

**Values and Democracy:
Postmaterialist Shift versus Cultural Particularity
in Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan**

By

Katsuto Furusawa

Submitted for the degree of PhD in Politics

**Department of Politics
Faculty of Law, Business, Social Sciences
University of Glasgow**

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Abstract

This thesis has two main themes: (1) values shift versus cultural particularity and (2) values and democracy. The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories of values shift presented by Ronald Inglehart and others assume that, as a consequence of industrialisation and post-industrialisation, people's values transform in such a way as to increase an emphasis on self-esteem, self-expression and other qualities. Individuals become increasingly capable, autonomous and inclined to public demands, which can be conducive to liberal democratic outcomes. In relation to these, the present study suggests that cultural particularity should be taken into consideration as a factor competing with that of values shift in terms of influence on people's attitudinal conditions. For individualism is often quoted as a core element of Western civilisation, which is not necessarily so in other cultural scenarios.

With this enquiry, the study mainly concentrates on the analysis of the World Values Survey. Postmaterialist indexes are closely investigated by comparing the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. The examination further incorporates broader regions: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions. The results indicate a certain validity in the cultural effect. This is especially the case with a Postmaterialist values item on 'freedom of speech', which contrasts with other Postmaterialist item: 'giving people more say in important government decisions'. Their implications for democracy are subsequently considered. These non-Western societies appear to exhibit certain weaknesses in the Postmaterialist transformation and its attitudinal efficacy for polyarchy-like democracy.

The attention turns to gaps in perceptions of freedom between the USA, Russia and Japan, which could be applied to the trilateral regions. This national difference also seems to be present in the area of protest, notwithstanding the fact that there are some indications of values shift. Culture seems to matter on popular outlooks *vis-à-vis* the Postmaterialist effects. Multivariate analysis on this aspect endorses the same conclusion. The outcomes imply variation between the citizens of these societies in ways that they relate to government. The nations are compared with respect to the influences of liberal democratic attitudes on moderate protest and views of governance. After all, American (and probably British) individuals seem to be more compatible with public demands and participatory democracy than those in Russia and Japan. Western cultural emphasis on the particular quality of freedom could be favourable to Postmaterialist values as well as individual attitudes that call for responsive and accountable democracy.

Contents

Abstract	i
Contents	ii
Tables	iv
Figures	v
Acknowledgements	vii
Declaration	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction – Postmaterialist Values, Culture and Democracy	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Review: Postmaterialist thesis and democracy.....	2
1.3 Values shift versus cultural particularity.....	14
1.4 Values and democracy.....	27
1.5 Conclusion.....	43
Chapter 2: Methodology	45
2.1 Introduction.....	45
2.2 Background: studies on values and democracy.....	45
2.3 Postmaterialist index.....	49
2.4 Exploring dichotomy: values shift versus cultural particularity.....	62
2.5 Quantitative methods and survey data.....	63
2.6 Conclusion.....	69
Chapter 3: The Postmaterialist Index	70
3.1 Introduction.....	70
3.2 Hypothesis.....	70
3.3 Postmaterialist index.....	72
3.4 Decomposition of Postmaterialist four-item index.....	86
3.5 Conclusion.....	101
Chapter 4: 'More say' and 'free speech'	104
4.1 Introduction.....	104
4.2 Variables of relative commitment: 'more say' and 'free speech'.....	105
4.3 Methods of analysis.....	110
4.4 Durability of local particularity.....	115
4.5 Analysis of regional context:	
Does being Western, Postcommunist or East Asian matter?	118
4.6 Conclusion.....	120
Chapter 5: Postmaterialist Variables and Democracy	131
5.1 Introduction	131
5.2 Postmaterialist variables and polyarchy	131
5.3 Values shift, cultural particularity and democracy.....	140
5.4 Conclusion.....	142

Chapter 6: Freedom.....	144
6.1 Introduction.....	144
6.2 Order versus freedom: initial observation.....	145
6.3 Meaning of freedom.....	149
6.4 Regional cultural specificity.....	162
6.5 Conclusion.....	166
Chapter 7: Protest.....	180
7.1 Introduction.....	180
7.2 Analytical frameworks.....	180
7.3 A general inclination to protest.....	183
7.4 Measures on five types of protest.....	185
7.5 Missing values	192
7.6 Combined measure of 'answered' and missing data.....	196
7.7 Conclusion.....	197
Chapter 8: Values and Political Dimensions – Multivariate Analysis.....	212
8.1 Introduction.....	212
8.2 Postmaterialist values and protest.....	213
8.3 Evaluating civic protest.....	219
8.4 Views of governance.....	223
8.5 Conclusion.....	232
Chapter 9: Conclusion.....	248
9.1 Introduction.....	248
9.2 Review of findings.....	249
9.3 Originality of findings.....	252
9.4 Values shift versus cultural particularity.....	254
9.5 Values and democracy.....	259
9.6 Conclusion.....	273
Appendices.....	276
References.....	287
Bibliography.....	290

Tables

Chapter 4

Table 4.1 Mean comparison: three regions.....	128
Table 4.2 Multiple regression models: effect of economic development versus regional particularity on relative commitment to Free Speech and More Say.....	130

Chapter 5

Table 5.1 Correlation: Postmaterialist items and the dual aspects of democracy.....	138
---	-----

Chapter 6

Table 6.1 'Order vs. freedom': Western democracies.....	170
Table 6.2 Percentages (A): 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice).....	172
Table 6.3 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'.....	173
Table 6.4 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'order vs. free speech'.....	174
Table 6.5 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'free speech four-rank measurement'.....	174
Table 6.6 'Order vs. freedom': Postcommunist and East Asian societies.....	176
Table 6.7 Regional comparison (mean): 'order vs. freedom'.....	177
Table 6.8 Three regions: freedom (in 'order vs. freedom') and free speech (%).....	178

Chapter 7

Table 7.1 A general protest inclination: mean.....	201
Table 7.2 Correlations: Freedom House ratings and protest.....	206
Table 7.3 Percentages of protest actions.....	207
Table 7.4 Views and actions of protest.....	208
Table 7.5 Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity.....	211

Chapter 8

Table 8.1 Protest each item and postmaterialist index	239
Table 8.2 Protest each item and 'free speech' and 'more say'.....	240
Table 8.3 Protest (general scale) and liberal democratic attitudes.....	241
Table 8.4 – (1) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes.....	242
Table 8.4 – (2) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes.....	243
Table 8.5 Mean estimation: non-democratic rule and efficacy of democracy.....	244
Table 8.6 A view of non-democratic rule (A) and liberal democratic attitudes.....	245
Table 8.7 A view of non-democratic rule (B) and liberal democratic attitudes.....	246
Table 8.8 A view of the efficacy of democracy and liberal democratic attitudes.....	247

Figures

Chapter 1

Figure 1.1 Values shift and cultural particularity.....	22
---	----

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Maslow's values hierarchy and Postmaterialist and Materialist items.....	52
Figure 2.2 Postmaterialist index.....	53
Figure 2.3 Types of measurements.....	60

Chapter 3

Figure 3.1 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1981.....	74
Figure 3.1 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1990.....	74
Figure 3.1 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1995-7.....	75
Figure 3.1 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1999-2002.....	75
Figure 3.2 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: Britain.....	77
Figure 3.2 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: the USA.....	77
Figure 3.2 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: Japan.....	78
Figure 3.2 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: Russia.....	78
Figure 3.3 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1990.....	80
Figure 3.3 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1995-8.....	80
Figure 3.3 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1999-2002.....	81
Figure 3.4 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: the USA.....	83
Figure 3.4 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Japan.....	83
Figure 3.4 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Russia.....	84
Figure 3.5 (I) PM-M index B: first choice 1981.....	88
Figure 3.5 (II) PM-M index B: first choice 1990.....	88
Figure 3.5 (III) PM-M index B: first choice 1995-8.....	89
Figure 3.5 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice 1999-2002.....	89
Figure 3.5 (V) PM-M index B: second choice 1981.....	91
Figure 3.5 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice 1990.....	91
Figure 3.5 (VII) PM-M index B: second choice 1995-8.....	92
Figure 3.5 (VIII) PM-M index B: second choice 1999-2002.....	92
Figure 3.6 (I) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Britain.....	95
Figure 3.6 (II) PM-M index B: first choice: change in the USA.....	95
Figure 3.6 (III) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Japan.....	96
Figure 3.6 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Russia.....	96
Figure 3.6 (V) PM-M index B: second choice: change in Britain	98
Figure 3.6 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice: change in the USA.....	98
Figure 3.6 (VII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Japan.....	99
Figure 3.6 (VIII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Russia.....	99

Chapter 4

Figure 4.1 Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index: comparison of four societies across four time points.....	123
Figure 4.2 Variables of relative commitment to respective items: comparison of four societies across four time points.....	124
Figure 4.3 Comparison of four variables within each society.....	125
Figure 4.4 Free Speech: age cohorts.....	126
Figure 4.5 More say: age cohorts.....	127
Figure 4.6 Comparison of economic effect: Free Speech and More Say	128
Figure 4.7 Economic level versus regional difference.....	129

Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 Values and institution: Postmaterialist values items and the dual aspects of polyarchy (with modification).....	139
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Chapter 6

Figure 6.1 'Order vs. freedom'.....	170
Figure 6.2 Postmaterialist (PM) four-item index: first choice and second choice.....	171
Figure 6.3 Percentages (A): 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice).....	172
Figure 6.4 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'	173
Figure 6.5 Individual (general) freedom and free speech (<i>vis-à-vis</i> order).....	175
Figure 6.6 Three regions: 'order vs. freedom'.....	177
Figure 6.7 Three regions: free speech and order (%)	179

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1 A general protest inclination.....	200
Figure 7.2 A general protest inclination: mean comparison of societies.....	202
Figure 7.3 Diagram of protest.....	203
Figure 7.4 Comparison of protest patterns (A): between societies.....	204
Figure 7.5 Comparison of protest patterns (B): within societies	205
Figure 7.6 Protest: the patterns of missing values.....	209
Figure 7.7 Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity.....	210

Chapter 8

Figure 8.1 The sequence of effects in a values shift theory versus cultural particularity..	238
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Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. The work contained herein is my own, except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text. Reference to the work of others is indicated where appropriate. Main parts of this thesis consist of the analyses of data derived from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme. The authors of the respective datasets are acknowledged in the 'References' section of this thesis.

Chapter 1: Introduction – Postmaterialist Values, Culture and Democracy

1.1 Introduction

The Postmaterialist thesis has endured for some decades and received a broad recognition. When it is placed in the context of non-Western societies as well as implications for democracy, nonetheless, there still seems to be a further possibility of exploration. The Postmaterialist thesis was originally created to explain the changing orientation of popular values in economically advanced industrial societies and their attitudes and behaviours in relation to democratic governments. The concept of Postmaterialist values is therefore initially utilised to study popular orientations in established democracies that are maintained for relatively long periods. Most of such democracies are located within the category of Western societies that share the West European tradition. For that reason, it seems that the extent of attention to non-Western regions has been considerably less for its analysis in comparison to Western democratic societies.

The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories assume that industrialisation and post-industrialisation are likely to have the effects of values transformations. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that the attitudinal patterns in relation to Postmaterialist and Materialist values are influenced by culturally particular factors especially in non-Western societies. Despite this, there do not seem to be sufficient approaches to consider such effects. It is plausible to employ the view of two competing factors: the values shift and cultural particularity. On the other hand, when the issue of democracy is considered in the context of the Postmaterialist perspective, it seems that its implications have not been explored substantially. Do the distributional patterns of Postmaterialist and Materialist values affect democracy and democratisation, and how? When this is clarified, the binary effects of the values shift and cultural particularity will come to have significant meaning with respect to democracy. If the Postmaterialist values are conducive to some dimensions of democracy, and if there is the presence of the values shift, economic development could be understood as being conducive to democracy in that context. If, however, the cultural particularity considerably influences the state of Postmaterialist-Materialist values, the conditions of democracy and democratisation could be interpreted to be rather specific to the locality of individual societies regardless of (or in addition to) economic conditions.

As such, these are summarised into three issues: (1) how do Postmaterialist values shift and cultural particularity respectively affect the condition of the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension, (2) what implication do Postmaterialist values have for democracy, and further (3) how do the values shift and cultural particularity matter to the state of democracy? A major purpose of this thesis is to explore the three issues. And, particular attention is paid to the comparative analysis of four societies, Russia, Japan, the USA and Britain, and regional implications are further examined. The values of freedom and individual autonomy are often regarded as apt underpinnings for the function of liberal democracy. Postmaterialist values share considerable commonality with these values. Are they able to be attained through a universal process? Are they rather not – due to different cultural elements? These are the questions to be kept in mind throughout the thesis.

1.2 Review: Postmaterialist thesis and democracy

In view of the fact that the present research mainly refers to Inglehart's thesis, this section explicates his contribution to the study of democracy. It, first of all, reviews Inglehart's Postmaterialist and other related theses. The second part focuses on the Postmaterialist effect on political dimensions. The next part examines his studies particularly related to democracy while screening out what specific dimensions of democracy his perspective is concerned with. The point is further clarified with some critique and speculation on this perspective, which will be a basis for questions presented in following sections.

Briefly speaking, what is Inglehart's crucial contribution to the study of democracy and democratisation? After all, Inglehart's Postmaterialist thesis and the further evolved concepts of Inglehart's work are about the increasing awareness and concern of individuals (such as self-actualisation and self-esteem) as a result of industrialisation and post-industrialisation processes, which entail society's attainment of economic prosperity and its long-standing maintenance with stability. The process is to be accompanied by an increasingly liberal outlook and distrust of authority among the people. It also increases individuals' acquisition of social and political skills and knowledge, as well as critical capability, due to the spread of economic and intellectual resources such as education. These could amount to popular inclination to public self-expression. In the political

context, in my view, this could correspond with rising awareness of governmental responsiveness among the populace. With this summary, let us start with the overview of Inglehart's thesis.

1.2.1 Thesis of values shift

In the Postmaterialist thesis, it is hypothesised that a process of intergenerational change is gradually transforming popular values in advanced industrial societies. According to Inglehart, it is assumed that, as a consequence of economic development and its security in most industrialised nations, the experiences of younger generations in their formative years were distinct from those of older generations, which resulted in the rise of different outlooks.¹ The economic growth and affluence satisfied people's basic needs for safety and sustenance and facilitated changes in popular values. Inglehart states:

[T]he historically unprecedented degree of economic security experienced by the postwar generation in most industrial societies was leading to a gradual shift from "Materialist" values (emphasizing economic and physical security above all) toward "Postmaterialist" priorities (emphasizing self-expression and the quality of life).²

The concept of Postmaterialist values was initially presented as early as the 1970's. This was expounded in Inglehart's early book, *The Silent Revolution* (1977), being followed by series of studies on values shift. Although the Postmaterialist thesis attracted numerous debates and critiques, its essence has been maintained as central to Inglehart's work for decades with some revisions and refinements. The thesis has survived with accumulation of survey data, which has enabled the testing of the hypothesis and provided supportive evidence. In his second book, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (1990), there was a great deal of evolution. Whereas Inglehart suggests his intention to continuously study the Postmaterialist transformation, he points out that this is only a

¹ Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4.

² Ibid., p. 4. Also, for the Postmaterialist thesis, see Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977).

single dimension within a much larger trend of cultural transformation.³ He also notes the growth in the empirical scope and capability to explore the trends thanks to the substantial availability of time series data.⁴

An investigation has been presented in a more articulate manner by his third book, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (1997). He termed the broad trend of values shift 'Postmodernization'. The idea is linked with the central claim of modernisation theory. It is argued, based on empirical evidence especially from the World Values Survey, that there are coherent cultural patterns that have close links with economic development. Inglehart argues that, in the course of economic development, cultural and political changes tend to occur, and their patterns are likely to be coherent and, to a certain degree, foreseeable.⁵ He points out that industrialisation has a certain tendency of giving rise to a sociocultural syndrome in a society. In Inglehart's terms, 'Modernization' involves industrialisation, bureaucratisation, centralisation, economic development, occupational specialisation, rising educational level, urbanisation, belief and values that support high rates of economic growth and so forth. 'Postmodernization', on the other hand, involves rising emphasis on the quality of life, self-expression, individual freedom and autonomy. It also is accompanied by growing suspicion of authority and declining support for hierarchical social and political institutions.⁶ With this wider perspective, a Postmaterialist shift, though not necessarily regarded as the most important, is still seen as one component of the broad trend and remains a key indicator for its analysis.⁷ In fact, by recognising 'Modernization' and 'Postmodernization' processes separately as a two-step trend in his terms, Inglehart seems to acknowledge a Postmaterialist shift within the latter phase of the trend, 'Postmodernization'.

On the basis of these works, Inglehart's thesis of values shift has been evolving. Conceptually, the thesis has been extending the scope for more direct connection with democracy.⁸ Methodologically, renewed quantitative techniques have been constantly

3 See Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 5-7.

4 Ibid., p. 7.

5 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 5.

6 For the detailed account of values change, 'Modernization' and 'Postmodernization', see *ibid.*, pp. 5-107.

7 Ibid. pp. 4-5, 78, 108.

8 For instance, see Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005).

added. Geographical areas covered by the World Values Survey, on which his analysis is based, have been widened, covering representative samples from most countries across the globe.⁹ This seems to have provided supportive outcomes for his thesis to propose a more generalised argument on values shift at a world-wide level. The details are discussed in later sections.

1.2.2 Inglehart and democracy

What is his contribution to the study of democracy? When we look at Inglehart's academic contribution in terms of democracy, there are several key points to consider. One of the most relevant cases is a chapter in his book, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (1997). In this chapter, he explores correlations between several variables and three dimensions on the conditions of democracy: stability of democracy, level of democracy, and change of level of democracy. The main variables to be analysed were (1) well-being and trust, (2) social structure (i.e. education, occupation) and (3) social capital (i.e. organisational network and membership). Although there are numerous variations of the results due to the many combinations of the variables, he emphasises, and in fact the results indicate, that well-being and trust as variables have a strong correlation with those conditions of democracy.¹⁰ Furthermore, well-being and trust are the components of Postmodern values. Similarly, in following his works, Inglehart consistently argues that trust and subjective well-being are crucial factors that have a strong relationship with democracy.¹¹

As for Postmaterialist values, Inglehart claims that Postmaterialist values are conducive to democracy for three reasons:

- (1) Postmaterialist values 'entail an emphasis on self-expression and participation that is inherently conducive to political participation... Postmaterialists are relatively likely to

⁹ Inglehart and Welzel state that the survey data utilised is 'from eighty-one societies containing 85 percent of the world's population, collected from 1981 to 2001'. See *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁰ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 160-215. As for the three measures, for stability of democracy, see *ibid.*, note 1, p. 165. See *ibid.*, 'appendix 3', p. 357.

¹¹ For example, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Trust, well-being and democracy,' in Mark Warren ed., *Democracy and Trust* (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-120; Inglehart, Ronald and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness', in Ed Diener and E. M. Suh eds., *Subjective Well-being Across Cultures* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 165-183; Inglehart, 'Globalization and Postmodern Values', pp. 215-228.

act to attain democracy.'¹²

(2) 'Postmaterialists view democracy as something that is intrinsically desirable'.¹³

(3) 'Postmaterialists tend to hold a wide range of basic democratic norms'.¹⁴

In the course of the argument, he presents positive results in respect to the connection between Postmaterialist values and democracy. He argues that '[n]ations with relatively high proportions of Postmaterialists are much more likely to have had continuously functioning democratic institutions than other institutions'.¹⁵ Inglehart assumes that the values shift has an effect of increasing popular demands for more democratic institutions.¹⁶ Although he admits that mass attitude is not a singular determinant for democratisation, he shows 'remarkably strong correlation between the ratio of Postmaterialists to Materialists and the existence of stable democracy ($r = .71$)'.¹⁷

Inglehart further explains why nations with a relatively high ratio of the population in endorsing Postmaterialist values tend to be stable democracies, as follows:

(1) '[T]heir publics give relatively high priority to individual freedom and to democratic values'.¹⁸

(2) '[T]heir publics are relatively likely to engage in direct political action that can help bring a shift from authoritarian to democratic regimes'.¹⁹

In connection with these, Inglehart indicates that Postmaterialists have stronger inclination to undertake protest actions, such as joining boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations and

¹² Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 210.

¹³ Ibid., p. 210.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 210.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 213. Inglehart points out that nations with strongly Materialist publics are likely to be either non-democracies or recent democracies (with perhaps instability).

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 213. In this analysis, he admits that, when Postmaterialist values are entered into regression analyses that incorporate multiple variables such as interpersonal trust, subjective well-being, social structure and economy, there were 'positive but not significant linkages with stable democracy and high levels of democracy.' See *ibid.*, p. 214. Nonetheless, Postmaterialist values are part of the syndrome involving these other values and therefore share qualitatively similar elements (and thus possibly the elements of statistical variance) with them. Postmaterialist values could have more influence than nominal output indicated in the regression analyses. See *ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 214.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 214.

so forth, than Materialists do. This relationship is present not only in Western societies but also in others such as Eastern Europe and East Asia, as observed in the World Values Survey. According to Inglehart, this implies that the emergence and spread of Postmaterialist values increases mass inclination to elite-challenging actions such as protest, which has been often regarded as unconventional political action. While stating that these unconventional political actions played an important role in the transitions to democracy across Eastern Europe as well as democratisation moves in East Asia and Latin America, Inglehart suggests the possibility of their more vital role in non-democratic regimes than in the West.

Aside from the plausibility of factors such as the economy and other elements motivating people to protest, and aside from economic and other effects on the collapse of the regimes, Inglehart claims the possible influence of Postmaterialist values in encouraging the people to esteem free speech and self-autonomy, and its impact on democratisation. Likewise, Inglehart argues that, with some findings, the younger, better-educated and more Postmaterialist cohorts have been replacing the older, less-educated ones in the populations covered by the World Values Surveys (of 1981 and 1990). In correspondence with this change, Inglehart points out the relative increase of inclination to elite-challenging behaviours (such as protest) and the comparative stagnation or decrease in likelihood of elite-controlled forms of participation (such as voting) among the mass publics throughout industrial societies.²⁰

In similar terms, Inglehart's assumptions and findings that are related to democracy are things such as 'cognitive mobilisation' and individuals' increasing tendency to dislike authority in the Postmodern process. Overall points underlying these assumptions as well as his Postmodern/Postmaterialist thesis are that, as a result of industrialisation and post-industrialisation processes, individuals become increasingly capable, autonomous and critical of authority. In this process, individuals are assumed to shift and strengthen their concerns toward themselves individually while acquiring more capacity of social/political communication and protest through the increasing level of economic and intellectual resources among the masses. This image of strengthened individuals is possibly related to

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 211-213. As quoted by Inglehart, the connection of Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy with the inclination to protest actions is also demonstrated in Barnes, Samuel, and Max Kaase, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).

some essential factors for democracy such as 'public contestation', 'rights consciousness' and so forth.²¹ By suggesting the presence of such a development, nonetheless, the emergence of Postmaterialist values is not necessarily the direct determinant of regime changes toward democracy. Rather, Inglehart seems to argue that it is *conducive* to such transformations in non-democratic nations, whereas in established democracies it gradually gives substance to democracy. Probably, the democracy that Inglehart emphasises is a democracy that attaches strong importance to popular inclination to individuals 'speaking out' their wills and claims with awareness of freedom that includes self-esteem, self-expression, individual autonomy and so forth. Accordingly, on the side of institutions, the attention would be directed toward governmental responsiveness to their claims.

In relation to such issues, Inglehart's recent work attempts further development on studies of democracy using the World Values Survey, whereas the Postmaterialist index and its elaborated versions have become components of these analyses. For example, as noted before, in some of his works, the former Postmaterialist index is dealt with as one component of 'survival vs. self-expression values'.²² In another study, the measure of Postmaterialist values is examined (along with 'survival vs. self-expression values') in terms of correlation with Freedom House ratings as a measure for the level of democracy. According to Inglehart, these variables have a somewhat higher correlation with the level of democracy than indicators of regime support (such as an 'autocracy/democracy' measure) do.²³ By this, he seems to suggest economic development and the subsequent rise of self-expression (and Postmaterialist) values are viable factors conducive to a higher level of democracy.

In his article co-authored with Welzel and Klingemann, the four-item Postmaterialist index is developed into another slightly elaborated version called the 'liberty aspirations' variable.²⁴ This version is integrated into the measure of 'emancipative values,' which is, in

21 For public contestation, see Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-16. For rights consciousness, see Gibson, James L., Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', *The Journal of Politics* 54: 2, (May 1992), pp. 329-371; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', *Political Research Quarterly*, 47: 1 (1994), pp. 5-39.

22 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', *American Sociological Review*, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51.

23 Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', *PS* (January 2003), pp. 51-57.

24 In this elaboration, from the first and second choices of four-item question, four-point index is created

a way, a reorganised version with some changes of components from the measure of the 'survival vs. self-expression values' (and partly 'traditional vs. secular-rational values') in Inglehart's former studies.²⁵ In this article, they attempt to integrate the linkage between socioeconomic development, emancipative values and levels of democracy. Their claim is that socioeconomic development provides individuals with objective resources that enable them to have autonomous choice, whereas the rise of 'emancipative values' enhances their subjective willingness for choice, and democratisation institutionally entitles them to their freedom for choice.²⁶ In the process, there is also an 'impact on elite integrity', enhancing effective democracy.²⁷ By employing the concept of 'human development', while integrating perspectives of modernisation theories, they try to present more precise articulation of modernisation processes conducive to democratisation with universal implication. Overall, the work attempts to demonstrate the impact of economic development on democratisation.

In another work by Inglehart and Welzel, the argument is maintained in consistency with the former studies while revising the measure of 'emancipative values' into that of 'self-expression values' with slight modification of its components and their terminology.²⁸ As one of its components, the 'liberty aspirations' measure is renamed as 'liberty and participation' with the identical format (which is therefore the elaborated version of the Postmaterialist four-item index). The other components are: 'tolerance of diversity,' 'public

assigning from 0 to 3 point. In comparison, the former Postmaterialist four-item index is made from the same settings of the question items into a three-point scale consisting of the categories of Postmaterialist, Mixed and Materialist types. For details, see Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,' *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (2003), p. 341-379, esp. 354. This way of four-point (0-3) index is employed in other article as well with different name called 'liberty-participation' variable. See Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' *Comparative Politics*, 36: 1 (October 2003), p. 65.

25 For comparison, see descriptions of the variables in *ibid.*, p 354; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 24.

26 Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', p. 341-379.

27 *Ibid.* As for measurements, in addition to the scale of 'emancipative values,' they employ Freedom House rating for 'formal democracy (the aspect of freedom rights),' and Transparency International scores for 'elite integrity.' By simple mathematical manipulation of these two kinds of scores, they created the measure of 'effective democracy.' For the scale of 'individual resources,' they utilise Vanhanen's 'index of power resources'. For details, see *ibid.*, pp. 353-358, 373-375.

28 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' *Comparative Politics*, 36: 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-79. For comparison, see *Ibid.*, p. 65; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', p. 354.

self-expression (using variable of signing petitions),' 'interpersonal trust' and 'life satisfaction.' These include the same elements as ones that Inglehart has respectively paid attention to: Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension, interpersonal trust, subjective well-being and (peaceful) protest. Moreover, in his former studies, he constantly regards them as crucial constituents of the values syndrome in the course of economic development (and 'Postmodernisation' in his term) while claiming them to be conducive to democracy and democratisation. Another point to be noticed in this article is the naming of the 'liberty and participation' variable (as an elaborated version of the four-item Postmaterialist index). Here, Inglehart seems to be aware that 'free speech' and 'more say' items in the scale correspond with 'liberty' and 'participation' accordingly.

In a similar direction, Inglehart's recent academic interest has been paying direct attention to the matter of democracy, often in collaboration with Welzel. For instance, in one of their works, they emphasise the impact of economic development on the emergence of pro-democratic political culture, which in turn facilitates the emergence and stability of democracy as an institution. With multivariate analyses, they suggest that the pro-democratic culture (that is, self-expression values) matters in shaping democratic institutions far more than being shaped by it.²⁹ As a consequence of their research, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (2005) presents a comprehensive treatment of issues on values and democracy. Thus, Inglehart's works have provided significant contributions to the studies of democracy. Accordingly, the four-item Postmaterialist index has played a crucial part for these studies.

1.2.3 Individualism?

Nonetheless, these works seem to be based on an underlying view that has a very strong stress on, and esteem for, freedom and the individual as exclusively essential in his definition of democracy. In that sense, 'democracy' in these works might have a specific connotation that places a high regard on the values of individual liberty. In fact, in the course of his argument on self-expression values as a central pro-democratic attitude, Inglehart relates the values to individualism.³⁰ For the matter of democracy, one of the

²⁹ Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Howard J. Wiarda eds., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164.

³⁰ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 6, pp. 135-145.

main measurements employed in his works is the Freedom House rating, which evaluates two dimensions of societies: civil liberty and political rights. Whereas these are major facets of democracy in a general sense, the evaluation of the rating is mainly concerned with the extent of freedom. In that sense, the 'democracy' that is presupposed in his works (and probably the Freedom House rating) is something close to 'liberal democracy' or 'democracy with strong emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom.'³¹

Incidentally, 'liberal democracy' or 'democracy that puts strong emphasis on liberty' coincides with the general idea or critically conceived model of so-called 'Western democracy'. Although this concept is vague and neither clearly defined nor accepted with academic precision, it may well be said that democratic societies in the Western tradition tend to hold prevailing values that attach importance to a sense of liberty and individualism. At least, their emphasis seems to be generally stronger than in societies of other regions. As pointed out by some scholars especially from non-Western contexts, individual freedom is not necessarily as highly appreciated in some non-Western traditions as in Western culture. For example, Bell and Jayasuriya argue that, although the high esteem of freedom such as individual autonomy is the core element of values in Western civilisation, it is not necessarily a universal phenomenon. In relation to this, they question the immediate application of the universality of liberal democracy that is predominant and possibly unique in the Western region.³² In similar terms, as for liberal democracy, Parekh argues for the 'cultural particularity of liberal democracy' in the West.³³ Thus, strong emphasis on and sensitivity to freedom constitute one of the central features of Western societies.³⁴

31 For the details on the Freedom House measurement, see <http://freedomhouse.org>.

32 Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.

33 Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in David Held ed., *Prospect for Democracy: North, South, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-175. In addition, on liberal democracy and individual, Parekh argues that liberalism is the premise and foundation of liberal democracy, and that 'liberalism takes the individual as the ultimate and irreducible unit of society' while stating that individualism 'lies at the heart of liberal thought'.

34 For example, see Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 71-72. For quantitative comparison in relation to individualism, see Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001), esp. pp. 209-278. Lipset argues the American people's salient inclination to individualism, while those in other Western societies (to a less extent) hold similar penchant being compared with those in some non-Western zones. See Lipset, S. M., *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (London/New

To be fair, the excessive invalidation of liberal democracy *per se* does not have plausibility. In fact, the institutional arrangement of liberal democracy has provided a strongly viable and perhaps the sole model that systematically secures civil rights and freedom against the coercion of authoritarian rules. Hague and Harrop mention that a major character of liberal democracy is the protection of individual liberty and rights by the law, such as constitutional arrangements, that limits the exercise of the power by government over individuals.³⁵ Nonetheless, when it comes to the realm of 'values', it is still possible to acknowledge societies where cultural or traditional particularity exists in a manner that is somewhat obstructive to liberal views.

In the case of Japan, for instance, although there seems to have been an increase of liberal outlooks, still the cultural penchant strongly appears to deter the fully-fledged spread of liberal and individual values in comparison with the West. According to the World Values Survey in 1995, the proportion of respondents who chose 'freedom' rather than 'order' is higher in younger age cohorts, implying its potential rise through generational shift. However, the overall level *per se* is unequivocally lower than that of the USA and Russia. Institutionally, Japan holds highly liberal democratic arrangements and receives high scores on the Freedom House ratings comparable to Western democratic societies. Nonetheless, the formal arrangement does not necessarily indicate the people's actual orientation to freedom and their informal capacity that underpins liberal social practice. Maruyama's critical account of Japanese political culture includes the people's weakness of individuality, which has a persistent penchant to be submerged under the authority of holistic as well as hierarchical social contexts.³⁶ Lipset argues for a Japanese proclivity in clear contrast with the American one. He argues that the Japanese tradition is prone to collective norms such as deference, obligation, consensus and hierarchy in

York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996). Pye argues, for instance, paternalistic authority in the context of Asian values, which has contrast with the emphasis of individual autonomy prevalent in Western culture. See Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985).

³⁵ Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 6th ed., (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 35-50. For comprehensive account of liberal democracy and democracy in general, see Held, David, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity), 1996.

³⁶ Maruyama, Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo*, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964). For the English translations of his selected monographs, see Maruyama, Masao (Morris, Ivan ed.), *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

interpersonal relations, whereas American culture tends to emphasise freedom, self-autonomy, egalitarian values based on free-standing and right-asserting individuals, and competitiveness on fair ground.³⁷ Japanese heritage seems to be less compatible with elements conducive to liberal democratic practice. In particular, the trait would be disadvantageous to individual participation, free speech and public discussion. That virtually constitutes the peculiarity of the Japanese situation on values, which suggests the considerable influence of historically inherited characteristics.

Even so, it may well be noted that Inglehart's approach still possesses a certain validity and strength as a criterion. Above all, the clarity of its theory and empirical tools are considerably useful for cross-national comparison. The relevant employment of conceptual standards and measurements produces workable and meaningful comparative analyses.³⁸ In this sense, Inglehart's arrangement possesses qualities that reasonably meet such conditions. The central claim of his thesis is relatively straightforward. Its theoretical background is systematically articulated. These features allow researchers to make focused and lucid reference to hypotheses and theories in relation to empirical studies. Moreover, the Postmaterialist index and related scales hold clearly defined items of values, which enables actual tests to be performed on relatively common ground. As long as a view of subjective bias is avoided, his model would secure a legitimate position as an analytical device. For this, it is crucial to be aware of what normative potential may be involved in the notional model.

37 Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, ch. 7, pp. 211-263. Also, see 'Appendix: Individualism and Group Obligation', pp. 293-296.

38 For comparative method, see for instance, Mackie, Tom and David Marsh, 'The Comparative Method', in Marsh, David and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 9, pp. 173-188; Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, ch. 5, pp. 69-85; Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 58-79; Kohno, Masaru, 'Hikaku-seiji-gaku no Hohoron [Methods of Comparative Politics]', in Masaru Kohno and Masahiro Iwasaki, eds., *Akusesu Hikaku-seiji-gaku [Access to Comparative Politics]* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha, 2002), pp. 1-16. For the issue of measurement, see King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 150-168; Peters, B. Guy, *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp. 80-108; de Vaus, David, *Research Design in Social Science Research* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 29-32.

1.3 Values shift versus cultural particularity

This section, first of all, raises a question of culture *vis-à-vis* the view of values shift. Subsequently, the discussion is focused on the cultural effect on the Postmaterialist index. Also, a primary perspective for analyses on the competing efficacies of economic development and cultural particularity is mentioned.

1.3.1 Question of culture

As reviewed so far, the central claim of the values shift thesis is that economic development or industrialisation and post-industrialisation processes nurture conditions favourable to democracy. Especially, according to Inglehart's perspective, the conditions would emerge in the realm of values as a pro-democratic political culture. Nonetheless, there is one question. Is the state of the values not due to inherited cultures or historical contexts that have already been present specifically in a given society? Even if there is the evidence of values shift, is it not possible that the directions of the transformations are affected by cultural and historical divergence?

The USA, Britain and the West

The USA and Great Britain hold democratic institutions and are often cited as having democratic norms and practices as their cultures.³⁹ In Almond and Verba's classic work, *Civic Culture* (1963), American and British citizens' orientations were depicted as closer to an ideal of participatory democracy.⁴⁰ It was published more than a decade before *The Silent Revolution* (1977) explicated the emerging Postmaterialist shift. Tocqueville's observations on democratic culture in America were presented as early as in nineteenth century.⁴¹ Democratic systems in both of the countries were established and nurtured long before the burgeoning of Postmaterialist values.⁴² Thus, their democratic arrangements and

³⁹ For comprehensive empirical studies on British political culture, see Miller, William L., ed., *Alternatives to Freedom: Arguments and Opinions* (London/New York: Longman Group, 1995); Miller, William L., Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff, *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁴⁰ Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). Also, for an attempt of its re-examination, see Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

⁴¹ Tocqueville, Alexis de, *Democracy in America* (London: Fontana Press, 1994 [1837]).

⁴² Inglehart describes that Postmaterialist shift occurred after the World War II. See Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 4.

customs preceded the values shift. This implies that the presence of their traditions is independent, not the consequence of the Postmaterialist transformation.

Democratic practices could be their embedded heritages. The populace, for example, attaches an exceptional importance to democratic accountability. In Britain, there are very frequent occasions where the Prime Minister and ministers answer questions as regards governmental policies such as a regular arrangement of 'Question Time'.⁴³ For Western Europe as a whole, the European Union seems to have a considerable concern for the state of public opinion.⁴⁴ The Eurobarometer survey has been routinely conducted to observe the postures of popular outlooks on behalf of the European Commission.⁴⁵ In February 2006, the Commission adopted a 'White Paper on a European Communication Policy'.⁴⁶ There are comprehensive attempts to encourage the people to directly express their views by such methods as consultations, discussions and other communicative means through the internet.⁴⁷ These would be concerned with promoting public legitimacy of the European Union. The attempts correspond with a tendency that West European people (and elites) have critical awareness of governmental responsiveness as a prime source of legitimacy. For the World Values Survey, there is an indication that in Western Europe 'democracy' is understood in the sense of public accountability, whereas in others such as Postcommunist societies it is not necessarily so.⁴⁸

As for liberal or individual oriented outlooks, the USA, Britain and most Western societies have a stronger inherited attachment than societies in non-Western contexts.

43 Jones, Bill, Dennis Kavanagh, Michael Moran, and Philip Norton, *Politics UK*, 4th ed. (London/New York: Pearson Education, 2001), pp. 358-359.

44 The current policy initiatives of the European Union mainly stem from West European nations. Therefore, it would be plausible that a normative basis for its direction is likely to reflect values prevalent in Western Europe. Due to this, the policies of the European Union are presented as examples to demonstrate West European cultural orientation.

45 For Eurobarometer survey series, see ESDS International, Economic and Social Data Service [<http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/access/eurobarometer.asp>]; GESIS (German Social Science Infrastructure Service) [<http://www.gesis.org/en/data%5Fservice/eurobarometer/>].

46 For the White Paper, see [http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/doc/white_paper_en.pdf]. Other related documents are: 'The Commission's contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate'; 'Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission'. See [http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/index_en.htm].

47 For instance, see 'Your Voice in Europe' [<http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index.htm>]; 'Debate Europe' [http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm].

48 West European societies tend to have negative significant correlation between two question items asking whether respondents have positive or negative attitudes towards (1) 'having a democratic political system' and (2) 'having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country'. For these, Postcommunist opinions tend to have not significant (and in some cases positive) correlation on this.

There has been a liberal tradition in Great Britain.⁴⁹ American political culture possesses an even stronger orientation to freedom and individualism.⁵⁰ As mentioned above, the esteem for liberty and individual autonomy is a core element of Western heritage. Likewise, Inglehart's values map indicates that Western societies share close locations, constituting a cluster almost distinct from other cultural zones; especially, for one of its axes: the 'survival vs. self-expression' scale, the Western cases concentrate noticeably higher scores among societies across the world.⁵¹ Moreover, similar groupings are found in Inglehart's variables such as trust, well-being and so forth.⁵² Considering the fact that these scales have a clear correlation with the Freedom House rating, liberal democratic attitudes would distinctively characterise the populace in the contemporary West.⁵³

Thus, there seems to be cultural coherence among Western societies, which is highly compatible with liberal democratic attitudes. The features of this cultural zone overlap with the Postmaterialist and self-expression values. This raises one problem. In Inglehart's thesis, these attitudes are supposed to be the outcomes of the values shift. Nonetheless, there may be a potential that the attributes are due to cultural heritage rather than results of the values change.

Japan and East Asia

Japan is a case that has attained an economically comparable level to many Western societies while holding the experience of a long-standing democratic system for more than fifty years. On the other hand, Japan is often regarded as having culturally particular values, and there are studies on its cultural aspect.⁵⁴ This provides a rationale to incorporate

49 Jones, Kavanagh, Moran and Norton, *Politics UK*, pp. 79-87.

50 Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*.

51 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 92-100; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 48-76, esp. 63.

52 For example, see Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', pp. 89-91; Inglehart, 'Globalization and Postmodern Values'; Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 70-72, 139-144.

53 For the correlations, see for instance, Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', p. 149; Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', p. 54.

54 For Japanese political culture, see for instance, Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics]; Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, ch. 6, pp. 158-181. For in-depth analyses of Japanese culture, Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947).

Japan for comparison with the Western societies.⁵⁵ In particular, such a comparison allows one to detect the extent of cultural influence over the conditions of values. For instance, the length of maintaining the economic security in Japan should enable one to expect a widespread Postmaterialist values shift equivalent to Western democratic societies. Nonetheless, the Postmaterialist tendency among the Japanese public seems to have a certain weakness. As depicted in later chapters, there is a lower degree of individual inclination to public discussion, free speech and contestation. This runs counter to an account that industrialisation and post-industrialisation universally cause the values transformation. There seem to be cultural factors that have been affecting the *status quo*.

Also, Japan is a part of East Asia and shares traditions with societies in this region. Pye sees Japanese political culture in the context of (East) Asian values.⁵⁶ As presented later in this research, there seem to be comparatively homogeneous perceptions of freedom and order among East Asian public opinions. Likewise, Inglehart's values map demonstrates that these societies hold analogous positions constituting a group.⁵⁷ East Asian societies are often claimed to have provided examples of democratisation models.⁵⁸ For instance, while leaving aside political changes towards democracy, the countries give first priority to the pursuit of guided industrialisation and economic development under the auspices of authoritarian regimes. Democratic changes are expected (albeit not necessarily certain) to take place gradually after the attainment of economic security and affluence.⁵⁹ Moreover, the viability of the 'economic first' model in East Asia implies the popular orientation towards Materialist rather than Postmaterialist values. One of major conditions

55 Ike made a remark similar to this rationale. See Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', *American Political Science Review*, 67 (1973), p. 1195.

56 Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, pp. 1-89, 158-181, 283-346.

57 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 92-98; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 48-76, esp. 63.

58 For studies on democracy in East Asia, see Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner ed., *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Huntington also mentions an East Asian model. See Huntington, Samuel, 'Democracy's Third Wave', in L. Diamond et al., eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 3-25; Huntington, Samuel P., 'Democracy For The Long Haul', *Journal of Democracy*, 7: 2 (1996), pp. 3-13. Inoguchi presents an overview of comparative studies of East Asian politics. See Inoguchi, Takashi, *Seiji-gaku no Mechie* [The Métier of A Political Scientist] (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 1996), ch. 6, pp. 93-120.

59 Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then (Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East Asian Model', in *Democracy and Democratization: Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 255-268.

that enable East Asian countries to take such a model is probably that their cultural orientations would not persistently motivate the expansion of liberal and political rights as in the West. Liberal democratic causes may have much less appeal than economic growth.⁶⁰ Such a pragmatic orientation is comparable to Materialist values, since Materialist orientation is to give priority to economic and social security over public self-expression and political participation. In contrast, the degree of importance that Westerners attach to democratic priorities seems much higher. The distribution of values in East Asia could be due to cultural difference rather than the state of values shift, which potentially affects the output of Postmaterialist-Materialist index.⁶¹

Russia and Postcommunist societies

Russia is another example for cultural variation, which is generally considered to have a distinct outlook from the standard of the contemporary West. There is a prevalent perspective that historically Russia has held to a tradition in which the people are supportive of a strong leader or authority that ensures the order of society.⁶² The people have peculiar or complex attitudes on the matter of order and freedom, at least in comparison to Westerners' perceptions.⁶³ Before its transition from the communist regime, there had been a Soviet legacy that 'the authorities were above the law'.⁶⁴ For some of Inglehart's variables, Russian public opinion has a strong skew towards an opposite direction to one that Western opinions normally take. The Russian average is located in the realm of the survival values, whereas the great majority of Western societies are around the self-expression values.⁶⁵ The rating of subjective well-being is exceptionally low for

60 Heywood, Andrew, *Politics* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), pp. 34-35.

61 Nonetheless, it is not to negate the validity of economic modernisation effect on democratic changes, but to raise the point that cultural particularity also matters. The East Asian 'economic first' model in fact suggests both its cultural particularity and the emergence of conditions favourable to democracy due to economic development.

62 White, Stephen, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).

63 For the issue of order and freedom, see Gibson, James L., 'The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture,' *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 32: 2 (1997), pp. 271-290; Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions between Democracy and Order among Russian Citizens,' *Studies in Public Policy*, 352 (2001).

64 Bacon, Edwin with Matthew Wyman, *Contemporary Russia* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 112.

65 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 92; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 63.

Russia, whereby the score drastically decreased from 1981 to 1995.⁶⁶ In political terms, the country has been 'consolidating' the extraordinary concentration of power to the presidency with popular support.⁶⁷ This in fact corresponds with the above mentioned view of Russian political culture, which in turn presents a deviant scenario from Western democratic contexts.

Aside from the salient Russian character, Postcommunist societies tend to cluster together in attitudinal orientations around Russia. Inglehart's values map shows a distinctively Postcommunist area.⁶⁸ Multiple types of his variables are apt to exhibit emphatically Postcommunist proclivities for these societies' outputs, which are often opposite to Western responses.⁶⁹ There seem to be culturally or historically particular elements, which have driven them to have such distinctly 'Postcommunist' or East European attributes. In one way, in the last century these societies had achieved and maintained a certain economic level. Under former communist regimes, social welfare was relatively equally provided to the people, so that at least physical and social security was secured to some degree for a relatively long period. In Inglehart's terms, 'physiological needs' were met to the extent that can diminish scarcity. Moreover, educational standards of these societies are at high levels for the world average.⁷⁰ With this, if the Postmaterialist hypothesis is applied, an indication of the values shift should be expected. Even if the impact of regime transition is considered as an intervening factor, there should be a sign for it, since the majority of the population had spent their formative years before the transitions.⁷¹ In reality, nonetheless, the Postcommunist societies hold much less support

66 Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'.

67 White, Stephen, *Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3, pp. 70-106; Willerton, John P., 'Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 2, pp. 18-39; Waller, Michael, *Russian Politics Today: The Return of A Tradition* (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 23-47.

68 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, p. 92; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 63.

69 Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', pp. 89-91; Inglehart, 'Globalization and Postmodern Values'; Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 70-72, 139-144.

70 It should be noted that education is an important element in relation to the values transformation and Postmaterialist outlooks, since widespread rising level of education in a society is one of the crucial characters in post-industrial society. For a related diagram, see Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, p. 5; Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, p. 6.

71 According to the Postmaterialist theory, experiences during a juvenile period affect the formation of basic

for Postmaterialist values than the West. They are rather oriented to Materialist values. This denotes the importance of paying attention to cultural and historical factors, which could not be explained simply by the Postmaterialist hypothesis.

In fact, the people in ex-communist societies have historically gone through different circumstances. Before their transitions, many of them had not experienced a capitalist system.⁷² The people's freedom (especially of speech) was restricted. Many of them did not have formalised systems of representative democracy comparable to Western counterparts, though the authorities regarded the regimes as democratic centralism. There was communist ideology that was dominantly shared as an official view. There were governmental controls that permeated politics, economy and the people's daily lives.⁷³ The people developed views and behaviours to adapt to the circumstances. As for East European attributes, they have not directly gone through much of the significant experience in West European history (with the exception of societies contiguous to the borders).⁷⁴ The collapse of the former regimes also has had serious impacts on the particular state of their outlooks.⁷⁵ There are numerous reasons to assume the presence of cultural and historical factors that affect the popular values, which could be observed even within Postmaterialist-Materialist categories.

Consequently, the cases of Japan and Russia present qualitatively different characteristics from the USA and Britain, which could not be explicated simply by the values shift. Accordingly, these societies respectively hold cultural traits of their own regional commonalities: the USA and Britain for the Western tradition, Japan for East Asian values, and Russia for Postcommunist and East European attributes. Cultural and historical heritage matters for the conditions of values and their rationales. This raises the necessity of an additional perspective in relation to the distribution of Inglehart's values dimensions, including the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy.

outlooks, which maintain a certain durability thereafter.

72 In relation to this, for example, Nodia argues that communist modernisation is different in that communism abolished the institution of private property and seriously influenced individual attitudes. See Nodia, Ghia, 'How different are Postcommunist Transitions?,' in Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democracy after Communism* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 3-17.

73 In relation to this, for the concepts of 'totalitarian' and 'post-totalitarian' regimes, see Linz, J. and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

74 For the historical account of East European societies, for instance, see Kido, Shigeru, and Takayuki Ito, eds., *To-o Gendai-shi* [Modern History of Eastern Europe] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987).

75 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 38.

1.3.2 Values shift and cultural particularity

It would be reasonable to employ the view of two competing elements: the values shift and cultural particularity. The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories of values shift support the perspective that values orientations are likely to change through the process of industrialisation and post-industrialisation. Nonetheless, inherited cultures probably influence the directions. In fact, Inglehart and Welzel notice that both of the effects affect the state of people's outlooks, so that the conditions of values are 'path-dependent' over time.⁷⁶ Likewise, Inglehart and Baker present cultural divergence as a crucial factor on attitudinal postures while recognising the effect of economic development.⁷⁷ Girvin notes that, in the face of trends conducive to changes, inherited political cultures still persist. They might assimilate the changes, but the core values of the heritages have steady continuity.⁷⁸ Similarly, Dalton points out that Inglehart's relatively recent work has become more sensitive to cultural and local variation.⁷⁹ Thus, the Postmaterialist index seems to need an amended interpretation. The figure 1.1 presents its basic perspective. It incorporates both views of values change and cultural variance for the translation of the Postmaterialist scale.


⁷⁶ Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 1, pp. 15-47.

⁷⁷ For instance, see Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.

⁷⁸ Girvin, Brian, 'Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture', in J. R. Gibbins ed., *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age* (London: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 31-51.

⁷⁹ Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1988), p. 109.

Figure 1.1 Values shift and cultural particularity



1.3.3 The selection of cases

This part deals with the related issue of case selection. Especially, reasons for choosing the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan, in conjunction with three regional groups, are considered. Why are the cases restricted to only four nations? In methodological terms, this arrangement would be categorised as a focused comparison or 'small-N' analysis.⁸⁰ Although limiting the number of cases may have some restrictions, there is an advantage in that the fewer cases we investigate, the more details we can examine.⁸¹ In fact, including more than these nations could result in a superficial description of each case. Although it might be possible to conduct the detailed examination of a larger number of cases, it could make the analysis and its presentation unduly complex. In addition, the disadvantage of the 'small-N' analysis is compensated by incorporating the analysis of national figures from the three wider regions (that is, Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions), which includes elements of a 'large-N' analysis.⁸²

But why do the cases specifically have to be these four countries? With respect to the USA and Britain, first of all, they are typically applicable to the overall assumptions of the Postmaterialist thesis, and therefore can be regarded as exemplars, based on which comparison could be conducted with other types of countries. This could be the case with a wider group of Western societies, since the Postmaterialist hypothesis has been mainly examined on this range of societies with relatively supportive outcomes. Although comparative examination is able to illuminate the attributes of respective cases in relative terms, employing cases that tend to conform to a hypothesis (thus, basic examples) would enhance the efficacy of comparison. In the context of democracy, similarly, the USA and Britain could be taken as representatives of Western liberal democratic nations, which would be able to play the roles of standard models in comparison with non-Western cases. Moreover, in Verba and Almond's *Civic Culture*, the USA and Britain were chosen as examples of stable democracy.⁸³ Since our research would be categorised within the

80 See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 74-77; Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, ch. 5, pp. 80-83.

81 For the issue on the number of cases, see Peters, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 58-79.

82 Also, statistical analyses of survey data conducted in this research has the quality of 'large-N' analysis. For the problems of 'small-N' analysis, see King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 119-122, 126, 144-146, 196-197, 204-206, 208-230; Peters, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 61-74.

83 Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*. Also see, Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, p. 66.

political culture approach, it would be of use to employ similar settings to this classic work. With such standard examples which have consistency with the theories, it is a viable method to present contrasting cases that possibly raise questions about the theories. Presenting atypical cases as evidence is one of the effective methods of questioning the validity of a given theory. The Japanese and Russian cases could be employed with this reasoning, since they may directly counter the main rationale of values shift and Postmaterialist thesis. On the other hand, this setting could present the element of a 'most different' design in comparative methods.⁸⁴ If there is a common tendency that corresponds to the Postmaterialist hypothesis among these cases despite their obvious cultural difference, it could suggest possible validity in a certain aspect of the Postmaterialist thesis.

Our study assumes that, for some attributes, the four societies have continuities with wider groups of societies: the USA and Britain with the Western societies, Russia with Postcommunist societies, and Japan with East Asian societies. As mentioned above, there are indications that there is cultural coherency within each of the groups. In this context, the case studies of the four nations would be able, within a certain limitation, to illuminate analogous differentiations of characters between these larger groups. With this framework of case selection, let us expand the central rationale of the comparison.

The trilateral difference in the analytical settings of the four societies and the three regions can have direct relevance to the evaluation of Postmaterialist and values shift discourses. One major issue is a gap in the perception of freedom. The Postmaterialist discourse presumes that, after economic development fulfils the material needs of the people, their values orientation is likely to transform in a manner to emphasise self-actualisation needs.⁸⁵ Along with further-elaborated values shift theories, it is generally hypothesised that the individual increasingly acquires self-oriented values, an inclination to public expression, a critical stance towards authority, proactive participatory attitudes, and intellectual and political skills and resources.⁸⁶ In one aspect, this may be interpreted as the growth of individualism. Nonetheless, societies where such a values orientation is

⁸⁴ For the 'most different' design (and a 'most similar' design), see *ibid.*, pp. 62-66; Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, pp. 82-83; Peters, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 37-41.

⁸⁵ See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution*.

⁸⁶ Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

flourishing are mainly ones with Western traditions. As mentioned earlier, there is an inherited cultural emphasis on the freedom of individuals in these societies. This could be advantageous to the spread of Postmaterialist and related values. Thus, traditional culture could be functioning as an intervening factor (as an enhancer for this case). On the contrary, there could be other cultural scenarios that have opposite effects, especially if the normative worth of individual liberty is de-emphasised by historical or cultural backgrounds. The cohorts of Postcommunist nations and East Asian nations respectively present such cases with particular coherency. Some of their elements can systematically run counter to Postmaterialist shift at least in the realm of freedom.

In East Asia, there is the cultural presence of a conformist orientation, which virtually discourages the presence of autonomous free-standing individuals.⁸⁷ Higher priority is likely to be placed on the holistic interests of community, society or state rather than personal ones. Culturally, a border between self and others is more ambiguously perceived than in Western perspective. There is a strong sense of social ties between individuals. The people are likely to find a sense of security and well-being by being a part of larger social contexts. Paternalism and familism can often be accepted as viable societal norms that provide benevolent elements and legitimate rationales to collective behaviour.⁸⁸ Thus, their embedded culture possesses an intrinsic resistance to Western-style individualism.

On the other hand, those in ex-communist societies can have a lower inclination to liberal motives as well as a different perception of freedom from the one typically conceived in the West. Historically, they have gone through the imposition of a communist ideology whereby individual freedom was restrained in numerous aspects of society. Free market and private ownership were suppressed in the name of state planning that was supposed to provide collective prosperity to the people. The long-term experience of such a system could nurture popular attitudes to rely on the state rather than free competition, which could encourage their support for a collective goal prior to individual autonomy.

⁸⁷ For East Asian political cultures, see for example, Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*; Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*; Diamond and Plattner ed., *Democracy in East Asia*. For Japanese case, see Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].

⁸⁸ Pye discusses paternalistic authority in Asian values whereas Maruyama mentions familism in Japanese case. See Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics]; Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*.

Politically, many communist states took the form of totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes.⁸⁹ The regime facilitated what is called social atomisation while eliminating many elements of civil society, thereby countless individuals lost social channels to actualise their free wills. Mass mobilisation for the state and the ideology seems to have eventually fostered widespread political passivity (and apathy).⁹⁰ These presumably deterred the politically proactive and spontaneous attitudes of individuals. It is possible that communist experience prevented the rise of participatory values based on free wills. Moreover, the lack of a free environment and the prevention of liberal values transformation may have preserved traditional outlooks, which include cultural attitudes submissive to political authority in such as Russia and post-Soviet republics.⁹¹ Thus, although communist nations had achieved a certain level of economic development, the process seems to have been a different version of modernisation from the one typically found in the West. These Postcommunist particularities possibly have given rise to irregularity to and deviation from the standard effects of values shift. As a consequence, there could be an attitudinal and perceptual gap in relation to freedom between Postcommunist and Western societies.

Consequently, popular mind-sets in Postcommunist and East Asian societies could incorporate a systematic hindrance towards Postmaterialist transformation especially concerned with the matter of liberty. At least, their particularities function as intervening factors in relation to the Postmaterialist effect. Thus, the two regional groups respectively present the coherent examples that hold particular elements competing with the Postmaterialist effect. Such coherency may be perhaps salient in comparison with other non-Western groups. In this sense, Postcommunist and East Asian groups are ideal cases to examine the present theme: Postmaterialist shift versus cultural particularity.

But why do Japan and Russia have to be representatives of these two groups? As mentioned earlier, Japan has maintained a level of economic development comparable to Western democratic societies for a long period. Given this, if Japan hold a certain attribute

⁸⁹ For the concepts and their application to former communist nations, see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*.

⁹⁰ For political mobilisation during the communist era, see Friedgut, Theodore H., *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). For the political disengagement in Russia and former Soviet republics, see Hutcheson, Derek S., 'Protest and Disengagement in the Russian Federal Elections of 2003-04', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 5: 2 (2004); Hutcheson, Derek S. and Elena A. Korosteleva, 'Patterns of Participation in Post-Soviet Politics', *Contemporary European Politics*, 3: 4 (December 2005).

⁹¹ For Russian case, see for example, White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*.

in consistency with other East Asian societies, and especially if such an attribute is not observed in Western societies, it would suggest the presence of an East Asian cultural element as against that of values shift. For it exists among the East Asian nations *regardless of* the effect of economic development (as the source of the values transformation). Russia is a typical major case of a country with communist experience. Its cultural traditions are relatively independent of Western influence in comparison with some other Postcommunist countries close to Western Europe. Although other former Soviet republics may have such traits, Russia is the largest in size and therefore would be the most comparable to the USA among them. Some may question that Japan does not have an equivalent size in this context. Nevertheless, although the size of the land may not be so, that of the population can be at a comparable level. Moreover, Britain is incorporated as another case of Western society, which could be comparatively close to Japan in the extent of the national territory.⁹² In this way, the risk of Japanese gap *vis-à-vis* Russia and the USA could be reduced.

1.4 Values and democracy

This section considers the matter of values and democracy. First of all, general issues surrounding 'Western' liberal democracy are mentioned. For this, the importance of differentiating values and institutions is suggested. Subsequently, the influence of values on institutions is explicated. In view of this, the final part presents variables to be examined for this research.

1.4.1 Liberal democracy?

When liberal democracy and culture are considered, there may be some responses from non-Western regions with potentially negative connotations. As mentioned above, many such questions are directed to the 'liberal' aspect of liberal democracy on the basis of an account that the high esteem of freedom is not necessarily the core attribute of non-

⁹² The sizes of the countries are as follows: The USA (population: 285318000, surface area: 9632030 [sq. km]); Britain [United Kingdom] (population: 59500252, surface area: 243610 [sq. km]); Russia (population: 145949580; surface area: 17098240 [sq. km]); Japan (population: 127149000, surface area: 377880 [sq. km]). The World Bank Group, *World Development Indicators*, 2001 [<http://www.worldbank.org/>].

Western cultures.⁹³

Nonetheless, even though there might be people who regard liberal democracy as something particular to Western nations, is there any actual alternative that is not liberal but democracy in the current world? Although the definition of 'liberal' would vary and therefore need to be treated with caution, for 'liberal democracy' at least we could consider the case of democracy that institutionally ensures freedom of the people including civil liberty and political rights. Given this, could a system be a democracy without such attributes? In reality, it is difficult to imagine democracy that lacks the quality of freedom. In a similar vein, the concept of 'polyarchy' presented by Dahl involves the element of freedom.⁹⁴ Moreover, the notion of polyarchy has been a viable model explicating an important dimension of democracy.⁹⁵ There are arguments on freedom as a crucial element in relation to democracy.⁹⁶ The two indicators of the Freedom House rating are political rights and civil liberties. The rating has been widely regarded as a measurement of democracy. Plattner argues with respect to a connection between liberalism and democracy.⁹⁷ The institutional guarantee of liberty seems to be an essential asset for being a democracy that one can conceive in the present age.

Meanwhile, there are governments that restrict certain types of liberty while holding some formalities of democracy. For instance, there are newly introduced democratic systems where the governmental offices consider the restriction of free speech or other freedoms as a policy option. Some of them rationalise the regulation due to the fact that the systems suffer social instability, which could seriously affect the security of order. This at times tends to be supported by the populace, owing to drastic changes and confusions

93 For Asia, for example, see Fareed Zakaria, 'A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew', *Foreign Affairs*, 73: 2 (March-April, 1994), pp. 109-127. For Russia, for instance, in March 2000 then acting-President Vladimir Putin made statements which included that 'democracy is the dictatorship of the law' while rebuking those who 'privatise' the law to serve own interests. Quoted in Bacon with Wyman, *Contemporary Russia*, ch. 6, pp. 111-130.

94 Dahl, *Polyarchy*, esp. pp. 1-16.

95 See Masahiro, Iwasaki, and Kogure Kentaro, 'Seiji-hatten-ron [Political Development Theories]', in Kohno and Iwasaki eds., *Akusesu Hikaku-Seijigaku*, ch. 4, pp. 71-91, esp. 74-77; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20:1 (March 2004), pp. 28-55.

96 Beetham, David, 'Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit', in David Beetham ed., *Defining Measuring Democracy* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 28-30; Beetham, David, 'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

97 Plattner, Marc F., 'Liberalism and Democracy: Can't Have One Without the Other', *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1998).

produced through such things as a regime transition processes or economic difficulty. There is an argument that economic development is likely to be successful under the guiding force of a political authority.⁹⁸ Apparently, these systems might have traits compatible with variants of elitist models for democracy.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, these types of rationales have a potential to be taken advantage of to excuse authoritarian rules. This is the point that has been a centre of criticisms by intellectuals and public opinion especially from Western or liberal democratic societies, as seen for some cases of the former USSR republics and Asian nations.¹⁰⁰ Some scholars regard them as 'managed' or 'delegative' democracy.¹⁰¹ There could be weakness in quasi-democratic systems in terms of democratic practices such as civil and political liberties. Hague and Harrop categorise such regimes as 'semi-democracy'.¹⁰²

The institutional guarantee of freedom is crucial for democracy. However, why are there some non-Western voices that question 'liberal' democracy while criticising it as 'Western' democracy? To be fair, one reason might be that their democratic customs and outlooks are still too premature to employ and adjust to a democratic system. On the other hand, it would be true that there is something very 'Western' in it, which is heterogeneous and therefore could not be fully accommodated by the non-Westerners. It is not reasonable to simply regard non-Western outlooks as 'traditional' or 'pre-modern' in a deterministic

⁹⁸ For a brief introduction of debates for and against this view, see Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 57.

⁹⁹ For the description of elitist models, see Held, *Models of Democracy*, pp. 157-198. For Schumpeter's original account in relation to an elitist perspective on democracy, see Schumpeter, J., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976).

¹⁰⁰ For related discussions on 'Asian values', see Thompson, Mark R., 'Whatever Happened to "Asian Values"?', *Journal of Democracy*, 12: 4 (October 2001), pp. 154-165; Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, p. 48. For Russia, see Bova, Russell, 'Democracy and Russian Political Culture', in Russel Bova ed., *Russia and Western Civilization: Cultural and Historical Encounters*, (Armonk NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-276; White, Gitelman and Sakwa ed., *Developments in Russian Politics* 6; Waller, *Russian Politics Today*, pp. 23-47.

¹⁰¹ O'Donnell, Guillermo, 'Delegative Democracy', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 94-108; Sakwa, Richard, 'Politics in Russia', in White, Gitelman and Sakwa eds., in *Developments in Russian Politics* 6, ch. 1, pp. 1-17.

¹⁰² Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics*, ch. 3, pp. 35-50. For related arguments, see Collier, David and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49:3 (1997), pp. 430-451; Collier, David, and Robert Adcock, 'Democracy and Dichotomies', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), pp. 537-565; Brown, Archie, 'From Democratization to 'Guided Democracy'', *Journal of Democracy*, 12: 4 (2001), pp. 35-41; Ottaway, Marina, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

perspective of a modernisation process. For such a view holds a risk of being biased. With this, what is it that non-Western people could not help claiming as different? It is 'individualism' to which one of their major critiques is directed. The criticisms are often accompanied by caution and scepticism towards a strong reliance on the esteem of freedom, by referring to its incompatibility with their own cultural contexts.¹⁰³ This tends to be mixed and confused with arguments on the institution of liberal democracy (along with modernisation and Westernisation).¹⁰⁴ The crucial point is that the object of their attention is mainly the 'values' of liberty. The core critique is not necessarily of the 'institution' *per se* that secures liberty. Thus, values and institutions need to be differentiated.

1.4.2 Values and institutions

It is important to perceive values and institutions separately. Inglehart and Welzel are particularly aware of this. They explicitly identify variables that represent each of these while placing them in theoretical contexts.¹⁰⁵ This also enables analyses to be functional. It would be useful to present a sketch of disaggregation on at least one dimension of liberal democracy. The following items are not exhaustive. However, they give a primary picture for matters treated in later chapters.

Institution:

	[Freedom House] ¹⁰⁶	[Polyarchy]
Democratic political system	Political rights	Inclusiveness (participation) ¹⁰⁷
		Public contestation

¹⁰³ For the case of Asian values, see Parekh, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy'; Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'.

¹⁰⁴ It should be noted that 'individualism' in many cases tends to be misunderstood by non-Westerners, which is different from the way Westerners conceive. Individualism is likely to be understood with connotations of 'selfishness' in non-Western criticism, whereas Westerners normally understand it in the sense of individual 'autonomy'.

¹⁰⁵ For example, see Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages'; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development'; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

¹⁰⁶ Inglehart and Welzel identify the Freedom House rating with a measurement for 'liberal democracy'. See Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 149-157.

¹⁰⁷ For the concepts, see Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 1-16.

Values:

Self-expression / Postmaterialist values [Inglehart]

Liberal democratic values¹¹⁰

- (1) Liberty / individualism¹¹¹ (2) Trust / social capital¹¹² (3) Tolerance (4) Equality¹¹³
 (5) Anti-authoritarianism¹¹⁴ (6) Participation (7) Contestation (8) Public discussion
 (9) Political consciousness (10) Right consciousness¹¹⁵ (11) Subjective well-being¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁸ This might be comparable to the notion of 'constitutional liberalism'. For this notion, see Zakaria, Fareed, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* (November 1997).

¹⁰⁹ Berg-Schlosser points to 'civil liberties' as a normative dimension included in the account of polyarchy in addition to public contestation and inclusiveness. See Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', pp. 30-32. For a similar point, see Diamond, Larry, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 8.

¹¹⁰ As mentioned earlier, Inglehart (and Welzel) notice that the elements of values such as trust, tolerance, liberty, participation and subjective well-being have linkages with liberal democracy measured by scales based on the Freedom House ratings. These elements are largely the components of the self-expression values.

¹¹¹ It should be noted that values of liberty in this sense is a comprehensive description of orientation to a sense of freedom. Therefore, it does not precisely represent exhaustive accounts of variants on liberalism in philosophical or ideological terms. This is rather an approximate direction of attitudes when people in the West generally conceive of the sense of individual and liberty or when non-Western people (vaguely) point out individualism in the West.

¹¹² An element of trust could have qualitative equivalence to that of 'social capital', which has been widely argued as being conducive to democracy. For social capital, see Putnam, Robert D., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Fukuyama, Francis, 'Social Capital', in Harrison and Huntington eds., *Culture Matters*, pp. 99-111; Putnam, Robert D., *Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York/London: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Putnam, Robert D., 'Civic Disengagement in Contemporary America', *Government and Opposition*, 36: 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 135-156; Norris, Pippa, 'Social Capital and Civil Society', in *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 137-167.

¹¹³ Bell and Jayasuriya notice equality as one of the crucial values in Western culture (in relation to liberal democracy). See Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'.

¹¹⁴ An anti-authoritarian attitude is also treated as part of a values transformational trend by Inglehart while being suggested as contributive to democratic orientation. See Inglehart, Ronald, 'Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy', in Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 236-256. For his values scales, nonetheless, the attitude to authority is incorporated in the 'traditional/secular-rational scale', which is applicable to the first half phase of the values shift. See for instance, Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 48-56.

¹¹⁵ For right consciousness, see for instance, Gibson, James L. and Duch, Raymond M., 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', *Political Research Quarterly*, 47 (1994), pp. 5-39.

¹¹⁶ Subjective well-being is crucial for the positive condition of liberal democracy, which is pointed out by Inglehart's works as mentioned above.

Among the above-mentioned liberal democratic values, the present research will pay a special attention to a liberal dimension, since the major focus is surrounding Inglehart's thesis. Inglehart and Welzel write, '[h]uman development is not linked with all forms of democracy to the same degree; it is most specifically linked with the liberal aspect of democracy that institutionalizes human choice.'¹¹⁷ They also state, '[o]ur analysis focuses on "liberal" democracy because our theory implies that human development is inherently linked with the liberating aspects of democracy.'¹¹⁸

As for values and institutions, Fukuzawa, an intellectual in the early period of modernising Japan, envisaged that the introduction of the external aspect of civilisation would have less difficulty, whereas the incorporation of its 'inner spirit' would encounter far more resistance.¹¹⁹ According to him, 'the externals of civilization are all empirical details, from food, clothing, shelter, implements, and so forth, to government decrees and laws'.¹²⁰ This external category therefore includes institutions. On the other hand, the 'inner spirit' would be largely analogous to values. In fact, later years, whereas Japan substantially accommodated the external sphere of Western civilisation, a traditional heritage strongly remained in the internal sphere. For instance, as late as mid-twentieth century, Maruyama pointed out cultural traditions that essentially underlay some political phenomena in Japan.¹²¹ Huntington's discourse largely supports this point in that inherited cultures are likely to persist. He points out 'the strength, resilience, and viscosity of indigenous cultures and their ability to renew themselves, and to resist, contain, and adapt Western import'.¹²² He further states that although political leaders 'can introduce the elements of Western culture, they are unable to permanently suppress or to eliminate the core elements of their indigenous culture'.¹²³

¹¹⁷ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 149. 'Human development' is another description of values transformation especially in its latter phase.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 173. This statement is made for the analysis of a causal direction between democratic values and democratic institutions. Also, see *ibid.*, 174-176.

¹¹⁹ Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, translated by David A. Dilworth and G. Cameron Hurst (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), pp. 16-19. [The original work was published in 1875, Japan, with a title, '*Bummeiron no Gairyaku*'.] In normative terms, because of the difficulty, he encouraged to incorporate the inner aspect first, then the external one later.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹²¹ Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].

¹²² Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p. 154.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 154. But also he notes that, once introduced, some Western elements remain and are difficult to remove.

Considering this, though at the risk of over-simplification, let us clarify the hypothetical characters of the two dimensions:

Institution:

1. Institutions would be the 'external' aspects of civilisation (which can be utilised as practical devices).¹²⁴
2. There would be less difficulty to be introduced in comparison with values.
3. There would be relative generalisability in their efficacy (if applied).

Values:

1. Values could involve 'internal' belief systems.
2. There would be more hindrance to its transformation or the accommodation of other values.
3. It would be more difficult to apply universal connotation (even if it is possible).

If these are the case, liberal democracy in an institutional sense would have less difficulty in its acceptance in non-Western societies than that of values. On the contrary, liberal values and individualism might not be fully understood and accommodated in non-Western societies. It implies the potential difficulty of incorporating liberal aspects of democratic values due to the persistence of cultural heritage in some societies. Also, such a hindrance could run counter to values shift favourable to liberal democratic attitudes. This demonstrates the importance of examining the conditions of dichotomous effects: cultural particularity and values transformation. Since this is still an assumption, examinations are left to later chapters.

1.4.3 Influence of values

There are, however, questions. Do values or political culture matter to institutions and their operations? Are values not merely products of institutional arrangements? It would be of course biased if one holds that only one side of either values or institutions has exclusively unilateral influence over the other. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that there are

¹²⁴ For the meaning of 'external', see the Fukuzawa's statement as quoted above.

certain bilateral interactions. The point is which element has predominant efficacy over the other. As Inglehart and Welzel note, 'there could be reciprocal effects in the relationship between democratic institutions and democratic mass values, in which case the key question is whether the causal arrow is stronger in one direction than the other'.¹²⁵

Values over institutions

There have been debates on the influence between values and institutions. Inglehart and Welzel's emphasis is on the effect of values on institutions. They hold that the core argument of political culture discourses resides in the congruence of political institutions and people's values that lead to stability and effectiveness of a governing system. The outlook of people for human freedom, and societal pressures for its institutionalisation, function against an authoritarian rule. In the meantime, opposite attitudes that are compliant to state authority could run counter to the consolidation and efficacy of liberal democracy.¹²⁶ As Inglehart and Welzel argue, Great Britain presents an important case for the independent effect of values.¹²⁷ Britain does not have a written constitution, but is a country maintaining democracy for a long period. Moreover, the British model is often conceived as one of ideal examples for a democratic system. They mention the former USSR in comparison with Britain. They point out that, despite the democratic characteristic of the Soviet Union's constitution on paper, its guarantees did not have any real effect, which is opposite to Britain where democratic practices are commonly observed with 'unwritten norms'.¹²⁸ Inglehart and Welzel state that '[f]ormal institutions and the underlying political culture have a symbiotic relationship, with institutions becoming a behavioral reality only in so far as they become a part of the political culture'.¹²⁹ By this, they argue for a strong influence of political culture on the survival of democracy rather than that of democratic institutions on political culture.

Empirically, Inglehart and Welzel examined the direction of influence between pro-democratic values and democratic institutions at a world level. Their results show that self-expression values as pro-democratic culture have powerful influence over the emergence

¹²⁵ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 173.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 158.

¹²⁷ Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', pp. 154-155.

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 154-155.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 155.

and survival of democracy. Although democratic institutions could be conducive to shaping self-expression values, it is a minor factor compared with economic development and cultural inheritances. They emphasise that culture far more affects democratic institutions than the other way around.¹³⁰ In another work, they demonstrate a similar proposition with theoretical articulations as well as empirical results based on four types of analyses.¹³¹ They point to the strong causal effects of self-expression values on the emergence of both formal and effective democracies, while mentioning that causal influences of democratic institutions on self-expression values are discovered to be trivial.¹³² These findings provide strong support for an explanation that emphasises values' effect on democratic institutions.

Institutions over values: critique

On the other hand, there are schools of thought that emphasise the predominant efficacy of institutions over political culture.¹³³ Such a view includes an emphasis that democratic culture is produced under democratic institutions.¹³⁴ People's values are shaped through learning and internalising norms and practices that are presented by the institutions.¹³⁵ Inglehart and Welzel do not concur with such habituation theories. They point out that the theories contradict the fact that historically pro-democratic conditions and outlooks had existed beforehand and led to the emergence of democratic regimes. According to them, emancipative values that emphasise self-expression and human autonomy can emerge even under an authoritarian regime and in fact it did.¹³⁶ They also quote Postcommunist cases. Despite the instalment of formal democratic or electoral systems, the levels of pro-democratic values in most of the former Soviet societies have not increased from their originally lower levels. Meanwhile, western Postcommunist societies such as East

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 153-161.

¹³¹ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 7 and 8, pp. 149-209.

¹³² Ibid., p. 208.

¹³³ For instance, see Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller, 'Social Capital and Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1 (1998), pp. 47-73.

¹³⁴ Muller and Seligson demonstrate that 'interpersonal trust' (as an element of civic culture) is not a cause but a result of democracy, although they admit that another element: 'support for gradual reform' would facilitate democracy. See Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships', *American Political Science Review*, 88 (1994), pp. 635-652.

¹³⁵ Rustow presents a model of democratisation that entails habituation phase. Rustow, Dankwart A., 'Transitions to Democracy Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, 2 (1970), pp. 337-363.

¹³⁶ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 166.

Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia hold rather more commitment to such values.¹³⁷ The conditions of values seem to stem from their continuous presence in respective societies rather than institutional arrangements.

In fact, the habituation hypothesis leaves a serious question. How can only external arrangements foster 'proactive motives' and societal forces that underpin the liberal democratic arrangement? In order to effectively operate a formal system, there needs to be momentum to propel the function. Nonetheless, the momentum would not be fully fostered through passively formulated patterns of behaviours. Habituation may shape the formality of deeds, at best, to the extent that people take it for granted. However, it would not go beyond it. If people are willing to support and accordingly utilise a given system, there need to be internally motivated rationales or attitudes that spontaneously commit them to the behaviours. The democratic arrangement could help such practices by allowing and entitling human free choices.¹³⁸ But, this would not be more than that. Institutions *per se* could not provide substantive reasoning and sources to bring about embedded motives in one's heart that voluntarily generate liberal democratic perception and practice. In Western societies, many democracies have been achieved and developed from within nations, and there *had* been popular motivations that exceeded what was expected by then existing systems. For Japan, the achievement of the democratic system was not due to a spontaneous process, but mainly to the introduction of the system as a consequence of its defeat in the World War II. For the former USSR, the initiatives of perestroika and a following transition virtually started from above (although there were reactive responses from the side of the masses). The people may have been habituated to take part in elections and behaviours that accompany the practice of a democratic system. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the people have attained internal willingness or desire for a liberal democratic ideal in concrete manners. To be sure, they would be discomforted and may protest if they were treated in unjust manners by political authorities. However, these could be passive or reactive concerns. This could not necessarily mean *proactive* outlooks, principles and demands towards the actual function and creation of democratic practices.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 159.

¹³⁸ Inglehart and Welzel point out that the instalment of democratic institutions is a part of pro-democratic process (termed as 'human development'), but not a sole condition for it. See for instance, *ibid.*, pp. 2-3, 152.

Moreover, generally speaking, spheres in which a formal democratic system can promote norms are limited—indeed, a very little portion of people's lives. For the great majority of the population, a political life occupies only a slice of daily concerns. Consider that, in our normal lives, people need to engage in professions, manage social lives, rear children, or receive education especially during youth. They have to conduct other various human and social activities. But, in what proportions do ordinary people commit themselves to political matters? The opportunities would be elections or times when people browse news on paper, television or the internet while occasionally pondering these matters. These are restricted parts of daily lives, and are not necessarily perceived as important issues unless a given person is committed to a specific political problem.¹³⁹ Then, from scratch, how could ordinary people and in fact a society as a whole foster internalised motivations that go along with liberal democratic norms? Meanwhile, intellectuals may create rationales or import democratic ideas from the Western democratic societies, and may contribute to the rationales of democratic principles. But there would be little chance that these substantially permeate people's minds to the degree that they are motivated on a voluntary basis. Such knowledge is at any rate external. It might be effective for those who are willing to assimilate intellectual discourses. However, for most people in society, such exhortations may be nothing particularly important for real lives that contain other numerous daily matters. It would be unlikely that only either democratic institutions or intellectual instilment create democrats with liberal perceptions in a substantial portion of population.

How do values matter?

With this, practically, how do values affect institutional operations? Let us consider an example that there are two types of societies, such as the USA and Japan, where political participation and public contestation are 'institutionally' guaranteed, and their institutional arrangements are qualitatively analogous. Given this, what if there is difference in 'values'? One society holds outlooks that emphasise freedom, individuals, self-expression, self-assertion and public discussion. The other society attaches more importance to

¹³⁹ To be fair, the accumulation of experiences could be conducive to the learning and internalisation of the democratic norms. Nonetheless, it would take a number of generations until it forms a substantial set of values if such values should take root.

interpersonal relationships, harmony, conformity, collectivism, self-regulation, consensus and attitudes to avoid explicit discussion at an individual level.¹⁴⁰

How would these attributes be reflected in their political behaviours? In the former society where individuals and freedom are respected, and public discussion is perceived to be important, the people are likely to be active in expressing their opinions and claims. The systems of public contestation and political participation, which are institutionally guaranteed, are likely to be utilised as viable means for their actions. On the other hand, in the latter society such as Japan there would be a much lower likelihood that the people take advantage of the equivalent institutions. At the level of masses, their consequences would make a clear difference. There would be a considerable gap in the degrees to which the people discuss politics personally with others, express publicly what they need, criticise incumbent officials on public accountability, and participate in civic protest towards political authority.

Whether such critical citizens are present can greatly matter to the degree of governmental responsiveness.¹⁴¹ Where there is a moderate but constant invisible pressure by the public for democratic causes, political elites tend to be regularly compelled to accommodate people's demands. They need to develop capacities to respond and channel the voices of the public.¹⁴² In this manner, such practice becomes more likely to be perceived as a source of legitimacy for governance. In other words, democratic accountability becomes a core principle in both norms and behaviours in a society. On the contrary, without such a civic orientation, a society lacks an element that underpins and facilitates governmental responsiveness. Thus, in actual practice, values can matter in the ways of democracy.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ For contrasting cultural difference between the USA and Japan, see Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, ch. 7, pp. 211-263.

¹⁴¹ Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel note responsive governance due to an effect of self-expression values. See Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

¹⁴² For an equivalent account, see Furusawa, Katsuto, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States', *Contemporary Politics*, 12: 2 (June 2006).

¹⁴³ In an analogous perspective, Maruyama presents an insightful account on how states of individuals affect political conditions. On the basis of his categorisation of individuals, he depicts the political consequences of their combinations. See Maruyama, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme'.

Liberal motives

In fact, liberal outlooks are not necessarily confined within a political dimension. The outlooks *per se* might even stem from other spheres before they acquired a political connotation. In the West, liberal democratic demands could be rather a political *consequence* of people's core values on freedom. Individual rights, fair treatment, their concrete institutionalisation, pluralism, a representative political body—these originated in the West. They qualitatively conform to the direction of liberal outlooks, which have been predominant in this cultural zone. It would be possible that these political elements have been substantially influenced by such popular values. In non-Western societies, if comparable values were to be fostered, it would require systematic conditions or a driving force that would motivate individuals' outlooks to burgeon from within rather than from outside themselves. Could there be such an internal driving force in a society in which such liberal democratic values have not been present? Or, is there no such potential that the people's outlook could be transformed from the inherited patterns of values? Inglehart and Welzel argue that there is such potential.¹⁴⁴ This research examines whether or not such elements could exist in non-Western societies through comparison. If there is, it attempts to explore to what extent and how these elements affect society.

1.4.4 Variables

Postmaterialist index and liberal democratic values

Given the primary frameworks, instruments are needed for empirical analyses. Which variables are examined for this research? Whereas the Postmaterialist index is specifically studied, attention is also directed to several items of the liberal democratic values mentioned above. By this, it is intended to examine the Postmaterialist index in relation to liberal democratic contexts. Since the emphasis of Inglehart's thesis is on liberal aspects of democracy, special attention is paid to the matter of freedom. Nonetheless, since these are in the realm of attitudes, they do not necessarily indicate anything concrete on political dimensions. Therefore, there need to be variables that have direct political and democratic relevance. For actual analyses, two types of variables are examined: (1) views of governance and (2) protest.

¹⁴⁴ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

Governance

Two variables on views of governance are employed as empirical measures that represent political and democratic contexts.¹⁴⁵ They are considered as primary attitudinal measurements concerned with democracy. As mentioned above, one of the main themes for this research is 'values and democracy'. In view of this, the two variables are examined in the context of association with liberal democratic attitudes (and Postmaterialist related values). As for the character of the variables, one of them measures the degree of support for non-democratic rule. This, from the reverse direction, can be a measurement that would evaluate the extent of agreement with democracy as against non-democratic regimes. The other variable is a scale on the evaluation of the efficacy of democracy. It measures the respondents' levels of support for the performance of a democratic system. In essence, they are scales that reflect respondents' attitudinal stances towards a democratic regime. Nonetheless, one might contend that these variables are not exhaustive as the indicators of attitudes in relation to democracy. In fact, Inglehart compared several attitudinal scales in terms of correlations with the level of democracy (based on the Freedom House ratings). Some of these scales (which are concerned with views of governance) overlap with the components of the two variables in this research. According to the comparison, such scales are less correlated than the 'self-expression values' scale does.¹⁴⁶ Thus, aside from views of governance, there could be other attitudinal dimensions and their measurements that are connected with democracy. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that views of governance as well as the variables in this research have relevance to the matter of democracy, which therefore should not be neglected. Moreover, regime support and popular views on democracy's performance (as the properties of these variables) directly deal with the issue of 'values and democracy' which is in fact one of our main themes. In this context, analyses are conducted by incorporating the perspective of views of governance.

¹⁴⁵ For the details of these variables, see Chapter 8.

¹⁴⁶ Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?'.

Protest

The following are the central reasons for using the variables of protest. The first rationale is that protest inclination is related to Postmaterialist orientation. Some observers suggest that behavioural motives of protest in post-industrial societies reflect values shift.¹⁴⁷ In Inglehart's thesis, some unconventional political actions such as citizens' protest are often explained as 'elite-challenging' forms of participation, instead of conventional 'elite-directed' political behaviours such as voting. They are regarded as a consequence of empowered individuals and their transformed outlooks through industrialisation and post-industrialisation processes.¹⁴⁸ Thus, in view of the connection with the Postmaterialist attitudes, protest inclination is one of the crucial variables to be examined in political terms.

The second rationale is protest variables' potential implication for democracy. People's protest, especially in the sense of 'civic protest', could be related to governmental responsiveness. In contemporary Western societies, the people hold an inclination to moderate protest activities.¹⁴⁹ Many of the actions are often on the basis of civic ideals or liberal democratic rationale. In Britain, a recent case would be the 'make poverty history' demonstrations surrounding the G8 Summit in 2005. In Europe, there were widespread anti-war demonstrations in 2003. Citizens' environmental concerns often emerge as grassroots movements, at times accompanied by peaceful protests. These moderate patterns of protest might be described as 'civic protest'.¹⁵⁰ Such protest could have qualities that underpin and facilitate governmental responsiveness. Civic protest can stand for people's strength to go beyond political passivity and demand towards government in peaceful manners. It can be the reflection of an underlying societal capacity to check the political authorities on regular basis, which informally ensures their sensitivity and norms to accommodate popular voices.¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, there could be gaps in the natures and

¹⁴⁷ Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, pp. 314-318; Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74. Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 43-44, 115-134.

¹⁴⁸ Inglehart has consistently mentioned 'elite-challenging' (or 'elite-directing') participation in relation to values shift. See for instance Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, pp. 5, 335-370; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 43-44, 307-315; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 94-134.

¹⁴⁹ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, pp. 58-74.

¹⁵⁰ Furusawa, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States'.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

patterns of protest between different societies. Especially, in some non-Western societies, protest could be simply protest that has traditional and radical connotations. Moreover, such a radical character could go against democracy, potentially threatening the stability and security of society. In other societies, protest may not be related to a sense of participation at all while being merely perceived as behaviour to be avoided. This study attempts to explore such an attitudinal variability of societies in relation to governmental responsiveness.

The third rationale is associated with the variation of protest patterns for different societies. A major interest is whether the variance is due to cultural divergence or the extent of progress in values shift. In fact, besides the reasoning of values shift, there could be a perspective that a penchant to protestation is a part of Western heritage. Dalton notes that protest is 'not new to Western democracies'.¹⁵² Marsh also mentioned protest activities as associated with British traits.¹⁵³ In fact, historically, there has been a persistent protest orientation in Western societies. Challenge from below followed by restructuring of systems that took over old authorities and norms has been, in a way, a typical scenario in Western history. The examples range from the Magna Carta, bourgeois revolutions, the French Revolution through to labour movements, American civil rights movements, student protests during the sixties and seventies, and so forth. As a recent case, environmental movements might share, in more moderate tones, similar qualities of such an orientation. The establishment of democratic systems *per se* has been in fact the consequence of protestations, which have been historically prevalent in the West. The protest tendency also seems to have played crucial roles for the gradual institutional extension of rights and welfare towards broader ranges of populations. On the other hand, the increase of people's *general* orientation to (civic) protest has been a rather recent phenomenon in post-industrial societies. Is protest orientation the consequence of Western cultural heritage or that of values shift? The nature of the question actually parallels to this dissertation's main inquiry: values shift versus cultural particularity. For this reason, the sphere of protest is treated as one of areas to be examined.

In sum, the Postmaterialist index, liberal democratic values, view of governance and protest are examined by comparing the four societies: the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan.

¹⁵² Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁵³ Marsh, Alan, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).

The investigation is concerned with their implications for democracy as argued so far, while incorporating another strand of a question: values shift versus cultural particularity.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an introductory picture of the overall research. Having reviewed Inglehart's thesis as a centre of attention, the present study consists of two main strands. The first strand is an issue: values shift versus cultural particularity. The second one is on values and its implications for democracy.

Inglehart's discourses and empirical works have contributed to the studies of democracy, especially in its liberal aspects. Meanwhile, this liberal emphasis seems to come across divergence of cultures, which potentially runs counter to a simple explanation of the values shift. The inherited orientations of the USA and Britain seem to be highly compatible with liberal democratic outlooks. On the other hand, cultural heritages in Japan and Russia respectively differ from those in the former two nations, and do not share analogous qualities and histories with their liberal traditions. It is the case with tripartite regional distinction: the West, East Asia and Postcommunist area. This could affect the distributions in the outcome of the Postmaterialist index and other measures for the values shift assumption. Consequently, one chief aim of the research is to employ a dichotomous view of these competing effects and examine the degrees of predominance by either of the two sides. Another concern is to probe the values' impact on democracy. In addition to the Postmaterialist index and its variants, several items of liberal democratic values will be investigated. Also, political attitudes related to this dimension are examined as intermediate spheres that reside between the values and institutions. The views of governance and protest (especially in the sense of 'civic protest') are examined for this purpose. For the series of analyses, comparisons between these societies are conducted.

All the way through this study, values in relation to the issues of freedom and individuals are the centre of inquiry. Indeed, this element could be a core issue for the values shift, cultural difference, the Postmaterialist thesis, and liberal democracy in both values and institutions. Does an emphasis on individual freedom emerge as a result of industrialisation and post-industrialisation? Is it rather a unique attribute of the Western

societies? How are the political consequences of these conditions in relation to democracy?
The following chapters will attempt to answer these questions.

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with methodological issues for this research and consists of four sections. The first section attempts to provide an approximate picture of where the present research is located within the map of disciplines for political science. A brief review of studies on democratisation, popular attitudes and public opinion data is presented as a background with particular reference to the World Values Survey and the work of Ronald Inglehart. The second section explores the issues of the Postmaterialist index. It starts with the reasons for utilising the index in this study, being followed by an introduction to the basic idea and components of the Postmaterialist scale. The subsequent part attempts to exemplify the validity of the scale with several questions. The third section mentions approaches that are employed to examine the dichotomy: values shift and cultural particularity. The fourth section explores the relevance and utilities of quantitative methods and survey data, which are major methodologies in this study.

2.2 Background: studies on values and democracy

The aim of this section is to clarify the position of the present study in the map of political science. It overviews the recent trends in the discipline, particularly looking at democratisation and studies on values, and subsequently centring on the World Values Survey and the values study thesis of Ronald Inglehart.

2.2.1 Democratisation and studies on values

When the third wave of democratisation from non-democratic regimes culminated in 1989, many scholars' interests were attracted to the study of democratisation especially during a transition phase.¹ As time went by, the major concerns gradually shifted from the transition

¹ For example, O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Philippe. C. and Laurence Whitehead eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For East European cases, for example, Bermeo, Nancy ed., *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Beyme, Klaus von, *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press in association with International Political Science Association, 1996); Mason, David S., *Revolution and Transition in East-Central Europe*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); McSweeney, Dean and

per se to the consolidation of democracy. Although institutional arrangements are of prime importance for the establishment of democracy, unless there are social conditions capable of maintaining and nurturing democracy such as popular values to support it, there is the potential that a newly adopted democracy will be constantly threatened by authoritarian elements and instability. Consolidation, therefore, is a crucial phase to establish durable democracy.²

The growing scholarly interest in the consolidation phase has led to a re-emphasis on exploring a political culture approach.³ Public opinion studies and their analytical skills, especially, have been enhanced by the spread of quantitative methods among social scientists thanks to recent technological advances. This development has opened the possibility of examining how conducive given popular attitudes are to the maintenance and development of (or, in some regions, transition to) democracy through a social scientific perspective. For Postcommunist societies, there have been in-depth examinations on popular attitudes in relation to the conditions of relatively new democracies.⁴

2.2.2 Cross-national data and World Values Survey

Along with this trend, cross-national studies of public attitudes have been developed markedly with their growing analytical capacity. Quantitative methods have become more widespread among scholars than ever before, owing to the increasing availability of computerised statistical resources.⁵ Meanwhile, due to worldwide co-operations of

Clive Tempest, 'The Political Science of Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe', *Political Studies*, 41: 3 (September 1993), p. 408-419; Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, 'Thinking About Post-communist Transitions: How Different Are They?', *Slavic Review*, 52: 2 (Summer 1993), p.333-7; White, Stephen, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

- 2 For democratic consolidation, see for instance, Linz, J. and Stepan, A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Diamond, Larry, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Sorensen, Georg, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Plasser, Fritz, Ulram, Peter A. and Waldrauch, Harald, *Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998).
- 3 For a review of several contemporary approaches on political culture, see Wilson, Richard W., 'Review Article: the Many Voices of Political Culture - Assessing Different Approaches', *World Politics*, 52 (January 2000), pp. 246-273.
- 4 For example, see Miller, William L., Stephen White and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998); Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka, eds., *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
- 5 For an attempt to depict such a new environment, see Tanenbaum, Eric, and Elinor Scarbrough, 'Research

academics, bountiful bodies of survey data have been accumulated across the world. There are, for instance, public opinion surveys such as the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the New Democracies Barometer, the Eurobarometer and so forth. Numerous surveys and quantitative data have been deposited to data archives across the world.⁶ This allows us to have a great deal of accessibility to well-established cross-national data that are carefully coordinated with academic precision.

The World Values Survey is a significant work in this connection. It encompasses representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of people on all six inhabited continents that cover the representatives of more than seventy percent of the world's population. This constitutes a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It builds on the European Values Surveys that first took place in 1981. A second wave of surveys was designed for global use and completed in 1990-1991. A third wave took place around the period 1995-1998, and a fourth wave was carried out around 1999-2002.⁷ The World Values Survey, due to its broadness, enables us to compare popular attitudes across countries, which could go beyond the borders of different civilisations. It also allows us to inquire into values shifts in multiple nations over one or two decades. There are numerous publications based on the World Values Survey, including works in relation to democracy.⁸

2.2.3 Inglehart and values studies

Strategies in the New Environment', in Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum eds., *Research Strategies in the Social Sciences: A Guide to New Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

6 Main data archives that provide comprehensive services are such as the UK Data Archive in the Great Britain, the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research) in the USA, and the GESIS (German Social Science Infrastructure Services) in Germany.

7 For descriptions of the World Values Survey, see for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Globalization and Postmodern Values', *The Washington Quarterly*, 23:1 (Winter 2000), p. 215; Dalton, Russell J., 'Appendix: The Major Cross-National Opinion Surveys', in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam eds., *Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 315-318; Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.3.

8 For instance, see Pharr and Putnam eds., *Disaffected Democracies*; Arts, Wil, Jacques Hagenaars and Loek Halman eds., *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity: Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2003); Arts, Wil and Loek Halman eds., *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2004). See also Inglehart, Ronald, 'Publications Using World Values Survey Data', *World Values Survey* (1999) [<http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/pub.shtml>]; 'Publications' in WVS [<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/library/index.html>].

Among the most influential examples of values studies are those written by Inglehart. He is also a leading figure in the development of the World Values Survey. His academic interests include the studies of values and public opinion survey for analysing their influence on politics and society, to which he has contributed numerous publications.⁹ Throughout these works, Inglehart's primary concerns are consistently based on a hypothesis that people's values change in response to industrialisation and post-industrialisation, which coincide with society's economic prosperity and its long-standing stability.¹⁰ It has a crucial effect on political and social attributes of nations. With this hypothesis, Inglehart has produced contributions to the area of democratic studies, which has been mentioned in the previous chapter.

2.2.4 Research position

There has been an area of studies on public attitudes involving quantitative methodology.¹¹ The discipline also constitutes one of trends in contemporary democratic studies.¹² The present study utilises the Postmaterialist scale as well as the World Values Survey for the comparative analysis of Russia, Japan, the United States and Britain. Further, a regional perspective is incorporated by referring to distinctions between Western, East Asian, and Postcommunist societies. It takes a position related to Inglehart's thesis especially on Postmaterialist values. Nonetheless, this is not to replicate it but to explore the further

9 Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

10 For the terminology of popular attitude and values, Inglehart at times uses the expression 'culture'. However, it should be noted that 'culture' in that specific sense is different from the definition of 'culture' generally used to describe traditionally inherited set of norms, customs and values in respective societies. The former includes popular attitudes and values before and after their transformation due to economic or modernising development of societies while assuming such attitudes and values are (at least some parts) transformable. The latter obviously is more concerned with 'difference' between societies with a certain degree of consistency or durability. In this research, the latter sense of 'culture' is employed.

11 For instance, see Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001); Arts, Hagenaars and Halman eds., *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity*; Arts and Halman eds., *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*.

12 For example, see Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Pharr and Putnam eds., *Disaffected Democracies*; Norris, Pippa, *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

potential or reinterpretation of the Postmaterialist scale in relation to democracy. Moreover, in addition to the *time* span perspective of the values shift, this research adds another dimension for consideration: the perspective of *space* as represented by cultural divergence. One of the prime foci is on people's attitude to civic protest, which is assumed to have a certain relevance to the development of responsive democracy. Protest attitudes are supposed to have connections with Postmaterialist values as well as a sense of individuality and freedom. Meanwhile, other political values such as the views of governance are examined.

2.3 Postmaterialist index

2.3.1 Using the four-item Postmaterialist index

As shown in the previous chapter, Inglehart's work employs comprehensive indicators such as a scale on self-expression values, for which the Postmaterialist four-item index is utilised as a part. In this study, rather than looking at the comprehensive variables, the investigation is centred on the measure of the Postmaterialist four-item index (and variants that are developed on the basis of the four-item index).

The reason is, first of all, despite Inglehart's recent work on broader trends of value transformation, the Postmaterialist thesis has had an independent importance in political and other social sciences. It is still relevant to pay particular attention to the Postmaterialist index *per se*. Secondly, from the outset, the Postmaterialist four-item index has constantly been utilised by Inglehart and his associates and has played a crucial role in his thesis. In relation to this, the four-item index has been employed consistently in series of surveys such as the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer Survey and others. Thirdly, the Postmaterialist four-item index has a special significance to democratic studies. Inglehart's recent articles on democratic studies involve the frequent use of this index.¹³ Especially, two of its items, 'free speech' and 'more say', have a strong relevance to some dimensions of democracy. After all, the items imply liberty and participation. With this, the following parts review the theoretical basis of the Postmaterialist index.

¹³ This has been done sometimes with modification in the form of variable as well as changes of its name such as 'liberty aspirations' and 'liberty and participation'.

2.3.2 Explaining the Postmaterialist index

How are Postmaterialist values evaluated? What are actual question and values items to be employed? This part briefly presents the constitution of the Postmaterialist index along with Maslow's values hierarchy quoted by Inglehart.

Maslow's values hierarchy

For the Postmaterialist-Materialist scale, Inglehart primarily took advantage of Maslow's values hierarchy, as presented in figure 2.1. According to this perspective, human goals are divided into several factors in hierarchical order. Overall, there are two categories, that is, (1) physiological needs and (2) social self-actualisation needs. It is supposed that individuals tend to first seek to satisfy their physiological needs. After their fulfilment, they are then inclined to step further and fulfil their social self-actualisation needs. Moreover, physiological needs are separated into (a) sustenance needs and (b) safety needs. Sustenance needs are such as food, water and shelter, which are basic to maintain human life and therefore sought as a first priority. When these needs are met, individuals continue to search for material concerns until the attainment of a comfortable margin of material security. These needs and concerns are interpreted as safety needs. After their attainment, individuals are assumed to have desires to satisfy feelings such as a sense of belonging and esteem, and further intellectual and aesthetic fulfilment. These amount to social and self-actualisation needs, which are located as higher-order in Maslow's hierarchy.¹⁴ Hence, the search of human needs is presumed to shift according to the hierarchy.

Inglehart interprets Maslow's values hierarchy in a Materialist and Postmaterialist context through the application of political issues. Physiological needs are described as Materialist values that include economic growth, security, order and so forth. They are believed to be conducive to the sustenance and safety of human requirements. Inglehart further goes on to apply another set of political issues to social and self-actualisation needs. Through the development of industrialisation, which ensures a high level of continuous economic security and affluence, a society would make significant advancement to fulfil its physiological needs. Then, a shift of values priority would occur towards an emphasis

¹⁴ For Maslow's thesis, see Maslow, Abraham, *Motivations and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).

on individual freedom, self-expression and participation, which are categorised as social and self-actualisation needs. This type of orientation is labelled Postmaterialist values.¹⁵

Postmaterialist index


What is a Postmaterialist index? There are two types of Postmaterialist-Materialist scale. One is a four-item index, and the other is a twelve-item index.¹⁶ They are based on question items of surveys such as the World Values Survey. As exhibited in figure 2.2, the four-item index is based on the question subset in the middle: scale B. The twelve-item index is based on all of the three scales.¹⁷ The four-item index is the most relevant to this study due to its connection with major aspects of democracy, as diagnosed in a later chapter.

¹⁵ Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, p. 39-43; Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), pp. 80-81.

¹⁶ The disadvantage of the four-item index is, as Dalton suggested, that 'it is based on only four items, and this provides a narrow basis for tapping a broad dimension of human values'. See Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 3rd ed., p. 95 (note 2). Nonetheless, the disadvantage could be moderated through the employment of twelve items. Moreover, empirical works so far have provided plausible supports for the validity of the scale. Another disadvantage would be the four-item index is particularly sensitive to temporary economic conditions, as argued later.

¹⁷ It should be noted that, as shown in figure 2.2, the Postmaterialist twelve-item index is based on five Postmaterialist items despite the fact that there are six items in the Postmaterialist category. This is due to the fact that one of the six Postmaterialist items: 'trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful' is not included (or treated as neutral) for the construction of the twelve-item index. According to Inglehart, the factor analysis of the twelve items had a result that all the six Materialist items cluster towards one pole whereas five of the Postmaterialist items cluster towards the opposite pole. The above-mentioned 'more beautiful cities' item was an exception, since it tended to be located in the middle between the two groups. Also, there might be a slight technical difference in the procedures of constructing the twelve-item scale between the original version and a version in the World Values Survey. See Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, pp. 39-53.

Figure 2.1 Maslow's values hierarchy and Postmaterialist and Materialist items



Source: Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42.

Figure 2.2 Postmaterialist index

Question statement:

'People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?'

'And which would be the next most important?'

Scale A (first and second choices)

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. A high level of economic growth | <u>M</u> |
| 2. Making sure this country has strong defence forces | <u>M</u> |
| 3. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done
at their jobs and in their communities | <u>PM</u> |
| 4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful | <u>PM</u> |

Scale B (first and second choices)

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. Maintaining order in the nation | <u>M</u> |
| 2. Giving people more say in important government decisions | <u>PM</u> |
| 3. Fighting rising prices | <u>M</u> |
| 4. Protecting freedom of speech | <u>PM</u> |

Scale C (first and second choices)

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. A stable economy | <u>M</u> |
| 2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society | <u>PM</u> |
| 3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money | <u>PM</u> |
| 4. The fight against crime | <u>M</u> |

Note: PM = Postmaterialist; M = Materialist.

1. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (4-item index)

This index is based on *Scale B*.

- | | | |
|---|--------------------|-------|
| If both Materialist items are chosen | => Materialist | (= 1) |
| If one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are chosen | => Mixed | (= 2) |
| If both Postmaterialist items are chosen | => Postmaterialist | (= 3) |

2. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (12-item index)

This index is based on all 12 items (*Scale A, B and C*). It sums up the total number of Postmaterialist items that were given high priority (i.e., ranked as either first or second most important in its group of four items). Scores range from zero (none of the five Postmaterialist items was given high priority) to five (all five of the Postmaterialist items were given high priority).

Source: '1995-1997 World Values Survey: English-Language Version of Questionnaire, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan' and 'SPSS coding instructions for Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Indices', in Inglehart, Ronald et al., *ICPSR 2790, World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997*, ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research) [a PDF file attached to the dataset], pp. 33-34, 171-172.

2.3.3 Validity of the Postmaterialist index

For the utilisation of the Postmaterialist index, it is worthwhile exploring its validity. In this section, several discussions are presented on this matter.

2.3.3.1 Conceptualisation of values dimensions

Conceptualisation of values dimensions is one of key debates. Flanagan challenged Inglehart's thesis regarding the concept of values change. He contended that in advanced industrialised societies there are at least two dimensions in values shift rather than a single dimension of Postmaterialist-Materialist values change. Whereas the first dimension is a values transformation from material towards non-economic values, the second one is from authoritarian towards libertarian values.¹⁸

On this argument, Dalton states, 'Flanagan's theoretical distinction is useful, but the empirical evidence suggests that these two value dimensions overlap and that both value shifts are occurring simultaneously in most advanced industrial democracies. Thus, Flanagan's two dimensions can be seen as subelements of Inglehart's broader framework. Regardless of how we conceptualize this process, however, there is general agreement that the value priorities of modern publics have been changing.'¹⁹ Indeed, Flanagan's concept of two values dimensions is not incompatible with Inglehart's thesis that explicates a single Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension. The former examines the relevant values transformation from two separated perspectives whereas the latter presents values transformation in highly modernised societies by elucidating the interconnection of the two dimensions that are in effect taking place concurrently. Thus, Flanagan's conceptualisation of the two-values dimensions does not invalidate the concept of Postmaterialist-Materialist values and could even be considered a supplement to it.

2.3.3.2 Validity of measurement

There have been discussions over the validity of the Postmaterialist index. One of the issues is, for example, 'whether we should measure values in terms of personal life

¹⁸ Flanagan, Scott, 'Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Society', *Comparative Political Studies*, 14 (1982), pp. 403-44; Flanagan, Scott, 'Value Change in Industrial Society', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), pp. 1303-19.

¹⁹ Dalton, Russell, J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinions and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 2nd ed. (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), p. 94.

conditions or phrased as political goals that are linked to political behaviors'.²⁰ Inglehart arranged Postmaterialist and Materialist values items on the basis of Maslow's values hierarchy. Relevant political goals are allocated to each of the items.²¹ It is pointed out that problematic nature of this would be 'the unsubstantiated nature of the relationship between values, as represented by public policy goals and psychological needs.'²² The main concern is whether the Postmaterialist scale in fact is able to tap the basic values dimension hypothesised in Inglehart's thesis.

There have been studies that have been concerned with this issue. Marsh probed a British sample with individual-level analysis. In his initial research as presented in 1975, Marsh cast doubt on the capacity of the Postmaterialist scale in measuring fundamental personal values.²³ Marsh developed a scale that measures the 'personal' dimension of Postmaterialist values in contrast with the Inglehart's Postmaterialist index. Marsh regarded the latter conventional index as representing the 'public' dimension, since it primarily employed political goals as survey question items that constituted the index.²⁴ Due to the political characteristics of the components, the 'public' Postmaterialist index was assumed to have weakness in tapping basic values orientations in relation to Maslow's values hierarchy.²⁵ Marsh suggested relatively low correspondence between the 'personal' and 'public' Postmaterialist scales by presenting their modest correlation and other results, which implied limitation in the 'public' scale.²⁶ Nonetheless, this does not necessarily invalidate the conventional Postmaterialist index. The two types of indexes could be different simply because they may mainly measure distinct areas of Postmaterialist and Materialist dimensions.²⁷ Furthermore, the validity of the 'public' Postmaterialist scale

20 Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 2nd ed., p.94.

21 For the details of the allocation of the items, see a section on Postmaterialist scale and Maslow's values hierarchy in this chapter.

22 Trump, Thomas M., 'Value Formation and Postmaterialism: Inglehart's Theory of Value Change Reconsidered', *Comparative Political Studies*, 24: 3 (October 1991), p. 368.

23 Marsh, Alan, 'The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain', *American Political Science Review*, 69 (1975), pp. 21-30.

24 Marsh, Alan, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977).

25 Marsh, 'The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain'; Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness*, pp. 165-197.

26 Ibid., pp. 165-184. Inglehart contends that the fact that the correlation figures (.22 and .21) are positive, albeit modest, is in favour of the Postmaterialist thesis. Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 160.

27 In this sense, the presence of the positive correlation between the two scales indicates that they overlap while sharing the same ground of a values dimension.

cannot be rejected only by the lack of conformity to the 'personal' scale, since the latter scale can also have weakness.²⁸ Meanwhile, in Marsh's findings, there is an indication that both scales represent the Postmaterialist and Materialist values.²⁹ Moreover, Marsh himself employed the two indexes in relation to protest potential.³⁰ He agreed that elements represented by the two types of Postmaterialist scales affect protest potential.³¹ This virtually indicates his acceptance of the 'public' Postmaterialist scale as a valid measure.

Lafferty and Knutson conducted individual-level research using sample data from Norway in the context of Postmaterialist values.³² They examined their own version of a 'personal' Postmaterialist index, having reviewed Marsh's study. They found that the 'personal' Postmaterialist values were systematically associated with the 'public' sphere of Postmaterialism, which would support Inglehart's thesis.³³ For it indicated the consistent presence of the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension across personal and political values. Moreover, their principal component factor analysis showed such presence in both measures.³⁴ Consequently, the findings of Lafferty and Knutson endorse the validity of the 'public' Postmaterialist index that utilises political items. In short, although scepticism on the validity of the Postmaterialist index may have certain plausibility in logic, this could be only sustained by empirical analyses. There have been examinations based on survey data to that effect, and they seem to have obtained results in favour of Inglehart's thesis and its scale.

28 For example, in a principal axis analysis, the item of 'respect' as one of supposed Postmaterialist items was located in the Materialist cluster. See Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness*, pp. 176-177. Also, practically, an empirical scale based on survey data cannot be a pure measure that perfectly taps a theoretically presumed values dimension. Therefore, it is implausible to employ the 'personal' Postmaterialist index as a definite standard to be able to judge the validity of other Postmaterialist scales.

29 For instance, the principal axis analysis indicated polarisation between Postmaterialist and Materialist groups in both indexes. See *ibid.*, 177.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 184-192.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 191-192.

32 Lafferty, William M., and Oddbjorn Knutson, 'Postmaterialism in a Social Democratic State: An Analysis of the Distinctness and Congruity of the Inglehart Value Syndrome in Norway', *Comparative Political Studies*, 17 (1985), pp. 411-430. For Lafferty's earlier work, which critically analysed Inglehart's thesis, see Lafferty, William M., 'Basic Needs and Political Values: Some Perspectives from Norway's Silent Revolution', *Acta Sociologica*, 19 (1976), pp. 117-36.

33 Lafferty and Knutson, 'Postmaterialism in a Social Democratic State', pp. 418-421, 426-427. This was further illuminated by the fact that the 'personal' values items did not show particular relationship with other two values dimensions: 'left-right placement' and 'leftist materialism'.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 424-427. It should be noted that, in similar analyses of ('public') Postmaterialist and Materialist items for several Western societies, Inglehart obtained results that largely indicated the presence of the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension cross-nationally. For the analyses, see Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, pp. 43-53; Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, pp. 131-141.

2.3.3.3 Susceptibility to temporary economic conditions

There have been questions if the Postmaterialist index is suspiciously susceptible to fluctuations in economic conditions.³⁵ For example, the four-item index is sensitive to conditions of inflation since one of the items is 'fighting against rising prices'. It could be affected by relatively high inflation, so that the choice of the item could be interpreted as an immediate reflection of current (therefore temporary) economic needs rather than an underlying basic values dimension.³⁶ Nonetheless, although the item of 'fighting against rising prices' might be relatively susceptible to economic conditions, this is a rather minor weakness of the index. In view of the fact that the whole index comprises twelve items, and six are chosen out of them, it is unlikely that only the fluctuation of the single item seriously affects the indication of actual values dimension.

Also, economic circumstances often have transitory elements and are easily distinguished when the types of conditions, such as inflation and unemployment, are present. This means that as long as analysts are careful about the choice of the cases and periods for observation, they can avoid such problems. Even if one chooses data under irregular economic conditions, analysts can simply take these into consideration. It is not difficult to recognise these factors. Furthermore, since an attitude to economic matters is essential for Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimensions, it is impossible to remove economic items. In effect, such criticism is only a minor technicality, so that it cannot rebut the usefulness of the Postmaterialist index. In brief, minor weaknesses on economic items do not significantly reduce the validity of the Postmaterialist index.

2.3.3.4 Index of choice

There are researchers who criticise the style of the Postmaterialist scale in that it measures

³⁵ For example, Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg, Chris McIntyre, Petra Bauer-Kaase and Max Kaase, 'The Effect of Economic Value Priorities on the Measurement of Value Change: New Experiment Evidence', *American Political Science Review*, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 637-647; Clarke, Harold D. and Nitish Dutt, 'Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment', *American Political Science Review*, 85 (1991), pp. 905-20; Duch, Raymond M., and Michael A. Taylor, 'Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition', *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (August 1993), pp. 747-79; As for counter arguments to such critique, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, and Abramson, Paul R., 'Measuring Postmaterialism', *American Political Science Review*, 93: 3 (September 1999).

³⁶ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 3rd ed., p. 95 (note 2).

the priority of values items in the context of a Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. They argue that although Postmaterialist and Materialist values are different, they are not conceptually opposite to each other. This means that 'rather than representing mutually exclusive (and hence contradictory) concerns, postmaterialism and materialism represent values which are in practice often compatible' as Brooks and Manza put it.³⁷ Davis and Davenport wrote that '[f]rom a measurement perspective, asking individuals to rank values that may be equally desirable and not mutually contradictory may be an inappropriate measure of value orientation.'³⁸

In appearance, these points may sound plausible. Nonetheless, they miss a point: the central aim of the Postmaterialist scale. Their claims may be true only if one's 'degree' of attachment is to be measured on a single item. However, this is not the case with the Postmaterialist index. The Postmaterialist scale is basically to measure an *orientation* towards either of two values: whether one is oriented to such concerns as self-expression (which constitute Postmaterialist values), or to materialistic and economically beneficial concerns (which amount to Materialist values). The two values do not need to be opposite. What matters is which set of values is more emphasised.

The critics support a type of a measurement that evaluates whether an individual is inclined strongly or weakly (in other cases, for or against) to one values item. They may allow another style of measurement that does not overtly ask a degree of support, by using two mutually exclusive and contradictory values items. In that case also, it measures one values issue. The point is that two items are located respectively at the two opposite ends of one measure line in terms of one issue. In this sense, when two mutually exclusive and contradictory items are used for measurement, it still qualitatively measures a person's 'degree' of attachment towards one side relative to the other side on one issue.³⁹

The Postmaterialist index is, however, fundamentally different in its nature. The index is about 'choice' on either of two different values: Postmaterialist and Materialist values, as shown in figure 2.3. It is about expressing priority or ranking which type of

37 Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza, 'Do Changing Values Explain the New Politics? A Critical Assessment of the Postmaterialist Thesis', *Sociological Quarterly*, 35: 4 (1994), pp. 547.

38 Davis, Darren W. and Christian Davenport, 'Assessing the Validity of the Postmaterialism Index', *American Political Science Review*, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 651.


39 Suppose that a person prefers one of the two opposite items in such a measurement. If the degree of the person's attachment to the preferred item is high, the attachment to the other item become automatically low. And, if the person prefers the other item, *vice versa*.

values are closer than the other type to a given individual's preference. This is clearly a scale to inquire the individual's values *orientation*. The natures of two values items do not need to be mutually exclusive and contradictory. Moreover, the arrangement of the index has relevance to political issues. Priority implies choosing options over others. That could indicate which options people would choose, if necessary, at the cost of the alternatives. Real political matters often constitute such questions of choice, often given limited resources and circumstances. The items provide the distribution of values priority directly related to policy choices. Thus, the validity of the Postmaterialist indicator is justifiable to this effect.

Figure 2.3 Types of measurements

1. Measurement of 'degree'


[A] Items of extent



[B] Mutually exclusive and contradictory items



2. Measurement of 'choice' (emphasis and priority)



2.3.3.5 Question of culture: revisited

There is one crucial question. The Postmaterialist index was basically developed to measure the consequences of the values shift. There is possibility, however, that the variable is affected by the presence of cultural characteristics. As Dalton points out, although Inglehart's earlier work had a close linkage with the Maslovian values hierarchy, his more recent work gives less prominence in the linkage, since he has become more sensitive to cultural and local variation that could affect what values are seen as scarce and therefore need to be emphasised.⁴⁰ In a study on Japanese attitudes, Ike suggested that although there was an indication of change, the indication was more complicated than the way Inglehart's perspective depicted in the case of Western societies. By this, he connoted the effect of traditional cultural presence in conjunction with economic development.⁴¹ Inglehart and Welzel's argument on the 'path-dependent' nature of values shift corresponds with this, which allows cultural variance to be taken into consideration.⁴² Hence, values priorities could be affected by cultural differences even within the range of the Postmaterialist scale.

As seen in the values hierarchy, people with values of (2) social and self-actualisation needs (Postmaterialist) would attach importance to self-expression and self-esteem being oriented towards individuals as well as to non-material and abstract beauty in the realm of ideas. On the other hand, those who emphasise (1) physiological needs (Materialist) give weight to actual benefit such as economic gain as well as security and social order, which are much related to immediate needs and daily concerns. These dispositions, however, could be due to a cultural penchant. If so, is it legitimate to interpret the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy simply in the context of 'values shift' with the scarcity hypothesis based on Maslow's values hierarchy? On the one hand, it sounds feasible (and has been tested with positive results in Western democratic societies) that as industrialisation advances and generates a certain degree of affluence and security for a long period, a certain values transformation occurs. On the other hand, in non-Western societies, where it has not been examined thoroughly in terms of values shift, it is also

⁴⁰ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 3rd ed., p. 95 (note 1).

⁴¹ Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', *American Political Science Review*, 67 (1973), pp. 1194-1203.

⁴² Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 1, pp. 15-47.

plausible that cultural particularity can have an influence over the variety of values priorities. In Inglehart's values map, there is a noticeable variation observed among different cultural zones regarding values priorities.⁴³

Considering this, it seems that the values distribution in Postmaterialist and Materialist values items should be understood through the perspective of a horizontal view that see the values items equally, rather than a hierarchical view that connotes a unidirectional shift. This would be especially suitable to comparing culturally different societies. Moreover, it is more precise to see the Postmaterialist-Materialist values items respectively, rather than categorically binding them together in terms of the two dichotomous values sets.

Consequently, having reviewed several discussions of the Postmaterialist index, it seems that there is relatively firm support for the validity of the index. The scale appears to have scientific foundations that have endured numerous examinations. In view of these, it is plausible to conclude that the utilisation of the Postmaterialist index can be justified. However, the index seems to have sensitivity to cultural variation, which is one of the core enquiries in the present study.

2.4 Exploring dichotomy: values shift versus cultural particularity

The exploration of dichotomy in terms of values shift and cultural particularity is one of the central themes for this study. In reality, however, it is difficult to distinguish whether the difference derives from values shift or cultural variation especially due to the availability of data, which covers only two decades at best. Given such restriction, nonetheless, several attempts are made in the present study to explore the dichotomy. One of the focuses is on 'durability'. If there is a consistent systematic change, this would connote a values shift. If there is coherent durability in the distribution of a given values, this suggests its persistent tendency and hence strength in the values' presence. It also

⁴³ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 92-100; Inglehart, Ronald and Baker E., 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', *American Sociological Review*, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, p. 48-76, esp. 63.

implies a certain 'immunity' to the variability of conditions that are the supposed causes of a values shift. And, if such a character is different from other societies, this could be translated as cultural particularity. For instance, we could take advantage of the availability of data from several time points (albeit limited), which may allow us to detect the signs of values change or durability. The durability could be measured even in data at a single time point. By using sociological variables (for example, age, income, occupation, gender, education and so forth) as independent variables, if a certain level persists regardless of such variables, it may be accepted that the indicated level of values have a durability that transcends different attributes in a given society. If such a tendency is unique in comparison with other societies, it suggests cultural particularity. Another method is to use multiple regression by employing dummy variables that represent regional groups. By comparing the relative impact of the dummy variables with other variables such as economic level, we could grasp the persistent presence of cultural effects.⁴⁴ This discussion will be considered in more detail in the relevant sections of later chapters.

2.5 Quantitative methods and survey data

This part examines the validity of the survey data and quantitative methods that are utilised in this study.

2.5.1 On parsimony and variance

It is possible to question whether the use of a quantitative approach with specified variables could be oversimplified when examining the realm of values. This is due to the complexity of the social and human issues involved. Nonetheless, in order to recognise the object of study in a tangible manner, one needs to employ abstraction or simplification at a certain level. Without abstraction, it is difficult to logically establish the presence of causality or contexts. Unless one simplifies a given phenomenon, a person could neither achieve a workable arrangement of analysis nor findings that could be communicated with others. Simplification provides clarity, and clarity enables a given idea to be shared with a number of others. Rightly abstracted conceptual models help indicating what is a crucial

⁴⁴ In fact, this method is employed by Inglehart's recent works (i.e. regression using dummy variables for measuring cultural/local/regional particularity).

context in order to adequately understand reality. Every detail is not required. Thus, simplification is a viable and essential tool for social sciences. As Huntington remarks, 'we need a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our purposes'.⁴⁵

Such simplification is often cited in relation to 'parsimony'.⁴⁶ Quantitative methods are in a way skills that purposefully employ adequate simplification and formalise analytical processes in accordance with it. For instance, econometric models as empirical tools for economics are based on this underlying idea.⁴⁷ To be fair, there are limitations for such methods. It is almost impossible that a single social theory can stand for every complex reality. Despite this, it is still possible to find out central patterns that are functioning with relative coherency. The aim of using theories and quantitative methods rest on this utility. Therefore, good theory, measurement and quantitative models are concerned with how correctly they identify the central trends and how effectively they express them in the best possible manner.

Technically, a theory (to which a researcher pays a focused attention) could be equivalent to a 'systematic part' of a quantitative expression, while residuals, namely, elements unfocused or unexplained by the systematic part could be equated to 'error terms (or disturbance)'. Let us consider a simple example where a given theory states that an element 'x' affects the state of 'y'. (Say, as 'x' increases, 'y' increases.)

A quantitative model: $y = ax + b + e$

(1) $y = ax + b$: (a systematic part: explained)

⁴⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 31.

⁴⁶ For parsimony, see for instance, King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 20, 29-30, 104-105; Gujarati, Damodar N., *Basic Econometrics*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), pp. 46-47; Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 4-5.

⁴⁷ For a basic notion of econometric models, see Maddala, G. S., *Introduction to Econometrics*, 3rd ed. (Chichester/New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001), pp. 3-10; Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, pp. 1-14; Kennedy, Peter, *A Guide to Econometrics*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 1-10; Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson, *Introduction to Econometrics* (Boston/London: Addison Wesley/Pearson Education, 2003), pp. 3-15; Wooldridge, Jefferey M., *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*, 2nd ed. (Mason, Ohio: South-Western, Thompson Learning, 2003), pp. 1-19.

(2) e : (an error term/residual: unexplained)

The 'x' is an independent variable or element that is to explain the condition of a dependent variable 'y'. The 'b' is a constant. The quantitative model takes into account *both* explained and unexplained elements on the state of 'y'. Moreover, the size of the 'e' (an error term) indicates the extent of the limitation of explanatory power by 'x', namely, a theory.⁴⁸

This is a primary awareness of quantitative methods. The methods not only accept but also consider the existence of errors that could not be explained by theories. Indeed, one of the crucial attributes of the methods is to intentionally cope with the variance. A good theory or model therefore is the one that is able to minimise the degree of variance, which in turn is to maximise its explanatory power in relation to a given phenomenon. In one way, quantitative methods are one of means to systematically show *to what extent* a given theory or model is valid for explicating reality. In this sense, a critique that quantitative methods are too simplistic is irrelevant, since the methods *are aware* of the limitation of a simplified theory, and are capable of explicitly presenting the degree of the limitation, that is, *how well* the theory explains a given phenomenon.

Moreover, with this basic principle, quantitative models can be developed to construct complex, robust and potent structures for empirical explanation. A primary step is to add extra independent variables, which enables competing theories to be compared for their levels of validity. For this, the selection of variables is crucial, since omitting essential variables could lead to a partial view of reality. Therefore, caution is needed in choosing what contexts are important while avoiding their undue exclusion. The more relevant decision we make for the selection, the more powerful the explanation becomes. Thus, quantitative analysis is a viable and powerful tool that makes possible both the focused examination and the systematic evaluation of hypotheses.

2.5.2 Quantitative methods versus qualitative methods

It is also possible to make criticisms of the methodological limits of analysing survey data. The critique may be that quantitative data based on questionnaires would be restricted and rigid in relation to the in-depth contexts of social and human attitudes. To be fair, on the

⁴⁸ For analogous arguments, see for example, Maddala, *Introduction to Econometrics*, pp. 4-6; Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, pp. 3-9, 37-52; Wooldridge, *Introductory Econometrics*, pp. 2-5, 22-61.

one hand, there may be a certain inflexibility in this type of research materials. Many of the data are based on ordinal and nominal measurement, which may fix responses within limited categories.⁴⁹ Even if interval measurement is considered, the data may simply represent a unidirectional variability in each item. Nonetheless, on the other hand, the use of quantitative data and techniques holds efficacies that more than balance the disadvantages. The advantages of quantitative methods and survey data could be well-illuminated by comparison with qualitative interview methods.

First of all, a general concern of simplicity is not necessarily the case with quantitative analysis. A researcher could attempt a great deal of complex examinations in a systematic manner. A number of combinations of variables are possible. There is a wide range of availability for numerous types of techniques. Analytical processes are relatively standardised. These make possible the fusion of complexity and systematic analysis, which is one of the key strengths in this method. In contrast, a qualitative approach may have disadvantages in this context. The format of data and analysis process is not as solidly standardised as a quantitative approach.⁵⁰ Due to the complicated, unique and probably reactive characters of conversational data extracted from individual interviews, inexperienced researchers may draw various interpretations, which would not necessarily be compatible with each other. Depending on analysts, there could be a potential risk that an analytical result would constitute a sum of divergent descriptions rather than a consistent conclusion. Meanwhile, although a quantitative approach could be complex, the complexity tends to be structured. This is due to the fact that the analyses are based on clearly defined variables and the formality of statistical methods.

Another shortcoming of qualitative approaches might be that the contents of interview could be susceptible to situations.⁵¹ During observations, the contents, flows and dynamisms of conversations can change, depending on multiple factors. The factors could

49 For types of questionnaire items and variables, see de Vaus, D. A., *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed. (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 80-105, 129-132; Bryman, Alan and Duncan Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists* (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), pp. 55-70; de Vaus, David, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 94-121, 203-206.

50 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry point out that the feature of a survey method is standardisation. They admit that '[t]here is no standard set of techniques that can be applied' for elite interviewing in qualitative contexts, while arguing that standardisation would not be adequate for that purpose. See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 205-6.

51 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry depict the processes and techniques of qualitative interviews, which entail strong sensitivity to situations. See *ibid.*, pp. 211-217.

be personalities and other attributes of both interviewers and interviewees, their temporary conditions, environments where these take place, researchers' communicative skills and experiences, and so forth.⁵² Although flexibility is an advantage of a qualitative interview, this flexibility can also allow inconsistent contents of interviews. On the other hand, survey methods would be less prone to these factors. Although responses may be affected by circumstantial effects to some extent, formalised sets of questions can minimise the fluctuations. Since the items in a questionnaire are clearly pre-arranged, it is easier to consistently draw answers for specific issues as planned.

Nonetheless, this is not to negate a qualitative approach *per se*. There are several arguments in its favour.⁵³ The method allows for in-depth probes and a more subtle approach to research objects, including issues that are unquantifiable.⁵⁴ This can be a source to generate important insights. It also has the capacity to be flexible.⁵⁵ The method is advantageous to focus on a sub-category of a population for a specific subject matter.⁵⁶ Moreover, quantitative and qualitative analyses are not necessarily exclusive to each other. It could be that 'the qualitative/quantitative divide is rather less clear-cut than is often assumed'.⁵⁷ It is possible to combine the strengths of the dichotomous methods. A qualitative study could often generate assumptions to be tested by a quantitative study, and albeit less frequent, *vice versa*.⁵⁸ There is an approach of triangulation, which is '[a] process by which two or more kinds of data from different sources are used to see if the information is corroborated'.⁵⁹ This logic could be applied to the two types of methods.⁶⁰ Similarly, Tarrow presents several possibilities to bridge quantitative and qualitative

52 Devine depicts how interviewers' stances, behaviours and skills affect responses from interviewees. See Devine, Fiona, 'Qualitative Methods', *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Marsh, David, and Gerry Stoker eds. (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 143-144.

53 For a comprehensive introduction to qualitative research, see for example, Harrison, *Political Research*, pp. 73-138.

54 For instance, see Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', pp. 137-138, 146-152; Harrison, *Political Research*, pp. 74, 78-79; Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, p. 211-236.

55 Harrison, *Political Research*, p. 75.

56 For political studies on decision-makers, for instance, elite interview is an efficient method to effectively draw useful information by spotting people who are particularly knowledgeable on a matter to be investigated. See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 205, 219.

57 Ibid., p. 277.

58 Ibid., pp. 277-278.

59 Harrison, *Political Research*, p. 168. For triangulation, see also Peters, B. Guy, *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp. 97-102.

60 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, pp. 277-278.

studies.⁶¹ Thus, both of the methods have respective advantages that could complement each other.

For practical reasons, however, researchers have to be selective for the employment of methodology. Which method is to be utilised depends on types of themes, theories and other characteristics of the research. For the present study, the theme is on the national comparison of popular attitudes. Due to this, a quantitative approach would be adequate in view of its function. To put it precisely, major reasons for using the approach are as follows. Its main rationale rests on generalisability. Thanks to the techniques of inferential statistics, it is theoretically possible to estimate population parameters (namely, actual figures of populations) by using sampled data. Moreover, for the World Values Survey, the numbers of cases in most national samples range approximately between 900 and 2600 (with a small number of exceptions).⁶² The large sizes of the samples support the generalisability of the analytical results.⁶³ On the other hand, qualitative methods may have a certain weakness for this purpose.⁶⁴ Methods such as qualitative interviews and participant observation are likely to allow only a limited number of cases to be observed.⁶⁵ This would make it difficult to generalise the results as representative of national populations. There is methodological difficulty in applying an inferential procedure to such a small size of respondents, who are often selected without particular sampling designs.⁶⁶ In addition, the nature of qualitative data might present a certain hindrance to generalisability because of its complexity and, for some cases, idiosyncrasy. In the

61 Tarrow, Sydney, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide', in Henry E. Brady and David Collier eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 171-179.

62 This includes the four waves of World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-8, 1999-2002.

63 For statistical analysis, it is normally the case that the larger a sample size is, the better it represents a wider population. For the issues of a sample size, see de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed., pp. 70-73; Bryman and Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows*, pp. 103-104; de Vaus, David, *Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 150, 175-186; de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed., pp. 80-83.

64 Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', p. 145.

65 Devine suggests that '[a] small sample of approximately 30-40 interviewees is the norm' for a qualitative research. See *ibid.*, pp. 142. Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry state that '20-30 interviews might be a reasonable target for a project in which elite interviewing was the principal method'. See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, p. 208.

66 Devine writes, '[r]ather than generate a tightly defined sample according to a range of criteria, qualitative samples are more loosely defined'. She states, '[t]here is often no sampling frame', while mentioning 'snowball sampling' as a usual way, which is dependent on a network of interviewees. See Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', p. 142. For a similar remark, see Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, *Research Methods in Politics*, p. 207.

meantime, the present research is concerned with issues surrounding Inglehart's thesis, which emphatically utilises survey data. For this specific purpose, it would be appropriate to focus the examination as an extension of his arguments and methods. Consequently, quantitative methods and the World Values Survey would be most suitable to the aim and character of the present research.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the methodological dimensions of the dissertation. Within political science, the present study occupies a position in the areas of studies on democratisation and popular attitudes while involving major academic interests concerned with political culture. Inglehart's thesis and the World Values Survey are the prime sources of examination. The Postmaterialist index, especially the four-item scale, is utilised as a main device.⁶⁷ Despite challenging critiques, the postmaterialist index holds considerable validity and utility. One major concern, however, is its possible susceptibility to cultural difference, although the index is supposed to measure outlooks in relation to post-industrial values transformation. This point is further investigated in the following chapters as one of the research themes. There are several options that could analyse the competing effects of values shift and cultural variation. As for quantitative methods and survey data, they are of great importance to the aims and nature of this research. With these, the following chapters move on to actual data analyses to examine the dichotomy: values shift vs. cultural particularity through comparison of the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. Some of the outcomes are further explored in the context of tripartite categories: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions. Also, the political consequences of their attitudinal patterns are considered in relation to democracy.

⁶⁷ Some variants are also developed from the index, as shown in a later chapter.

Chapter 3: The Postmaterialist Index

3.1 Introduction

Inglehart's Postmaterialist thesis puts its emphasis on values *shift*. This chapter incorporates another emphasis: the values *variation* of different societies. By this, it is envisaged to suggest a supplement to the Inglehart's thesis. The discussion takes advantage of the Postmaterialist scale and concepts of the thesis. The values shift depicted in the Postmaterialist thesis may be a plausible symptom of modernised societies. In the process of such a symptom occurring, nonetheless, there could be various cultural and historical conditions that either hinder or accelerate its development. A major purpose of this chapter is to compare values configurations of four societies: the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. The focus is to establish how different and similar their values distributions are within the Postmaterialist and Materialist categories. In a concluding section, the implications of the analytical outcomes to democracy and Russia are mentioned.

3.2 Hypothesis

According to Inglehart's thesis, the acquisition and continuation of wealth and security in a society satisfy material needs of the people. It amounts to a shift in their values toward non-material needs such as self-actualisation. This hypothesis underpins a values shift assumption, under which Postmaterialist outlooks are nurtured by a relatively long-standing affluence of society due to its economic growth.¹

However, societies with noticeable development of such values mostly belong to the Western democratic world. In these societies the freedom of individuals has been highly valued in comparison with other societies.² It seems that this social esteem of the

¹ See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997).

² Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16; Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp.

individual is deeply related (at least advantageous) to the historically earlier emergence and spread of Postmaterialist values in their societies. Since main elements in Postmaterialist values include self-actualisation and self-esteem, they in effect overlap with the emphasis on freedom in Western tradition.

Conversely, even if high economic growth and relatively long-standing wealth are maintained, in a society where individual liberty has not been strongly appreciated or even intentionally weakened, it is possible that the spread of Postmaterialist values will have been deterred or distorted. There are at least two types of societies in which this may be the case. One is the cohort of former communist societies, and the other is that of East Asian societies. What is common between the two types of societies seems to be such as social norms that under-emphasise individuals in comparison with a holistic goal of a society, state or governance, and tendencies that put more importance to material benefits rather than intellectual or abstract fulfilment. Under the former communist regimes, their official ideologies upheld state-planning economies, which were supposed to provide the equal supplies of economic benefits to the people while suppressing free competitions and private ownerships.³ The well-being of the populace was, at least officially, apt to be understood in material terms. For Russia, there has been historical popular orientation prone to a strong leader that ensures order of the nation.⁴ This in turn indicates a certain de-emphasis of freedom in exchange for order. In East Asia, cultural orientation is likely to encourage conformism and the overall benefit of society or societal contexts to which

71-2; Hofstede, Geert, 'Individualism and Collectivism', in *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001), ch. 5, pp. 209-278, esp. 215.

3 For descriptions of communist rule, its effects and post-communist changes, see for instance, White, Stephen, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, *Developments in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Sakwa, Richard, *Russian Politics and Society* (London/New York: Routledge, 1993); White, Stephen, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman ed., *Developments in Russian & Post-Soviet Politics*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1994); Sakwa, Richard, *Soviet Politics in Perspective*, 2nd ed. (London/New York: Routledge, 1998); Remington, Thomas F., *Politics in Russia* (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999); Diamond, L. and M. Plattner, ed., *Democracy after Communism* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Roskin, Michael G., *The Rebirth of East Europe*, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall/Pearson Education, 2002); White, Stephen, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

4 White, Stephen, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).

individuals belong.⁵ This is also applicable to Japanese cultural contexts.⁶ East Asian outlooks hold a pragmatic tendency in conjunction with a strong sense of achievement. With this, their societies and governances have been likely to put an emphasis on economic growth prior to the enlargement of civil and political rights.⁷ Consequently, these characteristics have closer attributes to Materialist values than Postmaterialist ones. These inherited factors can weaken the formation of the Postmaterialist orientation.

The inquiries could be reduced to the following hypothesis. Whereas the explanation of Postmaterialist shift due to economic growth and continuous affluence would be relatively appropriate to Western societies, this is not necessarily the case with societies in Postcommunist and East Asian regions. Their cultural or historical factors can discourage or distort the values shift and thus affect the state of Postmaterialist and Materialist values. The configurations of values could be affected by competing effects: economic development and cultural factors. But how? To answer this, the Postmaterialist index is examined in detail. By doing this, one can detect to what extent cultural variation matters within the Postmaterialist-Materialist categories. With this, the following sections pay particular attention to comparisons between Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan.

3.3 Postmaterialist index

In this part, the configurations of Postmaterialist and Materialist values are presented by comparing four societies: Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan. It separates into two sections for the four-item index and the twelve-item index. Each of the two sections further separates into two parts. The first half considers four societies comparatively, whereas the second half investigates each of the societies individually by comparing values conditions between different time points. The former part investigates whether there are differences or

5 For (East) Asian political cultures, see for example, Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, (Cambridge, MA/London: Belknap Press, 1985); Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*; Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner ed., *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

6 Maruyama, Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou*, Zoho-ban, [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964).

7 See, for instance, Heywood, Andrew, *Politics* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), pp. 34-35; Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then (Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East Asian Model', in *Democracy and Democratization: Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective*, (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 255-268; Saich, Tony, *Governance and Politics of China*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

common tendencies between the four different societies. The latter part looks at whether there are signs of shift or fluctuation in values conditions over a period of five or fifteen years, and whether there is any durability of values conditions in each of these societies over the periods. The four societies are compared by taking advantage of the four waves of the World Values Survey: 1981, 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002.⁸

3.3.1 The Postmaterialist four-item index

Comparison of societies

As presented in figures below, comparisons between the four societies are conducted. For the 1981 survey, only British and Japanese cases are available. Britain has a stronger orientation toward Postmaterialist values than Japan. This difference continues to be observed in the two subsequent surveys. Over fifteen years from 1981 to 1995-8, the British are consistently almost 10 per cent higher in the rate of Postmaterialism than the Japanese, whereas Japan is higher than Britain by approximately 10 per cent for Materialism. The USA shares a very similar tendency to the British case in this respect. There is a gap between the USA and Japan, which is consistently observed in available data from 1990 to 1999-2002. Thus, there is a gap between the two Western societies and Japan. Russia has a very strong orientation towards Materialism, which far exceeds Japanese case. In 1990, Postmaterialism in Russia is extremely low rate compared with the other societies, which is furthered in the following observation (1995-8). This low rate is sustained in 1999-2002. Consequently, Russia has a very strong skew to Materialism away from Postmaterialism at least over the decade. The Russian Materialist orientation is in a very sharp contrast to Britain and the USA, which show a relatively high inclination to Postmaterialism. The Japanese case takes a middle position between the two sides.

⁸ Although the data of the World Values Survey's third wave are labelled as '1995-7' in the dataset, the actual year when British case was sampled for the third wave was 1998. Therefore, '1995-8' is used here to describe the third wave of the World Values Survey.

Figure 3.1 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1981




Figure 3.1 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1990




Figure 3.1 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1995-8





Figure 3.1 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1999-2002



Comparison of waves

This section analyses each of the four societies on changes over two (or one) decades from the 1981 to 1999-2002 waves of the World Values Survey. Four graphs in figures 3.2 (I) – (IV) present the results. Postmaterialist-Materialist conditions in Britain for the three surveys seem to have relatively consistent forms. On the other hand, there is a gradual increase in Postmaterialism and a steady decrease in Materialism, which connotes a Postmaterialist shift. For the USA, the available three data show similar forms to each other. There is not a great fluctuation in its values distribution over the decade, although a slight withdrawal of a Materialist orientation is observed in favour of the Postmaterialist shift. The Japanese case exhibits the Postmaterialist shift in the first ten years, whereas in the second five years the distributions are almost identical. The following 1999-2002 survey shows a fall in a Materialist orientation although the level of a Postmaterialist orientation is sustained. As regards Russia, the state from 1990 to 1995-8 waves shows the further enhancement of the Materialist tendency, which is the reverse of the Postmaterialist shift.⁹ The distribution remains in similar forms from 1995-8 to 1999-2002 surveys. In the three waves, great proportions of the respondents hold a Materialist orientation.

To conclude, despite some fluctuations, there are consistent tendencies in the distributions for each of the four societies. This implies that respective societies have relatively durable particularities in their positions on the values. On the other hand, in British, American and Japanese societies, there are steady signs denoting the Postmaterialist shifts over the period. In the case of Russia, the situation is the reverse. The decrease of the Postmaterialist proportion may be due to the deterioration of economic and social conditions that can enhance the popular desire for Materialist needs. Nonetheless, even if such immediate circumstantial conditions are considered, the tendency in Russia is exceptionally inclined to Materialism in comparison with the other three societies. This is the case even in 1990, which is before the dramatic increase in Materialism. Therefore, Russia may well be regarded as having *basically* a strong Materialist orientation.

⁹ It should be noted that the time points when the data of the third wave (1995-8) were collected were 1995 for the USA, Russia and Japan, and 1998 for Britain.

Figure 3.2 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: Britain




Figure 3.2 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: the USA




Figure 3.2 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: Japan





Figure 3.2 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: Russia



3.3.2 The Postmaterialist twelve-item index¹⁰

Given the initial conclusion of the Postmaterialist four-item index, does it apply to the twelve-item version of the index? The following section probes the outcomes of the twelve-item index with this inquiry.

Comparison of societies

In this part, the societies are compared within each wave for the twelve-item index, which is shown in figures 3.3 (I) – (III).¹¹ For the 1990 survey, there is a similarity between Britain, Japan and the USA with majorities scoring as 2 or 3, although the USA has a slightly greater predisposition to Materialism than the other two. Russia, by contrast, shows a partiality to Materialism. The 1995-8 survey has a similar result, while having a notable Materialist increase in Russia.¹² As for the 1999-2002 survey, for which American and Japanese data are available, an analogous outcome to the previous surveys is observed. In both 1990 and 1995-8, the great majority of Russian respondents have low scores on the Postmaterialism indicator. The Russian increase in the Materialist orientation from 1990 to 1995-8 is exceptional in view of the other societies. It indicates that, whereas Russia was basically oriented to Materialism, its primary orientation to Materialism was strengthened during the period. Thus, the twelve-item index has an analogous result to that of the four-item index in the comparative states of the four societies.

¹⁰ The twelve-item index measures the degree of Postmaterialism with a 6 point score. The higher the score, the more the inclination toward Postmaterialism, with 5 as the highest score and 0 as the lowest score. For details, see Chapter 2.

¹¹ Data for 1981 are not available for the twelve-item index.

¹² British data are not available for this.

Figure 3.3 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1990




Figure 3.3 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1995-8





Figure 3.3 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1999-2002



Comparison of waves

This part analyses each of the three societies on changes from the 1990 to the 1999-2002 waves, as shown in figures 3.4 (I) – (II).¹³ For the USA, the overall distributions are very similar over the three waves. This indicates that there is not a great fluctuation across the three time points, denoting consistency in its posture.¹⁴ In the case of Japan, there are also similarities across the three waves, indicating consistency in the attitudes on Postmaterialist-Materialist values. As for Russia, there is an obvious decrease in the Postmaterialist orientation from 1990 to 1995-8, becoming more inclined to Materialism. However, despite such a change, the Russian distribution of values has a basic tendency that is inclined to a Materialist orientation. After all, despite some fluctuations, there seem to have been coherent tendencies in each of the societies across different time points in terms of Postmaterialist values conditions. This implies that they have durable peculiarities in their forms of the values distribution.

¹³ The data of the twelve-item index for 1981 are not available. Also, British case for the twelve-item index is available only in respect of 1990. Since this part compares values conditions between different time points, the British case is omitted.

¹⁴ There is, however, a slight change in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.

Figure 3.4 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: the USA




Figure 3.4 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Japan





Figure 3.4 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Russia



3.3.3 Summary

This section has examined four-item index and twelve-item index of Postmaterialism and Materialism in relation to Russia, Britain, the USA and Japan. Each of the two indexes was studied through dual comparisons. The first one compared the four societies whereas the second one compared different time points in the respective societies. The former investigated whether there were differences or common tendencies between the four societies. The latter looked at whether there were signs of values shift or coherent national patterns.

As for the comparison of the four societies, our results for the twelve-item index are similar to those in respect of the four-item index. There are relatively common tendencies between Britain, the USA and Japan. In contrast, Russia shows a strong inclination to Materialism, while having a further increase in its already strong Materialist orientation from 1990 to 1995-8. Meanwhile, there is a difference between the two sets of observations. In the four-item index, whereas Britain and the USA are very close to each other, Japan has a greater leaning towards Materialism than the other two societies. On the contrary, in the twelve-item index, among the three societies that shares a relative similarity, the USA has a slightly greater inclination to Materialism than Britain or Japan.

As regards the comparison of different time points within each of the societies, the twelve-item index gives analogous results to the four-item index. The common features between the observations of the two indexes are that, despite some fluctuations, there seem to be relatively coherent patterns in each of the societies that transcend different time points in terms of Postmaterialist and Materialist values. This implies that these societies individually have continuous particularities in the values distributions. In both four-item and twelve-item indexes, Russia shows an increase in its Materialist orientation from 1990 to 1995-8 that gives rise to fluctuations in its Postmaterialist-Materialist values distributions, although a skew towards Materialism remains as the basic Russian values distribution. On the other hand, there is a slight difference between the respective observations on the four-item and twelve-item indexes. In the four-item index, in British, American and Japanese societies, although they keeps a relatively coherent form, there seems to be a steady increase in Postmaterialist values over the period. In the twelve-item index, the USA and Japan maintain coherent forms of Postmaterialist-Materialist values

across three waves from 1990 to 1999-2002, so that fluctuation between the three time points appears to be minimal.

Consequently, in light of our initial hypothesis, there are supportive elements in these observations. Even for the proportional results of the Postmaterialist indexes, there are likely to be consistent national patterns, denoting durability. There are also signs of steady Postmaterialist shift in the societies, except for Russia which was probably affected by the deterioration of economic and social conditions. Over all, both the values shift and cultural/national particularity appear to be at work.

3.4 Decomposition of Postmaterialist four-item index

This part examines decomposed versions of the four-item Postmaterialist scale. The four-item Postmaterialist index categorises respondents into either 'Postmaterialist', 'Materialist' or 'Mixed'. The categorisation is based on the selection of four items, which are:

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. Maintaining order in the nation | [Materialist] |
| 2. Giving people more say in important government decisions | [Postmaterialist] |
| 3. Fighting rising prices | [Materialist] |
| 4. Protecting freedom of speech | [Postmaterialist] |

However, this style has the effect of obscuring which items are chosen by respondents. With this in mind, the following section will be slightly more precise by exploring the state of each item rather than what Postmaterialist-Materialist categorisation indicates. The analyses are set on the two original question items that constitute the Postmaterialist four-item index. These are (1) a first choice from the above four items, and (2) a second choice from the same options.¹⁵ The points to be examined are the same as so far: whether there

¹⁵ An examination of second choices in the Postmaterialist index, in comparison with first choices, leaves somewhat ambiguous the issue of popular choice among 'priorities.' However, there is no doubt that the second choice is also asking about 'priorities' though slightly less strong ones than in the first choice. The best way to deal with the second choice index is to conceive of the index as specifically measuring 'second choices' especially when the index is examined on its own. Another way of using the second choice index is to examine it in relation to the first choice index. Although the first choice index has considerable validity as a measure of 'priority' on its own and is worth a separate examination, the combination of the first choice and second choice index can provide for another strong measure of popular values priorities. In this sense, the second choice index is worth using for the purpose of such a

are national variations or the indications of the Postmaterialist values shift. If there are the national variances, are they consistent across multiple time points, implying durability in national patterns?

3.4.1 Comparison of societies

Four (or two) societies are compared within each wave of the World Values Surveys that were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002 respectively.

First choice: figures 3.5 (I) – (IV)

As for the results of the first choice, on the whole, there are basic patterns of the difference between the societies which are relatively consistent across the multiple time points (although there are changes in 'more say' and 'prices' items). Russia and Japan have consistently low scores on the 'free speech' item in comparison with Britain and the USA. Russia has a significantly different values shape among the four societies while holding a distinctive emphasis on 'order'. Britain and the USA have close forms of values allocations. Although Japan is relatively close to Britain and the USA, Japan is slightly similar to Russia in that 'free speech' has a low score.

measurement, as long its particular character is not forgotten.

Figure 3.5 (I) PM-M index B: first choice 1981




Figure 3.5 (II) PM-M index B: first choice 1990






Figure 3.5 (III) PM-M index B: first choice 1995-8



PM-M index B 1st choice 1995-8

Figure 3.5 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice: 1999-2002



PM-M index B 1st choice 1999-2002


Second choice: figures 3.5 (IV) – (VII)

For the second choice, there is even stronger consistency in patterns of difference between the societies over the period. Each of the societies has an own shape of the distribution. In Britain and the USA the four items are at similar levels and balanced around a range of 20 per cent to 30 per cent.¹⁶ In the Japanese case, the item of 'prices' occupies the top position among the four items while the 'free speech' item takes the lowest position. Between these two items, the 'more say' and 'order' items take positions at levels relatively close to each other. The Russian case has an analogous shape to the Japanese one with a much larger gap between the highest ('prices') and the lowest ('free speech') scores. In Russia, as in the Japanese case, 'order' and 'more say' stay at comparatively similar levels with a little fluctuation. In relation to 'prices', Russia and Japan have distinctively higher positions than Britain and the USA.¹⁷ On the other hand, Russia and Japan have significantly lower scores than Britain and the USA in relation to 'free speech'. The deviation from the cases of Britain and the USA is greater in Russian than in the Japanese case in relation to both 'prices' and 'free speech' (though in the opposite direction). Thus, there is national consistency in the patterns. This will be clearer in the following parts on the comparison of the waves.

¹⁶ The 'prices' item in the 1999-2002 American data is slightly deviant, but still has the score of 18.05 per cent.


¹⁷ The score of the 'prices' item in the latest Japanese data (1999-2002) may be slightly lower in this context.

Figure 3.5 (V) PM-M index B: second choice 1981



PM-M index B 2nd choice 1981

Figure 3.5 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice 1990



PM-M index B 2nd choice 1990

Figure 3.5 (VII) PM-M index B: second choice 1995-8





Figure 3.5 (VIII) PM-M index B: second choice: 1999-2002



3.4.2 Comparison of waves in each society (index B)

First choice: figures 3.6 (I) – (IV)

For the comparison of the waves with respect to the first choice, several points emerge clearly. On the one hand, the four societies have their own values configurations enduring over time in some respects. The cases of the USA and Russia clearly show respective forms of the configurations that persist across the waves. In the Japanese case, the degrees of support for the 'order' and 'free speech' items are sustained at consistent levels over the period of observation. Despite some changes in the British case, the scores of the 'free speech' item remain almost the same across the waves.¹⁸ On the other hand, the four societies also have changes. For Japan and Britain, an overall increase in the 'more say' item and a decrease in the 'prices' item are noticeable. The case of the USA shows a consistent fall in the 'prices' item. Thus, the items of 'more say' and 'prices' seem prone to Postmaterialist change in each of these three societies. By contrast, Russia shows a shift rather in favour of a still more strongly Materialist orientation. The shift is observed in the state of the 'prices' and (with fluctuation) 'more say' items.

As regards 'free speech', there is a strong element of stability in all of the four societies over the period of observation, while the level varies in each case. In fact, for Britain and Russia respectively, the 'free speech' scores over different waves remain almost identical. In Japan and the USA, although there are some fluctuations, the fluctuations are small, so that this also supports the impression of stability in relation to 'free speech'. What is more, the degree of priority given to 'free speech' varies in different societies. Britain and the USA maintain levels of around 20 per cent in 'free speech'.¹⁹ Russia and Japan rather consistently place much less importance on the 'free speech' item. Japan remains at less than 10 per cent and Russia less than 2.5 per cent. This shows that, in Britain and the USA, 'free speech' is consistently valued regardless of time and probably environment, whereas in Russia and Japan 'free speech' is given a clearly low priority with little influence of time and possibly environmental changes such as economic conditions (at least within the period the data cover).

With respect to the item of 'order', each society maintains a certain stability at its own

¹⁸ Moreover, the overall scores of respective waves are not too deviant from each other in the British data, which gives the impression of fluctuation.

¹⁹ The score of the USA in 1999-2002 is slightly higher, but still is 25.21 per cent.

level, although the item seems also somewhat prone to fluctuation. Between the first and the second waves (1981 and 1990) Britain and Japan show drops in the order item.²⁰ However, from the second to the third waves (1990 to 1995-8), the 'order' item shows some rise in each of the four societies. From the third to the fourth waves (1995-8 to 1999-2002) there are slight drops in Japan and Russia whereas the figure remains similar in the USA.

The most general conclusion is that, to a certain degree, basic values positions seem to be maintained in each society. However, there are the signs of a Postmaterialist shift in Japan, Britain and the USA in relation to 'more say' and 'prices'. Russia, on the other hand, shows some movement towards Materialist values. In contrast, 'free speech' is the most durable item, keeping the same levels over time in respective societies. Although 'order' items also remain relatively stable, the items are a little more prone to fluctuation. Nonetheless, this fluctuation is not necessarily in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.

²⁰ The 1981 data for Russia and the USA on this are not available.

Figure 3.6 (I) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Britain




Figure 3.6 (II) PM-M index B: first choice: change in the USA




Figure 3.6 (III) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Japan





Figure 3.6 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Russia



Second choice: figures 3.6 (V) – (VIII)

The clearest single conclusion from the second choice index is that the four societies maintain a high level stability over the three or four waves in their respective values configurations. Together with this stability, on the other hand, there are changes, though they may be comparatively minor. Britain and the USA maintain a relatively balanced values configuration across the four items, but also seem to show shifts in favour of a Postmaterialist orientation especially in the 'more say' and 'prices' items. Over the first three waves, with trivial fluctuations, Japan maintains a basic values configuration with the 'prices' item as the strongest priority (and 'free speech' as the lowest) among the four items. Although the results of the fourth wave show some changes, its shape is still an extension of the basic pattern.²¹ Russia also maintains a high degree of stability with a slight further shift towards the Materialist orientation. The basic Russian configuration is to have 'prices' at its peak and 'free speech' as the lowest position, which is very similar to Japan. These outcomes again show that the four societies appear to keep their own basic values configurations despite some changes among them. Whereas this tendency is consistent with the case of first choice index, the overall stability of the basic configurations is greater.

²¹ In the Japanese data, there is a decrease in the 'prices' item with an increase in the 'order' item. It should be also noticed that the score of the 'order' item has gradually risen over the four waves.

Figure 3.6 (V) PM-M index B: second choice: change in Britain




Figure 3.6 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice: change in the USA




Figure 3.6 (VII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Japan





Figure 3.6 (VIII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Russia



Summary: comparison of waves

With the respective observations of the first and second choices, the following is an analytical summary that draws together both outcomes. On the whole, there seems to be similarity between Britain and the USA in the state of values configuration. In the second choice (figure 3.6 (V) and 3.6 (VI)), Britain and the USA keep comparatively balanced four item configurations, which are distinct from those in Russia and Japan. This tendency seems to be stable across the waves. As for the first choice (figure 3.6 (I), 3.6 (II)), although the British and American configurations are less balanced than ones in the second choice, their patterns are clearly closer to each other than to the Russian pattern. Britain and the USA have analogous levels of support for the 'free speech' item, which are consistently higher than ones in Japan and Russia. This is observed across the available waves in both the first and second choices. In the meantime, the British and American results show some changes in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.²²

In Japan (figure 3.6 (III) and 3.6 (VII)), the first choice shows clear signs of a Postmaterialist shift in the items of 'more say' and 'prices', whereas the second choice keeps its own basic forms with stability (despite a modest shift in the fourth wave).²³ The 'free speech' item consistently occupies lower positions among the four items in both the first and second choice indexes.²⁴ The 'order' item is stable at relatively higher positions in the first choice, whereas it shows a steady rise in the second choice.²⁵

In Russia (figure 3.6 (IV) and 3.6 (VIII)), the basic forms are maintained at a stable level in both the first and second choice indexes over the period of observation. Although each of the two forms is distinctive, they have in common that in each of them there is an item that has a particularly high score among the four items ('order' in the first choice and 'prices' in the second choice). The point to be noticed is that the two items ('order' and 'prices') both belong to the range of Materialist values. Moreover, the 'free speech' item keeps not just low but very low positions among the four items over the period. The 'more say' item remains at around 15 - 25 per cent positions in both the first and second choices

22 In fact, the later the wave, the clearer the Postmaterialist orientation. For example, in the first choice in the third (and fourth) wave, the 'more say' item exceeds 30 per cent and the 'prices' item becomes lower than 20 per cent in both countries.

23 It also should be noted that, for the second choice, the decrease in the 'prices' item in the fourth wave coincides with an increase in the 'order' item. The two items are both within a Materialist category.

24 In comparative terms, 'free speech' occupies higher positions in the second choice than in the first choice.

25 This is somewhat opposite to a Postmaterialist shift.

over the same period. Simply put, in Russia, there is clear tendency that the very great majority of people tend to choose 'order' item as their first priority and 'prices' as their second priority among the four items. 'Free speech' is likely to have the least priority whereas 'more say' keeps a relatively low priority. On the whole, Russia retains a strong inclination to the Materialist orientation with a high degree of durability in its values configuration over the period.

3.5 Conclusion

Overall

In this chapter, the analyses have been conducted in inductive manners. Britain, the USA, Japan and Russia are compared in terms of observations made by the Postmaterialist indexes as well as the decomposed scales of the four-item Postmaterialist index. The overall result of observation is as follows: Britain and the USA have relatively similar forms of values configuration to each other in Postmaterialist and Materialist values allocations. Although Japan has configuration that is close to Britain and the USA, it also has deviation from the two societies in some respects, which makes Japan slightly similar to Russia. Russia as a whole has very different shapes of values configurations from the other three societies, having strong orientation to Materialist.

On the whole, the results support our initial hypothesis. Although there are signs of the Postmaterialist values shift, the values distributions are affected by national elements. Each of the four societies seems to have a basic shape of values configuration and tends to have certain consistency in the shape over the period of the observation. This implies that respective societies have durable and therefore basic peculiarities in their forms of values distribution. On the other hand, there are some shifts and fluctuations among these societies. Whereas Britain, Japan and the USA show changes that imply Postmaterialist shifts over the waves, Russia shows the opposite direction of change towards a more Materialist orientation in addition to its basic Materialist orientation.

The significant point on the Postmaterialist values shift is that among the four items 'more say' and 'prices' items are prone to changes in relatively coherent directions. Therefore, these two items seem to have particular connection with the values shifts. The

item of 'free speech', on the contrary, shows very strong durability since 'free speech' tends to keep the same levels over different time points in most cases of the four societies. It is possible that 'free speech' is likely to be highly influenced by nationally peculiar factors (such as inherited culture and history). Another point about 'free speech' items is that Britain and the USA largely put a certain priority comparable to the other three items. On the other hand, in Russia and Japan, 'free speech' item receives consistently low priority among the four items. This suggests that, in Russia and Japan, cultural or historical factors *hinder* the Postmaterialist effect on the popular evaluation of 'free speech'. Special attention is paid to this point in later chapters.

Implications for Russia

With the observations of this chapter, there is a question: what are their implications for Russia? The consolidation of the democracy is still underway, which just started in the very end of the last century. Under such a circumstance, what the people expect of the government possibly relates to the way in which democracy operates and the direction in which democracy is headed. Russian people, as examined in this chapter, have a strong inclination to the Materialist orientation. The Materialist view, that is asked in (particularly four-item index of) the Postmaterialist scale, is to expect a government to ensure material benefit and security (such as economic stability and social order) *prior to* political participation and freedom of speech that could be crucial to responsive democracy. In other words, the Russian public on the whole seems to share the dominant view that, if necessary for securing economic security and social order, it may well be accepted that a governmental role to ensure popular participation and freedom of speech is deterred. Since the Postmaterialist view is to expect more participation and free speech to be ensured by a government, the dominance of Materialist view and the scarcity of the Postmaterialist view among public as observed in Russia implies the lack of popular values conditions to underpin and push for the development of governmental responsiveness. This may imply the deviation of Russian political system from responsive democracy, which in turn may suggest its difference from Western models of democracy.

As observed in this chapter, Britain and the USA have relatively high rates of Postmaterialist view among the public. On the other hand, Japan has a lower rate of

Postmaterialist values than these two societies. Also, 'free speech' in Japan is chronically fixed at a low rate, which is a very similar tendency to Russia. Despite such values conditions that are different from the two Western societies, Japan has somehow been able to maintain democratic system for more than fifty years. This may be one of clues to figure out the way of Russian democracy under the popular values that are distinct from the typical Western societies and somewhat similar to Japan. What is a democracy that suits Russia and Russians? The later chapters explores further this underlying question.

Chapter 4: 'More say' and 'free speech'

4.1 Introduction

The Postmaterialist four-item index is a vital index that chiefly has been employed to examine the posture of Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension (and strings of related values explicated by Inglehart's thesis). In fact, results from the index have provided considerable support for Inglehart's hypotheses, including that of Postmaterialist values shift. Nonetheless, there still seems to be analytical leeway. In particular, this relates to two items that are categorised as Postmaterialist values. One is 'more say', which represents 'giving people more say in important government decisions'. Another is 'free speech', standing for an item: 'protecting freedom of speech'. They are items in multiple-choice questions asking about an important aim of a country. In the Postmaterialist thesis, and through the process of using the Postmaterialist index, these values items have been simply supposed to emerge and spread *together*. However, this may have neglected possible details that there could be a *time lag* or *difference* in ways of formation (or simply the conditions) *between* the values of 'more say' and 'free speech'. Separate analyses of the two variables make it possible to show such a difference. These further enable us to detect whether the respective conditions of the two kinds of values are due to a Postmaterialist shift or cultural particularity (or both). For this purpose, details of each values item in the Postmaterialist four-item index are closely scrutinised, by employing new variables: 'variables of relative commitment'.

One of the important sources of influence on these values conditions may be the presence or non-presence of a traditional heritage of individualism and high esteem of freedom, which might be related to a kind of distinction between Western and non-Western categories.¹ The values item of 'free speech' in the Postmaterialist four-item index could be strongly affected by this aspect in comparison with that of 'more say'. If this is the case, the state of such tradition, that is, cultural particularity, may have a considerable effect on the condition of Postmaterialist values, notwithstanding the effect of

¹ For example, see Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72; Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.

Postmaterialist values shift. This would further connote delay or less efficacy of the Postmaterialist shift in some non-Western societies, since such societies might have disadvantages or it may simply be that a fully-fledged version of the Postmaterialist shift – or at least, an immediate kind of values shift – is irrelevant to some non-Western societies. A main purpose of the present chapter is to investigate this issue.

4.2 Variables of relative commitment: 'more say' and 'free speech'

4.2.1 Variables of relative commitment

The following parts discuss the variables of relative commitment. Although the Postmaterialist four-item index is a vital measure for examining the posture of Postmaterialist-Materialist values and other related values concerning Inglehart's thesis, there still seems to be analytical leeway. One of the possibilities is that details of values items in the index could be more closely scrutinised. The Postmaterialist four-item index consists of four values items, that is, 'order', 'more say', 'prices' and 'free speech'. These items could be respectively investigated by creating a different version of the variables on the basis of the four-item index. New variables are introduced in this chapter with the name of 'variables of relative commitment'. The major advantage of the variables is that degree of emphasis specifically on each values item could be clarified, which is not possible in the Postmaterialist index.

4.2.2 Constructing the variables

The variable of relative commitment is different from the Postmaterialist index although both types of variables are based on the same original questions.² In the case of the World Values Survey, there are two original questions for a first choice and a second choice respectively. They constitute multiple-choice questions asking respondents to choose the first and second most important aims of a country from the four items below:

² For a basic argument on Postmaterialist four-item index, see Inglehart, Ronald, 'The Nature of Value Change', in *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), ch. 2, esp. pp. 27-34. Also, for SPSS coding instructions for the Postmaterialist index, see an additional section to 'Codebook' in Inglehart, Ronald et al., *ICPSR 2790, World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981–1984, 1990–1993, and 1995–1997* (PDF file), ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), pp. 171-2.

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| 1. Maintaining <i>order</i> in the nation | (Materialist) |
| 2. Giving people <i>more say</i> in important government decisions | (Postmaterialist) |
| 3. Fighting rising <i>prices</i> | (Materialist) |
| 4. Protecting <i>freedom of speech</i> | (Postmaterialist) |

Since the purpose of the variables of relative commitment is to tap the degrees of importance that respondents specifically attach to each one of the values items, the original questions are combined in a manner to effectively express such a particular emphasis. Four variables are created to that effect, that is, the variables of 'order', 'more say', 'prices' and 'free speech'. In particular, recoding has been carried out in the following way. If a particular relevant item is chosen as a 'first choice', these variables are to give the value of '2'. If the item is chosen as a 'second choice', the value of '1' is given. If the item is not chosen at all, the value is '0'. For instance, in the case of the 'free speech' variable, where 'free speech' was opted for as a first choice, it is given '2'. Where respondents put 'free speech' as a second choice, it is '1'. Where 'free speech' is not chosen at all, it is given '0'. Accordingly, variables are created for the other items ('order', 'more say' and 'prices') as well.

4.2.3 Validity of the variables

4.2.3.1 Separate analyses

The major advantage of the variables of relative commitment is that the specific weight of importance that respondents attach to each values item can be clarified. This is not possible in the Postmaterialist index, since its output only indicates either Postmaterialist or Materialist (or Mixed) values by simply integrating each values item for a single measurement that classifies them in terms of the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. This obscures the details of the individual values items. For example, for the two items of Postmaterialist values – 'more say' and 'free speech', separate analyses of the two variables would show the difference of their conditions – such as how they are distributed across various attributes of the respondents, what elements affect their states to what extent, and so forth. These further enable us to detect whether respective conditions are due to

Postmaterialist shift or cultural particularity (or both).

4.2.3.2 Indicator of commitment

Why are they called the variables of 'relative commitment'? What do the variables indicate? To answer these questions, a major point is that the variables indicate the degree of relative emphasis that respondents put on each of the four values items. Since the variables consist of *choices* from four competing items, the nature of the variable is to tap the strength of *emphasis* on each specific item *relative* to other three items. Obviously, because it is about choice, the strength is a relative one. Nonetheless, this relativity is crucial. Because of the relativity, the variable is capable of expressing commitment (or subjective persistence).

Comparing these variables with an index of rating makes this point clearer.³ The index of rating is a scale asking respondents to choose 'very important', 'important', 'not very important' or 'not important at all' with regards to the evaluation of an individual values item. In practice, although the latter index could indicate some difference of emphases among values items, differences in actual outputs may often be subtle. This is because the values asked about are generally ones which people see as important anyway. For instance, it would be normal for people to think both 'free speech' and 'more say' are important, so that the averages might fall around the level of 'important' in both cases, showing little difference between their outputs.

Unlike this type of index, the index comprising *choice* (such as the 'variables of relative commitment') indicates often clear-cut differences between values items in their levels of emphases. But why is it so important to detect such a difference clearly – the difference that could be only subtle in the case of the index of rating? This is because it indicates difference in the degrees of commitment that could persist possibly even at the cost of other values items if necessary. Such a measured persistence could be a viable indicator of actual strength of the support for each values item. Furthermore, the extent of commitment denotes the strength of *durability*, which suggests underlying 'values' – rather than superficial evaluation that is more likely to fluctuate being susceptible to

³ For some arguments on question types, see de Vaus, D. A., *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed. (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 86-92; de Vaus, David, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 99-107.

circumstantial changes. Thus, the variables of relative commitment are useful measures for the examination of values.

As noted, if one of the items still receives high scores in the measure of commitment, it denotes the strength and thus durability of support for that specific values item even with the loss of other items. If 'free speech', for example, has a certain degree of strength of support, that level indicates the extent of persistence that could transcend even a certain sacrifice or loss of 'order', 'prices' and 'more say'. In particular, the fact that 'order' and 'prices' are included as other items is important, since the index could show some durability of support for 'free speech' possibly even if social/political order and economic security were threatened to some degree. Likewise, this is the case with the measures of 'more say' and other items. Additionally, the strength of commitment on 'free speech' as well as 'more say' is especially important when it comes to the study in relation to democracy, as discussed below.

Another point to be noted is that the 'variable of relative commitment' is made up of the combination of two-step choices (giving '2' for the first choice and '1' for the second choice). By means of this strategy, the degree of relative emphasis can be tapped more deeply than an index that comprises only one choice.

4.2.4 Variables of 'more say' and 'free speech'

4.2.4.1 Rationale of focus: why 'more say' and 'free speech'?

The rationale for paying special attention to the difference between 'more say' and 'free speech' variables is as follows. Firstly, despite the fact that both 'more say' and 'free speech' are in the same category of Postmaterialist values, obviously what each of them connotes is not identical. This could lead to a difference in their distributions. It is therefore possible and worthwhile to analyse the distinctions between the two, which could not be done by the Postmaterialist index. In similar terms, secondly, sources of influence could differ between the two values items. One might be more susceptible to Postmaterialist effects, while the other might be more prone to other influences such as cultural particularities (or a mixture of influences). In other words, although 'more say' and 'free speech' are within the same category of Postmaterialist values, it is possible that the ways the two kinds of values take form are different to each other, and so are the types and ways of influences on

them. The degrees of the effects of Postmaterialist shift and cultural particularity could differ between 'more say' and 'free speech'. An aim of this chapter is to differentiate the ways in which such competing elements affect the states of these values items. Thirdly, the variables of 'more say' and 'free speech' are especially regarded as crucial due to their significance for some dimensions of democracy. These two values items respectively possess certain relevance to the aspect of governmental responsiveness as well as the normative direction of polyarchy, which will be mentioned in the fifth chapter.⁴ Therefore, special attention is paid to these two variables.

4.2.4.2 Difference of connotations and its outcome

The fact that they are both part of Postmaterialist values does not necessarily mean that they are the same. Although 'more say' and 'free speech' share some common elements and are thus compatible with each other to some extent, what they connote is not identical. They may share an attuned direction, but they are two individual items. Then, how different are they? 'More say' implies political participation, whereas 'free speech' denotes public expression. Participation has a vertical connotation, since it stands for the input of popular claims to political authority. Freedom, on the other hand, represents horizontal expression of popular views. Thus, the difference of the two items lies in their qualitative directions.

Obviously, 'free speech' holds strong connotations of freedom, which 'more say' does not necessarily share strongly. This subtle and seemingly slight difference could matter greatly in actual analysis and practice, as demonstrated in the following sections. For instance, if some societies have an important heritage of esteem for freedom while others do not, the state of the values distributions could be acutely affected by this gap. More precisely, it is said that freedom and individual autonomy are highly valued in Western societies as represented by the tradition of individualism. The cultural particularity of being Western could matter (that is, be advantageous) for having a relatively high degree of an emphasis on 'free speech' (and other values involving the sense of freedom). Meanwhile, the state of 'more say' could be less susceptible to such influence. This Western element of individualism could be a strong source of influence on the state of 'free

⁴ For the account of polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

speech' distributions, whereas societies that lack such a heritage could have considerably less appreciation for 'free speech' than Western societies. Likewise, such difference could be present even in the comparison of the four societies, showing a major distinction between two sides – the side shared by the USA and Britain, and that of Russia and Japan.

4.3 Methods of analysis

4.3.1 Assumption: what is to be tested?

The major aim of this chapter is comparison of 'more say' and 'free speech' variables in the context of dichotomous influences: Postmaterialist shift versus cultural particularity. This is conducted through the analysis of Russia, Japan, the USA and Britain, and of Postcommunist, East Asian and Western regions. The centre of concern is whether (and how) the two variables are affected by Postmaterialist shift or/and cultural particularity. Special attention is paid to an assumption that (due to their tradition of individualism and an emphasis on freedom) Western societies are likely to have relatively high appreciation of 'free speech' in comparison with other societies while maintaining a certain durability for this tendency. This means that cultural particularity especially matters to the values of 'free speech', despite the fact that 'free speech' belongs to Postmaterialist values. This point is disputable, since the Postmaterialist hypothesis holds that the spread of 'free speech' values is chiefly due to Postmaterialist shift. In this sense, the cultural particularity is regarded as a factor that could compete with Postmaterialist shift. Our task is to explore whether they actually compete and how.

In a practical analysis, the state of 'free speech' is compared with that of 'more say' which is another item of Postmaterialist values. By doing so, it is expected to demonstrate that, even in the same category of Postmaterialist values, the extent and manner of susceptibility to cultural particularity (and economic development) differs. Such a comparison is a functional method to illuminate the cultural susceptibility of 'free speech' in a tangible manner.

4.3.2 How to test

The most important point is: how we can figure out whether the states of the variables are

due to either Postmaterialist shift or cultural particularity, or to both? There are several methods to detect such differences, which are employed in subsequent examinations.

4.3.2.1 Durability: particularity versus shift

One effective method to explore such a distinction is to investigate 'durability' in distributions.

Average (mean) comparison: initial analysis

In an initial analysis, the evaluations of average (mean) scores over four time points across the four societies are conducted. These are presented through their comparisons within values items and within nations respectively. The point is to examine whether there are noticeably consistent differences over four time points (1981, 1990, 1995-8, 1999-2002) in degrees of support for the values items between nations as well as between the values items.

For instance, in an analysis to compare nations in terms of the state of each values item, if there are evident gaps between nations in a particular values item with strong persistence over the period, it will denote the existence of *durability* in their distinctions and thus imply national characteristics (viz. particularities) as regards that values item. On the contrary, if there are steady increases or decreases in a values item, it will suggest the possibility of a Postmaterialist shift. Likewise, in an examination within nations to compare between the values items, there may be coherent contrasts in the levels of esteem between the items transcending the period. This durability would imply national particularities of relative commitment to the respective four values items. In the mean time, constant rise or fall in their levels of support would indicate the possible effect of a Postmaterialist shift on the items.

Age cohort analysis: durability versus shift

In a subsequent part, the analysis is focused specifically on 'more say' and 'free speech', both of which belong to the Postmaterialist category. The study goes further to examine more details of them in relation to durability. Age cohort analysis is utilized, since it enables us to detect an indication of generational shift, where the predominant view of

younger age cohorts eventually take over that of older ones. If there is such a sign in favour of an increase, which consists of higher esteem in younger age cohorts plus a consistent rise over the multiple time points (with long-standing affluence or a comparable degree of economic security), this will plausibly suggest susceptibility of that values item to Postmaterialist shift. On the other hand, if there is no such evidence (especially with relatively equal distributions across the different age cohorts), it will rather point to the existence of durability in this values item. Moreover, if the overall degree in a given nation is particularly high or low in comparison with other nations while the degree is relatively constant across the multiple time points, it will be possible to infer that there is *particularity* of that nation with respect to the values item.

Scatterplot: comparison of durability against economic effect

This analysis goes beyond the four-society comparison. It incorporates worldwide cross-national data available from the World Values Survey with a nation (national aggregate/average) as a unit of cases, which also adds some flavour of generalisation. The scrutiny is centred on a contrast between 'more say' and 'free speech' with respect to the effect of economic development on them. An overlapped version of a scatterplot is used for the convenience of a visual comparison. To this, linear regression lines are attached for each of the two items.

According to the hypothesis of Postmaterialist shift, economic development is a crucial factor that enhances the values shift. With this rationale, the level of economy (GNP per capita) is employed as a key indicator of that aspect. While allocating economic level as an independent variable (X), 'more say' and 'free speech' are respectively assigned as dependent variables (Y). This provides a contrast of relative economic effects between 'more say' and 'free speech'. On the whole, if one of the two Y variables tends to hold a higher position than the other at given levels of economic development, it could be surmised that the former has higher (or more immediate) susceptibility to economic effect. At the same time, this would mean that the latter have stronger durability against economic impact. The higher susceptibility would represent more of a tendency to Postmaterialist shift whereas the greater stability would signify less influence of the values shift and thus suggest greater influence from cultural or local particularity. In this manner, relative

durability against economic development is investigated between 'more say' and 'free speech'.

4.3.2.2 Regional particularity

The question of cultural/local particularity *vis-à-vis* Postmaterialist shift is further explored in a regional context by taking advantage of the data available at the aggregate cross-national level. Regions, when adequately differentiated, could be representations of cultural zones, where identical or similar traditions are relatively shared.⁵ Of course, the meaning of cultural zone varies depending on what kinds and levels of human traditions are meant to be the objects of observation. In this analysis, the distinction of the West, Postcommunist and East Asia is regarded as useful and relevant, considering the earlier investigation on the four societies (Russia, Japan, the USA and Britain). Also, due to some particular heritages shared in each of the three regions, it would be quite legitimate to consider that, at some points, these regions possess categorical characteristics that are different from each other. In particular, in practice, as noticed later in the process of examination, it is observed that there are some regional characteristics, and some of them are meaningfully represented by the four societies. With this, the following analyses are employed to identify some valid clues to the issue of culture versus Postmaterialist shift.

Average (mean) comparison: initial analysis

As an initial analysis, mean scores of the three regions on 'more say' and 'free speech' variables are compared. Although they are simple averages, the figures give a primary and succinct view of the regional characteristics in relation to the two variables. As shown later, distinctions between 'more say' and 'free speech' as well as between regions monitored in the figure will consistently be a basis of what is discovered in subsequent

⁵ For example, Huntington differentiated, though controversially, several regional clusters that are regarded as sharing similar cultural and traditional heritages, calling the unit 'civilization'. See Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). In a more empirical manner, Inglehart tested and acquired positive results on an assumption that such regional distinctions exist and have influence on popular values. Nonetheless, the popular values, according to him, are also susceptible to economic development. See Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', *American Sociological Review*, 65 (2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and democracy', ch. 7, in Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97; Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997).

analyses.

Scatterplot: presence of regional particularity

This analysis is accompanied by another version of scatterplots. Although they could not provide precise numerical indicators, using this kind of visual figure is useful and effective in expressing the hidden trend of data in a tangible manner, which otherwise might not be easy in some cases. Being expressed by the axes of X and Y, a scatterplot could be perceived as a 'map' in which locations of dots (cases) sometimes form meaningful shapes.

The aim here is to probe the figures in terms of regional particularities. If cases of an identical region cluster around a similar position in the map, it would connote the possible existence of a regional character. This would be more likely when respective regions have such unique tendencies. If the locations of cases simply overlap or are compounded between different regions without any particular distinctions, the presence of regional particularities would be much less. The scatterplot employed in this analysis has an economic variable as X-axis (independent variable). This means that, if there is a distribution that signifies the presence of regional particularities, the regional particularities should be viewed as a factor that competes with economic effect (especially when some linear correlation is observed between X and Y). If there is no regional particularity while showing a linear correlation between X and Y, economic effect would be a predominant factor in that figure. The details of the visually perceived result will be further inspected by the following method of multiple regression analysis.

Multiple regression: regional particularity versus economic development

The multiple regression analyses employed here are to scrutinise the relative extents of dichotomous influences – regional cultural particularities and economic development – over people's commitment to 'more say' and 'free speech' respectively. Dummy variables are utilised for the purpose of tapping the regional particularities. Since the aim of analysis is mainly concerned with three regions, the created variables are 'West', 'Postcommunist' and 'East Asia'. As for coding in each of these variables, '1' is given to cases of a relevant region, and '0' to the rest. Coefficients presented by the multiple regressions will be lucid indicators in identifying how the binary influences compete. For reference, in a similar

context with different organisation of variables, the same method was used by Inglehart and Baker in order to search for the persistence of cultural/traditional values *vis-à-vis* the modernisation effect.⁶ The respective inspections of 'more say' and 'free speech' enable comparison between the two values items for the states of the competing influences on their formations. It is assumed that the influence of regional cultural particularity is noticeably high in 'free speech' in comparison with 'more say'. This is to be demonstrated in later analyses.

4.4 Durability of local particularity

This part presents the first half of output in actual analysis, which has been described so far. A major point is to scrutinise the extents of durability (*vis-à-vis* shift) in people's relative commitment to respective values items that derived from original questions of the Postmaterialist four-item index.

4.4.1 Initial analysis: average (mean) comparison

This section presents the result of an initial analysis on outputs from the Postmaterialist four-item index as well as the variables of relative commitment with the comparison of four societies across four waves.

4.4.1.1 Postmaterialist four-item index (figure 4.1)

In a previous chapter, Postmaterialist indexes were examined with comparisons of Russia,

⁶ See Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'. In their research, a dependent variable was a scale of 'traditional/secular-rational values' and 'survival/self-expression values', which constituted two multiple regression analyses. Their independent variables were 'variables measuring modernization and cultural heritage', which consisted of modernisation measures (such as real GDP per capita of 1980, percentage employed in industrial sector of 1980, percentage employed in service sector of 1980, percentage enrolled in education) as well as cultural heritage measures. In our research, dependent variables are 'more say' and 'free speech' that derive from the original questions of the Postmaterialist four-item index. In the mean time, the variable of 'survival/self-expression values' in Inglehart and Baker's research was composed of several variables that include the Postmaterialist four-item index. In that sense, their variables were for the search of comprehensive trends of popular values, whereas in a way our variables are to scrutinise very specific parts of what they studied. Nonetheless, it is still important and is valid to inspect 'more say' and 'free speech' independently, since our task is an *in-depth* analysis of *respective/specific* states and formations of the two values items, which possibly has a crucial implication in the issue of cultural particularity versus values shift/modernisation.

Japan, the USA and Britain. In this section, first of all, a summary analysis of the Postmaterialist four-item index is presented. This is presented as a primary observation to compare with the variables of relative commitment (which are reorganised versions on the basis of the four-item index) in a following part. In terms of the level of Postmaterialist values, Japan is somewhat lower, and Russia is obviously lower, than the USA and Britain. The USA and Britain are quite close. Also, this difference is consistent over four time points. This denotes that there is some durability in this values dimension.⁷

4.4.1.2 Variable of relative commitment (figures 4.2 and 4.3)

Considered here are the separated sum variables of the four items ('more say', 'free speech', 'order', and 'prices'). These variables represent relative commitment to the respective items. What is observed in figure 4.2 is that, especially for 'free speech', while the USA and Britain maintain comparable levels, Japan is obviously lower than them, and Russia is further lower. This also persists over different time points. As for 'more say', Britain and Japan are similar with some steady increase. The USA maintains a level comparable to the two nations over three time points, while showing a slight initial rise from the second to third waves. In the case of Russia, there is a decrease, being followed by a small increase. The steady rise of 'more say' in Britain and Japan (and partly the USA) possibly represents the Postmaterialist effect, due to long-standing economic security. The Russian change (especially the initial decrease) and lower emphasis on 'more say' may reflect economic deterioration, with priority on other values items in the Materialist category. As regards the item of support for 'order', the Russian case is distinctly high in comparison with the other three cases (that share similar levels). With respect to comparison between 'free speech' and 'more say', they are different. In 'free speech', the national difference persists, thus connoting durability. For 'more say', there is some similarity across nations, showing that they are possibly prone to economic changes.

Figure 4.3 presents a comparison of relative commitment to the respective four items within each nation. In the cases of Britain and the USA, people have more balanced levels

⁷ Though not presented as a figure in this chapter, analysis is made in Postmaterialist *twelve-item* index. It shows that in Japanese case the level of Postmaterialist values seems to be similar to the USA and Britain in relatively consistent way. This also illustrates that Japanese case is *lower* than the USA and Britain *particularly* in the Postmaterialist *four-item* index.

of commitment to the values items than in the other two societies. Postmaterialist items are, to a certain extent, at comparable levels to Materialist items (although the 'prices' item in the USA shows a gradual decrease and thus a deviation from the other items). In Japan and Russia 'free speech' receives distinctly lower support among the items. Moreover, in the Russian case, the support for order is very strong. These conditions, especially the state of 'free speech' support, persist in the respective nations across time points, implying the presence of durability.

4.4.2 Durability versus shift: age cohort analysis (figures 4.4 and 4.5)

We can further examine the stability as well as change in 'free speech' and 'more say' by investigating age cohort differences. If we look at figure 4.4, overall, there is not much difference in the support for 'free speech' over the age groups. Apart from slight fluctuations, the degrees of support tend to be steady in the four societies, whereas each of the societies maintains its own degree across the age differences. In the USA and Britain, the relatively high appreciations for 'free speech' are at similar levels over the separate age cohorts. Likewise, all the age cohorts in the Russian case are consistently at low levels. In Japan, in spite of some fluctuations, its particular level persists and is clearly distinct from that of the other societies.

On the contrary, in figure 4.5, there are observable changes in the case of 'more say'. In the cases of Japan, Russia and Britain, younger cohorts tend to have a higher commitment to 'more say'. In the USA, support for 'more say' is steady across the age cohorts at quite high levels, implying the stability of a comparatively strong commitment to 'more say'. In the cases of Britain and Japan, there is a steady increase over the available time points. This suggests a values shift that is consistent with the Postmaterialist hypothesis. In the case of Russia, there is a change in the overall level over the multiple time points, but this still keeps the age difference. The change may be due to the condition of the economy. Especially, economic deterioration may have facilitated its initial decrease as mentioned above.⁸ (The persistence of age difference might become conducive to values shift, if the economy were to attain good conditions.) At any rate, these indications of the changes in the 'more say' item still suggest some tendency to change – probably mainly

⁸ This perhaps encouraged a connection between economic concerns and the support of the 'more say' item

due to economic circumstances. In other words, the relative commitment to 'more say' has much less durability than that of 'free speech' (whether low or high).

4.4.3 Comparison of durability against economic effect: scatterplot (figure 4.6)

If we look at figure 4.6, this gives a comparison of scatterplots of the 'free speech' and 'more say' variables on the effect of economic development. Aggregate national means are used from the result of the World Values Survey 1995-98. According to the output, on the one hand, both the commitment to 'free speech' and 'more say' could be susceptible to economic change. Nonetheless, as seen in the graph, 'free speech' is consistently lower than 'more say'. The effect of economic development seems to be stronger on 'more say' than on 'free speech'. If the effectiveness of economic development is taken into account, the relative commitment to 'free speech' would be 'delayed' in comparison with that of 'more say'. Also, it should be noted that the R Squares in both cases are at moderate levels, so that it would only partly explain the linear effect of economic development on the two variables. Also, since this graph is assuming the linearity of the relationship, there may need to be some caution that there might be non-linear relationship. In fact, when curvilinear analysis is attempted, R Squares increase. At any rate, having looked at the overall scatterplot, a rise in economic development could have an impact on the increase of these variables. However, 'more say' consistently tends to take a position above 'free speech'. 'Free speech' seems to be more likely to maintain persistent levels.

4.5 Analysis of regional context: Does being Western, Postcommunist or East Asian matter?

This part presents the latter half of the output from the analysis. It is assumed that the difference between the four societies corresponds with that between three regions. The dichotomy of West versus non-West seems to be quite plausible, particularly in terms of the appreciation of 'free speech'. These points are demonstrated in the following sections.

4.5.1 Initial analysis: average (mean) comparison (table 4.1)

These are mean scores of the three regions (West, Postcommunist and East Asia). On the

whole, the averages of the Western region are higher than the other two. While the difference in the levels of 'more say' is relatively small, the gap in the score of 'free speech' is very obvious. This may be, on the one hand, surmised as regional cultural difference, in that the Western societies generally have a cultural tradition of a higher commitment to such values – especially to 'free speech'. But, is it really? Probably, we need to consider the economic factor. Since the Western region is obviously more economically developed and wealthier, this could be due to the economic effect as depicted by the Postmaterialist hypothesis (or, more broadly, modernisation theories).

4.5.2 Presence of regional particularity: scatterplot (figure 4.7)

Figure 4.7 is a demonstration of this question: the effect of economic development versus regional particularity. On the whole, there seems to be an economic effect – the higher the level of economic development, the greater the commitment to both. However, from the perspective of regionality, in 'free speech' especially, there is an observable regional difference. Each of the regional groups holds to a particular pattern. As for 'more say', regional distinction is rather ambiguous. This suggests that the state of 'more say' is mainly affected by economic difference, whereas 'free speech' is susceptible to regional particularity with durability (although also being affected by economic development). This difference is in clear accord with the earlier analysis.

4.5.3 Regional particularity versus economic development: multiple regression (table 4.2)

For the further exploration, multiple regression analysis is undertaken on the effect of economic development versus regional particularity. The result is as follows. As seen in table 4.2, as for 'free speech', there is a strong impact of regional particularity, while economic development also has an impact on the variable. With respect to 'more say', there seems to be little impact of regional particularity when entered with the economic variable. The economic variable constitutes a major predictor. (It should also be noted that the R Square on this is rather moderate unlike the case of 'free speech', so that there may also be other factors that have an impact or there may be a non-linear relationship.)

This suggests that the condition of 'more say' is susceptible to the effect that is

expected in the Postmaterialist hypothesis as well as the overall argument of modernisation theories (rather than stuck to regional particularity). Meanwhile, 'free speech' is more apt to be bounded by regional local factors with some durability, while sensitive to some economic or modernisation effect. In other words, 'more say' is changeable due to economic situations. Meanwhile, relatively high and stable commitment to 'free speech' is a particular asset in Western societies, as is the relatively weak commitment to 'free speech' in Postcommunist and East Asian societies.

4.6 Conclusion

4.6.1 Four societies: durability versus shift

From the comparison, for Russia and Japan the item of 'free speech' receives quite low support among the four items whereas in the USA and Britain 'free speech' is appreciated at comparable levels to the other items. As for 'more say', as seen in the case of Japan, there is a noticeable, consistent increase over the period of observation. In Russia, while the item of 'more say' is still low, there seems to be some fluctuation, unlike for 'free speech'. In the cases of the USA and Britain, the respondents have reasonably high regard for 'more say'. Considering these results, it is surmised that in Russia and Japan there are durable tendencies for weak commitment to 'free speech' whereas the appreciation of 'more say' is more subject to change. This implies that 'more say' is probably susceptible to changes in the environment such as the economic situation (whether long term or short term). On the other hand, 'free speech' seems to be much less affected by such factors keeping its state very steady.

The consistent increase of 'more say' in the Japanese and British cases may reflect a steady values shift due to long-standing economic security (as depicted by the Postmaterialist thesis). The relative stability with an initial rise in the level of American support for the 'more say' item would suggest that, after the process of values shift, the American values orientation may have reached 'a saturation point' of what is expected by the Postmaterialist theory. On the whole, the item of 'more say' seems to be more in agreement with the major issue of the Postmaterialist thesis, which hypothesises the impact of economic development on the increase of Postmaterialist values. Meanwhile, as for the

Russian change in 'more say' (and rise in 'prices'), it is inferred that the item is also somewhat sensitive to a short-term economic change (as some critics have argued).⁹ On the contrary, 'free speech' seems to be relatively free of such influence or at least comparatively high 'immunity' to the economic effect or the Postmaterialist effect, whilst receiving low appreciation in Russia and Japan and higher support in Britain and the USA.

Consequently, even if there emerge favourable conditions for Postmaterialist shift such as the attainment of economic prosperity and hopefully long-standing maintenance of affluence and security, what could be expected in Russia (and, as observed, in Japan) is quite likely to be a deficient version of the Postmaterialist effect. At least, if at all, the emergence of a high degree of support for 'free speech' would be considerably delayed (being compared with that of 'more say'). Besides such inference of the future, the current situation in Russia has, in economic terms, far from ideal conditions for the Postmaterialist hypothesis. For the moment at least, in comparison with actual improvement in daily lives, the luxury of Postmaterialist effects and values may not have reality in the actual minds of the people.

4.6.2 Regional implication

The characteristics observed at the level of national comparison between Russia, Japan, the USA and Britain correspond with the analysis at the level of regional comparison. That is, as far as the Postmaterialist-Materialist, 'more say' and 'free speech' variables scrutinised above are concerned, the cases of the USA and Britain quite clearly represent the regional group of the West. Likewise, the Russian case seems to neatly stand for the characteristics of the Postcommunist region, and the Japanese case for that of East Asia.

In Postcommunist and East Asian regions, as in the West, the inclination to 'more say' may be strengthened by economic development. Also, since the 'more say' dimension is associated with 'equality', the sense of equality may tend to be enhanced through


⁹ For example, Clarke, Harold D., Kornberg, Allan, McIntyre, Chris, Bauer-Kaase, Petra, and Kaase, Max, 'The Effect of Economic Priorities on the Measurement of Value Change: New Experiment Evidence', *American Political Science Review*, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 637-647; Clarke, Harold D. and Dutt, Nitish, 'Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment', *American Political Science Review* (1991), pp. 905-20; Duch, Raymond M., and Taylor, Michael A., 'Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition', *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (August 1993), pp. 747-79; For counter arguments to such a critique, see, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, and Abramson, Paul R., 'Measuring Postmaterialism', *American Political Science Review*, 93: 3 (September 1999).

economic development from a relatively early phase of the process. Moreover, according to the multiple regression, when incorporated as independent variables along with the economic effect, there is no significant indication that regional difference affects the state of the 'more say' variable. This suggests that, as far as the extent of appreciation for 'more say' is concerned, economic development has an impact whereas regional particularity *hardly* has.

In the meantime, in these non-Western regions, the obviously lower emphasis on 'free speech' than in the Western region is somewhat enduring. Although having some tendency to the influence of economic growth, the multivariate analyses show the strong susceptibility of 'free speech' to regional difference (which is not observed in the case of 'more say'). Being Western does matter in producing a higher commitment to 'free speech', and being non-Western (Postcommunist/East Asian) *vice versa*. Hence, while related to the values of 'freedom', this sphere seems to be strongly connected with regional cultural particularity. As mentioned earlier, Western societies are said to have a traditional esteem for freedom, which means that non-Western societies could have less strength of support in this area. Despite this seemingly simplistic assumption, the result indicates quite unequivocal and plausible support for it.


Consequently, in the Postcommunist and East Asian regions, although economic development would enhance the Postmaterialist effect, the result is not necessarily the fully-fledged version expected by the hypothesis. The support for 'free speech' could be a distinctly *local* characteristic of Western societies.

Figure 4.1 Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index: comparison of four societies across four time points




Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Figure 4.2 Variables of relative commitment to respective items: comparison of four societies across four time points




Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Figure 4.3 Comparison of four variables within each society




Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Figure 4.4 Free speech: age cohorts



Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Figure 4.5 More say: age cohorts



Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Note for Figures 4.4 and 4.5:

- (1) The youngest age group has a range between 15 and 24 years old for the 1999-2002 data and 18 and 24 years old for the other data.
- (2) A variable with six age categories is not available in the British data of 1998. Instead, a variable with three age categories is available.
- (3) The labels of age groups are based on categorisation in the respective datasets.

Figure 4.6 Comparison of economic effect: Free Speech and More Say




Table 4.1 Mean comparison: three regions

Report			
Three Regions		Free Speech Sum	More Say Sum
Postcommunist	Mean	.2490	.6009
	N	19	19
	Std. Deviation	.1116	.2140
West	Mean	.7380	.8969
	N	9	9
	Std. Deviation	.1014	.2414
East Asia	Mean	.2824	.6576
	N	3	3
	Std. Deviation	1.302E-02	.2484

Figure 4.7 Economic level versus regional difference





Table 4.2 Multiple regression models: effect of economic development versus regional particularity on relative commitment to Free Speech and More Say

Free Speech						
Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
GNP per capita \$, 1997	.147 (ns)	.416***	.687***	.374*		
West (= 1)	.585**			.174 (ns)	.520***	.512***
Postcommunist (= 1)		-.508***		-.509***	-.446***	-.540***
East Asia (= 1) (Beta)			-.346**	-.326**		-.390***
Adjusted R Square	0.469	0.555	0.434	0.695	0.635	0.694

More Say						
Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
GNP per capita \$, 1997	.529*	.490**	.580***	.715**	.541***	.528**
West (= 1)	.015 (ns)			-.234 (ns)		
Postcommunist (= 1)		-.147 (ns)		-.202 (ns)		-.160 (ns)
East Asia (= 1) (Beta)			-.143 (ns)	-.241 (ns)		-.155 (ns)
Adjusted R Square	0.257	0.277	0.277	0.28	0.275	0.282

Note: Coefficients are standardised.

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

N = 54 (Cases with missing values are excluded accordingly in respective analyses.)

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98

Chapter 5: Postmaterialist Variables and Democracy

5.1 Introduction

In comparison to previous chapters, this chapter is shorter but no less important. For while the issue of Postmaterialist-Materialist values has been examined so far, it is the present chapter that will demonstrate its implication for democracy. There are three major enquiries for the research, which were raised at the beginning of this dissertation. Our examination in the third and fourth chapters has had direct relevance for the first question: (1) how do Postmaterialist values shift and cultural particularity respectively affect the condition of the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension? The outcome has shown that the effects of the values shift and cultural particularity differ depending on Postmaterialist values items. What implication does it have for democracy? In order to explore this issue, the present chapter attempts to answer the other two research enquiries. The first section addresses the question: (2) what implication do Postmaterialist values have for democracy? It demonstrates the dimension of democracy to which Postmaterialist values items are pertinent. Particular attention is paid to the items of 'more say' and 'free speech' in the four-item Postmaterialist index (and its variants). For democracy, polyarchy is employed as a tentative model. The second section is for the question: (3) how do the values shift and cultural particularity matter to the state of democracy? It connects the logic of the first section with results from the previous chapters. In this way, the outcomes for (1) and (2) are combined together in order to answer question (3).

5.2 Postmaterialist variables and polyarchy

In Inglehart's view, Postmaterialist values are more likely to be conducive to democracy than Materialist values.¹ But, what type or dimension of democracy do the values affect? After all, it is the kind of democracy that attaches importance to 'the responsiveness to

¹ For an association between the Postmaterialist values and democracy, see for example, Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 210, 213-4; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Howard J. Wiarda ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 149-152; Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', *PS* (January 2003), p. 54.

popular claims'. The values items of the Postmaterialist index – especially, 'more say' and 'free speech' – could represent societal conditions under which individuals have a relatively strong inclination to have a say and communicate their wishes to government. This propensity has certain relevance to the quality of polyarchy. To expand on this point, let us start with a rationale for using the framework of polyarchy.

5.2.1 Polyarchy

For the study of democracy (especially in comparative as well as quantitative methods), it is crucial to define what is meant by 'democracy'. For this, to examine a framework of democracy is particularly useful. In this research, as an institutional sphere of democracy, polyarchy is employed as a conceptual model.² Polyarchy, for the convenience of analysis, is utilised as a tentative model that elucidates a single aspect of democracy. Therefore, it is not an absolute or general sense of democracy. It is employed as a conceptual measure in order to provide a clear scope for this study.

As Dahl states, 'a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.'³ To be fair, Dahl recognises that there are other elements in democracy. However, the main concern is specifically 'responsiveness'.⁴ To him, there are two chief dimensions of a democratic system: 'public contestation' and 'right to participate in election and office (inclusiveness)'.⁵ These aspects have, as noted later, considerable relevance to the Postmaterialist-Materialist perspective.

The model of polyarchy seems to be intrinsically focused on qualities of liberty. It involves the guarantee of freedom for the expression of one's own views and the formation of organisations, which can be mainly related to public contestation. The model also includes political rights for voting and running for elective offices, which can have direct relevance to inclusiveness. The political rights entitle people to participate on the basis of

2 For a brief introduction of polyarchy, see Masahiro, Iwasaki, and Kogure Kentaro, 'Seiji-hatten-ron [Political Development Theories]', in Kohno, Masaru and Masahiro Iwasaki, eds., *Akusesu Hikaku-seiji-gaku* [Access to Comparative Politics] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 71-91, esp. 74-77.

3 Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 1.

4 See *ibid.*, p. 1-2.

5 For the theoretical discussion on public contestation, inclusiveness (right to participate) and polyarchy, see *ibid.*, pp. 1-16.

their free wills. One might criticise the potential that employing the concept of polyarchy may encounter a normative bias on liberty in the interpretation of democracy.⁶ It is still, nonetheless, legitimate to use it as a conceptual measure. The evaluation is made while being aware of the fact that it could be a specific aspect of democracy. Insofar as there is such awareness, its objectivity can be secured. Moreover, the adoption of this standard enables the researcher to conduct an effective evaluation. One can estimate distances or variances of cases from the standard, whereby comparisons and appraisals are conducted clearly.⁷ Thus, the concept of polyarchy is adopted for an objective reason. Another point is that, as argued in the first chapter, the 'institutional' guarantee of freedom is in fact a crucial asset for a democratic system. There might be a gap in the emphasis and perception of liberty in 'values' between diverse cultural and ideological contexts, which could be a source of normative conflict. The 'institution' represented by polyarchy, however, constitutes an important component of a democratic system with a practical efficacy, which can have a certain validity cross-nationally. Furthermore, the model of polyarchy has been broadly utilised as an empirical framework for evaluating democracy.⁸

As for the actual measurement, Freedom House ratings are useful in this research.⁹ Diamond wrote that '[t]he "free" rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available

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- 6 For critiques of liberal democracy especially from non-Western contexts, see Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in David Held ed., *Prospect for Democracy: North, South, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-75; Lee, Kuan Yew and Fareed Zakaria, 'Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew', *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (1994), pp. 109-26; Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.
 - 7 For the argument of an ideal type analysis, see Peters, B. Guy, *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp. 105-107, 192. For concept stretching, see *ibid.*, p. 19. Also, for concepts and conceptualisation, see *ibid.*, pp. 81, 83-4, 86, 108, 146-7.
 - 8 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20:1 (March 2004), p. 30.
 - 9 For the explication of the Freedom House ratings, see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>. One might criticise the certain weakness of the indicator in terms of scientific rigour. Nonetheless, the Freedom House measure is widely employed by a number of political studies, which would virtually legitimise its validity. Likewise, Berg-Schlosser acknowledges the Freedom House ratings as a 'proxy' for comparing different democracy indicators. See *ibid.*, p. 34. It would be fair to argue that other indicators also suffer similar and/or other shortcomings. Moreover, the ratings can be employed for a practical reason to refer to other studies that utilise it. For the critique of democracy indexes, see Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices', *Comparative Political Studies*, 35: 1 (February, 2002), pp. 5-34. For discussions on measuring democracy, see Beetham, David ed., *Defining Measuring Democracy* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994).

empirical indicator of liberal democracy'.¹⁰ Berg-Schlosser referred to liberal democracy, which shares a similar direction with polyarchy.¹¹ He examined several indicators on democracy and pointed out that the 'political rights' measure (Freedom House) in fact highly correlates with major indexes such as 'institutionalized democracy' (Polity) and 'voice and accountability' (World Bank) indicators.¹² According to Coppedge and Reinicke, the Freedom House ratings have strong correlations with their Polyarchy Scale.¹³ Inglehart, often with Welzel, frequently utilises the Freedom House measure as a basis for their indexes of democracy.¹⁴ Since our study is concerned with Inglehart's thesis, it would be useful to employ the same measure for a comparative reason. Thus, the use of the Freedom House ratings is appropriate for the present study.

The Freedom House ratings consist of two types of scores: 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. The 'political rights' item would be largely pertinent to the aspect of rights to participate (inclusiveness). This item also overlaps with public contestation, since it includes openness to competitive political groupings and the presence of oppositions as criteria. On the other hand, the item of 'civil liberties' could represent the elements of foundation for public contestation and inclusiveness. Berg-Schlosser argues that, in addition to the dual qualities, a normative dimension in relation to civil liberties is presupposed in Dahl's notion.¹⁵ Likewise, Diamond regards civil liberties as crucial for the two aspects of polyarchy.¹⁶

¹⁰ Diamond, Larry, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 12. Also, see the argument of polyarchy and quantitative measure in Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 27-31.

¹¹ Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', pp. 29-32.

¹² Ibid., pp. 34-9.

¹³ They report their scale's correlation coefficients as .938 and .934 for the political rights and civil liberties respectively. Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, 'Measuring Polyarchy', in Inkeles, Alex ed., *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 57, 67.

¹⁴ For instance, see Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, ch. 6, pp. 160-215; Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And How Can We Measure it?'; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' *Comparative Politics*, 36: 1 (October 2003), p. 61-70; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁵ Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', p. 30.

¹⁶ Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, p. 8. He uses terms: 'opposition' and 'participation' for the two aspects of Dahl's polyarchy.

5.2.2 Values and institution

The institutional aspects of democracy, as presented in the previous section, could be understood in the context of public contestation and inclusiveness. This leads to the issue of how people's values can be related to institutions. When public contestation and inclusiveness are considered in relation to popular values, people's attitudes towards expressing their views in public and towards government are crucial. This orientation is a major factor that underpins the two qualities of polyarchy at the individual level.

For example, if a large proportion of the population share a relative propensity to freely discuss and advance their opinions, the function of public contestation will have a direct connection with the people. The account of public contestation involves the presence of competitive opposition groups *vis-à-vis* the government. This will acquire democratic substance if they are supported by the people who are willing to express their views and demands freely. Similarly, the system of inclusiveness will also be fulfilled by a public inclination to participation. Dahl presupposes that 'the greater the opportunities for expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be represented in policy making'.¹⁷ As the requisites of democracy in the context of polyarchy, he points out that elements such as 'right to vote', 'freedom of expression', 'freedom to form and join organisations' and so forth should be institutionally guaranteed.¹⁸ Given this, it is a people's inclination towards free expression and participation that would actively utilise such arrangements while giving functional substance to them.

On the other hand, if people lack such attitudes, the likely outcome will be quite different and such a tendency would mean silence and acquiescence. If the people are simply apt to comply with the decisions of political authorities and have little inclination to contest them, the arrangement of polyarchy should have very different consequences. Public contestation would rarely have any driving force from society. The role of ordinary people would be replaced by elite competition.¹⁹ Individuals would be kept at some

¹⁷ Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 26.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 2-3; Dahl, Robert A., *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10-11; Dahl, Robert A., *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 220-222.

¹⁹ Robinson is critical of polyarchy, by arguing that '[p]olyarchy refers to a system in which a small group

distance from the political arena, only pursuing private goals and being withdrawn from public affairs. The inclusiveness, if exercised, could be taken advantage of by the political authorities for mobilisation rather than a means for participation by the people.²⁰ Thus, the difference of popular attitudes can have different implications for the practice and function of the two aspects of polyarchy.

5.2.3 Postmaterialist items and the dual aspects of polyarchy

In such a context, the Postmaterialist four-item index is important to polyarchy. In the question set of the Postmaterialist four-item index, there are two items that have particular relevance: (1) giving people 'more say' in important government decisions, and (2) protecting 'freedom of speech'. In fact, as presented in table 5.1, there are significant correlations between the Postmaterialist items ('more say' and 'free speech') and two dimensions ('political rights' and 'civil liberties') in the Freedom House ratings.²¹ As noted above, the ratings are employed as measures that have certain relevance to polyarchy in this research. Thus, the attitudinal elements represented by the Postmaterialist items seem to matter to the polyarchy-like democracy.

On the whole, there seems to be a Postmaterialist influence on the sphere of 'civil liberties'. The two Postmaterialist items also seem to have a congruent influence on 'political rights', which can be relevant to the two aspects of polyarchy to a certain extent. As for the two aspects, further conceptual elucidation might be possible on the paths of the influence. As presented in figure 5.1, in relative terms, the values item of 'more say' is more pertinent to the right to participate (inclusiveness), whereas the 'free speech' item can be more relevant to public contestation.²² Public contestation and 'free speech' has a

actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites'. See Robinson, William I., *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 49. Although his critique may not entirely grasp the whole account of polyarchy, there could be such potential unless a given system of polyarchy is grounded on proactive or participatory popular values and behaviour that activate the system.

20 For example, during the period of the USSR, voting virtually had a character of an artificial mobilisation by the political authorities. See for instance, White, Stephen, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), esp. pp. 1-19.

21 In relation to this, Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index has significant and high correlation with Freedom House indices as observed by Inglehart. See Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And How Can We Measure it?', p. 54.

22 In connection with this, in Inglehart's later work, the Postmaterialist four-item index (which includes 'free speech' and 'more say') was developed into a slightly more elaborated version being called a measure of

horizontal connotation in society. The right to participate (inclusiveness) and 'more say' are more vertical since they imply the input of popular claims on government.²³

In addition, Inglehart argues that the Postmaterialist values orientation can enhance people's inclination to protest in a manner that contributes to democracy.²⁴ By democracy, he seems to mean a democracy that attaches importance to responsiveness to people's claims.²⁵ This view accords with the normative direction of polyarchy that emphasises contestation and participation, being underpinned by civil liberties. As noted earlier, on the side of popular outlooks, an element that supports such dimensions of democracy is a popular propensity to free public expressions and demands on government. These attitudinal elements are in fact the components of the Postmaterialist values.

'liberty-participation'. This naming and probably his awareness coincide with the conceptual correspondence between the nature of the four-item index and the two dimensions of polyarchy. See, for example, Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' p. 65.

23 The figure is slightly modified by swapping the vertical and horizontal axes of the polyarchy in accordance with this view.

24 See, for instance, Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, esp. pp. 211-213. Inglehart often refers to 'elite-challenging' styles of participation due to the values shift. See Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 5, 335-370; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 43-44, 307-315; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 94-134.

25 Inglehart and Welzel mention responsive governance in relation to self-expression values. See Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

Table 5.1 Correlation: Postmaterialist items and the dual aspects of democracy

		Freedom House Ratings	
		Political Rights	Civil Liberties
Free Speech	Pearson Correlation	.333*	.470**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.024	.001
	N	46	46
More Say	Pearson Correlation	.525***	.583***
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
	N	47	47

Note:

(1) The years of the Freedom House Ratings are in accordance with the years of survey sampling in respective nations.


(2) The scores of 'free speech' and 'more say' are national averages measured by the scales of relative commitment to each of the items, which are developed from question items in the World Values Survey.

(3) *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001.

Figure 5.1 Values and institution: Postmaterialist values items and the dual aspects of polyarchy (with modification)

Items for Postmaterialist four-item index

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| 1. Maintaining order in the nation | [Materialist] |
| 2. <u>Giving people 'more say' in important government decisions</u> | [Postmaterialist] |
| 3. Fighting rising prices | [Materialist] |
| 4. <u>Protecting 'freedom of speech'</u> | [Postmaterialist] |



Source: For the original diagram of the two aspects of polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 6.

5.3 Values shift, cultural particularity and democracy

As argued above, the two items of the Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index: 'more say' and 'free speech' have close relevance to the quality of polyarchy. With this framework, this section attempts to answer the third question of the research enquiries. The question reads as follows:

(3) How do the values shift and cultural particularity matter to the state of democracy?

In order to study this, it is necessary to combine two analytical results. The first result is (A) the competing effects of the values shift and cultural particularity on Postmaterialist-Materialist values, which was examined in previous chapters. The second one is (B) the relevance of Postmaterialist values items to democratic institutions, which has been clarified in the above section. For an effective explanation, it would be beneficial to review the preceding results on point (A).

5.3.1 Review: values shift vs. cultural particularity

Preceding chapters have found variations in the effects of the values shift and cultural particularity in relation to Postmaterialist-Materialist distributions. The Postmaterialist item: 'giving people *more say* in important government decisions', especially, was shown to be prone to values shift (as a consequence of economic growth and its sustained stability). As for Japan, there is an increase in the support for 'more say'. In Russia, 'more say' receives still low scores with some fluctuation. For the USA and Britain, respondents have consistently shown a relatively high regard for 'more say'. In contrast, the other Postmaterialist item: 'protecting *freedom of speech*' is less affected by values shift. The USA and Britain tend to have a comparatively strong emphasis on 'free speech' whereas its appraisal is clearly lower in Japan and Russia. The difference shows persistence, leaving each national level holding very steady. The degrees of appreciation for 'free speech' seem to have durability at the respective levels of the societies. This in turn suggests that idiosyncratic cultural or historical experience could be related to their particular levels. This has been discovered to be the case with tripartite regional contexts: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions. The emphasis on 'more say' exhibits susceptibility

to the values shift (and therefore, to economic development). 'Free speech' is clearly less so, implying cultural durability. On the whole, Western societies tend to cluster around a higher support level for 'free speech' and the Postcommunist and East Asian societies are likely to have lower appreciation in comparison.

5.3.2 'More say', 'free speech' and polyarchy

With this, what could be inferred for democracy in view of the above-mentioned point (B)? Point (B) denotes the relevance of 'more say' and 'free speech' to polyarchy. The following is its implication for the four societies. For the USA and Britain, both levels in favour of 'more say' and 'free speech' are reasonably high. This indicates the presence of stable popular outlooks to give certain attitudinal substance to the functions of civil liberties, public contestation and participation (inclusiveness). In the case of Japan, considering the steady low commitment to the support for 'free speech', popular values condition as underpinning for polyarchy would not be as substantial as that of its Western counterparts. Japanese people may have an inclination to 'more say' in government. They have much less concern, however, for 'free speech' with some hesitancy in public expression, discussion and the articulation of claims at an individual level. Indeed, according to the World Values Survey, the Japanese inclination to 'discuss politics with friends' is consistently the lowest among the four societies from the first to the third Waves. For Russia, the commitment to the two Postmaterialist values items (especially 'free speech') is at a low level, so that popular attitudes that support polyarchy have far less solid ground at least in this attitudinal sphere. Moreover, considering the 'immunity' of low support for 'free speech' to the values shift and thus economic factors, the fully-fledged emergence of Postmaterialist values could be considerably hindered, even if economic growth and its maintenance were achieved. For the Postmaterialist effects would tend to be valid on 'more say', but much less so on 'free speech' in Russia. In the political realm, economic development may enhance attitudinal underpinning of polyarchy to a certain extent, especially in the realm of participation. Nonetheless, it would not necessarily facilitate a popular inclination towards public expression. Thus, in Russia, there can be weakness in the effect of values shift to increase an attitudinal element that encourages civil liberties and public contestation with democratic substance.

What is their regional connotation? For all the three regions: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions, the inclinations to 'more say' could increase owing to economic development. In the political realm, economic development could be effective for reinforcing this aspect of popular attitude in a manner to support polyarchy. Nonetheless, in the Postcommunist and East Asian regions, the relatively low emphasis on 'free speech' is somewhat enduring, being influenced by regional particularities. The durable low regard for free expression in these regions can be a sign of attitudinal weakness in relation to civil liberties as well as democratic public contestation. Consequently, in Postcommunist and East Asia regions, even if economic development and its long-standing maintenance are achieved, the Postmaterialist effect would not necessarily be the fully-fledged version expected by the hypothesis. Popular values that underpin polyarchy could be less fostered in the range of Postmaterialist-Materialist values. In the meantime, in Western societies, the values shift based on economic development may have strengthened individuals' orientations to giving 'more say' to the government. As for support for 'free speech', a Western cultural penchant to give it priority seems to have been already and uniquely present. At least, such a cultural proclivity has been favourable to the Postmaterialist effect as regards the 'free speech' item. Thus, the particular characteristic of Western societies seems to be advantageous for the Postmaterialist values conditions as well as the democratic substance of polyarchy.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has suggested a tentative conclusion in relation to issues on the Postmaterialist four-item index and democracy. Polyarchy is employed as a pertinent model for this study. It is argued that two Postmaterialist items of the index ('more say' and 'free speech') are relevant to the model. This framework is applied to an outcome obtained in previous chapters. An overall conclusion is that, in Postcommunist and East Asian societies (including Russia and Japan), a values shift could have less effect than what is expected by the Postmaterialist hypothesis, so that there could be a certain weakness in its efficacy to nurture popular attitudes conducive to polyarchy. On the other hand, Western societies tend to receive full benefit in the values shift and, as a consequence, in the

development of an attitudinal underpinning for such a model of responsive democracy.

Since polyarchy has relevance to an aspect of liberal democracy as mentioned earlier, the result is critical for the state of liberal democracy. Culture seems to matter especially on outlooks on liberty and perhaps towards behavioural consequences for democracy. Economic growth and values shift would not necessarily be perfect medicines for liberal democratic development in the sphere of values in Postcommunist and East Asian contexts. Even if the sign of the attitudinal transformation emerges in a difficult domain, it could take a considerable length of time until the effect takes root.

With this, the following chapters further examine popular attitudes, especially those concerned with liberal democratic dimensions. First of all, the study will focus on the issue of freedom. Subsequently, the focus is extended to political aspects. Finally, associations between liberal democratic attitudes and political variables are explored in a comparative manner. In this context, the next chapter will explore the issue of freedom. So far, it has been discovered that there are enduring cultural differences in the level of esteem for 'free speech'. But, is freedom simply de-emphasised in non-Western societies? It is not necessarily so. The chapter will probe variations in the perception of freedom.

Chapter 6: Freedom

6.1 Introduction

Freedom has crucial implications for democracy, as it relates to popular outlooks on individual rights, participation and freedom of speech.¹ Analytical results so far have shown that there is societal divergence in the emphasis on free speech. The difference seems to be especially marked between Western and non-Western societies. With this in mind, the present chapter further explores the issue of freedom. A variable mainly examined is the relative priority of freedom and order, which connotes respondents' emphasis on either individuals' liberty or the power of political authority. Since the latter has the potential to deter individuals' spontaneous political behaviour, popular support for freedom as against order by the state could be conducive to the balanced functioning of democratic governance.

Nonetheless, even if the people appreciate freedom, the kinds of freedom on which various societies place their emphasis could differ. There may be divergent perceptions of freedom that are either conducive or non-conducive to the function of democracy. For democracy in the sense of polyarchy, Dahl points to the guarantee of freedom in several areas as its requirements.² These denote freedom of political involvement, which in turn would be supported by popular attention that is politically proactive rather than passive. Nonetheless, there could be a type of freedom that is not necessarily compatible with such a connotation, as argued later. Moreover, this difference seems to have relevance to a values dimension depicted by the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. A point that must be addressed is whether such a difference should be interpreted in the context of either cultural particularities or a values shift in economic modernisation processes. Our basic hypothesis is that, although there could be the effect of economic development to push for

1 For the issue of freedom and democracy, see for instance, Rose, Richard, 'Freedom as a Fundamental Value', *International Social Science Journal*, 145 (1995), pp. 457-471; Zakaria, Fareed, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* (November 1997); Plattner, Marc F., 'Liberalism and Democracy: Can't Have One Without the Other', *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1998); Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 6th ed. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 18-20; Beetham, David, 'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

2 Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 1-16.

a certain direction favourable to the Postmaterialist orientation, there is the presence and durability of culture that affects the state of the values concerned. Culture could hinder, diverge from or in some cases support the Postmaterialist effect. This chapter pays attention to these points while particularly referring to the meaning of freedom. A major aim is to explore the presence of social difference and how it is affected by social/regional particularities.

6.2 Order versus freedom: initial observation

Below are the results of a question that asks respondents which is the more important responsibility of government as between (1) to maintain order in society and (2) to respect the freedom of the individual.³ In the third wave of the World Values Survey, an initial observation is that the USA and Russia have a balanced view of order and freedom while Japan has a significant inclination towards order (figure 6.1).⁴ A later survey (the fourth wave) also reveals that Russia has a balanced view in this regard.⁵

6.2.2 Japan: order orientation

When literally interpreted from the question, in Japan the great majority of respondents expect the government to maintain order in society rather than to ensure the freedom of the individual, if they have to choose either. Does this mean that the people possess general attitudes that could potentially comply with the central authorities to limit political and/or civil liberties if it was imperative to maintain order? In reality, a current possibility of such an urgent case would be low, since Japan has maintained a stable liberal democratic system, social stability and positive economic performance. However, many Japanese seem to have a certain susceptibility to the collective interests of society rather than individual liberty.

³ Data on the USA, Russia and Japan are available for this.

⁴ For issues in relation to order and freedom in Russia, see Gibson, James L., 'The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 32: 2 (1997), pp. 271-290; Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions between Democracy and Order among Russian Citizens', *Studies in Public Policy* 352 (2001).

⁵ For the Russian figures of the fourth wave, 52.1 per cent of the respondents chose 'order' whereas 47.9 per cent of them selected 'freedom'. American, British and Japanese data are not available for this wave. See Appendix 1.

Moreover, there seems to be attitudinal consistency in this proclivity across various segments of society. In relation to the 'order vs. freedom' variables, the analyses of several sociological variables are conducted, including gender, income, subjective social class, occupation, employment status and age. The Japanese percentages of those who prefer 'freedom' are consistently lower than American and Russian counterparts across the sub-groups of the sociological variables. For most of the categories, gaps are evident between Japan and the other two societies.⁶ This suggests that, on the whole, Japanese respondents' low priority of 'freedom' *vis-à-vis* 'order' are not much affected by these sociological variations. This could be interpreted as indicating that there is a certain durability in its tendency.

Why is there such a skew towards order? This would be related to a conformist orientation in the Japanese tradition. Culturally, the people seem to have an inclination to security by being part of a group or the larger social entity to which they belong.⁷ There are studies in which a Japanese orientation to collectivism (and ambivalence towards individual freedom) is mentioned.⁸ There is a well-known proverb: 'if you go under a big tree, you will be in the shadow [that is, secure]', which depicts a typical Japanese character prone to authority and conformism.⁹ Traditionally, people's cooperation for the good of a 'whole' is accompanied by their expectation for consequential positive outcomes rather than immediate personal interests. An overall prosperity is often perceived as increasing individuals' security and welfare.¹⁰ The expectation would be informally conceived in

6 As exceptions, the categories where the gaps are narrow are such as the sub-group of 'lower' in a subjective social class variable and the youngest age cohort (18-24 years old) of a six-category age variable.

7 Heywood mentions Japanese emphasis on groups as well as community and social cohesion. See Heywood, Andrew, *Politics* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), p. 34.

8 For instance, see Maruyama, Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo*, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 26, 158-81; Lipset, S. M., *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (London/New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 211-63, 293-6; Sato, Yoshiko, *Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho to Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku* [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shin-sha, 2001).

9 The proverb is pronounced as 'yoraba taiju no kage' in Japanese. Another proverb would be: 'be rolled up by things that are long (nagai-mono niwa makarero)'. These are often quoted by Japanese themselves (in somewhat resigned or satirical manners).

10 Such a logic is compatible with an 'economic first model' in East Asian nations, where the enlargement of civil and political rights tend to be put aside while a priority is given to the national achievement of an economic growth. For the East Asian model, see Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then (Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East Asian Model', in *Democracy and Democratization: Post-*

exchange for their patience by suppressing personal liberty (which would be often regarded as selfishness).¹¹ In such customary norms, the order of the whole system would be taken as prior to individual freedom. Such order is supposed to provide the efficiency of the system, which can be conducive to an effective achievement of overall goals. The strong sense of order rather than freedom in Japan seems to reside in such outlooks.

Does such a quality affect politics at the national level? Contemporary Japan has high diversification and complexity in views and interests, so that collective identification and solidarity would be presently unlikely for the nation as a whole.¹² Moreover, Japan has maintained liberal democratic arrangements that guarantee extensive freedom.¹³ However, at the individual level, they have a basic attitudinal stance to depend on larger social contexts for their security rather than to be independent individuals. A sense of individuality is somewhat weak, which has a constant potential to submerge into collectivity.¹⁴ This quality could enhance their susceptibility to the state authority or main streams of public opinions without inherent strength and consistency to uphold individual liberty.¹⁵ Although current Japanese values have been attaining a stronger sense of freedom, the cultural proclivity of conformism seems to stubbornly remain.¹⁶

As for democracy, it seems that in Japan there is an embedded values element that could potentially run counter to the normative direction of democratic models such as polyarchy. In the account of polyarchy, for instance, Dahl argues that freedom of expression, freedom to form organisations, the right to votes, the right to run for elective

Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 255-268.

- 11 As East Asian characteristics, Heywood points out their emphasis on practical prosperity prior to individual freedom. See Heywood, *Politics*, p. 34.
- 12 Japanese society comprises the competitions of divergent groups. Pye mentions a perspective that, whereas Japanese have cultural propensity to commit themselves to group identity, the intensity of the belonging has a simultaneous consequence of competitions in wider society. See Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, p. 168-170.
- 13 For instance, Japanese scores on civil liberties and political rights in the Freedom House ratings are at a comparable level to Western democratic counterparts.
- 14 This point agrees with what Maruyama persistently argues. See Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].
- 15 In relation to this propensity, for instance, Maruyama's categorisation of individuals might be useful with some reinterpretation. See Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in Marius B. Jansen ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 489-531.
- 16 For example, an age cohort analysis of the 'order vs. freedom' variable suggests higher preference for freedom in younger generations, whereas the overall level *per se* is clearly lower than the levels of the USA and Russia. However, a caution on the possibility of a life-cycle effect is needed for its interpretation.

office and so forth should be institutionally guaranteed.¹⁷ Freedom is presupposed as an inherent norm. In the sphere of popular values, these can be underpinned by respect for personal autonomy. For such an emphasis would motivate one to seek for freedom and its entitlement in a manner to utilise the democratic arrangements. Thus, the values of freedom can constitute a quality that provides substance to democracy at least in the sense of polyarchy. In more general terms, this would be the case with liberal democracy. Parekh argues that liberalism is the premise and foundation of liberal democracy, and that 'liberalism takes the individual as the ultimate and irreducible unit of society' while stating that individualism 'lies at the heart of liberal thought.'¹⁸ As mentioned above, nonetheless, most Japanese respondents appear to be prone to prioritising the 'whole' rather than the 'individual'. The sense of individuality and liberty seem to be much less emphasised than the collective interest. This could diminish people's inclination to uphold individual rights.¹⁹ The weak rights consciousness can lead to a lack of attitudinal strength in participation and contestation.²⁰ If this is the case, popular values in Japan could have a considerable influence on the workings of polyarchy and probably liberal democracy.²¹

6.2.3 The USA and Russia: equilibrium and liberal democracy?

On the other hand, both the cases of the USA and Russia show fairly balanced percentages between order and freedom. In the case of the USA, there is an observable tension between the two elements. It could be initially surmised that the USA's democratic system is functioning with popular values that attach almost equivalent importance to order and freedom. Similarly, as presented in table 6.1, the available data from the World Values

17 Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 2-3; Dahl, Robert A., *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10-11; Dahl, Robert A., *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 220-222.

18 Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in Held, David, ed., *Prospect for Democracy: North, South, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), Ch. 7, p. 157.

19 Lipset mentions Japanese cultural predisposition in clear contrast with American one, including their different emphases on either obligation or rights. See Lipset, Seymour Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 211-263, 293-296.

20 For the concept of right consciousness, see Gibson, James L., Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', *The Journal of Politics* 54: 2 (May 1992), pp. 329-371; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', *Political Research Quarterly*, 47: 1 (1994), pp. 5-39, esp. appendix.

21 Heywood notices the possibility that 'polyarchical institutions operate differently in an Asian context from the way they do in a western one' while pointing out Asian cultural difference from values 'shaped by liberal individualism'. See Heywood, *Politics*, p. 34.

Survey (1995-98) indicate that Western democracies also largely attach an equal priority to order and freedom.²² If it is supposed that Western democratic systems are relatively close to the ideal of polyarchy or liberal democracy, the equilibrium may be a values condition supportive of such a democratic model.

As mentioned above, the guarantee of freedom is a crucial asset of polyarchy as well as liberal democracy. Accordingly, one of the citizens' qualities that give it substance would be their inclination to freedom of speech. It was found that Western societies tended to have a comparatively strong commitment to that quality. This connotes that the presence of masses with an emphasis on liberty would be advantageous to such a democratic system. Nonetheless, freedom without order could be conducive to an unstable state of society. With this primary awareness, it seems that those living in Western democracies tend to conceive the importance of order as counter-balancing that of freedom. In other words, Western respondents' emphasis on liberty is not necessarily a sole esteem of freedom. It is accompanied by a sound consciousness of societal order.²³

Given this, does the Russian balance between order and freedom as in the Western democracies mean that Russia also has a set of values that are conducive to polyarchy or liberal democracy? Not necessarily. It would be hasty to reach this conclusion in such a manner. To help to answer this question, in the subsequent sections, perception gaps between societies in their understanding of freedom are examined. The gaps could be crucial thresholds in terms of whether the respective societies' values (as regards order vs. freedom) are compatible with such a model of democracy.

6.3 Meaning of freedom

This section explores further the meaning of freedom relevant to each of the societies.

6.3.1 Freedom of the individual versus freedom of speech

²² An exception is Norway. Also, as for a result in the 1999-2002 World Values Survey, see Appendix 1.

²³ In other words, the perception of order in the Western sense seems to hold individuals as autonomous and thus separate agents for its premise. On the contrary, the Japanese (or Asian) view of order appears to have an emphasis on a holistic perspective, where individuals are ambiguously merged in larger social contexts. Distinctions between individuals, and between individuals and society/groups, are not clearly defined.

In addition to the variable of 'order vs. freedom' examined above, a result of observation on disaggregated version of the four-item Postmaterialist index needs to be considered, which was demonstrated in a preceding chapter. Here, observations based on the 1995 data (third wave) are presented (figure 6.2).²⁴ This is the same wave from which we derive our observation of 'order vs. freedom'.

The Russian case shows a puzzling output, which is seemingly incompatible with the preliminary result of the variable: 'order vs. freedom' (figure 6.1).²⁵ As seen in figure 6.2, in the Russian case the degree of support for 'free speech' shows very low percentages, indeed, the lowest among four items. This is the case in both first and second choices. On the contrary, the appreciation of 'order' shows noticeably higher percentages in the first and second choices than 'free speech'.²⁶ Especially in the first choice index, 'order' is at an extremely high level while 'free speech' is at an extremely low level. In the second choice, although the gap between them is more moderate, 'order' is still higher and 'free speech' is lower. This result is strangely opposite to the results of the 'order vs. freedom' index, where the two items are rather balanced with even some inclination to 'freedom' rather than 'order'. Thus, the Russian case indicates a very strong inclination to 'order' rather than 'free speech' on the one hand, whereas there is a balance between 'order' and 'freedom' on the other hand.²⁷ And both results derive from the same 1995 data.

Such puzzlement becomes greater when the cases of the USA and Japan are considered. In the case of the USA, the result of the 'order vs. freedom' index shows a balance between the two items. The other index exhibits a moderately balanced result between 'order' and 'free speech'. In the case of Japan, in 'order vs. freedom', 'order' shows a clearly higher percentage than 'freedom'. In the other index, 'order' is placed higher than 'free speech' in both the first and second choices.²⁸ These are in fact the results that are normally expected as a logical consequence. Nonetheless, the Russian outputs are not. Why?

24 For the result of the 1999-2002 data, see Appendix 1 as well as Figures 3.5 (IV) and 3.5 (VII) in Chapter 3.

25 The output of the 1999-2002 data is presented in Appendix 1.

26 The same results are observed in the fourth wave.

27 The outcome of the 1999-2002 wave conforms to this pattern.

28 For the American and Japanese data of the 1999-2002 wave, the outcomes of the disaggregated version of the Postmaterialist index (for the state of 'order' and 'free speech') correspond with this, whereas the data of 'order vs. freedom' index are not available.

The key seems to lie in the difference in the Russian perception between 'freedom' and 'free speech'. For Russian respondents, freedom of the individual and freedom of speech do not seem to be identical, although, of course, both of them include the meaning of freedom. Conceptually, in the sense of common definitions, freedom of speech could be included in freedom of the individual, since the latter means a general freedom while the former is about freedom *specifically to do with speech*.²⁹ Thus, in simple terms, freedom of the individual is general whereas freedom of speech is specific. In other words, freedom of the individual can include other kinds of freedoms in addition to freedom of speech. Despite such a general conceptualisation, nonetheless, Russian respondents appear to perceive a sharper distinction between these two freedoms. Public opinion is about the subjective views of respondents, so that its output does not necessarily correspond with a rigorous conceptualisation. It seems that, in a subjective sense, Russian respondents are likely to see freedom of the individual and freedom of speech as qualitatively different. There would be no doubt that freedom of speech is perceived as specific about speech. Nonetheless, freedom of the individual appears to be perceived as freedom with a strong emphasis on qualities other than speech. Or, even if freedom of speech occupies a place within the freedom of the individual, the emphasis on free speech would be extraordinarily small within it. Hence, for Russians, freedom of the individual and free speech appear to be perceived in different (at least, not identical) manners. This difference of perception would be a reason that could explain the puzzling results of the two types of indicators mentioned above.

What is inferred from the Russian results on the two indicators is that, as an overall tendency, freedom of the individual is valued as much as order, whereas order is much more highly valued than free speech. This could be expressed as:

$$\text{Freedom of the individual} = \text{order} > \text{freedom of speech}^{30}$$

On the other hand, in the case of the USA, the two indexes indicate that order is relatively balanced with both freedom of the individual and freedom of speech, which could be

²⁹ The 'speech' would qualitatively correspond with self-expression.

³⁰ '=' denotes an approximate equivalence. Therefore, obviously it does not indicate numerically precise equality.

expressed as:

Order = freedom of the individual

Order = freedom of speech

The Japanese case would be:

Order > freedom of the individual

Order > freedom of speech

It seems that, for respondents in the USA (and perhaps Japan), freedom of the individual and freedom of speech may be perceived as having comparatively similar *meanings* to each other. For Russia, the two freedoms seem to have a wider gap to this effect.

6.3.2 Analysis of two freedoms

To distinguish the possible difference between the perceptions of two freedoms (in the sense of priority *vis-à-vis* order), the following analyses are made while comparing the societies.

6.3.2.1 Crosstabulation

Two types of crosstabulations are examined. The first one is (A) the percentages of 'order vs. freedom' in a disaggregated Postmaterialist four-item index (first choice) (table 6.2 and figure 6.3). The second one is (B) the percentages of the disaggregated Postmaterialist four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom' (table 6.3 and figure 6.4).³¹

Russia

In Russia (like the USA and Japan), those who choose free speech tend to select freedom of the individual with the highest percentages as seen in (A). Nonetheless, those who choose freedom of the individual (against order) *mostly do not* select free speech as

³¹ (B) is a reverse version of (A). For the 1999-2002 wave, Russian outputs are available, whereas British, American and Japanese ones are not available. See Appendix 1.

indicated in (B). Rather, many of them opt for order (rather than free speech or others) among the four items.³² This means that, for most Russians, free speech is neither equivalent nor comparable to freedom of the individual. It also indicates that, for them, freedom of the individual is conceptually much larger than free speech. In other words, free speech can be accommodated in freedom of the individual while occupying only a small place within it.³³

Meanwhile, in (A), those who opt for order among the four items are more likely to select order against individual freedom than those who do not. However, this is in a relative sense. In actual quantity, those who select order among the four items only choose half-and-half in the 'order vs. freedom' measure, which obviously cannot be regarded as a high appreciation of order against individual freedom.³⁴ This indicates that even those who appreciate order as against free speech (and others among the four items) refrain from the selection of order when it comes to a choice against freedom of the individual (namely, a general sense of freedom). In other words, for Russians, a general sense of freedom has clearly more importance in comparison with free speech – to the extent that the weight of its importance reduces the priority of order.

In addition, the result shows that the dichotomous choice of 'order vs. freedom' has little impact on the choice of the four items (especially between order and free speech) as indicated in (B), whereas the latter has some impact on the former as presented in (A). When it is considered in the context of free speech and freedom of the individual (in terms of priority against order), it is inferred that the result is also because freedom of the individual is much more comprehensive in conceptual perceptions than free speech, and tends to accommodate the latter (figure 6.5).³⁵

Consequently, since free speech is likely to occupy a *part* of individual freedom, the

³² The 1999-2002 data also have the same result. See Appendix 1.

³³ As for order, those who select order against freedom of the individual in the 'order vs. freedom' index give a distinctively high priority to order among the four items (while choosing free speech least frequently). On the whole, the choice of either order or freedom of the individual does not make much difference in the selection among the four items. Both of them very highly appreciate order while having the lowest preference for free speech. This means that the Russian respondents, as a whole, give salient priority to order rather than free speech (and the other two) among the four items regardless of their preference in terms of either order or individual freedom.

³⁴ In the fourth wave data, although slightly more percentage of the respondents (who select 'order' among the four items) chose 'order' as against 'freedom', there still seems to be a relative balance between 'order' and 'freedom' in this context.

³⁵ On the whole, the outcome of the 1999-2002 data would agree with this.

choice of free speech tends to result in the choice of individual freedom. On the contrary, since individual freedom is perceived as having a much more comprehensive meaning than free speech, even though free speech is its part, it is quite likely that those who appreciate individual freedom will choose *other than* free speech.

The USA

The case of the USA contrasts with that of Russia. It seems that freedom of the individual and free speech are perceived to have similar meanings and therefore share considerable overlap between each other.³⁶

In (A), those who select free speech among the four items tend to choose freedom against order while those who choose order among the four items are highly likely to opt for order against individual freedom. Similarly, in (B), among those who prefer order to individual freedom, order is chosen to a notably high degree. For those who opt for individual freedom rather than order, free speech is selected at a reasonably high level (which is clearly higher than those who prefer order to individual freedom). This suggests that freedom of the individual and free speech are perceived in relatively similar terms to one another (in relation to order). Figure 6.5 presents the approximate conceptual locations of their perceptions.

In addition to free speech, in both (A) and (B), the item of 'more say (giving people more say in important government decisions)' seems to be quite related to freedom of the individual in the case of the USA. This suggests that, for Americans, freedom of the individual (or a general sense of freedom) has the strong connotation of freedom in public expression which could be directed towards political authority. At any rate, their freedom seems to be closely related to 'speech'.

Japan

The first point to be noticed in the Japanese case is that, in actual quantity, those who choose order exceed both those who choose freedom of the individual and free speech with clear gaps as observed in (A) and (B).³⁷ It seems that, for the Japanese, freedom in either

³⁶ American output of the 1999-2002 data for this is not available.

³⁷ Japanese output of the 1999-2002 data for this is not available.

sense comes after the primacy of order.

In addition to such a major feature, some other points are apparent. In (A), there is a slight but discernible tendency that those who select free speech among the four items are more likely to choose freedom of the individual than those who do not.³⁸ Nonetheless, the difference in actual percentages is rather trivial. In (B), strangely, those who select individual freedom against order are least likely to choose free speech among the four items.³⁹ Instead, they tend to opt for 'more say' while their selection of order is moderate. This connotes that the appreciation of freedom of the individual (against order) is related to 'more say' rather than to 'free speech'. On the other hand, those who select order against individual freedom most often appreciate order among the four items and least often prefer free speech, as expected.

What is inferred from the results is that, probably, for Japanese, the relationship between individual freedom and free speech seems not as close as in the USA. Even if they are related, according to (A) and (B), the relationship appears to be diminished by the primacy of order in the Japanese case. Another point to be noticed is the relatively close relationship between individual freedom and 'more say' rather than free speech.⁴⁰ What is, then, their individual freedom without free speech, but with 'more say' (to the government)? There are two points to be considered.

The first point is the propensity to avoid a type of participation involving public expression and discussion. Presumably, the freedom presupposed by Japanese is not a kind of freedom whereby people speak out in public and compete for the recognition and actualisation of their own views, which seems to be common in the USA. Rather than open appeals to policy-making processes, they may be inclined to covert ways of transmitting their voices upward such as personal pleas or lobbying to politicians if they should do so. More probable presumption would be that their inclination to 'more say' may be simply an inward expectation of being heard or understood by political elites without pronounced behaviour of expressing demands.

³⁸ This is observed in the cases of Russia and the USA more evidently. 'More say' is the second, and 'prices' comes third. Those who select order among the four items are least likely to opt for individual freedom (against order). On the contrary, those who choose order against individual freedom are ranged in reverse order to the above.

³⁹ This is a similar result to Russia.

⁴⁰ It is slightly observed in the Russian case as well.

The second point is related to a two-dimensional outlook, which is related to their social conventions. Contemporary Japanese attitudes involve a widespread sentiment against authority in a vertical sphere, while holding general hesitancy in self-expression in the horizontal sphere. Vertically, Japanese custom includes hierarchical norms, whereby people are supposed to show respect and be compliant with those in higher positions at least officially.⁴¹ Such social conventions have been practised without being questioned seriously by the great majority of the population. Despite this, there seems to have been a gradual but on-going permeation of modern rational outlooks throughout society. Rationality encourages people to seek for reasons for their own behaviour. This could give rise to scepticism towards the conduct of following the hierarchical conventions and even their *raison d'être*.⁴² Nonetheless, many of the conventions are engraved in societal customs and hard to avoid in reality. Much of the time, it is observable that Japanese use respectful wordings towards those in senior status regardless of their actual thoughts.⁴³ Their chronic inconsistency between mind and behaviour (though they have been accustomed to it) may have been conducive to intrinsic dissatisfaction with authority. In fact, according to an output of the World Values Survey, Japanese respondents have a considerable aversion to authority, which is consistent over multiple points in time. They also have a strong inclination to 'have more say' in relation to their government, to which the anti-authoritarian sentiment is presumably conducive. Thus, they possibly identify their 'freedom' with the vertical expression of their views against political authority – or more ambiguously, something 'above' in hierarchy.

Horizontally, on the other hand, Japanese seem to perceive further difficulty in

41 For example, as a Japanese culture, it is conceived as a common custom that people differentiate languages depending on the status of people to whom they talk. This generally involves hierarchical consideration. In contrast, in contemporary Britain, rather a frank and equal address to people tends to be accepted as the sign of familiarity and fairness in communications. Even in verbal exchanges, there is a clear cultural gap between Japan and Britain (and presumably Western societies), which would be related to the perceptions of, and behavioural patterns to, authority.

42 In analogous terms, Inglehart notes that people in post-industrial societies are likely to obtain an increasing sense of distrust of authority. See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy', in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, in Pippa Norris ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 236-256.

43 It is a common notion for Japanese to differentiate 'hon-ne (actual intentions/thoughts)' and 'tate-mae (public statements/expressions)' in their social communication. Analogous terms would be 'uchi (inside)' and 'soto (outside)', which are often applied to describing typical dual attitudes of individual personality as well as a group of people in Japanese culture. Pye mentions 'hon-ne' and 'tate-mae'. See Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, p. 175.

public self-expression. They often refrain from asserting personal opinions in an overt manner being afraid of disturbing harmony with surrounding people and social relations.⁴⁴ According to the 1981, 1990 and 1995-8 waves of the World Values Survey, the average propensity to 'discuss politics with friends' is consistently lower in Japan than in the USA, Britain and Russia.⁴⁵ It is their common practice to be much concerned about atmospheric or sentimental elements rather than logically clear exchanges in communication.⁴⁶ Their societal norms have been nurtured to that effect, so that their statements and behaviour are apt to be affected by situations as subjective constraints.⁴⁷ Horizontal social ties are likely to diminish a clear sense of individuality and liberty at least in the way understood in the West. This is especially the case when they are part of a wider social context. These amount to an extraordinary hindrance on individual attempts at public expression. This could be associated with their low priority of free speech even for those who prefer 'freedom' to 'order'.

Consequently, the Japanese seem to identify 'freedom' with a somewhat covert transmission of their wishes in the vertical direction. This is accompanied by ambivalence in regard to their own hierarchical world view, as they dislike authority while being prone to it. They do not seem to be inclined towards free speech, which connotes open expression in a horizontal sense. However, after all, the appreciation of freedom *per se* is basically trivial when it faces the primacy of order.

6.3.2.2 Correlation

Table 6.4 presents the correlation coefficients between 'order vs. freedom' and 'order vs.

44 For instance, Sato argues that Japanese hold a particular orientation to self-restraint in inter-personal communication in comparison British and American people. See Sato, *Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko* [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan].

45 As for the output of the 1999-2002 wave as regards the item of 'discuss politics with friends', the average propensity is lower in Japan than in Russia and the USA, whereas British average is lower than Japanese one.

46 Sato points out a Japanese inclination to sentimentalism or emotionalism in contrast with a British propensity to logicity or reason. She also relates Japanese emotional orientation (*shin-jo shugi*) to collectivism, whereas she associates British logical orientation (*ronri-shugi*) with individualism. According to her, these contrasting traits seem to burgeon as early as the period of infancy. See *ibid.*, pp. 33-36, 78-80, 93, 113-119.

47 Sato mentions the proneness of Japanese behaviours to situations in comparison with relatively consistent personalities of the Western counterparts, which are likely to transcend differing situations. See *ibid.*, pp. 6-8, 74, 91-93, 110-113.

free speech' variables.⁴⁸ As the results show, the USA has a notable correlation between the two variables, which is the strongest among the three societies. Japan is in the second place, whereas Russia has the weakest correlation.⁴⁹ This suggests that American respondents have a considerably stronger propensity to perceive individual (general) freedom and free speech in similar terms than the other two societies. Table 6.5 presents the correlation between the 'order vs. freedom' and 'free speech' four-rating measurement.⁵⁰ This indicates the extent to which those opt for freedom (rather than order) have more appreciation of free speech. Americans seem to have more propensity in this regard than Russians.

6.3.2.3 Summary of the analysis

Consequently, to the people of the USA, freedom of the individual and free speech are perceived as having a considerable overlap in their meanings in comparison with those of the Russian people. For Russians, freedom of speech occupies only a small place in the freedom of the individual. Russian respondents seem to hold somewhat different emphases in overall meanings, since the two freedoms show clearly different indications as regards their priorities *vis-à-vis* order. As for Japan, although individual freedom and free speech could be slightly more comparable than in the Russian case, it is much less so than in the USA. Rather, Japanese freedom is perhaps alien to free speech in the sense of explicit self-expression. Their freedom may be related to an inward expectation of being heeded by political authority with ambivalent sentiments. Nevertheless, the Japanese appreciation of freedom *per se* virtually becomes trivial when compared with the much greater primacy which they attach to order.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that the variable of 'order vs. free speech' is created by extracting only the data of those who choose either free speech or order among the four items of the disaggregated Postmaterialist first choice index. Therefore, the data of those who choose either 'more say' or 'prices' is omitted. Thus, the variable does not include the whole sample, and therefore is not a perfect measure to evaluate the dichotomous priority between order and free speech. Despite this, it indicates, among those who put the foremost importance on either free speech or order (of the four items), how the priority of either order or (general) individual freedom is acknowledged in each of the societies. Thus, the results of this variable are presented to supplement the explanation in terms of (general) freedom and free speech.

⁴⁹ The Russian case in the fourth wave (1999-2002) also shows a similar correlation coefficient (0.120**). American, Japanese and British figures are not available. See Appendix 1.

⁵⁰ Although evaluating these two variables does not directly indicate the conceptual overlap between individual freedom and free speech, it would be helpful as a supplementation to the result above. For this, the outputs of the 1999-2002 data for Britain, the USA, Russia and Japan are not available.

6.3.3 Two freedoms and the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension

The outcomes of the analyses raise questions. Why is freedom of the individual appreciated at an equivalent level to order while order comes prior to freedom of speech in the Russian case? Why are individual freedom and free speech comparable in the USA? What is the actual difference between the 'two freedoms' in the respective societies in relation to the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension? This section considers these points with reference to Maslow's values hierarchy.

6.3.3.1 Maslow's hierarchy and meaning of freedoms

In Maslow's values hierarchy in the second chapter (figure 2.1), free speech is located in the realm of self-actualisation needs, which involves abstract values such as self-esteem, intellectual interests, and aesthetic satisfaction.

In Russia, as shown in a previous chapter, the emphasis on Materialist values is predominant while placing a low priority on Postmaterialist values. This shows a clear distinction from the other three societies. Considering these, together with the identified result (freedom of the individual = order > freedom of speech) as above, Russian freedom of the individual is possibly *less* related to 'freedom' in the sense of self-actualisation needs (Postmaterialist values) than the USA. If understood in this context, freedom of the individual in Russia would be more to do with liberty that holds a pragmatic connotation, which is compatible with the Materialist orientation. Another point is that freedom of the individual could be perceived as politically passive emancipation from constraints such as a central authority, a political power and an ideology.

Generally, the Materialist view attaches importance to sustenance and safety needs including economic stability, social order and security. Often, these goals are either provided by the state or qualitatively increased by personal efforts in such forms as economic achievements. Politically, the individuals are likely to be passive, since they are either the receivers of pragmatic outcomes from the state or those mostly concerned with private goals rather than democratic causes. Freedom to this effect tends to be personal rather than public, which emphasises a release from control or intervention by a central

power, holding a centrifugal connotation.⁵¹

On the other hand, the Postmaterialist view includes intellectual or abstract goals linked with self-expression and participation, which seems to have a great deal of presence in the USA and Britain. Their concerns are apt to be associative and at times directed to political affairs often with democratic implications.⁵² The potential orientation holds a certain characteristic of spontaneous involvement in various forms of civil society.⁵³ In that sense, their freedom tend *not* to be passive, but to be proactive. It implies a sense of 'rights' to participate rather than a simple longing for non-intervention.⁵⁴

Thus, freedom of speech in practice implies proactive participation in social or political debates.⁵⁵ This type of engagement occasionally involves a certain public responsibility and elements to cope with criticisms or even reactionary attacks.⁵⁶ On the contrary, if such potential tasks are felt as something to be avoided, and if simply a release from social/political constraint is wanted as a matter of liberty, free speech would tend to be perceived as redundant. In that case, the subjective meaning of freedom in general would emphatically involve political passivity. In a similar vein, Beetham mentions dual

51 This could be related to 'privatised' type of individuals in Maruyama's four categories of individuation. However, when these Materialist concerns are mixed with the state of insecurity such as the deterioration of economy and social order, there would be more likelihood that 'atomised' individuals appear, which might have an centripetal orientation. For the categorisation of individual types, see Maruyama, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme'.

52 These qualities may be close to Maruyama's 'individualised' and 'democratised' types of individuals. See *ibid.*

53 There could be a qualitative difference between this sense of civil society prevalent in Western societies and one in Russia. For civil society in Russia, see for example, Evans, Alfred B., Jr., 'A Russian Civil Society?', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 96-113. On civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, see Smolar, Aleksander, 'Civil Society after Communism', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Democracy after Communism* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 48-62.

54 Being 'proactive' does not necessarily mean to be 'active' in political participation. The term is employed to indicate an opposite quality to 'passivity'. In fact, there is possibility that 'proactive' people withdraw participation or simply do not participate. The point is that their behaviour (and non-behaviour) is based on relatively *autonomous* concern and judgement independent of external political influences. They often hold associative motivations, which primarily stand on the ground of free will.

55 For instance, in Britain and the USA commonly there are many broadcasting programmes that take the forms of citizens' debates. They often consist of open discussions by several dozens of audience in studios. In Japan, comparable styles of such programmes are seen less frequently, and the attitudes of participants are clearly more passive. It is much less likely that the ordinary people voluntarily raise their hands and express their opinions in somewhat assertive manners as often done in the Western counterparts. Thus, the emphasis on an open speech and a public discussion seems to be *cultural* features of Western societies.

56 In this sense, freedom of speech is qualitatively connected with political involvement and its rights, which is opposite to political passivity in an attitudinal emphasis.

types of freedoms with reference to Benjamin Constant. He writes, 'Constant contrasted the idea of liberty as direct participation in public affairs with notions of liberty that viewed it as having mainly to do with the protection of essentially private pursuits and interests'.⁵⁷

Consequently, the Russian sense of freedom seems to be compatible with the Materialist orientation, implying a certain political passivity. According to the World Values Survey in 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002, the Russian propensity to be 'interested in politics' and to regard 'politics as important' was coherently lower than the American (and Japanese) ones.⁵⁸ During the era of the USSR, extraordinarily high rates of voting turnouts had the character of mobilisation by political authority.⁵⁹ The communist regime promoted various forms of political involvement in favour of the ideology, which were in effect artificial mobilisations.⁶⁰ It is possible that such conventions discouraged the spontaneous attitudes of popular participation based on free will. This may be indicated by the fact that there were continuous falls in electoral turnouts in some Russian elections from the mid-1990s.⁶¹ Similarly, there have been signs of political disengagement in Russia, which is particularly notable when compared with Western Europe.⁶² These denote a general political passivity among the Russian populace, which seems to be reflected in their perception of freedom.

6.3.3.2 Postmaterialist shift or culture?

The Russian view of freedom thus appears to be associated with the Materialist orientation. If, however, the hypothesis of a Postmaterialist shift is applicable to Russia, one may conceive of the possibility that Russia would attain a greater appreciation of free speech,

⁵⁷ Beetham also quotes 'Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive liberty and the negative principle of noninterference'. See Beetham, 'Freedom as the Foundation', p. 33. For the source of the quotation, see Constant, Benjamin, *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 316-318.

⁵⁸ However, British averages are lower than Russian ones in the 'politics important' item in 1990 and 1999-2002 as well as 'interest in politics' in 1999-2002. This may be due to a 'mature' cynicism towards politics in British culture.

⁵⁹ See White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), ch. 1, pp. 1-19; White, Stephen, 'Presidential Government', in *Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 34.

⁶⁰ See, for instance, Friedgut, Theodore H., *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

⁶¹ For the falls in turnout, see Hutcheson, Derek S., 'Protest and Disengagement in the Russian Federal Elections of 2003-04', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 5: 2 (2004).

⁶² Hutcheson, Derek S. and Elena A. Korosteleva, 'Patterns of Participation in Post-Soviet Politics', *Contemporary European Politics*, 3: 4 (December 2005).

provided that the nation achieves a higher level of economic growth and stability. Nonetheless, the question remains: is the difference not due to culture? Despite Russian liberty's link with the Materialist values, it does not necessarily mean that the Russian situation is more backward than the USA and thus could simply be transformed by a Postmaterialist shift. Is there no possibility that the Russian attitude to freedom derives from elements that are very Russian or Postcommunist? This is not to entirely negate the possibility of a Postmaterialist effect. Nonetheless, if cultural durability (related to the Materialist orientation) strongly exists there, such a shift could be hindered or delayed even if the above conditions take effect. Indeed, if the case of Japan is taken into account, this point is worth considering. As shown, although Japan so far has attained relatively long-standing economic affluence and social security comparable to both the USA and Britain, it shows a particular proclivity. While there seems to be the emergence of Postmaterialist outlooks, there are tendencies that represent a cultural peculiarity such as the primacy of order and the notably low priority that is placed on free speech, which goes against a Postmaterialist orientation. This is as if long-standing cultural patterns have been hindering the Postmaterialist effect. In order to explore this question further, in the following section the regional cultural specificity is further considered. Particular attention is paid to the issue of individual freedom and free speech (in relation to order) as examined so far.

6.4 Regional cultural specificity

In the last section, the perception gap in the meaning of freedom in relation to order was explored comparing the three societies. Is there, then, any possibility that their differences are affected by their cultures in regional contexts? This section examines this point. By regions, we mean Postcommunist, Western and East Asian regions, to which the four societies (the USA, Russia, Japan and Britain) belong.

6.4.1 Regional comparisons: order versus freedom

First of all, it is useful to look at the percentages of 'order vs. freedom' in the societies of

the three regions (tables 6.1 and 6.6).⁶³ The societies in the West have a largely balanced view in relation to the tension between order and freedom.⁶⁴ Similarly, the majority of Postcommunist societies indicate a balance to that effect.⁶⁵ On the contrary, although only the cases of Taiwan and Japan are available, both East Asian societies have an extraordinary skew towards order.⁶⁶ These tendencies are summarised in table 6.7. Figure 6.6 indicates an obvious concentration of the Western and Postcommunist cases around the point where order and freedom meet with half-and-half percentages, while the East Asian cases take points at high levels on the order axis.

These overall characteristics correspond with the comparison of the three societies studied so far as regards 'order vs. freedom'. As we have already seen, the USA and Russia show a balance or tension, while Japan has a strong orientation towards order. These results of the three societies might be, in some respects, possibly representing the three regions. In other words, there could be a possibility that each of the three societies has something in common with societies in its own region. That is to say, the USA might share some similar qualities with societies in the West, likewise Russia with other Postcommunist societies, and Japan with East Asia.⁶⁷ Although this might be a somewhat audacious presumption, the following analysis suggests plausible evidence that supports this view.

6.4.2 Regional comparisons: freedom and free speech

63 These tables show available data from the three regions from the third wave of the World Values Survey (1995-8). For the tables of the fourth wave (1999-2002), see Appendix 1.

64 Only Norway is an outlier, being inclined to order.

65 However, Poland and East Germany have a considerable leaning to order. Interestingly, they constitute a cohort geographically close to Western Europe among the Postcommunist cases. This connotes that their attributes may involve influence of Western traits. As mentioned before, a sense of freedom is accompanied by a consciousness of order in Western democratic contexts. Presumably, due to the unstable conditions of these societies at the time of the survey sampling, they may have been inclined to order. This conversely indicates the distinction of the former USSR republics, where priorities of individual freedom and order tend to hold even, despite the then instability. Bulgaria seems to be an outlier in this context.

66 As for the results of the World Values Survey 1999-2002, with relatively lower support for individual freedom, the figures of Postcommunist (and Western) societies are not as clearly balanced as ones in the 1995-8 survey. Nonetheless, with some exceptions, many of them still hold certain levels of support for individual freedom, which would be clear when they are compared with the East Asian pattern.

67 Oyserman, Coon and Kimmelmeier note that '[u]sually, researchers conceptualize individualism as the opposite of collectivism ...especially when contrasting European American and East Asian cultural frames'. See Oyserman, Daphna, Heather McCoon and Markus Kimmelmeier, 'Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism', *Psychological Bulletin*, 128 (2002), pp. 3.

Table 6.8 presents percentages for the 'order vs. freedom' variable. For comparison, the table includes the 'free speech' percentages from the disaggregated Postmaterialist four-item index (the measures of first and second choices).⁶⁸ As shown above, on the 'order vs. freedom' variable, societies in the West and Postcommunist world seem to largely share a similar tendency in the levels of support for 'freedom' *vis-à-vis* those for 'order' (with some outliers). Nevertheless, when it comes to 'free speech', they show clearly different patterns. The societies in the Western category in the table show a clearly higher inclination to 'free speech' than Postcommunist (and East Asian) societies on the both first and second measures. For the first choice measure, 'free speech' percentages in Western societies average around 20 per cent (with 14.4 per cent as the minimum and 30.9 per cent as the maximum). In contrast, in the Postcommunist region, all are less than 10 per cent, and the majority are less than 5 per cent. In the second choice measure, the Western cohort averages around 30 per cent (with 27.4 per cent as the minimum and 39.4 per cent as the maximum), whereas Postcommunist societies are mostly around the 10 per cent level (with two outliers, East Germany and Georgia).⁶⁹ In East Asia, the situation is different. Societies in this region have very low percentages both for 'freedom' (on 'order vs. freedom') and 'free speech'. For the 'freedom' percentage, while having clearly lower percentages than the West and Postcommunist societies, the East Asian cases do not show the same balance between order and freedom. For 'free speech', East Asian societies show percentages as low as the Postcommunist cases.

Consequently, Western societies have an orientation to both 'freedom' and 'free speech' in common. On the other hand, Postcommunist societies share a collective tendency that can be inclined to 'freedom', but not necessarily to 'free speech'. Meanwhile, the East Asian cases seem to have a low leaning to both kinds of freedoms.⁷⁰ Moreover, as suggested before, these regional characteristics correspond with propensities of the three societies – the USA, Russia and Japan – respectively. Therefore, the characteristics of the three societies seem to represent regional traits (at least as regards the relationship between

⁶⁸ For the output of the fourth wave (1999-2002), see Appendix 1.

⁶⁹ The fact that East Germany is the highest among Postcommunist societies (in both first and second choice measures) could also suggest the West's high inclination to 'free speech'. Since the country was unified with West Germany in 1990 and the year of East Germany's sampling was 1997, there possibly had been mixture of views with, or strong influence from, the view of the West among East Germans.

⁷⁰ On the whole, the 1999-2002 data seem to have similar results which would agree with these conclusions (with some exceptions). See Appendix 1.

'freedom' and 'free speech'). In other words, they are affected by regional cultural contexts.

6.4.3 Regional comparisons: free speech – a further examination

To examine such issues more closely, this section concentrates on the analysis of 'free speech'. Figure 6.7 presents scatterplots of the percentages of 'free speech' and 'order' in the disaggregated Postmaterialist four-item index.⁷¹ On the whole, there is an obvious difference between the Western cohort and the Postcommunist/East Asian cohort. In both the first and second choices, the West as a whole has a strong leaning to 'free speech', while the other two cohorts have evidently much less leanings towards it. Moreover, each of the regions seems to show a collective tendency in a consistent manner. As for the percentages in respect of 'order', the Western group seems to have a slightly less orientation than the Postcommunist and East Asian groups, especially as a first choice. As such, when a larger number of cases are incorporated in the analysis, it is rather more obvious that Western societies have a common proclivity to put an emphasis on 'free speech' whereas Postcommunist and East Asian societies on the whole do not.⁷²

⁷¹ This version incorporates many other cases, which were unavailable (and therefore not included) in the analysis of the 'order vs. freedom' variable.

⁷² The outputs of the 1999-2002 dataset show similar distributional forms to the Figure 6.7, which would agree with this conclusion. See Appendix 1.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined a variety of societies in terms of 'order vs. freedom', and a further perception gap between societies on the meaning of (general) individual freedom and free speech. The results, on the whole, seem to support the view that there is a social variation, to which culture matters.

Order, freedom and free speech

In the initial observation, the Japanese case has an extraordinary skew to order rather than freedom, whereas the USA and Russia both show equilibrium between order and freedom. Nonetheless, when it comes to free speech, the equilibrium is present only in the USA while Russia attaches a much lower priority to free speech (in comparison with order). This indicates that American respondents possess a relatively comparable perception between a general sense of freedom and free speech. For Russians, on the other hand, individual freedom and free speech are not comparable although the latter may represent only a small part of the former. Although the Japanese case seems to be inbetween, the appreciation of both types of freedom becomes trivial in relation to the primacy which they respectively place on order.

Implications for the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension

The differing degrees and qualities of appreciation of freedom in the three societies appear to have relevance to the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension. Freedom in the USA seems to be compatible with the Postmaterialist orientation, since free speech is one of the major elements within the Postmaterialist values category. Furthermore, another Postmaterialist item – 'more say' in government – also receives a fairly high rating among those who choose freedom rather than order in America. American freedom, therefore, seems to be largely understood in the context of self-expression, which has a strong relevance for the Postmaterialist emphasis. Moreover, they appear to esteem the power of 'language' as a crucial element for social and political life.

In contrast, in Russia, free speech is far less appreciated – despite the people's attachment to a general sense of freedom that even counterbalances order. The Russian sense of freedom could be, in its emphasis, qualitatively different from that of the USA.

Russian freedom could be more inclined to private concerns, which is rather close to the Materialist orientation. Moreover, this kind of freedom connotes political passivity.

In the case of Japan, basically, both free speech and freedom receive a markedly low priority in comparison with order. It is as if there is a general belief that any freedom could not be superior to order. Interestingly, the Japanese may appreciate 'more say (participation),' but not quite free speech. Even those who choose freedom over order are rather unlikely to opt for free speech, but instead go for 'more say'. A leaning to 'more say' to the government without free public self-expression (free speech) could be a peculiar Japanese proclivity. This also connotes their lack of orientation to Postmaterialist values. It seems that the Japanese are rather suspended between Postmaterialist and Materialist attitudes. Furthermore, their low priority on freedom *per se* can culturally run counter to the Postmaterialist direction, since Postmaterialist values are concerned with a strong emphasis on self-esteem, self-actualisation and self-expression.

Regional context and culture

The differences across the three societies especially on freedom and free speech have a notable relevance to the regional cultural context. In fact, the USA's emphasis on both freedom and free speech is commonly observable among societies in the Western region. Similarly, a certain emphasis on freedom, but not on free speech, as observed in the Russian case seems to be also present among Postcommunist societies in general. Likewise, East Asian societies seem to share a low priority on free speech and individual freedom *vis-à-vis* order. This result indicates the plausibility that differences across the three societies reflect regional peculiarities or regional cultural contexts. The outcome suggests that the peculiarities of these cultures affect the distribution of Postmaterialist and Materialist values.

Political implications: what matters to democracy?

In addition, what are the political implications of this chapter's results especially with respect to democracy? As mentioned above, the American sense of freedom tends to involve 'free speech' and 'more say' to a relatively high degree. This kind of freedom implies self-expression and therefore being proactive in social and political terms. It could

be compatible with a participatory orientation. Moreover, Americans' commitment to the support of freedom seems to be high to the extent that it counterbalances the sense of order. This could be advantageous to a type of democracy that puts an emphasis on citizens' participatory attitudes. The results somewhat resonate with the outcome of Almond and Verba's classic work on 'civic culture', to which American people were reported to hold a favourable orientation.⁷³ After all, these qualities would be more likely to sustain the responsive function of democracy.

On the other hand, for Russians, although their appreciation of freedom is strong, the kind of freedom they value is likely to involve a sense of political passivity rather than proactive participation. Thus, in Russia, the popular inclination to participatory democracy through open exchanges of free expressions does not seem to be high.⁷⁴ In this sense, their prevalent sense of freedom is possibly unlikely to be a driving force for seeking responsive and accountable government.

In the case of Japan, its principal feature is the strong presence of an order orientation, which seems to virtually overwhelm their appreciation of freedom. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Japanese people have some inclination towards 'more say' although they do not wish for 'free speech'. More input of their voices without speaking freely – such a peculiar and seemingly contradictory preference appears to exist among them. For democracy, presumably, they have political concerns and interests in private, so that there could be a potential motivation for participation. Nonetheless, they would not quite go for public expression entailing open explicit debates as free-standing individuals. What is inferred from their strong inclination to order is that they may prefer being under 'big trees' of larger social contexts while waiting for consequential benefits from the 'whole'. In that sense, probably, they tend to be passive in political behaviour due to their lack of individual strength in public expression, and this could be an obstructive element to the workings of responsive democracy. They may complain mainly behind the scenes, but not beyond a line that disturbs the harmony of personal social ties. It seems that they hold hesitancy in living as isolated but free, consistent and solid individuals in both private and public spheres. As Maruyama has put it, the history of Japanese politics

⁷³ Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁷⁴ At least, they are not in the same manner as in the USA.

comprises 'naki-neiri (crying in bed)' of people who suppress their grievances inside while, most of the time, being unable to express their claims in public.⁷⁵ Although his statement was made as early as the middle of the last century, the tendency seems to still remain. For the regional perspective, the results considered in this chapter would suggest that societies in the Western region are more advantageously placed for participatory and responsive democracy than Postcommunist and East Asian societies. In other words, current values patterns on freedom and free speech in the latter non-Western societies have a weakness in the support for such democracy in comparison with those in the West. Even if Postmaterialist effects are assumed to transform some of their values, the effect could be expected (according to the thesis) only if economic affluence is achieved at some time in the future. However, it should be recalled that culture or social/regional peculiarities have a stubborn influence on values orientations.

⁷⁵ Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics], p.144.

Figure 6.1 'Order vs. freedom'






Table 6.1 'Order vs. freedom': Western democracies

% within NAT WAVE Nation and wave			
	Order vs. Freedom		Total
	order	freedom	
W Germany 97	50.1%	49.9%	100.0%
Spain 96	45.9%	54.1%	100.0%
USA 95	48.6%	51.4%	100.0%
Australia 95	52.2%	47.8%	100.0%
Norway 96	72.3%	27.7%	100.0%
Sweden 96	46.9%	53.1%	100.0%
Finland 96	49.5%	50.5%	100.0%
Switzerland 96	49.4%	50.6%	100.0%

Figure 6.2 Postmaterialist (PM) four-item index: first choice and second choice



PM-M index B 1st choice 1995-7



PM-M index B 2nd choice 1995-7

Table 6.2 Percentages (A): 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice)

nations goals(2)-1 * govt:soc vs indiv Crosstabulation

% within nations goals(2)-1

Nation and wave			govt:soc vs indiv		Total
			order	freedom	
USA 95	nations goals(2)-1	order	67.9%	32.1%	100.0%
		more say	37.8%	62.2%	100.0%
		prices	56.1%	43.9%	100.0%
		free speech	31.2%	68.8%	100.0%
Japan 95	nations goals(2)-1	order	87.9%	12.1%	100.0%
		more say	71.1%	28.9%	100.0%
		prices	77.5%	22.5%	100.0%
		free speech	68.6%	31.4%	100.0%
Russia 95	nations goals(2)-1	order	49.9%	50.1%	100.0%
		more say	30.6%	69.4%	100.0%
		prices	44.0%	56.0%	100.0%
		free speech	6.3%	93.8%	100.0%

Figure 6.3 Percentages (A): 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice)




Table 6.3 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'

govt:soc vs indiv* nations goals(2)-1 Crosstabulation

% within govt:soc vs indiv			nations goals(2)-1				Total
Nation and wave			order	more say	prices	free speech	
USA 95	govt:soc vs indiv	order	45.7%	25.6%	14.9%	13.8%	100.0%
		freedom	20.4%	39.8%	11.0%	28.8%	100.0%
Japan 95	govt:soc vs indiv	order	43.1%	30.8%	21.0%	5.2%	100.0%
		freedom	22.1%	46.4%	22.7%	8.8%	100.0%
Russia 95	govt:soc vs indiv	order	70.5%	10.4%	18.9%	.2%	100.0%
		freedom	58.2%	19.3%	19.7%	2.9%	100.0%

Figure 6.4 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'




Table 6.4 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'order vs. free speech'

Correlations				
Nation and wave				Order vs Speech
USA 95	Spearman's rho	govt:soc vs indiv (Order vs. Freedom)	Correlation Coefficient	.360**
			Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
			N	784
Japan 95	Spearman's rho	govt:soc vs indiv (Order vs. Freedom)	Correlation Coefficient	.185**
			Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
			N	381
Russia 95	Spearman's rho	govt:soc vs indiv (Order vs. Freedom)	Correlation Coefficient	.138**
			Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
			N	1247


**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 6.5 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'free speech four-rank measurement'


Correlations				
Nation and wave				protect freedom speech (four-rank measurement)
USA 95	Spearman's rho	govt:soc vs indiv (Order vs. Freedom)	Correlation Coefficient	-.201**
			Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
			N	1440
Russia 95	Spearman's rho	govt:soc vs indiv (Order vs. Freedom)	Correlation Coefficient	-.124**
			Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
			N	1835

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).


Figure 6.5 Individual (general) freedom and free speech (*vis-à-vis* order)



USA



Japan



Russia

Table 6.6 'Order vs. freedom': Postcommunist and East Asian societies

% within NATWAVE Nation and wave			
	Order vs. Freedom		Total
	order	freedom	
Russia 95	45.2%	54.8%	100.0%
Ukraine 96	52.1%	47.9%	100.0%
Georgia 96	55.1%	44.9%	100.0%
Belarus 96	44.1%	55.9%	100.0%
Tambov 95	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
Estonia 96	51.0%	49.0%	100.0%
Lithuania 96	45.4%	54.6%	100.0%
Latvia 96	39.1%	60.9%	100.0%
Poland 96	77.0%	23.0%	100.0%
E Germany 97	71.3%	28.7%	100.0%
Bulgaria 98	70.9%	29.1%	100.0%

% within NATWAVE Nation and wave			
	Order vs. Freedom		Total
	order	freedom	
Japan 95	78.5%	21.5%	100.0%
Taiwan 95	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%

Table 6.7 Regional comparison (mean): 'order vs. freedom'

Order vs. Freedom			
REGION		Order percentage	Freedom percentage
West	Mean	51.8625	48.1375
	N	8	8
	Std. Deviation	8.4801	8.4801
Postcommunist	Mean	55.3455	44.6545
	N	11	11
	Std. Deviation	12.6182	12.6182
East Asia	Mean	84.2500	15.7500
	N	2	2
	Std. Deviation	8.1317	8.1317

Figure 6.6 Three regions: 'order vs. freedom'





Table 6.8 Three regions: freedom (in 'order vs. freedom') and free speech (%)
(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index)

		Order vs. Freedom: Freedom %	Free Speech 1st choice %	Free Speech 2nd choice %
Postcommunist	Russia 95	54.80	1.60	6.20
	Ukraine 96	47.90	2.40	8.50
	Georgia 96	44.90	6.20	22.60
	Belarus 96	55.90	5.30	8.40
	Tambov 95	42.40	1.20	4.40
	Estonia 96	49.00	3.40	13.70
	Lithuania 96	54.60	3.40	12.30
	Latvia 96	60.90	2.60	13.60
	Poland 96	23.00	4.10	12.00
	E Germany 97	28.70	8.30	24.40
	Bulgaria 98	29.10	4.90	13.80
West	W Germany 97	49.90	23.50	37.70
	Spain 96	54.10	16.90	29.50
	USA 95	51.40	21.50	27.40
	Australia 95	47.80	26.10	33.80
	Norway 96	27.70	16.10	36.90
	Sweden 96	53.10	22.10	28.90
	Finland 96	50.50	14.40	39.40
	Switzerland 96	50.60	30.90	29.20
East Asia	Japan 95	21.50	6.00	14.70
	Taiwan 95	10.00	5.80	16.60

Figure 6.7 Three regions: free speech and order (%)
(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index)



Note: The data includes three waves (1981, 1990 and 1995-8). For the result of the fourth wave, see Appendix 1.

Chapter 7: Protest

7.1 Introduction

The expression of inclination to protest does not merely mean people's willingness for protest in the specific sense of unconventional political behaviour. It also signifies their capacity to express their opinions openly towards authorities. The action of protest implies stepping further than regular political acquiescence in daily life. It is an action to cross borders, beyond which ordinary people would attract unusual attention, criticism and, in some cases, reactionary responses from the authorities. The behaviour requires a certain strength (or simply character) to be able to transcend the political limitations granted by the authorities. For this reason, the degree of protest inclination would be a useful clue to discover the extent of popular resilience for public expression, which could be a source of societal force to ensure governmental responsiveness.

Popular attitudes to 'moderate' patterns of protest could have considerable implications for the workings of democracy. Such behaviour implies two dimensions: demands towards authorities in vertical terms and public expression in horizontal terms. As far as peaceful forms of protest are concerned, these dimensions may share similar cognitive directions with participation and freedom of speech, which would be crucial elements of democracy. Moreover, examining popular resilience in this respect could have crucial relevance to the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity. For resilience denotes the presence of a stable core attribute that persists over a certain length of time and changes in environment. This in turn implies a coherent disposition, which has possibly been inherited as the culture of a given society. If, however, there is an indication of a consistent change in its degree over time, this may suggest the presence of a values shift. In this manner, consideration is required on the two competing effects. With this perspective, in this chapter, Britain, the USA, Japan and Russia are compared with respect to popular attitudes towards protest.

7.2 Analytical frameworks

The core theme of the present study is: values shift versus cultural particularity and its

implications for democracy. With this, the rationales for examining the protest dimension include several points.¹ The first key issue is on values shift versus cultural particularity. On the one hand, there are discourses suggesting that protest inclination is associated with values shift in post-industrial societies.² In this context, people's protests are often depicted as 'elite-challenging' styles of participation, which have been replacing some spheres of conventional 'elite-directed' political actions.³ On the other hand, protest patterns could differ depending on cultures. The analytical results so far indicate that Western citizens hold considerable orientation to public expression as represented by free speech and other self-actualisation needs. Since public expression is related to the quality of open contestation, it could be assumed that there is a higher degree of protest tendency among the Western populace than others. It in turn could be an attribute of Western culture. If this is the case, this would raise one question: is a protest orientation due to the Western tradition or the consequence of a values shift? In relation to these issues, this chapter primarily focuses the descriptive analyses of protest orientation by comparing the four societies. From this point of view, the USA and Britain could be treated as the representatives of the West, and Russia and Japan as those of non-Western nations (particularly, Postcommunist and East Asian ones).

There is another issue: protest variables have potential implications for democracy.⁴

¹ For the full account of the rationales, see the 'Protest' section in the first chapter.

² Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 314-318; Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 43-44, 115-134.

³ For 'elite-challenging' (or 'elite-directing') participation, see Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, pp. 5, 335-370; Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press), pp. 43-44, 307-315; Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43 (2002), pp. 300-316; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, pp. 94-134. Also, on protest activism, see Norris, Pippa, *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 10, pp. 188-212.

⁴ Parry and Moyser acknowledge (relatively moderate) protest as one of several modes of political participation, although they seem to regard protest as among minor political actions, which need to be treated with caution in terms of relevance to democracy. See Parry, Geraint and George Moyser, 'More Participation, More Democracy', in David Beetham ed., *Defining Measuring Democracy* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 46-51.

Citizens' orientation to 'moderate' forms of protest could have an informal linkage with governmental responsiveness. For it holds elements relevant to the normative direction of polyarchy, which includes public contestation and inclusiveness (participation) along with civil liberties.⁵ To be fair, mild protest *per se* may not be directly connected with the institutional procedures of democracy due to its unconventional character. Nonetheless, in quality, there is willingness to engage in open contestation and the inclusion of opinions in policy-making processes. In one way, temperate protest could be a strengthened version of public expression, which might be described as 'civic protest'.⁶ Public inclination to civic protest can be a *sign* of popular resilience that gives substance to the workings of governmental responsiveness. Its variables can, therefore, be viable indicators to estimate the informal capacity of society to that effect.⁷ For the present chapter, given the assumption that the USA and Britain (as well as Western democratic nations) have more favourable conditions to responsive democracy, if their citizens hold a stronger disposition to such a protest, it would provide support for such a hypothesis.

For an empirical examination, there are several points to be considered, which are:

- (1) Whether there is a general tendency of protest, and to what extent.
- (2) Whether the likely forms of protest are moderate or radical, and to what extent.
- (3) Whether there are consistent changes or durability in protest patterns.

The evaluation of the first point will depict primary characters of societies in terms of the overall degrees of popular expressions and contestation towards authorities. The second point is employed due to the fact that the matter of *moderation* in protest is particularly crucial to a stable state of democracy. In some societies, protest would be likely to hold traditional radical characters, which can worsen the order and security of society. Since such characters are opposite to democratic operations, caution and differentiation should

⁵ For polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 1-16.

⁶ For the concept of civic protest, see Furusawa, Katsuto, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States', *Contemporary Politics*, 12: 2 (June 2006), pp. 207-223.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 208, 219-220.

be applied in examining them. The extent of peaceful protest is a key quality to be probed. The third point will be a useful framework for considering the matter of values shift versus cultural particularity. Meanwhile, the point is relevant to differentiating whether data outcomes represent respondents' basic values or reflect circumstantial conditions such as economic difficulties. To be fair, protest actions are normally driven by circumstantial motives. Nonetheless, if people have a consistent preference for particular patterns of protest, it may well be interpreted as a basic orientation. The following examination is divided into three major parts. The first part studies the general degrees of protest inclination.⁸ The second part presents more detailed investigation by differentiating the five types of protests. The third part pays special attention to missing values.

7.3 A general inclination to protest

As regards a general inclination to protest, respondents in the USA have the strongest propensity towards a positive stance, and the British come as the second strongest. As for Japan and Russia, Russia comes higher than Japan in 1990, which reverses in 1995 due to the sharp decrease in the Russian score. The gap remains in 1999-2002. On the whole, except for Russia, the societies show steady shifts towards positive stances on protest. They also keep certain levels of durability in the shapes of distributions.

According to figure 7.1 and table 7.1, Britain shows a shift towards a more positive stance to protest from 1981 to 1999-2002. In the USA, similar shapes are maintained over the first three time points. Nonetheless, there is a stronger skew in favour of protest in the fourth wave. On the whole, the American case shows a clear increase in the protest orientation, despite a slight rebound in the middle term (between 1990 and 1995). Japan also has durability in the shape of distribution while having a steady increase towards the positive view from 1981 to 1999-2002. In contrast, the Russian case exhibits a sharp decline in the scores from 1990 to 1995. This is probably due to the decrease in enthusiasm for protest. Since the year 1990 was a time in which communist rule was collapsing, the spread of their political concern may have induced the relatively frequent occurrence of protest activities. Enthusiasm nonetheless seems to have declined probably due to

⁸ A measure for this is made from the aggregation of measures on five types of protests drawn from the World Values Survey.

disillusionment as to their efficacy.⁹ In addition, despite the changes, there seem to be some continuities in the distributional forms of protest scores over the waves in these societies.

Figure 7.2 presents a concise picture for an overall comparison. There seems to be a consistent tendency in that, among the four societies, the USA has the highest scores, and Britain has the second highest. A gap between Western and non-Western cases appears to exist as far as these societies are concerned. Moreover, there are coherent levels for each society (except for Russia), which suggests the presence of basic societal stances. It may be possible to relate the difference to cultural particularity. The USA and Britain both may have the same or similar factors that lead to a higher awareness of protest, which Japan and Russia may not share.

As for basic attitudes, how should the Russian case be interpreted? As mentioned above, its sharp decrease may be due to the erosion of an initial enthusiasm. In that sense, the figures in 1995 could represent the point where the enthusiasm evaporated. The Russian result in 1995 and 1999-2002 could therefore indicate their original stance. If this is the case, the basic values of Russian respondents towards protest would be more negative than Japanese, not to mention British and American counterparts.

Meanwhile, there is an overall tendency that popular preference for protest is steadily increasing over the period in the USA, Britain and Japan. Interestingly, in the preceding chapters, though not necessarily fully, steady changes in favour of a Postmaterialist shift are detected among the three societies. Especially, among the four items of a Postmaterialist measure, the item of 'giving people more say in important government decisions' showed noteworthy shifts (although that of 'protecting freedom of speech' tended to be static). This connotes an association between protest and Postmaterialist-related values. Protest orientation could be, at least partly, related to values shift in relatively stable and affluent societies. The Russian case may present some support for this assumption from a different direction. The sharp decline in the Russian protest tendency coincides with a steep decrease in their Postmaterialist orientation and a drastic rise in their

⁹ According to Inglehart and Catterberg's finding in the survey responses, from a phase before/during regime transition to a phase after regime change, the decrease of protest behaviour is observed in many of Postcommunist societies. This is especially the case with the former USSR republics. See Inglehart and Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline'.

Materialist one. This also implies a connection between the two attitudinal dimensions.

With respect to the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity, protest may be seen through both perspectives. Restricting ourselves to only one of the two perspectives would result in an unduly rigid interpretation. Adopting both perspectives in an eclectic manner does not necessarily contradict each other. It is plausible to assume that there are steady changes in favour of a Postmaterialist shift and protest especially in stable and affluent societies, whereas there are basic cultural contexts that affect the posture.

7.4 Measures on five types of protest

This section examines the disaggregated versions of protest measures individually. These comprise five individual measures, of which items are: (1) signing a petition, (2) attending lawful demonstrations, (3) joining in boycotts, (4) joining unofficial strikes, and (5) occupying buildings or factories.

7.4.1 Conceptual diagram of protest

Before going into the analysis of the measures, it would be helpful to consider a conceptual framework of protest types, through which these protest items are differentiated. Alan Marsh developed a diagram of protest modes through detailed pilot studies of surveys on protest as unorthodox political behaviour.¹⁰ Figure 7.3 presents a diagram of protest, which is extracted (with revisions) from Marsh's scale of unconventional political behaviour.¹¹ According to Marsh, his pilot work 'isolated some key examples of protest behavior that seemed to traverse the psychological distance between orthodox and unorthodox political behavior in progressive stages.'¹² And, these examples were incorporated into 'a kind of conceptual diagram which relates the examples, and the dimension they form...'¹³

10 See Marsh, Alan, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977), esp. pp. 39-54; Marsh, Alan, 'Explorations in Unorthodox Political Behavior,' *European Journal of Political Research*, 2 (1974), pp. 107-31. Also see Muller, Edward, 'A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence', *American Political Science Review*, 66 (1972), pp. 928-59.

11 The diagram is, with adjustment, based on a Dalton's modified version. See Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 2nd ed. (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), p. 72. For the original diagram, see Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness*, p. 42.

12 Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness*, p. 41.

13 Ibid., p. 41.

The main body of the diagram consists of four thresholds on the basis of moderate-radical degrees. Among the five protest types, 'petition' and 'lawful demonstration' are included in the first threshold where orthodox and unorthodox political behaviours overlap, while implying that 'lawful demonstration' possesses more connotation of unorthodoxy than 'petition'. Marsh goes on to write, '[the] second threshold is illustrated by "boycott" which marks a fairly unequivocal entry into political unorthodoxy and the first steps of "direct action." "Unofficial strikes" and "rent strikes" mark a third threshold position, wherein the question of conscious illegality arises.'¹⁴ Though illegal, the third threshold is of a non-violent character. The fourth threshold is illustrated by unlawful demonstration, occupations and damage to property, which includes violent characters.

Accordingly, the five protest items of the World Values Survey are able to be located in the diagram. In the context of the diagram, 'signing petitions' takes a position at the left end among the five protest modes whereas 'occupying buildings' is at the right end. The former is the mildest among the five kinds of protests while occupying buildings is the most extreme. 'Lawful demonstration,' according to the diagram, is the second mildest, and 'boycott' is the third. The closer to the left end, the milder the behaviour becomes.¹⁵ In addition, as Dalton writes, in the diagram, 'unconventional political action is cumulative. Individuals active at any one threshold also generally participate in milder forms of protest.'¹⁶ With this diagram as a basic perspective, the examination of the five protest items is conducted in the following sections.

7.4.2 Comparison of protest patterns (A): between societies

Figure 7.4 presents comparison between societies within respective years of the surveys as regards five protest items. For the data of 1995-98, Britain, the USA and Japan have particularly high scores in the 'petition' item, being the highest among the five types of protests. In Russia, on the other hand, the mean score for 'petition' is low, even lower than

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

¹⁵ Marsh's diagram takes 'lawful demonstration' as the second most moderate and 'boycott' as the third. This order of protest modes was established based on his pilot study. However, the interpretation may need caution depending on societies especially concerned with an order between 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott'. Nonetheless, this conceptual diagram remains of great use as a standard. It still has validity in presenting the tentative degrees of moderateness and radicalness, and of popular acceptability, on the protest modes. For Marsh's study on the protest modes, see *ibid.*, p. 29-54; Marsh, 'Explorations in Unorthodox Political Behavior'.

¹⁶ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 2nd ed., p. 73.

'lawful demonstration'. For other items, the USA and Japan have 'boycott' as the second highest, and 'lawful demonstration' as the third while these two protests constitute mid points among the five protests.¹⁷ Unlike others, Russia takes 'lawful demonstration' as the highest, 'petition' as the second, and 'boycott' as the third. For all three societies, 'occupy building' is the lowest, being almost zero, whereas 'join strike' is the second lowest. For Russia, 'lawful demonstration' and 'petition' hold close positions that are only as high as the mid point items of the USA and Japan. The USA and Japan have relatively similar distributions although the Japanese overall emphasis on protest is somewhat weaker than the USA. The Russian figures, nonetheless, exhibit a distinct shape from them. What may be noticed is that 'signing petitions' and 'boycott' respectively are clearly lower in Russia than in the USA and Japan.

For 1990, the figures show a similar tendency to the 1995-98 data, though there is a difference in the Russian figures. What is evident is, except Russia, the other three societies have relatively analogous shapes. Among the three, the USA is the highest in an overall inclination to protest while Britain is the second, and Japan the third. As for the Russian case, the 'shape' of relative priorities between different protest types is almost the same in 1990 and 1995-98. Nonetheless, in 1990 'the degree of emphasis on protest as a whole' seems to be boosted, so that the Russian case in 1990 attains comparable figures to the other three societies. As a result, what is distinctive about the Russian case in 1990 is the high degree of 'lawful demonstration', which is indeed the highest among the four societies. As regards 1981 data (in which the Russian case is not available), the tendency of the three societies are more or less equal to ones in 1990 and 1995-98. The overall tendency is largely as follows: the USA > Britain > Japan.¹⁸ The order is more or less the same throughout these waves. The result of the 1999-2002 data, on the whole, seems to conform to the tendency in the previous waves. Especially, it shows immediate continuity with the shape of the distribution in the 1995-98 data (although there is an overall rise in the American inclination to protest). The Russian scores in the fourth wave remain at the same level as the ones in the third wave.

7.4.3 Comparison of protest patterns (B): within societies

¹⁷ British case is not available.

¹⁸ 'Boycott' item in Britain shows slight weakness in comparison with Japan.

Figure 7.5 shows comparison over the multiple time-points of the surveys within each society. These societies tend to respectively maintain their own orders of priority in types of protest. Moreover, the overall patterns are rather stable over time. Although the Russian case is exceptional due to a significant decrease in the figures, still the same shape is maintained. A shift in the relative priority of 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott' in the British case might be also exceptional. The change, however, would be comparatively minor in terms of the British pattern as a whole. This would support the assumption that there is durability in the political cultural tendency of respective societies in terms of protests (although the degree of enthusiasm could be affected by circumstantial conditions such as regime transition and/or unusual economic conditions as seen in the case of Russia). In fact, there seems to be considerable durability of peculiarity in each society. Whereas Britain and the USA are close to each other in their forms, they also have respective patterns. Japan then shows an analogous shape to the two societies while continuously holding its own form and relative weakness. The Russian pattern is distinct among them. Despite an overall shift between the second and third waves, the 'form' is preserved as seen in the Figure. Therefore, the Russian shift is a withdrawal from protest in general, which is not the change of preference on specific types of protests. In addition, for Britain, the USA and Japan, the results largely show overall shifts towards more positive stances on protest over the period in spite of fluctuations in contrast with the Russian withdrawal.

7.4.4 Protest patterns: a general implication to democracy

What are their implications for democracy? Before discussing the four societies, let us consider a general perspective. The popular inclination to protest in 'peaceful ways' could be associated with responsive and perhaps liberal democracy. For it denotes citizens' capacity for public expression in relation to governmental responsiveness. Empirically, according to the World Values Survey, at the world level, Western democratic nations concentrate in the upper halves of country rankings on the percentages of respondents who have engaged in protest. This is especially the case with 'petition', 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', which are regarded as milder in Marsh's protest diagram.¹⁹ As for their

¹⁹ The result is according to the fourth wave of the Survey (1999-2002).

associations with democracy, table 7.2 indicates that 'signing petition' is evidently correlated with both of the Freedom House ratings. 'Joining boycott' also has a significant correlation coefficient with 'civil liberties'. Although 'lawful demonstration' is seemingly not associated, this would be due to the fact that its nature could vary. Demonstrations could be either related or unrelated to a democratic orientation.²⁰ Similarly, Inglehart shows that the popular attitude of 'signing petition' is clearly correlated with Freedom House indexes.²¹ There is an observation that West European societies tend to hold a stronger orientation to moderate forms of protest than their Postcommunist counterparts do. Also, milder protests are more associated with liberal democratic attitudes in Western Europe than in a group of states that consist of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.²²

Thus, it seems that Western democracy and probably liberal democracy are likely to be accompanied by the presence of citizens in favour of peaceful protest, where mass resilience of public expression and a system of political responsiveness *coincide*. The people's attitudinal commitment to open debates and demands helps to ensure such governmental functions. It could be moderate but continuous 'cognitive pressure' that encourages the flow of public opinion and behavioural principles that direct political elites. In this sense, a crucial point is not necessarily the actual behaviour of the moderate protest *per se*. A societal inclination to temperate protest is a *symptom* by which we could estimate such a popular capacity in democratic function.²³

7.4.5 Implications for the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan

In that specific perspective, the USA may have the closest conditions of popular attitudes to such a model. Britain seems to be the second to that effect. Furthermore, their conditions hold a certain durability, which may be rooted in their political culture. This would be supported by the observed fact that their stronger orientation to moderate protests tends to

20 There could be societies where spontaneous demonstrations are more likely, being associated with democratic causes. Other societies, however, may have conditions in which such behaviours are driven by economic desperations. For some societies such as ones with Soviet traditions, *lawful* demonstrations might be artificial political mobilisations. See, for instance, Friedgut, Theodore H., *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

21 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Haward J. Wiarda eds., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), p. 149; Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', *PS* (January 2003), p. 54.

22 Furusawa, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States'.

23 For a similar argument, see *ibid*.

be constant over multiple time points.

As for Japan, the protest tendency appears to be similar to that of the two Western nations at first glance. Nonetheless, the Japanese propensity is lower than them. Although this gap seems to be subtle in the above results, the weakness is more evident when the 'action' of protest is specifically considered.²⁴ For the commitment to actual protest behaviour would require a stronger willingness that exceeds psychological barriers towards real involvement in comparison with a simple judgement of either a positive or negative stance. In that sense, this would more explicitly tap popular resilience for public expression. As shown in table 7.3, the Japanese inclination is especially weaker in 'petition' and 'boycott' than American and British ones.²⁵ Although Japan may have conditions in favour of the democratic dimension discussed so far, their commitment to public demands is not as firm as in the Western societies. Moreover, its relative weakness is consistent over the series of the surveys, denoting cultural durability. Table 7.4 indicates an analogous result, which is extracted from other source. As for judgements on protestation without personal involvement, the levels of supports by Japanese respondents are comparable to ones by the two Western counterparts. Yet, when it comes to the matter of their own protest actions, Japanese scores are notably low. There appears to be an intrinsic lack of inclination to open contestation among Japanese populace. To be fair, as observed above, there is a steady shift towards a positive attitude towards civic protest. Nevertheless, a particular proclivity clearly persists in the Japanese attitude, which could run counter to the quality of public expression at an individual level.

As regards Russia, there are several points to be noted. First, it seems that the Russian protest orientation *per se* is *basically* not substantial. There is an obvious indication that the overall degree of protest is higher in 1990 than 1995 and 1999-2002. Since 1990 was a year immediately before the collapse of the communist rule, there were circumstantial conditions that were likely to motivate the frequent occurrence of protests.²⁶ It is inferred that in 1990 the higher appreciation of protest was due to a temporal

24 The results so far are based on averages of protest inclination which considers all the options of answers: 'have done' = 2; 'might do' = 1; 'would never do' = 0. It is possible that a gap of a subjective attachment to protest is wider between those who 'have done' and those who 'might do' than a gap between those who 'might do' and those who 'would never do'.

25 It should be recalled that these two types are correlated with the Freedom House ratings.

26 Also, see Inglehart and Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline'.

culmination, whereas in 1995 the popular evaluation on protest shifted back to its original level. This is supported by the fact that the same level continued from 1995 to 1999-2002 as shown in figure 7.5 and table 7.3. Second, there seems to be less stability in the Russian state of protest. This could be surmised in view of the fluctuation in the level of protest, which is not observed in the other three societies.²⁷ Third, consistently, the score of 'signing petitions' is much lower in Russia than in the USA and Britain (and Japan). Fourth, the Russian score of 'lawful demonstration' is comparatively higher among the lower scores of the five protest items. What does this signify in conjunction with the relative weakness in relation to 'petition'? Russian perceptions of protest would probably differ from the ones generally conceived in the contemporary West. Russian respondents appear to place less trust on a simple linguistic expression as a means of contestation. It should be recalled that this coincides with a consistent lower priority for 'free speech' in Russia, as identified in earlier chapters. Since 'petition' is a foremost indicator of civic protest among the five items, democratic or civic connotation may be much less emphasised in the realm of Russian protest. In Russia, protest could be understood mainly in traditional and pragmatic terms. The emphasis can be qualitatively different from protest prevalent in Western societies, which often involves abstract liberal democratic rationales.

Among the five protest items, 'lawful demonstration' is located within the first threshold in Marsh's diagram, which may be still within the category of moderate means. 'Lawful demonstration' could, however, denote unstable factors. Although it could be lawful and therefore taken as acceptable by the public, it may affect the stability of society. Since demonstration implies direct action, it has a certain unpredictability in its consequences. This factor may not be favourable to the maintenance of stable democracy, *unless* its activists, society and government have substantial capacity to accommodate such effects in a peaceful manner. Given the uncertain conditions of contemporary Russia, it would be difficult to judge whether it functions positively or negatively. To be fair, there might be an element in favour of responsive democracy. The occurrence of lawful demonstrations might push for the enlargement of governmental responsiveness to popular voices, as in 1960s/70s (and other times in their history) in the USA, Britain and other Western nations. Nonetheless, as argued above, Russian society appears to lack a

²⁷ Nevertheless, it should be recalled that there is durability in the 'form' of protest preference of the five protest items in Russian case.

consistent direction for public expression, being prone to circumstantial motives. This may not substantiate a societal force for the unidirectional development of responsive democracy. Moreover, the lack of consistency may not be advantageous for nurturing durable and moderate attitudes on public demands. For such attitudes would require long-term learning processes through recurrent events in coherent directions. In the West, the unidirectional attainment has been possible due to an inherent cultural orientation to the search of freedom residing in the individual. This has been enhanced by the spread of material and intellectual resources and values transformation among the people thanks to industrial and post-industrial processes. Russia on the other hand seems to hold a different cultural and historical background, which may not work in an identical manner to the Western one.

7.5 Missing values

7.5.1 Protest and missing values

This section examines missing values of protest measures and their implications. Why do they need to be analysed? The figures of missing values have important implications for the analysis of protest. Normally, missing values are excluded from the range of data analysis mainly due to their uncertain natures. Nonetheless, if there is a peculiar social difference in the proportions of missing values, it is useful to consider this sphere. In this context, the protest measures in our research have noticeable outputs worth paying attention to. Missing values connote responses that can be regarded as 'don't know' or 'no answer'.²⁸ These responses imply respondents' hesitation and/or ambiguity in giving clear answers (to questions asked by interviewers/questionnaires). The reasons behind it could be such as: (1) respondents do not have clear answers because answers can change depending on situations; (2) respondents are reluctant to give clear answers because there are matters in question that cause their hesitation.

²⁸ For the issues of 'don't know', no opinion and other related matters in survey response, see Schuman, Howard and Stanley Presser, *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording, and Context* (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 113-178; de Vaus, David, *Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 72-74. For a study on 'don't know' answers in Russian surveys, see Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence?: "Don't Knows" and Democracy in Russia', *Studies in Public Policy*, 237 (1994).

For protest measures, such responses could be interpreted to stem from either ambiguous or diffident attitudes in expressing clear judgments. Why are they ambiguous or diffident? Probably, for the ambiguity, respondents expect various situations and prefer to be adaptable. Their sensitivity to situations could cause equivocal judgment and statements. They would be cautious in giving clear (and therefore possibly hasty) answers while keeping flexibility in their following actions. As for diffidence, it would hold a similar rationale whereas the attitude further includes hesitation in asserting one's own views especially on sensitive matters such as protest. This would be likely if given people or societies have stronger norms which regard direct contestation as potentially disturbing peace and order of society, and more personally, of communal/social ties. Japan seems to have inherited the remnants of analogous traditions. It would be possible that the cultural heritage affects the way respondents answer in a particular manner. In effect, such a tendency is observable. In following parts, the examination of missing values pays special attention to this point.

7.5.2 Observation: indicators of ambiguity

As indicated in figure 7.6, what is significant is the exceptionally high degree of missing values of Japanese data in *all* of the four waves whereas Britain and the USA keep evidently low degrees throughout the waves. Russia takes middle positions between Japan and the two Western societies. The Russian case of 1990 is clearly higher than that of 1995 and 1999-2002. For Britain and the USA, the minimal levels of missing values suggest their propensity to clearly express their views on protest rather than having ambiguity in their responses. The Japanese case makes an unequivocal contrast with them by exhibiting consistently high levels of the missing values although there are more fluctuations. It denotes that in Japan there is an inclination to avoiding a definite statement on protest. The Russian case implies that the degree of evasion is lower than Japan, but still higher than Britain and the USA. This suggests an intermediate attitude in assertiveness on this issue. Meanwhile, circumstantial changes between 1990 and 1995 seem to be also at work in this sphere.²⁹

Each of the societies has relative consistency, that is, durability in each of their own

²⁹ 'Boycott', 'strike' and 'occupying building' show higher fluctuation than two milder protests.

degrees of missing percentages over multiple surveys (despite fluctuations). This suggests that each of the societies has a *persistent* tendency in responses on protest. This can be translated in the context of cultures. The fact that Japanese values are high at all of the four time-points could be due to a peculiar Japanese tradition. Likewise, the coherently low missing values in Britain and the USA could be based on their cultural particularity. Moreover, the constant proximity between Britain and the USA over the waves denotes their homogeneity. To a less extent, the Russian tendency to be at mid-points in the figures implies the reflection of a trait that is neither identical with Britain/the USA nor Japan. Consequently, the result implies that Japanese people are culturally evasive in their attitude to protest. British and American people have an enduring propensity to express clear stances. The Russian disposition tends to be in the middle although their attitude is prone to circumstantial changes.

7.5.4 Further implications: non-Western particularities

Japan

Given the above result, why are Japanese evasive to the question of protest? One reason would be that they are hesitant in giving public statements on socially sensitive matters. Japanese citizens are normally reluctant to protest. Culturally, the motivations of their public behaviours are heavily affected by holistic social norms, systems and atmospheres to which individuals belong rather than internally conceived personal principles.³⁰ Especially in public domains, individuals have a persistent concern for other people's sentiments and judgements, a normative trend of society, and roles and duties which they are supposed to fulfil in societal systems.³¹ Many of them are bound up in the complexity of intertwined social ties. This nurtures weakness in individual autonomy that should underpin self-motivated independent actions. Hence, at a personal level, these amount to their reluctance to engage in contestation, which is essentially due to their other-directed

³⁰ Their intrinsic dependence on external norms and judgement outside themselves might be related to Ruth Benedict's claim that Japanese culture is concerned with a sense of 'shame' in contrast with Western orientation to that of 'guilt'. See Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947).

³¹ Lipset mentions Japanese culture emphasise a sense of obligation, which has clear contrast with American orientation to that of rights and individual autonomy. See Lipset, S. Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 211-263, esp. 217-220.

rather than inner-directed predisposition.³²

Nonetheless, since their behavioural motives generally rely on constant reference to outer contexts, there might be a certain changeability in their deeds depending on surrounding atmospheres or main trends of society. In the sixth chapter, it was mentioned that the Japanese populace have a tradition of conformism. At a personal level, this could result in various behavioural outcomes, which would not necessarily be coherent.³³ Sato observed a situation-oriented tendency in the Japanese character as early as the period of infancy in comparison with British and American ones which have more consistent attitudes.³⁴ This suggests that there is already the burgeoning of the cultural difference in the early periods of their formative years. Consequently, the same logic can be applied to both a Japanese general hesitancy in relation to protest and a certain unpredictability. They inherently hold a strong sense of adaptation to surrounding situations, which regulates their behaviour. This is also connected with their ambiguity in opinions. It in turn is reflected in the high proportions of missing values.

Russia

What implication could be surmised for Russia as regards missing values? It seems that *basically* Russian people are not eager to engage in open contestation. The rationale is as follows. The Russian case shows a higher protest inclination and larger missing percentages in 1990, whereas they hold a weaker inclination with fewer missing values in 1995 and 1999-2002. In other words, they are ambiguous in 1990 despite greater interest. In contrast, they seem to be clear in their reluctance in 1995 and 1999-2002. The ambiguity in 1990 could stem from their ambivalence between temporary enthusiasm and basic diffidence in relation to protest action. Although Russians would be normally hesitant or perhaps sceptical in relation to such behaviour, the situation of 1990 seems to drag them

³² The Japanese other-directed predisposition would be an indigenous cultural trait rather than the consequence of modernisation. For the original concept of the 'other-directed' and 'inner-directed' characters, see Riesman, David, et al., *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).

³³ Maruyama's account on Japanese society in terms of patterns of individuation might be also helpful for this explanation. See Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme,' ch. 14, *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization*, in Marius B. Jansen ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 493-4.

³⁴ Sato, Yoshiko, *Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho to Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku* [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shin-sha, 2001).

into the momentum of protest. The equivocation in 1990 would be because they are suspended between two conflicting views. Thus, the shift from 1990 to 1995 could be interpreted as their return to a primary unwilling stance. At that point, they are confident in their reluctance to protest because they are expressing their original position. Another point is the matter of changeability prone to circumstances. This could be present in Russia since the evident gap between 1990 and 1995 suggests it. Russian changeability seems to be concerned with material conditions such as the economy or public order.

7.6 Combined measure of 'answered' and missing data

The degrees of missing percentages could be considered together with the states of 'answered' data. The combined analysis enables further differentiation in data interpretation, which could not be extracted otherwise. Figure 7.7 presents the output of this design. The measure consists of the combination of the mean scores in a general measure of protest ('answered') and the mean scores of missing percentages of five protest scales. Table 7.5 is the approximate summary of the design.

The interpretation is as follows. As for Britain and the USA, the societies' approximate stances to protest are relatively high with high degree of assertion.³⁵ With respect to Japan, despite a slight but steady rise in protest inclination and fluctuations in missing percentages, Japan consistently stays in middle positions of the inclination with high degrees of ambiguity. Russia shows a considerable difference between the 1990 survey and later surveys (1995 and 1999-2002). This would be due to circumstantial changes, as mentioned above. In 1990, Russian protest inclination ('answered') is relatively high while having a higher degree of ambiguity (missing percentage). This amounts to a still lower inclination to open contestation than Britain and the USA. On the other hand, when it comes to 1995 and 1999-2002, when stimuli and enthusiasm for protest fades away, Russian respondents opt for an unwilling stance with a high degree of assertion.

³⁵ The protest inclination of the American case in 1999-2002 is particularly high.

7.7 Conclusion

A crucial finding is that the USA and Britain have an orientation to protest especially in 'moderate' forms (so do many Western democratic societies). Although Japan has a tendency in a similar direction, it does so less clearly. Russia shows a deviant protest pattern and, on the whole, shows a lower protest inclination than Western counterparts. Even during the time of the political change around 1990, the Russian level generally did not quite go beyond those of the USA and Britain, despite the relatively frequent opportunities for protest during the period. Only a notable type of protest for Russia was 'lawful demonstration', which exceeded those in the other three societies in 1990 and decreased in 1995. Nonetheless, the level was not comparable to that of 'petition' in the British and American cases. Considering the peculiarity of the year 1990, the 1995 and 1999-2002 data would be closer to the basic attitudes of the Russian public. Therefore, the general tendency for protest would not be substantial in Russia (except for a particular orientation to demonstrations).³⁶ Moreover, on average, Russian perceptions of protest may differ from one generally understood in the contemporary West in the sense of 'civic protest'.

For the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity, the following is considered. On the one hand, among the four societies, long-standing affluent and stable societies have a greater inclination to open contestation in more peaceful forms. Also, the signs of their steady rises are observed in these societies. This may be concerned with the consequence of a values shift. Their social conditions probably have nurtured a stronger sense of self-esteem and self-expression, as suggested in the thesis of values changes. On the other hand, there is certain durability in each degree and form of protest and assertiveness in the four societies. This indicates the presence of cultural particularities. Societies with the tradition of the West (or Anglo-Saxon) have a greater propensity for protest. There could be a contextual correspondence between the Western heritage of individualism and the

³⁶ There might be a criticism that the result of the International Social Survey Programme in 1996 is contradictory to this claim. To be sure, the percentages of the respondents who have attended 'public protest meetings' and 'protest demonstrations' in Russia are higher than the Western counterparts. However, it should be recalled that the questions for these items indicate the experience of their involvement in 'last five years', which can include a period closely continuous from 1990. Also, the items are approximately comparable to 'lawful demonstrations' in terms of levels depicted in Marsh's diagram. In this sense, these items could have overlapping results with the state of 'lawful demonstration' in 1990.

protest inclination.³⁷ According to Lipset, the USA is the foremost in its cultural emphasis on free standing individuals and the assertion of rights. Japan is located at the opposite end with a particular orientation to consensus, collectivism and hierarchical interpersonal relations. West European societies including Britain are inbetween.³⁸ Sato's study on self-assertion and self-regulation in relation to child behaviour in the three societies corresponds with this.³⁹ Culture seems to matter to the degree of acceptance of protest.

As for the context of responsive democracy, the USA and Britain appear to be advantageous for the underpinning of the systems due to their capacity for public expression. Japan has a weaker resilience than the two nations.⁴⁰ Especially, the tradition of conformism seems to have been preventing the existence of such a popular capacity. With the high degree of ambiguity, Japan has a certain unpredictability in whether it can provide a coherent substance to public contestation. With respect to Russia, the extent of civic protest seems to be less than in the other three societies. Although there is an orientation to 'lawful demonstration', relative inconsistency in overall resilience and direction may be disadvantageous for the development of responsive democracy. A moderate protest with the power of language as represented by 'signing petitions' is much less emphasised than in the other societies. Despite the relative rise of the citizens' protest in 1990, the Russian basic propensity seems to be oriented to political acquiescence rather than consistent claims for their voices to be heard.

In one way, Russian democracy may not be fitted in the exact model of Western democracy, which attaches extraordinary importance to the inclusion and sensitivity of popular voices in the political decision-making process. The intrinsic quality of democracies in the West is to assimilate vigorous competition of political demands from society. It is a system to channel and coordinate these interests in formalised peaceful processes. The predominance of parliament, which has been historically a central feature of these societies, would be one of the examples that depict this.⁴¹ The strong claims of

³⁷ Meanwhile, in these societies, the practice of protest 'by peaceful means' is permitted and guaranteed in both legal and customary terms. With such wider freedom, the people would have stronger awareness and familiarity with civic contestation.

³⁸ Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, pp. 211-263, 293-296.

³⁹ Sato, *Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko* [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan].

⁴⁰ Despite this, there appears to be a certain effect of public opinion as checks and pressures on political authorities in Japan. Nonetheless, its major momentum seems to be led by media, not necessarily based on the capacity of public expression at an individual level.

⁴¹ Huntington mentions that the presence of representative political body is one of elements in Western


plural interests chronically emerge from not only social groups but also a number of individuals who hold a persistent penchant for public expression. Western democracy may be the most suitable system for societies where such a *political culture* predominates (and therefore may have been developed in the West). In this sense, the current Russian political culture would be disadvantageous and perhaps less suitable to the Western model of democracy.

Yet, it does not necessarily mean Russian democracy has a bleak future. As Almond and Verba put it, political acquiescence could, in one way, have an advantage for not to seriously disturb the stability of a political system while softening political tensions.⁴² For a society where material needs and societal order are imperative, the principles of participation and free speech may be perceived as luxurious ideals and less practical for acquiring such a priority. For the moment especially, Russian citizens may long for pragmatic outcomes in their immediate lives rather than abstract political principles. Meanwhile, if economic growth is resumed and maintained for a long period in Russia, one may expect increases in some aspects of Postmaterialist values, although it may not be a fully-fledged shift. If this happens, there may be a point when the society would begin to acquire certain elements in favour of responsive democracy. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that values transformation would take an extraordinarily long time even if favourable conditions were met. In reality, it is difficult to expect the realisation of economic affluence at the level of the West in the near future, let alone its long-standing preservation. Thus, at least for a time being, a values shift would not be an immediate remedy for the development of liberal democratic conditions comparable to the West.

civilisation. See Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72.

⁴² Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Figure 7.1 A general protest inclination



Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.


Table 7.1 A general protest inclination: mean

- Protest: mean estimation -

		Mean	Standard Error
Britain	1981	3.04	0.06
	1990	3.44	0.06
	1998	--	--
	1999-2002	3.85	0.07
USA	1981	3.21	0.05
	1990	3.85	0.05
	1995	3.64	0.06
	1999-02	4.58	0.06
Japan	1981	2.51	0.07
	1990	2.64	0.09
	1995	2.96	0.08
	1999-2002	3.16	0.07
Russia	1981	--	--
	1990	2.8	0.06
	1995	1.73	0.04
	1999-2002	1.74	0.04


Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Figure 7.2 A general protest inclination: mean comparison of societies



Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.


Figure 7.3 Diagram of protest



Note: With revision/omission, the diagram is extracted from Marsh's scale of unconventional political behaviour (on the basis of a Dalton's modified version). The protest items available in the World Values Survey are presented in capital letters.


Source: R. J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), pp. 61. For the original diagram, see A. Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), p. 42.

Figure 7.4 Comparison of protest patterns (A): between societies



Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Figure 7.5 Comparison of protest patterns (B): within societies



Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Table 7.2 Correlations: Freedom House ratings and protest

	Petition	Lawful Demonstration	Boycott	Strike	Occupying Buildings
Political Rights	0.54***	0.10 n.s.	0.27 n.s.	-0.07 n.s.	-0.03 n.s.
Civil Liberties	0.63***	0.11 n.s.	0.33*	-0.10 n.s.	-0.01 n.s.

Note:

(1) N = 45 / Cases with missing values are excluded.

(2) Variables:

[A] Protest: 'done' % within nations; [B] Freedom House ratings: year of survey / 6 = highest; 0 = lowest (recoded).

(3) *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001; n.s.: not significant.

(4) Coefficients are rounded.

Source: World Values Survey 1990-98.

Table 7.3 Percentages of protest actions

Petition	1999-2002	1995-8	1990	1981
USA	81	71	72	64
Britain	79	58	75	63
Japan	63	55	62	48
Russia	12	11	30	--

Lawful Demonstration	1999-2002	1995-8	1990	1981
USA	21	16	16	13
Britain	13	--	14	10
Japan	13	10	13	9
Russia	23	21	33	--

Boycott	1999-2002	1995-8	1990	1981
USA	26	19	18	15
Britain	17	--	14	7
Japan	8	7	4	3
Russia	3	2	4	--

(Respondents who 'have done': % within nations)

Note: Figures are rounded.

Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Table 7.4 Views and actions of protest

Views on Protest

(‘Should be definitely allowed’ %)

	Public Protest Meetings	Protest Demonstrations	National Strike
USA	55	49	18
Britain	57	34	14
Japan	40	33	19
Russia	46	41	35

Actions of Protest

(‘Definitely would do’ %)

	Attend Public Protest Meetings	Go on Protest Demonstrations
USA	32	22
Britain	24	11
Japan	7	5
Russia	15	13

(Last 5 years: ‘have done’ %)

	Public Protest Meetings	Protest Demonstrations
USA	14	9
Britain	12	5
Japan	4	3
Russia	21	11


Note:

(1) Figures are rounded.

(2) ‘Have done’: the sum of the percentages of ‘once’ and ‘more than once’.


Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1996 - Role of Government III.

Figure 7.6 Protest: the patterns of missing values



Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Figure 7.7 Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity



Note: This measure combines the means of a protest aggregate measure ('answered') and the means of missing percentages of five protest measures.

Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

Table 7.5 Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity

Protest Inclination (Answered)	Missing Percentage	Tendency	Ambiguity (Unpredictability)	Protest Inclination (Overall)	Society's Approximate Stance
Higher	Lower	Positive to protest, and confident in the attitude	Low	Higher	USA 99-02 USA Britain Japan 95, 99-02 Russia 90 Japan 81, 90 Russia 95, 99-02
Higher	Higher	Positive to protest, but ambiguous in the attitude	 High	Maybe Higher	
Lower	Higher	Negative to protest, but ambiguous in the attitude		Maybe Lower	
Lower	Lower	Negative to protest, and confident in the attitude	Low	Lower	

Chapter 8: Values and Political Dimensions – Multivariate Analysis

8.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have probed the sphere of values while considering issues surrounding the thesis of values shift. This chapter pays special attention to the question of whether values elements have influence on actual political attitudes and behaviour.¹ It draws together the variables examined so far in conjunction with other pertinent variables.

One of the major themes of the research is to examine dichotomous perspectives, that is, values shift and cultural particularity. Through cross-national comparison, we have sought to establish whether there are shifts in favour of a Postmaterialist orientation or nationally peculiar forms with durabilities.² As it has emerged, there are both elements that have been influencing each of the four nations. It suggests the validity of the binary perspective.³ In view of this, can the perspective be applied to other dimension of Postmaterialist thesis? The thesis assumes that Postmaterialist values are conducive to a protest inclination. The first section of this chapter compares the ways of the two elements' influence over protest attitudes in Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan.

Another theme of this research is the implication of values for the scope of democracy. Our examination has discovered that there are cultural gaps in the understanding of freedom as well as the degrees of its emphasis, which could be related to

1 For the implication of Postmaterialist and related values for political aspects, see for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', *PS* (January 2003), pp. 51-57. For the extended scale of 'self expression values' that incorporates the Postmaterialist variable, linkages with (liberal) democracy have been explored by Inglehart as well as Welzel, for instance, see Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Welzel, Christian and Ronald Inglehart, 'Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom: The Human Development Perspective', *International Review of Sociology*, 15: 1 (March 2005), pp. 81-108; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Howard J. Wiarda ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages', *Comparative Politics*, 36: 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-79.

2 For the issue of Postmaterialist values shift, there were discussions on Japanese case, for instance, see Inglehart, Ronald, 'Changing Values in Japan and the West', *Comparative Political Studies*, 14: 4 (January 1982), pp. 445-479; Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', *American Political Science Review*, 67: 4 (December 1973), pp. 1194-1203.

3 There are similar applications of this perspective by Inglehart. See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker E., 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', *American Sociological Review*, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.

the issue of democracy. The gaps seem to be the case with the patterns of public expression as represented by moderate forms of protest. This raises questions. Do *liberal* democratic attitudes matter on moderate protest behaviour? Do such effects vary depending on distinct cultural contexts? The second section scrutinises these issues. It is envisaged that, if stronger associations tend to hold between such attitudes and an inclination to moderate protest, the kind of protest may have the likely quality of 'civic protest'. With this vision, a cross-national comparison is conducted for the four societies. The third section turns its attention to views of governance. By utilising two scales, it is intended to examine whether liberal democratic attitudes affect people's perceptions in relation to democratic and non-democratic regimes.

Thus, the chapter comprises three sections. The first part will discuss the impact of Postmaterialist values on protest behaviour in the context of values shift versus cultural particularity. The second part will evaluate the quality of protest in the four societies in the light of the notion of 'civic protest'. The third part will examine views of governance and their association with liberal democratic attitudes. Through this threefold approach, this chapter concludes the analytical body of the research in relation to our major theme: values and democracy. Do values affect politics and democracy, and in what ways in differing societies?

8.2 Postmaterialist values and protest

8.2.1 Hypothesis

This part focuses on the Postmaterialist index and its variants in terms of these values' impact on protest behaviour, comparing the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan.⁴ A major issue is the effect of cultural particularity in comparison with that of Postmaterialist values. According to the theory of values shift, in post-industrial societies, popular outlooks are likely to transform and facilitate 'elite challenging' styles of participation such as (relatively moderate) protest actions.⁵ Nonetheless, there could be cultural variance, whereby a

⁴ In relation to this, for example, Inglehart presented a linkage between Postmaterialist values and protest potential. See Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 314-318.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. 5, pp. 115-134; Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges

consequence may not be unidirectional as expected by the theory. Inglehart notes that the actual directions of the values shift are path dependent, thus acknowledging possibility of cultural and historical influence.⁶ This could be the case with not only the process of the values shift, but also the *political effect* of these values, as presented in figure 8.1.

Given the availability of survey data for four time points: 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002, this section examines whether Postmaterialist values consistently affect protest orientations across the nations. If there is such a consistency, the political hypothesis in the values shift theory would be endorsed. For it will denote the constant effect of values on the enhancement of protest behaviour (if values are transformed in favour of a Postmaterialist shift). Nevertheless, if there is a coherent national difference, it will imply the influence of cultural particularity. This can indicate that, even if a values shift occurs, the political consequence could be diverse. This would provide an alternative conclusion in a modified perspective. The investigation is restricted to the effect of a Postmaterialist orientation on protest attitudes (table 8.1). Further attention is extended to the influence of the relative commitment to 'more say' and 'free speech' as independent variables (table 8.2).⁷

8.2.2 Observation

Table 8.1 shows the association of Postmaterialist values with attitudes to 'petition', 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott'. For the USA, Postmaterialist values seem to be relatively evenly associated with protest orientations. For the details, the Postmaterialist variable has statistically significant results with all the three protest items in 1990 and 1995, although

Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 307-315.

⁶ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 1, pp. 15-47 [esp. 18-22].

⁷ Ordered logit regression is employed for these analyses. This is due to the fact that the dependent variables are ordinal. For ordered logit regression, see, for instance, Long, J. Scott, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables* (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 1997), pp. 114-147; Borooah, Vani K., *Logit and Probit: Ordered and Multinomial Models* (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2002); Hamilton, Lawrence C., *Statistics with Stata: Updated for Version 7* (Belmont, CA/London: Wadsworth Group/Thompson Learning, 2003), pp. 228-230; Norušis, Marija J., *SPSS® 13.0 Advanced Statistical Procedures Companion* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2004), pp. 69-89; Ishimura, Sadao, *SPSS ni-yoru Kategorikaru-Deta-Bunseki no Tejun, Dai 2 Ban* [The Process of Categorical Data Analysis Using SPSS] (Tokyo: Tokyo Tosho Kabushiki-Gaisha, 2005), pp. 70-93.

the effects somewhat withdraw from 'petition' in 1999-2002.⁸ With respect to Britain, tendencies are similar to the American case. The Postmaterialist index exhibits a general association with the three protest items with the exception of 'petition' in the first survey. For the Japanese case, 'petition' does not have a significant association with Postmaterialist effects over all the four time points. Another feature is that, consistently, there seems to be a smaller influence on 'boycott' in comparison with the two Western cases. Russia also shows peculiar forms. Across the three available surveys, the Postmaterialist attitude has a clearly weaker association with 'lawful demonstration' than in the case of the other three nations. The fact that 'lawful demonstration' has a distinct tendency corresponds with the Russian pattern of protest as identified earlier, whereby respondents are unusually inclined to 'lawful demonstration' unlike the other three societies. This could be partly due to the Soviet heritage in which the people are mobilised into ritualistic forms of public demonstration.⁹ Since the 'Postmaterialist' category is for those who opt for both freedom of speech and participation as a priority, such an attachment would not be compatible with a forced pattern of protest.

Table 8.2 presents more details, where the effects of the esteem of 'free speech' and 'more say' items are differentiated. For the American and British cases, almost full loadings of the influence of both 'free speech' and 'more say' are found for 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott' over the period. Although such influence fluctuates in relation to 'petition', there appear to be fair indications of association with this item (except for the American case in 1999-2002). For the Japanese case, the pattern of the influence is far from even, which is different from the patterns of two Western societies. The association is statistically nil for 'petition'. Moreover, for 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', there seems to be relative weakness in the effect from the 'more say' emphasis across the two decades. 'Free speech' has a rather coherent influence. An even more particular form is observed in the Russian data. For all the three protest items, the influence mostly comes from the esteem of 'more say', whereas 'free speech' seems to be a trivial source for such

⁸ The Postmaterialist variable has statistically significant results with all the five protest items in 1990 and 1995. The overall effects somewhat withdraw in 1999-2002 with only intermediate (semi-radical) protests having such an indication. These are 'lawful demonstration', 'boycott' and 'strike'.

⁹ Friedgut, Theodore H., *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

motivation.¹⁰

In sum, in the USA and Britain, the protest items and Postmaterialist effect appear to be relatively evenly related. In particular, associations with 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott' are notable. These are also the case with both 'more say' and 'free speech'. For Japanese, the association is far from even, whereas 'free speech' is a likely rationale related to the protests. As far as Japanese 'petition' is concerned, nonetheless, there seems to be no such influence. The Russian case is the opposite. Largely the protest items are apt to be associated with 'more say'. These tendencies have a relative coherence across multiple time points.

We can conclude that there are national particularities in the associations between protest and Postmaterialist related variables. Moreover, their relative consistency over time denotes certain degrees of their durability, which suggests the presence of long-standing peculiarities. These may have roots in cultural or historical contexts. Thus, the form of influence differs depending on nations. This provides a modified conclusion to the hypothesis that values transformation simply facilitates protest behaviour, which is expected by the theory of values shift. As far as the four societies are concerned, Postmaterialist values do not evenly influence protest orientation in Japan and Russia, whereas they rather tend to do so in the two Western nations.

What consequences could be expected from such a result? For the American and British cases, a Postmaterialist values shift can evenly enhance (moderate) protest – especially 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott'. For the Japanese case, there is the outcome that 'free speech' (and not quite 'more say') is a major stimulus towards 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott'. On the other hand, the previous result indicates that a values shift towards a commitment to the value of 'free speech' is much less likely. As far as the Postmaterialist effect on protest is concerned, the further Japanese increase of the two types of protest would be weaker than in the two Western nations. Also, there is a potential that 'petition' would not be likely to be enhanced by the increase of Postmaterialist values in Japan.¹¹ For the Russian case, 'more say' holds a consistent influence, which may

¹⁰ The cases in 1990 show slight exceptional fluctuation, where there is *neither* significant association of 'lawful demonstration' with 'more say' nor 'free speech'. 'Free speech' shows some influence in that year. This particularity would be due to the nature of the year 1990, which is a time of culmination in regime transition where there may have been irregular elements in protest motives.

¹¹ It is in fact a puzzling result, given the fact that 'petition' has been gradually increasing.

seemingly denote the viability of protest increase due to a values shift. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that Russian values are rather oriented to Materialism and even having a reverse direction to the values shift. This indicates that the Russian state of protest would be less apt to be affected by elements explained by the values shift theory.

8.2.3 Further interpretations

What further interpretations can we draw from the analysis? In the USA and Britain, both 'more say' and 'free speech' are contributors to protest motives. This is especially the case with 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', which are neither too moderate nor too radical. The interpretation is straightforward. Culturally, these Western people emphatically acknowledge the power of public expression and contestation, which may involve moderate protest behaviour as a potential option for participation. Moreover, as observed in chapter seven, the actual levels of their emphasis of protest are generally higher than in the other two non-Western societies.¹² This seems to be especially applicable to intermediate styles of protest. These are relatively overt political actions, which go beyond behavioural passivity. With the higher esteem of self-expression and open debates, the Western publics may have the character of what is termed 'assertive masses'.¹³

For the Japanese case, the source of the protests is biased to 'free speech'. What does this signify? Are they willing to participate through overt contestation? Not quite. For this, not only the figures of association, but also the descriptive measures are of use for the interpretation. For protest orientation, the Japanese case is relatively weaker than the Western counterparts especially in the proportions of those who have engaged in protest. As shown before, there is constantly a lower commitment to the value of 'free speech' on the part of Japanese respondents. Furthermore, the regularity of 'discussing politics with friends' is clearly lower despite their relatively substantial interest in politics. Generally, they are not much inclined to public expression and debates at the level of individual

¹² This is especially so for the ratios of those who 'have done' as a category rather than mean scores for the scales, which consist of 'never', 'might' and 'have done'.

¹³ Hoffman mentions 'assertive masses' on the basis of a quotation from Putnam's work. See Hoffmann, Erik P., 'Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics', in Eckstein, Harry et al., *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations* (Lanham/Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 109. For the original quotation of Putnam's work, see Putnam, Robert D., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 104 ff.

attitudes. Those who go for protest could be rather unusual. It would be simply that protesters have a stronger commitment to 'free speech', which is not common for the majority. The relative strength of the association between 'free speech' and protest might be due to the gap between those who protest and those who do not, and the latter unwilling case is a general pattern. Moreover, 'more say' (the inclination to input their demands into policy-making) is not particularly associated with protest, although their emphasis on 'more say' is generally greater than of 'free speech'. Thus, for the Japanese, participation is not so connected with the explicit contention of demands as an individual mode of behaviour. Consequently, protest seems to be hardly regarded as means of participation. In addition, neither 'more say' and 'free speech' has a plausible association with 'petition' at all. They probably do not perceive 'petition' as relevant in both participation and freedom of speech.

For Russia, the result suggests that protest is not about 'free speech' but about demands to be heeded. The fact that 'more say' has predominant weight while 'free speech' scarcely does so is entirely opposite to the Japanese case. For the possible explanation, it is helpful to remember the discussion of the meaning of freedom and 'free speech' in a preceding chapter. 'Free speech' has an associative or politically proactive connotation rather than being passively free from control. As seen in Inglehart's diagram of Postmaterialist and Materialist items in accordance with Maslow's values hierarchy, 'free speech' is in a way a luxurious concern, which is appreciated by those who are not in material need such as the matters of economy and security.¹⁴ As we have seen, a small portion of the Russian respondents have a commitment to 'free speech'. Protest motives driven by 'more say' without 'free speech' would be understood in the context of the following rationale. Their sense of protest is more about immediate demands based on pragmatic concerns rather than abstract political ideals. Moreover, although 'more say' is formally in the category of Postmaterialist values, the item has conceptual leeway where Materialistic motivations could be involved.¹⁵ This denotes that 'more say' as a prime contributor for protest could be related to Materialist as well as to Postmaterialist motives.

¹⁴ For the diagram, see Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42. Dalton provides a concise account of this values allocation. See Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, pp. 78-82.

¹⁵ This is partly supported by the fact that the 'more say' item could be influenced by economic changes both in short and long term.

Furthermore, as previously shown in a descriptive measure, Russian responses on the whole are strongly skewed to the Materialist orientation. Thus, Russian protests would be more in traditional terms rather than in the sense of demands for participation and free expression. Additionally, it should be noted that in actual proportion, the inclination to protest is rather weak. The Russian populace could be pragmatic and perhaps docile in the face of the political authorities.

8.3 Evaluating civic protest

8.3.1 A framework

The examination so far has revealed that in the USA and Britain protest behaviour is apt to be related to the attitudes of participation and free speech. On the other hand, for the Japanese and Russian cases, this orientation tends to lag behind. Does this indicate that, as hypothesised in the seventh chapter, the two Western nations more emphatically subscribe to elements that could be described as 'civic protest'? This section further explores the sphere of protest with this inquiry. Attention is paid to whether there is a strong statistical relationship between liberal democratic attitudes and protest. Also, a consideration is made in terms of whether particular patterns of association exist in respective countries. Furthermore, by employing two time points of the World Values Surveys in 1995 (1998 for Britain) and 1999-2002, we shall investigate whether such patterns indicate consistency, implying nationally particular characters.

8.3.1 Variables

Civic protest is assumed to involve liberal democratic implications in its behavioural motivation or attitudinal background. Due to this, the following investigation expands the scope of the analysis to cover more general liberal democratic attitudes. It is intended to examine whether these attitudes affect protest behaviour. Therefore, protest indexes are placed as dependent variables, and liberal democratic outlooks as independent variables. The types of independent variables are extended from ones in the restricted models of the preceding section (which included only Postmaterialist related variables). Thus, in addition

to 'free speech' and 'more say' variables, several other components are incorporated.¹⁶ These variables are 'freedom vs. order', the propensity to 'discuss politics' with friends, 'political consciousness' and attitudes to authority. The 'order vs. freedom' variable is adopted for the purpose of comparison with the 'free speech' variable.¹⁷ The 'authority' measure would stand for the extent of anti-authoritarian attitudes. This variable could be viable as one of the measurements for liberal democratic contexts, since it includes a sentiment of contestation against interventions/compulsions from those in power as well as a sense of equality. The 'political consciousness' scale is employed, since a political concern tapped by the measure would represent a primary motivation for political action.¹⁸ Similarly, the variable of 'discuss politics' would be related to a political concern. But this also could be an initial behaviour that may be related to further political behaviour including protest.

As for dependent variables, a general scale of protest is examined as a first step. The scale is a measurement of the overall inclination to protest behaviour. Subsequently, respective protest items are analysed. For the latter, the focus is set on 'petition', 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', which are regarded as comparatively mild forms among the five protest types. For the disposition of civic protest is supposed to be associated with a stable liberal democracy.

8.3.3 A general scale of protest

This part presents the results of linear (OLS) regression analyses on a general scale of protest. The results are exhibited in Table 8.3. For the American case, liberal democratic attitudes are almost fully conducive to a protest inclination in 1995 except for (general) freedom. The R square shows that these variables explain approximately twenty percent of the variance, which is rather high for the influence of attitudes affecting political behaviour.¹⁹ For the 1999-2002 survey, although the R square is reduced by half, still they

¹⁶ The Postmaterialist index itself is not utilised in this analysis, whereas the 'more say' and 'free speech' variables (which are variants of the Postmaterialist four-item index) are incorporated. This is due to the fact that the focus of attention is on liberal democratic attitudes rather than the issue of Postmaterialism *per se*. This also enables to avoid obscuring the objective of the analysis as well as multicollinearity.

¹⁷ For discussions in relation to the two variables of freedom, see the sixth chapter.

¹⁸ This scale comprises the sum of scores in two variables: (1) the degree to regard 'politics as important' and (2) the extent of 'interests in politics'.

¹⁹ Generally, the figures of R-squares or correlation coefficients are not at impressive levels when examining attitudes. De Vaus writes, '[r]elationships between social science variables—particularly those

have a similar influence on protest orientation. The Japanese data exhibit a weaker tendency. The results for the two waves are symmetrical, implying coherence in patterns. As for Russia, there is also a consistent pattern across the two time points. Attitudes to authority and a relative commitment to free speech are not the elements that affect protest. For the British case, although only information on the three variables is available, they seem to be all relevant to protest inclination. In all the examined societies on the table, political consciousness and, to a lesser extent, 'discuss politics' and 'more say' have a constant influence.

Is protest related to liberal democracy? In the American case, almost full loadings of the liberal democratic variables are observed in association with this scale, and the extent is higher than for the two non-Western societies. Meanwhile, as mentioned in a previous chapter, among the four societies, the scores are higher in the USA and Britain than in Japan and Russia. It seems that being liberal or perhaps Western democracy matters to people's quality of protest.²⁰

In addition, this general indicator of protest includes both moderate and radical behaviour, so that the measured attitude could not be immediately regarded as relevant to stable democracy. Nonetheless, since the scale is intended to estimate a comprehensive protest orientation, it denotes people's inclination to publicly express their claims toward political authority. In one way, this attitudinal direction shares commonality with participation due to its intention for their demands to be heeded. Therefore, the outcome may well be regarded as presenting a rough picture of the present theme.

8.3.4 Respective items of protest

Given the above results, what if respective items of protest are closely examined in the same context? This section examines liberal democratic attitudes' connections with 'petition', 'demonstration' and 'boycott'. Table 8.4 shows the outcomes.

For the American case, the influence of liberal democratic variables is salient on 'demonstration' and 'boycott' in both surveys. Although 'petition' has less effect, there still

involving attitudes—are normally weaker than social science and popular stereotypes would have us believe.' See de Vaus, D. A., *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed. (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 294.

²⁰ In fact, Inglehart shows that the 'signing petition' variable has a strong correlation with the Freedom House ratings. See Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy', pp. 54; Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'.

are associations especially with attitudes on political concerns.²¹ For the British case, due to limitations in the data, no substantive conclusion is possible.²² There is a sign, however, that liberal democratic variables affect 'boycott' and perhaps 'demonstration', which could be analogous to the USA. As for the Japanese case, the liberal democratic attitudes seem to have limited effects. A case comparable to the American one seems to be restricted to 'demonstration' in 1999-2002. 'Political consciousness' is the only variable that consistently influences the three types of protest across the two surveys. The attitude to authority appears to be relevant in 1995, but not in 1999-2002.²³ On the whole, the Japanese associations are clearly less impressive than those in the USA.²⁴ In the Russian case, the most notable outcome is that 'free speech' does not have a statistically significant association with any of the protest items at all in both of the surveys.²⁵ The 'order vs. freedom' variable has no such association, except for 'lawful demonstration' in 1995.²⁶ Consistent influence for the overall protest items comes from 'political consciousness' and with variability 'more say'.²⁷ 'Discuss politics' tends to be influential.²⁸

This observation indicates the following conclusion, which is largely compatible with the view developed in the earlier sections. The USA has an orientation to what is termed 'civic protest' where liberal democratic motives tend to be involved affecting (moderate) protest. Especially, active but not too radical protest types are associated with such values in America, denoting a democratically assertive nature of the populace. There is a sign, albeit not for certain, that this may be potentially the case with Britain. The Japanese case shows a less tendency to that effect. The Russian motivation for protest

21 For the 1995 survey of the American case, 'order vs. freedom' is not significantly related to any of the three protests. Neither do the 'authority' variable for 'petition'. For the 1999-2002 survey, 'petition' does not appear to be connected with 'more say' or 'free speech'. The 'authority' variable seems to have withdrawn the influence from 1995 to 1999-2002.

22 In Britain, for 'petition' in 1998, 'more say' and 'discuss politics' are conducive, while 'free speech' and 'authority' are not. For 1999-2002, the attitude to authority and 'political consciousness' has viable influence on the three types of protest.

23 Strangely, for Japan, those who regard authority as 'good' are more positive to 'lawful demonstration' than those who 'do not mind' authority.

24 For the Japanese case, none of the three protests is connected with 'order vs. freedom' and 'discuss politics' in 1995. 'Discuss politics' does so for 'petition' and 'demonstration' in the later survey (where 'order vs. freedom' is not available).

25 This is the case with all the five types of protest.

26 Attitudes to authority appear to be only relevant with 'boycott' and 'demonstration' in 1995. Nonetheless, as opposite to a liberal democratic rationale, those with a pro-authority stance seems to be more positive to 'demonstration' (in the 1995 survey), which is similar to Japan.

27 There is, however, no statistically significant influence of 'more say' on 'demonstration' in 1999-2002.

28 This excludes 'boycott' (as well as 'strike' and 'occupying buildings') in 1999-2002.

stems from interest in politics and demands on government. Nonetheless, the matter of proactive freedom does not seem to have relevance to protestation.²⁹ It may be possible that their political interests are related to economic and other pragmatic rationales. If this assumption is made, it can be inferred that the Russian motives for protest tend to be based on direct concern for material needs rather than abstract principles of democratic liberty.

8.4 Views of governance

8.4.1 A framework

In addition to the aspect of protest, this section studies views of governance as another political dimension. Attention is directed towards respondents' views to two themes: non-democratic rule and the efficacy of democracy. An underlying aim is to probe attitudes to democracy.³⁰ The scale on the evaluation of non-democratic rule can reflect the extent of respondents' attitudinal distance from (or closeness to) agreement with a democratic regime. The measure of the efficacy of democracy, on the other hand, involves more qualitative connotations of the system *per se*. For it extracts the degrees of either positive or negative stances towards democracy in the context of performance. With this binary approach, views of governance are examined in terms of their associations with liberal democratic attitudes. Do values affect regime support?

8.4.2 Scales

Before going into the analysis, let us review the components of the two types of scales. The index of non-democratic rule comprises four original variables, which are based on questions on several political variables. The items are:

- (1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- (2) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.

²⁹ For the discussion on 'proactive' freedom, see the sixth chapter.

³⁰ For a cross-national research on political support in relation to democracy, see Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31-56.

- (3) Having the army rule.
- (4) Having a democratic political system.

Respondents are asked to choose either 'very good', 'fairly good', 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. The scores of these items are added together in a manner to express the degree of support for non-democratic regimes.³¹ In one way, from the reverse direction, it measures the strength of aversion to such rules. The full version of this scale is named 'non-democratic rule (A)'. There is another version that does not incorporate the item of '(4) a democratic political system', which is numbered (B). This is in order to include the British case into the comparison.³²

The measure of the efficacy of democracy is composed of four variables in relation to the performance of a democratic system. The questions measure respondents' extents of agreement with the following items:

- (5) In democracy, the economic system runs badly.
- (6) Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling.
- (7) Democracies are not good at maintaining order.
- (8) Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.

Respondents are asked to select either 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'. An index is created with the sum of their scores in a direction to express the level of support for the system's performance. This is labelled the 'efficacy of democracy'.

Thus, these scales can measure an overall evaluation as regards two aspects of governance. These criteria are more advantageous than examining the detailed individual variables *per se*. General scales can more acutely tap the binary dimensions of governance. For the output of the created scale tends to have the cumulation of a common essence

³¹ For methods to build a scale based on multiple variables, see de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed., pp. 249-275; Bryman, Alan and Duncan Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists* (London/New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 50-53; de Vaus, David, *Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 117-146; de Vaus, David, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 180-199. For transforming data by SPSS, see Norušis, Marija J., *SPSS® 10.0 Guide to Data Analysis* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 525-545.

³² The British data in 1998 does not include the item (4).

shared by the four basic variables.³³ This is especially so due to the fact that the scale has a wider range of scores than ones in the original four measures (which consist of only four ordinal values).³⁴ Another advantage is that a numerically larger range enables the researcher to employ a linear (OLS) regression analysis.³⁵

8.4.3 Analysis

8.4.3.1 Descriptive outputs

Table 8.5 presents the estimation of national average scores (means) of the scales. As for the level of support for non-democratic rule, in both (A) and (B) Russia holds the highest scores across the two surveys. Moreover, there is a clear gap between Russia and the other three societies. A similar division also exists in the evaluation of the efficacy of democracy across the two time points. Russia shows notably lower scores than the others. It seems that the Russian populace particularly hold a weaker endorsement of democracy.³⁶

Considering the results, a question arises: are such divisions related to gaps in the degrees of emphasis on liberal democratic values between these nations? The examination has so far revealed that Postmaterialist values and the emphasis on free speech and participation are less held by Russian respondents than their American and British counterparts (with the Japanese being largely in the middle). This somehow coincides with the gap in views of governance. Analogous divisions exist in other attitudinal spheres. Also, some of the values items hold certain associations with liberal democracy.³⁷ Do liberal democratic attitudes make a difference to the support of democracy in these societies, and in what ways? In this inquiry, the following part presents multiple regression analyses. The two scales on governance are located as dependent variables whereas liberal

33 The summation would create a scale that holds a roughly similar character to one based on a principal component analysis of four variables (where common factors of the variables are extracted).

34 The four ordinal values are, for instance, 'very good' (= 3), 'fairly good' (= 2), 'fairly bad' (= 1) and 'very bad' (= 0). This could be applied to response items on the degree of agreement or disagreement. It should be noted that the values can be different from this order depending on the directions of variables.

35 Although the scores are not precisely continuous variables, it may well be regarded as having an analogous property, which would be justified for using the OLS regression as done conventionally in social research. For this rationale, see de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed., pp. 313-314, 329.

36 As for the USA, Britain and Japan, there is a fluctuation in their order for the scores of the 'non-democratic rule' between the two surveys. In the 1995-98 survey, the USA is the least inclined to a non-democratic support. In the 1999-2002 survey, America is the most oriented to such a support among the three societies. At any rate, their levels are not comparable to that of Russia.

37 For instance, it has been observed that there are correlations between the Freedom House ratings and variables such as the 'free speech', 'more say', 'petition' and 'boycott'.

democratic attitudes are arranged as independent variables.

8.4.3.2 Non-democratic rule

Given the patterns of the Russo-Western gap, one might initially hypothesise that Western societies would hold stronger associations between the liberal democratic attitudes and views of governance than Russia. The following outcome, however, presents a more complex picture, which requires further explanation. For the case of non-democratic rule (A), the results are shown in table 8.6.

Complexity?

There are apparent changes in outputs between the two waves of the World Values Survey. In 1995, whereas the Russian case indicates the relatively overt influence from the emphasis on participation and free speech on the negative view of non-democratic rule, unexpectedly for the USA most of their influence has no statistical significance.³⁸ This could be contrary to the initial hypothesis. Nonetheless, this reverses in the 1999-2002 wave. The American case exhibits the presence of such associations (combined with the influence of 'political consciousness' and 'discuss politics'), while in the Russian case the statistical relationship is close to nil. This latter survey conforms to the hypothesis.

The USA

The outcome in the 1995 survey is in fact puzzling, given the fact that the American respondents largely hold an inclination to liberal democratic values as well as support for a democratic regime. Has the emphasis of free speech and participation nothing to do with the regime evaluation in the USA at the earlier time point? In fact, they do have associations. This is revealed by examining the data more closely. For the USA, when 'discuss politics' and 'political consciousness' (and others) are removed from the regression model, leaving only 'free speech' and 'more say' as independent variables, the coefficients of 'free speech' and 'more say' show statistically significant associations.³⁹ There are

³⁸ 'More say: first choice' is only item modestly significant for the USA in 1995.

³⁹ This indicates that, in the regression model with the full loadings of the independent variables, the variables of free speech and participation are controlled for by the other independent variables including 'discuss politics' and 'political consciousness'.

overlaps in influence on regime evaluation between the former ('discuss politics' and 'political consciousness') and the latter ('free speech' and 'more say'). 'Free speech' and 'more say' are deeply connected with political awareness and expression, and they *together* affect the evaluation of non-democratic rule. Meanwhile, the clear influence of participation and free speech items in the 1999-2002 wave would be the result of their enhanced presence. In the latter survey, these four items *independently* affect regime evaluation.⁴⁰

Given these results, a question arises: why is influence of 'more say' and 'free speech' weaker in 1995? One rationale could be that low American support for non-democracy (thus, their high support for democracy) in 1995 is probably very general no matter whether one is committed to a sense of participation and free speech. This corresponds to the output in table 8.5, which shows that the USA held a minimal endorsement of non-democratic rule in 1995 survey. When the aversion to non-democracy became slightly weaker in the later survey, the associations with 'free speech' and 'more say' were retrieved. Another rationale could be that the American negation of non-democratic rule is mainly a practical matter of whether one is politically aware and informed. It should be noted that 'political consciousness' has a constant influence in the USA across the two time points. On the other hand, the 'more say' and 'free speech' items are concerned with democratic principles. America has a stable established democratic system, so that the judgement of non-democratic rule in relation to such principles would not be domestically urgent. Practically, those politically concerned are more regularly conscious of such issues as democracy and authoritarianism. This may be why the variables of 'more say' and 'free speech' have a relatively weaker connection with the scale on the evaluation of non-democratic rule in 1995. Nonetheless, the items of free speech and participation have a clear association in 1999-2002. This suggests that, despite fluctuations, American citizens hold a *basic potential* to relate these liberal democratic principles to regime evaluation, whereas their political awareness is a major motive for such a judgement. Meanwhile, the

⁴⁰ One might criticise that the influence of the 'free speech' and 'more say' items are spurious in 1995, given the fact that they lose significant associations when they are controlled for by the variables of 'discuss politics' and 'political consciousness' (and others). But this can not explain why such associations clearly emerge in the subsequent survey. Moreover, these two items have a certain compatibility with 'political consciousness' and 'discuss politics' in their characters. Since they do not qualitatively exclude with each other, it would be reasonable that the effects of the 'free speech' and 'more say' are incorporated in that of the other two variables in the 1995 survey.

'discuss politics' has a constant influence on regime judgement.⁴¹ The American inclination to public debates and individual self-expression could be related to the notion of democracy.⁴² In addition, attitudes to authority do not seem to have much influence on the regime evaluation.

Consequently, in the USA, the rejection of non-democratic rule is related to political awareness and expression as well as free speech and participatory attitudes. On the whole, the initial hypothesis on the part of America is largely confirmed. For Americans, the judgement of non-democracy (*vis-à-vis* democracy) seems to be concerned with an image that informed free individuals get involved in open debates. Democracy in America may be one where individuals and the power of language matter.

Russia

For the Russian case, in 1995 there were significant associations between the rejection of non-democratic rule and an emphasis on 'free speech' and 'more say' in government. Nonetheless, there is a drastic withdrawal of the liberal democratic rationales from 1995 to 1999-2002. Why is there such an acute change? One reason could be that even those who emphasise free speech and participation may have become more amenable to non-democratic governance in the latter survey.⁴³ Around the time of 1995 survey, for those who emphasise free speech and participation, a strong leadership, army rule and expert rule may have been perceived as having the potential to undermine democratic ideals. This possibly was combined with concern about the nation's political situation.⁴⁴ These

41 It is interesting to notice that for the 1995 survey when 'order vs. freedom' is removed from the first US model, it inflates the value of the influence of 'discuss politics' in the second model. This denotes that freedom in relation to democracy might be perceived in the context of free debates.

42 But why does the 'free speech' item affect weakly in 1995 whereas 'discuss politics' hold clear influence? The 'discuss politics' is more concerned with daily, concrete and personal matter of 'free speech'. In the USA the freedom of speech is extensively guaranteed, so that domestically there is much less threat in its pursuit. The less sense of urgency for its protection may also contribute to associating democracy with immediate sense of free speech as denoted by 'discuss politics' rather than the abstract notion of 'free speech' *per se*. More association with 'free speech' items in the 1999-2002 would be simply the enhanced presence of the rationale on free speech, which is extended from a concrete sense of free speech to abstract principles.

43 It also should be noted that the figures of R square in the Russian case tend to be smaller than the others.

44 For the related situations in Russia, see for example, White, Stephen, *Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 8, pp. 255-292. For free speech and media, see Oates, Sarah, 'Media and Political Communication', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

perceptions may have driven them to give negative evaluations of non-democratic rule.⁴⁵ In that sense, the withdrawal of the associations in the latter survey is the most alarming. For the logic of 'free speech' and 'more say' may have begun to lack a connection with democratic accountability.⁴⁶ This could indicate the rise of a potential that could allow the rationale of 'delegative' or 'managed' democracy in Russia.⁴⁷ Freedom of speech, participation and other liberal democratic rationales may have lost their ability to check authoritarian rule.

Despite the withdrawal of the liberal democratic rationale in Russia, the appreciation of (general) freedom seems to have a consistent presence. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that freedom valued there does not necessarily involve politically proactive or associative connotations represented by free speech, which is unlike the Western counterparts. Thus, those who less support non-democratic rule tend to have an orientation to freedom from control rather than freedom to be involved. The issue of liberty would be consistently relevant to the judgement of non-democracy. This freedom, however, seems to be likely to be private, namely, politically passive freedom.⁴⁸

Japan

For the Japanese case, the elements that consistently have an impact on the rejection of non-democratic governance are political consciousness and anti-authoritarian sentiment over the two waves. The issue of participation does not seem to have relevance to that effect. As for liberty, only in 1999-2002, the appreciation of free speech exhibited a modest influence.⁴⁹ For the Japanese, the judgement of non-democratic rule may not

45 Nonetheless, it should be recalled that the actual proportions of commitment to participation and free speech were rather small. Therefore, the overall orientation was less negative to non-democratic rule and has a weaker emphasis on the two items than in the USA, Britain and Japan. Probably, in 1995, there was a substantial gap in the view of non-democratic rule between those who were attached to participation and free speech and those who were not. This probably has resulted in the higher coefficients of association.

46 The strong leadership, expert rule and army rule (as components of the non-democratic rule scale) have qualities that run counter to the logic of democratic accountability.

47 For the notions of 'delegative' and 'managed' democracies, see for instance, O'Donnell, Guillermo, 'Delegative Democracy' *Journal of Democracy*, 5:1 (January 1994), pp. 55-69; Sakwa, Richard, 'Politics in Russia', in White, Gitelman and Sakwa eds., *Developments in Russian Politics* 6, ch. 1, pp. 1-17.

48 This is supported by the fact that the impact of 'free speech' fluctuates between the two surveys, while the (general) freedom's influence persists being independent of the former. This suggests the regularity of influence from the passive part of freedom, when the impact of politically proactive freedom is excluded.

49 Inglehart's democracy/autocracy index, on the other hand, shows the influence of attitude in favour of (general) freedom rather than order.

involve the issue of participation. Concern for liberty may be related to that evaluation. However, it should be recalled that, in actual proportions, both (general) freedom and free speech tend to receive weaker priority *vis-à-vis* securing the public order.⁵⁰ In practice, there could be the potential that a concern for freedom has little strength for opposing non-democratic rule. Anti-authoritarianism seems to be a major rationale conducive to the judgement of regimes. Since this is not found in any of the other three societies, this tendency would be a particular feature of the Japanese regime evaluation.

Britain

For comparative reasons to include the British case, let us examine non-democratic rule (B), which is shown in table 8.7.⁵¹ Generally, the trend of the scale (B) is similar to that of (A). For the British case, as far as the available variables are concerned, liberal democratic attitudes are generally conducive to the rejection of non-democratic regimes in the earlier survey, except for attitudes to authority. This is analogous to the tendency of the USA (especially in 1999-2002). The later survey includes a limited set of variables, so that a clear evaluation is not possible.⁵² Meanwhile, in both of the surveys, anti-authoritarianism does not seem to have an influence on regime evaluation, which again corresponds to the result for the USA.

8.4.3.3 Efficacy of democracy

The scale on the efficacy of democracy measures the respondents' evaluation of the performance of democratic regimes.⁵³ On the whole, although the results for the scale have

50 This could be associated with the tendency argued in 'Asian values' discourses, for instance, see L. Pye with M. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA/London: Belknap Press, 1985). Maruyama also connotes Japanese individual orientation to sub-merge larger social (and political) contexts. See Maruyama, Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou*, Zoho-ban, [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); Maruyama, Masao (Morris, Ivan ed.), *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Lipset points out Japanese proneness to collectivity. See Lipset, Seymour Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996).

51 This excludes a question item on 'democratic system', so that the indicator consists of the summation of values of 'strong leader', 'expert' and 'army rule' variables.

52 An only noticeable point is that among the three available variables, 'political consciousness' has an association.

53 It should be noted that largely the directions of measurement are opposite between the two scales in terms of the pro and con of democracy. Therefore, the directions of coefficients (regarding either positive or

a certain similarity to the ones in the examination above, there are different details. The outcomes are shown in table 8.8.

For the relative commitment to participation and free speech, the variables do not seem to have significant effects on the view of democracy's efficacy in the USA, whereas they do in Russia. This is the case in both the surveys of 1995-98 and 1999-2002. Although this might be also puzzling in the light of the generally lower evaluation of efficacy and liberal democratic attitudes in Russia than America, the reason for this could be understood in a framework similar to some of the above rationales. American support for democratic efficacy is probably very common regardless of the emphasis on participation and free speech. Another point is that political consciousness and 'discuss politics' have a consistent association in America, while there is much less indication to that effect in Russia (with only a small influence of political consciousness in the latter survey). Consequently, for the USA, those who are especially in favour of the efficacy of democracy are more politically aware and proactive in public debates. In Russia by contrast, for those with liberal democratic attitudes, approval of democracy is a matter of principle due to its domestically urgent nature. Yet, despite the relative strength of the *association* in the Russian case, it should be recalled that there is an overall weakness in support for both the principle and performance of democratic rule *per se*. For those who emphasise free speech and participation in Russia, democracy tends to be perceived as viable in its performance. Nonetheless, they are likely to be a smaller portion of respondents than in the USA.

For Japan, 'free speech' and 'more say' have a weak presence in the figures (with only 'free speech' representing a modest source of support for efficacy). Attitudes against authority are more likely to contribute to views favourable to democracy's performance as shown in both waves of the surveys. This has an identical direction with the output of the non-democratic rule scale.

In fact, attitudes to authority are related to the evaluation of democracy's effectiveness for all three societies in the 1995 survey. Nonetheless, whereas anti-authoritarian sentiment is conducive to support for democracy's effectiveness in America and Japan, the Russian case shows that a *pro-authority* stance is more contributive to such

negative) need to be interpreted in this context.

support. There might be different rationales behind this matter in Russia. For the later survey, however, the view of authority does not have a statistically significant outcome for the American and Russian data. The survey suggests the presence of the impact for the British and Japanese cases. The British case also shows that a pro-authority stance is conducive. In addition, the issue of (general) freedom in relation to order seems to have relevance in the USA, Russia and Japan, although the data are only available for Russia in the 1999-2002 survey.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the three themes through multivariate analyses. The first two themes are on the matter of protest. We first of all discussed the impact of Postmaterialist values on protest behaviour in the context of values shift versus cultural particularity. The second part evaluated the quality of protest in the four societies with reference to 'civic protest'. Thereafter, the third theme examined views of governance and their associations with liberal democratic attitudes.

8.5.1 Postmaterialist effect, civic protest and democracy

The theory of values shift posits that transformation of values enhances moderate protest behaviour. Nevertheless, the result indicates that there is a national difference in the forms of influence. This provides a revised alternative to the hypothesis. Postmaterialist values do not evenly influence protest orientations in Japan and Russia. Therefore, a fully-fledged version of the hypothesis is implausible, being susceptible to each of their own national traits. On the other hand, the Postmaterialist shift could affect protest in the USA and Britain. For these values tend to be evenly and coherently associated with political actions among their citizens, whereby the initial presumption could be endorsed.

It can be argued that the two Western nations enjoy cultural advantages in these associations. Especially, such statistical relationships are significant for 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', which would be active but not so radical political actions. Also, their citizens' orientation to such protest is comparatively greater. Their perception of protest seems to have a participatory connotation with the image of self-expression and

public discussion. Therefore, they may well be described as having the predisposition towards 'assertive masses'. They tend to possess a critical tendency towards political authorities while holding civic rationales. Meanwhile, whereas Japanese protest orientations are partially affected by Postmaterialist related variables, their actual inclination to protest as well as general public expression lag behind those of their Western counterparts. The result indicates that the Japanese populace hardly regard temperate protest as a mode of participation. For Russia, protest does not seem to be concerned with free speech but with their demand to be heeded. Their perception of protest appears to be connected with immediate pragmatic needs rather than liberal political ideals. Given the prevalence of Materialist orientations in Russia, their protest behaviour may also be similar in its motivation. Additionally, it should be noted that there could be the influence of post-Soviet mobilisation for ritualistic pro-regime demonstrations. On the whole, given the relative weakness in their level of protest inclination, Russian citizens may be depicted as holding rather a pragmatic and perhaps docile character in the face of political authorities.

The above outcome as regards the Western cases relates to the notion of 'civic protest'. Further examination revealed that the USA has an orientation to 'civic protest' where liberal democratic motives tend to evenly affect moderate styles of protest. The Japanese case seems to be less orientated to it. The Russian motivation for protest stems from interest in politics and demands on government. But it may be possible that Russian motives for protest tend to be based on direct concern for material needs rather than abstract principles of democratic liberty. In that sense, Russian protest would be less related to civic protest than the American one.

What are the implications of these results? For American and perhaps British societies, their mass orientations to civic protest imply the assertive nature of the people towards political authorities. On the other hand, individual citizens in Japan and Russia may have comparatively weaker inclinations to such a tendency. These can have different consequences in the forms of democracy or governance in terms of inter-relations between people and government. Hoffman notes, 'according to congruence theorists, the combination of authoritarian elites and docile masses is most conducive to hierarchical or nondemocratic forms of stability. And the combination of responsive leaders and assertive

masses is most conducive to horizontal or democratic forms of stability.⁵⁴ If this is assumed to be the case, whether the masses are docile or assertive would be a crucial element for political structures and stability. The people's state in this respect can greatly matter to the likely form of governance. Assertive masses are, according to this scenario, suitable to and thus apt to reinforce democratic rule.

Western societies are well placed in this respect. Their assertiveness may even enhance the responsiveness of political elites. Civic protest is not only a temporary upsurge of people's demands. But also, it could be a sign of a societal capacity to generate regular 'cognitive pressure' to check government and ensure its accountability to citizens.⁵⁵ It could be the reflection of informal strength in their attitudinal orientation, which is compatible with responsive democracy.

The Japanese case seems to be restricted. Despite its increasing similarity to Western cases on the surface, there still is the persistence of peculiarities. It shows weakness in mass assertiveness at the individual level. This in turn may emerge as a predisposition that would not enhance governmental responsiveness. Democracy in their sense may be less conceived as a system in which the people 'own' the government. Accordingly, there may be less sense that they should be able to demand and participate on the basis of free public expression.⁵⁶

The Russian case could be another which is located in a disadvantageous position. The lower inclination to moderate protest connotes the rather docile character of the citizens in relation to the government. This may allow or even induce a potential of 'hierarchical or nondemocratic forms of stability' in Hoffman's terms. The prevalent rationale for protest would not be about participation and free expression, but more about the immediate pragmatic needs or the custom of mobilisation due to the Soviet heritage. An abstract concern for political rights may be perceived as still an indulgence. These

⁵⁴ Hoffmann., 'Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics', p. 109.

⁵⁵ For this account of individual attitudes, 'individualised' and 'democratised' categories might have similar traits in Maruyama's differentiation of individual typology in political contexts. See Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in Marius B. Jansen ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 489-531.

⁵⁶ This embedded political passivity would be related to Maruyama's consistent concern on the elements of Japanese political culture disadvantageous to democratic practices, which are in effect affected by its traditional cultural heritages. See Maruyama (Morris, ed.), *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*; Maruyama, *Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou* [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].

together could have different consequences in the forms and functions of governance as compared with ones in the West.

8.5.2 Views of governance

As for the examination of the two scales on views of governance, their descriptive outputs indicate that Russian citizens particularly show weaker support for democracy than those in the USA, Britain and Japan. Also, it is recalled that there is a greater inclination to attitudes related to liberal democratic outlooks in the two Western nations than in Russia. Due to this, the initial hypothesis is that Russia would show fewer associations between liberal democratic attitudes and views of governance than the Western counterparts.

In spite of this, the results at face value show puzzling outputs for the USA and Russia. In some cases, the variables of 'more say' and 'free speech' showed a significant association in the Russian case, which is rather little indicated in the American case. In others, America is stronger in these associations than Russia. Nonetheless, a careful interpretation has revealed that, in essence, the underlying contexts are consistent with the descriptive outcomes attained previously: the USA is inclined to democratic governance and liberal democratic values, whereas on the whole Russia has considerable hesitancy in support for both of them.

There seems to be a perception gap due to circumstantial differences between the two societies, which has resulted in the seemingly contradictory figures for association. For the USA, support for democracy might be too common to have clear associational figures with 'free speech' and 'more say' especially for the evaluation of non-democratic rule in the 1995-98 survey. In contrast, the overall weakness of Russian appreciation of liberal democracy seems to have led to the relative salience of those committed to such emphases, which in turn has emerged as a higher figure of associations in some respects.

A gap in the levels of domestic urgency in liberal democratic practices also seems to be conducive to asymmetrical results. For the American public, the view of governance is more connected with political awareness and practical public self-expression than commitments to abstract principles *per se*. For Russia, evaluations of regime and democratic performance are related to the extent of emphasis on the principles of free speech and participation probably due to the relative urgency of that matter. However,

overall hesitancy in support for both liberal democratic attitudes and governance in Russia should be considered for its translation.

As a particular case, it is alarming that there is a clear withdrawal in the Russian figures of the associations from 1995 to 1999-2002 in relation to the judgment of non-democracy. For it can run counter to the support of democratic governance. At this point, there is an indication that liberal democratic attitudes hardly check authoritarian rule in Russia.

For the Japanese case, the major influence on views of governance is the attitude to authority, and to some extent political awareness. The strong relevance of the authority variable is peculiar among the four societies. Mostly, the matters of participation and free speech seem to be of relatively little relevance to regime support. For the British case, the conclusion is restricted given the limited data. Within the restricted arrangement, however, there is a sign that the liberal democratic attitudes are fairly conducive to the judgement of non-democratic regimes in the earlier survey, excluding attitudes to authority. Meanwhile, the matter of authority seems to be relevant in the case of the efficacy of democracy.

8.5.3 Civic culture?

After all, for both realms of protest and views of governance, in the USA, there seems to be an inclination to participatory democracy and related attitudes, where those who are politically aware would get involved while discussing views openly. This has symmetry with the account of 'civic culture' by Almond and Verba.⁵⁷ For American citizens, protest is likely to connote a sense of 'civic protest', and their democracy entails a greater notion of self-expression which corresponds with their assertive mass character. This may have encouraged governmental responsiveness and public accountability in this Western nation. On the other hand, there seems to be a certain weakness to this effect in Japanese individual attitudes. The Russian case would be more distinct, holding a weaker sense of participatory democracy and perhaps public accountability in comparison to its Western counterpart.⁵⁸ This may have been furthered at the time of the later survey. In Russia, there

⁵⁷ See Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

⁵⁸ Bova explores current Russian political culture using a similar perspective. See Bova, Russell, 'Democracy and Russian Political Culture', in Russell Bova ed., *Russia and Western Civilization*:

seem to be substantial elements of being permissive to 'delegative' or 'managed' democracy.

Cultural and Historical Encounters (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-276.

Figure 8.1 The sequence of effects in a values shift theory versus cultural particularity




Table 8.1 Protest each item and postmaterialist index

Ordered logit regression

USA	Postmaterialist				
DV	4-item index (IV)	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	Mixed	--	.15	.50**	-.16
	Postmaterialist	--	.57**	.88***	.02
Lawful Demonstration	Mixed	--	.57***	.56***	.19
	Postmaterialist	--	1.22***	1.33***	.96***
Boycott	Mixed	--	.46***	.50**	.19
	Postmaterialist	--	1.10***	1.23***	.78***

Britain	Postmaterialist				
DV	4-item index (IV)	1981	1990	1998	1999-2002
Petition	Mixed	.10	.46**	.28	--
	Postmaterialist	.40	.86***	.45*	--
Lawful Demonstration	Mixed	.27	.50***	--	--
	Postmaterialist	1.39***	1.38***	--	--
Boycott	Mixed	.36*	.28*	--	--
	Postmaterialist	1.28***	1.08***	--	--

Japan	Postmaterialist				
DV	4-item index (IV)	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	Mixed	.12	.07	.07	-.01
	Postmaterialist	-.12	.36	.06	.42
Lawful Demonstration	Mixed	.68***	.12	.54**	.38*
	Postmaterialist	1.19***	.88**	1.01***	1.09***
Boycott	Mixed	.50**	.32	.28	.25
	Postmaterialist	.61	.76*	.73*	.77**

Russia	Postmaterialist				
DV	4-item index (IV)	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	Mixed	--	.49***	.45***	.51***
	Postmaterialist	--	.61**	.89*	.47
Lawful Demonstration	Mixed	--	.14	.37***	.23**
	Postmaterialist	--	.06	.25	.30
Boycott	Mixed	--	.55***	.46***	.55***
	Postmaterialist	--	.79***	.90*	1.08**

Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

- (1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.
- (2) Coefficients without ' * ' are 'not significant'.
- (3) Coefficients are presented in logit.
- (4) Coefficients are rounded.
- (5) Reference category: 'materialist'.
- (6) IV: independent variables; DV: dependent variables.

Table 8.2 Protest each item and 'free speech' and 'more say'

Ordered logit regression

USA						
DV	IV	Choice	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	More Say	2 nd	--	.29*	.52**	.13
		1 st	--	.50***	.44**	.23
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.14	.38**	-.16
		1 st	--	.22	.45**	.08
Lawful Demonstration	More Say	2 nd	--	.67***	.41**	.39**
		1 st	--	.73***	.70***	.77***
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.39**	.70***	.39**
		1 st	--	.71***	.90***	.71***
Boycott	More Say	2 nd	--	.58***	.57***	.26
		1 st	--	.74***	.76***	.55***
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.28*	.47***	.31*
		1 st	--	.65***	.76***	.68***

Britain						
DV	IV	Choice	1981	1990	1998	1999-2002
Petition	More Say	2 nd	.02	.39*	.09	--
		1 st	.11	.55***	.35*	--
	Free Speech	2 nd	.18	.35*	.13	--
		1 st	.45*	.45*	.28	--
Lawful Demonstration	More Say	2 nd	.44**	.52***	--	--
		1 st	.68***	.78***	--	--
	Free Speech	2 nd	.53***	.59***	--	--
		1 st	1.00***	.90***	--	--
Boycott	More Say	2 nd	.49**	.49***	--	--
		1 st	.61***	.69***	--	--
	Free Speech	2 nd	.49**	.40**	--	--
		1 st	.95***	.62***	--	--

Japan						
DV	IV	Choice	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	More Say	2 nd	.14	.20	.09	.13
		1 st	-.10	.10	.07	-.01
	Free Speech	2 nd	-.03	-.08	-.03	.32
		1 st	.24	.51	.04	.37
Lawful Demonstration	More Say	2 nd	.19	.23	.26	.32
		1 st	.75***	-.02	.52**	.41**
	Free Speech	2 nd	.73***	.17	.53**	.53**
		1 st	1.13***	1.30***	.89**	1.16***
Boycott	More Say	2 nd	.22	.38	.25	.22
		1 st	.48*	.13	.34	.27
	Free Speech	2 nd	.41*	.11	.22	.38
		1 st	.73*	1.07**	.74*	.92**

Russia						
DV	IV	Choice	1981	1990	1995	1999-2002
Petition	More Say	2 nd	--	.43***	.39***	.39***
		1 st	--	.46***	.60***	.65***
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.33*	.27	.36
		1 st	--	.11	.60	-.26
Lawful Demonstration	More Say	2 nd	--	.18	.25*	.20*
		1 st	--	.02	.48***	.28**
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.08	.16	.20
		1 st	--	.08	.42	-.29
Boycott	More Say	2 nd	--	.38**	.36**	.42***
		1 st	--	.59***	.72***	.73***
	Free Speech	2 nd	--	.37*	.28	.40
		1 st	--	.48	.01	.50

Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

- (1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.
- (2) Coefficients without ' * ' are 'not significant'.
- (3) Coefficients are presented in logit.
- (4) Coefficients are rounded.
- (5) Reference category: 'not chosen'.
- (6) IV: independent variables; DV: dependent variables.

Table 8.3 Protest (general scale) and liberal democratic attitudes

Linear regression

1995-1998					
Independent Variables	USA	Britain	Japan	Russia	Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice	.160***	--	.157**	.116***	MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice	.089**	--	.075 ns	.066*	FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 1st Choice	.147***	--	.085*	.024 ns	
Free Speech 2nd Choice	.102***	--	.041 ns	.036 ns	
Order vs. Freedom	-.005 ns	--	-.010 ns	.063*	
Discuss Politics: Frequently	.200***	--	.019 ns	.204***	DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	.191***	--	.100*	.173***	Auth: Bad
Political Consciousness	.214***	--	.245***	.133***	
Authority: Good	-.269***	--	-.046 ns	-.007 ns	
Authority: Don't mind	-.163**	--	-.237***	-.057 ns	
(Beta)					
Adjusted R Square	.205	--	.151	.093	

1999-2002								
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Russia
More Say 1st Choice	.157***	--	--	.102*	--	.126***	.125***	--
More Say 2nd Choice	.080*	--	--	.061 ns	--	.038 ns	.059*	--
Free Speech 1st Choice	.140***	--	--	.109**	--	.009 ns	.009 ns	--
Free Speech 2nd Choice	.052 ns	--	--	.040 ns	--	.047 ns	.042 ns	--
Order vs. Freedom	--	--	--	--	--	.009 ns	--	--
Discuss Politics: Frequently	.159***	.167***	.127**	.055 ns	.079 ns	.086*	.095**	.095**
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	.076*	.077*	.070 ns	.179***	.169***	.037 ns	.032 ns	.036 ns
Political Consciousness	.109**	.123***	.242***	.240***	.247***	.230***	.232***	.245***
Authority: Good	-.175**	-.215***	-.195**	.003 ns	-.020 ns	-.062 ns	-.068 ns	-.083 ns
Authority: Don't mind	-.057 ns	-.086 ns	-.032 ns	-.141***	-.157***	-.040 ns	-.049 ns	-.063 ns
(Beta)								
Adjusted R Square	.088	.070	.123	.147	.142	.091	.095	.083

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(2) ns = not significant

Table 8.4 – (1) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes

Ordered logit regression

USA 1995			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.380*	-.556***	-.743***
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.027 ns	-.331*	-.323*
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.342 ns	-.686***	-.602***
	Second Choice	[= 1]	.029 ns	-.089 ns	-.242 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]	.045 ns	.038 ns	.060 ns
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.956***	-1.372***	-1.083***
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-.468*	-.418**	-.368*
Political Consciousness			-.316***	-.216***	-.254***
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	.638 ns	.981***	.929***
	Don't mind	[= 1]	-.125 ns	.461**	.443**
N			1363	1342	1333
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.66	1.00	.88
	Deviance (Sig.)		1.00	.81	.09
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.10	.18	.16
	Nagelkerke		.13	.20	.19
	McFadden		.07	.09	.08
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.02	.02

Britain 1998			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.0.343*	Not available	Not available
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-0.176 ns		
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-0.147 ns		
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-0.068 ns		
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]			
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.0.914***		
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-0.061 ns		
Political Consciousness					
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	0.137 ns		
	Don't mind	[= 1]	-0.016 ns		
N			1021		
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.17		
	Deviance (Sig.)		.12		
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.05		
	Nagelkerke		.06		
	McFadden		.03		
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.27	

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) Reference Categories:

More Say:	First Choice	[= 2]
Free Speech:	First Choice	[= 2]
Order vs. Freedom:	Freedom	[= 1]
Discuss Politics:	Frequently	[= 2]
Authority:	Good	[= 2]

(2) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$;

*** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(3) ns = 'not significant'.

(4) Coefficients are presented in logit.

USA 1999-2002			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.187 ns	-.720***	-.497**
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.009 ns	-.331*	-.186 ns
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	.033 ns	-.692***	-.692***
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.087 ns	-.341*	-.321 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]			
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.697*	-.708**	-.966***
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-.119 ns	-.256 ns	-.484**
Political Consciousness			.142*	.198***	.101*
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	-.188 ns	.239 ns	.359 ns
	Don't mind	[= 1]	-.112 ns	.309 ns	.249 ns
N			1163	1153	1151
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.00	.34	.23
	Deviance (Sig.)		1.00	.05	.01
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.03	.09	.07
	Nagelkerke		.04	.10	.08
	McFadden		.03	.05	.04
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.14	.18

Britain 1999-2002			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	--	--	--
	Second Choice	[= 1]	--	--	--
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	--	--	--
	Second Choice	[= 1]	--	--	--
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]	--	--	--
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.647 ns	-.454 ns	-.937***
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-.620 ns	-.156 ns	-.519*
Political Consciousness			.320***	.339***	.271***
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	.586 ns	.811**	.676***
	Don't mind	[= 1]	.431*	.750***	.563***
N			907	891	896
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.00	.08	.24
	Deviance (Sig.)		.60	.01	.04
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.06	.13	.12
	Nagelkerke		.08	.15	.14
	McFadden		.05	.07	.06
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.63	.17

Table 8.4 – (2) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes

Ordered logit regression

Japan 1995			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.140 ns	-.543**	-.429*
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.092 ns	-.152 ns	-.034 ns
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	.090 ns	-.586 ns	-.886*
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.012 ns	-.115 ns	-.397 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]	.363 ns	-.131 ns	.271 ns
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.109 ns	-.321 ns	-.205 ns
	Occasionally	[= 1]	.267 ns	.151 ns	-.052 ns
Political Consciousness			.370***	.315***	.257**
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	.950**	.130 ns	1.380***
	Don't mind	[= 1]	.011 ns	-1.357**	-.257 ns
N			710	627	655
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.69	.14	.85
	Deviance (Sig.)		.47	.54	.88
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.11	.13	.11
	Nagelkerke		.13	.15	.14
	McFadden		.06	.07	.07
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.04	.15

Russia 1995			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.528***	-.400**	-.659***
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.199 ns	-.222 ns	-.391*
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.442 ns	-.233 ns	.204 ns
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.399 ns	-.101 ns	.277 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]	-.134 ns	-.263**	-.230 ns
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.879***	-.547**	-.971***
	Occasionally	[= 1]	.003 ns	-.044 ns	-.429**
Political Consciousness			.208***	.176***	.126**
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	-.257 ns	-.298 ns	.483*
	Don't mind	[= 1]	-.200 ns	-.408***	.065 ns
N			1537	1574	1540
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.17	.21	.00
	Deviance (Sig.)		.05	.00	1.00
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.09	.07	.05
	Nagelkerke		.11	.08	.07
	McFadden		.05	.03	.04
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.02	.04

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) Reference Categories:

More Say: First Choice [= 2]
 Free Speech: First Choice [= 2]
 Order vs. Freedom: Freedom [= 1]
 Discuss Politics: Frequently [= 2]
 Authority: Good [= 2]

(2) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$;

*** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(3) ns = 'not significant'.

(4) Coefficients are presented in logit.

Japan 1999-2002			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	.140 ns	-.373*	-.291 ns
	Second Choice	[= 1]	.135 ns	-.066 ns	-.040 ns
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.182 ns	-1.210***	-.824*
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.055 ns	-.986**	-.632 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]			
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.715*	-.838**	-.152 ns
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-.276 ns	-.084 ns	.392 ns
Political Consciousness			.269***	.296***	.239***
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	.330 ns	-.091 ns	.224 ns
	Don't mind	[= 1]	-.183 ns	-.834 ns	-.364 ns
N			974	828	868
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.01	.26	.02
	Deviance (Sig.)		.25	.71	.85
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.07	.14	.07
	Nagelkerke		.08	.16	.09
	McFadden		.04	.08	.04
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.04	.23

Russia 1999-2002			Petition	Demonstration	Boycott
More Say:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	-.619***	-.163 ns	-.654***
	Second Choice	[= 1]	-.337*	-.140 ns	-.306 ns
Free Speech:	Not Chosen	[= 0]	.087 ns	.187 ns	-.528 ns
	Second Choice	[= 1]	.493 ns	.383 ns	-.153 ns
Order vs. Freedom:	Order	[= 0]	-.026 ns	.107 ns	.031 ns
Discuss Politics:	Never	[= 0]	-.747***	-.443**	-.286 ns
	Occasionally	[= 1]	-.402**	-.110 ns	-.218 ns
Political Consciousness			.194***	.230***	.268***
Authority:	Bad	[= 0]	.159 ns	.129 ns	.339 ns
	Don't mind	[= 1]	.115 ns	.068 ns	.107 ns
N			1752	1802	1748
Model Fit			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	0	0
Goodness-of-Fit	Pearson (Sig.)		.01	.12	.41
	Deviance (Sig.)		.00	.00	1.00
Pseudo R-Square	Cox and Snell		.07	.06	.06
	Nagelkerke		.09	.07	.08
	McFadden		.04	.03	.05
Test of Parallel Lines			-2LL / χ^2 (Sig.)	.14	.01

Table 8.5 Mean estimation: non-democratic rule and efficacy of democracy

1995-1998			1999-2002		
Non-democratic rule (A)			Non-democratic rule (A)		
	N = 3345			N = 4193	
	Mean	Standard Error		Mean	Standard Error
USA	2.69	.06	USA	3.56	.07
Britain	--	--	Britain	3.15	.09
Japan	3.36	.07	Japan	3.29	.06
Russia	5.40	.06	Russia	5.15	.05
Non-democratic rule (B)			Non-democratic rule (B)		
	N = 4480			N = 4490	
	Mean	Standard Error		Mean	Standard Error
USA	2.16	.05	USA	2.95	.06
Britain	2.55	.06	Britain	2.52	.07
Japan	2.71	.06	Japan	2.59	.05
Russia	3.99	.04	Russia	3.81	.04
Efficacy of democracy			Efficacy of democracy		
	N = 3316			N = 4264	
	Mean	Standard Error		Mean	Standard Error
USA	7.77	.05	USA	7.68	.06
Britain	--	--	Britain	7.62	.07
Japan	7.66	.07	Japan	7.71	.06
Russia	5.07	.07	Russia	5.36	.06

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Note:

(1) Figures are rounded.

(2) The score ranges of the scales are as follows:

	Minimum (negative)		Maximum (positive)	
Non-democratic rule (A):	0	<=	=>	12
Non-democratic rule (B):	0	<=	=>	9
Efficacy of democracy:	0	<=	=>	12

Table 8.6 A view of non-democratic rule (A) and liberal democratic attitudes

[Linear Regression]

Dependent Variable: Non-Democratic Rule (A)

WVS 1995-1998									Categories
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Reference	
More Say 1st Choice	-.045 ns	-.065*	--	.057 ns	.061 ns	-.052 ns	-.075*	MS:	Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice	-.011 ns	-.021 ns	--	-.018 ns	-.006 ns	-.120***	-.131***		
Free Speech 1st Choice	-.042 ns	-.058 ns	--	-.035 ns	-.039 ns	-.102**	-.116***	FS:	Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice	-.043 ns	-.049 ns	--	-.030 ns	-.040 ns	-.063*	-.061*		
Order vs. Freedom	-.071*	--	--	-.059 ns		-.123***			
Discuss Politics: Frequently	-.152***	-.161***	--	-.057 ns	-.058 ns	.035 ns	.052 ns	DP:	Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	-.067 ns	-.075*	--	-.030 ns	-.038 ns	.009 ns	.028 ns		
Political Consciousness	-.139***	-.130***	--	-.149**	-.149**	-.096**	-.086*		
Authority: Good	.054 ns	.066 ns	--	.153***	.164***	.011 ns	.032 ns	Auth:	Bad
Authority: Don't mind	.083 ns	.093 ns	--	.124**	.140***	-.017 ns	-.002 ns		
(Beta)									
Adjusted R Square	.065	.060	--	.063	.073	.046	.031		

WVS 1999-2002									Categories
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Russia	
More Say 1st Choice	-.117**	--	--	.068 ns	--	-.001 ns	-.010 ns	--	
More Say 2nd Choice	-.086*	--	--	.025 ns	--	.050 ns	.037 ns	--	
Free Speech 1st Choice	-.169***	--	--	-.088*	--	-.002 ns	-.009 ns	--	
Free Speech 2nd Choice	-.088*	--	--	-.083*	--	.000 ns	.003 ns	--	
Order vs. Freedom	--	--	--	--	--	-.084**	--	--	
Discuss Politics: Frequently	-.132**	-.136**	-.021 ns	.039 ns	.027 ns	-.031 ns	-.053 ns	-.067 ns	
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	-.120**	-.120**	-.099*	-.014 ns	-.022 ns	-.056 ns	-.076 ns	-.089*	
Political Consciousness	-.125***	-.139***	-.213***	-.152***	-.181***	-.063 ns	-.055 ns	-.048 ns	
Authority: Good	.042 ns	.088 ns	.027 ns	.214***	.210***	-.055 ns	-.037 ns	-.031 ns	
Authority: Don't mind	.044 ns	.080 ns	.011 ns	.042 ns	.067*	-.071 ns	-.061 ns	-.052 ns	
(Beta)									
Adjusted R Square	.070	.049	.067	.082	.074	.010	.004	.006	

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(2) ns = not significant

Table 8.7 A view of non-democratic rule (B) and liberal democratic attitudes
[Linear Regression]

Dependent Variable: Non-Democratic Rule (B)

WVS 1995-1998									
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Reference	Categories
More Say 1st Choice	-.054 ns	-.080*	.112**	.033 ns	.047 ns	-.033 ns	-.050 ns	MS:	Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice	-.002 ns	-.017 ns	.026 ns	-.038 ns	-.014 ns	-.110***	-.123***		
Free Speech 1st Choice	-.033 ns	-.060 ns	-.076*	-.044 ns	-.062 ns	-.064*	-.073*	FS:	Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice	-.029 ns	-.038 ns	-.097**	-.047 ns	-.049 ns	-.055 ns	-.059*		
Order vs. Freedom	-.072*	--	--	-.047 ns	--	-.080**	--		
Discuss Politics: Frequently	-.174***	-.230***	-.168***	-.061 ns	-.092*	.052 ns	.016 ns	DP:	Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	-.105**	-.142***	-.197***	-.025 ns	-.059 ns	.043 ns	.039 ns		
Political Consciousness	-.095**	--	--	-.074 ns	--	-.093**	--		
Authority: Good	.052 ns	.059 ns	.043 ns	.119**	.145***	.088 ns	.090 ns	Auth:	Bad
Authority: Don't mind	.082 ns	.095 ns	.002 ns	.077 ns	.087*	.033 ns	.037 ns		
(Beta)									
Adjusted R Square	.055	.046	.062	.026	.033	.028	.019		

WVS 1999-2002									
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Russia	
More Say 1st Choice	-.122**	--	--	.078 ns	--	.046 ns	.037 ns	--	
More Say 2nd Choice	-.098**	--	--	.033 ns	--	.052 ns	.038 ns	--	
Free Speech 1st Choice	-.156***	--	--	-.064 ns	--	.016 ns	.011 ns	--	
Free Speech 2nd Choice	-.086*	--	--	-.056 ns	--	.008 ns	.004 ns	--	
Order vs. Freedom	--	--	--	--	--	-.055 ns	--	--	
Discuss Politics: Frequently	-.101*	-.105**	.009 ns	.022 ns	.022 ns	-.014 ns	-.036 ns	-.051 ns	
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	-.092*	-.093*	-.080 ns	-.027 ns	-.029 ns	-.044 ns	-.063 ns	-.072*	
Political Consciousness	-.091**	-.103**	-.199***	-.112**	-.135***	-.050 ns	-.040 ns	-.028 ns	
Authority: Good	.058 ns	.103 ns	.023 ns	.218***	.215***	.012 ns	.027 ns	.032 ns	
Authority: Don't mind	.047 ns	.083 ns	.025 ns	.012 ns	.027 ns	-.019 ns	-.008 ns	.000 ns	
(Beta)									
Adjusted R Square	.048	.028	.052	.065	.059	.002	.001	.002	

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(2) ns = not significant

Table 8.8 A view of the efficacy of democracy and liberal democratic attitudes
[Linear Regression]

Dependent Variable: Efficacy of Democracy

WVS 1995-1998								
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice	-.050 ns	-.046 ns	--	-.057 ns	-.048 ns	.108***	.121***	MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice	.003 ns	.000 ns	--	.024 ns	.017 ns	.089**	.098**	
Free Speech 1st Choice	.042 ns	.056 ns	--	.076 ns	.102*	.111***	.123***	FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice	.050 ns	.061*	--	.068 ns	.091*	.110***	.104***	
Order vs. Freedom	.065*	--	--	.132**	--	.122***	--	
Discuss Politics: Frequently	.110**	.113**	--	-.017 ns	-.017 ns	.000 ns	.002 ns	DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	.056 ns	.057 ns	--	-.014 ns	-.007 ns	.069 ns	.072 ns	
Political Consciousness	.118***	.110**	--	.132**	.121*	.014 ns	.010 ns	
Authority: Good	-.119*	-.120*	--	-.259***	-.244***	.142*	.129*	Auth: Bad
Authority: Don't mind	-.063 ns	-.065 ns	--	.005 ns	.002 ns	.102 ns	.095 ns	
(Beta)								
Adjusted R Square	.046	.040	--	.097	.076	.059	.042	

WVS 1999-2002								
Independent Variables	USA	USA	Britain	Japan	Japan	Russia	Russia	Russia
More Say 1st Choice	.006 ns	--	--	-.003 ns	--	.080**	.108***	--
More Say 2nd Choice	.028 ns	--	--	.048 ns	--	.078**	.092**	--
Free Speech 1st Choice	.016 ns	--	--	.094*	--	.055*	.069*	--
Free Speech 2nd Choice	.006 ns	--	--	.073 ns	--	.036 ns	.044 ns	--
Order vs. Freedom	--	--	--	--	--	.163***	--	--
Discuss Politics: Frequently	.108**	.103**	.065 ns	.029 ns	.056 ns	-.025 ns	.008 ns	.009 ns
Discuss Politics: Occasionally	.119**	.115**	.011 ns	.041 ns	.048 ns	.022 ns	.030 ns	.040 ns
Political Consciousness	.133***	.137***	.007 ns	.185***	.196***	.066*	.037 ns	.049 ns
Authority: Good	.056 ns	.049 ns	.133*	-.151***	-.156***	.081 ns	.068 ns	.063 ns
Authority: Don't mind	.027 ns	.016 ns	.119*	-.117**	-.123**	.043 ns	.035 ns	.042 ns
(Beta)								
Adjusted R Square	.037	.040	.004	.087	.084	.045	.019	.002

Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.

Notes:

(1) * = statistically significant at $p < .05$; ** = statistically significant at $p < .01$; *** = statistically significant at $p < .001$.

(2) ns = not significant

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the findings of the research and their implications for the two central themes of the thesis: (1) values shift versus cultural particularity and (2) values and democracy. The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories on values shift presented by Inglehart and others primarily assume that, as a consequence of industrialisation and post-industrialisation, people's values transform in manners to increase an awareness and an emphasis on self-expression, self-esteem and other qualities. It is implied that this contributes to (liberal) democratic outcomes.¹ In relation to these, the present study raised another question, suggesting that cultural particularity should be taken into consideration as a factor competing with the effect of values shift on people's attitudinal conditions. Especially, it was assumed that the state of an emphasis on the individual (as a supposed quality of the increasing values orientation) could be affected by cultural difference. Individualism and an emphasis on liberty are often quoted as core elements of Western societies, which are not necessarily so in other cultural scenarios. With this inquiry, the four-item Postmaterialist index and related values items were scrutinised closely by comparing the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. At some points, the examination was expanded to broader regions: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions. It turned out that there was a certain relevance in the account of the cultural effect especially on items concerned with freedom. Attention was also paid to political areas that are theoretically associated with the values shift thesis. While incorporating the view of cultural influence, the findings were considered in terms of their implications for democracy. This chapter will attempt to summarise a series of these investigations and further explore core issues underlying the inquiries. The first part will review the main results of our research. The second part mentions the originality of our findings. In the subsequent parts, consideration will be given to the two main themes. Throughout, freedom and individuality are the key elements.

¹ Inglehart's recent research often associates 'self-expression values' (as a consequence of values shift) with democracy (on the basis of measurements utilising the Freedom House scores). See, for example, Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Howard J. Wiarda ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164.

9.2 Review of findings

9.2.1 Postmaterialist index

The following sections summarise the findings in previous chapters. The present study firstly conducted an examination of the Postmaterialist index. It was discovered that, even within these restricted items, there were variations in relation to the competing effects of values shift and cultural durability. Especially, the states of two items within the Postmaterialist category differed. These items were: (1) 'giving people more say in important government decisions' and (2) 'protecting freedom of speech'. The 'more say' item tended to be prone to values shift and to some extent circumstantial changes. In contrast, the appreciation of 'free speech' was less subject to such an effect. The USA and Britain were likely to have higher emphasis on it at comparable levels to 'more say'. On the other hand, the appraisal of 'free speech' was clearly lower in Japan and Russia than in the Western counterparts. Moreover, such gaps persisted at multiple time points, implying the durability of the particular characters. Cultures or historical experiences seemed to have a stronger influence over the conditions of attitudes to 'free speech'.

9.2.2 'More say' and 'free speech'

This finding was further explored for confirmation, and it attained supportive outcomes. For the analysis, the variables of relative commitment to 'more say' and 'free speech' were employed. 'More say' indicated its proneness to generational values shifts for Britain and Japan. Russian support for 'more say' seemed to be affected by economic conditions.² America seemed to have already achieved a high and stable emphasis on it in view of the values shift. Conversely, an emphasis on 'free speech' varied with each of the four societies having a particular degree that persisted over time. The two items were further compared in terms of the competing effects of economic development and regional identities (that is, Western, Postcommunist and East Asian societies). These effects were regarded as representing the dichotomous influences of the Postmaterialist values shift and cultural

² Russia might have a possible element for a generational change for the 'more say' item, if the change takes place. In an age cohort analysis, the support for the 'more say' item tended to be largely higher in younger generations than in older ones, which was consistently observed in the available three waves.

particularity. The result was largely consistent with the earlier finding: 'more say' was prone to change, and 'free speech' was culturally durable.

9.2.3 Postmaterialist variables and democracy

The implications of above-mentioned results were considered in the context of democracy. The relevance of two Postmaterialist items to the model of polyarchy was discussed. The previous outcomes suggested that, in Postcommunist and East Asian contexts (including Russia and Japan), there would not be full effects of the Postmaterialist shift. Due to this, there could be a certain weakness in the effect of the values shift to foster popular attitudes conducive to polyarchy. On the other hand, Western societies may have been culturally advantageous to the Postmaterialist effect as well as popular attitudes in favour of polyarchy.

9.2.4 Freedom

The perception of 'freedom' (in relation to 'order') was further examined through a cross-national comparison. In view of the likely influence of culture on 'free speech', there was a question whether the meaning of 'freedom' would differ depending on national characteristics. According to the results, for American respondents, '(general) freedom' seemed to have more overlap with 'free speech', whereas Russians clearly less associated '(general) freedom' with 'free speech'. The Russian public seemed to appreciate 'freedom', but not necessarily in the sense of 'freedom of speech'. Although the overlap in Japanese perceptions was inbetween the two sides, the priority of 'freedom' was both low *vis-à-vis* 'order'. Such distinctions were also discovered to be corresponding to regional differences. Postcommunist (especially former USSR) societies shared a similar character with Russia. Likewise, the American result exhibited closeness to that of Western societies, and Japan to East Asian societies. Cultural traits seemed to matter in the perception of freedom.

9.2.5 Protest

Subsequently, the realm of protest was investigated, as having relevance to both Postmaterialist values and responsive democracy. Since moderate protest would denote people's inclination towards public demands on political authority, this could have a

symmetrical direction with the issue of governmental responsiveness. Overall, the USA and Britain had more orientation to protest than Japan and Russia. Japanese people tended to be highly ambiguous on attitudes to protest, thus implying weakness in public expression and contestation. Russian respondents did not seem to have a substantial orientation to protest among the four societies even during 1990.³ Through the comparison, on the one hand, there was a sign of values shift affecting the state of protest, since steady increases of temperate protest were observed in the three long-standing affluent societies.⁴ On the other hand, there was an indication of cultural particularity at work. The four societies had respective patterns of popular attitudes to protest with durability. The result implied that the Western nations could be advantageous to responsive democracy whereas the others would be less likely to be so.

9.2.6 Values and political dimensions

As a final investigation, multivariate analyses were conducted on three issues. The first part examined associations between Postmaterialist values and protest. The values shift theory presumes that citizens' orientation to moderate protest is facilitated by post-industrial values transformation. Our outcome, however, discovered variation in the patterns of the associations across the four societies. This suggested national difference in Postmaterialist effects on the state of protest attitudes. It would be plausible to incorporate the perspective of cultural particularity in addition to that of values shift. The second part probed the influence of liberal democratic attitudes on protest in view of 'civic protest'. The American case seemed to conform to the model where moderate protest was evenly affected by liberal democratic motives. Japan appeared to have less orientation to this. For the Russian case, there was a possibility that protest would be motivated by pragmatic needs rather than the ideal of democratic liberty. The third part investigated views of governance and their associations with liberal democratic attitudes. Two indexes showed that the Russian case held distinctly low agreement with democracy among the four societies. Meanwhile, in the USA, regime support was more related to political awareness and self-expression than an emphasis on abstract principles of free speech and participation. For Russians, the commitment to these principles seemed to be more

³ This was when the transition from communist rules saw the culmination of protest action.

⁴ They are the USA, Britain and Japan.

associated. Nonetheless, careful analyses led to the conclusion that essentially American people had more orientation to a democratic regime as well as liberal democratic attitudes, whereas Russian citizens held certain reservations about both of them. Moreover, Russian attitudes in the latter survey (1999-2002) seemed to have become more amenable to authoritarian forms of governance.⁵ In the Japanese case, an attitude to authority was notable in association with views of governance, while those of participation and free speech were rarely so. Consequently, at least in the realms of protest and views of governance, the American populace held attitudes compatible with participatory democracy as well as 'civic culture'. The citizens may be described as 'assertive masses'. Japanese and Russian individuals had a weaker orientation to this effect.

9.3 Originality of findings

With these findings, what is exactly an original contribution to political science? This section will outline the ways in which this dissertation makes a unique contribution to this academic field. First of all, our findings provide a modification to the scope of the Postmaterialist thesis (and related values shift theories) expounded by Ronald Inglehart and others. It should be noted that the work by Inglehart and related scholars primarily emphasises values shift *per se*, although some of their literature mentions cultural elements affecting popular attitudes.⁶ This study places more explicit stress on the effect of cultural particularity, which competes in terms of explanatory power with the concept of values shift. The empirical outcomes of this work have successfully shown the importance of cultural elements in terms of understanding the variation of values and value shift in different country contexts. In addition, this thesis has further refined the measurement of Postmaterialism in work by Inglehart. This has been done by a further differentiation of Postmaterialist items in its four-item index (namely, 'more say' and 'free speech' items) in

⁵ The withdrawal of the associations in Russia from 1995 to 1999-2002 in the judgment of non-democracy suggested that liberal democratic values might have become ineffective in checking authoritarian governance.

⁶ For values shift literature that mentions cultural factors, see Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', *American Sociological Review*, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.

relation to the two competing effects. In the existing values shift theories, these Postmaterialist items are simply located within one category, and popular orientations to these values items are assumed to grow together. However, work for this thesis has found that even within the same Postmaterialist group, the effects of values shift (and cultural particularity) *differ* depending on the items.

This thesis also has found evidence that the Postmaterialist item labelled as 'free speech' is, to a certain degree, resistant to values shift as it is anchored by cultural factors. Moreover, Western societies tend to place a greater emphasis on this item in comparison with Postcommunist and East Asian societies. The finding parallels the claim of some cultural discourses that Western traditions attach importance to liberty and individualism.⁷ In the meantime, this thesis has empirically found that a perception of freedom can vary depending on different cultural scenarios. This finding contributes to the extension of the scholarly debate relating to the theoretical differentiation in types of freedom.⁸ Another academic contribution would be that, whereas Inglehart discussed the relationship between Postmaterialist values and democracy, this thesis developed further this matter theoretically by incorporating the notion of polyarchy, which is connected with the above-mentioned differentiation of Postmaterialist values items.⁹

In addition, protest is mentioned in the context of values shift in Inglehart's work. However, his exploration of protest does not provide enough depth of investigation into the importance of cultural differences in understanding values shift. In this thesis, the study of protest is conducted explicitly in relation to values shift versus cultural particularity, which includes both the national comparison of protest patterns as well as an examination of the relationships between Postmaterialist values and protest. This comparison revealed the validity of using cultural particularity to examine the role of protest in values shift. The research in this study also highlights that there can be difference in quality of protest,

7 See, for example, Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72; Bell, D. and K. Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones eds., *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 1-16.

8 See, for instance, Berlin, Isaiah, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Constant, Benjamin, *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. pp. 316-318; Beetham, David, 'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), esp. p. 33.

9 For Postmaterialist values and democracy, see '1.2.2 Inglehart and democracy' in the first chapter.

which may add useful insight to preceding studies on protest behaviour. Another key contribution is that this thesis explicitly incorporates the concept of 'civic protest' into the study of values shift in a comparative perspective. Inglehart mentions the rise of a protest orientation as an 'elite-challenging' style of participation, which is combined with values transformation while being conducive to democracy.¹⁰ With the awareness that this phenomenon is typical of post-industrial (especially Western) nations, this research has considered its connection with liberal democratic attitudes through the comparison of different cultural settings (in this case Russia and Japan).

Finally, this research contributes to the debate within the study of political culture that is broader than the concept of Postmaterialism. On the whole, the findings in this thesis are compatible with the rationale of *Civic Culture* by Almond and Verba, in that those in the USA and Britain hold relatively strong orientations to participatory democracy.¹¹ The results that Russia and Japan have weaker support for these concepts chime with earlier findings about political culture discourses on these countries.¹²

9.4 Values shift versus cultural particularity

9.4.1 A dichotomous perspective and non-Western contexts

One of the major themes of our study is values shift versus cultural particularity in the context of the Postmaterialist thesis. What conclusion could be drawn from our investigation so far? In principle, our findings positively endorse the validity of our hypothesis, which was initially presented in the first chapter. We assumed that the Postmaterialist shift and cultural particularity constitute competing effects on values conditions. This parallels some of Inglehart's research, which present the particularities of

¹⁰ For protest as 'elite-challenging' form of participation, see Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 307-315; Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43 (2002), pp. 300-316; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 94-126.

¹¹ Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

¹² For example, see Maruyama, Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo*, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); White, Stephen, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).

cultural zones in addition to the effect of economic modernisation.¹³ Similarly, while Inglehart and Welzel argue in terms of values shift including Postmaterialist and broader contexts, they also seem to notice that the details of actual directions are path-dependent for respective societies, being affected by cultural and historical heritages.¹⁴ In view of their studies, our research has more emphasised the cultural factors, by examining how they actually affect popular attitudes *vis-à-vis* the effect of values shift. Since the major emphasis of the preceding literature on the Postmaterialist thesis has been on Western post-industrial societies, the examination of non-Western nations would expand the potential to detect cultural variations. For this study, Japan and Russia have been employed as non-Western cases.¹⁵ From this point of view, let us consider these societies.

For Japan, there have been the signs of both a values shift and the strong presence of traditions. This has been creating complexities in their attitudinal situations.¹⁶ A Postmaterialist transformation has been observed in certain respects. Nonetheless, it is not a fully-fledged version. For instance, the third and fourth chapters discovered that, within the four-item Postmaterialist index, 'more say' tends to be subject to such a change, whereas 'free speech' rather stays still at a lower level over multiple time points. There seem to be cultural norms or tendencies that de-emphasise a sense of liberty. In fact, as presented in the sixth chapter, freedom seems to have much less priority when it is compared with securing order in society. Conformism is still a general behavioural custom, which runs counter to the effect of rising self-expression and individual esteem as the quality of a Postmaterialist shift.¹⁷ The individual orientation to public discussion seems to

13 For instance, see Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy'.

14 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 1, pp. 15-47, esp. 18-22.

15 There are studies in similar perspectives, see, for example, Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', *American Political Science Review*, 67: 4 (December 1973), pp. 1194-1203; Flanagan, Scott, 'Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings', *Comparative Political Studies*, 14: 4 (January 1982), pp. 403-444; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Changing Values in Japan and the West', *Comparative Political Studies*, 14: 4 (January 1982), pp. 445-479; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', *Political Research Quarterly*, 47 (1994), pp. 5-39.

16 Also, Sawa mentions Japanese conditions of Materialism and Postmaterialism in economic terms with certain particularity. See Sawa, Takamitsu, *Shijo-Shugi no Shuen: Nihon-Keizai wo Dousurunoka* [The End of Marketism: How Do We Cope with Japanese Economy?] (Tokyo: Iwanami-Shoten, 2000), pp. 80-96.

17 Vogel mentions Japanese orientation to groups and conformity. See Vogel, Ezra F., *Japan as Number One* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

be lower. Meanwhile, what about the sphere of protest as one of political indicators connected with Postmaterialist values and public expression? In Japan, an overall inclination to protest, its pattern and shift show some similarity to ones in the USA and Britain. Nonetheless, there are particular properties in the Japanese case. When it comes to the matter of protest 'actions', Japanese figures show clearly less inclinations. The extent of missing values in response to questions on protest is constantly high, implying their strong ambiguity on this issue. 'Civic protest', as a potential phenomenon to values shift (in Western post-industrial societies), does not seem to be fully applicable. In Japan, there has been a values shift, but not to the same extent as in the Western nations especially in terms of its efficacy. It is possible that their traditional culture underlies these particular conditions.

For Russia, there seems to be strong particularity, which could reflect the influence of its own experience. Great proportions of Russian respondents are oriented to Materialist values, which implies that its attitudinal patterns are virtually the opposite of Postmaterialist outlooks. One might contend that the communist experience, which had supposedly achieved a certain economic development and social welfare, may have contributed to the emergence of Postmaterialist outlooks. There is a report of the presence of such values.¹⁸ Nonetheless, as detected in the preceding chapters, on the whole, a strong Russian skew towards Materialist values is observed. A careful examination of the Postmaterialist index and its variants revealed that there are coherent distributions in the Russian figures in a manner different from the USA and Britain. There are indications that 'free speech' receives a low emphasis with a durable character in contrast to its higher appreciation by Western counterparts. The main perception of 'freedom' appears to be qualitatively different from American one. As for the realm of protest in Russia, the degree of an inclination, patterns, the way of Postmaterialist influence and the state of associations with liberal democratic values hold distinct features from the two Western societies. All of these show particularity. These have respective properties that could run counter to the elements of transformations presumed by the values shift theory. National particularity seems to have considerable presence and influence, which might be connected with cultural elements.

¹⁸ Gibson and Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy'.

Considering these, does the Postmaterialist hypothesis still have validity for the Russian future? At present, it is difficult to give a clear answer, given the difficult situation in the economy and social well-being. One possible judgment would be that there would be little possibility to expect the immediate rise of a Postmaterialist orientation, due to the current lack of prerequisites. The Postmaterialist theory primarily assumes that there needs to be long-standing economic security as a condition for values transformation. Even if such conditions were met, it should be expected that it would take generations for the effect to emerge. Consequently, at least for the moment, Russian attitudinal conditions are more likely to be susceptible to what already have existed in the society, which would include cultural and historical factors. Also, as empirically detected, these factors could represent a considerable hindrance to the emergence of Postmaterialist values, if it were to take place.

In addition, our results indicate that some of the above-mentioned national characteristics have commonalities with broader regions, within which each of the nations are located. Japan shares some common elements with East Asian nations, whereas Russia does so with Postcommunist nations (especially former Soviet republics). It is also applicable to the cases of the USA and Britain with Western societies. This also suggests the influence of cultures on popular mind-sets.

9.4.2 Freedom as a core issue

There has been one primary issue that has been consistently underlying across our research. This is the matter of 'freedom'. The issue is connected with both values shift and cultural particularity. For instance, Inglehart's thesis in essence holds an increasing sense of self-esteem and self-expression in post-industrial societies as a central element. This would be related to attitudinal conditions on freedom. Likewise, Inglehart and Welzel argue the rise of an individualistic orientation in a positive tone as a consequence of socio-economic development (especially in the phase of post-industrialisation) while associating this with 'self-expression values'.¹⁹ On the other hand, the discourses of cultural particularism indicate that individualism or the emphasis on freedom is rooted in Western culture.²⁰

¹⁹ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 6, pp. 135-145.

²⁰ For example, see Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy', in David Held ed.,

In relation to this, what do the findings of the present study suggest? Non-Western societies (such as Postcommunist and East Asian societies) are not quite susceptible to the full effects of the values transformation in attitudes to freedom. At least, this is the case with the outlook on a certain type of freedom as represented by 'free speech'. Although this does not negate the theory of the values shift *per se*, cultural variation appears to have an enduring influence on the attitudinal quality of freedom. This implies that non-Western factors could function to obstruct, or simply be irrelevant to, the emergence of popular support for a specific kind of liberty, which is supposed to be part of an outcome predicted by the values shift theory. Simply put, the particular kind of freedom overlaps with idiosyncratic elements in Western culture, which may not be simply increased by post-industrial transformations in a universal manner. An effect of such an increase, when it happens, would tend to be confronted with a cultural hindrance to its enhancement. In addition, why is it possible to point to a 'specific' freedom? As one of the rationales, an argument in the fifth chapter should be recalled. It was noted that there was a qualitative gap between 'freedom' emphasised by those in Russia and post-Soviet societies and 'freedom' largely conceived by American and Western publics. This suggests that the types or qualities of freedom could be differentiated.²¹

What is the freedom that could be emphatically Western? To answer this, it would be useful to pay attention to one of our findings: Western citizens tend to place a greater emphasis on 'free speech' than the others (at least, people in East Asian and Postcommunist societies). Although the argument is seemingly simplistic, the result of the data output was too unequivocal to be declined, as presented in the fourth and sixth chapters. Why do Western publics possess such a clear inclination towards 'freedom of speech'? What character of liberty is it that has to involve 'free speech'? Huntington mentions the presence of individualism as one of the core components of Western civilisation.²² According to Inglehart's values map, Western societies cluster around higher scores on the 'self-expression values' indicator.²³ But more precisely, what nature does this freedom possess

Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-75; Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'.

21 For a related topic on the differentiation of freedom, see, for example, Miller, William L. ed., *Alternatives to Freedom: Arguments and Opinions* (London/New York: Longman Group, 1995), pp. 1-4.

22 See Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, pp. 69-72.

23 For the values map, see Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 92-100; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel,

as its substance? For this, it would be helpful to recall the argument on the perception gap of freedom in the fifth chapter. In Maslow's values hierarchy, Inglehart locates 'free speech' in the realm of self-actualisation needs, which includes self-esteem, intellectual interests and aesthetic fulfilment.²⁴ It was discussed that freedom in this sense would involve associative connotations. This could have the character of spontaneous participation in society, which implies a politically proactive rather than passive tendency. It is compatible with a sense of 'rights'. This could be qualitatively distinct from a kind of freedom that primarily emphasises private and pragmatic goals of the individual as well as simple non-intervention by (political) authorities in pursuit of them. After all, the 'freedom' often conceived by those in the West would be strongly connected with individuals' intellectual or cognitive autonomy as well as spontaneous participation in society.²⁵

Is such a sense of freedom unachievable to the level of mass values in non-Western societies due to its idiosyncratic character? It might be possible to some extent by the effects of post-industrial values transformation (and partly the introduction of the norms and ideas from the West). Nonetheless, the presence of cultural differences probably would have a strong influence on attitudinal conditions. It can function to obstruct or diverge such effects in non-Western scenarios (especially, for East Asian and post-Soviet societies). As shown in the fourth chapter, for example, the degree of national emphasis on 'freedom of speech' was susceptible to cultural particularity, which could not be simply explained by the state of economic development. In a similar vein, according to Inglehart and Baker, the state of the 'self-expression values' is substantially affected by the difference of cultural heritages in addition to modernisation effects.²⁶

9.5 Values and democracy

9.5.1 Freedom, individuality and democracy

Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 48-76, esp. 63.

²⁴ See Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42. Although Inglehart utilised the values hierarchy in the context of a post-industrial values shift, the present argument place more emphasis on cultural difference, so that the values allocation is viewed from a horizontal perspective rather than a vertical/hierarchical one.

²⁵ This interpretation would resonate with ideas such as civil society, public discussions and voluntary organisations, which are prevalent notions in the contemporary West.

²⁶ See Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'.

This section considers one of our research themes: values and democracy. The preceding section has suggested that one of the crucial points on values shift versus cultural particularity resides in the matter of freedom. Freedom is concerned with how one views the individual and how its conditions are. It seems that the state of the individual and its variation matter to national differences in certain aspects of democracy. The discussion will start with this point.

What kind of national variation is there in terms of individuality? Lipset's argument would be worth noticing as an initial step. He discusses an American orientation to a strong sense of freedom, self-autonomy, and free-standing and rights-asserting individuals. By contrast, the Japanese are prone to a sense of obligation, deference and consensus, which connotes collective norms. Britain (and other West European countries) tend to be located between the USA and Japan in the degree of emphasis on the individual.²⁷ Similarly, according to Hofstede's individualism index, the USA has the highest figure among fifty countries and three regions whereas British ranking is third. Japanese is ranked lower than most of Western nations.²⁸ There seem to be clear differences in the general perceptions and conditions of the individual. Our findings accord with this point of view. As mentioned above, these include the Japanese priority of order in society rather than the freedom of the individual as well as their lower inclination to public discussions and protest than the USA and Britain. Japanese individuals are not particularly inclined to self-expression and public demands, which coincide and probably are associated with a weaker or more ambiguous sense of individuality than Western counterparts. Weaker open demands imply a lesser potential to call for governmental responsiveness and accountability at the individual level.²⁹

On the other hand, in the USA and Britain, there is a greater presence of 'assertive masses'. They hold a certain propensity to express their claims to the government. This can be connected with their orientation to self-expression. But it also derives from a substantial

27 Lipset, Seymour Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), esp. pp. 211-263, 293-296.

28 Western countries that hold lower scores than Japan are only Portugal and Greece. See Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001), esp. p. 215.

29 On accountability, see Schmitter, Philippe C., 'The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). pp. 18-31.

sense of personal autonomy as a crucial asset of individualism. A sense of autonomy would compel one to take control of one's life and environment. Political authority can be an existence that has considerable influence over these, which therefore can be perceived as having the potential to conflict with their autonomy. Likewise, the persistent sense of autonomy is more likely to go against the rationale of paternalism, which could be extended to the political realm.³⁰ Subjectively, people with such values are apt to perceive authority as a potential disturbance or in some cases a threat, which may affect their freedom, well-being and perhaps security. They therefore tend to clearly acknowledge the necessity of restricting political authority and making sure that power is duly exercised in a regulated manner.³¹ Moreover, under a democratic regime, the people are supposed to endow political elites with their power. With this, the stronger attachment to individual autonomy can enhance the people's motivations to check government and ensure its responsibility to provide measures that accord with their wills. The individuals tend to hold a stronger awareness and inclination to seek accountable and responsive government.

If the sense of individual autonomy is weak, such conflicts with authority will be less likely to be recognised. Paternalism may have more possibility to be accepted, which at times could function to endorse the legitimacy of strong political authority. This could be more likely in non-Western contexts that have different perceptions of the individual. Pye mentions the Asian orientation to paternalistic authority, whereas he acknowledges the presence of individualism in the West in contrast with Asia.³² As suggested earlier, freedom in Russian terms may be distinct from one conceived in the West. There could be less attachment to the cognitive autonomy of the individual in Russia, which would allow more leeway for political paternalism.³³

Meanwhile, the matter of freedom can be associated with the aspect of protest. Our findings suggest that there are national gaps in the quality of protest. As suggested in the

30 A definition of 'paternalism' reads as: '[t]he power and authority one person or institution exercises over another to confer benefits or prevent harm for the latter regardless of the latter's informed consent. Paternalism is thus a threat to autonomy as well as to liberty and privacy.' See Honderich, Ted, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 647.

31 In Western democratic societies, 'the rule of law' seems to be understood emphatically in the sense of regulating the government in order to prevent the abuse of the power over the individual. This would be more likely in societies where the people's emphasis on individual autonomy is prevalent.

32 See Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Mass./London, Belknap Press, 1985).

33 For a related topic, see for instance, Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions between Democracy and Order among Russian Citizens', *Studies in Public Policy*, 352 (2001).

seventh and eighth chapters, the people in the two Western nations are more orientated to 'civic protest'.³⁴ American and British respondents also showed the inclination to 'petition', which was not the case with Russian respondents.³⁵ These seem to have certain symmetry with the national variations in the perception of freedom. It is possible that the particular sense of freedom in the West, which was discussed previously, is affecting their higher orientation to civic protest. The civic protest is in turn a viable indicator of 'assertive masses', whose presence would be conducive to the performance of governmental responsiveness.

To conclude, the difference in cultural traits on individuality and the attitudinal quality of freedom seem to make a difference to how the people see and interact with government. This in turn could have relevance to some functions of democracy.

9.5.2 National implications: the individual and democracy

There are national variations in attitudes in relation to freedom and individuality. To some extent, the variations seem to have different consequences in a political sphere. With this in mind, it would be helpful to summarise the picture of each nation in view of our findings.

In the USA, democracy seems to involve the images of spontaneous participation and open contestation on the basis of individualism. Since the cognitive autonomy of the individual is emphatically valued, 'spontaneity' would be a basic principle for social and political behaviour.³⁶ Freedom, especially in the sense of self-expression, constitutes a core value of their society, where autonomous free individuals demand, participate and discuss of their own accord.³⁷ The active use of language is therefore a crucial asset. Unambiguous language enables them to have clearly defined self-images and communicative exchanges as separate independent beings. These amount to their attachment to 'freedom of speech' as

³⁴ It was discovered that liberal democratic values were more associated with (moderate) protest in the USA than in Japan and Russia.

³⁵ Japan is a little weaker than the Western nations on this.

³⁶ In relative terms, the American type of individuality may resonate with the character of an inner-directed disposition in comparison with Japanese orientation towards an other-directed one. Although Riesman's original rationale on the typology is concerned with the different phases of a society, the categorisation seems to be relevant to the description of cultural difference. For the original conceptualisation of the notions, see Riesman, David, et al., *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).

³⁷ The strong perception of the individuals as separate independent beings may enhance a view on the equality of rights and a sense of fairness in the sense of balance.

an essential element. This in turn is connected with the emphasis on public discussion and contestation, which share an identical direction with civic protest as well as responsive democracy.

For the Japanese case, firstly, it seems that the issue of authority plays a major part.³⁸ They seem to hold an embedded vertical image in a political dimension. Government, in their perception, appears to be located at an upper level of the social hierarchy. Persistent anti-authoritarian sentiments at an exceptionally high level in survey responses may be a negative reaction to their own social customs where they are somehow prone to authority. In horizontal terms, secondly, their weakness in the emphasis on liberty coincides with their lack of orientation to public expression and political contestation at an individual level. For the Japanese, overt self-expression and open demands may be perceived as neither a viable way to participate nor a method to be heard. They seem much less to associate democracy with participation by autonomous free-standing individuals. Japan is formally a liberal democracy, and institutionally citizens' rights and freedom are guaranteed at a historically unprecedented level. Nonetheless, culturally, the individual is bound up with emotionally and structurally intertwined social norms and connections. Conformism seems to be still an embedded custom at work, where individuals often seek acceptance by socially collective contexts as a means for self-actualisation. In some way, however, there is dynamism and ordered security, which the people are enjoying. In such a society, constant self-assertion, public claims and fair logical debates by independent and autonomous individuals may be seen at odds by many, let alone civic protest.

Britain seems to share similar qualities with America in that there is a respect for individual liberty, although they differ in details. The inclination to moderate protest is relatively high. There seems to be a common norm that individuals should be treated equally, and their rights and autonomy should be respected. If this should be violated, there would be often a reaction of protest. On the other hand, comparatively, Britain is different in that its values do not necessarily as fully emphasise individualism as in the USA. There are more elements of consensus and ambiguity.³⁹ This emerges as less clarity and weaker

³⁸ See, for instance, discussions on Japanese attitudes on authority in the sixth chapter as well as the results of multivariate analysis in eighth chapter.

³⁹ This may be perceived as softening social relationship and communication with a flexibility of situational discretion. Sato mentions that British people tend to use more equivocal and indirect expressions in communication than American people do. See Sato, Yoshiko, *Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho*

persistence in explicit public debates on normal occasions. Their values are liberal democratic, but also allow communicative ambiguity. In political terms, the people would conduct public debates and resort to protest according to necessity. However, on a regular basis, they seem to stay discreet and react in accordance with certain principles.⁴⁰ Their society is working with moderate but constant cognitive pressure by the public towards government, which is virtually functioning as an invisible and informal 'checks and balances' system of democracy. This at times emerges as civic protest, if regarded as necessary by the citizens. Such may be a quality that Maruyama acknowledges at a certain point of British history.⁴¹ The quality seems to have become prevalent in modern Britain as a whole and perhaps across Western societies.⁴²

Russian perceptions and behaviour in relation to democracy seem to be different especially as compared with their Western counterparts. As argued previously, the Russian emphasis on freedom seems to hold a politically passive rather than proactive orientation, despite their general appreciation of freedom. This may be much less related to the sense of participation and contestation than the way the American (or Western) populace often conceive. It suggests a potential lack of strength in the society to constantly check the state of governmental responsiveness. As for the Postmaterialist values items, there is a relative appreciation of 'giving people more say in important government decisions', which is higher than that of 'protecting freedom of speech'. Nonetheless, this does not sufficiently guarantee the stronger awareness of participation. The orientation to 'more say' could be subject to not only Postmaterialist shift but also circumstantial changes. Thus, the degree of the emphasis on their voices to be heard may vary, depending on the conditions of the economy, social order or other immediate environments. 'More say' especially in the

to *Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku* [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shin-sha, 2001).

40 In a similar vein, according to Marsh, whereas British citizens are known for the quality of deference in their political culture, they in fact hold protest orientations. See Marsh, Alan, *Protest and Political Consciousness* (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977), ch. 2, pp. 29-54. Lipset suggests that, comparatively, British culture holds more sense of deference with a certain hierarchical connotation than American one. See Lipset, Seymour Martin, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 213-224.

41 Maruyama, Masao 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in M. Jansen ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 489-531.

42 For instance, anti-war protest movements in 2003 were the most prominently observed across Europe among its worldwide examples.

Russian case has a notional leeway where Materialist considerations could intervene.

Moreover, protest in the Russian sense may be qualitatively different from civic protest. In Russia, should there be popular demands on political authority, the causes would tend to be pragmatic necessity rather than abstract liberal democratic rationales.⁴³ Such needs are often based on circumstantial conditions, which are subject to change. The changeability of the motives for the demands would indicate the lack of consistency in political behaviour. There might hardly be constant and unidirectional popular cognitive pressure in a manner to develop governmental responsiveness and accountability. To be fair, there could be political activism and protest for demanding democratic practices. Nonetheless, besides the direct motives, the causes could be rooted in the relatively unstable state of the individual. In quality, the individual may be prone to the impulse of the mobilisation to political activism due to a chronic state of material and psychological insecurity. In Maruyama's terms, there could be a certain presence of 'atomised' individuals.⁴⁴ Inglehart and Klingemann point out the notably low degrees of Russian subjective well-being.⁴⁵ As shown in the seventh chapter, Russian respondents hold a relative inclination to 'lawful demonstration' whereas their emphasis on 'petition' is comparatively low among the four societies. Also, there seems to be comparative instability in the state of protest. Thus, the underlying factors of political activism may rest on the precarious conditions of individuality, transcending respective issues. In fact, although there are occasional reports of protest actions in Russia, the types of claims considerably vary including economic demands, democratic rallies and nationalist movements.⁴⁶ This could be different, in its major tendency, from civic protest in the West where popular demands often entail a relatively coherent liberal democratic direction with stability and moderation.

Meanwhile, cultural and historical experience could be affecting their particular

⁴³ See arguments in the seventh and eighth chapters.

⁴⁴ Maruyama suggests possibility that 'atomised' type of individuals could turn into 'democratic' individuals. For the explanation of the types of individuals, see Maruyama, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme'.

⁴⁵ Inglehart, Ronald and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness', in Ed Diener and E. M. Suh eds., *Subjective Well-being Across Cultures* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 165-183.

⁴⁶ For reports on protest movements in Russia, for example, see *RFE/RL*, 13 April 1995; *RFE/RL*, 16 July 1997; *RFE/RL*, 7 March 2006; *RFE/RL*, 8 April 2006; *RFE/RL* 3 November 2006; *RFE/RL*, 4 November 2006; 18 December 2006; *RFE/RL*, 7 April 2007; *RFE/RL*, 21 May 2007.

features. There have been arguments on the possibility that the communist totalitarian heritage has been obstructive to the emergence of liberal values and civil society comparable to ones in the West.⁴⁷ There are also views that Russia holds a historically embedded proneness to an authoritarian legacy, which is often depicted as the dominance of a central figure at the top of the state.⁴⁸ In fact, the recent Russian system constitutes firmly centralised power held by a presidency with popular support.⁴⁹ There seem to be deep-rooted patterns in Russian political culture, which have been engraved through a long historical process. This might run counter to 'democratisation' in Western terms.⁵⁰

9.5.3 Individualism versus trust

As argued so far, there seem to be positive democratic efficacies owing to an emphasis on particular freedom in Western societies. Nonetheless, is it fair to state that Western post-industrial societies hold exclusively ideal values conditions for democracy? The USA, Britain and probably other Western societies seem to have advantageous traits for underpinning responsive democracy. Their attitudinal conditions, however, might have counter-productive effects.

47 For instance, see Nodia, Ghia, 'How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?', in L. Diamond and M. Plattner eds., *Democracy after Communism* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 3-17; Smolar, Aleksander, 'Civic Society after Communism', in *ibid.* For a concise discussion on Russian civil society, see Evans, Alfred B., Jr, 'A Russian Civil Society?' in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., in *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 6, pp. 96-113; Linz and Stepan made several remarks on civil society in comparative perspective of democratisation. See Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

48 See, for example, White, Stephen, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979). For Russian leadership, see Breslauer, Geroge W., 'Boris Yeltsin as Patriarch', *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, Archie Brown ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 70-81; Huskey, Eugene, 'Overcoming the Yeltsin Legacy: Vladimir Putin and Russian Political Reform', in *ibid.*, pp. 82-96; Shevtsova, Lilia, 'Power and Leadership in Putin's Russia', in Andrew C. Kuchins ed., *Russia after the Fall* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 62-78; Shevtsova, Lilia, *Putin's Russia*, [translated by Antonina W. Bouis] (Washington: D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

49 For Russian presidency, see White, Stephen, 'Presidential Government', in *Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3, pp. 70-106; Willerton, John P., 'Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 2, pp. 18-39; Waller, Michael, 'The Presidency', in *Russian Politics Today: The Return of A Tradition* (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 23-47.

50 See White, *Russia's New Politics*, ch. 8, pp. 255-292.

Individualism and the West

Numerous scholars have observed a distinctive emphasis on the individual in the West. Non-Western theorists often note that the esteem for freedom and individuals is a key Western value, which in turn is related to liberal democracy.⁵¹ Huntington points out that central attributes in Western civilization include the heritages of individualism, social pluralism, representative bodies and so forth.⁵² Bova refers to Western traits including the emphasis on individuals, civil liberty, contestation and participation, for the comparative evaluation of Russian political culture.⁵³ Scholars of 'Asian values' such as Pye notice the difference in the perceptions of individuality and the degrees of emphasis on the individual between the West and Asia.⁵⁴ Through quantitative comparison on cultures, Hofstede shows that Western societies generally have higher scores for his individualism index in comparison with others.⁵⁵ On the other hand, other theorists claim that Postmaterialist and self-expression values have been rising as an outcome of a values shift in post-industrial societies (which mainly overlap with the West).⁵⁶ Inglehart and Welzel argue that such a transformation is a process of human development with universal connotation.⁵⁷ They write that such a process largely promotes and emancipates individual autonomy and freedom, which in effect contributes to the emergence and enhancement of liberal democracy.⁵⁸ At any rate, no matter whether it is a consequence of a Western heritage or values transformation, the emphasis on individualism would be a feature of *current* Western societies, which may not be shared by societies in other cultural zones.

51 For instance, see Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'; Parekh 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy'.

52 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, pp. 69-72.

53 Bova, Russell, 'Democracy and Russian Political Culture', in Russell Bova ed., *Russia and Western Civilization: Cultural and Historical Encounters* (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-276.

54 Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*.

55 Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences*, ch. 5, pp. 209-278, esp. 215.

56 Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Dalton, Russell J., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), ch.5, pp. 77-96.

57 Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (2003), pp. 341-379.

58 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*; Welzel, Christian and Ronald Inglehart, 'Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom: The Human Development Perspective', *International Review of Sociology* (January 2005). Also in similar contexts, see Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages', *Comparative Politics*, 36, 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-79.

The USA: individualism versus trust

As for political culture of individualism, the USA is often quoted as an exemplar. Lipset argues an American 'exceptionalism', which attaches special importance to individuals.⁵⁹ A similar view on America in comparison with Western Europe is found in the discourse of Fuchs and Klingemann.⁶⁰ Putnam argues a 'bowling alone' where individuals have been becoming solitary beings, which has led to increasing social and political disengagement.⁶¹ Inglehart contends on this view that the phenomenon is simply a shift to new patterns of participation with more humane, free and self-autonomous outlooks as a part of the human development process.⁶² At any rate, there seems to be an embedded individual orientation, which has been and is still being furthered in American society.⁶³

In a society where individualism predominates, there is a certain distance between people in order to secure personal autonomy. Individuals tend to hold separate self-contained ideas and systems in each of their own views. The emphasis on the individual, however, may have a side effect of reducing the sense of 'trust', which is another crucial element for democratic performance. In America, the ideas of freedom and free market are prevalent, which encourages competition as a societal trend. Where competitions are norms, a clear perception of individuals as solitary beings can enhance the tendency of

⁵⁹ Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*.

⁶⁰ Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison between East and West', *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka eds. (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 25-66.

⁶¹ Putnam, Robert D, *Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York/London: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Putnam, Robert D., 'Civic Disengagement in Contemporary America', *Government and Opposition*, 36: 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 135-156.

⁶² According to Inglehart's theory, the process includes a rising tide of (moderate) protest behaviour as an 'elite-challenging' form of participation, instead of 'elite-directed' conventional patterns. See, for instance, Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 5, pp. 115-134; Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, ch.4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 307-315. Also, Inglehart presented a linkage between Postmaterialist values and protest potential. See Inglehart, Ronald, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 314-318.

⁶³ In my view, this is a part of on-going individualisation, which has been occurring throughout especially since the society began to engage in a modernisation process. The flourishing social associations and civic participations in America around the third quarter of the last century might have been a response to increasing individualisation, which had become no longer compatible with traditional sense of local community ties. Subsequently, the current trend towards social disengagement would be the extension of the on-going process. These types of social associations probably have been becoming incompatible with more strengthened version of individualism. In this respect, Inglehart would be right, since he grasps the trend in the context of value transformation. For the conditions of social associations and civic participations in the USA, see especially the time series figures in Putnam, *Bowling Alone*.

utilitarian social relations. The merit and utility of the individual become of prior importance rather than coordinated reliance and empathetical cooperation. Nonetheless, if separate plural gains are sought by clearly differentiated actors emphatically, people's interests might have more potential to face off one another. Lipset point to the litigiousness in American culture.⁶⁴ This may derive from an enhanced view of individuality, which draws clear lines between self and others in perception.⁶⁵ If a given social relationship becomes seriously intensified, there would be more likelihood of discord than other cultural scenarios where a view of dependency and consensus is prevalent. These may have the possibility to affect the general state of interpersonal trust. A strong sense of individuality may not be advantageous for conditions of trust.

The concept of 'social capital' presented by Putnam may be a response to such a situation. In political terms, according to the concept, democracy is not able to function fully without an element of trust. The view incorporates facets of human inter-relations. Accordingly, there have been discussions that trust or social capital would be a crucial factor for the stable and effective performance of democracy.⁶⁶ Inglehart pointed out that despite the presence of democratic institutions in the USA throughout the twentieth century, interpersonal trust among the populace decreased noticeably.⁶⁷

Trust and Asian values

Meanwhile, according to Inglehart's data output, West European societies tend to have

⁶⁴ Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*.

⁶⁵ Additionally, in my view, there would be compatibility or perhaps association between individualism and the commitment to the rule of law. Clear perception of the individual allows ones to see themselves as comparable beings regardless of social attributes. The law is a source or viable instrument for impartial judgment on fair ground. Moreover, this impartiality of the law and a view to see people as equal existence share an identical quality in that both use abstracted concept of 'individuals' (which can notionally exclude other details of attributes such as characters, genders, social standing and so forth for a given specific purpose). This element, the function of abstraction, seems to strongly underlie American (and perhaps Western) liberal democracy.

⁶⁶ For instance, see Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, ch. 6, pp. 160-215; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Trust, Well-being and Democracy', *Democracy and Trust*, in Mark Warren ed. (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-120; Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', *PS* (January 2003), pp. 51-57; Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, ch. 11, pp. 245-271; Fukuyama, Francis, 'Social Capital', in Harrison and Huntington eds., *Culture Matters*, pp. 99-111; Norris, Pippa, 'Social Capital and Civil Society', in *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*, (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 137-167; Putnam, Robert D., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁶⁷ Inglehart, 'Trust, Well-being and Democracy', p. 88.

relatively high levels of interpersonal trust.⁶⁸ Does this mean that their traditions hold relatively substantial elements of trust? This would be partly the case, since West European traits include a communitarian orientation.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, the higher sense of trust could be due to economic well-being, since interpersonal trust and GNP per capita visibly show correlation.⁷⁰ Trust in Western Europe may be dependent on economic level at some point.

In contrast, there is another cultural zone that seems to have a constantly high level of trust regardless of economic levels, which is an area that encompasses East Asia and India.⁷¹ Does this imply the validity of 'Asian values' in the matter of trust? The argument of 'Asian values' often emphasises the values of interdependence or dependency.⁷² Culturally, their version of trust could involve personal interrelations often at an emotional level. Borders between individuals are likely to be ambiguous with an element of empathy. On the other hand, trust in the West tends to be a bridge between autonomous persons, so that the solitude of the individual is held as its basis. In the Asian view, there may be an inherent limitation in Western trust, since there are certain borders between individual beings, which one could not go across, preventing reliance on each other. From a Western perspective, the attitude of Asian dependency may be translated as having a risk of interference in individual autonomy as well as proneness to conformism and collectivism. Nonetheless, trust, social capital and social engagement often entail interpersonal elements and belonging to some social contexts. Strong persistence in freedom and individualism could have characters that run counter to these. To be fair, nonetheless, the points of both arguments could be relative. Since a subjective emphasis on one side of the dichotomy (viz., freedom versus trust) may underestimate the other side's efficacy, there is more likelihood to perceive risks on the opposite side. At any rate, it would be at least plausible that some elements of Asian culture can have positive and independent effects on trust and

68 Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 36.

69 For instance, see Fuchs and Klingemann, 'Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison between East and West'.

70 Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 36.

71 See Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', p. 89-91. According to Inglehart's figure on trust, for China and India, their levels of interpersonal trust are as high as West European counterparts, despite their small figures of GNP per capita. Taiwan and South Korea are economically intermediate in the figure, but with comparable level of trust. Likewise, Japan is at a similar level.

72 For instance, see Pye with Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*. Also, for a related issue, see Hofstede, Geert, 'A European in Asia', *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 10: 1 (2007), pp. 16-21.

probably social capital that are conducive to democratic performance.⁷³ In the meantime, based on the figure, Inglehart notes, '[a] heritage of communist rule also seems to have an impact on this variable, with virtually all ex-communist societies ranking relatively low.'⁷⁴

Thus, whereas American society may have merit in some spheres of democracy such as governmental responsiveness, it is not necessarily an all-around ideal to others. Rather, their emphasis on individualism may hold a potential disadvantage in terms of trust. Culturally embedded particularity in Asia seems to have a possible advantage in the area of trust and social capital. The Postcommunist experience, however, does not seem to be favourable to either.

9.5.4 Western Europe: the state of achievement values

As discussed so far, in Britain and Western Europe, there seems to be a more moderate emphasis on individuals and freedom than in America. There is a relatively substantial indication of trust in their societies. The ideas of civil society, the rule of law, respect for reason and spontaneous participation appear to be broadly shared in this region. Their social democratic traditions involve an emphasis on care for popular welfare by the government. Do West European values have ideal conditions? Despite these positive components for democracy, there might be attributes that would present a certain weakness in economic terms.

If their current values orientation is explained in the context of Inglehart's thesis on value shift, economically developed West European societies have entered the phase of post-modernisation where self-expression and Postmaterialist orientations increasingly predominate. This denotes a transition from the emphasis on achievement values towards

⁷³ Nonetheless, there have been debates whether the 'Asian values' could be an excuse of authoritarian rule or cultural consequence that provides benefits to the populace in unique manners. On Asian values, see, for instance, Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya and Jones eds., *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*; Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner eds., *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 3-54; Thompson, Mark R., 'Whatever Happened to "Asian Values"?', *Journal of Democracy*, 12: 4 (October 2001), pp. 154-165. For a concise summary of the argument, see Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 6th ed. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 48, 57.

⁷⁴ Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', p. 90. For the state of social capital in Russia, see Rose, Richard, 'Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-modern, and Anti-modern', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 16 (2000), pp. 33-57; Twigg, Judyth L., and Kate Schecter, eds., *Social Capital and Social Cohesion in Post-Soviet Russia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

the quality of life.⁷⁵ On the one hand, this may contribute to democratic attitudes and outcomes, as mentioned above. Also, some theorists point out that the people are increasingly critical of government and more distrustful of authority in Western post-industrial societies.⁷⁶ This orientation could function as a greater sense of equality and an attitudinal checking system on the political authorities.

On the other hand, from an economic point of view, the European values shift that has been occurring over the last several decades may have a drawback. For the values transformation virtually indicates the decline of Materialist and achievement values, which could have been a source of competitiveness.⁷⁷ In fact, it has been quite a while since the European economy and perhaps societies as a whole have somehow lost their vigour. According to the 1999-2002 World Values Survey, among the 'qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home', the percentage of respondents who chose 'hard work' is clearly polarised between West European and Postcommunist societies. Whereas West European societies cluster together in the lower half of the world ranking, the Postcommunist societies concentrate in the upper half. As for the percentage of those who reported work as 'very important', on average West European respondents tend to have a weaker emphasis than those in the Postcommunist societies. With the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2000, the European Union started promoting various attempts to boost the economic capability of Europe, aiming at 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world'.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, it is possible that the attitudinal weakness in achievement motives would not function in favour of this kind of growth. Without popular attitudes to sustain momentum, policy arrangements for economic strength may lack some of its substance. In the meantime, although Postcommunist

⁷⁵ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*.

⁷⁶ For related discussions, see for instance, Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 3rd ed., ch.12, pp. 235-257; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Post-materialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority', in *Why People Don't Trust government*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 217-236; Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁷⁷ For instance, Granato, Inglehart and Leblang empirically show that achievement motivation is conducive to economic growth in addition to the effects of other factors. Granato, Jim, Ronald Inglehart, and David Leblang, 'The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests', *American Journal of Political Science*, 40: 3 (August 1996), pp. 607-631.

⁷⁸ For the European Union's official summary on the Lisbon Strategy, see [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/lisbon_strategy_en.htm]. For key documents on the Lisbon Strategy, see [http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/key/index_en.htm].

countries are still economically less advanced, the people appear to have a stronger orientation towards Materialist and achievement values. At least in the sense of public attitudes, they may be advantageous for invigorating economic and social dynamism. Thus, whereas the values conditions in Western Europe would be conducive to the society's democratic practice, there may be a potential lack of strength for further economic growth.

9.6 Conclusion

This concluding chapter has drawn together the findings and arguments in the present research in a manner to converge on our two major themes: (1) values shift versus cultural particularity and (2) values and democracy. Based on the findings, attention is focused on the issues of freedom and individuality, which have had substantial importance across this study.

In the context of the first theme, freedom was acknowledged as a crucial element in the issue of values shift versus cultural particularism. It was discussed that the attitudinal conditions on liberty could be strongly affected by national and regional particularities. Especially, an emphasis on a particular kind of freedom is prevalent in Western societies, which is not necessarily the case in non-Western contexts such as Postcommunist and East Asian societies. This type of freedom involves the ideals of cognitive autonomy of the individual and spontaneous participation in society. Popular emphasis on this freedom may not automatically be increased by economic development and values shift effect due to the hindering effects of cultural particularity in non-Western nations.

As for the second theme of values and democracy, gaps in the views and conditions of individuality seem to considerably affect their national variations in political areas. The presence and degrees of individualism is related to people's inclination to public demands. The USA is the foremost in this term among the four societies. Britain is the second with moderation. Japan is the opposite in that they hold weakness or ambiguity in individuality and open contestation, which are related to their proneness to conformism. Russian freedom and individuality could be distinct with a connotation of political passivity. Probably due to their general orientation towards Materialist attitudes, their public

demands would be primarily concerned with pragmatic motives rather than (liberal) democratic ones. Together with other factors, the state of Russian popular attitudes may not effectively function for the unidirectional development of responsive democracy with public accountability. Hence, the conditions of freedom and responsive democracy would be susceptible to cultural factors. As another issue, it was discussed that the cultural scenario of individualism could be disadvantageous to the conditions of trust in society. This could be especially the case with the USA where individualism is salient. Culturally, Asian societies may be well-placed for the embedded presence and functioning of trust. The Postcommunist experience seems to be unfavourable in this respect. West European nations hold a positive state of values in both freedom and trust. Their attitudinal stances, however, may have a weakness in achievement values and thus economic dynamism.

Albeit invisible, the people's outlooks can make a difference to the function and quality of democracy. Especially, as we have shown, the issues of freedom and individuality hold important implications for them. Whereas the tangible indications of attitudinal and behavioural characters would be observed in nationally collective terms, these at any rate derive from the individual, which is the basic unit of society. The perception and state of the individual therefore can be crucial for political outcomes and customs on democracy, if certain characteristics of individuality are shared to some extent in a society. Not least, these would constitute what we call the political culture of a nation. They might be affected by the effect of the values shift. Nonetheless, their states are often rooted in embedded cultural and historical experiences, which can hold an enduring strength of continuity. At least, their presence can have considerable influence on the path of values transformation.

Culture matters to values and democracy. It exercises a substantial influence over people's attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. Culture competes with and, in some areas, surpasses the effect of economic development and values shift. Our study has paid special attention to the dichotomous factors in the context of the Postmaterialist thesis. Despite some limitations in the paradigm, the two factors would constitute crucial contexts across nations. With their dynamism, societies could develop various consequences and characters. Nonetheless, people may not necessarily be passively prone to these effects. There could still be a chance that they could intentionally influence the direction of their

outlooks and societies. For the human being has a subjective existence with the capacity of leading life. We should always keep this in mind and be open to such possibility.

Appendices

Appendix 1:

The results of World Values Survey 1999-2002 for 'Chapter 6: Freedom'

Order vs. freedom (%)

	Maintain order	Respect freedom
Russia	52.1%	47.9%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Note: In the World Values Survey 1999-2002, Russian data is available for 'order vs. freedom' whereas British, American and Japanese data for it are not available.

Postmaterialist four-item index: first choice and second choice

Russia	Order	More Say	Prices	Free Speech	Total
PM First Choice	56.4%	18.7%	23.6%	1.3%	100.0%
PM Second Choice	27.6%	24.0%	43.1%	5.3%	100.0%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'free speech'

Russia	Order vs. Free Speech
Order vs. Freedom	Correlation Coefficient (Spearman's rho)
	.120**
	Sig. (2-tailed)
	.000
	N
	1283

** : Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Note:

(1) Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the above is: 0.132** (N = 1259).

(2) British, American, Russian and Japanese data for (Postmaterialist) 'free speech' four-rank measurement are not available.

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.


Order vs. freedom (%): three regions

		Order vs. Freedom		Total
		Maintain Order	Respect Freedom	
Postcommunist	Russia (1999-2000)	52.1%	47.9%	100.0%
	Belarus (1999-2000)	66.5%	33.5%	100.0%
	Ukraine (1999-2000)	49.6%	50.4%	100.0%
	Lithuania (1999-2000)	65.5%	34.5%	100.0%
	Czech Republic (1999-2000)	82.1%	17.9%	100.0%
	Slovenia (1999-2000)	62.8%	37.2%	100.0%
	Georgia (1995-7)	51.4%	48.6%	100.0%
	Azerbaijan (1995-7)	89.5%	10.5%	100.0%
	Armenia (1995-7)	47.8%	52.2%	100.0%
West	Iceland (1999-2000)	57.9%	42.1%	100.0%
	Spain (1999-2000)	46.6%	53.4%	100.0%
	Australia (1995-7)	51.3%	48.7%	100.0%
	New Zealand (1995-7)	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%
	Norway (1995-7)	72.3%	27.7%	100.0%
	Switzerland (1995-7)	53.0%	47.0%	100.0%
East Asia	Taiwan (1995-7)	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.


Percentages (A) 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice)

Russia 1999-2002		Order vs. Freedom		
		Order	Freedom	Total
First Choice	Order	58.7%	41.3%	100.0%
	More say	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%
	Prices	53.0%	47.0%	100.0%
	Free speech	11.5%	88.5%	100.0%



Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'

Russia 1999-2002		PM First Choice				Total
		Order	More say	Prices	Free speech	
Order vs. Freedom	Order	63.1%	12.8%	23.8%	.3%	100.0%
	Freedom	48.8%	25.8%	23.2%	2.2%	100.0%



Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Three regions: freedom (in 'order vs. freedom') and free speech (%)
(in disaggregate measure of four-item Postmaterialist index)

Country/Region		Order vs. Freedom: Freedom %	Free Speech: 1st Choice %	Free Speech: 2nd Choice %
Postcommunist	Russia (1999-2000)	47.9%	1.3%	5.3%
	Belarus (1999-2000)	33.5%	5.3%	11.7%
	Ukraine (1999-2000)	50.4%	1.9%	9.6%
	Lithuania (1999-2000)	34.5%	3.9%	12.5%
	Czech Republic (1999-2000)	17.9%	7.9%	19.8%
	Slovenia (1999-2000)	37.2%	9.7%	25.8%
	Georgia (1995-7)	48.6%	5.6%	21.8%
	Azerbaijan (1995-7)	10.5%	2.2%	13.2%
	Armenia (1995-7)	52.2%	8.4%	18.3%
West	Iceland (1999-2000)	42.1%	9.4%	25.9%
	Spain (1999-2000)	53.4%	17.7%	27.3%
	Australia (1995-7)	48.7%	26.1%	34.1%
	New Zealand (1995-7)	38.4%	14.1%	29.4%
	Norway (1995-7)	27.7%	16.1%	36.9%
	Switzerland (1995-7)	47.0%	33.8%	30.8%
East Asia	Taiwan (1995-7)	10.0%	6.4%	15.5%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Note: It should be noted that, for some countries that were not surveyed in the fourth wave, the data of the third wave are included in the World Values Survey 1999-2002 dataset. See European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 'User Guide and Codebook', *European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I (Second ICPSR Version)*, August 2004.

Three regions: order and free speech (%)
in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index - (I)

	Order: First choice	Free speech: First choice		Order: Second choice	Free speech: Second choice
Postcommunist					
Albania	70.1%	6.6%		17.6%	23.0%
Azerbaijan	74.2%	2.2%		13.5%	13.2%
Armenia	61.2%	8.4%		22.1%	18.3%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	71.0%	3.9%		14.0%	21.9%
Bulgaria	75.9%	5.9%		15.4%	21.7%
Belarus	56.1%	5.3%		24.8%	11.7%
Croatia	27.8%	9.1%		21.4%	24.0%
Czech Republic	55.7%	7.9%		23.0%	19.8%
Estonia	57.2%	1.8%		24.3%	11.1%
Georgia	65.3%	5.6%		18.6%	21.8%
Hungary	52.5%	1.9%		26.3%	8.3%
Latvia	53.7%	4.4%		26.0%	13.9%
Lithuania	24.1%	3.9%		26.8%	12.5%
Republic of Moldova	62.7%	2.9%		20.3%	21.1%
Poland	40.4%	4.4%		28.8%	13.5%
Romania	49.2%	8.1%		25.8%	16.8%
Russian Federation	56.4%	1.3%		27.6%	5.3%
Slovakia	48.1%	3.7%		32.7%	12.3%
Slovenia	41.8%	9.7%		25.7%	25.8%
Ukraine	54.6%	1.9%		26.5%	9.6%
Republic of Macedonia	76.6%	4.3%		12.3%	22.3%
Serbia	49.3%	6.5%		26.5%	17.4%
Montenegro	53.9%	5.8%		17.4%	19.8%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.


Three regions: order and free speech (%)
in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index - (II)

	Order: First choice	Free speech: First choice		Order: Second choice	Free speech: Second choice
West					
Australia	22.9%	26.1%		21.8%	34.1%
Austria	36.0%	24.3%		22.9%	40.1%
Belgium	38.3%	20.0%		24.5%	32.5%
Canada	22.2%	22.1%		17.3%	30.4%
Denmark	58.5%	22.1%		23.2%	41.1%
Finland	52.2%	10.8%		24.9%	27.7%
France	43.1%	14.4%		18.8%	31.4%
Germany	42.2%	9.5%		23.2%	24.1%
Greece	39.6%	9.2%		20.6%	22.8%
Iceland	56.6%	9.4%		24.7%	25.9%
Ireland	37.2%	8.4%		20.7%	25.9%
Italy	32.1%	16.9%		19.9%	32.3%
Luxembourg	45.2%	13.8%		20.9%	28.3%
Malta	32.7%	8.5%		31.4%	19.9%
Netherlands	40.5%	36.7%		29.8%	34.3%
New Zealand	33.2%	14.1%		20.2%	29.4%
Norway	66.3%	16.1%		18.7%	36.9%
Spain	36.2%	17.7%		21.7%	27.3%
Sweden	44.8%	20.1%		27.0%	31.1%
Switzerland	31.9%	33.8%		23.8%	30.8%
United States of America	32.6%	25.4%		23.9%	29.1%
Northern Ireland	40.5%	10.6%		21.2%	27.8%
Portugal	33.0%	9.2%		27.7%	16.9%
East Asia					
China	56.9%	5.0%		24.6%	12.8%
Japan	33.5%	4.8%		27.5%	14.6%
Republic of Korea	42.5%	4.3%		33.4%	10.8%
Taiwan	68.7%	6.4%		18.3%	15.5%
(Singapore)	68.1%	4.6%		17.9%	13.5%

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Three regions: free speech and order (%)

(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index)



P = Postcommunist societies; W = Western societies; E = East Asian societies

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.

Note: For the convenience of comparison, it should be noted the presented visual range of 'order 2nd choice' axis in an output presented in Chapter 6 is from 0 to 80, whereas that of the above graph is from 10 to 35. With this, it is observed that these outputs share similarity in the distribution of three regions.

Appendix 2:

Further defence of a quantitative approach

(A supplementary argument to Chapter 2)

As for the validity of quantitative methods, one may criticise the simplicity and rigidity of quantitative variables as incapable of measuring concepts correctly. Moreover, the divergence of societies, cultures and individuals would not allow such measurement to be pertinent, being unable to 'travel' across the difference. This is not necessarily the case.

First of all, there are a number of carefully developed methods for reducing such problems while creating potent variables on the basis of survey data.¹ For instance, there are notions of reliability and validity, which are related to how adequately a given variable taps what is to be measured.² Various methods are available to explore these qualities.³ Factor analysis enables a researcher to check to what extent a given set of variables share a homogeneous conceptual direction in respective societies.⁴ It allows to see if these variables have similar connotations across different societies. A Likert scale is a method that constructs an effective measurement that covers multiple facets of a single concept by aggregating plural question items.⁵ This can increase the generality of the concept, which

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- 1 For the construction of variables, see de Vaus, D. A., *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed. (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 233-275; de Vaus, David, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 147-199; de Vaus, David, *Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis* (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 1-146.
 - 2 For the reliability and validity, see Moore, David S., *Statistics: Concepts and Controversies*, 5th ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 2001), pp. 130-140; de Vaus, *Analyzing Social Science Data*, pp. 25-27.
 - 3 For example, see de Vaus, *Analyzing Social Science Data*, pp. 17-32. However, de Vaus suggests that there is no absolute solution to establish unequivocal evidence of *validity* especially in the realm of social sciences, partly due to the abstract nature of concepts used. He writes, '[v]alidity has to be argued for: it is not proven'. See *ibid.*, p. 27.
 - 4 The method can also examine conceptual locations of respective variables while being capable of generating a factor scale. For factor analysis (and principal component analysis), see Bryman, Alan and Duncan Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists* (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), pp. 271-285; Tabachnick, Barbara G., and Linda S. Fidell, *Using Multivariate Statistics*, 4th ed. (Boston/London: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), pp. 582-652; de Vaus, *Analyzing Social Science Data*, pp. 134-146, 384-385; Field, Andy, *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*, 2nd ed. (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 619-680; Norušis, Marija J., *SPSS® 13.0 Statistical Procedures Companion* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), pp. 393-430.
 - 5 This makes possible to create a comprehensive variable for one concept while retaining the functionality of simple question items for data collections. For Likert scales, see de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 4th ed., pp. 88, 252-257; Bryman and Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows*, pp. 56-57; de Vaus, *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th ed., pp. 102, 181-186; de Vaus, *Analyzing Social Science Data*, pp. 122-133.

enhances its relevance to divergent societies. Moreover, these methods are conducted by using data of research object. The applicability of variables is secured at any rate, since the aim of the above methods *per se* is to screen out and construct *applicable variables* to the data and therefore to societies to be examined.

Secondly, it is implausible that well-coordinated survey data is incapable of tapping popular attitudes simply because of cultural and social differences. The World Values Survey has been conducted on the basis of pilot studies and worldwide academic co-operation over around two decades. Moreover, the survey's standard questionnaire includes items that amount to more than two hundred variables.⁶ The items cover a wide range of attitudes. Of course, there may be cultural conceptual gaps for some items in varying degrees. However, it would not be plausible that the cultural gaps are so great that the entire variables are unable to measure attitudes across borders. It would be unlikely that fundamental human concepts irrationally diverge between cultures. In the World Values Survey, many of the items are reasonably common questions that ordinary people normally understand. To be sure, there is cultural variety, and one of the research aims is to explore this point. Nonetheless, an excessive emphasis on difference would be unreasonable. Across societies, human beings share much of commonalities rather than heterogeneities. The validity of the World Values Survey questions could not be rejected simply because of cultural gaps. Rather, their value is clearly much greater than their supposed disadvantages.

Finally, the fact that statistical indications are observed *per se* demonstrates the relevance of the quantitative data. There would be of course variations in concepts across nations and even individuals. Such variation is in fact part of the 'variance' that statistical analysis can consider. Given such a variation, it is likely that the aggregate results of national data will show relative densities in central patterns such as mean scores with small standard deviations, certain level of correlation coefficients, regression coefficients with tangible R squared scores and so forth. With this, how can one claim that there is conceptual irrelevance? Because there is the relevance in these variables, there are indications of central tendencies and associations. If there is conceptual irrelevance, why

⁶ See Inglehart, Ronald, et al., 'Codebook, Combined Three Waves 1981-1990-1995 World Values Survey', in *World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997* (2000); European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 'User Guide and Codebook', in *European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I* (2004).

do such indications emerge? To be fair, there could be conceptual gaps between nations or cultures that could be indicated in the statistical indicators. This difference is, however, the very point which the present study attempts to explore. Consequently, quantitative variables are not something to be rejected because of cultural differences. They are rather viable tools to examine it.

Appendix 3:

Protest variables: missing values percentages

Britain	1981	1990	1995-8	1999-2002
Petition	1.14	1.15	2.2	2
Lawful Demonstration	2.44	2.83		4
Boycott	4.55	4.11		4
Strike	3.33	3.17		5.8
Occupying Buildings	2.36	2.49		4.8
Average	2.76	2.75	2.2	4.12
USA	1981	1990	1995-8	1999-2002
Petition	4.34	2.77	2.08	0.5
Lawful Demonstration	6.15	4.73	3.7	1.58
Boycott	6.19	4.95	4.41	1.83
Strike	6.32	5.27	4.54	2.92
Occupying Buildings	6.24	5.06	5.71	5.25
Average	5.85	4.56	4.09	2.42
Japan	1981	1990	1995-8	1999-2002
Petition	15.86	15.43	11.48	10.21
Lawful Demonstration	24.5	28.78	22.3	25.4
Boycott	25.58	29.57	19.92	21.44
Strike	23.09	28.88	23.24	25.77
Occupying Buildings	21.26	24.33	20.87	19.97
Average	22.06	25.4	19.56	20.56
Russia	1981	1990	1995-8	1999-2002
Petition		10.45	6.57	6.6
Lawful Demonstration		7.5	4.75	3.8
Boycott		14.89	6.47	7
Strike		14.99	7.45	6.88
Occupying Buildings		16.32	6.86	7.76
Average		12.83	6.42	6.41

(%)

Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.

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[As requested, I acknowledge and thank the investigators and the institutions mentioned above. Neither the original collectors nor the Zentralarchiv bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented in this thesis.]

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