563,734 |
| Quintino Bocayuva | 42,542 | Justo Leite Chermont | 59,887 |
| Ubaldino de Amaral | | Candido Barata | |
| Fontoura | 5,371 | Ribeiro | 1,791 |
| Júlio Prates de Castilho | 1,343 | Júlio Prates de Castilho | 884 |
| Severino dos Santos Vieira | 913 | Lauro Sodré | 638 |
| Prudente J. de Moraes Barros | 332 | José Leopoldo de Bulhoes Jardim | 541 |
| Rui Barbosa | 269 | Arthur César Rios | 425 |
| Lauro Sodré | 234 | Various others (approx.) | 3,000 |
| Various others | 3,000 | Blank votes | 8,265 |
| Blank votes | 206 | | |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” (R.de Janeiro Imprensa Nacional)

Bocayuva was second. His 6.6% of the vote came almost entirely from Rio de Janeiro with a couple of thousand votes from opposition groups, in Minas Gerais, Bahia and the Federal District. Ubaldino de Amaral obtained only a derisory 1.4% from the two states of São Paulo and Paraná (Table IV/2).

In São Paulo, the PRP made it clear that there was no place for a rival party. The Dissidência were subjected to brutal repression and despite the fact that it had the support of a number of prestigious local and regional political chiefs within the state with big clienteles of their own, the Dissidência polled only 4.5% of the state vote. In Paraná they fared better winning 14% of the state vote. The Vice-Presidential candidate for the Dissidência, Justo Chermont, was more successful. He polled 9% of the total national vote for the Vice-Presidency, but this was because of the state votes he received from Pernambuco and Maranhão. In Rio de Janeiro some coronéis, uncertain which of the Vice-Presidential candidates had been endorsed by the state's ruling elite, cast blank votes.

A significant feature of the 1902 election was the almost total absence of an opposition vote in most states. In sixteen states, less than 1%, of the vote was recorded against the candidate endorsed by the ruling party. Only in Paraná did a sizeable proportion of the state vote go to the opposition candidate. The effects of the política dos governadores was evident in the almost total suppression of the opposition in the states.

Only in the Federal District the establishment failed to crush the opposition. It was here that the worst effects of the President's deflationary economic policies were felt in the large number of unemployed and the high cost of living. The government

did not allow elections to be held in half of the sections (that is in 135 of the electoral zones). Of the 51,639 registered voters only 31% voted. Of those who voted 3% supported the candidate for reform, Ubaldino de Amaral. However, the Capital had lost much of its political significance now that the radicals in the states had been won over.

Conclusion

Campos Sales' most important political achievement was to end the ideological differences that had divided Republican politics since 1890. The former parties, the Partido Concentração and the Partido Republicano had concluded that there were no fundamental ideological differences between them, and that they were all Republicans loyal to the Constitution of 1891. From now on all state parties would simply be known as the Republican Party. The death of Julio de Castilhos in 1903 was the most fitting conclusion to the end of ideological politics. His successor in R.G.do Sul, Borges de Medeiros, though a positivist, was more pragmatic. After the death of Prudente in 1903 the Dissidência also disintegrated without achieving its aim of forming a national party committed to liberal reform. Above all, the election of Rodrigues Alves in 1902 was a victory for the President who had selected Alves for his successor and secured his election to assure the continuation of his financial and conciliatory policies.

In the history of Presidential elections of the old Republic, the election of 1902 marks a watershed. First, it ended the ideological conflict which had dominated Republican politics since 1890. The election of Councillor Rodrigues Alves, the former monarchist, was endorsed by the radical Republicans. Second, the election of

1902 saw the beginning of regional rivalry in Presidential politics Minas Gerais demanded the Vice-Presidency for its state, Rio de Janeiro the Presidency for its favourite son, Pernambuco and Maranhão a regionally balanced Presidential ticket. Third, for the first time a candidate for liberal reform was put up for election.

TABLE IV/2

Distribution of Votes for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency by States

| States | Presidency | | | | Vice-Presidency | | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------|-------------------|--------|
| | Rodrigues Alves | Quintino Bocayuva | Amaral de Fontoura | Others | Silviano Brandão | Justo Chermont | Others |
| Amazonas | 12,022 | | | 34 | 12,028 | 3 | 25 |
| Pará | 42,483 | 11 | 3 | 9 | 42,470 | 24 | 10 |
| Piauí | 19,051 | - | - | 2 | 18,674 | - | 1 |
| Maranhão | 19,421 | - | 22 | 6 | 3,024 | 16,425 | - |
| Ceará | 27,625 | - | - | 3 | 27,601 | - | 37 |
| R.G.do Norte | 10,900 | 6 | - | - | 10,900 | - | 6 |
| Paraíba | 22,687 | 3 | 13 | 10 | 22,668 | 36 | 13 |
| Alagoas | 18,835 | 34 | 20 | - | 18,834 | 47 | 7 |
| Sergipe | 10,275 | 159 | 11 | 23 | 10,265 | 220 | 10 |
| Pernambuco | 37,147 | 94 | 27 | 66 | 2,221 | 35,135 | 6 |
| Federal District | 14,682 | 498 | 402 | 259 | 14,591 | 847 | 338 |
| Bahia | 85,907 | 1,439 | 416 | 2,601 | 87,883 | 1,030 | 4,551 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 934 | 36,798 | - | 608 | 21,343 | - | 24,096 |
| Minas Gerais | 134,445 | 2,601 | 495 | 1,483 | 144,855 | 659 | 800 |
| Goías | 21,698 | - | 16 | 255 | 18,471 | 175 | 771 |
| Mato Grosso | 6,762 | 6 | - | 2 | 6,769 | - | 1 |
| São Paulo | 51,441 | 198 | 2,235 | 34 | 51,409 | 2,376 | 120 |
| Paraná | 11,342 | - | 1,761 | - | 11,297 | 1,796 | 52 |
| Sta. Catharina | 8,648 | - | - | 16 | 8,649 | - | 6 |
| R.G.do Sul | 31,819 | 3 | - | 107 | 31,846 | - | 74 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” May-June 1902 pp.1037-1066.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1906: INTER-STATE RIVALRY AND THE CONVENTION OF TAUBATÉ

Introduction

The consolidation of power in the hands of state oligarchs after 1901 led to a new source of instability in national politics in the form of inter-state rivalry. In particular the emergence of Minas to play its full part in national affairs and the rise of R.G.do Sul changed the nature of national politics. In the election of 1906 inter-state rivalry and opposition to paulista hegemony was a dominant issue with three states contending for the Presidency. A secondary issue was the opposition to the President nominating his successor on behalf of his state, with Congress claiming this right instead as the representative of national interests. These factors and the need for São Paulo to sacrifice its Presidential ambitions to sustain its economic interests ensured the Presidency for Minas in 1906 and also an uncontested election.

The selection of Afonso Pena as Presidential candidate in 1906 has been variously interpreted. To some it was the outcome primarily of the agreement between the coffee states, to others the result of inter-state rivalry, the selection of Pena being largely a victory for Pinheiro Machado and R.G.do Sul. Chapter Five is concerned with evaluating the relative influence of these factors in the 1906 Presidential selection. The chapter also tries to argue that the selection of a mineiro President in 1906 promised a new economic orientation to the Republic.

1. Significant Developments in National Politics after 1901

The política dos governadores did not end political instability at national level. Hitherto, as has been seen, the political differences between the radical Republicans on the one hand and the moderates and adesistas on the other, which had divided the political elite in the Federal Capital had been a reflection of the internal power struggle within the states. The política dos governadores had decided that conflict in favour of incumbents in power, allowing them to consolidate their position by eliminating the opposition at the polls. But now that the ruling elites of the states were internally secure, they were free to exercise greater independence in national politics. Inter-state rivalry became a new source of political instability after the turn of the century. Already in the 1902 Presidential elections, the states of Pernambuco, Maranhão and Rio de Janeiro had challenged the domination of the 'southern' states in the official slate.

The most important political development by 1905 was the full participation of Minas Gerais in national politics. With its superior bancada in Congress and a fifth of the national electorate, Minas was São Paulo's most powerful rival. Until 1898, internal political conflict had preoccupied the state's politicians. There had been a struggle for power between the new economic elite of the South and Mata Zones, where coffee and cattle rearing had brought a new prosperity, and the old mining elite¹ which had had less sympathy for the Republic. The election of Silviano Brandão, a native of the south, to the state governorship, had finally brought the new elite to power. During his term in office, Silviano Brandão united the various political factions which had operated since 1889, in the Partido Republicano Mineiro - PRM.

¹. Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República. (Afrânio de Melo Franco e seu tempo)" (op.cit.) Vol.I p.307 passim.
João Camillo de Oliveira Torres: "História de Minas Gerais." (Difusão Pan-Americana do Livro Belo Horizonte) Vol V Chapter III passim.

Minas Gerais first asserted itself in national politics in 1901, when Silviano Brandão claimed the Vice-Presidency for his state and was himself nominated for the post. When he died before the inauguration of the new Presidential term, the mineiros insisted that another native of their state should be nominated for the by-election for the Vice-Presidency. Mineiro Afonso Pena was duly selected and accepted by all states except Pernambuco and Maranhão, which again put forward Justo Chermont of Pará to contest the election on February 18, 1902. Congress certified the results in June 1903 in favour of Afonso Pena.¹

The other significant political development was the emergence of R.G.do Sul as one of the more dominant of the major states. Between 1902 and 1910, it gradually replaced Pernambuco and Bahia to become the third most important state in national politics. The main reasons behind R.G.do Sul's rise have been explained in the introductory chapter. Next to São Paulo it was the region of most rapid economic and demographic growth. By 1906 the size of its electorate had surpassed that of Bahia. Unlike Bahia, R.G.do Sul also had a disciplined and stable Republican Party, and although an opposition faction remained in the state, it was tightly controlled. In Congress the bancada of R.G.do Sul though inferior in size to that of Bahia, was united and disciplined and from 1891 until 1915 it had only one leader - Pinheiro Machado - whilst that of Bahia lacked cohesion as a result of the internal power struggles within the state.

There can be little doubt however, that without Pinheiro Machado, R.G.do Sul would not have enjoyed the same level of political prominence that it did between 1902 and

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 17, 1903 pp.465-509.

| | | | |
|----------------|---------|-------|-----------|
| Afonso Pena | 652,921 | votes | |
| Justo Chermont | 42,947 | " | |
| Others | 8,000 | " | (approx.) |
| Blank | 2,570 | | |

1915.¹ Its rise during this period followed that of Pinheiro Machado in national politics. Whilst it was undoubtedly his own consummate skill in political manipulation that was the basis of his political strength in Congress, circumstances also favoured Pinheiro Machado's rise in the House after 1902. President Rodrigues Alves, who had come to office surrounded by an unprecedented political harmony, exercised less control than his predecessor, and Pinheiro Machado who had been elected Vice-President of the Senate in 1902, was able, during the three years that he held the post, to build up a clientele amongst the smaller states in the House. By securing the election of influential politicians of these states to office in Congress, Pinheiro built political goodwill towards himself, whilst at the same time assuring that his nominees held key posts in Congress. This would later give him control over the certification committee for Congressional elections, when he challenged the President's right to select his successor.

A third important development in 1905 was the schism which threatened the paulista Republican Party with the growing dispute over the measures necessary to deal with the coffee crisis in the state. The economic controversy will be dealt with later, but it is necessary to mention it here since it weakened São Paulo's position in national affairs and prevented the state, for the first time, from exercising the dominant influence it had hitherto done in the Republic.

The effect of the political changes which had been transforming the nature of national politics since 1901 was first evident in the pre-electoral bargaining for a consensus

¹. Biographies of Pinheiro Machado include: João da Costa Pôrto: "Pinheiro Machado e seu Tempo: Tentativa de interpretação" (Rio 1951).
Cyril Silva: "Pinheiro Machado" (Rio n.d.)
Gustavo Barroso: "Pinheiro Machado na intimidade - Evocações" (Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 211. April-June 1951).

slate for the Presidential elections in 1906. In previous elections of 1894 and 1898, a decision in favour of a paulista candidate had been quietly arrived at by a few states including Bahia and São Paulo and endorsed by the majority of states. In 1902 the incumbent President had personally selected and secured the support of the states for another paulista candidate on behalf of his state. Now however, neither Minas Gerais nor Bahia were disposed to endorse a fourth candidate from São Paulo. Whilst in Congress Pinheiro Machado backed by other Congressional leaders claimed for Congressmen the right so far exercised by the President on the succession issue. But the paulistas were reluctant to relinquish their hold over the Federal government which they had come to monopolize. They hoped, with the authority of the President behind them - Rodrigues Alves was a paulista - to impose yet another Presidential candidate from their state. The existence of so many rival and competing interests threatened the Republic with political instability arising from a seriously contested election and resulted in a long-drawn search for a consensus candidate for the 1906 Presidential election.

2. Contenders for the Presidential Nomination

The first moves for the succession were made at the end of 1904. Initially the President tried to impose a personal choice which cut across the interests of his own state. In November Rodrigues Alves visited Minas Gerais and met political bosses of the state. In the Federal Capital it was assumed that the President had gone to ask the PRM to endorse the candidature of mineiro Afonso Pena, the incumbent Vice-President, for the Presidency in 1906.¹ The two men had been colleagues at the Law Faculty in São Paulo and later prominent Conservative politicians and Councillors of the Empire. Pinheiro Machado

¹. "Jornal do Brasil" July 11, 1905. A.A. de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" (op.cit.) pp.524-556 succession question.

immediately stepped in to block his candidature, accusing the President of continuing the "Republic of Councillors". He also questioned Afonso Pena's administrative abilities, alleging that his directorship of the Banco do Brasil had been disastrous.¹ But if the President had favoured Afonso Pena, he dropped his preference when the Republican Party of his native state São Paulo endorsed the candidature of paulista Bernardino de Campos for the Presidency.² He had already served twice as governor of São Paulo and had been Federal Minister of Finance. President Alves instructed his Minister of the Interior J.J.Seabra to sound the state bancadas on the candidature of the paulista. Ironically as will be seen in the reaction that now followed the attempt of the President to impose a candidate on behalf of his state, Afonso Pena emerged as the national candidate.

The major states and Congressional leaders were openly hostile to another paulista Presidential candidate. The governor of Bahia, José Marcelino, publicly pledged the state to support Rui Barbosa, its favourite son for the Presidency, "No Brazilian", he said, "could compare with Rui in the services he had rendered the Nation and the Republic and even less in his intrinsic and extraordinary abilities which have aroused the adoration of his compatriots."³ Minas Gerais would likewise endorse only their own candidate. However, the mineiro state bosses were divided over their choice. One group favoured the incumbent state governor Francisco Sales, whilst the faction of Bias Fortes preferred Afonso Pena.⁴

But it was in Congress that there was the greatest opposition to Bernardino de Campos who was dubbed the 'official' candidate - the President's nominee. The opposition was led by Pinheiro Machado and Rui Barbosa. Rui had acquired a reputation as the nation's

¹. "Jornal do Brasil" August 11, 1905.

². Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" p.216.
"Jornal do Brasil" May 19, 1905.

³. "A Bahia" (São Salvador, Bahia) March 13, 1905 under heading 'Candidatura Presidencial'.

⁴. A.A.de Melo: "Um Estadista da República" Vol II,p.460 passim.

liberal conscience since the days of his campaign for liberal reform under the Empire. In the Republic, he continued the campaign becoming a vehement critic of Floriano's 'unconstitutional' and repressive government and later accusing Campos Sales of 'usurping' the rights of the electorate to choose its President. the Dissidência in 1902, Rui now argued in favour of Congress selecting the Presidential candidate. He maintained that in the absence of national parties, Congress rather than the President should nominate candidates. Rui's argument was enthusiastically supported by Pinheiro Machado, R.G.do Sul was not powerful enough to secure the election of a candidate of its own state, but Pinheiro Machado on behalf of his state hoped to influence the selection with the support of the satellite states whose loyalty he enjoyed. He now opposed the candidature of Bernardino de Campos as a regional nominee, and proposed instead that another paulista, Campos Sales, who had had such great successes during his 1898-1902 Presidential term, should be endorsed as the national candidate.¹

Thus by mid-1905, there were four serious contenders for the Presidency. Bernardino de Campos proposed by the paulista Republican Party and backed by the President, Rui Barbosa put forward by Bahia, another paulista Campos Sales, backed by Pinheiro Machado on behalf of R.G.do Sul, and the candidate of the Republican Party of Minas Gerais, either Francisco Sales or Afonso Pena.

The chances of the individual candidates depended on the states which supported them. The initial skirmishing between the states was for the key Congressional offices during May 1905.² Despite the efforts of President Rodrigues Alves, the paulistas were

¹. "Jornal do Brasil" May 8, 1905. "Jornal do Comércio" August 19, 1905. Article written by Campos Sales entitled "A Minha Candidatura." Letter of Rui to Antonio Azevedo April 19, 1905 on the subject in Luís Viana Filho: "A Vida de Rui Barbosa" (Martins, São Paulo 1965) p.294.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 12-15, 1905. Congressional elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the renewal of a third of the Senate were due in 1906, and whoever controlled the certification commission in the House would have the advantage in the succession manoeuvres. The

unsuccessful in getting any of their nominees elected including to the major post of Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. By the end of June, Bernardino de Campos, candidate of São Paulo, though supported by the President, had secured the backing of only two states: Sta.Catharina and Goiás.¹ Pinheiro Machado had meanwhile lined up seven states behind Campos Sales - the two major states of R.G.do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, and five satellites: Paraná, Sergipe, do Norte, Amazonas and Mato Grosso, and also the Federal District,² Afonso Pena of Minas Gerais was emerging as another strong contender. He was backed by part of the Mineiro Republican Party and was favoured by Pernambuco and Maranhão.³ The fourth candidate Rui Barbosa, proposed by the Bahian governor, was virtually out of the race. His candidature failed to win the support even of the major bosses of Bahia itself.⁴

Thus the two candidates that had emerged as the most likely to win the Presidential nomination were Campos Sales and Afonso Pena.

3. The Emergence of the Consensus Slate and The Convention of Taubaté

During July, the states began to fall behind Afonso Pena, the mineiro candidate. The move

paulistas united with Pernambuco and nominated Deputy Julio de Melo (Pernambucan) to run for the Presidency of the Lower House against the candidate of R.G.do Sul and Bahia, Deputy Francisco de Paula Guimarães (Bahian) who had been the presiding officer in the last session and now stood for re-election. Despite the efforts of President Rodrigues Alves in favour of Julio de Melo, the general opposition to the paulistas was evident. The Bahian Deputy won convincingly. Not only Guimaraes, but all those who had previously held other executive posts in Congress and belonged to pinheiro Machado's clientele, were re-elected against the paulista nominees.

1. Leaders of these two states Lauro Muller and Leopoldo Bulhoes were Ministers of Transport and Finance respectively in the Alves administration.
2. "Jornal do Brasil" July 7, 1905.
3. "Jornal do Brasil" July 7, 1905, Costa Pôrto: "Os Tempos de Rosa e Silva" (op.cit.) pp,134,138.
4. For example, the former Bahian state governor Severino Vieira, now Federal Senator, described Rui's candidature as an encumbrance that would attract no outside support and would prevent the state from arriving at a beneficial agreement in return for Bahian votes, as they had done in previous elections. The Bahian bancada and politicians in the Federal Capital moreover were divided between those loyal to the state governor and others to Pinheiro Machado. See Luís Viana Filho: "A Vida de Rui Barbosa" p.293. Maria Mercedes Lopes de Souza: "Rui Barbosa e José Marcelino" (Rio de Janeiro, Casa de Rui Barbosa 1950) Letters of Rui on the problems posed by his candidature p.62 passim.

was begun by Bahia, Minas Gerais was told that Bahia would support a mineiro if the Republican Party of Minas would unite behind one mineiro candidate.¹ Informed of the new move and fearing to be left with a minority candidate, Pinheiro Machado dropped his opportunistic support for Campos Sales and followed the Bahian example.² But he was anxious that the mineiros should endorse their state governor Francisco Sales, rather than Afonso Pena, whom he had earlier opposed.³ But after a meeting of the mineiro bosses, Francisco Sales agreed not to run and the mineiro state party united behind Afonso Pena.

As the candidature of the mineiro was gaining momentum, that of Bernardino de Campos had begun to run into trouble in his own state. This was partly for personal reasons,⁴ as he was almost blind. However, it was the crisis in the coffee economy which posed the real internal threat to the candidature of Bernardino de Campos. Overproduction had led to a slump in prices since the 1890s. In the earlier period however, rapid devaluation of the milréis had allowed big profits to be made on foreign sales. But with the upvaluation of the milréis, following Campos Sales' successful deflationary policies, this trend changed. Many planters who had incurred heavy debt to start the plantations now found themselves unable to cover even the cost of production, let alone the repayments of their debts. The coffee crisis dominated the thinking in the state.⁵ Between 1901 and 1906 a

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- 1 . Luís Viana Filho: "A Vida de Rui Barbosa" footnote 21, p.298, Letter of Rui to José Marcelino.
 - 2 . Ibid., pp.299-300.
 - 3 . A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol 2, p.462.
Maria Mercedes Lopes de Souza: "Rui Barbosa e José Marcelino" p.185. Letter of Rui to Afonso Pena on subject.
 - 4 . "Jornal do Brasil" May 11, 1905. Article entitled Eleição Presidencial. The eye operation he had undergone in Europe earlier in 1905 had not been successful Pernambuco and R.G.do Norte had opposed his candidature because of it, and even his friends doubted his ability to cope with the demands of the Presidency. He also had many personal enemies who used this and the former financial scandals in which he was said to have been involved to oppose his candidature.
 - 5 . An excellent account of this is given by a French traveller in the state at the time. See Pierre Denis: "Brazil" (T.Fisher Unwin 1914) Chapter X. The Valorization of Coffee p.235.
A detailed study of the coffee crisis and the pressures for valorization in 1906 is published in the Revista de História Vol.45, 1972 p.99 article by Cira Siedjamer, Margarida cavallhosa, Maria Lucia de Freitas, Maria Regina Lois Bueno, e Rosa Maria Fischer.

host of pamphlets and books were written on the subject, all concluding that some form of government intervention was imperative. In 1904 the Sociedade Paulista da Agricultura, a powerful planter lobby, began to agitate for government help and were successful in electing as state governor Jorge Tibiriça, a planter and an agronomist with a greater interest in sustaining coffee interest than financial orthodoxy. He was committed to a buffer stock scheme to stock surplus coffee to maintain prices, the stocks being released in years of poor harvests. But the stock-purchasing required a loan of £15 million which had to be contracted abroad and required a Federal guarantee. This would be allied with a devaluation scheme. The exchange rate of the milréis would be pegged at a lower level than its real value to maximize profits to native exporters.

This valorization proposal however was highly controversial both for economic and political reasons.¹ The suggested state intervention contravened liberal economic orthodoxy. President Rodrigues Alves opposed the scheme. His decision was seconded by the Jornal do Comércio, the most prestigious business newspaper. Abroad the government financiers, Rothschilds, were highly sceptical of the plan and reluctant to make loans available. The request for aid to coffee was also opposed on regional grounds. The north-east which had earlier been refused special treatment for the flagging sugar economy now insisted that coffee should not be treated differently.

Moreover as the negotiations over the schemes for the valorization² of coffee coincided with the manoeuvrings over the Presidential succession, the one affected the

¹. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Instituições e Classes Sociais)" (Difusão Européia do Livro, São Paulo 1970) pp.33-43. Summary of the coffee problem, A.A.de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" (op.cit.) Vol II pp.437-444,448 passim. "Jornal do Comércio" August 15, 1908. Article entitled "O Café e a Imprensa Inglesa". British Diplomatic Papers FO 371 File No.21/1907.

2. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 1905 passim. There was no serious opposition in Congress to coffee valorization in itself; because of the importance of coffee exports to the national economy most congressmen accepted the need to protect coffee prices; the issue however was used as a political lever. When the valorization scheme was later voted on in Congress, it was passed easily. On December 30, 1905 a Federal Law authorized the President to enter into an agreement with the state of São Paulo to regulate the coffee trade.

other. In Congress opponents of the candidacy of Bernardino de Campos accused the paulistas of seeking to dominate the Presidency to serve their regional interests. The efforts of the governor of São Paulo to unite with the other coffee producing states: Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo, to bring pressure to bear on the President, were badly received. The paulista negotiators (Francisco Glycério and Candido Rodrigues) reported a strong anti-paulista feeling over the succession question which was affecting the attitude of Minas and Rio de Janeiro on the question of coffee valorization. The paulista negotiators advised that São Paulo support a candidate from Minas Gerais for the Presidency and one from Rio de Janeiro for the Vice-Presidency in return for an agreement among the three states over a coffee valorization scheme.¹

After prevarication and under mounting pressure from coffee interests,² the paulista government finally dropped its candidate. The decision was facilitated by the publication of Bernardino's own proposals to solve the coffee crisis.³ Amongst the remedies he suggested was a reform of the tax system and the abolition of the export tax.

In August a consensus emerged: São Paulo undertook to support Afonso Pena and Nilo Peçanha, the incumbent governor of Rio de Janeiro, for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates respectively; in return the two states would sign a coffee agreement with São Paulo. The agreement, the Convention of Taubaté was signed by the governors of

¹. Rodrigo Soarea Júnior: "Jorge Tibiriça e Sua Época" (São Paulo, Nacional 1958) Vol.2.

². The flowering of the coffee trees in mid-1905 indicated a bumper harvest that year, at a time when two-thirds of the world's annual consumption of 11 million bags, was already in stock. The harvest later yielded 23 million bags.

³. Bernardino de Campos had expressed his views at an interview conducted by the journalist for "O Paiz" Alcindo Guanabara, a Deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro and closely associated with the faction of Pinheiro Machado. Whilst favouring government intervention to aid coffee producers and all other agricultural and industrial activities, he opposed the demands of the export sector for stabilization of the currency at a lower level than its true value. He also suggested that a more effective way of helping producers would be to change the tax system which fell most heavily on producers, replacing it with a Federal income tax and a sales tax. These proposals were opposed not only by all those who were against the revision of the Constitution, but also the government of São Paulo which derived two-thirds of its revenue from the export tax. See "O Paiz" June 26, 1905. "Jornal do Comércio" June 29, July 7, 1905. José Maria dos Santos: "A Política Geral do Brasil" pp.416-421,

the three states at the end of February 1906. It pledged them to set up a special commission empowered to withdraw surplus coffee from the market which was to be released in times of scarcity. The project was to be financed by a foreign loan and the interest and amortization guaranteed by a super tax charged on each bag exported.¹ The Afonso Pena/Nilo Peçanha ticket was accepted by all states except Pernambuco, which objected to the way in which the Vice-Presidential candidate was chosen without prior consultation of the states.² By late August Bernardino de Campos, Campos Sales³ and Rui Barbosa formally withdrew their candidatures, leaving the 'official' ticket Afonso Pena/Nilo Peçanha without any competitors.

It had taken nine months to arrive at a 'consensus' ticket. The selection of the mineiro Afonso Pena was a result primarily of regional rivalry and opposition to paulista hegemony. Minas Gerais was the only state that could unite the others behind a candidate of its own. A contested election had been averted because São Paulo had eventually been forced to end its monopoly over the Presidency to sustain its economic interests. The inability of the President to secure the election of his successor or to decide the elections of the Executive in Congress in May 1905 moreover demonstrates, that the inbuilt power of the Presidency could only be effectively exercised with the cooperation of at least half of the major states.

4. The Coligação is formed in Congress

Although, as we have seen, the Presidential ticket for 1906 was decided by the ruling elites of the major states and not by Congress itself, nevertheless the efforts of the President to

¹. Terms of the Convention of Taubaté in "Documentary History of Brazil" Edited by Bradford Burns (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1967), p.325.

². "O Estado de São Paulo" August 29, 1905.

³. "Jornal do Comércio" August 11, 19, 1905.
"Jornal do Brasil" August 10, 20, 1905.

secure another paulista candidate and his failure to do so, was seen as a major victory for Congress. Under Rui Barbosa's direction, Congress now prepared to present the candidates to the nation.¹ Rui had decided that there should be no Nomination Convention. He maintained that the three previous ones had been a sham and that nomination conventions had a place only in political systems with organized and regular parties. Instead Congress adopted his proposal that the bancadas should form a coalition, the Coligação, and publish a 'Manifesto to the Nation' introducing the candidates. The Manifesto was written by Rui himself.² In it he stated that the Coligação did not claim to represent national opinion nor intended to impose the candidates for the 1906 election; its aim, he wrote, was limited to canvassing for a ticket which had been agreed to by the majority of politicians after long negotiations, taking into account the interest of the states, Rui further defended the alliance of such diverse elements in Congress as necessary to end the 'habit' of the President determining his successor on behalf of his state. This, the Manifesto maintained, destroyed public morality, threatened public order, led to national oppression and destroyed political liberty. The Manifesto was read in the two Houses of Congress, but signed by only 150 Congressmen.³

It was also soon obvious that the self-imposed leaders of the Coligação did not reflect the views of Presidential candidate Afonso Pena. It has been noted that the state governors had accepted the need to support policies which would help exporting interests and the Afonso Pena/Nilo Peçanha ticket was partly the outcome of this agreement. However, whilst the

¹. "Jornal do Brasil" September 4, 1905.

"O Estado de São Paulo" August 29, September 2, 1905.

². Maria Mercedes Lopes de Souza: "Rui Barbosa e José Marcelino" Manifesto reproduced pp.98-105.

³. The bancadas of São Paulo, Sta.Catharina and Goiás refused to sign the Manifesto which criticized the President for interfering in the succession question. Pernambuco and Maranhão did not endorse it either because they were not consulted over the Vice-Presidential candidate.

buffer stock scheme for coffee was generally approved, the decision to fix the exchange rate of the milréis at an artificially low level was less popular. One state opposed to it was R.G.do Sul,¹ and under the influence of Pinheiro Machado in Congress, the Coligação produced a policy document² which attempted to tie the next administration to the existing orthodox financial and economic policies. However in his own Manifesto Afonso Pena, endorsed the view of his own state, Minas Gerais. He argued for economic growth and against financial orthodoxy, "The gendarme state, that is a state committed to the maintenance of law and order and distributing justice", he said, "is out of fashion even in England." "The responsibilities of the state", he maintained, "were wider; it should take note of the standard of living of the population exercising initiative in the economic field where individual enterprise itself was insufficient." The candidate committed his government to fixing the rate of exchange at a level favourable to exporters.³

Moreover Afonso Pena made it clear in his Manifesto that he intended to govern independently of the Coligação. The Executive, he stated, should not try to legislate, nor should Congress try to govern. The Constitution, he argued, had recognized the need for the two branches to cooperate on issues vital for the progress and wellbeing of the Nation, by establishing the independence of the two branches within their separate spheres.

In its commitment to economic growth as the first priority of his government,

¹. R.G.do Sul's financial policies stemmed partly from ideological commitments to positivism which strongly favoured financial orthodoxy. But the state's economy was also geared primarily to exporting internally and it favoured a high rate of exchange for the milréis which kept down the cost of living in the urban centres and helped the sales of charque (dried meat), one of the main exports of R.G.do Sul to the cities. See J.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp. 134-135, 126, 153.

². "Jornal do Brasil" September 25, 1905.

⁴. "Jornal do Comércio" October 12, 1905.

³. Even before his election Afonso Pena showed his determination to govern independently and to see his policies through. When the governors of the coffee states met to draw up the coffee agreement which would be presented to Congress, a special clause was included to ensure the stabilization of the exchange rate by setting up a Conversion Fund (Caixa de Conversao). See A.A. de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" (op.cit.) Vol II, p.465.

Afonso Pena's programme was a major departure from the policy initiated by the paulista Presidents a decade earlier.

5. The Election

The differences over the platform however did not lead to a schism in the Colligação when the elections were held on March 1, 1906, the 'official' slate went largely uncontested and was therefore a mere formality. The poll not surprisingly, was a low 38%. Less than half the numbers that had voted in 1902 turned out in 1906 (see Table V/1). In Goiás no elections were held in a third of the municípios and only an 18% poll was recorded. In Minas Gerais a mere 25% turned out to vote for the state's first Presidential candidate. At least 88 sections mainly from the northern region of the state which had opposed Pena's candidature did not hold elections.

All states cast their votes for the 'official' candidates except for Pernambuco, which recorded a blank vote for the Vice-Presidency. The 'official' candidates obtained almost 98% of the votes cast as the Table below shows.

TABLE V/2

| Presidency | | Vice-Presidency | |
|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Name of candidate | Vote obtained | Name of candidate | Vote obtained |
| Afonso Pena | 288,285 | Nilo Peçanha | 272,529 |
| Lauro Sodré | 4,865)* | Alfredo Varela | 618)* |
| Rui Barbosa | 207) | Rui Barbosa | 211) |
| Campos Sales | 95) | Rosa e Silva | 207) |
| Various others | 750) | Others (approx.) | 600) |
| Blank votes | 173) | Blank votes | 17,769) |

*Votes cast by dissident minority factions in various states.

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Ano XVIII no.38, June 20, 1906. pp.540-542

TABLE V/1

| States | Registered Voters (1) | Voted (2) | % poll |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|--------|
| Amazonas | 7,539 | 2,907 | 39 |
| Pará | 39,167 | 22,449 | 57 |
| Maranhão | 25,805 | 9,915 | 38 |
| Piauí | 18,096 | 4,266 | 24 |
| Ceará | 38,720 | 20,035 | 52 |
| R.G.do Norte | 11,317 | 7,657 | 68 |
| Paraíba | 20,224 | 8,174 | 40 |
| Alagoas | 20,880 | 12,183 | 58 |
| Sergipe | 11,785 | 3,966 | 34 |
| E.Santo | 14,612 | 4,038 | 28 |
| Pernambuco | 48,146 | 21,590 | 45 |
| Goías | 11,701 | 2,045 | 18 |
| Mato Grosso | 5,822 | 2,543 | 44 |
| (Bahia | 73,441 |)* |)* |
| 138,490 (Federal District | 19,934 | 49,712) | 36) |
| (Rio de Janeiro | 45,115 |) |) |
| Minas Gerais | 179,128 | 44,538 | 25 |
| São Paulo | 80,636 | 29,548 | 37 |
| R.G.do Sul | 82,776 | 42,689 | 52 |
| Paraná | 21,070 | 4,689 | 22 |
| Sta. Catharina | 15,627 | 6,318 | 40 |
| Total | 791,541 | 299,262 | 38 |

* Separate voting figures for the three areas are not available.

Source: 1. Directoria do Serice de Estatística: “Estatística Eleitoral” pp.9, 16, 39, 55,

60, 66, 75, 86, 90, 117, 128, 136, 145, 157, 165, 174, 187, 197, 204, 234, 241.

2. “Diário do Congresso Nacional” Ano XVIII no.38, pp.539-553.

But although a formality, the elections of 1906 were significant in two respects. First, the new electoral regulations of 1904 designed to reform the electoral system and ensure fair elections and minority representation, did not have any influence on the certification of the electoral returns. Congress rejected the proposal that all returns with procedural irregularities should be rejected, and instead only ballots where there was a clear indication of fraud were disqualified. This subjective basis for certifying elections, in effect, enabled the majority faction in Congress to continue to be the real arbiters of all Federal elections.

Second, this refusal of the ruling elite to implement the electoral reforms of 1904 disillusioned many dissident factions who had expected to get fair political representation. They now began to turn to radical groups who aimed to overthrow the state oligarchs by force. This formed the basis of the opposition in the 1906 Presidential election. One of the noteworthy aspects of the election result were the votes obtained by the only serious opposition contenders Lauro Sodré and Alfredo Varela for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency respectively. As Table V/3 shows, Lauro Sodré's votes came from dissidents in a number of states. Both Sodré and Varela were amongst the leaders of a putsch by radical Republican officers in 1904 to topple the government of Rodrigues Alves¹ in opposition to the consolidation of power in the hands of oligarchs after 1901. These officers took advantage of the political and social unrest following the government's measures for the renovation and sanitation of the Federal Capital to stage a revolt. Their aim was to depose President Alves in favour of Lauro Sodré "the patriot who has preserved his purity and whose loyalty and generous soul always floats above the engulfing waves of corruption

¹ . Edgard Carone: "A República Velha - Evolução Política" pp. 207-211, gives a full description of the uprising.

and political duplicity that plague this country.”¹ The revolt failed, but it laid the base for an alliance between military dissidents and civilian dissident politicians. The alliance between these two groups was to be of major importance in the future.

Conclusion

The política dos governadores was proving an unstable political system. Regional rivalry and the inability of any one state to dominate after the turn of the century threatened a political crisis over every Presidential succession. This regional rivalry also prevented the President from imposing a successor on behalf of his state after 1902. The power of the Presidency could only be effectively exercised if he had the backing not only of his native state, but also of the bancadas of at least some of the other major states in Congress. Opposition to paulista hegemony ensured the selection of a mineiro in 1906 since next to São Paulo, Minas was the strongest contender for the Presidency. A contested election was averted only because São Paulo sacrificed its political ambitions in return for economic cooperation to sustain coffee prices.

The política dos governadores and the oligarchs it maintained in power in the states also had another undesirable consequence. Minority factions in states denied any opportunity to achieve power through the ballot box, turned to revolutionary alternatives, and began to welcome the intervention of the military in politics.

¹. Ibid.

TABLE V/3

Distribution of Votes by States in the Presidential Election of 1906

| State | For President | | | For Vice-President | | |
|------------|---------------|-------|--------|--------------------|---------|-------------|
| | Afonso | Lauro | Others | Nilo | Alfredo | Others |
| | Pena | Sodré | | Pecanha | Varela | |
| Amazonas | 2,882 | 23 | 2 | 2,897 | 3 | 6 |
| Pará | 22,455 | 4 | — | 22,458 | 1 | — |
| Maranhão | 9,576 | 327 | 13 | 9,621 | 13 | Blank |
| Piauí | 4,220 | 43 | 4 | 4,231 | — | votes:283 |
| Ceará | 11,962 | 60 | 13 | 19,980 | 39 | 36 |
| R.G.do | | | | | | |
| Norte | 7,000 | 654 | 4 | 7,028 | 594 | 1 |
| Paraíba | 8,109 | 62 | 7 | 8,124 | — | 136 |
| Alagoas | 12,023 | 154 | 6 | 12,177 | — | 6 |
| Sergipe | 3,946 | 18 | 2 | 3,960 | 9 | 6 |
| Pernambuco | 20,118 | 1,457 | 41 | 3,620 | — | NB:18,002 * |
| Espírito | | | | | | |
| Santo | 4,023 | 11 | 4 | 4,014 | — | 3 |
| Bahia |) | | | | | |
| R.de |) | | | | | |
| Janeiro |) 42,708 | 480 | 491 | 42,940 | — | 709 |
| Federal |) | | | | | |
| District |) | | | | | |
| Minas | 43,679 | 725 | 141 | 43,596 | — | 470 |
| Gerais | | | | | | |
| Goías | 2,000 | — | 45 | 2,009 | — | 36 |
| Mato | 2,523 | 13 | 8 | 2,516 | — | 15 |
| Grosso | | | | | | |
| São Paulo | | | | | | |
| Paraná | 4,588 | 91 | 10 | 4,236 | — | 43 |
| Sta. | 6,461 | 6 | 8 | 6,471 | — | 4 |
| Catharina | | | | | | |
| R.G.do Sul | 41,533 | — | 121 | 37,622 | — | 250 |

* NB including 17,935 blank votes.

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 1906 pp.539-553.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1910. THE KINDERGARTEN - BLOCO CONFLICT, MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE CIVILISTA CAMPAIGN

Introduction

The Presidential election of 1910 is of special interest for a number of reasons. Unlike all other elections after 1905, inter-regional rivalry was not the major issue in this election. Rather, the conflict centred around the struggle for control between the 'Bloco', the Old Guard in the Senate who wanted to dominate national politics through Congress after 1905, and the 'Kindergarten', the younger generation of politicians who favoured a strong Executive with full powers to promote national economic development. Through the política dos governadores, the President was able to bring the Kindergarten to power in Congress and in 1909 it seemed that he would successfully impose as his successor his Minister of Finance, a member of the Kindergarten.

However, the succession question was complicated with the re-emergence of the military in politics. They succeeded not only in forcing the withdrawal of the President's candidate, and the destruction of the Kindergarten, but also secured the endorsement of their military candidate by the Bloco and the majority of state governors.

This in turn resulted in a civilian reaction, with São Paulo leading the 'Civilista' opposition campaign, in what was to be the first seriously contested election of the Republic. The election of 1910 also saw the first attempt to involve the urban voters in an electoral contest in an American-style Presidential campaign.

Chapter Six looks at the various stages and aspects of the struggle for the Presidency in 1910. With the help of published letters, memoirs, Congressional

papers, newspapers, election manifestos, campaign speeches and electoral returns, it examines in particular two specific assertions. First, it looks at the argument that has generally been put forward, that Marshal Hermes was the candidate of the civilian politicians and especially of R.G.do Sul, and hence concerned to defend their political and economic interests, and tests the proposition that Marshal Hermes was in fact primarily the choice of the radical officers and dissident civilian politicians anxious to overthrow the oligarchs in the states. Second, by analysing the composition of the civilista coalition and the electoral returns, Chapter Six tries to argue that the high percentage of votes obtained by the civilista candidate was due primarily to the support of state oligarchs and not to that of urban voters as has popularly been claimed.

The Mineiros New Republican Orientation

The inauguration of the mineiro Afonso Pena, as President, not only replaced political dominance by the paulistas with that of the mineiros, but the mineiros also brought a new direction to the Republic. The economic depression experienced by the country at the turn of the century-had led to a re-thinking of basic economic objectives. In Minas the state governor had convoked a special Congress of Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial interests in May 1903 to discuss the crisis and suggest a solution.¹ The meeting was influenced by the man who presided over it, João Pinheiro (da Silva), a son of a Neapolitan immigrant and a positivist, who was referred to as the Castilhos of Central Brazil.² Under his direction and in contrast to the narrow emphasis on the plantation economy, foreign trade and orthodox finance that the paulistas had imposed on the Republic, the

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.1, pp.326-334, 440-447.

². Augusto Franco: "Dr João Pinheiro, Ensaio Biográfico e Político" p.87 in particular describes his views, Paulo Tamm: "João Pinheiro" (Belo Horizonte, 1947).

mineiro economic Congress called on other state governments to turn their attention to national needs, and advised a more comprehensive outlook and the development of all national resources.¹

When in the following year João Pinheiro was elected a Federal Senator, his lodgings in the Capital became a centre for gatherings of young Congressmen, at first mainly of mineiros, but soon frequented by deputies from other states. They had become disillusioned with national politics, the constant manoeuvrings for power in Congress and the way in which policy issues became affected by factional infighting. They were, in particular, hostile to the "boss" politics of Pinheiro Machado and his associates in the Senate, and their attempts to control the administration. The programme for national development outlined by João Pinheiro stimulated these young men. They came to believe that for government to be effective, it should be exercised only by the Executive, assisted by a centralized elite of trained technocrats who were intelligent, cultured, patriotic and honest, so bypassing Congress and state governors.

As his platform indicated, Afonso Pena was attracted to the ideas of João Pinheiro for national development. Breaking with the precedent established by former Presidents-elect, who had visited European creditors prior to their inauguration, he undertook in the interim a tour of the country from north to south. He professed to be full of optimism in the future prosperity and greatness of Brazil. Ignoring the advice

1. Specifically the mineiros seemed to favour Federal and state governments committed primarily to promoting economic growth by (a) expanding transport, providing credit facilities, encouraging European immigration, and expanding technical education. (b) Secondly, they advocated a more evenly balanced economy. Whilst supporting the agricultural export economies - coffee, rubber - they were also concerned to expand production for home consumption and to end dependence on foreign imports. (c) They also wanted a more regionally balanced economic growth with special attention to the less developed regions. The mineiros however do not seem to have advocated the development of artificial industries at the expense of agriculture. Their emphasis was more on fully exploiting untapped local resources to increase the nation's wealth. For references see previous page, footnote 1 and 2.

of the Senate bosses, Pena chose for his Ministers mainly young men of proven ability the 27 year old engineer Miguel Calmon to head the Ministry of Industry, Transportation and Public Works; Davi Campista at Finance¹; Baron Rio Branco at Foreign Affairs², and perhaps most significantly at Defence Marshal Hermes da Fonseca³, an efficient administrator who could help realize the President's ambition to make Brazil a major military power. The three latter Ministers were to be prominent in the crisis over the succession in 1909.

2. The President Consolidates his Power in Congress with the Kindergarten

In Congress, the President initially found a major obstacle in securing support for his technocrat Ministers and the economic and financial policies he proposed to see through. In April 1906, even before his inauguration, the most senior and prestigious Senators had organized themselves into an informal grouping, the bloco, under the leadership of Pinheiro Machado,⁴ through which they hoped to control Congress and sanction government policies.

¹. Davi Campista had made his reputation in his native state, Minas Gerais. His knowledge of constitutional law, finance and administration became apparent in the debates in the state Constitutional Legislature. It earned him numerous important appointments. He served twice as Secretary of Agriculture and also as Secretary of Finance in the state. In this latter post he was chiefly responsible for re organizing the state's finances on a sounder basis. See A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (*op.cit.*) Vol.II, pp.586-7.

2. Alvaro Lins: "Rio Branco" (São Paulo, Nacional 1965). Baron Rio Branco had already had notable success in the last government in ending some of Brazil's boundary disputes with its neighbours, to the advantage of the nation.

3. Hermes, a nephew of Deodoro the first Republican President, had demonstrated both his loyalty to the government in power and his administrative ability. In 1904 he had put down the military revolt in Rio and had been rewarded with his appointment to Commander of the military region which included the Federal District. During this period Hermes had already begun to reform military education and discipline. It was this that recommended him to Afonso Pena, In his letter inviting Hermes to head the Ministry of War, Pena wrote of the bad impression that he had received during his visit of certain barracks and military establishments and intimated that the aim of his government would be to ensure that the "Army occupied the status that was due to it as one of the great national institutions". See Hermes da Fonseca Filho: "Marechal Hermes, dados Pará uma biografia" (Rio de Janeiro, 1961) pp.69-70, copy of letter Oct.7, 1906 Pena to Hermes. Nini Miranda: "A vida do Marechal Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca" (Rio de Janeiro, 1942).

⁴. See "Jornal do Comércio" 10, 11 April, 1906; March 8, 1908, Gazetliha.

However President Pena succeeded in outmanoeuvring the bloco in Congress, with the full backing of João Pinheiro himself - who had gone to become governor of Minas Gerais in 1906 - and the tacit support of the paulista governor who faced strong opposition within his state to the coffee valorization programme and was in need of Federal cooperation to sustain coffee exporting interests. The bancadas of the two states helped the President to gain control over the Lower House by securing the election of the young men who had gathered around João Pinheiro to key Congressional posts. The 24 year old leader of the mineiro bancada, Carlos Peixoto,¹ who had assumed leadership of the disciples of João Pinheiro after his departure from the Federal Capital, was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Another member of the group, the young gaúcho deputy, James Darcy, broke away from Pinheiro Machado to become the leader of the government majority in the House. The youth of these men and the President's Ministers led them to be pejoratively dubbed the Kindergarden by the bloco.

President Pena went on to consolidate his position and that of the Kindergarden during the first half of his term in office, by undermining the power of some of the Senate bosses of the bloco over their native states, notably Severino Vieira in Bahia and the Vice-President Nilo Peçanha in Rio de Janeiro. Encouraged by the Kindergarden and with the backing of the President, the incumbent governors of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro defied the authority of the Congressional bosses and asserted their independence.² In upholding the authority of the incumbent governors

1. For biographies of mineiro leaders of the Kindergarden see Antonio Gontijo de Carvalho: "Estadistas da República" (Revista dos Tribunaes, São Paulo, 1940). Manuel Duarte: "Carlos Peixoto e seu Presidencialismo: esboço político" (Rio de Janeiro, 1918).

². British diplomatic reports from Brazil in the period 1906-1910 contain perceptive observations of the political situation in the country during the administration of Afonso Pena. See F.0.371 File Nos.401-403, 603-605, 831-833 reports by Milne Cheetham, William

against the self-appointed bosses in the Senate, the President was also complying with the terms of the política dos governadores. In return he won two firm allies.

Midway through his term in office, the President had good reason to be confident of his position. The governors of three major states: Minas Gerais, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro were fully committed to his administration. Despite the efforts of Pinheiro Machado to dislodge the Kindergarden in Congress, Carlos Peixoto had been re-elected President of the Chamber of Deputies for a third successive year.¹ Nor was there a likelihood of any immediate challenge to the authority of the President and to that of his state, Minas Gerais. The Paulista Republican Party was bitterly divided over the issue of coffee valorization. The schism in the PRF weakened São Paulo in national politics until 1912 when the party was re-united.² In R.G.do Sul also the gubernatorial election of 1907 was seriously contested for the first time by a dissident member of the gaúcho Republican Party. Although the ruling Republican Party won an overwhelming majority, the result of the election was significant because it persuaded the various opposition factions in R.G.do Sul to unite to provide a more effective opposition to the gaúcho ruling elite. In 1908 the opposition Democratic Republican Party under the leadership of Assis Brasil was organized in the state.³ Its existence prevented R.G.do Sul from making a bid for the Presidency for itself.

Haggard and Roger Casement. For the internal schism in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro see F.O.371 File No.402-403. Monthly Report March by W. Haggard. The internal struggle in both states occurred over gubernatorial elections. In Bahia governor José Marcelino, without consulting Severino Vieira, nominated Araujo Pinho to succeed him. Vieira responded by putting forward an opposition candidate. The result was an impasse following the elections with both sides claiming victory. The President intervened to uphold the governor's candidate. The defeat of the Vice-President Nilo Peçanha was a greater triumph for the President. When Nilo had taken up his Federal post he nominated Alfredo Backer to complete the remaining two years of his gubernatorial term in Rio de Janeiro. In 1908 however, Backer refused to hold elections claiming to have been elected for a full four year term. Again he was supported by the President and was able to win his claim.

1. "Correio da Manhã" (Rio de Janeiro) April 28, 1908. Article on the conflict between Pinheiro Machado and Carlos Peixoto. "Jornal do Comércio" March 4,8,13, 1908.

2. Rodrigo Soares Júnior: "Jorge Tibiriça e Sua Época" (op.cit.)

3. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" pp.83-85.

Finally the prestige of the Federal government was high. Its achievements were highly acclaimed by foreigners and natives alike at the Brazilian Exhibition held in Rio in 1908, where the latest technological and economic advances were displayed. Moreover the President seemed assured that his policies would be continued in the next administration. João Pinheiro, the governor of Minas Gerais, was generally expected to be the successor to Afonso Pena. His governorship had been enlightened and he had a good reputation both in the state and nationally. None of the other major states were in such a strong position in 1908. The mineiros were united behind their state governor and also controlled the Presidency and Congress through Afonso Pena and the Kindergarden. These factors made the nomination of João Pinheiro a certainty.

3. The Succession Question. The President Nominates his Minister of Finance Davi Campista

The President suffered his first serious setback on October 25, 1908 when João Pinheiro died after a short illness. His death not only deprived the President of a popular successor, but it also opened up the possibility of internal strife in Minas: João Pinheiro had himself been elected as the conciliation candidate for the governorship by the opposing factions within the state's Republican party.¹ If the new gubernatorial elections to fill the vacancy left by his death reopened the rift in the PRM, the President's authority would be weakened. But the President was determined that Minas should remain in power and that his own political, financial, and economic policies should be continued, and he now decided to secure the election of his Minister of Finance, mineiro Davi Campista, a member of the Kindergarden, as his

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.II.

successor.

The extent of the President's and the Kindergarden's authority is obvious from the fact that there was little open hostility to Campista from Congress or the ruling elites of the states. This was despite the real weakness of Campista's candidature who though talented was not popular, lacking a political standing either in his native state Minas or nationally. Moreover the President was again using the authority of his office to secure a candidate of his state. In the last chapter, Congressional opposition to the President nominating his successor in 1905 has been noted. But of those who had opposed the President's interference in the succession question in 1905, only Rui Barbosa publicly denounced Campista's candidature. In a letter to Afonso Pena he wrote, "you occupy the Presidency because of our opposition to President Rodrigues Alves choosing his successor. We cannot concede you the right we denied him. No citizen ought to consider himself a candidate unless he has been indicated by public opinion, by a political party or by a state of the union ... moreover," he continued, "he [Campista] did not have the experience, maturity or the authority for the post;... in his own state he is not considered one of its more deserving sons... His election therefore would be entirely due to the President of the Republic."¹ Later Rui disassociated himself from the governor of his native state Bahia when he endorsed the President's candidate.

Rui's appeal to Pinheiro Machado for a more active opposition to the 'official' candidate also went unheard.² Although the bloco was naturally hostile to Campista's

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- ¹. "Contra o Militarismo: Campanha Eleitoral de 1909 a 1910" (J.Ribeiro dos Santos (Editor) R.de Janeiro) 'Address in São Paulo,' pp.12-16, copy of letter Rui to Pena, December 1908. Copies of other correspondence of Rui on the question of the candidature of Davi Campista are published in Maria Mercedes Lopes de Souza: "Rui Barbosa e José Marcelino" pp,181-9. João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República," pp.118-122.
 2. "Contra o Militarismo..." 'Address in São Paulo'(op.cit.) p.11. Copy of letter Rui to Machado

candidature, their opposition was muted, Pinheiro Machado for example held private meetings with the President to persuade him to drop Campista and, as a tactical move he suggested he nominate a nationally more prestigious politician such as Rui Barbosa or the Baron Rio Branco. But when he failed, Machado did not attempt to organize an opposition in Congress. In Minas itself it was known that important and senior members of the PRM executive committee, Francisco Sales and Bias Fortes were opposed to Campista (who had been selected without consultation with the party chiefs) but their opposition was to come only months later.

This reluctance to oppose the President was largely due to the fact that the Congressional elections were due in April 1909. Since the Kindergarden continued to control the certifying commission, it was expected in the House that the Congressional slates of any state that opposed Campista's candidature would not be certified.¹ The President had also been trying to get support for his candidate from the governors of Minas and São Paulo. In Minas, the President secured the election of Wenceslau Bráz² as governor of the state after he indicated his willingness to back Davi Campista for the Presidency.³ On March 16, the President visited São Paulo ostensibly to open a gunpowder factory. The paulista governor Albuquerque Lins was said to be sympathetic to Campista, but had demanded in return the Vice-Presidency for São Paulo and the continuation of the financial policies favourable to exporting interests.⁴ The governors of two other major states: Bahia

Dec. 2, 10, 1908; April 20, 1909, Sertório Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) p.230.

¹. José Vieira: "A cadeia Velha" (Jacintho Silva (Editor); R.de Janeiro, 1912) p.16, 31.

². Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" (Belo Horizonte, 1958) copies of letters between President and mineiros on subject; Nov.7-16; pp.141-7.

³. Sertório Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) p.233. "Anais do Senado Federal" Discourse of Antonio Azaredo and João Luís October 1, 1909. Rodolpho Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais de Convenção de 22 de Maio Para o quadriennio de 1910 a 1914. Artigos publicados 'n' O Paiz de Junho a Agosto de 1909" (Rio de Janeiro, 1909) pp.21-23. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" (Livreria Francisco Alves, R.de Janeiro, 1911) pp.65-66.

⁴. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 2, 1909; speech of Cincinato Braga on relationship

and Rio de Janeiro, in whose favour the President had earlier intervened during internal crises in their states, were expected automatically to endorse the President's candidate.

The candidature of Campista was first broached at the end of 1908, but except for Rui and until May 1909 there was no open hostility to the President's candidate from civilian politicians. The skill that Pena had shown in using his office to his advantage, contested gubernatorial elections in the major states and national Congressional elections due in 1909, had made the states more cautious and reluctant to oppose the President openly.

4. The Military Candidate - Marshal Hermes da Fonseca

But the candidature of Davi Campista was threatened from another source, the army. The new waves of militarism and nationalism affecting Europe had begun to sweep South America and had set off an arms race between Argentina and Brazil, as the two nations attempted to assert their dominance over the continent. In Brazil, the government of Pena under its able Minister of War, Marshal Hermes da Fonseca, had begun to reorganize and build up its armed forces. A law of compulsory military conscription by lot, on the agenda since 1906, was finally passed at the beginning of 1908.¹ This was a great victory for the armed forces who in the past had relied on the socially deprived for their recruits. Discipline and training - previously appalling - were improved, and for the first time the carioca populace was able to view regular troop manoeuvres. The reorganization greatly improved the morale of the officer corps which had been badly shaken as a result of the debacle of Canudos. When the

¹. between São Paulo and President Pena and reply of Angelo Pinheiro
Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371. February 11, 1907, Feb.13, April 11, June 18, Sept.22-27, 1908; July 22, August 16, Dec.26, 1910. Report on reorganization of the armed forces and the arms race

Brazilian High Command was invited to visit Germany in 1908 to review the most powerful military force in Europe, the pride of the officers in their achievements and ability rose to new heights, Marshal Hermes, the Minister of War, was chiefly responsible for this transformation.

From 1908 there were constant rumours of plots to 'impose' Marshal Hermes in the Presidency, so that he could undertake the regeneration of the Republic as he had done with the army.¹ It was rumoured that João Pinheiro had received an anonymous letter in February 1908.² In it he had been informed of a plot to put Hermes da Fonseca in the Presidency by force, to overthrow the oligarchies in the states, end the Federal system, dissolve Congress and the Supreme Federal Tribunal and set up a centralized dictatorship. As the first cracks appeared in President Pena's political armour with the death of João Pinheiro, the agitation in favour of the candidature of Hermes da Fonseca increased. In October a group of officers openly invited the Marshal to be the candidate of the military for the Presidency. In another regiment 32 officers held a reunion, at which they passed a motion pledging the garrison to make every effort "within and outside the law" if necessary, to secure the victory of Hermes at the Presidential elections.³

The political significance of the candidature of Hermes increased when he began to attract the support of dissident civilian politicians in the states and Federal Capital.

¹. The whole question of the existence of a military plot to impose Hermes President was subject to a furious debate during the election campaign. The civilian supporters of the Marshal were anxious to stress the civilian origins of his candidature, the civilistas insisted that his name was imposed by the military. However, there is little doubt that the candidature of Marshal Hermes originated in the army. "O Paíz", Oct.7, 14, 1909. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" (Livraria Francisco Alves, R.de Janeiro, 1917) pp.51-2, 63-4. Edgard carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" p.234, also footnote. "Contra o Militarismo: ..." Address in São Paulo (op.cit.) pp, 27-44; also 45 quoted interview given by Pinheiro Machado to 'Correio da Manha' J.Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" (op.cit.) p.221 copy of letter written by Mena Barreto to press Dec. 14, 1914.

². "Contra o Militarismo: ..." (op.cit.) pp.42-44. This revolt was expected to take place when the Marshal returned from the military manoeuvres in Europe: he would go straight from the quay to the Catete. The rumours were confirmed in mid-1908 by a paulista who had been visiting relatives who worked in the Consulate in Germany; he reported that the Presidency of Hermes was openly discussed and taken for granted by the Brazilian officers in Berlin.

³. Ibid., pp.42-44.

Deprived of constitutional means of achieving power, the opposition in states like Ceará, Pará and Bahia, as in 1906, turned to a military alliance as their only hope to achieve power. By early 1909, the candidature of Hermes was also being supported by some members of the bloco in the Federal Capital, including Severino Vieira and the incumbent Vice-President Nilo Peçanha, for whom the election of Campista could mean the end of their own political careers. With the reluctance of the state governors and the bloco to challenge the President, it had become obvious that they could prevent Campista's nomination only in an alliance with the pro-Hermes army officers.

The major problem that confronted them was the Marshal's reluctance to accept the nomination. He was a staunch defender of the establishment. Moreover he could hardly be disloyal to the President, not only because he was a Minister in the government, but also because the President had shown a particular interest in the reconstruction of the armed forces. President Pena himself was confident of the loyalty of his Minister.¹

Then on May 6, Carlos Peixoto provided the catalyst that sent the Marshal into opposition. When Congress reconvened to certify the national Congressional elections, the Kindergarten successfully dominated the Certification Commission and ratified the slates of the state governors who were expected to cooperate on the succession question. By May only the disputed elections of Rio de Janeiro, Goiás and the Federal District remained to be settled.² Confident of his own and the Kindergarten's position, Carlos Peixoto (who had just been re-elected to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies), decided to confront the question of military agitation in his inaugural speech to the House, and referred to the proven ability of Congress to maintain civil liberties by preventing politics from degenerating into "reckless demagoguery and anarchy which ends in

¹. "O Paíz" Oct. 16 1909 interview of Carlos Peixoto.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" April 20-May 4, 1909. José Vieira: "A Cadeia Velha" pp. 32-90.

tyranny and autocracy.”¹

This hostile allusion to the armed forces was immediately exploited both in the barracks, by those who wished to secure the Presidency for Hermes, and in Congress by opponents of the government. On May 12, six days after Carlos Peixoto's speech, a banquet was organized by the officers to honour the Marshal whose birthday it was. It became the occasion for a general show of solidarity not only of the officers but of dissident civilians behind the candidature of Hermes. The speeches were openly subversive. Captain Jorge Pinheiro called on Hermes to complete his "patriotic mission for which he had been designated by regenerating the nation".² A special commission of prestigious officers was formed to formally endorse the candidature of Hermes for the 1910 Presidential election. Though reluctant to allow his name to go forward, the Minister of War submitted his resignation to the President on May 5, asserting that though not a candidate himself, he could not accept that a military man was ineligible for an elected post, and challenged the authority of the President to nominate his successor.³ The letter was interpreted as an open threat of military intervention, if the President insisted on imposing his successor.

5. The Disintegration of the Kindergarden. The Hermes-Wenceslau Bráz Ticket

The events following May 6 shook the politicians, particularly the President and the leaders of the Kindergarden. Congress was temporarily brought to a standstill as members of the Kindergarden stayed away, to prevent its opponents from taking further advantage of the situation. But the President could avert the crisis if Minas endorsed Davi

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 6.

². Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" Chapter IV, pp.74-80.

³. Nini Miranda: "A vida do Marechal Hermes da Fonseca" p.31 copy of letter of Hermes to Afonso Pena.

Campista as its candidate, thus invalidating the criticism that he was the President's nominee. Pena therefore, immediately despatched the mineiro Federal deputy Bueno de Paiva to Belo Horizonte, to request the new mineiro governor, Wenceslau Bráz, to secure the formal ratification of Davi Campista's candidacy by the PRM. Meanwhile Hermes was persuaded to withdraw his resignation.¹ But the hopes of the Kindergarden were finally shattered on May 17, when Wenceslau Bráz informed them that though personally willing to stand by his commitment to Campista, he had failed to persuade all the members of the Executive Committee of the PRM to do likewise.²

This inability to carry his own native state undermined the authority of the President and the Kindergarden. In Congress, Carlos Peixoto resigned his post as President of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of the mineiro bancada, since, he said, he "no longer had the confidence of the state party".³ The schism in the mineiro bancada over his candidature also led Davi Campista to withdraw from the Presidential contest.⁴ At the same time he submitted his resignation as Minister of Finance, but the President refused to accept it.⁵ These resignations of the leaders of the Kindergarden resulted in the collapse of the Kindergarden itself.

In Congress, political leadership passed to Pinheiro Machado and the bloco, which was now strengthened by the support of the mineiro political chiefs Bias Fortes and Francisco Sales. 'O estouro da boiada', the stampede of the herd (the satellite states), had begun, as soon as it was evident that the Kindergarden was no longer ascendent. Now Sabino Barroso, the mineiro who had throughout been hostile to the

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" May 16, 1909.

². A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.II, p.599.
Rodolpho Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais da Convenção de 22 de Maio Pará o quatriennio de 1910 a 1914. Artigos publicados 'n' O Paiz de Junho a Agosto de 1909" (Rio de janeiro, 1909) pp.29-31, 37-38 passim. Why mineiro opposition to Davi Campista.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 17, 1909.

⁴. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" copy of telegram, p.89.

⁵. Ibid., pp.92-93 Campista's letter of resignation.

Kindergarden, was easily elected President of the Chamber of Deputies to replace Carlos Peixoto.¹ Another member of the bloco, the Bahian J.J.Seabra, became majority leader. The certification of the disputed Congressional elections in Goiás, the Federal District and Rio de Janeiro was now completed in favour of the opposition factions, which had opposed the Kindergarden. The House was now predominantly hostile to the government. On May 18, 19 and 20 Severino Vieira, the deposed Bahian boss, repeatedly called on the President to resign and advised him to catch the "train in the Central to 'Santa Barbara'" - his home town in Minas.

While these developments had destroyed the candidature of Campista, they did not settle the succession question. Here Pinheiro Machado and the bloco were under pressure from military circles to endorse the candidature of Hermes, who still refused to be the candidate of the military. But most civilian politicians feared revolutionary changes might follow if Hermes became President, since his candidature had originated amongst the radical officers who would expect to come to power with him. Amongst the anti-military civilians was Pinheiro Machado. In April 1909, Machado had urged President Pena to avert the military threat by dropping Campista in favour of a nationally more popular candidate like Baron Rio Branco or Rui for the Presidency with Hermes as the Vice-Presidential candidate.² Eventually three factors forced Pinheiro Machado and the bloco to endorse the candidature of Hermes da Fonseca. One was the increasing fear that Hermes would allow himself to be forcibly imposed as President. The second was the inability of civilian political leaders to unite over a civilian candidate. A number of Congressional bosses, Lauro Muller, Francisco Sales, were openly sympathetic to

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 22, 1909.

². A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" pp.593-4, 596-7.
"Anais do Senado Federal" Nov.16, 1911. Discourse of Francisco Glycério.

Hermes, whilst the candidature of Rio Branco or Rui Barbosa aroused little enthusiasm.¹ Senior army officers also threatened Pinheiro Machado that if he was not willing to back the candidature of Hermes, they would turn to his long-time rival Rosa e Silva.² To forestall a coup d'etat by the reformist officers and fearing to be outmanoeuvred by a political rival, Pinheiro Machado decided to take over the campaign in favour of Hermes and to present him as the candidate of R.G.do Sul and the majority of the ruling elites of the states. The decision was endorsed by the mineiros Francisco Sales and Bias Fortes who had refused to support Campista's candidature. On May 17, twenty politicians of various states met secretly and pledged their support and that of their states to Marshal Hermes. They hastily drew up a programme committing their candidate to defend the political status quo³ - the incumbents in power. The approval of the satellite states was easily secured. On May 20, Hermes who had earlier made his acceptance of the nomination conditional on the approval of the nationally prestigious Baron Rio Branco and Rui Barbosa, who were uninvolved in the partisan conflicts and had themselves been proposed as alternative candidates, finally agreed to run for the Presidency, although only the Baron Rio Branco had backed him.⁴ The success of the Marshal's candidature was ensured when the governor of Minas Gerais, Wenceslau Bráz, consented to accept the Vice-Presidential nomination on the same ticket, thus throwing his state behind the Marshal, On May 22, a formal Nomination Convention comprising only Senators was hastily convoked in the Senate to endorse the Hermes/Bráz slate on behalf of their states. Representatives of only four state governments: São Paulo,

¹. "Anais do Senado Federal" Nov.13, 1914. Rui explained how Pinheiro Machado had asked four Congressional leaders: Antonio Azeredo, Francisco Glycério, Lauro Müller and Francisco Sales to choose between Marshal Hermes and Rui Barbosa for the Presidential candidate. The first two voted in favour of Rui, the latter two for Hermes. Reluctant to cast the deciding vote, Pinheiro Machado turned to Rosa e Silva who decided in favour of Hermes. Also "Contra o Militarismo Carta do Rui Barbosa a cerca da candidatura Hermes" pp. 104-105.

². Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" pp.90-91.

³. "O Estado de São Paulo" May 25, 1909; June 9, 1909.

⁴. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 26, 1909 testified by J.J. Seabra.

Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Sergipe were not present.¹

The Convention had been brought forward to end the growing agitation in the Federal Capital; this had been sparked off by the fear that the the civilian politicians would reverse their decision to support Hermes. The Republican Party of São Paulo in particular had decided on May 17 against a military candidate. They offered instead to back any civilian candidate who had the support of the other states and requested that the politicians in the Federal Capital postpone their Convention at least for a month to allow fresh negotiations to take place.² But on May 20, students of the Escola Superior da Guerra had published a manifesto presenting Hermes as their candidate and warning that he would be imposed by force, if necessary.³ In Congress itself, the more radical deputies like Barbosa Lima, urged the "representatives of the people to fulfil their duty" by endorsing Hermes. Quintino Bocayuva also later defended the hasty Convention. "It was necessary", he said, "to avoid the fearful and grave consequences that threatened because of the lamentable conflicts."⁴

Thus it can be seen that Marshal Hermes was essentially the candidate of the anti-establishment army officers. However, they were unable to impose Hermes as the candidate solely of the military because of the opposition of the majority of officers including Hermes himself, to a forceful military intervention in politics. But the schism amongst the ruling elites resulted in an alliance between dissident civilian politicians, including some senior politicians of the bloco, with the army.

A significant aspect of the rift between the bloco and the Kindergarden was that it cut across state loyalties, since it centred around the 'Old Guard' and the younger

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" May 23, 1909.

². "O Estado de São Paulo" May 17, 22, 25; June 1,9,1909, "Jornal do Comércio" May 23, 1909.

³. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" p.99.

⁴. "Anais do Senado Federal" June 12, 1909. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 16, 1909.

generation of politicians. By allying himself with the Kindergarden, the President had challenged the power of the older politicians, and the Old Guard had to fight for their political survival. It was mainly in Minas Gerais that this conflict was most seriously fought. Thus when the President was most in need of the support of his state party, the new state governor - himself a relative newcomer to the political scene - had not had the opportunity to gain control over the state party, and the Old Guard were able to undermine the authority of the Kindergarden and the President by voting against their presidential candidate. With the collapse of the Kindergarden and their candidate, and the absence of another civilian candidate around whom the bloco could unite, the candidature of Marshal Hermes was further strengthened and under continual military pressure finally endorsed.

6. The Opposition 'Civilista' Ticket: Rui Barbosa - Albuquerque Lins

However the ratification of the Marshal's candidature by the majority of the state governors did not end the political controversy. The powerful Republican Party of São Paulo feared that if Marshal Hermes were elected President, the autonomy of the states would be threatened by the radical officers and civilian opposition factions who would attempt to intervene in states to depose the oligarchs in power, and the political instability this would give rise to would adversely affect the states' economic interests. Already foreign newspapers were reacting critically to the military candidate. The London journal 'The Economist' warned investors in Brazil to be prepared for a revolution.¹ Their strong criticism aroused great animosity from the pro-Hermistas in Congress at foreign attempts to interfere in the country's internal affairs. However, as noted in the last chapter, the coffee economy was particularly dependent on foreign loans at this time, to finance their

¹. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" pp.136-7.

buffer stock scheme. The paulistas therefore were anxious to prevent the election of Marshal Hermes, and the PRP which had until mid-May carefully avoided becoming directly involved in the controversy over the candidature of Campista, now led the campaign against the candidature of Marshal Hermes. Having failed to stop the Nomination Convention endorsing his candidature, the paulistas threw their full weight behind the President¹ and prepared to put forward an opposition civilian candidate at the election. The governors of two other major states: Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, joined the civilian opposition. Although President Afonso Pena had lost the support of the governor of Minas Gerais, he retained the loyalty of a significant minority of the Mineiro Republican Party and their bancada in Congress, which was now divided, Rui Barbosa's published denunciation of the candidature of Marshal Hermes as a military imposition, his resignation as Vice-President of the Senate and break with the bloco added to the civilista strength.² The civilistas formed a National Committee - the Junta Nacional - to organize their campaign and decided to hold a Convention on August 22, at which an opposition slate would be ratified.³

This regrouping of forces around the President once again threw the national political balance in doubt. Partly because of their reluctance to oppose the President, and partly because of their fear of being deposed should Marshal Hermes be elected, bancadas of satellite states began privately to show their sympathy to the civilista coalition.⁴ Some elements in the armed forces were also openly hostile to military

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 17, 1909, In Congress, the paulistas had tried unsuccessfully to prevent Carlos Peixoto from resigning as President of the Chamber of Deputies and had argued that he had been elected not just by Minas, but by a majority of the House. But the paulistas were able to persuade the President to accept the resignation of his Minister of War Marshal Hermes and to replace him with General Luiz Mendes de Moraes, a native of São Paulo.

². "Contra o Militarising, Campanha Eleitoral de 1909-1910" (op.cit.) "Parta do Rui Barbosa a cêrca da Candidatura Hermes" pp.101-110. "A Tribuna" (Rio de Janeiro) May 20, 1909.

³. João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" (op.cit.) p.130.

⁴. José Vieira: "A Cadeia Velha" (op.cit.) pp.153-4, 178.

involvement in politics.¹ This led the bloco, the main organizers of the pro-Hermes campaign after May 22, to issue a new Manifesto to end the anxiety of the state governors about the political intentions of Marshal Hermes. In the Manifesto they stated, "we are pleased to affirm that the choice of the nation has fallen on citizens who are entirely worthy of our confidence because of their known concern for law and order, their conservative temperaments and their aspirations for progress with order." However, the Manifesto was signed by the majority of Congressional representatives of only eight states.² In the case of other states, only a minority subscribed to it.

But on June 14, the prospects for a winning civilista ticket were abruptly shattered by the sudden death of the President after a brief illness. The civilistas maintained that his death was caused by 'moral trauma';³ there could be little doubt that the political reversals he suffered and the death of his son earlier had profoundly affected Afonso Pena. Nilo Peçanha, who as Vice-President, now took over Presidential duties, belonged to the bloco. At first however he favoured conciliation between the two sides, offering himself as the candidate of conciliation.⁴ Although the civilistas were enthusiastic, the bloco would not consider it, fearing military repercussions. After this, Nilo threw his full support behind Hermes, who now became the 'official' candidate backed by the acting President and a majority of establishment state parties.

The weakness of the civilistas, now that they no longer had the support of the Presidency, was soon apparent in the difficulty of obtaining a suitable candidate. As noted earlier, Davi Campista had withdrawn his candidature when the Kindergarden

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo" June 6, 1909.

². "Jornal do Comércio" June 11, 1909, The eight states were: (a) satellite states Amazonas, Pará, Maranhão, Ceará, Mato Grosso; (b) major states Rio Grande do Sul, Minas, Pernambuco.

³. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 14-16.

⁴. Luís Viana Filho: "A Vida de Rui Barbosa" (op.cit.) p.346 footnote 29. Gomes de Castro: "Benedito Leite e Urbano dos Santos" (op.cit.) p.124.

collapsed. The only hope for the civilistas to make an impact at the election was by adopting a candidate of national reputation, or from a major state. But Baron Rio Branco, Rosa e Silva and Rodrigues Alves, who were in turn approached, turned down the invitation.¹ Two days before the civilistas' Convention was due, they were still without a candidate. It was then that the Banian bancada approached Rui Barbosa to accept the nomination.² He agreed on condition that the governor of São Paulo, Albuquerque Lins, ran on the same ticket as the Vice-Presidential candidate, to give the opposition ticket some weight.

The civilista Nomination Convention met in the Theatro Lyríco in the Federal Capital on August 22. Unlike the 'official' Convention, the representation was broadly based being attended by delegates from municípios and also of interest groups. There was also enthusiastic popular participation.³ A serious disagreement based on ideological differences however soon developed amongst certain delegates at the Convention. The gaúcho Assis Brasil, one of the more eminent politicians at the gathering, had finally succeeded in organizing a Democratic Party in R.G.do Sul, and he now hoped to use the civilista's Convention to establish the party on a national basis pledged to the 1901 revisionist programme outlined by the Dissidência. But the proposal was opposed by the paulista delegates, who insisted that their mandate was restricted to endorsing the civilista

¹. Luís Viana Filho: "A Vida de Rui Barbosa" p.346 footnote 29.

². João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" pp.130-134.

³. "Contra o Militarismo: ..." (op.cit.) No Lyríco, pp.3-37. "Jornal do Comércio" June 11, 1909. "O Estado do São Paulo" October 27, 1909. The civilistas had adopted the Dissidência's Convention formula and municípios had been invited to send one delegate each to participate. Altogether some 320 municípios were represented, the majority from São Paulo, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. About 70 of the 136 mineiro municípios also sent representatives. However, 12 states mainly of the north and north-east did not participate at all. Representatives of some commercial, industrial, journalist, worker and student groups were present too. This was a festive popular occasion unlike the 'official' Convention. The delegates were enthusiastically welcomed by the carioca populace to the most widely publicized Convention yet held in the Republic. The Theatro Lyríco was gaily adorned with light bulbs, flowers, emblems, and the flags of the states. Two bands were hired for the occasion as well as the local police to keep out the crowd of 5,000 spectators that had gathered to watch.

ticket for the Presidential election.¹ It was obvious that the Republican Party of São Paulo would not give up their political independence by joining any national party, particularly one with a programme which aimed at restricting the powers of the President and the dominance of the major states. The paulista delegates were backed by Rui. He argued that it would be irresponsible to argue over ideologies when the country was threatened by militarism and stated that the civilista Convention represented not a party "but all opinions, parties and all Brazilians" who were opposed to the military candidate. The aim of the Convention, he said, was a limited one: it intended to fight 'militarism' and to campaign against the 'undemocratic' practice of Congress certifying the results of the elections in favour of their choice.² It was soon clear that there was little support for Assis Brasil's idea of a national party and he walked out of the Convention. However, though the Democratic Party of R.G.do Sul did not participate in the civilista campaign, they later voted for its candidates. The candidature of Rui Barbosa and Albuquerque Lins for the civilista Presidential ticket were overwhelmingly endorsed by 482 and 486 respectively out of a total of 510 or so votes cast by the delegates present. Assis Brasil received only some 14 votes for the Presidential candidacy.³ Later in September, when the civilista coalition published their Manifesto, it contained the limited programme that Rui had outlined for the coalition at the Convention.⁴

7. Electoral Campaigns and Manifestos

Although the aims of the civilista coalition were limited, the campaign was interesting

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" August 23, 24, 1909.

². "Contra o Militarismo:..." Discurso do Sr Senador Rui Barbosa p.65 passim, 73, 85.

³. The detailed voting figures were as follows:

For a civilista Presidential candidate: Rui Barbosa 482, Joaquim Murtinho 19, Assis Brasil 14.
Vice-Presidential candidate: Albuquerque Lins 486, Assis Brasil 22.

⁴. "O Estado de São Paulo" September 14, 1909 "O Manifesto do Junta Nacional".

for two reasons. First as noted, for the first time in the Republic, the 'official' candidate was being opposed by a significant opposition. Second, the civilista candidate, Rui Barbosa, broadened the basis of the campaign which until now had been confined to the precincts of Congress and newspaper debates. Rui ran a more personal American style campaign, in an effort to alert the urban electorate to the dangers of military rule. He conducted a five month tour from October 1909 to March 1910, travelling through the civilista strongholds - São Paulo, Bahia, Minas Gerais and the Federal District. An orator and a prolific writer, he was well equipped for this task: he held eight conferences, two dozen public meetings, published a 'Manifesto to the Nation' and a 'Letter to the Electorate'. It was on Rui personally that the entire civilista campaign rested.¹

His addresses consisted mainly of an attack on military involvement in politics.² He argued that the candidature of General Hermes was a military imposition, that military governments inevitably led to militarism and that this was incompatible with the Constitutional role of the armed forces as defenders of the nation and guardians of the Constitution. Rui then went on to list the evils of militarism. It was, he said, "the common scourge of all opinions, all interests, all national rights: the extortion of liberty, the obliteration of intelligence, the prohibition of civic pride, the destruction of credit, the negation of constitutional government, the empire of the master without law, responsibility, culture, redress or hope."³

He presented himself as the liberal candidate defending democratic rights and claimed to stand for "liberty, as interpreted by the tribunals, for the freedom of speech and

¹. The major part of his campaign speeches and writings is contained in Rui Barbosa: "Contra o Militarismo: ..." (op.cit.) Rui Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia e Minas Gerais. Manifesto a Nação." (R.de Janeiro, 1910).

². Rui Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral ..." pp.15-18, 71-78, 128-154, 160-194, "Contra o Militarismo:..." Address in São Paulo p.32 passim; "Conferência no Teatro Lyrico" p.43 passim; "Manifestação a 15 de Julho."

³. "Contra o Militarismo:..." (op.cit.) "Conferência no Teatro Lyrico" P.84.

press, for moderation and tolerance, for progress and tradition and for mass education."¹

The electorate were urged to "go to the election booths to nominate the President."

Although women did not have the vote, Rui appealed to them to demonstrate publicly against the political involvement of the military. In addition to the rhetoric, the success of Rui's attempt to involve the voters in the election was obvious from the large crowds which he attracted. Rui himself commented at one stage "the nation is on its feet and marching. It is the baptism of people in democracy, the rebirth of our nationality."²

Compared to the civilistas, the campaign of the 'official' candidate was conducted in a much lower key, and mainly in the traditional manner. Civilian supporters of Marshal Hermes stressed that his nomination originated amongst the civilians who had resorted to his candidacy to "prevent the anarchy threatened by the civilian politicians" unable to unite over a candidate.³ But Rui's popular campaign forced the Marshal to visit some states, particularly Minas Gerais, in an effort to rally his supporters, but here he was met by violent demonstrations.⁴

Violence also threatened to break out in Congress itself as the bancadas of pro-civilista states: São Paulo, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, confronted those of the pro-Hermes

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- ¹. Rui Barbosai "Excursão Eleitoral..." Manifesto a Nação (op.cit.) p.14.
 - ². "Contra o Militarismo: ..." (op.cit.) Conferência no Teatro Lírico p.47. Rui Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral..." Manifesto a Nação (op. cit.) pp.99, 103-104.
 - ³. See for example interview of P.Machado with the 'Tribuna Italiana' of São Paulo October 14, 1909. Labienus Rufiro Tavares Júnior:
"Propaganda Política candidaturas Hermes da Fonseca e Wenceslau Bráz. Colaboração do São Paulo. Diário de São Paulo e Tribuna do Povo (Junho de 1909 a Março de 1910" (São Paulo, 1910) passim. Rodolfo Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais de Convenção de 22 de Maio Pará o quadriennio de 1910 a 1914 (articles published in 'O Paiz') de Junho a Agosto de 1909" (op.cit.) passim.
 - ⁴. The mineiro Republican party was almost equally divided between the civilista and the majority candidate. The election in the state was important to both factions because of the size of the electorate. But when Hermes visited the southern and central zones of the state in November, it was obvious that the civilistas were in a majority here. His progress was marked by violence leading to a few deaths, as civilistas turned up in large numbers to demonstrate. In Barbacena, the município of Bias Fortes himself, hostile crowds had to be dispersed by police fire in which one student was killed. Later when Hermes learnt that students from Juiz de Fora were travelling to Barbacena to confront him, he hurriedly left the state. See Rui Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral ..." (op.cit.) speech in Juiz de Fora p.186 importance of Minas in election.

states. There were violent exchanges¹ in Congress, primarily over the manner in which the military candidate was selected, and this spread to other areas of political life especially the Federal Capital.²

One of the more interesting aspects of the campaign was the published views of the two candidates on the policies they intended to implement if elected. Both reflected basically the interests of the groups which had endorsed their candidature. For example in his Manifesto,³ Rui admitted that he favoured fundamental revision of the Constitution on the lines proposed by the dissidência in 1901, but this, he said, was a divisive issue amongst the civilistas (which included the governments of three states), and since their main objective was to combat the threat of a military government, such revision would not be part of his programme.

The reforms Rui proposed were less controversial, since the ruling elites themselves paid constant lip service to them though they failed to put them into practice. These included reform of the Judicial system to secure its independence,⁴ electoral reform to ensure automatic registration for life of all literate males who came of age, a secret

¹. See "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 23-December, 1909 passim, British Foreign and Diplomatic Papers FC.371 File No, 831 report by Roger Casement Dec.19, 1909. Cries of 'mata', 'mata' - kill him, kill him - were often heard from the galleries. Each side accused the other of bringing capangas to intimidate its opponent. Paulista Cincinato Braga, the leading spokesman for the civilistas, was alleged to be plotting the assassination of Hermes and Pinheiro Machado. In the Federal Capital, the acting President Nilo Peçanha ordered all members of the município Council to be searched for weapons before being allowed to enter the building,

². See for example "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Sept,23, 1909, Pro-civilista students in the Federal Capital subject to police harassment, demonstrated by burning an effigy of the chief of police. They in turn reacted by shooting dead two students present and planning a massive attack on the Medical College. Only the protests from civilistas in Congress and student agitation in the Federal Capital and São Paulo prevented further confrontation.

³. Rui's Manifesto is contained in "Excursão Eleitoral ..." (op.cit.) Manifesto a Nação pp.10-84.

⁴. To secure its independence and impartiality, Rui proposed (a) the centralization of the Judicial system under the sole control of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, (b) this body would be responsible for all Judicial appointments and promotions, (c) the legal procedure in the Federal District would be made fairer and more efficient; trials would be open to the public, accused and prosecution allowed to present their case and fewer records would be written down; there was however no suggestion of trial by jury. (d) The use of the state of emergency would be restricted to real national crises, the immunity of the Judiciary and Congress enforced and the effects of the emergency would cease to be operative as soon as the state of siege was lifted. Ibid., pp.28-31, 35-41.

ballot and proportional representation, and the expansion of secondary and university education.

The views Rui expressed on the economy and finance, also showed his dependence on the electoral support of the paulistas, and the need to defend their interests. Although as Finance Minister in the provisional government, he had advocated government intervention to promote economic development and had resorted to easy money policies to aid agriculture and industry, he now professed a belief in free trade, financial orthodoxy and an end to excessive protectionism, though he undertook to facilitate European immigration to make available labour for the coffee plantations,¹ and to continue the Conversion Fund stabilizing the milréis at an artificially low level to help exports. As would be expected from a civilian opposition candidate, whose campaign was intended primarily to prevent the election of a military man to the Presidency, Rui pledged himself to depoliticize the military.²

The published intentions of Marshal Hermes were even more interesting since he appeared torn between the reforming army officers amongst whom his candidature had originated, and the ruling elites who had endorsed it, both of whom were now claiming him as their candidate.³ On the one hand radical newspapers presented Hermes as the candidate for regeneration. The 'Fôlha do Norte' of Pará, a newspaper sympathetic to Lauro

¹. Three new proposals of Rui's on the financial question however are worth noting, since they were to be implemented by later Presidents: (a) to abolish the rights of municípios and states to contract foreign loans, (b) to allow the President a partial veto over the annual budget, (c) to end the abuse of congressmen adding riders to the budget. *Ibid.*, p.32.

². Rui proposed (a) to make military men in active service ineligible for all elected and nominated political posts, (b) to enforce strict discipline and prevent any collective manifestations, (c) to limit the training of the armed forces to their professional needs, (d) to turn the military into a small highly trained force, and by compulsory military service for all civilian males, to provide a reserve force against foreign invasions, (e) to narrow disparities in training and remuneration between the rank and file and the officer corps by improving the conditions of the former. *Ibid.*, pp.71-78.

³. See for example the following publications: Labienus R.T.Jnr: "Propaganda Política Candidaturas Hermes da Fonseca e Wenceslau Bráz. ..." (*op.cit.*) passim. Rodolfo Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais de Convenção de 22 de Maio Pará a quadriennio de 1910 a 1914 ..." (*op.cit.*)

Sodré wrote: "After the series of Councillor Presidents under whom the regional oligarchs have been allowed to pilfer public revenues, the candidature of the Marshal arises like the promised dawn to restore the fundamental principles of the Republican Constitution."¹ In Minas Gerais one journalist defended the military candidate as necessary to deal with the "despotic oligarchies in the states supported by the Federal forces." This, he wrote, was the "consequence of the politics of governors which had made the distribution of spoils of government the chief political preoccupation distorting the Constitutional principles." On the other hand the Congressional politicians supporting Hermes emphasized that the Marshal had been selected to defend the political status quo, i.e. incumbents in power. Francisco Sales stated that Hermes was not coming to power "to change the system or introduce new ideas." Later Quintino Bocayuva maintained that Hermes did not need to spell out a programme since he would only be continuing that of his predecessor Nilo Peçanha.²

The Marshal himself did little to clear the ambiguity, and the programme he outlined for his administration on various occasions was often contradictory. On one such occasion, at an impromptu interview by a journalist of the 'Étoile de Sul', the policies Hermes favoured were unequivocally revolutionary.³ He indicated his intention of extending central authority, redrawing state boundaries to end regional disparities, and overthrowing the state oligarchies. However, when in December Hermes read out his 'official' programme, which had been ghosted by the civilian politicians in Congress who had endorsed his candidature, it formally rejected these revolutionary measures.⁴ The aims

¹. R.Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral ..." (op.cit.) p.127.

². R.Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais ..." (op.cit.) pp.16-17, 19 passim. R.Barbosa: "Contra o Militarismo: ..." Address in São Paulo (op.cit.) p.53.

³. R.Barbosa: "Contra o Militarismo: ..." Address in São Paulo (op.cit.) p.57 passim.

⁴. "O Estado de São Paulo" December 27, 1909. Speech read at an official banquet in the Teatro Municipal in the Federal Capital and attended by politicians and representatives of business interests.

of his administration, he said, would not be to introduce "any new ideas" but to ensure that the spirit of the Constitution was maintained. Like Rui's Manifesto, that of Hermes also reiterated the intention of the candidate to end the abuse of the liberal principles of the Constitution by insisting on "institutional honesty" and "administrative morality", safeguarding political and civil liberties, including minority representation and an impartial Judiciary. His government, he said, would publish a Civil Code, ensure the independence of magistrates, extend primary schooling and provide better secondary school facilities. Both Rui and Hermes also mentioned specifically the need for political and administrative reform of the Federal District, where political repression and administrative abuses by the Federal authorities, had made liberal reform a major issue. The special attention to the Capital also showed the awareness amongst the politicians of the need to court the independent and disgruntled urban electors here.

On the question of the economy too, there was not much difference between the Manifestos of the two candidates. The official emphasis was on the need for greater economic diversification, the development of all regional economies and an equal attention to internal inter-state trade and the foreign export trade.¹ On the issue of industrialization, Hermes also, whilst recognizing the need for promoting national industries, favoured only moderate protectionist policies.

The official Manifesto of 1910 differed from past ones and from that of the civilista candidate only in one respect. This was in its reference, for the first time, to the unrest of the urban proletariat - the 'social question' as it was called. Even so Hermes was anxious to minimize its significance, stating that the social problem of Europe

¹. The 'official' Manifesto also committed its candidate to continuing the Conversion Fund begun by President Pena, which aimed at replacing the paper currency with a metallic one, and fixing the rate of exchange at an artificially low level to benefit the export interests. Presumably this was included to satisfy mineiro and paulista interests since, as noted in Chapter Five, R.G.do Sul favoured financial orthodoxy.

was an "exotic plant" in Brazil, and whilst acknowledging the hardships suffered by the urban proletariat as a result of unemployment and a shortage of basic consumer goods, he put this down to an increased population in the cities. His government, he said, would look after the welfare of the proletariat without however disrupting the "status quo" or "prejudicing industry and capital".

Thus there was in practice little to choose between the Manifestos of the two candidates. Political necessity forced Rui to modify his programme for liberal reform and to defend economic policies to benefit paulista interests. The official Manifesto also paid the usual lip-service to the liberal principles of the Constitution and undertook to ensure that they were maintained, but made no reference to revolutionary change.

8. The Role of Fraud, Coercion and Violence in the Elections

Notwithstanding the assertions of liberal sympathies by the two candidates, both sides resorted to fraud, coercion and violence at all levels: Federal, state and município, to increase their electoral support. But it was the 'official' ticket which had the advantage here, primarily because it controlled the Presidency (as we have seen after June 1909 the Vice-President Nilo Peçanha who held the post, was backing the military candidate). In addition, the 'official' ticket had the backing of the armed forces, greater sources of revenue, and state governments and their parties behind it. Bargains were struck with political bosses and the local coronéis to change sides. The Hermistas, for example, won the support of the paulista dissidents Rodolfo Miranda and Manuel Pedro Villaboim. It was understood that in return they would be helped in the state elections.¹ A similar attempt by the civilistas to attract mineiro boss Bias Fortes, with the promise to back him at

¹. "O Estado da São Paulo" July 3, 1909.

the next gubernatorial election, failed.¹

But it was in the electoral contests in the states, for state and município offices, that fell during the period of the Presidential campaign, that the official ticket had the greatest advantage, since the Presidential office was used to try and replace state governors and coronéis supporting the civilistas with supporters of Hermes. In two civilista strongholds, the Federal District and Rio de Janeiro, the acting President Nilo Peçanha succeeded in returning to power dissident pro-Hermes candidates. In the elections for the Municipal Council in the Federal Capital, the Federal authorities intervened to rig ballots and make false returns in the first district where the civilistas were in a majority.² The state of Rio de Janeiro suffered likewise during its elections for município Councils, state legislature and Justices of the Peace early in 1910.³ Here the acting President, anxious to regain control over his state, which he had lost in 1908 when President Pena had intervened in favour of the state governor Alfredo Backer, sent in Federal troops to supervise the polling booths. The state was finally left with two Legislative assemblies, one in Nitheroy, the other at Petropolis, and duplicate Councils in a number of municípios, all claiming victory. But it was obvious that the civilistas had lost control over the state, Nilo proclaimed Presidential rule and appointed an interventor to run the state. The Hermistas however were defeated in their efforts to capture the state legislature of São Paulo,⁴ although the opposition which had been well organized by Francisco Glycério and had presented a complete dissident opposition slate, had had the backing of the Federal government. The Federal acting President also failed to intimidate the PRP with its threat to put up the rate of exchange to

¹. R.Abreu: "As candidaturas Presidenciais ..." (op.cit.) p.116.

². British F.O.Diplomatic Papers: F.0.371 File No.831, Report by William Haggard March 7, 1910.

³. "O Paiz" March 14, 1910. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers F.0.371 File No.833, Report by William Haggard January-March.

⁴. Labienus R.T.Jnr.: "Propaganda Politics candidaturas Hermes da Fonseca e Wenceslau Bráz ..." (op.cit.) p.61 passim, 65-69, 74-76.

16 d to the milréis, an increase of 1 d, if the state continued to back the civilistas.¹

In other areas where the state governments were having difficulty in containing the civilistas, Federal forces were sent in as reinforcement. One light infantry battalion stationed in Sta.Catharina, was ordered to go to Juiz de Fora, a civilista stronghold in Minas.² They stayed to supervise the polling booths during the Presidential elections. Similarly in the Federal District, the civilistas alleged that "300 swords and 5000 bayonets of the military garrison" were waiting to falsify the results of the forthcoming Presidential elections.³

Corruption was involved too.⁴ The civilistas accused the Hermaistas of using public funds to buy votes. In the Federal District the salaries of civil servants were increased and new posts created. The government of Minas Gerais was also said to have made available some 23,000 contos for the campaign. On the other hand the paulistas were accused of using the £15 million loan that the state government had borrowed to finance the coffee valorization programme, to sustain the civilista campaign.

Meanwhile in the municípios, the coronéis were employing fraud and violence to increase their electoral following. An example is the prosperous município of St.Amaro in north-east Bahia with a thriving commercial city.⁵ Here the chief coronel and prefect of the município was Dr Aranje Pinho Júnior, the son of the state governor. He of course belonged to the establishment faction and like it, was a civilista. But Pinho's position in the município was seriously challenged by a rival coronel Rodrigo Brandão, and in four of the

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo" May 13, 26, 1910. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Instituições e Classes Sociais)" (op.cit.) p.97.

². Ibid., pp. 35-36} 55-56. R.Barbosa:"Excursão Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia ..." (op.cit.) Manifestos a Nação March 26, 1910 p.235 passim, use of the military in the elections.

³. British F.O. Diplomatic Papers: F.0.371 File No.831 January 7 report by W.Haggard.

⁴. Labienus R.T.Jnr.: "Propaganda Política ..." (op.cit.) pp.46-7, 58-9, 62-3, 71, 85, R.Abreu: "As candidatures Presidenciaes ..." (op.cit.) p.127. R.Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia ..." (op.cit.) speech in Ouro Preto p.162.

⁵. Brazil: Anais do Congresso Nacional: Apuração da Eleição de Presidente 1910" (Imprensa Nacional R.de Janeiro, 1911) vol.2 pp.457-67 June 22, 1910.

seven districts of the município - Purificação, Rosario, Sabara and Oliveira - Brandão had a sizeable and loyal electoral following. But since the Pinho faction controlled the registering commission, they had the electoral advantage. Agents were despatched to bribe potential voters. A boarding house was opened simultaneously in the Praça da Purificação where full board and lodging was provided free for a day for anyone prepared to register. Not surprisingly, many were only too happy to re-register several times under assumed names. It was such practices that made St.Amaro, electorally, the second most important in the state. Coronel Brandão maintained that its electorate of 2,600 would be halved if those who no longer lived in the município or were dead and others fraudulently registered were eliminated. But Hermistas benefited from this type of fraud as well. In the município of Prudentópolis for example it was the civilistas who complained that the electorate was swelled by the inclusion of foreign immigrants and in the município of Barbacena in Minas Gerais, an Italian in the pay of Bias Fortes was alleged to have forged 150 electors' cards. Elsewhere, as in the Federal District and Minas Gerais, civilistas were forcibly prevented from recruiting new voters.¹

The contested election resulted in a 50% increase in the numbers of registered voters from 800,000 to 1,155,146 since the last Presidential election in 1906. However as Table VI/1 shows the differences amongst states were great.

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 20, 1910, p.804.

N.B. There were various reasons for the difference in the level of recruitment of new voters: one was the extent of the involvement of the state government in the election, satellite states were generally less concerned; another was the strength of the dissident faction within the state; a third was of course the higher and expanding literacy rates in some states which qualified a larger proportion of males to register.

TABLE VI/1

Percentage Increase in Size of Electorate between 1906 and 1910

| Above or at national average | | Below national average | |
|------------------------------|------|------------------------|-----|
| São Paulo | 100% | Pará | 48% |
| Amazonas | 100 | Goiás | 42 |
| R.G.do Sul | 73 | Mato Grosso | 39 |
| Paraná | 71 | Bahia | 37 |
| R.de Janeiro | 60 | Pernambuco | 34 |
| Minas Gerais | 50 | Espírito Santo | 29 |
| Sta.Catharina | 50 | Maranhão | 27 |
| | | R.G.do Norte | 27 |
| | | Federal District | 25 |
| | | Paraíba | 25 |
| | | Piauí | 22 |
| | | Alagoas | 20 |
| | | Ceará | 10 |
| | | Sergipe | 8 |

Source: Directoria do Serviço do Estatística: "Estatística Eleitoral" (R.de Janeiro, 1912)

9. The Election

The level of controversy and Rui's personal campaign led to a higher degree of participation in the election on March 1, 1910 than usual. The national average poll was 60.3 (Table VI/2 overleaf). This was a 22.3% higher turn-out than at the last Presidential election in 1906 which was not seriously contested. But it was an even higher poll than that recorded at two contested elections for the National Congress in 1909 and 1912 when there was a 50.8% and 52.2% poll respectively.¹ Fraudulent voting distorted the poll somewhat upwards in 1910 as also in 1909 and 1912. This was however partially balanced by the forcible closure of polling booths in other areas. The Federal District suffered most severely in this respect in the 1910 Presidential contest. Elections were allowed only in 9 sections of the 52 in the

¹. Directoria do Serviço de Estatística: "Estatística Eleitoral" (op.cit.) p.245.

first district, and 28 of the 44 in the second district.¹ In Mato Grosso a quarter of the polling booths were shut down; hence the low poll in these areas.

The fraud and violence that had marked the campaign intensified on election day. The most common irregularity was experienced in the formation of the electoral boards, and in many cases representatives of the opposition were refused permission to supervise elections. The bico de pena - forging of ballots - was employed and the civilistas in particular complained that elections in a number of municípios in Minas Gerais, Sta.Catharina, Paraná, R.G.do Sul and in all northern and north-eastern states were fabricated.²

¹. Brasil: Anais do Congresso Nacional: Apuração da Eleição de Presidente 1910 (op.cit.) pp.253-265.

². Ibid., pp.379-406 contains the many protests submitted to Congress by the municípios, also vol.I passim. R.Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral ..." (op.cit.) Manifestos a Nação. Feb.26, 1910, p.223 passim; March 26, 1910, p.266 passim, 274, 307 passim, 318-328.

TABLE VI/2

Percentage Poll by State in the 1910 Presidential Election

| | States | Registered Voters | Voted | % poll |
|----|---------------------|-------------------|---------|--------|
| 1 | Bahia | 99,935 | 91,373 | 91.5 |
| 2 | Piauí | 21,843 | 15,448 | 70.2 |
| 3 | Rio de Janeiro | 71,539 | 49,056 | 68.5 |
| 4 | São Paulo | 160,494 | 108,705 | 67.7 |
| 5 | Ceará | 43,418 | 29,322 | 67.5 |
| 6 | Pará | 57,936 | 38,807 | 66.9 |
| 7 | Rio Grande do Norte | 14,236 | 9,473 | 66.4 |
| 8 | Alagoas | 23,909 | 14,464 | 60.5 |
| 9 | E.Santo | 18,512 | 10,949 | 59.1 |
| 10 | Rio Grande do Sul | 116,515 | 66,803 | 57.3 |
| 11 | Sta.Catharina | 24,810 | 13,966 | 56.2 |
| 12 | Minas Gerais | 266,081 | 146,109 | 54.9 |
| 13 | Paraíba | 27,794 | 13,512 | 54.1 |
| 14 | Pernambuco | 64,220 | 34,077 | 53.0 |
| 15 | Goías | 17,130 | 8,844 | 51.6 |
| 16 | Sergipe | 13,071 | 6,704 | 51.2 |
| 17 | Paraná | 36,463 | 17,530 | 48.1 |
| 18 | Amazonas | 14,231 | 6,362 | 44.7 |
| 19 | Mato Grosso | 7,989 | 3,511 | 43.9 |
| 20 | Maranhão | 32,774 | 13,949 | 42.6 |
| 21 | Federal District | 25,246 | 8,687 | 34.4 |
| | Total | 1,155,146 | 697,651 | 60.3 |

Source: Directoria do Serviço de Estatística: “Estatística Eleitoral” p.244

The election of 1910 is notable for the use made of Federal armed forces to supervise elections in civilista strongholds.¹ Civilista supporters in the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro, the first district of Bahia, North Paraná and the centre and south of Minas Gerais suffered intimidation from the army and were prevailed upon either not to vote or to cast their ballot for Marshal Hermes. In other areas both sides freely deployed capangas where the opposition was powerful. These capangas supervised elections and, if necessary, forcibly removed ballot boxes.

The general atmosphere of election day in states where elections were strongly contested can be gauged from some of the written protests from Minas Gerais sent to the certification commission.² The pro-Hermista Justice of Peace in the município of Conceição do Serro in the first district wrote³ that after the election, he was accosted by a band of capangas led by the civilista Coronel Nordestino Perreira de Figueredo, who threatened to kill him unless he signed a declaration that no elections were held in the area. He maintained that this was because Hermes had won an overwhelming majority. Civilistas submitted similar protests. In the município of São José do Paraizo of the fifth district,⁴ the civilista supervisor claimed that he had been driven out of the município by a gang of capangas and was not allowed to attend the elections. Some of the most violent encounters took place in the sixth district. In the town of the município of St.Rita de Cassia,⁵ Rui's agents claimed that the local police had intervened to prevent the civilistas from voting. Later the pro-Hermes coronel, Saturnino Felicio Pereira, had forcibly removed the ballot box threatening the civilistas with a revolver. In another part of the town the Hermaistas

¹. R.Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia ..." (op.cit.) Manifestos a Nação, February 26, 1910, p.223 passim. March 26, 1910 p.235 passim.

². Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 1910, pp.597-965 passim; 614-647 report official commission; 735-965 report of the civilista commission.

³. Ibid., p.619.

⁴. Ibid., p.883 passim.

⁵. Ibid., p.910 passim.

were alleged to have led in a group of fifteen to twenty capangas and fired at the civilistas when they had refused to leave the building where elections were taking place.

It was obvious from the many protests submitted to Congress, that both sides were guilty of fraudulent practices during the election, but the forces behind the 'official' candidate had the advantage.

10. Certification of the Election

The standard electoral procedure was that the official candidates, who had the support of the majority of the state governors, would be certified the winners by the bancadas in Congress. However it was soon apparent that the civilistas were not prepared to accept the certain victory of Hermes. Shortly after the elections, they began to publish results favourable to their candidates.¹ Meanwhile political agitation in many states and particularly in the Federal Capital was growing. Fearing riots of the carioca population when Congress met to certify the elections, pro-Hermes Senators attempted to arrange another meeting place for Congress, and suggested halls near the military garrison in São Christavão,² arguing that the present Congressional building was in an unsafe condition. But the civilistas were not so easily deceived. The Hermistas however need not have worried, for whilst Congress investigated the election returns and the civilistas challenged the reports of the official Congressional commissions, General Mena Barreto daily exercised the Second Brigade under the windows of the debating Hall.³

The immediate task facing Congress was to elect the six commissions that would study the electoral returns from the states and prepare a detailed report on their respective

¹. See for example R.Barbosa: "Exeursao Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia ..." (op.cit.) Manifestos a Nação. March 26, 1910, pp.313-318; also general analysis of elections p.266 passim.

². Ibid., pp,252-2551 273.

³. Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.)

region. On the basis of these reports, Congress would later certify the results of the Presidential election. Since the majority in the House supported the Hermes - Wenceslau Bráz ticket, they succeeded in electing to the commissions Congressmen who favoured the majority ticket. The civilistas questioned the impartiality and efficacy of the commissions¹ and proceeded to appoint their own men to prepare independent reports on the electoral returns. Predictably the reports arrived at widely differing conclusions.

As Table VI/3 shows, the civilistas' electoral commissions went further in invalidating ballots, rejecting 53% of the total votes cast as compared to the 27% disqualified by the 'official' commissions. By far the most common reason for invalidating elections was irregularity in the organization of the election boards in the electoral sections of the municípios² In addition to failures to comply with electoral procedure which automatically invalidated elections, the civilistas rejected ballots in a large number of município sections which were obviously fraudulent.³ However, whatever their criterion for

¹. Brasil: Anais do Congresso Nacional "Apuração da Eleição de Presidente 1910" (op.cit.) Vol.1 Sessions May 16-June 20 p.36 passim. R.Barbosa: "Excursão Eleitoral aos Estados da Bahia ..." (op.cit.) Manifestos a Nação, March 26, 1910 p.275 passim.

The civilistas generally and Rui Barbosa in particular questioned the Constitutional propriety of Congressmen, who had participated in the official Nomination Convention to select candidates, to certify the results of the election. More specifically, Rui was critical of the electoral procedure adopted for the certification, arguing that it did not allow a satisfactory study of the electoral returns from the states. In a motion signed by 35 Congressmen, he demanded (a) that the number of commissions be doubled to ten (b) that the commissions be allowed a longer time to study the returns and submit a report (c) that the report be distributed to Congressmen before debates were held on them and (d) that the period allowed for debates on the report be extended.

². See Brasil: Anais do Congresso Nacional: "Apuração da Eleição de Presidente 1910" Relatorios das Comissoes official: pp.215-289; 376-449; 466-554; 597-683. Civilist reports: pp.289-375; 391-466; 554-597; 649-653; 684-701; 1082-1105.

These boards were responsible for supervising elections and tabulating 'regular' ballots and as noted in Chapter One, the electoral regulations had laid down a detailed and compulsory procedure for the organization of these boards to ensure their impartiality. Failure to comply with the procedure was supposed to invalidate the board and the election it supervised, but until now these requirements had been ignored when certifying elections. The civilistas also disqualified a number of elections where the electoral boards had failed to follow the procedure required to authenticate electoral returns sent to Congress: for example for failing to authenticate the documents by signing them or for forgetting to include the list with the signatures of the electors who voted, This list often provided the best evidence of fraud.

³. Ibid., Civilist reports passim. Evidence of such fraud was provided by the clearly forged signatures on the list of signatures of electors, the difference in the numbers of votes cast for candidates and the number of electors who actually voted, ballots in excess of registered voters in the area, duplicate

certification, neither the 'official' nor the civilista commissions were consistent in dealing with the electoral returns, each side favouring its own candidate. As a result their final conclusions differed to the extent that after eliminating the 'irregular' ballots, the 'official' commission gave their candidate, Marshal Hermes, 67% of the votes for the Presidency, whilst the civilistas concluded in favour of Rui Barbosa, who was given 61% of the votes for the Presidency.

returns and finally the written complaints of intimidation and coercion, On the above basis the civilistas disqualified the entire election in the state of Espírito Santo and the majority of the ballots in the north and north-eastern states.

TABLE VI/3a

Report on the Electoral Returns of the 1910 Presidential Elections Submitted by the

Congressional Commissions

| States | (A) Report of the 'Official' Commissions (Partial Reports) | | | | (B) Report of the <u>Civilista</u> Commissions | | | |
|------------------|--|--------|------------------------|--------------|--|--------|------------------------|--------------|
| | <u>Presidency</u> | | <u>Vice-Presidency</u> | | <u>Presidency</u> | | <u>Vice-Presidency</u> | |
| | Hermes | Rui | Wences-lau | Albu-Querque | Hermes | Rui | Wences-Lau | Albu-querque |
| Amazonas | 5266 | 115 | 5275 | 99 | 572 | 0 | 572 | 0 |
| Pará | 36732 | 129 | 37736 | 0 | 4560 | 0 | 4560 | 0 |
| Maranhão | 1804 | 717 | 2811 | 719 | 1356 | 717 | 1359 | 0 |
| Piauí | 12850 | 2581 | 12850 | 2575 | 1367 | 674 | 1684 | 676 |
| Ceará | 3562 | 17 | 3562 | 17 | 3929 | 17 | 3929 | 17 |
| R.G.do Norte | 9579 | 82 | 9579 | 37 | 776 | 0 | 776 | 0 |
| Paraíba | 7921 | 322 | 7792 | 318 | 7921 | 322 | 7796 | 318 |
| Pernambuco | 31577 | 174 | 31425 | 117 | 2993 | 0 | 2993 | 0 |
| Alagoas | 12695 | 191 | 12685 | 187 | 4060 | 147 | 4056 | 137 |
| Sergipe | 334 | 31 | 334 | 31 | 334 | 31 | 334 | 31 |
| Bahia | 20058 | 40989 | 19697 | 40651 | 17543 | 52089 | 17255 | 52208 |
| Espírito Santo | 6670 | 613 | 6717 | 612 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 24529 | 10951 | 22256 | 13290 | 7709 | 17016 | 7418 | 17071 |
| Federal District | 1460 | 3066 | 1438 | 3065 | 1430 | 2976 | 1408 | 2975 |
| Minas Gerais | 68202 | 38052 | 71022 | 38014 | 21224 | 32403 | 22143 | 31327 |
| Goías | 7688 | 796 | 7751 | 721 | 1089 | 409 | 1092 | 379 |
| Mato Grosso | 2792 | 673 | 2808 | 665 | 168 | 94 | 169 | 93 |
| São Paulo | 14951 | 42667 | 15068 | 42825 | 24789 | 78392 | 25277 | 78241 |
| Paraná | 11434 | 6154 | 11493 | 6168 | 5802 | 4300 | 5309 | 4300 |
| Sta. Catharina | 10174 | 3189 | 10208 | 3137 | 3169 | 2411 | 3169 | 2411 |
| R.G.do Sul | 50326 | 16373 | 50350 | 16274 | 14895 | 8358 | 14875 | 8358 |
| Total | 341594 | 167858 | 341857 | 169562 | 126392 | 200359 | 126084 | 198223 |

Source: Brasil: Anais do Congresso Nacional. Apuração da Eleição de Presidente
1910 Vol.2, pp.202, 203.

Note: The figures for Minas (b) have been corrected, see “Diário do Congresso Nacional” Vol. April-July, 1910, p.576.

TABLE VI/3b

Table showing the differences in the report submitted by the Hermistas and the Civilistas in the key state of Minas Gerais. The result given is for each of the 7 electoral districts into which the state was divided

| Districts | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | |
|------------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|------|
| State poll | 54% | | | | | | | |
| Poll in districts | 57% | | 49% | | 48% | | 62% | |
| Candidates | H. | R. | H. | R. | H. | R. | H. | R. |
| Votes cast | 9582 | 12973 | 17372 | 9514 | 13201 | 11397 | 9672 | 8588 |
| Valid Hermista Report | 9558 | 12963 | 9802 | 4576 | 10737 | 8667 | 6665 | 4852 |
| Valid Civilista Report | 3367 | 8825 | 5043 | 4222 | 4492 | 8068 | 3069 | 4461 |
| % Disqualified by Hermistas | .2 | .09 | 43 | 51 | 18 | 24 | 31 | 43 |
| % Disqualified by Civilistas | 64 | 34 | 71 | 56 | 63 | 29 | 68 | 48 |

| Districts | 5 | | 6 | | 7 | |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|
| State Poll | 54% | | | | | |
| Poll in districts | 62% | | 48% | | 53% | |
| Candidates | H. | R. | H. | R. | H. | R. |
| Votes cast | 12962 | 2116 | 11020 | 7429 | 12008 | 2580 |
| Valid Hermista report | 11335 | 1526 | 8651 | 4888 | 11480 | 2242 |
| Valid Civilista report | 1500 | 521 | 2645 | 5110 | 1108 | 1199 |
| % Disqualified by Hermistas | | 12 27 | 21 | 34 | 4 | 13 |
| % Disqualified by Civilistas | | 88 75 | 76 | 30 | 90 | 54 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 20, 1910 pp.614, 620-21, 625-6, 631, 635, 641, 643, 647, 966.

Note: H = Hermes; R = Rui

THE DISTRICTS OF MINAS - 1910




TABLE VI/4

Total Number of Ballots for the Presidency disqualified by the National Congress

| | A | B | C | % rejected i.e. C%/A |
|------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| States | Total votes cast | Votes certified | Votes disqualified | |
| Amazonas | 6,362 | 6,221 | 141 | 2 |
| Pará | 38,807 | 30,118 | 8,689 | 22 |
| Maranhão | 13,949 | 11,960 | 1,989 | 14 |
| Piauí | 15,448 | 12,255 | 3,193 | 26 |
| Ceará | 29,322 | 27,937 | 1,385 | 5 |
| R.G.do Norte | 9,473 | 7,671 | 1,802 | 19 |
| Paraíba | 13,512 | 8,253 | 5,259 | 40 |
| Pernambuco | 34,077 | 31,751 | 2,326 | 7 |
| Alagoas | 14,464 | 12,884 | 1,580 | 11 |
| Sergipe | 6,704 | 6,352 | 352 | 5 |
| Bahia | 91,373 | 61,098 | 30,275 | 33 |
| Espírito Santo | 10,944 | 8,801 | 2,143 | 20 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 49,056 | 37,971 | 11,085 | 23 |
| Federal District | 8,687 | 4,526 | 4,161 | 48 |
| São Paulo | 108,705 | 108,618 | 87 | 0 |
| Paraná | 17,530 | 17,422 | 108 | 1 |
| Sta.Catharina | 13,966 | 13,739 | 227 | 2 |
| R.G.do Sul | 66,803 | 66,732 | 71 | 0 |
| Mato Grosso | 3,511 | 3,502 | 9 | 0 |
| Goías | 8,844 | 8,489 | 355 | 4 |
| Minas Gerais | 146,109 | 141,267 | 4,842 | 3 |
| Total | 697,651 | 617,567 | 80,084 | 11% |

Source: Directoria do Serviço de Estatística: “Estatística Eleitoral” p.244.

Note: A slightly larger number of votes were certified for the Vice-Presidency:
625,938.

It was now left to the whole House to study the two reports and to decide on the final certification of the election. The executive board of Congress which was chaired by the Vice-President of the Senate, Quintino Bocayuva, rejected both reports and their basis for judging the validity of electoral returns. It decided instead that failure simply to comply with electoral procedure did not invalidate the election in a particular area. Only in cases where there was evidence of "irregularities with the intention of perverting the outcome of elections" would the results be disqualified. On this basis Congress rejected only some 11% of the total votes cast; over half of these were in Bahia, where elections had been fiercely contested, Rio de Janeiro, Pará, Paraíba, Minas Gerais and the Federal District were the other areas where a large number of votes were rejected (Table VI/4). This result was more acceptable to the ruling state elites, since it disqualified almost an equal proportion of votes from both sides and did not radically alter the outcome of the electoral returns which the governors had submitted to Congress.

When the results were finally certified on July 27, two and a half months after the count had begun, the official candidates, as expected, were declared the winners. The Hermes - Wenceslau Bráz slate were allowed 64% of the valid ballots.

TABLE VI/5

Result of the Presidential Election of 1910 as certified by Congress

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|----------------|------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Marshal Hermes | da Fonseca | 403,867 | Wenceslau Bráz |
| Rui Barbosa | | 222,822 | Albuquerque Lins |
| scattered | (approx.) | 550 | scattered (approx.) |
| | | | 400 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 27, 1910 p.559.

The 36% of the national vote conceded to the civilistas was the highest so far obtained by any opposition candidates at Presidential elections. As could be expected, Rui polled a majority in the two states São Paulo and Bahia, whose state governments had endorsed the civilista ticket (Table VI/6). Despite the repression in the Federal District, the civilistas also secured a majority here. Most of the other remaining votes came from states where there was a significant dissident faction: Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catharina and Paraná, in which states they obtained over a third of the state vote; from R.G.do Sul, where the Partido Democrático were allowed 25% of the state vote for the civilistas; and from Mato Grosso, Piauí and Maranhão, which gave them 20%, 19% and 15% respectively of the state vote. However, in the majority of the northern and north-eastern states, the civilistas fared very badly, securing below 10% of the state vote.

This fact led Rui to claim in his Memoranda on the elections presented to the House,¹ that the civilista vote had come from the independent voters of the developed regions of the country, whilst his opponents had obtained their support from the state oligarchs particularly of the north and north-east. However, despite his assertions, Rui received over 50% of his votes from the oligarchic controlled state governments of São Paulo and Bahia. The rest came mainly from the 'outs' in the other states, and except for the Partido Democrático of R.G.do Sul and the urban voters of the Federal District, their ideology was no different from that of the oligarchs in power.

Rui himself never accepted the results of the elections as certified by Congress. In his Memoranda, he questioned the eligibility of Marshal Hermes,² who had not registered as a voter, to stand for the Presidency, and asserted that in any case, if all the electoral returns

¹. Brasil: Anais do Congresso Nacional: Apuração da Eleição de Presidente 1910. Vol.2 July 21-29, 1910. Memória apasantada pelo Sr Senador Rui Barbosa.

². Ibid., p.897 passim - 971, The Constitution had stated that only those who enjoyed political rights, that is the right to vote, were eligible for elected posts. The civilistas argued that by failing to register as a voter Hermes did not at the time enjoy political rights.

which did not follow the procedure set out in the electoral regulations¹ and the fraudulent ballots were rejected, the victory of the civilistas would be unquestionable.

But his Memoranda made no impact. São Paulo, the major power behind the civilistas, was not anxious to challenge the authority of Congress to certify the elections, with its implicit criticism of the power of the ruling elites of the major states to decide the outcome of Federal elections. Moreover, Congress had rejected the report of the official commissions which had invalidated over 50% of paulista ballots, and instead endorsed the report submitted by the state governor. It has also been noted, that one reason why the paulistas were opposed to the election of Marshal Hermes as President, was because of the hostility of foreign investors to a military government. However, it would appear that European financiers had not forgotten Rui's policies when he himself was Minister of Finance in 1889-1890, and were even less enthusiastic about a government under Rui.²

Conclusion

In order to ensure his authority in Congress, President Pena relied on the política dos governadores and brought to power in the states governors who were willing to back the President in Congress. However, the events surrounding the election of 1910 demonstrate the fundamental weakness of the política dos governadores. In the absence of developed informal political institutions, in particular of a party system, the effectiveness of the political system depended largely on the skill of the individuals holding office and their ability to manipulate it. Thus the death of the mineiro governor, João Pinheiro, removed the one man who was able to hold the PRM together. Although President Pena secured the election as governor in Minas of a candidate who was willing to endorse the

¹. Ibid., passim.

². British F.O. Diplomatic Reports: F.O.371 File 831 December 18, 1909 report by Roger Casement.

President's policies, Wenceslau Bráz proved incapable of controlling the PRM: whilst the schism in his native state weakened the base of the President's authority in Congress destroying his majority and his chance of imposing his successor.

Regional rivalry, another major source of instability, prevented the state politicians from uniting over an alternate candidate and secured the Presidency for a military candidate, thus opening the way for the radical officers to come to power to challenge the política dos governadores itself.

TABLE VI/6

Results of the Election of 1910 by States

| States | Presidency | | Vice-Presidency | |
|------------------|------------|--------|-----------------|-------------|
| | Hermes | Rui | Wenceslau | Albuquerque |
| Amazonas | 3,237 | 108 | 3,247 | 91 |
| Pará | 21,778 | 114 | 21,782 | 108 |
| Maranhão | 9,779 | 1,539 | 9,794 | 1,546 |
| Piauí | 10,062 | 2,193 | 10,062 | 2,186 |
| Ceará | 23,737 | 35 | 23,707 | 60 |
| R.G.do Norte | 7,666 | 5 | 7,668 | 5 |
| Paraíba | 7,921 | 332 | 7,792 | 318 |
| Pernambuco | 31,577 | 174 | 31,425 | 117 |
| Alagoas | 12,693 | 191 | 12,685 | 187 |
| Sergipe | 334 | 31 | - | - |
| Bahia | 20,048 | 40,989 | 19,697 | 40,651 |
| Espírito Santo | 8,093 | 711 | 8,150 | 690 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 22,832 | 12,648 | 22,256 | 13,290 |
| Federal District | 1,460 | 3,066 | 1,438 | 3,065 |
| Minas Gerais |) | | | |
| Goías |) | 97,468 | 56,578 | 100,975 |
| Mato Grosso |) | | | 53,853 |
| São Paulo | 25,384 | 82,198 | 25,188 | 82,634 |
| Paraná | 11,434 | 6,154 | 11,493 | 6,168 |
| Sta.Catharina | 10,174 | 5,928 | 11,158 | 5,942 |
| R.G.do Sul | 50,326 | 16,373 | 50,350 | 16,274 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional June, July 1910 pp.225, 382, 467, 139-40, 968, 986, 987.

Note: The results are those given by the official Congressional Commissions. The detailed results of the elections by states as finally certified by Congress are not available. However, the above report formed the basis for the final certification.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PRC-SALVATIONISTA STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL ASCENDANCY. THE SÃO PAULO-MINAS GERAIS PACT OF OURO FINO FOR POLITICAL STABILITY. THE ELECTIONS OF 1914 AND 1918

Introduction

The inauguration of Marshal Hermes as President resulted in radical changes in the national power structure. First, it altered the balance of power between the major states, R.G.do Sul becoming temporarily the dominant state after 1910. Second, it brought the radical officers in the army back into power and led to a struggle for control over the state governments between the incumbent ruling state elites backed largely by the gaúcho dominated national party, the PRC, and the salvationista officers supported by the dissident factions in the states anxious to overthrow the entrenched state oligarchies. Although by 1912, the power of the salvationista officers in the Federal government was broken, they had succeeded in capturing five state governments including two major states Bahia and Pernambuco.

The succession question in 1914 was dominated by the rivalry between the salvationista state governors on the one hand, and Pinheiro Machado and his PRC on the other. But the political balance depended on the two major states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais.

Chapter Seven examines the contest for the Presidency in 1914 and 1918. It is concerned in particular with the São Paulo-Minas Gerais alliance over the succession question, and the coalition or coligação between these states and the salvationista officer governors against the PRC in 1913. A study of the correspondence of the incumbent mineiro

governor on the succession issue of 1914 and Congressional papers of the time have thrown new light on the role of São Paulo in this election, and have shown the nature of the paulista-mineiro alliance and the coligação about which little has hitherto been known.

Chapter Seven also looks at the second premature effort by the liberals to organize a national Liberal Party and to endorse its own candidate for the 1914 election. The 1918 election is interesting chiefly because it shows the paulista-mineiro pact in operation to select a consensus candidate.

1. The Organization of the Partido Republicano Conservador - PRC

The electoral victory of Marshal Hermes changed the balance of power between the states, Minas Gerais, which had dominated during the administration of President Afonso Pena, had lost its influence after the state's Republican Party split over the succession question in 1909. Although the state governor and the majority faction of the PRM supported the candidature of Hermes, and the mineiros held a number of important posts during his administration, including the Vice-Presidency, the Ministry of Finance and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies - held by Wenceslau Bráz, Francisco Sales and Sabino Barroso respectively - their influence remained weak, Minas reasserted its independence and authority only in May 1913 during the crisis over the succession question.

The São Paulo Republicans who had led the civilista opposition to Marshal Hermes went into opposition. When on October 26, 1910 the paulista state Senate voted in favour of a motion of confidence in the future Federal government, the official party newspaper, the 'Correio Paulistano' (October 30) immediately reiterated the intention of the state party to continue to oppose the military government. The only paulista in the new

government, Pedro de Toledo, who headed the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, belonged to the state's dissident faction. It was only in January 1912 that the paulista government, threatened by intervention, made its peace with the President.

There was little doubt that the state which had the most influence over President Hermes and his administration was R.G.do sul. Pinheiro Machado had been the leader of the bloco which was responsible for endorsing his candidature. After his nomination, Hermes, who was a native of R.G.do Sul, was claimed as the candidate of the state. The Marshal, anxious to clear his candidacy of any hint of military imposition, was only too willing to accept the patronage of R.G.do Sul. Moreover he was basically a professional soldier with no experience or interest in political manipulation and he was happy to leave this aspect of his Presidential duties in the hands of Pinheiro Machado.¹

But the civilian politicians faced a serious threat to their authority from army officers who prepared to enter politics with Marshal Hermes. To forestall this influence from the barracks, Pinheiro Machado suggested that all the state parties should unite to form a national coalition party with whose representatives in Congress the Federal government would have to govern. The idea was taken from the PRF, the national party which the paulistas had organized in 1893 to secure the election of a civilian President in 1894.

But in its organization² and in its Manifesto, the new national party, the Partido Republicano Conservador - PRC (Conservative Republican Party) established in November 1910 - was modelled on the PRF. The designation 'conservative' was

¹. J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.)

². "Partido Republicano Conservador: Acto do convocação" (Rio, 1910) Cyro Silvat "Pinheiro Machado" (Rio, n.d.) p.154 passim. "O Paiz" November 6-10, 1910.

Structurally the PRC was similar to the PRF. Each state including the Federal District was represented by two delegates on the National Party Convention, which in theory at least was supposed to be the party's decision-making body. When the Convention was not in session, it was represented by a seven men executive committee which was to be elected yearly by the Convention. The committee was to act entirely in an advisory capacity.

specifically chosen to underline the PRC's opposition to revolutionary change like that favoured by the radical officers. In its party Manifesto, the PRC again stressed its commitment to the Constitution of 1891 and in particular to state autonomy and opposition to any form of revision in these. In addition, to attract the paulistas, the PRC undertook to support the financial policies of the last administration, a fixed rate of exchange and the conversion fund presumably at the artificially low rate favoured by the coffee exporting interests, and to promote economic development by providing infrastructure. The armed forces were also assured of the PRC's desire to see the last administration's defence programme continued.

Except for the ruling elites of three major states: São Paulo, Bahia and Pernambuco, all others joined the PRC. São Paulo and Bahia which had opposed the election of a military candidate as President went into opposition after 1910. Pernambuco feared that the PRC would become an instrument through which Pinheiro Machado would attempt to consolidate his power and that of his state R.G.do Sul nationally. However, although the majority of the PRC's executive committee were known to be proteges of Pinheiro Machado,¹ it was obvious from the fact that Minas Gerais joined the party - the mineiro Bias Fortes sat on the executive committee - that the PRC was intended primarily as an instrument to curb military influence. Pinheiro Machado himself was aware that any suggestion of the PRC being used as a tool for political control by R.G.do Sul would result in other major states abstaining from the party and so he refused to accept the leadership of the PRC. Quintino Bocayuva, the prestigious national Republican politician of Rio de Janeiro, was elected instead to preside over the party.

The PRC however made it clear that they were not opposed to the military being

¹. These were: Antonio Azeredo from Mato Grosso, Leopoldo Bulhoes from Goiás, Urbano dos Santos from Maranhão, and Tavares de Lyra from R.G.do Norte.

actively involved in politics, so long as they were prepared to support the aims of the party and to accept its discipline. One General Siqueira Menezes, a deputy for Sergipe, was elected to sit on the executive committee of the PRC. Another General, Fonseca Hermes, an uncle of the President and a deputy for R.G.do Sul, was appointed majority leader in the Chamber of Deputies.

2. The Rise and Fall of the Salvationista Movement

However the officers who had already staged one unsuccessful revolt in 1904 to overthrow the political system, were not interested in joining the PRC - the coalition of ruling state oligarchs. The officers were bitterly opposed to the self-seeking elites who dominated the states, particularly in the north and north-east. These oligarchs were accused of nepotism, misappropriation of state funds, political malpractices and administrative incompetence. The aim of the officers was to regenerate the states by overthrowing the factions in power; hence their interventions in the states became known as the salvações - salvations or rescues.¹ These radical officers were now supported by other senior officers who had been active in seeking the election of Hermes as President and had ambitions of entering politics themselves. Although Hermes, on his inauguration, rewarded the officers by promoting them within the ranks, some of them had ambitions to govern the states. Among these were Emydio Dantas Barreto and Antonio da Fontoura Mena Barreto, who were promoted to the rank of Generals. Dantas Barreto was also appointed Minister of War in the new government. The Ministry thereafter became a key force behind the salvationista movement.

¹. The whole salvationista movement has not yet been seriously researched. A general survey is to be found in Edgard Carone: "A República Velha -(Evolução Política)" pp.263-282. Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" p.280 passim, Ralph della Cava: "Miracle at Joazeiro" (New York, 1970) pp.80-176.

The opportunity for the army officers to intervene in state politics was provided by the dissident state factions who now planned to come to power with the support of the military. In almost every state, opposition groups contested the gubernatorial elections during 1911 and 1912. In many cases the co-operation of the military was secured with the adoption of high-ranking officers who were also often natives of the particular state, as the candidate of the opposition to run against the 'official' candidate - the nominee of incumbents in office. In some instances, the political conflict that developed resulted in mob violence in the state capitals, as for example in São Salvador Recife and Fortaleza where growing social unrest had for long been latent.¹ The violence was fuelled by the opposition and sometimes even by the Federal garrisons stationed in the capitals. The virtual anarchy that prevailed as a result provided further excuses for military intervention often under the direct orders of the Minister of War.

Any assessment of the factors responsible for the initial impulse to the salvationista movement, however, must include the PRC itself. Ironically it was the PRC, anxious to depose state governors who had not joined the party, which was most active in promoting the early salvações. The first successful salvação was executed in Pernambuco. Since the political boss of the state, Rosa e Silva, had declined to join the PRC, his various opponents in the state combined to form the PRC branch in Pernambuco. With the backing of the PRC in the Federal Capital, they prepared to contest the gubernatorial election in November 1911 and chose for their candidate the Minister of War himself, General Dantas Barreto, a native of Pernambuco, when President Hermes, whose candidature for the Presidency had been endorsed by Rosa e Silva, intervened personally to save him and attempted to persuade his Minister not to accept the nomination, he was reproved by the PRC. Quintino Bocayuva

¹. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" p.263 passim.

argued that "the candidate of our allies in Pernambuco (Dantas Barreto) is our candidate and that of the PRC ... Our political duty and our principles demand this support."¹ Although Rosa e Silva himself stood as the 'official' candidate in the contest for the governorship, the state legislature, under duress from the Federal forces stationed in Recife and from mob violence, certified the elections in favour of General Dantas Barreto. In the case of Bahia, both the PRC and the President openly favoured the opposition and when J.J.Seabra, the Minister of Transport, publicly announced in April 1911 his intention of running against the official state candidate in the gubernatorial race early in 1912, the PRC congratulated him, whilst President Hermes visited the state in August to honour his Minister. However in this case, as we shall see below, the PRC later turned against intervention. A third state where the PRC was actively involved in an attempt to depose the incumbents, was São Paulo. The dissident faction of Rodolfo Miranda which was allied to the PRC nominated the new Minister of War, General Mena Barreto as their candidate for the state's gubernatorial election in January 1912. But the paulista Republican Party alerted the state militia, whilst patriotic battalions quickly sprang up in the municípios to defend the state. Neither the President nor the PRC were willing to face a civil war and the paulista Republican Party secured the election of its candidate Rodrigues Alves.

However the salvationistas soon made it clear that they were not interested in carrying out interventions on behalf of the PRC and they extended their activities to states belonging to the national party - Ceará, Alagoas, Sergipe, Paraíba, Piauí; even R.G.do Sul and Minas Gerais were amongst the states threatened. Despite the protests of the PRC, the salvationistas were successful in securing the election of officer-governors Colonel Marcos Franco Rabelo, Colonel Clodoaldo da Fonseca (an uncle of President Hermes) and General

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" September 14, 1911.

Siqueira Menezes to the states of Ceará, Alagoas and Sergipe respectively. In Alagoas for example, Fonseca Hermes, majority leader in Congress, personally appealed to his brother Colonel Clodoaldo to avoid political conflict in the state by refusing his nomination. But the Colonel replied he was "not disposed to make arrangements with politicians without morality who were disgracing the Republic." This incursion into states loyal to the PRC caused the party to reverse its attitude to interventions. For example, when the opposition in Bahia contested the local município elections in São Salvador and formed a dual Município Council at the end of 1911, it found the PRC unwilling to concede its request for Federal intervention in its favour¹.

But the salvationistas could not sustain their victories. They were a minority in the army and had never really enjoyed the support of the President, although Hermes had been reluctant to take a strong line against the salvationistas,² particularly after his son, Mario Hermes, became involved with the movement in Bahia and was appointed leader of the salvationistas in the Chamber of Deputies. The indiscriminate and widespread onslaught on almost all states further weakened the salvationistas, since it resulted in the dispersal of the limited number of salvationista officers and prevented co-ordination of the movement. As a result the salvationistas were quickly defeated once the PRC began a determined campaign against them. In a number of states the PRC blocked the entry of the officers simply by persuading the ruling state party to compromise with the dissident state faction.

During 1912, the salvationistas also slowly lost control in the Federal government.

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" November 30, December 2, 4, 5, 1911. In this case, General Mena Barreto, the Minister of War, authorized the opposition in the state capital to call in the Federal garrison to support its claim. When the Bahian state governor refused permission - conceded by the Federal Judge, for the opposition to meet in the Assembly Hall, and called out the state militia and irregular forces, the Federal troops stationed in São Salvador bombarded the city. The incident caused a crisis in the Federal Cabinet and led to the resignation of the Minister of Navy. But the opposition remained in control in Bahia and J.J.Seabra was easily elected governor in March 1912.

². Maria do Carmo Campelo de Souza: "O processo Político - Partidário na primeira República" (op.cit.) in Brazil em Perspectiva p.206.

At the end of March 1912, their ally, the Minister of War, General Mena Barreto, resigned from office after a number of disagreements with the President. One of them was over the Minister's intention to contest the gubernatorial elections in R.G.do Sul as the candidate for the opposition. Hermes intervened personally to stop his Minister from interfering in gaúcho politics, and replaced him with General Vespasiano de Albuquerque, a professional soldier. The salvationistas also failed to strengthen their support in Congress at the Congressional elections of 1912. The paulista Republicans who had consistently opposed the interventions and were said to be financing newspapers in the Federal Capital to conduct a campaign against the salvationistas,¹ united with the PRC in Congress to prevent the certification of Congressional candidates on the salvationista slates of Pernambuco, Ceará and Alagoas amongst others.² At the end of 1912, the last tenuous link between the salvationistas and the government was broken when Mario Henriques became estranged from his father because of the President's infatuation with a society lady, only weeks after the death of his wife.³

Thus by 1912, the power of the salvationista army officers in the Federal government had been broken and the ruling elites of the states reasserted their authority through the PRC in Congress. However, the salvationista threat to the PRC was not over. Five state governments: Bahia, Pernambuco, Ceará, Alagoas and Sergipe had fallen to the Salvationistas and the governors of these states now united to challenge the authority of the PRC. The issue over which the PRC/salvationista schism emerged in 1913 was the Presidential succession to Marshal Hermes.

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 12, 1912.

². Ibid., April-May, 1912.

³. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" pp.207-8.

3. The Succession Question. The PRC attempts to Reassert its Political Dominance:
the Candidature of Pinheiro Machado

As the salvationista movement waned during 1912, the PRC was left as the most powerful political force. But the party had undergone certain changes since 1910. The dominant influence of R.G.do Sul over the PRC, as indeed over the government itself, was now unquestionable. Following the death of Quintino Bocayuva in July 1912, Pinheiro Machado accepted formal leadership of the party and was elected President of its executive committee. In the government the gaúchos acquired a new Ministry,¹ in addition to the Ministry of Interior and Justice, which was held by Rivadavia Correia. As the President became increasingly absorbed in his private affairs after 1912, he relied almost entirely on Pinheiro Machado for advice on matters of state.

However as noted, the salvationista movement had not left the PRC unscathed; three of the five state governments that had fallen to the salvationistas - Alagoas, Sergipe and Ceará had belonged to the PRC. Moreover, the salvationistas controlled states which besides these three satellite states also included the two major states of Bahia and Pernambuco, now united to destroy the PRC. The PRC had been chiefly responsible for protecting the ruling oligarchs of more states from being toppled by the salvationista officers and to the officers, the PRC and Pinheiro Machado in particular, represented the worst evils of the oligarchic political system, with its ruthless repression of all opposition and boss controlled politics. Leadership of the five salvationista states was assumed by General Dantas Barreto, governor of Pernambuco. In an attempt to weaken the PRC and the domination of R.G.do Sul, General Barreto revived the issue of regional disparities between

¹ Barbosa Goncalves, brother of the incumbent governor of R.G.do Sul, replaced J.J.Seabra as Minister of Transport in 1912. Another gaúcho, General Bento Ribeiro, was appointed Prefect of the Federal District.

the north and south and suggested the organization of a Confederation of the North.¹ Besides the salvationista states, Amazonas and Pará were interested in the idea and the Confederation was launched in the first half of 1912 under the presidency of General Barreto. Although it does not appear to have developed further, it was obvious that the PRC faced serious opposition from the salvationista states.

In January 1913, the PRC began to assert its political dominance by taking the initiative over the question of a successor to President Hermes. Pinheiro Machado was the obvious choice of the PRC and his candidature was suggested privately by a number of the executive committee of the party.² There was little doubt that his candidature would be endorsed by the majority in the PRC, which was composed largely of satellite states and R.G.do Sul. But crucial questions remained. Would the other major states within the PRC, Minas Gerais in particular, and Rio de Janeiro, support the party line on the succession? Would the salvationista states accept the leadership of the PRC on the succession issue and endorse its candidate? What would be the attitude of São Paulo which was not a member of the PRC?

The salvationistas were the first to challenge the PRC. The PRC's executive committee had invited the governors of all the states to send delegates to a Party Convention to be held soon after May 22, and which would deal with the succession. General Dantas Barreto questioned the authority of the PRC to decide on the issue and called instead for a National Convention, which would represent all political forces.³ This defiance of the PRC assumed immediate importance as anti-Pinheiro Machado newspapers

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" February 25, 28-29, April 16, 1912.

². Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" (*op.cit.*) pp.151-155. Copies of letters Antonio Azeredo to B.Brandão January 18, 1913; February 2, 1913; A. Azeredo to W.Bráz February 13, 1913.

³. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" letter of P.Machado to D.Barreto, p.212. Letter D.Barreto to P.Machado pp.214-216, also pp.211-229 generally on succession issue.

in the Federal Capital - "O Correio da Manhã" and "O Imparcial" published the contents of the telegrams praising General Dantas Barreto for his courageous stand in "defence of democracy". Other salvationista states - Bahia, Ceará, Alagoas and Sergipe - now joined the revolt against the PRC.

The salvationista revolt encouraged Rio de Janeiro to assert its independence of the PRC. Nilo Peçanha, a representative of the state on the PRC's executive committee, suggested that the National Nomination Convention to choose the Presidential candidates should comprise delegates of municípios like the conventions of the Dissidência and the civilista coalition in 1901 and 1909 respectively. When the PRC's executive (not surprisingly) rejected the idea, since the party would be unable to control such a convention, Rio de Janeiro withdrew from the party. The schism with Rio de Janeiro, a major state, was a serious blow to the PRC, particularly as the state united with the salvationista when they offered to nominate Nilo Peçanha as their Presidential candidate.¹ Thus the state government of three major states: Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and three satellite states: Ceará, Alagoas and Sergipe, were ranged against Pinheiro Machado and his PRC.

The co-operation of Minas Gerais with the PRC was therefore crucial if the party was to control the succession to Hermes. However, it was soon obvious that the mineiro governor, Bueno Brandão, was reluctant to endorse the PRC's proposal for a R.G.do Sul-Minas Gerais ticket at the election, although the PRC had suggested Brandão himself as the Vice-Presidential candidate with Pinheiro Machado for the Presidency.² Governor Brandão would not commit the PRM without consulting the party's executive committee, but it was no

¹. Maria Carmo de Campello Souza: "O Processo Político Partidária na Primeira República" p.211 footnote

². Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" letter A.Azeredo to B.Brandão January 18, 1913; B. Brandão to A.Azeredo February 7, 1913 pp.151-157 passim; pp.203-207 letters of R.Junqueira to B.Brandão.

secret that a number of mineiro political chiefs were not willing to support Pinheiro Machado and hoped to obtain the Presidency for Minas.¹ However, as usual, the mineiros were having difficulty in uniting behind one candidate from their state.²

As it became apparent that the two major states of the PRC, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, would not endorse the candidature of Pinheiro Machado, the PRC executive attempted to bring pressure from other sources - the President and the municípios, to oblige these states to co-operate with the PRC. Under the direction of Pinheiro Machado, President Hermes personally requested the governors of Minas and Rio de Janeiro to support the candidature of Pinheiro³ "a good friend and an honest Republican" as his successor. The President maintained that except for a few "young Turks", Pinheiro was favoured by a majority of the officers, but added hastily that his appeal on behalf of Pinheiro was not intended as an attempt by the military or the President to impose a candidate. At the same time the PRC also instructed governors of loyal satellite states to get their municípios to publicly endorse Pinheiro's candidacy so that he would appear as the popular candidate.⁴

But the response was disappointing.⁵ Only a majority of the municípios of Paraíba and Maranhão came out in support of Pinheiro, whilst the governor of Rio de Janeiro categorically refused to back him even after Rivadavia Correa, the Minister of Interior and Justice, who was conducting the negotiations on behalf of the President, offered the state governor Cliveira Botelho the Vice-Presidency on the same ticket. The governor of Minas

¹. "O Imparcial" February 13, 1913. Interview with Ribeiro Junqueira.

². Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" p.208 passim and 263 passim; letter R.Junqueira to B.Brandão February 5, 1913; B.Brandão to R.Junqueira February 19, 1913; Francisco Sales to B.Brandão. The two most popular mineiro candidates initially were the incumbent governor Bueno Brandão and Francisco Sales, Minister of Finance in the Hermes government.

³. Ibid., letter Sabino Barroso to B.Brandão April, 1913. Hermes to B.Brandão May 7, 1913 pp.32-33; 167-170; 189-190; 352 passim; Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" pp.237-238.

⁴. "O Imparcial" April 19, 1913. "Jornal do Comércio" May 1, 1913.

⁵. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" pp.40-42.

Gerais initially continued to be evasive as he did not wish to antagonize R.G.do Sul by an outright rejection of Pinheiro Machado, since Minas would eventually need the support of the PRC if it was to secure the election of a mineiro candidate.

As in previous elections since 1905, rivalry between major states over the Presidency, hindered co-operation over the succession question. Although Minas and Rio de Janeiro had joined the PRC to oppose a military take-over in the states, they would not submit to the party when it became an instrument for domination by R.G.do Sul. In 1913 Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro like R.G.do Sul aspired to the Presidency. The failure of President Hermes to secure the co-operation of these major states for a candidate he personally favoured, again demonstrates the limits of the Presidential powers, which did not extend to imposing a successor. But as noted, the controversy over the succession question in 1913 also had another aspect besides the interstate rivalry. This was the conflict between the officer—governors who aimed at ending the power of the ruling state oligarchs exercised through the PRC, by preventing the election of a candidate of the PRC, in favour of a salvationista backed candidate. Thus three possible contenders for the Presidency had emerged by April 1913. First, Pinheiro Machado backed by the incumbent President, R.G.do Sul, and most of the satellite states in the PRC; second, Nilo Peçanha, the candidate of Rio de Janeiro and some of the salvationista states including one major state, Pernambuco, and two satellites, Ceará and Sergipe; third, a candidate from Minas Gerais supported by this state and with the tentative backing of two salvationista states, Bahia and Alagoas, and two satellite states of the PRC, Espírito Santo and Goiás. There was however no candidate of the military itself, although General Dantas Barreto was suggested as an alternative to Nilo Peçanha by some salvationista elements; he was being considered because of his position as governor of a major state and not as an officer. Indeed, amongst

the senior army officers there was no enthusiasm for another military President.

4. The São Paulo-Minas Gerais Pact of Ouro Fino

The position of São Paulo, another major state, remains to be considered. The incumbent paulista state governor, Rodrigues Alves, was quietly working for a civilian consensus ticket that would avert a contested election and ensure political stability in the next administration.¹ In particular the paulistas were anxious to prevent further threats to state autonomy like that posed earlier by both the PRC and the salvationista officers. In effect this meant the rejection not only of a military candidate but also of a partisan civilian candidate belonging to either faction. To secure its purpose in the succession issue, the paulistas sacrificed their own ambitions for the Presidency and instead São Paulo assumed the role of a moderator in the controversy over the succession. Since the state had neither supported the salvationista officers nor joined the PRC,² it was in a position to mediate in the succession dispute.

However, São Paulo was not powerful enough to act as an arbiter by itself and the paulista governor appealed to Minas Gerais, the electorally most powerful state, for its co-operation in securing a succession ticket "which would end the general agitation with which the country is afflicted", Minas was willing and the PRM's executive sent a representative (Dr Antonio Gomes de Linia) to São Paulo to find out how best the two states could co-operate in indicating a President, adding that Minas would like to endorse the candidature of Bueno Brandão because of his "administrative achievements in the state", but if he was not

¹. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" letter of A.Azeredo to B. Brandão February 2, 1913} R.Junqueira to B.Brandão February 9, 1913 pp.153-4, 204. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" (op.cit.) Vol.2 pp.524-566.

² In January 1913, the PRC's executive committee in fact invited the São Paulo Republicans to join the PRC so that they could co-operate on the succession, but the paulistas declined the invitation. See Guerino Casasanta (op.cit.) R.Junqueira to B.Brandão February 5,1913.

acceptable, Minas would support "any other name worthy of the post".¹

It was not until the end of April 1913, after President Hermes attempted to use the influence of his office in favour of the candidature of Pinheiro Machado, that the governments of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, fearing an attempt at forceful imposition by the President, hastily arrived at a formal and secret understanding. The agreement became known as the Pact of Ouro Fino after the city in Minas Gerais where Cincinato Braga, the representative of the paulista governor met Bueno Brandão to finalize the policies that the two states would follow in the succession conflict to maintain political stability.² The Pact stated that the "security of the Republican institutions" depended on São Paulo and Minas Gerais and that these institutions were at risk if the country faced another contested election. The two states therefore undertook to work for a conciliation ticket which would be acceptable to all major political groupings, and which would also ensure that the next administration would be free of conflict. On these grounds, the Pact vetoed the candidature of Pinheiro Machado, Nilo Peçanha and Dantas Barreto. Both Minas and São Paulo also agreed not to put forward any candidate from their respective states unless he was mutually acceptable. Finally it was decided that in order to prevent a political crisis over the succession question, both states would make every effort not to break with the government of President Hermes and that they would make known their opposition to Pinheiro Machado's candidacy only indirectly, in the hope that Machado would himself withdraw his candidature - thus avoiding a major political confrontation between the government and the PRC on the one hand and São Paulo, Minas, Rio de Janeiro and the salvationista states on the other. It was agreed that in any case they would not make known their opposition to Pinheiro Machado until the elections for the Presidency of the Lower House - due in early May - had been

¹ Ibid., Francisco Sales to B.Brandão February 15, 1913; Bias Fortes to Rodrigues Alves March 19, 1913 pp.34-35, 263 passim.

² Ibid., Pact of Ouro Fino pp.38-39.

certified in favour of a mineiro candidate and they were assured of future control over the House.

But the two states failed to prevent a rift with the PRC and further political polarization as they had hoped. Although as noted, the mineiro-paulista pact had been secret, within days of it being formalized, rumours were rife in the Federal Capital of the anti-Machado agreement between São Paulo and Minas. This was no doubt partly explained by the fact that R.G.do Sul controlled the telegraph system and mail was also regularly intercepted.¹ Anti-Machado newspapers anxious to destroy Pinheiro's candidacy and weaken the PRC by forcing Minas to withdraw from the party, exploited the rumours, 'O Imparcial' reported that the PRC had no intention of moving to the defensive as Minas and São Paulo had hoped, and 'Rio News' announced that the decision of these states not to veto openly Pinheiro's candidacy was seen as a sign of the weakness of his opponents and the PRC was meeting to ratify formally the candidature of Pinheiro Machado.² Whether in fact this was true was never certified, but the news led the Republican parties of both São³ Paulo and Minas to reject him openly. At a special meeting convoked on May 4, the executive committee of the PRM stated its intention "to oppose by every means the candidature of Pinheiro Machado which did not suit the interest of the country at the moment". One member of the committee, Francisco Bressane, also added that Minas as a Catholic state could not support Pinheiro because he was a positivist and opposed to the Church.⁴

Despite the efforts of São Paulo, the ruling elite had by May 1913 divided into two main groups: first, the pro—Pinheiro Machado camp which comprised the President,

¹ Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.156.

² Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" letter of Francisco Sales to B.Brandão May 2, 1913; letter of Cincinato Braga to B.Brandão pp.40-42; R.Junqueira to B.Brandão p.217.

³ Ibid., letter of Cincinato Braga to B.Brandão April 29, 1913; also other correspondence pp.43-44.

⁴ Ibid., B.Brandão to C.Braga pp.42-44; B.Brandão to A.Azeredo p.165; B.Brandão to Hermes pp.167, 342-344.

R.G.do Sul and the majority of the satellite states in the PRC; second, the anti-Machado faction which included the five salvationista states, Rio de Janeiro, Minas and São Paulo.

5. The Formation of the Coligação (The Coalition of anti-PRC States)

Pinheiro Machado's immediate concern now was not to defend his candidature for the Presidency, but to prevent Minas from resigning from the PRC, since this would considerably weaken the party. On May 7, at a hastily convened meeting of the executive committee of the PRC, Pinheiro withdrew his candidature for the Presidency, resigned as leader of the party, and had President Hermes elected to the post instead.¹ It was hoped that Minas which had recently indicated its continued support for the government would be reluctant to break away from the PRC if it was led by the President, But the move failed to avert a split. On May 8, the mineiro Francisco Sales resigned as Minister of Finance in the government. Later in the month, the mineiros ignored an invitation of the PRC to a general meeting.² The PRC also failed to get São Paulo to join the party after extending the state a second invitation, this time with the offer of a seat on the PRC's executive committee and a Ministry in the government.³

The breach between Minas and the PRC delighted the salvationista governors. Although Pernambuco in particular had ambitions of seeing one of the salvationista's own nominees selected for the Presidency, other salvationista governors notably of Bahia and Alagoas were more realistic, and argued that with the opposition of the incumbent President, the PRC, and both dominant states São Paulo and Minas, they had no chance of winning the

¹ Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" R.Junqueira to B.Brandão May 9, 1913 p.219.

² "Correio da Manhã" May 8-11, 1913. "Jornal do Comércio" May 11, 1913. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" p.167; Sabino Barroso to B.Brandão May 22, 28, 1913.

³ Ibid., letter Cincinato Braga to Adolfo Gordo May, 1913. Francisco Sales to B.Brandão May 27, 1913 p.270.

Presidency. Moreover, both Bahia and Alagoas were more anxious to protect the position of existing salvationista governors which was threatened by the PRC. Already in Ceará the legitimacy of Colonel Franco Rabelo was being challenged by the PRC backed opposition state faction and Federal intervention was expected to restore the deposed oligarchy. The weaker salvationista states therefore, Ceará, Alagoas, and even Bahia, were anxious to obtain the patronage of a powerful bancada in Congress that would defend them against Federal interventions. The paulistas had bitterly opposed the salvationista governors' incursions in the states, and were not expected to protect them now against the PRC. But Minas was known to be more sympathetic since the mineiros were opposed to the gaúcho dominated PRC and had been canvassing for support for a mineiro Presidential candidate. Both Bahia and Alagoas had been conducting negotiations with Minas in favour of a mineiro Presidential candidate and General Clodoaldo da Fonseca, governor of Alagoas, had even suggested to Dantas Barreto as President of the Confederation of the North¹ that they should fall behind a mineiro-paulista entente, presumably if the paulistas were willing to co-operate with the salvationistas.

As noted, São Paulo had initially opposed an alliance with either the PRC or the salvationista governors, but in May 1913, both São Paulo and Minas were forced into an alliance with the salvationista bancadas in Congress to prevent Pinheiro Machado and the PRC from gaining control over the executive committee of the Chamber of Deputies, which would give them the advantage in the certification of the results of the Presidential election next May. This coalition of the anti-PRC states in Congress was simply known as the coligação (coalition). Although the PRC for some time refused to recognize the existence of a formal opposition (one PRC devotee referring to it as "a group that was still mysterious of

¹ Ibid., telegram Clodoaldo Fonseca to B.Brandão March 31, 1913; Clodoaldo to Dantas Barreto February 20, 1913; B.Brandão to R.Junqueira May 27, 1913 pp.182-184, 192, 208.

which only the name was recognized") the composition of the coligação was no secret to anyone, as the newspapers of the time and Congressional debates indicated.¹ It comprised besides the ruling parties of Minas, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the ruling factions of the salvationista states Pernambuco, Bahia, Alagoas, Ceará; the allegiance of Sergipe and Pará was less certain. The coligação indicated that its aim was to select as Presidential candidate "a Brazilian worthy in all respects of such high authority, someone who is already noted for his great services to the Nation and the Republic". There was also a suggestion that the coligação should have its own newspaper for propaganda purposes, which would be financed by a contribution of 10 contos per month from the affiliated states, but this did not materialize.²

In Congress at least, it was soon obvious that the two sides were deadlocked, as with a large number of absentees and deliberate abstentions neither the PRC nor the coligação were able to command the majority necessary to have their nominees elected to the executive of the Chamber of Deputies. But there could be little doubt that the PRC was now on the defensive. Pinheiro Machado instructed its members to absent themselves to prevent a quorum. Some fifteen Congressmen then touring Europe were instructed to return home immediately.³ In June, one deputy for Rio de Janeiro, Lourenço da Sa, and a member of the coligação, quoted an article in the journal 'A Epoca'.⁴ "... we judge the coligação is getting stronger all the time since the Minister of Finance Rivadavia Correa finds it necessary to bribe two Pernambucans with 200 contos de reis each." The coligação, Lourenço da Sa claimed, could rely on 96 votes and Pinheiro on 86.⁵ Electorally, too, the

¹ "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May-June, 1913.

² Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de bueno Brandão" F.Bressane to B.Brandão May 11, 28, 1913 p.245.

³ "Diário do Congresso Nacional" speech of Mauricio Lacerda Dec.17, 1913.

⁴ Ibid., June 13, 1913.

⁵ Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" p.245 passim F. Bressane to

coligação were undoubtedly superior since they had the support of five major states and some satellites.

6. In Search of a Consensus Ticket

To secure a consensus ticket acceptable to both the PRC and the coligação, it was necessary first of all that the Presidential candidate was non-partisan and belonged to neither side. Secondly, to be a strong contender for the Presidency, he would also have to be an eminent establishment politician, preferably from São Paulo or Minas. He would in addition have to be a non-controversial figure who could be relied on to defend existing political institutions, particularly state autonomy and the export dominated economy.

Following the collapse of Pinheiro Machado's candidature, the PRC once again attempted to seize the initiative in the succession question. If it was successful in securing the endorsement of its nominee, the PRC could claim him as a victory for the party. The PRC put forward paulista Campos Sales as a conciliation candidate and invited the states in the coligação to attend a Nomination Convention of the PRC to ratify the decision.¹

The initial response of the majority of the coligação was hostile.² Although Campos Sales had in fact not been involved in the recent political confrontation, and was a prestigious national politician who had already served one successful Presidential term (1898-1902), during which he had consolidated the Republic's political system and put its finances on a sound footing, he was now elderly and infirm and it was feared that he would be unable to exercise the same degree of independence in office and be manipulated by the

B.Brandão.

¹ "Jornal do Comércio" May 11, 1913. G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B. Brandão" p.219, R.Junqueira to B. Brandão May 8, 1913.

² Ibid., letter coligação to PRC executive May 11, 1913 pp.46-48: R.Junqueira to B.Brandão May 9, 1913 p.220, 222. D.Barreto to B.Brandão May 25, 28, 1913 pp.180-181. Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" p.247, 249-250, B.Brandão to D.Barreto and reply.

PRC. Moreover the coligação were not prepared to attend a Convention of the PRC which would signify a surrender to its authority. Four major states: Minas, Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, declined the PRC's invitation in a joint letter. "To attend such a Convention" (of the PRC) they stated, "would be to submit to the domination of a minority party and this contravened the democratic principles to which the coligação is committed."

But São Paulo anxious only to avert a contested election and to end the political confrontation, proposed a basis for co-operation between the two sides.¹ The coligação would accept Campos Sales as a "candidate of conciliation"; the Vice-Presidential candidate must be chosen by Campos Sales from a list of five names drawn up by the coligação; this 'consensus' ticket would be ratified in a National Convention attended by all Congressional Senators and Deputies as delegates of their respective state governments. This time it was the turn of the PRC to object on the grounds that the proposals favoured the coligação. Eventually Campos Sales himself proposed the acceptable formula: he would choose a non-partisan Vice-Presidential candidate and the ticket would be presented in a written Manifesto to the Nation signed by both sides, the PRC and the coligação,² as had happened in 1905.

Finding a Vice-Presidential candidate who was unaligned and of acceptable political stature was not easy. By mid-June the most likely candidate was the incumbent Vice-President Wenceslau Bráz.³ As in 1909, he had maintained a discreet silence over the succession issue, spending much of his time in his município Itajuba in Minas Gerais. His candidature was proposed by mineiro governor Bueno Brandão; the PRC were sympathetic and the governor of São Paulo was sure to accept. But the candidature of

¹ G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" p.35, 171; R.Alves to B.Brandão May 24, 1913.

² Ibid., pp.49-52 passim.

³ Ibid., pp.36-37, 49-58; letters exchanged by mineiro governor with governors of coligação states; 174-179 passim; 190-191; 201-202; 272 passim; 344-349.

Wenceslau Bráz was opposed by other mineiros - Ribeiro Junqueira and Francisco Sales, who thought him too closely associated with Pinheiro Machado. This view was also held by Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, Dantas Barreto was also concerned that since Wenceslau Bráz, as the incumbent Vice-President, would have to leave office six months before the election, Pinheiro might use the opportunity to make President Hermes resign on some pretext and as Vice-President of the Senate, himself assume the Presidency.¹ Then just as the mineiro governor had obtained the consent of the majority of the coligação states, Campos Sales - unwell and exasperated with the haggling - withdrew his candidature on June 16. He was followed three days later by Wenceslau Bráz.²

After six weeks of bargaining, another round of negotiations had broken down. In any event, the ticket would not have lasted for long even if it had been finalized, since on June 28, Campos Sales died. Meanwhile, the phase of co-operation over candidates had not eased political tensions. Congress was still unable to function as the executive had yet to be elected. Instead, the debates had become more acrimonious. The PRC had begun reprisals in Ceará and Alagoas, and Federal civil servants loyal to the state governors were dismissed.³ In Congress, salvationista supporters demanded that the incumbent President should maintain political neutrality and not condone the PRC's assaults on the states. The underlying political issue continued to be the succession question and the state of uncertainty here continued.

¹ Ibid., pp.52, 180-181.

² Ibid., pp.186-7.

³ Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp.159-160. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" debates June, 1913.

7. Proposed Alliance with the Civilistas and the Rui Barbosa-Francisco Glycério ticket

Following the collapse of the Campos Sales-Wenceslau Bráz ticket, the coligação turned to the governor of São Paulo, Rodrigues Alves, as the only candidate who could breach the political rift.¹ Like Campos Sales, Rodrigues Alves was a politician of national prestige with a reputation for non-partisanship and concern for the national good. As governor of São Paulo, Alves had been mainly responsible for the state adopting the role of moderator in the struggle for the Presidency. In a letter dated June 26 to the executive commission of the paulista Republican Party, the governors of Minas, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Pernambuco, Alagoas and Ceará called on Rodrigues Alves to accept the nomination for the Presidency, stating that this request was not "an artifice of party politics but a national call to one of its most dear sons". But Alves declined, reluctant to be involved personally in the succession struggle.

In order to understand the move in favour of Rui's candidature that now followed, it is necessary to review first the position of the civilistas since their electoral defeat in 1910. In fact only a handful of dissident civilian Congressmen, mainly from Minas, São Paulo and the Federal District under Rui Barbosa's leadership, continued the civilista campaign after the inauguration of Marshal Hermes. Both the São Paulo and Bahia governments had withdrawn from the civilista coalition following the certification of the 1910 Presidential elections. By 1912, the paulista government went further and re-established normal relations with the government of Marshal Hermes, whilst the formerly pro-civilista ruling elite in Bahia was toppled by the salvationista officers and replaced with the state's opposition group. Despite their numerical weakness, however, and the numerous attempts

¹ A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.11 pp.791-2. G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de Brandão" pp.249, 332.

of both the PRC and President Hermes himself to conciliate with Rui,¹ the civilistas continued to oppose the military government and campaigned for liberal reform. In 1913 the civilistas decided in favour of putting forward their own ticket in the Presidential election of 1914 and appealed to Rodrigues Alves as governor of São Paulo, which had supported the civilistas in 1910, to accept the nomination as their candidate.² When Alves refused, they endorsed the 1910 civilista ticket with Rui Barbosa—Albuquerque Lins.³ Meanwhile certain sections of the press in the Federal Capital, 'A Noite', 'Correio da Manhã', 'O Imparcial', 'A Época', amongst others, also began a campaign in favour of Rui's candidature to end the political crisis over the succession. In mid-June the pro-Rui camp gained new support when some mineiro politicians hostile to the choice of Wenceslau Bráz for the Vice-Presidency, decided after a meeting in Belo Horizonte to support another ticket with Rui for the Presidency.

At first the political forces behind Rui's candidature were insignificant, but as the negotiations over the Campos Sales-Wenceslau Bráz ticket ended abruptly in mid-June and the state governors seemed incapable of uniting over a ticket, their Congressional representatives in the Federal Capital began seriously to consider Rui as a candidate with popular national support. The enthusiasm for him increased when the governor of Bahia, J.J.Seabra publicly endorsed his candidature at the end of June.⁴ In the Senate Bueno de Paiva, closely associated with the mineiro leadership, began a campaign in his favour. He said that now that the candidature of Campos Sales had fallen through, the politicians ought to support the popular candidate, Rui. It was also known that Francisco Sales had left for Belo Horizonte to consult the mineiro governor on the question. On July

¹ João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" (op.cit.) pp.192-3.

² 'O Imparcial' January 25, 1913.

³ 'Jornal do Comércio' May 2, 3, 8, 1913.

⁴ Guerino Casasantai "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" J.J.Seabra to B. Brandão June 22, 1913.

6, Ribeiro Junqueira, leader of the mineiro bancada, wrote to the governor urging that the state party endorse Rui. Junqueira assured the governor that, once elected, "Rui would respect all the ruling oligarchs of states, and support legality".¹ The paulistas in Congress went even further: they decided in favour of a Rui Barbosa-Francisco Glycério ticket and obtained its endorsement by a majority of the executive committee of the paulista Republican Party. The leader of the paulista bancada Galeão Carvathal and Francisco Glycério informed Rui in the first week of July that the coligação were sympathetic to his candidature and they only awaited the consent of the paulista governor Rodrigues Alves to finalize the decision.² They pointed out that this was a mere formality. It was said that the PRC were also prepared to accept Rui's candidature for the Presidency unconditionally.

But in fact the Congressmen had seriously misjudged the reaction of their incumbent governors. The mineiro governor Bueno Brandão doubted whether Rui's candidature would be acceptable to President Hermes. In his letter to the bancada leader, Brandão³ wrote that though Rui would "provide the popular element capable of generating enthusiasm, I expect a strong reaction from the Federal government (presumably because of Rui's civilista campaign), which will destroy the peace which is our aim. "Bias Fortes, the mineiro political boss, was even more strongly opposed to Rui⁴ since he feared that his candidature would resurrect the schism of 1909-1910 in Minas, which would in turn weaken the chances of national political unity because of the state's political importance in the Federation. Neither did Rui, an advocate of liberal reform, appeal to paulista governor Rodrigues Alves who, as noted, desired a candidate who could be relied on to defend the

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" p.792. G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" letter of Junqueira to Brandão July 6, 1913; General Clodoaldo to Brandão p.184, 332, 359.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 19, 1913 speech Alfredo Ellis. The three members of the PRP who favoured Rui were: Francisco Glycério, Adolfo Gordo and Bernardino de Campos. The two opposed to him were César Bastos and Dr Rubiao Júnior.

³. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" B.Brandão to R.Junqueira July, 1913.

⁴. Ibid., Bias Fortes to B.Brandão July 6, 1913 p.260.

established political and economic system. Although it was said that the PRC favoured Rui, this was only a diversionary tactic employed by Pinheiro Machado, partly to earn the goodwill of the pro-Rui elements, partly to give time for a more acceptable PRC candidate to emerge. During the succession crisis of 1922, Antonio Azeredo, who had acted as spokesman for Machado in 1913, admitted in Congress that this was in fact the case and that Rui's candidature had been "a political ploy of the moment".¹

5. The Consensus Ticket Wenceslau Bráz-Urbano Santos

However, whilst the Congressmen were debating the Rui Barbosa-Francisco Glycério ticket, the state governors were quietly negotiating the successful ticket. It has been stated earlier that Minas was particularly anxious to see a mineiro President in 1914 Governor Brandão now prepared to secure support for mineiro Wenceslau Bráz as an alternative to Rui.² Bráz had earlier been considered as Vice-Presidential candidate with Campos Sales and the reluctance of some mineiro politicians and the Salvationista governors who thought him too closely allied with the PRC, was noted. But the mineiro governor figured that if Pinheiro Machado on behalf of R.G.do Sul, President Hermes and São Paulo could be persuaded to endorse Wenceslau Bráz, then the salvationista governors and the satellite states in the PRC would have no alternative but to ratify the decision.

Securing the compliance of Pinheiro Machado posed the real difficulty, but in fact, due to a serious miscalculation on Machado's part, governor Brandão easily won approval not only from Pinheiro Machado on behalf of R.G.do Sul and the PRC, but also from President Hermes himself. Since the collapse of the Sales-Bráz ticket, Pinheiro Machado had decided that the period of conciliation between the PRC and the coligação was over

¹ "Diário do Congresso Nacional" (op.cit.) 1921.

² Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" p.58 passim.

and the PRC was now considering a strong partisan ticket, which would ensure the Presidency for a PRC candidate in 1914.¹ The candidature of Wenceslau Bráz endorsed by the mineiro governor and the PRC seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for splitting the coligação. The salvationista governors had already demonstrated their hostility to Bráz; the paulista Republicans were more or less pledged to support the Rui-Glycério ticket; moreover, within Minas itself Bráz was unpopular and a schism in the PRM - as had happened in 1909 - would make the incumbent governor more dependent on the PRC to see his candidate through. So Pinheiro Machado consented to Bráz and secured the approval also of President Hermes for him.²

But as governor Brandão had anticipated, the paulista governor Rodrigues Alves was only too willing to endorse the candidature of the mineiro Wenceslau Bráz, not only because it was acceptable to the PRC but also to stop the Rui bandwagon. Despite the protests of paulista Congressmen who had pledged the PRP to the Rui-Glycério ticket,³ governor Alves accepted Bráz on behalf of São Paulo.⁴ The salvationista governors were now obliged to fall behind Bráz and by the end of July Pernambuco, Ceará, Pará, Alagoas and Rio de Janeiro had individually accepted his candidature.⁵ Only Bahia continued to support Rui, but even so the Bahian governor was apologetic. He informed Minas that he personally preferred their candidate, but he could not abandon a native of his own state.⁶ Now that Minas and São Paulo had arrived at an understanding with the PRC, the

¹ J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (*op.cit.*) p.167; P Machado to Borges de Medeiros July 22, 1913; p.283..

² A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (*op.cit.*) p.793. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" pp. 194-5 235; 251 passim; 331 passim contain letters from various mineiro Congressmen to B.Brandão.

³ "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 19, 21-22, 1913; August 11, 15, 1913. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" F.Bressane to B.Brandão July 22, 1913 pp.253-4.

⁴ A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" p.794 telegrams Minas to Alves and reply. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de Bueno Brandão" P.173 R.Alves to B.Brandão July 12, 1913.

⁵ Dantas Barreto: "Conspirações" (*op.cit.*) p.255, Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" p.176 passim letters of salvationista governors and R.de Janeiro to B.Brandão.

⁶ Ibid., J.J.Seabra to B.Brandão July 13, 1913 p.235.

salvationista states feared severe retribution if they remained in opposition.

Since Wenceslau Bráz was young and in sufficiently good health to leave no doubt that he would successfully complete his term in office, there was less interest in the Vice-Presidency and the PRC was allowed to nominate a candidate. Pinheiro settled for Urbano Santos of Maranhão, thus satisfying the demand of the northern states for a regional balance. On the question of the organization of the National Convention, the PRC also withdrew their earlier demand for all states to attend a Convention of the PRC, and instead agreed to have the election ticket ratified at a National Convention comprising all the Congressional representatives of the states. But Pinheiro Machado was allowed to preside over this assembly which met on August 9.¹ Only the Bahian government was not represented. After stating their commitment to the political status quo, presumably on the question of state autonomy, and their intention to see continued orthodox financial policies, in particular balanced budgets and the fixed rate of exchange, the Convention voted almost unanimously for the Wenceslau Bráz-Urbano Santos ticket. Only 2 of the 213 delegates cast a blank ballot for the Vice-Presidential candidate and another voted in favour of Senator Tavares de Lyra of R.G.do Norte. As usual, the 'official' Convention had done no more than ratify and formalize the understanding arrived at earlier by the state governors and their representatives.

The ratification of the 'Wenceslau Bráz-Urbano Santos ticket was a triumph for Minas and São Paulo. Whereas the PRC had failed to divide the coligação as Pinheiro Machado expected to do by endorsing Wenceslau Bráz, the salvationista governors had been compelled to support Bráz after São Paulo agreed to his candidature. Minas had thus obtained a Presidential candidate from its state whilst São Paulo had secured a ticket

¹ "O Paíz" August 10-12, 1913. "Jornal do Comércio" August 10, 1913.

backed by both the PRC and the salvationista governors and which averted a political crisis over the succession question. The agreement over the election ticket was followed by co-operation between the PRC and the coligação in Congress.¹ For the past two months, May and June, the House had been unable to function because of a deadlock over the election of an executive in the Lower Chamber. Now however the two sides agreed to a compromise solution that would give each side an equal number of representation on the executive. It was obvious also from the electoral manifesto of the Presidential candidate, that the paulistas had secured a candidate who would defend the institutional system of the Republic against the radical and liberal reformers and who would also support policies that would balance annual budgets.

9. The Candidate's Electoral Manifesto

Wenceslau Bráz read his Manifesto² on December 14, at a banquet in the Hall of the Club dos Diários in the Federal Capital. It dealt with three basic issues: financial, economic and political. On the financial question, the candidate indicated that the main concern of his administration would be to restore budgetary stability. The government of President Hermes had run an annual deficit and resorted to more foreign borrowing on which interest payments were now due, and Wenceslau Bráz stated that if elected, his government would have to obtain a moratorium from its creditors, but it would also have to see through a deflationary policy. He warned that supplementaries to the annual budget would not be honoured and to raise Federal revenue, tariffs would need to be revised.

But at the same time, Wenceslau Bráz could not ignore the demands for government assistance from the regions, and the social unrest after 1910 caused by

¹. Guerino Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" F.Bressane to B.Brandão pp.249-250.
² "Jornal do Comércio" December 15, 1913.

economic hardship amongst the inhabitants of the sertão. The sudden collapse of rubber prices after 1910 following large-scale exports from the British-owned rubber plantations in Malaysia, had led to financial difficulties in the rubber producing states of Amazonas and Pará, which now demanded a valorization programme similar to that which had been set up to maintain coffee prices after 1906. The candidate was unwilling to commit his government to a valorization scheme which would destroy his programme for financial stability, but he promised to consider means of diversifying the economy of the region and improving rubber production methods to cut down costs and make rubber exports more competitive internationally. The serious social unrest in the north-eastern states which, as noted earlier, had benefited the salvationista movement in the states, led Bráz to come forward with two proposals. One was to encourage the search for minerals in the sertão which, if discovered, could help to bring some new wealth to the area; the second, and of more immediate significance, was his suggestion to set up co-operative colonies for landless peasants, where, with the assistance of Federal experts and government provided machinery, they would be able to cultivate their own plots. In addition, his Manifesto had the usual concessions for the coffee exporting interests; to maintain a fixed rate of exchange, provide infrastructure and promote European immigration. On the third issue, the political question, Wenceslau Bráz indicated his intention of governing in the national interest and not of that of any party - a clear rejection of both the coligação and the PRC. But he did undertake to reform the electoral system to ensure free elections. This was obviously intended to satisfy the former civilistas and dissident politicians in the states who, as shall be seen, had now organized themselves into a party for liberal reform. As usual, the candidate was careful to commit his government to take a special interest in the needs of the armed forces.

10. The Liberal Party and the Rui Barbosa-Alfredo Ellis Ticket

The progress on an 'official' consensus ticket however did not arrest the efforts of the liberals to put forward their own candidate and for a while it appeared that Rui would be running against the 'official' candidate and conducting a campaign similar to that in the 1910 election. The sudden collapse of negotiations between the ruling state parties in favour of Rui's candidature was followed by a move to organize a national Liberal Party, as had been advocated by the gaúcho politician Assis Brasil during the 1909 civilista Convention, committed to a programme for liberal reform and which would put forward its own candidates for the Presidential election. Amongst the leading organizers of the Party¹ were Rui himself and Assis Brasil and his Democratic Party of R.G.do Sul, paulistas Albuquerque Lins, Francisco Glycério and Alfredo Ellis, and mineiro Carlos Feixoto, most of whom had been prominent in the civilista campaign. But two surprising activists were former salvationistas² Lauro Sodré of Pará and General Mena Barreto, who as Minister of War in the Hermes administration had unsuccessfully contemplated a salvação in R.G.do Sul in 1912. Their alliance with the former civilistas indicates the salvationistas realization of their inability to carry out reform through revolution and the need to unite with civilian liberal reformers and work through the ballot box. The liberals also enjoyed popular support in the Federal Capital and the government, fearing demonstrations, attempted to prevent the organization of a national opposition Liberal Party by refusing permission for the meeting to be held in the public halls. Undaunted, the liberals held an outdoor public meeting in the local park, Parque Fluminense, at the end of July during which the Party was formally established and its programme ratified. The programme was based on that of the dissidência of 1901 with its emphasis on political and civil rights and

¹ João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" (op.cit.) p.199.

² "Jornal do Comércio" May 23, 1913. They had at first tried to get the salvationista governors and the military to support Lauro Sodré for the Presidency, but had been unsuccessful.

judicial reform.

At a later Party Convention, attended by some 562 delegates of municípios, Rui Barbosa and paulista Alfredo Ellis were nominated to contest the Presidential election against the 'official' ticket.¹ However, the liberal ticket had been endorsed entirely by dissident factions in the states and could not hope to win the election. Although the candidature of Rui was also being supported by the governor of Bahia, J.J.Seabra, he did not join the Liberal Party or endorse its revisionist programme, Rui however prepared to campaign in the major cities to secure the urban vote for the liberal ticket and spent the next few months composing his campaign speeches.²

But suddenly in December 1913, Rui withdrew his candidature. In an ambiguous and controversial 'Manifesto to the Nation',³ he wrote that it would be irresponsible to have a contested election when the country was faced with financial bankruptcy and political anarchy, and he exhorted the Nation to "come in torrents to the polling booths" to vote for a national candidate and to make every effort to end the present anarchy. As it stood, this could be interpreted as an appeal for voters to support the 'official' national ticket of the ruling elites thus ending political instability. But in fact the ruling elites interpreted it as an appeal to the electors to turn out and vote for a popular candidate, i.e. Rui himself, against the 'official' nominee and they accused Rui of attempting to stir up political unrest and carry out a revolution, an allegation which Rui himself refuted. If in fact this was his intention, it seems odd that he should withdraw his candidature, particularly when it led to the collapse of the Liberal Party itself.

¹ "O Estado de São Paulo" October 27, 1913.

² Speeches published in "Ruínas de um govêrno" by Fernando Neri (1931),

³ J.Magalhães Jnr.: "Rui, O homem e o mito" (Editôra Civillzação Brasileira S.A., Rio de Janeiro, 1965) pp.381-387.

11. The Election and its Aftermath

Rui's withdrawal from the election meant that it was no longer contested but the election was nevertheless significant for the turn-out in some states and the protest votes. As could be expected, the poll was lower than in 1910 - a fiercely contested election - but in 1914 it was particularly low in São Paulo and the Federal District. In São Paulo, the veto of Rui's candidature by governor Rodrigues Alves, although it had been favoured by the majority of the state party's executive committee, had created deep resentment. Only some 64,015 votes were cast in São Paulo, as compared to 107,582 in 1910. In the Federal District where a large protest vote was expected, the authorities closed a number of polling booths particularly in the first district, the city centre, where only a 30% poll was recorded.

Only one state government, that of Bahia, did not support the 'official' Presidential candidate Wenceslau Bráz and 61% of the state vote went to Rui. Although the Liberal Party ticket did not contest the election, it received protest votes from dissident factions in a number of states as Table VII/2 shows.

TABLE VII/1

Certified Results of the Presidential Election of 1914

| For President | For Vice-president | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| Wenceslau Bráz Pereira | Urbano Santos da Costa | |
| Gomes | 532,017 Arango | 556,127 |
| Rui Barbosa | 47,782 Alfredo Ellis | 18,580 |
| José Gomes Pinheiro Machado | 222 J.J.Seabra | 926 |
| Nilo Peçanha | 192 José Gomes Pinheiro Machado | 129 |
| Others | 528 Irineu de Melo Machado | 125 |
| Blank | 60 José Leopoldo de Bulhões | 121 |
| | Others (approx.) | 1800 |
| | Blank | 165 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 1, pp.740-741.

The election of Wenceslau Bráz as President had important political consequences. It restored the Presidency to civilian control, rejected the salvationistas and other reformers, reaffirming the power of the oligarchs in power and reasserted the political dominance of Minas and São Paulo. There had been no serious attempt by the military to impose another of their own candidates. The failure of the salvationista movement to make any long-term impact had shown that the radical army officers were only a minority in the armed forces, and after 1912, there was real opposition within the armed forces to active military participation in Federal politics. The inauguration of Wenceslau Bráz restored the government totally to civilian rule.

The salvationista officer-governors who had allied themselves with Minas and São Paulo in the hope of obtaining protection from intervention and retribution by the PRC were also disappointed. The coligação ceased to have any function after the ratification of the official ticket. The mineiro and paulista governors who had had no sympathy with the anti-state oligarchy salvationistas, were content to see them weakened politically and during 1914 and 1915, the last year of the administration of Hermes and the first of Wenceslau Bráz, the PRC systematically punished those states that had defied its authority, whilst Minas and São Paulo watched impassive.¹

But these states had no intention of allowing the PRC, controlled by Pinheiro Machado and R.G.do Sul, to exert the influence it had done during the Hermes administration and Minas formed the political base for the Wenceslau Bráz government.² Mineiros Sabino Barroso and João Pandiá Calógeras held the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture respectively, whilst a third mineiro Antonio Carlos became majority leader in

¹ G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" S.Barroso to B.Brandão August 8, September 3, 1913 p.196; also pp.241-2, 349.

² Ibid., pp.196-200. S.Barroso to B.Brandão September 10, 11, 23, 1913, R.Junqueira to B.Brandão October 8, 1913 pp.240-241.

the Chamber of Deputies. But the government of Wenceslau Bráz relied also on São Paulo.¹ Before his inauguration, the President-elect had visited the state and although the paulista governor had declined any important Ministries, he assured Bras of his state's backing in Congress.

The assassination of Pinheiro Machado in the Federal Capital in September 1915 finally led to the disintegration of the PRC itself, and the reassertion of the President's authority based on the politics of the governors. Machado had been personally responsible for organizing the party and for formulating its policies, and there was no one who could replace him. His departure from the political scene in the Federal Capital where he had been one of the dominant political figures since 1905 brought, as could be expected, important changes. Machado's presence in Congress had been a major factor in limiting the power of the President after 1902. He had been a leading opponent of the concentration of power in the hands of the executive and had tried to assert the authority of Congress. By exploiting this issue, he had been able to unite first the political chiefs in the Senate and later the bancadas of the majority of satellite states under his leadership. With his death, the rivalry to Presidential authority was removed, the power of the President - backed by the dominant states Minas and São Paulo - was reasserted and the satellite states quickly fell behind the executive. After 1915 there was no attempt to organize Congressional authority against that of the Presidency and the dominant political issue in national politics was inter-state rivalries. Where R.G.do Sul was concerned, the loss of Pinheiro Machado led only to a temporary eclipse of the state; because of its steadily increasing economic and electoral power, the state was able to assert an influence in national affairs in its own right.

¹ Ibid., R.Junqueira to B.Brandão September 10, October 1, 1913 pp.240-1.

TABLE VII/2

Results of the Presidential Election of 1914 by States

| States | President | | | Vice-President | | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------|------------------|------------------|--------|
| | Wenceslau Bráz | Rui Barbosa | Others | Urbano Santos | Alfredo Ellis | Others |
| Amazonas | 8,783 | 3,014 | 118 | 8,731 | 2,967 | 200 |
| Pará | 27,034 | 34 | 24 | 27,049 | - | 15 |
| Maranhão | 16,415 | 403 | 2 | 16,833 | 272 | — |
| Piauí | 14,612 | 837 | - | 14,611 | 824 | 5 |
| Ceará | 22,214 | 70 | 20 | 22,218 | 66 | 22 |
| R.G.do | | | | | | |
| Norte | 8,044 | 7 | 1 | 8,038 | 5 | 5 |
| Paraíba | 11,799 | 49 | 8 | 11,811 | 16 | 29 |
| Pernambuco | 34,219 | 66 | 14 | 34,235 | 44 | 20 |
| Alagoas | 12,097 | 1,375 | 50 | 12,062 | 1,336 | 4 |
| Sergipe | 8,190 | 9 | — | 8,096 | 8 | 95 |
| Bahia | 18,493 | 31,071 | 157 | 23,996 | 4,192 | 1,815 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 32,151 | 971 | 200 | 31,205 | 847 | 200 |
| Federal District | 4,582 | 359 | 200 | 4,585 | 335 | 200 |
| Espírito Santo | 11,155 | 44 | 3 | 11,166 | 36 | 1 |
| Minas Gerais | 139,586 | 2,695 | 250 | 139,419 | 2,262 | 250 |
| Goías | 8,401 | 420 | 5 | 8,367 | 345 | 117 |
| Mato Grosso | 3,740 | 268 | 1 | 3,735 | 268 | 2 |
| São Paulo | 59,512 | 4,503 | 82 | 60,360 | 3,941 | 70 |
| Sta. Catharina | 12,459 | 11 | — | 12,460 | 10 | — |
| Paraná | 15,077 | 311 | — | 14,980 | 308 | - |
| R.G.do Sul | 58,834 | 257 | 1 | 58,638 | 247 | 6 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June, 1914 pp.681-734.

Note: According to the reports submitted by the Congressional Commissions.

12. The Presidential Election of 1918. The Rodrigues Aves-Delfim Moreira Ticket

Essentially the selection of a Presidential candidate for the 1918 election was guided by the need for political stability. As São Paulo and Minas had recognized in the Pact of Ouro Fino, this stability rested largely on the co-operation of the two states over the selection. But it was obvious that this could not be easily realized. Not all paulistas were willing to sacrifice the state's claim to the Presidency in return for political peace, as Rodrigues Alves had done in 1913. The restlessness of the paulistas over the dominance of the mineiros in the Federal Capital became apparent after Rodrigues Alves left the office of governor in 1916. In an effort to limit the power of the mineiros, São Paulo tried unsuccessfully to form a bilateral alliance with R.G.do Sul.¹ The paulistas intended to secure the Presidency for their state in 1918. But the mineiros were demanding another term in office. They argued that whilst São Paulo had already had three terms in the Presidency, Minas had had only two. The succession question threatened to be even more contentious when Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, in an attempt to influence the choice of candidates, united to oppose a candidate from São Paulo.

The President stepped in to avert a disputed election. He informed both the mineiros and the paulistas in March 1912, that he would back any candidate selected by the paulista Republican Party² and approved by the governor of Minas Gerais, Delfim Moreira. Eventually São Paulo and Minas Gerais united behind a Rodrigues Alves-Delfim Moreira ticket. Although it was usual for the incumbent governor to secure the nomination of the state party, Altino Arantes, who had succeeded Rodrigues Alves as governor in São Paulo, was a controversial figure in the state. Rather than see the state

¹ Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) p.176,

² On the succession manoeuvres of 1918 see: Ibid., pp.180-181. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" pp.314-315. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.11 pp.914-915, "O Estado de São Paulo" March 4, 9, 11, 1917. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Rodrigues Alves" Vol.11, pp.792-814.

forfeit the Presidency, Altino Arantes sacrificed his own candidature in favour of Rodrigues Alves, who had already served one Presidential term in 1902-1906. This choice also reconciled the mineiros to a paulista President. Rodrigues Alves was known to be dying and was not expected to be too effective. The mineiro governor also secured the Vice-Presidency for himself in return for backing Rodrigues Alves, and thus the mineiros had a reasonable expectation of the Presidency. The consent of the satellite states was easily obtained for the São Paulo-Minas ticket, which was endorsed by the President. This led the other major states R.G.do Sul, Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro also to fall behind Rodrigues Alves and Delfim Moreira. This ticket was formally ratified on June 7 by the bancadas of all the states in Congress who represented their states at the National Nomination Convention in the Federal Capital.¹

Only Rui Barbosa protested formally in a letter addressed to Congressmen Urbano dos Santos and Antonio Azevedo who organized the National Nomination² Convention, at the way in which the candidates had been selected by two states. Rui also published a 'Manifesto to the Nation'² in which he accused establishment politicians of depriving the 'people' of their democratic and constitutional right to select their President. He went on to say that the Brazilian nation could not, whilst condoning this action, join the allies in the European war, since they were fighting a war for democracy. Rui further predicted that Brazil was not likely to be ruled by a minority elite for long and warned that the country would soon be convulsed by a revolution such as was already toppling autocratic governments and Empires in Russia and China. He ended with a call to Rodrigues Alves to "crown his great services to the nation" by refusing the nomination. As would be expected the call went unheeded since Alves was above all a representative of the

¹ "Jornal do Comércio" June 8, 1917.

² "O Estado de São Paulo" June 6, 1917. João Mangabeira: "Rui, Estadista da República" pp.242-246.

establishment. The liberals also held Rui responsible for the disintegration of the Liberal Party, which was blamed on his withdrawal of his candidature in the 1914 Presidential contest, and they did not now rally behind him. Without the backing of any faction Rui was in no position to make an effective protest.

Rodrigues Alves read his Manifesto at a banquet on October 28 at the Club dos Diários.¹ Like his earlier Manifesto of 1901, this one also stated the candidate's support for the existing state establishment parties and balanced budgets. Subsequently it was not the candidate's programme that was to be important, but the address given by Senator Epitácio Pessoa of Paraíba, who presided over the Convention and later in 1919, following the death of Rodrigues Alves, was elected President himself. In his speech he called attention to two issues: the economy and regional disparities.² He warned both businessmen and politicians that the economic boom that the country was then enjoying as a result of the new markets provided by Europe during the war could not last for long, and outlined three ways in which the country might prepare for the recession; businessmen, he said, ought to be more concerned with improving the quality of their goods to make them competitive in world markets; they should show greater interest in providing for the expanding domestic market; and the country should also ensure that it obtained the maximum benefit from its foreign trade by nationalizing commerce to exclude foreigners.

Drawing attention to the regional disparities in the country, Pessoa criticized former Presidents for partial distribution of Federal funds which, he maintained, had only helped to increase the differences in population, transport facilities and economic development between the north and the south. He stressed the need to redress the balance, and particularly the need for a consistent and effective programme to solve the problems caused

¹ "Jornal do Comércio" October 29, 1917.

² "A Capital" (São Paulo newspaper) February 21, 1919.

by drought in the north-east. Only an economically integrated Brazil, he repeated, could hope to have a significant role in international trade. The two issues of economic nationalism and regionalism were to become the dominant issues of the 1920s.

As the election of 1918 was not contested, the only interesting question pertaining to it was the turn-out, since it was indicative of the extent of the support of the state governors for the candidate. However, it is not possible to make a meaningful assessment in this respect by a comparative study with previous elections, because large numbers of former voters had been disenfranchised as a result of the electoral reform of 1917. As noted in Chapter One, this reform, in an attempt to end fraudulent elections, placed the commissions for registering voters under the supervision of the judiciary. Existing registers were destroyed and those who qualified to vote were expected to re-register with the new commissions. The reform failed to end fraudulent registration and large numbers of former voters had not re-registered by 1918. Although there was no opposition ticket contesting the elections, there were protest votes from dissident factions in the states, see Table VII/4.

TABLE VII/4

Results of Presidential Election of 1918 by States

| States | President | | Vice-President | |
|------------------|-----------------|--------|----------------|--------|
| | Rodrigues Alves | Others | Delfim Moreira | Others |
| Amazonas | 3,189 | 144 | 3,200 | 123 |
| Pará | 11,202 | 23 | 11,213 | 19 |
| Maranhão | 10,220 | 23 | 10,264 | 14 |
| Piauí | 5,296 | 4 | 5,286 | 18 |
| Ceará | 30,498 | 60 | 30,505 | 34 |
| R.G.do Norte | 5,048 | 10 | 5,052 | 5 |
| Paraíba | 12,267 | 29 | 12,239 | 25 |
| Pernambuco | 28,213 | 44 | 28,059 | 34 |
| Alagoas | 12,375 | 9 | 11,576 | 4 |
| Sergipe | 7,979 | 80 | 8,015 | 60 |
| Bahia | 42,436 | 348 | 41,198 | 410 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 26,279 | 306 | 26,103 | 270 |
| Federal District | 17,918 | 1,734 | 18,423 | 630 |
| Espírito Santo | 6,312 | 12 | 6,218 | 9 |
| Minas Gerais | 64,888 | 470 | 64,460 | 341 |
| Goías | 4,187 | 20 | 3,952 | 14 |
| Mato Grosso | 3,421 | 60 | 3,447 | 130 |
| São Paulo | 47,651 | 592 | 46,826 | 872 |
| Sta. Catharina | 5,342 | 2 | 5,301 | - |
| Paraná | 8,051 | 9 | 7,875 | 9 |
| R.G.do Sul | 38,042 | 51 | 37,551 | 195 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” May, 1918 pp.611-753 passim.

Note: Results as reported by the Congressional Committees.

TABLE VII/3

Certified Results of the Presidential Election of 1918

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Rodrigues Alves | 390,810 | Delfim Moreira | 386,297 |
| Nilo Peçanha | 1,258 | Dantas Barreto | 376 |
| Rui Barbosa | 1,014 | Others | (approx.)2,100 |
| Others | (approx.) 1,450 | | |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 6, 1918 pp.751-752

Conclusion

The quiet election of 1918 confirmed that the ruling elites in the states were more firmly entrenched than ever, their position being assured by the majority of the armed forces. But although there was little chance for either liberal or radical reformers to change the system themselves, the political system was basically very unstable. This instability stemmed from regional rivalry and the desire of the ruling elites of the major states to control the Presidency. The Pact of Ouro Fino recognized the need for co-operation between São Paulo and Minas to ensure an uncontested election and a smooth transition every four years. The election of a paulista in 1918 to succeed a mineiro President showed that the basis for co-operation between these states was to be the rotation of the Presidency between them, with the incumbent President using his office to further this aim. However, its smooth functioning depended on two factors: first, the acceptance by Minas and São Paulo of the principle of rotation of the Presidency between them; the initial disagreement over the selection in 1918 showed that this was not so. Second, it also required the four other major states should be willing to support this arrangement. Again in 1918 we find that three of the major states were reluctant to do so. Although R.G.do Sul had accepted

the mineiro-paulista agreement in 1918, in future elections it was to veto a candidate from these states.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE POLITICAL INTERLUDE: THE ELECTION OF 1919

Introduction

The election of 1919 is significant for several reasons. For the first time, hitherto politically quiescent economic and professional groups took the initiative and endorsed the popular candidate Rui, who emerged as the strongest contender. But the ruling elites of three major states saw him as a threat to their position, and they demonstrated their continuing domination by uniting the elites of the majority of states around the candidature of Epitácio Pessoa of Paraíba. Despite the lack of support from the incumbents in power for Rui, it was a seriously contested election. In addition to continuing his campaign for liberal reform, Rui attempted to broaden the base of his support in the urban centres by championing the interests of the working class, demanding for the first time a comprehensive social welfare programme. The election result was notable for the relatively high percentage of votes he obtained, a sign of change in the established order.

Chapter Eight is concerned with the extraordinary decision of the governors of three major states in favour of the candidature of a native of a satellite state, Paraíba. Studies of the election of 1919 have correctly ascribed the nomination of Pessoa to R.G.do Sul, after the state vetoed the candidature of a mineiro or a paulista, but the question which remains to be answered is why these states concurred. This chapter looks at two factors which demanded a consensus in 1919. First, the emergence of pressure groups to take an active part in the selection; second, the ambition of mineiro governor Artur Bernardes to ensure his own candidature in the following election of 1922. The chapter also looks at the attempts of the ruling elites to appease political dissidents by holding a more

representative Nomination Convention. Finally, this chapter examines Rui's campaign in 1919 and analyses electoral results to find out where dissident votes came from.

1. The Candidature of Rui Barbosa

President Wenceslau Bráz, Minas and São Paulo had secured a consensus ticket for the 1918 Presidential election at the expense of non-viable candidates. Both Rodrigues Alves and Delfim Moreira were dying. Though inaugurated in November 1918, Rodrigues Alves never took up his Presidential duties. His deteriorating health kept him in Guaratingueta, São Paulo, until December. His death in the Federal Capital in mid-January re-opened the succession question since the Constitution required that new elections be held if a President died without completing half of his term in office. In any event, Vice-President Delfim Moreira would not have been in a position to substitute President Alves. The caretaker government which he headed for six months whilst the new President was being elected, inspired little confidence. He, too, was ill and rumoured to be suffering from "tertiary syphilis" which was said to be affecting his mental abilities. His government was reputed to lack central direction, each Minister running his own separate department.¹

The disastrous Rodrigues Alves-Delfim Moreira ticket resulted in a profound disillusionment and concern, particularly amongst economic and professional pressure groups, the representatives of agricultural, industrial, commercial, and white collar (lawyers, professors, doctors, civil servants) interests. Hitherto, except for student organizations and the intervention of coffee interests in the 1906 election, these groups had not been conspicuously involved in Presidential politics and had gone along with the

¹. See Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" (op.cit.) Vol.II for the administration under Delfim Moreira.

decision of the ruling elites. But they now doubted the ability of the politicians to select a candidate capable of dealing with the serious domestic - social and economic - and international problems. The rising cost of living, low wages, poor working conditions, had sparked off a series of general strikes since 1917.¹ Economic recession and unemployment after the war was expected to increase social unrest. With the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in mind, there was a demand for a government capable of containing the situation. Economic interests also wanted a government that would give priority to the stimulation of production. In the international field, the forthcoming peace talks at Versailles were expected to try to regulate the working conditions of the workers' commodity markets and maritime traffic. In Brazil it was feared that the developed nations would dictate the terms to favour their own interests at the expense of the less powerful countries, and there was a demand for a President who could command respect abroad and defend Brazil's interests.

Amongst many economic and white collar pressure groups it was felt that Rui Barbosa was the most suitable candidate for the Presidency. He had already represented the country at the international gatherings at the Hague in 1908 and had made his presence and that of Brazil felt with his long discourses which had been proudly printed in local newspapers, though European delegates had privately decided that he was a bore and had nicknamed him 'Mr. Verbosa'. As a Minister of Finance in the provisional government of 1891, he had been primarily concerned with promoting economic development, favouring easy credit and papalist policies so that new enterprises could be established. Rui was also the most vocal opponent of oligarchic rule and champion of liberal reform and the pressure groups were beginning to demand a greater say in political affairs. Following the

¹ Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Instituições e Classes Sociais)" (*op.cit.*) pp.216, 226 *passim* provides an account of the social unrest after 1914. British Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers: F.0.371 File No.2900 for 1917, reported that the general disorders in the period led the landed and commercial interests to form themselves into a league to campaign for electoral reform.

death of Rodrigues Alves in January 1919, representatives of economic and professional groups outside the Military Club, for the first time took the initiative in endorsing a candidate. At a meeting called by the Directorio Central do Comércio e Indústria¹ and attended by representatives of agricultural, industrial and commercial organizations generally, Dias Tavares, the Director of the Association proposed that they should adopt Rui as their candidate. Rui, he said, was the defender of "rights and liberties" and would restore the "rights" of which industry and commerce had so far been deprived. His proposal was seconded by Dr Augusto Remos representing Industry, and Miguel Calmon, the Vice-President of the Sociedade Nacional de Agricultura. In his speech Miguel Calmon said the country was in need of a liberal government and that Rui the "untiring defender of civil liberties" was the obvious candidate. The Advocates Association in the Federal Capital on the other hand stressed Rui's "wisdom and experience" on international affairs.² Amongst other professional bodies³ which supported his candidature were the Association of Civil Servants, the Acadêmicos de Medicina and the Comissão das Profissões Liberâes and various newspapers, notably 'O Imparcial' and the 'Correio da Manhã'.

The move in favour of Rui's candidature became important because of the absence of a strong contender from São Paulo or Minas Gerais. Although the paulistas wanted the Presidency for their state, claiming that this was their term for office, the incumbent governor, Altino Arantes, failed to gain the unanimous support of the paulista Republican Party.⁴ Internal political problems also prevented Minas from making a bid for the Presidency after the last gubernatorial election in 1917 had led to bitter inter-factional

¹. "A Capital" (São Paulo newspaper) February 10, 1919. "Jornal do Comércio" January 30, 1919.

². "Jornal do Comércio" February 2, 1919.

³. "Jornal do Comércio" February 7, 1919.

⁴. "A Capital" (São Paulo) January 29, 1919. Castro Sertório: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" pp.374-375.

squabbling.¹

Moreover it was clear that if Minas or São Paulo tried to impose a candidate, they risked a seriously contested election. The governor of R.G.do Sul, Borges de Medeiros,² vetoed the idea of a mineiro or paulista candidate. He instructed the gaúcho bancada on January 21 to support any candidate backed by São Paulo and Minas Gerais so long as he did not come from either state.³ Rio de Janeiro was likewise opposed to a candidate from these states.

At the end of January, after a fortnight of negotiations over candidates, Rui Barbosa was the only serious contender. In addition to the support he had received from the economic and professional associations, a number of political groups in the Federal Capital had begun to endorse his candidature. In an attempt to block Minas or São Paulo from gaining the Presidency, Nilo Peçanha committed Rio de Janeiro to Rui, and began to canvass for support for him from other states. The bancadas of Ceará, Pará and the Federal Capital were favourable to Rui.⁴ Governor Artur Bernardes of Minas, who had sent his Secretary of Finance, João Luís Alves, to the Federal District to report on the progress of negotiations over the succession, was informed that Rui's candidature was the most popular in Congress and the Capital generally.⁵

But the operation of the politics of governors meant in practice that the success of any candidate depended on the support of the major states, particularly São Paulo and

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.II pp.907-909. The successful contender of the Mata region Artur Bernardes had begun a purge of the PRM to rid it of the long-time party bosses, including Francisco Sales. But in 1919 Bernardes had not yet consolidated his power and that of his faction in the PRM sufficiently to make a bid for the Presidency as the candidate of the PRM.

². "A Capital" (São Paulo) January 22, 1919. The article also claimed that there were 14 states including Bahia and some paulista politicians supporting Borges de Medeiros himself for the Presidency, but he refused to stand.

³. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Rationalism 1862-1930" P.184.

⁴. "A Capital" January 20, February 4, 1919. "Jornal do Comércio" (Rio de Janeiro) January 28, February 7, 1919.

⁵. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista a República" Vol.II, p.936.

Minas Gerais, The governor of Minas was firmly opposed to Rui. He argued that Rui's reformist programme would lead to political conflict and instability.¹ In São Paulo reactions were more mixed. The Executive Committee of the PRP divided on the question, two of the five members favouring Rui. The state governor was also said to be sympathetic, but he did not publicly back Rui's candidature.²

Rui might yet have been accepted by the political elites of the key states, if he was willing to abandon his programme for Constitutional revision. He was known to favour the re-allocation of revenues between the Union and the states in favour of the Union and also to limit some of the privileges of the states, in particular their right to borrow abroad, and the major states were especially anxious to prevent any encroachment on their powers. The governor of R.G.do Sul, Borges de Medeiros, offered to endorse Rui's candidature if he undertook to drop his revisionist programme and uphold the Constitution of 1891.³ In the Federal Capital Nilo Peçanha, who had now become the organizer of the pro—Rui campaign, tried to dispel these fears.⁴ But Rui remained intransigent and announced that he would only accept the nomination by the political elites if they agreed to his programme, arguing that only immediate reform could avert a revolution. In answer to an invitation to attend a meeting of Congressmen on February 8 to decide on the reorganization of the National Convention, which would formally ratify the candidate selected by the political establishment, Rui questioned the authority of the Congressmen to decide on such an issue and the justification for Conventions in a political system without national parties.⁵

1. Ibid., p.937.

2. "A Capital" (São Paulo) January 29, 1919. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" pp.321-322.

3. "O Imparcial" (Rio de Janeiro) February 16, 1919. Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa, Vol.XLVI 1919 Vol.II. "Campanha Presidencial" (Ministerio da Educação e Cultura, Rio de Janeiro) pp.251-252.

4. João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" pp.280-284, Copy of Rui's letter to Nilo February 3 and 5 and reply to invitation to attend the Convention.

5. João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" p.283.

Rui's uncompromising hostility to the Constitutional and political status quo made it impossible for the establishment politicians to support him. The first move to destroy his candidature came from J.J.Seabra, the governor of Bahia, Rui's native state. In 1914 Seabra had been the only governor to support Rui; but since then differences over internal state politics had separated the two men. Presumably Seabra feared intervention in Bahia if Rui became President. Bahia now proposed the candidature of Altino Arantes of São Paulo.¹ Rui alleged that the ambassador of the United States, Mr.Morgan, was also involved in the anti-Rui pro-Altino Arantes campaign because Rui favoured national independence in international issues whilst Arantes was an ally of the United States.²

The paulistas now approached Minas Gerais to support governor Altino Arantes. Minas was willing on condition that R.G.do Sul was also agreeable. But Borges de Medeiros reiterated his fundamental objection to a paulista³ and so the idea was not pursued.

Preliminary skirmishing had revealed that a consensus candidate in 1919 still had to satisfy three state elites: São Paulo, Minas and R.G.do Sul. It also showed that these elites continued to resist the pressure from political dissidents and professional groups for liberal reform.

2. The Mineiro Initiative in the Succession. The Consensus Candidate Epitácio Pessoa

It was largely due to Minas that the ruling elites finally agreed over a candidate. The mineiros were primarily concerned to ensure the Presidency for their state governor,

¹. Castro Sertório: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" pp.376-377.

². Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers, 1919: F.O.371 File No.3653, Report by Arthur Peel. The allegations were made after a ball given by the ambassador in São Paulo City, to which he invited leading politicians. During the occasion, the ambassador was heard to remark that because of his age - he was almost 70 - Rui's election could end the same way as that of Rodrigues Alves and he had suggested Altino Arantes as a more satisfactory alternative.

³. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.184.

Artur Bernardes, in the next election in 1922. A contested election in 1919 and political instability in the next three years could jeopardize this ambition. With the intention of winning goodwill for the state and its governor, Minas took on the role of mediator and co-ordinator in the succession of 1919. In a telegram¹ to all state governors Artur Bernardes stated the need for the political elites of the country to co-operate in the succession question at a time of national crisis caused by growing social and economic problems. He also stressed the need for a 'democratic' choice and suggested that a National Convention representing all political opinions should be held. He concluded with the assertion that Minas was not putting forward a candidate from its own state, and neither did it have any regional interest, but wished to co-operate to select a candidate who was generally acceptable to the Nation.

The majority of the mineiros, as noted above, were opposed to Rui. His controversial reform programme was sure to lead to political confrontation with the overwhelmingly conservative elites of the states and to endanger their position. The alternative candidate, Altino Arantes, was also dropped after R.G.do Sul's veto. But when Borges de Medeiros proposed Epitácio Pessoa instead as a suitable candidate, Minas was immediately interested.²

Since neither Minas nor São Paulo had a strong contender for the Presidency, Epitácio Pessoa was in many ways the ideal candidate for the situation. He was a native of the small north-eastern state of Paraíba and whilst his election would satisfy those who for so long had complained about regional inequalities and the domination of the major states, at the same time the political weakness of Paraíba in the Federal Congress would force Epitácio Pessoa to rely on the key states and preclude an over-independent

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.II pp.932-34 copy of telegram included.

². Epitácio Pessoa: "Pela Verdade" (Rio, 1925) p.43. Laurita Pessoa Raja Gabaglia: "Epitácio Pessoa (1865-1942)" (Livraria José Olympio Editôra, Rio de Janeiro, 1951) Vol.I p.322.

executive.

On the more fundamental issues of the Constitution, economic and fiscal policies, Epitácio Pessoa seemed prepared to go along with the established system, although he had voiced his criticism of the regional disparities and the failure of the Constitution to provide a better balance between the states.

He also satisfied the demand for a President of national prestige and international repute.¹ He had years of experience in Congress, where he had made a reputation for himself as a defender of the principle of equality of states and for fairer distribution of Federal resources. His selection to toast Rodrigues Alves at the National Convention in 1917 was a recognition of his position as a politician of national standing. But it was in the legal field that he had shown his greatest talents and made most rapid progress. President Campos Sales had appointed Epitácio Pessoa as his Minister of Justice in 1898. His successor, President Rodrigues Alves, made Pessoa a member of the Supreme Federal Tribunal and General Prosecutor. On the international plain, Pessoa had been appointed in December 1918 to head the Brazilian delegation to Versailles, after Rui had turned down the invitation. Pessoa's legal expertise enabled him to defend Brazil on the two issues which immediately concerned it: compensation for the 1,850,000 sacks of coffee which had been held in German ports since the war, and the right to buy the German ships apprehended in Brazilian ports during the war.² Brazil was also one of the minor nations with Greece, Spain and Belgium, with a seat in the Executive Commission of the League of Nations. As leader of the delegation, Epitácio Pessoa won credit for these successes.

¹. For a biography of Pessoa see Laurita Pessoa Raja Gabaglia: "Epitácio Pessoa (1865-1942)" (op.cit.) Vol.I.

². Ibid.: British F.O. Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371 File No.2900, 1917. January, on the acquisition of German ships; File No.3655, 1919. April, Brazil's role in the League of Nations.

The mineiro governor agreed to Pessôa's candidature on condition that São Paulo also accepted the choice. The paulistas were enthusiastic and so too were the ruling elites of Pernambuco and Bahia. Artur Bernardes sent his Secretary of the Interior, Raul Soares, who had earlier so skilfully secured Bernardes' election as state governor, to the Federal Capital to approach the satellite states and to unite them behind Pessôa. On February 20, Congressmen representing the state parties of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco, Maranhão and Mato Grosso, decided to drop the candidature of Altino Arantes and support Eptácio Pessôa instead.¹

The country was now left with two candidates: Eptácio Pessôa, backed by the elites of five major states and at least two satellites; Rui, supported by the major state of Rio de Janeiro, the Congressional representatives of the Federal District, the governor of Pará, and various economic and professional groups in the centres. With the five major states behind Pessôa, his candidature was politically more powerful, but the elites behind his candidature feared that the National Nomination Convention, in which for the first time dissident political factions in the states were represented, would ratify the popular candidate Rui.

3. The National Nomination Convention of 1919

Although Presidential candidates were selected by governors of major states as we have seen, and subsequently simply endorsed by the satellite states, Nomination Conventions were nevertheless held to give the form, if not the substance, of national choice. In the past, the Conventions which were attended by Federal Congressmen, had represented mainly incumbents in power in the states and had automatically ratified the decision of their state

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.II, pp.938-939 letter of Raul Soares to João Luís Alves on the meeting. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Debates on November 12, 1921, also more generally first two weeks of November.

governors. However in 1919, governor Artur Bernardes of Minas, again in an attempt to further his Presidential ambitions for 1922, tried to advertise himself as a defender of democratic practices and proposed to the state governors that they hold a more representative Convention, which would comprise delegates representing not ruling elites in the state capitals, but the electors in the municípios, each município being allowed one delegate at the convention. This idea was not of course new. It had first been adopted by the dissidência in 1901, and since been resorted to by the civilistas in 1909 and the Liberal Party in 1913 and was obviously popular with dissident political factions in the states.

But the suggestion for a convention of município delegates met with a great deal of opposition from state governors, both on practical grounds as well as on principle.¹ Goiás, for example, pointed out that lack of communication facilities and vast distances made it impossible for the state to inform all municípios and for them to send their delegates to the Federal Capital in time for the Convention. R.G.do Sul and Sta.Catharina also opposed the idea as impractical. Other states, notably Espírito Santo and - surprisingly - São Paulo, preferred a system based on equal state representation, R.G.do Norte was opposed to representation for temporary dissident factions, whilst Ceará and Mato Grosso stated their preference for the customary system of Congressmen representing their states. In view of the differences it was decided to set up a Congressional Commission, which would study the various proposals of the state governors and arrive at an acceptable basis for organizing the Convention.

The Commission, which began work on February 8, came out with a formula a week later. It rejected representation by municípios and instead incorporated two basic principles: equality of states and proportional representation of all factions within the

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" (Rio de Janeiro) February 8-16, 1919.

states (which had contested the last Congressional election in 1918). The equality of states was to be achieved by allowing each state three representatives, two of whom were to be selected by the ruling state elites and the third by the electorally most powerful minority faction in the state. But to ensure the proportional representation at the Convention of all factions within the state, it was decided that in addition each faction in the state was to be allowed one delegate for every 5000 electors who voted for its candidates in the Congressional election of 1918 plus 1 for the remaining voters. Any other faction which received less than 5000 votes was also allowed one delegate. Altogether some 184 delegates were to attend the National Convention which was to meet in the Senate building on February 25.

Besides its complexity, Table VIII/1 shows the absurd outcome of this formula. Firstly, the principle of state equality was contradicted by the desire for proportional representation of dissident factions within the states. It can be seen in Column 1 of the Table that the total number of delegates for the states varied enormously. Sta.Catharina, for example, which was unfortunate enough not to have had dissident groups contesting the election in 1918, was under-represented at the Convention, Secondly, as a result of allowing every opposition group within the state representation, even if - as in some cases - he was a lone coronel with a personal grudge against the state elite, meant that in some states the delegation of the ruling elites was outnumbered by the total number of delegates for the dissidents, though in fact electorally they were inferior. This was the case, for example, in Rio de Janeiro and the Federal District. Despite the obvious weaknesses of the proposal, the political elites accepted it.

TABLE VIII/1

Table showing the Composition of the Nomination Convention in 1919

| | Column 1 | Column 2 |
|------------------|---------------------------|---|
| | Total number of delegates | D i s t r i b u t i o n Govern- ing party |
| Amazonas | 6 | 3 |
| Pará | 8 | 5 |
| Maranhão | 7 | 4 |
| Piauí | 5 | 3 |
| Ceará | 12 | 6 |
| R.G.do Norte | 5 | 3 |
| Paraíba | 6 | 4 |
| Pernambuco | 10 | 7 |
| Alagoas | 5 | 3 |
| Sergipe | 6 | 3 |
| Bahia | 13 | 9 |
| Espírito Santo | 6 | 4 |
| Federal District | 12 | 5 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 15 | 6 |
| São Paulo | 13 | 10 |
| Paraná | 6 | 4 |
| Sta.Catharina | 5 | 5 |
| R.G.do Sul | 13 | 10 |
| Minas Gerais | 20 | 17 |
| Goiás | 5 | 3 |
| Mato Grosso | 5 | 5 |
| Total | 182 | 119 |

Source: “Jornal do Comércio” February 16, 1919.

Note: Column 1 indicates total number of delegates for each state.

Column 2 shows the allocation of delegates within the states.

However as it became obvious that Rui continued to attract popular support even after the key states had endorsed the candidature of Epitácio Pessoa, the ruling elites became anxious about the outcome of the Nomination Convention. Not only were one-third of the delegates representatives of dissident groups, but Rui had the support of the state governors of Rio de Janeiro and Pará, and most satellite states had not declared their position a few days before the Convention was due. Since they could not control the Convention, the pro-Pessoa campaigners resorted to a trick to forestall Rui's nomination. On February 21 and 22 over thirty telegrams were posted to state politicians and newspapers announcing that Rui had decided to withdraw his candidature in favour of Pessoa.¹ Rui later emphatically denied ever being consulted or undertaking to support Pessoa. Indeed, Rui argued that Pessoa was ineligible for the Presidency, a paid post, since as a retired judge of the Supreme Federal Tribunal he was receiving a Federal pension.

When the Convention finally voted for the Presidential candidate,² 139 delegates voted in favour of Pessoa and 42 for Rui. Except for Rio de Janeiro and Pará, the ruling elites of all other states had fallen behind Pessoa, whose election was therefore a certainty. Informed of the results of the Convention, Pessoa, who was still in Paris at the Versailles peace talks, accepted the nomination but because of his absence in Europe until after he was elected President, he did not publish an election manifesto.

4. Rui's Opposition Campaign and Manifesto

Although Rui had failed to win the nomination and had little chance of winning a contested election, he was nevertheless encouraged by the support he received from dissident state

¹. Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa: "Campanha Presidencial 1919" (op.cit.) Tomo I "As Classes Conservadores" p.45 passim.

². "Jornal do Comércio" February 26, 1919. "O Estado de São Paulo" February 26, 1919. The exact number of votes for Pessoa is disputed. The total was either 129 or 139 but his obvious majority was not in doubt.

factions at the Convention. When the politicians from Rio de Janeiro, Pará and the Federal District, anxious to protect their long-term position now that their candidate had lost the nomination, advised Rui to withdraw his candidature, arguing that with the majority of state ruling parties against him he would obtain a derisory percentage of the votes,¹ Rui, aware of the level of dissatisfaction with the political establishment and more optimistic about his chances, determined to contest the election. He argued also that the electors must be given a choice. The politicians who had earlier backed him now reluctantly decided to support Rui's campaign.

During the remaining month prior to the election scheduled for mid-April, the seventy-year old Rui carried out a campaign similar to that in 1909-1910. Once again he concentrated on the Federal Capital, the states of Minas, São Paulo and Bahia.² This time without the military issue to dominate the campaign, independent of the backing of state oligarchs as he had been in 1910 when São Paulo and Bahia sustained the civilistas, and confident of the popular demand for reform, Rui pursued a more open and unambiguous campaign. It was in the two public meetings which he held in the Federal Capital on March 8 and 20 that he made his two major speeches.

At the Associação Comercial in the Federal Capital, Rui revived his earlier attacks on the ruling oligarchs³ accusing them of corruption, notably subverting the independence of Congress and the press with bribes obtained by embezzling public funds. Only by radical reform, he said, could they hope to regenerate the Republic and he called on the

¹. João Mangabeira: "Rui, O Estadista da República" (op.cit.) pp.285-7.

². Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa: "Campanha Presidencial 1919" (op.cit.) Tomo I and II:
 Campaign Federal District March 8. Associação Comercial de R.de Janeiro
 March 20. Meeting in Teatro Lyríco
 Minas Gerais; Juiz de Fora April 2.
 São Paulo April 4.
 Bahia April 12. Teatro Politeano
 April 14. Discurso na Faculdade Medicina.

³. Ibid., Vol.I pp.5-60.

"conservative classes" (in which he included not only the economic elite, the owners of the means of production, but also the labouring classes) to vote for him, the candidate of change.

On March 20, at the Teatro Lyrico in the Federal Capital¹ Rui dealt with the emotive "social question". In a surprising speech he contradicted the statements he had made only months before (November 1918) on the problem. He had, at this occasion, attributed the discontent of the workers in the cities to bolshevism, and accused European immigrants of fomenting unrest and had argued that unless the government used force to control it, there would be a coalition between the working class and discontented military officers.² In March 1919, however, he attributed the causes to domestic social conditions rather than agitation. He attacked successive governments for not razing the slums and improving the living conditions of the workers; for the continued exploitation of women and child labour; and the derisory compensation for accidents. Rui still opposed socialism and the theory of class conflict, but he now claimed to be a social democrat and stressed the need for social welfare legislation. To his 1910, 1914 and 1918 programme for Constitutional reform he now added an eight point plan for advanced social reform.³ This programme still fell short of many demands of labour organizations of the time. Nothing, for instance, was said about the workers' right to unionize and to hold political meetings. Moreover as his programme upset employers, Rui attempted to assuage their anxieties by stating that his social welfare measures would not be pushed through without first

¹. Ibid., pp.65-130.

². "A Capital" (São Paulo) reported on February 4, that a group of officers had met to select their own military candidate and that Lauro Sodré and Dantas Barreto were the most likely candidates.

³. This included (a) an eight hour working day (b) prohibition of night shifts except in cases where it was indispensable, in which case the hours of work must be reduced (c) the fixing of a minimum age and maximum hours of work for child labour (d) the establishment of a minimum wage (e) equality of the sexes in employment (f) special paid maternity leave (g) obligatory accident insurance by employers of all industries so that they could compensate workers in cases of accidents at work (h) abolition of company stores where workers were obliged to make their purchases.

changing the Constitutional provision which "established the absolute liberty of contracts".¹

In other words, without the co-operation of the employers themselves whose interests were represented by the political elites in Congress.

Whether in fact, Rui had genuinely progressed from a liberal democrat to a social democrat as he claimed, or whether his new posture was merely a vote-catching exercise, as some leaders of working class organizations maintained,² the prominence given to the social question in the election of 1919 was indicative of the sudden importance that the issue had acquired since the last election of 1914. Organizers of the pro-Pessôa campaign also emphasized their candidate's concern for the plight of the workers and claimed that he had been actively involved in securing the International Labour code. The organized intensive general strikes since 1917 had shown that the working class was emerging as a political force to be reckoned with.

As a result of the social unrest and disillusionment with the established order, the opposition campaign in 1919 aroused great enthusiasm in the cities, especially in the Federal District, and impartial observers and even some pro-establishment newspapers reported a possible victory for Rui. The Jornal do Comércio, whose editor had earlier refused to endorse Rui's candidature, published an article³ claiming that all civilian elements not directly linked with the political elite, would ensure Rui a victory. The British embassy in Rio reported in its despatch that the tremendous success of the campaign tours in São Paulo and Minas Gerais also "greatly stimulated the hope of his

¹. Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa: "Campanha Presidencial 1919" Vol.I "A Questao Social e Política no Brasil" pp.108-114.

². "A Capital" (São Paulo) February 6, 1919 claimed that the textile workers of the Federal District and São Paulo City had threatened to strike if Rui was elected President. It also published on March 7 an interview with Nicamor Nascimento, Labour leader in the Federal Capital, which was very critical of Rui's proposed Labour legislation.

³. "Jornal do Comércio" February 27, 1919.

followers and restored their confidence in his final success."¹

Even more than in 1910, this opposition campaign was carried out by Rui personally. Although the majority factions of Rio de Janeiro, Pará and the Federal District continued to support his candidature, there was little enthusiasm for an opposition campaign, partly because of the need to defend their interests, but also because the ratification of Epitácio Pessoa as the 'official' candidate had in fact invalidated the main reason for the pro-Rui campaign, which had been initially endorsed by these states to block a paulista or mineiro candidate. As a result no formal coalition of his supporters was organized to sustain an opposition to the 'official' candidate, Francisco Sá, who emerged in Congress as the apologist for the politicians behind Rui, justified their decision to continue to support him "as an act of national gratitude for the years of service he has given to the nation, as a recognition of his national reputation, to show admiration for his dogged defence of liberalism and because his candidacy was the only one that had come spontaneously from the people".²

On the other hand, supporters of the 'official' candidate who believed that Rui's campaign was a threat to the established order, subjected him to severe criticism. In Congress his speeches were described as a call to revolution and conflict.³ In São Paulo he was accused of inciting people to revolt and to destroy public property and in the Federal Capital his campaign was said to be characterized by a "spirit of intolerance". But it was in Bahia that the most extreme allegations were made by the state's ruling elite.⁴

¹. British Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers F.O.371 File No.3653/1919 Report of Arthur Peel April 9, 1919.

². Diário do Congresso Nacional July 11, 1919.

³. Diário do Congresso Nacional, debates May-June.

⁴. British Foreign Office Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371 File No.3167/1918; File No.5653/1919 "Memorandum on the political situation in Bahia". Report by Arthur Peel. J.J.Seabra, who had come to power in 1912 as a result of a salvação, had attempted to consolidate his position in the state by creating his own Democratic Party and in 1914 he had in fact supported Rui in the Presidential contest. However, as a result of extreme mismanagement, he now feared that Rui

But despite his obvious popularity and the fear of upheaval that Rui's campaign generated amongst the politicians, the state elites knew that since they controlled the electoral machinery, Rui could not win at the polls. Except in Bahia, where the unpopularity of the state governor was such, that a victory of the opposition in favour of Rui was a real possibility if they were not forcibly repressed, elsewhere state governments were confident of polling a majority with the backing of the coronéis and their clientele and there was little attempt to prevent the opposition polling and thus exacerbating the political unrest. Thus in 1919 unlike 1910 there were none of the frantic efforts to manipulate the electorate fraudulently by registering illiterates as voters, closing polling booths and the like.

5. The Election

Unfortunately because of the unavailability of the figures of total numbers of registered electors in 1919, it has not been possible to find out the percentage poll in this election, a crucial question in view of the active campaign. In absolute terms the numbers voting were higher than in 1918, an uncontested election: 420,000 as compared to 390,000 approximately. The count in Congress began on June 5 and Rui at first considered producing his own report on the electoral returns, but the lack of enthusiasm amongst his political supporters in Congress to challenge the certification prevented him from doing

would seek to have the administration overthrown by intervention and was particularly anxious to prevent his election. Moreover, as a result of financial bankruptcy, salaries of civil servants were months in arrears and there was a real fear of anti-government revolts if Rui was allowed to campaign in the state. Hence the state government went to great length to prevent Rui's entry. One Bahian deputy, Moriz Sodré, informed Congress that Rui had formed "Clubs of Death" listing names of adversaries who were to be exterminated. He alleged further that leading state politicians including the governor and himself had already been threatened. Rui's appeal to the Vice-President to have the ban against his entry into the state lifted failed, but his second appeal lodged with the Supreme Federal Tribunal was successful. When, three days before the election was due, Rui entered Bahia, all business in the capital São Salvador came to a standstill as pro- and anti-state government forces took to the streets.

so. Whether in fact Rui would have invalidated large numbers of the returns in favour of Pessôa and declared the result in his favour - as he had done in 1910 - is not certain.

When the results were announced a month later,¹ Pessôa as expected was certified the winner, Table VIII/2, but for Rui, the 28% of the votes he obtained vindicated his assertion that public opinion was in his favour.

TABLE VIII/2

Certified Results of the Presidential Election held on April 13, 1919

| For President | |
|-----------------|---------|
| Epitácio Pessôa | 286,373 |
| Rui Barbosa | 116,414 |
| Scattered | 572 |
| Blank | 201 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” July 9, 1919 p.689.

Unlike in 1910 where the majority of his support came from the ruling oligarchs of São Paulo and Bahia who had supported him, in 1919 only 34% of his vote could be ascribed to the ruling elites of the two states of Rio de Janeiro and Pará, Table VIII/3. In the Federal District, where the Federal government had for once not intervened in the election, a 55% poll was recorded and the Aliança Republicana of Paulo Frontin was able to deliver 60% of the vote to Rui. Other states where Rui obtained a sizeable vote were: Bahia 34%, São Paulo 27%, Sergipe 24%, Minas Gerais and Paraná 23% each, Maranhão 20% and R.G.do Sul 16%.

On July 19, Rui published in the 'O Imparcial' a 'Manifesto to the Nation'. In it he accepted the results of the election certified by Congress and contended that his own vote had come from the urban centres in the Federal District, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia

¹. Election data: Diário do Congresso Nacional June-July 1919, pp.689-724.

and the capitals and cities of other states.¹ He pointed out that whereas in 1910 he had obtained 167,858 votes when supported by state oligarchs, in 1919 his vote was 120,139 without the backing of the powerful states. He asserted that in São Paulo for example, he had polled a majority in the urban sections of 21 out of 33 prosperous municípios and that in the others he had a significant minority vote. Gaps in electoral data have not made it possible to verify this assertion for São Paulo, but in the case of Bahia, for example, it was certainly true that Rui obtained a majority in the first district, which contained the state capital São Salvador and the largely commercial municípios of the coastal region.

Conclusion

The election of 1919 was significant primarily because of the emergence of new forces, economic and professional pressure groups and other discontented urban elements, as was evident in the Nominating Convention and the electoral returns. Although they were able to muster only a third of the vote, this had serious implications for future elections when the ruling elites were themselves seriously divided over elections.

The election of 1919 with R.G.do Sul vetoing candidates from São Paulo and Minas foreshadowed the regional strife that would dominate future elections. In 1919 a consensus was possible partly because São Paulo, which claimed the Presidency, did not have a strong candidate and partly because Minas Gerais was determined to prevent a contested election. This was not to happen in future elections.

¹. Obras Completas de Rui Barbosa: "Campanha Presidencial 1919" Vol.2 "Manifesto a Nação" pp.193-245; 208-229.

TABLE VIII/3

Ballots Cast in the Presidential Election of 1919 Distribution by States

| States | Epitácio Pessoa | Rui Barbosa |
|--------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Amazonas | 2,033 | 836 |
| Pará | 4,117 | 11,575 |
| Maranhão | 6,252 | 1,556 |
| Piauí | 2,369 | 1,546 |
| Ceará | 13,602 | 494 |
| R.G.do Norte | 5,903 | 44 |
| Paraíba | 12,506 | 9 |
| Pernambuco | 18,496 | 2,144 |
| Alagoas | 5,435 | 583 |
| Sergipe | 5,417 | 1,704 |
| Bahia | 27,218 | 16,839 |
| Espírito Santo | 4,683 | 814 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 7,868 | 22,543 |
| Federal District | 8,558 | 12,954 |
| São Paulo | 40,492 | 14,758 |
| Paraná | 7,071 | 2,122 |
| Minas Gerais | 70,677 | 21,137 |
| Sta.Catharina | 8,590 | 281 |
| R.G.do Sul | 41,208 | 7,267 |
| Mato Grosso | 2,008 | 310 |
| Goías | 2,032 | 433 |
| Total votes cast | 296,525 | 120,139 |
| Votes disqualified | 10,152 | 3,725 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” July 1919 pp.689-724.

CHAPTER NINE

AGAIN REGIONAL STRIFE AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS. THE ELECTIONS OF 1922 AND 1926

Introduction

The interest of the election of 1922 lies in three developments. First, the breakdown of consensus between the major states, with Minas and São Paulo ranged against R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, and the seriously contested election that followed as a result. Second, the re-emergence of the military in Presidential politics, its unsuccessful efforts to block the 'official' candidate Artur Bernardes, and the revolt of July 1922 which was largely the outcome of this failure. Third, the retribution that President Bernardes carried out in the states that had opposed his election, partly as a result of which, São Paulo and Minas backed by the Presidency, were able to secure a paulista President in 1926 in an uncontested election.

The main events of the election of 1922 are well known. The mineiro-paulista support for Artur Bernardes, the opposition of R.G.do Sul, the rivalry over the Vice-Presidency which sent Pernambuco and Bahia into opposition, and their offer of the Presidential nomination to Rio de Janeiro, which led this state to unite with the opposition. The involvement of the military, the episode of the false letters in which Bernardes was said to have insulted the forces, and the failure of the Military Club to destroy Bernardes' candidature, even after it had judged the letters authentic; the dispute over the certification of the election by Congress and the victory of Bernardes; the contested gubernatorial elections in Pernambuco, which sparked off the unsuccessful revolt at Copacabana and finally the disintegration of the opposition Reação Republicana

and the retribution in the opposition states.

This chapter is concerned with four main issues: first, it looks at the mineiro determination to secure the Presidency in 1922 and the crucial support for Minas from São Paulo, which now abandons its role of mediator. Second, it examines the effect of the regional schism on the election campaign, and the way in which the campaign of the opposition Reação Republicana differed from that of the dissidência and of Rui Barbosa. Third, it looks at why the military became involved in the election of 1922. Lastly, the chapter is concerned with the significance of the failure of the Reação Republicana in the election and the retribution in the states for the balance of power amongst the states themselves, and also between the Federal government and the states.

1. The Mediating Role of Minas 1919-1921

The principle of rotation of the Presidency between Minas and São Paulo, which since the Pact of Ouro Fino in 1913 had become the basis for co-operation between the two states over Presidential politics, made it the mineiros' turn to provide a President in 1922, although the paulistas could hardly be said to have occupied the Presidency in the last Presidential term. Nevertheless, Minas was determined not to forgo its turn. Unlike the Republic's founding fathers, the new generation of Republican politicians who were coming to power in the states during the 1910s, generally tended to be intransigent and not given to political compromise and consensus. They were also more regionally minded, largely because - unlike their predecessors, who had served in different provinces during the Empire - their political experience was confined to the Republic with its predominantly regional interests. The mineiros' preoccupation with their status in the Federation was enhanced by the fact that the state was rapidly losing its demographic and

electoral pre-eminence and the level of its per capita economic wealth as compared to that of its nearest rivals São Paulo and R.G.do Sul, and was also declining as the general census of 1920 showed (Chapter One, Section 2). Moreover, the incumbent mineiro governor, a religious fanatic, was convinced of the personal mission for which he had been chosen by God to rid the country of what he believed to be the bolshevik inspired agitation.¹ Although Bernardes' chief aides, Raul Soares, Afrânio de Melo Franco - leader of the mineiro Congressional bancada, and the Federal deputies João Luís Alves and Afonso Pena Júnior - son of the former President, may not have had the same religious convictions, regional pride and personal ambitions made them share the determination to see Bernardes President in 1922.

This aim had influenced their policy in the 1919 Presidential election and led the state to act as a mediator to ensure a consensus candidate. During the government of Epitácio Pessoa, the mineiros continued to act as moderators to prevent a political schism and also to ensure the support of the President and the state governors, particularly of São Paulo, for Minas in the next Presidential election. Although President Pessoa was anxious to govern independently of the major states and in the interests of the smaller and more needy ones where possible, he did not have his own base in Congress; his native state of Paraíba had only five representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. In order to commit the dominant states to his government, President Pessoa offered all the ministerial posts to the natives of these states. But his particular indebtedness to Minas deriving from his original selection, was strengthened by the crucial assistance afforded to him by the state when he made a controversial decision to nominate civilians to the Ministries of War and Navy. Under the Republic, these posts had become almost a

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.III p.960. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371 File 10607 Report of March 5, 1925.

prerogative of the military, a price that previous civilian Presidents had come to accept as necessary to keep the military out of active politics. Epitácio Pessoa however had not become reconciled to the idea and believed strongly in a professional military divorced from politics and subject to the authority of the constitutionally elected government. The President's intentions, as expected, aroused the opposition of the armed forces.¹ Both São Paulo and R.G.do Sul were unwilling to antagonize the officers and turned down the Ministry of War which they were in turn offered;² but the mineiro governor, Artur Bernardes, rescued the President by accepting both the Ministries of War and the Navy for the state. Whilst on the one hand Minas had thus compromised President Pessoa with their state, on the other they were to pay heavily incurring the hostility of the officers towards the state.

When new political crises developed over the President's other policies, it was Minas Gerais who maintained the political balance between the dominant states in Congress and the President, at the same time using the issues to forge alliances with the state governors. A dispute between President Pessoa and São Paulo over the coffee policy, for example, allowed Minas to arrive at an understanding with São Paulo. In 1920 the paulistas sought Federal support to maintain coffee prices, which were declining as a result of overproduction and also a post-war slump in exports. The President refused to concede the paulista demand for devaluation of the currency and the institution of a new bank which would provide credit for stockpiling; this led the paulista deputy Carlos de Campos to resign as majority leader in the House, a post he held since May, 1920.³ The

¹. J.M.de Bello: "A History of Modern Brazil" (op.cit.) p.241.

². The paulistas held the Ministries of Transport and Foreign Affairs; R.G.do Sul settled for the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. The Ministry of Justice went to a Pernambucan, whilst Bahia provided the leader of the majority in the Lower House in 1919, though subsequently the post went to São Paulo.

³. "O Estado de São Paulo" September 15, 16, 18-20, 1920.

President hoped to overcome the crisis with the support of Minas Gerais and invited the leader of its bancada, Afrânio de Melo Franco, to accept the post of majority leader. But the mineiros instead tried to defuse the issue by seeking not only to accommodate coffee interests including their own, but also to arrive at an understanding with the paulistas over the election of a mineiro President in 1922, as had happened in 1905-1906. When governor Artur Bernardes expressed his sympathy with the demands of São Paulo, pointing out the similarity of economic interests between the two states and requesting that the demands be met,¹ the President submitted, and Carlos de Campos resumed the leadership of the House. In 1921 the government went further. The Federal Treasury itself undertook to protect coffee prices and a Coffee Defence Institute was set up within the Treasury, a departure from the earlier valorization schemes which were run by the coffee states themselves.

A further crisis arose at the end of 1920, when the President was also faced with the opposition of São Paulo, R.G.do Sul and Rio de Janeiro over his proposed new import duty to meet a deficit in the Federal budget.² Again it was Minas that mediated. Although privately Governor Bernardes expressed his anger at the "ingratitude" of the President who owed his election to the southern states but refused to govern in their interests,³ he was anxious to prevent a major political confrontation which threatened as the President showed his determination to challenge his opponents on the issue. The mineiro governor eventually persuaded the states to accept a compromise and the President agreed to replace the proposed tax by a less onerous one.

There was little the President could do to assert real independence of the major

¹. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.II pp.971-3 copies of telegrams and letters on the subject. Epitácio Pessoa: "Pela Verdade" p.278. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" September 1920.

². "O Estado do São Paulo" 23-30 December, 1920.

³. A.A.de Melo Francos "Um Estadista da República" Vol.II pp.974-5;copy of letter of December 22; pp.975-8. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" December 24-28, 1920.

states and Minas. He had tried unsuccessfully to organize the northern states into a political block behind the government, which would free him from the need to rely on Minas Gerais and allow him to carry out his own policies. In August 1920, after the first confrontation with the coffee states, Epitácio Pessoa despatched the Paraíba deputy Tomas Cavalcante, to promote an alliance of all northern states including Bahia.¹ But there was little enthusiasm. The President had a limited mandate, whereas the key states were a permanent political force nationally whose protection the incumbents in the satellite states relied on in all contested elections in the states. Both the major northern states, Pernambuco and, in particular, Bahia, were internally divided and in no position to uphold the authority of President Pessoa. Moreover, Federal Congressional elections were due early in 1921. Since a mineiro, Bueno Brandão, was the presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies, Minas was in a position to determine the composition of the certifying commission in Congress, which in turn had the power to decide the elections either in favour of the slates of the incumbents in office or of the dissident state factions, as to who would form the bancadas of the states in the Federal Congress. The military was the only institution which could have provided the President with the power to challenge the dominant states. But Pessoa had alienated the armed forces. In any event, he was opposed to using the military for political purposes.

Thus the President could not dispense with the support of Minas, whilst the mineiros exploited their position to consolidate their own alliances with other states and to prevent inter-state rivalry.

¹. "O Estado do São Paulo" November 10, 1920.

2. The Presidential Succession. The Imposition of the Majority Ticket: Artur Bernardes-Urbano Santos

Minas was concerned only to see Artur Bernardes elected as President in 1922. The mineiros believed that if São Paulo endorsed his candidature, they would secure other states behind him. Rio de Janeiro, a major state, had already in 1920 agreed to Bernardes.¹ Federal Congressional elections were due in 1921 and Minas, which controlled the certifying commission, could - with the backing of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro - make the certification of the slates of most state governors dependent on their prior undertaking to support Bernardes for the Presidency. Although R.G.do Sul, and perhaps even Pernambuco and Bahia, despite the internal political schism within their states, might not be intimidated and fall behind Minas, the election of Bernardes, who would have the backing of the majority of state governors, would be assured.

The paulista governor, Washington Luís, who had his own Presidential ambitions for 1926, had no objection to Bernardes, but he argued that his election was possible only if President Pessôa, who was noted for his opposition to the hegemony of the coffee states, did not oppose him.² Although his weakness in Congress had not allowed Pessôa to assert real independence so far, the paulistas feared that regional animosity would result in other major states now falling behind the President, and if this happened, the support of the satellite states for Bernardes could not be assumed. The paulistas therefore made their support for Bernardes conditional on the consent of the President, but they undertook to approach him on behalf of Minas, hoping that the paulista-mineiro backing for Bernardes would force the President to submit.

But as the paulistas had predicted, President Pessôa was hostile. A staunch

¹. Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" (n.p. 1931) p.27. José Tolentino: "Nilo Peçanha" (op.cit.) pp.233-4. L.Pessôa R.G.: "Epitácio Pessôa" Vol.II pp.482-3.

². A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.II p.988.

Constitutionalist, he was particularly opposed to the intention of the coffee states to exploit the Congressional elections to secure the Presidency for their candidate, and to prevent this abuse, he insisted that the succession issue should be shelved for a future date, using as a pretext the argument that the early negotiations would lead to political tensions and affect his ability to govern.¹ However, when the incumbent governor of Rio de Janeiro exerted pressure on the President in favour of Bernardes,² Pessôa, believing that he was not strong enough to resist his candidature, partially submitted. Whilst he would not himself endorse Bernardes' candidature, he promised not to oppose it either, insisting that the Presidency should not be involved in the succession question, but suggesting that at least the Vice-Presidency should go to the north to prevent a regional schism over the Presidential ticket.

The support of Minas, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro for Bernardes and the neutrality of President Pessôa on the succession question led all other states except R.G.do Sul to endorse Bernardes by the end of April, 1921. The gaúcho governor, Borges de Medeiros, however opposed his candidature for two reasons:³ first, because it was the continuation of the regional hegemony of the coffee states and R.G.do Sul was not willing to simply fall behind a candidate chosen by these states; second, Borges was also critical of the choice of Artur Bernardes, who as governor of Minas had favoured inflationary policies with his demand for Federal credit for stockpiling coffee, and as noted in Chapter Five, R.G.do Sul supported orthodox monetary policies both for doctrinal reasons and in the state's economic interests that was geared to the internal market. Borges therefore demanded that aspiring candidates for the Presidency should first present a manifesto outlining the policies they intended to see through if elected.

¹. Epitácio Pessôa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.) p.475

². José Tolentino: "Nilo Peçanha" (op.cit.) pp.234-41.

³. "O Estado de São Paulo" May 1, 24, 26; September 25, 1921. "Jornal do Brasil" (Rio de Janeiro) June 21, 1921.

Although R.G.do Sul was a formidable state in the Federation, the basis of its power being a growing electorate, a united bancada and increasing wealth, it was nevertheless unable by itself to stage a significant revolt, and its opposition would have gone unheeded had not a dispute developed over the Vice-Presidential candidate for the 'official' slate¹ which now threatened the candidacy of Bernardes himself. The mineiros and paulistas were willing to comply with President Pessôa's wish that the Vice-Presidency should go to the north, but the trouble began when three states: Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro demanded the nomination for their respective states. Rio de Janeiro was persuaded to withdraw its claim, but the other two were intransigent³ refusing to accept any method of conciliation through arbitration by neutral parties or a third candidate, even after President Pessôa intervened personally, fearing a political crisis over the succession when the military was restive. Instead on May 21 and 22, the bancadas of Pernambuco and Bahia endorsed the candidature of their own incumbent state governors, José Bezerra and J.J.Seabra respectively, for the Vice-Presidency. When Minas, fearing that a contest for the Vice-Presidential nomination at the Nomination Convention, would threaten its unity and put the selection of Bernardes himself in jeopardy, attempted to end the deadlock by endorsing Urbano Santos of Maranhão as a conciliation Vice-Presidential candidate, both Pernambuco and Bahia went into opposition.² They endorsed the sentiment of the gaúcho deputy, Alvaro Batista, that Brazil was not prepared to accept "what came from Minas simply because it came from Minas",³ and accused the mineiros of not keeping their promise to allow the northern states to select the Vice-President.

¹. "O Paíz" (Rio de Janeiro) May 25-June 8, 1921 passim. "Jornal do Comércio" May 21-June 8, 1921 passim. Epitácio Pessôa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.) p.476.

³. Epitácio Pessôa: ibid., pp.476-80. Laurita Pessôa R.G.: "Epitácio Pessôa" (op.cit.) vol.II, p.488 copy of letter Pessôa to José Bezerra. Diário do Congresso Nacional, Sept.3, 1921 speech of Carlos de Campos, leader of paulista bancada.

². "Jornal do Comércio" June 5, 7, 1921.

³. Diário do Congresso Nacional, May 28, 1921.

Thus three major states: R.G.do Sul, Bahia and Pernambuco, had gone into opposition to Minas by early June. They now hoped to attract Rio de Janeiro to their side,¹ by offering to endorse a candidate from their state for the Presidency. Although the ruling elite of the state had been the first to back Bernardes, the political boss of Rio de Janeiro, Nilo Peçanha, had been touring Europe in the past year and was due back in Brazil only in the first week of June, 1921. In former elections, he had been one of the chief critics of the hegemony of the coffee states. Peçanha's attitude was at first ambivalent.² He expected that Minas and São Paulo would, as they had done in the past, drop Bernardes for a consensus candidate and he would be in a strong position to be nominated as a compromise candidate. But it was obvious that Minas had lost the support of Rio de Janeiro for Artur Bernardes.

Despite the opposition of four major states to the Artur Barnardes-Urbano Santos ticket, and the requests of politicians of a number of minor states for a conciliation ticket, Minas backed by São Paulo were determined to see their candidates through and fearing that any further delays in the formal ratification of their ticket would lead other states to withdraw their support, summoned the Nomination Convention to meet on June 8. Initially this body was to have been organized on the same basis as in the 1919 election, with dissident factions in the states being allowed representation, and in fact the Congressional commission set up to organize the Convention had already published the allocation of delegates for the states and the dissident factions within them.³ However, with four major states against the mineiro-paulista ticket, the presence of delegates of dissident factions would jeopardize the chances of the Artur Bernardes-Urbano Santos ticket being endorsed by the majority. Minas and São Paulo therefore rejected the

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo", June 6, 1921. "Correio da Manhã" (Rio de Janeiro) June 6, 1921.

². Epitácio Pessôa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.), pp.493-4. "O Estado de São Paulo" June 8, 1921.

³. See Table IX/1.

recommendation of the Congressional commission and instead invited the Federal bancadas of the states who represented only the ruling state elites, to attend the Nomination Convention on behalf of their states.

Although the state governments of R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro refused to attend a Nomination Convention biased in favour of the Bernardes-Santos ticket, the Convention met as scheduled. With the opposition not represented, the delegates of state governments already pledged to the official ticket easily secured the endorsement of their candidates. Bernardes received the support of 188 of the delegates, with only three abstentions. Urbano Santos was also the favourite Vice-Presidential candidate, obtaining 143 votes, whilst his rivals J.J.Seabra and J.Bezerra¹ received only 38 and 7 votes respectively.

The selection and ratification of the 'official' slate in 1921 departed significantly from the practice followed since 1905. Hitherto the concern had been to arrive at a consensus slate that would avoid a seriously contested election. Even in 1910 the candidature of Marshal Hermes had been endorsed because some of the civilian ruling elites had feared that they otherwise risked his forceful imposition by the army. In 1921, however, Minas and São Paulo were prepared to impose their choice although it alienated the ruling elites of four major states and threatened a seriously contested election.

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" June 9, 1921.

TABLE IX/1

Table showing the Initial Allocation of Delegates by States to the Nomination Convention of

1921

| State | Govern- ment faction | Op-position factions | Total for state | Allocation of delegates according to the 1921 Congressional election | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--|----|---|
| | | | | Government faction | | Opposition groups |
| Amazonas | 3 | 4 | 7 | governistas | 3 | Coronal Nery 1, União Repu- blicana 1, Partido Liberal 1, Dorval Pôrto 1 |
| Pará | 6 | 3 | 9 | " | 6 | Coronel Chermont de Miranda 2 " Artur Lemos 1 |
| Maranhão | 4 | 3 | 7 | " | 4 | " Costa Rodrigues 2 " Herculano Parga 1 |
| Piauí | 5 | 1 | 6 | " | 5 | Opposition 1 |
| Ceará | 8 | 5 | 13 | " | 8 | Coronel Belisario Tavora 2, " Floro Bartholomeu 1, " Marinho de Andrade 1, " José de Borba 1 |
| Paraíba | 5 | 2 | 7 | " | 5 | opposicionistas 2 |
| R.G.do Norte | 4 | 2 | 6 | " | 4 | " 2 |
| Pernambuco | 9 | - | 9 | " | 9 | -- |
| Alagoas | 4 | 2 | 6 | 1* | 4 | opposicionistas 2 |
| Sergipe | 4 | 2 | 6 | " | 4 | Coronel Deodato Maia 2 |
| Bahia | 13 | 6 | 19 | " | 13 | opposicionistas 4, Ubaldo de Assis 1, Francisco Rocha 1 |
| Espírito Santo | 5 | 1 | 6 | " | 5 | opposicionistas 1 |
| Federal District | 6 | 5 | 11 | Allianca | 6 | Independentes 3, Nicainor 1 Elyseu César 1 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 9 | 8 | 17 | governistas | 9 | Miguelistas 2, Norival de Freitas 1, José de Moraes 1 Faria Souto 1, Maurício de Lacerda 1, Henrique Borges 1 Joaquim Moreira 1 |
| Minas Gerais | 28 | 4 | 32 | " | 28 | Odilon de Andrade 2, Hercu- lano César 1, Americo Lopes 1 |
| São Paulo | 14 | 4 | 18 | " | 14 | Amaral Carvalho 2, Rubião Meira 1, Partido Munic- palista de Lorena 1 |
| Goiás | 4 | 2 | 6 | " | 4 | opposicionistas 2 |
| Mato Grosso | 4 | 2 | 6 | Fusionals | 4 | opposition 2 |
| Paraná | 5 | 2 | 7 | govt. | 5 | opposition 2 |
| Sta Catharina | 6 | - | 6 | " | 6 | |
| R.G.do Sul | 12 | 3 | 15 | " | 12 | " 3 |
| Totals | 158 | 61 | 219 | | | |

Source: "Jornal do Comércio" May 30, 1921.

Other sources for discussions and the organization of Convention: "O Estado de São Paulo" May 25, 1921. Mozart Lago: "A Convenção Nacional de 1921 fatos e documentos" (op.cit.) pp.299-305. "Jornal do Comércio" May 27, 30; June 4, 7, 9, 1921.

3. The Opposition Reação Republicana and the Nilo Peçanha-J.J. Seabra Ticket

The states which had opposed the 'official' ticket made it clear that they intended to contest the election with their own candidates, although they did not stand a chance of winning against the candidates ratified by the majority of state governors. The first concern of the opposition was to select candidates for their own ticket.¹ Not surprisingly, Rui the intrepid fighter for liberal reform was a popular choice, but he refused to run. Worn out by his 1919 Presidential campaign and the bloody election contest in his native state Bahia, in 1920, Rui died in 1922 aged 73. Two other names that emerged were those of Borges de Medeiros and Nilo Peçanha, but Borges also would not accept the nomination. Finally, as it became obvious that São Paulo and Minas were not open to a compromise and were standing by the Bernardes-Santos ticket, Nilo Peçanha agreed to run as the opposition's Presidential candidate.

The opposition united to form a coalition and adopted the name of Reação Republicanos - Republican Resistance. Instead of holding a convention, they published a Manifesto on June 25,² which was circulated in Congress for signatures of its sympathizers. From the signatures, it was clear that the Reação Republicana was a formidable opposition. It comprised the four politically most powerful states after Minas

¹. "O Estado de São Paulo" June 8,12,13,16,19,20,25, 1921. "Correio da Manhã" June 25. "O Paiz" June 13. Diário do Congresso Nacional, June 11, 1921.

². "Jornal do Brasil" June 25, 27, 1921. "O Estado do São Paulo" June 25, July 2, 1921. "O Paiz" June 25, 1921.

and São Paulo: R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, Moreover in Bahia and Pernambuco, the incumbents in power united with the dissident state factions over the Presidential elections. Although dissident factions in R.G.do Sul and Rio de Janeiro were supporting the 'official' ticket, the Reação Republicana had the support of dissident factions in other states and in the Federal District.

4. Electiona Manifestos

In view of the seriously contested election that both the official and opposition coalitions were prepared to risk, it is pertinent to ask what was at stake. Did their manifestos for example outline policy objectives that were new or especially significant where specific regional or class interests were concerned? In fact, the manifestos¹ differed little from those presented by 'official' candidates in the past Presidential elections. Where the Reação Republicana was concerned, there was no attempt to continue the campaign of previous oppositions at Presidential elections for liberal reform, and the opposition Manifesto of 1921² could be described as only the special pleading of conservative state governors dissatisfied primarily because of their exclusion from the selection process for the 'official' Presidential ticket.

Besides the demand from the opposition coalition for an end to the mineiro-paulista regional hegemony, the key issue in both Manifestos was the financial and economic crisis, whereas the opposition was concerned largely with financial equilibrium,³ demanding tight control over public expenditure, the 'official' Manifesto was caught in the usual dilemma between the contradictory demands on the one hand for

¹. For the Party Manifesto of the Concentração Política see "Jornal do Comércio" June 17, 1921. Manifesto of the 'official' candidate Artur Bernardes "Jornal do Comércio" October 19, 1921.

². Manifesto of the Reação Republicana in "O Paiz" June 25, 1921. "Jornal do Brasil" June 25, 1921.

³. See also Nilo Peçanha: "Política, economia e finanças: Campanha Presidencial 1921-1922" (Rio de Janeiro, 1922) p.101 passim.

financial orthodoxy, and on the other hand, the claims of regional and economic interests for Federal funds and public expenditure to promote development. As usual, the 'official' Manifesto took refuge in pious hopes, vague promises and general platitudes.

For example, on the question of improving the financial situation, the 'official' candidate's Manifesto undertook to balance the Federal budget by cutting down on public expenditure and increasing revenue. Artur Bernardes promised that his government would restrict the money supply and he intended to set up a National Bank under Federal control which alone would be responsible for issuing bank notes and servicing government bonds. In addition, as a large percentage of Federal revenue went to repay foreign loans, he undertook to raise and stabilize the rate of exchange. The fall in the value of the milréis, since the attempts to stabilize it at 16 d had been abandoned under Marshal Hermes, had made the repayments of foreign debt obligations very onerous. He also planned, he said, to increase Federal revenue by a reform of the system of tax collection.

This was one way out of the dilemma caused by the need to increase revenue to balance budgets without having to resort to additional taxation which was unpopular with economic interests on whom it fell. In fact, the 'official' Manifesto went on to make all sorts of claims based on the improbable success of the reform of tax collection. Not only would it make it unnecessary to raise the level of taxation, indeed it would enable existing taxes on exports to be lowered. The assurances to cut public expenditure were also flatly contradicted a few paragraphs further by the promise to continue development aid to the north-eastern region, presumably to continue the programme to combat drought begun by President Pessôa, and to see through wide-ranging measures that would increase the level of exports, including stabilizing the rate of exchange at an artificially low level and

continuing the coffee valorization programme.

The question of labour unrest was another problematic issue and the need for political and social stability made it impossible to ignore the question. At the same time, however, the interests of both the employers and the workers had to be satisfied. Whereas employers, whose interests were largely represented by the ruling elites, could not be alienated, neither could social and industrial peace be assured, even with the aid of police repression, unless some concessions were made to the workers. The opposition Manifesto did no more than pay lip service to the issue, promising vaguely to set up "institutions for social progress",¹ and arbitration between workers and employers. But it was the Manifesto of the 'official' candidate that was surprisingly progressive on the question, though it is not clear whether the concessions to the workers were inspired by his fear of the spread of bolshevism or whether it was an opportunistic attempt to attract labour voters. In addition to undertaking to see through the social welfare legislation outlined by Rui in 1919 and to set up arbitration councils to settle disputes between employers and employees, Artur Bernardes conceded two of the more radical demands of workers' organizations, "the right to hold meetings" hitherto denied them, and a "share in the profits". Although there was no attempt to specify what sort of meetings were intended, for example, whether they would be limited to discussing matters relating to employment only or also political issues, or how the share in the profits was to be achieved, nevertheless it was an important concession and one that was recognized by at least some workers' organizations who committed their members to support the 'official' ticket.²

The Manifesto of the 'official' candidate was significant in three other respects.

¹. N.Peçanha: "Política, economia e finances: Campanha ..." (op.cit.) p.153 passim. In his later campaign address to the paulistas however, Nilo - in an attempt to attract the vote of the European immigrant workers - recognized the need for extensive social legislation.

². "Jornal do Comércio" August 18, 20, 1921.

First, for his concession to demands for Constitutional revision. Unlike all former 'official' candidates who had adamantly opposed any Constitutional amendments, Bernardes stated that although he was not outlining his own programme for revision, he would not block proposals from Congress on the subject. In office Bernardes was in fact to push through Congress his own comprehensive amendments to the Constitution, which amongst other things strengthened the Presidency against the states and the power of the ruling elites against dissident factions. Second, the Manifesto was notable for the sympathy Bernardes showed to nationalist groups that had emerged amongst the bourgeoisie elements during the war.¹ He promised to see through compulsory conscription which the nationalist saw as a means of developing a sense of national pride and also of raising the level of literacy of the nation. (The military was known to be more conscientious in ensuring that the rank and file received rudimentary education than the state governments were in providing elementary education for the state population.) Third, Bernardes made a slight concession to the demands of the opposition coalition for greater independence of Congress from the Executive, and that it should be allowed to exercise effective control over government policy. He suggested that on the initiative of the government, Ministers should be made to defend their policies before Congressional commissions.

The Manifesto of the 'official' candidate was not a document for radical change but it was distinctive in two respects. Its social programme was more progressive than that of Rui in 1919; and Bernardes was the first 'official' candidate to openly state his support for Constitutional revision. The Manifesto of the opposition, on the other hand, had little that was new to offer, being confined to two issues, the need for regional balance and

¹. E.Carone: "A República Velha (Instituicoes e Classes Sociais)" (op.cit.) see under Social Classes. Bourgeoisie II Ideological concepts of.

financial equilibrium without however offering any new ways of ensuring this. But the candidate of the Reação Republicana partly made up for this during his electoral campaign when he aired popular demands.

5. The Election Campaign

The campaign which followed from July until the election in March 1922, far surpassed in its national perspective, intensity and organization, the former campaigns of 1910 and 1919 which had been conducted and dominated largely by Rui and who had directed his appeal to urban electors.

The Reação Republicana was the first to set up its campaign organization which consisted of a committee with representatives of the four major states and the dissident factions of others who had joined the opposition coalition.¹ It was the task of the committee to co-ordinate and organize the campaign. It decided that the campaign would be carried out in Congress where the opposition had already formed an opposition coalition faction,² on tours which would be conducted by the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the north and south of the country, and through newspapers. Local município coronéis were also instructed to register potential voters and to ensure a big vote for the opposition ticket. A month later on July 26, supporters of the 'official' ticket also drew up their campaign plans.³ They decided to call the official coalition the Concentração Política - Political Majority, and for some obscure reason to concentrate their campaign in "all important cities and ports" and in the "populous areas of the states" where they would discuss the "financial and political situation", though it was not clear what aspect of these issues would be chosen to attract the urban electors. The impression given by the 'official'

¹ "Jornal do Brasil" May 25, 1921.

² "Jornal do Comércio" June 10, 1921. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 9, passim 1921.

³ "Jornal do Comércio" July 27, 1921.

campaigners was that they were only trying to keep up with the Reação Republicana, and the aims of the campaign and the means to achieve them were not clearly conceived.

In contrast, the Reação Republicana aimed to exploit all issues that would discredit the two dominant states in the eyes of the ruling elites of satellite states and economic groups which had endorsed the 'official' ticket. It was in Congress that the campaign first got under way, the Reação Republicana faction in the Chamber of Deputies which was led by gaúcho deputy Otavio Rocha comprised about a third of the Lower House, see Table IX/2, and were therefore in a position to conduct a vigorous campaign. However, since the President was himself neutral on the succession question, the opposition had to be careful to direct their criticism not at the government, but at the Concentração Política itself in Congress.

TABLE IX/2

Division of the National Congress between the two candidates

| | Pro-Artur Barnardes | | | Pro-Nilo Peçanha | | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------|-------|------------------|----------|-------|----|
| States | Senators | Deputies | Total | Senators | Deputies | Total | |
| Amazonas | | 3 | 4 | 7 | - | — | - |
| Pará | | 1 | 7 | 8 | 2 | - | 2 |
| Maranhão | | 2 | 6 | 8 | - | — | - |
| Piauí | | 3 | 4 | 7 | - | — | - |
| Ceará | | 2 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| R.G.do Norte | | 3 | 4 | 7 | - | - | — |
| Paraíba | | 3 | 4 | 7 | - | - | |
| Pernambuco | | - | — | - | 3 | 17 | 20 |
| Alagoas | | 3 | 5 | 8 | — | 1 | 1 |
| Sergipe | | - | 4 | 4 | 2 | — | 2 |
| Bahia | | - | - | — | 2 | 22 | 24 |
| Espírito Santo | | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Federal Capital | | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| Rio de Janeiro | | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 13 | 14 |
| Minas Gerais | | 2 | 35 | 37 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Goías | | 3 | 3 | 6 | - | 1 | 1 |
| São Paulo | | 3 | 22 | 25 | - | - | - |
| Paraná | | 3 | 4 | 7 | — | — | - |
| Sta. Catharina | | 3 | 3 | 6 | - | 1 | 1 |
| R.G.do Sul | | — | 2 | 2 | 3 | 14 | 17 |
| Mato Grosso | | 3 | 4 | 7 | — | - | - |
| Totals | 41 | 131 | 172 | 18 | 79 | 97 | |

Source: “O Piauí” (Piauí) January 8, 1922.

The first issue that the Reação Republicana challenged in the House was the report of the Finance Commission which had been presided over by the mineiro Antonio Carlos de Andrade. A depreciation in the rate of exchange after 1910 had, as stated earlier, made it difficult for the government to meet its foreign debt obligations and to combat this problem subsequent governments had resorted to imposing a gold quota on the import tax, the chief source of revenue for the Federal government. The gold quota had been rising steeply as the exchange rate fell further and by 1919 already comprised between 35-55% of the total tax due.¹In 1921, the Finance Commission in Congress suggested a further rise in the quota to enable the government to pay the interest due on foreign loans. This report caused panic in commercial and industrial circles who claimed that their in-ability to pay the gold quota had already brought trade to a standstill whilst warehouses were filled to capacity. The opposition took advantage of the grievances of the trading sector to criticize Minas since its representatives had dominated the Congressional Finance Committee.² They argued first that there should be no tax on internal trade; second, that importers of foreign goods should be given time to pay off the extra tax burden and suggested that only the percentage due in paper currency should be enforced immediately, the gold quota being owed. Third, they suggested that, to prevent a worsening of the balance of payments deficit which led to further speculation against the milréis, imports should be severely restricted and a stiff tax imposed on non-essential goods, until an improvement in the trade balance caused the exchange rate of the milréis to rise to 12 d. Finally, they said that the government should limit expenditure and suggested that all contracts and public works except for the expansion of the railway system should be stopped and that the expensive celebrations

¹. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers; F.O.371. File No.2900, 1917, January and February 1917.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 16, 20, 22; August 2, 1921. "Jornal do Comércio" July 21, 1921. "O Estado de São Paulo" July 21; Sept, 15, 1921.

planned for 1922 to mark the centenary of Brazil's independence from Portugal, should be cut.

The Congressional minority also played on regional grievances, particularly of the northern rubber states of Amazonia and Pará. State governments obtained revenue from taxing exports, and as rubber exports continued to slump, both states were faced with the real prospect of bankruptcy, which in turn generated deep social and political instability. The problems of the rubber industry became a major theme of the election. The Federal government's refusal to adopt a valorization scheme to uphold prices, as it had done for the coffee trade, provided a good example of regional discrimination; although such a scheme could not have worked for rubber, since unlike coffee, it rapidly lost its monopoly in the international market after 1910. In Congress, representatives of Amazonia and Pará¹ accused the government of facilitating European immigration to the south whilst the native population of the north was dying of hunger. They maintained that Amazonia was dismissed as a primitive region, distant from the centre of Brazilian civilization and not worthy of the investment of Federal resources and asserted that if Amazonia had belonged to Britain or Germany, it would have become one of the richest parts of the country. They pointed out that rubber had for a long time provided about a third of the foreign exchange of the country and that Amazonia had helped inter-state trade by importing large quantities of food. The Reação Republicana now backed the demands of Amazonia in Congress and were quick to point out that the Finance Commission had yet again ignored the needs of the region in its report.

The theme of regional exploitation was taken up by the candidates of the Reação Republicana during their campaign tours from September to November, Whilst the Vice-

¹ 'Diário do Congresso Nacional', July 16, 22 passim.

Presidential candidate J.J.Seabra toured the south, the Presidential candidate Nilo Peçanha visited the states from Amazonia to Espírito Santo. An effective orator, he was able to attract large crowds. In his speeches he dwelt on three major themes: regionalism, the problems of the rural hinterland, and economic nationalism.¹ Nilo spoke of a kind of "imperialism within our borders", the result of an unbalanced Federal structure, which had allowed economic domination by two states. He demanded that the protection enjoyed by coffee should be extended to other export crops like rubber, cocoa and sugar. He criticized the efforts of the states of the centre and south to attract immigrant labour from the north and north-east, a process which was depopulating and further impoverishing the region. He argued instead in favour of more positive discrimination in favour of the underdeveloped regions, which would improve transport, provide credit for agriculture and establish industries to manufacture rubber goods. The Reação Republicana, Nilo emphasized, stood for "the equal treatment of the basic interests of the regions". Secondly, the opposition candidate defended the interests of the rural hinterland and agriculture as opposed to that of the cities. Successive governments he said, had contracted foreign loans for urban development and setting up protected and subsidized industries, whilst agriculture stagnated. The balance should be rectified to make the country agriculturally self-sufficient. Third, on the question of economic nationalism he argued that only a country which was economically self-sufficient could be politically independent. There was a need, he said, to turn away from the "magnetic fascination" of Europe. He called on the nation to develop its own mineral resources and to end the flow of Brazilian wealth abroad by establishing heavy industries, particularly iron and steel.

But Nilo's solutions to the problem of regional imbalance were opportunistic

¹ Nilo Peçanha: "Política, economia e finanças: Campanha ..." (op.cit.) Regional exploitation p.14 passim, 53 passim, 73, 123 passim. Economic nationalism p.41,59; agriculture pp.30-1,39,79 passim, 87.

rather than realistic. Other critics had argued that for regional equilibrium to be achieved, radical institutional reform which would limit state autonomy and give the states equal representation in Congress was necessary first. Nilo disagreed with this view, which conflicted with the interests of all major states including his own. All that was needed, he said feebly, was a change of attitude. He was also careful to protect himself from criticism of being anti-foreign and Jacobin with which he had been associated in the early years of the Republic. Catholic priests in some northern states had begun to instruct parishioners not to vote for him, asserting that he was opposed to the Church. Despite these limitations in his campaign, Nilo's airing of regional grievances struck a chord at least in one state government, that of Amazonia, which switched its support to the Reação Republicana.

By focusing on regionalism, economic nationalism, and the problems of the rural hinterland, Nilo had shifted the emphasis from the previous opposition campaigns. Whilst Rui had spoken to the urbanized and industrialized sections of the community and on their behalf, Nilo attempted to represent the interests of the undeveloped regions and rural hinterland. Rui's concern was with liberal issues - constitutional government, civil rights, free elections, an impartial judiciary; whilst Nilo was concerned with the institutional, financial and economic organization of the country.

6. Military Involvement in the Succession question

Except for a minority faction, the armed forces had generally endorsed the political system of the Republic with its rule by state oligarchs, and were opposed to active military involvement in politics. But President Pessôa's anti-military policies had alienated the officers from the civilian politicians. The appointment of civilian Ministers of War and

Navy resulted in disagreements between them and senior officers,¹ over military appointments, transfers, the employment of a French Military mission without consultation with military leaders, cuts in military expenditure and government refusal to meet demands for higher salaries. The resentment intensified when the President allowed Congressmen a 20% rise. With the return of Hermes da Fonseca to the Federal Capital in November 1920 after a five-year self-imposed exile in Europe following his disastrous Presidential term in office the discontented officers found a spokesman for their grievances.² He was welcomed back at a grand banquet attended by all the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and officers of the Military and Naval Clubs.³ In an interview he gave soon afterwards to the Correio da Manhã, Hermes expressed his concern at the complaints of his colleagues and made clear his intention to defend military rights.⁴

The dissatisfaction of the officers concerned the promoters of the candidature of Artur Bernardes, Minas Gerais and São Paulo, Bernardes had supported the President's anti-military actions and both the Ministers of War and Navy, directly responsible for the unpopular policies, were mineiros. Thus there was a deep hostility to Bernardes in particular, and Minas in general, in the forces. The fear of military opposition to the election of Bernardes is evident in the efforts of São Paulo and Minas to secure the support of Marshal Hermes for Bernardes as early as February 1921.⁵ At first Hermes was reluctant. He stated that as a non-political officer he could not give his support to anyone. But when Hermes accepted an invitation to visit Minas in May 1921 this was interpreted in

¹ Bruno de Almeida Magalhães: "Artur Bernardes. Estadista da República" (1973, Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympic Editôra) p.90 passim.

² Hermes da Fonseca Filho: "Marechal Hermes" (op.cit.) p.246 passim.

³ "O Estado do São Paulo" November 5, 1920.

⁴ "Correio da Manhã" November 7, 1920.

⁵ Edgard Carone: "A República Velha (Evolução Política)" (op.cit.) vol.2 p.333.

political circles as sympathy for Bernardes.¹

This illusion was soon dispelled. The rift over the Vice-Presidential candidate for the official ticket which led Bahia and Pernambuco to join R.G.do Sul in opposition to Minas and resulted in a serious division amongst the ruling elites, prompted the radical army and naval officers, representatives of workers' organizations and dissident politicians of the Federal District to endorse Marshal Hermes as their candidate for the Presidency at the end of May 1921.² In the following weeks, the candidature of Hermes received the support of a number of labour unions and dissident state politicians.³

Hermes allowed his name to go forward and during June the agitation in favour of his candidature increased. At a banquet held to celebrate his birthday, one naval captain Alencastro Graça, a member of one of the commissions in the Ministry of War, made a political speech in which he attacked governments by "political cliques"⁴ and called for Hermes to be the next President to purge the system; it would appear that his record as President had been forgotten. For his breach of discipline, the captain was imprisoned for eight days by the Federal government. A more significant development was the endorsement of Hermes' candidature by Rui Barbosa. Since 1919 Rui had been warning the ruling elites of the possibility of socialist orientated labour organizations forming an alliance with the army to control the Presidency and carry out radical reform, and to forestall them, he now urged that the ruling elites select a candidate acceptable to the officers and who would put forward a programme for social and liberal reform.⁵ He suggested Marshal Hermes as a conciliation candidate with himself as the Vice-President.

The Reação Republicana also tried to exploit the hostility to Bernardes in the

¹ "O Paiz" May 3, 1921.

² "O Estado de São Paulo" May 27, 1921.

³ Ibid., May 31 passim, June 2, "Jornal do Comércio" June 21, 1921.

⁴ "O Estado de São Paulo" June 3, 1921.

⁵ "Jornal do Brasil" June 28, 1921 published Rui's letter of June 15 to Nilo Peçanha on the subject.

armed forces. In Congress gaúcho deputy Otavio Rocha, an ex-army officer himself, stated that the political participation and co-operation of the armed forces was essential for political stability. But the civilian leaders of the opposition were not anxious to endorse a military candidate and instead attempted to obtain military support for the Nilo-Seabra ticket.¹ Officers of the First Military Region, which included the Federal District, had already endorsed the opposition civilian ticket.² Although there was widespread military opposition to Bernardes, few officers sympathized with radical labour organizations concerned to bring about radical social change, and some preferred to back the civilian opposition ticket which at any rate had a better chance of success. But it was soon apparent that the military were anti-Bernardes rather than pro-Nilo-Seabra.

With the open participation of the military officers in the Presidential question, a new source of tension was introduced into the political conflict. President Pessôa was genuinely concerned to maintain neutrality in the succession conflict. But he was also opposed to any political manifestations by the military and the threat of force to determine political issues; as a result of the government's disciplinary action against officers involved in a breach of conduct, a number of anti-Bernardes officers were punished. This led to an argument over the right of the officers to active participation in politics, a sensitive issue for the officers since the Military Question of the 1880s, and it increased the hostility of the officers to the President and Artur Bernardes.

The President's disciplinary actions also affected relations between the government and the Reação Republicana. Invariably Pessôa's punishment of outspoken military opponents of Bernardes led to the accusation that the President was actively involved in promoting his candidature. In Congress the opposition attacked the government's actions

¹ "O Estado da São Paulo" July 18, 1921.

² Ibid.

and defended the right of the military to participate freely and to vote for the candidate of their choice.¹ They argued also that the military had always intervened to save the country at a time of political crisis and that since co-operation between the armed forces and the government was essential for political stability, no candidate who did not have the support of the military should be elected.

The extent of the military hostility to Bernardes and the government is obvious from the episode of the false letters that dominated the succession issue from October to December. The facts relating to the incident are well known. On October 9, the virulent anti-Bernardes Rio newspaper, "Correio da Manhã" published a copy of a letter purported to have been written by Bernardes to his aide, mineiro Raul Soares, on June 3. In it Bernardes had referred in insulting terms to Marshal Hermes, "this sergeant", and instructed Soares to insist that the President deal firmly with the officers who pronounced on military matters.² Although Bernardes immediately sent telegrams to Congress denying authorship of the letters,³ the Military Club were quick to seize the opportunity this offered to destroy the candidature of Bernardes. The Club's Executive, which was presided over by its President Marshal Hermes, drafted a manifesto in which it expressed concern over the insult to the armed forces and stated that Bernardes should not be President since they could not assure his government of their support. The manifesto was signed by eighty officers.⁴

There could have been little doubt amongst both politicians and officers that the letters were forgeries. Various politicians including mineiros and newspapers had been

¹ Diário do Congresso Nacional, Debate August 7, 1921 passim.

² "Correio da Manhã" (Rio de Janeiro) October 9, 10 copies of letters.

³ Diário do Congresso Nacional, October 10, 1921. G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" pp.65-8 copy of letter A.Bernardes to B.Brandão.A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) vol.II, pp.1016-1026.

⁴ Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na areia de Copacabana. ociclo de Vargas" Editôra Civilização Brasileira S.A., R.de Janeiro 1964) vol.1 pp.62-3 Copy of manifesto.

first approached to buy the letters, but they had refused to touch them knowing them to be false.¹ Rui, who was asked to arbitrate in the matter after the Military Club published its manifesto, refused, stating his conviction that they were forgeries.² It was also alleged that Hermes had himself expressed the same view to Bernardes,³ but if so he did not publicize his doubts. For the anti-Bernardistas it was an opportunity not to be missed. In Congress the Reação Republicana stated that the honour of the army was at stake and demanded an enquiry into the authenticity of the letters. The cry was taken up by the Military Club and on November 12, the motion that the handwriting of the letters should be studied by specialists was passed by a majority of 439 votes against 327, Artur Bernardes, either reassured by Hermes or fearing that a refusal for an investigation could imply guilt, consented to it.

When the Commission chosen by the Military Club to judge the authenticity of the letters met on November 16, it was obvious that it was dominated by anti-Bernardes officers determined to find him guilty.⁴ Although Bernardes had been allowed to send his own representatives to supervise the proceedings, they soon resigned in protest at the partiality of the Commission. On December 28, by 493 votes to 90, officers at the Military Club accepted the report of the Commission which stated that the letters were authentic and resolved to "leave the case to the Judgement of the Nation".

Clearly, except for a small group of officers, the intervention of the military in the succession question of 1922 was not motivated by a desire for radical economic, political or social changes, but by hostility to Artur Bernardes himself. As governor of Minas, he had

¹ A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) vol.II, pp.1019-1020.

² Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na areia de Copacabana ..." vol.I, p.65 copy of telegram from Rui Barbosa.

³ "Jornal do Comércio" October 14, November 13, 1921.

⁴ The documents regarding the organization of the investigation committee and its proceedings are published in "Clube Militar, Documentos Historicos Relativos a Pericia Legal da Carta Ofensiva aos Brios das Classes Armadas" (Liv. Ed. Leite Ribeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1922).

made possible the execution of anti-military policies favoured by President Pessôa. At least some officers feared that his election as President would be against the interests of the military.

7. São Paulo stands by Minas

(a) Against the Military. The acceptance by the Military Club of the mineiro governor's responsibility for the letter insulting the military created a new problem for the candidature of Bernardes. Already the ruling elites of four major states were against his selection. The Military Club also opposed his election. There were two choices for the 'official' candidate, Bernardes could accept the verdict of the Commission on the letters and withdraw his candidature; or he could challenge it and risk a military revolt.

A number of politicians were of the opinion that since Bernardes had agreed to an enquiry into the letters, he should now accept the consequences, even if the impartiality of the Commission was in doubt. But the mineiros who had worked so hard to secure the selection of their state governor argued against his withdrawal.¹ They maintained that it would lead to panic amongst the ruling elites and enable the armed forces to come to power. On the other hand they argued, if Minas and São Paulo stood firm behind their candidate, they would have the support of the ruling elites of other states, whose primary concern would be to maintain order.

The fate of Artur Bernardes however depended on São Paulo. Since the Presidential office remained neutral on the succession question, the candidature of Bernardes was possible largely because of the backing of the paulistas. Even before the verdict of the Military Club was published, there was pressure on São Paulo to drop its

¹ Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na Areia de Copacabana ..." vol.I, p.84 copy of letter of A.Pena to Bernardes.

support for Bernardes in favour of a candidate of conciliation. After the publication of the manifesto by the Military Club, the "Correio da Manhã"¹ which had conducted its own investigations and come to the same conclusion, called on São Paulo to demonstrate its "patriotism" by withdrawing its support for Artur Bernardes. But paulista governor Washington Luís remained intransigent. He maintained that São Paulo always has a defined and definite attitude.² Washington Luís was to display the same obstinacy in the succession crisis of 1930 which was to provoke a revolution.

Strengthened, Artur Bernardes decided to ignore the manifesto of the Military Club and on December 29, the day after the resolution of the Military Club, he published his own Manifesto to the Nation³ in which he again denied authorship of the letters, defended his action in submitting it to a scrutiny and asserted that he could not withdraw his candidacy since he had been selected by "the majority of the Nation", in effect as we have seen, by the majority of state governors who had endorsed his candidature, although even then it could hardly be said that they had been given a choice. Like the Military Club, Bernardes also left it to the Nation and the election of March 1922 to decide whether he should be President of the country. This prompt reply to the Military Club left the Concentração Política, the coalition of state governors behind the official ticket, intact.

(b) Against any Compromise. But it also kept anti-Bernardes agitation alive. Officers continued to oppose his election asserting that if Bernardes became President, they would not accept him as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and it was proposed that they should seek a Habeas Corpus from the Supreme Federal Tribunal for all high ranking

¹ A.A. de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República ..." (op.cit.) vol.II p.1038.

² "O Estado do São Paulo" December 3, 1921.

³ A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) vol.II pp.1034-5 copy of Manifesto.

officers, to excuse them from taking orders from Bernardes if he was elected President.¹ More serious were the threats of military revolt to prevent him taking office.² In April 1921 there were rumours of a revolt in the Federal Capital and Niteroi. It was also reported that a General Luís Barbedo had travelled to São Paulo to plan an uprising of the Federal forces and the state's Força Publica, which would overthrow the government of São Paulo and march on the Federal Capital. Two military revolts did in fact break out between March and April. An uprising of naval officers stationed in Guanabara Bay was followed by a revolt in the army garrison in Fortaleza Ceará.³ Though neither was directly connected with the dispute over the succession, they were nevertheless the outcome of the general military agitation.

The schism of the ruling state elites over the succession also continued. Following the election on March 1, 1921, both the Concentração Política and the Reação Republicana began to claim victory. However, the winner of the election would be decided by the National Congress when it met in May, and since the Concentração Política had the backing of the majority of state governors, the victory of their candidates Artur Bernardes-Urbano Santos was a certainty. But the Reação Republicana stated that it would not accept the certification of the electoral results by Congress and demanded instead that the electoral returns should be studied by an impartial body. They suggested a Court of Honour, comprising Congressmen, Supreme Court judges and military officers should be set up for the purpose.⁴ The idea had the support of the Military Club who now

¹ "O Estado de São Paulo" February 18, 1922. Veiga Miranda: "Um depoimento para a História: O Comentário" vol.I (ano I 1926) pp. 39-41).

² E.Carone: "A República Velha. Evolução Política" Vol.2, pp.352-3.

³ "O Estado de São Paulo" April 9, 19-30 passim: May 4, 12-13, 20-28passim. "Correio da Manhã" April 27-79, 1922.

⁴ Otto Prazeres: "A Presidência da República" copy of letter N.Peçanha to A.Azeredo, Vice-President of Senate.

saw another opportunity of preventing Bernardes becoming President.¹

The political instability created by the division amongst the ruling elites and the dissatisfaction of the military over the candidature of Bernardes, led President Pessôa to intervene personally in the conflict at the beginning of May, 1922 in an attempt to conciliate the opposing factions.² Backed by the civilian Ministers of War and Navy, the President warned paulista and mineiro politicians of the revolutionary situation, asserting that 90% of the officers were anti-Bernardes and predicting that if elected, Bernardes would not remain in the Presidential palace for twenty-four hours, and appealed to them to avert the crisis by accepting a compromise solution. At first it was suggested that the Presidential election that had already taken place in March should be invalidated and another election be held instead at which a consensus ticket would be presented. When it was rejected, the President appealed to them to accept the demand of the opposition for a Court of Honour to judge the election already held.

But both the paulista and mineiro governors were opposed to any concessions, Washington Luís upheld the view of governor Bernardes that the question of a Court of Honour had to be decided by Congress itself since the Constitution had laid down the procedure for Certification.³ But in practice no amendment could pass through Congress without the support of these state governors. The determination of Minas to see Bernardes as President, and the obstinate refusal of Washington Luís to reverse the original decision of São Paulo to support his candidature, meant that only a successful revolt could prevent Bernardes from being inaugurated as President. Pessôa's failure

¹ G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" (op.cit.) p.384. A.Bernardes to B. Brandão April 28, 1922.

² Eptácio Pessôa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.) n.p.102-103. G.Casasanta: "Correspondência de B.Brandão" p.405. Pessôa to B.Brandão and reply October 11, 1925.

³ Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" (op.cit.) pp.68-73 copy of reply from A.Bernardes May 4, 1922. Diário do Congresso Nacional, May 5, 1922 Bernardes to A.Azeredo April 1 29, 1922. Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) pp.430-431.

to obtain a compromise¹ also shows that the President was unable to assert the authority of his office without the threat of sanctions.

8. The Election and its Certification

The contested election had led to a massive registration of new voters and over 1.3 million were on the roll in 1922. The poll was generally high in all states, see Table IX/3, the national average poll being 60.7% and 200,000 more votes were cast in 1922 than in the Congressional election of 1921. The one significant departure was the low (37%) turnout in the Federal District. Fear of a military revolt had kept many voters away.

The Reação Republicana had failed to get a Court of Honour to decide the results of the election and when Congress met to study the electoral returns on May 18, the opposition refused to participate claiming that the victory of the 'official' ticket was a foregone conclusion since the majority of the Congressmen had pledged their support to it. As a result the count in Congress, first by the Congressional Commissions and then the House itself, was conducted without any interruptions as had happened for example in 1910, and the results were announced three weeks later on June 7. The House had attempted to produce an impartial certification, and had rejected almost an equal proportion of questionable ballots from both sides,² though less than would have been expected (see Table IX/4). The final result which conceded the official Presidential

¹ President Pessoa made one other effort at conciliation. He appealed personally to Borges de Medeiros, governor of R.G.do Sul to accept Certification by Congress. To assure impartiality, he suggested that he himself together with one representative each from R.G.do Sul and São Paulo would study the ballots in dispute and submit a recommendation to Congress. Borges agreed on condition that the Congressional Commissions reporting on the electoral returns would be composed of equal numbers of representatives of the two sides, together with a group of impartial supervisors to act as juries in case of a deadlock. But President Pessoa would not accept this condition. See Eptácio Pessoa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.) p.505 passim, copies of correspondence between Pessoa and Borges on subject. L.Pessoa R.G.: "Eptácio Pessoa" (op.cit) vol.II pp.526-529.

² Diário do Congresso Nacional, June 8, 1922, p.803. The electoral returns from the states had given Bernardes 491,509 votes; Peçanha 341,761 votes.

candidate, Artur Bernardes, victory with 59.5% of the 'valid' votes was in fact in keeping with the predictions made before the elections based on the line-up of the ruling state elites in the contest.

TABLE IX/3

Percentage Poll by States

| States | Electorate | Voted | Percentage voting |
|------------------|------------|---------|-------------------|
| Pernambuco | 58,756 | 44,980 | 76.6 |
| Bahia | 122,631 | 88,850 | 72 |
| R.G.do Sul | 153,825 | 106,969 | 70 |
| Sergipe | 17,247 | 11,571 | 68 |
| Amazonas | 7,134 | 4,737 | 66 |
| Minas Gerais | 314,813 | 203,747 | 65 |
| Pará | 48,000 | 30,332 | 63 |
| Ceará | 62,676 | 39,... | 63 |
| São Paulo | 164,234 | 102,733 | 63 |
| Espírito Santo | 17,358 | 10,036 | 62 |
| Paraná | 31,893 | 18,928 | 59 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 86,517 | 51,291 | 59 |
| Sta. Catharina | 27,735 | 16,027 | 59 |
| R.G.do Norte | 15,759 | 9,319 | 59 |
| Alagoas | 21,528 | 12,712 | 59 |
| Paraíba | 27,071 | 15,399 | 59 |
| Maranhão | 32,216 | 18,901 | 59 |
| Mato Grosso | 9,248 | 5,458 | 59 |
| Piauí | 14,289 | 7,651 | 53 |
| Goías | 12,042 | 5,101 | 43 |
| Federal District | 70,102 | 25,779 | 37 |
| Totals | 1,305,826 | 833,276 | 60.7 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 8, 1922 p.795.

TABLE IX/4

If all elections in which more than 85% of the electorate voted are considered fraudulent, then the following votes would have to be disqualified

If all elections in which the opposition obtained less than 15% of the vote were considered fraudulent, then the following votes would be disqualified

| State | Bernardes | Nilo | Bernardes | Nilo |
|------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Amazonas | 34 | 166 | 1,309 | 1,606 |
| Pará | 3,265 | 139 | 13,548 | 7,068 |
| Maranhão | 200 | 40 | 8,878 | 3,476 |
| Piauí | — | - | 2,158 | 960 |
| Ceará | 2,195 | 322 | 16,040 | 5,722 |
| R.G.do Norte | 665 | 63 | 1,072 | 332 |
| Paraíba | — | - | 6,246 | 2,482 |
| Pernambuco | 25 | 4,394 | 308 | 1,212 |
| Alagoas | 148 | 30 | 5,938 | 2,187 |
| Sergipe | 1,124 | 324 | 6,062 | 3,448 |
| Bahia | 2,718 | 25,813 | 10,715 | 24,430 |
| Espírito Santo | 214 | 13 | 4,499 | 1,651 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 20 | 1,089 | 13,064 | 22,578 |
| Federal District | - | - | 7,736 | 1? 566 (1) |
| São Paulo | 14,925 | 233 | 16,419 | 7,018 |
| Minas Gerais | 29,604 | 916 | 30,705 | 13,585 |
| Goiás | - | - | 2,124 | 957 |
| Mato Grosso | - | — | 1,786 | 1,032 |
| Paraná | 1,046 | 41 | 8,025 | 4,788 |
| Sta. Catharina | 439 | - | 6,592 | 3,579 |
| R.G.do Sul | 504 | 18,787 | 8,603 | 23,062 |
| | 58,027 | 52,367 | 171,826 | 131,175 (excluding Federal District) |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 8, 1922 p.796.

Note: The assumption that a poll of 85% and a dissident vote of under 15% was indicative of fraud was generally accepted by politicians at the time. See ibid., p.796. (1) Illegible

TABLE IX/6

Results of the Presidential Election of 1922 by States as Certified by Congress

| State | President | | | Vice-President | | |
|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|------------|--------------|
| | Artur Bernardes | Nilo Peçanha | % state vote | Urbano Santos | J.J.Seabra | % state vote |
| Amazonas | 1,382 | 2,343 | 63 | 1,310 | 2,368 | 64.5 |
| Pará | 22,612 | 7,5.. | (1) 33 | 19,130 | 10,731 | 34 |
| Maranhão | 13,938 | 3,306 | 19 | 13,268 | 2,984 | 18 |
| Piauí | 6,445 | 1,675 | 21 | 6,500 | 1,030 | 14 |
| Ceará | 25,835 | 5,878 | 19 | 25,697 | 5,664 | 18 |
| R.G.do Norte | 8,548 | 479 | 5 | 8,531 | 477 | 5 |
| Paraíba | 12,258 | 2,950 | 19.5 | 12,255 | 3,031 | 20 |
| Pernambuco | 1,079 | 40,726 | 97.5 | 1,.84 (1) | 40,902 | 98 |
| Alagoas | 9,725 | 2,866 | 23 | 9,469 | 2,908 | 23.5 |
| Sergipe | 7,851 | 3,440 | 32 | 7,722 | 3,268 | 30 |
| Bahia | 11,689 | 67,437 | 85 | 9,128 | 69,966 | 89 |
| Espírito Santo | 8,886 | 1,850 | 18 | 7,302 | 3,456 | 32 |
| Federal District | 7,921 | 17,858 | 69 | 6,720 | 18,637 | 73.5 |
| R.de Janeiro | 12,889 | 33,098 | 72 | 13,529 | 32,399 | 75 |
| São Paulo | 89,108 | 8,271 | 8 | 87,886 | 8,393 | 8 |
| Paraná | 8,929 | 3,293 | 27 | 10,899 | 3,323 | 23 |
| Sta Catharina | 11,068 | 3,801 | 26 | 11,156 | 3,785 | 26 |
| R.G.do Sul | 11,132 | 92,173 | 90 | 11,022 | 92,105 | 90 |
| Minas Gerais | 186,790 | 15,723 | 7.5 | 185,349 | 15,3.9 (1) | 7 |
| Goías | 3,964 | 1,137 | 22 | 8 | 5,0.5 (1) | 99 |
| Mato Grosso | 4,137 | 1,351 | 24.5 | 73 | 5,411 | 99 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 8, 1922.

Note: (1) Illegible. The percentages are rough approximations.

TABLE IX/5

Result of Presidential Election of 1922 as certified by Congress

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| Artur Bernardes | 466,877 | Urbano Santos | 447,595 |
| Nilo Peçanha | 317,714 | J.J.Seabra | 330,592 |

Source: “Diário do Congresso Nacional” June 8, 1922, p.803.

The 40.5% of the 'valid' votes conceded to the opposition Presidential candidate was the highest percentage yet obtained by any opposition candidate. This was due to the support from the political machines of the ruling parties of R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, which gave him three-quarters of his total vote. (Table IX/6) The opposition also received the majority of the state vote in Amazonia. The remaining opposition vote came from dissident factions in other states. The most significant of these was the Federal District, where President Pessôa had intervened to secure free elections, and as a result, the opposition polled a majority in both districts although the political group which controlled the Council, the Alliança República, had supported the official ticket. The opposition Vice-Presidential candidate J.J.Seabra fared a little better generally, polling 42% of the national vote. He received the support also of the ruling elite in Mato Grosso and Goiás and a bigger dissident vote in Espírito Santo and Pará.

An interesting feature of the elections in 1922 was the low dissident vote in the major states (Table IX/6). As the level of dissidence intensified, the ruling elites were resorting to greater repression to maintain themselves in power. However, the election results of 1922 also show that the ruling elites of satellite states with less developed party machines and poor police forces were less successful in containing the opposition state

factions.

9. The Disintegration of the Reação Republicana

In previous contested elections as in 1910 and 1919, fear of reprisals had led state governors who had been active in the opposition coalition to withdraw from it after Congress certified the elections in favour of the 'official' ticket. But in 1922, the Reação Republicana indicated its intention to continue to challenge the verdict in favour of the Artur Bernardes-Urbano Santos ticket and to prevent their inauguration which, as usual, would take place in November.

However, two developments led to the disintegration of the Reação Republicana by the first week of July, only a month after the certification. One was the revolt of the military officers; the other, the defection of Pernambuco to the Concentração Política. The events leading to the military uprising have been narrated often. The sudden death of José Bezerra, the pro-Reação Republicana governor of Pernambuco in March 1922, had led to a serious internal schism over the gubernatorial election for his successor, after President Pessôa and the Concentração Política in Congress encouraged a rival faction to put forward their own candidate.¹ As a quasi-civil war situation developed in the state's capital, Recife, at the end of May, the President despatched Federal troops. When anti-Bernardes officers, resentful of being used to bring a pro-Concentração Política governor to power in Pernambuco,² were instructed by Marshal Hermes on behalf of the Military Club not to become involved in the internal political dispute,³ President Pessôa replied by imprisoning

¹ Hélio Silva: "1889 A República não Espereu o Amanhecer" (op.cit.) pp.343-425 contains copies of letters and telegrams on subject. L.Pesso R.G.: "Epitácio Pessôa" (op.cit.) vol.2 p.561.

² "O Estado de São Paulo" June 4, 1922.

³ Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" (op.cit.) pp.74-5 copies of telegrams from Hermes.

Hermes and shutting down the Club.¹

The military revolts that broke out on July 5 in the Federal Capital and Niteroi, the capital of Rio de Janeiro, were a spontaneous reaction to the President's imprisonment of Hermes, but there had been clandestine plotting to prevent the inauguration of Artur Bernardes as President since the election in March, and the rebels stated that their chief aim was to prevent Bernardes taking office in November.² In Mato Grosso, General Clodoaldo da Fonseca, the former salvationista governor of Alagoas, assumed command of the Federal forces stationed in Cuyaba and in the next few days began organizing the Divisão Provisoria Libertadora, intending to march first on São Paulo and then on the Federal Capital "to force the government to declare the elections of 1922 null and to certify our candidates (of the Reação Republicana)."³

But although the opposition to the election of Bernardes as President was widespread in the military, few officers were prepared to prevent his inauguration by force. As a result the rebels were isolated and the Federal government's defeat of the rebellion in the Federal District and Niteroi within a fortnight of the outbreak, abruptly ended the military preparations in Mato Grosso. Although a number of army officers remained hostile to Bernardes, open opposition to him in the military was temporarily ended.

The revolt also provoked a hostile reaction from the Reação Republicana. The ruling elites were genuinely committed to law and order and feared a revolt at a time of social unrest which would jeopardize their own position in the states. In Congress,⁴ the

¹ L.Pessoa R.G.: "Epitácio Pessoa" (op.cit.) vol.2 p.568 copies of letters of Hermes to Pessoa. Epitácio Pessoa: "Pela Verdade" (op.cit.) pp.530-33 copy of President's decree.

² For a detailed description of the military revolt see Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na Areia de Copacabana" (op.cit.) pp.105-214.

³ Ibid., p.213.

⁴ Diário do Congresso Nacional, Debates July 5 passim. Leonidas do Amaral: "Os Podrões da

Reação Republicana hastened to condemn the revolt disclaiming any involvement in it, and voted with the Concentração Política in favour of a motion allowing the President to declare a 30-day state of siege in the Federal District and in Rio de Janeiro with the right to extend it to other parts of the country, if necessary.

R.G.do Sul went further. Fearing intervention in the state, governor Borges de Medeiros withdrew from the Reação Republicana on July 18.¹ His action signalled the end for the anti-Bernardes opposition coalition of major states, since Pernambuco had already defected to the Concentração Política early in July. The internal schism in Pernambuco over the state's gubernatorial election has already been referred to. President Pessôa was eventually able to bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion. The death of the official Vice-Presidential candidate, Urbano Santos, on May 7, even before the certification of the elections, necessitated another election for a Vice-President after the Reação Republicana failed by 7 votes to 5 to win their appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal that the opposition's candidate, J.J.Seabra, should be automatically certified.² When the Concentração Política offered to put forward the Pernambucan Estácio Coimbra as their Vice-Presidential candidate, if the state ended the dispute over the gubernatorial elections by agreeing to a compromise candidate, the Pernambucans accepted the deal and automatically withdrew from the Reação Republicana.

With two states out of the opposition coalition it was as good as finished although Bahia and Rio de Janeiro did not withdraw formally from it.³ When the election for a new

Campanha Presidencial as Cartas e os primeiros discursos" (São Paulo, 1929) pp.356-7.

¹ J.L.Love: "R.G.do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) p.201.

² "Correio da Manhã" (Rio de Janeiro) June 18, 1922.

³ Nilo Peçanha, the opposition Reação Republicana's Presidential candidate, in fact informed the Concentração Política in September, 1922 that he would recognize Bernardes as the President-elect in return for an amnesty for the military officers involved in the rebellion, an end to the state of siege which had been extended after the one month it was originally conceded for, and the re-opening of the Military Club. But the Concentração Política did not need to make any concessions, and his offer was ignored. Nilo then issued a Manifesto to the Nation on November 13. In it he

Vice-President was held on August 20, 1922, the candidate of the Concentração Política, Estação Coimbra, was elected unopposed.¹ The state parties of R.G.do Sul, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia abstained.

10. Institutional Changes after 1922. The Presidential Succession of 1926: The Election of a Paulista-Mineiro Ticket

After 1922, there was a significant shift in the balance of power between the Federal government and the states and also amongst the states themselves. One factor which enhanced the power of the Presidency was the President's skilful intervention in all the states that had opposed his election. Pernambuco had already suffered intervention under President Pessôa though eventually the state did well out of it, obtaining the Vice-Presidency in 1922. Other states were less fortunate. In Rio de Janeiro and Bahia,² President Bernardes intervened in contested gubernatorial elections securing the victory of the candidates of dissident state factions against the nominees of incumbents in power who had joined the Reação Republicana. Bernardes also took advantage of a contested gubernatorial election in R.G.do Sul at the end of 1922 to intervene in the state.³ Although the importance and influence of R.G.do Sul prevented him from invalidating the election of Borges de Medeiros to a fifth consecutive term in office, the President forced Medeiros to endorse the peace treaty of Pedras Altas with the opposition party, the Partido

still refused to accept the results of the election of 1922, and demanded the implementation of the secret vote and a reduction in the size of the bancadas of the big states - a proposal he had refused to defend during the electoral campaign. The Manifesto, not surprisingly, went virtually unrecorded. see Diário do Congresso Nacional, Nov.13, 1922. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista ..." (on.cit.) vol.II p.1084.

¹ Certified results of elections of August 20 for Vice-President } Estação Coimbra 295,787 J.J.Seabra 790 Scattered 350 Source: Diário do Congresso Nacional, Nov.10, 1922 pp.5037-5051.

² "Correio da Manhã" December 1922, January 1923. Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na Areia de Copacabana ..." (op.cit.) pp.251-278. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha: Evolução Política" vol.2, PP.363-4; 369-370.

³ J.L.Love: "R.G.do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp.201-8.

Libertador, in 1923. Under it the state constitution was amended to prohibit the re-election of the incumbent governor to a consecutive term and to allow political minorities greater representation.

The outbreak of a fresh series of military revolts after 1924 which led to emergency powers being placed in the hands of the President also tended to concentrate powers in the Federal government at the expense of the states. The uprisings of 1924 in São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Pará, R.G.do Sul and Sergipe were largely provoked by the President's refusal to concede an amnesty to those officers who had participated in the rebellions of 1922, and the harsh sentences meted to some of them following their trial in 1924. But as the rebels of 1924¹ adopted openly revolutionary aims during their Long March through the interior under the command of Captain Luís Carlos Prestes and Miguel Calmon, and sought to arouse the peasants to rise against the existing political, social and economic order, the ruling elites of all the states united behind the President to defend the status quo.

¹ The reasons for the tenentes revolt in 1922 and from 1924 culminating in the Long March which ended in February 1927 are disputed. There was a tradition of radical opposition to the established order in particular within the army. The officers who were highly educated were part of the nation's intelligentsia. However, it is necessary to distinguish the positivist and salvationista officers from the rebel tenentes of the 1920s. Unlike their predecessors, the tenentes' training was largely professional and not philosophical; special French and German military missions being employed for this purpose. The frustration of the Júnior officers resulted from the fact that their own senior officers, who did not have a similar training, continued with their outmoded practices. Moreover, promotions to the higher ranks were not only very slow but were dictated by political considerations rather than professional qualifications. Since all senior appointments were ultimately the prerogative of the President, the Júnior officers became critical of the political system. However, the revolt of 1922 as noted was spontaneous, resulting from the generalized discontent in the armed forces with the government of President Pessôa and hostility to Bernardes in particular. The uprisings of 1924 were the reaction to Bernardes' punitive treatment of those who had opposed his election. After the failure of the 1924 revolts, those involved had no alternative but to continue their rebellion since a surrender would condemn them to heavy punishment. It was only during their long three year march that the rebel tenentes evolved a more fundamental criticism of the social, economic and political system of the country. See Hélio Silva: "1922 - Sangue na Areia de Copacabana" (op.cit.); 1926 "A Grande Marcha" (Editôra Civilização Brasileira S.A. (Rio de Janeiro, 1965). Edgard Carone: "A Primeira República (1889-1930) Texto e Contexto" (op.cit.) p.255 passim. N.W.Sodré: "História Militar do Brasil" (op.cit.) p.198 passim. Neill Macaulay: "The Prestes Column (Revolution in Brazil)". (A Division of Franklin Watts Inc., New York, 1974) John D.Wirth: "Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930" (Hispanic American Historical Review XLVI No.2 May, 1964.) Robert J. Alexander: "Brazilian Tenentismo"(H.A. H.R. XXXVI No.2 May, 1956.) Boris Fausto: "A revolução de 1930; Historiografia e História" (São Paulo, 1970).

It was during the suspension of political freedoms that President Bernardes backed by Minas and São Paulo pushed through Congress amendments to the Constitution of 1891,¹ which the Republican politicians had resisted for so long. This revision, which gave the Federal government the right to intervene in states which failed to meet their financial obligations, limited the use of habeas corpus for political purposes and allowed the President a partial veto over the budget, all contributed to the authority of the President.

If the Presidency acquired greater powers as a result of Bernardes' policies, his successful imposition as President itself signified a shift in the balance of power between the states, the north-eastern states of Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro losing further to the São Paulo-Minas axis. Since 1905 the major states had opposed the hegemony of any one state over the Presidency and after the imposition of a military President in 1910, the two dominant states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais had accepted the need for consensus to prevent a seriously contested election and political instability. But in 1922 they rejected the consensus. The Bernardes-Santos ticket was essentially a mineiro-paulista ticket and it was imposed despite the opposition of the other four major states and the hostility of the military. Moreover this was achieved without the aid of the Presidential office, which under President Pessôa remained outside the contest.

With the Presidency held by a mineiro after 1922, the power of the São Paulo-Minas entente was further enhanced, and with R.G.do Sul, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco subdued by the Federal interventions in their states, and the military outbreaks after 1924, President Bernardes prepared to impose his successor.² The paulista-

¹ Hamilton Leal: "História das Instituições Políticas do Brasil" (op.cit.) p.436. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Evolução de Crise Brasileira" (Companhia Editora Nacional, São Paulo, 1965) p.76 passim.

² See Sertório Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) pp.491-505. Edgard Carone: "A Velha República. (Evolução Política)" p.391. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" vol.III, pp.1274-1276, J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.213.

mineiro understanding demanded a paulista President in 1926, and President Bernardes found in paulista Washington Luís a man who could be relied upon to continue his financial and political policies. For a while it appeared that the ambitious incumbent governor of Minas, Melo Viana, would try to block the selection of Washington Luís.¹ Although the President had banned all discussion of the succession question by the politicians to prevent dissidents from exploiting the issue, Melo Viana conceded an interview to a newspaper in the Federal Capital in which he opposed the candidature of the paulista, demanded the selection of a candidate by a democratic Nomination Convention representing municípios and called for an amnesty for all political prisoners and military rebels as a measure of conciliation.

The interview led dissidents to make fresh demands for an amnesty. The President averted a crisis by offering the Vice-Presidency to the mineiro governor, although he had intended it for a candidate of the North - Miguel Calmon of Bahia. However, despite the regional domination of São Paulo and Minas on the election ticket, there was no opposition to it.

The Washington Luís-Melo Viana ticket was officially ratified at a national domination Convention on September 12, 1925. Although politicians had accepted Melo Viana's demand for a Convention selected by municípios,² the Convention in fact was similar to its predecessors. Since the majority of município Councils were controlled by coronéis loyal to the state governor, the delegates represented the ruling elite of the state. Except in a few instances like Rio de Janeiro where powerful local coronéis were selected, and in the case of Mato Grosso, where the state governor, Coronel Pedro Celestino was one

¹ Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro, 1930" interview published p.96.

² Each state was to be represented by three delegates chosen by municípios. The selection was carried out in two stages. Every município Council selected its representative to a state Convention, which in turn selected three delegates to the national Convention, See "Jornal do Comércio" August 11,15,23; September 13, 1925 full report on Convention.

of the delegates, the state Conventions chose mainly Congressmen to represent the state. Thus the Convention, dominated exclusively by representatives of the ruling state elites, unanimously endorsed the official Washington Luís-Melo Viana slate.

From his electoral Manifesto outlined at the Automobile Club in the Federal Capital on December 28,¹ it was clear that Washington Luís intended to continue the policies of President Bernardes. One of the most controversial issues at the time was that of amnesty for those who had participated in the revolts since 1922. Dissident politicians and proponents of conciliation favoured a general amnesty which, they argued, would lead to the rebels surrendering their arms. However, Washington Luís preferred the President's hard line policies. He showed his determination to deal firmly with rebels, arguing that the fundamental duty of any government was to ensure law and order which was necessary for progress, and that this could not be achieved by weakening authority and making concessions to a few hundred rebels "without ideas or national support".

The candidate was equally uncompromising over the demands for radical liberal and social reform. He argued for political and administrative continuity, "conservation and development along established lines". He denied that there was a social problem - hardship amongst the urban proletariat and peasants, maintaining that this was a European problem and did not exist in Brazil. He pointed out that land was plentiful in Brazil and asserted that many of the present prosperous agriculturalists and capitalists had begun as colonists with small plots of land. He added that the country also had social legislation to ensure conditions of labour and minimum wages and it was now up to the judiciary to enforce it. There was one concession to the liberals: Washington Luís accepted the need for electoral freedom. He insisted that the only way of preventing electoral fraud was by

¹ "Jornal do Comércio" December 29, 1925. Manifesto of Washington Luís.

enforcing the penal measures outlined in the electoral regulation and he proposed further that a section of the judiciary should be designated only to deal with the electoral procedure from registering voters to acting as arbiters in the certification of elections. He also favoured making registration and voting a compulsory obligation for all those who qualified. However, because of the obviously dangerous implications for the ruling elite of such reform, Washington Luís did not implement them during his term in office, which was one of the most repressive of the Old Republic.

As with many of his predecessors, Washington Luís stated that the main aim of his government would be to maintain the financial stability of the country. He stated his intention of restoring the national currency to gold convertibility and outlined the usual deflationary measures he would have to push through to bring this about. He promised also to stabilize the rate of exchange at a high level, although it was against the real interests of the coffee exporters of his native state. He argued instead that this was necessary to help wage earners who depended on imports for many of their basic requirements. Finally, Washington Luís undertook to look after the interests of the armed forces and like Bernardes stated his support for compulsory conscription. It was an obviously conservative programme intended to continue on the basis established by President Bernardes.

As the national political elite were unanimously in favour of the Washington Luís-Melo Viana ticket, there was no opposition candidate and no campaign. The elections held on March 1, 1926 were the quietest of the Republic. But the poll was high at 54%, only 6% less polling than in 1922, a seriously contested election. Over 700,000 votes were cast as the ruling elites of the states demonstrated their support for the official candidates who received over 98% of the votes cast. Congress certified the elections in their favour at

the beginning of June.

TABLE IX/7

Results of the Presidential election of 1926 as certified by Congress

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|------------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
| Washington Luís | 688,528 | Fernando de Melo Viana | 685,754 |
| Assis Brasil | 1,116 | Barbosa Lima | 1,122 |
| Isidoro Dias Lopes | 76 | Captain Carlos Prestes | 262 |
| Others (approximately) | 850 | Others (approximately) | 1,200 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" June 9, 1926 p.434.

Note: The votes for Isidoro Lopes, the army officer who led the military uprising in São Paulo in 1924, and for Captain Prestes, leader of the rebel Prestes Column were cast in the Federal District.

Conclusion

The elections of 1922 and 1926 had significant implications for the political system of the Republic. São Paulo and Minas were prepared to continue their hegemony over the Presidency by force and any state that opposed them risked reprisals. The paulista-mineiro entente was virtually impregnable particularly when they held the Presidency, but the crucial question for the future was how long this understanding could be maintained.

The other important political development after 1922 was the new powers acquired by the Presidency. Hitherto the potential powers of the Presidency could be exercised only with the support of at least some of the major states, including at least Minas or São Paulo. However, as a result of Bernardes' policies and the military revolts, the Presidency acquired powers in its own right which even the major states would be reluctant to challenge.

CHAPTER TEN

THE ELECTION OF 1930. THE MINAS-SÃO PAULO SCHISM, THE ALLIANÇA LIBERAL,

FEDERAL INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR

Introduction

The election of 1930 is significant for a number of reasons. First, the São Paulo-Minas alliance operative since the Pact of Ouro Fino in 1913 and based on the rotation of the Presidency broke down when São Paulo sought a second Presidential term in 1930, provoking a contested election with Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba going into opposition. Second, the opposition Aliança Liberal conducted an effective electoral campaign despite its lack of support from the ruling elites of the majority of states. Third, for the first time, state governors in opposition to the 'official' ticket formed an alliance with revolutionary dissident groups including the tenentes and prepared for a revolt. Fourth, the opposition Aliança Liberal staged a successful revolution after the election, deposing the Federal government and state governors behind the 'official' ticket and imposing their own candidate Getúlio Vargas as President.

Like the election of 1922, that of 1930 which toppled the Old Republic and led to the establishment of a new political system has received a great deal of attention. This chapter examines four main issues which throw light on the institutional, political and social changes which had been taking place in the Republic since its inauguration. It looks at the manner in which the enhanced power of the President affected the process of selection of candidates in the 1930 election and the factors which enabled the Aliança Liberal to carry out a powerful campaign; it attempts to argue that the preparations for a revolt and the civil war that followed resulted from

the determination of Minas and R.G.do Sul to defend state autonomy and the institutional balance of the Republic as it had existed since 1891, against the attempts of São Paulo to reassert its hegemony over the Republic; lastly, the chapter tries to set out the aims of the various revolutionary factions in the Aliança Liberal.

1. The Institutional Imbalance of the Republic

After 1926 the institutions of the Republic were out of balance. This was a result of the Presidency whose authority had been increasing since 1922 at the expense of the states coming into the hands of São Paulo, which since 1906, when it last controlled the Presidential office, had also acquired greater power in the Federation vis-à-vis the other major states and was now anxious to reassert its hegemony.

The reasons for the enhanced authority of the Presidency under Artur Bernardes were, as we have already noted, due to a number of factors. It was partly the result of his successful interventions in the states that had formed the Reação Republicana, partly from the new powers that the Constitutional amendments invested in the Federal executive at the expense of the states and the National Congress, and partly the result of the emergency powers that Congress allowed the President throughout his term in office to deal with the military insurrections. This was manifested in the succession of 1926 in which President Bernardes successfully imposed a paulista-mineiro ticket in the interest of regional hegemony.

To the enhanced powers of the Presidency, Washington Luís brought in 1926 first, the power of São Paulo which was to provide an additional basis for his authority; and second, his own resolute personality and belief in firm government. As noted in Chapter One, São Paulo grew rapidly in demographic strength during the

Republic. Although the size of the state's bancada was not increased accordingly, its percentage of the national electorate had almost doubled since 1890. This gave São Paulo greater political importance vis-à-vis Minas Gerais which had gradually been losing its electoral preponderance over its nearest rival, and convinced the paulistas of their ability to dominate the Republic independently of Minas Gerais.

President Washington Luís himself firmly believed in the superiority of his native state. As Secretary of the Interior in São Paulo from 1904-1908 he had been responsible for modernizing the state's militia with the help of a French military mission. He now wished to reassert the hegemony that São Paulo had enjoyed over the Presidency from 1894-1906.

Everything about his past indicated the determination of Washington Luís to succeed in his ambitions.¹ This precluded government by consensus. Moreover the President also believed that to conciliate was a sign of weakness which affected adversely the authority of the government. Instead he was inclined to a strong personalized rule.

Although the paulista control of the Presidency in 1926 resulted in an institutional imbalance, this was in fact not evident in the first half of President Luís' administration. Unlike Bernardes, Washington Luís did not face any challenge to his authority when he came to power.² His candidature had been supported by all state governments. He also benefited from the fact that there was a profound desire for peace, after the four years of strife- ridden government of Bernardes with constant

¹. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias Vol.II. A Aliança Liberal e a Revolução de 1930" (Editôra Globo, Pôrto Alegre, 1963) pp.17,39; copies of letters Neves to Vargas, November 29, 1928.

². For a general political history of the administration of W.Luís see: Virgílio A.de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" (Schmidt, Rio de Janeiro 1930 pp. 140-1 passim. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha. Evolução Política" (op.cit.) José Maria Bello: "Memórias" (Coleção Documentação Brasileira Rio de Janeiro, 1958) p.156.

military revolts. In February 1927 the military rebels who had participated in the Prestes Column also ended their march, disillusioned by the lack of response to their call for an uprising of the peasants in the backlands and hoping for an amnesty from the new government if they surrendered, which however the President did not concede.

In the first two years of his administration there was little to disturb political tranquility and the President had complete control over the political situation. Washington Luís had appointed an entirely political and regionally balanced Cabinet.¹ In return the state governments cooperated with the President in Congress which became a rubber stamp for his policies. Two issues in particular interested the President. One was his programme for financial stability, the other was the fight against communism. Only a month after coming to office a new finance bill was passed through Congress.² The milréis was stabilized at twelve pence and a bureau for the conversion of paper money into gold at the fixed rate of exchange was to be established. These measures were intended to meet the interest payments on foreign debts. In August 1927, Congress also voted in favour of the Lei Celerada.³ The law was intended to proscribe the Communist Party which had reemerged earlier that year, after President Luís lifted the state of emergency which had been imposed throughout his predecessor's administration. The law became a new instrument of political control for the President. It enabled the Federal government to impose press censorship and to curb political activity which it judged endangered the status quo.

¹. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers. F.0.371 File No.11118 Report for November 1926. Sertório de Castro: "A República que a Revolução Destruiu" (op.cit.) p.507 passim.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional", December 1926.

³. Ibid., August 1927. "O Paíz" January 14, 1926 reported that in 1922 before it was proscribed, the Communist Party had 12,000 members with branches in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas and R.G.do Sul. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers: F.0.371 File No.11116, 1926. Report of January 19, 1926.

2. The Presidential Succession. The Candidature of Júlio Prestes and the Paulista-Mineiro Split

The real test of the President's authority was to come over the question of his successor. Since the Pact of Ouro Fino in 1913, São Paulo and Minas had co-operated over Presidential elections on the basis of rotating the Presidency between the two states, and in 1930 it was the turn of Minas to provide a Presidential successor. However for perceptive political observers of the period, there were signs as early as 1927 that Washington Luís was grooming another paulista Júlio Prestes to be his successor.¹ Prestes had been majority leader and spokesman for the Federal government in Congress since Washington Luís was inaugurated as President in November 1926.² When the incumbent paulista state governor died in 1927 following a brief illness, President Luís secured the election of Júlio Prestes as state governor in an uncontested election, thus placing him in a position to make a bid for the Presidency in 1930.

It has been argued that the President's preference for Júlio Prestes was dictated by his overriding concern to see his financial programme continued.³ Although the mineiros had supported the President's financial bill in Congress, it was doubtful that the incumbent governor Antonio Carlos, who was expected to be Minas' candidate for the Presidency, would give the same priority to orthodox financial policies. A professor of history and political economy, Antonio Carlos had, in his numerous books on finance and in the state and Congressional posts he had held, placed greater

¹. J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) p.226. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) p.164.

². British F.O.Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371. 1928/ File No.13469. Record of leading personalities in Brazil. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) pp.157-162.

³. Ibid.

emphasis on the need to stimulate economic growth.¹

Moreover he differed in his political views from the President. Unlike Washington Luís, Antonio Carlos believed in the need for political conciliation through concessions. He is credited with the saying "let us make the revolution before the people make it". As governor of Minas he attempted to conciliate his liberal opponents introducing the secret ballot in state elections and allowing the opposition in Belo Horizonte to win several seats in the local Council. In contrast, Júlio Prestes as governor proved himself a disciple of Washington Luís ruthlessly repressing the new Democratic Party of São Paulo,² the dissident faction of the paulista Republican Party, which had broken away in 1926 to form a state-wide liberal opposition party. These differences in political style created a certain personal animosity between the President and Antonio Carlos.³

However it is clear that had the continuation of his financial policies been the primary consideration in the choice of his successor, the ideal candidate for the Presidency would have been Getúlio Vargas, who as Finance Minister had been responsible for seeing the policies through. Moreover Vargas was a gaúcho, and R.G.do Sul had been the most consistent supporter of orthodox monetary policies. Instead the President was risking political instability by imposing another candidate of his state. The facts indicate that the President's main aim was to reassert the hegemony of the paulistas in the Federation. The mineiros certainly believed that President Luís was deliberately discriminating against their state in an attempt to

¹. British F.O.Diplomatic Papers F.0.371. 1928/File No.13469. Record of leading personalities in Brazil. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) pp.127-139. Aurelino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" (Edições Pindorama, Belo Horizonte 1933) pp.7-13. "Jornal do Comércio" "Gazetilha" July 18, 1926; June 26, 1929.

². Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideais e lutas de um burgues progressista. O partido Democrático e a revolução de 1930" (São Paulo, Anhambi, 1958) pp.210-14; 271-88; 301 passim.

³. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) Neves to Borges p.187.

weaken it.¹ The Federal government repeatedly turned down their requests for financial assistance to the state. One specific issue over which the states were divided was the iron ore enterprise which the mineiros were planning to develop in the state.² The paulista bancada protested that this would adversely affect their own iron and steel fabricators who worked with scrap metal. It was obvious that there was a serious regional jealousy between the two states. During 1927 and 1928 newspapers in the Federal Capital published anti-mineiro articles. In Minas at least it was believed that paulista funds were being used to discredit the state. One thing that rankled with the paulistas was the fact that from 1906 until 1926 no paulista had served as President whilst there had been three mineiro Presidents and two Vice- Presidents during the period. Hence Washington Luís prepared to impose another paulista, Júlio Prestes, and to challenge the right of Minas to an equal political status with São Paulo in the Federation.³

The determining factor would be how many of the major states could be persuaded to accept the President's choice. The candidature of Júlio Prestes could not be expected to be popular. He was plainly the President's nominee and the choice of another paulista would be interpreted as another attempt at state hegemony. Júlio Prestes was little known nationally. He had served as Federal deputy only briefly between 1924-1927. Only 47 years old, he was relatively young for a President of the Republic. He had little administrative experience and would not even have completed his term as governor of São Paulo by 1930. What made the President's candidate most vulnerable however was the certainty of mineiro opposition. The opposition could

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional", August 3, 1929. Speech of José Bonifácio, Afrânio de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.III, pp.1292-5.

². Warren Dean: "The Industrialization of São Paulo 1880-1945" (op.cit.) pp.147-8.

³. Hello Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" Neves to Borges and Vargas November 29, 1928, p.187.

well lead other major states to veto a paulista or mineiro candidate as they had done in previous elections.

The President however was confident of seeing his candidate through if he could secure the support of R.G.do Sul, politically the third most important state after São Paulo and Minas. Since 1919, R.G.do Sul had led the opposition to paulista and mineiro Presidential candidates, but the Federal intervention during the civil war of 1923 had made the state more wary of challenging Presidential authority. Washington Luís was also in a favourable position to pursue a São Paulo-R.G.do Sul understanding.¹ As governor of São Paulo he had refused to give the assistance that the Partido Libertador had requested during the civil war in R.G.do Sul. After his election, Washington Luís had paid a special visit to Pôrto Alegre. He was the first President-elect to do so since the famous tour undertaken by Afonso Pena in 1906. Borges de Medeiros wholly approved of the President's financial programme and prepared to support the government in Congress. The relationship between Washington Luís and R.G.do Sul was further strengthened when his Finance Minister, Getúlio Vargas, was elected governor for R.G.do Sul, replacing Borges de Medeiros who had been forced to step down by the terms of the Pact of Pedras Altas of 1923. The President had found Vargas pliable and co-operative as Minister. As governor, the relationship between the two became intimate as is witnessed by the frequent exchange of letters.² Vargas was concerned to promote the economic development of his state and the President willingly complied with the many requests for Federal assistance as João Neves acknowledged during his meeting with the President on December 3, 1928: "The solution found for the ... nationalization of charque, the

¹. J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) pp.213-4.

². Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) pp.148-156, 209-211, 214-15, 222-224; copies of letters exchanged between Washington Luís and Vargas.

transference of experimental stations to the states, the concessions of the Port of Torres and Pelotas, the renewal of the contract for the railway system, the fiscal measures destined to benefit tavern keepers and all other manner of minor assistance ... linked the name of President Luís to the progress of Rio Grande do Sul."¹ In return the President expected gaúcho backing for his policies, including the succession.

With the two major states of São Paulo and R.G.do Sul and the weight of Presidential authority behind Júlio Prestes, his candidacy would be in a strong position. Washington Luís had a trump card. The Presidential election in 1930 was to coincide with the Congressional elections for Federal deputies and a third of the Senators. In Congress the certification commission would be controlled by the President's nominees. As in former elections, the President planned to make the certification of the Congressional slates of the establishment state parties conditional on the support of the state governors for Júlio Prestes.

Meanwhile Washington Luís discouraged any discussion of the succession question until September 1929.² This postponement of the selection until six months before the election was due, would leave little time for an effective opposition to develop. The President was able to dictate the programme for the succession for two reasons:³ first, the initial success of his financial policies allowed him to demand that this should not be jeopardized by a dispute over the succession; second, many politicians were of the opinion that the conflict over the 1922 succession had resulted largely because President Pessôa had refused to direct the negotiations. There was

¹. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) pp.20-21. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) pp.186, 207, 220-6; copies of other letters on same subject.

². Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" (op.cit.) copy of letter of Afrânio de Melo Franco to Epitácio Pessôa, p.156, J.Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) pp.26, 27. "Jornal do Comércio" "Gazetilha" May 10, 1929.

³. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" pp.222-223 copy of letter of Washington Luís to Vargas} pp.234-5 see example in copy of letter of Borges to Vargas June 16, 1929.

now a general consensus that it was the duty of the President to manage contentions, political issues over which the establishment state parties were divided and which encouraged other challenges to the status quo. The state governors seemed willing to comply with the President's timing on the succession.¹ In a letter dated May 10, 1929 Vargas assured Washington Luís: "I have remained silent to any manifestation on the subject of the Presidency, so that Your Excellency would be free to take the initiative when you judged it opportune." Even Antonio Carlos responded favourably. At the end of May he wrote to the President: "All those in the Constitutional regime in which we live who will have to be called on to advise on the succession question, without doubt respect the patriotism of only pronouncing on the subject in the right time. This moment will be decided by the President." However while this might postpone a dispute, it could not prevent it.

3. The Minas-Rio Grande do Sul Entente. The Pact of the Hotel Glória

Antonio Carlos decided that if Minas could not have the Presidency, neither would another paulista hold the office. During 1928, he looked for a non-paulista candidate around whom São Paulo and Minas Gerais could unite. His brother, José Bonifácio, and leader of the mineiro Federal bancada approached Epitácio Pessoa, the man to whom the two states had turned in 1919.² But Pessoa declined to stand again. He did however promise the support of his state Paraíba for any candidate outside the two states that Minas might propose. A candidate either from Pernambuco or Rio Grande

¹ Leonidas do Amaral: "Os Podrões da Campanha Presidencial - As cartas e os Primeiros Discursos" (op.cit.) pp.13-15 copy of letter Vargas to W.Luís; pp.16-18 copy of letter Antonio Carlos to W.Luís. "Correio Paulistano" (São Paulo) August 9, 1929 published both letters.

² Laurita Pessoa R.G.: "Epitácio Pessoa" (op.cit.) vol.2, p.785. Afrânio A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" vol.III, p.1310.

do Sul was considered the most likely to be successful, though some mineiros argued against Pernambuco, fearing rather oddly "northern domination".¹

The preference for a candidate from R.G.do Sul was dictated primarily by its electoral potential.² It became even more attractive when the opposition party in R.G.do Sul the Partido Libertador agreed to back the candidature of Getúlio Vargas.³ This had the effect of unifying the state for the first time in an electoral contest, Vargas himself played a central role in this.⁴ Although theoretically Vargas owed allegiance to positivism and had been a member of the Bloco Acadêmico Castilhista in the Law Faculty of Pôrto Alegre, in power he had shown little enthusiasm for ideological conflict being essentially a pragmatist. He saw the presence of an organized opposition faction in the state as a major obstacle to the state's political progress in the Federation. As a gesture of conciliation Vargas allowed the opposition greater political freedom and permitted them to win a few more seats in local councils and the state legislature after 1928. Impressed by these developments Antonio Carlos was ready by the end of 1928 to enter into an alliance with the gaúchos. He informed Vargas that Minas was not interested in the Presidency for itself, but that the state would also definitely veto the candidature of a paulista, Minas was willing instead to endorse a nominee from R.G.do Sul either in agreement with the President, or in opposition to an official paulista candidate.⁵

The leadership of the Republican party of R.G.do Sul were in two minds about an alliance with Minas. On the one hand they were eager to secure the Presidency for

¹. Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" (op.cit.) pp.18, 23-24.

². Alexander José Barbosa Lima Sobrinho: "A verdade sobre a Revolução de Outubro" (São Paulo Editôra Gráfica, Unitas 1933) p.21 copy letter A.Carlos to Vargas.

³. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" pp.165-6. Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" p.152.

⁴. J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" (op.cit.) p.225.

⁵. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) p.49.

the state¹ but would this be achieved in an alliance with Minas or São Paulo? There were some gaúcho Congressmen who believed that if R.G.do Sul remained on too friendly terms with São Paulo and the President then this would be interpreted in political circles as gaúcho support for the President's candidate and would have the effect of strengthening the candidature of paulista Júlio Prestes.² Other gaúcho Congressmen argued however that any alliance between R.G.do Sul and Minas would destroy the opportunity for their state to provide a compromise candidate since they had been made to understand by the paulistas that if Minas vetoed Júlio Prestes, the candidature of Vargas would "arise logically"³ given the role he had in promoting the government's financial reform when he was Finance Minister.

Vargas and Borges de Medeiros, who still retained the leadership of the state's Republican party, were also worried about the consequences of an unsuccessful bid for the Presidency by the state. Whilst the Presidency was a key prize, opposition to the official candidate could mean Federal intervention in the state as Artur Bernardes had so skilfully demonstrated after 1922. For R.G.do Sul the loss of the Federal government's goodwill would be particularly serious since, as we have seen, the state had been receiving generous Federal economic assistance. The central question that the gaúchos had to answer was what chances did they have of securing the Presidency with the assistance of Minas. Vargas distrusted Antonio Carlos and suspected that he was trying to use R.G.do Sul to secure the Presidency for his own state, Minas.⁴ Even if Antonio Carlos was sincere both Vargas and Borges doubted that a gaúcho

¹. Ibid., pp.50-51. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) pp.212-213 copy of letter of João Pinto da Silva to mineiro João Daudt.

². For the differences of opinion see (a) João Neves da Fonseca: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) pp.29-39; (b) Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) copies of letters pp.181-200 passim, 216-7, 218-220.

³. "O Paíz" October 10, 1930. Manifesto of Paim Filho. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) copy of letter Flores da Cunha to Vargas November 29, 1928 pp.195-7.

⁴. Ibid., p.260. Letter of Hasslocher to Vargas. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May, 1929.

candidate backed by Minas and R.G.do Sul would be able to secure the support of the majority of states against the candidature of Júlio Prestes backed by the President and São Paulo. Borges asserted that Antonio Carlos was "not in a position to challenge Prestes in an electoral campaign led by the President of the Republic. His official contacts in the states are weak. It is necessary to remember that Presidential power has been much enhanced in Brazil with the defeat of all opposition campaigns of revolutionary tendencies" (presumably the military revolts of the 1920s).¹ A little later Borges was more emphatic. He wrote, "I am certain of the support he (the President) will receive from almost all states. The wish and power of the President will prevail as always and for me it is no longer possible to harbour illusions in this respect."²

The possibility of the paulistas looking to R.G.do Sul for a compromise candidate, the suspicion of being used by Minas, and the fear of defeat and its consequences should the state take the offensive in an alliance with Minas, led Vargas and Borges to decide in favour of keeping their options open in the succession question and they indicated their hostility to a secret alliance with Minas.³ Thus preliminary moves in May had indicated that a pre-emptive mineiro-gaúcho entente was not viable.

But for Minas an alliance with R.G.do Sul had become even more vital at the end of May. The mineiros had staged a massive demonstration in this state attended by 1200 representatives of some 215 município councils, to show their support for the candidature of Antonio Carlos for the Presidency.⁴ But the demonstration which had

¹. J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) copy of letter Borges to Vargas December 29, 1928 pp.70; 4.

². Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) copy of letter Borges to Vargas June 24 pp.244-245; also other letters on same subject pp. 236-7.

³. Ibid., Vargas to Neves June 15, 1929 pp.230, 117, 213-4.

⁴. "Jornal do Comércio" May 29, 1929.

been held by the mineiro governor primarily to test the support for him nationally, proved to be a disappointment. Only a handful of municípios in other states responded, two of them were dissident municípios from Rio de Janeiro state where an Antonio Carlos-Getúlio Vargas combination was endorsed for the first time.¹ Moreover Minas had broken its pledge to the President not to discuss the succession until September. The demonstration had opened up the question. On June 12, the issue was discussed in the Federal Senate. The leader of the bancada of Rio de Janeiro rose to disassociate the ruling party of his state from the proclamations of the two dissident municípios. On June 13, gaúcho deputy Batista Luzardo of the opposition faction in R.G.do Sul, demanded that the Presidency should so to his state. Another deputy suggested that the House should elect twelve of its most prestigious members (who would be known as the "Twelve Apostles of Democracy"!) to suggest a ticket for the succession.

Minas had implicitly declared its hostility to a paulista candidate and it seemed now that this could only be forestalled with a candidate from R.G. do Sul and so Antonio Carlos was prepared to offer the gaúchos a very attractive deal.² Minas offered to sign a secret pact with R.G.do Sul. Under the terms of the pact Minas would undertake to put forward the candidature of Vargas or Borges de Medeiros for the Presidency. Should it be refused by the President and São Paulo, Minas would sustain the gaúcho candidate in opposition to an official paulista nomination. R.G.do Sul would be required only to support the candidature of Antonio Carlos if it was proposed by the President. Should any other mineiro be suggested, Minas would only

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" June 7, 8, 18, 1929.

². J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (*op.cit.*) pp.71-83. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" terms of Pact of Hotel Glória pp.241-242; also p.229 *passim* copies of other letters and telegrams on the gaúcho-mineiro pact.

accept the offer if the Vice-Presidency went to a gaúcho. Both partners were to be guaranteed against one partner withdrawing exposing the other to Federal reprisals, by a clause stating that the pact could be dissolved only by mutual consent. In return for the advantageous terms for the gaúchos, Minas required the pact to be signed immediately, a condition which the gaúcho Congressional leader João Neves readily consented to, but with the proviso that the pact would only become binding if ratified by Borges de Medeiros. On June 17 leaders of the two bancadas José Bonifacio and João Neves on behalf of their states signed the Pact at the Hotel Glória in the Federal Capital.

Even for the cautious Vargas and conservative Borges de Medeiros, the Pact of the Hotel Glória as it subsequently became known seemed a splendid opportunity for the state to provide a President, and it nullified some of the former arguments against an entente with Minas. The mineiros had committed themselves to putting forward a gaúcho candidate. There seemed a strong possibility that the President and the paulistas would accept it as a compromise when the mineiros asserted their veto of another paulista President. Even should R.G.do Sul fail to be accepted by the paulistas and be forced to go into opposition, the state it appeared would be insured against intervention by its alliance with Minas. The Pact was therefore enthusiastically approved by Borges who wrote to Vargas that "in the interests of R.G.do Sul we ought not, neither can we refuse the agreement that Minas offers spontaneously."¹ Borges however would not allow his own name to go forward for the Presidency and the choice fell on Vargas.

The issue at stake in the 1930 Presidential election was clearly regional rivalry

¹. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" (op.cit.) copy of letter of Borges to Vargas June 28, 1929 pp.247-8.

between São Paulo and Minas. The paulistas backed by the Presidency were rejecting the entente with Minas which required a mineiro President in 1930. In an attempt to block another paulista President, Minas had formed a Pact with R.G.do Sul to nominate a gaúcho for the Presidency. However the negotiations for the succession which have been described so far show how much they differed from previous elections. The fear of Federal intervention made even Minas and R.G.do Sul nervous of challenging the President.

4. The Schism of the State Ruling Elites. The Contração Conservadora and the Aliança Liberal

The Pact of the Hotel Glória was important for Minas since it enabled the state to challenge the President's attempts to impose another paulista as his successor by proposing another strong contender. At the beginning of July 1929 the governor of Minas and R.G.do Sul separately informed the President of the decision of Minas to nominate Vargas for the Presidency (without, of course, divulging the existence of the Pact itself). In his letter, the mineiro governor stated that he had declined the candidature for himself as desired by his state since "authoritative voices had suggested the need for states not yet represented in the (Presidential) office to be given an opportunity".¹ Although his letter could have come as no surprise to the President, the defection of R.G.do Sul was an unexpected setback. Despite the friendly tone of his letter, Vargas had made it clear that he would withdraw his candidature only in favour of a conciliation candidate.²

But as noted earlier all the trump cards were in the President's hands. With the

¹. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" copy of letter July 20, 1929 pp.24-5.

². Ibid., copy of letter July 20, 1929 pp.26-7.

power of the Presidency enhanced, the fear of intervention particularly with Congressional elections due in 1930, and the desire to avoid a schism over the succession which would encourage new revolts from the exiled tenentes, the ruling elites of the other states unlike at a previous election were not disposed to challenge the President's attempts to impose a successor on behalf of his state, São Paulo. Moreover President Washington Luís had been judiciously preparing the state governors to accept his nominee Júlio Prestes, and he now personally requested each state governor to endorse his candidate for the election. On July 26, he informed the governors of Minas and R.G.do Sul that "without commenting on the merits of your candidate, and in complete solidarity with the President, seventeen states have indicated and accepted another name equally honourable and in sympathy with the present government."¹ Only Paraíba, the state of Epitácio Pessoa, currently under the governorship of his nephew João Pessoa, had refused its support for Júlio Prestes.²

Thus mid-July found the ruling elites once again divided over the succession. The President and seventeen states including four major ones: São Paulo, Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, had endorsed paulista Júlio Prestes. Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba were left backing gaúcho Getúlio Vargas. Although Vargas and Borges de Medeiros could not have relished going into opposition, the President's uncompromising reply had left them and Minas no option, since a submission to the President's choice would be a humiliation for the states. They argued that the President had not consulted the states on the candidature of Getúlio Vargas as he had promised, but simply asked state governments to support Júlio Prestes, hence denying

¹. Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" copy of letter Washington Luís to Vargas, pp.132-36; Washington Luís to A.Carlos pp.136-39. Leonidas do Amaral: "Os Podrões da Campanha Presidencial As cartas ..." pp. 22-3, 26-9.

² Ademar Vidal: "1930, História da Revolução na Paraíba" (Companhia Editôra Nacional, São Paulo, 1933) pp.40-3.

them a choice and accused Washington Luís of imposing a successor on the nation.¹ In Congress the bancadas of Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba went into opposition to the government setting up a committee to organize an opposition campaign.

But the opposition were to be disappointed in their expectation of attracting greater support once the news that the two major states were backing the candidature of Vargas spread; instead the President was able to consolidate his support. Even the major states of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco did not withdraw their support for Júlio Prestes.² The President secured Bahia behind his candidate by offering the Vice-Presidency to the state governor Vital Soares. The death of Nilo Peçanha in 1923 had removed the political boss of Rio de Janeiro who had consistently opposed paulista and mineiro regional hegemony although it had resulted in numerous interventions; now, however, the view of more cautious state politicians predominated and Rio de Janeiro remained loyal to the President. In the case of Pernambuco, Washington Luís had maintained a close relationship with the state governor Estácio Coimbra, having personally secured Coimbra's election as state governor and this now led him to turn down the offer of the Vice-Presidency on the opposition slate with Getúlio Vargas. The leader of the majority faction in the Federal Capital likewise remained loyal to the President refusing the Vice-Presidential nomination on the opposition ticket. In fact no state pledged to Júlio Prestes was willing to change sides even with the offer of the Vice-Presidential - nomination and the opposition had to settle for João Pessoa of Paraíba who was already committed to it.

¹. L.do Amaral: "Os Podrões da Campanha presidencial. As cartas ..." pp.141-145 copy of letter Vargas to W.Luís; A.Carlos to W.Luís.

². J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.54-5; 94; 97-8. Virgílio de M. Franco: "Outubro 1930" p.140. "Jornal do Comércio" August 7, 1929.

The lack of support from the ruling elites of the states for the opposition ticket was a serious blow to it, and confirmed the fears of Borges that the states were not in a position to challenge the President. Writing to his daughter, Epiácio Pessoa commented bitterly that the states which were always complaining about the hegemony of São Paulo did not now have a single word of protest.¹

However the schism of the ruling elites was well received by dissident groups, in particular the National Democratic Party - PDN. The PDN was the national opposition party for liberal reform which the Partido Democrático of São Paulo and the Partido Libertador of R.G.do Sul had united to organize in 1927. They had finally realized Rui Barbosa's ambition of forming a national liberal party, though the PDN's real support was at this stage limited to São Paulo, R.G.do Sul, Sta. Catharina and the Federal District,² Although the liberal democrats of the Federal District had argued in favour of the PDN endorsing its own candidate for the election who would be pledged to a programme for liberal and social reform, the gaúcho and paulista liberals favoured a more pragmatic approach,³ arguing that the PDN could not make any impact on its own. Instead they endorsed the Vargas-Pessoa ticket when the ruling elites behind the opposition ticket undertook to fight for the PDN's liberal programme.

The support of the PDN was important to the states opposing the official candidate. It meant that Júlio Prestes would not have the backing of the whole paulista state whereas in R.G.do Sul, the ruling Republican Party and the opposition Partido Libertador were able to form a united front, Frente Unica, behind the Vargas-Pessoa

¹. Laurita Pessoa: "Epiácio Pessoa" Vol.2 pp.791-794 copy of letter.

². Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues Progressista: O Partido Democrático e a revolução de 1930" Chapter III p.152 passim; pp.295-298.

³. Ibid., p.373. "Jornal do Comércio" August 3, 7, 14, 29; September 3, 4. "Diário Nacional" (São Paulo) July 31, 1929. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" pp.412-415 gives the terms on which the Partido Libertador of R.G.do Sul undertook to support the gaúcho Republican Party on the succession question.

ticket.

The two slates for the Presidential elections of 1930 were ratified by Nomination Conventions in September. At the official Convention on September 12, 1929 representatives of the ruling elites of seventeen states and the Federal District and dissident coronéis of the three other states: Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba unanimously endorsed the Júlio Prestes-Vital Soares ticket.¹ The coalition of state parties and dissident factions behind the 'official' slate adopted the name of Concentração Conservadora - Conservative Majority, pledging itself to defend the policies of the incumbent President.

The opposition held its Nomination Convention on September 20. As a result of the system of representation devised,² it was dominated by mineiros and gaúchos. The Getúlio Vargas-João Pessoa opposition ticket was unanimously ratified. The opposition coalition which comprised the ruling elites of three states: Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba, the PDN and the dissidents of other states not included in the PDN, adopted the name of Aliança Liberal - Liberal Alliance.

The Aliança Liberal's campaign slogan was "let us make a revolution before the people make it", but its Convention Manifesto was designed to attract liberal

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" August 11; September 12, 13. Each state had been allowed three delegates which had to be elected by representatives of the state municípios, but as in 1925, the delegates chosen were mostly Congressmen. 61 delegates voted in favour of the official ticket with two abstentions, one from the Federal District, the other from Espírito Santo,

². "O Estado de São Paulo" September 21, 1929. "Jornal do Comércio" August 11, 14, 29; September 20, 21, 1929, P.Nogueira Filho: "Ideias e lutas de um burgues Progressista: O Partido Democrático e a revolução de 1930" pp.693-698. J.N.da Fontoura: Memórias II ..." pp.130-131; 185-188. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.101-117 passim. The Aliança Liberal had devised yet another formula for representation at the Convention, as usual arguing that it was more democratic than former ones. The number of delegates for each state was to be proportional to the size of its electorate with a minimum of 4 for any one state. The delegation for every state had to represent both the ruling faction and the opposition groups according to their electoral strength in the last disputed Presidential election, that of 1922. Minas and R.G.do Sul had 40 and 25 delegates respectively, all the other states were represented by 79 delegates. However, the disparities were not significant.

opponents of the regime, the PD and PL of São Paulo and R.G.do Sul, rather than radical social reformers and was more like the programme of the paulista dissidência of 1901-1902.¹ The Aliança's Manifesto demanded a secret ballot, free elections, proportional representation for minority factions, guarantees for impartial certification of elections, legislation to prevent oligarchic rule and to ensure freedom for the opposition parties and the repeal of the recent legislation which allowed government the powers to restrict political freedom by imposing press censorship, prohibiting political meetings, and demonstrations. The Aliança was also concerned to limit the powers of the executive. It demanded that incumbents should not be allowed to impose their successors, that the powers of legislative bodies should be restored, state governors should be prohibited from appointing prefects and the independence of state parties from incumbents in power ensured.

The liberal programme adopted by the Aliança Liberal to satisfy its electorally weak ally the PDN, gives an unrepresentative ideological bias to the electoral conflict of 1930, which was essentially about state power. The combined authority of the President and São Paulo had succeeded in intimidating the majority of state governments into accepting another paulista candidate. The inability of Minas to attract the support of the ruling elite against São Paulo, as it had done in the past, was a clear indication of the waning political influence of Minas Gerais and the strength of the incumbent President. Even R.G.do Sul, which in the past had defied the combined paulista and mineiro forces, was now becoming apprehensive of the consequences of being in opposition and unwilling to take a risk. "The remembrance of former and recent contests," Vargas wrote to João Neves, "required a careful balance of

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" August 21, 1929.

possibilities so that R.G.do Sul is not thrown into risky adventures."¹ The seed of this doubt was to grow.

5. The Political Weakness of the Aliança Liberal. The Washington Luís-Getúlio Vargas Pact

Both Vargas and Borges had always hoped to avert a split with the President over the succession. When the gaúcho leaders accepted the nomination for Vargas they had expected the President to endorse it, since there had always been a good relationship between them and it did not seem likely that with the mineiro veto of Júlio Prestes the President would risk a contested election. When R.G.do Sul found itself in opposition to the President, Vargas and Borges were concerned for the future of the state. Already in August 1929, the President reversed his decision to build telegraph lines in the state.² The gaúchos expected worse retribution to follow as the electoral dominance of the Concentração Conservadora and the inability of the states of the Aliança Liberal to defend themselves became apparent.

Initially the Aliança Liberal had been optimistic about their electoral chances.³ They had reckoned on obtaining 400,000 votes in Minas Gerais, 200,000 in Rio Grande do Sul, 30,000 from the Partido Democrático in São Paulo besides some tens of thousands from dissident factions in other states including the Federal District. Júlio Prestes on the other hand was expected to poll only some 150,000 votes in São Paulo, his biggest block vote. But it was soon obvious that the Aliança Liberal had miscalculated. Whilst they had based their figure for São Paulo on the number of

¹. J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) pp.171-2.

². J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.229.

³. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" copy of letter Neves to Vargas June 15, 1929 pp.231-4 and pp.257-8 July 6, 1929.

registered voters in the state in 1922 (approximately 164,000), their calculation for the votes in their own states had been made on the basis of the new voters whom they expected to register in time for the election. In fact the massive registration of new voters that took place in São Paulo at the end of 1929 more than doubled the size of the state's electorate. As a result, the electoral superiority of Minas Gerais over São Paulo was considerably narrowed. Whereas in 1922 Minas had had a 9% higher share of the national vote, by 1930 the margin was down to 4% (Table X/1). It also appeared that as a result of repression by the state government of São Paulo, the Partido Democrático might not be allowed the 30,000 votes for the opposition ticket that it was expected to muster.

In October, the Aliança received a more serious electoral setback when the Republican Party of Minas Gerais divided over the state's gubernatorial election. There seems little doubt of the President's involvement. As early as July, sources close to the Federal government began to spread rumours of an impending split in the political front in Minas.¹ The intention was to frighten R.G.do Sul from formalizing an alliance with Minas Gerais on the Presidential succession. By October, Washington Luís was in fact able to engineer a conflict in the state² using the incumbent Vice-President - the mineiro Melo Viana whose personal political ambitions had threatened the peaceful solution of the Presidential succession in 1926. The internal schism in Minas occurred over a dispute on a candidate to succeed Antonio Carlos as governor of the state. Melo Viana who had already served one gubernatorial term failed to win

¹. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" copy of letter Neves to Vargas May 23, 1929 p.227. July 6, Paulo Hasslocher to Vargas pp.260-261; Lindolfo Collor to Flores da Cunha pp.261-263.

². A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.III pp.1326-28; 1335-40. "Jornal do Comércio" "Gazetilha" October 23, 1929. Leonidas do Amaral: "Os Podrões da Campanha Presidencial. As cartas e os primeiros discursos" pp.37-42. Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapter VI pp.121-4.

the nomination of the PRM and went into opposition, causing a serious schism in the state party. The faction behind him now formed a dissident group in the state and threw their support behind the Concentração Conservadora in the Presidential contest. They took with them at least 20% of the state vote. In return the mineiro dissidents expected Federal intervention to secure the election of Melo Viana as state governor.

Ever since the President had indicated his determination to see Júlio Prestes succeed him and it was established that the majority of state governments supported the President's candidate, Vargas was anxious to withdraw his own candidature.¹ In August he suggested that the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates for the opposition ticket should come from Pernambuco and Ceará. He argued that this would add two other states to the opposition coalition. But the proposal was rejected by Antonio Carlos. He advised Vargas to have faith in the aims of the Aliança Liberal and pointed out that Minas would suffer far worse consequences than R.G.do Sul for challenging the President. Minas would only consent to withdraw the candidature of Vargas for a conciliation candidate.² Vargas then advised the mineiros that they should procure the services of Epitácio Pessoa to arrive at a conciliation with the President. Unfortunately, the letter on the subject written by Afrânio Melo de Franco to Pessoa and explaining the demoralized condition of the Aliança leadership, fell into the hands of the Concentração Conservadora.³ It was published in the newspapers in September and became the subject of lengthy debate in Congress and only served to show the weakness of the Aliança Liberal. When the Republican Party of Minas split,

¹. 2. J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." Vargas to Neves July 12, 1929 appendix pp.XIX-XXII; pp.168-181; 191-2; 197-8; 206-8.

². José Maria de Bello: "A History of Modern Brazil" p.278 footnote.

³. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" Vol.III, pp.1318-21 copy of letter of Melo Franco to Pessoa; 1325, 1328-34 passim.

Vargas prepared to drop the Aliança altogether and to endorse the official ticket.¹ But R.G.do Sul could not simply withdraw without re-opening the confrontation with the state's opposition faction, the Partido Libertador. Vargas therefore requested that the President should indicate his willingness to consider three of the demands of the opposition: a general amnesty for the revolutionaries of 1922 and 1924, electoral reform and the lifting of press censorship and restrictions on political activities. But Washington Luís believed that if he made any concessions he would be weakening his own authority and refused to accept the conditions proposed by Vargas.

Unable to withdraw his candidature, Vargas formed a secret Pact with the President that would protect R.G.do Sul from Federal reprisals after the election.² Vargas undertook not to leave the state to campaign for the Aliança and if defeated at the polls to recognize the victory of Júlio Prestes. In return Washington Luís and Júlio Prestes would certify all the candidates of the Republican Party of R.G.do Sul who contested the Congressional elections on March 1; the Federal government also undertook not to support the Partido Libertador against the PRR. It was agreed in addition that R.G.do Sul and the President would return to normal relations after the elections. This Pact remained a close secret between Washington Luís, Júlio Prestes, Getúlio Vargas and the gaúcho deputy, Paim Filho, who negotiated the agreement with the President.

The Pact was a triumph for the President. Since the schism in the Partido Republicano Mineiro, R.G.do Sul had become the most important state of the Aliança Liberal. It was now neutralized. The power of the President and the position of the Concentração Conservadora appeared unassailable.

¹. J.L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.230.

². A.Barbosa Lima Sobrinho: "A verdade sobre a revolução de Outubro" pp.126-7.

TABLE X/1

Comparison of Registered Voters between 1922 and 1930 and Percentage of Numbers

Voting by States

| State | Registered 1922 | Voters 1930 | Numbers Voting 1930 | % poll |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|--------|
| R.G.do Sul | 153,825 | 367,782 | 297,532 | 81 |
| Goías | 12,042 | 23,906 | 18,749 | 78 |
| Bahia | 122,631 | 227,604 | 163,995 | 72 |
| Ceará | 62,676 | 124,835 | 89,529 | 72 |
| São Paulo | 164,234 | 516,651 | 367,439 | 71 |
| Paraíba | 27,071 | 61,969 | 42,126 | 68 |
| Pará | 48,000 | 91,838 | 62,372 | 68 |
| Piauí | 14,289 | 33,124 | 22,728 | 68 |
| Maranhão | 32,216 | 61,311 | 41,185 | 67 |
| R.G.do Norte | 15,795 | 61,969 | 17,171 | 64 |
| Mato Grosso | n.a. | 21,900 | 13,693 | 63 |
| Pernambuco | 58,746 | 117,171 | 72,082 | 62 |
| Sergipe | 17,247 | 28,725 | 17,344 | 61 |
| Sta. Catharina | 27,735 | 75,351 | 46,018 | 61 |
| Minas Gerais | 314,813 | 645,521 | 369,766 | 57 |
| Espírito Santo | 17,358 | 48,708 | 26,463 | 54 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 86,517 | 167,999 | 90,296 | 54 |
| Paraná | 31,893 | 100,496 | 53,129 | 53 |
| Alagoas | 21,528 | 35,893 | 18,311 | 51 |
| Federal District | 70,102 | 144,744 | 64,442 | 45 |
| Amazonas | 7,134 | 19,350 | 5,886 | 30 |
| Average national | | | | |
| Poll | 1,305,826 | 2,941,778 | 1,900,256 (approx.)64 | |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21, 1930 p.546.

6. The Future of the Aliança Liberal

Despite internal political friction in Minas and an unenthusiastic gaúcho leadership, the Aliança Liberal conducted an offensive election campaign. One reason for this was that the leaders of the Republican party of Minas Gerais opposing the election of Júlio Prestes believed that not only their political future, but that of their state was at stake if another paulista became President. It has already been noted that Washington Luís was accused by the mineiros of seeking to weaken Minas politically, Júlio Prestes was expected to continue the process. Minas also had less fear of retribution. No President, not even Floriano, had dared so far to intervene in Minas for fear of a civil war and to the mineiros, ignorant of the private understanding between the President and Vargas, the state seemed doubly insured as a result of the Pact of the Hotel Glória with R.G.do Sul. The mineiro governor promised 17 million dollars to finance the campaign.¹

In R.G.do Sul itself, there were differences of opinion over what attitude the state should take in the Presidential contest. Borges and Vargas were unwilling to make an unsuccessful bid for the Presidency in which the state stood to lose not only the real economic benefits they were receiving from the Federal government, but risked political retribution which could weaken the PRR in the state and also the position of the state in the Federation. Other gaúcho politicians thought differently. João Nevea, for example, Vice-governor of R.G.do Sul and leader of the bancada in Congress, who more than anyone was responsible for promoting the Pact with Minas, was determined that R.G.do Sul should provide the next President and was willing to challenge the incumbent President and São Paulo. Vargas faced a dilemma whatever

¹. Jordan M.Young: "The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath" (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967) p.44.

course he pursued in the succession question. Whilst on the one hand he feared Federal intervention, on the other, submission to the 'official' ticket threatened a split within the PRR and also the Frente Unica - the alliance between the PRR and the opposition Partido Libertador. The PL had already warned against any support for the reactionary Federal administration. Moreover the PL was also in touch with the rebel tenentes to overthrow the government in the Federal Capital. For example, João Neves and Oswaldo Aranha, the Secretary for the Interior in R.G.do Sul argued that capitulation, not defeat at the polls, would most endanger the state.¹ To protect R.G.do Sul from this threat, Vargas allowed the gaúcho bancada in the Federal Capital to conduct an active campaign against the government whilst the state was insured from Federal retribution by the Pact with the President.

It was the Aliança's anti-government campaign in Congress that caused the President the most embarrassment. Until the schism over the election there had been few debates in Congress, but the scene changed dramatically in August, 1929.² Although the Aliança could count only on 74 deputies and 16 Senators, just over a third of the total House, and their numbers decreased after the split in the mineiro bancada in October, they pursued an effective opposition to the administration and provided the leadership for the Aliança's national campaign. This was only partly because of their disciplined opposition, the debating and oratorical talents of some of the Aliança's leaders, notably José Bonifacio and João Neves, and the lack of enthusiasm for the government's cause except amongst the paulista and Pernambucan bancadas in Congress.

¹. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" copy of letter Aranha to Vargas p.426; "1930 - A Revolução Traída" João Neves to Vargas March 31, 1930 pp.83-84.

². "Jornal do Comércio" August 3, 1929. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" August - December, 1929 passim.

The Aliança also had the advantage of being able to take up popular issues. It began with an attack on the President for nominating his successor.¹ José Bonifácio, leader of the mineiro bancada, argued that Minas had always opposed this practice and cited as examples the cases of 1905, 1909 and 1913 when the state opposed the candidatures of Bernardino de Campos, Davi Campista and Pinheiro Machado respectively. The mineiros also claimed, though unconvincingly, that in the national interest the mineiro governor Antonio Carlos had refused to accept the candidature for himself and proposed that of a gaúcho instead to satisfy demands for an end to regional hegemony of the two dominant states. The main contention of the Aliança Congressmen was that the President had not allowed the ruling parties of the states to choose between the proposed candidates Júlio Prestes and Getúlio Vargas; they accused Washington Luís of "moral usurpation" of the nation's democratic right to elect its leaders and they demanded electoral reform to prevent electoral manipulation.

A second dominant national issue which the Aliança Congressmen took up was the question of amnesty for the tenentes and other political prisoners.² The President had refused to concede an amnesty to the political exiles, although they had ended their revolt. One reason for the government's intransigence was the demand of the rebels and their supporters for reinstatement in their former position in the forces, a move which was opposed by loyal officers. But the rebels had a popular image amongst civilian political dissident factions and in urban centres. It was largely due to the PDS which had been campaigning for an amnesty since 1927 that the Aliança was forced to take up the issue; however, it was careful not to justify the rebellion, demanding amnesty only as a "means of political appeasement".

¹. Ibid., August 5 passim, especially August 5, 16; September, 2.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" September 14. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." (op.cit.) p.264.

But the mineiros, gaúchos and paraibans did not have a clean record on any of these issues themselves as the Concentração Conservadora in Congress pointed out. The Bahian deputy, Simoes Filho, reminded them that on the question of amnesty for example, the three states of the Aliança had until recently supported the government's policies. The publication in September of Afrânio de Melo Franco's letter to Epitácio Pessoa, in which he explained the electoral considerations that had led to the selection of a candidate from R.G.do Sul belied the Aliança's claim to be a coalition of principle and revealed the absence of any democratic choice in the selection of their own candidates. It was an opportunity for a counter-attack which the Concentração Conservadora did not miss.¹

The Aliança derived greater "advantage" from the economic and financial problems facing the government in 1929. Even before the succession question had brought political differences into the open, there were signs of an impending economic and financial crisis. On May 23, João Neves informed Vargas that coffee prices were falling, foreign banks withdrawing capital and the Banco do Brasil's transactions were declining.² The situation worsened in the following months. Overproduction on the coffee plantations combined with a world economic depression and a slump in all trading activities, resulted in a sharp drop in prices of exports during 1929.³ Coffee which had sold at 22.1 cents per pound between 1928 and 1929, fell to 13.2 in the following year and stood at 8.7 by 1930-31. The trade recession severely affected the government's financial programme. The shortage of foreign exchange coincided with an abrupt end to foreign investments, the flight of capital

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" September, 25 passim.

². Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" copy of letter pp.224-5.

³. J.M. Young: "The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath" Chapter V, The Collapse of the Coffee Economy, pp.70-80.

abroad and the difficulty of contracting new loans in American and European financial capitals, particularly after the crash of the New York Stock Exchange Market in October, 1929. As the exchange rate fell, the government was obliged to meet its foreign financial obligations from its gold reserves.

The crisis provided an opportunity for a more serious criticism of the policies of the Federal government and the 'official' candidate. The attack was mounted on two issues. The first which was directed at the 'official' candidate Júlio Prestes, concerned the misdirection of the policy of coffee valorization (i.e. stockpiling to raise coffee prices), which had been administered by the government of São Paulo under Júlio Prestes since 1927.¹ Instead of merely defending the price level of coffee exports, the paulista Institute for the Permanent Defence of Coffee put into effect a more ambitious programme which aimed to increase the price and thereby the value of sales by creating artificial shortages. Prestes claimed that the scheme would not only maximize profits from the coffee economy and permanently solve the crisis which had plagued the coffee economy, but would also stimulate all other production. Indeed with heavy speculation on the Stock Exchange, the coffee prices rose until the first half of 1929.

From the first the Partido Democrático of São Paulo had been hostile to the scheme as an expensive and risky venture. The Aliança Liberal now took up the arguments against it, João Neves pointed out² that with the reorganization of the Institute the producers no longer had a say in its running; the guarantee of 60-70

¹. Edgard Carone: "A República Velha Vol.I (Instituições e Classes sociais" (op.cit.) pp.50-1. As noted in Chapter VI, the Federal government under Epitácio Pessoa had accepted responsibility for the defence of coffee prices and set up the Institute for the Permanent Defence of Coffee. His successor, Artur Bernardes, had insisted that São Paulo take over responsibility for the scheme, and in 1924 the paulista governor, Carlos de Campos, set up the Paulista Institute for the Defence of Coffee to replace the Federal Institute which was abolished.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional", September 16; November 25, 1929.

milréis per sack of coffee deposited in the warehouses and the failure to restrict planting had resulted in over- production; the high returns on coffee production had adversely affected sugar and cotton production largely because of their inability to compete for labour; the high price of coffee abroad had resulted in the expansion of coffee plantations outside Brazil, as for example in Columbia, and Brazil would now face competition for markets. The collapse of the valorization scheme after October 1929 and the failure of Júlio Prestes to find a solution to the coffee crisis led the Aliança Liberal to question his administrative competence and his suitability to be a President.

The second attack was directed at Washington Luís and his financial policies, though it had its roots in the same problem of the coffee marketing policy and the effect of the world economic depression. With the collapse of the Stock Exchange in New York, the Coffee Institute was no longer able to contract the loans from abroad on which it had so far depended for purchasing coffee for stockpiling from the planters. The Institute therefore requested the Federal government to increase the stock of paper currency and for a moratorium in the debt obligations of the coffee producers. But Washington Luís would not reverse his financial policies based on the stringent control of money supplies and argued that the problem was one for the state. This refusal and the resignation of the paulista Secretary for Finance Rolim Teles, who had been responsible for the Coffee Institute, only led to greater panic and a further slump in coffee prices. The President's attitude provoked severe criticism from representatives of the agricultural interests,¹ the Sociedade Paulista de Agricultura, the Sociedade Rural Brasileira and the Liga Agrícola Brasileira, and was echoed by the

¹. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.234-235.

Aliança Liberal. Following a congress held in early January in São Paulo to discuss the coffee crisis, the "Agrarian sectors of São Paulo" representing agricultural interests in the state generally, published a Manifesto on January 17, 1930. In it they demanded that the government regulate the coffee being shipped out of Santos, financial aid for planters and the reorganization of the Coffee Institute to give producers majority representation on the Council of Directors.

In Congress some members of the Aliança Liberal took the opportunity to attack the government's financial policies on a broad front, given that the candidature of Júlio Prestes had been justified on the grounds that he would continue them. Senator Pires of Piauí for example stated¹ that in view of the "growing bankruptcies, unemployment, falling prices of export commodities and general depression", the President should leave the nation to decide whether they wanted a continuation of his policies. The Aliança Liberal also attempted to subject the President's budget for 1930 to criticism but with the majority in the government's favour the bill was rushed through the House in early November. To prevent further criticism of its policies, the government instructed its supporters to absent themselves from further meetings of the House after November 18. The Aliança Liberal were unable to obtain the numbers necessary to form a quorum. However, the opposition met on the steps of the Congressional building and held public debates instead.

The Aliança Liberal was able to take advantage of growing social distress created by the economic depression.² By 1930 unemployment was estimated at some 2 million amongst the industrial proletariat, white-collar workers and rural wage-

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" July 11, and debates in October and first two weeks of November, 1929.

². Warren Dean: "The Industrialization of São Paulo" (op.cit.) p.181, Paulo Nogueira Filho: "O Partido Democrático e a Revolução de 1930 ..." pp.417-48.

earners; in the coffee fazendas of São Paulo a cut of 40% was reported in wages. In Paraná and São Paulo the salaries of civil servants were months in arrears as government revenue from exports suffered a decline. The "Diário Nacional", the newspaper of the Democratic Party of São Paulo, reported "what one sees in the interior of the state is a real tragedy. The drama of misery to which the working classes are reduced is greater and gloomier than reported".¹ Under the heading 'Fome' - hunger, opposition newspapers in the Federal Capital appealed for subscriptions to help the unemployed in São Paulo fazendas who were said to be leaving for the City in droves. It was estimated by the "Diário Nacional" that over 6,000 people in a month used the food and shelter provided as emergency relief.

But although the opposition was quick to exploit the government's weakest points and to court support by defending popular issues, it was unwilling to support a programme for radical social and economic changes. Instead they campaigned for reform of the political system, in particular the implementation of the secret ballot; but some members of the opposition were willing to compromise even on this all important issue.²

7. Vargas' Election Platform

In his own programme which he published on January 2, 1930³ Getúlio Vargas was

¹. The "Diário Nacional" was itself affected by the economic crisis. Its proprietor Bento de Abreu Sampaco Vidal was faced with failing returns on his large coffee fazendas and was unable to finance the paper. The Partido Democrático had to rely on a subsidy from the Aliança Liberal's campaign funds to cover a deficit of 1,200 contos on their newspaper. Ibid., pp.392-4.

². For example João Neves argued in Congress that the voter should be allowed to choose whether to cast an open or a secret ballot, although anyone who chose to cast a secret ballot would automatically be suspect and open to intimidation by the ruling elites. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" August 16, 1929.

³. Getúlio Vargas: "A Nova Política do Brasil" (Livraria José Olympio Editôra, Rio de Janeiro, 1938) Vol.I pp.19-54.

equally concerned on the one hand to satisfy the liberal allies of the Aliança Liberal and to court the support of other dissatisfied interests, whilst on the other hand ensuring that there would be no radical change that would offend the conservative instincts of the existing ruling elites, particularly on the question of law and order and financial orthodoxy.

Like other candidates before him, Vargas accepted the need for electoral reform and the defence of civil rights and endorsed the Aliança's programme for a secret ballot, compulsory registration and an impartial and more efficient judiciary with regional tribunals to ensure this. On the other two cardinal demands of the Aliança, the repeal of the repressive legislation limiting political freedom and a general amnesty for the exiled rebels, Vargas was more circumspect. Whilst supporting these demands, he insisted that new legislation would be required to ensure law and order and that the reinstatement of the rebel officers in their former status in the armed forces should not prejudice those loyal officers who had since been promoted to fill the vacancies left by the rebels.

During the electoral campaign, the Aliança's supporters made much of Vargas programme for social reform. Unlike Washington Luís, Vargas insisted on the need for the government to recognize the existence of social problems and as a member of the International Labour Bureau of the League of Nations, Brazil, he maintained, must begin to look at the clauses regarding labour conditions. However, Vargas was not the first candidate to propose social reform; it has been noted that Rui Barbosa drew up a programme for social welfare legislation in 1919 and Bernardes had accepted the right of the workers to form unions and the need to set up arbitration tribunals to settle disputes between employers and employees. Vargas did no more than endorse these

programmes which had not yet been put into effect, but he also wished to extend greater protection to the rural proletariat - the landless peasants who were then suffering from the collapse of the agricultural export economies, and also to meet the grievances exploited by the tenentes. Although he did not advocate any radical reform of the land tenure system, he did propose that under-utilized fazendas comprising arable land should be bought, divided, and sold to local and foreign colonists.

Vargas was particularly skilful in defending orthodox financial policies whilst at the same time pledging his government, if elected, to meet the needs of various interest and regional groups whose electoral support he was in need of. Despite the recent criticism of the financial policies of the (government of Washington Luís, Vargas stated his intention to continue it "because worse would follow if it were changed". He emphasized in particular the need to balance budgets by a strict control over expenditure and the collection of revenue, and to foster a favourable balance of trade. This latter aim was to be achieved by encouraging exports and cutting down imports. On these bases Vargas was able to defend a policy for government support of coffee and other exporting interests, but he argued against the existing valorization schemes, proposing instead a system of subsidies to the planters through produce co-operatives, rather than price supports which benefited mainly exporters and middlemen. Using the same argument for a need to expand exports and minimize imports, Vargas promised aid to other regions particularly the rubber states and the poor north-east. He pointed out that if the country was self-sufficient in staple foods, energy requirements and iron and steel, it would be saving on the foreign exchange currently being spent on importing these products. Vargas however showed that he was firmly opposed to the defence of artificial industries, that is, industries which

depended on the import of expensive raw materials and that could only survive under a heavy protectionist barrier.

To the urban electorate, particularly the white collar workers, Vargas was able to claim that the anti-protectionist policies and diversification of the economy to provide basic consumer requirements that he was advocating would curb inflation, one of the main complaints of the urban dwellers. On the question of the low salaries of public employees, Vargas maintained that the problem was created by an overmanned bureaucracy and he intended to freeze its growth so that the salaries of employees could be raised.

The interests of the armed forces whose political support was vital to any candidate had to be guaranteed although they contradicted the programme for financial stringency. Vargas promised to establish arsenals and an iron and steel industry which would make the country independent of foreign sources of armaments. He intended to continue professional training of the forces and to ensure that they were equipped with modern weapons. He also undertook to have a fairer system of promotions which would take account only of talent and to reform the method of conscription to ensure its implementation. The Navy was singled out for a comprehensive and long-term naval programme intended to overhaul and modernize the whole service.

Vargas' manifesto therefore was not a programme for revolutionary change in any sphere: institutional, economic, or social. It comprised much the same combination of promises to established regional, economic and military interests and generalized statements of intentions to see reform, as made by former candidates. In the end Vargas' Manifesto did not differ much from that of the 'official' candidate,

Júlio Prestes, who had finally decided in favour of abandoning the non-compromising attitude of Washington Luís in favour of some concessions to demands of various interest groups. In his Manifesto¹ Prestes promised to consider every individual application for an amnesty, to lower taxes, continue government support to maintain coffee prices, to raise the income of civil servants and to give special attention to the interests of the military.

8. Popular Support for the Aliança Liberal

Ultimately however it did not matter greatly whether the Manifesto of the opposition candidate promised the deep rooted changes that were necessary if there was to be any real reform. It was adequate to champion popular issues. The Aliança Liberal's strength was that it provided the only real alternative. The opposition campaign drew crowds from the earliest stages in all parts of the country. On September 5, the Aliança organized a huge march and demonstration in favour of political amnesty in the Federal Capital.² Two weeks later delegates travelling to the Nomination Convention of the Aliança Liberal at the Palacio Tiradentes in the Capital were cheered by crowds. The hero at this occasion was governor Antonio Carlos of Minas. In his address to the Convention he declared that the programme of the Aliança was to bring the people closer to the instruments of power, so that the government ceased to be the private instrument of a privileged minority and fulfilled instead the promises made to the people, serving their interests and realizing their hopes.³ The climax of the campaign in the Capital came at the end of the year when Aliança Liberal

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" December 18, 19, 1929. "Gazetilha" "Correio Paulistano" (São Paulo) December 18, 1929.

². "O Paiz" September 3, passim 1929.

³. Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp. 103-5.

Congressmen began to hold a meeting on the steps of the Palácio Tiradentes. As crowds gathered to listen to the opposition, the government ordered the police to break up the gathering by force, leading ultimately to the killing of a deputy.¹

The enthusiastic reception given to the candidates of the Aliança Liberal a few days later when they arrived in the Federal Capital in the first week of January 1930 to read the election Manifesto, has been described often.² The government's refusal to allow the Aliança to hold a meeting in a public hall turned out to the advantage of the opposition. An audience of a hundred thousand attended the outdoor gathering at the public square, the Esplanada do Castelo in downtown Rio, to listen to Vargas' manifesto. Even more frantic crowds greeted him in the port of Santos and São Paulo City in the President's and the 'official' candidate's own home state, São Paulo. This is how "O Combate" described the scene in São Paulo City: "it rained buckets. The people answered ... 'let it rain, we want Getúlio'. In this manner they continued until midnight ... It was like a collective madness without a dissonant note."³ These popular scenes contrasted markedly with the reception accorded the 'official' candidate. When he arrived in the Federal Capital to read his Manifesto to an audience of five hundred gathered at the Automobile Club, the only outward sign of recognition was signalled by the hired band playing in the station and the leaflets dropped from the air over the city.⁴

For the Aliança such demonstrations of popular support, particularly in São Paulo, had great significance. One Congressman, Henrique de Souza Queiroz remarked, "it is no longer true ... that the liberal candidates are supported only by

¹. P.Nogueira Filho: "O Partido Democrático e a Revolução de 1930" pp. 400-401.

². Ibid., pp.401-409. For the social upheaval of the 1920s and its influence on the 1930 election see also Boris Fausto: 'A Revolução de 1930: historiografia e história' (op.cit.).

³. "O Combate" São Paulo January 5, 1930.

⁴. "Jornal do Comércio" December 18, 19, 1929.

three states of the Federation. São Paulo has anticipated the voting by the plebiscite of January 4."¹ Even Vargas, who had had to be forced by the gaúcho bancada to attend the reading of the Manifesto in the Federal Capital, and by the threat of the Partido Democrático to leave the coalition, to visit São Paulo, confessed that the demonstration in favour of the Aliança's Platform had changed the nature of the contest. Previously, he said, he felt that he represented Rio Grande do Sul but now he realized that this was not "a Personal cause; not a regional wish of Rio Grande do Sul, but a Brazilian cause".² To Antonio Carlos he confided, "the spontaneous and enthusiastic welcome that the candidate had in the Capital of the Republic is a sure prognostication of victory". Vargas' contribution to the campaign was the shortest and most effective. He replaced Antonio Carlos as the hero of the Aliança Liberal.

Although the ruling elites of the states in the Aliança Liberal feared reprisals for opposing the President's candidate in the election, they fought an offensive campaign: the political future of Minas was at stake; in R.G. do Sul, the unity of the PRR and of the Frente Unica with the Partido Libertador was threatened if the state government capitulated to Federal pressure. But it was the growing social discontent arising from the economic crisis which resulted in popular support for the Aliança Liberal and gave substance to the campaign.

9. The President's Activities in Favour of the Official Candidate

Politicians of the Aliança were convinced that in a fair contest their candidates would win. They agitated for measures that would guarantee free elections. As early as August 16, 1929 the minority coalition had suggested a formula to ensure this. They

¹. P.Nogueira Filho: "Ideais e lutas de um burgues progressista ..." (op.cit.) Vol.II p.406.
². Ibid., pp.414-415.

proposed that two months before the election an impartial electoral body should be set up in each state.¹ The scheme was not accepted by the Concentração Conservadora who argued that it would be unconstitutional because it would be encroaching on the authority of Congress which alone was responsible for certifying election results. They maintained also that it would infringe state autonomy and would be tantamount to twenty state interventions.

For his part, President Washington Luís planned to control the composition of the new Congress to ensure that the certification of the 'official' Presidential slate, Júlio Prestes-Vital Soares, would not be challenged in the House. With the intention of cutting down the number of Aliança Liberal Congressmen, the President encouraged the pro-Concentração Conservadora opposition factions in Paraíba and Minas Gerais to put forward a complete slate for the Congressional elections which were due at the same time as the election for the Presidency. R.G.do Sul, the third state in opposition, was spared as a result of the united front between the PRR and the opposition PL and also the Vargas-Washington Luís Pact by which Vargas had agreed to recognize the victory of Júlio Prestes if Congress certified the election in his favour in return for the recognition of the gaúcho Congressional slate.

The policies which the President pursued on Minas and Paraíba to weaken the ruling state elites and uphold the state dissident factions were intended to improve the electoral chances of the candidates of the Concentração Política as well as being

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" August 16, 1929. Their duty would be to supervise registration, to ensure freedom of speech and the press, prevent police repression and the use of public funds for the election campaign. They would also nominate one person to every counting board who would be responsible for submitting a detailed report on the elections to Congress. The proposal however failed to answer the crucial question of where the impartial observers were to be found.

retributive.¹ All Federal economic and financial support for the state was stopped and the Banco do Brasil prevented the states from contracting foreign loans. Federal civil servants and military officers stationed in the Federal garrisons in Minas and Paraíba who were loyal to the state governments were replaced. The Federal government also engineered conflicts in these states to create an opportunity for Federal intervention. The extensive campaign tours or caravans as they were known, organized by both factions to promote their candidates, provided the occasion for political confrontation during the first months of 1930.

The Aliança Liberal had organized a campaign on the same scale as in the 1922 contest.² In January of 1930, the caravans of the Aliança Liberal left for the north, north-east and central regions from the Federal Capital with representatives from Minas, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraíba and the PDN. The Aliança had planned that their candidates would hold meetings in all the state capitals, but Vargas - anxious to honour the terms of the Fact with the President - excused himself from any further campaigning after he had ventured from the state to read his Manifesto. Only João Pessoa accompanied the caravans to the North-east and to Minas Gerais. Violence wrecked most of the campaign addresses of the Aliança Liberal. In Natal, capital of Rio Grande do Norte, the Aliança's meeting ended in riots when counter-demonstrators appeared on the scene backed by the state police. The most bloody encounter took place in Victoria, capital of Espírito Santo, where there was a similar

¹. See for example: J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.120-124; 144-150; 219. A. de Moraes; "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.92-100; 106; 118-119; 127; 170}201-207, A.A. de Melo Franco "Um Estadista da República" Vol.III, p.1335. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A Revolução Traída. O ciclo de Vargas Vol.III," (Editôra Civilização Brasileira S.A., Rio de Janeiro, 1966) pp.81-3 copy of letter of João Neves to Vargas, "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Debates September, 1929.

². The caravans and campaign speeches are described in J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.139, 256 passim; 272, 295 passim. Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapter VIII; pp. 149-165; 167-214.

confrontation. The rioting which lasted over two hours claimed over a hundred dead.¹

In Minas Gerais a similar clash during a meeting organized by the Concentração Conservadora faction in an Aliança Liberal stronghold in February 1930 provided a pretext for Federal troops to be despatched to the state ostensibly to maintain peace.² But the Aliança protested vigorously accusing the Concentração Conservadora of deliberately staging the incident. The presence of Federal troops loyal to the Federal government was of great importance to the Concentração Conservadora in Minas. Although they had succeeded in gaining control over a large number of the public services, including the Banco do Brasil, the railways, telegraph and postal system and the tax collecting office, the state militia remained loyal to the state government. Federal troops were employed in influencing the outcome of the elections in favour of the Concentração Conservadora; they also prevented the mineiro government from sending any significant military aid to Paraíba during the civil war of 1930 in the state and restricted the preparations for a rebellion in Minas itself after March 1930.

In Paraíba too, Washington Luís encouraged a schism between the state governor João Pessoa and the powerful coronéis of the interior. A latent hostility between the state governor and the coronéis had existed for some time as a result of governor Pessoa's efforts to develop the coastal trade and the port of Cabadello at the expense of the interior.³ The coronéis had their chance to retaliate when governor

¹. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideais e lutas de um burgues progressista ..." (op.cit.) Vol.11 pp.419-420, Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.183-187.

². Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" (op.cit.) pp.190-214.

³. For a history of the conflict in Paraíba and of the civil war see: Ademar Vidal: "1930, História da Revolução na Paraíba" (op.cit.) Ann Quiggins Tillers "The Igniting Spark - Brazil 1930" in Hispanic- American Historical Review Vol.XLV No.3 August 1965, p.384. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A Revolução Traída ..." pp.154-182. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapter XV p.319 passim, copies of letters from João Pessoa to the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Washington Luís, presidents of Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Pessoa challenged the President over the succession question. They broke away from the incumbents in power in the state Capital, formed an opposition faction and pledged their support to the Concentração Conservadora. From here the conflict escalated and by the end of February 1930, a civil war was being waged in the state. The advantage soon lay with the dissident state faction. The state militia was a small and poorly equipped force and the Federal government now prevented any ammunition from reaching them, whilst São Paulo, Pernambuco, R.G.do Norte, Ceará, Alagoas and the Federal government itself, supplied the dissident faction with food, finance and ammunition.

Despite public opinion and the general dissatisfaction with his policies, President Washington Luís showed his determination to see his candidate through even if he had to intervene in dissident states to ensure the victory of his candidate.

10. Certification of the Presidential Election

The election of 1930 is interesting for the turnout voting and the measures taken to control the certification of the results. The contested election had resulted in the registration of large numbers of new voters. As Table X/1 shows, the numbers of registered voters had more than doubled since the last contested election in 1922. The average national poll was high, 64%; but as usual there were great differences between the states. Whilst R.G.do Sul recorded the highest poll 81% the poll in Amazonas - the lowest in the country - was only 30%. Another notable fact of this election was the large number of votes cast in São Paulo, which almost equalled the ballots cast in Minas Gerais (Table X/1). The Aliança Liberal accused the paulistas of

and to the Minister of War.

resorting to the bico de pena to increase artificially the state vote for their candidate.¹

As usual, Federal control over voting booths resulted in a low poll in the Federal Capital.

As in all previous elections, a state-wide tabulation of votes was to be conducted first by the Junta Appuradora - the Counting Board, in the state capital. As the Congressional and Presidential elections coincided, the Junta was required to first complete the tabulation of the Congressional election. In the majority of states where the ruling factions were supporting the 'official' Presidential ticket, the Junta Appuradora comprising three judges appointed by state governors, proceeded to tabulate the elections in favour of the government's Congressional slates and the 'official' Presidential ticket.

In Minas and Paraíba however, the ruling elite were not allowed to control the Junta Appuradora. In Paraíba, the Federal government replaced the Junta with its own appointees² who proceeded to decide the Congressional elections in the states in favour of the entire opposition slate. In the case of the Presidential elections almost two-fifths of the votes for the candidates of the Aliança Liberal were disqualified.

In Minas, the post-election developments were a little different.³ The opposition succeeded in having many of the ballot boxes stored in the Post Office building instead of the judicial office or the administrative centre of the Municipal Council in Belo Horizonte where they were normally deposited. During the weeks

¹. "Jornal do Comércio" May 25, 1929. Interview with Eptácio Pessoa.

². A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.275-9. One pro-state government judge was ordered to take immediate leave, another was suddenly summoned to the Federal Capital. The new appointees were not even members of the legal profession. One was a nephew of the chief dissident state politician João Suassuna, the second a failed businessman, the third a recent employee in the postal services had been convicted for embezzlement. Governor Pessoa lodged a protest with the Supreme Federal Tribunal, but it was ignored.

³. Ibid., pp.253-275; 279-290.

before the count when the ballot boxes remained here, the opposition altered large numbers of the electoral returns in their favour. No state-wide tabulation of the Congressional elections was allowed in the state despite the mass demonstration that was held in Belo Horizonte on April 3 in protest against this decision.¹ The Junta Appuradora only submitted to Congress a report on the electoral returns for the Presidential elections. During the count, supporters of the Aliança Liberal were forcibly kept out of the judicial offices by Federal troops posted outside the building.

As a result of the recognition of the entire opposition Congressional slate in Paraíba and the refusal to hold any tabulation of Congressional elections in Minas, the Aliança Liberal was represented largely by the gaúcho bancada in Congress, after it convened at the end of April to certify the results of the contested Congressional seats and of the Presidential elections. When Congress finally certified the Congressional elections in Minas Gerais, fourteen candidates on the state government slate had lost their seats in favour of the opposition candidates.² As a result the mineiro bancada in Congress was seriously weakened.

The predominantly Concentração Conservadora Congress had simultaneously been studying the electoral returns and the reports of the Junta Appuradora on the Presidential elections. The Federal government, anxious to complete the certification so that the President-elect Júlio Prestes could sail for the United States and Europe by the end of May to secure loans to shore the country's tottering finances, had instructed its supporters to hurry with the final certification. The request of the opposition's

¹. The official excuse for not allowing state-wide tabulation of the Congressional elections in Minas was that since they were all challenged by the opposition, the count would have to be carried out by Congress. In effect, the President's aim was to prevent Aliança Liberal Congressmen from Minas participating in the certification of the Presidential elections and delaying the final count in favour of Prestes.

². "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21, 1930.

Presidential candidate Vargas for permission for his own investigator to study the reports on the election submitted by the Congressional Commissions was refused. By an overwhelming majority Congress certified the elections at the end of May in favour of the official slate; 23,668 votes cast for Júlio Prestes and 39,842 for Vargas were disqualified. A similar proportion of the votes for the Vice-Presidential candidates was also rejected.

TABLE X/2

| For President | | For Vice-President | |
|--|-----------|--------------------|-----------|
| Júlio Prestes | 1,091,709 | Vital Soares | 1,079,360 |
| Getúlio Vargas | 742,794 | João Pessôa | 725,566 |
| Scattered | 3,832 | Scattered | 3,864 |
| <u>Source:</u> " <u>Diário do Congresso Nacional</u> " May 21, 1930. | | | |

As in 1922, the degree of political intimidation is evident in the very low percentage of votes obtained by the dissident factions in most states (Table X/3). Except in seven states dissident factions received less than one-fifth of the total votes cast.¹ In Paraíba and Minas the opposition vote was above a fifth because it supported the Federal government and benefited from the assistance described above. In R.G.do Sul the almost unanimous support for the state's candidate is explained by the Frente Unica. In São Paulo the Partido Democrático was allowed only 1% of the state vote for their candidate.

¹. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.242-244 publishes the instructions circulated to coronéis or the Concentração Conservadora in Paraíba on how to distort elections in favour of their candidates. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho: "A verdade sobre a Revolução de Outubro" pp.153-157. "Jornal do Comércio" Interview with Epitácio Pessoa May 25.

TABLE X/3

Table showing the votes received by the candidate supported by dissident state

factions as a percentage of the total vote cast in the state

| State | % vote |
|------------------|--------|
| Federal District | 48 |
| Sta. Catharina | 30 |
| Paraíba | 26 |
| Piauí | 24 |
| Paraná | 23 |
| Minas Gerais | 22 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 21 |
| Alagoas | 20 |
| Mato Grosso | 14 |
| Espírito Santo | 13 |
| Maranhão | 11 |
| Pernambuco | 11 |
| São Paulo | 11 |
| Bahia | 7 |
| Sergipe | 5 |
| Goiás | 4.8 |
| Pará | 4.7 |
| Ceará | 4.7 |
| Amazonas | 3.8 |
| R.G.do Norte | 2.6 |
| R.G.do Sul | 0.3 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21, 1930 p.545.

TABLE X/4

Results of the Presidential Elections by States according to the Report submitted to

Congress by the Executive Committee of the House

| States | President | | Vice-President | |
|------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|
| | Júlio Prestes | Getúlio Vargas | Vital Soares | João Pessoa |
| Amazonas | 5,650 | 226 | 5,652 | 226 |
| Pará | 59,377 | 2,914 | 59,242 | 2,897 |
| Maranhão | 34,210 | 4,497 | 34,156 | 4,362 |
| Piauí | 16,343 | 5,171 | 16,414 | 5,172 |
| Ceará | 84,678 | 4,151 | 84,600 | 4,157 |
| R.G.do Norte | 16,371 | 447 | 16,374 | 446 |
| Paraíba | 10,945 | 31,112 | 10,878 | 31,115 |
| Pernambuco | 61,584 | 9,881 | 60,747 | 9,792 |
| Alagoas | 14,612 | 3,497 | 14,571 | 3,500 |
| Sergipe | 16,362 | 944 | 16,392 | 801 |
| Bahia | 141,367 | 11,273 | 144,913 | 6,775 |
| Espírito Santo | 22,947 | 3,515 | 22,936 | 3,506 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 69,347 | 17,651 | 68,526 | 17,017 |
| Federal District | 32,844 | 30,613 | 33,519 | 29,774 |
| São Paulo | 327,188 | 38,719 | 313,344 | 37,967 |
| Paraná | 40,593 | 11,039 | 40,273 | 11,285 |
| Sta. Catharina | 31,980 | 13,736 | 31,725 | 13,360 |
| R.G.do Sul | 1,031 | 295,777 | 948 | 293,937 |
| Minas Gerais | 77,563 | 284,458 | 76,899 | 273,074 |
| Mato Grosso | 11,853 | 1,863 | 10,855 | 1,865 |
| Goías | 19,611 | 904 | 19,627 | 888 |
| | 1,115,377 | 782,636 | 1,103,359 | 759,736 |

Source: "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21, 1930 p.544.

The Aliança Liberal's candidate Getúlio Vargas and João Pessoa received 40% of the total number of votes certified, 2%, less than the opposition in the 1922 Presidential contest. They obtained a majority in the three states which formed the Aliança: Minas, R.G.do Sul and Paraíba, but the largest number of votes came not from Minas but R.G.do Sul. Most of the opposition's remaining votes came from the PD of São Paulo, the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro, Sta Catharina and Paraná (Table X/4). Given the alliance of state ruling parties in the electoral contest and the fact that the ruling elites controlled the elections at state level, the results were predictable, but nonetheless gave a good indication of the hostility to the Federal government and São Paulo.

11. Preparations for a Military Revolt

Like other closely contested elections in the past that of 1930 demonstrated above all the futility of trying to resist the power of the elites of the major states by means of contesting residential elections and it reopened the question of alternative means to power. However, few civilian politicians were prepared to endorse revolution at national level as an alternative to defeat in the ballot box. The revolts that followed the contested election of 1922 for example, were led almost entirely by army officers and the ruling elite of the states in the Reação Republicana quickly disassociated themselves from the rebellions.

In the Presidential contest of 1930, the numbers of civilian politicians of the Aliança Liberal who favoured the revolutionary alternative were more significant, but they were still a minority. Probably the group within the Aliança which was most committed to achieving power through revolution was the PDN. However this did not

include all the state factions which formed the PDN. The majority of the Partido Democrático of São Paulo was hostile to such a solution,¹ despite the repression that the party had suffered in the local município elections in 1928 and more recently during the campaign for the Presidential elections. It was the Partido Libertador of Rio Grande do Sul backed by the Democratic Party of the Federal District who were the chief proponents of revolution.² The PL had already resorted to revolution in Rio Grande do Sul following the gubernatorial election of 1923 and won a partial victory with the Pact of Padras Altas.

The PL had also established links with the rebel tenentes during the revolts that broke out in the state from 1924³ - Assis Brasil was known as the civilian chief of the revolution. Congressional representatives of the PL defended the tenentes in Congress and demanded an amnesty for them. It was mainly as a result of the pressure from the PL and the PD of the Federal District that the PDN stated that one of its aims was to unite the civilian and military elements of the nation "interested in the moral regeneration of the Republic."⁴ The schism between the ruling elites of the states provided an ideal opportunity for a revolution against the 'official' coalition. Representatives of the PL contacted the tenentes for their support for the Aliança Liberal.⁵ The tenentes were enthusiastic to prepare for another revolution, particularly since otherwise with the certain victory of Júlio Prestes at the polls they would have to continue in exile. The "Diário Nacional", the PDN's newspaper, published regularly on its front page the photograph of Luís Carlos Prestes beside that of Vargas.

¹. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues progressista" Vol.I pp.237-8.

². Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882-1930" p.212.

³. Ibid., p.210.

⁴. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues progressista" Vol.I pp.227-238; 263-270 links between PDN and tenentes.

⁵. Ibid., vol.I, pp.373; 396-7. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.330-33. Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" p.212 *passim*.

Another group which favoured revolution consisted of prominent politicians of the ruling party of R.G.do Sul - the PRR. Amongst them were Oswaldo Aranha, the Secretary of the Interior in Vargas' government, João Neves, Vice-Governor of the state and leader of the gaúcho bancada in Congress, and Flores da Cunha, a Federal Senator. They were not willing to submit to the political domination of President Luís and the hegemony of São Paulo. They asserted it was the turn of R.G.do Sul to hold the Presidency and they were prepared to resort to force if the 'official' candidate was imposed by a fraudulent election and certification.¹

But the majority of the gaúcho politicians were opposed to this view.² For example in a letter to Vargas informing him of the attitude of the gaúcho bancada to the succession pact with Minas, João Neves wrote that only two had approved of the move. The others feared a contested election and the possibility of a revolution that it entailed. They pointed out that the social consequences arising from such a revolt would be incompatible with the PDR's commitment to "conservative development" based on law and order. Even veterans of the 1922 election campaign were apprehensive and one deputy, Joaquim Luís Osorio, who had been a leading debater of the Reação Republicana, resigned.

Ultimately for a revolutionary threat to be serious, it required the backing either of the Federal army or of the state governments who controlled the state militias and state revenues. Except for the rebel tenentes, a defeated minority force, the political schism in the 1929-1930 Presidential contest did not result in military

¹. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" pp.315-317 copy of letter August 20, 1929 of Oswaldo Aranha to his uncle.

². João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.87-88; 120, 301, Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" p.446. Copy of letter August 12, 1929 of Lindolfo Collor to Vargas; pp.415-8 copy of letter of resignation of Joaquim L.Osorio. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A - Revolução Traída" Appendix p.439. Manifesto of Paim Filho published in "O Paíz" October 9 and 10, 1930.

involvement as it had done in 1922. The leaders of the state governments who were behind the Aliança Liberal, R.G. do Sul, Minas and Paraíba were also generally opposed to a revolt. Borges de Medeiros was ideologically opposed to any violent solution. In his last speech to the state legislature in 1927, he had stated that the PRR was "fundamentally conservative" and a "defender of order and authority". The interview he conceded "A Noite", published on March 19, 1930 following the Presidential election which caused much conflict at the time is well known. In it he stated that the Aliança Liberal should recognize the election of Júlio Prestes. He argued that both sides were guilty of fraudulent practices, described revolution as a "monstrous crime" and asserted that the country would be faced with a revolution every few years if the faction defeated at elections resorted to force, Borges remained hostile to a revolution until August, 1930.

Unlike Borges, Vargas' opposition to a revolt did not stem from doctrinaire reasons. He doubted the ability of the Aliança Liberal to win and he was not prepared to jeopardize the future of the state in a risky venture.¹ Moreover it was not certain who would be the real victors in a successful uprising against the government. Would it be the tenentes or the state governments behind the revolt? Antonio Carlos like Vargas, feared the consequences of an unsuccessful rising for Minas. Other leading politicians of Minas and Paraíba opposed revolution on principle. Francisco Campos, Secretary of the Interior for Minas, for example, did not want an alliance with the tenentes and João Pessôa stated that he would rather have ten Júlio Prestes than a revolution. Eptácio Pessôa was critical of the violent tones in which Congressional representatives of the Aliança Liberal conducted their campaign against the

¹. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.171-172.

government. He also thought that some of the demands of the Aliança were too radical, particularly on political and social reform and he argued that the fundamental responsibility of the government was to defend society and the status quo. He ruled out the possibility of a revolution.¹

But despite their rejection of a call to arms if their Presidential ticket was defeated in Congress, the states of the Aliança Liberal prepared to revolt if the Federal government intervened in the states and refused to certify the Congressional slates of the state governments.² Federal retribution in the states which had backed the Reação Republicana in 1922 had not been forgotten. Already in August 1929, Washington Luís had begun reprisals in the states which were defying his authority.³ There were rumours that the President was strengthening Federal military garrisons in Santa Catharina and Paraná and that São Paulo was buying arms from France with the intention of isolating Rio Grande do Sul and intervening in Minas Gerais, There were also rumours that the Federal government intended to prevent the certification of the Congressional slates of the three rebel governors. In his letter of September (1929) to Epitácio Pessoa, Melo Franco wrote of the serious political situation that the President was creating by this policy of reprisals. He warned that the country might not arrive at elections in March and that the government by its crimes was creating an intolerable situation for the states of the Aliança "unleashing in the country the gravest crisis in history". The Aliança also threatened to form a duplicate legislature and Congress in the Federal Capital if the President did not certify their Congressional slates and

¹. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.245-6, 251.

². J.N.da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.163-4; 188; 217. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" p.169. Chapter XII p.251. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" Debates September, 1930. A.A.de Melo Francos "Um Estadista da República" Vol.III pp.1341-2; 1351.

³. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" pp.188-199; 176 Chapter IX passim.

Minas Gerais in particular threatened to secede from the Federation.

In R.G.do Sul, Getúlio Vargas prepared to defend the state against Federal intervention as early as September 1929, when he held a secret meeting with Luís Carlos Prestes to discuss plans for a revolt. Later Oswaldo Aranha was appointed chief co-ordinator of the revolutionary planning.¹ As noted earlier, Vargas simultaneously arrived at a secret Pact with Washington Luís that would protect the state against Federal reprisals. Minas and Paraíba united with R.G.do Sul to prepare for a revolt on a contingency basis only in March following the election when it became more obvious that the President intended to subvert the results of the Congressional elections in favour of the opposition faction in the states.²

Although the Paraíba official ticket suffered most heavily in the certification since none of its candidates were recognized, it was the certification of only 23 of the 37 official mineiro candidates which led to the greatest anger. The autonomy of Minas had always been respected since the earliest days of the Republic. It was felt that Washington Luís had over- reached the authority of his office by repudiating the autonomy of one of the dominant states. Following the certification, both Minas and Paraíba accused the President of taking a revolutionary step. In his letter to the paulista Cardoso de Almeida, the leader of the Chamber of Deputies, João Pessôa, wrote of this "unprecedented step and you accuse the Aliança Liberal of being revolutionaries".³ In Congress the most severe criticisms that followed were made not on the results of the Presidential election, but of the Congressional elections in Minas

¹. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1832-1930" p.236.

². Ademar Vidal: "1930 História da Revolução na Paraíba" p.166-7. Aurino de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapter XVI passim. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideias e lutas de um burgues Progressista" Vol.II pp.468-492. Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" p.226 passim; 273 passim.

³. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" p.305 copy of letter; also p.306 copy of letter of A.Carlos to President of Chamber of Deputies.

and Paraíba.¹

Most politicians of the Aliança Liberal believed now that they had no alternative but to revolt. The rebel tenente João Alberto later recorded in his memoirs that "the conflict which for so long had been seen as a solution only for others, now seemed the only way out in the situation of incompatibilities created between the governistas and the oposicionistas. Conservative men like Afrânio de Melo Franco and Dr A.Bernardes openly prepared for it as an epilogue to a political system that had been eroded by political excesses and regional intolerances."²

The President's actions in Paraíba and in Minas made it impossible for Getúlio Vargas to withdraw from the Aliança Liberal and re-establish normal links with the Federal government as he would have liked to after the election.³ R.G.do Sul had been spared Federal intervention and its entire Congressional bancada was recognized. In April 1930 Washington Luís, anxious that R.G.do Sul should withdraw from the Aliança, made available a Federal loan for the state.

But it was too late. Vargas risked a schism in the Republican Party of R.G.do Sul if the state government withdrew from the Aliança Liberal.⁴ João Neves and Oswaldo Aranha amongst others continued to argue that R.G. do Sul would lose all credibility if it deserted its allies. The decision of the gaúcho leadership to allow their state bancada to continue in opposition was crucial in sustaining the Aliança Liberal after the certification of the elections, since with Minas and Paraíba weakened politically, they would not have been able by themselves to offer any effective

¹. "Diário do Congresso Nacional" May 21. Congressional candidates of opposition factions in São Paulo, Pernambuco, Espírito Santo and Alagoas were also not certified.

². João Alberto Lins de Barros: "Memórias de um Revolucionário" (Editôra Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, 1953).

³. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A Revolução Traída" p.79-80; copy of letter Borges to Vargas March 30 pp.87-9; copy of letter Vargas to Borges April 15 pp.90-2.

⁴. João Neves da Fontoura: "Memórias II ..." pp.311-319. Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" p.425.

opposition and the Aliança Liberal would have quickly disintegrated as previous dissident coalitions, organized to contest Presidential elections, had done. In his Manifesto to the Nation published on May 31, Vargas accepted the final result of the Presidential election but stressed that continuing Federal retribution in Minas and Paraíba was preventing political conciliation.¹ The main issue between the Aliança Liberal and the Federal government during June and July was the President's continued refusal to grant Federal assistance to the Paraíba governor in the civil war.

Meanwhile the preparation for a revolt which was being hatched since March 1930, continued.² In the plans that the Aliança Liberal drew up, the state militias and irregular forces of the municípios were to form the main fighting force of the rebellion. The presence of Federal troops and dissident state factions loyal to the President made it difficult for Minas and Paraíba to acquire arms and to organize a rebellion. R.G.do Sul was therefore given the key role in organizing and leading the uprising. The state was to amass ammunition and weapons for the revolt and then lead the main offensive and the march to the Federal Capital. Minas' role was limited to keeping the Federal forces in the state occupied and preventing them from marching southwards. With the civil war still dragging on in Paraíba, it was not expected to offer much assistance during the rebellion. The experienced fighters of the Prestes Column and the Partido Libertador who had been active in the revolts of the 1920s played a vital part in the organization and command of the rebellion of the Aliança Liberal.³

¹. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A Revolução Traída" pp.427-30 Appendix copy of Manifesto.

². Virgílio de Melo Franco: "Outubro 1930" p.270 passim. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideias e lutas de um burgues Progressista" Vol.II pp.468-492. A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapters XVII and XVIII p.379 passim. Joseph L.Love: "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism" pp.236, 239 passim.

³. John D.Wirth: "Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930" (op.cit.).

But the revolt would not have got off the ground without the support of some sections of the Federal army, particularly those stationed in the south. Growing disillusionment with the President's policies and his ability to deal with the general crisis, the little hope of his successor Júlio Prestes diffusing the situation, and the support of conservative state governors and politicians from R.G.do Sul, Minas and Paraíba for a revolt in the end were sure to influence the armed forces.¹ Lieutenant-Coronel Pedro Aurelio de Goes Monteiro, for example, who assumed command of the rebel forces after Luís Carlos Prestes had turned down the offer, had been working for the Washington Luís administration until 1930.² It is not possible to estimate the real support for the Aliança within the Federal armed forces during the months of preparation since approaches were made secretly. There was no open appeal to the forces as there had been in the 1922 election. In the South Góes Monteiro had formed a secret rebel group within the army, who were no doubt responsible for the disappearance of large quantities of weapons and ammunition from the Federal garrison that was reported to the President by the Commander General Gil de Almeida. The desertion of whole divisions of Federal troops after the outbreak of the revolt suggests that there was widespread and serious disillusionment with the Federal government if not actual sympathy for the Aliança in the army.

12. The Aims of the Revolution

As we have seen, far from aiming at revolutionary change, the rebellion of the

¹. Jordan Young: "Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution" in Hispanic American Historic Review XLIV No.2 May, 1964. Also: "The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath" (op.cit.) Chapter IV. And: "The Military and the 1930 Revolution" p.30. A.A.de Melo Franco: "Um Estadista da República" (op.cit.) Vol.3 pp.1356-7.

². He had earlier led Federal forces against the Miguel Costa-Luís Carlos Prestes Column and the Federal government had despatched him to R.G.do Sul especially to strengthen Federal forces in the South as rumours of an Aliança revolt spread.

Aliança Liberal organized and directed by the government of three states, was intended primarily to defend the institutional status quo in regard to the autonomy of the states and regional balance in the South. Both had been threatened during the 1930 Presidential contest by the attempts of the paulistas to assert hegemony over the Presidency notably through the President's intervention in Minas Gerais and non-certification of a third of the Congressional slate of the ruling elite. In a Manifesto of October 4, 1930 published in Pôrto Alegre, the day after the outbreak of the Revolution Vargas wrote "we are before a counter-revolution to re-establish liberty, restore the purity of the Republican regime and reconstruct the Nation".¹

But the aims of the Aliança Liberal also went a little way beyond the defence of the institutional status quo. Even the most conservative supporters of the coalition believed that the conservative ideology of the Republican parties formed forty years ago, was no longer tenable and that some form of social and political reform was imperative.² The increasing social and political instability since the European war, the growing support for the newly established opposition parties in the 1920s, the Communist Party and the PDN all underlined the growing pressure for change. Both Vargas and Antonio Carlos had, as governors of their states, already made some concessions by allowing the dissident state factions greater political representation. After the Presidential election in March 1930, it was felt that the Aliança Liberal could not just disintegrate after the event, but would have to continue to fight for the reformist programme that it had put forward. During the revolt, Vargas stated his

¹. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues Progressista" (op.cit.) Vol.II. Manifesto of Vargas October 4, 1930 pp.725-727.

². See for example: Hélio Silva: "1926 - A Grande Marcha" letter of Lindolfo Collor to Vargas August 12, 1929 p.447 passim.

intention to implement the Aliança's election pledges.¹

This programme relied heavily on political and judicial reform and did not envisage major structural changes, either in the institutional, economic or social field. This limited programme of the PDN had been accepted not only by the conservative ruling elite of the states behind the Aliança Liberal, concerned basically to maintain the status quo, but also by the majority of the tenentes. The reason why the tenentes acquiesced with this mildly reformist programme was partly tactical:² since their failure to obtain an amnesty even after they had laid down their arms, they had become primarily concerned to exploit any divisions amongst the civilian politicians which would enable them to stage an effective revolt. During 1928 for example, a number of the exiled tenentes had been willing to unite with the PDN behind the slogan of "Representation and Justice". Only the two tenente leaders Miguel Costa and Luís Carlos Prestes made their support for the Aliança Liberal conditional on their adoption of a radical manifesto particularly on the social question.³

But quite apart from tactical considerations, most tenentes did not subscribe to a socialist programme. Although in their critical diagnosis of the Republican system the tenentes had dwelt on its fundamental weaknesses - regional disequilibrium, concentration of power in the hands of the executive, government by oligarchs, the monocultural economy dependence on foreign markets, administrative incompetence, nepotism and corruption - their prognosis was mainly political and judicial reform.⁴ In their preference for greater centralism, elitism and nationalism which has been noted

¹. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues Progressista ..." Vol.II pp.728-731. Vargas' interview with United Press.

². João Alberto Lins de Barros: "Memórias de um revolucionário" Pt.I (op.cit.) p.199 passim.

³. Ibid., p.218 passim.

⁴. Boris Fausto: "A revolução de 1930: Historiografia e história" (op.cit.) p.63 passim. Nícia Vilela Luz: "A Década de 1920 e suas Crises" in Revista do Instituto de Estudo Brasileiros No.6, 1969 (São Paulo).

in their works, the tenentes were not making new demands. A minority of civilians including Rui Barbosa, had long opposed excessive state power and argued for greater centralization, notably in the judicial system. The dissidência had in 1901 argued in favour of restricting political rights to a select minority and as in the case of the tenentes, this demand arose from the belief that the existing electorate - though literate - was controlled by the coronéis and unable to exercise political independence. Anti-foreign feeling, as noted in the early chapters, had been prevalent since the first days of the Republic and had given rise to the Jacobin movement. Economic nationalism had been a major theme of the opposition Presidential campaign in 1922. Therefore the alliance between the politicians and the tenentes imposed less ideological strain than first apparent.

However in May 1930, the tenentes who had joined the Aliança Liberal did outline their own programme for the revolution. This move was prompted by the need to disassociate themselves from their former leader Luís Carlos Prestes who had finally announced his conversion to communism, publishing the Communist Manifesto.¹ His action signified his final rejection of the Aliança Liberal and its reformist aims. The programme outlined by the pro-Aliança tenentes was the work of Juarez Távora² and in it he firmly rejected the idea of class warfare. However the reforms he proposed, though vague, nevertheless implied radical change. The tenentes stated the need to "nationalize" the Constitution so that it was in keeping with the culture of the nation rather than being modelled on foreign constitutions, they wanted different class interests to be represented in proportion to their numerical strength and

¹. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideas e lutas de um burgues Progressista: ..." Vol.II copy of the Manifesto pp.710-713.

². Ibid., Manifesto of Juarez Távora pp.714-718.

favoured the creation of small property owners and government by efficient and trained non-political technocrats who would ensure administrative morality and efficiency. Though these proposals went beyond the programme of the Aliança Liberal, they did not lead to a schism with the tenentes.

Ultimately, the Old Republic was doomed not by the appeal of the programme of the Aliança Liberal or its allies the tenentes, but by the general disillusionment with the Republican system. This had been brought about not only by the political crisis over the succession, but more particularly by the collapse of the government's economic and financial policies in the wake of the world recession and the general social unrest it had generated. The depth of this disillusionment was evident when the revolt led by the Aliança Liberal finally began on October 3. Few were prepared to defend the government of Washington Luís and the ruling elite of the states supporting him. Within three weeks the majority of state governments were overthrown and whole regions had fallen to the rebels.¹ The Federal Military Headquarters attempted to forestall the triumphal march of the rebel forces into the National Capital by forcing the resignation of President Washington Luís and setting up a Provisional Junta headed by three military men.² But when the Aliança Liberal insisted on an unconditional surrender and that Getúlio Vargas be installed as President, the Junta complied. With the defeat of loyal Federal troops in Juiz de Fora in Minas Gerais on October 21, the route to the Federal Capital had been opened to the forces of the Aliança Liberal.

The states which were responsible for organizing the Aliança Liberal and

¹. For a general history of the revolt see: A.de Moraes: "Minas na Aliança Liberal e na Revolução" Chapters XIX passim. Paulo Nogueira Filho: "Ideias e lutas de um burgues progressista" Vol.II p.507 passim. Hélio Silva: "1930 - A Revolução Traída" p.185 passim.

². British F.O.Diplomatic Papers: F.O.371. File Nos. 14200-14202, especially for October, 1930.

leading the opposition to military victory would not be able to resurrect the Old Republic and re-establish the institutional balance which had been threatened by São Paulo and the government of Washington Luís. The Republican system established in 1891 had failed to adjust to changes and to meet the demands of new social forces and had become defunct. It was to fall to Vargas to mould a new system after 1930.

CONCLUSION

Despite the institution of a liberal democracy after 1889, the political system of the first Republic was more closed than that of the Empire. The existence of the poder moderador - moderating power - and its skilful use by Emperor Dom Pedro II had enabled a two party system to function during the Empire. The freedom of political expression enjoyed is evident in the organization of dissident parties under whose pressure the parties in power were forced to adopt reformist programmes. As a result the last two decades of the Empire witnessed a gradual liberalization of the political process. By contrast the Federal system instituted after 1889 further increased regional disparities. The política dos governadores resulted in a one party system. At a time of rapid economic and social transition, the political system proved incapable of absorbing new interest groups. Instead the ruling elites resorted to increasing repression and political fraud to maintain themselves in power. The political polarization of the 1920s inevitably resulted in a bloody civil war and a revolution which initiated a new phase - the second Republic after 1930.

This research which has been limited to the study of Presidential elections has raised a number of questions and suggested areas requiring further research. There are three themes relating to the period as a whole.

The thesis has shown how despite the inbuilt powers of the Presidency the interests of the dominant states were assured because of their power in Congress and their ability to prevent interventions. However their willingness to risk political instability and military intervention to acquire the Presidency suggests that Presidents used their position largely to benefit their native states. Research into the allocation of Federal resources to the states by different Presidents is required to test this

hypothesis.

This study has dealt with election manifestos in some detail. However it has not been possible, without broadening its scope, to examine how far these manifestos were put into effect. An examination of the administrative achievements of the Presidents is required. In particular it would be interesting to look at what changes were brought about after 1906 as a result of the mineiros' differing conception of the role of the government.

This thesis has shown how incumbent Presidents manipulated the política dos governadores in connection with Presidential elections. However it is necessary to carry out case studies of interventions more generally for a better understanding of the relationship between Federal governments and the states.

More specific questions have also been raised by individual elections. Little for example is known of the changes in power structure within the majority of states in the first decade of the Republic, but these internal conflicts largely explain the rifts at national level. The schism in the paulista Republican Party over the issue of coffee valorization suggests that the Party also represented other interests which depended on orthodox monetary policies. The salvações movement, its strength within the armed forces, the manner in which it was operated and its effect still remain to be researched. Finally, there are two areas of regional rivalry which affected national politics requiring attention: the attempt of Pernambuco and other northern states to combat the political dominance of the centre- south particularly between 1880 and 1910; the reasons for the growing animosity between Minas and São Paulo after 1910.

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