# Nationalism from Above and Below: Interrogating 'race', 'ethnicity' and belonging in post-devolutionary Scotland

Minna Liinpää

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School of Social and Political Sciences

College of Social Sciences

University of Glasgow

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# Abstract

2014 was a politically interesting and eventful year in Scotland due to an independence referendum taking place. The referendum also provided a sociologically interesting moment: as the 'Scottish nation' was widely debated and reflected upon both prior and after the referendum, this political context provided an opportune moment to consider how nationalist narratives are constructed, expressed and experienced both from above and below. Thus, drawing on data collected before and after the referendum, this thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the broad field of nationalism studies. Specifically, it focuses on the relationship between nationalist narratives and 'ethnicity', 'race', and belonging in Scotland. The fieldwork took place between May 2014 and September 2015, and this thesis draws on data gathered using a number of qualitative methods: interviews, observation and content analysis. Though the findings emerge within the political context of the referendum, this thesis seeks to situate them in a historically informed, post-devolutionary framework. This thesis has two broad aims: on the one hand it seeks to interrogate the post-devolutionary relationship between nationalism and minority communities within Scotland. In relation to this, it seeks to uncover the ways in which nationalist narratives are constructed and publicly expressed from above by the SNP, and how individuals from different ethnic minority backgrounds interpret, make sense of and potentially challenge nationalist narratives in and through their daily lives and experiences. On the other hand, this thesis aims to understand and investigate the legislative, institutional and structural contexts for the management and creation of 'the nation' and who belongs to it, as well as the individual, subjective understandings and negotiations of 'the nation' and how one's place within it is understood. Contrary to much existing scholarship, this thesis argues that the SNP's nationalism does not take a wholly civic form (and indeed that the civic/ethnic dichotomy is analytically unhelpful). Further, it underlines the importance of 'values' and emotions to nationalist narratives, and the centrality of England as Scotland's 'national other'. Finally, the findings shed light on ethnic minorities' complex and often contradictory experiences of nationalist narratives — the findings support Smith's (2016) argument that the capacity to experience the everyday as unreflective is a privilege. Ethnic minorities encounter continuous implicit and explicit challenges to their sense of belonging —consequently, in a 'hyper-nationalist' context the nation merely becomes *louder*.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement

I am sure I am not alone in saying that going through a PhD is simultaneously one of the most rewarding as well as the most challenging things to do. Because of the latter, I have been looking forward to writing this part of my thesis as there is such a significant number of people who have helped me, spurred me on, and inspired me throughout the process (indeed, I am afraid there is not enough space to name everyone). At times when the PhD and other commitments — work or otherwise — seemed insurmountable, having the many lovely people around me was paramount.

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Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Printed Name:  Minna Liinpää

Signature:

Chapter 1

Introduction

*1.1. Scottish independence referendum 2014*

Living in Scotland in the lead up to the 2014 independence referendum was an exciting time for anyone interested in social and political issues. It seemed practically impossible to escape the referendum; you read and heard about it in the media daily, you overheard heated debates in shop queues and cafés, and you ended up discussing it with taxi drivers and strangers in pubs. The referendum was everywhere: there were Yes and No campaigners on Glasgow's Buchanan Street; rallies at the 'Freedom Square' (George Square in Glasgow); 'Yes' and 'No Thanks' stickers, posters and banners around towns, cities and the countryside as well as people walking around wearing 'Yes' and 'No Thanks' badges on their lapels and bags. What was noticeable about the referendum was its pervasiveness.

Importantly for this thesis, beyond being an exciting and intriguing moment politically, the independence referendum also provided a favourable — and a unique — context in which to study nationalism and the ways in which nationalist narratives are produced, experienced, understood, and challenged. The fieldwork — which I will discuss in more detail shortly — took place prior to, and after, the referendum. Fox (2017), drawing on Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, writes about the significance of moments when the edges of the nation become newly visible. The Scottish independence referendum offered such a context where the parameters of the nation, and how it is constituted and understood, became more easily discernible. During times when there is heightened awareness of the nation, or the 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006), it can be easier to tap "into people's otherwise self-evident assumptions about what the nation is" (Fox, 2017:38).

This thesis is, thus, concerned with nationalism. More specifically, it is concerned with understanding and explaining the intersection of nationalist narratives and

ideas with 'ethnicity', 'race', belonging and difference. That is: who does, and does not, belong to the Scottish nation and why? How are nationalist narratives experienced? How is the Scottish nation imagined? As per Fox's arguments, the referendum provided an opportune moment to explore these questions. As argued by multiple authors (e.g. Triandafyllidou 1998 and Göl 2005), nationalist narratives — in order to be effective — usually require 'an Other'. These 'others' have often been ethnic or racialised minorities, and these groups and the 'traits' attributed to them come to represent that which (supposedly) the nation is not. Thus, by studying nationalism within the context of the independence referendum (though I consider and situate the discussion within the broader post-devolutionary context), this thesis seeks to contribute to an improved understanding of how nationalist narratives are mobilised and shaped from above vis-à-vis ideas around 'ethnicity', 'race', belonging and difference, and how those narratives are experienced, understood and potentially challenged from below by ethnic minorities themselves.

*1.2. The political context*

Before discussing the original contribution of this thesis in more detail, it is useful to briefly contextualise the independence referendum. The prospect of an independence referendum in Scotland became reality following the Edinburgh Agreement. On 15 October 2012, the Scottish First Minister (FM), Alex Salmond, and the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, signed the Agreement alongside the Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Moore and the Scottish Deputy First Minister (DFM), Nicola Sturgeon. This agreement — which was reached between the Scottish and the British Governments led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Conservatives respectively — set out the terms for an upcoming Scottish independence referendum. Scottish self-determination and sovereignty were (and of course continue to be) SNP's key political goals and were their key 2011 election pledges (SNP, 2011), and now — in 2012 — the party had secured a future vote on the matter. The draft legislation on the independence vote was brought before the Scottish parliament in March 2013, and the date for the referendum was set for 18 September 2014.

The pro- and anti-independence sides were spearheaded by two mainstream campaigns. Better Together (led by Labour and the Conservatives), with their slogan 'No Thanks', were campaigning against independence, while Yes Scotland (led by the SNP) campaigned for Scotland to become independent from the rest of the United Kingdom. In addition to these mainstream campaigns, the Radical Independence Campaign emerged as a socialist, non-party-political pro-independence campaigning group which argued for a "radical yes" and that "Another Scotland is possible". The Scottish Green Party — though allowing for its individual Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs) to make up their minds regarding independence — nonetheless campaigned on an official platform for a 'Green Yes'. In addition, especially on the Yes side, we witnessed a proliferation of grassroots groups ranging from 'Trade Unions for Independence' to 'NHS for Yes'. Moreover, many of these grassroots groups organised around 'ethnicity': thus, there were groups such as 'Scots Asians for Independence', 'Africans for an Independent Scotland', 'English Scots for Yes' and 'Poles for Yes'.

The independence referendum saw the highest ever voter turnout for an election or referendum since the introduction of universal suffrage in the UK. Altogether 84.6 per cent of the population in Scotland turned out to vote. Included in those entitled to vote were 16 and 17-year-olds, European Union (EU) nationals as well as Commonwealth citizens with a leave to remain or those who do not require such leave. In the end, a majority of 55 per cent voted against Scotland becoming an independent country, with 45 per cent voting in favour of independence. Though most local government areas voted against independence, Dundee, Glasgow, North Lanarkshire and West Dunbartonshire voted for it. It is safe to say that a voter turn-out of 84.6 per cent is remarkable, and a general political galvanisation could be clearly witnessed during the referendum period.

However, while the referendum represented an exciting moment of political engagement, others pointed to the divisiveness of the campaigns and the vote. In particular, Scottish Labour and its (now former) leader Kezia Dugdale voiced their opposition to any future independence referendums (Scottish Labour 22/5/2017) arguing that "Scotland is already divided enough" (Scottish Labour, 21/3/2017: n.p.)

*1.3. Nationalism, 'ethnicity' and racialised minorities in Scotland and beyond*

Besides the referendum offering a favourable moment in which to study nationalism, Scotland — more broadly — presents an interesting context within which to explore nationalism and its relationship to 'ethnicity', 'race', belonging and difference. This is the case for at least four different reasons.

Firstly, nationalism (and especially that of the SNP) continues to be widely hailed as taking a 'civic' form in Scotland (that is, as open and inclusive, following the idea of *ius soli*) as opposed to an ethnic form (namely, exclusive and closed, following the idea of *ius sanguinis*). Such claims are made not just by SNP politicians but also by many academics, as will be explored in Chapter 4. Thus, as the argument goes, anyone living within the confines of Scotland is effectively 'Scottish', as Scottishness is purportedly to do with residence rather than 'blood'. As a way of illustrating this, let us consider the current First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's address to the 2017 SNP spring conference. In it she rearticulated the idea of 'Scottish civicness' as she looked back at the late Bashir Ahmad, a Pakistani migrant who became the first Asian MSP. Sturgeon (2017) went on to say,

> *The first time he addressed an SNP conference, Bashir articulated this simple message. "It's not where we come from that is important...' he said. 'It's where we are going together." Today, with the forces of intolerance and xenophobia seemingly on the rise across the world, Bashir's words have never seemed more appreciate.*

These supposedly 'civic' conceptions of Scottish nationhood have nonetheless been publicly and explicitly challenged. At the 2017 Labour Party conference, the London Mayor Sadiq Khan argued that "there is no difference between those who try to divide us on the basis of whether we're English or Scottish and those who try to divide us on the basis our background, race or religion" (Kerr, 2017: n.p.). Though Khan did end up qualifying his statement by saying that "of course I'm not saying that nationalists [referring to Scotland] are somehow racist or bigoted" (Kerr, 2017: n.p.), his remarks were nonetheless met with an outcry from the SNP. An SNP spokesperson went on to say that,

*Sadiq Khan is quite right to highlight the dangers of prejudice — but it is spectacularly ill-judged to compare supporters for Scottish independence to Trump or Brexiteers, and indeed it is an insult to many former and current Labour voters.* (Carrell, 2017).

Thus, the first important point to note in relation to understanding nationalism in Scotland — as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4 in relation to my findings — is the way in which it is framed as being an exemplar of a 'civic form'.

The second specific point regarding 'race' in Scotland relates to the Irish experience in Scotland. This theme also recently arose in the aftermath of Khan's comments. Following the London Mayor's remarks, Claire Heuchan — a Scottish black radical feminist writer — argued in *The Guardian* that the "parallels are clear" between "Scottish nationalism" and racism or religious intolerance (2017: n.p.). Consequently, Heuchan received a barrage of racist and misogynistic abuse online, which led to her quitting Twitter for some time. While Heuchan made some important points in her comment piece, there were issues with some of her arguments. She rightly highlighted the links between 'Scottish exceptionalism' vis-à-vis England and Englishness. England is frequently positioned as Scotland's 'other' in nationalist narratives which, in turn, allows for the creation of a portrayal of Scotland as more 'progressive' and 'inclusive' than its Southern neighbour. This is a theme which emerged strongly through my data, and which I will take up in Chapter 5. Heuchan did, however, argue that "white SNP supporters and allies have never been subject to racism" while "Khan, a second-generation Pakistani immigrant, has" (2017: n.p.).

This remark was then criticised by columnist Angela Haggerty from *The Herald* who argued that Heuchan "effectively eras[ed] the horrendous experience of the Irish in Scotland for decades" (2017: n.p.). Therefore, secondly, in order to understand 'race' in Scotland, it is important to understand the historical, as well as the continuing, Irish experience. From the seventeenth century onwards the British state was avowedly Protestant, relegating the Catholic minority to the position of a religious, and purportedly subversive, 'other'. The immigrant Irish tended to be shunned or perceived as a threat on account of their ethnic origin or religion (although not all Irish were, or are, Catholic) (Knox & Houston, 2001:xxii). There were anti-Catholic

riots in Scotland's major cities in the late 1680s and late 1770s, while anti-Irish societies, such as the Loyalist Orange Order, flourished in the West of Scotland (Knox & Houston, 2001:xxii). Building on this long history of sectarianism, a process of racialisation took place: for example, in 1923 the Church of Scotland released a pamphlet titled '*The Menace of the Irish Race to Our Scottish Nationality*'. The vestiges of these events and ideas can still be found in the chants and taunts of Celtic and Rangers supporters and in the existence of separate Catholic schools (Knox & Houston, 2001:xxiii), for example.

The third point relates to Scotland's 'significant other' (Williams and de Lima 2006), namely England (and Englishness). Understanding what Scotland is and is not, is intimately connected to how England is imagined to be or what 'Englishness' is seen to entail. Importantly, this is also where a classed understanding of Scottishness becomes apparent: while the SNP are careful to refer to *Westminster* rather than *England* in their political rhetoric, I found that in everyday interactions Westminster is frequently read as connoting England or Englishness. This coding, further, is closely connected with classed understandings of Scotland by which the nation is presented as 'progressive', 'egalitarian' and 'leftist', while England is regarded as more conservative and as having a less obvious appetite for equality.  Though I will argue in detail in Chapter 6 that 'anti-Englishness' should not be regarded and understood as a form of racism, accounting for anti-Englishness is crucial to any effort to fully understand how Scottish nationalist narratives are mobilised and constructed. I will consider the significance of England and Englishness in light of my data in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in particular.

Finally, it is worth noting that The Scottish Government, led by the SNP, have included the following as one of their sixteen national outcomes: "We take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity" (The Scottish Government, 'national identity': n.p.). The national outcomes describe what the government wants to achieve in the next ten years. The government argues that this particular national outcome is important because,

> *Scotland's national and cultural identity is defined by our sense of place, sense of history and sense of self. It is defined by what it means to be Scottish; to live in a*

*modern Scotland; to have an affinity to Scotland; and to be able to participate in Scottish society.* (The Scottish Government, 'national identity': n.p.)

Therefore, due to the Government's explicit commitment to 'inclusive national identity', issues around belonging are prominently included in the political elite's agenda.

In sum, these factors make Scotland an analytically interesting case for the study of nationalism. This is especially the case because of the starting the point: that is, because of the political elite's strategic framing of Scottishness as 'civic' as opposed to articulating — on the face of it — a more 'primordialist' understanding of the 'nation'.

## 1.4. Aims, objectives and justification for the research

As argued at the beginning of this chapter, the referendum provided an opportune moment for studying the experience, social construction, and expression of nationalism. More specifically, the referendum also provided a favourable context for studying the relationships and interconnections between nationalism, 'ethnicity', 'race', belonging and difference. In order to improve and deepen our understanding of how nationalist narratives are used in the construction of 'a nation', and how those narratives are experienced by those residing within the confines — geographical or otherwise — of the nation, analysing this signal political event was crucial. More specifically, it provided a useful moment to interrogate how those whose membership of a nation is not non-problematic or not unquestioned — i.e. ethnic minorities — relate to the processes by which national identity is imagined and ascribed. Furthermore, it also allowed for an investigation of how nationalism is experienced, and the ways in which those narratives may both materially and immaterially shape the lives of racialised minorities.

Thus, this research seeks to better understand nationalism and its relationship with 'ethnicity', 'race', belonging, and otherness. Firstly, this thesis aims to interrogate the wider post-devolutionary relationship between nationalism and minority

communities within Scotland. In relation to this, on the one hand, I seek to uncover the ways in which nationalist narratives are constructed and publicly expressed from above. On the other hand, this thesis also seeks to uncover how individuals from different ethnic minority backgrounds (including more recent migrants as well as those whose parents or grandparents migrated to Scotland in the past — see Chapter 3 for an extended discussion regarding the concepts of 'ethnic minority' and 'migrant') interpret, make sense of and potentially challenge nationalist narratives in and through their daily lives and experiences.

With regard to the construction and expression of nationalist narratives from above, I have taken the conscious decision to focus on the SNP, and the ways in which they narrate an idea of the 'Scottish nation' and 'Scottishness'; that is, this thesis focuses on the SNP's version of Scottish nationalism. This is due to a number of reasons — pragmatically, focusing on the SNP allowed me to demarcate clear contours for the study in terms of data collection in particular, and my focus more broadly. More importantly however, the SNP are absolutely central to contemporary Scottish politics and the ways in which ideas of 'the Scottish nation' are imagined, constructed and articulated in the public sphere. The SNP are, of course, not the only source of nationalist rhetoric and imagery in Scotland, but due to their visibility, power and status as a key political party — and, crucially, as a *nationalist party* — it is analytically interesting to focus on them. The SNP were established in 1934 as an amalgamation of two parties: the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party (Hassan, 2009:1). Since 2007, the SNP have been in government, forming a minority government in 2007 and 2016 and a majority government in 2011. Crucially, the SNP were a pivotal voice within the independence referendum — which this thesis focuses on — insofar as they were the most prominent constituency calling for a referendum to take place, were involved in formally agreeing the conditions for it with the UK government, and then spearheaded the Yes campaign. As will be demonstrated, the SNP, through their public rhetoric, seek to construct a specific understanding, and image of the 'Scottish nation'. What is of interest are the ways in which ethnic and racialised minorities are or are not included in this narrating of the nation. Thus, the focus is very much on the SNP's narratives and constructions of the 'Scottish nation' and who does (not) belong to it.

Secondly, this research aims to understand and investigate the legislative, institutional and structural contexts for the management and creation of 'the nation' and who belongs to it, as well as the individual, subjective understandings and negotiations of 'the nation' and how one's place within it is understood. Through the course of the thesis, I seek to answer the following research questions:

1. *How have different projects and narratives of nationalism been imagined, mobilised and contested in the context of the Scottish independence referendum in particular, and in the context of devolution more generally, by the SNP? What are these narratives' essential components?*

2. *What are the particular ways in which the public rhetoric of the SNP's nationalism has addressed questions of 'diversity', 'ethnicity' and 'belonging' in Scotland; how has it addressed and engaged with ethnic minorities post-1999 and in the context of the independence referendum more specifically?*

3. *How, if at all, have the SNP's nationalist narratives intersected with the formation of policy with regard to minority communities, anti-racism and so-called 'race equality', and with approaches to the treatment of recently arrived migrants?*

4. *How do nationalist narratives contribute to the shaping of the experiences of ethnic minorities, if at all? How do minority communities respond to, interpret and possibly challenge nationalist ideas and narratives?*

Posing these questions is important because not only will the answers shed light on and improve our knowledge of nationalism and nationalist narratives in Scotland in particular, but they will also help us build a more comprehensive understanding of how nationalist narratives are mobilised and drawn upon more broadly. It is also interesting to explore the construction of nationalist narratives from above, and what effect, if any, they have on the everyday lives and experiences of ethnic minorities living in Scotland. Moreover, I believe understanding how nationalist narratives intersect with these issues is important for a normative reason as well: by exploring how nationalist ideas make use of different processes of othering and exclusion, as well as inclusion, and how those ideas and processes are made sense of by ethnic

minorities on the ground, we can continue the struggle to dismantle racialising structures of oppression.

My PhD journey began in September 2013, and my fieldwork took place between May 2014 and September 2015 — i.e. from four months before to a year after the independence referendum. In terms of data collection, I used a combination of methods. Firstly, in an effort to uncover the ways in which the SNP construct and imagine the 'Scottish nation' I analysed key SNP independence publications, and key SNP figures' speeches (most notably those made by First Minister Alex Salmond and Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon). Secondly, I also conducted interviews with Yes and No campaigners as well as representatives of different race equality organisations in Scotland. Thirdly, in order to understand how nationalist narratives affect ethnic minorities' experiences of living in Scotland, I interviewed 'ordinary voters' from different ethnic backgrounds (African, English, Indian, Pakistani, and Polish). Finally, I attended and observed a number of independence debates and meetings. My observations helped me gauge the different ways in which ideas around 'the nation' featured and took shape in independence debates, and how attendees responded to and engaged with these ideas.

*1.5. Defining 'race' and 'ethnicity'*

I have outlined that this thesis is concerned with the relationship of nationalism to ideas around 'ethnicity' and 'race'. Therefore, before explaining the importance of operating from a historically informed frame of understanding when studying nationalism, it is useful to briefly define 'ethnicity' and 'race', and the ways in which I understand and use these concepts. It is especially important to do this early on as Miles (2000) notes that much of the writing pertaining to 'race' does not actually define what is meant by the concept.

Indeed, my understanding of 'race' is strongly influenced by the writings of Robert Miles (e.g. 1989; 1993). Miles (2000:137) notes that, historically, certain somatic

features — both real and imagined — "were socially signified as natural marks of difference (e.g. skin colour), a difference that became known as difference of 'race'". Consequently, "these marks, conceived as natural, were then thought to explain the already existing social position of the collectivity thereby designated by the mark" (Miles, 2000:137). Miles, from whom I take the practice of using inverted commas in order to highlight the social construction of 'race', goes on to say:

> *This social process of signification was (and remains) an important ideological moment in a process of domination. The idea of 'race' thereby came to express* nature*, something given and immutable, with the result that what was in fact the consequence of social relations became understood as* natural*: and so 'race' was thought of as a determinate force, requiring social relations of domination to be organised in a specific form, thereby obscuring the human construction.* (2000:137 — original emphases)

Like Miles, I resist using 'race' as an *analytical* concept. However, "this does not require denying that the idea of 'race' is a constituent element of everyday common sense" — thus, there exists a belief that 'races' exist (Miles, 2000:135). Because of this, rather than a tool for analysis, 'race' "should be used only to refer descriptively" to the ways in which the term is used in everyday understandings (Miles, 2000:135). Our focus should be, therefore, directed towards "the active determinant of exclusion and disadvantage", namely processes of *racialisation* — i.e. "the attribution of significance to certain patterns of, or the imagined assertion of, difference and the use of that process of signification to structure social relationships" (Miles, 2000:139). Thus, I do not wish to reify 'race', but to remain cognisant of its social construction. At the same time, I acknowledge that it has 'everyday purchase'; that is, as Eriksen puts it, "concepts of race can nevertheless be important to the extent that they inform people's actions" (1996:29). Thus, it is the different processes of racialisation — how ideas around 'race' are appropriated, mobilised and operationalised — that are of interest.

'Ethnicity', in turn, is notoriously hard to define. Weber connects 'ethnic groups' to custom, physical type and language (1996:35); Nash argues that the core elements of 'ethnicity' are kinship ("the presumed biological and descent unity of the group"), commensality ("the propriety of eating together"), and a common cult ("implicating a

value system beyond time and empirical circumstance, sacred symbols and attachments") (1996:25); and Eriksen notes that "the term 'ethnicity' refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive, and those groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society" (1996:30). Importantly, Eriksen also points out that although 'ethnicity' is often used to denote minorities, "majorities and dominant peoples are no 'less' ethnic than minorities" (1996:28).

Definitions of 'ethnicity' are thus "broad and loose" (Fenton, 2010:3). Further, the way in which 'ethnicity' is officially recorded in censuses does not make matters any clearer. Looking at the Scottish census, for example, the tick-box options combine elements relating to 'race', nationality, and geography. Indeed, in everyday interactions, 'ethnicity' is often used as a more 'politically correct' way of referring to 'race' (Baumann, 1996; Davidson, 1998). Similarly to the points made above with regard to 'race', what is important for the purposes of the current study, I think, is understanding the processes through which people view — or come to view — their 'ethnicity' as either constitutive of who they are, or as constitutive of who others are; that is, how they come to conceive of a 'them' who are of a different 'ethnicity' to 'us'. Certain ethnic groups or 'ethnicities' are, then, attributed political, social or historical significance either by themselves or by others.

As Fenton puts it, we can think of "ethnicity as referring to social identities — typically 'descent' and 'cultural difference' — which are deployed under certain conditions" (2010:3). Importantly, "ethnicity refers to the *social construction* of descent and culture, the social mobilization of descent and culture and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them" (Fenton, 2010:3 — original emphasis). Thus:

> *People or peoples do not just possess cultures or share ancestry;* they elaborate these into the idea of a community founded upon these attributes. *Indeed, it is entirely possible for people to elaborate an idea of community despite the fact that claims to sharing descent and culture are decidedly questionable.* (Fenton, 2010:3 - original emphasis)

Thus, 'ethnicity' — either 'ours' or 'theirs' — is attributed meaning in everyday interactions, and it is this meaning and the processes of attribution that are significant. What is of particular interest to this project are the ways in which these

processes of ethnic identification or attribution intersect with ideas of the 'nation'.

## 1.6. Importance of history to nationalist narratives

Throughout the research process I was careful to situate my discussion and findings in a historically informed framework of understanding and analysis. Though my focus is very much on the 'here and now' (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008b), I was mindful of both history (that is, how current events relate to and should be understood in relation to the past) as well as political representations and mobilisations of history (namely, how history is made use of and appropriated for contemporary political aims).

The latter point is especially pertinent as contemporary nationalist ideas rely heavily on the use of history as a narrative and legitimising tool. As Lawrence puts it: "nationalism has always been intimately connected to a sense of the past" (2013:713). As part of its analytical framework of understanding, this thesis, thus, recognises the importance of history and the ways in which it is narrated as a key building block for nationalist discourses: it is therefore important to consider what or who is, and is not, remembered in the narratives of the nation. Silences can be as revealing as — or, even more revealing than — the events, people and places that we choose to incorporate into our national stories. Ernest Renan famously argued that "forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation" (1990:11). In her wonderful essay, Himani Bannerji notes that the writing of history is not a transparent affair, but entails issues of representation which, in turn, entail issues of epistemology and ideology (1998:287). She goes on to elaborate that 'representation' has a double-edge to it:

> *By claiming to re-present someone, some moment in time, some situation — in fact all three, all at once — through our reporting, recording, or narration, "representation" implies both epistemological and (re)constructive responsibilities.* (1998:287)

Therefore, Bannerji points out how remembering history, or representing the past (be it people or events), has a normative element to it; historical memories, which are

often misrepresented, can serve specific political and ideological ends. Moreover, when she talks about 'responsibilities' she highlights the burden that those in powerful positions have in regard to representing the past in a fair and truthful manner.

As the research went on, it became clear to me that this thesis, and the contemporary understandings of what Scotland and Scottishness are imagined to be, needed to be historically contextualised and situated. The centrality of history to both the nationalist narratives emanating from the SNP, which 'storify' the nation, as well as to the understandings and views coming from the participants, made it clear that an awareness of the uses and implications of history, and by extension heritage and tradition, (or, more accurately, how these three things are constructed and appropriated) need to be at the centre of this project.

Two underlying arguments will be advanced throughout this thesis: firstly, that by drawing on history, regardless of the 'truthfulness' of that history, nationalist narratives seek to demarcate the contours of the nation — that is, define those who (do not) belong. These contours are fuzzy and open to challenge; thus, they are by no means rigid or unchanging. Depending on *what* history is remembered and forgotten, and *how* it is remembered or forgotten, the contours of the nation can shift and change drastically. Secondly, once history is used to demarcate the nation, the nation then requires its 'content', its spirit, and its shape. Here, 'heritage' and 'tradition' are crucial and extensively drawn on – by relying on historical understandings and nationalist narratives as to what the nation is imagined to be  (see specifically Chapter 5), 'the national community' is given its defining features and its *character*.

*1.7. Contribution*

This thesis seeks to make a contribution on three different but interrelated fronts. Firstly, drawing on an analysis of my data, this thesis will critically assess the

analytical usefulness of the predominant civic-ethnic dichotomy evident in nationalism studies. Importantly, much of the existing academic literature pertaining to nationalism in Scotland tends to place it firmly in the 'civic' camp (see examples in Kearton, 2005). Due to the normative element of the way in which political movements lay claim to civic nationalism, and the normative quality of the judgement when researchers label nationalism*s* as being of the 'civic' as opposed to the 'ethnic' kind, I argue that a rethink is needed in how nationalism is analysed and understood.

Thus, I suggest we move towards conceptualising nationalism and studying nationness as an 'event' as Brubaker (1996:19) puts it — as fluctuating, unfixed, and ever-changing. To this end, this thesis will map out the ways in which the SNP's nationalism — and other nationalisms beyond Scotland — can be understood by utilising Zimmer's (2003) 'process oriented approach' which focuses on the mechanisms through which national boundaries are constructed, and the symbolic resources used to demarcate those contours of the nation. Thus, rather than fixating on the end product and asking whether certain nationalisms are civic or ethnic — or on labelling parts of those nationalisms either civic or ethnic — the focus, I believe, should be on understanding the processes by which such identification*s* come to be salient. Here the two-pronged argument I advanced at the end of the previous section becomes especially relevant. That is, I explore how, by drawing on the symbolic resources of history and heritage, nationalist narratives sketch out the *contours* of the nation (who belongs). On the other hand, I examine how drawing on history enables people — both from above and below — to construct the *content* and the 'spirit' of that nation. Here, the idea of national values (even when they are, indeed, universal!) becomes especially important in terms of forging a claim to uniqueness and identity.

Secondly, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the fairly recent but quickly expanding literature on 'banal' and everyday nationalism (e.g. Billig, 1995; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a and 2008b; Skey, 2011; Fox 2017; Antonsich, 2016; Skey and Antonsich, 2017). This area of study emerged in order to provide nuance with respect to the grand tradition of nationalist theorising, which focuses on the macro level, often at the expense of understanding micro level processes and the experiences of

'ordinary people'. However, what has been missing from everyday nationalism literature is a sustained focus on ethnic minorities. So far, everyday nationalism studies have mainly focused on the ways in which those participants who are generally viewed as being part of the 'majority' or 'indigenous' nationality (most of the research focuses on western white-majority nations) experience nationalist ideas in their everyday lives. That is, it seeks to uncover the banal, taken-for granted nationalist narratives and the ways in which these are experienced, reproduced, and how they structure and affect people's lives in the everyday. However, turning the analytical focus on to the experience of ethnic minorities whose national membership may come under challenge offers us a novel way of uncovering the lived reality of nationalism. From my data analysis it quickly became clear that issues pertaining to invisibility, visibility and inconspicuousness (see Chapter 6) dominated the participants' experiences and reflections as regards 'ethnicity', difference and belonging across various social spaces and contexts.

Finally, this thesis seeks to bring the two levels of analysis — those focused on nationalism from above as well as below — together and in dialogue in an effort to build a comprehensive picture of nationalist narratives at work. As will be explained in Chapter 2, so far, most literature — in particular on nationalism in Scotland — has mainly pertained to either elite nationalist discourses or constructions, or to ordinary people's understandings and experiences of nationalism. Understanding the two in tandem will provide new insights on the relationship between elite, strategic, institutionalised narratives, and the messy reality that is our everyday lives.

*1.8. Structure of the thesis*

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter has outlined the political context for the research, as well as introduced its aims, objectives and the central research questions. Further, following this outline of the structure, it provided a rationale and justification for the research in terms of the contribution it seeks to make. Chapter 2 will locate the current study within the broader theoretical

discussions of nationalism and will offer a critical engagement with existing literature. Moreover, it will seek to identify the gaps and omissions within this literature and will address definitional issues. While introducing the classical theories of ethnosymbolism and modernism, it will argue that post-classical theories of nationalism pertaining to gender and everyday nationalism, for example, have begun to fill in gaps in knowledge evident in earlier theorising. I will also discuss the dualistic categories of 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalism (which I will revisit in more detail in Chapter 4), and the ways in which 'the Other' is understood in nationalism literature. Finally, Chapter 2 will focus on Scotland specifically, and explain how literature on Scottish nationalism has mainly focused on nationalist discourses from above, on the one hand, and people's lay understandings and experiences of the nation, on the other, without the two levels being effectively related.

Chapter 3, which focuses on methods and methodology, explains how the research was conducted using a multimethod approach, and it revisits the aims, objectives and research questions already touched upon in this chapter. This chapter will also discuss the sample, explain the data analysis process in detail, and consider the limitations of the study.

Chapter 4 is the first of four chapters to discuss the empirical findings, which emerged from an inductive process of data analysis. It focuses on the civic/ethnic distinction and, firstly, revisits the debates around the dichotomy. It will consider the ways in which the SNP's nationalism is framed as civic in both political and academic commentaries, as well as the ways in which the SNP framed the Scottish independence referendum specifically as an example of civic nationalism in practice. The chapter will also critically interrogate whether the predominant framing of the SNP's nationalism as 'civic' is warranted. As the Scottish independence referendum coincided with the second Year of Homecoming, this made it an opportune moment to consider the 'civicness' of the SNP's nationalism within this political and cultural context. Finally, based on the findings, I will reassess the analytical usefulness of the civic/ethnic dichotomy.

Chapter 5 will move the discussion towards 'national values' and will demonstrate

how, during the referendum, a specific framing of supposedly *Scottish* values was advanced. In this chapter I will introduce and make use of Zimmer's (2003) framework, which suggests moving beyond the civic/ethnic frame of understanding. On the one hand, he argues for an analytical framework that — rather than labelling nationalism as 'civic' or 'ethnic' — accounts for the mechanisms social actors use to reconstruct "the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time" (2003:178). On the other hand, the framework considers the symbolic resources social actors draw on when reconstructing these boundaries (2003:178). Chapter 5 will thus explore how social actors (both from above and below) construct Scotland as a distinct 'value community' and how, as part of this process, they interpret and operationalise certain symbolic resources.

Chapters 6 and 7 shift the focus firmly onto ethnic minority participants' experiences of Scotland, Scottishness and nationalism, both within the context of the Scottish independence referendum (Chapter 7), and more broadly (Chapter 6). Chapter 6 emphasises the importance of studying the everyday and, crucially, for the importance of understanding the capacity to be unreflective in our everyday lives as a privilege. Chapter 7, in turn, highlights the importance of accounting for emotions and affect in our understandings of how nationalist narratives are experienced. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, the participants would often present their experience of Scotland and Scots as being 'friendly' and 'welcoming' but, as the interviews went on, this narrative was often disrupted. Importantly, this demonstrates the purchase that predominant framings of Scotland as more inclusive have, but also how this frame of vision comes under challenge in and through everyday interactions. Consequently, a complex picture begins to emerge which this thesis seeks to map out and analyse.

Finally, Chapter 8, which is the Conclusion, will reflect on the ways in which this thesis has made a contribution to literature as well as to empirical understandings of nationalism. It will also consider potential further, future areas of investigation, as well as the potential broader implications of this thesis beyond academic merit. For these broader implications, I take my cue from Dorothy Smith. Here she discusses the importance of understanding women's personal lifeworlds although this excerpt can be read as relating to other forms of oppression beyond gender:

*The sociologist is not an astrologer giving private consultations. Rather the approach attempted here offers something comparable to consciousness-raising. Perhaps indeed it is a form of it, aiming to find the objective correlates of what had seemed a private experience of oppression. Like consciousness-raising it is also to be shared. The strategy of institutional analysis explicates generalized bases of the experience of oppression. Hence, it offers a mode in which women can find the lineaments of the oppression they share with others and of different oppressions rooted in the same matrix of relations.* (1987:248)

Chapter 2

Nationalism Studies: From grand narratives to the minutiae of the everyday

*2.1. Introduction*

Though nations are central to understanding the ways in which the vast majority of different societies are organised, nationalism studies have remained somewhat isolated from wider social theory. This seems curious, especially as — on the one hand — Smith argues that "a fundamental way to grasp the nature and shape of the modern world is through an exploration of the nature and origins of nations" (1989:420). Consequently, social theorists can often be guilty of taking nations and nationalism for granted (Day & Thompson, 2004:4-5). On the other hand, Billig points out how sociologists often fail to define 'society', and when they do offer a definition, it is difficult to distinguish from that of 'nation' "as peoples with a culture, a limited territory and distinguished by bonds of action" (1995:53). Indeed, for Smith the "study of society is always ipso facto the study of the nation" (1983:26). Thus, nationalism studies have remained, to a considerable degree, removed from what gets constituted as 'canonical' sociological theory. This is important because the context in which such theorising takes place remains 'national' – yet, limited attention is paid to the relationship between 'society' and 'nation'. Thus we might ask: what is the impact of nationalist ideas on the myriad social phenomena studied by sociologists? How could drawing on nationalism studies aid social theorising?

This chapter seeks to offer a critical overview of key literature pertaining to nationalism studies, and therefore to put nationalism studies front and centre — as advocated by Smith above. It will, in other words, try to accord the literature the care and attention it often fails to attract elsewhere. By way of introduction, it will, firstly, discuss the development of nationalism studies. Following this introduction, the chapter will then move on to discuss common definitions found in literature – the focus will be on the key concepts of nation, state, nationalism, and national identity. Interrogating the key terms is important in order to have a solid conceptual base to build on, and I will comment on the definitions and understandings utilised in this

thesis.

Having covered the conceptual field, this chapter will subsequently briefly turn to the classical debate waged mainly between 'modernists' such as Gellner and 'ethnicists'/'ethnosymbolists' such as Smith, before addressing post-classical theories (e.g. theories around everyday nationalism, and nation and gender). Because a key concern in this thesis is to understand how nationalist narratives potentially contribute to the shaping of ethnic minorities' experiences and how such narratives are made sense of and possibly challenged by ethnic minorities, the focus will be on the latter theories. Chapters 6 and 7 in particular seek to contribute to the ever-expanding literature within the field of everyday nationalism studies.

As will be seen, Scottish nationalism (especially the SNP's nationalism) is habitually defined as 'civic' in nature. Thus, after discussing (post-)classical theoretical debates, the focus will then turn to the key trope of dualistic categories of nationalism such as Eastern/Western, political/cultural, and importantly, ethnic/civic nationalism. Both Chapters 4 and 5 will, especially, build on a critique of the civic/ethnic framework of understanding. Subsequently, the overarching themes of this thesis will be covered, namely the relationship between nationalism and 'race' and 'ethnicity' more broadly, as well as how belonging, diversity and difference are addressed in public political rhetoric in Scotland. Because this project is situated within the Scottish context, it is necessary to offer a brief overview of nationalism studies pertaining to Scotland. Finally, as way of conclusion, this chapter establishes the theoretical framework within which the present study is situated. Therefore, the broader aim of this chapter is to ground the subsequent discussions in historical and theoretical understandings of nationalism studies and nationalist narratives, and to consider the areas in nationalism studies to which this study seeks to contribute.

*2.2. An overview of nationalism studies and its place in sociology*

As a point of departure, it is important to have a clear view of the field of nationalism

studies in an effort to understand the background against which more recent theories have emerged. Understanding how the field has evolved and developed might help us to decipher its weaknesses, strengths and the direction it might take in the future.

It was not until the mid-19th century that nationalism became the subject of historical inquiry, and not until the early 20th century that social sciences became engaged in nationalism studies (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994:3). Prior to World War I, it was mainly historians and social philosophers that studied nationalism, and their concerns were largely ethical and philosophical in nature (Özkirimli, 2000:12). Historians like Hayes (1931), Kohn (1944), Snyder (1954) and Shafer (1955) carried out encyclopaedic surveys of the differing forms of nationalism found around the world, while Cobban (1944) and Carr (1945) contributed from the field of international relations (Day & Thompson, 2004). Indeed, Hayes and Kohn are regarded by some as the 'founding fathers' of the academic scholarship on nationalism (Özkirimli, 2000:13).

However, even if these scholars did contribute to this developing field, contemporary theorists take a rather critical stance towards their early predecessors. Anderson (2006) criticises their historical reach and theoretical power, while Smith (1996, 1998) sees the absence of general theoretical models as a great weakness: although the ideology of nationalism is analysed, what led to its rise and spread is not. Though the field saw a rise in more sustained investigation after World War I, nationalism studies really took off from the 1960s onwards (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994:3). Kedourie's *Nationalism* and Gellner's essay on nationalism in *Thought and Change* were published in 1960 and 1964 respectively, and are regarded by many as "the pioneering works of the modernist approach" (Özkirimli, 2000:52).

Where, then, was sociology during this early period of nationalism studies? The 'founding fathers'[1], Weber and Durkheim, although being — to varying degrees — influenced by national thought, did not dwell on it as a subject of analysis. For Weber,

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[1] See, however, important criticisms of the ways in which the 'sociological canon' is constructed and who is included in it — e.g. Connell (1997), Bhambra (2007) and Connell (2007).

the turn to ideology could be understood as a way of attempting to escape the on-going rationalisation of society. Early social theorists, such as Marx and Durkheim, did not see nationalism as integral to the forms of social change which they identified (Day & Thompson, 2004:4-7). Out of these theorists, it was Weber who discussed nations and nationalism in most detail. He very much links nationalism to the historical attainment of 'power-positions' (1994:21), and therefore sees elites — or those in power-positions — as central to the development and diffusion of nationalist ideas. Weber goes on to say that the attachment to this 'political prestige' "may fuse with a specific belief in responsibility towards succeeding generations" (1994:21). Consequently, those groups holding

> *...the power to steer common conduct within a polity will most strongly install themselves with this ideal fervor of power prestige. They remain the specific and most reliable bearers of the idea of the state as an imperialist power structure demanding unqualified devotion. (Weber, 1994:21)*

Here, the word 'unqualified' is very interesting as it signifies 'total' or 'limitless' devotion; that is, Weber seems to suggest that nationalist ideas speak to people's deepest senses of loyalty and commitment. I will pick up this thread in Chapter 7 in relation to the affective quality of nationalist narratives. Furthermore, Weber contends that the political prestige serves direct and material imperialist interests, as well as "partly ideological interests of strata that are in various ways intellectually privileged within a polity and, indeed, privileged by its very existence" (1994:21). These strata comprise "especially all those who think of themselves as being the specific 'partners' of a specific 'culture' diffused among the members of the polity" (1994:21). Here, "the naked prestige of 'power' is unavoidably transformed into other special forms of prestige and especially into the idea of the 'nation'" (1994:21). Weber's understanding of the elites' role is shared by Hutchinson and Smith who argue that nationalist movements start with an elite of intellectuals, then expand to include professional classes who often act as political agitators, and finally engulf masses (1994:5).

As mentioned, it was from the 1960s onwards that sociologists and political scientists began to increasingly take part in discussions pertaining to understanding and

studying nationalism (Özkirimli, 2000:13). In addition to Kedorie's and Gellner's work, Deutch's writings "gave a fresh impetus to the debate on nationalism" during the 1960s (Özkirimli, 2000:52). Though Smith wrote extensively in the 1970s (1971; 1973; 1976; 1979), the 1980s marked a turning point as this decade gave rise to the 'core debate' within the classical approach (e.g. Armstrong, 1982; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Smith 1986) which was further consolidated in the 1990s by key works integral to the classical approach (e.g. Greenfeld, 1992; Llobera, 1994; Guibernau, 1996) (Day & Thompson, 2004:8). I will consider the classical and post-classical approaches in due course, but following this introduction I will next turn to key concepts and definitional issues.

*2.3. Defining the key concepts*

There are multiple factors that complicate the study of nationalism. Day & Thompson note that the study of nationalism uses a language and a conceptual apparatus of its own while referring to historical and case specific literature (2004:2) and, thus, as Smith (1983) points out, an interdisciplinary[2] training is needed. Hutchinson and Smith (1994:3) identify as a further obstacle the fact that "the forms that nationalism takes have been kaleidoscopic", and list variants such as religious, conservative, liberal, fascist, communist, diaspora, and pan nationalism.

Crucially, I argue that a further key complication is that there is often a tendency to employ concepts without paying due care and attention to the meanings we assign to them. The study of nationalism is abounds with different concepts and ideas ranging from Nationalism/nationalism, nation, nationhood, nationality, nation-ness, national identity, to national consciousness and nation-building — to name but a few. Rustow, for example, has pointed out how "nationalist writers have done little to clarify what they mean by nation" and, therefore, "have generated more heat than light" (quoted in Özkirimli, 2005:15).

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[2] See Anderson's (2016:133-163) interesting discussion of the development of disciplines and interdisciplinarity.

Reading through the literature, it quickly becomes clear that a central problem within the field is confusion regarding the ways in which different concepts are used, what their relationship is to one another, and how different nuances and meanings are attributed to various analytical categories. Thus, a central difficulty is finding adequate and agreed definitions of key concepts (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994:3-4). However, this is, so to speak, a fertile difficulty in that it goes to highlight the slipperiness and malleability of the different concepts, and the conceptual debates that follow offer crucial insights into both the social phenomena under scrutiny and the *study* of those social phenomena itself. Importantly, issues of definition are deeply politically charged, "and any definition of the nation legitimates some claims and delegitimates others" (Calhoun in Özkirimli, 2005:15).

Consequently, we risk taking for granted and reifying the very social constructs we seek to critically interrogate. A problem related to this within nationalism studies, it seems to me, is how nationalism, as a concept, is discussed. There is a tendency, often unwittingly, to reify the concept of nationalism and to refer to it in ways in which seem to endow agency to nationalism; that is, that nationalism comes across as a 'thing' in and of itself. This, of course, is misguided: nationalism does not lead a life of its own which is somehow detached from people. Nationalism is a phenomenon which stems from and is created, changed and reproduced by people on both macro and micro levels. Just as we 'do' gender, we also 'do' nationalism, actively taking part in shaping and experiencing it. Thus, I would urge the reader to keep in mind that when I refer to 'nationalism' in the remainder of this thesis: I use it as a short-hand and my intention is not to ignore the active processes that make and re-make nationalisms.

Taking Rustow's critique regarding the lack of definitions, as well as the above point regarding reification into account, this section seeks to, on the one hand, engage with existing definitions of key concepts such as nation, national identity and nationalism found in nationalism studies literature. On the other hand, in order to lay down a solid conceptual basis for this study, I will explain my understandings of these terms and how they are employed in this research.

*2.3.1. Nation and state*

A central concern of this thesis is understanding how the 'Scottish nation' is constructed and imagined; how this 'nation' is experienced by ethnic minorities; and how 'ethnicity' and 'race' are linked to these processes. Thus, taking the question 'what is a nation?' as a definitional starting point seems apt. Because 'nation' and 'state' are often, especially in everyday language, equated and seen to denote the same phenomena, it seems logical to discuss the two in tandem. While the two are closely related, they are not the same thing (Spencer and Wollman, 2002:2) as will be explained. Scotland is often termed a 'stateless nation' or 'a nation without a state' (something that political actors and activists — through the 2014 independence referendum — sought to address, and create a sovereign Scottish state). Thus, in order to contextualise Scotland as a 'nation' and a 'state', dwelling on these two concepts in the first instance seems appropriate.

As mentioned, for many the two concepts seem synonymous. Sutherland, for example, notes how the adjective 'national' is "often used to describe matters pertaining to the state" which "is because the nation has become the key means for states to legitimate their power over people and place, and exercise both domestically and internationally recognised authority" (2012:9). However, she stresses the importance of distinguishing between the two concepts: while nation "refers to the cognitive, legitimating basis for authority (...), the state embodies the territorial and institutional dimensions of authority" (2012:9-10). The conception of the nation is a way of justifying where borders are drawn; while "nation need not have a state", "states need some kind of national construct to legitimate their control" (Sutherland, 2012:10). Therefore, out of the two concepts 'nation' emerges as more powerful for Sutherland in the sense that states rely on a 'national construct' as a basis for legitimacy.

Traditionally, different ways of defining 'nation' have drawn on what have been termed objective or subjective markers of nations (Davidson, 2000; Özkirimli, 2005; Smith 2001). Stalin, for example, neatly encapsulates the 'objective' criteria in his oft-quoted essay 'Marxism and the National Question' from 1913. In it he argues that a

nation is a historically constituted community of people, and the characteristic features that make up a nation are common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up (manifesting itself in common culture) (1994:18-20). None of these characteristics taken separately make up a nation; rather, they all need to be present simultaneously (Stalin, 1994:20-21). Thus, Stalin's formulation relies on 'objective' markers such as common history, language and territory.

On the other hand, an example of 'subjective' criteria is offered in the definition by Zionist Ahad Ha'am: "If I feel the spirit of Jewish nationality in my heart so that it stamps all my inward life with its seal, then the spirit of Jewish nationality exists in me; and its existence is not at an end even if all my Jewish contemporaries should cease to feel it in their hearts" (quoted in Davidson, 2000:9). For Ha'am, then, being part of a nation, or his nationality, is defined by a personal and inner feeling that is not dependent on others' views. Thus, commonly cited subjective elements defining a nation include self-awareness, solidarity, loyalty and common (or collective) will (Özkirimli, 2005:17-18). According to Hugh Seton-Watson (1977), "a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they form one" (quoted in Davidson, 2000:9). For Davidson, a nation is "a human community that has acquired national consciousness" (2000:11). Further examples of 'subjective' definitions are Renan's view that the nation is "a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future" (quoted in Özkirimli, 2005:18).

Özkirimli draws our attention to the relationship between objective and subjective elements in that objective markers do not themselves make nations, but "are necessary to generate the feeling of commonality that gives birth to or sustains the nation" (2005:18). In other words, the 'objective' elements — language, territory, culture — are used as raw stock for 'subjective' forms of imagining the nation. This is an important argument, and I will pick it up in Chapter 5 in relation to 'national values' and the symbolic resources (Zimmer, 2003) nationalist narratives draw on in an effort to forge a sense of the nation's 'character'.

Turning to the concept of 'state', there are certain features which different authors see as central to it. These are, notably, shared territory, self-governance, and legitimate use of violence. Weber famously argued that the state has the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory (Coakley, 2012:7). Similarly, Smith explains that a state can be taken to refer to "a set of autonomous institutions exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory" (2009:61-62). Coakley (2012:11), in turn, argues that the state is a self-governing territorial entity with a central decision making agency which possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in ensuring compliance with its decisions on the part of all persons within its borders. Finally, Giddens sees the state as formative to the existence of nations as, for him, nation "only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed" (1994:34). Thus, to sum up his viewpoint of the nation-state as a bordered 'power-container', Giddens argues "the nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence" (1994:35).

In terms of the connections between the two concepts, Weber argues that nation and state are intimately linked:  "a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own" (2009:176). Smith (2009:61-62) argues broadly along the same lines as Weber and notes that "a free nation often needs a state of its own for protection and the nurture of its culture" but "this is not an absolute requirement" as has been evidenced by stateless nations such as Quebec and Catalonia. Connor sees the state as quite straightforwardly "the major political subdivision of the globe" which is easily conceptualised in quantitative terms by measuring the number of inhabitants, the size of the territory and the location, for example (1994:36). By contrast, he finds 'nation' difficult to define "because the essence of a nation is intangible"; the essence being a "psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the *subconscious* conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way" (1994:36; added emphasis). The nature of that bond is, however, shadowy and elusive (Connor, 1994:36).

Importantly, like Giddens, we often refer to 'nation-states', thus combining the two concepts into one. Sutherland, for example, argues it is unlikely that the two will be decoupled in contemporary politics as citizenship legislation, for example, builds on nation-based criteria (2012:127). Thus, the administrative, bureaucratic and legislative domain of citizenship is intimately linked to ideas of the 'nation' and 'nationhood'. Connor notes how the term 'nation-state' describes a territorial-political unit (state) whose borders (nearly) coincide with the territorial distribution of a national group (1994:39). Greenfeld argues that state is an impersonal, legal-rational form of government which — at least in principle — has a representative character, while also being an implication of the principle of popular sovereignty (2004:39). Greenfeld, like Sutherland, links state and nation by saying that the authority that the state exercises emanates from the nation (2004:39). Also worth noting is a further concept linked to the state, namely nation-building which for Sutherland means 'official, state-led nationalism' (2012:7).

In terms of my understanding of the definitional debates around nation and state, I would argue that focusing on finding 'objective' criteria to pin down the 'essence' of a nation is a risky endeavour. Therefore, I agree with Bauman's view regarding the search for an 'objective definition' of 'nation':

> *The search for an 'objective definition' obliquely legitimizes the nationalistic claims that it is the sharing of certain attributes that 'makes a nation' (…) rather than exposing the fact that the 'commonality' itself (…) is always an artefact of boundary-drawing activity: always contentious and contested, glossing over some (potentially disruptive) differentiations and representing some other (objectively minor) differences as powerful and decisive separating factors.* (1992 in Özkirimli, 2005:17)

Indeed, it is telling that the concepts of nation and state have become equated with one another, especially in elite political discourse. As previously mentioned, Connor (1994) argues that states are, by and large, more easily quantifiable in terms of their borders and population sizes, for example. Thus, they feel more *real* and natural or *beyond question*. They seem like a fact of life — merely one of the different ways in which our social world is organised. By equating nations with states, nations come to feel more real and natural as well.

This study takes Benedict Anderson's famous conceptualisation as a starting point with regard to sociologically understanding and interrogating the concept of 'nation'. He argued that nations are 'imagined communities', and "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (2006:6). Nation is imagined "because the members (…) will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (2006:6). In a related sense to Anderson's formulation, Connor argues that an intuitive conviction of the nation's uniqueness gives nations a psychological dimension approximating that of the extended family (1994:38). Importantly, as Spencer and Wollman (2005a:5) point out, for Anderson 'imagined' is not the same as 'invented'. Indeed, Anderson highlights the drawback with Gellner's formulation that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (quoted in Anderson, 2006:6): for Anderson, Gellner "assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that 'true' communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations" (2006:6).

As outlined above, the state is often conflated with nation, and the two are taken to be synonyms. In the present study, the state is taken to mean that standardised and formalised entity that has power over the legitimate use of violence as well as political, institutional, administrative, bureaucratic and legislative processes which in turn guide and structure life within the borders of a given polity. However, state borders do often, but not always, contain within them perceived 'nations'; that is, they contain an 'imagined community', most of the members of which hold in their minds different and overlapping imaginaries of a communion. Furthermore, beyond state boundaries, there can also be 'diasporas' (this concept will be discussed further in Chapter 4 in relation to the Homecoming franchise) which, although not residing within the confines of the state, are nonetheless seen to belong to the 'nation'.

### 2.3.2. Nationalism

The concept of 'nationalism' is at the heart of this thesis, and directly relates to all

four central research questions. I am interested in how nationalism is narrated and experienced, and what its relationship is to 'race' and 'ethnicity' and, by extension, diversity, difference and belonging. Conventionally, a number of authors have suggested that nationalism involves the aim of creating a state (Davidson, 2000:13). Spencer and Wollman (2002:2-3) define nationalism as "an ideology which imagines the community in a particular way (as national), asserts the primacy of this collective identity over others, and seeks political power in its name, ideally (if not exclusively or everywhere) in the form of a state for the nation (or a nation-state)". Smith — similarly to Spencer and Wollman above — also highlights the ways in which nationalism as an ideology seeks to create nations: nationalism is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of an existing or potential 'nation'", and "as a movement, nationalism often antedates, and seeks to create, the nation, even if it often pretends that the nation already exists" (1989:343). He emphasises that nationalists cannot, however, create nations *ex nihilo*. In order for them to reach their goals of autonomy, unity and identity, "there need to be some core networks of association and culture, around which and on which nations can be 'built'" (1989:343).

In an effort to sum up the key definitional paradigms, Smith (2001:5-6) lists the following meanings that are usually associated with the concept of 'nationalism':

> *(1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations;*
> *(2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation;*
> *(3) a language and symbolism of the nation;*
> *(4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation;*
> *(5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular.*

Balibar, however, notes that defining nationalism is difficult because it never functions alone; rather, it is always a part of a chain (alongside gender and 'race', for example) in which it is both the central and the weak link (2005:164). Hobsbawm, on the other hand, points to the vagueness of nationalism and its lack of programmatic content (1996:357), thus allowing it to be shaped and modified to fit the needs of a given national project. It is, importantly, these characteristics pointed out by Balibar and Hobsbawm — that is, nationalisms' 'add-ons' and its vagueness — that make it

such a potent force in the modern world. Nationalist ideas are highly malleable and flexible, as well as often contradictory (as will be seen in Chapters 4-7). As Bhabha so well puts it (1990:292):

> *It is the mark of the ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy — and an apparatus of power — that it produces a continual slippage into analogous, even metonymic, categories, like the people, minorities, or 'cultural difference' that continually overlap in the act of writing the nation.*

Investigating these slippages into difference, 'race' and 'ethnicity' in the writing of the nation is crucial when seeking to understand nationalist narratives in Scotland and beyond.

There is also the issue of patriotism in relation to nationalism. Connor, for example, sharply distinguishes the concepts of nation and nationalism (or ethnonationalism, as he calls it) from those of state and patriotism (Smith, 2001:15). Connor, then, "would speak of a Belgian or Spanish 'patriotism' — that is, a loyalty to the larger territorial state and its institutions — and contrast it with a Flemish or Catalan 'ethno-nationalism'" which he would define "as a psychological bond of ancestral relatedness, stemming ultimately from kinship sentiment — even if the myth of origins fails (as it so often does) to correspond to real, biological descent" (Smith, 2001:15-15). Thus, in the British context, Connor sees British state patriotism, on the one hand, co-existing with English, Scots and Welsh ethno-nationalisms (Smith, 2001:16). Similarly, Kedourie (1994:49) distinguishes nationalism from patriotism and xenophobia "with which it is often confused". Kedourie goes on to say that "patriotism, affection for one's country, or one's group, loyalty to its institutions, and zeal for its defence, is a sentiment known among all kinds of men" (1994:49-50). Smith, however, doubts whether such a sharp distinction between nationalism and patriotism can be maintained even if analytically useful. He critiques the idea with regard to the example of British patriotism: "in practice, the English have always found it impossible to distinguish their own English ethno-nationalism from a British patriotism, which they conceive of equally as their 'own'" (2001:16). Thus, Smith argues that separating 'English ethno-nationalism' and 'British patriotism' is impossible as English nationalism strongly relies on ideas of 'Britishness'.

While I agree with Smith's critique of Connor, I would, further, contest the concept of

patriotism on analytical grounds. Indeed, it seems to me, patriotism is often used as shorthand for what is seen as a more acceptable form of nationalism or as wholly different from nationalism and its perceived negative connotations. For example, Billig discusses Northern Ireland and notes how Northern Irish secessionists seeking to *alter* boundaries are automatically seen as 'nationalists' whilst the UK state, in its aim to *maintain* boundaries, escapes such a label. Therefore, 'nationalist' often carries with it an association with 'extreme' in commonplace semantics. Thus, the world of settled nations appears as the 'point-zero of nationalism' as wars waged by democratic states are not labelled nationalist while, in contrast, those waged by rebel forces are (2005:193-195). In the Scottish context, as will be seen in Chapter 7, during the referendum campaign, those on the Better Together side often highlighted their acceptable 'patriotism' in comparison to the perceived unacceptable 'nationalism' of the Yes side. Thus, the distinction between patriotism and nationalism quickly becomes a political and normative one (as is the case with distinctions between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalism as will be shortly discussed — see Chapter 4). Questions need to be asked about the analytical usefulness of the concept or, certainly, great care needs to be taken if using the term, and its political connotations need to be accounted for.

However, while contemporary nationalism studies usually focus on and foreground ideas around 'narrating the nation' (to use Bhabha's term) and emphasise the ambiguity and fluidity of the 'nation', it is important to keep the state's structuring forces in mind. These have a considerable and real effect on people's lives. Thus, it is important to avoid thinking and talking about nations as purely 'imagined' or 'stored entities' that are "created and manipulated by states and their elites" (Smith, 2009:14). Discussing nations as purely 'imaginings' threatens to hide the very real consequences of nationalist narratives on people's lives. Take citizenship rules, for example: while the shape they take is affected by seemingly abstract ideas and discourses around who may and may not belong to a given state and, by extension, 'nation', they have material effects on people's experience. Furthermore, there is a close — albeit an ambiguous — relationship between nationalism and ideas around 'race' and 'ethnicity'. This relationship is, in turn, crucial — among other factors — to the formation of national anti-racism and 'race equality' policies and actions. These anti-racist and 'race equality' policies and actions, then, have material and both direct

and indirect effects on the lives of racialised ethnic minorities in the form of, for example, policing, housing, or employment, as well as on potential efforts to introduce positive action. They also impact public attitudes to racism.

For the purposes of this thesis and as a result of the preceding discussion, analytically, I understand nationalism as two interlacing and overlapping processes. On the one hand you have the political sphere where the world is seen as being organised in accordance with putative 'nations', and there is an operating assumption that these national entities (which are normatively expected to fall perfectly within the borders of the state) should be sovereign and independent (a goal which is, of course, limited by our globally interconnected world). On the other hand you have nationalism as a narrative; that is, as a conglomeration of idea(l)s and imaginings of what the 'nation's' 'essence' or 'being' is. Through nationalist narratives nations are 'storied' and given a character, uniqueness, a history, myths, and values among other things. Nations come to exist because people, through nationalist narratives, construct them. Both understandings are linked to the current project: on the one hand, in the independence referendum, a question was asked whether Scotland should be a sovereign national entity or state. On the other hand, this thesis is concerned with questions around nationalist narratives and the type of nation Scotland is imagined to be and who is regarded as belonging to it.

Authors such as Zimmer (2003) have emphasised the importance of specific symbolic resources — or raw materials (such as culture and history, for example) — social actors use when constructing national boundaries. I also argue for the key importance of understanding the mechanisms (Zimmer, 2003) through which nations come to be imagined (Anderson, 2006) — that is, which resources (e.g. values, historical myths) nationalist narratives draw on, and how they do this, in order to conjure up an image of a nation. This is of great interest because understanding how nations come to be constructed especially vis-a-vis 'race' and 'ethnicity' holds within it transformative potential from an anti-racist viewpoint: understanding how nations are 'made' may give us clues as to how they may be re-imagined or deconstructed. Finally, it is important to once more emphasise that nationalist narratives or ideas structure how the material world is organised, and thus have real consequences on

people's everyday lives. As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, the malleability and ambiguity of nationalism is crucial as it allows nationalist ideas and narratives to take often contradictory forms.

### 2.3.3. National identity/National consciousness

Studying and explaining the concept of 'identity' is by no means a straightforward matter, and the usefulness of 'identity' as an analytical concept has been challenged. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) famously argued that social scientists need to move 'beyond identity'. They argue that researchers should account for processes of reification, and "avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis" (2000:5). By categories of practice the pair refer to "something akin to what others have called 'native' or 'folk' or 'lay' categories" (2000:4). Categories of analysis are those concepts we use in social and other science to theorise and explain the world around us. For Brubaker and Cooper, then, 'identity' as a concept lacks analytical purchase, it is too ambiguous and too torn between 'soft' and 'hard' meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers (2000:1-2).

Similarly, Anthias (2002) also argues for the limited heuristic value of 'identity', and argues for the use of concepts of 'location' and (translocational) 'positionality' instead which, for her, would avoid the danger of essentialising identities via social analysis. Following Bakhtin, Anthias notes that her participants' notions of belonging and their stories about the social categories which they use to locate themselves in particular places and times "are not given or static, but are emergent, produced interactionally and contain elements of contradiction and struggle, that is, they are not unitary" (2002:500). This kind of understanding and mode of studying identity would then emphasise the situated nature of claims and qualities, the creation of these in different times and places, and recognition of the narration as an action or performance. However — and this is an important limitation — which identities are available to a person depends on their social position. Thus, the capacity to mobilise and manipulate certain cultural markers is dependent on the amount of cultural and

social power the said individual has, in order "to 'pass' as something in the social interactions of daily life" (McCrone, 2002:306).

'National identity', specifically, can be briefly understood as a political-cultural identification with territory (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008:1245). It is important as not only can it affect life chances in that being considered 'one of us' has an effect on an individual's social, political and cultural participation in wider society (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008:1246) but, in addition, being able to claim a national identity and having that claim accepted by others can have a significant impact on an individual's sense of inclusion, belonging or acceptance. A certain complication to the study of identity is that matters of identity seem everywhere and yet nowhere because most people do not have to think about or negotiate them explicitly very often (McCrone, 2002:317). Indeed, for most, national identity is banal (Billig, 1995) in that it is "taken for granted, everyday, affirmed by the iconography of daily life" (McCrone, 2002:317). However, taking the perspective of those on the margins, whether in national or ethnic terms, offers a way to gain an improved understanding of the negotiation codes used as people attempt to navigate their way through processes of acceptance and affirmation (McCrone, 2002:315).

This latter point is important for the purposes of this research project. On the one hand, it seeks to interrogate the processes of 'belonging' (and, consequently, being or becoming 'Scottish') in terms of understanding how the parameters of belonging to the nation are constructed from above especially vis-à-vis 'those on the margins'. On the other hand, it also seeks to understand how 'those on the margins' — that is, ethnic minorities whose belonging to the nation may be challenged — negotiate and make sense of 'Scottishness' and their relationship to it.

As we have seen, 'nation' is a contested and ambiguous term as well, and when paired with identity ('national identity') it assumes a new layer of complexity. Davidson (2000), for example, criticises the way in which many authors fail to distinguish between nationalism and national consciousness on the one hand, and between national consciousness and national identity on the other. He quotes Guibernau, who

states that:

> *The fragmentary nature of current approaches to nationalism originates from their inability to merge its two fundamental attributes: the political character of nationalism as an ideology defending the notion that state and nation should be congruent; and its capacity to be a provider of identity to individuals conscious of forming a group based upon a common culture, project for the future and attachment to a concrete territory.* (1996:3)

Thus, Guibernau sees a disconnect between theories of nationalism and national identity, and suggests that the two do not often meet. Davidson also emphasises how national consciousness is different from national identity. For him, "identities are the ensemble of all the external signs through which people show both to themselves and to other people that they have chosen to be identified in that particular way" (2000:17). Billig, for whom "to have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood" (2005:8), also notes that it should not be presumed that "an identity is a hidden psychological state, as if there is a wordless, psychological or neurological state of 'having an identity" (1997, quoted in Davidson, 2000:18). Davidson argues that national consciousness is indeed that internal psychological state which, in turn, seeks expression in the outward signs of identity (2000:18). Smith, similarly, talks about 'national sentiment' finding its expression through myths and symbols of the common past (1989:343).


Davidson's point regarding 'national consciousness' and 'national identity' is a useful one. However, on a practical level, it is often difficult to neatly differentiate between 'external signs' (national identity) and 'psychological states' (national consciousness) as both interact and inform one another. Nonetheless, understanding that national identity/consciousness operates and is constituted on different levels helps to understand the process more fully. For simplicity's sake, I will refer to 'national identity' as an umbrella term which includes both the external and internal ways in which a person's national belonging is projected, felt, understood and experienced by that person. Importantly, beyond the individual, other people constantly make assumptions or judgements about you in terms of who you are and whether you are, for example, 'Scottish' or not. In turn, those assumptions we make about other people may serve to consolidate or challenge the ways in which we understand ourselves in national terms.

Identities do not exist in a vacuum; they are deeply relational. Who we are also depends on who or what we are not. In this regard, Anthias's 'translocational positionality' is a helpful framework for thinking through the ways in which identities may shift across social contexts — that is, how you identify yourself may change depending on where and with whom a social interaction takes place. Anthias argues along the same lines with Brubaker and Cooper (2000) and notes that 'identity' tends to function as a disabling concept in that it "limits the focus and moves the analyst away from context, meaning and practice" (2002:493). Instead, she advocates for understanding 'identity' via narratives of location, and positionality. Here, location refers to "an account that tells a story about how we place ourselves in terms of social categories such as those of gender, 'ethnicity' and class at a specific point in time and space" (Anthias, 2002:498 — see also D.E. Smith, 2005). Positionality, in turn, refers to "placement within a set of relations and practices that implicate identification and 'performativity' or action" (Anthias, 2002:501).

*2.4. Origins of nations — Classical theories*

After attempting to clarify some of the conceptual debates, the next area to look at is the different theories of nationalism. I will focus on both 'classical' and 'postclassical' theories. While the former theories are more concerned with historical debates regarding when and why nations come to emerge, the latter seek to move beyond the origin debates and pose new types of questions about national phenomena. My research questions speak more directly to postclassical theories and are focused on the "here and now" (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008b) (though my analysis is historically informed) and I do not seek to uncover at what point, historically, the 'Scottish nation' came to exist. Thus, the emphasis will be on postclassical theories but in order to understand the importance and value of them, it is worth situating these theories in a broader context. This will help make sense of why there has been a shift to post-classical debates.

Within the classical approach to nationalism there are two main camps — modernists and ethnicists/ethnosymbolists. While modernists insist that nations are recent

phenomena — taking shape from the late 18th century onwards — with next to no connection to the past, ethnicists/ethnosymbolists argue that the roots of nations lie in the early medieval times and are based on *ethnie*, to use Smith's concept. Smith, one of the most prominent ethnosymbolists, is interested in looking at how "collective identities in pre-modern eras helped to shape modern nations" (1989:341). Thus, Smith and fellow ethnicists/ethnosymbolists such as Connor, Hutchinson and Armstrong regard "nations as specialised developments of ethnic ties and ethnicity" and claim that "we cannot hope to comprehend the powerful appeal of the nation without addressing its relationship with ethnic ties and sentiments" (Smith, 2006:169) as well as with popular ethnic traditions (Smith, 2005a:25-6). Consequently, "nations are formed on the basis of prior ethnic ties and networks, which provide nationalists with cultural resources for their projects of 'nation-building'" — "without such resources, the task of forging new nations becomes an uphill struggle against disunity and fragmentation" (Smith, 2006:169).

Smith focuses on 'la longue durée' when seeking to explain and understand modern nations and nationalisms — thus, the origins and formation of nations must be traced over long periods of time (2005a:23). Hastings argues that the origin of nations should be identified at an earlier time in history than modernists 'feel safe to handle'; that is, all the way back to the shaping of medieval society (2005a:37). Smith admits that in antiquity and in much of the medieval era, nations as they are now understood — following his own definition in which they are understood as named communities of history and culture, possessing unified territories, economies, education systems and common legal rights — were "rarely, if ever, to be found" (1989:344).

What is key to Smith's argument, however, is the existence of pre-modern '*ethnies'* or 'ethnic communities' as we now call them. Smith argues that different *ethnies* manifest certain characteristics to a greater or lesser degree, namely: a common name for the unit of population included; a set of myths of common origins and descent for that population; some common historical memories of things experienced together; a common 'historic territory' or 'homeland', or an association with one; and one or more elements of common culture (language, customs or religion) (1989:344-5). While some, e.g. "the speakers of, say, Slovakian and Ukrainian dialects" lacked a

consciousness of their membership in any single community, there were nonetheless a multitude of *ethnies* in the ancient and medieval worlds "which at first sight resemble, but are not, nations" (1989:345). Therefore, Smith recognises the modernity of nations as we now understand them but argues for their solid rootedness in previous *ethnies*. These *ethnies,* in turn, provide the raw material for nation-building processes. Thus, there is a parallel here to Zimmer's (2003) 'process-oriented approach' which agues for the importance of considering the symbolic resources nationalist narratives use when constructing nations.

Gellner (who was Smith's supervisor), Hobsbawm, Anderson and other modernists do not see nations and nationalism as extending their roots beyond the period associated with the major socio-economic processes of modernity (Day & Thomson, 2004:9). Modernists believe that Smith et al's approach is fundamentally flawed: they argue that it gives too much weight to the claims of nationalists themselves, and that 'nation' — in any sense we recognise it today — does not have deep roots but is a modern phenomenon which emerged at a particular point in time for specific reasons (Spencer & Wollman, 2005:5). For Gellner, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (1964:168-9). Hobsbawm argues along the same lines by saying that "nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way around" and that nation is a recent phenomenon and "a social entity only in so far as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation state' and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except in so far as both relate to it" (1990:9-10). Gellner notes that a modernist theory considers nationalism to be an inherently modern phenomenon but, at the same time, it does not consider all social phenomena to be modern: culture and power are perennial but they come to be related to each other in a new way in the modern age — in a way that engenders nationalism (2005:42). While Gellner, perhaps somewhat confusingly given his broader stance, agrees that some nations possess 'genuine ancient navels', some navels have been invented and some are navel-less — out of these categories he suspects the second one to be the most common (2005:44).

According to Gellner, transition from one kind of society to another — in this case from an agrarian society, where literacy was limited to elites, to modern industrial

societies which require extensive communication between their mobile members — creates the need for nations due to the need for communication in a highly differentiated society (Spencer & Wollman, 2005a:5). Thus, "nationalism derives from the requirement of industrial economies for a workforce with at least a generalised, basic education such as is provided by the centralising 19th century state" (Day & Thompson, 2004:9). The new public culture that is created and reinforced by the state becomes, then, the national culture for the majority of the population (Day & Thompson, 2004:9). Gellner argues that culture is produced by a centralised education system and, consequently, 'culture' becomes identity: therefore, national identity becomes valued in modern societies not because of any desire for stability or belonging, but due to sociological forces (Day & Thompson, 2004:9:10-11).

Anderson (2006) links the emergence of nationalism to capitalism, technological developments and to the spreading of the vernacular and, in addition, especially to the American War of Independence. In his memoirs, Anderson (2016:128), however, concedes that there were issues with his approach, noting that using nations and nation-states as basic units of analysis ignored how these units were tied together and crosscut by global political-intellectual currents such as liberalism, fascism and socialism as well as by religious networks and economic and technological forces. Thus, he points out how very few people are 'solely' nationalist.

For Breuilly, Gellner et al's approaches seem too abstract, and he thus locates nationalism in a conception of modernity in which politics plays a more central role. Here, the emergence of the modern state is key because the prime focus of nationalist mobilisation is gaining control of the nation state's power and resources. Therefore, nationalist ideas are not important for their own sake; rather, they are important because they are used for identifiable projects and purposes (Spencer & Wollman, 2005a:6). Most modernists — although Anderson to a lesser extent — have a particularly Western focus as they locate the key features of modernity, such as industrialisation, mass literacy and print capitalism, in the West (Spencer & Wollman, 2005a:6).

Although classical theories that focus on the origins of nations help to situate the

debate on nationalism in a historical context, and highlight some of the key moments in the forming of nations, critical questions must be asked about the usefulness of these debates — especially in terms of understanding nations and nationalisms currently and because the debates tend to remain rather stagnant. In classical debates, nations and nationalism are often seen as unproblematic and straightforward concepts: although opinions vary about the origin and modernity of nations and nationalism, as concepts, they avoid further scrutiny.

Historically, the classical debate has dominated the study of nationalism with its grand narratives. In the process, however, classical theory often misses the nuances and ambiguities, as well as the pluralism of nations and nationalisms. The intersections between nationalism and 'race' and 'ethnicity' (a key concern for this thesis), gender, sexuality and faith, for example, go unexplored. In addition, they also concentrate on the view from above at the expense of the view from below. Thus, I will now turn to post-classical debates which seek to address these issues. Before doing so, however, it is worth noting that I will revisit the idea that contemporary nationalisms draw on historical raw materials — as suggested by Smith et al — in Chapter 5 specifically, where I consider the ways in which Scotland is framed as a 'value community'. Thus, in an effort to uncover how the 'Scottish nation' is imagined and how nationalist narratives are mobilised contemporarily, Smith's points in relation to *ethnies* are of use.

*2.5. Post-classical theories of nations and nationalism*

Post-classical approaches, which represent an alternative to classical theories, have become more prominent since the 1990s. What unites these theories is the "belief in the need to transcend the classical debate by proposing new ways of thinking about national phenomena" (Özkirimli, 2000:191) and there is an aspiration towards redefining the terms of the debate while posing new and different questions (Day & Thompson, 2004:13).

Day & Thompson (2004) offer a useful four-fold typology of the main features of post-

classical theory. Firstly, post-classical theory is less involved and interested in forming general historical-sociological theories regarding the rise and development of nationalism. Although historical sociology is not abandoned altogether, there is less focus on the longue durée and more on the day-to-day (Day & Thompson, 2004:15). Brubaker (1996:19), for example, is more concerned with the 'eventful' than the 'developmental' nationalism and studies "nationness as an event, (…) as a contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action". He challenges the treatment of nations as real entities and shows that they are, indeed, subject to continual renegotiation across time: rather than reflecting reality, nationalism helps to organise people into groups. Post-classical theory is, thus, influenced by a turn against 'grand narratives' and seeks to uncover the temporality of nationalism. It also involves critical reflection on the practice of social theory itself — especially on how social theorists reify the nation (Day & Thompson, 2004:15).

Secondly, post-classical theory is post-foundational in that it rejects the idea that we can point to distinct nations that are, for example, bounded by a common culture. These approaches thus concentrate on how the 'nation' is constituted in various times and places, often through competing discourses of the same nation (Day & Thompson, 2004:16).

Thirdly, post-classical theory nonetheless takes into account the normative value of the idea of nation as a real community. As Miller (1995) notes, even if nations are not real in a sense that they have an existence independent of people's thoughts about them, it is still possible to conceive of a 'common public culture' and it is thus possible to speak of nations as substantive entities. Miller also points out that they can be "created and sustained by active processes of thought and interchange among the relevant body of people" (1995:6). Consequently, a nation is a form of community whose values and identity are subject to on-going negotiation and reflection (Day & Thompson, 2004:16).

Finally, post-classical theory involves "a broad emphasis on the active role of people

in interpreting and making sense of nationalism and national identity"; thus, post-classical theories often conceptualise "nationalism as something that people create together, rather than as a phenomenon over which they have no control" (Day & Thompson, 2004:16).

Post-classical approaches draw on different areas of social theory. For example, social theory pertaining to gender, sexuality and feminism highlights the relationship between nationalist discourses, symbolism and patriarchal practices and ideology while looking at connections between nationalism and gendered discourses of sexuality and sexual morality (Day & Thompson, 2004:13). Yuval-Davis (1997:1) notes how most of the hegemonic theorisations of nations and nationalism have ignored gender relations as irrelevant. While primordialists such as Geertz (1963), Shils (1957) and van den Berghe (1979) regard nations as an extension to kinship relations, they forget women when discussing national '(re)production', instead relating it to state bureaucracies or intellectuals who are seen to establish and to reproduce national and ethnic state boundaries and ideologies (Yuval-Davis, 1997:1-2). Yuval-Davis argues, however, that it is "women — and not (just?) the bureaucracy and intelligentsia — who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically" (Yuval-Davis, 1997:2). As nationalism is more often than not discussed with regard to the public political sphere, because women have long been relegated to the private sphere, women usually remain excluded from the political arena (Pateman, 1988; see also Kandiyoti, 1991).

An important and growing field within post-classical theories of nationalism looks at everyday nationalism. Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a:537) argue that mainstream nationalism studies have focused on the political, economic and cultural determinants of popular nationalism somewhat at the expense of the people. That is, the popularity of nationalism has not been systematically accounted for, and people are "assumed to be attuned to the national content of their self-appointed nationalist messengers" (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008a:537). Fox and Miller-Idriss, however, argue that the nation "is not simply the product of macro-structural forces; it is simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities" (2008a:537).

Billig's work has been highly influential within this field, especially *Banal Nationalism* (1995). With 'banal nationalism', Billig refers to those ideological habits that enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. Importantly, these habits are far from being removed from everyday life, as some have supposed. Here, Billig criticises especially Giddens who maintains that nationalism is a "primarily psychological" phenomenon, and that nationalist sentiments arise when the "sense of ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines" (1985:218), making nationalism an exception rather than a rule because nationalist feelings "are not so much a part of regular day-to-day social life" (1985:215). For Billig, nationalism is very much the rule. Indeed, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged', daily in the lives of its citizenry which means that nationalism, "far from being an intermittent mood in established nations", is rather the "endemic condition" (1995:7). Nationhood provides a continual background for political discourses and cultural products, and the reminding is so familiar and continual that it often escapes our conscious awareness.

Studying nationhood via studying the everyday is a fairly recent endeavour. As mentioned, the 1990s was characterised by a rejection of grand narratives in nationalism studies (Smith, 2008:564), and 'everyday nationhood' studies emerged as a rejection of what was seen as elite-centred studies conducted by modernists and their opponents — thus, the focus shifted to non-elites and 'the people' (Smith, 2009:134). Although himself a 'grand narrativist', Hobsbawm notes that even though nationalism is mainly constructed from above, it also needs to be analysed from below — that is, in terms of the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist" (1990:10). For Fox and Miller-Idriss, then, the nation is a discursive construct in that it is simultaneously produced by people on the ground, and through their daily activities. Thus, following from Bourdieu, "these discursive acts are not simply descriptive of social reality; they are simultaneously constitutive of that reality, willing into existence that which they name" (1991:223 in Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a:538). Therefore, nationalism operates and is discursively constructed both from above as well as from below.

Everyday nationhood studies have, nonetheless, come under attack from Anthony Smith, for example, who argues that ethno-symbolism straddles the gap between historical grand narratives and cultural micro analyses of "ordinary people" (2009:135). According to him, ethno-symbolists share a focus on non-elites' beliefs, activities and attitudes, while those studying everyday nationhood "pay little or no regard" to history (2009:134). Furthermore, he states that ethno-symbolism, which is rooted in the understanding of history, concerns itself with "historic nationhood" as well as everyday nationhood in that it considers the ways in which various cultural legacies and traditions of previous generations provide essential frames of reference for subsequent generations whose members adapt them to changing conditions and new challenges (Smith, 2009:134). Consequently, ethno-symbolism, according to Smith, came to be due to the dissatisfaction with purely structural modernist accounts of nationalism, which failed to pay attention to cultural and symbolic elements that are involved in the formation and shape of nations and nationalisms (Smith, 2009:135).

However, I would argue that ethno-symbolism fails to uncover the ways in which nationhood and nationalisms play out in people's everyday lives on the ground, that is, it — alongside other grand theories — fails to capture the *experience* of nationalism. This is not to disregard grand narratives as both micro and macro analyses are important, and both are needed. If we want to achieve a well-rounded and full understanding of nationalism at work in the contemporary world, we need to study the "here and now", as Fox and Miller-Idriss put it (2008b), while remaining attuned to debates with regard to history. Furthermore, we need to understand how nationalist narratives, many of which seek their legitimacy from history, operate contemporarily. Understanding how history, among other elements, is appropriated in nationalist narratives helps us understand the context in which people, both nationals and non-nationals, experience nationalist ideas in today's society. While I do agree that there is a tendency in some nationalism studies to disregard history and only study the 'here and now' without acknowledgement as to how we arrived 'here' in the first place, this kind of belittling of everyday nationhood studies seems unwarranted. I am, consciously, trying to address this gap between micro and macro theories, as well as contextualise my work, which looks at Scotland contemporarily, in relation to the history of Scotland.

As Fox and Miller-Idriss note in their reply to Smith (2008b:574), their primary research focus is not historical; rather, they are interested in the 'here and now' of nationhood, i.e. "the everyday contexts in which nationhood becomes (or is made) meaningful for (or by) ordinary people". Furthermore, they note how historically sensitive approaches, such as Smith's, and their more contemporary approach, are not incompatible but are guided by different concerns. While Smith focuses on the moment of ethnogenesis, Fox and Miller-Idriss — and their colleagues — focus on "the ways in which ethnonational idioms — once in circulation — are enacted and invoked by ordinary people in the routine contexts of their everyday lives" (2008b:574). While Smith and his colleagues, whether modernists or ethnosymbolists, have theorised about how "such idioms have entered circulation", "the availability of such idioms (…) does not in itself explain when, where or how those idioms actually get manipulated by their end users: ordinary people in the 'here and now' of everyday life" (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008b:574).

Smith does, however, level apt criticism against everyday nationalism studies when he asks:

> *And what is the relevant frame of reference of the various immigrant communities in western states? Here, the failure to separate ethnic community from nationhood conceals as much as it reveals.* (Smith, 2008:567)

I agree with this criticism to some degree — everyday nationalism studies have not made great inroads into investigating how minorities experience nationalism in their daily lives. Although looking at those whose "sense of belonging, and entitlement, remains largely 'beyond question'" is of great interest, and, although it means that, consequently, "we may be in a better position to explain why national forms of identification and organisation matter and, just as importantly, why such issues are being debated so ferociously at the current time" (Skey, 2011:2), we also need to look at those whose national membership comes under scrutiny and is problematised, and the ways in which the nation is evoked in *their* daily lives.

As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, in sociological writing pertaining to everyday nationalism, the everyday is often taken to uncritically mean the context in which things happen, while this context is never systematically scrutinised. Passing

through everyday contexts in an unreflective and unremarkable way is not an option for everyone (Smith, 2016). Everyday nationalism studies have mainly focused on those whose national belonging is not called under question, and whose everyday is often marked by unreflectiveness. However, looking at those whose belonging comes under scrutiny and challenge in their everyday lives reveals much about the relationship between race and nation, for example, and this focus also begins to disrupt the idea of the everyday as mundane and unremarkable. Indeed, the constant challenges to the right to occupy the space that you do, and reminders that you do not belong, demonstrate how unreflectiveness in relation to the everyday is a privilege. Black and brown Scots, especially, often face a continuous struggle to justify their presence and voice as will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7.

As already stated, Billig (1995) is interested in 'banal nationalism', and especially in the ways in which national identity is embedded in the routines of everyday life. As a result of this, the nation's presence is forgotten about. Further, he highlights how the 'flaggings' or reminders of the nation operate mindlessly rather than mindfully in the form of flags that go unsaluted and ignored, for example. However, I would like to emphasise that these flaggings are often far from being banal to those not belonging to the national community or who have a more complex relationship with the said imagined community. Billig does, however, note that banal does not signify benign and the institutions reproducing nationalism also possess vast armaments (1995:7-8). Further to this, I would add, banal nationalism is also reproducing the boundaries of the nation via 'ideological armaments', if you will, demarcating how the nation is envisioned to be in terms of values, culture (see Chapter 5) — or bodies (see Chapter 6), for example.

Thus, post-classical theory manages to capture those important micro level experiences and understandings of nationalism, and it deepens the picture and the analysis that is emerging with regard to contemporary understandings of what nations, nationalisms and national consciousness are, how they change over time, how they are manipulated, adapted and enacted, and how they may look like in the future. While the classical debate seems to be going round in circles or remain

stagnant at times, post-classical theories open up new horizons and seek to problematise familiar concepts. Chapters 6 and 7 specifically seek to make a direct contribution to this field of study.

*2.6. Dualistic categories of nationalism*

Spencer and Wollman (2005b:197) point out that there has been a tendency to split nationalism into two fundamentally different types, a tendency that goes back "at least to the seminal work of Hans Kohn". Thus, nationalism is often divided into oppositional categories: civic/ethnic, political/cultural, Western/Eastern or, more simplistically, as good/bad. Because there is such a strong conviction in both academic and political circles that the SNP's nationalism represents the 'civic' as opposed to 'ethnic' type — and this conviction has an effect on the ways in which the contours of the nation are imagined — it is worth considering the dualist categories in detail here, as this discussion will provide a theoretical foundation for Chapters 4 and 5 especially.

Historically, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism goes back to the work of Meinecke and Kohn. While Meinecke distinguished between 'Kulturnation' — a largely passive cultural community — and 'Staatsnation' — an active, self-determining political nation — in 1908 (Smith, 2005a:177), Kohn distinguished between 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalism in his work from the 1940s and 1950s (Spencer and Wollman, 2005:200). Kohn, Plamenatz and Gellner played a prominent role in coining the East/West dichotomy. Rather than being a merely geographical divide, these two types were attributed a particular — and value-laden — content (Spencer & Wollman, 2005b:199). According to Kohn (1965), nationalism was first developed in the West along singular lines as a product of the Enlightenment. He depicts Western nationalism as an essential expression of the confidence of rational and bourgeois individuals who wish to pursue legitimate interests, which is in opposition to Eastern nationalism which, in turn, developed in a different environment and along different lines as a reaction to the success and confidence of the West. Thus, Kohn made a normative distinction between the two opposing types of nationalism: Western types of nationalism — that were essentially political and

voluntarist — were seen as better than their 'backward' counterparts in the East (Mitchell et al, 2011:107).

Similarly, Plamenatz distinguished between Eastern (bad) and Western (good) nationalism (1973). Plamenatz holds a highly controversial view about the differences between East and West with regard to nationalism. He argues that in the West, nationalism can be seen to emerge among people who feel themselves at a disadvantage but who are, nevertheless, "culturally equipped in ways that favour success and excellence" (1976:33). The Eastern model, for him, represents "the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to them and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards" (1976:33). As Nairn writes, the Western type was perceived as "original, liberal and good" while the Eastern type "was reactive, envious, ethnic, racist and generally bad" (in Xenos 1996:214). Leah Greenfeld, a more recent author, also sees Western Europe and North America as places where civic nationalism is rife and Central and Eastern Europe as sites where ethnic nationalism can be observed (Xenos, 1996:215). Some commentators have noted the 'neo-orientalist' flavour of such characterisations (Brubaker, 2002:56). Indeed, such value-laden assumptions of the differences between West and East reflect what Stuart Hall has termed the discourse of 'West and the Rest' (2005b:200-1), and these assumptions highlight the ethnocentrism of the Western writers who denounce Eastern nationalism while remaining blind to the deficiencies (as well as the irrationalism, I might add) of the Western form.

The distinction between cultural and political nationalism is closely related to this distinction between Eastern and Western nationalism. Kohn (1965) refers to Western *political* nationalism which is progressive, modern and a creation of the present although orientated towards the future. Eastern *cultural* nationalism, on the other hand, is a reaction to political nationalism and stands in opposition to its core values and is driven by a different dynamic. While the former is rational and is related to the liberal revolt against absolutism, the latter is based on emotions, is inward-looking and concentrates on the past. However, when looking at particular cases the sharpness of the distinction between the two types is often hard to sustain (Spencer

& Wollman, 2005b:202). For example, the political ideal type is often, in practice, underpinned by a logic of assimilation: in France "cultural assimilation is the price that must be paid (...) for integration into the political community" (Mitchell & Russell, 1996:67). Nations that are ostensibly models of the political form of nationalism seem to exhibit pride in 'their' culture and, simultaneously, to experience anxieties about their health, security and visibility (Spencer & Wollman, 2005b:202).

The most discussed distinction is that between ethnic and civic nationalism, however. This is also especially important for the Scottish case, as Scottish nationalism is habitually referred to as a shining example of civic nationalism in action both by academics as well as (mainly SNP) politicians. The civic/ethnic dichotomy can be seen as an extension to, or as a reformulation of, the political/cultural distinction. For Ignatieff, civic nationalism denotes a nation that is composed of all those who subscribe to the nation's political creed regardless of race, colour, ethnicity, gender or language thus envisaging "a community of equal, right bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values" (1993:3-4). Civic nationalism can, then, be seen to follow the principle of *ius soli*, leaving membership to at least some degree open. In contrast, an ethnic nation is "first and foremost a community of common descent" (Smith, 1991:11) and such nations are believed to be "historically determined entities based on ancestry" (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996:15). Here, national membership is not a choice and remains closed and exclusive following from the principle of *ius sanguinis*.

Although drawing a similar distinction between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism, Brown differentiates between civic and ethnocultural forms of nationalism (2000) thus using slightly different terminology. While ethnocultural nationalism draws on a sense of community which focuses on a belief in myths of common ancestry, civic nationalism manifests itself through the belief that residence in a common territorial homeland and commitments to its state and civil society institutions generates a distinctive national character and civic culture (2000:51-52). Thus, all citizens — regardless of ancestry — "comprise a community in progress, with a common destiny" (2000: 52). Brown also distinguishes between the two in terms of their outlook: civic nationalism is forward-looking in that its vision is of a community in

the process of formation, and ethnocultural nationalism is backward-looking in its focus on the myths of the past (2000: 52)[3].

However, the dualistic way of opposing ethnic and civic nationalism is a highly problematic framework both theoretically as well as analytically as will be argued and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. On the one hand, the dichotomy relies on Weberian 'ideal types' and it thus does not reflect and, indeed, serves to conceal the messy reality of nationalisms. On the other hand, the civic/ethnic paradigm often involves (either implicitly or explicitly) a normative value judgement regarding 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms.

*2.7. Nation and 'the Other'*

As the focus of this thesis is on the ways in which Scottish nationalist narratives deal with difference and belonging from above, and the ways in which ethnic minorities experience said narratives from below, considering theories that focus on the relationship between nation, 'race' and 'ethnicity' are of great importance. It is often difficult to draw a clear-cut line between definitions pertaining to 'ethnicity' and to 'nation' as many of the features used to identify one are frequently used to identify the other as well.

Spencer and Wollman, for example, note how three out of six elements identified by Anthony Smith as central to ethnic identity reappear in his definition of national identity (2005a:11). They argue that although it may be possible and feasible to maintain an analytical distance between the two concepts, more often than not such formulations crumble in practice as in real life nation and 'ethnicity' become overlapping and interlaced in various and complex ways. By extension, the ambiguity between 'ethnicity' and 'race' has also been pointed out (Eriksen, 2010) which, in turn, complicates matters further. What, then, is the relationship between 'race',

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[3] Although Brown does clarify that the difference is not as clear-cut as both can take influences from the future as well as from the past (2000:56).

'ethnicity' and nationalism, and does this relationship help us understand how the nation's 'Other' is constituted?

Benedict Anderson (2006:149) famously argued that "nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history". Thus, for him, "the dreams of racism actually have their origins in the ideologies of class, rather than those of nation", and "above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to blue or white blood and breeding among aristocracies" (2006:149). Anderson further argues that because racism and anti-Semitism manifest themselves within national boundaries but not across them, "they justify not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination" (2006:150).

Gilroy, in his critical take on Anderson, argues that for the latter "racism is essentially antithetical to nationalism because nations are made possible in and through print languages rather than notions of biological difference and kinship" and "anyone can in theory learn the language" and become a citizen through naturalisation (1992:44). Gilroy, I feel, is being slightly unfair to Anderson. Rather than saying that racism and nationalism are antithetical, Anderson argues — contra Nairn — that racism does not *derive* from nationalism (2006:148). Anderson's argument is thus to do with the origins of racist ideologies which he links to class as opposed to nation. Further, Anderson seems to suggest in *Imagined Communities* that biology and kinship do play a part in the feeling of nation-ness:

> *Something of the nature of this political love can be deciphered from the ways in which languages describe its object: either in the vocabulary of kinship (motherland, Vaterland, patria) or that of home (heimat or tanah air (…)). Both idioms denote something to which one is naturally tied. (…) [I]n everything 'natural' there is always something unchosen. In this way, nation-ness is assimilated to skin-colour, gender, parentage and birth-era — all those things one can not help. And in these 'natural ties' one senses what one might call 'the beauty of Gemeinschaft'. To put it another way, precisely because such ties are not chosen, they have about them a halo of disinterestedness.* (2006:143)

Thus, Anderson's argument seems to resonate with Geertz's idea of 'primordial attachments' which Geertz explains as (1994:31):

*...one that stems from the 'givens' — or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' — of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, and following particular social practices.*

Consequently, Geertz argues, "these congruities of blood, speech, custom (...) are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves" (1994:31). The tie itself is thus attributed great importance. As Smith notes, primordialism has been associated with fixity, essentialism and naturalism, and Geertz has often been misread (2001:53). Thus, the important qualifying phrases of 'assumed' and 'are seen to' as well as Geertz's reference to culture (Smith, 2001:53) signal that it is humans who see these ties as givens, and that they are by no means given in a sense of being 'natural' or 'of nature'. Anderson therefore highlights how nation-ness comes to be assimilated with seemingly unchosen 'natural ties' such as skin colour or parentage. Such attributes then derive their power from their unassumingness: they are seen as beyond question, and what it means to be a 'national' comes to be associated with such attributes.


Etienne Balibar, in turn, sees racism not as an expression of nationalism but as a supplement internal to nationalism. Thus, racism — vis-à-vis nationalism — is "always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always still insufficient to achieve its project" (1991:54). Similarly, nationalism on its own is indispensable and insufficient in achieving the formation of the nation or the project of a 'nationalisation' of a society (1991:54). Racism induces an excess of 'purism' with regard to the nation; for the nation to be itself, it needs to be racially and culturally pure (Balibar, 1991:59-60). For Balibar, 'the Other' becomes crucial when constructing what it means to belong. In order to construct race as a supernationality, a way to recognise 'true' or 'essential' nationals based on some sure criterion is required. In practice, "the racial-cultural identity of the 'true nationals' remains invisible, but it is inferred from (and assured by) its opposite, the alleged, quasi-hallucinatory visibility of the 'false nationals'" (1991: 284-5). As a result, populations and social groups are 'racialised' and their collective features are designated stigmata of exteriority and impurity. When seeking to identify and circumscribe the shared essence of nationals, racism aims to uncover the 'core' of unobtainable authenticity, shrinking the boundaries of nationality and destabilising the historical nation.

However, as Balibar notes, the 'superior' race cannot, by definition, coincide with the totality of the national population due to the historical and social heterogeneity of the 'people' (1991:285-6).

Billig (1995:78) also points out how nationalism involves stereotyping 'them'; thus, nationalism is not just about 'us' but is also an ideology of the third person — there can be no 'us' without 'them', and defining who we are also emphasises who we are not. (see also Triandafyllidou, 1998). Billig (1995:79-85) highlights the fact that nation is never completely inward-looking but that a community can only be imagined by also imagining communities of foreigners (whereby 'foreigner' is a specific category, not just any 'other'). Nationalism is, thus, an international ideology as it constantly observes other nations in order to ensure that the nation meets universal codes of nationhood while at the same time gaining access to stereotyped judgements about foreigners. These stereotypes are then used to distinguish 'them' from 'us', and 'we' assume 'ourselves' as standard, the unmarked normality against which 'their' deviations appear notable.

Paul Gilroy (1992:44) argues that politics of 'race' in the UK are surrounded by conceptions of national belonging and homogeneity which not only blur the distinction between 'race' and nation but rely on the ambiguity for their effect. Nation is represented in biological and cultural terms and 'new racism' is primarily concerned with exclusion and inclusion in that it specifies who can legitimately belong to a national community while, at the same time, it advances reasons for segregation or banishment of those whose 'origin', sentiment or citizenship assigns them elsewhere (Gilroy, 1992:45). Gilroy refers to the 'camp mentality of nationalists', and defines 'national camps' as locations in which "particular versions of solidarity, belonging, kinship, and identity have been devised, practiced, and policed" (2000:85). The camp, specifically, is used as "a *metaphor* for the pathologies of 'race' and nation" (2000:85 — original emphasis).

For Hobsbawm (1992), nationalist movements seem to be reactions of weakness and fear; attempts to erect barricades to keep the forces of the modern world — such as

immigration — at bay. National movements, therefore, fuel defensive reactions in the face of a combination of international population movements and ultra-rapid, fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformations. He notes that "wherever we live in an urbanized society, we encounter strangers: uprooted men and women who remind us of the fragility, or the drying up of our own families' roots" (1992:173). Gilroy, in similar vein, notes that "alien cultures come to embody a threat" and any perceived national decline and weakness is blamed on the arrival of non-nationals  (1992:45-46). Worsthorne has said, with regard to the UK, that "though Britain is a multi-racial society, it is still a long way from being a multi-racial nation": while formal membership is provided by laws, more substantive membership derives from historic ties of language, custom and 'race' (in Gilroy, 1992:59). Gilroy points out that nationhood is not an empty receptacle that can be filled with alternative concepts according to the dictates of political pragmatism; rather, although it may be malleable to some degree, its links to the discourses of classes and 'races' and the organisational realities of these groups are not arbitrary. Thus, nationhood is confined by historical and political factors (Gilroy, 1992:59).

The authors cited above thus by and large agree that a close relationship exists between 'race' and nation, and that in order for the idea of 'the nation' to have purchase an 'Other' needs to be imagined as well. Gilroy's insight about the ambiguity regarding the overlap and interconnections between 'race' and nation is a crucial and revealing one. The concept of the nation — in order for it to have emotional traction — needs to be elusive and fuzzy so that it caters for a heterogeneous audience who may all have very different understandings of what a given nation is or ought to be. Beyond the elusiveness and fuzziness, however, different and often contradictory understandings of who belongs to the nation can be brought to view through careful interrogation and investigation.

Thus, this thesis seeks to contribute to these debates around 'race' and nation, but it is especially interested in the *processes* (Zimmer, 2003) through which understandings of 'race' and 'ethnicity' — as well as discourses around 'diversity' and 'difference' — are drawn upon and are related to ideas of 'the nation'. Understanding these processes is important because it allows us to focus on the messy and

contradictory ways in which nations are made and negotiated. Rather than labelling nationalism as 'civic' and 'inclusive' or 'ethnic' and 'exclusive' (and thus potentially racist), the focus needs to be on the ways in which social actors' nationalist narratives draw on certain ideas, discourses and understandings in an effort to demarcate and patrol the edges of the nation.

*2.8. Nationalism studies in the Scottish context*

Nationalism and national identity have attracted much interest in academia in the Scottish context. The focus has been both on Scotland by itself (e.g. Kiely et al, 2001; Bond, 2006; Virdee et al, 2006; Hopkins 2007) as well as on comparative studies whereby Scottish nationalism has been mainly looked at in comparison to Catalan and Quebecois nationalisms (e.g. Keating, 1996; Henderson, 1999; Hepburn 2011; Guibernau et al, 2013). Here, for the sake of brevity, the focus will on the former.

Studies pertaining to Scottish nationalism have mainly taken place at two levels (especially vis-a-vis 'race' and 'ethnicity'): from above and from below. That is, studies looking at Scottish nationalism from above have focused on the SNP's rhetoric and narratives around Scotland, 'Scottishness' and Scottish national identity in particular. Leith (2008), for example, seeks to find out whether Scottishness is projected as a political or territorial identity, and as an ethnic/exclusive or a civic/inclusive-based identity (or both at the same time) by studying SNP manifestos. Leith concludes that the employment of the notion of Scottishness within the SNP manifestos is resolutely civic in nature, with an inclusive vision of identity. However, he also demonstrates that there has been a change from the past when manifestos provided expressions of Scottishness that were more ethnic in focus and exclusive in nature.

Mycock (2012), however, contradicts Leith's reading of the SNP's understanding of what constitutes a 'Scottish nation'. He argues that the SNP deploys a form of 'black sheep nationalism' (see Shin et al, 1999) which seeks to denigrate rival constructions

of Scottish national identity whilst overlooking limitations in their own account. He concludes that the SNP's nationalism is not, as claimed, wholly civic and that ethnic constructions of the Scottish nation and its people still resonate. Furthermore, he argues that popular attitudes towards immigration allied to residual sentiments of Anglophobia and Islamophobia (see also Hussain and Miller, 2006) suggest there is potential for a more exclusionary form of ethnicised Scottish nationalism to emerge.

Meer (2015:1491), on the other hand, through conducting qualitative interviews with MSPs, looks at "how elite political actors are locating minorities within projects of nation-building under conditions of multinationalism and multiculturalism". Meer seeks to illustrate the ways in which political elites "can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in Scotland can be meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too" therefore arguing that there exists a rather 'civic' vision of Scottish nationhood among the political elite — though Meer acknowledges that Scotland's "historical experience self-evidently casts a shadow over contemporary expressions of nationhood" thus referring to Scotland's role within the violent history of the British Empire (a theme I will return to in more detail in Chapter 4).

On the other hand, studies looking at nationalism from below have focused on individuals' — both 'indigenous' Scots' and ethnic minorities' — identities and understandings of 'Scottishness'; that is, who is 'Scottish', and what does 'being Scottish' entail? These studies have also sought to tease out the ways in which nationalism and national identity interact and intertwine with issues of 'race' and 'ethnicity', for example. In the past two decades, scholars such as David McCrone, Michael Rosie, Frank Bechhofer, Richard Kiely and Ross Bond who are, or have been, part of the Edinburgh National Identity Group at the University of Edinburgh have been building a more comprehensive picture of Scottish nationalism and how Scottish national identity is constructed, reproduced and negotiated. McCrone argues that they have gone "beyond the more commonly held view that national identity is handed down in the form of a relatively fixed repertoire by power systems", and have focused on "how actors negotiate and mobilise identities which are open to them" (2001:153). On the one hand, the Edinburgh School have been criticised — and rightly so — for not taking sufficient account of the structures (including class

structures — see Hopkins, 2007) that limit or enable individual choice with regard to identity. On the other hand, they have also been criticised for attributing too much agency to individuals and overstating their ability to negotiate and claim (national) identities (Pryke, 2001). Nonetheless, while I agree with these criticisms, they have at the same time provided rich data — both qualitative and quantitative — regarding the changing conceptual boundaries of the Scottish nation.

Members of the Edinburgh group have come to term the key elements affecting claiming, attributing and assessing claims to nationality as 'identity markers' and 'identity rules'. While identity markers are defined as "those social characteristics presented to others to support a national identity claim and looked to in others, either to attribute national identity, or receive and assess any claims or attributions made", 'identity rules' are probabilistic rules of thumb which guide rather than enforce judgements about who is (not) one of us (Kiely et al, 2001:35-6). Thus, because markers themselves do not tell you how people use them, it is necessary to focus attention also on the study of rules in order to uncover and understand how markers are enacted. Furthermore, markers and rules are usually implicit and taken-for-granted, only coming to the fore more explicitly when something is problematic and contested about them (Kiely et al, 2001:35-6). Rules do, however, change over time, and they are sustained in the everyday dialogues between people when judgements are made about who people are and whether or not they belong (Kiely et al, 2001:52).

In addition to the study of identity 'markers' and 'rules', there has been a trend towards researching people's identifications with regard to prioritisation of identities. Hopkins found that young Muslim men living in Scotland tended to give priority to their Scottish identities, and that such findings can provide important information about the ways in which people choose to order their identities. He nonetheless contends that "such a line of questioning forces people to choose between two identity markers that they do not necessarily need to choose between" (2007:65). Further, Hopkins notes how focusing on the prioritisation of identities conceals their variations across space and time, as well as their fluid and contested nature. While a person might choose to identify as 'more Scottish than British', the

meanings, understandings and interpretations of such an identity will vary significantly between individuals, groups and places (2007:65). Here, considering Anthias's ideas regarding positionality discussed before are of use: depending on our "placement within" any given "social relations", the ways in which we act or identify may change.

This thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the two focal points of existing nationalism research — that is, nationalist elite rhetoric from above (notably by the SNP) and ethnic minorities' experiences and understandings from below. Studying both elite constructions of the nation as well as ethnic minorities' experiences of those constructions gives a more detailed and wholesome picture of the different processes at play — especially as this was done within the temporal and social context provided by the independence referendum. Research focusing on the SNP has, almost exclusively, adopted the binary civic/ethnic theoretical framework and thus, from an analytical point of view, remained rather restricted. Chapter 4 critiques both the analytical usefulness of this dichotomy, as well as the aptness of the dominant view of framing the SNP's nationalism as 'civic'. Chapter 5 begins sketching out new ways of analysing nationalism in Scotland using Zimmer's (2003) process-oriented approach in relation to the idea of 'Scottish values'. Literature pertaining to Scottish nationalism and both ethnic minorities and 'white Scots' has mainly focused on the issue of 'national identity'. What has been missing, however, is detailed discussion of how nationalist ideas affect the everyday lives of ethnic minorities in Scotland — this, in turn, will be the focus of Chapters 6 and 7. Indeed, as has been argued, studies of everyday nationalism more broadly have failed to take into account the experiences of those whose membership to a nation more often comes under challenge and scrutiny.

*2.9. Conclusion*

This chapter has sought to outline, introduce and critically discuss some of the key debates to which this thesis aims to contribute. All the debates covered in this

chapter tie into the subsequent discussions, and provide a theoretical basis for the chapters that follow. I have allocated a considerable amount of space to definitional issues — I felt that this was necessary as authors in this field do not always provide clear definitions of the key terms and concepts they use.

In terms of the 'origin debates', I find myself taking a position somewhere between modernist and ethnosymbolist arguments. I agree that 'nations' are modern phenomena and a modern way of imagining and conceptualising a community of people, and that modern technological advancements and industrialisation, for example, played a part in the rise of nations and nationalism. However, the biggest problem with modernist theories, in my view, is that they are offer a very pragmatically orientated account and by and large fail to account for the passion and emotional attachment (see Chapter 7) that feelings of belonging to a national community evoke in people, and why that is. Here, I think, ethnosymbolism goes some way in filling the gap by

> *...analysing communities, ideologies and sense of identity in terms of their constituent symbolic resources, that is, the traditions, memories, values, myths and symbols that compose the accumulated rivage of cultural units of population.* (Smith, 2009:15-16).

Thus, culture is privileged over the material and political domains "only inso far as we are dealing with the form, contents and appeal" of nationalism (Smith, 2009:16).

However, as argued, the post-classical debates have provided a welcome and fresh perspective to the study of nationalism by shifting the discussions beyond 'the chicken and the egg' debate of which came first, nations or nationalism. Post-classical debates have, instead, focused our attention on the relationship between 'race' and nation, for example, as well as between nationalism and the everyday. What has been, however, missing from everyday nationalism studies is a focus on those people whose membership of the national community is not usually seen as beyond question in everyday interactions (i.e. those who are ethnicised or racialised through both formal and informal means — see section 3.3.1.1. for a more extended discussion). In order to uncover how nationalist narratives contribute to the shaping of experiences of ethnic minorities (if at all) in Scotland and beyond, putting ethnic minorities' at the

heart of studying everyday nationalism is crucial.

Finally, the civic versus ethnic dichotomy has dominated much of literature on nationalism. This kind of theorising is not restricted to nationalism studies as "pervasive dualism" — as Calhoun puts it — is evident in Western thinking (in Heaney, 2013:244) more generally. Heaney (2013:244) — who takes an "expressly anti-dualistic" position — argues that "the spectre of dualism has haunted the social sciences for most of their history". That is, binary oppositions have historically included "mind vs body, order vs chaos, men vs women, being vs becoming, agency vs structure, individual vs society" as well as reason versus emotion (Heaney, 2013:244). I will discuss the civic/ethnic dichotomy in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 3

Methods and Methodology: Making sense of nationalism through a
multimethod approach

*3.1. Introduction*

The aim of this chapter is to explain and critically discuss what the rationale for this thesis is, the ways in which this research was conducted, and what the methods used to gather and analyse data were. I used a combination of methods, namely interviews (with practitioners, that is people working for ethnic minority third sector organisations; pro and anti-independence campaigners; and with lay individuals who come from an ethnic minority background), participant observation (at debates on the Scottish independence referendum and other related referendum events), as well as content analysis (of party political speeches and publications; interviews in the media; and televised and radio appearances of key actors in relation to the Yes and No campaigns). I will also discuss and elaborate my decision to focus on the independence referendum specifically.

*3.2. Aims and objectives*

This research is motivated by an ambition to better understand the relationship between how, on the one hand, nationalist narratives and rhetoric are constructed, developed and expressed in Scotland by the SNP and, on the other hand, how ethnic minorities in Scotland interpret, make sense of and possibly challenge or embrace nationalist narratives in their daily lives and experiences. Therefore, this research considers both the structural and institutionalised forms of the nationalist project 'from above', that is, from political actors and institutions, as well as ethnic minorities' understandings, interpretations, and contestations of the nationalist narratives; that is to say, their experiences 'from below'. Thus, using the

independence referendum as a case study, yet situating the discussion in a wider post-devolutionary framework, this research aims to, firstly, investigate the post-devolutionary relationship between nationalism and minority communities within Scotland, considering both the public, discursive construction of nationalist narratives with regard to 'ethnicity', and the interpretative and formative responses of minority communities to nationalism. Secondly, this research aims to understand and investigate the legislative, institutional and structural contexts for the management and creation of 'the Scottish nation' as well as the individual, subjective understandings and negotiations of this 'nation'. Therefore, this research considers how the structural and individual contexts interact, and possibly inform, overlap, and challenge one another. In order to meet these aims, I am guided by these research questions:

1. *How have different projects and narratives of nationalism been imagined, mobilised and contested in the context of the Scottish independence referendum in particular, and in the context of devolution more generally, by the SNP? What are these narratives' essential components?*

2. *What are the particular ways in which the public rhetoric of the SNP's nationalism has addressed questions of 'diversity', 'ethnicity' and 'belonging' in Scotland; how has it addressed and engaged with ethnic minorities post-1999 and in the context of the independence referendum more specifically?*

3. *How, if at all, have the SNP's nationalist narratives intersected with the formation of policy with regard to minority communities, anti-racism and so-called 'race equality', and with approaches to the treatment of recently arrived migrants?*

4. *How do nationalist narratives contribute to the shaping of the experiences of ethnic minorities, if at all? How do minority communities respond to, interpret and possibly challenge nationalist ideas and narratives?*

Questions 1 and 2 seek to uncover the ways in which nationalism is discursively and publicly constructed 'from above' by the SNP, and to consider how these narratives potentially account for difference and diversity in relation to 'race' and 'ethnicity' in

particular. Question 2, further, aims at highlighting the ways in which ethnic minorities feature and are included in the SNP's nationalist project (if at all) and question 4 considers how nationalist messages are understood and made sense of by ethnic minorities on the ground. Question 3 turns the focus on the more structured, formalised and institutionalised ways in which ethnic and racial minorities are addressed via 'race equality strategies' and citizenship rules, for example. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, nationalist narratives are not merely discursive formations, but have real effects on people's lives through policy formation, for example.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, when discussing nationalism in Scotland the dualistic prism of ethnic versus civic nationalism is often adopted. Within this framework, the SNP's nationalism in particular is usually argued to be an example of the latter 'type'. In seeking to answer questions 1-3, I will critically engage with literature pertaining to the civic/ethnic distinction, and interrogate the distinction's *analytical* usefulness in Chapters 4 and 5, especially. Furthermore, underlying my research questions is an engagement with seeking to understand the relationship between nationalism, 'race' and 'ethnicity'. Thus, I seek to make a contribution to existing understandings, as outlined in the previous chapter, pertaining to this relationship. With regard to question 4, I am especially looking to contribute to debates around everyday nationalism studies by considering ethnic minority voices and experiences within that context.

Although the discussion and analysis in this thesis will take the wider post-devolutionary context into account, I have made a conscious decision to focus on the period immediately before, during and after the Scottish independence referendum which took place on 18 September in 2014. Firstly, the decision to have a specific focus helped me to locate define the parameters of this study, and to give it a distinct and manageable shape and scope. It is incredibly easy to have one's research project expand beyond the limits of what is possible and feasible, and having such a clear focal point aided me in keeping the contours of the research in check. More importantly however, apart from the practical concerns, the main reasons for

choosing this approach had to do with theoretical, analytical and methodological concerns. My research focuses on issues around 'ethnicity', 'race', identity, belonging, and nationalism — themes which, notoriously, can be rather difficult to capture precisely because of their 'everydayness' or banality (Billig, 1995), at least to those people who feel themselves to belong unproblematically to the national community and consciousness.

Therefore, as McCrone notes, "it is generally in contexts where national identity is seen either to be highly salient or regarded as problematic that the complex processes of identity construction become most clearly apparent" (2002:307). Thus, it seemed to me that the independence referendum offered such a context of heightened visibility of issues highlighted above, namely 'ethnicity', 'race', identity, belonging and nationalism. Similarly, Flyvbjerg notes, in relation to the case study method, that atypical and extreme cases often reveal more as they activate more actors (2006:229) at a given moment in time. Further, drawing on ethnomethology's 'breaching' practice, Fox (2017:33) urges us to look to the edges of the nation — that is, to those "places, times and contexts where the nation is on the periphery — the edges — of our consciousness". Within these contexts our underlying understandings and experiences of the nation can be teased out. I will return to this point in more detail in Chapter 7.

I started working on this thesis in September 2013 — that is, one year prior to the vote. The official referendum campaigning period started on 31 May 2014 and lasted for 16 weeks — thus, I was able to follow the entirety of the campaigns when conducting my research. I received my ethical approval on 20 May 2014, so I was able to go into the field when the campaigns started. I conducted my last interview in September 2015, and this marked the end of my fieldwork period.

*3.3. Methods and data analysis*

As already outlined, I used a combination of methods to gather data, including interviews, participant observation and content analysis. Further to these, I also kept

a fieldwork diary where I would record my ideas, thoughts and feelings as the fieldwork and data analysis progressed. In this section, I will give an overview of the methods used, my rationale for choosing them, and will explain what I was trying to achieve through using these methods. I will also explain and discuss how the data were analysed.

As a brief reminder, through my data collection and analysis, I sought to answer the following research questions:

1. *How have different projects and narratives of nationalism been imagined, mobilised and contested in the context of the Scottish independence referendum in particular, and in the context of devolution more generally, by the SNP? What are these narratives' essential components?*

2. *What are the particular ways in which the public rhetoric of the SNP's nationalism has addressed questions of 'diversity', 'ethnicity' and 'belonging' in Scotland; how has it addressed and engaged with ethnic minorities post-1999 and in the context of the independence referendum more specifically?*

3. *How, if at all, have the SNP's nationalist narratives intersected with the formation of policy with regard to minority communities, anti-racism and so-called 'race equality', and with approaches to the treatment of recently arrived migrants?*

4. *How do nationalist narratives contribute to the shaping of the experiences of ethnic minorities, if at all? How do minority communities respond to, interpret and possibly challenge nationalist ideas and narratives?*

*3.3.1 Interviews and observation*

I conducted 29 interviews with 30 participants[4], nine of which were practitioner and campaigner interviews and 20 of which were interviews with 'ordinary' people. I have provided two tables offering an overview of the participants (see Appendix V). While the interviews were semi-structured in that I had an interview schedule at hand, I sought to conduct the interviews — especially with the voters — in a fairly informal fashion in order to make the participants feel more at ease, and to take the inherent power dynamics of the interviewing situation into account.

I began my fieldwork by conducting interviews with practitioners, that is, with representatives of third sector organisations working in the broad field of ethnic minority representation and rights. Interestingly, the practitioners I interviewed occupy a 'liminal' position in that although their organisations are mainly funded by the government — and that can therefore be seen as being closely linked with and implicated by dominant discourses — practitioners, nonetheless, are outwith the institutional structures of the government and, indeed, often directly challenge and contest the government's policies. I was interested in talking to these individuals as I was hoping that, due to their vast experience and expertise in the field, they would be able to give me (critical) insight into how ruling relations and discourses might affect and shape ethnic minorities' position and experiences in Scottish society — especially in terms of government policies and structural inequalities. That is, the practitioners can recognise how these discourses perform mediating, positioning work. Furthermore, many of the organisations the participants worked for also organised events and debates — some of which I personally attended — around the Scottish independence referendum. Again, I felt that because of this, they were in a good position to discuss the referendum from the vantage point of ethnic minorities.

I also interviewed people who were involved in the Yes (pro-independence) and No (anti-independence) campaigns, and therefore had a profound political interest and

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[4] There were two participants present at one of the 'practitioner' interviews; otherwise I conducted all interviews on a one-to-one basis.

conviction in relation to the referendum. While I initially grouped campaigners with practitioners due to their 'expert' knowledge and approached specific individuals due to their role in the campaigns, many of the campaigners spoke very much out of their own experience, and drew on their personal circumstances in the interviews. Furthermore, apart from one, all campaigners came from non-Scottish backgrounds. Therefore, the line between the campaigners and the 'ordinary' people I interviewed eventually became quite fuzzy. This is also why I have included these participants in the 'voters' table (see Appendix V) rather than along with the practitioners. The Yes campaigners I spoke to were the founders and/or active members of ethnic minority Yes groups. As mentioned in Chapter 1, during the referendum we saw the proliferation of campaigning groups organising along ethnic lines, and such groups as 'Polish for Yes', 'English Scots for Yes', 'Africans for an Independent Scotland' and 'Scots Asians for Independence' featured visibly in the debates and on social media. While some of the members of these campaign groups had an affiliation with the SNP, others did not. I was interested in speaking to political actors and activists especially from these kinds of groups because I was keen to hear how they negotiated their ethnic minority position vis-à-vis Scottish nationalist narratives, and how they made sense of their national, ethnic, and other identities in relation to these aforementioned narratives.

Additionally, I spoke to two No campaigners; one of whom was what the census would term 'White Scottish', and the other English with an African parent. I found it more difficult to identify No campaigners to speak to because, it seemed to me, most of the No campaign operated under the unified banner of Better Together while the Yes campaign was splintered into smaller groups (e.g. 'NHS for Yes', 'Academics for Yes', 'Labour for Yes', 'Seniors for Yes', 'Yes LGBT' — the list goes on). I recruited experts by directly contacting them, and requesting an interview. Therefore, I identified key organisations which had been vocal in relation to ethnic minority representation and rights, as well as 'ethnicity' based referendum campaign groups. I then identified the key contacts in these organisations and groups, and asked to conduct an interview with them.

As mentioned above, in addition to the practitioner and campaigner interviews, I

interviewed 20 ethnic minority voters. These interviews took place on university campus, in cafes, and at the participants' places of work, and lasted between half an hour and two hours, depending on time constraints and how much the participants had to say on the topic. The participants were recruited via different avenues: I placed ads on both Gumtree and Metro; recruited participants through friends; and snowballed interviews through other participants.

I decided to focus on people from specific ethnic minority backgrounds, namely African, Caribbean, English, Indian, Pakistani, and Polish. While I am fully aware of the criticisms made against such 'groupism' (Brubaker, 2002), I felt this decision made the management of the recruitment process easier. Nonetheless, Brubaker criticises the practice of taking groups for granted in the study of race, 'ethnicity', and nationhood (2002:164). This, for him, is 'groupism', i.e. "the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life (…) and fundamental units of social analysis", the tendency to reify such groups, and "the tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs" (2002:164).

While I agree with Brubaker's criticism, importantly, in addition to practical reasons, I felt there was a solid analytical rationale for focusing on these specific 'groups'. My intention is, by no means, to reify or essentialise these putative ethnic groupings. As Baumann (1996:9-36) convincingly argues in relation to the concept of 'community', by using such broad and wide-ranging concepts, we end up concealing more than we reveal; such overarching terms as community, or group for that matter, shape ethnic categories into communities defined by a reified culture (1996:16), therefore hiding the heterogeneity within these purported 'communities' or 'groups'. However, in addition to practical concerns, I consciously chose these 'ethnic groups', which I will now consider each in turn, because of what I considered to be their analytical value for the research, and their historical and contemporary significance to Scotland.

During the referendum, the veteran BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman argued that the campaign for Scottish Independence was fuelled by 'hatred' against the English (Harrison, 2014). Furthermore, Alex Salmond, when taking part in the phone-in hour on BBC Radio Scotland in August 2014 (this incident will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) was asked a question regarding what the listener saw as the growth of anti-English hatred in Scotland. More generally, Miles and Dunlop (1986) have argued that historically, with regard to 'race relations', Scotland has looked to its southern neighbour, and especially Westminster, as its 'other', rather than internally to its ethnic minorities. Therefore, because of the prominent position of the English in relation to Scotland's national imagining, I felt it was crucial to include English voices in the research.

I included the African minority (which, obviously, is extremely heterogeneous as it comprises people from an entire continent) as it is the most rapidly growing minority group in Scotland — totalling 5,000 in the 2001 census, and 30,000 in the 2011 census (thus seeing an overall growth of 479 per cent) (Simpson, 2014). Poles, in turn, are the biggest minority in Scotland at the moment, numbering 61,000 in the previous census (Simpson, 2014). Thus, as the biggest minority, and as the object of numerous moral panics (Cohen, 2002) fuelled by the right-wing press in relation to alarm over eastern European immigration in terms of numbers 'swarming' in and British people losing *their* jobs, this group seemed to be crucial to understanding Scottish national consciousness. Finally, I included the Indian and Pakistani minorities firstly due to their close connection with the British Empire and its colonial project. Secondly, Scotland has a long history of Indian, and especially Pakistani, migration stemming mainly from the historical imperial link. Finally, taken together, the two minorities total 82,000 people (33,000 Indians and 49,000 Pakistanis) in the 2011 Scottish census (Simpson, 2014), thus making up a group often referred to as 'Asian Scots' or 'Scots Asians'.

Because these groups are already politicised categories in social life, and have been subject to different racialising and essentialising discourses, it seemed appropriate to recruit participants from these backgrounds. Gaining insight into their experiences

would then allow me to critically interrogate essentialised views of ethnic difference by exploring how that perceived difference is experienced, negotiated and potentially challenged by ethnic minorities in relation to dominant ideas of 'Scottishness' and Scottish identity. Thus, these 'groups' are not the object of my study in and of themselves; rather, they are of interest due to their *political positioning* in relation to Scottish nationalist narratives. Understanding and studying their experiences will help shed light on the ways in which nationalist discourses operate, are constructed and affect people's lives beyond the local context.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that these groups differ in terms of their visibility in the literal sense of the word. While Englishness and Polishneness are, for the majority of time, imagined as white (both in terms of how people define themselves in the census, and what the 'traditional' understanding of these identities is in terms of 'race'), Africans, Indians, and Pakistanis are marked out as visibly different (as Black, Brown or as 'people of colour') in the White majority Scotland. Therefore, having both 'visible' and 'invisible' minorities offers an interesting contrast, and it is this comparison that proved to render rich data which will be discussed in due course in the following chapters.

In addition to interviews, I also observed events — especially political debates — connected to the referendum in the run-up to the vote (10 in total). I was especially interested to see how, in these events, nationalist narratives featured in the discussions, and how issues around belonging, identity and ethnic minorities were discussed — if, indeed, at all. I was also paying attention to how ethnic minorities[5] themselves interacted and spoke at these events. Furthermore, these events gave me a chance to have informal conversations with fellow attendees, and get a better understanding of how the debates were experienced and analysed by those following them. I kept fieldnotes where I recorded the themes and main discussion points that featured in the debates, as well as comments that were made from the floor. I also sought to record the general atmosphere and the feeling at these events.

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[5] Speakers would often profess their 'minority status'.

*3.3.1.1. Defining 'ethnic minorities' and 'migrants'*

Migration, to put it simply, "is the relocation of individuals to some distant place, i.e., at least beyond one's own city or town" (Bartram et al, 2014:4). While being a geographic phenomenon, migration is also — importantly for this thesis — a *social* phenomenon connected with such "life domains" as identity, economics, culture, and politics (Bartram et al, 2014:4). The migrant is thus someone who has moved, nationally or internationally, individually, with their family or other people, to a new location and place of residence. However, migrants often retain connections to their countries of origin as "even in relatively settled communities, people can communicate or travel between new country and home country, giving rise to the *transnational* communities and transnational transfers" (Fenton, 2010:118). Further, due to the growing trend towards "circular migration" (Martin and Martin, 2006 in Fenton, 2010:6) migration may often be quite short-term. In this thesis, the migrants I discuss have moved to Scotland from within the UK (England and Guernsey) and from outside the UK (e.g. Poland, Pakistan, Zambia).

As discussed in Chapter 1, "ethnicity refers to the *social construction* of descent and culture, the social mobilization of descent and culture and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them" (Fenton, 2010:3 — original emphasis). Ethnicity matters because people attach meaning to their own ethnicity and to that of others. Importantly, 'ethnicity' is also given meaning and has material effects through formal processes: "state institutions commonly use ethnicity as a system of classification in ways that can be highly consequential" — "for example, instruments like the census and the passport can make ethnic (and national) classifications seem natural" (Bartram et al, 2014:63). In the public sphere, "actions of private sector organizations and the media can have similar impacts: these institutions often present different ethnic groups as having distinct cultures and consumption habits, making ethnic differences seem natural" (Bartram et al, 2014:63).

Ethnic minorities are therefore those who are marked through both formal (e.g. institutional) and informal (e.g. everyday interactions) processes of classification and

categorisation as 'different' or 'other' and are not regarded as being part of the 'dominant' or 'majority ethnicity' (that often goes unmarked or invisible as the 'norm' which others are different from). As Fenton notes, minorities may be native-born, immigrants, or children of immigrants (2010:137). Indeed, "there are a variety of ways in which minorities become incorporated into political communities, from the conquest and colonization of previously self-governing societies to the voluntary immigration of individuals and families" and "these differences in the mode of incorporation affect the nature of minority groups, and the sort of relationship they desire with the larger society" (Kymlicka, 1996b:10).

The two concepts, 'migrant' and 'ethnic minority', are therefore closely related and not mutually exclusive. For the purposes of this thesis, ethnic minorities are those who, by virtue of e.g. their origins, language, religion, dress (and a combination of these) are marked out as different from the 'ethnic majority' both in everyday interactions as well as through more formal means (e.g. the census, equal opportunities monitoring forms). Migrants, when arriving in a new country, often become 'ethnicised' (and racialised) and are seen as belonging to particular "ethnic groups" (Kymlicka, 1996b). Perceived ethnic minority groups are thus made up of more settled minority groups and more recent migrants, for example. Crucially, these minority groups are not homogenous but individuals are further differentiated based on class, gender, sexuality, and disability, for example. I use the terms, i.e. 'migrant' and 'ethnic minority', to emphasise different facets of experience. When referring to migrants in a given context, I seek to highlight the experience and attribution of transience and a Simmelian sense of being a "stranger". When referring to ethnic minorities, I seek to foreground different processes of racialisation and othering. In real experience, of course, this conceptual differentiation is much less fixed, and a person's experience as a migrant, and their experience as a member of a racialised minority, will often overlap. Further, I also take into account the participants' own terminology whereby they may refer to themselves alternatively as 'migrants' or as being part of an 'ethnic minority' in different contexts.

Interestingly, Kymlicka draws a distinction between 'national minorities' and 'ethnic minorities'. By the former, he refers to cultural diversity that,

> *...arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state. These incorporated cultures, which I*

> *call 'national minorities', typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies.* (1996b:10)

In contrast,

> *In the second case, cultural diversity arises from individual and familial immigration. Such immigrants often coalesce into loose associations which I call 'ethnic groups'. They typically wish to integrate into the larger society, and to be accepted as full members of it. While they often seek greater recognition of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and self-governing nation alongside the larger society, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences.* (1996b:10-11)

The latter concept is useful for the purposes of defining 'ethnic minorities'. 'National minority', in turn, is interesting when considered in the context of Scotland itself. While it could technically be argued that Scots are a 'national minority' within the wider UK in the sense Kymlicka discusses the concept, I remain dubious of such an assertion. This is because Scottish elites have long wielded power within the UK, and have been absolutely central to shaping and contributing to its political, economic and social life and structures (including its colonial project — see Chapter 4). While certain fractions of the Scottish society have sought independence, and have therefore sought self-government, drawing a parallel between Scots and oppressed national minorities such as Native Americans, Maoris or Canadian Aboriginals seems disingenuous. Further, treating Scots as a 'national minority' risks feeding into and propping up the idea of Scottish exceptionalism (see Chapter 5) whereby Scots are depicted as somehow inherently different and more progressive than others (notably the English).

It is, however, important to recognise that the *belief* or *feeling* of being a 'national minority' does feed into certain expressions of nationalism in Scotland; that is, whether 'national minority' is an apt conceptual tool within the Scottish context is up for debate, but the belief of some constituencies that Scots *are* a national minority contributes to ways in which the nation is imagined and experienced especially vis-à-vis its 'significant other' (England). It could also be argued that certain sections of the population supporting independence (notably those living in Gaelic speaking areas) could potentially be seen as genuine national minorities following Kymlicka's

conceptualisation — though, historically, it would have been both Scottish and British elites who were responsible for the Gaelic speakers' 'incorporation'.

*3.3.2. Content analysis*

Institutional ethnographers have helpfully pointed out that technologies of social control are increasingly and pervasively textual and discursive (Smith, 1999 cited in DeVault, 2006:294). That is, texts matter because social relations are, in part, realised through the "textually-mediated social organisation", and it is therefore important to study dominant "texts-in-use" (Longhofer et al, 2013:88) which coordinate people's activities (Smith, 2006:65).

I, too, consider texts to be of great analytical interest, and I thus conducted a content analysis of party political speeches, manifestoes and publications. My focus was specifically on the SNP, but I also read and followed publications and speeches by the other main political forces behind the Yes and No campaigns, namely those released by the Labour Party, the Conservative Party (both part of Better Together) and the Scottish Green Party (campaigning for a Yes vote, although they gave individual MSPs the freedom to express differing opinions). I was interested in manifestos because "as definitive statements of party positions, manifestos are especially significant and enable systematic analysis over time" (Leith, 2008:84). While much of the analysis of material of this kind has tended to be quantitative in nature (Budge et al, 2001; and Klingemann et al, 2006 cited in Leith, 2008:84), as Smith and Smith (2000, cited in Leith, 2008:84) note, manifestos are "rhetorical constructions of political realities", and therefore their language and idioms are of great interest. Furthermore, as Leith notes (2008:84), while British party political manifestoes have been the subject of meticulous analysis, Scottish political manifestoes have been less so.

However, as Brack (2000) notes, these documents may not be widely read. Therefore, speeches and other public engagements by key figures from both the pro- and anti-

independence campaigns[6] were of crucial importance as, when conducting the interviews, a majority of the voters spoke about at least one of these politicians, and the majority had followed referendum debates on TV and through press and therefore had an idea about what their key political messages might be. Thus, speeches and other public performances are a central form of getting a party's political message and, importantly, their nationalist narrative across to the public, and are key media through which ruling relations are mediated.

In terms of the parameters of the sample, the publications I focused on were the SNP's White Paper on independence (The Scottish Government, 2013), and the preceding publications *Your Scotland Your Future* (The SNP, 2011) and *Choice — An historic opportunity for our nation* (The SNP, 2012). As for speeches, the sample was restricted based on temporal and person-based factors. I chose to focus on First Minister Alex Salmond's, Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's, Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism and External Affairs Fiona Hyslop's and Minister for External Affairs and International Development Humza Yousaf's contributions. This decision was taken due to these three politicians' centrality to the Yes campaign due to their roles. Additionally, Yousaf is one of the most prominent politicians of colour in Scotland — although born and raised in Glasgow, Yousaf's parents migrated to Scotland in the 1960s (his father comes from Pakistan and his mother from Kenya). Furthermore, I chose to focus on speeches delivered well in advance the start of the referendum campaign period in the spring of 2014, and immediately after the referendum result. Thus, the timeframe for the speeches under scrutiny is between January 2012 and September 2014. This allowed me to trace the development of the SNP's narrative over a set period of time, beginning with the preparations for the future referendum and ending with the thoughts and reflections on the result. Altogether, I analysed 36 SNP speeches (see Appendix VI for details). Through content analysis, I was trying to gain a better understanding, and to present to the reader the ways in which nationalist rhetoric is constructed, vocalised and developed by political actors and parties, and how it is communicated to the wider public. Understanding and interpreting how nationalist rhetoric is taken advantage of and

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[6] Such as those by Alex Salmond, Nicola Sturgeon and Humza Yousaf (SNP) and Patrick Harvie (Greens) from the Yes side, and Alistair Darling, Douglas Alexander, Johann Lamont, Anas Sarwar (Labour), David Cameron and Ruth Davidson (Conservatives) from the No side.

expressed from above provides the context in which ethnic minorities' everyday experiences and understandings of belonging and identity, then, exist and are possibly shaped by these public articulations of nationalist narratives.

### 3.3.3. Fieldwork diary

During my fieldwork, I also kept a diary where I recorded my thoughts, reflections and feelings with regard to the research itself, as well as with regard to the issues and themes arising from the research in general and the fieldwork more specifically. It also gave me a chance to reflect on my own positioning within the debate which I was very intimately connected to. I moved to Scotland in 2008, and at the time of writing this, have lived here for over nine years. Many of the questions I put forward to my participants were of great personal interest to me, and they were questions I had a personal view on as well.

This thesis seeks to uncover the ways in which nationalist narratives are constructed, and how those narratives are interpreted, understood and potentially challenged by ethnic minorities in Scotland. Being white, middle-class, cis-gendered, straight, able-bodied, and coming from a Nordic country in Western Europe (indeed, an area which was often referred to as a model for progressive politics by the Yes campaign), I fully acknowledge that my experience and perception is very specifically situated. However, I nonetheless live outside my country of birth, and listen to the same anti-migration right-wing rhetoric as my fellow migrants, and the descendants of migrants. I understand what it is like to struggle with feelings of belonging: to be in-between nations. While I cannot fully understand what it is like to be the target of racist violence, whether physical or psychical, I can nonetheless seek to uncover it and write about it as an ally, and therefore be committed to anti-racist politics.

### 3.3.4. Analysis

All data — interview transcripts, fieldnotes and the data for content analysis — were coded and analysed thematically. The analysis process, I believe, begins with the transcription of the interviews and the reading of materials for the content analysis as the researcher comes to know the data intimately, and starts to notice similarities as well as differences across the data. Following this, I began with 'open coding' (Neuman, 2007:330; Basely, 2013:126) whereby I started to group the data under broad 'emergent themes' such as 'nationalism' and 'Scottish distinction', for example. I also started to think about more focused 'subthemes' under these broader themes (Bernard and Ryan, 2010:54) such as 'anti-Englishness' under 'nationalism', for example. At this stage themes are tentative and open to challenge and revision.

Following this initial stage of identifying themes which gave me an overall picture and sense of the data, I immersed myself in the data again in order to undertake a more meticulous and focused reading of the data which enabled me to develop and tweak my themes and subthemes arising from the interviews and content analysis further. In addition to the coding process, I also wrote analytic memos with regard to the analysis. As Neuman notes, memos forge a link between the data and theoretical thinking (2007:334). For me, memos are a way of having a conversation with the data, and of noting down analytical ideas and thoughts as they arise in relation to the data.

Rather than line-by-line coding, I chose to code more substantial sections of text. In my view, this approach enables the researcher consider the broader context of the section under scrutiny, detect nuances throughout the speech and text, and to more readily notice connections between the data. Indeed, when coding, most passages fell under multiple themes and subthemes which highlights the richness and complexity of the data, and how intimately the themes are interconnected. Thus, data cannot be reduced to a simple and monochromatic interpretation. On a practical note, following a recommendation from a colleague, I used a storyboarding software called Scrivener to code and organise the data as, simply, I found Scrivener the most intuitive, easiest and most straightforward to use.

*3.4. Limitations of the study*

No research is perfect, and neither can it be. While there are many strengths to the present study, there are also limitations. Due to time constraints and unsuccessful meeting requests, I was unfortunately unable to recruit Caribbean participants. I was keen to recruit from this group due to Scotland's intimate, and violent, historical link with the West Indies as a result of slave trade and colonialism (see Chapter 4). Nonetheless, I did manage to recruit Indian participants who provided a link to Scotland's historical connection to the British Empire and, more broadly, I managed to recruit participants from categories that are politicised contemporarily (e.g. Poles) as well as contemporarily and historically (e.g. the English). Furthermore, the Caribbean and Scotland's historical and contemporary relationship with it will be a central concern of the broader analysis.

While I was able to gather and analyse data from multiple sources and by using various methods, I was also hoping to include a press review as part of my analysis. Due to time constraints, however, it became impossible to meticulously analyse these data. It would have been interesting to, firstly, see how party political manifestos, speeches, and other publications were represented in the media, and what aspects of them were given a platform. Secondly, it would have been interesting to see the extent to which newspapers discussed issues to do with 'ethnicity', identity and belonging in relation to the referendum and, if they did indeed refer to these subject matters, how and in what manner were these topics covered. This was, however, not doable within the timeframe of a PhD. Although media outlets were of crucial importance in getting parties' and media corporations' views of the referendum across to voters, as mentioned previously, speeches and televised and radio debates also fulfilled this role. Furthermore, in order to truly capture the SNP's nationalist narrative as they present it, second-hand accounts would have, perhaps, been counterproductive taken the aims and objects of the present study.

*3.5. Conclusion*

This chapter has outlined and critically discussed the central aims, objectives and research questions guiding, and giving shape, to this research. Crucially, this thesis seeks to contribute to understandings of nationalism on two analytical levels: on the one hand, by focusing on the SNP, it considers the ways in which elite nationalist narratives construct ideas and imageries of a 'nation'; who does and does not belong to that nation; and how that belonging can be or is achieved. As outlined in the Introduction, focusing on the SNP is interesting due to its status as a nationalist party, and due to the power the SNP has held especially since 2007 when they became the governing party. On the other hand, this thesis also interrogates ethnic minority individuals' experiences and understandings of, and responses to, nationalism within the Scottish context.

I have outlined that while I focus on the independence referendum as a case study, I nonetheless seek to situate the discussion in a broader, post-devolutionary framework. Besides making the project more manageable in pragmatic terms, it makes analytical sense to focus on the referendum. Nationalism can be extremely difficult to 'pin down' and thus moments when the edges of the nation (Fox, 2017) become more obviously visible are of important analytical value. The referendum provided such a context: as Scotland's future was up for debate, people reflected on the nation in ways that were revealing in terms of understanding how the content and contours of the nation were made sense of and imagined.

In terms of how the research was conducted, I opted for a multimethod approach. I therefore used interviews, content analysis and observation. These methods enabled me to collect meaningful and holistic data that would help me answer my research questions. In terms of the fieldwork process (which often tends to be rather messy!), keeping a fieldwork diary to organise and record my thoughts and ideas as they developed was especially useful. The diary also provided space for reflection during the thematic data analysis process.

Having provided a theoretical and methodological basis for my thesis, I will now move on to discuss the key findings of this research in Chapters 4-7.

Chapter 4

Civic vs. Ethnic Forms of Nationalism: Interrogating the dichotomy in Scotland and beyond

*4.1. Introduction*

Traditionally, the SNP's nationalism has been conceptualised through the binary distinction of civic versus ethnic nationalism, with various academics, politicians and political commentators arguing for the 'civic' quality of the SNP's nationalism. Based on a close analysis of SNP speeches and referendum publications, as well as interviews with practitioners and Yes and No campaigners especially, this chapter problematises this view by suggesting that it is erroneous to consider the SNP's nationalism as being wholly civic in its expression. Indeed, I argue that the conceptualisation of nationalism more generally in terms of a civic/ethnic dichotomy is analytically constraining and problematic.

Thus, this chapter will advance two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it will argue that understanding and considering the SNP to demonstrate nationalism of the civic, as opposed to ethnic, variety is misguided when taking into account the ways in which the nation is constructed in public political discourse. Secondly and importantly, this chapter will also argue that analysing and making sense of nationalism through the civic/ethnic lens restricts and limits our analytical process by drawing rigid analytical lines where they should not exist. Instead, nationalism should be understood as a complex and multilayered construction that must not be reified as a 'thing'. Nonetheless, it seems difficult to completely abandon ideas around civic and ethnic nationalism, as these have become an everyday way of making sense of nationalism in the Scottish context and beyond and, as such, are of interest as *objects* of analysis (as opposed to *tools* of analysis) (Brubaker, 2013:6) — thus, *how* we engage with ideas of civic and ethnic nationalism is of utmost importance.

In order to make these arguments, this chapter will, first of all, build on issues discussed in Chapter 2 and further consider the theoretical discussion around the civic/ethnic distinction. Secondly, it will then move on to look at the different explicit and implicit ways in which Scottish nationalism — as exemplified by the SNP — has been framed as civic both by the SNP as well as by academics. Following this, the notion of 'Scottish civicness' will be challenged on two grounds, namely in relation to culture and heritage on the one hand, and history on the other. Finally, this chapter will begin to move beyond the Scottish context and take a more detailed look at the analytical shortcomings of the civic/ethnic dichotomy.

This chapter will, thus, address issues regarding how nationalist narratives were mobilised during the referendum (and beyond), and especially consider the ways in which questions around 'diversity', 'ethnicity' and 'belonging' have featured in political discourse. In relation to this, I will also discuss how nationalist narratives affect and intersect with approaches to 'race equality' in devolutionary Scotland.

*4.2. Setting the theoretical scene: Civic vs. ethnic nationalism*

As explained in Chapter 2, nationalism is often understood and conceptualised in terms of dualistic categorisations in academic literature; be it cultural or political, Eastern or Western or, importantly for this chapter, ethnic or civic. Furthermore, these dualisms are closely interlinked — while civic nationalism is often depicted as political and Western in origin, ethnic nationalism is seen as cultural and Eastern. These simple dichotomous distinctions are then expected to do normative, descriptive as well as analytical work (Brubaker, 2004; Yack, 1996). Ethnic nationalism is seen as veering towards authoritarianism as it "presupposes an inherited commonality that must be imposed when it is not otherwise forthcoming" (Xenos, 1996:215) and is characterised as "illiberal, ascriptive, particularist and exclusive" (Brubaker, 2004:56). Conversely, civic nationalism is characterised as "liberal, voluntarist, universalist and inclusive" (Brubaker, 2004:56). Civic nationalism is thus seen as being ahistorical and acultural; a voluntary association of

culturally unmarked individuals for whom nation-membership is a chosen and not a given. This is, then, in contrast to ethnic nationalism whereby membership is understood to be based on 'ethnicity' (Brubaker, 2004:59-61). As Hearn has noted, "it has been common to make a distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' forms of nationalism, the former involving beliefs in biological and cultural essentialisms, and the latter involving commitments to ideas of citizenship and the rule of law" (2000:7 in Kiely et al, 2005:150).

However — and as will be discussed in more detail later — it is difficult to draw a clear-cut line between ethnic and civic types of nationalism. Keating (1996:5-6 in Brubaker, 2004:61-62), for example, characterises civic nationalism as "rooted in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity" and says it is based on "common values and institutions" as well as "patterns of social interaction". Thus, the "bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, historical memories and rational secular values" and "anyone can join the nation" regardless of their ethnic origins, "though the cost of adaptation varies". While "there is no myth of common ancestry" and nationhood is based on territorially defined community, he nonetheless contends that "there need to be a structured set of political and social interactions guided by common values and a sense of common identity".

Brubaker (2004:62), however, importantly points out that while Keating retains the universalist and rationalist emphasis on choice in his 'thin' understanding of civic nationalism, his "more sociologically realistic understanding pushes him to acknowledge the importance of 'common values', 'customs', 'historical memories' and 'a sense of common identity'". But, these are particularist, 'thick' and 'given' factors which more broad, culturalist understandings of 'ethnicity' usually highlight (Brubaker, 2004:62). Therefore, even such sophisticated definitions of civic nationalism as Keating's often include elements that are traditionally attributed to ethnic nationalism. Consequently, the line between ethnic and civic nationalism remains blurred and this, in turn, calls into question the analytical usefulness of such rigid typologies which do not seem to bear the definitional weight that is ascribed to them.

Similarly, when discussing the differences between civic and ethnic nationalism, Smith (2005b) seems to blur the line between the two types as well. While he attributes laws and institutions as well as legal and political rights to the Western or 'civic' model of the nation, he also sees a measure of common values and traditions among the population — or "at any rate its 'core' community" (2005b: 178) — as important. Furthermore, he also argues that civic nationalism is a predominantly spatial or territorial conception. However, this does not apply to just any stretch of land: "It is, and must be, the 'historic' land, the 'homeland', the 'cradle' of our people, even where, as with the Turks, it is not the land of ultimate origin" (2005b: 178). As a result, the "homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations, the place where 'our' sages, saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought" (2005b: 178). Thus, "in the Western model of national identity nations were seen as culture communities, whose members were united, if not made homogenous, by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions" (2005b: 178). With reference to ethnic nations, Smith mentions stress on (presumed) descent, a strong popular or demotic element and vernacular culture — furthermore, membership in such a nation is a given: in a sense that whether you stay or emigrate, you remain organically a member of the community of your birth (2005b:180).

As with Keating's definition, Smith's model attributes elements to civic nationalism which would, in Brubaker's terms, fall under the 'thick' understandings of ethnic nationalism. Not only does Smith evoke the idea of common values and traditions, he also makes reference to a 'historic' homeland which serves as a site of historical memories and associations. It is not clear how this, then, translates into an inclusive sense of nationalism: whose culture, values and traditions get to be included or get to be at the 'core'? Whose and which historical memories get to be remembered? Which myths and symbols come to prevail? Such a model seems to suggest that there is indeed a specific ethnic group around which such a nation comes to be, and continues to be, built.

*4.3.Civic SNP nationalism: Explicit framings*

Therefore, as seen in the previous section, the problem which emerges from the literature is the apparent instability of the categories of 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalism. As a result of the data analysis process it became clear that the SNP's nationalism is both explicitly and implicitly portrayed as being of the 'civic' kind. I will begin by discussing the explicit framings.

*4.3.1. Academic perspectives*

The SNP's nationalism has been portrayed as demonstrating civic characteristics not just by the party and its key figures themselves, but by various academics and political commentators alike. As Kearton notes, the civic conception of Scottish nationalism is widely accepted in academia (2005:26). She goes on to highlight Tom Nairn's comment that the "national movement [is] conducted exclusively in political terms — political, and indeed quite self-consciously civic and pacific terms" (Nairn in Kearton, 2005:27). T. C. Smout (in Kearton, 2005:27), in turn, argues: "Modern Scottish identity is much more firmly allied to a sense of place than to a sense of tribe." Similarly, for McCrone "Scottishness falls at the "civic" rather than the "ethnic" end of nation-ness" (in Kearton, 2005:27). Thus, as Hamilton notes (in Leith, 2008:83), there emerges a consensus in much academic writing which sees Scottish nationalism as civic and inclusive, and the SNP as "resolutely civic in [its] orientation", supporting a Scotland "where membership is a legal concept and not one based on ethnic exclusion".

Leith (2008) has provided perhaps the most meticulous and detailed analysis of what he sees as the civicness espoused by the SNP; indeed, he starts by saying that "this article *confirms the consensus* that the contemporary employment of Scottishness within the SNP manifestoes is very resolutely civic, with a clearly inclusive-based vision of identity" (2008:84; emphasis added). He does, however, demonstrate that the current state of affairs has not always been the case: analysing the SNP's manifestoes from the 1970s, he contends there has been "a change from the past

when manifestos provided expressions of Scottishness which were much more ethnic in focus and exclusive in nature" (2008:84). Leith, thus, argues that on an "exclusive/inclusive nationalism spectrum", the SNP has become "more inclusive in tone and direction" (2008:85). Therefore, for Leith, "the SNP has clearly become less nationalist within the manifestoes in the manner in which a sense of national identity is presented" (2008:85).

What is, however, curious is Leith's contention that the SNP is becoming 'less nationalist'. While he argues that the SNP demonstrate civic nationalist characteristics, he notes how they have become 'less nationalist' — therefore equating nationalism in general with its ethnic variant. So for Leith, moving from one end of the spectrum (ethnic nationalism) to the other (civic nationalism) seems to signal a decrease in nationalism as such, and becoming civic means you are 'less nationalist'. This is — as will shortly be discussed in more detail — a problem within nationalism studies. As long as the 'good' type of nationalism is manifested, it is not viewed as 'truly' nationalistic, whereas 'bad' forms of nationalism are. Thus, a clear normative distinction is made between the different forms of nationalism. This, in turn, leads to a simplistic 'civic-good, ethnic-bad' dichotomy which, to me, does not seem like a sound analytical tool. Crucially, as Brubaker notes, "understandings of nationhood as based on citizenship or political creed (...) are not more inclusive, but differently inclusive — and exclusive — than understandings of nationhood as based on cultural community or common descent" (2004:65).

Interestingly, during my fieldwork, some of the participants demonstrated similar conclusions to those drawn by Leith (2008). John — a 31-year-old SNP councillor originally from England — argued that 'Scottish nationalism' has been on a journey from an ethnic form to now being civic in form:

> Scottish nationalism has been on a long journey from its ethnic national roots right through to the very, very civic nationalist system which you see in place now. (...) There was definitely an aspect of ethnic nationalism in Scotland — Scottish, it being a thing of ethnicity, given the times in the 1930s was only to be understood. But, since then, it has been on a very long journey from ethnic nationalism right to the very core of civic nationalism...and I think that you said that academia's long espoused Scottish nationalism as an example of civic

*nationalism and it's very true.*

Therefore, he acknowledges how, historically, the nationalist ideas espoused by the SNP have drawn on Scottishness as an ethnic identity. This is, however, understood by the participant in terms of the historical circumstances of the 1930s. Another participant — Eilidh, a 54-year-old social worker originally from Guernsey — was highly critical of the SNP's policies and their nationalist agenda in general, and similarly noted how the SNP's nationalism has not always been "so…inclusive or so…cuddly", and that she is not sure "how long that will last and it certainly is very new".

### 4.3.2. Political perspectives

Aside from academics, the SNP have also been very vocal regarding the purportedly civic quality of their nationalism in the post-devolutionary period. Directly referring to nationalism in Scotland, in 2007 Salmond argued that it is a "democratic, liberating movement that everybody can buy into" which is "based on a peaceful, inclusive, civic nationalism, one born of tolerance and respect for all faiths, colours and creeds and one which will continue to inspire constitutional evolution based on a positive vision of what our nation can be" (Mycock, 2012:54). He has also highlighted the inclusivity of Scottishness and its compatibility with different identities and ethnicities by saying that: "No-one should be asked to sacrifice their identity to be part of Scottish society. (…) We see diversity as a strength not a weakness of Scotland" (Kearton, 2005:27). Such rhetoric lead Mitchell et al to point out how the civic-ethnic distinction has become part and parcel of the political discourse in Scotland and while this might "not have had an impact on the public at large", politicians from the SNP habitually describe themselves as civic nationalists (2011:109).

During the independence referendum campaign, the SNP continued to emphasise this discourse and explicitly remarked and made reference to the 'civicness' of Scottish nationalism. Alex Salmond, in his speech at the Glasgow Caledonian University's New York Campus on 7 April 2014, argued for Scotland's key role in international

diplomacy, citing the Northern Irish peace process and the 2006 St Andrews Agreement as examples. This then led him to argue that more could be done to support such initiatives if Scotland were to be a sovereign state, and that "our current democratic journey provides a helpful context — as we decide our future in a context based entirely on consensual, civic, non-ethnic and peaceful principles".

A few weeks later, on 28 April 2014, Salmond gave a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, and made a similar point by arguing that "ours is a peaceful, inclusive, civic — and above all a democratic and constitutional independence movement". Further, he went on to say that:

> *And our vision for our nation includes and welcomes all those who want to call Scotland their home. Of course, this inclusiveness extends to our elections. Scotland is one of the few places in the EU to allow other EU nationals to vote in our national Parliament's elections. They will also have a vote in the referendum on Scottish independence on 18 September. All 160,000 of them. That tradition is long-standing in our politics. Before the European Union was founded, citizens of the Irish republic were allowed to vote, as indeed they and citizens of other Commonwealth countries still are. Our civic nationalism promotes internationalism; our independence movement embraces interdependence. We seek sovereignty, knowing that we will then choose to share that sovereignty.*

Here he draws our attention to the voting rights granted to non-nationals as a sign of inclusion, and makes reference to Irish and Commonwealth citizens as a historical example and testimony of this inclusiveness. Rather than inward looking and closed off, for Salmond, Scottish civic nationalism promotes internationalism and global connections. Thus, he seeks to convey civic nationalism as a positive force, as an outlook that is open to the world — a view that is implicitly contrasted to 'traditional' understandings of nationalism as aggressive, inward-looking and exclusive.

### 4.3.3. Practitioners' and campaigners' perspectives

Apart from academics' and the SNP's framing of 'Scottish nationalism' as civic, what was telling about many of my 'expert' interviews was the extent to which this account of 'civic' SNP nationalism was reiterated amongst my respondents. Thus, it is interesting to consider the ways in which the participants — especially the ones more

directly involved in politics or activism and the race equality sector — made sense of the SNP and characterised its nationalist narratives. Their views are of interest because these actors are likely to be more actively aware of, or engaged with, SNP's visions of the 'Scottish nation', or where the SNP may imagine the parameters of that nation to lie. Therefore, taking their 'expert' understanding of the SNP and its ideas and policies into account, it is interesting to see to what extent they agree with the 'civic' characterisation.

For example, a CEO of an ethnic minority third sector organisation — albeit perhaps with slight hesitation — put it this way:

> Practitioner 1: *But I mean, that's...so...I think we know from the SNP's nationalism it's not identity and it's not...everything they've said about everyone will be a citizen. But it's their view, we don't know but, you know.*

And later:

> Practitioner 1: *Okay, the SNP nationalism has been very civic, inclusive nationalism — not a problem for anybody — and they've said the right things inside but...what you don't know is what will happen or who will be in power.*

The participant, thus, highlights three points in relation to the SNP's presentation of the party's nationalism: he argues that it is not about identity and that it is inclusive — it is "not a problem". Secondly, there is — as already suggested — slight hesitation to his account: for example, in relation to citizenship he qualifies his statement with "we don't know but, you know". Thirdly, in relation to this, as he points out, the SNP promised citizenship for everyone living in Scotland at the point of independence.

Indeed, in order to demonstrate their discourse of openness and inclusivity in more practical terms, the SNP argued for a liberal take on citizenship during the referendum campaign. Thus, the White Paper outlines that

> *At the point of independence, this Government proposes an inclusive model of citizenship for people whether or not they define themselves as primarily or exclusively as Scottish or wish to become a Scottish passport holder. People in Scotland are accustomed to multiple identities, be they national, regional, ethnic, linguistic or religious, and a commitment to a multi-cultural Scotland will be cornerstone of the nation on independence.* (The Scottish Government, 2013:271)

Alex Salmond reiterated this view in a phone-in hosted by BBC Radio Scotland:

> *Well, Morris [the caller] — again, the White Paper outlines the citizenship qualifications which are extremely thorough and open. I mean, everybody in Scotland, regardless of background, where they came from, everybody born in Scotland — a range of other categories can apply for citizenship in an independent Scotland. We couldn't be more explicit, and we couldn't be more generous in terms of what's been offered. (...) there's nothing in that which could possibly be described as in any way inward-looking or mean-minded; just the opposite.* (Morning Call, 29.8.2014)

Of course, granting citizenship cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of an unproblematic demonstration of full inclusiveness and civic nationalism — and the participant is not suggesting it should. Although citizenship grants an official status of belonging to a polity legally, we must not uncritically treat it as the ultimate form of belonging (although we should also be careful not to downplay the type of security and status a passport can impart). While it is important to acknowledge the SNP's rather inclusive vision of citizenship, it is important to look beyond passports.

Similarly to the CEO quoted above, Pietr, a 31-year-old health care worker originally from Poland, and an active Yes campaigner, mentions how the SNP's nationalism is 'civic' and 'left-wing' nationalism. I asked him to explain what civic nationalism means to him:

> *It doesn't matter who you are or from where you come from, if you are living here, you are taking responsibilities for this country and you got tried to do your own country, yeah. That's how I see it. And it's totally in the contrast of British nationalism — ol- - well, this campaign was a clash of two different nationalisms. A British one, which is defined in the conservative way, like...Britain for British people [unintelligible]. Look how often they were saying 'I'm patriotic, I'm British, proud, army, queen', yeah. That's what they were saying during the campaign and on, on the contrast you have the Yes movement, yeah, civic nationalism. Umm, [unintelligible] nationalist because it was saying about democracy, equality, umm, diversity, human rights. [Pause] That's the difference.*

Pietr starts his definition by highlighting things that, for him, are key to civic nationalism. What matters is that you live in Scotland (residency) and that you are taking responsibility for the country (making a contribution) as you would do in your

'own country'. As will be discussed, these tropes of residency and contribution became central to the SNP's understanding of who make up the 'people of Scotland'; those who live and work here. Further, Pietr also explains what civic nationalism (as embodied by the Yes movement) is through a comparison with British nationalism which, for him, conveys a conservative 'Britain for British people' attitude. Pietr goes on to argue that British nationalism relies on such institutions as the military and the monarchy as receptacles of pride and patriotism. While Scotland, of course, shares the Queen as the head of state and contributes to the army, these, for Pietr, are not central to Scottish civic nationalist understandings or constructions of the nation.

In a similar vein, the Yes campaign was framed as an example of civic nationalism by John, the SNP councilor who I interviewed, and by one of the practitioners who works as a policy officer in the third sector. Here John, in a similar vein to Pietr, expresses the importance of residency and contribution as a foundation for national belonging.

> John: *Whereas civic nationalism, which I'm really glad the Yes campaign is all about, civic nationalism is the idea that if you live and work in a country, and you work for its betterment, and you work to better the lives of all people in that country, regardless of where they're from, regardless of where they're born, regardless of their religious creed, their gender, their ethnicity, their...sexual orientation, their, their age or their, you know, the colour of their hair for that matter — it doesn't matter, you live and work here, then we're for you.*

> Practitioner 5: *(…) the rise of rightwing extremism in Europe, ehm, which is mirrored in some way by the rise of UKIP in, ehm, Britain and that the Yes campaign was somehow the...equivalent rise of nationalism within Scotland as we had some in another areas of Europe, was ehm...disingenuous I believe, because it's not a ch-chance - - no snowball's chance in hell that groups (…) within the race equality sector would stay quiet for one second if they had a sniff of ethnic nationalism within the con- - context of the independence referendum. Ehm, you touched upon different ethnic minority communities have set up their own specific, ehm, campaigning groups and I think that is testament to the fact that it's a civic nationalism as opposed to an ethnic nationalism.* (Policy officer, Ethnic minority third sector organisation)

Interestingly, the latter quote from the policy officer highlights how the participant sees the proliferation of Yes groups based on 'ethnicity' — such as 'Africans for Independent Scotland', 'Scottish Asians for Independence', 'English Scots for Yes',

'Polish for Yes' — as an indication of how 'civic' nationalism in Scotland is. A similar point was made by Odogwu, a Nigerian 36-year-old student and active Yes campaigner who talked about the Yes campaign as being a grassroots and community-driven campaign which people from 'all over the world' took part in:

> *(...) communities in the sense that you have groups of people, people from..different parts of the world who have decided to make this place their home, or call this place home, so you know, you have different groups. So this wasn't about nationalism per se, because you had Nigerians, you had Polish campaigning for independence, I met Canadians, I met, you know, different people from different pa..all over the world campaigning for this.*

Here Odogwu, interestingly, also raises the issue of the independence referendum not being "about nationalism *per se*" — a theme that, as we shall see in due course — featured strongly in SNP's imagining and interpretation of the motives for the referendum.

Crucially, however, the cropping-up of such ethnic minority Yes groups did highlight a certain paradox. Here, John, the SNP councillor, was speaking about how some people might fall into the trap of thinking that the vote was about 'ethnicity' if they mainly hear English voices on the No side, and Scottish voices on the Yes side. Therefore:

> John*: (...) I think someone needs to be English and speak up for the Yes side as well, because I can tell someone it's not about anti-Englishness at all, it's not an anti-English message, it's not about Scots versus England, it's about where we should be governed from, and they'll listen to me because I'm English.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah.*
>
> John*: 'Cause they..they'll..it is about nationality. So ironically, while it's not about nationality, I founded a group that's about nationality [laughs], so it's kind of a..an interesting, umm, what the word, umm, it's kind of a...almost an illogical fallacy, I'm..*
>
> Minna*: Yeah, like a paradox.*

Such an insight into the way in which 'ethnicity' and nationalism interact is extremely valuable. Here, a far more complicated picture begins to emerge — indeed, one that begins to challenge the dominant discourse of the SNP's nationalism as straightforwardly civic and not concerned with 'ethnicity'. There are 'paradoxes' at play, and it is exactly these inconsistencies that are most revealing about the ambiguity of dominant conceptions of nationalism (a point which I also raised in

Chapter 2).

Thus, as can be seen from the above, the civicness of nationalism in Scotland — especially in terms of the SNP's nationalism — is often mentioned in explicit terms by academics and political actors, and this view was echoed by practitioners and campaigners as well. During the referendum campaign there was also a more implicit tendency to highlight the ostensible openness and inclusiveness of Scottish nationalism. This was mainly reflected in the way in which the referendum itself was framed — as Odogwu put it, it was not about 'nationalism per se'. Through arguments pertaining to democracy, social justice and fairness, diversity, and rationality, the SNP argued that independence was necessary to affect wider societal change with regard to inequalities, for example. In addition, the SNP also take a neoliberal and utilitarian approach to immigration, which implicitly contributes to the framing of Scottish nationalism as civic.

## 4.4. 'Civic' SNP nationalism: Implicit framings

In addition to explicit framings, the SNP implicitly framed their nationalism as civic during the referendum. Here, the arguments related to 'democratic deficit', 'social justice', 'diversity', 'independence as the rational choice', and the 'economic utility' of migration.

### 4.4.1. 'Democracy' arguments

Let us begin with the SNP's argument that a key justification for independence was a perceived democratic deficit with regard to Scottish affairs. In his foreword to *Scotland's Future* (The Scottish Government, 2013) — i.e. the SNP's White Paper on independence — Alex Salmond makes the argument which was frequently reiterated during the referendum campaign: namely, that voting for independence was a matter

of democracy, that it was about "the power to choose who we should be governed by and the power to build a country that reflects our priorities as a society and our values as a people" (p.viii). Indeed, in the 36 SNP speeches analysed for this thesis, this democratic argument featured in 26. In his spring conference address (23 March 2013), Salmond notes that "on 18 September 2014 we will have the opportunity to ensure that decisions about Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and work here" — thus, for him, this is "the essence of self-determination for the nation" (speech at Mareel Arts Centre, 25 July 2013).

Fiona Hyslop — Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism and External Affairs — extends this notion by saying that

> *...it is the fundamental belief that it will be better for us all, if decisions about the future of Scotland are taken by those who care most about Scotland — the people who live here. (...) It will mean supporting the view that people who live here, rather than in Westminster, will do a better job of running Scotland* (speech at the University of Edinburgh, 5 June 2014).

For Salmond independence would end "our democratic deficit" and "the people of Scotland will finally get the governments we vote for" (speech in Arbroath, 18 August 2014). Thus, "UK governments that we don't vote for should have none of the say" — rather, "the people of Scotland should have all the say" (DFM Nicola Sturgeon, SNP Spring Conference, 23 March 2013). Salmond argues that the democratic deficit is "not a passing inconvenience, but a debilitating disconnect at the very heart of politics". He goes on to reflect on Westminster governments:

> *I'm 59 years old. For more than half of my life, Scotland has been ruled by parties with no majority. At the last four UK elections, the Conservatives in Scotland have won 0, 1, 1, and 1 seat respectively.* (*New Statesman* Lecture, 4 March 2014)

Therefore, in terms of the argument that independence would fix the issues of democratic deficit, some key points become evident. Firstly, an idea that runs through the SNP speeches and written Yes materials such as the White Paper on independence (The Scottish Government, 2013), is that the people who live and work in Scotland are best placed to take decisions about Scotland and its future. Thus, there is a sense of framing belonging to the 'Scottish nation' through residency — 'living

here' — and economic contribution — 'working here'. Secondly, linked to this is the notion that Westminster does not have Scotland's best interests at heart; that people who live and work in Scotland are the ones that *care* most about Scotland.

Finally, repeated references are made to the extent to which Scotland "is still affected by decisions on welfare, employment, taxation and business regulation — made by UK governments which, more often than not, we didn't vote for" (Alex Salmond, International Festival for Business, Liverpool, 17 July 2014). This point is usually made with reference to Conservatives:

> *With independence Scotland will get the governments it votes for. In contrast, we are now governed from Westminster by a Conservative led administration. In the last four UK General Elections, the Conservatives have won — in order — zero, one, one and one Westminster seats in Scotland[7]. Yet they make the big decisions on our economy, welfare and tax systems, and on whether nuclear weapons should continue to be based in this country. That might sound like an anti-Tory point. But it is more fundamentally a pro-democracy one.* (DFM Nicola Sturgeon, Keynote speech to the David Hume Institute, Edinburgh, 15 January 2014)

Here, Sturgeon is keen to point out that she is not making 'an anti-Tory point' in relation to the democratic argument; that is, should having a Conservative government be the will of the people in an independent Scotland, that would be democracy at work — unlike now. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, a strand of 'anti-Toryism' is evoked when imagining Scotland and Scottishness through the notion of shared values and ideals.

### 4.4.2. 'Social justice' arguments

In addition to the democracy arguments, the referendum was also framed through the ideas of social justice and fairness (see also Mooney & Scott, 2015). Again, in the 36 SNP speeches analysed, the themes of 'fairness' and 'social justice' were referred to in 27. Nicola Sturgeon, for example, said in her spring conference address (23 March 2013) that "if we are to build a better, more democratic, just and prosperous country

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[7] In the 2017 General Election, the SNP lost 21 seats while Scottish Conservatives gained 12 seats. As a result, the two parties now have 35 and 13 MSPs respectively.

for our children to inherit, then let me tell you this — Independence is not optional. Independence is essential".

Further, she also noted how the UK government's welfare cuts "are a dagger to the heart of the fairness and social justice that we hold so dear". Sturgeon also connected the social justice argument to the democratic deficit argument by saying that the cuts "are a disgrace to democracy too" since "four out of five — 80% — of Scottish MPs voted against the benefit cap" and "90% voted against the bedroom tax". She goes on to say, "And Westminster's reaction? They shrug their shoulders and impose the cuts anyway. It is a democratic outrage and its time is up". Alex Salmond noted how the Yes 'movement' was "dedicated to a common goal", namely "to build a better Scotland" and "to create a fairer society" (SNP conference address, 12 April 2014).

Therefore, both Salmond and Sturgeon sought to steer away from identity politics by suggesting that the fundamental issues at stake in the referendum — and the fundamental reason for voting yes on independence — were to do with advancing social justice (i.e. building a more equal and socially just society) and democracy (i.e. taking political decisions locally). As Sturgeon summed it up in her spring conference speech (23 March 2013):

> *Our case for independence is about the kind of country we want Scotland to be. It can be summed up in three words — fairness, prosperity, democracy. Three pillars of any decent society.*
>
> *(...)*
>
> *And, make no mistake, each and every one of them is being undermined and eroded by out of touch Westminster governments. And Scotland needs independence to put a stop to it.*

### 4.4.3. Referendum and diversity

Furthermore, during the referendum, there was also a strong suggestion that

regardless of where you come from, you should be able to take part in making this decision. Again, the supposed inclusivity was used as a way to frame the debate as civic. This tendency was highlighted by Alex Salmond in an interview with a Polish expatriate magazine: "There is, I believe, a universal law, which is that the people who live and work in a country are the best ones to decide its future. It's nothing to do with background or origin" (MacGuire and Bator-Skórkiewicz, 2014:27). Similarly, Nicola Sturgeon emphasised the role that all 'people of Scotland' have in taking part in the process of building Scotland's new chapter:

> *My case for independence is based on confidence, it's based on belief, it's based on hope and it's based on an unshakable knowledge that we in Scotland — all of us, regardless of where we come from — if we work together, we can build a better country.* (Sikh Channel, Independence referendum special 6.9.2014)

Indeed, Scotland's diverse communities were referred to on several occasions during the referendum campaign. Nicola Sturgeon, taking part in a referendum debate with Labour's Anas Sarwar at a Gurdwara in Glasgow, said that being there gave her a chance to say,

> *...from my heart, that I believe the diversity of Scotland, the wonderful cultural diversity of our country, is one of our great strengths. You don't have to have been born in Scotland to vote yes in the referendum. Anyone who has chosen to make Scotland their home, anyone who has done us the great honour of making Scotland their home, is part of Scotland. You belong to Scotland and Scotland belongs to you, as much as that is the case for me.* (Sikh Channel Independence referendum special, 6.9.2014).

In a similar vein, Salmond praises the diversity and vibrancy of Scotland on the opening pages of the White Paper (2013:viii). As a result, Scottishness is routinely framed as an open and all-encompassing identity:

> *And all this nonsense about repatriating English — we value, absolutely value English people in Scotland, they're part of the community and it's perfectly satisfactory for people to be English and Scottish, Irish and Scottish, Pakistani and Scottish — it's one of the great things about Scottishness: it's a nonexclusive identity. And every single person who's part of our community will have equal status as a citizen, and equal rights and deserves equal respect.* (Alex Salmond, Morning Call, BBC Radio Scotland, 29.8.2014)

Humza Yousaf, an SNP Minister for Europe and International Development and, as he describes himself, "a son of Pakistani immigrants", went on to argue in an interview on Channel 4 News that "there has *always* been an identity of Scottishness", and that ethnic minorities are more likely to call themselves Scottish as shown by studies. He then goes on to say that,

> *Actually — in Scotland — and talking as an ethnic minority in here, we've never been asked, 'look, are you Scottish or are you Pakistani, are you Scottish or Asian, are you Scottish or English'. Actually, people accept you for being Scottish; you complain about the bad weather, the sometimes dodgy football team and that makes you Scottish* (Channel 4 News, 1.5.2014).

Thus, across these statements, diversity is praised as a strength. Interestingly, Sturgeon argues that you do not need to be born in Scotland in order to vote yes. Consequently, she highlights and contests the implicit and underlying sense of a yes vote potentially being seen as nationalist or patriotic. Salmond and Yousaf raise the issues of identity, and argue that Scottishness is a 'nonexclusive identity' that does not require the denouncement of other identities — rather, Scottishness is portrayed as happily existing alongside other identities, and as deriving from such mundane, everyday activities as complaining about the weather and supporting a 'dodgy football team'. However, although these visions of the 'Scottish nation' seem inclusive and democratic on the face of it, understandings of the 'Scottish nation' nonetheless remain underpinned by essentialised notions of racial difference. There is an implicit assumption that there exists a type of 'Scottishness' from which some are *different* but despite their difference — because of the non-exclusionary nature of 'Scottish identity' — they can nonetheless *belong*.

### 4.4.4. Independence as the 'rational' choice

What transpires, on the surface at least, then, is a sense of utilitarianism as regards the SNP's independence endeavour — through independence Scotland would be an even better global citizen; independence would enable democracy *propre*; and it would enable the creation of a fairer and more prosperous nation. Indeed, Nicola

Sturgeon, in her speech at the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law on 16 June 2014, draws upon a distinction between 'existential' and 'utilitarian' nationalists made by Sir Neil MacCormick. She counts herself in the latter category, as someone who supports independence "as the best way of achieving the sort of society we want" while 'existential nationalists' "support independence for its own sake". While she contends that "this being Scotland, of course, both strands of nationalisms comfortably co-exist within the country, the Yes Campaign, the SNP, and probably within most individual nationalists", for her the current debate on independence is nonetheless predominantly "about the opportunities that independence will bring Scotland — opportunities for economic growth, for a fairer society, and for Scotland's place in the world". Thus, for Sturgeon, "the terms of the debate are very much those of the utilitarian nationalism". Not only is nationalism on the Yes side thus presented as being civic in form, but it is also utilitarian in its purpose, rather than instinctual or 'natural'.

Therefore, "at its heart, ours is not an emotional argument", Sturgeon maintains. Rather,

> *It is rational, reasonable and responsible. It is about the best way forward for our country — the best way to build the fair, prosperous, democratic nation we want to be. We know that no-one is more passionate about the future of our nation than the people of Scotland. No-one else cares as much. So it should be the Scottish people who take the decisions that will shape the lives of this and future generations. It is that simple.* (23 March, 2013)

Similarly, SNP councillor John argues that the Yes campaign made use of rational arguments — perhaps contrary to what some people might have expected at the outset — and that it was actually the No campaign that was making a nationalist, emotive argument based on a notion of Britishness.

> *I think the real defining thing about the debate, the interesting thing is, 10 years ago if you told people there'll be a referendum in 2014, describe what the various campaigns will be saying, I think the opposites of what's actually happened would be the case. People would be saying that the Yes campaign would be full of emotive language and tugging at the heart strings stuff, talking about history, racial history, ethnicity and really trying to appeal to the 'your Scottish, therefore you should vote yes'. Whereas I think...and the No campaign (...) would be talking about the mind: they would be talking about the economics of independence being bad, they would be talking about the money versus the..the arguments about statehood and democracy et cetera. They wouldn't be trying to appeal to*

*your emotional aspects. And I think in actuality the opposite has happened. (...)*
*So, we've..we've not really talked about nationality at all in this debate, it's a*
*debate for us about democracy, the economics of making Scotland a fairer, a*
*more equitable society. Whereas the No campaign, their entire campaign has*
*been focused on this notion of Britishness, this notion of being better together*
*because think of all the things that Britain has done as a nation state (...).*

### 4.4.5. Neoliberalism and migration

Finally, in the broader post-devolutionary context, the SNP implicitly frame their nationalism as 'civic' with reference to the party's approach to immigration and 'race equality'. Further, this approach needs to be contextualised in terms of the SNP's neoliberal and utilitarian vision of immigration. Although migrants are not excluded within this framing, aligning migrants' value so closely with economic considerations raises some important questions regarding the nation and belonging.

During the referendum campaign, the SNP's White Paper was very vocal of what they saw as Westminster's "aggressive approach to immigration, asylum seekers and refugees" which culminated in people being told "to leave the UK and 'go home'" (The Scottish Government, 2013:267)[8]. Further, the then Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon argued that she is confident that an independent Scotland, regardless of which party was in power,

*...would take a much more positive attitude towards immigration than is taken*
*by Westminster. I very, very much loath the attitude that we hear from*
*Westminster, that tries to tell us that immigrants are a drain in our society. I*
*don't like that, but I also don't agree with it because I know from my own*
*experience it's not true.* (Sikh Channel Independence Special, 6.9.2014)

Similarly, Humza Yousaf, an SNP Minister for Europe and International Development, agreed on the positive impact of immigration. Speaking on BBC2's (2014) Generation

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[8] 'Go Home' is in reference to 'Operation Vaken'. As part of this operation targeting 'illegal immigration', vans with a text "In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest" written on them were driven around UK cities. See Jones et al (2017).

2014 programme Minister Yousaf argued that Scotland needs immigration due to its ageing population, but also that the current UK immigration policy, as he sees it, is driven by UKIP. He points out how he "was disgusted to see just a mile down the road from here posters that said 'go home'". For him, "Go Home is one of the worst racist insults I've ever had thrown at me" because "this is my home, I don't have another home". To have such a campaign adopted by the UK government was, for Humza Yousaf, 'disgusting' (Generation 2014, BBC 2, 22.3.2014).

Although the SNP's rhetoric surrounding immigration has been and continues to be positive — and this is especially commendable considering the broader climate surrounding migration issues in relation to the refugee crisis and spikes in post-Brexit racist hate crime, for example — this rhetoric must be placed within a broader neoliberal context. The SNP espouse a discourse favourable to migrants and migration, thus aligning themselves with a 'civic' conception of 'inclusive' Scottishness, and the issue of immigration is usually presented in conjunction with concerns pertaining to Scotland's demography and skills gaps and, by extension, Scotland's economic performance and growth. As de Lima notes, population trends and their impact on the economy have provided a "backdrop for discourses on migration in Scotland and have implications for the existing and new minority ethnic groups in Scotland" (2012:97). While Scotland's declining population has been a long-term concern for Scottish policy-makers, the issue has become a more central focus since devolution and in particular since 2007 when the SNP took office (de Lima and Wright, 2009:392). This concern with demographic and skills shortages is neatly captured in this quote from the SNP's Yes pamphlet *Your Scotland, Your Future*:

> *As a small country with an ageing population, Scotland needs a certain number of migrants. We recognise that new Scots can help to address skills shortages in our labour market. EU nationals have the same right to live and work here as we have in their countries. Since independence will give us responsibility for our own borders, we will be able to tailor our immigration policy to suit Scottish needs and to help address the economic challenges of demographic change. (*2011:19)

Thus, arguments pertaining to Scottish migration and race equality policy need to be placed within a neoliberal context. In order to do this, it is useful to, first of all, consider what neoliberalism means and entails. As David Harvey puts it,

*Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.* (2005:11)

Thus, neoliberalism is "the project of economic and social transformation under the sign of the free market" and it has been successful in creating markets for things whose commodification was once almost unimaginable (Connell et al, 2009:331). The most dramatic form of commodification has been the privatisation of public assets and institutions (Connell et al, 2009:331). At the heart of neoliberalism is a sustained effort "to promote competition, choice, entrepreneurship and individualism" and these themes of this "new dominant social ideology (...) implicitly justif[y] the social inequality that allows proper rewards for 'winning'" (Connell et al, 2009:333). Harvey argues that neoliberalism has become "hegemonic as a mode of discourse" (2005:12) and, as such, it has a significant impact "on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world" (2005:12).

Therefore, neoliberalism becomes a condition and a structuring factor (among many other factors) of the world in which we live. As Connell et al put it, neoliberalism is not just an economic policy agenda, that is, a re-arrangement of the relations between capital and the state, but also an agenda for cultural and institutional change which, potentially, extends across every arena of social life (2009:333). Importantly, this 'reform' agenda, as it often tends to be called, is not necessarily popular and has faced crises of legitimacy (Connell et al, 2009:333). Recently, we have witnessed this in relation to the strong opposition to the 'bedroom tax' as well as public spending cuts in the UK. In Scotland, while the rail system was privatised under John Major and the Conservatives in the 1990s, recently the awarding of the ScotRail franchise to the Dutch state-owned company Abellio was met with loud objections as it was seen to have "dashed hopes of taking Scotland's railways back into public hands" (Gardham, 2014).

Neoliberal ideas also place great emphasis on globalisation, and international markets

are seen as a positive (Harvey, 2005:13). In their 2007 economic strategy the SNP put forward a vision of globalisation as an opportunity which, if seized, could deliver "accelerated rates of growth through developing, attracting, and retaining mobile capital and labour" (in Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009:107). While, on the one hand, immigrants may be represented as irritants and threats, and these representations are then "discursively linked to their role as subordinate and exploitable labor", on the other hand, "immigration can be represented as a source to replenish the nation with new citizens, fresh labor, innovation and creativity" (Bauder, 2008:57-8). Consequently, "these representations of immigration as threat and/or opportunity can facilitate and legitime neoliberal regulatory transformation" (Bauder 2006 in Bauder, 2008:58).

As in Scotland, the representation of immigration as an economic tool has been central to German immigration discourses as well (Bauder, 2008:58); that is, immigrants' 'economic utility' (*wirtschaflicher Nutzen*) (Wengele 2003 in Bauder 2008:58) is at the core of these narratives. When this economic utility approach is applied in favour of immigration, Bauder argues, "the central theme is that the skills of immigrant workers are a necessity for the well-being of key industrial sectors" (2008:63). The SNP's stance on immigration has been heavily influenced by a vision which sees immigration as an opportunity for economic growth. In their White Paper for independence, the SNP note how,

> *An independent Scotland will also be responsible for immigration and citizenship, with the opportunity to develop an immigration policy that sensibly meets Scotland's population and economic needs, while enriching our society.* (The Scottish Government, 2013:257)

Thus, as can be seen from this extract, population and economic needs are foregrounded, with societal enrichment being somewhat of an 'add-on'. Furthermore, the SNP note that,

> *Migrants have played an important part throughout Scottish history in enriching and renewing our culture and boosting the economy of the country. We will welcome people who want to come to work and live in Scotland.* (SNP, 2013:269)

Again, while migrants' cultural contributions are acknowledged, their role in boosting the economy and willingness to work in Scotland seems to be the framing idea.

Harvey also explains how, for proponents of neoliberalism, the shorter the terms of market contracts are, the better (2005:13). He notes how Lyotard has identified the postmodern condition as one in which 'the temporary contract' supplants "permanent institutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and international domains, as well as in political affairs" (in 2005:13). This, in turn, resonates with the experiences of many migrants; that is, with the impermanency and precarity that many (non-European) migrants experience vis-à-vis visas and the UK Border Agency's immigration controls. Those coming to the UK (and Scotland) need to provide ample evidence of their favourable financial situation, present and future, in order to gain entry to (and the ability to remain) in the country. Thus, foreign bodies become marked and categorised by their ability to contribute to the neoliberal and capitalist mode of production in the context of the UK's national policies on immigration.

The SNP, on their part, envisaged a points-based system for skilled migration in an independent Scotland (SNP, 2013:254). Bauder notes that many recent studies suggest that migration plays an important role in neoliberal restructuring (Basok 2002; Bauder 2006; and Herod, 2000 in Bauder, 2008:55). In 1987, Robin Cohen argued that migration is "a structural necessity" for industrialised countries' economies (Bauder, 2008:57). Thus, "immigration law serves the objectives of the existing population" (and, might I add, the neoliberal order) by "using migrants as a utility — similar to the items in a toolbox — that can be selected to fix various problems, including filling labour shortages and attracting investment capital (Ley, 2003 and Piore, 1979 in Bauder, 2008:57).

As noted by Davidson, we have witnessed a significant failing of academics based in Scotland — some of whom act as public intellectuals — to analyse the effects of neoliberalism locally (2010:i). He finds this surprising given the extent to which Scotland has integrated into the capitalist world economy, and how "one of the flagship policies of the second phase of British neoliberalism, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), was launched in Scotland from 1995 with the construction and commercial operation of the Skye Road Bridge" (Davidson, 2010:i). Since taking office

in 2007, the SNP have continued on the path of neoliberal economics and politics (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009). The economy has had, and continues to have, a central priority for the SNP: in their 2007 economic strategy, the SNP proclaimed that "sustainable economic growth is the one central purpose to which all else in government is directed and contributes" (in Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009:107). Importantly, this resonates with the ways in which race equality is framed through demographic considerations in the Scottish context. Concerns regarding the population, in turn, are closely linked to the underlying economic considerations.

During the referendum, immigration continued to be talked about largely in terms of demographic and economic concerns. When debating Jim Murphy on BBC2, Humza Yousaf, the then Minister for External Affairs and International Development, noted that Scotland needed immigration due to an ageing population and said that "we need our own control over the immigration system so where we have skills gaps — like engineering (...) we can use the immigration policy levers to attract more highly skilled immigrants" (BBC2, 2014). Thus, as can clearly be seen from both the White Paper as well as Humza Yousaf's statement, the SNP's main concerns with regard to immigration continued to be influenced by demographic trends and economic considerations during the referendum. As Meer notes, "because of a history of population decline there has been a clear recognition that a successful Scottish *economy* needs to attract and retain migrants" (2015:4; emphasis added) in order to address labour market gaps and rural depopulation, for example (de Lima and Wright, 2009:392).

Since their ascendance to power, the SNP have brought immigration to the very core of their economic strategy. The Government policy has been founded on the assumption that an increasing population is "a key contributor to, and consequence of, a more vibrant society and a more dynamic economy" (The Scottish Government 2007 in de Lima, 2012:98) and that immigration can contribute to this process (de Lima, 2012:98). An illuminating example of how economic concerns are at the heart of the SNP's policies is the Scottish Government's Race Equality Statement 2008-2011 which preceded the current Race Equality Framework 2016-2030. The document was

explicitly framed around the needs of the economy: the Race Equality Statement clearly stated that it "is informed by, and will contribute to, the delivery of the Scottish Government's *economic strategy* and its national objectives and outcomes" (2008a:1 — added emphasis). Further, it went on to make the following points:

> [The Race Equality Statement] *is placed within the context of fast changing demographics, the current economic and global challenges facing Scotland and its communities, and the shifts in the equality landscape. It is informed by, and will contribute to, the delivery of the Scottish Government's economic strategy and its national objectives and outcomes.* (Scottish Government, 2008a:1)

> *At this time it is important that we properly draw on the talents and skills of all our workforce and that we remove the barriers which preclude some in our minority ethnic communities from achieving their full potential in education, skills, training and employment.* (Scottish Government , 2008a:3)

> *Scottish Government has identified a suite of national economic targets and outcomes, a number of which have particular relevance to race equality: to have tackled the significant inequalities in our society; we live our lives safe from crime, disorder and danger' and 'we take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive Scottish identity'.* (Scottish Government , 2008a:4)

> *The Scottish Government's stated purpose is to focus the Government and public services on creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic growth.* (Scottish Government , 2008a:9)

Consequently, the issues of migration as well as race equality become framed as issues which matter in terms of demographic change and economic challenges. As the Race Equality Statement puts it above, the Statement is informed by, and contributes to, the delivery of the Government's economic strategy. Thus, the economy lies at the heart of the Statement with race equality revolving around it. Race equality then comes to be seen as a building block in the project of achieving a more prosperous nation in this instrumentalist vision. Though the economic vision is 'civic' in that one's belonging is measured through economic contribution, one is left wondering if immigrants and ethnic minorities are recognised as anything more than economic agents carrying the potential to bolster Scotland's finances. As de Lima and Wright note (2009:394), migrants' "migrant labour identity is privileged over all other forms of identity with little acknowledgement of the ways in which their personal, social and cultural background may be mobilised and shape their experiences in particular

circumstances". Thus, this in turn has an implication for the extent to which ethnic minorities can feel and develop an affinity with the 'Scottish nation' when their existence is so strongly framed through their economic utility.

Thus, as we have seen so far, there is a variety of ways in which the SNP's nationalism has been portrayed and understood as civic by politicians, academics, campaigners and practitioners, as well as a variety of ways in which the referendum was steered away from nationalist identity politics. I will now move on to critically consider whether this pervasive view of the SNP's nationalism as 'civic' — which has strongly emerged from my findings so far — is a fair or accurate representation.

### 4.5. Interrogating the civicness of the SNP's vision of the nation

It is nothing new that political elites make use of historical myths or common ancestry to forge a feeling of commonality (Kearton, 2005) or an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006). When nationalist narratives turn to historical myths or ancestry as resources in an effort to construct a shared 'nationness', the myths these narratives make use of usually directly relate to a specific group of people or 'nationals' — or *ethnie* as Anthony Smith would put it (see Chapter 2). As a result, the nation comes to be constructed according to and around the culture, history, and heritage of these specific people. This, then, means that the contemporary nationalist narratives appropriating historical myths or ancestry tend to border on so-called 'ethnic nationalism'. Within this imagining of the nation a bounded, specific group of people is placed at the core of the nation.

The SNP's nationalism — as we have seen above — is routinely referred to and understood through the lens of civic nationalism. As such, if it is 'truly civic' and anyone can be Scottish, nationalist narratives should not construct the nation in ways that may serve to exclude certain people from 'the nation'. Kearton, although still embracing the civic/ethnic analytical distinction, has challenged this predominant

understanding of 'Scottish nationalism' by saying that "while Scottish nationalism is clearly further towards the civic end of an ethnic-civic spectrum, the understanding of Scotland as a civic nation is not unproblematic" (2005:30) and "while the Scots' civic identity is inclusive in that (in theory) anyone can join, some of its recurring tropes have particular ethnic and cultural origins" (2005:39). Thus, she argues that while Scotland is an example of a predominantly civic nation formed in modernity, it nonetheless draws on symbols from its ethnic past in order to gain legitimacy.

Thus, among the dominant 'Scottish nationalism is civic' academic views, more critical standpoints exist. Based on a careful analysis of my data, it became apparent to me that there are indeed grounds for contesting the dominant 'civic' trope. This section will consider the civicness of the SNP's nationalist narratives in relation to two broad themes that arose from the data and which are closely linked to processes of constructing the 'Scottish nation' — namely culture and heritage, on the one hand, and history on the other.

### 4.5.1. Highland culture and Gaelic as symbols of Scottishness

In the Introduction to this thesis, I advanced a twofold argument especially in relation to Chapters 4 and 5. I argued that when nationalist narratives draw on history (irrespective of the 'truthfulness' of this history), those narratives seek to, on the one hand, demarcate the contours of the nation — that is, they serve to define who does (or does not) belong. What history is remembered (or forgotten), and how that history is remembered (or forgotten), is important as this affects where the contours of the nation fall at a given time. On the other hand, once history has served its purpose in terms of demarcating the tangible and intangible borders of the nation — that is where 'we' end and 'you' begin — that national community then requires its 'content' or, using Renanian (1990) terminology, its 'soul' and 'spiritual principle'. In order to achieve this, political elites draw on 'heritage' and 'tradition' (which are, of course, highly contested concepts).

Heritage refers to "the whole complex of organisations, institutions and practices devoted to the preservation and presentation of culture and arts", and heritage "becomes the material embodiment of the spirit of the nation, a collective representation of (...) *tradition*" (Hall, 2007:88). For McDowell, heritage signifies the selective use of the past for contemporary purposes, and heritage can be seen as an aggregation of myths, values, inheritances that are determined and defined by the needs of societies in the present (2008:37). McCrone et al argue that "we have constructed heritage because we have a cultural need to do so in modern age" (1995:1). What is more, heritage also serves the needs of nationalist narratives. As such, heritage only has "a tenuous connection to actual events" (McCrone et al, 1995:1). Heritage aims not only to preserve for posterity things of value (whether in aesthetic or historical terms), but to also exercise power: heritage carries with it symbolic power to order knowledge, to rank, classify and arrange, and consequently to give meaning to objects and things through the imposing of interpretive schemas, scholarship and what Hall terms the 'authority of connoisseurship' (Hall, 2007:88).

Thus, this section will explore and present some of the ways in which the SNP has sought to construct the Scottish nation by utilising remembering and forgetting, history, heritage, and tradition, and how these endeavours, in turn, can be argued to run against the grain of what is normally understood to constitute 'civic' nationalism. Thus, based on an analysis of data from interviews as well as political speeches and publications, this chapter has — so far — demonstrated that Scottish nationalist narratives were frequently understood and framed as 'civic' by the SNP during the referendum. The extended content analysis in this section will reveal what the political rhetoric seems to deny or ignore with regard to its construction of national identity.

For Hall, we should think of heritage as a discursive practice: "it is one of the ways in which the nation slowly constructs for itself a sort of collective social memory" (2007:89). By storying their turning points into a single, coherent narrative, nations construct identities by selectively binding their chosen high points and memorable achievements into an unfolding 'national story'. This story, then, serves as the

nation's 'tradition' (Hall, 2007:89). Building on Raymond Williams' idea of 'selective tradition', Hall argues that (2007:90):

> *Like personal memory, social memory is also highly selective, it highlights and foregrounds, imposes beginnings, middles and ends on the random and contingent. Equally, it foreshortens, silences, disavows, forgets and elides many episodes which — from another perspective — could be the start of a different narrative. This process of selective 'canonisation' confers authority and a material and institutional facticity on the selective traditions, making it extremely difficult to shift or revise. The institutions responsible for making the 'selective tradition' work develop a deep investment in their own 'truth'.*

Drawing on Benedict Anderson, Hall argues that "even so-called 'civic' states (...) are deeply embedded in specific 'ethnic' or cultural meanings which give the abstract idea of the nation its *lived 'content'*" (2007:88-89; emphasis added). Consequently, national heritage is a powerful source of such meanings and "it follows that those who cannot see themselves reflected in its mirror cannot properly 'belong'" (2007:89). Thus, heritage — or what is constructed as heritage — serves as a powerful link between history, nationalism and belonging. Hall's use of the word 'mirror' is very significant here. Through the (often political) construction of heritage, people acquire a tangible vision of themselves: of their roots, of continuity, of belonging that transcends the present, and of who they are. Of course, not everyone signs up to this vision and, importantly, not everyone fits into this vision.

During the referendum, the SNP placed a strong emphasis on culture in their Yes publications. Scotland's "strong and vibrant culture" was argued to be "one of our most enduring and powerful national assets" while Scotland's "rich heritage gives [Scotland a] sense of place and underpins our understandings of our past, our present and our future" (Scotland's Future, 2013:309). Furthermore, "culture and heritage can enrich and empower our communities, transforming places and lives" (Scotland's Future, 2013:314). Indeed, culture and heritage are not measured in worth solely in monetary terms — as the SNP argue that Westminster does (Scotland's Future, 2013:19) — but "we value [them] precisely because they *embody* our *heart and soul*, and our *essence*" (Scotland's Future, 2013:314; emphasis added). Thus, culture and heritage are framed as bearers of what it means to be Scottish; they embody the very being of what this identity is about. Consequently, what Scotland's culture and

heritage is understood to comprise of becomes extremely important. How Scottish culture and heritage are imagined to be gives us clues as to how the nation is imagined to be.

Scotland's cultural life and heritage are portrayed as taking "many different forms, as diverse as the land, peoples and places of our country" (Scotland's Future, 2013:316) — or, as the then Culture Secretary Fiona Hyslop put it, "there is no one thing that defines us" (5 June 2013, Edinburgh University) — thus signalling a broad understanding of these things. However, some cultural elements are given precedence over others: as Fiona Hyslop goes on to say, "there are, of course, iconic images, poems, films, artists, writers, performers, compositions, buildings and landscapes that evoke our sense of 'Scotland'". Scotland's historic languages, and specifically Gaelic, are promised to be given "a secure future" in Scotland "by increasing the numbers learning, speaking and using Gaelic" (Scotland's Future, 2013:314). The SNP assert that

> *The inspiration and significance we draw from our culture and heritage, including Gaelic and Scots, are fundamental to shaping our communities and the places in which we live. Culture and heritage make our communities attractive places to live, work, invest and visit. (...) Through their contribution to our social fabric, community cohesion and economic wellbeing, culture and the arts support better outcomes for healthier, safer and more resilient communities.* (Scotland's Future, 2013:312)

Gaelic is recognised as "a continuing element in Scottish heritage, identity and history for many centuries" and the Scots language, which was included in the 2011 census for the first time, is flagged up as something the government wants to promote and support in policy developments (Scotland's Future, 2013:449).

Mycock notes the SNP's continued emphasis on the historic languages of Scots and Gaelic as parts of Scotland's identity and heritage in the party's publications (2012:56). According to Mycock, "these 'indigenous' languages underlie romantic nationalist conceptions of Scottish identity and mark linguistic distinctiveness with England" (2012:56). Consequently, Mycock points out how such promotion of Scots and Gaelic potentially ethnicises the Scottish nation as the national community seems to be defined by two historical and distinct, yet somewhat dying, languages rather

than the SNP making any formal attempts to recognise other minority languages spoken by (newer and bigger) communities (2012:56). Further, as Phipps and Fassetta (2015:10) highlight, while the SNP's White Paper on independence reiterates Scotland's welcoming attitude to migrants, it "makes no mention of the languages and cultures that migrants bring with them". Thus, expressed support for Scotland's 'historic languages' "offers a fascinating insight into the place [sic] languages play in the development of national policy and identity in a country recently devolved and seeking further powers" (Phipps and Fassetta, 2015:10). Consequently, there is scope to argue that the way in which the SNP approaches culture and heritage via official policy compromises the dominant discourse of civic nationalism.

In order to make sense of Gaelic's current standing in Scotland, as well as its broader significance in relation to 'Highlandism', it is useful to briefly consider the history of Gaelic in Scotland. A small kingdom, Dalriada, used to exist in south-west Argyll. The Scots of Dalriada began migrating there from modern-day Antrim in Northern Ireland sometime before their king, Fergus Mór, arrived c.500 (Lynch, 1998:17). Gradually, a Celticisation of parts of Pictland in the Highlands as well as intermarriage between Gaelic speakers and Picts began happening, and eventually the two kingdoms merged in the early 9th century (Lynch, 1998:23-25). Gaelic, thus, came to be part of 'Highland culture'. 'Highlandism' became the dominant force in Scottish cultural life in the first half of the 19th century thanks to Sir Walter Scott's influence. In his novels, Scott imagined a romantic and fictitious picture of the Scottish past which, in turn, encouraged 19th century Scottish historians to recover and study historical documents as well as records, and recreate similar pictures of the past (McCrone et al, 1995:4). Scott's 'historical revolution' created a new way of considering the past, and introduced the idea of past and present being two very different entities (McCrone et al, 1995:4). Consequently,

> *This new past gradually came to be cherished as a heritage that validated and exalted the present. And the new role heightened concern to save relics and restore monuments as emblems of communal identity, continuity and aspiration.* (Lowenthal, 1985:xvi cited in McCrone et al, 1995:4)

Thus, material and imagined aspects of Highland life and regional identity (e.g.

heather, thistles, bagpipes, and tartan) have come to be central to popular constructions of 'Scottishness' (Knox & Houston, 2001:xviii-xix). 'Highland culture' therefore features heavily in the SNP's imagining of Scottish culture and heritage not only in the form of Gaelic, but in terms of tartan as well. During the referendum, Alex Salmond described Scotland as a tartan on multiple occasions. Talking to a Polish expat magazine, he said:

> *(...) a tartan has many shades in it, and each tartan has different shades woven into the cloth and they together make up an absolute distinctive pattern. I like to look upon Scotland as a tartan and the Polish communities are part of the thread, a strand of that tartan.* (MacGuire and Bator-Skórkiewicz, 2014:27).

Additionally, during a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, he also noted that,

> *Tartan is the distinctive national cloth of Scotland. It's made up of patterned threads of different colours. I like to think that Scottish identity is like the tartan. There are many colours, many threads, many strands to the Scottish tartan of identity.* (28 April 2014)

Utilising the imagery of tartan in this way is interesting on two counts. On the one hand, it could be argued that through statements like this, the cultural nationalist appropriation of Highland culture can be seen as reconceptualising these motifs in an inclusive manner. On the other hand, the statements could also be seen as providing evidence of the degree to which claims about civic and inclusive nationalism in Scotland are still closely attached to, and aligned with, the imaginaries of cultural nationalism. The value attached to Gaelic by consecutive SNP governments, therefore, is telling in terms of what history is deemed important for the construction of Scottish 'heritage'. Gaelic, its present status and the ways in which it is appropriated in nationalist narratives and policy debates cannot be separated from Scott's legacy of 'Highlandism' and 'tartanry'.

### 4.5.2. Empire, Homecoming and the 'Scottish diaspora'

As we have seen, a very specific history is drawn upon in an effort to construct an idea of 'Scotland' and 'Scottish culture and heritage'. At the same time the more sinister chapters are forgotten or remain behind a curtain of silence. Thus, a very

particular understanding of history is employed, and as such it works towards excluding some voices and experiences from Scotland's 'national story'. This partial historiography was especially evident in the context of the recent 'Homecoming' franchise in Scotland which took place in 2014 (the same year as the referendum), and sought to entice the 'Scottish diaspora' to 'come home'.

So far I have shown how public rhetoric around Scottish culture and heritage has an effect on the contours and content of what the 'Scottish nation' is imagined and understood to be. Further, I would argue that those parts of Scottish history that are remembered or not remembered have an effect on ideas regarding the 'Scottish diaspora', especially in relation to the Homecoming franchise.

Kearton (2005) has previously argued that when drawing on Scotland's 'ethnic history', the SNP use history in a way such that the "ethnic core is used to project an inclusive, forward-looking vision of the nation" (Kearton, 2005:39). Thus, the multi-ethnic roots of medieval Scotland — consisting of Picts, Britons, Scots, Anglo-Saxons and Norse — are drawn upon as a rhetorical device to legitimise the contemporary claim that Scottishness is an open and inclusive identity, and Scotland being an ethnically diverse nation (Kearton, 2005.:27-28). Indeed, in the run-up to the referendum, Salmond referred to two of the most talked about Scottish historical figures, Robert the Bruce and William Wallace, and uses their ethnic origins to argue for an inclusive vote in September:

> *The two greatest heroes in Scottish history are Robert the Bruce and William Wallace. Firstly, Robert de Brus, his family were of Norman extraction. William Wallace, William le Waleys, means William the Welshman. His family came from Wales. So this is nothing to do with where you are from, this is about where you are. That is the argument, which will carry the YES vote in September.* (MacGuire and Bator-Skórkiewicz, 2014:27)

Indeed, people such as Bruce and Wallace are important building blocks in nationalist narratives. Similarly, Robert Burns and his poetry have become to denote quintessential Scottishness. However, while Salmond contends that he's "happy to be the representative of a country whose most celebrated figure, Robert Burns — with

the third most statues of any secular figure across the planet — is not a soldier, but a poet" (speech at Glasgow Caledonian University New York campus, 7.4.2014) he conveniently chooses not to mention that Burns came very close to moving to Jamaica in order to take on a job at a plantation. Thus, mixed origins of Scottish national heroes and people are appropriated as evidence of civic nationalism and of the 'mongrel nation' that Scotland supposedly is.

However, a specific section of population is often forgotten and, consequently, Scotland's 'historical diversity' is used in a way to occlude Scotland's leading role in the empire and the violence perpetrated under the banner of 'Great Britain'. As Tom Devine puts it, Scotland has long suffered from 'national amnesia' in the public domain in relation to its colonial past. The ways in which Scotland's past is entangled with slave trade and slavery has been shrouded with — in Mullen's terms — a "myth of denial" and a casual acceptance that "it wisnae us" (2009b:5). Rather, popular history is more often seen to be one of subjection; "of a Scotland economically and politically subservient to the will of its larger neighbour[9]" (Mullen, 2009b:5).

Scots played a central role — as doctors, plantation owners, slave traders, merchants and appointed imperial officers and governors — with regard to managing and running the empire; indeed, they were disproportionately represented in the imperial endeavour when considering the size of the population (Hamilton, 2012; Mackenzie, 1993). Scots flocked especially to the Caribbean sugar colonies (e.g. Jamaica, Grenada, Dominica, St Vincent and Tobago) in their thousands (Hamilton, 2012:429) and were thus a significant presence in these societies. Although relatively few slave voyages originated from Scottish ports[10], there was nonetheless money to be made in the slave trade, and Scottish investors, captains, surgeons, merchants and crew all worked to make the slave trade profitable (Hamilton, 2012:430).

The Caribbean islands were 'slave societies' in that they depended on un-free, forced

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[9] Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the participants often reiterated and supported the narrative of 'Scottish victimhood' although the minority also challenged it as well.

[10] Ships carrying slaves mainly originated from Liverpool, Bristol and London.

labour as without the slaves it would have been impossible to run the sugar economies, and by 1850 about 85 per cent the British West Indies' population was comprised of black Africans (Devine, 2003:224). Devine notes how the Caribbean was "known as the graveyard of the slaves" as the suffering of the slaves was especially horrendous (2003:224). As mentioned previously, Scots came to the Caribbean in great numbers, and they were highly visible due to their positions in the white communities as plantation owners, merchants and their employees, clerks, bookkeepers and overseers (Hamilton, 2012:429). Scots also served as attorneys, i.e. as those managing the estates for absentee landowners, thus occupying positions of responsibility since they wielded enormous power over the enslaved Africans (Hamilton, 2012:429).

Scots' intimate relationship with the slave economy carried more than just financial consequences: children of Scots migrants and enslaved and 'free coloured' women is a notable legacy of Scotland and slavery (Devine, 2015:8). As Robert Wedderburn (a radical anti-slavery advocate and a son of a Jacobite Scot in Jamaica) explains in his writings with regard to his father James Wedderburn, Esq. of Inveresk (a proprietor of sugar estates in Jamaica) and his mother Rosanna (a slave to Lady Douglas):

> *From him [James Wedderburn] I have received no benefit in the world. By him my mother was made the object of his brutal lust, then insulted, abused, and abandoned (...). (...) It is a common practice, as has been stated by Mr. Wilberforce in parliament, for the planters to have lewd intercourse with their female slaves; and so inhuman are many of these said planters, that many well-authenticated instances are known, of their selling their slaves while pregnant, and making that a pretence to enhance their value.* (1991:45-46)

Therefore, to this day, there is a large Caribbean population with a direct link to Scotland. Indeed, many carry Scottish surnames, such as Campbell, Lamont and Grant, which were forced upon their enslaved ancestors by their Scottish slave masters. There were also black people of Scottish descent living in Scotland which leads Hamilton to note how notions of a historically 'white country' are misplaced (2012:437). Furthermore, many ordinary people of African, Indian and Scottish descent lived and worked and were educated across the country, the presence of whom "challenges historians to think carefully about who they regard 'Scottish' in the

late eighteenth-century Scotland" (Hamilton, 2012:437).

On the one hand, Scotland's political elite continues to perpetuate the discourse of social justice, which, as will be argued in Chapter 5, is anchored on the idea of 'Scottish values' and Scottish exceptionalism. On the other hand, its political discourse also draws on the view of Scotland being a 'mongrel nation'. This 'historical diversity' or mixedness, then, accommodates civic nationalist ideas of openness and inclusiveness: because Scotland has been historically made up of diverse peoples and tribes, it is an oxymoron to suggest that Scottish nationalist narratives would be of the 'ethnic' instead of the 'civic' type. However, this understanding of a 'mongrel nation' — or 'mixed origins' — does not extend to those in the Caribbean with a historical connection to Scotland.

A case in point regarding the way in which Scottish history and 'heritage' is used in nation-building, and how Scotland's violent history is occluded, is the Homecoming franchise. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the Scottish Government's national outcomes is 'inclusive national identity'. According to the government, "the awareness and advocacy for Scotland by the Scots diaspora" is a key factor contributing to successfully achieving 'inclusive national identity' (The Scottish Government, 'national identity: n.p.). This national outcome is, thus, closely connected to the Homecoming franchise which seeks to entice 'diasporic Scots' to 'come home'.

The first Homecoming Scotland event — which lasted an entire year — took place in 2009 with the second Homecoming taking place in 2014 at the same time as the referendum. While the 2014 event website notes that "contemporary Scotland blends a rich array of cultures from around the world", it nonetheless singles out "several icons considered uniquely and recognisably Scottish" (VisitScotland, 2014). Unsurprisingly, and in line with Sir Walter Scott's 'Highlandism', these turn out to be kilts, bagpipes, tartan, Highland games, Gaelic, and the Saltire. As Mycock notes, the main focus of the SNP-led government initiatives, such as the 2009 Homecoming, have been to encourage (affluent) Scottish self-identifier diasporic communities from

countries such as the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia to come visit 'their home' (2012:63). While the term 'Blood Scots' was originally used, there was a swift shift to 'ancestral Scots'. Thus, Mycock argues that SNP's focus with regard to Homecoming is "instructive in determining how Scottish nationality is understood by the SNP" (2012:63). While the marketing of Homecoming 2009 was firmly directed towards Canada, the US and NZ and Australia (Mullen, 2009a:9), other parts of the Commonwealth which are intimately linked with Scotland and its historical legacy — notably the Caribbean — were forgotten about. Indeed, Sir Geoffrey Palmer pointed out that no Jamaicans were officially invited to take part in the events even though many Jamaicans consider themselves to be part of the Scottish diaspora (Mullen, 2009a:9). Thus, there has been a lack of engagement with those diasporic communities that are directly linked to the violent legacy of Scottish colonialism (Mycock, 2012:63).

Following Homecoming 2009 the event was, however, framed in a more all-encompassing way with Alex Salmond arguing that the events "captured the imagination of people around the world who have links to and ties to Scotland and more widely people who simply love our country" (Homecoming Scotland 2010:2). While Homecoming is directly linked with Scotland's imperial past in that it urges Scots from the Commonwealth to 'come home', the more oppressive chapter of Scotland's history connected with slave trade and plantations has been, to a large part, absent from public rhetoric related to the event. The SNP has not actively engaged with Scotland's imperial legacy in its constructions of Scottish nationalism, and there is "scant acknowledgement of [the colonial legacy's] potential contribution in shaping contemporary Scottish national values or identity" (Mycock, 2012:62). Thus, via Homecoming, the SNP are demonstrating what Brubaker terms 'homeland nationalism' by which he means nationalism which is

> *...directed 'outward' across the boundaries of territory and citizenship, towards members of their own ethnic nationality, that is towards persons who 'belong' (or can be claimed to belong) to the external national homeland by ethnonational affinity, although they reside in and are (ordinarily) citizens of other states.* (1996:111)

Such constructions of the nation bring the civic nationalism that the SNP claim to propagate into question. What becomes evident through events such as Homecoming

is that Scottishness is not solely an identity based on residency or on one's choice to live and work in Scotland but that ancestry — but not *all* ancestry — plays a key part in constituting Scottishness as well.

It must, however, be acknowledged that during Homecoming 2014 steps were taken in remembering Scotland's slavery past[11]. The Commonwealth Games, which were held in Glasgow in summer 2014, provided a convenient arena for thinking and discussing Scotland's role in the empire in public fora. Over the period of about two weeks, people from all over the Commonwealth gathered together in the 'second city of the empire'. Before the games started, Humza Yousaf — an SNP MSP and the then Minister for External Affairs — noted that there are many reminders in Glasgow of "Scotland's role in the UK's dark past throughout the city" (2014:11). Furthermore, he went on to say that:

> *I see the 2014 Commonwealth Games as a chance for us to learn lessons for our past, and look forward to a new relationship with the Commonwealth, which includes a large proportion of African and Caribbean countries. This new relationship will be built on partnership and collaboration, rather than a relationship where one country is superior to the others.* (2014:11)

He concluded by saying that he hoped that by acknowledging this particular part of Scottish history, "Glasgow's Commonwealth Games will allow us to move towards a more positive future and a relationship with Commonwealth countries which is a partnership of equals" (2014:11).

Similarly, the issue of Scotland's role in the empire came up twice at an independence debate in Edinburgh. In this context, again, Yousaf argued that we should not look at Scotland's past through rose tinted glasses, especially as Glasgow was the second city of the Empire (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014). There was also a question from the audience with regard to the former overseas colonies and the injustices the people from those countries have suffered. The speaker wondered what would happen to UK overseas territories in case of a yes vote. In his reply, Humza Yousaf said that it was not the

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[11] Also, especially in 2017, there have been numerous high-profile newspaper articles about Scotland and slavery (Campsie, 2017; Garavelli, 2017; McLaren, 2017) and the programme for Black History Month 2017 coordinated by the Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights once again included various events focusing on Scotland's connection to the slavery.

SNP's intention to absolve Scotland from difficult parts of its past, and that the issue of territories would be a question of negotiation with regard to assets. He finished by noting that he was "a son of immigrants" and for him independence was not about politics or geography — if it was, then "I'm not a nationalist" (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014).

Yousaf (2014) also mentions Empire Café as an example of the cultural programme that took place during the games and which was aimed at examining Scotland's links with the slave trade "over tea and cake" (Duffy, 2014b). The Empire Café was an idea of author Louise Welsh and architect Jude Barber, and it was open for a week during the Commonwealth Games. The café, which was based in the Briggait in Glasgow's Merchant City hosted readings, films, art installations and discussions around the theme of Scotland and slavery (Duffy, 2014b). In addition to the café, a street-theatre play entitled Emancipation Acts also took place during the games. This series of plays explored Glasgow's role in Caribbean slavery, its abolition and current calls for reparations (What's On Glasgow). Graham Campbell, who curated Emancipation Acts and is now an SNP councillor in Glasgow, noted that "it is important for Afro-Scots now, as a lot of people are relatively new to this city, and knowing their ancestors played a big part in building the city from a long time ago, and that they really do belong, it is an important thing to tell them" (Duffy, 2014a). There was also an exhibition in Glasgow's Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum entitled *How Glasgow Flourished, 1714-1837*. Although the exhibition focused on Scotland's thriving economy, it nonetheless featured items relating to slavery, and the Glassford Family Portrait, which famously includes a (now hidden) black boy in the background — thus hinting at Scotland's role in the Atlantic slave trade — was prominently displayed, for example. Furthermore, in the opening ceremony of the Commonwealth Games, Pumeza Matshikiza, a South-African soprano, sang 'Freedom Come All Ye', an anti-imperialist song sung in Scots and written by Hamish Henderson in 1960.[12]

Thus, in sum, while the SNP use Scotland's 'mixed ethnic history' to argue for the civicness and openness of Scottish identity and nation, this line of argument does not extend to those people connected to the violent parts of Scottish history. The

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[12] You can find the lyrics here: http://www.scottishpoetrylibrary.org.uk/poetry/poems/freedom-come-all-ye [Last accessed 25/1/2018]

Homecoming franchise, which took shape under the SNP government and which seeks to entice the 'Scottish diaspora' to 'come home', challenges the view of Scottishness as being based on residency and contribution ('those who live and work here'). Rather, a more ethnic conception of Scottishness whereby one is linked to the country by blood takes shape. Further, the franchise has completely ignored the Scottish diaspora in the Caribbean and, therefore, the SNP are demonstrating a highly selective understanding and remembering of history. This, in turn, has an effect on where the contours of the nation are imagined to be.

*4.6. Analytical issues with the dichotomy*

After outlining some of the ways in which the claims about Scottish civic nationalism can be challenged, I will take a more detailed look at the analytical shortcomings in relation to dichotomous understandings and portrayals of nationalism. As Mitchell et al note, the theoretical literature on ethnic and civic nationalism is largely based on historical analysis or focuses on political philosophical concerns. "There is little that explores nationalist movements but rather the focus is on (perceptions of) nations or even states. The dichotomy is rarely tested empirically in the literature" (Mitchell et al, 2011:107). Thus, this chapter seeks to do just this: to offer an empirically informed discussion (and critique) of the dichotomy. What follows is a threefold argument: 1) the labels of civic/ethnic nationalism are used normatively and, as a consequence, lack analytical creditability; 2) the dichotomy is not refined and sophisticated enough to do precise and rigorous analytical work; 3) nonetheless, it is important to account for and deconstruct the ways in which civic and ethnic nationalism are used as categories of practice (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) in both public and everyday understandings.

Within academia, this analytical distinction has both its proponents and opponents. While Mitchell et al argue that the "distinction is unhelpful in understanding modern Scottish politics given the breadth of identification with the Scottish nation" (Mitchell et al, 2011:107), some, such as Kearton (2005:25), continue to maintain the dichotomy's analytic utility as a tool which can be used to examine existing types of

nations and nationalisms. Others, such as McCrone, are slightly more doubtful with regard to the usefulness of the two concepts:

> *While the analytical value of the civic/ethnic distinction has been put to good use...it does lend itself to ethnocentric caricature — why can't they be more like us? It is also a distinction which can be criticised on analytical grounds. Is it, for example, possible to maintain such a distinction in practice?* (in Mitchell et al, 2011:107-8)

Here, McCrone highlights two key issues: normativity and analytical soundness, which will be discussed each in turn.

The first shortcoming, as alluded to by McCrone, is that characterising nationalisms as civic or ethnic tends to imply a value-judgement regarding the merits of a specific state or nation. Thus, when Alex Salmond, for example, goes on to explicitly announce and underline how the SNP represent civic nationalist views, he implicitly suggests the SNP occupy the moral high ground of 'good', inclusive civic nationalism as opposed to 'bad', exclusive ethnic nationalism. Therefore, the SNP are making a value judgement by explicitly aligning themselves with a specific form of nationalism as opposed to another one; that is, *our* type of nationalism is acceptable. The analytical issue here is not the SNP portraying themselves as exemplifying civic nationalism — a claim which, as discussed previously in this chapter, can be challenged. The issue is that a concept which is used normatively in public political narratives, and therefore carries heavy analytical baggage, is not a sound analytical tool. As Brubaker (2004:57) notes, the dichotomy is normative in the sense that it is used to make distinctions between states in an ideological way — i.e. that while one's own civic nationalism is seen as good and legitimate, others' ethnic nationalism is seen as bad and illegitimate. It is, thus, used politically to legitimate or discredit particular state policies or movements. In the SNP's case, it is also worth keeping in mind that because of their economic agenda, it is in the SNP's best (strategic) interest to frame themselves as proponents of civic nationalism.

When concepts such as civic and ethnic nationalism are uncritically incorporated into academic language and analysis, we risk migrating those value connotations — either implicitly or explicitly — into our scholarly practice. Politicisation is not beyond

academia: as Brubaker goes on to argue, scholarly accounting belongs to the realm of nationalist politics in that it awards the label of civicness to some while denying it to others (2004:58). Therefore,

> *...the work done by the notion 'civic', with its normative prestige, in such accounts may be more political than analytical: it may speak more to the putative international respectability and legitimacy of the state or movement in question than to its empirical characteristics.* (Brubaker, 2004:58)

Consequently, ethnic nationalism is invariably 'a term of abuse' while civic nationalism is 'a term of praise' (Brubaker, 2004:64).

As a result, Brubaker observes how many scholars — myself included — have grown uncomfortable with such sorting (2004:58). Indeed, the distinction itself reflects ethnocentrism in that the dichotomy should set off alarm because these two types of nationalism are so often juxtaposed in terms of being "Western/Eastern, but rational/emotive, voluntary/inherited, good/bad, *ours/theirs*" (Yack, 1996:195-6). Furthermore, Brubaker makes an important point by highlighting that all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are inclusive and exclusive at the same time — "what varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion" (2004:64).

Secondly, the dichotomy lacks serious analytical purchase. Although Brubaker himself used the ethnic-civic distinction in his comparative study of nationalism in France and Germany (1992), he has since offered a convincing critique of why the civic/ethnic dichotomy lacks analytical rigour. Brubaker argues that the two terms are deeply ambiguous (2004:59). Firstly, 'ethnicity', as Weber has famously argued, is extremely difficult to pin down. It can be understood in a narrow sense, i.e. based on descent and biology; however, such an understanding constricts the domain of ethnic nationalism greatly. Brubaker argues that if we are to view 'ethnicity' narrowly, when common culture is emphasised in nationalist rhetoric — but not common descent — this needs to be coded as a kind of civic nationalism (2004:60). Consequently, civic nationalism becomes too broad and heterogeneous a category while the category of ethnic nationalism looks rather vacant. Conversely, if ethnicity is understood broadly as ethnocultural, then virtually all nationalisms have to be seen as ethnic (2004:61).

There is a risk, conversely, that we define civic nationalism out of existence when it is understood as "a voluntary association of culturally unmarked individuals" as "even the cases most often cited as paradigmatic of civic nationalism — France and America — involve crucial cultural components" (2004:61). Consequently,

> *If one combines a strict understanding of civic and a strict understanding of ethnic nationalism, then one is left with few instances of either one and a large middle ground that counts as neither, and one can no longer think of the civic-ethnic distinction as an exhaustive way of classifying types of manifestations of nationalism.* (Brubaker, 2004:62)

If you, however, choose to use a broad understanding of both, you will, again, be left with a large middle ground that could be coded as either civic or ethnic. Thus, the distinction cannot be seen as mutually exclusive. Those advocating for the continued use of this typology argue that the middle ground demonstrates cases that combine elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism. However, Brubaker points out that the problem is the deep ambiguity of the two concepts, and the uncertain place of culture within this scheme (2004:62).  Both Yack (1996) and Brubaker (2004) note how France and America (which are usually seen as prime examples of civic nationalism) make use of cultural components in their constructions of national identities. Thus, for Brubaker, civic nationalism only exists as an ideal type and even then it is problematic (2004:61).

As has been discussed in great detail, the SNP's and its key politicians' rhetoric makes substantial use of a conception of Scottish history. Consequently, they anchor a sense of Scotland and Scottishness to certain ideas of heritage, culture and tradition; to Gaelic and 'Highland culture' especially. Furthermore, the Homecoming franchise, though originally Scottish Labour's idea (Hay and Morrison, 2012:1), was properly implemented under the first SNP minority government in 2009, and again in 2014 when the referendum also took place. Homecoming has been promoting and enticing diasporic Scots 'to come home' and celebrate Scottish (Highland) culture. However, Scottish diaspora has been narrowly defined, and the event has failed to extend a welcome to Scotland's Caribbean diaspora. Indeed, the SNP's nationalist imaginings of

history and heritage have by and large failed to account for Scotland's role in the Empire, slavery and colonialism. Thus, taking Brubaker's critique regarding the ambiguity of the analytical categories of civic/ethnic nationalism into account, Scottish nationalist narratives would occupy the middle ground. If we take a broad understanding of 'ethnicity' as ethnocultural, the SNP's nationalism would fall under this label. If we take a narrow view of 'ethnicity' based on biology and ancestry, the SNP's nationalism could still be argued to fall under ethnic nationalism since, as we have seen, during the first Homecoming 'blood Scots' were initially asked to 'come home'. At the same time, there are instances — such as the fairly inclusive plans of awarding citizenship at the point of independence — which would suggest the SNP's nationalism being civic. However, I fear this kind of sorting and labelling process leaves us with more questions than answers. As has transpired in this chapter, nationalist narratives come with, and indeed often rely on, contradictions. Consequently, analysing such multi-layered and composite nationalist narratives through dichotomous understandings risks obscuring more than it reveals.

Thirdly, however, it is important to highlight that the civic/ethnic dichotomy continues to be important as a category of practice — i.e. as something that is akin to 'native', 'folk' or 'lay' categories (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:4). These categories of everyday social experience are developed and deployed by ordinary social actors and are distinguished from the "experience-distant categories used by social analysts" (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:4). Thus, it is important to acknowledge the important ontological work 'civic nationalism' can do as a category of practice. As we have seen, practitioners working for ethnic minority rights organisations tended to highlight the civicness of the SNP's nationalism: "the SNP nationalism has been very civic, inclusive nationalism — not a problem for anybody" (Practitioner 1).

It also seemed that branding the SNP's nationalism as civic also gave the practitioners the tools with which they could hold the government accountable. As argued by Practitioner 5, there was

> *...no snowball's chance in hell that groups like [our organisation] or the Scottish Refugee Council or you know others within the race equality sector would stay quiet for one second if they had a sniff of ethnic nationalism within the*

*con...context of the independence referendum.*

Thus, holding on to the identification of the SNP's nationalism as civic — however false or compromised this conceptualisation may be — gave the practitioners leverage to challenge problematic or unwanted nationalist narratives. Further, as categories of practice, civic and ethnic nationalism carry real political differences. That is, those political parties, such as the SNP, who identify themselves as civic nationalists, are likely to have more open and inclusive policies around nationality, for example. Conversely, parties identifying themselves with more ethnic ideas of nationalism are likely to favour policies where nationality is legally rooted in familial descent.  It is, therefore, important to account for the ways in which, and to what end, civic and ethnic nationalism are used as categories of practice by political actors, practitioners and the public alike in order to explore and interrogate the ways in which people make sense of their social world.

Nonetheless, while something is salient as a category of practice does not mean that it should uncritically be used as a category of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). While the SNP and others may continue to employ the concept of 'civic nationalism', this does not mean that social scientists should do the same. As Brubaker and Cooper note with regard to the concept of 'nation', "one does not have to take a category inherent in the *practice* of nationalism — the realist, reifying conception of nations as real communities — and make this category central to the *theory* of nationalism" (2000:4). Analysts should be accounting for the process of reification rather than contributing to it. By uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis, we are unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:4).

Something being a category of practice does not automatically exclude it from being used as a category of analysis, however — the problem lies within the ways in which a certain category is used (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:4). Thus, it is our job as social scientists to critically study and make sense of the ways in certain nationalisms are framed as civic without reifying the concept. Branding something as straightforwardly civic or ethnic makes us lose sight of the processes; of how

nationalist rhetoric and ideas are formed, how they operate and how they change and shift. It flattens the nuances and the complexities, and reifies nationalism as a 'thing', as something that 'is' without treating it as something that we 'do'. This play of either/or — or a bit of both — seems to overlook the fuzziness and inherent inconsistencies and paradoxes that are present in the ways in which nationalist ideas are used. As Brubaker argues with regard the category of 'Muslims' (2013:6), similarly, rather than a tool of analysis, civic/ethnic nationalism should be treated as an object of analysis.

*4.7. Conclusion*

Focusing on the civicness of some nationalisms and the ethnic elements of others seems to, in my view, lead to a form of complacency whereby some nationalisms and corresponding states are seen as unproblematic. Thus, critical voices — such as those of Mycock, Palmer and Kearton — are relegated to the back stage while the dominant rhetoric, both within and beyond academia, describes the innate civicness of 'Scottish nationalism' (especially in relation to the SNP).

In this chapter I have sought to make a twofold argument. On the one hand, this chapter has sought to demonstrate how the SNP's nationalism is habitually described and defined as civic by the party itself, academics and practitioners within the race equality sector. I have also questioned this dominant discourse by drawing on two themes that emerged from my data — namely understandings around culture and heritage as well as history — which *challenge* how the SNP's nationalism is widely understood.

On the other hand, this chapter has also argued that conceptualising nationalism via simplistic binary categorisations lacks analytical purchase, and that we need to make sense of nationalist narratives without falling into the trap of normative categorisations that obscure the complexities of how nationalist narratives are constructed. However, I have also conceded the importance of analysing 'civic nationalism' as a category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Scholars of

nationalism must therefore unpack and deconstruct nationalist narratives without uncritically reifying them in the process — that is, civic and ethnic nationalism are too value-laden, ambiguous and analytically poor to use as categories or tools of analysis. Our task, I believe, is to identify and explore the ways in which the civic/ethnic distinction, among other discursive tools and practices, is used to occupy a terrain of legitimacy. That is, how the idea of 'civicness' is used by different (often political) actors as a normative tool to take the moral high ground and how, in the process, cracks begin to emerge and nationalist narratives come to rely on paradoxes.

Finding more nuanced ways to understand and explore nationalism is especially important in order to make sense of nationalism vis-à-vis ethnic minorities' experiences of belonging, inclusion and exclusion. I have argued that rather than reifying nationalism as a 'thing', as something that 'is' civic or ethnic, we need to focus on nationalism as a process, as something that is 'done' and actively interpreted. To this end, I will draw on Zimmer's (2003) theoretical framework in the next chapter. The following chapters will continue the work begun here by, firstly, unpacking the SNP's constructions of Scotland and Scottishness, followed by a discussion of ethnic minorities' understandings and experiences of nationalism in Scotland within the context of the independence referendum and beyond.

Chapter 5

‘Scottish Values’, National Community, and its Boundaries

*5.1. Introduction*

The previous chapter challenged the analytical usefulness and rigorousness of the predominant civic/ethnic distinction, and contested the widely held views — both in academia and beyond — which represent the SNP's nationalism in particular as ‘civic’ in form. This chapter will build on this critique by beginning to sketch out the ways in which nationalist narratives can be analysed and understood beyond the binary distinction. As noted by Mooney and Scott (2016:248), “the myth of Scottish progressiveness, egalitarianism and collectiveness comes to occupy an even more privileged position within politics and across public discourse in Scotland”. Indeed, it is these ‘values’ of progressiveness, egalitarianism and collectiveness amongst others — and the framing of these principles as ‘Scottish values’ — that emerged as a dominant theme throughout the different types of data that were gathered and analysed for this thesis (namely content analysis of SNP speeches and publications, observational data from referendum events, and interviews with ‘experts’, campaigners and individuals from different ethnic minority backgrounds).

As noted in Chapter 2, Benedict Anderson, who relates the emergence of nationalism to capitalism, technological developments and to the spread of the vernacular (Spencer and Wollman, 2005:5), famously argued that nations are ‘imagined communities’ (2006). Importantly for this chapter, Anderson also notes how “communities are to be distinguished (...) by the *style* in which they are imagined” (2006:6 — added emphasis). Although understanding the roots of nationalism is important (see the classical debates in Chapter 2), it is equally as important to focus on contemporary forms of nationalism and on the construction of imaginary national communities (see post-classical approaches in Chapter 2).

Importantly, it is crucial to understand how and why we draw boundaries between, and *within,* different nations in order to shed light on, as Brubaker puts it, nationness as an *event*: "as a contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision" (1996:19). Here, Brubaker draws our attention to nations in flux; that is, to the observation that the way in which nations are imagined and constructed (the shape and form that a nation takes) shifts and changes over time. Importantly, and as will be discussed further in the subsequent chapters, the ways in which nations are imagined have material and psychic consequences for the lives of those who do not 'unproblematically' belong to the nation.

Thus, this chapter seeks to uncover, in Anderson's terms, the style in which the Scottish nation is imagined, and the ways in which boundary mechanisms (Zimmer, 2003) play a key role in negotiating the contours of the nation (i.e. who 'we' are). I therefore address questions regarding how nationalist narratives and projects have been mobilised and contested in Scotland in relation to the referendum and in the devolutionary context, and what the components of these nationalist narratives are. Drawing on Brubaker's argument above, Zimmer (2003) suggests we take a 'process-oriented approach' to national identity — that is, that we account for the changes, paradoxes and complexities of nationalist narratives without simply labelling one form of nationalism as 'civic' or 'ethnic'. Rather, the focus should be on understanding nationalist narratives as a "precarious frame of vision" (Brubaker, 1996:19). In order to do this, the focus of this chapter, as alluded to above, will be on the notion of 'national (Scottish) values' as a way of imagining the national community.

The chapter will firstly start with a brief discussion of the concept of 'values'. On the one hand, I will explore its centrality to sociological concerns and, on the other hand, its somewhat uneasy relationship with nationalism studies. Secondly, after discussing values I will return to Zimmer's framework and introduce it in more detail. This chapter will then move on to consider how Scotland is framed as a 'value community' both from above (by the SNP) and from below (by participants). This chapter will consider the ways in which history — and especially Enlightenment history — is appropriated in the SNP's narrative of the nation and, importantly, how the party

constructs 'Scottish values' as rooted in history and in the Scottish *psyche*. Thus, this chapter contributes to the argument advanced in the Introduction and in the previous chapter that nationalist narratives draw on history in order to provide the nation with its putative 'content' or 'spirit'. Finally, before further discussing and concluding the arguments raised in this chapter, the discussion will explore how ideas of 'Scottish values' and 'Scottish distinctiveness' are constructed in juxtaposition to Westminster and in opposition to values which are seen to emanate from south of the border. The focus of this chapter will be on the SNP's nationalist narratives from above on the one hand, and on interviewees' understandings and experiences of those narratives on the other.

*5.2. Nationalist narratives and values*

Values, the focus of this chapter, have long been a central concern for sociologists. Thus, it is useful to briefly outline and explore what the concept of value means and entails. A value can, in 'lay talk', be seen as what is deemed good, and ideals that guide one's actions (Tappolet & Rossi, 2015:3). Rokeach defines value as "an enduring belief that guides actions across specific contexts" (1969:160, cited in Henderson and McEwen, 2005:174). Simmel (2004 [1900]), of course, famously developed a theory regarding value in *The Philosophy of Money*. In it he argues that there are two fundamental forms of understanding the world, namely value and being (Cantó Milà, 2005:146). For Simmel, "values introduce nuances and qualitative differences to the homogenous picture that is achieved through the lens of being" — furthermore, he does not differentiate too closely between economic, moral and aesthetic values; rather, these are special instances of the same concept (Cantó Milà, 2005:146). Values are thus fundamental to "the very possibility of social experience" and to society, and people "cannot perceive anything at all without colouring it with value nuances" (Cantó Milà, 2005:146). What is key to Simmel's understanding is that there are no transcendental values but, rather, desiring subjects construct — in reciprocal relations with each other — the only lenses of value there are. Thus, the lens of value is subjective in the sense that our valuations never simply reflect or emerge from intrinsic qualities of objects (Cantó Milà, 2005:147).

The importance of values has also been noted in the field of nationalism studies specifically (e.g. Zimmer 2003; Lægaard 2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). Focusing on political discourse in Canada and the UK, Henderson and McEwen note how "shared values nurtured within political discourse serve three different purposes", namely, "the pursuit of ideological or policy goals; the mobilisation of the population; and the promotion of inter-regional solidarity and identity" (2005:174). For Henderson and McEwen, it is this final function that is of interest; that is, how values are "drawn upon in political discourse to serve a nation-building purpose within multinational states" (2005:174). Zimmer's (2003) framework, which will be explained in more detail shortly, focuses on boundary mechanisms on the one hand (that is, on the mechanisms social actors use to reconstruct national identity) and on symbolic resources, on the other hand (that is, on the raw materials that social actors appropriate when drawing the boundaries of national identity). For Zimmer, these resources are political values/institutions, culture, history and geography. Thus, Zimmer highlights the importance of values as a symbolic resource in the construction of national boundaries.

However, there has been hesitation in nationalism studies to acknowledge that "appeals to 'national values' may themselves be a kind of nationalism" — that is, different authors have been hesitant to view nationalists' appeals to political values or principles as constitutive of nationalism (Lægaard, 2007:38). Authors such as Kymlicka (1996a) and Norman (1995), as noted by Henderson and McEwen, have argued that "shared values are entirely distinct from national identity" (Henderson and McEwen, 2005:177). Specifically, Norman (1995) has argued that "shared identity drives national cohesion rather than shared values" (Henderson & McEwen, 2005:177). Further, because the values under scrutiny are often deemed "standard liberal ideas and principles such as individual freedom, equality, tolerance and democracy" — values which chime with the SNP's rhetoric as will be seen — these values are "understood as claiming universal validity and even as being in conflict with nationalism" (Lægaard, 2007:38). Because liberal values "are ordinarily presented as based on a conception of all humans being free and equal", "the very idea of presenting liberal values as national values seems at best peculiar and at worst incoherent (e.g. Joppke 2005:56f.), particularly if national values are supposed to provide a differentiation between members of the nation and non-members"

(Lægaard, 2007:46).

However, as Zimmer (2003) urges, we need to think about the *process* of nationalism; that is, the ways in which boundary mechanisms operate, and concentrate less on the *what*, i.e. on the cultural content which those boundaries supposedly enclose. Thus, even if the values cited as 'national' could be seen to be 'universal', the focus should be on the ways in which (or the processes by which) these 'universal values' are framed as 'national'. As Henderson and McEwen argue, and I agree with their position, "a discourse of shared values may play a role in maintaining and shaping national identity" (2005:177). Thus, rather than treating values as a separate sphere from national identity, I would argue that values contribute to collective national consciousness and that they are used as building blocks — much like Zimmer (2003) suggests — in nationalist narratives. As Henderson and McEwen put it (2005:189), "the discourse of shared values serves as a tool in the politics of nation-building", and the idea of shared values can be appropriated to create a sense of commonality and distinctiveness from others (which, in Scotland's case specifically, is often Westminster). While values framed as 'national' are often universal values, "the belief that values are distinctly national may be more important than any objective evidence to the contrary" (Henderson and McEwen, 2005:177).

### 5.3. Zimmer's process oriented approach to nationalism

In his insightful article, Zimmer suggests a move beyond the civic/ethnic dichotomy which is "too thematic to come to terms with the dynamic nature of social and political processes" (2003:173). As Zimmer rightly points out, "nationalism is by necessity a complex blend of these two visions — the voluntaristic and the deterministic" — or, as they are often called, civic and ethnic. Yet, there is a temptation to classify "entire cases rather than examining national identities in terms of dynamic process" (2003:177). While the insight that 'nations' are socially constructed is useful and a crucial starting point, it is important to shed light on the *ways* in which they are constructed. Having this insight allows us to better understand the processes of nation building (rather than the 'end product' of

labelling something as 'civic' or 'ethnic'), and to more flexibly interrogate, deconstruct and trace the messy and often contradictory ways in which national belonging and 'nation-ness' are being negotiated, made, and re-made. Importantly, understanding the ways in which nations are made and imagined helps us understand the very real consequences these processes have in the lives of people (including the lives of racialised minorities). This is a point I return to in more detail in Chapter 6.

Further, while Zimmer concedes that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism "has helped to shed light on the complex genesis of nationalism, not least by enabling comparisons between a wide range of different cases and historical periods", he nonetheless points out how a rather different framework is needed "if our concern relates to the discontinuously occurring public redefinitions of nationhood rather than to long-term developments" (2003:177). Thus, "the classic model has turned out particularly inadequate when it comes to analysing national identity as a public discourse as represented in newspapers, public speeches and the like" (2003:177).

Zimmer begins to develop a 'process-oriented approach' to understanding national identity. This approach focuses, on the one hand, on the mechanisms social actors use to reconstruct "the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time" and, on the other hand, on symbolic resources social actors draw on when reconstructing these boundaries (2003:178). For Zimmer, symbolic resources are political values/institutions, culture, history and geography, and these "resources provide the symbolic raw material (…) which social actors use to define national identities in public discourse" (2003:179-80).

In addition to symbolic resources, boundary mechanisms are important to Zimmer's understanding of national identity construction. Following Renan, Zimmer divides boundary mechanisms into two types: voluntarist and organic. Firstly, the voluntarist boundary mechanism "rests on a voluntarist conception of nationhood" (2003:178). Secondly, he proposes an organic boundary mechanism. Zimmer argues for the usefulness of the concept of 'organic' over 'ethnic' by noting that it, firstly, stands in

direct opposition to 'voluntarist' by denoting a particular, deterministic mechanism of constructing national identity. Further, "the term 'ethnic' refers to a specific *understanding of* national identity — one in which ethnic descent appears as the prime factor" (Zimmer, 2003:178; original emphasis). Rather than 'civic', Zimmer proposes the use of 'voluntarist' because the former "conflates a particular symbolic resource (political values and institutions) and a specific mechanism of identity construction (voluntarism) into a single concept" (2003:178-9). While voluntarist mechanisms emphasise the constructed character of national communities, references to the nation's "*alleged* organic rootedness serve to establish a link with the invariant in a world of recurrent change" (2003:179; added emphasis). Thus the two mechanisms work in conjunction: organic mechanisms emphasise the nation's "integrity as a distinctive community" whilst voluntarist mechanisms, while "portraying the nation as virtuous and unique", also bring out "its constructed and contingent nature, thus exposing its potential fragility" (2003:189).

In his critique of the civic/ethnic distinction, Jensen points out how it makes little sense to label certain cultural idioms or content, such as 'liberal values' (2014:564), 'ethnic' or 'civic' — as is often done — because "the open-ended nature of any cultural idiom or resource makes it receptive to both inclusive and exclusive interpretations" (2014:567). Indeed, 'shared values' are often understood as a key content of 'civic nationalism' (see Ignatieff 1993:3-4 and Brubaker, 2004:61-62). However, supposedly 'civic' elements — such as 'liberal values' — may well be framed in exclusionary terms especially by the radical right (Jensen, 2014:569). Halikiopoulou et al (2013) demonstrate the ways in which European radical right parties seek to appropriate 'liberal values' such as tolerance, diversity and equality in order to define boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Thus, because of the present 'civic zeitgeist', "instead of utilising a rhetoric focused on ethnic and/or primordial elements of national identity such as race, creed, blood and kinship, these parties have annexed civic values in their discursive toolkit, including the notions of democracy, citizenship and respect for the rule of law" (Halikiopoulou, 2013:108). Exclusion, no longer justified in purely ethnic terms, is then "targeted at those who do not share 'our' liberal values such as democracy, multiculturalism and the rule of law" (Halikiopoulou et al, 2013:112; see also Fozdar and Low, 2015).

Importantly, this has consequences for any conception of a civic/ethnic dichotomy as well: while 'progressive values' supposedly embodied in civic nationalism are seen as the polar opposite to the 'regressive values' of ethnic nationalism, what often goes under-analysed are the ways in which seemingly civic discourses are appropriated to exclusionary ends. Thus, the "dichotomy does not capture the inherent contradictions within liberalism and the delicate balance between tolerance, inclusion and exclusion that these entail" (Halikiopoulou et al, 2013:113). Such discourses are, in turn, closely related to the rise of 'cultural' or 'neo' racism (see Barker 1990 [1981]; Balibar, 1991) whereby cultures are depicted as a fixed property of social groups and cultures are presented as being arranged along ethnically absolute lines — thus, as culture is brought into contact with 'race', it is transformed into a pseudo-biological property of communal life (Gilroy, 1990:266).

Having outlined both the centrality of values to nationalist ideas and understandings and Zimmer's 'process oriented approach' which will guide the discussion, I will now turn to the data. I will discuss the ways in which Scotland was framed as a 'value community' during the independence referendum by the SNP, and how history was used and understood both by political actors and my participants with regard to values. I will then consider the 'view from below' and the ways in which the participants experienced and framed Scotland and ideas of Scottishness. Before concluding, I will focus on the idea of 'Scottish exceptionalism'.

*5.4. Framing Scotland as a value community*

As argued in Chapter 4, and as also pointed out by Mooney and Scott (2015; 2016), the Scottish independence referendum was to a large degree framed around issues of social welfare and social justice. The SNP explicitly stated that they represented a nationalism that is 'civic' in form, and thus open and inclusive. Further, and linked to this, this argument about the SNP's 'civic' outlook was compounded by how the broader Yes campaign was framed in relation to issues around democratic deficit and social justice. Importantly, these arguments around social justice and welfare, as well as democratic deficit, were explained and understood with reference to 'values'.

Consequently, during the referendum debates, values became an important reference point through which 'Scottishness' and Scottish national identity came to be constructed and understood. Henderson and McEwen (2005) have also previously highlighted the importance of claims regarding specific values to mainstream Scottish political discourse (especially by the SNP but also by Scottish Labour), and to the construction of Scottish national identity. Similarly to my findings, they note how "mainstream political discourse emphasises the values of *enterprise, social justice* and support for *egalitarianism* as the distinguishing traits of Scottish national identity" (2005:183; added emphasis).

### 5.4.1. 'Scottish values' and the view from above

As will be explained below, speeches by SNP figures and the party's referendum publications made use of very specific values (also referred to as 'principles' by the party) and framed these as 'Scottish values' or 'our values'. Indeed, the SNP, during the Yes campaign, argued that "democracy, prosperity and fairness are the principles at the heart of the case for independence" (Scotland's Future, 2013:40). Consequently, "if we transfer decision-making powers from Westminster to Scotland we are more likely to see policies that are in tune with the values of people of Scotland" (Scotland's Future, 2013:40). Thus, independence was framed as an opportunity to begin to fulfil these values: "independence would enable us to build a new Scotland — a Scotland that is fairer, better, wealthier, more confident and more outward looking than ever before" (Your Scotland, Your Future, 2011:3). The ways in which the SNP appropriated values (as symbolic resources) in its active process of constructing a specific vision of the 'Scottish nation' can helpfully be understood through Zimmer's (2003) approach outlined above.

The particular values that were highlighted during the campaign were: fairness; democracy and social democracy; equality and egalitarianism; entrepreneurship, prosperity and wealth; and internationalism. The frequency with which these themes were mentioned in the 36 SNP speeches analysed provides an indication of the centrality of 'values' to the case for independence: fairness was mentioned in 21

speeches; democracy was mentioned in 24 speeches; social democracy was mentioned in 4 speeches; equality and egalitarianism were mentioned in 10 speeches (inequality was mentioned in 16); entrepreneurship, prosperity and wealth were mentioned in 26 speeches; and internationalism was mentioned in 20 speeches. Claims about 'values', thus became central to the SNP's nationalist narratives.

While it was acknowledged that values such as fairness, equality and democracy are, on the one hand, 'universal', they were, on the other hand, also framed as '*Scottish* values' by the SNP. Speaking at a conference focusing on the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games and their legacy, Humza Yousaf (Beyond the Games conference, Glasgow Caledonian University, 21 July 2014) noted that "The Scottish Government is committed to creating an equal and fair society for everyone, built on the fundamental values of a nation free from prejudice, discrimination and victimisation, and tackling injustice and exclusion in all forms". He went on to say that "the Commonwealth Games values of humanity, equality and destiny are *universal* and cherished in Scotland" (added emphasis).

Similarly, but focusing on the national (British) context, FM Salmond suggests that previous social reforms, although UK wide, have a stronger legacy in Scotland. He begins by noting that,

> *For much of the postwar period, people in Scotland largely embraced the great social reforms which were implemented by Clement Atlee's government and sustained through much of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. National insurance, housing for all and the establishment of a national health service commanded a consensus which spanned political boundaries and national borders.* (Speech, 'Scotland's Place in the World', Hugo Young Lecture, London, January 2012)

However, he goes on to say that "it probably is the case that Scotland subscribed particularly strongly to the values of the post-war consensus". Thus, there is — on the one hand — recognition of the universality of values such as equality and fairness but, even then, on the other hand, there is also a suggestion that there is greater appetite for what are framed as "our shared progressive values" (FM Salmond, SNP spring conference address, 23 March 2013) in Scotland.

Thus, certain values are framed as being *Scottish* or *Scotland's* values, and as being '*our* values'. The White Paper on independence, for example, argues that independence will provide an opportunity to "set out a vision for the type of economy and society that captures *Scotland's distinct values* and build distinct economic, industrial and social policies which reflect these aims" (The Scottish Government, 2013:94; added emphasis). Similarly, DFM Nicola Sturgeon asked whether Scotland should "have the status of a region, lobbying Westminster in the hope that the UK Government will protect our interests and promote our values" (keynote speech to the David Hume Institute, Edinburgh, 15 January 2014) and FM Alex Salmond argued that "nobody will do a better job than we can, of reflecting our own priorities and values, of creating the sort of country we wish to see" (Speech at the Royal Highland Show, Ingliston, 19 June 2014). Thus, there is a strong sense of taking national ownership of certain 'progressive' values, and a tendency to frame these as peculiarly *Scottish*.

These Scottish values would, according to the SNP's proposition, be 'enshrined' in a Scottish constitution. As outlined in the White Paper, they envisaged independent Scotland as having a written constitution "which expresses Scotland's values" while embedding the rights of citizens and setting out the relationships of different state institutions (The Scottish Government, 2013:560). As a result, "Scotland's written constitution should reflect our identity as a nation and what is important to us" (The Scottish Government, 2013:560-561). The process of drafting a constitution was presented as open and all individuals and parties would be encouraged to partake and contribute. Thus, "the process of drawing up a constitution (...) will provide us with a chance to reflect on the democracy and society we want to live in, the values that we most cherish" (Salmond, 'Social Union and the Union of the Crowns' speech, Campbeltown Summer Cabinet Public Discussion, 28 August 2013).

As summarised by Lægaard, "one of the elements or components in the traditional notion of civic nation" — which I would argue, as has been noted, is a problematic and unhelpful category of analysis — "is precisely the idea that what unites the members of such a nation is their shared allegiance to certain political principles and values,

perhaps as set out in a constitution, as in Habermas' idea of constitutional patriotism" (2007:43). Thus, the SNP put forward an idea of a 'civic' Scottish nation based on values such as fairness and social democracy which should be enshrined in a constitution.

As a result, values become central and crucial building blocks — or, in Zimmer's (2003) words, symbolic resources — which are used to construct the boundaries of the 'Scottish nation'. Further, as will be seen in the subsequent section, due to the ways in which the symbolic resources of values and history are used, the boundary mechanisms take a more organic form.

### 5.4.2. History and Enlightenment

*FAIRNESS runs through Scotland like a vein. We have a strong tradition, maintained over centuries, of seeking to create an inclusive society which encourages hard work and excellence but also supports those most in need. That's one reason why we are so concerned about the way the Tories in Westminster are trying to change things.* (Your Scotland, Your Future, 2011:16)

Importantly, there was another layer to how symbolic resources were used in an effort to construct a vision of Scotland as a value community in these elite discourses. During the referendum campaign, Scotland was portrayed as uninterruptedly aspiring to equality and fairness throughout history. In order to bolster this claim, key SNP actors repeatedly drew on historical events and people — especially the Enlightenment and Adam Smith — to argue that fairness, egalitarianism and democracy are indeed 'Scottish values' that "[run] through Scotland like a vein". Framing such values as inherently national makes political sense. As Jensen notes, "the maximally universal construction of civic nationalism makes poor sense of particularism because ahistorical, universal political values cannot differentiate between national groups. Universal values are per definition unable to direct the loyalty of individuals towards particular communities" (2014:565). Thus, the SNP anchors these values in a specific historiography and a claim to Scottish

distinctiveness.

As mentioned before, Henderson and McEwen (2005) have previously written about the importance of values to mainstream Scottish political discourse. Their analysis, however, overlooks historiography as a central building block — or symbolic resource — in the constitution of 'national values'. Thus, they do not consider the ways in which historical events and people are selectively appropriated in an effort to narrate the nation. Mooney and Scott (2016:239), on the other hand, importantly argue that "legacies of eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment continue to influence and shape Scottish political debate in the early twenty-first century, even if rarely made explicit". While this is a key observation which is very much in line with my findings, and I agree that the perceived Enlightenment legacies do influence and shape public debates, I would argue contra Mooney and Scott that these legacies are indeed made very explicit by the SNP, as will be shown in due course.

Nationalist narratives — as established previously — rely heavily on the selective remembering of history. Kearton (2005) has previously highlighted how the SNP has appropriated history in order to bolster certain contemporary political aims. She draws on different examples such as the prevalence of the idea of 'popular sovereignty' in the SNP's speeches, and argues that the SNP often refer back to the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) as the starting point for the tradition of Scottish constitutional thought and of seeing power as essentially limited and contractual (2005:30-31). This is certainly a theme that continued during the referendum campaign — in the 36 SNP speeches analysed, the Declaration of Arbroath was mentioned in six (by Salmond, Sturgeon and Hyslop). FM Alex Salmond, for example, noted that:

> *If you think for a moment about Scotland's past, the reason I'm here in the USA at this particular time is because of ideals of liberty and elective governance which were distilled in the Declaration of Arbroath almost 700 years ago.* (Speech at the Glasgow Caledonian University New York campus, 7.4.2014)

Interestingly, however, another strand of history — as referred to by Mooney and

Scott (2016) — was drawn upon by leading SNP figures in order to justify and provide momentum for the case for independence during the referendum campaign. Scotland and its thinkers' role in the Enlightenment was evoked on multiple occasions during the Yes campaign, and it was argued that there exist certain Scottish values which have been apparent throughout Scotland's history — namely fairness and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, these values are positioned as important today. Alex Salmond spoke about Adam Smith's 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' during the same speech in New York quoted above:

> (…) I want to look today at the contribution an independent Scotland will make to the world. I'll outline our intention to be a good global citizen, working in partnership with countries across the planet. I'm going to argue that our international policy — like our domestic policy — should be governed by another enlightened Scottish idea — the one Adam Smith pursued in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" — of enlightened self-interest. By helping others, we will help ourselves. (Speech at the Glasgow Caledonian University New York campus, 7.4.2014)

What is key here is the reference to 'enlightened self-interest' which became a key concept used by Salmond when referring to Adam Smith or the Enlightenment. Salmond continually positioned Scotland as a 'progressive beacon' which could set 'a positive example' — and this example is set through combining fairness and prosperity. Speaking at the Tsinghua University in Beijing, China on 5 November 2013, Salmond again made reference to the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* as well as *The Wealth of Nations*. Salmond contends that while it has been argued that Smith's ideas in these two books contradict each other, for him, taken together, they "balance each other" — "the moral philosophy of the first, and the science of economics of the second, supply many of the insights we need to confront the challenges of today. In particular, enlightened self-interest helps us to reconcile individual desires and collective needs". Thus, for him — and for the SNP's political stance more broadly — it is important to join up the values of wealth and entrepreneurship on the one hand, and social fairness on the other. This is achieved through the idea of 'enlightened self-interest'.

The following rather lengthy quote from an interview with Salmond neatly sums up this point. Here we can see how the past is appropriated in order to make claims with regard to supposedly intrinsic Scottish values, which are seen as the driving force behind the independence endeavour:

> *"In Scotland, nationhood comes out of 1,000 years of history forged in a long millennium of time," Salmond says (...). "Our values, though, I think largely emerged during the enlightenment, both in terms of the rational thinking that came forward, that sprung out of Scotland and Edinburgh, and also the poetry which was memorably encapsulated in the work of Robert Burns." So what are these values? Well, they're values which say, look, people have to work hard. We founded entrepreneurship, we founded the modern world. But the reason for doing that is so that you can have a fairer society."*

Here, the interviewer interjects:

> *The reason many 'Yes' voters want independence, I put it to him gently, is a little more prosaic: that they can 'end Tory rule forever', as one pro-independence placard puts it. These same values are ultimately leftist; they could be found anywhere in the north of England, just as fed up with the dominance of the London-centric elites of Britain.*

Salmond replies:

> *"They're not leftist sentiments, they're Scottish sentiments," Salmond insists. "They're based on the precepts of Adam Smith and the Enlightenment. That's what I think people in London struggle to see." [Salmond] quotes Andrew Carnegie, the "most successful entrepreneur in history", who said that "he who dies rich dies shamed". (...) As Adam Smith taught us, he continues, "the prosperity of a nation is tied up in the welfare of its citizens". What welfare means here, he says, is "the promotion of prosperity, but also the promotion of fairness".* (Stevenson, 2014)

In this interview, Salmond highlights the values of entrepreneurship and fairness and, crucially, denies that the values he is talking about are universal and 'leftist' — rather, they are specifically Scottish. Importantly, Salmond makes an explicit reference to London, and the ways in which elites there "struggle to see" that these values are 'Scottish sentiments', and thus avowedly particular to the Scottish context. I will pick up the issue of London, Westminster and England later on in this chapter (see section 5.5.).

The focus on the Enlightenment is also interesting in light of Scotland's historical

involvement with slavery already discussed in Chapter 4. Since the discourses around 'progressive' values and 'principles' is key to the SNP's idea of the Scottish nation and its character, there is a notable focus on specific Enlightenment history (e.g. Hume, Smith) and a deafening silence on other aspects of Scottish history (colonialism and slavery) which influence understandings of the contemporary Scottish nation to this day (e.g. who counts as part of the 'Scottish diaspora' during Homecoming). Since the Enlightenment period and Scotland's involvement in colonialism and the slave trade overlap it is telling that the SNP have focused more on the former. Stephen Howe notes how "until very recently, 'imperial and colonial history existed in an almost entirely separate sphere from the writing of "domestic" British history'" (quoted in Geppert and Müller, 2015:2). This seems to speak to the Scottish experience as well. Slavery past does not exist as part of the national story but is outside it; that is, it is not portrayed as something that represents the nation and its values (indeed, it stands in direct opposition to the celebrated values that are portrayed as making up a major part of Scottish national identity).

This occluded history has been acknowledged more recently: for example, at a referendum debate in Edinburgh, "in his brief opening statement, Humza Yousaf argued that we should not look at Scotland's past through rose tinted glasses, as Scotland was the second city of the Empire" (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014). He then went on to argue "that Scotland could contribute to the world as a *nation*" and "said how Scotland has a duty to help those who flee horrors of their countries, and he condemns dawn raids, destitution, and says how food coupons distributed to the asylum seekers are 'dehumanising'" (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014). Thus, while there is fleeting recognition of Scotland's violent past, the tradition of humanity (which ties in with this presentation of 'Scottish values') is foregrounded.

Thus, in Zimmer's (2003) terms, drawing on the symbolic resource of (universal) values theoretically works as a voluntarist boundary mechanism as anyone can, technically, sign up to these values. However, because values are appropriated in conjunction with the symbolic resource of history, the values are, in turn, anchored in historical 'Scottishness'. Thus, the boundary mechanism takes on a more organic form.

This is where the strength of Zimmer's framework lies: it uncovers and makes visible the complex and contradictory ways in which symbolic resources are drawn on, and how putatively 'civic' resources (such as values) can be used in exclusionary ways.

### 5.4.3. The view from below: Class and community

The focus has so far been on the ways in which the SNP has framed Scotland as a 'value community' and how this has been done by appropriating certain symbolic resources. Interestingly, in the interviews, many of the participants vocalised similar views to those of the SNP — that is, that Scotland is fairer, which was usually framed in terms of Scotland being more leftist, and that there is a stronger commitment to 'community'. This extract from Noor illustrates this tendency:

> *I think Scotland has always kind of shown itself as be- - wanting to be a much fairer, sort of, society anyway, we've a- - because we, we are much more leftist. And I think that's where the arguments about the finance kind of came in which was that if we were able to, ehm, have control over how we spend our budgets, then, you know, we wouldn't have this kind of, this, this - - well, we would still have, ehm, problems with poverty but at least we could address, you know, the more serious issues. So I think, ehm, yeah [sighs] — I mean I am - - that, that's — that is, I am fundamentally a socialist.* (Noor, Scottish-Indian, teacher, 45 years old, voted yes.)

Importantly, she understands Scotland's left-wing-ness as being a longstanding trend ("always…shown itself") which is shared across the people ("*we* are much more leftist"). Noor of course also identifies as a socialist herself, so her political identity is intimately connected to the values which she sees as characteristically Scottish.

Lukasz — a Polish 21-year-old college student and part-time cleaner who voted yes — although explaining that he is "not really a socialist", nonetheless enjoys "the socialism spirit here 'cause it's quite different that my people know it". For him, socialism in Scotland, as he sees it, is vastly different from the "dark side of socialism and communism" that "we [Poles] know". Consequently, his friends in Poland call him "a bloody socialist" — "you're red army and shit" — but for Lukasz "it's not that socialism, no it's not the best but well, umm, still it's completely, completely different view for the, for the politics".

Both Noor's and Lukasz's understanding, therefore, is that there is a more evident mainstream political current of socialism in Scotland. Lukasz's understanding of it is situated in the context of his post-Soviet and post-communist understanding of socialism. While for his friends socialism is a 'dirty word', Lukasz saw there being a different type of socialism at work in Scotland which is different from what was experienced in Poland (Lukasz himself identified as being to the right of the political spectrum).

In addition to many of the participants viewing Scotland as being fairer and more leftist in general, many also saw the referendum debate as being about — or being framed as — a question of class. When interviewing Odogwu, a 36-year-old university student from Nigeria who actively campaigned for a yes vote, we seemed to be, for a while, implicitly discussing the relationship between the referendum and class without specifically naming 'class'. Eventually, I brought up a newspaper article I had read in which Jonathon Shafi (2014) — one of the key figures in the Radical Independence Campaign — argued that class was at the heart of the vote. Odogwu said he agreed with Shafi's stance, and that it came down to how "*they* want to maintain the status quo" (added emphasis) and that the referendum was "about class because you have people fighting from below, the people who are completely disenfranchised" and who "have been silenced" until now. He went on to say that, under Conservative rule, these people have witnessed the negative effects on the NHS, for example, and they are standing up to "fight it".  Thus, Odogwu frames the referendum as being about class and the no vote as maintaining the status quo. More specifically, he frames the referendum as being a moment when the disenfranchised were rising up and fighting back against the Tory government and their austerity policies. While it did not become clear who "they" were exactly, it seemed likely that he was referring to the Conservative political elite in Westminster.

Others also raised the issue of those benefiting from the status quo as being more likely to vote no, and therefore seeing the vote in class terms. George explained his views:

> Umm..yeah, I think people were frightened and..there's also the possibility of

*there being a class divide, umm, a lot of the comfortable middle classes..fear losing that comfortable status. Whereas a lot of the working class people are keen on a chance to improve their lives, so they wanna vote yes. It didn't obviously just break down at class divide but I think there was..something to that. (…) Umm..I'm not sure what decided it [the outcome of the vote]. I think…yeah, I think it comes down to the fear of change, I think that was the big thing with it, umm, and fear of…people losing..somewhat comfortable lifestyles that they have. Umm, so you look at the really deprived areas, they voted quite heavily yes. Umm, and then the more affluent, they voted really firmly no, so it seems to be that..I'm doing well, fuck everyone else.* (English, 28 years old, stock room worker, voted yes.)

Similarly, Lukasz spoke about an ESOL teacher who came from a wealthy background and how she "obviously" voted no. Lukasz went on to explain how the teacher persuaded some of the students to vote no "just because of [her] own advantage". As George put it, the referendum was not only about class but "there was something to that". George and Lukasz thus understand the vote as being, at least to some extent, about class in a way that the working class was likelier to vote yes while middle classes and above would vote no.

This, however, opens up the possibility that those voting no can be framed as un-Scottish or as being against values such as fairness and equality (see section 4.2.1.) Eilidh, who identified as being politically on the left, challenged the idea of the referendum being about class. For her, it became a "disingenuously framed class issue" because those voting yes could not comprehend someone who is not a Tory voting no and, consequently, no voters became portrayed as having "all the land", wearing tweed and not caring about foodbanks, poor people and social problems. Thus,

*…it's a class issue in that I've- - it's almost, it's almost umm..it reminds me a little of..th- - th- - the portrayal of capitalists around the time of the Russian revolution and so on. (…) You know, top hats and nasty person hitting the, hitting people who were less well-off.*

In Eilidh's view, then, those voting no came to personify and embody an almost caricatured understanding of privilege and a lack of social consciousness.

Following on from this, it is useful to briefly step back and consider to what extent perceptions of Scotland's supposed left-winged-ness are accurate. According to data

from YouGov, people surveyed in Scotland do indeed stand slightly more to the left on a number of issues such as immigration, multiculturalism, healthcare, the benefits system and redistribution of wealth compared to others in the rest of the UK (Jordan, 2015). However, as Rachel Ormston (co-director of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey) cautions, "we often paint ourselves as much more socially democratic and left-wing than the data shows that we are" (Brooks, 2015). Curtice and Ormston conclude, based on data from the Scottish and British Social Attitudes Surveys, that "although Scotland is more social democratic in outlook than England, the differences are modest at best" and that, indeed, "like England, Scotland has become less — not more — social democratic since the start of devolution" (2011:1). Here, the authors define a 'social democrat' "as someone who is concerned about economic inequality and believes that the state should take action to reduce it" (2011:2). Curtice's and Ormston's report focuses on the key issues of inequality; redistribution; tax and spend; and distinctive policies (2011).

Take inequality, for example. People in Scotland and England were asked whether the gap between those on low and high incomes was too large. In 2010, 78 per cent of Scottish respondents and 74 per cent of English respondents agreed. Apart from 2009, Scottish respondents "have consistently been a little more likely than those in England to express this view" (2011:2). However, this difference has declined: in 1999 84 per cent of Scots said the income gap was too large compared to 78 per cent in 2010. England has also seen a similar shift, and the two countries have thus moved in parallel (2011:2). Interestingly, while 78 per cent of people in Scotland agree that the gap in income inequality is too large, "only 43 per cent agree that the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less well-off" — "much the same pattern is found in England" (2011:2-3). The difference between the countries is modest (43 per cent in Scotland agreeing with income redistribution compared to 34 per cent in England in 2010), and the gap has not widened over the last decade: thus, Scotland "simply remains a little to the left of England on this issue" (2011:3).

There is, however, evidence of Scots being more favourable about higher taxes and spending, though an overall downward trend has been apparent in Scotland since 1999. In 2010, while 30 per cent of English respondents supported an increase in 'tax

and spend' policies, 40 per cent of Scots thought this should be on the agenda. Although the gap between the two countries with regard to the tax issue is now bigger than ever before since the first survey in 1999, Scotland has not shifted more to the left on the issue. That is, over the years Scots have become less keen on increased taxes and spending thus "mirroring the trend in public opinion in England" (2011:3). There is, nonetheless, more support for higher taxes in Scotland than in England even if there has been a decrease in popularity for these policies in both countries.

While the figures cited above are from 2010, Craig McAngus from the Centre on Constitutional Change poses the question of whether "the legacy of the referendum led to a shift to the Scottish public becoming more left-wing than their neighbours to the south" (2015). Using data from the British Election Study carried out after the General Election in May 2015, McAngus found that on a left-right spectrum, 14.5 per cent of the Scottish public "are on the most left-wing point of scale" in comparison to 9.8 per cent of people in England. Thus there seems to be a slight difference in terms of having a greater proportion of Scots sitting at the 'radical left' end of the spectrum. A lack of previous data, however, makes it difficult to attribute the figure to specific events and, therefore, it is unclear whether there has been an increase before or after the referendum.

Therefore, while slight differences do exist which seem to suggest that voters in Scotland seem to fall slightly to the left of their English (and indeed Welsh) counterparts, the differences often become somewhat inflated in political discourse. As pointed out, the difference is only modest, Scotland has become less — not more — social democratic in outlook since devolution, and public opinion in Scotland has moved in parallel with that in England so the overall gap between the two countries has not widened (Curtice and Ormston, 2011:4). Of course, it must be pointed out that what is understood as left-wing, or what kind of policies are seen as leftist, is highly contested, but the figures do, nonetheless, give some indication regarding the differences of opinion between different parts of the UK. However, whether the people of Scotland *truly are* more left-wing or have a 'different' social consciousness

is not so much at issue here; what is important is that there exists a *belief* that Scots share certain values and are somehow culturally different, especially — and importantly — with reference to England. This, in turn, offers interesting insights into the workings of nationalism, nation building and nation-ness.

After this brief detour, let us return to the interviews. In addition to ideas around fairness and class, the concept of community also surfaced. This excerpt from an interview with Rachel offers a good example of how the concept is explained and understood:

> Rachel: *[...] Umm.. But then the longer I live here, the more I appreciate that..that there is just a different outlook on life, generally — it's, it's horrible because you can't talk about this without using sweeping generalisations.*
>
> Minna: *Yeah, yeah.*
>
> Rachel: *Umm, but — generally..I think there's a bigger commitment to community, I think generally there is a more left of centre, umm, kind of political affiliation. Umm...yeah. And, and that is stuff that you..you don't get to understand by visiting — you only get to understand by living here and then..having a kind of drip-feed to you.* (English, development officer, 33 years old, voted yes.)

Again, Rachel portrays Scotland as more left-wing and fairer, and Rachel does this especially in comparison with England (a theme I will pick up in more detail in the next section). Whilst she acknowledges that she is using "sweeping generalisations", she nonetheless perceives that there is a different political outlook in Scotland compared to its southern neighbour. In addition to this, what is of interest is the focus on 'community' and the commitment to it. Later on Rachel goes on to say there is a bigger "desire for community" in Scotland and that policies "that kind of feed that desire in a way that the Westminster parties don't" are formulated. According to her, this is "because they're still very much, you know, in the kind of Thatcherite 'there is no society — individuals'" frame of mind.

Similarly, Rahul — who is a 28-year-old student from a Scottish-Indian background and voted no — noted that a lot of people in Scotland hold socialist views. When I asked what makes Scotland more socialist in his opinion, he explained that "a lot of people's opinions are (...) based around helping the wider community and not just

you, yourself". Thus, as with Rachel, Rahul connects the perceived stronger socialist outlook with a commitment to 'community'. Community was also a key focus for SNP's Yes campaign — in the White Paper they argued that "w*ith independence we can create a social nation: a country that acts and feels like a community, a vibrant society where we know the benefits of looking out for each other"* (The Scottish Government, 2013:44 — italics in original). Importantly, in Zimmer's (2003) terms, here 'community' becomes a symbolic resource (and proxy for left-of-centre 'values') Rachel and Rahul draw on when constructing the boundaries of the 'Scottish nation'.

Community is itself, of course, an interesting and complex concept sociologically speaking. Zygmunt Bauman (2001:1) notes how words have meanings but that some words have a feel. For him, community is such a word: it feels good, and it is a warm, cosy and comfortable place. Furthermore, an understanding seems to be shared with all members of the community and it seems 'natural' — however, this shared understanding which makes community escapes notice (or, as Tönnies puts it, it is tacit) (Bauman, 2001:10-11). According to Bauman, then, the impact that community has on people relies on its everydayness, on its naturalness; it is not questioned. Gilroy, for example, notes that "community' 'signifies (...) a particular set of values and norms in everyday life: mutuality, co-operation, identification and symbiosis" (1987:234 in Baumann, 1996:15). Cohen remarks how community is that entity to which one belongs — it is greater than kinship but more immediate than the abstraction we call 'society' (1985:15).

Rachel and Rahul both describe something similar to Gilroy's conceptualisation as they note how community has to do with something bigger than the individual and a close-knit, more personal collectivity of people where they look after one another. More specifically, Rachel argues Scotland has a *desire* for community-ness which is something that is in contrast to the desires of Westminster parties that continue to exhibit a Thatcherite, individualistic outlook. Three things are of interest here. Firstly, both Rahul and Rachel connect this desire or commitment to community with Scots' ostensibly left-leaning political conviction. Secondly, Rachel's use of the term 'desire' is an interesting one: it suggests that community is something that needs to be achieved, something that needs to be worked for. Consequently, rather than an

unnoticed or natural concept — as Bauman puts it — community becomes something more reflexive. As argued by Back (2009:203-204; original emphasis), "community is not simply an organic fact or a straightforward state of affairs" — rather, "there might be some merit in thinking of community as *narrative achievement*, a way of thinking and telling life's story". This, in turn, opens up interesting questions regarding membership of that (national) community. What are the rules and processes that govern who can or gets to belong?

However — thirdly, and finally, desire also has close connotations with deep felt feelings and emotions: it speaks of longing. The narrative of Scotland as being more left-of-centre or a more caring community is achieved through a juxtaposition with an 'other' — England or Westminster. Consequently, the issue of community becomes closely tied with nationalism, with the boundary between 'us' and 'them'. Nationalism, rather than being made up of merely rational ideas and theories as to how the world should be understood or organised, taps into our thoughts and feelings and to our *very sense of self*. This, in turn, offers an interesting – and potentially dangerous — problematic in terms of community. While 'desire' highlights the potential for reflexivity regarding the content and contours of the community, emotions could be argued, at least to some degree, to disrupt this reflexive process — as argued by Hill Collins (2010:10-11), "community is not simply a cognitive construct; it is infused with emotions and value-laden meanings".

Thus, what I take from Rachel's comment regarding the 'desire' for community is the lingering invidious quality of national identity and its conceptions. Many of the participants, as we have seen, made the broader point about Scotland being a different kind of 'value community' — i.e. more leftist or socialist as opposed to its 'other', England or Westminster. Therefore, when Scotland is portrayed as a 'progressive' community, this is achieved through constructing an essentialised, emotionally charged understanding of Scotland (and Scottishness) as different from its southern neighbour.

Before moving on to discuss 'the other' and the borders of the community in more detail, it is — finally — important to point out that many participants challenged the 'Scotland as more equal' trope. While some participants, as we have seen, argued that Scotland is fairer and more left-wing, such characterisations of Scotland were also called into question. For example, this CEO of an ethnic minority third sector organisation challenges the reputed egalitarianism of Scotland, and does this especially in relation to racism:

> Practitioner 3: *There is, there is a bit of a myth that Scotland is a very equal place, there's no racism, no — you know, I think. I think there is, you know, you were talking about the poster One Scotland, and to me, if on those posters they put the proper stats of, you know, the employment rate for BME people in Scotland is this, what are you gonna do about it? You know, that — I think that would be more meaningful than shaking hands.*

Eilidh raises a similar point:

> *Umm — I interview people all the time who, you know, routinely use racist terminology, routinely, umm..consider themselves more entitled than..other people from other ethnicities. (...) I - - I don't think..I think..I think there's quite a bit of mythmaking, umm, or..or, umm..co-opting of myths, umm, which were existing and are quite handy for 'oh yeah, we're all for social justice because that's the way we roll any way'.* (From Guernsey, social worker, 54 years old, voted no)

Thus, for the CEO and Eilidh, there is an existing myth of 'no problem here' (Donald et al, 1995) and, importantly, there is an ongoing active process of *mythmaking*, as Eilidh puts it, in operation. The CEO and Eilidh raise further two points which are of interest. Firstly, Eilidh points out how the 'co-opting of myths' helps to uphold the imagery of Scotland as more socially just, and she makes this point especially with reference to racism. Secondly, and relatedly, the CEO points out how anti-racism campaigns such as One Scotland are lacking in a sense that they do not address institutional racism and deep-seated racist structures in the employment market, for example.

These points raised by the two participants chime with the (rather limited) academic literature that exists on Scotland and 'race'. It was not until the late 1990s that a series

of disturbing events — the two murders of Imran Khan and Surjit Singh Chhokar[13] in 1998 — encouraged a shift in attitudes and approaches to racism in Scotland (Penrose and Howard, 2008:97)[14]. Even so, Williams and de Lima (2006:499) highlight how a longstanding 'no problem here' attitude towards racism has led to 'laissez-fair politics' regarding race equality in Scotland. Further, Penrose and Howard note (2008:95) how Scotland has been imagined as devoid of racism by 'white' Scots and, Scotland being a predominantly white country, consequently this has lead to an idea that conceptions of racism having neither purchase nor relevance in the Scottish context.

The authors, rightly, challenge such views and note how they stem from two faulty assumptions: namely, that the presence of visible minorities is a prerequisite to racism, and that the degree of racism is directly proportional to the size of non-white population (2008:95). Thus, a degree of complacency has been evident in Scottish politics and policies vis-à-vis 'race' and racism since the devolution. Because the discourse around fairness and equality is so constant and dominant, it becomes almost commonsensical, and it becomes a trope that is difficult to challenge. Consequently, there is a real danger of overlooking the racism experienced by racialised Scots, and of responding to racist incidents on an individual basis rather than focusing on and seeking to dismantle structures that enable all forms of racism.

Similarly to the CEO and Eilidh, Jim, a 48-year-old trade unionist who campaigned for a no vote, directly challenged the idea of 'Scottish values'. He noted that there was a sense in the SNP's rhetoric that "if it's Scottish it's better, and we do things better in Scotland because we are better people because the Scottish character and Scottish society is…more left-wing" while at the same time also being "more entrepreneurial". The referendum process was "accompanied by quite deliberate myth-making" and

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[13] The Chhokar case was recently back in court. As a result, Ronnie Coulter was convicted of Chhokar's murder in October 2016.

[14] The timing of these events is of course of great significance as Stephen Lawrence, a black youngster, was brutally murdered by a group of white men in South London in April 1993. The Macpherson Report, which looked into the appalling management and handling of the Lawrence investigation and case, was published in February 1999; it was found that the Metropolitan police was institutionally racist. Thus, it is widely argued that it took the Stephen Lawrence inquiry to truly bring 'race' on the agenda (William and de Lima, 2006:499) in Scotland.

"became a sort of self-perpetuating thing that 'well, if we do things on a Scottish basis, they will automatically be better than doing them on a UK basis'". Consequently, he argued, the campaign "came down to certain myths about the nature of Scotland, which I think ignore vast amounts of actually existing Scotland".

In particular, Jim picked up on and referred back to Nicola Sturgeon's speech on having a Scottish constitution and the values she wanted to see embedded in it:

> *And she talked about — she wanted national values firmly embedded in the constitution and things like that. I got quite worried about that — who defines national values and, you know, umm..[...] You know, the, the, umm...there are — it's not as if you only have two settings on the nationalist dial of kind of civic minded pragmatist — so we only want independence for Scotland because, well, Westminster inefficient, we'd do it better here. Or, you know..march along singing the McHorst Wessel Song — you know, I mean it would be foolish, you know, to say that's the only two things you can have. But there's a, you know — there are gonna be a range of things in between that, and the more things go on, the more you talk about embodying national values. You know, the more you talk about that Scotland's a state of mind..but it's a state of mind that you need to share, otherwise you're not properly Scottish. The less comfortable I became with it all.*

Here Jim raises some intriguing issues regarding what he seems to describe as the spectrum of nationalism. Rather than having two polar opposites — a civic, pragmatic nationalism and ethnic nationalism and fascism — Jim argues there are "a range of things between that" or a continuum of ways in which nationalist ideas are expressed. This links to Zimmer's (2003) arguments which advise against simply labelling nationalist narratives as 'civic' or 'ethnic'.

Importantly, what made Jim uncomfortable was the portrayal of Scotland as having certain national values, and that in order to truly belong, one would need to sign up to these *Scottish* values. Jim quite neatly captures a key point with his reference to "Scotland's state of mind". During the campaign, Scotland came to be reified as an almost person-like entity with a distinct character and identity of its own — spearheaded by the SNP's vision and understanding of what Scotland is — rather than being seen as a conglomeration of heterogeneous individuals.

*5.5. 'Scottish exceptionalism', Westminster, and the English*

This chapter has focused on the more positive ideas around Scottishness: that is, the claim that there are certain "*Scottish* values that define *us*", and that "these values are part of an uninterrupted national story evident since the Enlightenment". However, in order to construct a national imaginary, it is not enough to argue who we are, but also who, or what, we are not — this idea of the 'national other' was discussed in Chapter 2.

In the Scottish case, for SNP politicians Westminster plays a central role in representing opposing values. The SNP have been careful to make reference to 'Westminster values' (though see quote from Salmond on p.153), and to avoid any essentialised notions of Englishness or 'English values'. However, in the English participants' experience — in their everyday lives and encounters — and in their understandings of the political messages, they felt that they came to embody 'Westminster politics' and the opposing, 'un-Scottish values' (I will revisit this theme in Chapter 7). Thus, the English participants came to interpret conceptualisations of 'Westminster' as coded references to English identity.

As Henderson and McEwen note, (2005:183), "the idea that Scots hold dear a set of values that distinguishes them from their English neighbours was especially prominent during the Thatcher years, and informed the movement for Scottish self-government". Thus, as the authors argue:

> *The 1980s witnessed three trends in Scottish politics: the steady decline in the Conservative vote; the strengthening of Scottish national identity; and the increased demand for Scottish home rule. These trends were interrelated. The decline in the Conservative vote in Scotland, coupled with the continued dominance of that party in Westminster, gave rise to the view that Scottish values and policy priorities were increasingly different from those held in England.* (2005:183-4)

During this time, opposition parties — especially Labour and the SNP — "nurtured and articulated collectivist values as 'Scottish' values and a symbolic reflection of Scottish national identity. Being Scottish was considered to reflect a belief in social justice and egalitarianism" (Henderson and McEwen, 2005:184). More recently, since

around the time of the Scottish devolution, there has been a continuous trajectory of juxtaposing 'Scotland's values' against those seen to emanate from Westminster. In 1998, Salmond argued that "the twin values of compassion and enterprise" underpin "our culture and identity" and that they are anathema to the "social and economic conservatism of Blair" (in Henderson and McEwen, 2004:185). This juxtaposition between 'Scottish values' and 'Westminster values' became very evident and a central tenet of the referendum debates.

The existence of an Other is important when considering values, on the one hand, and the concept of (national) community, on the other. Let us focus on values first of all. Simmel emphasises the relationality of values, and notes that the creation and consolidation of values does not stop at the individual level of desire (Cantó Milà, 2005:156). Thus, "Simmel argues that the processes that make individual valuations objective values are of social and relational character". ""[I]nitially subjective valuations reach out beyond their subjective origins, and are crystallised into objectified values which become independent of the desiring subjects, facing them as objective realities" (Cantó Milà, 2005:156). What makes any valuation possible is its comparative quality, the weighing of the valuation of one thing against another. This comparison, then, eventually crystallises "into a scale of values which is bestowed upon each object" (Cantó Milà, 2005:157). In order to illustrate his point, Simmel uses the analogy of length. He goes on to say that,

> *...a line gains the quality of length only by comparison with others. For its length is determined not by itself — since it is not simply 'long' — but by another line against which it is measured (...). If we were to assume that there is only a single line in the whole world, it would not have any specific length since it lacks any relation to others. It is impossible to measure the world as a whole, because there is nothing outside the worlds in relation to which it could have a specific size. This is true of a line so long as it is considered without being compares with others, or without its own parts being compared with each other; it is neither short nor long, but lies outside the whole category.* (2004 [1900]:83-84).

In order for the SNP to portray Scottish values as progressive, a point of comparison — Westminster and the values it is seen to embody — is needed. Values do not exist in a vacuum but require a comparator.

The SNP's referendum campaign was, as explained, built around the expression of the supposedly intrinsically 'Scottish values' of democracy, fairness and entrepreneurship/prosperity — and independence was justified as a means to achieve the implementation of these values. This process was, in turn, seen as being hindered by Westminster politics, by the Conservatives in particular and their austerity agenda. Indeed, Scottish values and their enactment were portrayed as being in direct opposition to Westminster and the actions of the UK government:

> *Right now, UK government reforms to welfare risk punishing vulnerable people. The approach of a Scottish government will be more closely aligned with Scotland's social democratic values than the actions of the Westminster government.* (Your Scotland, Your Future, 2011:16)

> *In the face of appalling financial pressures, we have have chosen a different path from Westminster — a path that reflects Scotland's social democratic consensus, our shared progressive values, our priorities as a society.* (FM Alex Salmond, SNP Spring conference address, 23 March 2013)

> *With each passing day it becomes clearer that the Westminster system is not fit for any purpose — it is further away than ever from Scotland's values, and past its time. (FM Alex Salmond, SNP Spring conference address, 23 March 2013)*

As these examples demonstrate, FM Alex Salmond, and the SNP more broadly in its independence White Paper, directly position *Scotland's shared progressive values* as different from those being supported at Westminster (again, SNP's claims are clearly made with reference to Westminster, rather than England). In the 36 SNP speeches analysed, Westminster was mentioned in 25. Interestingly, the case for independence was illuminated vis-à-vis policies implemented by Conservative governments such as the poll tax (instituted by Thatcher's government in 1989), and the more recent bedroom tax (instituted by Cameron's government in 2013).

Now, these two taxes are to be understood — with great justification — as detrimental to social and economic equality. In the 36 SNP speeches analysed, the poll tax was mentioned in two and the bedroom tax in eight. Salmond, for example, concluded that after independence, "Westminster governments, rejected at the ballot box in Scotland, will no longer be able to inflict the poll tax or the bedroom tax on the

most vulnerable people in our society" (The Scottish Government, 2013:x). These policies do heighten social and economic inequalities and they, thus, deserve to be criticised. What is of interest here from a nationalism point of view is that they are linked to arguments about Scottish distinctiveness.

Recently, Mooney (2016:68) has noted how,

> *...in the hands of the SNP in particular, though this is not confined to the SNP, the idea of Scotland as progressive on social welfare is used as a way of distinguishing Scotland from the rest of the UK. In particular it's been used to distance Scotland from England. So all the 'bad' things in welfare and welfare 'reform', as well as other policies taking place in England (...) are seen as driven by a London-based government that was/is seriously out of tune with Scottish values and aspirations.*

Mooney and Poole note the "long-standing assumptions about 'Scottish distinctiveness' that embody a number of inter-related claims" — that is, claims to do with institutional differences regarding the organisation and delivery of social welfare and policy. The claims are

> *...that Scottish social and political actors engage with the issue of social welfare within a distinctive discursive context using different, at times less normative language, to that used in England; and that 'the Scots' are more committed to social democracy, especially in relation to social welfare policy and delivery.* (2004:459)

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that Lord Ashcroft's immediate snap poll of 2,000 voters following the referendum showed that the main issues driving the yes vote were, firstly, "disaffection with Westminster policies" — that is, that the UK parliament is "increasingly out of touch with the needs of Scotland" — and, secondly, there were worries about the future of the NHS in Scotland especially in terms of concerns of privatisation (Mooney and Scott, 2015:10). Thus, there seemed to be a genuine and real appetite for change which was due to people feeling removed from Westminster policies. However, what is of importance is that the SNP sought to channel this feeling into a claim about 'Scottish values' and a homogenising vision of the 'nation's character'.

In addition to framing Westminster as embodying 'un-Scottish values', Westminster

was also othered by situating Scotland and Westminster in an unequal power relationship. Therefore, the idea of 'English oppression' surfaced during the referendum campaign. In order to illustrate this, let us consider the following excerpt from one of the SNP's referendum publications:

> *An independent Scotland would be following over 50 nations that were once ruled from Westminster, like: United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, Pakistan, New Zealand, Barbados, Singapore.* (Choice: An Historic Opportunity for Our Nation, 2012:10)

While it is true that certain powers are reserved to Westminster and, therefore, Scotland is technically "ruled from Westminster" on some matters, Scots do, of course, vote in Westminster elections and send representatives to the UK parliament. This is an obvious yet important qualification as, *historically,* British colonies — as listed above — did not have the privilege of being represented in the parliament. Thus, it seems to me that the SNP are drawing a false comparison between Scotland and the colonial experience of countries such as India or Barbados.

This excerpt does not only disregard this imbalance of representation; more fundamentally, it disregards the power imbalance between the former colonies and the British Empire — which Scotland was a part of — and it also disregards the central role played by many Scots within that Empire (see Chapter 4). By listing Scotland alongside such countries as India, Pakistan and Barbados, the SNP seem to be implicitly presenting Scotland as an equally colonised nation which, to me, seems misguided and perplexing. During the campaigning period, I attended an independence referendum debate in Glasgow on 9 March 2014 where Anas Sarwar (a then Labour MP, currently a Labour MSP) "criticised the Yes camp for trying to make the referendum about the British Empire or British imperialism and its rights and wrongs". Furthermore,

> *...he noted how Scotland was not a victim of the empire — and we shouldn't pretend as if this was the case — but, rather, at the very heart of it and not on the sidelines. He noted how fifty per cent of the governments that have ruled Punjab were British — or Scottish.* (fieldnotes, Glasgow, 9.3.2014)

Interestingly, this idea of 'Scottish victimhood' was also a narrative echoed by some of

the participants in the interviews. Indeed, I am deliberately using these interviews to explore the effects and the real life consequences of coded expressions of Scottish exceptionalism. What transpires through the data is that Scotland was often portrayed as being controlled and ruled by England. Ahsan explains what he sees as the Scots' *dislike* of the English as being due to England's control over Scotland:

> Ahsan*: They* [Scots] *just don't like them* [the English], *I don't know why. Obviously, um, they think, um, see the English people, they, like, took over everything from Scotland and they're ruling them, you know. And um, everything is coming from England to Scotland, which is like their benefits and their, um, economic things and obviously…obviously it's like a, it's like a different thing which is happening and which they don't like. They want their own things.* (38 years old, Pakistani, shopworker; cab driver; student, did not disclose how he voted)

Chalwe, on the other hand, goes a step further and refers to Scots' *hatred* of the English:

> Chalwe*: Right. I thought the, I thought the Yes campaign…was about being patriotic.*
>
> Minna*: Mmm.*
>
> Chalwe*: It was about being Scottish, it was about the hatred for the English. I was - - you see, I'm speaking from - -folk I spoke on the grassroots. I give an example: one woman said 'I hate the English, look at what they did to us'. But the same person, interviewed on telly, will not say that. They'll probably just say 'oh no, we just want to be independent'. (…) [O]thers thought independence meant being Scottish, now you can stand on your own, you don't need the English, they've, they killed our Queen Mary. Look at what Margaret Thatcher did, she took away our jobs and so on. They bring up that history. (…) And, they looked at that as being, umm, patronised and therefore they wanted something that they could do on their own as Scots. They wanted to manage their own moneys, you know, revenue from the oil, um, reserves. You know, it's patriotism in that particular sense. You know, the Scottish have been a great nation, we don't really need the, the English. Um, they would cite, umm, Robert Burns, they would cite, umm, is it Adam Smith.* (Zambian, 46 years old, university student and office worker, voted no)

Chalwe suggests that the Yes campaign was about being patriotic, and that patriotism in the Scottish context involves hatred of the English. Interestingly, he suggests there is a marked difference between the official, public discourse seen on TV, for example, and what transpires on the grassroots level. While there was, in Chalwe's view, an underlying current of anti-Englishness within the Yes campaign — certainly on the

grassroots level as he sees it — this does not surface and enter the more public realm.

Other interviewees were more critical about the idea of Scottish victimhood. Eilidh, who is from Guernsey but often mistaken as English, and Paula, whose parents are English, both brought up the issue of Scotland being presented as the victim of English oppression: I asked Eilidh what her experience of Scottish nationalism is and how does it affect her life. She replied by saying that "Oh, I have been abused on the street when I've been heard speaking" which is "not often" but "it has happened". Because Eilidh speaks in a Standard English accent, this, then, led me to ask:

> Minna*: Yeah. Is, is that- - do you feel then that kind of Scottish nationalism is, it's a lot of it is about anti-Englishness and kind of..i—is that a big part of it?*
>
> Eilidh*: I, I think it depends on who you're talking to, but yes. Umm, yeah, a lot of it is more outgroup stuff. Umm, or umm casting ca- - people casting themselves as oppressi- - oppressed people, victims, you know, victims of English oppression et cetera, et cetera.*
>
> Minna*: Mmm.*
>
> Eilidh: *Which completely ignores Glasgow's history as a slave centre. Not to mention the, umm...the leading role that Scottish people played in...the colonial times generally.* (From Guernsey, 54 years old, social worker, voted no)

Paula, who identified there being anti-Englishness in the Yes campaign, put is thusly:

> Minna: *Yeah. What about then — you said there was some...you felt like there was a bit of anti-Englishness in, in the umm, in the kind of...Yes campaign and — how did that kind of, manifest itself, like, in what ways do you think that - -*
>
> Paula: *Umm, um...it was — it was the kind of...we've been tied into this union for this many years and that kept coming through and as if, like, we had — like, Scotland had no choice in being part of the union, it was all England just being bossy. And it was as if they still kind of were holding on to that view like, we're just under England's thumb and I think...yeah, that's just England and Westminster kind of being put under the same category. (...) Mmhm, yeah, and even just...the formation of the union being — like, when it happened back in history, there were using that as such a negative, like, we've been part of this union for this long, was - - but when we joined the union the history wasn't - - the history was different then and it wasn't necessarily England taking over, it was kind of a bailout for England, so...* (English, 21 years old, university student, voted no)

Both therefore underline Scotland's active role in the Union, and Eilidh is highly critical of Scotland being cast as a victim — especially due to Scotland's prominent role in the British Empire and the slave economy. Paula notes that Scotland was not dragged into the Union against its will, and she criticises the way in which England and Westminster are often conflated. For these interviewees, the idea of seeing Scotland as the victim has little traction.

While Westminster, as we have seen, was referred to as the polar opposite of Scotland especially in terms of values — as also identified elsewhere (Mooney and Scott, 2016:248) — the Nordic countries and the Nordic model of a welfare state were often evoked as a standard that Scotland should aspire to, and could reach, as an independent country. Nordic countries often surfaced as a topic of discussion during the referendum; for example, in the 36 SNP speeches analysed they were mentioned in 12. This tendency did not go unnoticed by the participants: Eilidh, for example, noted that "at the moment the SNP are promoting themselves as a sort of Scandi party". She was not sure "how long that will last" and said this 'branding' "certainly is very new" because the SNP was "not always so..inclusive or so..cuddly".

Agnieszka, a 25-year-old Polish university student who voted yes, recalled how, during the referendum, "out of a sudden there was so many questions about, eh, Nordic heritage". Having a Danish boyfriend made her pay more attention to how often Nordic countries were mentioned, and Scotland's "Viking past" was brought up. She interpreted this as being an attempt to "break away from..British heritage and British culture and English as well" and "sort of trying to develop into something else, sort of the other side". Agnieszka noted how there was a desire to break away from one thing "but also trying to forge another thing" without Scotland really "stand[ing] by itself". In these excerpts, we can indeed see how the SNP positions the Nordic countries — Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland — as bastions of fairness and equality:

> *Nations that are similar to Scotland — such as Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden — sit at the top of world wealth and well-being league tables. Unlike Scotland, they are independent and are able to take decisions in the best interests of their own economies. They do not leave the important decisions*

*about their economy to parliaments whose interests necessarily lie elsewhere. That is their independence advantage and they have used it to build societies that deliver a higher quality of life for their citizens.* (The Scottish Government, 2013:43)

*European nations such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway are among the ten most equal countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Under devolution we can frame policies which allow us to do a bit better than the rest of the UK, to mitigate Westminster's mistakes.* (FM Alex Salmond, 'Independence from the Political and Economic Union', Dalrymple Hall, 2 September 2013)

However, such characterisations conjure up a very one-sided and idealised picture of the 'Nordic welfare model'. It is important to note that we have witnessed increasing inequalities in the Nordic countries (see e.g. Kvist et al 2012) and the proliferation of austerity measures (Kvist & Greve, 2011). Since the recession in the mid-1990s, foodbanks and 'bread lines' (*leipäjono*) have been a stable feature of Finnish society. While Finland identifies itself as a Nordic welfare state (Silvasti, 2015:471), the existence of food aid seems to contest this dominant characterisation[15]. In 2015 the Finnish government announced major budgetary cuts (Helsingin Sanomat, 28.5.2015) which targeted areas such as education and social security. Thus, it is crucial to keep in mind that the way in which the SNP frame Nordic countries as unproblematically fair, equal and progressive (let us also not forget that right-wing nationalist parties such as the Sweden Democrats, Danish People's Party and The Finns Party — formerly known as True Finns — have had great political success recently) is profoundly misguided and unhelpful.

Thus, what is interesting in terms of the SNP's rhetorical use of the Nordic countries and the Nordic welfare model — even if this understanding is flawed as has been argued above — is what the SNP's approach is telling and revealing in terms of how nationalist narratives operate. As argued by Zimmer (2003), the focus should be on the processes and mechanisms which social actors use when reconstructing the boundaries of national identity. Rather than drawing on an idea of an 'Other' that is

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[15] Although it has been argued that the emergence and persistence of food aid in Finland cannot fully be explained as a social and poverty policy issue (see Silvasti, 2015).

different from Scotland in a negative way (such as Westminster is in terms of its 'un-Scottish values'), Nordic countries are portrayed as positive examples of how the state's welfare structures, for example, should be organised. By extension, after being independent — as the Nordic countries are — the SNP would be able to build a system akin to the Nordic societies that reflected the national, Scottish values in practice. Thus, with reference to nationalist processes, comparisons to other countries can also be aspirational. This, then, is opposed to the nationalist trope of portraying the 'nation's other' in antagonistic terms ('who or what we are not').

*5.6. Conclusion*

In conclusion, drawing on data from my content analysis and interviews, this chapter has looked at the ways in which the Scottish nation has been framed and imagined as a 'value community', and I have argued for the importance of understanding values as a crucial building block in nationalist narratives. Theoretically, this chapter has drawn on Zimmer's (2003) approach which challenges the civic/ethnic dichotomy and focuses on different boundary mechanisms, both voluntaristic and organic, social actors use to reconstruct boundaries of national identity, as well as on the different symbolic resources (such as values and history) that are drawn on when boundaries are being constructed. While, as Lægaard notes, critics "are right in arguing that shared political values, which are among the symbolic resources listed by Zimmer, cannot by themselves generate the differentiation or boundary which is necessary for them to qualify as a conception of the nation", critics are nonetheless wrong to deduce "that shared political values cannot provide the content of a conception of the nation" (2007:45). Thus, values are an important symbolic resource drawn on by political actors, among others, in their narratives of the nation.

This chapter put forward a number of arguments based on the research data. Firstly, it was shown how certain values such as fairness, democracy and prosperity were heavily drawn on by the SNP during the referendum campaign. These values were, importantly, framed as being *Scottish* or *Scotland's* values — 'our values' — which would eventually be enshrined in a constitution. Secondly, these values were

explained as being rooted in history and especially the Scottish Enlightenment. Here, it is interesting to note how history is consciously used to justify claims about Scottishness while, in relation to Homecoming for example (as discussed in Chapter 4) certain historical events are not spoken about.

The SNP uses claims about what are traditionally termed universal values — such as fairness and equality — in their vision of Scotland and why Scotland should become independent. Arguably, a national identity based on values can be a fairly open and accessible one: as long as you sign up to the 'national values', you are a member of said nation. As Henderson and McEwen note, "defining nation according to its commitment to shared values can serve as a means of inclusion" (2005:188). Thus, sharing what are framed as the core principles or 'content' (see section 1.6.) of a specific national identity may give ethnic minorities — especially recently arrived migrants — a stronger sense of belonging to the 'national community'.

However, supposedly open and universal values can also be used in an exclusivist way (by right-wing parties especially). Halikiopoulou et al's (2013:109) study asks "how does a party movement pushing what amounts to an ethnic exclusivist agenda annex the values of tolerance, liberalism and diversity in the interest of mobilising a nation"? In answering this, the authors note that these parties identify "these values as the unique patrimony of the nation, threatened by an influx of outsiders who do not share and are unable or unwilling to adopt them" (2013:109). Interestingly, while the SNP, of course, is not a right-wing party and as such does not fall within the same category as parties covered in Halikiopoulou et al's study, the SNP nonetheless frame certain values as 'the unique patrimony of the nation'. However, this is not done in an exclusivist way that would target racialised groups, such as Muslims, and paint them as 'incompatible with Western values' as has been evident in radical right wing parties' political rhetoric elsewhere (e.g. Swedish Democrats, The Finns Party, Front National, Jobbik). As Zimmer puts it,

> *...what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less what resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use: the voluntarist conception of nationhood processes the available resources in voluntaristic terms — as a product of human action; the organic conception of nationhood, by contrast, processes the resources in deterministic*

*terms — as manifestations of the communal organism called 'the nation'.* (2003:181)

However, the way in which values are used in the SNP's rhetoric is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, as mentioned, having 'national values' as the basis for belonging can open up the possibility of non-Scots laying claim to the national community by declaring support and taking ownership of 'national values'. On the other hand, however, these values are constructed as *inherent to Scottishness* via history. Thus, there seems to be an ethnic undertone to the seemingly open-ended 'national community'. The framing of Scotland as a 'value community' is done organically; that is, these values are framed as *Scottish* through using physiological or embodied analogies (such as 'fairness runs through Scotland like a vein'). Importantly, these perceived Scottish values — whose universality is at times acknowledged — are juxtaposed to Westminster politics and values (furthermore, these politics and values come to be understood as specifically 'English' in everyday settings as will be further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).

Thirdly, this chapter also discussed how the participants echoed the SNP's views and understood that there was a stronger commitment to community in Scotland, and the society being more 'leftist' or 'socialist'. They thus positioned the Scottish society as adhering to more left-leaning values. Others, however, challenged the 'Scotland as more equal' trope, and they did this especially with regard to racism and a sense of mythmaking around Scottishness. This raises interesting — and difficult — questions with regard to causation: did the progressive popular understandings push the SNP to amend their construction and presentation of Scottish nationalism, or has the SNP's construction of Scotland as a value community gained traction among the public? It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions but it seems to me that there is a mutual process at play.

Participants — with some exceptions — portrayed Scotland as being more leftist. Even 'the exceptions', i.e. those who did not sign up to this view, noted that there exists a popular myth of Scotland being more 'socially minded'. As Noor saw it, Scotland 'has always shown itself wanting to be a fairer society anyway' thus

suggesting there exists a deeper appetite for advancing equality. It therefore makes sense for the SNP to capitalise on this popular opinion and to transform it into political capital and authority (in terms of representing the 'popular opinion'). Because the SNP made constant use of the 'Scottish exceptionalism' trope during the referendum, it is also likely that this message was picked up by the public (especially by those who were receptive to the 'fairness myth' to begin with). As a political party, the SNP remain somewhat of an enigma: while policies such as universal baby boxes, free NHS prescriptions, and lack of tuition fees can certainly be perceived as 'leftist' — and thus the party has come a long way since its 'Tartan Tory' days — commentators are hesitant to label the party as social democratic (Gall, 2015).

Finally, this chapter focused on the idea of 'Scottish exceptionalism' and the ways in which rather than merely focusing on the positive ideas around what defines 'us', a vision of the other was also evident in the SNP's understanding of 'Scottish values'. While the SNP's use of values is linked to the framing of their nationalism as civic, these values are nonetheless presented as an innate feature of Scots passed down through history and they are used to draw boundaries and to exclude others. Specifically, it is Westminster (and England) that comes to represent this other, and embody 'un-Scottish' values. Interestingly, during the interviews a related theme of 'Scottish victimhood' also surfaced which was seen as a valid framing by some and challenged by others.

So far, the focus has been mainly on narratives, social constructions and discourses both from above as well as below. While these are important to map out and understand, is it crucial not to lose sight of the material and very real effects these often fairly abstract-seeming imaginings have in people's lives. Thus, the next chapter will focus on the everyday lives of ethnic minorities and how nationalist narratives shape and impact on the lives of ordinary people — especially those whose claim to the nation (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2010) might come under challenge. Chapter 6 will build on the ideas and theories which have been introduced and discussed so far, but the focus will be on the lived realities of people and the ways in which they make sense of and understand their experiences.

Chapter 6

Friendly and Welcoming?: Experiencing nationalism in Scotland

*6.1. Introduction*

The previous two chapters have investigated nationalism in Scotland, as represented by the SNP, in relation to their alleged civicness (and challenged such definitions both conceptually and in terms of the substantive evidence) and the ways in which the idea of 'values' are taken advantage of in the SNP's nationalist narratives. Chapter 4 has focused more firmly on nationalism 'from above', and Chapter 5 has considered views from both 'above' and 'below'. This chapter, however, focuses firmly on people's everyday experiences and understandings with regard to Scotland, Scottishness and nationalism. Thus, it seeks to uncover the ways in which ethnic minorities (including more recent migrants and those, though native-born, whose parents or grandparents migrated to Scotland — see section 3.3.1.1.) make sense of Scottish public political rhetoric around nationalism, as well as how the participants experience — and potentially challenge — nationalist ideas and narratives in their daily lives.

The chapter will start by considering the importance of studying the everyday more generally, and in relation to 'ethnicity' more specifically. As argued in Chapter 2, while everyday nationalism studies have highlighted an important research agenda and added valuable knowledge to how we understand and study nationalism, ethnic minorities have remained rather invisible within this area of study. The majority of studies pertaining to everyday nationalism have focused on the 'white majority' and the ways in which these people — whose belonging often goes unquestioned — experience nationalism in mundane settings. Interesting and important as this is, considering the experiences of those who, perhaps, do not unproblematically belong to the national imaginary might open up new vistas for understanding how nationalist narratives operate across time and space, and what their (im)material consequences on people's lives may be.

Following a brief overview of studies of the everyday, this chapter moves on to look at the ways in which Scotland was often portrayed as a 'welcoming' and 'friendly' place in the narratives of the participants. Importantly, as with the SNP's contrast between 'Scotland's values' and those perceived to emanate from Westminster, the participants juxtaposed Scotland's 'friendliness' to, as they saw it, the lack thereof in England. Following this discussion, the differences between urban and rural Scotland will be interrogated. The participants flagged up that rural areas were often imagined or deemed to be unwelcoming or even hostile towards 'outsiders'. Importantly, the chapter will consider the ways in which visibility and difference operate, and what it means to go unnoticed or to be inconspicuous. Because anti-Englishness surfaced as a key theme during the interviews, this chapter will briefly consider its significance in Scottish nationalist narratives and understandings.

*6.2. Studying everyday nationalism, 'ethnicity' and racism*

This chapter will focus on the participants' everyday experiences of living in Scotland, especially from the vantage points of everyday nationalism, 'ethnicity' and racism. Scott (2009:2-3) notes how the 'everyday' as an object of study "enjoyed an absent presence" in sociology — while classic studies focusing on poverty (Rowntree 1901), family and kinship (Willmott and Young 1960) and deviance (Becker 1963) sought to demonstrate general social trends based on an examination of such trends on people's lived experiences, it is only recently that the everyday has become a focus of study in its own right. Here, people like Lukács, Lefebvre and de Certeau have worked as 'path breakers' (Scott, 2009:3).

Scott (2009:3) notes how Bennett and Watson (2002) offer three perspectives as to why this shift came about. Firstly, they note, there has been a change in our understanding regarding what is worthy of public representation, and there has been an increased interest in 'ordinary' people's lives. Secondly, there is a Foucauldian argument to be made: because we live in a 'disciplinary society' where our lives are subject to control, regulation and surveillance, the everyday merits close attention.

Finally, they argue that the rise of social movements (such as women's and civil rights) brought questions of identity and lifestyle differences to the vanguard of political consciousness and changed the way in which we think about the social world. As a result of these three developments, individuals' private lives became more and more visible to academics as objects worthy of study.

Essed notes that the everyday is vaguely defined: it has been branded as that which is 'ordinary' by Antaki and 'common sense' by Furnham (1991:47). For Scott, everyday life can be defined as those sites in which people do (i.e. perform, reproduce, challenge) social life; it is that which is often — but not always — mundane, familiar and unremarkable as well as routine, repetitive and rhythmic (Scott 2009:1-2). You get up in the morning as your alarm goes off; you brush your teeth; you have breakfast; you run down the street in order to catch the bus to work — and so it goes. However, this does not mean that everyday phenomena are "trivial, benign or insignificant: Martin (2003) reminds us that the everyday world is infused with power, politics and historical significance" (Scott, 2009:2).

Rather than conceptualising the notion of 'the everyday' in terms of the philosophy of everyday life, following Smith (1987), Essed (1991:47) seeks to understand it in terms of the categories and social relations operative in everyday life — a focus which this chapter will also take. Essed explains that "everyday life always takes place in and relates to the immediate environment of a person"; "a world in which we are located physically and socially" (1991:47). The content and structure may change from person to person and, indeed, these can be different in different periods of people's lives. The reason why everyday life matters analytically is that "everyday life is not only reproductive of persons but also positions of persons in social relations and of social relations themselves" (Smith, 2016:6). Thus, what happens to and between us contributes to who we are, impacts on our social location as well as on the ways in which our interconnections and interrelations are structured. Further, the everyday also matters because "it is at the level of the everyday, not at the level of abstract structure, that much of the 'persuasiveness' of 'race'" — or, indeed, any other concepts such as 'nation' — "happens, socially speaking" (Smith, 2016:6).

Andrew Smith urges us to remember that "understanding everyday racism" — or everyday nationalism for that matter — "requires us to grasp the complexity and political significance of the concept of everyday itself" (2016:8). This is significant in at least two respects. Firstly, the everyday as a site of mundane, unreflective and unremarkable events and happenings is a privilege. Smith (2016:9), drawing on Essed's work (1991), notes how those who are racialised are denied the possibility of acting in the unreflective ways "that characteriz[e] much of what we do in everyday life". That is, going about your daily business unnoticed and in an unreflective way is not always a possibility for those who are marked as 'different', as a 'threat', or as 'inferior' due to the colour of their skin or their assumed religion (especially Muslims contemporarily). Those marked out as different often cannot pass through space and time without someone, at some point, challenging them, their very being, and their right to occupy a certain space. The same goes with respect to nationalism (and, as will become clear in this chapter, everyday racism, nationalism and 'ethnicity' are closely linked): those deemed not to belong to the nation are constantly reminded of this, and of their status as a 'stranger'.

Secondly, grasping the complexity and political significance of the concept of everyday life is also significant because "the denial of everyday racism rests on construing the everyday as that which is trivial or incidental and thus discrete: not meaningfully connected to anything beyond itself" (Smith, 2016:9). Thus, it becomes crucial to recognise the repetitiveness of experiences of everyday racism; to recognise experiences which happen "day after day" and are "routine and continuous rather than arbitrary and discontinuous" (Smith, 2016:9). Once the constant and unrelenting nature of racism which "systematically shapes daily life" becomes clear, "its complicity with structures of inequality and their endurance comes much more immediately into view" (Smith, 2016:9).

What is of interest presently are the ways in which nationalism, 'ethnicity' and racism are connected as well as experienced and understood — and potentially challenged — by the participants in their everyday lives and everyday spaces. The key ideas around everyday nationalism studies have been covered in Chapter 2 in more detail and need not be discussed at length again. It is worth pointing out here however, that

although nationalist ideas and rhetoric operate at the institutional level of politics, and these ideas are given a platform through speeches and party political publications, for example, it is mainly through everyday incidents that the participants experienced and negotiated their sense of belonging to the national community. Of course, these everyday experiences are often informed by and intimately linked to broader political debates, agenda and rhetoric. Everyday situations and experiences can also work as a space where that official rhetoric may come under challenge. As Skey, who studies everyday nationhood, puts it, through "the study of everyday life" we can uncover "the ways in which a complex matrix of knowledge, social practices and institutional settings contribute to the (re)production of a relatively consistent and meaningful sense of 'reality' for disparate individuals" (2011:14).

Brexit and the rise of populist movements in Europe and the US are examples of "nationalism on steroids" (Fox, 2017:26). Though these "nationalist fireworks" attract attention, they are mere "intermittent bursts of nationalist fervour that punctuate an otherwise flaccid, humdrum nationalism, the nationalism of everyday life" (Fox, 2017:26). Once these fireworks go out, nationalism does not disappear "but it does fade from view, receding into the fissures of everyday life, guarded from the gaze of prying eyes" (Fox, 2017:26). Thus, "the success of this nationalism rests not upon commitment and attachment, but indifference and apathy; the people in whose name it speaks silently ignore it, submitting to its invisible power" (Carter et al 2011 cited in Fox, 2017:29).

As argued by Fox (2017), everyday nationalism becomes more pronounced at the edges of the nation. These edges can be spatial and temporal on the one hand, but also political on the other. Importantly, Fox argues that the political edge of the nation can be discernible through the study of immigration and migrants, and that devolution, and Scottish independence specifically, provides "fertile ground for tapping into people's otherwise self-evident assumptions of what the nation is" (2017:38). This is what this chapter aims to do: it focuses ethnic minorities' (including migrants') views and experiences, and seeks to tease out the ways in which the nation is made visible in everyday life. Further, it does this within the context of

the independence referendum which offered a fruitful moment to focus on issues around nationalism due to the reflexive quality of that moment when the conceptual bordering of the nation was explicitly up for discussion.

This chapter will focus on the more general ways in which the nation, 'ethnicity' and 'race' were discussed during the interviews. Chapter 7 will then build upon this discussion, and focus specifically on the independence referendum.

*6.3. 'Welcoming' Scotland?*

During the interviews, I tended to ask the participants very early on what their experience of living in Scotland was, and if they liked being here. Scotland was often — *to begin with* — depicted as welcoming. Thus, there was a strong sense of congruence between the view put forward by the participants, and that put forward by the SNP which depicts Scotland as open and inclusive, and welcoming of 'new Scots':

> *And we're comfortable with the idea of overlapping identities — we know that you can be Scottish and British, Scottish and European, Scottish and Polish or Scottish and Pakistani. Tartan is the distinctive national cloth of Scotland. It's made up of patterned threads of different colours. I like to think that Scottish identity is like the tartan. There are many colours, many threads, many strands to the Scottish tartan of identity.* (FM Alex Salmond, Scotland's Place in Europe, College of Europe, Bruges, 28 April 2014)

Salmond's use of the analogy of tartan, of course, links with what was said before in Chapter 4 with regard to 'Highlandism'. While minorities are included in the 'tartan of Scottish national identity', it is nonetheless telling that it is the Highland tartan that figures as an image of what Scotland is imagined to be and to consist of, culturally speaking.

This sense of Scotland being welcoming was articulated, in particular, through the idea of Scots being 'friendly' during the interviews. Agnieszka (Polish, 25 years old,

university student, voted yes), for example, professed to liking Scottish culture and "the way people are here", i.e. "extremely friendly" and "polite". Similarly, Chalwe (Zambian, 46 years old, university student/office worker, voted no) found Scots very "friendly", Tom (English, age unknown, teacher, voted no) said he liked living in Glasgow "because, umm — probably the people" who override the effect of the bad weather, and without whom the decision to live in Glasgow would have been a tougher one to make. Eilidh (from Guernsey, 54 years old, social worker, voted no) also mentioned Glasgow being welcoming ("hence I'm still here") and spoke about how she enjoys "the crack" and the "banter" which is "second to none": "here people are immediate, and I used to love that, standing at bus stop and getting someone's life story kind of thing". Although you're not always "in the mood" for such stories, it is nonetheless "just so typical" of Glasgow. Here, Eilidh professes a sense of localism (a point I will return to subsequently) where she consciously connects her experiences to a specific location (Glasgow, in her case).

Further, similarly to Eilidh's comments, Chalwe went on to say that "I've experienced it [people's friendliness in Scotland] from the street and the shops, umm, at work, university, so I suppose..I, I'm, I'm speaking from a solid base, a-ha" — that is, in everyday situations and spaces, much like Eilidh (on bus stops). Chalwe's reference to speaking "*from a solid base*" is interesting. This, to me, seems to highlight the importance of everyday situations and places and those often fleeting connections and moments people share when passing each other on the street or places of work, connections which, subsequently, leave a person feeling like they are welcomed and thus contribute to a certain sense of belonging. Thus, everyday interactions hold an important formative power with regard to the ways in which a person comes to experience their surroundings and social contexts, and their understanding of their place within them.

In making claims of this sort, participants often drew a comparison between Scotland and England, whereby Scotland and Scottish people were portrayed as friendlier and more welcoming in comparison to England and the English. Thus, as with the SNP drawing comparisons to Westminster vis-à-vis values, the participants did the same

with respect to the perceived characters of the two countries. Padma (Indian, 36 years old, works for a third sector organisation, did not vote) lived in England for three years before moving to Scotland in 2009. Asked if she liked living in Scotland, Padma asked if I was referring to "the people experience" or "the weather experience" — the latter being "quite not nice [laughs], to be polite". With reference to people, she went on to say:

> Umm, I like the people, I think they're much more warmer up so- - up north than down south, and that's something I've said to a lot of people from England as well. People are a lot more open, lot more receptive, and..I don't  know if it's got to do with the university environment or it has to do, you know there - - you're the social scientist, you probably have more answers to that, but I quite like the people in Scotland. And, um, it's been an enjoyable ride, and I've been quite surprised - - you know, you walk in with your own biases about certain cultures and environment, and um — well, maybe from your personal experience - - in my case, my personal experience is down south. And I was quite pleasantly surprised that Scots are a lot more warmer, um, compared to..English.

Like many others, Padma offered this comparison between Scotland and England — or the people in the two countries — voluntarily as an answer to a question regarding the experience of living in Scotland.

The Polish participants, especially, drew a comparison with regard to the ways in which they viewed migrants being treated. Agnieszka lived briefly in England and said how she, when visiting England, misses Scotland and feels "a bit more excluded" south of the border. She has also heard second-hand reports of Poles living in England not feeling welcome, and she concluded that she does not have "the same feeling of belonging in England" as she does in Scotland, and that this has to do with "just the way people are" down there. When discussing the differences between Scotland and England she went on to say that:

> I think people here are a lot more friendly and a lot more welcoming. Umm, also just to..people from the outside basically, so I felt..a lot more welcome, so. And sort of accepted in the society, 'cause when I came here, I went..almost straight to the highlands and, umm, the high school I went to was maybe..[unclear] that's 1,300 pupils, and I was one of the, sort of, only outsiders. And I think there was another Polish girl with me umm, and German girl and a guy from Africa or somewhere, a country in Af- - and that was about it, so for the entire school.

Thus, Agnieszka felt that people's attitudes towards and outlook on "people from the outside" or "outsiders" is more open and inclusive. Fellow Poles Pietr (31 years old,

health care worker, Yes campaigner) and Lukasz (21 years old, college student and cleaner, voted yes) put it in the following terms:

> Pietr: *(...) Umm, but why I did the research [on the referendum] — because that's the reason — I did the research because of the fear and hate — fear and hate towards, I would say, Teresa May — she's the minister of the... (...) Yeah, yeah, Home Affairs Secretary, yeah. Since 2010 David Cameron, umm, got into power, yeah. Her ideas were to do how to impose some extra things en masse on all your migrants from the European Union — their, their, their language full of hate, xenophobia, this rhetoric coming out from the Westminster parties plus, umm, umm, this Europhobia I would say, yeah. It actually has driven me towards the, the Scottish independence idea, I knew that..Great Britain is not the same country as it was in still March 2008 when I arrived, yeah. It's totally different now, especially England, yeah. I realise that yes, Scotland is different, yeah. Scotland is still opposing those ideas. I just wonder for how long. I knew that if they would remain the part of Great Britain..sooner or later, umm, this, this, this virus will come here, yeah. (...) Umm..so yeah, so, so, so that's why I actually realised that I need to stand on some side — which side to choose. Do I choose the side which was actually, umm, see the potential in me or should I stand on the side of the people who are spitting on me, yeah.*

> Lukasz: *(...) [T]here is not really a racism like in England, and through living here and reading news, 'cause I had to read some news, umm, information to get, to get some knowledge about Scotland, I notice that they don't treat as umm parasites or anything, especially when most of the Poles stopped sending money back to, back to the country. 'Cause they took whole families with them here.*

Pietr and Lukasz, then, directly compared their positive experience in Scotland to their perception of Westminster and England. Pietr related this to what he viewed as Westminster parties making xenophobic comments and Lukasz to his perception of there being less racism in Scotland. For Pietr, it was important to cut Scotland loose from the UK before the 'xenophobic virus' would make its way to north of the border. Thus, along with Agnieszka, their positive experience was specifically to do with a feeling of being 'accepted' and not being treated as 'parasites'.

Many of the participants' experiences of England were to do with London specifically and, as a result, London became a proxy for what they imagined England and the English to be like. London was characterised by its fast pace of life — Violet (Zambian, 40 years old, university student, voted no) noted that "Everybody's busy (...) people here [Scotland] will pay attention, they will listen to you and..rather than..London" and Mary (Kenyan, 46 years old, works in housing, voted no), who lived in London for a while, found it difficult to cope there, and chose Scotland as she "liked it so much" when she tried it out for a week. Mary found that "life wasn't so fast" in Scotland and

that "people are quite nice" which made it "easier to settle with the kinds and things like that". Ahsan (Pakistani, 38 years old, works in a shop, drives a cab and studies — did not disclose how he voted) felt that England was "quite congested". Padma did, however, point out that London "in itself is a different country" where people seem "a lot colder" compared to people in Scotland who she characterised as warmer, more honest and more laid back.

Another contrast that cropped up in the participants' accounts was the difference between Scots being more 'polite' (as mentioned by Agnieszka previously) and English people being deemed as 'rude'. Talking about England, Ahsan noted that "I have to say but the people are really rude kind of" and that, in contrast, "here in Scotland it's nice, friendly, you always get a smile from even from a stranger, you know". Towela (Zambian, 19 years old, college student, did not vote) noted that "I feel English people are very rude" and discussed asking for directions as an example of this:

> They [the English] are very rude people, 'cause when you go down, even when you're just asking for directions, you know, somebody will just ignore you, look at you and just ignore you. And it's like really difficult to talk to them. But when you come over here, everything is different, everybody's nicer, you know, they'll listen to you, when you need directions and all of that. And we don't say 'oh no, we don't accept this currency, like it's, it's foreign', you know. [laughs] That kind of thing, yeah.

Thus, once again, those fleeting moments when you interact with people — as noted in relation to Chalwe and Eilidh previously — become extremely important for forming a sense of what a perceived group of people (the English or the Scots) are like and what your place within that national context is. What is more, this feeds into how the entire imagined community — those beyond the individual interactions — is envisaged to be. Those encounters with 'rude' individuals come to affect how an entire 'nation' is seen. Paula (English, 21 years old, university student, voted no), however, argued that she saw "more similarities between the north of England and Scotland than she did "with the north of England and south England" (though she did concede "but then, I don't know the south of England that well").

Some of the participants did, however, acknowledge the danger of generalising. While Violet said that "ah, there is a difference, people here are friendly..than in London, I think", she qualified this: "Though not everybody, but there are some in London, that are friendly as well". Chalwe, for example, having briefly lived in England, said the following:

> Chalwe*: And admittedly the Scots do seem, umm, friendlier than the English — it's funny, but umm, a-ha. Well, the Scots are more — they keep to themselves. The English are a bit loud, a bit outspoken. The Scots are a bit, umm, reserved, if I could use that, umm, expression.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah.*
>
> Chalwe: *But umm, on the whole they seem to be friendly, umm. You do have bad and good where you go but umm, you know, it's not as compared to, um, England. Mmhm.*

Following this Chalwe then went on to discuss the ways in which he had experienced Scots' friendliness on the streets and shops as already previously discussed. Notably, there seems to be a paradox here in what Chalwe says: on the one hand, he argues that Scots are friendly yet on the other hand that they are reserved. However, to him Scots nonetheless seem "friendlier than the English" although, like Violet, he qualifies this by pointing out that you get good and bad people wherever you go.

Ahsan — while conceding that Scots he comes across at work are "nice people" and "friendly" — explains that he is

> *...not saying like all of them were good but obviously you get some mad people and, you know, the crazy people who had a bad night and..obviously so, and in the morning they started like shouting and sometimes and, you know, being rude. But obviously it's not like in majority, it's minority. Ma- - majority of people are good, yeah.*

Here we see Ahsan beginning to disrupt the dominant narrative of Scotland and Scots being friendly, polite, welcoming. Indeed, the interviews would often proceed following this pattern whereby the positives about Scotland were discussed first — especially in relation to England — following which this narrative was eventually challenged either implicitly (by dropping hints) or explicitly through 'demotic discourses' (Baumann, 1996:9-36). I interpreted this, at least to some degree, as connected to the prevalence of the common-sensical 'Scotland as welcoming' narrative which can make it difficult and even intimidating to challenge.

This, then, links to Ahmed's (2010: 158) idea of the 'happiness duty'. She argues that "migrants as would-be citizens are (...) increasingly bound by the happiness duty not to speak about racism in the present" and "not to speak of the unhappiness of colonial histories". Ahmed, further, argues that

> *The happiness duty for migrants means telling a certain story about your arrival as good, or the good of your arrival. The happiness duty is a positive duty to speak of what is good but can also be thought of as a negative duty not to speak of what is not good, not to speak from or out of unhappiness.* (Ahmed, 2010:158)

Thus, those participants who were more recent migrants tended to, at least initially, focus on the positives. However, as the interviews went on, this depiction of Scotland — which was in keeping with the requirements of the 'happiness duty' — began to take on a more nuanced and complex shape, leading to disclosures of profoundly racist experiences as will be discussed later on in this chapter.

I also witnessed the tendency to frame Scotland as welcoming at Radical Independence Campaign's (RIC) conference in Glasgow in November 2014. This is an excerpt from my fieldnotes:

> *I also attended one of the workshops which focused on issues termed as UKIP and Westminster's 'divide and rule' tactics in relation to immigration. (...) I felt some of the speakers highlighted the positives of Glasgow as a welcoming place at the expense of perhaps turning a blind eye to the racism we are also witnessing. This was pointed out by a young man in the audience, probably about 18 years old, who pointed out how he found it very problematic that the panellists seemed to paint an overly positive picture of Glasgow. He told a story about how he and his friends, 11 boys altogether, had flown to Amsterdam, and it was the 10 'white guys' that got through security without any problems whereas their Muslim friend was taken aside for more questioning. As a response to this challenge, the panellists — many of them coming from minority backgrounds — conceded that they had witnessed and experienced racism. Anum Qaisar, for example, noted how, when she had worn a hijab when going to a mosque to meet a friend, had noticed a total change in the way people looked at her; wearing the hijab made her feel like people were a lot more hostile towards her. Similarly, Rozah Salih said she had experienced and witnessed racism.* (Fieldnotes, 22.11.2014)

The RIC operates from an explicitly anti-racist viewpoint and thus the attendees and speakers could be expected to be more attuned to the problematic notion of 'Scottish exceptionalism'. Yet, even within this context, the myth of Scottish progressiveness had purchase, which highlights the potency of this idea.

*6.4. Migrants as strangers*

Although many of the participants who were more recent migrants depicted Scotland and Scots as 'friendly' or 'welcoming', as we have seen, it was interesting that many nonetheless also described themselves as 'outsiders' or 'visitors'. Chalwe, who spoke about Scots being friendly yet reserved, explains that there is an older man in his block of flats who, when he sees Chalwe walking out, always says hello. He is, however, "the only one — the others, they keep to themselves and, you know, it's a..it's just — as if they're not interested in knowing who you are and that sort of thing". To Chalwe, "they just don't seem sort of um, umm, *bother"*. Interestingly, directly after this observation Chalwe goes on to conclude "so..as a society, I mean, we're the visitors, inverted commas". Thus, Chalwe seems to attribute at least some of the disregard or disinterestedness towards him and his family to their status as 'visitors' — that is, people do not bother because they are seen as transient due to their migrant-ness.

Simmel, famously, wrote about the 'stranger' as a wanderer "who comes today and stays to morrow" (1950[1908]:1). The stranger remains "the *potential* wanderer: although he [sic] has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going" (Simmel, 1950[1908]:1, original emphasis). The suggestion therefore is, in Chalwe's case, that Scots seem distant or uninterested because of his visitor status and because he may leave — he is, after all, a potential wanderer. Therefore, he is not seen as completely 'rooted'.

Relatedly, Towela draws attention to how this label of stranger or wanderer is hard to shake off:

> *And see the funny thing is, obviously when you meet other people here, like other black people, or foreign people, when they come and ask you, they don't assume that you've, you, you stayed here that long, or that  - - the-  -they say, where are you from? They ask you where you're from. You know, immediately, so then you have to say I'm from Zambia. I think it will always stick, though, it will always be there even if I decide to stay here in Scotland, people will always ask me where I'm from, first instead of just, you know, thinking I just live here. And will always be there. [laughs]*

Here Towela draws our attention to processes of racialisation that those marked out

as ethnic minorities go through in terms of othering on the one hand, as well as to her status as a migrant on the other. As regards this latter point, we can again take our cue from Simmel who argues that the stranger "is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries" (1950[1908]:1). He goes on to say (1950[1908]:1) that "his [sic] position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imparts qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself". Thus, for someone not born in Glasgow (or someone who has to answer the question "where are you *really* from?" due to their different skin colour in a white majority country, for example), there is the frequent experience of being deterministically fixed with a specific identity (national or otherwise).

Simmel also discusses the issue of objectivity, which is closely connected to points raised by Catherine and Stefania. Simmel argues, in relation to objectivity and the stranger, that "he [sic] is not radically committed to the unique ingredients and peculiar tendencies of the group, and therefore approaches them with the specific attitude of 'objectivity'" (1950[1908]:1-2). This objectivity is not simply about "passivity and detachment" but "it is a particular structure composed of distance and nearness, indifference and involvement" (1950[1908]:2). Catherine (Nigerian, 32 years old, university student, did not vote but would have voted no), contemplating the independence referendum, noted that she was a 'bystander' because "I have no..like, I don't have a horse in the race, to me I just feel like I'm neutral kind of". Thus, Catherine would — in Simmel's terms — be more 'objective' vis-à-vis the referendum.

Besides the idea of neutrality or 'not having a horse in the race', Stefania (Polish, 32 years old, college student, voted no) highlighted that her outsider status affords her a different perspective:

> *...immigration to the UK, or to Scotland, taught me one thing — I've got, my real asset is the fact that I've been through a completely different political system, umm, educational system, and I can see — I look at Scotland from a kind of, from a perspective. Despite being nine years in this country, I look at this country from a different perspective.*

In order to make sense of this, it is useful to revisit Simmel's discussion of objectivity as freedom:

*...the objective individual is bound by no commitments which could prejudice his perception, understanding, and evaluation of the given. The freedom, however, which allows the stranger to experience and treat even his close relationships as though from a bird's-eye view, contains many dangerous possibilities. In uprisings of all sorts, the party attacked has claimed, from the beginning of things, that provocation has come from the outside, through emissaries and instigators. Insofar as this is true, it is an exaggeration of the specific role of the stranger: he* [sic] *is freer practically and theoretically; he surveys conditions with less prejudice; his criteria for them are more general and more objective ideals; he is not tied down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent.* (1950[1908]:2)

Stefania explains how she, having grown up in Poland, looks at Scotland and the different societal issues 'from a different perspective'. Thus, there is a sense of freedom in that migrants — like Stefania indicates — may feel removed from political and educational contexts in a way which allows them to look at issues from a different angle even after living in a country for a prolonged period of time. Stefania and Catherine's 'objectivity' — or their different perspectives on the social — are however, of course, influenced and affected by their previous experiences outside Scotland. Their objectivity is thus not non-normative or value-free but, rather, different.

*6.5. 'Race' and space: Urban versus rural Scotland*

It quickly became clear in the interviews that not all of Scotland was imagined in the same way, and there was an acknowledgement among the participants that, perhaps, they would not be as welcome beyond the big cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, and especially in the Highlands. Thus, there are perceived limits to Scotland's 'welcome-ness'.

Agnieszka, who now lives in Glasgow but lived in the Highlands before, begins to allude to the perceived differences by noting that she finds people living in the Highlands "extremely patriotic". She highlights this by saying how there were lots of Yes banners "on hills and everywhere, over cities and small towns". Eilidh remarks on how her experience of people being friendly is mainly based in Glasgow, and that when travelling for work she "found that it's a different kind of atmosphere" in other

parts — for example, "working in the East coast or - - and although people have a warmth, it sometimes takes a little bit of warming up [laughs]". Considering space is important when seeking to understand how 'race' and, by extension, ideas regarding the nation and who belong to it operate. Goldberg (1993 quoted in Neal, 2002:450) persuasively argues that,

> *The category of space is discursively produced and ordered. (...) Racisms become institutionally normalised in and through spatial configuration, just as social space is made to seem natural, a given, by being conceived and defined in racial terms (...). After all, social relations are not expressed in a spatial vacuum.*

Both De Lima (2008) and Neal (2002) note how there has been a longstanding gap in literature regarding 'race', 'ethnicity' and the rural. The focus of most research has been on 'race' in the urban context. Further, Neal (2002:456) highlights the importance of local, geographic, social and economic factors to understanding and studying race in different social contexts: stating that "racism is the same in Birmingham as it is in Cornwall" is, to Neal, very problematic. She argues that it is important to recognise "the context specific nature of racism" and that "racism in rural areas is able to operate through different discourses and social mechanisms" in comparison to urban areas (2002:259). Further, Neal notes how there is a tendency amongst those living in rural locations to downplay the existence of racism suggesting that "there is a rural tradition of hostility to *all* outsiders" (2002:456). Indeed, Garland and Chakraborti (2006:163) found exactly this when their interviewees suggested that "any discrimination directed against those from different ethnic backgrounds was merely a symptom of this intense 'localism' and not racism per se" — rather, "it was caused simply by the fact that 'outsiders' simply did not 'fit in' with the standard norms of the community". Neal notes how these kinds of arguments naturalise racism and conceal processes "which make certain outsiders (of which 'ethnicity' is a particular marker) more unwelcome than others" (2002:457).

With regard to this, Farnod (Iranian, 39 years old, land surveyor, did not have a vote), in relation to a question about whether Scotland is welcoming, notes that "not in every part of Scotland" and that,

> *...for example if I go to Inverness, I, I don't think people accepted me. Or if I go to,*

*um, some kind of Highland cities, no, I don't think so.*

Thus, he finds that there is a difference between Glasgow — which is, as he says, a university city and thus quite international — and the rest of Scotland, apart from Edinburgh and Aberdeen which also attract other nationalities due to their universities and the oil business. Similarly to Farnod, Mary (Kenyan, 46 years old, works in housing, voted no) singled out Inverness as potentially more unwelcoming:

> Mary: *Yeah, but here, y- -you find that people talk to you – not everybody of course, but people talk to you normally. Ehm, ask you how you feel, how the weather is like and things like that.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah.*
>
> Mary*: Which is, which makes..ehm, it makes it easier to live here so, because you're not feeling isolated. I, I feel that I'm no isolated. (…) Umm, I, I don't have any experience of other parts of Scotland so I'm, I'm not speaking for the whole of Scotland.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah, yeah. Absolutely.*
>
> Mary*: Yeah, a-ha. 'Cause y- -you never how, say if you went to Inverness where there's very few people from out- - from outside. Maybe they would see you as a, as somebody different, you know.*

Thus, both Mary and Farnod view Inverness, a key highland city, as a place where people might react to them differently compared to bigger cities. Further, both of them link this to their perception of Inverness as less diverse — Farnod notes that university and oil cities tend to be more international and, similarly, Mary points out that there are "very few people…from the outside" in Inverness (something that would, in her view, lead locals to view her as "somebody different"). Once again, the importance of everyday interactions is highlighted as Mary explains that where she lives now "people talk to you normally" about the weather, for example, which makes you feel part of the social sphere ("you're not feeling isolated") and not marked out as different. Furthermore, while some of the participants had direct experience of dealing with people beyond the big cities, there seemed to be a certain way of *imagining* the countryside as unwelcoming. As seen above, Farnod noted that "I don't *think* people accepted me"; that is, he is not sure but he has a strong feeling about it. Similarly, Mary — although she does not have experience of living outside Glasgow as she notes — suggests that she would perhaps not feel as included in Inverness. While

this has to with Glasgow and Edinburgh being more diverse — or 'dynamic' as many of the participants put it — it is also to do with the *perception* of the countryside and its character.

Other research certainly supports Farnod's and Mary's 'hunch' regarding the countryside especially in relation to the ways in which rurality is entangled with 'whiteness'. Neal (2002:444), referring to England, notes that "in a post-colonial era the importance of English rurality has developed around the politics of (invisible) whiteness and constructions of ethnicity, identity and belonging" thus echoing Agyeman and Spooner's (1997:197) views who argue that "dominant common-sense and populist discourses (re)present the English countryside as a timeless 'white landscape'". Garland and Chakraborti (2006:160) found, through their research, that notions of rural English tradition, belonging and community "can result in a process of exclusion of perceived 'outsiders' from many village communities". While they found that a process of 'othering' is usually applied to any 'newcomer' "who looks different or leads an alternative lifestyle, it is especially marked for those who look visibly different from the 'white norm'" (2006:160). Agyeman and Spooner further argue that excluding

> *...minority ethnic people from English rurality in historical, cultural and symbolic terms can also be read as the exclusion of minority ethnic people from Englishness per se: the denial of a relationship to English pastoralism precludes inclusion in the nation.* (Neal, 2002:445)

Indeed, Garland and Chakraborti agree, suggesting that "conceptions of Englishness are still strongly associated with notions of the 'rural idyll, which itself is conflated with 'whiteness'" (2006:161).

Within these imaginings of the rural spaces lies a link to ideas of 'white safety': as argued by Solomos and Back, the countryside is depicted as a safe haven away from urban malaise and the diverse — or 'unEnglish' — spaces beyond English pastoralism (Neal, 2002:445). Murdoch and Pratt, similarly, argue that "the rural is easily portrayed as a 'civilised retreat'", that is, "a zone where Sameness (British or English middle-class whiteness and heterosexuality) is reasserted in the wake of profound postcolonial anxiety" (1997:56). Here, 'whiteness' nonetheless carries with it a

fractured and a hierarchical character, i.e. that there is desirable and undesirable whiteness, which is often concealed in idealised depictions of the 'white countryside' (Dyer 1998 in Neal 2002: 447).

The Scottish Highlands and 'Highland culture' feature as a central theme in the imaginary of the SNP, especially in relation to the Homecoming franchise, as has been established (see Chapter 4). Thus, rural Scotland comes to be represented as 'quintessential Scotland' — this, in turn, links to the ways in which the rural and the nation overlap and how the two are mutually constitutive. By excluding themselves — and feeling excluded — from rural, 'traditionally Scottish' spaces, Farnod and Mary limit their belonging to cosmopolitan or international cities where it is easier to feel a sense of inclusion.

Nirmal Puwar, in her excellent book *Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place* (2004), considers who are the insiders and outsiders vis-à-vis particular spaces, and what the 'somatic norm' of such spaces is. As argued by Mean and Tims, "public space is better understood less as a predetermined physical space, and more as an experience created by an interaction between people and place" (quoted in De Lima, 2008:36) — thus, a space does not, of course, carry a 'somatic norm' in and of itself; rather, spaces acquire a meaning through social interaction. Puwar argues that it is illuminating to study spaces from which women and racialised minorities have been conceptually and historically excluded — until now. This "moment of change" is intriguing as the arrival of those previously excluded "sheds light on how spaces have been formed through what has been constructed out" (2004:1). Furthermore, the arrival of women and ethnic minorities disturbs the status quo "while at the same time bearing the weight of the sedimented past" — an encounter which "causes disruption, necessitates negotiation and invites complicity" (2004:1).

Importantly for nationalism studies, bodies that are out of place have the capacity to invoke "the constitutive boundaries of the imagination of the nation" (Puwar, 2004:5). Puwar sums up her key argument by noting that "some bodies are deemed

as having the right to belong, while others are marked out as trespassers" and, thus, "out of place". Due to "not being the somatic norm" these bodies are consequently "space invaders" (2004:8). Importantly, the arrival of space invaders "brings into clear relief what has been able to pass as the invisible, unmarked and undeclared somatic norm" (2004:8). Thus, the arrival of 'new bodies' is revealing as they "highlight the constitutive boundaries of who can pass as the universal human" (Puwar, 2004:8). Whites, as the "ghosts of modernity", Goldberg argues, "could assume power as the norm of humanity, as the naturally given" (quoted in Puwar, 2004:55). Occupying the status of a 'universal human' is, as Puwar notes, a powerful and disembodied position whereby you are unmarked by your body — "its power emanates from its ability to be seen as just normal, to be without corporeality" (2004:56-57).

Keeping Puwar's arguments in mind, let us turn to Padma (Indian, 36 years old, works in the third sector, did not vote), who now lives in Glasgow but used to live in Dumfries. She reflected on her experience of living in the Borders, and I asked if she felt that there was a difference between the two places, to which she responded "*absolutely*" (her emphasis) and went on to explain:

> Padma*: Absolutely. I don't know, if you're talking the rural/urban thing, I [laughs] - - I'm gonna be very blunt.*
>
> Minna*: A-ha.*
>
> Padma: *I was probably one of the few brown faces in Dumfries. And there was a time, and perhaps - - there was a Thai restaurant in Dumfries, so I'm presuming people from that, um, area were kind of familiar with other ethnicities.*
>
> Minna*: Mmm.*
>
> Padma*: But when — I remember the first time I walked into the town centre, and I — I'm not even - - kind of feel..your typical brown woman but I did come across as someone who's not [unclear], I got a lot of stares and it, it happened for quite a few months and - - it's a very - - I don't know if you've been to Dumfries, it's a very, very small town centre.*

Here Padma talks about being the object of people's prolonged looks and stares. Frantz Fanon famously spoke about being "an object in the midst of other objects" and being "sealed into that crushing objecthood" evidenced by such exclamations as

"Look, a Negro!" ([1952] 2008:82). Puwar (2004:41) explains how Fanon observes 'the look' taking place "often without verbal communication, in everyday spaces in the city (bars, cafés and trains), as well as more enclosed institutional spaces (lecture halls, doctor's surgeries and psychiatric hospitals)" — or, indeed on the street. Thus, bodies marked out as different do not have an undisputed right to occupy a space; rather, they are seen as "suspiciously out of place" — that is, "to use Fanon's vocabulary, they are burdened by the claims black bodies can make on the world" (Puwar, 2004:42). Padma, moving through the streets and everyday spaces in Dumfries, was marked as 'out of place' and reminded of her difference from the somatic norm via the looks people gave her, and of which she was very aware.

Padma went on to recount an incident that took place in Dumfries as she was spending an evening with her friends and they decided to go to a pub.

> Padma: *...there was this incident, it's too funny not to tell you. We were — this is - - an international group of students who I was hanging around with. One of our friends told us, who's my partner now, he told us that, um, there is a very nice, um, music — he's a musician — there's a very nice music scene, yeah let's go and check it out, like fine. So we were a group of ten people, all of different nationalities, nobody, not a single Scottish person in there. And it was actually a pub, it was a typical working man's, white man's pub [laughs] — we didn't know that. And what live music - - was actually, there was a karaoke scene, and I kid you not, we actually walked into this pub, all ten of us, and you know how you sh- - they show them, those western films where..people just stop talking. And you can hear the pin drop. We literally, we walked in, and we got stared at [laughs] — just turned around so. It was- -*

> Minna*: So you didn't go in.*

> Padma: *Of course no, no, we just walked out. We knew it was gonna be, it was awkward. So — had a couple of incident like that. But nothing overtly, you know, nobody would come up and say - - you would get stared at. There have been a couple of, um, kind of, I don't know how relevant it is — racist incidents when I've travelled.*

Padma raises a number of points which are of great interest with regard to 'race', class, gender and space. As argued by Puwar (2004), some bodies — often those of women and racialised minorities — are marked out as 'out of place'. Here, Padma describes the pub as a space for white *working* men (something her and her friends did not know before entering). She thus seems to conjure up, at least implicitly, the idea of the white working class. Importantly, in her understanding, white working class men become associated with hostility to non-white 'strangers' and she feels the

group is not welcome within this space. Thus, they do not occupy the right kind of corporeality to fit in in this specific gendered and classed space.

Going back to the idea of the 'white gaze', Towela (Zambian, 19 years old, college student, did not vote) discussed a similar experience to that of Padma. Towela's family had moved to Scotland (nearby Glasgow) when she was about 13. She noted that it was quite difficult to adapt to life in Scotland at first — especially at school. Asking what were the biggest issues in terms of settling in to life in Scotland, Towela explained that the weather in Zambia was different as well as the people: "you get used to seeing a lot of black people [laughs], and then you come here and it's like really different". She went on to note that "I was actually the only black person in high school". Asking how she felt about it, Towela recounted that she "wasn't comfortable with it at first 'cause people did look at me funny, you know what I mean, like, I don't know, some people were acting like they've actually never seen a black person [laughs] before". Not stopping at merely looking at her "funny", "they would ask to touch my hair, you know, things like that". Although it all felt too much when she first started at the school, Towela explained that she is "used to it now".

I asked if there has been a change since Towela started school in terms of there being not as much focus on her, as she noted previously that she found the attention quite uncomfortable.

> Towela: *Yes, yes, a-ha. It's changed because there's, there's actually, like, a l- - quite a few of black people in [my old] high school, I know a lot of blacks that go there now, so I'm sure they're used to seeing that now. And just not the same - - even when you're on the bus, though, like you get kids, it's so uncomfortable, you get kids like staring [laughs].*

> Minna: *Oh yeah?*

> Towela: *Yeah. But I don't know, I, I think some people not come like that close to black people. In, in England, though, there's a lot of black people there. So I'm sure they're used to seeing everybody but whereas in Scotland, there's not that many. (…) Because there's, I think loads of them in, in England. So more people need to come down here, so they can get used to it 'cause - -you know, I mean, it's the same thing though, if a white person went to Africa, they would probably stare at you [laughs]. (…) 'Cause they're, they are like surprised, like how can — obviously in Africa, like, I remember before coming here, would always watch white people on TV and you would see like loads of white people in New York, in*

*films, and there weren't a lot of, like, movies with like black people or Indian, Asian, you know, so it's always like just white people on TV, white people on TV.*

Minna: *Yeah.*

Towela*: And when you go to like a private school, obviously you see them and you get used to it, but there's people that don't see them at all. So when, when you see like a white person like crossing, you get people staring, some will follow you around, like a celebrity [laughs].*

Here, Towela draws a comparison between being black in Europe, and being white in Africa, and through this understanding seeks to make sense of people staring at her. Yet, she also links this to the lack of representation — Towela notes that she did not see many black people on TV (especially on American TV shows and films). This, of course, is connected with broader debates such as the recent #OscarsSoWhite campaign which sought to challenge and bring change to the whiteness of the Academy Awards. Bonilla-Silva (2012:178), in his 2011 Ethnic and Racial Studies Annual Lecture, discusses 'watching whiteness'. He, thus, draws attention to the ways in which racial minorities are underrepresented in films and on TV. Importantly, Towela touches upon something important: power and representation. While she begins by making a comparison between black people in Europe and white people in Africa, she nonetheless, implicitly, acknowledges the global power imbalance between what we are used to seeing on mainstream western TV shows and who we are not — or, as Puwar would put it, who is the 'universal human' and who is constantly marked out as 'the other'. Further, she attributes this to there being fewer black people in Scotland as opposed to England.

Similarly, Mary (Kenyan) explained that, "some people I *know* have thought, have moved to England 'cause they thought, they feel like they are more at home there because there's more black people there". She however felt "more at home here [in Scotland]" than she did in England because she found people to be "welcoming" and because "you don't feel so conscious that you're actually a foreigner" — "even though you are", she goes on to say. However, Mary concedes that "obviously I'm not saying it's 100 per cent, there are obv- - because I've, I've struggled so much in terms of getting the right job and things like that but..socially I think it's fine". Thus, she seems to me to suggest that although her "social experience" with people in Scotland has

been fine, she may have encountered structural barriers — here she does not identify whether she thinks this is caused by institutional racism, although elsewhere in the interview she discusses her lack of connections which locals may often have when looking for work.

While some participants professed to liking Glasgow due to it being "multicultural" (Stefania) and "international" (Tom), this diversity is relative. Rachel (English, 33 years old, development officer, voted yes) notes how she experienced a "real culture shock" when she moved to Glasgow having come from one of the most ethnically diverse neighbourhoods in London. When she moved to Glasgow, it was the whiteness of the city that struck her: "couldn't [laughing] stop, like, staring at how white it was, the city is just white, yeah — 'wow'…'wow'". Though her husband had warned her, she "kind of thought he was joking" and she "didn't realise — when I lived in London, I had absolutely no understanding of how different Scotland is". Similarly, Farnod (Iranian, 39 years old, land surveyor, did not have a vote), who lived in London briefly described London as a "very cosmopolitan city" where you "don't feel a stranger" because "many people are from outside England" and the city is thus "very dynamic". Thus, not only was the countryside or rural Scotland imagined as 'white', the diversity of Glasgow was also seen as limited, especially vis-à-vis London.

### 6.6. 'Universal humanity', visibility and difference

The previous section focused on 'race' and space, and the ways in which the participants imagined rural and urban Scotland. Within this dichotomy, the rural is very much understood and experienced as a 'white space'. Urban spaces, notably Glasgow, are seen as more 'dynamic' and 'cosmopolitan' but this diversity is relative when compared to metropoles such as London. Being non-white in a white majority country — even when moving through more 'cosmopolitan' urban spaces — is connected with issues around visibility. That is, rather than being inconspicuous or going unnoticed, the differences of those deviating from the 'national (white) norm' are pointed out or made known.

While Ignatieff has noted that "the repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism" (1993:2), and thus sees nationalism as something that comes and goes (Billig 2005:193), for non-nationals nationalist narratives and, by extension, ideas about the parameters of the national community and the national norm, are constantly present. They may not be major occurrences, but even if they are 'bubbling under' or for the majority of time go unnoticed, nationalist demarcations are ever-present, making their appearance, however fleeting, in the hustle and bustle of the everyday — on the streets, in shops, or at the hairdresser's. Thus, rather than being an "intermittent mood in established nations", nationalism is "the endemic condition" (Billig 1995:6).

In a white majority country, however, the experiences of visibly 'white' ethnic minorities (though there are of course 'shades of whiteness' — see e.g. Garner 2007; 2010) often differ from those of ethnic minorities of colour given their capacity to 'pass' and be rendered inconspicuous. Rachel, as discussed, was shocked by the whiteness of Glasgow in comparison to London and noted how she could not stop *staring* at the lack of diversity as she saw it.  Thus, she highlights the idea of seeing diversity — that is, seeing visible (non-white) difference out on the streets and public spaces in and around the city. Of course, ethnic diversity extends beyond non-white skin colour (and hence I have included people from English and Polish backgrounds in my sample), but in a white-majority country those who are visibly different from the 'somatic norm' are often marked out as 'the other' from the 'national norm' in their everyday lives and interactions.

Understanding the ways in which 'race', 'ethnicity', the nation and nationalism are connected, overlap and work vis-à-vis one another is a key consideration for this thesis. Finding an answer — or even a fragment of an answer! — to this question is challenging. As discussed in Chapter 2, drawing a clear-cut line between 'nation' and 'ethnicity' is difficult as the two are often defined similarly in both academic and non-academic spheres. A central issue with regard to the imagined national community is the question of who can unproblematically belong to the nation; that is, whose presence goes passively unquestioned and unchallenged and whose presence is

actively declared, pointed out or even challenged? While those who live in Scotland and consider themselves Scottish are not homogenous, research has pinpointed to the fact that whiteness and accent (e.g. Kiely et al 2005; Kyriakides et al 2009; McCrone & Bechhofer 2010; Bechhofer & McCrone 2012) usually function as key markers of 'Scottishness'. Thus, those who *look* and/or *sound* different from the 'national norm' are codified as 'different' or as 'the other' by people who see themselves as unambiguously belonging to the nation. The nation therefore becomes closely entangled with 'race' and language (the latter is often taken to be an element of 'ethnicity'), among other things.

The experience of not being white in a predominantly white country highlights specific issues with regard to a person's sense of belonging. Chalwe recalled a time he went to the get his hair cut with his wife:

> Chalwe: *This woman looked at us, said 'yes, can I help you'. We said we'd like to have our hair done. My wife [wants?] something. She says 'wow, okay, umm, sorry, umm, we never done like so hair before' [laughs].*
>
> Minna: *Okay, yeah.*
>
> Chalwe: *So I was thinking, wow, so if - - I think I - - you can't blame them! If the numbers are..insignificant, maybe, d'you know, our voices may not be..umm..important.*

Chalwe and his wife decided to visit a hairdresser which is a mundane, everyday space where people go to look after or manage their appearance (or part of their decorum, to put it in a Goffmanian sense (1990 [1959]). Chalwe's remarks show how they were marked out — or, more specifically their bodies — as different from 'the norm'. In this space, Chalwe and his wife were visibly different, and embodied difference (non-white; different kind of hair). Thus, their difference and, by extension, non-belonging to the (national) norm (rather than visiting 'standard' hairdressers, they are expected to visit 'specialised' hairdressers) was actively made known.

As was discussed previously, Towela, who is Chalwe's daughter, also mentioned hair: she was discussing her experience of being one of the few black people the children in her school had met, and of being stared at and of people asking permission to touch her hair. Instances like these, where a person's difference is pointed out or their

embodied difference is used as a reason not to offer a service, serve as constant reminders and 'flaggings' of that person's outsider status on the one hand, and of broader debates regarding the nation and who belongs to it on the other. While the incident at the hairdresser's is perhaps, at first sight, more of an example of everyday ethnicity (see Karner, 2007) at work, because of the complex ways in which 'ethnicity' and nation intersect it cannot be removed from understandings of the nation. Instances like the one described by Chalwe feed into people's personal understandings and experiences of (not) belonging to the nation's imagined community.

Many participants also spoke of racism they had personally experienced or witnessed. Thus, there are different ways in which minorities are reminded that they do not belong or that, in addition to not belonging, they are also told that they are inferior. Along this continuum you will find staring, for example, as well as racist violence (I use the term violence broadly to refer to physical, emotional and psychic trauma). Violet shared the following story with me:

> Violet*: So sometimes you just feel oh no, you don't - - that's when now you feel okay, you don't belong anywhere if people can treat you like that — why me. Now this time I don't even ask, yeah. The other time, I didn't know, I was on a bus and there was this guy with a black dog.*

> Minna*: Mmhm.*

> Violet: The dog sat next to me, and then 'hey, you dog!'. I realise that he was talking about [me?] [laughs], just literally 'you black dog!' — 'black dog!'. Now, he kept on insisting on the colour and stuff, so I was just like oh my god, I think this is terrible, you know. And then guess what, there's a lady who stood up and they said, you know, sh- - she shouted abo - -at this man and just said, you know, you can't do that, can you please get up. You know, and this lady spoke to the driver and that man was just- -

> Minna*: Thrown out?*

> Violet*: Yeah! So I was like oh my god, and I said thank you, you know. Yeah, so after that I think my husband wrote an article about this lady because I didn't even talk to her, and I just explained I said oh my god, he said what happened, and this woman just came to my rescue. And that's when you feel oh no, because, at home yes, at home you meet — you know, I think bad people are everywhere, even where you belong, people will treat you badly. So it just depends, that's what I can say. People will steal from you. When I went home, that's home, in Zambia. (…) Anyway, it's just that sometimes we pay attention to bad things rather than good things. Honestly, a good, umm, most of the things that I've experienced here, they're really good, I can't even say no, it's a bad place, no.*

Prior to Violet discussing her experience of being subjected to racist violence on the bus, she discussed an incident that happened at the cinema where she had gone with her family. She explained that someone threw a bottle at her although she "wasn't talking" and she "wasn't on the phone" — "[she] was just there".

What is telling is that Violet did not disclose these events — which, it would be fair to assume, would have a significant effect on one's sense of inclusion, belonging and welcome-ness — until late on in the interview. Indeed, it is not until page 17 (out of 22) of the transcript that she begins discussing these racist incidents. This, then, links back to Ahmed's 'happiness duty' and migrants' reservation to discuss that "what is not good" (2010:158), and to the 'dominant discourse' (Baumann, 1996: 9-36) positioning Scotland as 'friendly' and 'welcoming'.

Through these incidents, Violet is othered, her difference is pointed out, and her belonging challenged based on her perceived 'race' — therefore, these attacks, although much more extreme incidents, exist on the same continuum alongside with what happened at the hairdresser's. Despite the attacks, Violet nonetheless concludes that Scotland is not "a bad place", and that "people will treat you badly" wherever you go. For her, the two different incidents — someone stealing from you in Zambia, and someone inflicting racist violence upon you in Scotland — are understood through an individualised, rather than structural, framework whereby some people are 'bad'. As such, these ways of individualising racism enable migrants (who are racialised) to, ultimately, maintain the dominant narrative of Scotland as 'welcoming'.

*6.7. From audible difference to inconspicuousness*

For ethnic minorities of colour (including both more recent migrants and native-born minorities), the experience of living in Scotland tends to be characterised by a sense of 'being different' from the 'national norm' — or, more specifically, of being made to feel different, of being made to feel like bodies out of place. When considering

national belonging, there seem to be two levels at play: on the one hand there is that personal understanding or sense of self ('identity') in terms of national consciousness — your personal feeling regarding an affinity to a nation. On the other hand, there is that fleeting impression you make on others in everyday contexts — that is, who you are assumed or imagined to be. However, with regard to the latter, white minority groups have the potential to be positioned differently: you may not feel Scottish and therefore do not consider yourself to belong to that particular nation. If you are white in a white-majority country (which corresponds with an imagined national community), you may go unnoticed or 'under the radar'.

There is a tendency to understand 'ethnic minorities' as being 'non-white', and thus 'being an ethnic minority' is linked with visible difference. This is linked to the dominant position of considering 'white' as the norm (or 'universal humanity' as Puwar (2004) would put it), and thus positioning everything else as deviant (Garner, 2010:34). 'Whiteness' becomes unmarked and — for most people — it does not function as a racial or ethnic identity (Garner, 2010:35)[16]. A particular skin colour, after all, comes to mark or symbolise other phenomena, or comes to be used as a social mark, only through a process of signification. Thus, no given skin colour's visibility is inherent in its existence as such (Miles and Torres, 1999:32).

Being white in a white majority country thus accords certain privileges with regard to race and space: it allows the possibility to go unnoticed in public spaces; that is, it allows certain people to '*pass*'. By passing I mean social instances where someone who would otherwise be marked out as 'different' or 'other' passes as what is understood to be the dominant 'norm' or as what is seen to be 'standard'. According to Schlossberg (2001), passing disrupts the logics and conceits around which identity categories are established and maintained. She notes that (2001:2):

> *If passing wreaks havoc with accepted systems of social recognition and cultural intelligibility, it also blurs the carefully marked lines of race, gender, and class, calling attention to the ways in which identity categories intersect, overlap, construct, and deconstruct one other.*

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[16] Although, of course, recent political events and the rise of the so-called 'alt-right' (notably in the US) have brought issues around 'white pride' very much to the fore.

Furthermore, the passing subject's ability to transcend his/her 'authentic' identity "calls into question the very notion of authenticity itself" (Schlossberg 2001:2). Thus, passing threatens to call attention to the performative and contingent nature of all seemingly 'natural' and 'obvious' identities. Nonetheless, the authors do point out how passing can be fundamentally conservative because it "generally holds larger social hierarchies firmly in place" (Schlossberg, 2001:3). Schlossberg does, however, seem to conclude that passing is more about the creation and establishment of an alternative set of narratives and a way of creating new stories out of unusable ones. According to Epps (2001:115), although passing can be a strategy of domination, "it more often than not involves the resistance to domination". He sees passing as "generated in and out of fear, insecurity and relative lack of power", and passing is a tactic of empowerment, "weak and partial" though it may be (2001:115).

Picking up this argument, Sara Ahmed notes how the discourse around passing tends to position it as a radical and transgressive practice which seeks to destabilise and traverse the system of knowledge and vision upon which subjectivity and identity precariously rest (1999:88). However, she argues that there is a failure to theorise "the means by which relations of power are secured, paradoxically, *through this very process of destabilization*" (Ahmed, 1999:89 — emphasis in original). Therefore, she calls for more analysis of the way in which instability and crisis can enable the stabilisation of relations of power (Ahmed, 1999:90). Furthermore, Ahmed goes on to say that "ambiguous bodies that do not fit existing criteria for identifications keep in place, or are even the condition of possibility for, the desire to tell bodies apart from each other through the accumulation of knowledge" (1999:92). Thus, there is a constant urge to categorise, compartmentalise and label people, for example based on their ethnic or national identity, and failing to do this based on visible criteria, other methods of differentiating between people need to be drawn upon.

For many of the participants, especially those who were white, it was accent that functioned as a (non-visible) signifier of difference. As mentioned previously, accent has been identified as a key marker of Scottishness in research focusing on understandings of national identity. I asked Towela whether, after living in Scotland for six years, she identified as being Scottish in any way. She replied "no", and went

on to explain: "no, 'cause, 'cause I struggle with the accent as well" and that, ultimately, "people would automatically just know that I wasn't born here, or I'm foreign by the way I speak". I asked if accent was a "a big part of, kind of, being Scottish" to which she said "yes" — thus, for her, 'sounding Scottish' was key to feeling Scottish as well as to other people considering you as Scottish. When the white participants did not speak, and their *audible difference* was not made known, they were able to move through spaces straightforwardly — or to 'pass'. In relation to this, Towela discussed accents and mentioned her Polish friend who,

> *...came here when she was about ten, but somehow, she sounds very Scottish, very Scottish. And I know in, umm, like before Romania, Poland, you can tell from the accent that they're from the EU, and without it's very, it's very Scottish so people can't tell. People are actually surprised when they find out that she's, she's Polish, a-ha.*

Some are, thus, able to pass through space and time without undue attention being paid to them. As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter (as per Smith's (2016) argument), in order to make sense of the notion of 'the everyday', its political significance has to be accounted for in our understandings. The everyday as a mundane, seemingly unreflective experience is a *privilege* — the ability to be inconspicuous is not open to everybody or, indeed, *every body*. Puwar notes, in relation to gender and race, the privilege those in oppressed positions can still hold:

> *The relative degree to which white women are the somatic norm, on the grounds of whiteness, gets overlooked. The extent to which their whiteness grants them a certain level of 'ontological complicity' (c.f. Bourdieu 1990b:11-12) with normative institutional cultures, even while they are, on the grounds of gender and possibly class, 'space invaders', remains hidden.* (Puwar, 2004:9-10)

Farnod, for example, made a distinction between audible difference and visible difference when he notes that, "if I walk in the street nobody recognise me as a..Asian or Iranian guy", and he can therefore 'pass' as a local if he does not have to speak. I asked if Farnod had experienced "negativity from people" to which he replied, "not to me, actually". He did, however, go on to reflect on his friend: "but I had some friend

from Iran, different face and different colour, yeah they had bad experience. Sometimes they had, they were angry about, um, I mean, how they, um, the - - the relationship between refugees and Scottish people". Thus, Farnod draws our attention to audible and visible difference, and potential to 'pass' and move through everyday spaces unnoticed.

Farnod, discussing audible differences, concluded that "when I started speaking it, everybody says yeah, you're not British". For him, "one of the main things in Scotland" is the "different accent". Eilidh, similarly, brought up the importance of accents, that is, the idea of sounding Scottish. I asked her what her experience of Scottish nationalism was like, and how it affected her life. She replied: "Oh, I have been abused on the street when I've been heard speaking. (…) I mean not often. It has happened". She went on to say that targeting of people "because of something that's essential about them" is completely unacceptable, and that that is something that the nationalist agenda lets in through the door "even if it doesn't intend to". Eilidh, further, mentioned a time at work when she was interviewing someone about racially aggravated behaviour, which happened to be against an English person.

> Eilidh: *And as soon as I s- - started to speak to the person who's perpetrated it he was immediately on the defensive thinking I had an agenda about it. Oh, you know, where are you from and I - - all of a sudden, well that's really irrelevant and that's the point of this whole conversation.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah.*
>
> Eilidh: *So, people often try and guess, with the accent, where it's from. So that kind of- - or they* assume *that I'm English.*

Though Eilidh is from Guernsey and therefore not English, because of the way she sounds she is habitually misrecognised as being English, which has led to negative experiences. However, for Eilidh, these incidents only occur when she opens her mouth and directly engages with people, or is overheard speaking. Further, it is worth mentioning what McIntosh et al (2004) call "degrees of Englishness" — that is, certain accents (especially from the North of England) are regarded as being "more acceptable to Scottish ears". Indeed, Tom (age unknown, English, teacher, voted no) found himself accentuating his Geordie accent.

Two things are worth noting here. Firstly, the importance accorded to the Scottish accents by the participants speaks to Kiely et al's (2001; 2005) and McCrone and Bechhofer's (2008) work, which has emphasised the importance of the Scottish accent as an identity marker. That is, Scottish accent plays a key part when refuting or accepting an individual's claim to Scottishness. Secondly, while accents function as markers of similarity or difference in many national contexts, there is something specific to Scotland at play here. The Scottish accent (and of course there are regional variations within Scotland), I would argue, has a certain symbolic charge due to the extent to which, historically, the Scots accent itself has been subject to a kind of stigmatisation which is closely linked to understandings of class (see Cheyne, 1970).

Among many of the participants, there was a strong sense of a desire to fit in — or to be *inconspicuous*, to go unnoticed. Stefania talks about her sons' struggles to find friends, and attributes this to their obvious Polishness, due to their names:

> Stefania: *But because they were given Polish names, I think that makes - - people don't think like, umm, people - - my son struggles to have friends because they hear, you know - - when someone says even Tomas, or his name is Tomasz, Tomas sounds German, so they still kind of know he's not, he is not from here. And I sometimes wonder, how can I make them…it went to the point of I actual- - umm, tell, told my son to introduce himself as Tom.*

> Minna*: Tom, yeah, yeah.*

> Stefania: *So he can blend within the, you know, within the community.*

Further, and leading on from the previous discussion, apart from anglicising Tomasz's name to Tom, Stefania also suggests that if Tomasz were to acquire a Scottish accent, that might also alleviate the situation:

> Stefania: *And I can clearly see, he's gonna end up — if I stay in Scotland for the next couple of years — he is gonna get that Scottish accent, you know. He, he, he is much more, and maybe then — so maybe that's the solution.*

> Minna*: Yeah.*

> Stefania: *We can try and mix him. But you know, if I can't mix him, umm, with Scottish children, how am I supposed to, you know, how am I supposed to give him those opportunities? You know, school is not, you know, you, you, you are not gonna make friends, really, if you only see them at school. And I'm trying to make every effort (…).*

For Stefania, having her children 'blend in' — that is, going unnoticed — is important because, in her view, there is a lot at stake: making sure that her child is not different

from the 'norm' and that he mixes with 'indigenous' children means he will have more opportunities in life.

Noor, who was born in Scotland but whose parents migrated to the UK from India, spoke about not wanting to be different from other children when growing up. She explained how people at school would ask "do you speak a funny language at home and do you dress in a different way" to which her and her siblings would say "no, no, no, no, we speak English". She did not want to speak Punjabi out on the street in case anyone heard and she wanted to dress the same way as other children. "If it was like parents meeting", Noor and her siblings would feel embarrassed as she thought "everyone is gonna find out my mom's English is not good" — "because you just want to be like every other child". However, as she got older she became "proud of the fact that, you know, that you can speak two languages and then you can, you know, you've got that - - and people are then a bit more fascinated".

Ahsan, who has lived in Scotland for five years, said he was "trying to adopt to things" and to speak like 'locals' (I noted to him that I noticed he used a lot of Scottish words, such as 'aye', 'cannae', 'wouldnae'). He explained that he believed that,

> ...when you move to a country and you know you're gonna live there for lifetime, so you should struggle to get their language adopted, and their c- - you try, you have to try to, to mix up with the local people.

This is because "you don't want to be like a (...) *separate* character". Ahsan recalls that when he arrived from Pakistan, he had a big moustache. He explained how "back in Pakistan most people have a moustache" but when he came to Scotland, he saw that "nobody have a moustache [laughs]" which led him to "feeling like an odd person in this culture, you know, in this environment". Thus, "after a couple of weeks, I took mine off, I just shaved myself and I said no - - because I'm living here, and I have to live here for long, so I need to adopt to things from these local people". Thus, the participants adopted various strategies in relation to the way they spoke or the way they looked in order to 'fit in' with the 'national norm'.

Before moving on to the next section, it is — finally — important to linger on Stefania,

Noor and Ahsan and the ways in which they sought to 'fit in' or 'blend in'. It is crucial to recognise and acknowledge Stefania's and her children's whiteness within this context. Let us consider this excerpt from Claire Heuchan's *Sister Outrider* blog (2016):

> *I am Black. I am Scottish. To some, it's obvious that the two are not mutually exclusive. To others, Black Scottish identity is a contradiction in terms: either you're of this place, Scottish and therefore white, or Other, Black. Rest assured, the two fit together — admittedly there are tensions, but those mostly arise from the expectations of other people (read: white people) rather than any aspect of what it actually is to be Black and Scottish. The plurality of Black identity often gets lost in how this discussion is approached, because constructions of national identity are so often treated as binary and static. "Where are you from, originally?" Five words that plague people of colour across Britain. It's essentially code for "if you're here, then why aren't you white?" When I was a child that question left me feeling sick, scared. I dreaded it, and have developed something of a sixth sense for when it's coming. What caused me discomfort was that it positioned me as Other, and was often asked because white people couldn't wrap their heads around the idea of a Black child belonging in an otherwise white family. Now, having grown up and inhabited this world as a Black woman for 24 years, I have a much thicker skin when it comes to micro-aggressions. But people still ask it. Random strangers still feel entitled to ask that, completely out of the blue, their curiosity outweighing basic courtesy. That question can't be separated from what it is to be Black and Scottish. It's an indicator of how white people consider Scottishness, what can and cannot be Scottish. The underlying assumption around which the question is framed is that Scottish identity is inherently white.*

It can be hard to distinguish a Polish child who is white, has an anglicised name, and has a Scottish accent from a 'white Scottish' child. However, the possibility of so-called 'white' minority groups 'passing' as Scottish[17], or being inconspicuous does not mean that they do not experience exclusion and oppression. It is therefore important to bear in mind that racism does not come in one shape or form; rather, there are *racisms* through which racialised minorities are excluded, inferiorised, subordinated and exploited in different historical and social contexts. Further, different racisms are experienced in different ways by various class, ethnic, and gender categories (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1993:2).

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[17] As mentined before, Scottishness is — according to e.g. social attitudes survey data — still strongly connected with the idea of 'whiteness' (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2010).

Whiteness is a continuous variable "whose hues are a product of processes of racialisation" (Fox et al, 2012:692), and the racialisation of minority groups occurs when migrants are collectively disparaged with reference to a combination of cultural, social and/or quasi-biological traits (Fox et al, 2012:689). Garner (2007) refers to 'contingent hierarchies' of whiteness, by which he means the internal borders within the white category that are produced by processes of racialisation; i.e. that there are socially observable degrees of whiteness between different groups that seem to be unproblematically white (Garner, 2010:121). Thus, sociologically, 'white' can be interpreted as "encompassing non-material and fluid dominant norms and boundaries" (Garner, 2007:67).

So far, within the British context, theories have been advanced about such groups as Central and East European immigrants (e.g. Dawney, 2008; Fox et al, 2012), Roma (e.g. Poole, 2010), the Irish (e.g. Finn, 1991; Devine, 2000; Garrett, 2002) and the English (in Scotland) (McIntosh et al, 2004; Hussain & Miller, 2005). Importantly, understanding the 'contingent hierarchies of whiteness' "is not an attempt to take the focus away from the dominant racialised groups' constructions of alterity but to stress continuity and change in the way the Other is represented and dealt with" (Garner, 2004:108). Thus, the way in which we understand white groups has to be nuanced and has to account for both white privilege as well as the different modalities of racism.

*6.8. Scotland and anti-Englishness*

A theme that emerged very strongly during the interviews was anti-Englishness, and it thus merits a closer consideration. Here, it is important to foreground the discussion by drawing a clear line between racism and anti-Englishness because the latter is *not* an instance of the former. In order to do this, it is helpful to refer to Miri Song's excellent work on what she terms as the *culture of racial equivalence* (2014). Song, alongside Miles (1989), for example, argues that racism is more often than not over-used and defined and understood too loosely which leads to the term's "conceptual inflation" and "declining utility" (2014:108) — almost anything and

anyone can be labelled racist.

Song takes her cue from Omi's and Winant's (1994:162) influential 'racial formation' theory, which argues that racism is "a fundamental characteristic of social projects which create or reproduce structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race". As Song argues (2014:113), this conceptualisation is "helpful because racially essentialist claims on their own are not sufficient to constitute 'racism' as such: rather, such essentialist categories or ways of thinking must be shown to 'create or reproduce structures of domination' in specific historical contexts". Song argues that while theorising on racialisation emphasised "the ambivalence and contradictions embedded in *individuals'* racial attitudes and behaviours" and has thus "enabled us to analyse multiple *racial incidents* with more care and specificity", at the same time "in doing so, it has also fostered a highly individualistic and privatised understanding of 'racism' which obscures conceptualisations of racism as structured systems of power and domination which have a historical basis" (2014:122-123 — original emphases). Therefore, racialisation or racial incidents do not automatically signify racism — indeed, "the growing equivalence in how racism is understood (…) is worrying, as it denudes the idea of racism of its historical basis, severity and *power*" (Song, 2014:125 — added emphasis). Consequently, "commonplace assertions of racism (…) end up trivialising and homogenizing quite different forms of racialized interactions" (Song, 2014:125).

In order to make sense of nationalism in Scotland, we need to understand the relationship between Scotland and England, or Scottishness and Englishness. We also need to understand how anti-Englishness relates to Scottish nationalist narratives and experiences of nationalism in Scotland, but I would argue that it is not helpful to think of it through the analytical lens of racism. In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that imagining 'an Other' is a key component of nationalist narratives. In reference to the UK, many commentators have argued that the English are Scotland's 'significant other': Hearn, for example, notes that identities are "often constructed in opposition to a particularly significant other" and that "Englishness undoubtedly plays that role in relation to Scottishness, a role arising out of a long and complex history of rivalry and interdependence" (quoted in Watson, 2003:18) and McIntosh et al (2004) found

that several of their participants "observed that 'Scottishness' explicitly involved asserting difference from 'Englishness'".

In relation to this, Ahsan (Pakistani, 38 years old, didn't disclose how he voted) — who among other jobs drives a taxi — explained how he had witnessed Scots becoming "more patriotic" when they are drunk. Asking what kinds of things he had heard, Ahsan said:

> Oh..well, obviously, I don't born here and I don't know their um, s- - national kind of songs and that — which they sing that time of, I'm - - sometimes I don't understand what they are singing, what they are talking about. But the things you in general get from their appearance and their expressions is like more patriotic 'I'm Scottish, I'm not English, I'm not British, I'm Scottish'. They have this thing in them, yeah.

Here, Ahsan highlights the connection of England to Scotland as its 'significant other'. McIntosh et al (2004) conducted a qualitative study whereby they sought to uncover English people's experiences of anti-Englishness in Scotland. McIntosh et al (2004: n.p.) concede that while the participants "were relatively powerful and privileged in relation to other minority groups in the UK", nonetheless "this relative power did not prevent their sense of 'belonging' to Scotland, being undermined or cast in some doubt in regular and routine interactions with Scots". McIntosh et al (2004) noted that amongst those they interviewed, there was a sense that "their experiences of anti-Englishness often revolved around assumptions of a deep rooted, almost 'natural', difference between them and Scottish people". Thus, McIntosh et al argue that there are essentialist constructions of 'The English' at play, and that the English have been racialised to some extent. However, drawing on Song (2014), I would argue that though the English in Scotland may experience racialised incidents and racialisation, these experiences cannot be understood through the analytical lens of *racism* as the English have not been the victims of systemic structures of power and domination historically (unlike, for example, the Irish in Scotland). However, it is important to understand that "overcoming such 'racialised boundaries' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Miles, 1993) can be a very tiresome, wearing and at times for some a deeply offensive and threatening feature of daily life in Scotland" (McIntosh et al, 2004).

Considering this antagonism and the idea of England and the English as Scotland's other from the recent migrants' perspective is interesting. The participants who were relatively new to Scotland had quickly picked up on what they saw as a sense of anti-Englishness in Scotland. Catherine (Nigerian, 32 years old, student, didn't vote), who lived in England for a while, shared her experience:

> *I feel like there are differences [between England and Scotland], but then they are not like- - I understand like there's the history and everything but I feel like - - because when you're in England and you talk about Scotland, people are normally really nice about Scottish people, they are like 'oh, those people are friendl- - like, when I told my friends in England that I was coming down to Scotland they were like 'wow, they are people- - nice people there, the weather is cold but then the people are friendly' and everything and then I got to Scotland and I — when I talk to people about England and it's like the other way around, like, 'those devils', those - - it's like, I don't know [laughs].*

I asked why Catherine thought there existed this animosity between Scotland and England. She argued this was probably to do with the history and she knew that there was "something about the English people taking over Scotland by force and all of that". Interestingly, she alludes to the process of learning about the underlying processes and attitudes which guide social interactions and understandings:

> *...sometimes I just feel really bad, 'cause I feel like to me, like to an outsider, you just see like everybody's the same kind of thing, but then by the time you get to know them, you know that there's like..this animosity.*

Thus, as an 'outsider' — or a stranger in Simmelian sense — little by little, she learned about the 'animosity' that exists among Scots, as she sees it, against the English. I asked if she picked up on the animosity quite quickly, to which she responded "I did. (...) I did like almost immediately actually. Because when people ask me like 'oh, where are you coming' I'm like 'oh, I just moved up from England', they say 'oh, England'".

In the interview situation, Catherine went on to say that she would like to move to England after finishing university in Scotland, which led me to ask why she wanted to live in England. At this point, Catherine looked around, lowered her voice and confirmed with me: "nobody's listening". Thus, she had internalised the idea of anti-

Englishness to the extent that she did not want to be overheard by Scots saying positive things about England. Similarly to the points raised by Catherine, Ahsan spoke at length about the anti-Englishness he had witnessed. Going back to his point about Scots being "more patriotic" when they are drunk and about them saying that "we're Scottish, we're not English", I asked if Ahsan felt there was a lot of anti-Englishness in Scotland. He said "yes, there is" and "it's a lot, it's a lot". He noted how Scots "don't feel a hesitation telling you that they don't like English people, they're quite bold on that" and that "you get harsh comments and statements against English people". Like Catherine, Ahsan connected the perceived animosity to an understanding of Scotland being 'oppressed' by England. Consequently, he understood this to be a factor that affected the independence referendum debates — that is, Scotland freeing itself from English control[18].

Anti-Englishness was experienced in other ways by the participants as well. "Banter and joking", McIntosh et al (2004) write, "were important for serving constant reminders of these 'differences' [between the Scots and the English]". Among Watson's participants, verbal abuse was the most common type of anti-Englishness, and was reported as being "banter", "teasing", "joking" and "occasionally abuse" (2003:130). Rachel (33 years old, English, development officer, voted yes) said she has set her roots in Scotland as she bought a house here, has a long-term job and has a son who was born in Scotland. Thus, she feels "part of the community". Nonetheless, she has been left "with an odd sense of identity" which manifests itself in her telling anti-English jokes:

> Rachel*: Umm, because…[sighs and laughs] Because… Why..I'm not quite sure how this works. I quite frequently come up with anti-English jokes.*
>
> Minna*: [laughs]*
>
> Rachel*: [laughs] And I think it's just because my, like…my husband has a really black humour. And I think he — I don't know if this a wide term or if it's a particular Glaswegian thing, but he talks about [unclear] humour which is like jokes you would only say to people who know you don't mean it, it's that kind of like Frankie Boyle kind of stuff. Umm, it's only funny because it's completely outrageous and if you meant it you would never say it.*
>
> Minna: *Yeah.*

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[18] Catherine's and Ahsan's points are closely connected to the discussion of 'Scottish victimhood' (see Chapter 5).

Rachel: *So, he..he would always make, like, outrageous anti-English jokes to me. Umm, and..like, on the understanding that I know that he doesn't [laughs] mean it. But the problem is, I'm now the one who thinks of them, and they come out of my mouth and I'm like 'what are you saying?'.*

Here, rather than other people labelling anti-English comments as 'banter' or 'jokes' (apart from Rachel's Scottish husband), Rachel confesses to making anti-English jokes herself. Her use of irony or humour vis-à-vis her national identity is revealing. Feminist literature speaks about irony being used as a form of agency — that is, it is used as a strategic means of countering or questioning established truths or ideas (Rainford, 2005:3). While operating "from within the structure it interrogates", irony entails a repetition of structurally dominant beliefs in a way that negates their value and implies that, in actuality, "the *real* truth" is something completely different (Rainford, 2005:3 — original emphasis). Speaking with reference to gender and patriarchy, Rainford (2005:4) notes:

*...the ironic woman does not simply seek a subjectivity of her own to replace the masculine ideal. Instead, she uses her secondariness as a form of "negative freedom", repeating it back to the patriarchal structure in order to undermine the authority of (sexed) subjectivity itself. Irony creates a way to unravel the prevailing "truth" of gender positions without being obliged to step outside these positions.*

Similarly to the point raised in relation to 'passing' and its transgressive capacity, irony thus emerges from, and operates within, the structures it seeks to negate (Rainford, 2005:11). Humour or irony, nonetheless, offers an interesting insight into the workings of nationalist narratives and identity.

Though not related to anti-Englishness, it is useful to bring in something that Rahul said here. During the interview, Rahul (Scottish-Indian, 28 years old, student, voted no) — whose family comes from India but he was born and brought up in Glasgow — referred to India as the "mother nation":

Rahul*: Ehm [long pause]. Yeah. [pause] You could — okay, so there's another nation, India — it's - - from, from my, ehm, homeland if you wanna call it that [laughs].*

Minna*: [laughs]*

Rahul*: [laughs] The mother nation, ehm. [laughs]*

This exchange really stuck with me, and I wrote about it in my fieldwork diary later:

*Transcribing Rahul's interview from last August, I find in interesting how there is a sense of self-deprecating humour coming through. He refers to, rather sarcastically, 'homeland' and 'mother nation' when referring to India (where his parents are from). Both of us laugh loud and heartily after this. I think this moment just crystallised the certain ridiculousness of national ties and identities/consciousness. Due to his heritage he's 'supposed' to view India as — maybe not formative as such — but as a defining element of his being and self-understanding. I suppose the ridiculousness is the weight & emphasis that is placed on, and expected of people to place on, their national allegiances. As someone who has a hybrid sense of self such overarching and rigid identifications seem rather futile and constricting. (8.6.2016)*

Thus, through ironic or self-deprecating remarks, the socially constructed contours of the nation, as well as the expectations and assumptions regarding national identifications — their supposed 'naturalness' — become newly visible.

Following this slight detour, let us return to the issue of anti-Englishness. A key way of understanding the relationship between Scottishness and Englishness is through the analytical lens of class. As Mcintosh et al (2004) note,

*...from a Scottish perspective, an English national identity is one which is very often understood as being quintessentially 'middle class' and is often contrasted with, and provides reinforcement for, Scots sense of themselves as being much more 'proletarian' in nature and outlook.*

Watson (2003:93) came to a similar conclusion: "One of the most striking effects of an English accent was the perception by many Scots that this ascribed middle-class status to, or upon, the speaker". More broadly, McCrone argues that "the narrative of class in Scotland is one in which issues of national identity play across class" (quoted in Watson, 2003:94).

Eilidh (54 years old, social worker, voted no), who is from Guernsey but is often assumed to be English due to her accent, admitted to experiencing "quite..assumptive reactions" from people which often "include an assumption about m- - my politics (…) which is usually that I'm a Tory of some sort". Thus, "based on the way that I speak, some people make assumptions about my class and they're not necessarily valid" (she

explains how she is "from a family of five, we never had any money"). Eilidh nonetheless accepts that "people make assumptions based on...what they can see I suppose, and what they can hear". She finds herself in difficult territory because while the attitudes can be "negative" and "dismissive", "if I try and explain that I'm not English, then I get into territory where...I'm — I feel sometimes I'm implying that being English is a bad thing in itself but I don't want to be on that...,wave length" which makes the whole thing "quite...fraught at times".

As alluded to by Eilidh, due to the way in which the English in Scotland sound, they often come to be symbolically representative of Westminster and right-leaning politics. As has been discussed at length previously, Scottish people seem to be only marginally to the left in comparison to their neighbours south of the border. The recent gains by the Conservative Party in Scotland in the 2017 general election certainly challenges the view that Conservative politics does not have any traction among the Scottish voters[19]. Nonetheless, in order to distinguish Scotland and Scots from England and the English, there is a powerful myth of Scotland being more socialist or left-leaning in its outlook. This, I have argued, has been attributed to 'Scotland's values' by the SNP political elite. Thus, anti-Englishness in the context of Scottish nationalism carries a strong link to class. That is, Scottishness comes to be understood through class, and this classed framing segues into nationalised identification.

*6.9. Conclusion*

This chapter has sought to outline and critically discuss the ways in which the participants experience Scotland and Scottishness in their everyday lives. The participants come from different ethnic minority backgrounds, and most of them are connected by a sense of migrant-ness: while some are recent migrants to Scotland, others are native-born whose parents or grandparents have migrated to Scotland previously. This chapter has specifically focused on everyday nationalism, i.e. the

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[19] Alex Salmond, of course, famously joked that there were more pandas in the Edinburgh Zoo (two) than Scottish Tory MPs in Westminster (The Guardian, 2014).

ways in which the perimeters of the nation are experienced and made sense of in the daily lives of people. As ethnic minorities have not been focused on in great detail in everyday nationalism studies literature, this chapter has sought to address this gap — especially as studying those whose belonging to a nation may not be "beyond question" can offer some interesting insights into how nationalist narratives operate and impact the lives of people.

What transpired from the data was that, firstly, participants tended to depict Scotland and Scots as 'friendly' or 'welcoming', especially in comparison to England and the English. However, as each interview progressed, the participants began to disrupt and challenge this dominant narrative, which — as demonstrated in Chapter 5 — gains traction and credence through relations of the ruling (D.E. Smith, 2005). Further, the participants — especially those who were more recent migrants — often described themselves as 'outsiders' or 'visitors' who, thus, do not see themselves as fully belonging. Interestingly, this sense of 'outsider-ness' gave the participants a feeling of 'objectivity' and a unique perspective vis-à-vis independence, sometimes resulting in participants comparing and contrasting the Scottish case to that of their 'homeland'. Padma and Ahsan, for example, discussed independence in relation to Pakistan and India.

Secondly, drawing on literature on 'race' and space (especially on Puwar, 2004) and considering the idea of the 'white gaze', this chapter focused on the ways in which 'the rural' was often imagined as more hostile and unwelcoming to especially non-white ethnic minorities while Glasgow was seen as more multicultural where it is easier to blend in. There were, however, limits to this blending in, with issues around non-Scottish accents being especially pertinent.

Thirdly, this chapter considered experiences of feeling, and made to feel, different (both visibly and audibly) from the 'national norm' and the outright racist abuse some of the participants had encountered. This ties in with Balibars' argument introduced in Chapter 2; he argues that "the racial-cultural identity of the 'true nationals' remains invisible, but it is inferred from (and assured by) its opposite, the

alleged, quasi-hallucinatory *visibility* of the 'false nationals'" (1991: 284-5; added emphasis). However, when considering difference in a country where the majority of the population is white, it is crucial to think about the privilege that whiteness accords in terms of 'passing', going unnoticed or remaining inconspicuous. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that processes of racialisation do not affect those ostensibly white and whose ability to 'pass' may be rather limited.

Fourthly, this chapter discussed the issue of anti-Englishness, and the ways in which the participants regarded it as playing a central role in their understanding of Scotland and Scottishness. I argued that though anti-Englishness should not be understood through the analytical lens of racism, England (and Englishness) as Scotland's 'significant other' is crucial for making sense of Scottish nationalist narratives. Importantly, in everyday understandings, Englishness was seen as closely connected to class.

The next chapter will build on the issues discussed in this chapter, and focuses on ethnic minorities' experiences of the independence referendum specifically.

Chapter 7

When the Nation Becomes Louder: Experiencing the 2014 independence referendum

*7.1. Introduction*

This chapter will discuss a key theme that emerged during the data analysis process, namely emotion (and affect). Thus, it will consider the emotional and affective character of nationalist narratives more broadly, and the respondents' affective responses to nationalist narratives within the context of the referendum in particular (that is, how the referendum made them *feel*). Emotion is a theme that also surfaces in the other chapters: Chapter 5 considered the emotional pull of the concept of 'community' and the ways in which the participants framed Scotland as a community. Moreover, the SNP — as discussed in Chapter 4 — sought to distance themselves from emotions, and frame the independence argument in terms of rationality. During her SNP spring conference address, DFM Nicola Sturgeon argued that "at its heart, ours is not an emotional argument" (23 March 2013).

The previous chapter focused on ethnic minorities' — both recent migrants' and native-born minorities' — everyday experiences of national belonging and otherness. Drawing on Smith (2016), I argued that the capacity to experience the everyday as unreflective whereby people 'just get on' with their everyday lives is a privilege. Those who do not 'unproblematically' belong to the national community — or whose belonging to the nation is not 'beyond question' — are constantly reminded of their difference by others and often critically reflect on their own national belonging in their everyday lives. Importantly, this self-reflection happens within spaces — such as the hairdresser's — and situations which, for many, are sites of mundanity and which *usually* are not seen or experienced as *loci* for deep, personal reflection. The previous chapter demonstrated that in non-nationally heightened, 'ordinary' contexts issues around difference and belonging shape and impact upon ethnic minorities' everyday lives.

My research took place at a unique point in time, namely during and after the Scottish independence referendum. Thus, this final findings chapter will focus on the independence referendum specifically, and on the participants' views, experiences, and — notably — *feelings* regarding the debates, campaigns, the vote and its aftermath. Based on interview data and my fieldnotes from observing independence events, this chapter will interrogate the ways in which nationalist narratives played out both implicitly and explicitly in the political context of the independence referendum, and how the participants made sense of these nationalist narratives and, in some cases, challenged them.

As previously explained, Fox (2017:26) encourages us to look to the 'edges of the nation' — that is to "the places, times and situations where the nation is on the periphery — the edges — of consciousness". Through 'breaching' — i.e. challenging the 'background expectancies' that govern and structure our everyday social order — the everyday processes and understandings that are used to construct and imagine the 'nation' can be teased out and made visible (Fox, 2017:30). Fox (2017:30) identifies 'the political edges of the nation' as a site where the contours of the nation become more easily discernible — especially with regard to immigration: "Immigration is a provocation: it challenges our cherished notions of who we are, and it does so in an explicitly national register".

Besides immigration, Fox, drawing on Condor, notes that other areas "might also prove fruitful" to focus on, and argues that devolution in the UK more generally, and Scottish independence more specifically, "provide fertile ground for tapping into people's otherwise self-evident assumptions about what the nation is" (2017:30). Thus, this chapter seeks to do just that but, importantly, considers the referendum from ethnic minority participants' viewpoints. The referendum was not, of course, an *everyday event.* Thus, an analytical line should be drawn between the previous and the current chapter. Chapter 6 focused on the mundane, everyday contexts and spaces. This chapter focuses on an extraordinary moment of political mobilisation and political reflexivity during which the 'nation' and its future was open for debate. The referendum came to shape interactions within everyday spaces, and there were

limits with regard to *who* could debate it, and *how* it could be debated. The referendum, thus, created a kind of 'breaching moment' with regard to understanding the edges of the nation.

That being said, it must also be taken into account that the data presented in the previous chapter, although much of it not directly related to the referendum, was gathered not long before and after the referendum. Thus, it could be argued that the participants might have been more attuned to the 'nation' overall — even when recounting non-referendum related events (particularly in the referendum's aftermath).

In terms of structure, this chapter will, firstly, begin by discussing some key theoretical contributions in relation to nationalism and emotions. Following this, I will return to the theme of anti-Englishness (which was also discussed in Chapter 6). I will then discuss the pervasiveness of the referendum; a theme which the majority of participants brought up. Thirdly, the discussion will move to the limited visibility — as the participants saw it — of the No campaign, and the participants' interpretations as to why this was the case. Finally, before concluding, I will consider participants' — who are more recent migrants — reflections vis-à-vis having a vote in the referendum.

*7.2. Nationalism and emotion*

 Multiple authors (e.g. Berezin, 2001; Guibernau, 2013; Heaney, 2013) have commented on the relative absence of theories of emotion in the social sciences. As Heaney notes, historically, emotions were relegated to a "subordinate" position in a "binary opposition" of reason and emotion (2013:243). Sociologists, however, have been interested in uncovering and re-evaluating the role that emotions play in social life since the 1970s, and there has been a flurry of activity since the 1990s (Heaney, 2013:243-4). Recently, literature around social movement theory has been

particularly good at integrating emotions to the broader process of analysis (e.g. Berezin, 2001; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Eresin, 2018). This literature has been interested in interrogating the role that emotions play in the "formation, maintenance and dynamics" (Heaney, 2013:245) of social movements.

While sociological literature in general has been engaging with emotions, literature on nationalism has not engaged with emotions in great detail. Although Anderson's (2006) conceptualisation of 'imagined communities' is central to the way in which I understand 'nations', Heaney raises an important point in relation to the absence of emotions in Anderson's writings. Heaney notes that Anderson's understanding regarding "processes of national identification" operate "almost exclusively on a cognitive level, with little regard to the emotional dimensions to such a process" (2013:248). While Anderson writes that we need to understand why nation-ness commands "such profound emotional legitimacy" (2006:4), the issues regarding emotions "remains either under-addressed in his analysis, or emotion acts as unspecified 'under-labourer', implicitly subsumed under notions of 'comradeship' or 'community'" (Heaney, 2013:248).

Heaney, further, argues that literature pertaining to nationalism and emotion has been problematic on three fronts (2013:248). Firstly, "some literature reduces nationalism to emotion"; secondly, some approaches reproduce the simplistic "reason/emotion dichotomy" (2013:248); and thirdly, some authors are 'expressively cognitive' in their orientation, thus either ignoring emotions completely, or treating them tokenistically (2013:248). According to Heaney, "the old dichotomies (appear to) hold sway" in nationalism literature (2013:243). That is, when emotions are discussed, "they are again cast in negative terms, seen as motors of irrational violence and ethnic hatred" — thus, they are "associated with 'hot' or 'bad' nationalism" while "civic or liberal nationalism, by contrast, is 'cold', rational and 'good' (2013:243).

Thus, herein lies a further critique of the civic/ethnic distinction. When the SNP, as was discussed in Chapter 4, implicitly and explicitly identify the form their nationalism takes as 'civic', a further implicit normative judgement is evident —

namely, it is suggested that 'civic' nationalism is *rational*. As argued in Chapter 4, independence was framed as being the 'rational choice' by the SNP. Furthermore, I also discussed Nicola Sturgeon's argument that her nationalism is of the 'utilitarian', as opposed to 'existential', kind. When making this statement she was therefore actively distancing herself from the emotionality or 'hotness' that is often connected with nationalist ideas and narratives in public and political understandings. That is, her nationalism was of the pragmatic — it is a rational means to an end. Yet, as I have demonstrated, the SNP's nationalist rhetoric relies heavily on symbolic resources (Zimmer, 2003) such as history, values and heritage, which have the capacity to evoke emotional responses.

This chapter, therefore, seeks to demonstrate how the referendum was *felt*, and to understand the centrality of emotions that nationalist narratives can trigger. That is, what is the affective experience of nationalism like? This is important because how we feel has consequences on our material choices and lifeworlds; for example, where we choose to live (both nationally as well as locally). Although the focus is on participants' emotions 'on the ground', it is important to point out that affect played a part in elite discourses as well. During the referendum — although the SNP sought to frame the vote in pragmatic and rational (or 'utilitarian nationalist') terms — their rhetoric made use of emotive language (as seen in Chapter 5 in relation to 'national values'). For example, in his speech, FM Alex Salmond said that,

> *Firstly, I want to emphasise that contrary to the destructive campaigning style and rhetoric of the Westminster establishment, the Scottish Government will continue to be constructive and positive about the future of this country. I believe that a positive campaign will always win out over a negative campaign (…). They also badly misread the nature of Scotland and the character of the Scottish people. (…) With all this accumulated negativity, it's little wonder the no campaign calls itself[20] Project Fear.* (Speech in Edinburgh 17/2/2014)

Besides again making reference to the homogenous entities of 'Scotland' and 'Scottish people' which share a 'character' and a 'nature', Salmond is framing the two campaigns in emotionally charged ways: as positive (Yes) and negative (No as 'Project Fear').

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[20] This is in relation to suggestions that "privately, some inside Better Together even refer to the organisation as Project Fear" (Gordon, 2013: n.p.).

*7.3. Referendum and anti-Englishness*

As discussed in Chapter 6, anti-Englishness was a central theme in the participants' understandings of Scottish nationalist narratives, and this theme was also discussed specifically in relation to the referendum. As argued in Chapter 6, while anti-Englishness cannot be understood as an instance of racism, it needs to be carefully accounted for in an effort to understand nationalism in Scotland. Further, it should also be remembered that being at the receiving end of any kind of abuse or essentialised notions is psychically difficult and damaging. During her interview, Eilidh (from Guernsey, 54 years old, voted no) shared a story about her English friend who used to live in Scotland. Eilidh explained that her friend "said that at the time, because she was English, people would round on her and give her a hard time about Thatcher, and..you know, she was meant to be some kind of figurehead for the politics of this, of the, the metropolitan elite".

Thus, Eilidh's friend came to represent, due to where she was from and the way in which she spoke, Thatcher's politics in the eyes of some Scottish people. Indeed, Eilidh's friend found that the referendum, and the debates surrounding it, reminded her about the hard time she would get when she used to live in Scotland, and that she was happy not to be living up north during the referendum. Therefore, working class politics in general, and the anger at Conservative attacks on the working class in particular, can become routed through a national imaginary. That is, on the ground, those who sound English come to represent or mark 'collective guilt'.

Many of the participants interpreted the core argument on the Yes side boiling down to an argument about 'Scotland versus England'. Noor put it thus: "I suppose some people, umm, I think the fear was — which it did happen of course — the fear was that some people would vote yes purely because it's, like, you know, the Scots versus the English". For Paula, though not "wanting to be generalising", she felt people were "quite anti-English in the referendum" which manifested itself as a hatred of Westminster (and Westminster, in turn, was in her view equated with England). Thus, as previously discussed, in everyday encounters the line between Englishness

and Westminster became blurred, and the latter became coded as 'England' or 'Englishness'.

Similarly to Paula, at the beginning of the independence campaign, Rachel remembered articulating that she could not "engage with the debate because (...) it was drawn on the lines of anti-Englishness" which "immediately alienated" her. Eventually, as the debates progressed, she began to hear about "more positive" reasons for independence such as the democratic deficit argument. Rachel felt that it was the media that "played on the anti-Englishness". Certainly, during the referendum, a number of articles were published on the ostensible anti-English motivation behind the referendum (Johnson, 2012; Clegg, 2013; Gilligan , 2014;). For Rachel, "the  closer we got to the referendum" the more she noticed that "it wasn't an anti-English campaign" — "but it suited (...) certain people to try and portray it as that". John, an English Yes campaigner, underlined his view that "there is no anti-Englishness in the SNP or the Yes campaign" which does not mean that "there aren't any anti-English people out there that support these campaigns".

Najuma, a No campaigner, told me she did witness anti-Englishness during the campaign. Like Paula, she felt the debates framed Westminster and England as "bad" where "all bad things radiate from". Najuma — although "having lived in Scotland longer than anywhere else" — speaks with an English accent. She remembered an occasion when she was phone canvassing:

> Najuma: *...I was sitting in my kitchen one evening, umm, and I phoned someone up. And I asked, you know – I'm from Better Together campaign, you know, have you decided which way you'll be voting yet, umm, 'I'm not going to tell you'.' That's absolutely fine, it's perfectly alright to, to not tell me – you don't need to tell me, thank you very much for your time anyway'. Umm, 'but can I ask you a question', he said to me and I said 'yeah, go ahead', you know, 'my role is to inform as much as possible, ask anything you want'. 'Have you been bussed up here from England?'*

> Minna: *What did you say to that?*

> Najuma: *[laughs] I said..'could I ask you, if you're asking me that question because of the way that I speak?' – 'yes'. And I said 'I have to say, I'm really, really offended by that, I'm..I have lived in Scotland for 11 years, and I'm calling you from my kitchen' and I told him where in [city] I was calling from, which was*

*literally around the corner from the street that he was in. (...) Umm, but..there was that...that nastiness, umm... And a lot of it was directed at Westminster, but a lot of it was anti-Englishness as well.*

Here, Najuma was marked out as different due to her audible Englishness (see Bond et al, 2010), and the person on the phone suggested she had been sent over from England to campaign for Better Together. As already discussed (see Chapter 6) and as noted by McIntosh et al (2004), accent is the main way in which the English are "marked out as 'different'". Consequently, the participants would use different strategies in different social contexts to either adapt their accent or vocabulary, or remain altogether silent (see also discussion regarding inconspicuousness and passing in Chapter 6).

In relation to remaining silent, Marissa discussed the day after the referendum, and on her way to the office, she stopped at George Square:

Marissa: *It was really bleak! I think on the way in I had gone down to George Square, just because I wanted to see — 'cause I knew there was gonna be celebration if..it went the other way [laughs]. So I was kind of like oh I wonder what's happening. And there was a group of people who were all rioting [laughs]. [unintelligible] [laughs]*

Minna*: No, no..*

Marissa: *Umm.. Yeah there was just like a small group of Yes campaigners stand there and it was one guy who made a huge like 'look,[unintelligible] get out our feelings, talk about it' and like one by one going to the middle just express how he felt about it. Which was really interesting but I felt, like, out of place there, especially with an English accent I was like 'oh crap I need to go' [laughs].*

Within this context, Marissa, feeling "out of place", chose not to speak. She did not elaborate what she thought might have happened had she said something, but she was careful not to draw attention to herself. Thus, what Marissa's account reveals is also the underlying assumptions governing *who* is seen to have the right to speak — or who feels they have the right to speak — in certain, nationalistically heightened situations. She had, thus, an internalised sense or intuition that she was not welcome to speak, and she — specifically — links this to her audible difference and obvious Englishness.

In conclusion, within the context of the referendum, the English participants felt aware of their Englishness. They reported, on the one hand, a sense of being unable to speak out (Marissa) or, on the other hand, being challenged if they did (Najuma), and they explicitly connected these feelings to their Englishness. Furthermore, the English (sounding) participants argued that, on the ground, anti-Westminster or anti-Conservative views come to be directed at English sounding people who serve as 'figureheads' for the political elite. Importantly, at times class politics are therefore routed through a national imaginary. In the process, the 'national others'' actual political views or their class position may be ignored (as is the case with Eilidh who is self-confessedly on the left of the political spectrum, yet feels she is seen as a representative of Conservatives' politics).

*7.4. Pervasiveness of the referendum*

As discussed in Chapter 1, it was virtually impossible to escape the independence referendum in Scotland before and after the vote. Debates and discussions concerning the vote took place almost everywhere — be it at work places, pubs or the back seats of taxis.

Indeed, what immediately came through strongly from the participants' accounts was the pervasiveness of the referendum. Catherine (Nigerian, 32, didn't vote) summed up many of the participants feelings succinctly when she explained that she "felt like there was no escaping them [the campaigners]". For Catherine, then, the referendum (and those campaigning around it) became somewhat overbearing — especially as she characterised herself as an 'outsider' multiple times during the interview (see also Chapter 6). Catherine, therefore, signalled that she was not personally invested in the debates, and did not have a "horse in the race" (I will return to the reasoning behind this comment in section 7.6.). As a result, she found the Yes campaigners who, as she put it, were "in your face" especially overbearing:

> *I think it was like the yes people, so they were like in your face kind of thing, so I felt like I was, I- - like, the barbecue thing that I went for, I didn't even  - - I just*

*went for, just an innocent barbeque and then it turned out like, we had like an hour with politicians coming to talk about - - I was like...dude, like, I didn't ask for this [laughs]. If you, if you told me I was going to have like one hour, probably I'd just gone out for that one hour and then come back after what - - 'cause it was like, just kind of in your face, so. I know. I felt like I was passive in all of - - I felt like I was being dragged into those things where I wasn't really interested in that, like, you, you're not trying to give me like a choi- - maybe that made me like, dislike the yes thing more because of that, because they were like so...in your face.*

This feeling of pervasiveness of the referendum extended to all spheres and spaces of people's everyday lives. Agnieszka (Polish, 25 years old, votes yes) noted that wherever she went, independence "was the main topic" — "even if it wasn't, then eventually it became it [laughs]". She concluded: "it wasn't possible to talk about anything else [laughs]". Similarly, Lukasz (Polish, 21 years old, voted yes) explained how he ended up having an "argument all the time" — be it at work or "just on the streets, you went to post office and you had argument with post lady [laughs] about the referendum". Here, both Agnieszka and Lukasz were laughing out loud as they made their comments. Indeed, this emotional response signals the all-encompassing nature of the referendum: that is, they find it amusing, on the one hand, how often they ended up discussing (or arguing about) the vote and, on the other hand, how the arguments or discussions took place in unusual places (e.g. the post office).

Mary (Kenyan, 46 years old, voted no) recounted that the referendum was a key discussion point in the office. Although she found the referendum "an exciting time", people in her office were "falling out because of it". She ended up taking the day of the vote off work "because I just didn't want to discuss it (…) because everybody had very strong views". She made a particular reference to "some people in the office who had very, very, mhm, nationalistic kind of views". During the interview, one of Mary's colleagues knocked on the door and entered the room to talk about a work matter. Mary turned to me and said, "so this one, this guy here, listen, he, he's the one I was fighting with". This leads to a light-hearted exchange between the two about the referendum (the colleague, unlike Mary, was a yes voter). After the colleague leaves, I observe that "it seems to be all, kind of, good humour now". To this Mary replies: "Yeah. Not at the time, though". Thus, as the debate crept into and became part of the work environment, this had repercussions on people's relationships within the

workplace. Though Mary and her colleague can laugh and joke about the referendum now, at the time of the vote the atmosphere was more serious and, from Mary's point of view, repressive to the point where she did not want to come into the office after the vote.

Apart from the more outward-facing, public arenas such as the workplace, the referendum was also evident in the private sphere; namely, in the home. Noor (Scottish Indian, 45 years old, college teacher, voted yes) explained that her family (which consists of her parents, her six siblings, and her nieces and nephews) was divided on the issue of independence with some voting yes, others voting no, and the remaining being undecided.  In order to help with the decision, Noor and her family decided to stage question and answer sessions at her parents' house.

> Noor: *And ehm, one of the things that — one of the things that we did as a family was very interesting, was that umm..as it kind of got closer and they had done more research, we decided to have a kind of Q&A session.*
>
> Minna*: Oh yeah! That's brilliant.*
>
> Noor*: And ehm..it was — it started off as being quite fun and actually it became really, it became quite serious and kind of in-depth.*
>
> Minna*: Yeah.*
>
> Noor*: We had three Q&A sessions and the, umm, when people were over, and basically it was, ehm, there was the - - just kind of like the kind of political sort of debates. There was the yes, the no and the undecided. And the, the undecided were allowed to then bring their questions forward. And ehm..and it was fantastic because they were able to present their questions and say ok, you've done a lot more research so convince me (...).*

In addition to the pervasiveness, and perhaps as a result of it, there was also a sense of *expected* openness with regard to people's voting intentions. That is, voting preferences were openly disclosed and publicly manifested as badges pinned on the lapels of jackets, and in certain social contexts there was an expectation to disclose how you were planning to vote. At the time of the referendum, Ahsan (Pakistani, 38 years old, didn't disclose how he voted) was working in a post office. He explained that the customers would directly tell him how they wanted the vote to turn out, and

asked Ahsan how he intended to vote. Ahsan said he would sometimes "take it as a fun but sometimes you take it as 'sorry, excuse me, [unclear], that's my personal thing'". Thus, "sometimes I would say 'how you are voting' and 'obviously yes' and 'then I'm voting no', just for a fun's sake, you know". Ahsan said that "obviously" he was not going to tell people how he will vote, and he used humour to deal with the recurring discussions about the referendum. For Ahsan, the vote was personal. Marissa (English, 28 years old, voted no) found the openness of the way in which many people around her spoke about their yes or no preference surprising:

> Marissa: *[Talking about the people in her office] And really, like, good people – like, I get on with them really, umm, they've been very welcoming with me coming back to the office. But they were so fiercely Yes campaigners, umm, that our office kind of turned into Yes banners…*
>
> Minna: *[laughs]*
>
> Marissa: *…and I was like 'wow, we're not hiding this'.*
>
> Minna: *Yeah.*
>
> Marissa: *'Cause I'm kind of used to, yeah General Election, you don't really..have huge discussion or you don't – you might discuss it but you might - - you don't always disclose what you're gonna vote.*
>
> Minna: *Yeah, private.*
>
> Marissa: *Yeah, it's a private like, well I'll consider it and I'll do it myself. Umm… Whereas this is not how it went [laughs]!*

Noor also discussed the openness of the debate. She began by noting that "politics is something — I mean politics is something that the UK is… is renowned for not discussing, you know". At her job at the college, where she works with many students who come from outside the UK, she makes this known to them:

> *…and you always, when you teach your students, you know, there are certain things that the British people don't like to talk about and it's like money, you know, so never ask on their salary, umm, don't ask really personal question and also, we don't like to talk about politics.*

Here she frames not discussing politics as a quintessentially *British* approach. National identity — rather than being made up of things we *actively do* — is also made up of things we *actively do not do,* and of knowing which topics not to broach. However, the Scottish referendum, for Noor, was different:

> *However, what I found with the Scottish referendum was that there was a real open discussion, and that was something that Scotland showed the rest of the UK*

*that you really can talk about politics. And also you can have huge discussion and fights with your friends and with your colleagues and then you get on with things — it's not about 'oh I can't believe it's, it's not about, you know, it's not the sa- - to me it wasn't the same… it's just not the same as, umm… umm… you know being in a room with someone, a friend, who doesn't share the same political beliefs as you. You know, if you're a Labour person and, and they're Conservative — that's really… that's not the same thing.*

For her, the handling of the debates was something "Scotland should be really proud of" as "they were able to show that you could sit and have a big fighting match with a friend and then you accept that your friend's going to vote yes or no and you agree or disagree and then you get on with it".

Although not an everyday occurrence itself, the referendum infiltrated everyday spaces and came to dominate ("independence was the main topic") and shape ("you had an argument with post lady" or everybody was "falling out") interactions, emotions and dynamics within those settings. As Tom (English, late 20s/early 30s, voted no) put it, "I've never known politics just infiltrate every sphere of lives, like couldn't — like, couldn't go anywhere without interacting with it". Furthermore, the family home alongside cafés, post offices and work places became scenes where the *supposedly* British norm of not discussing politics became subverted and challenged. Interestingly, the majority of the participants seemed quite ambivalent about the prevalence and almost suffocating force of the referendum. This demonstrates how, under exceptional circumstances, something that is not everyday, becomes integrated in everyday settings and interactions: that is, we *accommodate* it.

Despite this integration, however, some of the participants noted that people were feeling "tired" (Lukasz) of the constant focus on independence. Tom explained how

*…everywhere was talking about, it was — like you got on a train you hear it, it's on the radio, it was just… we couldn't go anywhere with like [unclear] the week before, I was so sick of hearing about it and I just… I just don't care about what the outcome is, I just want it to stop.*

Similarly, Marissa, referring to her friends, noted that she thought "they were so fed up with talking about it for months in the end. And a lot of my friends [unclear] campaign 'I just can't wait til it's over'".

Tom and Marissa, thus, signal their wish to return to 'normality': the referendum occupied space within everyday settings and interactions in a way that could not be avoided. This also tells us something about the nation and the everyday more generally. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, ethnic minorities are reminded of their difference often and, as a result, a reflexive negotiation with regard to belonging is an on-going process. Thus, the everyday is never apolitical (consider also for example the 'Everyday Sexism' project), but when the everyday becomes — even if momentarily — profoundly and tangibly shaped by significant, nationalist political upheaval and mobilisation, you become 'tired', 'sick of hearing about it' and 'fed up'. As a result, the spaces and interactions usually experienced as mundane or 'ordinary' — though ethnic minorities' experience of 'ordinary' does not often come with the privilege of unreflectiveness — become the sites of *obvious* nationalist struggle. Through nationalist narratives the nation, rather than a whisper caught up in the banality of the everyday, becomes loud; it becomes 'in your face'. National belonging and difference from the 'national norm' tend to be ever-present in the everyday encounters and experiences of ethnic minorities — but they do become *louder* during moments of nationalist mobilisation.

*7.5. Public space and (in)visibility*

Although the vote dominated everyday interactions as a topic of discussions, the public manifestations of the referendum tended to be limited to the Yes campaign. That is, the Yes movement was more visible in public spaces — or as Jim put it, there was an apparent "occupation of public space" by the Yes side. This was particularly evident in Glasgow: you would quickly lose count of Yes posters seen on tenement flat windows on Byres Road; Yes campaigners often set up their stalls on Buchanan Street; there were Yes stickers on lamp posts; Yes badges were pinned on people's bags and clothes — and so on. During the referendum, George Square in Glasgow's city centre became unofficially branded 'Freedom Square' (I will return to the significance of the name later), and it hosted a number of independence rallies and demonstrations in the lead up to the vote as well as after it.

This 'occupation' of George Square was significant. City squares play an important role in our everyday lives as sites for meeting, conversing, observing and entertaining. Low, for example, illustrates the centrality of the 'plaza' in her ethnography of two public squares in San José, Costa Rica (2000). Public squares also transform into sites of political significance during times of political unrest or change. George Square — apart from being an everyday space for sitting down on a bench and watching the world go by — has long been, and continues to be, a site for political mobilisation and gatherings. For example, in 1919, during the Battle of George Square, or 'Bloody Friday', over 60,000 demonstrators gathered at the Square "in support of the 40-hours strike and to hear the Lord Provost's reply to the workers' request for a 40-hour week" (Glasgow Digital Library).

In 2014, the Square once again became a site of political mobilisation, and this everyday space came to be identified with and occupied by the independence movement. Although I am not sure of the exact motivations behind the unofficial naming of the space as 'Freedom Square', 'freedom'— in the Scottish context — is meaningful. It quickly conjures up associations with the film *Braveheart.* The 1995 Hollywood blockbuster portrays the First War of Scottish Independence whereby William Wallace led his men against Edward I of England's army. *Braveheart* includes a famous scene where Wallace, played by Mel Gibson, delivers a speech to his men before battle saying that their enemies — the English — "may take our lives, but they will never take our freedom". In a later scene, Wallace has been taken as a prisoner and the only way for him to escape hanging is to cry out 'mercy'. Instead, Wallace gathers all his strength and cries out 'freedom!'.

Wallace is a prominent figure in the Scottish heritage industry in and around Stirling especially, where the Wallace Monument stands (Edensor, 1997:135). Around the time of the release of the film in the mid-1990s, the SNP sought to capitalise on *Braveheart*'s success, and — as a result — "opinion polls (…) recorded a dramatic rise of eight points in those intending to vote for the party" (Edensor, 1997: 147). Films such as *Braveheart* are "important cultural forms which reconstruct the nation through the mass shared experience of various symbolic ingredients — traditions, ways of life, landscapes, histories and myths" (Edensor, 1997: 137). *Braveheart*

continues to occupy a central role in Scottish nationalist imaginary and self-understanding, and the SNP have not distanced themselves from the film: "in a documentary accompanying the new DVD release Fiona Hyslop, Scotland's secretary for culture, praises it for boosting 'pride and confidence in our country'" (Dickie, 2014: n.p.).

The significance of the concept of 'freedom' in the Scottish context can further be illustrated through this exchange with Rachel (English, 33 years old, voted yes). She "grew up going to Mayfairs and country dancing" and "dated a Morris dancer" — Rachel therefore explains "there is no escaping the fact that I'm really English" yet she feels "like I belong to Scotland now". After this preface, she goes on to recount an incident when her family was travelling back to Scotland from England:

> Rachel: *And my family, you know, my husband and my sons, you know — my eldest was 5 when he moved here — he considers himself to be Scottish, he would only ever, umm… And occasionally he will say he's both, but umm… [laughs] He…[laughs]…he was — we were driving up, umm, from visiting family and we went across the Scotland border and he shouted 'freedom!' at the back of the car.*
>
> Minna: *Classic.*
>
> Rachel: *And I was like [laughs]… he was born in [English city]! [laughs] What… Where is this freedom coming from?*

Here, Rachel acknowledges the importance of *Braveheart's* and 'freedom's' cultural purchase and significance as a nationalist marker of identification. My comment, "classic", emphasises the ordinariness and commonness of using 'freedom' as an interpretative repertoire (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) in everyday interactions. Further, the interaction highlights the relational character of 'freedom' — it is to be understood as a reference to the antagonistic relationship between Scotland and England. As such, the naming of George Square as Freedom Square is revealing: inherent in the meaning of 'freedom' is *freedom from* something. In *Braveheart,* Wallace shouted 'freedom' in relation to England; the Yes movement wanted freedom from outside (Westminster) political rule. However, Westminster, as has been established, is often codified as 'English' in everyday encounters. The principle of freedom, as it is so deeply written in modern political self-identification, is difficult, if not impossible, to appeal or contest. However, what is significant is the link between the idea of freedom and Westminster and England in Scottish nationalist narratives.

Beyond the visibility of the square, the participants commented on the prevalence of Yes paraphernalia. Padma (Indian, 36 years old, did not vote) and Chalwe (Zambian, 46 years old, voted no) made reference to what they regarded as the overwhelming majority of Yes posters, placards and stickers especially in Glasgow and the surrounding areas. Padma explained that she followed the debates attentively, read Yes and No materials, and closely observed what kinds of posters were displayed in public in order to try and gage the views of other people. Padma noted that she did not see a lot of No posters displayed — "at least not overtly displayed, they were all yes" — around Glasgow[21].

Chalwe recalled thinking it would be the Yes side that would win "'cause everywhere you went it was blue and white[22]". For him, "the Yes campaign made more noise on the streets than the No campaign" with those choosing to vote no knowing "what they were doing but" not wanting "to make noise about it". Similarly to Padma and Chalwe, Marissa (English, 28 years old, voted no) thought the Yes side would succeed:

> *And Glasgow was so persuasive in the Yes campaign, probably more so than other, umm, counties that... I think it was kind of.... i--it almost made feel like 'is this how everyone feels in Scotland', like - -*

Odogwu (Nigerian, 36 years old, Yes campaigner), who I interviewed a couple of months after the referendum, pointed out that "every single place you went to" during the referendum "people had posters in their windows". At the day of the interview, he said he had seen a woman with a Yes sticker. This led him to lift up his shirt under which he was wearing a Yes t-shirt and to say that even months after the referendum, "I still wear my badge".

However, as hinted at by Chalwe above — who said that no voters did not want "to make *noise* about it" (my emphasis) — there was a sense of invisibility with regard to the no vote and voters. Although Paula (English, 21 years old, voted no), Najuma (English, 30 years old, No campaigner) and Chalwe reported initial excitement for the

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[21] The majority of people in Glasgow voted Yes — 53.5 per cent. 46.5 per cent voted no. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results for other areas.

[22] Blue and white were the colours of the Yes campaign — and of course the colours of the Saltire.

debates to come, as time went on, all three described experiencing a feeling of animosity or hostility. For Paula, the "political unrest" made her feel that the social and political world around her was less stable and more insecure, and thus the experience seemed to be unsettling. Eilidh (from Guernsey, 54 years old, voted no) — "as somebody who never wanted to be asked that question in the first place" — also found the referendum to be "quite an unsettling experience". For her, this came down to "particularly the aftermath" and the way in which it "set people against each other" and was "divisive".

What particularly contributed to participants' negative experiences of the referendum was a hesitance about 'outing' themselves as no voters. During both participant observation and interviews, it became clear that the participants felt that the no vote was framed as being 'unpatriotic'. According to Ahsan, no vote was widely taken to signify that "you are not sincere with our country". Marissa, considering the different campaigns, noted that the "No campaign was quite a quiet campaign" because "the national identity argument" was aligned more clearly with the Yes campaign. Consequently, "it did kind of feel like you're more Scottish if you vote yes". Similarly, Paula explained how a yes vote was branded as an "I love Scotland vote" and Tom noted that there was a sense of "if this is truly your nation you will vote for us, if you vote yes". Jim (Scottish, 48 years old, No campaigner) criticised the Yes campaign for creating an 'out-group' consisting of those who voted against independence:

> You got, you got stuff quite like that, you know, and it was an attempt to like not be an ethnic nationalist — anybody can be Scottish. But this increasingly - - anybody could - - but to be, but the flipside of that was to be properly Scottish you had to support independence. You know, so on one level it's, you know, it, it pretends to inclusivity but actually it's creating an out-group just as [laughs], you know, just as firmly — and you can see that in the whole spiralling social media, you know, you know — you're not Scottish, you're x because you don't support independence. So the — it's a... it's self-selecting, umm, in a way that... is no more - - it's, it's as exclusionary a philosophy.

I have argued before that contradictions are inherent in nationalist narratives, and can be revealing. Here, Jim highlights one such contradiction as he sees it: though anyone can, technically, be Scottish, to be truly Scottish requires you to vote yes.

Although the SNP made it clear that people had a 'choice' in terms of how they decided to vote (indeed, one of their key referendum publications from 2012 was entitled *Choice – A historic opportunity for our nation*), Salmond nonetheless signalled in the aforementioned publication that "we can choose a different and *better* path" (The SNP, 2012:1 — added emphasis). Thus, according to the SNP, although Scottishness is portrayed as being inclusive, and the referendum was about 'choice', the referendum was also about choosing a better future. Consequently, those voting against this supposedly brighter future could be, on the ground, either actively labelled as being 'unpatriotic' by others or implicitly left to feel this way. There is an apparent contradiction in the SNP's statements: in everyday contexts, these messages are interpreted or experienced in different ways and they serve to shape individuals' sense of self and belonging. Some no voters, thus, felt alienated and labelled as 'not properly Scottish'.

In relation to this, at the independence events, the unionist politicians tended to voice their commitment to Scotland in no uncertain terms. At a meeting in Edinburgh, Jim Murphy (Labour) declared that he "loved Scotland" (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014) and Anas Sarwar (Labour) said that "he is a proud Scot, and is a proud Scot even when Scotland is part of the UK" (fieldnotes, Glasgow, 9.3.2014). Similarly to Sarwar, Ken Macintosh (Labour — though currently independent) argued that "he is 'proud to be Scottish', and that voting to stay in the union does not make him 'any less Scottish'" (fieldnotes, Glasgow, 26.3.2014). Thus, among the unionist politicians, there was a tendency to emphasise their affinity to the Scottish nation, and to highlight their emotional commitment to Scotland despite seeking a no vote. The political elite, on the No side, thus seemed aware of the dominant discourse positioning no voters as unpatriotic and sought to address it through explicit pronouncements of national belonging.

In a context in which voting no was framed as 'unpatriotic', some no voters chose to remain invisible. Thus, this is in direct contrast to Noor's earlier point regarding the openness and publicness of the political debate. What Eilidh found particularly "disturbing" was that people were "afraid to stand up and say I voted no", which led to her making a point of admitting it unless it was "*really* [going to] cause tumbleweed to go past me". Catherine noted how most no voters had to be "secretive"

about their vote "because it wasn't very popular to say you were against [independence]". As a no voter, Paula "was quite shy" and kept her voting intention to herself. She felt like she could not be a "proud no voter" and her and her family — who also voted no — "didn't kind of have anything to show that we were no voters"; rather, the identity of being a no voter became personal and private — something you would not speak of or actively present to the outside world.

At the more extreme end of the spectrum, some of the participants felt that there was real danger in their political persuasion becoming known or visible to other people. Catherine said she was "secretly" supporting the no vote "so I don't get killed [laughs]". Though she said it jokingly, there is something to this feeling of threat: Chalwe explained that he "couldn't even see myself wearing, you know, a no thanks badge or a t-shirt" (unlike the Yes supporters who he observed wearing Yes paraphernalia) because "then you fear for your, you fear for your life, you know, it's not wise". As a result, though Chalwe was excited and looking forward to the vote, he was left feeling "alienated" and not being able to express his views — because he felt "threatened", he became "withdrawn" from the political process.

In direct contrast to Odogwu who still wore his Yes t-shirt after the vote and proudly exhibited it to me, Chalwe and Paula did not carry any markers — such as badges or t-shirts — that would identify them as no voters out in the public. Jim, who has "championed some deeply unpopular causes over the years, or at least minority pursuits", said he was "wary" and "dubious" about walking around with a no badge on, although he had previously never thought twice about attaching a badge to his clothes. Thus, he was "worried about wearing a No badge (…) at the bus stop and this kind of thing [laughs]" in case he got hit. Najuma recalled her frustration during the campaigning period as she and fellow Better Together campaigners put up posters: "not sooner would they go up they were getting pulled down again". Further, she explained that as they spoke "to people on the doorsteps who were very, very, very firmly in the Better Together camp" and offered them Better Together posters, they would refuse to take these as they were worried about the reaction of other people who would see the posters. For Najuma, "that was a very, very genuine fear". Thus, Najuma felt there was a kind of "subtle hostility" which left people thinking "they

couldn't open up and express their opinions" and which she found "very uncomfortable".

What the data therefore reveal is that the no voters I interviewed experienced a pressure to hide their voting intention in the public sphere — being a no voter became a private identity. Yes voters, in contrast, made their voting intentions known by displaying or wearing Yes badges, posters and t-shirts. Crucially, Sawer (2007:39) discusses the ways in which colours and related symbols are used in politics to convey meanings and engage the emotions of social movement participants. In addition, these colours and symbols also perform a more instrumental purpose in terms of branding specific movements or parties. Thus, Sawer (2007:39) highlights the "relative significance of emotion on the one hand, and the rational pursuit of interest on the other" in relation to political and social movements' use of symbols. Importantly, she points out that "the colours not only [serve] the purpose of visual identification with 'the cause' and the outward display of values but also [play] an important role in sustaining a sense of community" (2007:40). Thus, "the wearing of political colours is a significant statement of identity and/or values" and "such public displays help engender an emotional unity and can be an important resource in building social movements and other campaigns" (Sawer, 2007:46).

Those voting yes wore and displayed Yes symbols openly. No voters, however, as we have seen, were more hesitant — sometimes due to fear — to make their political conviction known. Thus, emotions are not only connected to the willingness to display political symbols (e.g. pride or passion regarding a cause) as discussed by Sawer before, but also with the unwillingness to display certain symbols (e.g. fear for being 'beaten up' — like Jim — for wearing a No badge). Many no voters felt excluded from the broader political debates, and chose to remain silent. Indeed, what came through the data was the way in which the referendum was talked about as a sensory experience. That is, the referendum was *visible* (posters, stickers, badges) or it was *invisible* (lack of No posters/badges). Further, the referendum was explained in relation to the concepts of *noise* and *silence* (the ability to voice your views; the choice/necessity to keep your views unspoken; and in terms of the loudness of the Yes campaign)*.* As Bull et al (2006:5) argue, "senses mediate the relationship between

self and society, mind and body, idea and object". That is, "*the senses are everywhere*" and they are "fundamental to our experience of reality" (2006:5 — original emphases). Therefore, we can observe the world around us through our senses, and through emotions, we attach meaning and respond to that world.

*7.6. Participating as a non-Scot*

In addition to discussing the pervasiveness, supposed openness and (in)visibility of the debate, the participants — especially those who were more recent migrants — also reflected on their own ability to vote in the referendum. Many people who would not ordinarily have a vote in key political events in the UK were able to vote in September 2014.

Having a vote was regarded as a way of inclusion by many of the participants who were more recent migrants. Ahsan (Pakistani, 38 years old, didn't disclose how he voted) argued that having a vote was a good thing, and made "you feel part of" the country. Violet (Zambian, 40 years old, voted no) explained that being able to vote gave her a feeling of being included:

> Minna: *Okay, yeah. Do — do you still — like, do you feel at home in Scotland, would you say it's home now or?*
>
> Violet: *Yeah, honestly, I do feel like home because — I don't know, when I just came I didn't know I was even allowed to vote, do you know- -*
>
> Minna: *Yeah.*
>
> Violet: *-- so at least with voting it made me feel part of, you know, the crowd-– being part of the, you know, the is the nation, yeah.*
>
> *Minna: Yeah.*
>
> Violet: *So I feel - - I felt a sense of belonging. Okay, I know, I'm not Scottish and stuff but, I just felt like oh, so, I'm also included, I can also decide, you know. Mmhm, yeah.*
>
> Minna: *How did that feel, when you got that kind of power to - -*

Violet: *Yeah, it just felt like oh yes! [laughs] You just - - is, is, you know, it empowers you to have a say in certain things, yeah, to be heard, so – yeah, it's quite, it's quite a... good feeling, for feeling and kind of like yes.*

Violet went on to say that if you are not given a vote, "automatically you are excluded" which makes you feel like "you should just pack and go". Agnieszka (Polish, 25 years old, voted yes) explained feeling "privileged" that she could vote in the referendum, and Mary (Kenyan, 46 years old, voted no) said having a vote made her feel "I was part of it" and that she was included. Stefania (Polish, 32 years old, voted no) noted that being granted a vote made her feel "I *am* actually treated as a person".

The granting of voting rights in the referendum beyond the holders of British passports poses some interesting questions with regard to national belonging and indeed citizenship. Jacobson notes that "determining who may become a member and a citizen is the state's way of shaping and defining the national community" (1997:5). The right to vote has, traditionally, been seen as a right and responsibility of citizens of nation states, whether they reside within or beyond its borders. Soysal (1994), however, talks about a post-national form of citizenship whereby there is an expansion of rights and an allocation of these rights to those who would have been denied them before.

With regard to the Scottish case, the referendum voting rights offer an interesting case in point with regard to Soysal's remarks. The right to vote was extended to those who can vote in the Scottish parliamentary and local elections, as well 16 and 17-year-olds. Thus, British citizens resident in Scotland; Commonwealth citizens resident in Scotland who have a leave to remain in the UK or do not require such a leave; citizens of the Republic of Ireland and other EU countries resident in Scotland; members of the House of Lords resident in Scotland; service personnel serving in the UK or overseas with the armed forces who are registered to vote in Scotland; and Crown personnel serving outside the UK with HM Government who are registered to vote in Scotland were able to vote in the Scottish independence referendum (The Scottish Government – Scotland's Referendum). While many people resident in Scotland were excluded from the vote — such as asylum seekers and refugees — the

vote was nonetheless opened up to a broader constituency than, for example, the UK parliamentary elections or, indeed, the recent referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union that was held in June 2016.

Nonetheless, despite the feeling of inclusion or belonging that some people felt as a result of having a vote in the independence referendum, the participants (especially those who were more recent migrants) also reported a lingering sense of — as Violet put it — not knowing "where my place was exactly". This made her feel "scared" and meant that she shied away from debating issues to do with independence. Agnieszka (Polish, 25 years old, voted yes) recalled overhearing people's conversations regarding whether EU nationals should be able to vote and some holding the view that maybe "Polish or EU nationals shouldn't be really allowed to vote". Tom (English, voted no), though he "gets to" vote, described feeling as if he was "a guest in the womb" regarding his suffrage.

Beyond feeling removed or unsure of "one's place", others felt a sense of hostility when engaging in debates and discussions about the referendum. Chalwe (Zambian, 46 years old), who voted no, went to work the day after the vote. As he walked in, and his colleagues knew he was — in his words — a "unionist", a co-worker said to Chalwe: "well it's fine for you to whistle, but you were not here in the 80s". Thus, "you get such comments, you voted out of ignorance, you were not here, you don't know what these people did to us, it was that bad". Consequently, Chalwe said he felt "alienated" and came across "animosity" when the debates started. Many people, he thought, expected him not to vote. Specifically, he linked the animosity and the perceptions that he should not vote to being black in Scotland:

> *Umm, I think being a... black person... in Glasgow, showing an interest in a topic which was out of bounds for black folk. I say out of bound because I remember [laughs] – one person that works at the - - 'are you going to vote?' and I said yes, and the person went on to ask – she said, umm, 'but..you're not, you're not even Scottish, you're - - you don't, you know, you could, you could even go back, you know, this is not really your, your home'.*

Chalwe felt that the colour of his skin, thus, marked him as 'obviously' non-Scottish[23] — the person "judged [him] as a foreigner" — and thought he "wasn't entitled to vote". Chalwe explained that he "learned later on to sort of (…) keep quiet" which was "really hard (…) because I love politics". Chalwe was made to feel like an outsider, and his decision to exercise his right to vote was challenged and undermined by a co-worker due to him not being Scottish in her eyes. Thus, the right to have a say on the Scottish independence matter was, in her eyes, limited to those who were Scottish. Indeed, here we can also return to Simmel's (1950 [1908]) concept of 'the stranger' discussed in Chapter 6. For Chalwe's co-worker, Chalwe remained a "*potential wanderer*" who "had not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going" (1950 [1908]:1) — rather than prioritising Chalwe as someone who indefinitely abodes in Scotland, Chalwe was still fixed in his Zambian-ness in his colleague's eyes. Consequently, his perspectives were devalued and, indeed, his entitlement to hold a position at all was questioned.

However, the co-worker's comment regarding Chalwe not being here in the 1980s needs to be considered carefully. While this may have been a coded way of referring to, and talking about, 'race', it may have, also, signalled genuine concern with regard to Chalwe's potential unawareness of political lessons of the past. However, what is significant is that, in the broader context, this comment made Chalwe feel as if he was being shut down and alienated due to his 'blackness'. It is also telling — given the focus on the 'edges' of the nation — that Chalwe used the phrase "out of bounds". That is, he resides beyond 'the bounds of the nation', and is thus unqualified to make and affect a decision that relates to the nation's future. This incident therefore draws attention both to the ways in which Chalwe is, and feels he is, racialised ("being black in Glasgow") and how his migrant-ness is emphasised ("you weren't here in the 80s") — and these two facets are, of course, closely interlinked.

Violet (Zambian, 40 years old, voted no) raised similar issues to Chalwe, and explained feeling scared to say she was voting yes or no "because it was bringing a lot

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[23] The link between public perceptions of 'Scottishness' and 'whiteness' have been highlighted in McCrone and Bechhofer's studies of Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (see e.g. 2015)

of problems" — specifically, she was worried about losing friends and thus "just kept quiet, knowing in my heart". She suggested that "maybe if I was Scottish maybe I could say something and nobody would hurt or nobody would say something". I also witnessed this hesitance to speak or to take part in the independence debates. I attended a referendum debate in Edinburgh at the end of April in 2014 where "there was also a question from a young man from the audience who said he was from Glasgow, lives in Edinburgh, and is from Sierra Leone". He went on to apologise for his accent, "to which the chair said there was no need to apologise and that it was a beautiful accent" (fieldnotes, 30.4.2014).

Within this context, thus, the young man from Sierra Leone was very aware about sounding different amongst an audience that, at least on surface, seemed to be made up of mainly 'white Scots'. While the panel encouraged him, what is telling is that the man felt that he should apologise in the first instance. That is, he felt he needed to qualify and explain his difference before he could put a question to the panel. Although no one was acting in an exclusionary way towards him (indeed, the panel was encouraging him), his qualification potentially reflected past experiences of having your sense of belonging and views — and, by extension, your very sense of self — questioned, scrutinised, and possibly challenged.

Finally, others felt ambiguous as regards the referendum, and chose not to vote. Catherine explained to me why she felt like she did not have a "horse in the race":

> *Because I'm, I'm not Scottish, and I'm not English — I'm just like, umm, a bystander, kind of like, somebody who has...I have no...like, I don't have horse in the race, to me I just feel like I'm neutral kind of, which is we- - 'cause I, I know I live in, umm, Scotland, so I should probably say yes 'cause of that but then I lived in England as well and I loved the experience. So it's like, I really, I don't care [laughs], but at the same time I really wanted them to stay together 'cause I felt — to me, they're like, brothers, like family, so why would you want to...go apart.*

While Catherine connects her decision no to vote explicitly to not being Scottish or English (and, in the process, she contradicts herself by saying "I don't care" on the one hand, and "I really wanted them to stay together" on the other hand), Padma (Indian, 36 years old, did not vote) saw not voting as taking a moral stance. She began by

explaining that she is "*mindful*" (her emphasis) of the fact that she "treat[s] [herself] as a guest here" — "as a welcomed guest"[24]. She goes on to say:

> *Um, I think it partly has to do with the fact that I've travelled so much, and I usually don't stay for more than..four, five years in one place — four, five years is saying lot, it's usually not more than two or three years. So when you kind of travel like that, and you li- - you've lived in different places, you're attitude towards home is very different from people who have lived in that place, born and brought up and probably die there. And you're — you, don- - the way - - well, this is my understanding, could be wrong, the way I see it, the way you view relationships, the way you view..friendships or the way you view permanence in life is very different. Because you've been uprooted so many times. And I think that has been, in my case as well, I..I don't, umm...[long pause] I'm passionate about what is morally right, but if it means I have to step away because it's morally right — and I know why you ask me that, 'cause I will, I'll come to the decision why I didn't vote. Umm, so I think it was morally right for me to vote, even though I would have voted no. Is because...I've not been here long enough, I'm not been born and brought up here. And I will probably not live here for more than another two or three years — I'll move away.*

Due to her experience of being transient, Padma felt it was not morally right to vote. She, thus, reveals the struggles of Simmelian 'strangers' — in addition to the external challenges to migrants' voting rights (as experienced by Chalwe), Padma discusses her internal doubts as to whether it is 'her place' to have a say in the referendum.

*7.7. Conclusion*

The participants — especially those voting yes or involved in the Yes campaign — spoke at length about the "energy" and "passion" evident at the referendum gatherings, and how "there was just so much hope and positivity [that] it was almost overwhelming" (George). Following the vote, those who had voted yes — like Pietr and Noor — reported feeling "depressed", with Pietr explaining that he started "to cry in the afternoon" the day after the vote when the result was clear. Lukasz remembers going to college the day after the vote, and seeing "all those faces who voted no being like ha-ha!" while him and his "yes voters mates" were feeling "like really depressed". Furthermore, Lukasz recalls the emotional rollercoaster during the debates —

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[24] Here, it is worth emphasising that while Padma started off the interview by making this comment about being a 'welcomed guest', as we saw in Chapter 6, she also experienced instances of 'othering' in different contexts (e.g. her experience of walking into the 'working man's pub').

"during the referendum it was crazy, you got sadness, you had happiness, just everything, you know, the excitement", that is, "actually, every feeling, umm, possible".

Those who voted no also registered the sombre mood among yes voters the next day. Marissa went to the office where he saw her colleague Paul who was upset and who she thought had been crying. She explained feeling "shocked" noticing how much the vote meant to Paul, and feeling "really guilty": "so I was like 'god, I was part of that not happening'". Rahul, who voted no, noted that the result was, in the end, "a sad moment" as "there was that little bit of an emotional pull there thinking ach, (…) it might have been… something there" in terms of Scotland becoming independent.

The referendum, thus, evoked deep emotions in the participants, and on both sides of the debate. This chapter has focused on the somewhat neglected relationship between nationalism and emotion. It is precisely this emotional pull of nationalist narratives that grand theories of nationalism (see Chapter 2) — especially on the modernist side — tend not to capture. On the one hand, I suspect this to be the case due to emotions being relegated to and seen as a property of the private sphere. On the other hand, although "emotions are central in social structure and social processes", nonetheless "they are often neglected or studied as a negative and disruptive element capable of blinding actors to the advancement of reason and rationality" (Guibernau, 2013:145-6). However, emotions have an "important role both as a trigger for political action and as the invisible cement indispensable in the construction of social and political" — including national — "attachments" (Guibernau, 2013:154).

This chapter has, firstly, argued that on the ground, Westminster becomes codified as 'English' or 'England'. Consequently, the English (sounding) participants tended to report feeling like they were representatives or 'figureheads' (as 'Conservatives') in relation to Westminster politics. Secondly, I discussed the pervasiveness of the referendum, and the ways in which it came to structure everyday interactions. Importantly, I argued that the participants' reflections on the pervasiveness were

revealing in terms of understanding everyday nationalism from ethnic minorities' standpoint.

In relation to this second point, although the edges of the nation (Fox, 2017) became more visible to *everyone* during the referendum (including those whose national belonging is 'beyond question'), there was — in actuality — not much difference between ethnic minorities' mundane experiences of nationalism and their experience of nationalism in a 'hyper-nationalist' context (such as the referendum). So, what transpires is that the ethnic minorities' experience and existence are continuously impacted upon and shaped by nationalist narratives and a sense of having to negotiate belonging. During the referendum, nationalist narratives did become louder and came to shape everyday interactions in more intense ways (e.g. in the workplace) — to the point where some participants felt 'fed up'. This, thus, reinforces Smith's (2016) point that the capacity to experience the everyday in unreflective ways is a privilege.

Thirdly, I discussed the visibility of the Yes campaign on the one hand, and the invisibility of the No campaign on the other. I explained the hesitance of the no voting participants to 'out' themselves as being against independence. They also argued that because the yes vote was publicly branded as — in Paula's words — the 'I love Scotland vote', voting no came to be seen as unpatriotic. Fourthly, and relatedly, although being able to vote served as a means of feeling included in the 'nation', as discussed by Violet, others reported feeling 'alienated' and feeling like the political debates were 'out of bounds' to non-Scots.

Discussing "the symbolic and emotional practices that nation-states marshal to mobilize affection for the polity" (2001:84), Berezin argues that "public political rituals create '*communities of feeling*'" (Berezin, 2001:93; added emphases) — a concept which Berezin derives from Raymond Williams' 'structures of feeling'. Those who were involved in or supported the Yes side spoke about the political galvanisation and excitement of being part of something bigger. Those who were

voting no tended to feel like they had to hide their voting intentions. As explained by Collins (cited in Heaney, 2013:245), involvement in a group creates 'emotional energy' "that serves to reinforce group solidarity and produce a particularized cultural capital for those within the group".

Berezin explains that,

> *The repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity -* '*we are all here together, we must share something'; and (...) it produces collective memory — 'we were all here together'. What is experienced and what is remembered is the act of participating in the ritual event in the name of the polity* (2001:93 — original emphases).

Such an act could be, for example, opposing Conservative politics in the 1980s, or being involved in or feeling an affinity to the Yes campaign. Political rituals — such as Yes rallies in George Square — thus produce shared memories. While elite nationalist discourses draw on distant historical events or people as symbolic resources (such as the Enlightenment or William Wallace), individual actors also draw on symbolic resources such as shared memories ("you weren't here in the 1980s") to demarcate the boundaries of the nation. Understanding the connection between nationalist narratives and emotions is key because "belonging includes an emotional component; it implies a certain degree of commitment and identification with the group's objectives, ideals, practices and categorization of other individuals and groups as both 'friends' and 'enemies'." (Guibernau, 2013:144). Emotions are, thus, "intrinsic to social and political attachments and, as such, are essential to an understanding of belonging" (Guibernau, 2013:145). In this sense, accounting for the emotional pull or push of nationalist narratives in the context of the referendum highlights the complex and  — once again — contradictory nature of nationalist narratives and claims.

Chapter 8
Conclusion


Nationalism is a difficult topic to study especially when it comes to uncovering everyday understandings of nationhood. As argued by Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a:540), "most of the time nationhood does not frame people's understanding of themselves, their interactions or their predicaments". Nations are — therefore — often taken for granted with little *explicit* attention being paid to them in people's everyday lives (though nations are, of course, in banal ways ever-present). However, for those whose national belonging may at any given time come under challenge, the nation seems consistently salient in everyday interactions and contexts. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 1, the Scottish independence referendum provided an opportune moment for studying nationalism as 'the nation' was more prominently discussed and reflected upon.


Overall, this thesis has addressed the broad themes of nationalism, 'ethnicity', 'race' and belonging. Empirically, as mentioned, it has used the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a focal point, but the discussion has been situated within a broader, post-devolutionary context. Using a variety of methods, this thesis has investigated the ways in which nationalist narratives are made use of and constructed from above by political elites (the SNP) as well as the ways in which they are experienced, understood and potentially challenged from below by ethnic minorities from different backgrounds. The backgrounds I chose to focus on are African, English, Indian, Pakistani, and Polish. Though I am aware of the dangers of such 'groupism' (Brubaker, 2002), in Chapter 3 I offered a rationale for my choice of sample. Importantly, I argued that because public debates and understandings surrounding these 'ethnic groups' are politically charged in different ways, they merit closer inspection.


This final concluding chapter will, firstly, revisit the aims and research questions that this thesis sought to address. Secondly, I will consider the implications for further research in Scotland and beyond. Thirdly, this chapter will explain the key arguments

that were advanced and that arose from analysis of the qualitative data gathered for this thesis — that is, how the research questions were answered. Finally, it will consider the analytical and methodological significance and contribution of this thesis to the field of nationalism studies, and to understandings of how 'the nation' is linked to 'race' and 'ethnicity'.

*8.1. Aims and research questions revisited*

I will begin by returning to the aims and research questions as a brief reminder. As previously explained, this research was interested in studying nationalist narratives at two levels: that is, on the one hand, considering how nationalist narratives and rhetoric are constructed, developed and expressed in Scotland from above by the leading political party in the country, the SNP, and, on the other hand, exploring how ethnic minorities in Scotland interpret, make sense of and possibly challenge or embrace nationalist narratives in their daily lives and experiences. Thus, both the structural and institutionalised forms of the nationalist project 'from above', as well as ethnic minorities' understandings, interpretations, and contestations of the nationalist narratives 'from below' are considered.

The first substantial aim was, therefore, to investigate the post-devolutionary relationship between nationalism and minority communities within Scotland, considering both the public, discursive construction of nationalism with regard to 'ethnicity', and the interpretative and formative responses of minority communities to nationalist projects. Secondly, this research aims to understand and investigate the legislative, institutional and structural contexts for the management and creation of 'the Scottish nation' as well as the individual, subjective understandings and negotiations of this 'nation'. In order to meet these aims, I have been guided by these research questions:

1. *How have different projects and narratives of nationalism been imagined, mobilised and contested in the context of the Scottish independence referendum*

*in particular, and in the context of devolution more generally by the SNP? What are these narratives' essential components?*

2. *What are the particular ways in which the public rhetoric of the SNP's nationalism has addressed questions of 'diversity', 'ethnicity' and 'belonging' in Scotland; how has it addressed and engaged with ethnic minorities post-1999 and in the context of the independence referendum more specifically?*

3. *How, if at all, have the SNP's nationalist narratives intersected with the formation of policy with regard to minority communities, anti-racism and so-called 'race equality', and with approaches to the treatment of recently arrived migrants?*

4. *How do nationalist narratives contribute to the shaping of the experiences of ethnic minorities, if at all? How do minority communities respond to, interpret and possibly challenge nationalist ideas and narratives?*

*8.2. Implications for further research*

Although this research advanced a number of key arguments and made analytical and methodological contributions (which I will discuss shortly), more remains to be done. Firstly, more work should be done on studying everyday nationalism from racialised minorities' points of view. This is, I believe, a potentially fertile angle to take as exhibited by authors such as W.E.B. Du Bois in America (2005[1903]). Further research within this field will improve our understandings with regard to understandings and articulations of the nation in the everyday. For example, those ethnic minority individuals who are more recent migrants to their country of residence may be more attuned to different nationalist narratives and their significance in structuring their everyday experiences (though this may be somewhat counterbalanced by what Sara Ahmed (2010) terms the 'happiness duty').

Secondly, the constantly evolving political landscape in Scotland provides an exciting context for further work to take place. It would be worthwhile to look at how the

themes identified here continue to play out and potentially shift, change and take on new hues in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and the recent Conservative surge in Scotland following the 2017 General Election.

Finally, although I planned to conduct a media analysis of newspaper articles before, during, and after the referendum, I could not fully employ method due to the time it would take to properly analyse the data. However, analysing the ways in which 'the nation' was discussed in news stories and think pieces during the referendum — especially in relation to the themes of belonging and difference — would be valuable. This is especially so because of the centrality different media play in the circulation of nationalist ideas (Anderson, 2006). For example, during the interviews most English interviewees were aware of Jeremy Paxman's comments with regard to Scots' supposed 'hatred for the English' (Harrison, 2014). Thus, a content analysis of media sources and a reception study of people's understandings and experiences of media messages would be of use. This would help us understand the role media played in circulating information and affecting experiences and understandings of the referendum vis-à-vis issues around 'race' and 'ethnicity'.

*8.3. Key arguments*

In an effort to answer the questions I set for this research, I have advanced a number of overarching arguments which I will now summarise and relate to one another.

Firstly, in Chapter 1 I highlighted my commitment to understanding nationalism within a historically informed framework. My key underlying argument has been that history is an important symbolic resource (Zimmer, 2003) which can be used in ways that serve to demarcate the contours (who does (not) belong), and imagine the content (nation's 'spirit', shape, and character), of the nation. In Chapters 4 and 5 especially, I demonstrated the ways in which historical remembering (and forgetting) — in tandem with other symbolic resources (notably values, heritage and culture) — occurs in the processes of imagining the nation.

Secondly, while the SNP and many of the 'expert' and 'lay' participants continued to — both implicitly and explicitly — frame the SNP's nationalism as being of the 'civic' form, I have argued that the civic/ethnic distinction is not analytically helpful due to its elusiveness and its overlap with normative judgement. The SNP tend to use the label of 'civic nationalism' as a legitimising tool to frame their politics and nationalist narratives. While this, in my opinion, leaves the concept unsound as a category of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) as it serves the normative needs of the SNP, this has notable consequences for the 'race equality sector' in Scotland. It became evident that organisations working in the field of ethnic minority rights and anti-racism use the SNP's self-professed commitment to a civic form of national identity as leverage. That is, deviation from the supposed civic agenda becomes easier to challenge if the SNP is seen to fall short of their own 'standard'.

Thus, while I do not support using 'civic nationalism' as a category of analysis, understanding it as a category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) should be part of the research agenda in the field of nationalism studies. Drawing on Zimmer (2003), it is important to focus on the *processes* through which, and the ways in which, nations come to be imagined, and what symbolic resources are used in these processes. Rather than reifying nationalism as a thing, nations and how they are constructed and narrated should be seen as being in flux[25]. Nationalist narratives are the accomplishment of social actors from above and below who — through their interactions, ideas and actions — prop up, reproduce, reconstruct, and challenge those existing narratives.

Notably, the SNP — as argued in Chapter 4 — sought to steer clear of identity politics and frame the referendum as addressing questions of social justice and democratic deficit. Yet, as argued in Chapter 5, these two tropes were firmly linked to 'Scottish values' and 'Scottish exceptionalism' — that is, 'Scotland's values' were contrasted to 'Westminster values' and Westminster, in return, became codified as 'English' in everyday encounters as evidenced by the participants' observations. As such, the SNP's nationalist narratives were significantly (albeit implicitly) structured around essentialised notions — drawing on notions of a historical Scots *ethnie* — of who or

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[25] Though, of course, the context within which the 'nation' fluctuates is confined or limited by social, historical and economic factors. That is, nations are in flux *within limits*.

what 'we' are or are not.

Thirdly, I also argued for the importance of including the voices of ethnic minorities in the everyday nationalism literature. Focusing on ethnic minority experiences problematises the very concept of the 'everyday' and highlights the privilege of being able to move through everyday spaces and interactions in an unreflective manner (Smith, 2016). Interrogating how ethnic minorities make sense of, understand and experience nationalist narratives in their everyday lives provides us with new insight: those whose national membership or belonging may come under challenge or questioning more often bring the contours of the nation into sharper view.

Fourthly, what became clear through the research is the importance of the national 'other', which, in Scotland's case, predominantly remains its southern neighbour. During the referendum campaign, this difference was essentialised through the idea of 'national values'. The SNP were careful to refer to Westminster and emphasise the difference in 'Scottish values' as opposed to 'Tory' or 'Westminster values'; however, as demonstrated by the participants' accounts, in everyday understandings Westminster came to be codified as 'English'. Those who are English or *perceived* to be English (e.g. Eilidh due to her accent) are often marked out as other in everyday interactions, and all English (sounding) participants reported having experienced anti-Englishness. Importantly, this otherness should be understood through the prism of class — which, at times becomes routed through a national imaginary — and not as an instance of racism as argued in Chapter 6.

Finally, what also transpired was the difference in experience between 'white' and 'non-white' ethnic minorities. While the 'non-white' participants — in a white majority country — were often marked out as different in everyday spaces (pubs, hairdresser's, school etc.), participants from predominantly 'white' minority groups could sometimes *pass* especially when they did not speak and their audible difference was not made known. 'Non-white' participants reported a feeling of being watched or stared at; that is, they were the objects of a 'white gaze' in spaces where their presence was questioned. Here, it was thus important to consider the issue of *inconspicuousness* and the different tools and resources that the participants were

able to mobilise in an effort to 'fit in' or go unnoticed (e.g. anglicising children's names). Importantly, the geographical context played a crucial part here: rural and urban spaces were interpreted and experienced in different ways. These interpretations were both based on past experience (e.g. Padma walking to a 'white working man's pub' where she did not feel welcome) and on perception (e.g. Farnod suggesting he would not be as welcome in the Highlands as he is in Glasgow).

Importantly, while 'white' participants may be able to 'pass' or remain inconspicuous in certain situations, this does not mean that they escape processes of racialisation. The Polish participants reported very distressing experiences of racism, and Stefania explained she felt like she was being 'watched' in the small town she lives in where many people know she is Polish:

> *And I like to just mix in the crowds, I actually enjoy being, you know, in places where I - - which are very crowded. 'Cause I find myself most, you know, when I'm in a crowded place, when it's [huge?] like. I sometimes feel like..I'm kind of stalked be- - because I'm kind of watched so closely.*

Thus, in Stefania's case, the idea of the othering 'gaze' also surfaces. She found it "difficult" to live in the town because there "seems to be a lot of stereotyping" as regards Polish people. Thus, while it is important to account for the differences between 'white' and 'non-white' participants, it is important not to fall into the trap of essentialism. Furthermore, whether someone is seen or regarded as 'white' or 'non-white' can also change depending on the social and historical context, or on the person looking.

*8.4. The contribution and significance of this thesis*

So, what is the significance of this particular piece of research? What was noticeable during the Khan/Heuchan incident discussed in Chapter 1 was the deafening silence from the SNP on the matter. The debate that ensued on the pages of *The Guardian* and *The Herald*, among other papers, offered an excellent opportunity for the party to address the relationship between nationalism, 'race', 'ethnicity' and racism. Yet, the SNP and its key figures decided to remain almost silent aside from a few soundbites from an SNP spokesperson and Nicola Sturgeon briefly challenging Khan's comments.

However, no extended discussion ensued; such a discussion would have been very welcome as academics (Donald et al, 1995; Dimeo and Finn, 2001), as well as practitioners, have long commented on the prevalent 'no problem here' attitude vis-à-vis 'race' and racism in Scotland.

Thus, the myth of Scottish exceptionalism holds its ground (though recent literature (Davidson et al, 2018) is addressing and challenging it). As we have seen, the idea of Scotland being somehow fairer, more progressive or more socialist/leftist — an idea that was vocalised by both the SNP political elite as well as the participants — in comparison to England has limited empirical validity; while there are some differences in social attitudes with regard to wealth redistribution, for example (as was established in Chapter 5), the gap between England and Scotland is relatively small  (Curtice and Ormston, 2011). What is crucial, however, is the staying power — and, by extension, the structuring power — of this myth. Further, egalitarianism is often depicted as an inherent quality of Scotland and the Scots (i.e. that Scots are more progressive 'by nature') through corporeal, organic analogies such as the idea of "fairness run[ning] through Scotland like a vein" (The SNP, 2011:16). This depiction, in turn, raises important and interesting questions in terms of how the myth occludes a proper reckoning with the in-egalitarian and often oppressive aspects of Scottish history and present.

The importance of challenging the dominant discourse of Scottish exceptionalism cannot be overstated. It is important to give credit to the SNP where credit is due: at a time when inflammatory, xenophobic and racist remarks in relation to migration and racialised minorities are part of our political everyday life, the positive rhetoric emanating from the current Scottish government in relation to migration has to be commended. It is also worth noting that ethnic minorities in Scotland are more likely to describe themselves Scottish compared to ethnic minorities in England (who are less likely to describe themselves English) (Simpson & Smith, 2014). However, at the same time, this cannot lead to complacency — there is a long way to go in terms of eradicating racism and racial inequality in Scotland. Further, this positive rhetoric needs to be understood within the Scottish neoliberal context and in relation to class — what kinds of migrants does the SNP welcome and envisage as making Scotland

their home? The myth of Scotland as friendlier, more inclusive and more welcoming makes for a powerful narrative — but it is important to point out the complexities and contradictions as well as silences inherent in these particular narrations of the Scottish nation.

These complexities and contradictions are, firstly, interesting from an academic point of view as we improve our understanding of how nationalist narratives are constructed and what kind of work they are then harnessed to do by social actors. This thesis has sought to make a contribution to literature on nationalism in Scotland specifically, and to the field of nationalism studies more broadly. Importantly, it has brought the elite discourses of the SNP in conversation with minorities' understandings and experiences from below in an effort to build a more comprehensive picture of the ways in which nationalist narratives are drawn upon, understood and challenged. Ethnic minority voices have been largely invisible in the literature on everyday nationalism, and the data addressed in Chapter 6 begins to fill in this gap. Especially in relation to studies on nationalism within the Scottish context, this research has added to knowledge by moving beyond the largely quantitative analyses of the Edinburgh School to a more nuanced and growing field of qualitative investigation regarding nationalism in Scotland. Importantly, as explained, the referendum provided a favourable moment to study nationalism as the edges of the nation became more visible (Fox, 2017). Being able to track and dissect the debates and reactions to these as they were happening, is a unique feature of this research project.

Analytically, the findings reinforce the importance of an 'other' for nationalist narratives. While elite political discourses continuously framed 'Westminster' as Scotland's 'significant other' from above, in everyday encounters and understandings Westminster became coded as 'England' and 'Englishness'. This, therefore, offers insight into the ways in which ruling relations are interpreted on the ground and how these understandings, in turn, have an effect on and come to shape and structure everyday interactions. 'National values' were a critical element within this framing: while some commentators (Norman, 1995; Kymlicka, 1996a) have argued against understanding values as building blocks of nationalist narratives, my findings

demonstrate the centrality of values to processes of national imaginings.

This thesis also offers new analytical insights into understandings of the everyday. The findings support Smith's (2016) claim that the capacity to experience the everyday as unreflective is a privilege — that is, the participants were (made) aware of their differences or qualified belonging in various everyday spaces and contexts. Thus, while the referendum provided a 'hyper-nationalist' context in that the 'nation' was more actively and consciously reflected upon in general, the difference to ethnic minorities' (non-referendum related) everyday experiences was not particularly striking. Thus, I argued that the nation merely became *louder* during the referendum. Further, I also drew attention to the deeply affective quality of nationalist narratives, and the ways in which they make people *feel*. The relationship between emotions and nationalism has long been ignored in literature despite nationalism evoking feelings such as a sense of "self-sacrificing love" for your country (Anderson, 2006: 145).

Finally, this research is also important from an anti-racist viewpoint: if racism, prejudice and discrimination are understood and portrayed as going against 'an egalitarian Scottish nature', such understandings risk silencing the voices of racialised minorities in Scotland. Thus, in an effort to contribute to the anti-racist cause, it is paramount to keep critically engaging with nationalist narratives and uncovering the ways in which they overlap, intersect, inform and are informed by understandings of 'race' and 'ethnicity'. Importantly, and linked to this, throughout this thesis I have stressed that nationalist narratives are not only about 'storying' the nation. The ways in which nations are imagined and narrated carry material and psychic consequences for the people within and outwith their borders. Understanding the processes of nationalism and the different layers (public official discourses; the everyday) is important because understanding how and where national borders are being drawn, and how these may fluctuate over time, helps us understand and map out what the political, economic and social, material and immaterial consequences of nationalist narratives are.

Information sheet for 'experts'

# Information Sheet

### 1. Study title

*Nationalism, Devolution and Ethnic Identity in Scotland*

### 2. Invitation paragraph

My name is Minna Liinpää and I am currently doing a PhD in Sociology at the University of Glasgow. You are being invited to take part in a research study, but before you decide to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any further questions.

Thank you for reading this.

### 3. What is the purpose of the study?

Taking place in the run-up to, and in the aftermath of, the Scottish independence referendum, this study aims to find out how individuals from different ethnic minority backgrounds engage with, interpret and experience the referendum campaigns, debates and the rhetoric surrounding it. In addition, I also want to find out how stakeholders working for different organisations, political parties and campaigns make sense of the referendum debate with regard to ethnic minorities. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to build a broader picture of how the referendum debate engages with and is, in turn, responded to by people from various ethnic backgrounds. Through this study I aim to improve our knowledge of how nationalism, diversity and belonging interact, what their relationship is like, and what possible problems and challenges might arise.

### 4. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen to take part in this research because of your expertise and active engagement in the field of ethnic minority rights and representation and/or the referendum debate.

### 5. Do I have to take part?

Participation is entirely voluntary, and it is absolutely down to you whether you want to take part in the study. I would, of course, be most grateful for your input in helping me to complete the research which I hope will benefit the wider community by offering an in-depth analysis of the issues discussed above. You can withdraw at any time without giving a reason, and you will not have to answer any questions you do not wish to.

## 6. What will happen to me if I take part?

Your participation would involve taking part in an interview lasting for about an hour. The interview would take place at a mutually convenient time and at a mutually convenient location. With your consent the interview would be audio recorded.

## 7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

I will treat all information confidentially. Any documents stating your name will be stored in a locked cabinet, and all computer files will be protected by a password. Any documents or files mentioning your name will be stored separately from the data in order to further guarantee confidentiality and anonymity. Once the research process is finished, I will delete all computer files and shred any hard copies I might have that state your name or other personal information. I have the right to keep the interview data (but not any personal information) for up to ten years.

All data will be accessible to me and my two supervisors only. As part of the data analysis process, I will transcribe the interview, and I will use pseudonyms throughout the transcription process – thus, you will not be identified in any of the data arising from the research. I must, however, note that although I will protect your identity, I cannot guarantee that someone will not be able to recognise you by what you say, for example.

## 8. What will happen to the results of the research study?

Following the completion of the research, I will include and analyse the findings in my thesis. I would be more than happy to provide you with a copy of it, should you wish to read it. The findings might also be discussed in potential articles in academic journals or in papers presented at academic conferences. I would, of course, respect confidentiality and your anonymity in any possible articles or conference papers by using pseudonyms throughout.

## 9. Who is organising and funding the research?

My PhD is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in collaboration with Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE).

## 10. Who has reviewed the study?

In order to conduct research, I have obtained an ethical approval from the University of Glasgow Social & Political Sciences Ethics Committee.

## 11. Contact for Further Information

Should you wish to ask further questions, or volunteer to be a participant, please contact me at m.liinpaa.1@research.gla.ac.uk.

Should you have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project, you can contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer by contacting Dr Muir Houston at Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk. You can also contact my first supervisor Dr Andrew Smith at Andrew.Smith.2@glasgow.ac.uk.

Information sheet for voters

# Plain Language Statement

### 1. Study title

*Nationalism, Devolution and Ethnic Identity in Scotland*

### 2. Invitation paragraph

My name is Minna Liinpää and I am currently doing a PhD in Sociology at the University of Glasgow. You are being invited to take part in a research study, but before you decide to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any further questions.

Thank you for reading this.

### 3. What is the purpose of the study?

Taking part in the run-up to, and in the aftermath of, the Scottish independence referendum, this study aims to find out how individuals from different ethnic minority backgrounds engage with, interpret and experience the referendum campaigns, debates and the language surrounding it. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to build a broader picture of how the referendum debate engages with and is, in turn, responded to by people from various ethnic backgrounds. Through this study I aim to improve our knowledge of how nationalism, diversity and belonging interact, what their relationship is like, and what possible problems and challenges might arise.

### 4. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen to take part in this research because I am interested in your personal views and opinions, and I want to hear about your thoughts and experiences with regard to the referendum debate.

### 5. Do I have to take part?

Participation is voluntary, and it is absolutely up to you to decide whether you want to take part in the study. I would, of course, be most grateful for your input in helping me complete the research which I hope will benefit the wider community by offering an in-depth analysis of the issues discussed above..

You can withdraw at any time without giving a reason, and you will not have to answer any questions you do not wish to.

## 6. What will happen to me if I take part?

Your participation would involve taking part in an interview lasting between one and two hours. The interview would take place at a mutually convenient time and at a mutually convenient location. With your consent the discussion would be audio recorded.

## 7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

I will treat all information confidentially. Any documents stating your name will be stored in a locked cabinet, and all computer files will be protected by a password. Any documents or files mentioning your name will be stored separately from the data in order to further guarantee confidentiality and anonymity. Once the research process is finished, I will delete all computer files and shred any hard copies I might have that state your name or other personal information. I have the right to keep the data arising from the interview (but not any personal information) for up to ten years. All data will be accessible to me and my two supervisors only. As part of the data analysis process, I will transcribe the interview, and I will use pseudonyms throughout the transcription process – thus, you will not be identified in any of the data arising from the research.

## 8. What will happen to the results of the research study?

Following the completion of the research, I will include and analyse the findings in my thesis. I would be more than happy to provide you with a copy of it, should you wish to read it. The findings might also be discussed in potential articles in academic journals or in papers presented at academic conferences. I would, of course, respect confidentiality and your anonymity in any possible articles or conference papers by using pseudonyms throughout.

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APPENDIX III

Sample[26] interview schedule for 'expert' interviews

- Can you tell me a bit about yourself ?
- How did you come to be involved in politics and the Yes campaign?
- What was your take on the independence debate and the different campaigns in the run up to the referendum?
- Can you tell me a bit more about the no campaign and your experiences of being part of it?
  - How has your campaign been received generally - both by the wider Yes Campaign and by the public?
- Did the different independence campaigns engage with ethnic minority communities?
  - How (not)?
  - Could they have done anything else?
- In your opinion, was the referendum debate inclusive of everyone in Scotland? How (not)?
  - **If it wasn't**, why not? What is the effect of that?
  - **If it was**, what is the effect of that?
- Is there a difference in the way in which Better Together and the Yes camp took minority communities into account or engaged with them?
  - If yes, in what ways?
- What if we turn it around - do you think minority communities were engaging with the debate?
  - **Yes:** How?  What does that tell you?
  - **No:** Why not? What might have stopped them?
- One thing that has been assigned to the Yes campaign was the grassroots engagement; did you see similar patterns emerging on the No side?
- Why did we see a proliferation of minority Yes groups? (e.g. SAFI, Poles for Yes, AFIS…)

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[26] The questions varied slightly depending on who was interviewed (Yes or No campaigner; political party representative etc.)

- Do the ways in which minority communities were involved in the independence debate tell anything about their wider position in the Scottish society, over time?
- There has been talk about whether this debate is about the head or the heart... Has the referendum debate and the independence campaign been about identity at all?
- What do you make of statements such as that made by Jeremy Paxman re: Scottish independence is fuelled by 'hatred' for England?
  - Is there anti-Englishness in Scotland? If yes: how does it manifest itself?
- How do you hope to see Scotland move forward now that the campaigns are over and the result is out?

APPENDIX IV

Interview schedule for voters' interviews

1.  Can you tell me a bit about yourself?
2.  What is it like to live in Scotland?
3.  What did you think of the referendum campaigns?
4.  What about people close to you – how did they view the debate?
5.  Did you engage with the referendum?
    a.  In what ways?
    b.  Why not?
6.  In your opinion, what were the key issues being discussed and debated during the campaigns?
7.  What do you think decided the result of the referendum vote?
8.  [If it doesn't' come up:] Did ideas around identity feature in the debates and campaigns at all?
9.  What about nationalism – did it play a part in them?
10. What do you understand by 'nationalism'?
11.  Can nationalism be observed in Scotland?
    a.  In what ways? What is the impact of it?
    b.  Why not?
12. Who is 'Scottish'? What does 'being Scottish' mean?
13. How would you describe yourself? (In terms of how you identify yourself?)
14. What kinds of things affect the ways in which you see yourself?

# APPENDIX V

## Details of participants

**Voters and campaigners**
*("C" after the name denotes a campaigner)*

| Name | Date of Interview | Background | Gender/ Age | Occupation | Yes/No voter |
|------|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| John (C) | 29.7.2014 | English | M/31 | Councillor | Yes |
| Najuma (C) | 17.10.2014 | English | F/30 | Student | No |
| Pietr (C) | 19.11.2014 | Polish | M/31 | Healthcare worker | Yes |
| Odogwu (C) | 19.11.2014 | Nigeria | M/36 | University student | Yes |
| Marissa | 21.11.2014 | English | F/28 | University student | No |
| Rachel | 10.12.2014 | English | F/33 | Development Officer | Yes |
| Jim (C) | 18.12.2014 | Scottish | M/48 | Trade unionist | No |
| Tom | 14.1.2015 | English | M/Age unknown | Teacher | No |
| Agnieszka | 21.2.2015 | Polish | F/25 | University student | Yes |
| Paula | 25.2.2015 | English | F/21 | University student | No |
| Lukasz | 26.2.2015 | Polish | M/21 | College student; works as a cleaner | Yes |
| Noor | 26.2.2015 | Scottish-Indian | F/45 | Teacher | Yes |
| George | 27.2.2015 | English | M/28 | Stock room worker | Yes |
| Eilidh | 17.3.2015 | Guernsey | F/54 | Social worker | No |
| Chalwe | 22.4.2015 | Zambian | M/46 | University student; works at an office | No |
| Violet | 22.4.2015 | Zambian | F/40 | University student | No |
| Farnod | 23.4.2015 | Iranian | M/39 | Land surveyor | Didn't have a vote. |
| Mary | 23.4.2015 | Kenyan | F/46 | Works in | No |

| | | | | | housing | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stefania | 24.4.2015 | Polish | F/32 | College student | No |
| Catherine | 30.4.2015 | Nigerian | F/32 | University student | Didn't vote but would have voted no. |
| Towela | 1.5.2015 | Zambian | F/19 | College student | Didn't vote. |
| Murtaza | 21.5.2015 | Scottish-Pakistani | M/39 | Stay-at-home dad. | Yes. |
| Padma | 5.6.2015 | Indian | F/36 | Works in the third sector. | Didn't vote. |
| Rahul | 6.8.2015 | Scottish-Indian | M/28 | University student | No |
| Ahsan | 7.9.2015 | Pakistani | M/38 | Works in a shop; drives a cab; studies. | Didn't disclose. |

## Practitioners

| Code | Date of interview | Gender | Role in organsation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Practitioner 1 | 8.8.2014 | Male | CEO |
| Practitioner 2 | 8.8.2014 | Female | Policy officer |
| Practitioner 3 | 20.8.2014 | Male | CEO |
| Practitioner 4 | 26.8.2014 | Male | Race equality mainstreaming officer |
| Practitioner 5 | 8.9.2014 | Male | Policy officer |

APPENDIX VI

Details of SNP speeches analysed

**FM Launch of National Conversation White Paper (30/11/2009)**
Available at: http://www.gov.scot/News/Speeches/Speeches/First-Minister/whitepaper [Accessed 18/3/2015]

**FM Alex Salmond: Scotland's Place in the World (25/01/2012)**
Available at: https://www.snp.org/speech/2012/jan/scotlands-place-world [Accessed 4/9/2014]

**DFM Nicola Sturgeon: Claim of Right (26/1/2012)**
Available at: http://www.snp.org/speech/2012/jan/claim-right [Accessed 18/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond gives his Spring Conference address (23/3/2013)**
http://snp.org/speech/2013/mar/first-minister-alex-salmond-gives-his-spring-conference-2013-address [Accessed 9/4/2014]

**DFM Nicola Sturgeon: Spring Conference address (23/3/2013)**
Available at: https://www.snp.org/speech/2013/mar/nicola-sturgeon-msp-spring-conference-address-2013 [Accessed 4/9/2014]

**Fiona Hyslop (Culture Secretary): Past, Present & Future: Culture & Heritage in an Independent Scotland (5/6/2013)**
Available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Culture-Heritage 05062013 [Accessed 1/5/2015]

**Fiona Hyslop (Cabinet Secretary for Culture and External Affairs) Speech to the Descendants of the Signers of the (US) Declaration of Independence (4/7/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Speech-to-the-Descendants-of-the-Signers-of-the-US-Declaration-of-Independence-e.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: The Currency Union (16/7/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-Currency-Union-523.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: Defence Union through NATO (25/7/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Defence-Union-through-NATO-524.aspx  [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: The European Union (21/8/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/The-European-Union-527.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: Social Union and the Union of the Crowns (28/8/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Social-Union-and-the-Union-of-the-Crowns-529.aspx [Accessed 3/10/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: Independence from the Political and Economic Union (2/9/2013)**

Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Independence-from-the-Political-and-Economic-Union-52d.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond - Scotland and China: Wealth and Wellbeing of Nations (5/11/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Scotland-and-China-Wealth-and-Wellbeing-of-Nations-5dd.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond - Scotland and China: Wealth and Wellbeing of Nations (5/11/2013)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Scotland-and-China-Wealth-and-Wellbeing-of-Nations-5dd.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond speech to the FT International Financial Centers (7/11/2013)**
Available at:
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-s-speech-to-the-FT-International-Financial-Centers-5eb.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2016]

**FM Alex Salmond speech to the FT International Financial Centers (7/11/2013)**
Available at:
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-s-speech-to-the-FT-International-Financial-Centers-5eb.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2016]

**DFM Nicola Sturgeon - speech to the Institute of Charted Accountants of Scotland (22/11/2013)**
Available at:
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Speech-to-the-Institute-of-Chartered-Accountants-of-Scotland-697.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2016]

**DFM Nicola Sturgeon's speech to the David Hume Institute (15/1/2014)**
Available at:
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Keynote-speech-to-the-David-Hume-Institute-848.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2016]

**FM Alex Salmond Business for Scotland speech (17/2/2014)**
Available at: http://www.news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-Speech-February-17-2014-95a.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: 'Scotland's Future in Scotland's Hands' (New Statesman Lecture in London) (4/3/2014)**
Available at: http://www.news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-New-Stesman-lecture-a0f.aspx [Accessed 10/3/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond speech at Bannockburn visitor centre (28/3/2014)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Fisrt-Minister-speech-at-Bannockburn-visitor-centre-a1b.aspx [Accessed 22/4/2014]

**Fiona Hyslop (External Affairs Secretary): What Perspectives for an Independent Scotland? (3/4/2014)**
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/-What-perspectives-for-an-independent-Scotland-b1f.aspx [Accessed 16/9/2016]

**FM Alex Salmond speech at Glasgow Caledonian University (New York Campus) (7/4/2014)**
Available at:
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/Alex-Salmond-in-New-York-Glasgow-Caledonian-Univeristy-Speech-April-7-2014-b45.aspx [Accessed22/4/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond's SNP Conference address (12/4/2014)**
Available at: http://www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2014/apr/first-ministe-alex-salmond-snp-conference-address  [Accessed 27/5/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond's Speech to the Scottish Trades Union Congress (15/4/2014)**
Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-speech-to-2014-Scottish-Trades-Union-Congress-b86.aspx [Accessed 16/7/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond's George's Day Speech (23/4/2014)**
Available at: : http://news.scotland.gov.uk/Speeches-Briefings/First-Minister-St-George-s-Day-2014-speech-bbf.aspx[Accessed 16/7/2014]

**FM Alex Salmond: Scotland's Place in Europe (28/4/2014)**
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