IMAGES OF GERMANY

A theory-based approach to the
classification, analysis, and critique of
British attitudes towards Germany:
1890-1940

VOLUME ONE

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ABSTRACT

The thesis attempts to set sources broadly representative of the range of British attitudes to Germany and the Germans - from Spender, Low, Maxse and Dillon, to Rowse, Namier, Vansittart, Gollancz and Barraclough - in a framework informed by multidisciplinary theory. There are five main themes: the classification of attitudes; the analysis of content; the identification of a relatively constant British self-image; the potential for attitudinal dilemmas and cognitive dissonance inherent in that self-image; national character as a concept and as a descriptor. Although dealt with in this order the themes interrelate. For example, the first phase of content analysis [chapters 4 to 8], where the emphasis is on the way in which sources differ, anticipates the discussion in chapter 10 of the differences in their approaches to the modal distribution of cultural and individual characteristics in Germany; the classificatory model proposed as an alternative to the Idealist-Realist dichotomy in chapter 2 [and 'tested' in a brief case study in chapter 3] is consistent with the definition of the self-image and facilitates discussion on cognitive dissonance.

It is proposed that a classificatory system based on an

Idealist-Realist dichotomy with respective pro and anti-German sub-sets does not adequately highlight the nuances and ambiguities which often informed group or individual attitudes toward Germany. It is argued that such a system cannot readily deal with the views of realists who were ideologically neutral [i.e. not _ideologically_ anti-German] in their definition of Germany as the enemy, of idealists who were ideologically _opposed_ to Germany, or of others who were equivocal. An alternative model is offered in the form of partially congruent parallel continuums of competition and cooperation, travelling in opposite directions in relation to respective minimum and maximum positions.

In chapters 4 to 8 the content analysis of sources focuses on their different perceptions of Germany and the Germans: whether they made distinctions between Germans - and what form such distinctions took - or regarded them as 'all of a kind.' It is argued that underlying expressed attitudes to Germany and the Germans from the British side was a notion of _self_, incorporating two main components: a _pragmatic_ component defining Britain as a material competitor in a competitive world, and an _ideological_ component defining a package of traits and values associated with the cultural condition 'being British.' The ideological component of the self-image was commonly validated and served as an assessment instrument for making judgements on Germans. It is argued that the

intellectual and psychological need to maintain a consistent relationship between expressed attitudes and declared values, particularly when the values were central to the self-image, led to the use of dissonance reducing mechanisms.

The ways in which one national culture may reasonably be said to differ from another, and the methodological requirements for tenable cross-cultural analysis, are explored through critical consideration of the concept 'national character.' A theoretical framework is devised for the critical analysis of the views presented by the sources on the national character of the Germans. This framework relates their perception of modal structure [unimodal, bimodal, multimodal] to their level of commitment - positive or negative - to propositions on cultural homogeneity, differential sharing, the causal autonomy of situational factors, the significance of international cultural influences, the innate nature of characteristics, and concern for methodological rigour. An image of the configurations and features in the German cultural profile is formulated. Recognition of the partial and provisional nature of this image, and discussion of what it omits and lacks in terms of texture, is used to demonstrate the deficiencies of the Schwarzweissmalerei approach to Germany and the Germans.

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

ORIGINS AND PURPOSES

The form and content of this thesis have their origins in the convergence, over a period of 20 years, of a number of personal interests and professional imperatives. First degree studies at the University of Glasgow stimulated a long-standing interest in German history, language and literature, and in multidisciplinary approaches - theoretical and conceptual - to an understanding of the past. Those interests were reinforced by reflection on the various images of Germany and the Germans to be found in the work of British historians and other writers, particularly since some of the images appeared to have achieved a longevity which was resistant to changing circumstances. The variety and ubiquity of British images of Germany led in turn to curiosity about the British self-image that might underlie them and to an attempt to identify that self-image, initially through analysis of feature films.[1] Professionally, involvement in curriculum development called for response to particular problems. The design, implementation and evaluation of teaching materials intended to develop or advance the critical thinking capacities of low achieving school leavers depended upon the construction of attitude tests for experimental and control groups. The pre and post-teaching tests carried out in schools in the Strathclyde Region, 1970-72 and 1980-82, supported the hypothesis that 'history teaching which places an emphasis on procedural skills is accompanied by a greater reduction in the incidence of evaluative generalisations about national, racial,

and religious groups than occurs in pupils not so taught,' but also provided interesting confirmation of the resilience of national stereotypes.[2] These separate experiences come together in the thesis.

Images of Germany and the Germans have rarely been peripheral features of the British 'view of the world' in the twentieth century. It is likely that more has been written about the Germans - their behaviour, past or anticipated, and their 'character' - than about any other modern national group.[3] There has certainly been a "proliferation of theories" designed either to sustain or to challenge particular perceptions of the Germans.[4] J. H. Morgan's prefatory note [1915] to his annotated translation of _Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege,_ informed the reader that "the temperament of the German is saturated with... belligerent emotion and everyone who is not with him is against him."[5] In March 1990, the reflections of the Foreign Correspondent of the _Daily Express_ on developments which had culminated in the opening of the border between East and West Berlin were published under the title: 'I just wish I could trust the United Germans.' Although convinced that there was "a policeman in every one of them", the correspondent wondered if she should saddle the Germans of 1990 with the crimes of their forefathers; was it really fair to assume that "every one of them has jackboots under the bed, and brown shirts at the back

of the wardrobe?" She concluded:

"Germans, I love your country. I love your art, literature and theatre. I have many very good, close German friends. Why do you make me not trust you?"[6]

With modifications to take account of advances in psychological theory, J. A. Cramb's view, published posthumously in 1914, that "the enmity of England and Germany is like one of those springs that rise from the nether deep; the more you try to fill them up the wider they become", reappeared in 1990 as commentators sought to account for the perceptions of Germany and the Germans held by Nicholas Ridley, and the tenor of the minuted discussion at Chequers.[7]

There was a time when Shelley's attitude to the Germans - "die widerwärtigen Deutschen" - was idiosyncratic rather than widely held. Britain and Germany had never been at war with each other; the respective peoples had strong dynastic, cultural, religious, and economic connections. But then to German military power there was added dramatic industrial development, imperial claims, naval ambitions, and a sense of mission.[8] "A new cock in the barn-yard", wrote Price Collier [1913], "is never received with great cordiality." He summed up the

material and psychological impact on Britain of her relative
decline:

> "When a nation for more than a hundred years has been
> quite comfortably safe from any fear of attack because she
> has been easily first in commerce, wealth, industry, and
> in sea power, it comes as a shock, even to a phlegmatic
> people, to learn that they are being rapidly overtaken
> commercially, financially, industrially, and as a fighting
> force on the sea; and all this within a few years."[9]

One of the many legacies of the First World War was a canon of
stereotypes about Germany and the Germans. The short interlude
between that experience and the rise of Nazi Germany was far too
short for remediation – although an attempt <u>was</u> made – and the
nature of the Nazi regime and what it led to, the mark it made
on the world, reified the stereotypes and in a sense
"boobytrapped" the future.[10]   Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest that
reification is facilitated by a process of restocking,
generation to generation. And the stereotypes, sometimes nicely
implicit, perhaps even non-conscious, can find their way into
learned reviews. Michael Howard's impression of Paul Kennedy's
analysis of <u>The Rise of The Anglo-German Antagonism</u> was that

> "If his erudition is <u>Teutonic</u>, his writing is in the best

FIGURE [1]   LICKERT TEST RESPONSES OF A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 'THINKING THROUGH HISTORY' PUPILS TO A STATEMENT ABOUT GERMANS.

PUPIL NUMBER	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DON'T KNOW	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
1				✓	
2					✓
3	✓				
4					✓
5					✓
6				✓	
7	✓				
8	✓				
9	✓				
10	✓				

THE GERMANS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN OTHER PEOPLE TO BULLY OTHERS TO GET THEIR OWN WAY.

FIGURE [2]   THE SENTENCE COMPLETION RESPONSES OF A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 'THINKING THROUGH HISTORY' PUPILS.

THE GERMANS, WHO LIVE IN GERMANY, ARE

1.	BOSSEY THEY THINK THEY RULE THE WORLD.
2.	I DONT HAVE ANY POINTS OF VIEW.
3.	NATZIS.
4.	PEACELOVING. AFTER WORLD WAR II THEY HAVE BECOME VERY CLEAN AND DONT DROP LITTER.
5.	NEAT, TIDY, LIKEABLE, EFFICIENT AND HARD WORKERS. THEY ALSO HAVE CONSIDERATION FOR OTHERS.
6.	EXTREMELY WELL MANNERED AND CLEAN BUT CAN SOMETIMES BE ARROGANT
7.	A VICIOUS, BAD TEMPERED AND CLEVER NATION OF PEOPLE WHO LIKE EVERYTHING THEIR OWN WAY.
8.	PEOPLE WHO USED OR AS SOME OF THEM STILL DO ARE A NATIONALITY WHO LIKE POWER.
9.	PEOPLE WHO LIKE TO BE TIDY AND WOULD LOVE TO RULE THE WORLD AND TRIED TO WIPE OUT THE JEWS.
10.	NOISY AND ALWAYS SHOUTING AT EACH OTHER.

FIGURE [3]   THE INCIDENCE OF UNFAVOURABLE/FAVOURABLE STEREOTYPES IN THE REPERTORY
GRID RETURNS OF A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 'THINKING THROUGH HISTORY' PUPILS.

STEREOTYPE	NUMBER OF TIMES SELECTED	NUMBER OF NIL RESPONSES	NUMBER OF COUNTER GENERALISATIONS	NUMBER OF RESERVED JUDGEMENTS	TOTAL
VERY CLEAN/ CLEAN	7	1		2	10
VERY HARDWORKING/ HARDWORKING	8		1	1	10
VERY BAD TEMPERED/ BADTEMPERED	5	1	1	3	10
VERY BOASTFUL/ BOASTFUL	4	1	2	3	10
VERY RUDE/ RUDE	4	1	4	1	10
VERY CRUEL/ CRUEL	6	1		3	10
VERY WARLIKE/ WARLIKE	6		2	2	10
VERY MEAN/ MEAN	6		2	2	10
VERY BRAVE/ BRAVE	9			1	10
VERY UNFRIENDLY/ UNFRIENDLY	4		3	3	10
VERY SERIOUS/ SERIOUS	7	1		2	10
VERY DISHONEST/ DISHONEST	4	1	2	3	10

style of <u>British</u> historiography; <u>lively,</u> informative, and witty, as well as authoritative. It is a deeply <u>humane</u> book in the very best sense of the word."[11]

Occasionally, they are put to use in support of a particular socio-political point of view. In September 1988 the Annual Conference of the British Association for the Advancement of Science was warned that

> "The seeds of the Nazi Holocaust may have been sown 100 years ago by German parents who brought their children up too strictly", and "a return to Victorian values could result in a nation of Nazis."

Hitler had been able to

> "Command the allegiance of millions who had been raised on child-care manuals based on mental cruelty... They were trained to be obedient so successfully, and at such an early age, that the training never lost its effectiveness."[12]

In the immediate aftermath of the 'Ridley Affair' newspapers were eager to publish public perceptions of German characteristics. Mori revealed that of 606 adults participating

in telephone interviews on Friday 13 July, 1990, the Germans were considered aggressive by 60%, arrogant by 75% and tolerant by 37%. It appeared that

"... too many rainy afternoons watching old war films, or perhaps more recent battles for the beaches in Mediterranean holiday resorts, still condition British attitudes to the German character."[13]

Consideration of British attitudes to Germany and the Germans may not be as unproductive an enterprise as the mere passage of time would suggest.

Using sources broadly representative of the range of British attitudes towards Germany and the Germans, the thesis attempts to address five main and interrelating themes: the appropriateness of an idealist-realist dichotomy as a means for classifying attitudes, a comparative analysis of the content of the sources, the extent to which a British self-image not only lay behind attitudes to Germany but also had a profound influence on those attitudes, the significance for individual sources of the strain towards consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves, and the issue of national character both as a concept and in its applications as a descriptor. Themes 1 to 3 are covered in volume one and

themes 4 and 5 in volume two.

The popular idealist-realist dichotomy, with its general tendency to define respective pro and anti-German sub-sets, is accepted as a means for bringing extensive and complex data into order and allowing for the comparison of one category with the other. Such a dichotomy adequately classifies the attitudes of a number of sources, particularly at the extremes where ambiguity is less of a problem, and is certainly useful in the identification of stereotypical positions such as 'peace-cranks' or 'warmongers' assigned by one side to the other. It is argued, however, that the idealist-realist dichotomy provides an unreliable guide to the identification of pro and anti-German attitudes, that it does not easily embrace the nuances and multifaceted perceptions involved in many attitudes, and that it does not provide a reliable model for the accurate placement of attitudes on a continuum. Further, in its general tendency to identify respective pro and anti-German sub-sets carrying connotations of favour and blame, it takes little account of the paradox that ideologically neutral positions could define Germany as the enemy. The proposition is advanced that relationships between states tend to occur within the ambiguous context of competition and cooperation, and an alternative model is constructed on that basis. It is suggested that a competition-cooperation model can embrace all attitudinal

positions towards Germany - mixed and ambiguous as well as unequivocal - that it allows for greater flexibility in the definition of pro and anti-German sub-sets, and leads to consideration of a whole cluster of associated concepts and constructs such as aggression, frustration, international culture, reciprocity, partnership, and equity.

Through comparative analysis of the content of sources, answers are sought to questions such as: how do they differ? - to what extent are distinctions made between Germans as opposed to the application of blanket judgements? - what type of distinctions are made? - to what extent is a British self-image involved, explicitly or implicitly and, if involved, to what extent is it used as an instrument for assessing Germany and the Germans? It is argued that the British self-image was dualistic, incorporating on the one hand the perception of Britain as a material entity with pragmatic interests which had to be defended against rivals, and on the other hand an ideological construct subsuming a set of intermeshing traits and values. To what extent does examination of the sources suggest that there was common validation of the ideological component of the self-image? Did common validation produce common attitudes? What happens when the self-image is projected outwards? What attitudinal differences are likely to arise when the image 'fits' or does not 'fit' the object towards which it is

projected?

The assumption that there is a strain towards consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves is discussed critically. Sources which used the British self-image as an instrument for assessing Germany and the Germans are examined to determine the extent to which the self-image sympathetically informed those judgements. It is argued that the use of mechanisms to maximise the internal consistency of the cognitive system and so reduce psychological discomfort can be detected in a number of sources. [14]

A tentative approach is made to the concept of national character. The views of Mazlish [1968] and Stearns [1970] are countered on the grounds that national character profiles can be built up, subject to stringent theoretical and methodological principles. [15] An analytical framework is constructed for the comparative analysis of the versions of German national character contained in the sources. Consideration is given to the incidence with which the sources assign traits and characteristics such as authoritarianism and sado-masochistic personality structures to the Germans. The validity of such ascriptions is tested by reflection on the historical record and by critical analysis of more formal expressions of theory, particularly those of Erich Fromm and Milton Rokeach. A <u>draft</u>

German cultural profile is formulated, with the caveat that it is partial and provisional. It is suggested that the deficiencies of views on German national character may be calculated by the extent to which they either regard the formulation as adequately descriptive of actual cultural and personality configurations, or go beyond it to consideration of a number of important issues such as multidimensional approaches to legitimacy, the possibility that conformity may conceal a wide variety of attitudes and motives, the relative weight to be assigned in different situations and at different times to instrumental and consummatory values, and what might be described as the generalised, non-culture specific and non-heroic nature of the human condition in modern society.

In the chapters that follow theories and concepts from a number of disciplines are enlisted both as analytical tools and as aids to an understanding of the past. When historians seek explanations they are concerned with two main variables, the characteristics of the historical agents and the situations to which they are responding. There is something of an imbalance in work which does not give serious consideration to both. To do this, however, requires 'trespass' into the territory of other disciplines, predicated upon the assumption that human affairs are so complex that the historian, qua historian, is not the only one capable of saying something meaningful about them. [16]

Consideration of sources broadly representative of the range of
British attitudes to Germany and the Germans required the
application of sociological concepts and theoretical constructs.
It was not possible to ignore the fact that particular
perceptions of German culture - in the shape of patterned
conditions of life and generalised modes of conduct - figure
prominently in these sources. It would have been impossible to
construct a meaningful framework for the critical analysis of
attitudes to authority or of views on national character without
calling on theory.[17] Posing the question - to what extent and
in what forms did the sources infer dynamic personality
structures from behavioural regularities? - requires that
attention be given to the theoretical constructs from the fields
of individual and social psychology and psychoanalysis. In view
of what might be regarded as a traditional wariness on the part
of historians toward such approaches, it is important that the
reader have a clear indication of the explanatory status
accorded here to such theories.

Historians have been rightly concerned about "... wild and vague
pattern-makers, often entirely lacking the historical attitude
and only too rarely showing intellectual humility"; about the
tendency in many 'social science' texts to communicate through
the medium of "a barbarous jargon and a self-made vocabulary
more liable to obscure thought than to express it."[18] The

analogy of the inverted triangle may be used to describe the historian's reservations in face of psychological and psychoanalytic theories: extensive speculation about the motivations and personality structures of large numbers of people taken collectively rests on a very narrow evidential base derived from the study of a limited number of individuals. Speculation about the behaviour of historical agents at its non-conscious and non-rational levels is seen as less than satisfactory when the subjects "can neither affirm, deny, aid, nor obscure [the] analysis by responding to it..."[19] It was the fact that psychoanalytic theories were not subject to refutability, that they could always be made to fit the phenomena they were attempting to explain, always seemed to be confirmed, always produced an "incessant stream of verifications" that worried Popper [1957].[20] It is to be expected that historians will baulk at the simplistic notion that large numbers of Germans could be identified as having sado-masochistic personality structures because (i) they were enthusiastic about a leader who had such a personality structure and (ii) leaders appeal to the led because there is a necessary identity between the personalities of those who follow and those who lead. No less unexpected is the historian's rejection of the idea that there is no qualitative difference between the normal and the abnormal personality.[21] Perhaps the most untenable assumption, from the historian's point of view, is

that which regards the context in which historical agents find themselves, and all the environmental variables associated with that context, as "subsidiary to the residual factors of childhood experience", factors which are uncovered, in Allport's words, "by the art of deep-sea diving."[22] Reich [1961] made a standard statement on these lines:

"The typical authoritarian German family, particularly in the country and small town, bred Fascist mentality by the million. This family created in the children a structure characterised by compulsive duty, renunciation and absolute obedience to authority which Hitler knew so splendidly how to exploit."[23]

Apart from its neglect of the variability in personality development among the members of one family ['the same fire that melts the butter hardens the egg'] to say nothing of variability between families, how does such a statement unqualified and unrevised, help to explain attitudes to authority in the Weimar Republic?

Notwithstanding the reasonableness of such objections, there are weaknesses in the case which would argue for the exclusion of multidisciplinary theory from historical studies. It is not at all certain that the historian's interpretations meet the

requirement of refutability any better in real terms than other propositions about human experience. Criticism, however savage, directed by one historian at another is not quite like refutation in, say, chemistry. There is more of the 'alleged' about refutation in history. As an argument without end and a process of creation, doubt and uncertainty are in the nature of history. Historians infer cognitive and emotional states from the behaviour, and outcomes of the behaviour of historical agents. These inferences, essentially acts of imagination however controlled, are not really open to refutation because the activity which produced them [involving the conjunction of data and personal mental processes] is individual and unique and as such not freely reproducible by others. And the historian's subjects are, by and large, no more able to affirm, deny, aid, or obscure <u>his</u> inferences than they are those of the psychoanalyst. There is also the matter of double standards. The brief statement made above in criticism of Reich has its roots in <u>theory</u> from disciplines other than history. If, as Langer argued, historians "have habitually thought of themselves as psychologists in their own right",[24] it seems odd that the theory which gives substantive meaning to such an activity should ever be disdained. Even a 'common-sense' grasp of psychological principles depends on the fact that a body of theory exists. If history may be regarded as 'the study of culture at a distance', it is difficult to ignore the cognate

hypotheses and explanatory constructs of sociology.

A matter relating to presentation should be explained. Since content analysis - albeit at varying levels of refinement - was involved and since interdisciplinary terrain was being traversed, it was decided in the interests of verification that, consistent with the coherent development of argument, sources should be allowed to speak for themselves.

REFERENCES

1. For example, The Prime Minister [1940] directed by Thorold
   Dickinson and starring John Gielgud and Stephen Murray.
   At the Congress of Berlin, 1878, Disraeli refuses to be
   bullied by Bismarck. He threatens to leave Berlin at 9.00
   pm if the issue - withdrawal of Russian troops - is not
   resolved. At dinner, Bismarck brings the conversation
   round to Shakespeare:

   Bismarck: "I don't agree with my colleague that Shakespeare
             was German. Think of it, 'to be, or not to be?'
             How indecisive!"

   Disraeli: "How British!"

   Consideration of what the phrase 'to be, or not to be?'
   means in terms of process throws up concepts such as
   debate, doubt, consideration of options. The British
   self-image is one which subsumes tolerance, rational
   consideration of different points of view.

   Note also Went the Day Well [1942] directed by Alberto
   Cavalcanti and starring Leslie Banks, Frank Lawton,
   Elizabeth Allen, Basil Sidney, Marie Lohr and David Farrar.
   The British self-image is revealed in an interesting way.
   Invading German soldiers pretend to belong to a British
   unit, and as far as they can, attempt to demonstrate
   British characteristics. The German commanding officer
   visits the vicarage. His manner is diffident, pleasant,
   and 'requesting'. Every politeness is observed with
   apparent sincerity. He is devastated to think that he
   might have interrupted the vicar at breakfast. He lifts a
   cat from a chair, speaks to it, strokes it, and sets it on

his lap - instead of sitting on it! He is not interested in his own billeting arrangements until those of his men have been seen to. He is, in sum, friendly, sincere, considerate, thoughtful and caring of others. The pretence cannot last, however, and the Germans soon reveal their true colours, and in doing so point up the characteristics of the British. A village youth lifts the cover of a tarpaulin on a lorry and sees a field radio. He is grabbed by a soldier and has his ear twisted savagely. The post-mistress intervenes: "You great big brute you... You're a disgrace to your uniform... why, you're no better than a German, that's what you are."

It is possible to identify references to the British self-image in comedy. Note, for example, Let George Do It [1940] directed by Marcel Varnel and starring George Formby, Phyllis Calvert, Gary Marsh and Torin Thatcher. A British intelligence agent, using the cover of a musician, has been murdered by Nazi spies. Formby, in the role of innocent ukulele player, is mistakenly enlisted as a substitute. In a dream sequence he rescues Phyllis Calvert from the Nazis and goes to heaven - only to be told that he cannot get in unless he captures the Ace of Knaves [Hitler]. Formby flies to Germany on a barrage balloon, climbs down a rope, and halts a Nuremburg type rally by 'socking' Hitler on the chin. The interesting thing is that Hitler's henchman, after the fashion of the witch's guards in The Wizard of Oz [made one year earlier in 1939] applaud George for rescuing them from slavery. George and the henchman dance and shake hands. The British do not hold grudges and they do not make wholesale condemnations.

2. See D. MacIntyre and J. E. McIntyre, Thinking Through History [Blackie, Glasgow 1972]; D. MacIntyre, "Thinking Through History: A skills-based Approach", History Teaching Review, 9, 2, October 1977, pp.17-20; D. MacIntyre, "History and the Non-Academic Pupil: An Approach to Curriculum Development", Bulletin of the Scottish Centre For Social Subjects, No.3, December 1973.

3. See Alex. Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, National Character: The study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems, in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson [eds], The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol.IV, 2nd Edition [Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1969], p.484.

4. See Milton Mayer, They Thought They Were Free [London: University of Chicago Press, 1955], pp.243-244.

5. J. H. Morgan [trans.] The German War Book: Being 'The Usages of War on Land', issued by the Great General Staff of the German Army. [London: John Murray, 1915], p.XIV.

6. Kate du Pont, "I Just Wish I Could Love The United Germans." Daily Express, Tuesday, March 20, 1990, p.9.

7. J. A. Cramb, Germany and England [London: John Murray, 1914] p.108. The Spectator published an interview with Nicholas Ridley, Thursday, 12 July, 1990. The Independent on Sunday, 15 July, 1990, published the minute of a discussion held at Chequers on March 24, 1990. Participants in the discussion were Prime Minister Thatcher; Douglas Hurd, The Foreign Secretary; Lord Dacre [Hugh Trevor-Roper]; The Journalist Tim Garton Ash; Norman Stone, Professor of Modern History, University of Oxford; George Urban, formerly Director of Research at Radio Free Europe; Fritz Stern, Professor of History at Columbia University; Gordon Craig, Professor of History at Harvard University. The minute was written by Charles Powell, Mrs Thatcher's Private Secretary.

"We started by talking about the Germans themselves and
their characteristics... Their insensitivity to the
feelings of others... Their obsession with themselves, a
strong inclination to self-pity, and a longing to be
liked... angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying,
egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality... a capacity
for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the traces... a
tendency to over-estimate their own strengths and
capabilities... There was a strong school of thought among
those present that today's Germans were very different from
their predecessors. This view was not accepted by
everyone... If it had happened once, could it not
happen again?... the way in which Germans currently
used their elbows and throw their weight about in the
European Community suggested that a lot had still not
changed... the effects on the character of a united
Germany of bringing in 17 million predominantly Protestant
north Germans... How would this alter the basically
Catholic Rhineland basis of the post-war FRG, with its
political and economic centre of gravity increasingly with
south and west?" The views expressed in this discussion,
the list of 'characteristics', the regional distinctions
between north and west, north and south, could be regarded
as regurgitations from the period 1890-1940.

8. See Thomas F. A. Smith, The Soul of Germany [London:
    Hutchinson 1916] p.104; Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the
    Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914. [London: George Allen
    & Unwin, 1980], p.464; Zara S. Steiner, "British Foreign
    Office Attitudes Toward Germany, 1905-19." Paper to the
    Anglo-German Group of Historians, September 1973:
    "Basically the problem arose from the development of a

new and powerful state in the centre of Europe with ambitions which went beyond the frontiers established under Bismarck." p.1.

9. Price Collier, Germany and The Germans, [London: Duckworth, 1913], pp.562, 531.

10. See Mark Frankland, "Hitler's Boobytrap Explodes".
Observer, Sunday, 20 November, 1988. Vansittart, in
Roots of The Trouble [London: Hutchinson & Co., 1941], p.11
"All the miseries of the world's last three generations
have issued from the German land and the German soul."
Karl Robson, Germany. [News Chronicle Publications, 1951],
p.2: "Can the Germans, with their deeply ingrained
tradition of dictatorship and conquest by war, develop into
good democrats and potential allies?"
G. P. Gooch, Historical Surveys and Portraits [London:
Longmans, 1966], p.68: "Long after the fiercest passions of
the struggle with the Nazi revolutionaries have cooled, the
memory of their fiendish atrocities will cast a shadow over
the German name."

11. Michael Howard, Sunday Times, 25 January 1981.

12. Alan MacDermid, "Psychiatrist Lays blame for the Holocaust
on German Parents", Glasgow Herald, 8 September, 1988.

13. Sunday Times, 15 July, 1990.

14. The types of inconsistency resolution discussed in Chapter
8 include the form used by Ramsay MacDonald in response to
Nazi Germany. "For those who accepted the liberal ethos...
the dilemma was... painful. They detested Nazism, but
could not suppress an uneasy awareness that the Nazis might
never have come to power if Germany had been treated less
harshly in 1919... When he [Hitler] denounced the
inequities of the peace treaty and insisted that Germany
should be given parity with the wartime allies, they had no
satisfactory reply. By the same token, they were not

prepared to... rely on force... Reliance on force, they believed, bred war... The dilemma was specially painful for MacDonald... For him... force was an 'ugly brute beast'..." David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald [Jonathan Cape, 1977], pp.749, 751. The dilemma was resolved and consistency maintained by the mechanism of transcendence. [see Chapter 8]: "It is not God but the Devil who is in charge of the international situation and those who are working for God in it are poor servants if all they do is to worship God and neglect their duty to circumvent the Devil." Ramsay MacDonald to Helen Roberton, 1934, quoted ibid., pp.750-751.

15. Bruce Mazlish, 'Group Psychology and Problems of Contemporary History', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.3, Number 2, April 1968, p.168, argued that concepts such as 'authoritarian personality' were interesting, but unable to throw much light on the phenomena of contemporary history, because such traits have existed for a long time and to use them is "like trying to explain culture by climate, when the climate has stayed the same for centuries." Although it may be true that similar motivations have obtained for a long time it is the mixture [to maintain the meteorological analogy] of high and low pressure, the particular combination of isobars - in short, the weather - that is important at any given point in time. Peter N. Stearns 'National Character and European Labour History', Journal of Social History, Vol.4, Number 2, 1970, p.123 accepted that the idea of National Character was deeply embedded and would be difficult to dislodge, but recommended that "it at least be suspended" because so many "presumed national features collapse when subjected to any comparison."

16. See Tacott Parsons, General Theory in Sociology, in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects [New York: Harper 1965], p.37: "...good general theory in the field of human action, no matter how firmly grounded in one discipline, is inevitably interdisciplinary theory."

17. See Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., p.418: "The ancient problem of national character stands at the interface of individual psychology... and the social sciences... it requires a crossing or transcending of disciplinary boundaries..."

18. David Thomson, The Aims of History, [London: Thames & Hudson, 1969], pp.79, 82.

19. E. J. Hundert, 'History, Psychology, and the Study of Deviant Behaviour.' The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.11, 4, Spring 1972, p.459.

20. Karl Popper, Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report, in C. A. Mace (ed.). British Philosophy in Mid-Century [New York: 1957], p.159, and note ibid., p.158: "It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their greatest weakness."

21. This issue is discussed in Chapter 10 in the context of a criticism of Erich Fromm's theories. But note also Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation [London: Constable and Company, 1949], p.13, who argued that odd conjunctions arose when psychoanalytic principles were applied to healthy mental processes: "... balance is interpreted in the same way as lack of balance; the sane are represented by the insane. The view that normality may be studied through the lens of abnormality is remarkably common, but is none the less debatable."

22. Allport, ibid., p.13, also, for criticism of the

ontogenetic approach: "...the bulk of personal motives and traits which comprise the individual are not, as psychoanalysis claims, necessarily rooted in the unconscious. They cannot all be understood simply by the art of deep-sea diving. Even where links are correctly traced between present trends and the experiences of childhood, they have often been so long rusted and broken that they are not, as analysis maintain, the bonds in the present structure of an individual's life; in neurotics perhaps, but in most people, no. Traits and interests, like plants, are capable of casting aside the shell of the seed from which they grew. Their direction of growth is upward into the future, and not downward into the past. In short, conscious motives and manifest behaviour are of as great significance as are repressed motives and latent dispositions." See also Peter Blos, 'The Epigenesis of the Adult Neurosis', in Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 27, 1972: "...there is no rigid causal chain between an infantile trauma and a later neurotic illness. The adaptive outcome, whether neurotic or healthy, if it is traced along a developmental continuum, cannot remain identical throughout and therefore cannot be regarded as unchanging or unchangeable." p.111. See also Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, 'The Coming Crisis in Psychohistory, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.47, Number 2, 1975, p.219. "The pervasiveness of ontogenetic propositions in psychoanalysis has constantly directed attention away from problems of realistic interaction between the individual and society. These propositions also give the impression of an inevitability ... which is belied by the complex nature of the social world."

23. Wilhelm Reich, _The Discovery of The Orgone: Vol.1, The Function of the Orgasm, sex-economic Problems of Biological Energy._ Trans. T. P. Wolfe [New York: 1961], pp.217-218.

24. William L. Langer, 'The Next Assignment' in Bruce Mazlish, (ed.), _Psychoanalysis and History_ [Englewood Cliffs, 1963], p.89.

PART 2

THE CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY

CHAPTER 2

A CRITICISM OF THE IDEALIST - REALIST DICHOTOMY AND THE DEFINITION OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL.

Paul M. Kennedy (1975) has suggested a conceptual framework, in the form of an Idealist-Realist dichotomy, within which attitudes toward Germany can be analysed and classified.[1] In summary, the argument which he develops is that idealists had a view of Anglo-German relations which was coloured by their commitment to the principle of "the brotherhood of man". Tensions and disputes could be removed by the salves of arbitration and conciliation. The world was big enough to accommodate the interests of both states. Realists on the other hand dealt in "...cold hard facts...".[2] And those facts proclaimed that Britain and Germany were locked in a Machtkampf. National self-interest had to take precedence over utopian visions of international morality and goodwill. Idealists derived their views from a perception of the world as it should be. The arguments of realists were derived from a perception of the world as it was. Idealists were of an optimistic and realists of a pessimistic frame of mind. The former, unlike the latter, were prepared to make a distinction between nation and government when dealing with the problem of Germany. Those "...general ideological standpoints..."[3], argues Kennedy, were at the roots of Germanophile and Germanophobe attitudes, so that "...during the greater part of the period under discussion, pro-Germans and anti-Germans corresponded to a very large degree with idealists and realists respectively."[4]

Kennedy's model gives form to extensive and complex data. For example, it helps to clarify the distinction between two ideological positions which appeared in the same volume of Fortnightly Review in 1918.[5] In an article, "The Greater Community"[6], Mona Caird made a plea for the cultivation of "...understanding and goodwill between people of different nationality."[7] The Allies should not be motivated by a desire to exact vengeance, for "...it would surely be preposterous if [they] were to treat the whole German people, without possibility of proof, as uncoerced accomplices in the savageries of their rulers..."[8] Her faith in the brotherhood of man was undiminished by four years of war. "The feeling of human comradeship comes out if it has the ghost of a chance. Our business is to give it a very robust and able-bodied chance."[9] Frederic Harrison took a quite different view.[10] In response to those who envisaged Germany taking its place as a good-intentioned member of the international community, persuaded to the practise of moral behaviour of an other-regarding kind, he claimed "...as well preach vegetarianism to a maneating tiger in order to convince him to leave off his disgusting ways."[11] There was only one solution to the problem of Germany. That nation must be crushed, must be made to experience utter exhaustion. "Nothing but this", wrote Harrison, "will take the wild beast out of them. As to convincing them by talk and generous advice - you might as well

sing psalms to the leopard to induce him to change his spots, you might as well invite Satan to study the Sermon on the Mount."[12]

A commitment to international co-operation is implicit in the title of Mona Caird's article. A conciliatory rather than a punitive policy towards Germans is recommended. An optimistic belief in the concept of 'a better nature' is supported by a dedication to reveal it. The attitudes of the German people are not to be confused with those of their rulers. Harrison's implicit appeal to 'cold hard facts' is suggested by the analogies which he uses. Those analogies point to the futility of conciliation. It would be conciliation without reciprocity. His appraisal of the character of the German nation (note the indiscriminatory use of 'them' and the pejorative imagery of the analogies) is pessimistic. Harrison can be classed as a Germanophobe and Caird, in the relative sense, and also in terms of the internal logic of her internationalism, can be classed as a Germanophile. From this it would appear that there is a good match between the Idealist-Realist dichotomy suggested by Kennedy and the contrasting perceptions of Caird and Harrison. And it is true that the match can be made in other instances.

However, on a number of substantive issues, Kennedy's model is open to challenge. The concepts idealist and realist describe

group or individual perceptions of situations, as for example the trend of international and associated domestic events. The concepts pro and anti describe group or individual attitudes towards objects within the situations, as for example British attitudes toward Germany in the context of international and associated domestic events. There is no necessary connection, as Kennedy's model is near to suggesting, between the concepts which describe perceptions of situations and the concepts which describe attitudes towards objects within the situations. That is to say, there is no necessary connection between an idealist perception and a pro-German attitude, a realist perception and an anti-German attitude. Although idealist and realist perceptions do on occasion coincide with pro and anti-German attitudes respectively, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the coincidence is far from being a consistent one. Of particular relevance are those cases where marked degrees of idealism and realism do not coincide with pro and anti-German attitudes. Various group or individual perceptions of a situation could be similar and yet produce quite different attitudes towards the same object within the situation. The failure to make such distinctions could be regarded as a flaw in Kennedy's argument.

It is certainly debatable, for instance, that "...pro-Germans and anti-Germans correspond to a very large degree with idealists/

and realists respectively."[13] It is possible to demonstrate
that a number of important advocates of realism, in terms of the
criteria set out by Kennedy were, by virtue of their realism,
ideologically neutral in their attitudes toward Germany. This
is not to infer that they perceived Germany as anything other
than a dedicated and dangerous rival. It is to suggest that
they interpreted Anglo-German rivalry as the outcome of
historical forces which had closed down the options open to both
sides. In such a situation blame was redundant. Neutrality in
this sense was in direct proportion to the extent to which
necessity was seen as the characteristic feature and motivation
in Anglo-German relations.

In the years leading up to 1914 L.J. Maxse's editorials for the
National Review presented a consistent and coherent case for
realism. The National Review could be savage and extravagant in
its criticism. However, this was aimed not at Germany herself
but at all who did not share the journal's commitment "...to
waken Englishmen out of their dangerous torpor..."[14] in
respect of the threat posed by Germany. The targets of the
criticism included those who had an optimistic view of the
future of Anglo-German relations, those who pressed for the
resolution, through negotiation and conciliation, of issues
dividing the two states, and those who appeared to be so
preoccupied with domestic matters that they did not give

adequate thought to the significance of the international crisis.

In the opinion of the Review, "...the refusal of British statesmen to recognise the character and purpose of the German Government arises from...ignorant and invincible optimism..."[15] Such optimism had to be combatted with vigour since it served to cultivate, dangerously and erroneously, "...the fiction of a friendly Germany..."[16] Realistic policy making was inhibited by leaders "...who remain under the spell of old and respectable traditions, and cherish the warmest admiration, not merely for the genius who occupies the German throne, but also for the many sterling good qualities of our Teutonic kindred..."[17] Such leaders were condemned as "...illusion mongers..."[18], and "...political deadheads..."[19] A sensible reappraisal of their attitudes might reveal to them that they were "inspired by...thoughtless optimism...fatuous sentimentalism... [and] sublime ignorance of the world."[20]

The National Review took an implacable stand against "...fatuous observations...as to the uselessness of armaments in this enlightened age of arbitration..."[21]; and advocates of Anglo-German co-operation who were "...profuse in their professions of attachment to the higher interests of

civilisation..."[22] were derided as "...peace cranks..."[23]

Extravagant criticism of this kind was levelled, irrespective of

party, at ministers who did not share the Journal's prescience

of impending peril or recognise the need to accept its

perception of the national interest: "As a general rule it is

impossible to get the Foreign Office to take an interest in any

purely British enterprise, but call the enterprise

'Anglo-German' and Downing Street is at once prepared to play

the bagman."[24] Lord Lansdowne was characterised as one who

"...can conceive of no higher role for the British Empire than

perpetually to revolve as a satellite round Germany,"[25] and of

his Cabinet colleagues the journal claimed that "...it would be

quite in accord with their fatuous record in the past that they

should consider it advisable to 'do something to oblige

Germany'..."[26] The charges of unwarranted optimism and

neglect of national self-interest were not restricted to the

Conservatives. In March 1907 it was noted with disparagement

that "...Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his colleagues are

rending the air with their pitiful whines for disarmament...",

and in August of the same year the Liberal Ministry was

described, dismissively, as "...largely composed of ignorant

sentimentalists..." By September 1908 the accusations of

culpability had been ground to an even sharper edge in Maxse's

editorials: "The German Government have been encouraged by the

criminal utterances of the two chief adventurers in the Cabinet,

Mr Winston Churchill and Mr Lloyd-George, to anticipate a further weakening of British national defences by the reduction of our Regular Army and the curtailment of our shipbuilding programme." Through an article entitled 'Traitors in High Places' the readers of the National Review were left in no doubt of the urgency of the situation: "...the country has not a moment to lose...it must get rid of the Cabinet which has played into Germany's hands at every turn...Another five years of Liberal administration would infallibly seal the ruin of the Empire." [27] The "spell of old and respectable traditions" which allegedly had captivated the Conservative Ministry in 1902 appeared to have lost none of its potency so far as the Liberal administration of 1910 was concerned: "...we have speeches from Ministers...in the 'Parliament-of-man-Federation-of-the-world' style, demonstrating that the universe is governed by gush alone, and that if we gush sufficiently all will be well...According to these simpletons, we are adored by all nations, especially Germany..." [28]

Yet another pattern of behaviour condemned respective parties of government in the eyes of the National Review. This was their apparent preoccupation with domestic issues to the neglect of international perils. In 1902, for example, the journal complained about "...microscopic discussions of an Education Bill..." [29] The editorial of December 1903 declared that

"Englishmen must not allow their absorption in the Fiscal Question to divert them entirely from international affairs..." Advice of this kind did not appear to have any lasting effect, for in November 1908 there is the admonition that "...our Parliamentary podsnaps are, as usual, immersed in trifles. They divide their time between the village pump and the village pub, with an occasional diversion on the right of small boys to smoke cigarettes...Our popular press devotes its columns to the puerile proceedings of the Suffragettes, at what may well prove a turning point in our history." The National Review did not deny that domestic issues deserved attention, but it was very clear in its definition of priorities: "The Constitution must be saved, but the country must not be lost."[30]

The foregoing summary of the views expressed from the pages of the National Review in the years leading up to 1914 suggests that they are located firmly on the realist side of Paul M Kennedy's dichotomy. The attitude toward the future of Anglo-German relations was profoundly pessimistic; attempts to resolve difficulties through co-operation and conciliation were regarded not only as futile but as treasonable; an unambiguous order of priorities was defined, with the national interest on a world scale coming before the parochialism of domestic considerations. Despite this it does not seem appropriate to sustain Kennedy's thesis to the point where the National Review

could be labelled as 'anti-German'.

Maxse's Journal certainly had 'Germany on the Brain', but this preoccupation had much less to do with Germanophobia in the accepted pejorative sense than with a conviction that inexorable historical forces were at work, bringing Germany and Britain into a conflict determined by their respective national destinies. In every real sense the two states were powerless in face of those forces; the option of abject surrender and submission had a purely theoretical existence, since to take it up would have meant the denial of all spiritual and material heritage and aspiration. Anglo-German relations were enmeshed in a clash of two supremacies, one in being and one in the process of becoming. Both nations were imprisoned by the logic of crucial hypothetical imperatives: if Germany aspired to supremacy she had to challenge; if Britain wished to retain supremacy she had to resist.

When the Review referred to 'The German Danger' it was with an awareness of what was regarded as the immutable internal dialectic of events rather than with Germanophobia: "...a great people carries its destiny within itself, and that inward strength will soon realise its proportionate external expression in despite of any political obstacle..."[31] This element of determinism was a recurrent theme: "Great Britain

is...confronted with the development of a new sea-power, founded on the same economic basis as herself, and impelled by a desire to be supreme."[32] Germany had industrialised, had seen her population expand, and in consequence had become dependent on imports of food and raw materials. An increasing reliance on sea-borne trade had defined security imperatives which could be met in full only if she emancipated herself from British dominion over the seas. Britain, on the other hand, could not surrender her dominion "...and at the same time preserve more than a shadow of independence."[33] The issues separating Britain and Germany were not negotiable.[34] Conflict was inevitable. It was inconceivable that Germany could make a downward revision of her aspirations or that Britain could relinquish her dominant position. The latter event would be possible only if "...the old spirit of the English nation passes away."[35]

The National Review was biting in its criticism of opinion which was contrary to its own, but it reserved its ideological antipathy for those who either supposed that the dialectical processes leading Britain and Germany to conflict could be negated or redirected by mutual accommodations, or did not recognise the existence of the processes. It was not, and by the nature of its argument could not be anti-German.

Usher (1914) [36] provides a similar example of the limitations of the Idealist-Realist dichotomy as a formula for classifying attitudes toward Germany. The manner in which he defined the German threat and referred to those who did not recognise it places him on the realist side of the dichotomy. "The Germans aim at nothing less than the domination of Europe and of the world by the Germanic race," he wrote, adding that "...one of the fundamental errors, of which idealists and advocates of peace have been often guilty, is to treat this vast project as an unreality." [37] But this appraisal of the international situation did not form the basis for an anti-German attitude. Usher regarded himself as a "...candid student...not anxious to support a propaganda..." or to "...cavil and blame...," and as such asked his readers to "...recognise in Pan-Germanism the expression of a national determination to preserve and strengthen the corporate life of a great people." [38] Behind German intentions lay the demands of necessity, demands which would bear on any corporate entity which was not of a suicidal bent. Having attained a national consciousness and a national individuality (this latter concept is left undefined) the next and necessary step was "...to insure the continued existence of this corporate individual for all time." [39] In this context "...Pan-Germanism [was] merely self-preservation." [40] There was nothing particularly remarkable in all this. It was "...the working of natural forces...", and to a greater or lesser degree

all states were driven by the motives which influenced Germany.[41]

There was something fundamental and normal about German aims.[42] It was true that those aims threatened the status quo, but there was nothing sacrosanct about existing conditions; they were not "...the end and object of the process of evolution."[43] Given the ambitions of rival powers, the status quo was, in the nature of things, a temporary alignment, subject to the changes which could be brought about by the demands of national self-interest as perceived by individual states. The national existence and ambitions of the members of the Triple Entente would be best furthered by the maintenance of the status quo because such an outcome would allow Britain, France and Russia to keep what they already held. But such an outcome would not satisfy Germany. All this had little to do with "...ethical precepts..."[44] It was as selfish for the Triple Entente to insist upon peace as it was for the Germans to demand war.[45]

The ideological neutrality of Usher's realistic appraisal is summarised in the form of an analogue:

> "One might almost compare the two coalitions with a trained
> swordsman and a countryman who have somehow gotten into a
> quarrel. The swordsman wishes to settle the point of

honour by a duel with rapiers under limitations which require the combatants to employ only one arm and to use only the point, to attack only after due warning, and not to press the adversary to the utmost. These conditions condemn the countryman to defeat. He wishes to fight with his fists, to hit wherever he can and as often as possible, to give no quarter, and to continue the fight until one or the other is exhausted. The swordsman, gazing upon the brawny figure of his opponent, is afraid that, in a struggle of that nature, he might not be successful, and hesitates to stake his all upon a rough and tumble battle. He insists upon fighting like a gentleman, and talks about honour, and ethics, and the obligations of civilisation. The countryman sees plainly enough that all this is intended to rob him of an advantage, and he, therefore, declines to be bound by a variety of ethics or a code of morals which necessarily condemn him to defeat."[46]

J.A. Cramb (1914)[47] must be regarded as a realist. He identified Germany as the enemy. He insisted that dedication and strength of will and action would be required to ensure Britain's survival in the coming conflict, which he saw as inevitable. He was distressed by "...the apathy...the stolid indifference of the nation...", when confronted by "...the single, devoted purposefulness throbbing everywhere throughout

Germany."[48] He was dismissive of any notion that co-operation
or conciliation would be effective in the context of
Anglo-German relations. Indeed, it was his belief that "At the
present stage of world history it is, of course, useless to seek
a practical policy in arbitration. It would be a waste of words
even to demonstrate the invalidity of this device."[49] In
Cramb's view, Pacifism "...this effusive sentiment for
peace..."[50] would weaken resolve and make Britain and her
empire easy prey for the enemy. "What", he wrote, "is likely to
be the comparative effect on England and Germany of Pacificism
with its denial of the part played by danger and suffering in
all heroic life? Upon a young and virile nation, a rising
military state, daily growing in power, Pacifism can never exert
much influence for evil; there is no possibility of such a
nation being seriously turned from heroism. But to an old
nation in which the forces of decay seem...already to be
manifesting themselves, might not such a theory, if too ardently
adopted, be fraught with very terrible danger, with very real
and disastrous consequences."[51]

In spite of all this, Cramb's attitude was not anti-German. He
perceived a kind of necessity underlying relationships between
Britain and Germany, in the shape of organic laws.
Supplementing those laws was a mysterious, spiritual force,
defying reason, influencing the destinies of the two states.[52]
In such a situation it would have been out of place to apportion
blame, except in the case of those who could not see the writing
on the wall.

"In the history of nations", wrote Cramb, "there is a Fate, an inexorable nexus of things...making the sequence of events...now seem inevitable as some dark and purposeful drama, now controlled by laws more akin to Nature...than to the motives of human action."[53] The general theory that there were "...deep underlying forces in the inward fate and destiny of nations..."[54] found specific manifestation in Anglo-German relations, where "...a law, obvious, universal and inevitable in its application, discloses itself. It concerns the struggle for power."[55] Not all events in history, not all relationships between states were determined by "an inexorable nexus of things". The organic laws tended to come into play when rivalry between states expressed itself in the shape of mutually exclusive destinies. For example, "...in Germany's antagonism to Russia there is nothing fateful, nothing organic. It is a wound that...can be cauterised at any moment, because there is not and never has been any innate cause for war between Germany and Russia...but the enmity of England and Germany is like one of those springs that rise up from the nether deep; the more you try to fill them up the wider they become."[56]

It was no ordinary conflict which lay ahead for Britain and Germany, no ordinary struggle for power. This much was revealed in that part of Cramb's argument which dealt with pacifism.

He conceded that the ideal was not without its attractions, confessed his admiration for the vision of "...nation side by side with nation, race beside race...sedulous in a many coloured harmonious activity"[57], and noted that war had been damned as an evil in itself, as inimical to international prosperity[58], and opposed to social well-being·[59] How then could one explain that "...despite the hubbub of talk down the centuries war has continued..."?[60] Perhaps it was because there was in war "...something which has escaped the examination of Pacifism..."[61] This something was the proposition that "...in human life as a whole there are always elements and forces, there are always motives and ideals, which defy the analysis of reason..."[62] The mysterious force, defying reason, which governed the destinies of Britain and Germany was "...the idea of Empire".[63] "Here", wrote Cramb, " we have this transcendental force governing the wars of England. And if we turn from England to Germany we find the same element which transcends reason governing the wars of Germany."[64]

Cramb argued that with the twentieth century Britain had reached a new stage in her career as an imperial power. The task of acquisition had been fulfilled. An even greater destiny beckoned, that of facilitating "...the evolution, not of an exterior uniformity, but of an inner harmony..."[65] Attention had to be directed to the matter of internal organisation,[66]

to the difficult issue of an Imperial Parliament, to the establishment of democracy in India and Africa. However, the fulfilment of this destiny was in jeopardy, for "...there still beyond the North Sea [was] a stern Watcher, unsleeping, unresting, bound to her own fate, pursuing her own distant goal undeviatingly, unfalteringly..."[67] Again we find the notion of one supremacy in being and another in the process of becoming. The world was witnessing "...the confrontation of two states, each endowed with the genius for empire; the one, the elder, already sated with the experience and glories of Empire; the other, the younger, apparently exhaustless in resources and energy, baulked in mid-career...and now indignant."[68]

Believing, as he did, that the respective futures of Britain and Germany were entwined in the pursuit of mutually exclusive destinies, defined by organic laws supplemented by transcendental forces which were not susceptible to "...the ordinary process of reason..."[69], it is not surprising that Cramb took a sympathetic view of German aspirations. His attitude was not Germanophobic. Putting himself in the shoes of the enemy he was, for example, able to appreciate Bernhardi's claim that for Germany there were two alternatives and no third — "Weltmacht oder Niedergang".[70] This nation, with its own genius for empire, its own destiny to fulfil, conscious of its strength and energy, and yet "cooped up between the North Sea

and the Danube, the Rhine and the Plains of Poland..."[71] could not "...acquiesce in England's possession of one-fifth of the globe..."[72] It was all very well for Britain to protest that she had no aggressive designs against Germany; the truth of the situation, in German eyes, was that Britain's mere existence as an Empire was a continuous aggression.[73]

It was naive to think that Germany's image of Britain matched Britain's self-perception. Britain might see itself as eager to enjoy peace in order to fulfil a grand and enlightened empire-wide destiny, but Germany saw Britain as "...the successful burglar who, an immense fortune amassed, has retired from business, and having broken every law, human and divine, violated every instinct of honour and fidelity on every sea and on every continent, desires now the protection of the police."[74] Were Germany to submit to this "...it would seem as if her great soldiers had fought in vain, as if the long roll of her battles had passed like an empty sound..."[75] To proposals that she limit the build up of arms Germany responded that "A nation's military efficiency [was] the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism."[76] It seemed to Cramb that this was "...a magnificent and manly answer..."[77]

And what of Britain? Confronted by a nation straining towards her destiny, Britain could acquiesce and submit, make

concessions, suffer one diplomatic defeat after another, and "...gradually sink to a secondary place in the councils of Europe and of the world..."[78] This however was a theoretical rather than a practical option, for the creative power which had shaped her ancient and famous empire[79] was not dead. It would lead her to strive towards her own ultimate destiny. The inevitable outcome of two great and mutually exclusive missions was war.

Cramb underlined the dangers facing Britain and pointed to the policies and attitudes which her people and leaders should adopt. When confronted by a nation "...high in its courage, lofty in its ambitions, containing within itself apparently inexhaustible forces..."[80], Britain's own grand ideals and purposes should not be contaminated by "...the desire for arbitration, for the limitation of armaments, a 'naval holiday', peace at any price..."[81] Britain's war spirit, energy and sense of heroism should rise above "...the mere craving for life and its comforts..."[82] Cramb's aim was to rouse his countrymen to meet and resist the challenge. Only in this way could the great struggle between competing destinies resolve itself in Britain's favour.

In all this there was nothing anti-German. Like Britain, Germany was fixed in the "...inexorable nexus of things...",

subject to organic laws and to forces that transcended reason. If anything, Germany was, at the time, the more heroic in pursuit of her destiny. In Cramb's case realism did not, and could not correspond with an anti-German attitude.

It would be an exercise in sleight of hand to suggest that the above examples of realist opinion demonstrate pro rather than anti-German attitudes. In each case Germany was identified as the source of a major threat which had to be resisted in terms of national self-interest. On the other hand, it would be a distortion to argue that the examples are representative of an anti-German frame of mind. There is in the arguments an empathetic appreciation of the imperatives facing Germany which leaves little scope for pejorative attitudes.

The reliability of Kennedy's formula for classifying attitudes is in question even when the opinion being analysed _is_ markedly anti-German. E.J. Dillon[83] was a major voice in the debate on Germany in the pre-1914 period. His arguments were characterised by savage condemnation rather than ideological neutrality. His clear perception of the threat posed by Germany, his record as a persistent ringer of alarums, his irritation in face of credulity and optimism, and the depth of his animosity, appear to place him in the realist camp.

In common with most writers who had issued warnings about Germany's intentions, Dillon found it impossible to disguise the sense of frustration which came from being thwarted by the "...quietism of the masses and their self-complacent leaders..."[84] The fact that he could claim an intimate knowledge of German life and affairs whereas others, less well informed, traded successfully in "...comforting assurances..." and "...dangerous mirages which lulled the nation's misgivings to slumber"[85], deepened his resentment. "Those who, like myself," he wrote, "know the country, its institutions, its language, literature, social life and national strivings, and who continually warned their countrymen of what was coming, were put out of court as croaking prophets...[86] over and over again I expressed my regret at finding the people of Great Britain irrationally hopeful and unsuspecting, utterly ignorant of Germany's systematic strivings and subversive machinations, yet unwilling to learn from those who were conversant with these matters."[87] If Britain was now in grave peril it was the fault of optimists who had "...objected that the German people and their chancellor were peacefully disposed..."[88] National security had been endangered "...because the British nation as a whole obstinately refused to listen to those who apprised them of this elemental movement, and of the dangers it concealed..." In consequence, "...they dispensed with a large land army, slackened the work of shipbuilding..."[89]

Dillon's perception of the situation in terms of the trend of
international and associated domestic events was certainly
realistic in the sense in which Kennedy uses that word. Indeed
Dillon's views as so far expressed would not have looked out of
place on the pages of the National Review. But his attitude
toward Germany as an object within that situation was quite
different from Maxse's or Cramb's. There was no suggestion of
necessity, of the closing down of options in face of inexorable
historical forces, no empathetic appreciation. The leitmotiv of
Dillon's argument was that Germany was a power with plain, old
fashioned evil intentions. 'The Scrap of Paper' phrase was, for
example, described as "...a Satanic sneer hurled with fell
purpose into a world of civilised human beings."[90] The
inability of the British to apprehend the true nature of the
evil which confronted them called for the remedy of
exorcism,[91] since "they seemed possessed by the demons of
credulity and pacifism."[92] The imagery used by Dillon to
describe the German attempt to engineer British neutrality in
July/August 1914 is reminiscent of the temptation in the
wilderness.

> "The bid for British neutrality...was proffered with an
> intensity of emotion, a high-pitched feeling for the weal
> of the British nation, and a biblical solemnity which must,
> it was felt, tell with especial force with a people whose

character so often merges in temperament and whose policy is always suffused with morality...the smooth-tongued tempter...appealed to our loathing for crime...our aversion to the horrors of war, our love of peace...they adjured us to hold aloof from the war and connive at their disregard of a treaty which they would have been delighted to respect had not brutal necessity compelled them to ignore it...It was at the end of the cleverly fashioned disguise that the cloven hoof protruded."[93]

Dillon's attitude toward Germany was crystalised in his claim that that country was "...the political Antichrist...", waging war against "...the wellbeing of Europe and the continuity of human progress."[94]

Despite his distaste for complacency and optimism, his positive identification of the enemy and its sinister nature, E.J. Dillon cannot be regarded as a realist when measured against the totality of the criteria set out by Paul Kennedy. On a number of vital counts his anti-Germanism was based on idealism. It was to universal ethical values rather than to the parochial morality of national interest that he appealed. He held up a vision of the world as it should be rather than a reflection of the world as it was. When he complained about Germany's disrespect for "...the plighted word"[95] it was not primarily because such disrespect could have unfortunate consequences for

Britain as such, but because the honour and trust involved in pledges given and received constituted "...the inner cohesive force which holds the elements of society together...Destroy that and you have withdrawn the cement from the structure..."[96] He defined Teutonism as meaning "...Germany above everything, including human and divine laws",[97] and it was from this equation that his anti-Germanism emerged. His argument was founded on ethics, and "In this new faith ethics plays no part."[98] Prussianism, which he took to be the creed animating German policy was anathema, not simply because it challenged the national self-interest of Britain, but more importantly because he saw it as a "...monstrous product of savagery...enlisted in the service of rank immorality."[99] In casting Germany in the role of Cain, Dillon could not ignore the material harm which such a player would effect on the international stage, but his condemnation went far beyond this to deeper issues: "She has deliberately brought about a crude, naked might-struggle, in which war-lust and brute force are pitted against the most sacred and imprescriptible rights that lie at the very roots of organised society."[100] Dillon's purpose was less a matter of assessing the damage which German action could inflict upon Britain as an individual state than of measuring "...the abyss which sunders the old-world civilisation, based on all that is loftiest in Christianity, from modern German culture."[101]

It was as an idealist, committed to universal ethical values,
that Dillon demanded retribution. In face of the "...virus of
the fell Prussian disease...", humanity as a whole, with faith
in truth, honour, trust, law, justice and right could not afford
to be "...either indifferent or lenient."[102] Germany had
"...parted company with morality..."[103], and all who had not
done so must resist.

The Idealist-Realist dichotomy is theoretically suspect in yet
another sense. Although group or individual perceptions of
situations can be unambiguous they tend to be so only at the
extreme. For example, the ultra-realist may see no other
solution than a zero-sum conflict (i.e. winner takes all)
whereas the ultra-idealist may see no other solution than world
brotherhood. Between those extremes lies a wide range of
ambiguous or multifaceted perceptions. The concepts idealist
and realist are too vague, and any model in the form of a
dichotomy too simplistic to make much sense of the nuances of
the range of perceptions which lie in the middle ground.

Two articles which appeared in Contemporary Review (1908) [104]
highlight some of the nuances which cannot readily be
accommodated in such a simplistic model, and demonstrate the
ambiguities which are common in attitude formation. They raise
doubts about the appropriateness of assigning a pro-German label
to writers who saw virtue in conciliation. An objective content

analysis suggests that Harold Spender and Sidney Low were arguing an anti-zero-sum-competition case rather than a pro-German one, although it has to be accepted that contemporaries, for political or other reasons, might have regarded their empathetic interpretation of Germany's actions and aspirations, and their pleas for conciliation as evidence of Germanophilia.

Spender was critical of the way in which heavy expenditure in armaments closed off a number of social policy options and reinforced social inequalities. Where a high priority was given to armaments, the need for social reform could be neglected, and the necessary burden of taxation could fall on the weaker members of society. In this sense Spender could be regarded as an idealist. Such a neat and convenient summation would not, however, get to the heart of his attitude toward Anglo-German rivalry. Reduction of armaments and equilibrium in international affairs could be brought about by mutual understanding and conciliation. This was inhibited by strange legends which occupied the minds of men on both sides: "It is easy for us to laugh at the fictions about ourselves which carry authority in Germany; but are we sure that our beliefs about Germany have any better ground?"[105] It was natural, then, for Spender to argue that "...the British must...try to comprehend the elements of the German point of view...her deep desire...for

a voice in world politics."[106] Yet it is clear that his wish for increased understanding did not lead him to ignore British national interest, the alleged ark of the covenant of the realist. Whatever ambitions Germany might be allowed to realise, sea predominance would remain essential for Britain, since it amounted "...to nothing more than a statement of her position in the world as an island power, with dominions mainly across the sea."[107] Here we have that measure of ambiguity which is difficult to deal with in the idealist-realist dichotomy.

Spender's analysis of the motives behind German policy might have been regarded as sympathetic by those of his contemporaries who were anti-German; on the other hand it is possible to see him as a realist insofar as he recognised the need to examine, rationally and without emotion, the springs of German action. In this approach, if not in the conclusions which followed from it, he does not differ in principle from many of the so called realists. The emphasis which he laid on making rational assessments of the aspirations and perceptions informing the policies of a rival state, in order to define a range of response options in relation to a range of value options, came to characterise the work of political scientists and social psychologists during and after the Second World War. The idealist in one sense was a realist in another. Paul M.

Kennedy[108] conceded that idealists sometimes argued that they were the true realists, but he appeared to have in mind those who saw the promotion of harmony between states as the only real hope for civilisation, rather than those who attempted an objective study of the realities behind policy and diplomacy. Because of this he felt that such reservations did not reduce the validity of the Idealist-Realist dichotomy, and so did not challenge the thesis that attitudes toward Germany stemmed from that dichotomy. But where individuals (and Spender is one of many cases) can meet significant elements in opposing sets of criteria, that is, where idealists can also be regarded as realists without recourse to Kennedy's minor reservation, then the value of the idealist-realist dichotomy as a formula for classifying attitudes is diminished.

Spender recommended that Germany be appraised with an awareness of "...how recently she has become possessed of independence and unity, with what efforts and sacrifices she has shaken off...weakness, division and external dictation."[109] And he touched on psycho-political interpretation, suggesting a sort of national adolescence, in the comment: "She has in many respects both the pride and the touchiness of a Power that has newly arrived. She has not shaken off the eager self-consciousness and the intense self-concentration of early youth."[110] This attempt to understand what lay behind German policy was without

prejudice to the security of other states, for he took the view that "...Great Britain may fairly ask her to recognise and respect the Powers that were there before her coming..."[111]; but he believed as a result of his analysis that Britain would "...make a grave mistake if she refuses to this newcomer, with all the virtues and faults of her kind, a place in the sunlight of the world."[112] There was nothing to be gained by complaining that Germany did not need a fleet. The inference was that those who offered reasons why Germany did not need to develop in this direction were emotional and unrealistic. For the fact was that Germany _wanted_ a fleet, and this was because she considered that "...her immense power in Europe was largely counterbalanced by helplessness over the rest of the world's surface."[113] This had led Germany to pursue a policy of national self-interest which Spender regarded as "...frank selfishness...[but] at any rate, honest..."[114] He did not see anything sinister in German policy; it had "...all the faults of a fitful impulsiveness, more like the spasms of a caged tiger than the deep cunning of a fox..."[115] What response option should Britain take up? Was there "...any real wisdom or sound advantage in driving her to madness by blocking her every turn?"[116] Was the world "...so small that every expansion for Germany must mean so much contraction for Great Britain?"[117] It would be unreasonable to deduce from this that Spender was pro-German. It seems clear, however, that he

was renouncing zero-sum competition.

Sidney Low's attitude to Germany reflects similar ambiguities - the elements of idealism demonstrated by his advocacy of conciliation, and the elements of realism showing themselves not only in his awareness of Britain's national interests but also in his willingness to make a rational appraisal, in psycho-political terms [note the title of his article] of Germany's motives, in order to inform British responses. And, again, the argument is anti-zero-sum competition rather than pro-German. Of Germany's 'condition' he noted "...there is ambition, undoubtedly, and there is anxiety. These are the two passions which just now reign in the Teutonic breast. The restlessness, the malaise, of Germany are due to those conflicting emotions..."[118] In common with Spender, he introduces the notion of national adolescence, an indication of the facility with which some writers on Anglo-German relations made early use of the concepts of psychology. "She is obsessed by a fervour of aspiration, of material progress, by a youthful eagerness to stretch the mighty limbs she has clothed in steel and to find vent for the energies of the seething brain. To every nation, as to every man, there comes from time to time this yearning for self-realisation through action..."[119] "The shifts, the turns, the curious and disturbing manoeuvres of German foreign policy, are not caused so much by aggressiveness and ambition as by a permanent attack

of fidgets."[120]

It was obvious that the activities of Germany would have ramifications for others. How should Britain respond? Low recognised the constraints of national interest: "We cannot permit Germany to relieve herself at our expense..."[121]; "it is no business of ours to calm her nerves by modifying any policy which happens to suit our purpose."[122] But he believed that Germany's policies were related to a set of circumstances that could operate on any state, and that any state would be likely to respond to such circumstances in much the same way as Germany. Spender had opened his mind to the realities of international relations in a period of uncertainty, suspicion and tension - the interlocking of challenge and response. He referred to the situation in which one side would make a proposal and the other side would resent "...not so much the proposal of the other, but the fact that she made it."[123] Low had a similar approach: "...we ought to recognise that all our recent international action has tended in the direction that excites German apprehensiveness..."[124]; "...if a good many people here are afraid of their ambition and aggression, a still larger number there go in fear of these qualities in ourselves."[125] This led him to argue that "...it is no business of ours to seek to hinder her so long as she does not interfere with us...The operation of bottling up great nations

is usually disastrous, and Germany bottled would be more uncomfortable than Germany with the steam blowing off somewhere in colonising and commercial activity."[126]

Both Spender and Low argued in favour of conciliation and accommodation [an idealist position] but neither were critical of national self-interest [a realist position], and both attempted to understand the dynamic, interacting nature of international relations. This approach, linking the elements of idealism and realism produced not a pro-German attitude but one which denied the value of zero-sum competition.

The above discussion suggests that the Idealist-Realist dichotomy is inadequate as a formula for the classification of attitudes toward Germany. A more precise analytical model is required for the study of group or individual perceptions. Such a model can be derived from the concepts of competition and co-operation.

Figure [4] is a representation of parallel continuums of competition and co-operation, travelling in opposite directions in relation to the respective minimum and maximum positions (as co-operation increases competition diminishes, and vice-versa) and lacking congruence at the extremes (where there is a maximum competition there is no co-operation, and vice-versa).

Point of Balance

(a)
(+)
Competition

(b)

(c)

(–)

(d)
(+)
Co-operatior

(–)

Area of Congruence

note: at the 'point of balance' a b= cd,
indicating that the attitude held is equidistant
from the extremes of competition and co-operation

Figure [4] PARALLEL-REVERSE CONTINUUMS OF COMPETITION
AND CO-OPERATION.

A working hypothesis could take the following form: <u>In any situation which falls short of a Hobbesian condition of nature, relationships between states tend to be perceived, over time, as occurring within the ambiguous context of competition and co-operation.</u> It is accepted that in certain situations groups or individuals may have unambiguous perceptions. For example, a situation could be perceived as one of competition unmoderated by co-operation or <u>vice-versa</u> [the positive extremes of competition and co-operation]. Between those extremes each element would tend to moderate the other. The degree of moderation would depend upon the relative merits of competition and co-operation as perceived by groups or individuals in relation to specific situations and, theoretically, those perceptions would coincide with specific points on the parallel continuums.

With regard to the perceptions of the writers quoted in this chapter, it is suggested that Mona Caird is located marginally right of centre in the area of congruence, since the element of competition naturally present in a state of war was moderated by a relatively high commitment to co-operation[127]; Spender and Low are located marginally left of centre in the area of congruence; and Frederic Harrison, L.J. Maxse [and his contributors], J.A. Cramb, Roland G. Usher and E.J. Dillon (the latter for reasons probably shared by Harrison but not by the

others) are located at the positive extreme of the competition continuum, outside the area of congruence. At the positive extreme of the co-operation continuum would stand pacifists and those whose credo took the following form: "I am not concerned to know whether seizure by force - theft - is advantageous or not. It is wrong; I object to it and base my hopes upon the survival one day of better ideals."[128]

As a tentative conclusion it can be argued that this model has a number of substantive advantages over the Idealist-Realist dichotomy. It takes explicit account of the ambiguities which tend to inform group or individual perceptions of situations. Because of this it offers a safeguard against oversimplified forms of classification of group or individual attitudes towards objects within those situations. It attracts attention to the basic functional concepts which tend to form the bases for relationships between states (i.e. competitive, competitive/co-operative, co-operative). It promises a greater degree of accuracy in the actual locating of one perception relative to another, and a more precise means of measuring changes in the distribution of perceptions over time. It opens up opportunities for consideration of the relevance of the cluster of concepts, hypotheses and theoretical models associated with the psychology of competition and co-operation. For example, it is held that the onset of competition

presupposes some form of aggressive behaviour. Frustration theories offer explanations of how aggressive behaviour can be triggered; in very general terms they rest on "...the supposition that an aggressive drive develops as a result of interference with goal directed behaviour. The frustrated person [and for person we could read state] is then motivated to injure the source of the interference."[129] Is the historian, concerned with how people perceived relationships between states and with the attitudes they formed as a consequence of those perceptions, entitled to ignore such theories? Another perspective on the development of aggressive/competitive behaviour is provided by social learning theory which suggests that behaviour is a learned response. Using the language of the psychologists, one way in which such behaviour can be learned is through response facilitation, that is to say, behaviour which is aggressive/competitive might be "...prompted or facilitated through the appearance of similar behaviours in esteemed models..."[130] If for argument we take the phrase "esteemed models" to imply models whose achievements are regarded as worthy of imitation and not to connote any notion of intrinsic merit on the part of the models themselves, an interesting link between response facilitation and frustration theories could be suggested for the case of Germany in the pre-1914 period, and the question posed: To what extent were German aims and ambitions facilitated and translated into policy in response to

the international achievements of other states, in particular,
say, Great Britain, then frustrated through interference with
this goal directed behaviour by the diplomatic activity of other
states? This question could be of significance in the critical
analysis of those attitudes toward Germany which were based on
the alleged national characteristics of the German people.

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"Self-preservation is not the final law for nations any more than for individuals...The progress of humanity may demand the extinction (in this world) of the individual, and it may demand also the example and the inspiration of a martyr nation. So long as the Divine providence has need of us, Christian faith requires that we shall trust for our safety to the unseen, but real forces of right dealing, truthfulness, and love; but, should the will of God demand it, we must be prepared, as Jeremiah taught his nation long ago, to give up even our national life for furthering those great ends 'to which the whole creation moves.' This may be 'fanaticism', but, if so, it is the fanaticism of Christ, and of the prophets, and we are willing to take our places along with them."

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CHAPTER 3

THE PLACE OF APPEASEMENT IN THE COMPETITION - CO-OPERATION MODEL.

The idealist-realist dichotomy as a formula for investigating attitudes to Germany has been criticised on the grounds that 'realist' opinion (in terms of certain stated criteria) was not necessarily anti-German, and that 'idealist' opinion was not necessarily pro-German. Indeed, some of the most ideologically neutral views on Germany came from the 'realists', and some of the most damning views from the 'idealists'. It has been suggested that the dichotomy is too simplistic to take account of the ambiguities which often lay behind attitudes, although it must be accepted that at the extremes of Germanophobia and Germanophilia, that is to say, at the poles of the attitude range, the dichotomy cannot be challenged on the grounds that it does not take account of ambiguities. Ambiguities did not exist at the extremes. In order to take account of the ambiguities, and at the same time to recognise the existence of unambiguous attitudes at the extremes, a model representing parallel and reverse, but not totally congruent continuums of co-operation and competition, was suggested as an alternative to the idealist-realist dichotomy. It is now argued that the validity of the alternative model is enhanced, if not confirmed, by the fact that it can accommodate what could be regarded, tentatively at least, as general trends in British foreign policy from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the Second World War, and also the opposition to those trends which came either from the extremes of zero-sum competition and

pacifism or from other points on the parallel continuums. Paul M Kennedy refers to those trends as 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy'.[1]

Kennedy defines appeasement as "...the policy of settling international (or for that matter, domestic) quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which could be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous."[2] He argues that the policy, said to be characteristic of the 1930s, "....must be traced...back to the middle of the nineteenth century...", and that "...the nature of British foreign policy did not greatly alter in its overall framework from that time until 1939..."[3] This presupposes a long-standing commitment which did not finally lose credibility and break down until the conjunction of the Munich Agreement (1938) and the German march into Prague (1939).

Rational negotiation and compromise implies co-operation, but it also implies competition. If, as Kennedy asserts, appeasement was "...based upon certain optimistic assumptions about man's inherent reasonableness...",[4] this need not mean more than a belief that in most situations zero-sum conflict could be avoided. It does not deny, in fact it implies, a pessimistic awareness that quarrels and grievances are likely to arise out

of competing perceptions of national interest. It is as well to avoid a pessimistic-optimistic dichotomy as it is to avoid one based on idealism and realism. Such positions are rarely uncomplicated by ambiguity. Pessimism and optimism are often part of the same attitude. One point of view can be pessimistic about the future unless action is taken timeously, and optimistic (part of the justification for taking action) about the outcome if the action is timeous. Another point of view can be optimistic about the chances of negotiation because of a pessimism about a future which does not allow for negotiation.

If it is true that appeasement "...has been a particular form of diplomacy since the middle of the nineteenth century...",[5] what lay behind it, what gave it its justification? Kennedy suggests that moral considerations, economic aspirations, global commitments and domestic situations all had a bearing.

The moral considerations subsumed the concepts of 'justice' and 'fair play'. These led to a willingness to accept and participate in international arbitration, to abjure war except in cases of self-defence, and to place emphasis on conciliation and compromise as a means of settling disputes.

This predisposition to apply the principles of morality was supported, however, by a set of pragmatic considerations. In

the mid-nineteenth century Britain was the workshop of the
world, standing at the centre of the global economic system.
She would be the first to suffer if the system was disrupted by
war. Even when under challenge in the late nineteenth century,
and in relative decline vis-a-vis the USA and Germany, she had a
surplus on invisible trade which so compensated for the deficit
in visibles that the balance of payments was healthily in
surplus. War would mean a reduction in exports and an increase
in imports which would make a visible trading deficit even
worse; it would also mean a decrease in invisible earnings. The
balance of payments situation would therefore deteriorate. It
appears reasonable to argue, then, that "The preservation of
peace was, for an economy such as Britain's...a vital national
interest."[6] A derivation of this argument, and one which is
related to issues involving Britain's global position and her
domestic situation, was that a contrary policy would involve
such expenditure on armaments, particularly at a time of
relative economic decline when the rate of growth could not
absorb it, that necessary domestic reforms could not be carried
through and some of the many global commitments could be
neglected. Kennedy argues that for this budgetary reason,
"British governments could normally be relied upon to seek to
end an arms race by diplomatic means, and thus reduce defence
spending."[7]

The significance of Britain's global position was that she had interests in every part of the world, and "...multifarious national obligations..."[8] Consequently, it would have been dangerous to concentrate on any one area or region. In Liddel Hart's phrase, Britain was experiencing "...strategical overextension".[9] The problem of meeting every need in every corner where her interests lay was becoming very serious. It was not surprising, therefore, that "...her stretched global position was an enormously powerful reason for compromise...and for the pacific settlement of disputes."[10]

With the extension and liberation of the electorate in the last third of the nineteenth century (1867, 1872, 1883, 1884) those with the vote and more independence to use it as they saw fit were "...ever more reluctant to deny [themselves] social and economic reforms in deference to a large defence budget."[11] Introducing social, constitutional and economic reform, all of which of course competed with other options such as defence expenditure, was a means of staying in power.

Kennedy argues that against this background British foreign policy was, with rare exceptions (some of them of course being of outstanding importance) "...pragmatic, conciliatory and reasonable."[12] Stated simply, "...the peaceful settlement of disputes was much more to Britain's advantage than recourse to

war."[13] Interestingly, this perception of British foreign policy trends is shared by the German historian, Niedhart.[14] It is important to note, however, that it is general trends that are suggested rather than a universal application to all cases. After Palmerston's death in 1865 appeasement was evident in the form of internal compromises (electoral and economic reforms) and in foreign policy. Clarendon, Foreign Secretary to Russell (1865/66) sought arms reductions in Europe. Gladstone (1868-74) pursued a conciliatory policy at the time of the Franco-Prussian war. Disraeli (1874-80) does not fit the case, adopting a more aggressively forward policy with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean, India, Afghanistan and Zululand/Transvaal. On his return, however, Gladstone (1880-85) pursued a policy of "...avoiding trouble and seeking a reasonable compromise with the demands of others...",[15] stepping back from adventures in South Africa and Afghanistan, searching for compromise solutions in India and Ireland. It was not possible, of course, to maintain this policy at all costs, and Gladstone felt that Egypt had to be occupied to preserve order, and that colonial expansion had to take place in face of French and German gains in the period 1884-85. In spite of this, Kennedy feels that the underlying trend was being established and that British foreign policy was being conducted for the most part by men "earnestly struggling to solve problems on a rational and ethical basis."[16]

Kennedy considers that the same basic pattern obtained between 1896 and 1914.[17] The reconquest of the Sudan and the Boer War should be seen as part of a broad context. In this period domestic problems called for attention (Mearns, Booth, Rowntree, the emergence of the Labour Party); the relative decline in the economy was overt; the global responsibilities remained numerous.[18] In such a context, "...extreme caution had to be exercised over questions involving peace or war..."[19] Serious attempts were made to eliminate antagonisms between Britain on the one hand and France, Russia, and Germany. In the case of Germany efforts were made to achieve bilateral arms reductions, a 'naval holiday' was proposed, and colonial concessions negotiated. In addition, binding military obligations were avoided. Haldane's mission of 1912 was yet another example of the British government's efforts "...to solve matters of dispute by compromise, rational discussion and mutual understanding..."[20] The inevitability of German hegemony in Europe (including the west) if Britain did not intervene defeated this policy in 1914, but it re-emerged in the period 1919-1938.

All the basic elements reappeared, some in exacerbated form, and pervading everything was the impact of the First World War. Public opinion had been "...psychologically scarred..."[21], and "the disastrous course of the Great War...had made the British

public more receptive than ever before to the politics of moral enthusiasm and international amity."[22] The economic motives for appeasement grew in strength in the inter-war years. There had been an elevenfold increase in the National Debt between 1914 and 1918. By 1933 service to the Debt amounted to 21.4% of public expenditure as against 6.1% in 1913. This was a grim reminder of the financial costs of war.[23] The need to devote energies to the domestic front was also recognised. Further extensions to the electorate, the arrival of Labour to, and as a continuing contender for, power, meant that domestic reform could not be neglected. Governments "...had to respond to survive electorally."[24] By 1933 46.6% of public expenditure went on social services as against 33% in 1913. Although the absolute amount going to defence had increased (9.3M - 112.4M) the percentage had fallen from 29.9 in 1913 to 10.5 in 1933.[25] The strategic/global considerations had increased rather than diminished. Problems had to be confronted in Ireland, India, Egypt and Palestine. The economic/psychological situation "...created an impossible gulf between Britain's global obligations and her capacity to fulfil them."[26] All this led to the revival of appeasement.

A Foreign Office memorandum of 1926 claimed "...so manifold and ubiquitous are British trade and British finance that, whatever else may be the outcome of a disturbance of the peace, we shall

be the losers."[27] In the late 1920s the Chief of the Imperial General Staff complained: "...in no single theatre are we strong enough, not in Ireland, nor England, nor on the Rhine, nor in Constantinople, nor Batoum, nor Egypt, nor Palestine, nor Mesopotamia, nor Persia, nor India."[28] This same judgment lay behind the view taken by the Chiefs of Staff in December 1937: in the face of so many commitments the policy priority was to "...reduce the number of potential enemies..."[29] Interestingly, individuals who were later to establish reputations as far-sighted patriots when appeasement had been discredited, made contributions to it in earlier days. Sir Robert Vansittart, later recognised as the arch enemy of Germany, did not subscribe to the letter of Versailles. He advised colonial concessions to Germany as a means of curbing their "...explosive energies..."[30] Leo Amery, whose thorough conversion to a stop-Germany policy occurred as late as March 1938 (Anschluss) had earlier (October 1935) declared in a speech to his constituents, reported in The Times, that he was "...not prepared to send a single Birmingham lad to his death for the sake of Abyssinia."[31] In the same month he was indicating support for "...a foreign policy, prudent, conciliatory, and non-aggressive, seeking a quarrel with no one..."[32] And he had no objection, to begin with, to appeasing Germany at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe,[33] since this did not appear to pose a threat to Britain in the West. Certainly

before Munich, but less so after the Anschluss, there was a fairly general acceptance that German expansion in the east was in British interests because it would conciliate Germany, establish a bulwark against Soviet Communism (this view was not shared by the Labour Party), and leave western Europe undisturbed. The Sunday Times of March 31, 1935, announced that "...this country...has no real interest in Eastern Europe..."[34] In 1938 Alan Lennox-Boyd, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour (reported in The Times, 19 March) argued that Germany "could absorb Czechoslovakia and Great Britain would remain secure, but Germany could not invade France without threatening us."[35]

Inter-war friction in Anglo-French relations was due in large part to different perceptions as to how peace should be maintained. Those different perceptions stemmed, of course, from different sets of national priorities. British policy allowed for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Hugh Dalton of the Labour Party could make a distinction between the take-over of the Rhineland, an act carried out "...within the frontiers of the German Reich", and Italy's "...aggressive war...beyond...frontiers..." in Abyssinia. In his view the British public was capable of making this very proper distinction.[36] It was not, of course, a distinction which France could accept, given her anxieties over security. The Spectator probably echoed general feeling in

Britain at the time when, on 13 March, 1936, it claimed that "No one is disposed to moralise over-much about Germany's...breaches of the Treaty of Versailles."[37] This was all part of the British policy to accommodate and conciliate, and it was a policy which had overwhelming support at the time. The argument did not impress France, however. In the early twenties she had insisted upon full reparations in order to make sure that Germany remained weak. This did not suit Britain, economically or diplomatically. French support of Polish claims in Silesia (1921) and then the invasion of the Ruhr (1923) were further attempts to weaken Germany. And the alliances between France and Germany's eastern neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, were intended to contain Germany. All this ran counter to Britain's willingness to allow Germany room for manoeuvre in central and eastern Europe. The Franco-Soviet Pact (1935) also threatened Britain's plans to appease Germany in the east, and indeed raised fears that such French action could lead to war in the west. Relations between Britain and France were not improved by the June 1935 Anglo-German naval pact which was intended to hold German surface ships and submarines at 35% and 45% of respective British levels.

It appears that there is a case for arguing that there was a tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy, and that the differences between the pre 1914 period and the inter-war years

were "...ones of degree and not of kind."[38] Appeasement was,
"...after all, the natural policy of a Britain steadily losing
its dominant role in world affairs, steadily becoming
democratised, and steadily recognising that, for a mixture of
ethical and pragmatic reasons, the conciliatory approach in
diplomacy was of greater advantage to the country than the
resort to threats or even to the use of force."[39] How was it,
then, that "...the most noble term in the diplomatic
vocabulary..."[40] came to connote "...weakness, fear and
retreat in the face of bluff..."? Why was it that public
opinion swung against it and the government found itself forced
to meet the demands of its parliamentary opponents (from both
right and left)? And how does the policy of appeasement, and
the opposition which finally rose against it, fit into the
co-operation-competition model? The answers to such questions
are to be found in reaction to the Anschluss (March 1938) the
Munich Agreement, and the parliamentary debate which followed it
(September/October, 1938) and Prague (March 1939).

The Government found itself attacked by a small group of its own
supporters in the Spring and Summer of 1938. Those included
Eden, Amery, Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys. They were not
implacably opposed to further concessions to Germany, but were
opposed to any further concessions unmatched by firm guarantees
on Hitler's part. This vital issue of reciprocity will be

returned to. The group had widended by 5 October, 1938 (the Munich debate division in the House of Commons), and about 20 conservative M.P.s including Eden, Amery, Macmillan, Sandys, Churchill, Bracken, Cooper, Harold Nicolson and Richard Law (son of the former P.M.) withheld support from the government in the division. By March 1938 Leo Amery had moved away from his non-interventionist stance and claimed that British security now demanded "...a policy of Continental entanglements."[41] It was not just a question of the material security of Britain, however; there was now a moral argument against appeasement. Ideals and ethical principles were now at stake. Austria had stood "...for something rather unique in the world, the last remnant of that old tradition of a united Western Christianity, a super-national state..."[42] It had been trampled down. An ideal, with ethical significance had been attacked, the ideal of "...unity on free co-operative lines..."[43] Duff Cooper justified his resignation as First Lord in terms which linked consideration of universal values with thoughts on Britain's basic security position. He argued that if war had come in September-October, 1938, "it would not have been over Czechoslovakia as such, but to prevent the brutal domination of Europe by one great power."[44] Richard Law, in a speech to the Commons on 3 October, 1938, used words which implied moral as well as security considerations: "...ruthless...most cruel...most inhuman..."[45] In a radio broadcast on 16

October, 1938, Churchill used the same combination of arguments, calling for a "...swift gathering of forces to confront not only military but moral aggression."[46] Appeasement, which had its justification on moral and pragmatic grounds was now being challenged on both, from a group whose views tended to be located at the positive end of the competition continuum. The real crunch for the policy came when those opponents were joined by others whose views tended to be located at the positive end of the co-operation continuum.

The issue of reciprocity is of very real importance when discussing the revolt of the co-operationists against appeasement. The term co-operationist in this context covers those who tended towards the positive end of the co-operation continuum, but not pacifists who were at the extreme on that continuum. Pacifism was a self-contained position which did not require reciprocity to give it justification. E.H. Carr made a definitive statement of the co-operationist philosophy.[47] Carr argued that change was inevitable in international affairs because the relative power of countries was constantly shifting. Those countries which were growing in strength demanded concessions, and those countries which were becoming weaker in relative terms had demands made on them. The usual method of adjustment was war, but this option, with all its disadvantages, could be avoided if statesmen abandoned rigid positions and

adopted a more flexible approach, including the willingness to negotiate. This flexibility of approach had worked in the domestic area where the 'haves' confronted the 'have-nots'. The abandonment of rigid positions had produced a situation in which both sides showed "...a willingness to submit disputes to various forms of conciliation and arbitration..."[48] Here was the principle of reciprocity, the prerequisite for effective, meaningful co-operation.

Co-operationists could give general support to the policy of appeasement so long as there was no denial of reciprocity. Appeasement as a policy subsumed an attitude towards Germany as a member of the community of nations. It was an attitude which, certainly after the Great War, had a real measure of sympathy in it. In essence, that attitude was that Germany was a partner in the process leading to accommodations and compromises. The concept of partnership is significant. Margaret Mead [49] has pointed out that in the conceptual language of the British the word 'partner' has a specific meaning. In the British perception 'partnership' is interpreted in terms of a games model in which 'partners' are regarded as being in symmetrical relationship. "The British [associate] the word when applied to international affairs with a sports context, with [for example] the tennis partner who for the duration of the game is treated like oneself..."[50] This involves acceptance of the

same procedural values and the principle of reciprocity. When it became difficult to sustain the view that Germany was a partner in this sense, when the run of events gave a clear impression that Germany was paying scant attention to reciprocity, and was a taker without being a giver, the co-operationists mounted a challenge to appeasement. Without reciprocity there was no partnership; if no partnership, then no effective co-operation. The principle itself was now at stake. This encouraged the notion that appeasement had become "...a craven surrender to threats rather than the wise and rational application of moral principles."[51] Appeasement was now under attack from both ends of the parallel continuums because, in the end, it was regarded as a policy which "...neither satisfied the moral nor the practical requirements of British policy."[52]

The co-operation-competition model accommodates appeasement as a long standing policy and also the challenges raised against it in the late 1930s. The ambiguities inherent in the area of congruence were present in the policy itself. As long as Britain had specific interests these could clash with the interests of other states (competition); the way to deal with such problems, always assuming that ultimate interests [material and moral] were not at stake, was through mediation, conciliation and compromise (co-operation). This interrelationshp was described by Eyre Crowe when he said that

British policy was founded on a desire to harmonise national interests with "the general desires and ideas common to all mankind."[53] Significantly, Kennedy defined appeasement as "...a peculiar mixture of morality and calculated national interest..."[54], and as "...a very hybrid creature..."[55] The model can also be used to demonstrate the two stages of opposition to appeasement, the early stage ineffective and the later stage effective. In the early stage the policy was criticised from one direction because it was not competitive enough, and from the other direction because it did not go far enough in terms of co-operation. Such disparate opposition allowed the government to justify its policy at large as one of sensible moderation. In the later stage the opposition coalesced on the grounds that the government was inadequately competitive in a situation where morality and security were both at stake.

What has to be noted, however, and be subject to elaboration in Part Three, is that common cause against the Nazi threat did not remove the tensions between those who were thoroughly competitive in attitude toward Germany, and those who made distinctions between Nazi practices and other traditions in German life and experience. Those tensions were rooted in the different ways in which different people assigned relative weights to the pragmatic and ideological aspects of the British self-image.

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PART 3

THE DEBATE ON GERMANY AS A PRODUCT OF THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF THE BRITISH SELF-IMAGE.

CHAPTER 4

'US AND THEM': THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF THE BRITISH
SELF-IMAGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY

(i)

British attitudes to Germany offer a justification for the claim that "countries are judged by yet others according to the degree by which they have developed in their own image."[1] Those attitudes were frequently expressed, at times of tension and crisis, or at times of conscience-led reflection, in language which implicitly or explicitly defined the British self-image. This image was essentially dualistic, incorporating on the one hand the perception of Britain as a material entity with pragmatic interests which had to be defended against rivals, and on the other hand the perception of a national community with a set of intermeshing traits and values such as fairness, justice, considerateness, acceptance of ambiguity, tolerance, sensitivity, and empathy.[2] In the context of the parallel continuums model, attitudes which called for a competitive response to Germany, that is, attitudes located between left-of-centre and the positive extreme of the competition continuum, tended to involve both elements of the self-image in that they came from either a conviction that Britain as a material entity was under severe threat, or from what amounted, near and at the extreme, to a fanatical commitment to the 'ideological' element. In this latter case there was a virtual synthesis of both elements of the self-image, with the fervent, combative defence of values and traits becoming in effect the

defence of _everything_ Britain _was_ and _stood_ for.[3] On the other hand, attitudes which encouraged a co-operative response to Germany, that is, attitudes located between right-of-centre and the positive extreme of the co-operation continuum, tended to emphasise the ideological component.[4] Clustered around the centre of the area of congruence were attitudes which encouraged a composite response to Germany, derived from both aspects of the self-image in more or less equal proportions.

To regard the British self-image as dualistic is not a mere analytical convenience. Joseph Frankel [1970] has pointed to the substantive difference between the 'aspirational' and 'operational' responses of individuals and groups, including decision makers, to environmental factors. Aspirational responses refer to "... the vision of the good life, to some ideal set of goals...."; operational responses refer to interests "....capable of achievement within the foreseeable future...", and usually stem from "...considerations of expediency or necessity."[5] Geert Hofstede [1984] recommends that a distinction be made "...between values as the _desired_ and the _desirable_....", the desired relating more to pragmatic issues, the desirable to ideology.[6] David Apter [1965] has differentiated 'consummatory' values, "...based on a particular set of moralities", and 'instrumental' values; the adequacy of which "....can be judged on the basis of efficiency."[7] It

is not to be supposed, however, that the two components of the British self-image stood in isolation, one from the other. Although the total image was perceived differentially by various individuals and groups, each component was always awarded some significance by those who participated in the debate on Germany. Paul Kennedy's comment that British responses to international events tended to be "....a peculiar mixture of morality and calculated self-interest", [8] and J. W. Eaton's reflection that British actions were characterised by a "...combination of moral conviction and business sense...", [9] are descriptive of the interrelationship between the two elements of the self-image. It was, of course, the relative weights assigned to each element in the formulation of the 'mixture' that defined the attitudes of individuals and groups toward Germany. It was the essentially dualistic nature of the British self-image which gave rise to debate on Germany and the Germans and located views at particular points on the parallel continuums of competition and co-operation.

The pragmatic component of the British self-image, and its significance in relationships with Germany, has been well documented. The concern of this chapter, and the three that follow, is to examine attitudes toward Germany which either implicitly or explicitly suggest that integral to the image was the perception of a national community with a set of intermeshing traits and values. This, in conjunction with

the pragmatic element, will serve the purpose of identifying the underlying tensions within the self-image, tensions which fuelled the debate on Germany. It will also clear the way for discussion of another important issue: the dilemmas which arise when expressed attitudes derived from declared values appear to be inconsistent with the values themselves. Insofar as the British had the capacity to judge other nations not only as rivals who might provide obstacles to the pursuit of pragmatic interests, but also as national communities to whom they could ascribe disapproved traits and values, dilemmas were always going to arise. To criticise another nation because it did not come up to the standards of the moral element of the British self-image was one thing, but to treat that same nation unfairly, intolerantly, unsympathetically, was quite another thing, and raised problems of consistency. "The urge to keep images and the attitudes that attend them in some sort of internally ordered repair...." is an aspect of human motivation which has been of particular interest to social psychologists.[10] This issue will be addressed in Chapter 8.

The ideological component of the British self-image can be readily identified, even when not explicitly expressed in attitudes, by locating views of self and others on an 'Us and Them' axis.[11] When we are told "This is what they are like",

in a way which allows for few if any redeeming features, the self-image is identifiable even when not made explicit in contradistinction. There is, of course, no need to read between the lines when "This is what they are like" is addressed in an antagonistic mode and at the same time "This is what we are like is addressed in a non-antagonistic mode. The self-image also emerges, implicitly or explicitly, when "This is what they are like" is formulated either in a way which allows for a number of redeeming/justifying features, or suggests a real measure of similarity with "This is what we are like."

In the following analysis of how the British self-image was revealed, the treatment is chronological. It would have been possible to arrange the information under headings dealing with particular aspects of the image - for example, tolerance, fair-play, justice, empathy. Any apparent gain in coherence might, however, have been outweighed by the tedium of constant recapitulation. The advantage of the chronological approach is that authors have their full say without interruption.

(ii)

The <u>National Review</u> editorials of L. J. Maxse suggest an empathetic understanding of Germany's position. There was an attempt to see things from Germany's point of view, that of a nation caught up in a set of inexorable forces, imprisoned by the logic of crucial hypothetical imperatives. The fact that the conclusions to be drawn from all this supported Maxse's thesis that Germany posed a threat of such consequence that other British traits and values were made temporarily redundant, does not reduce the significance of the process which led to those conclusions. And that process involved sympathetic understanding.

In order to understand the perspective which Germany appeared to have of the world in the first decade of the twentieth century, Sidney Low [1908] constructed an alternative scenario, with Britain at the centre of it, and invited his readers to consider what <u>their</u> responses would be:

"Suppose Ireland were an independent country, burning for revenge, with a navy nearly equal to our own; suppose France had even more capital ships than ourselves; and suppose that the two powers were in permanent alliance.

It is possible that in that case we too should be restless, irritable, easily perturbed, fervently anxious to do something in order to protect ourselves against the menace."(12)

Harold Spender [1908] was also moved to see things from the German point of view. As things stood, the Germans had a particular image of the British, and the British of the Germans. Those images were too glibly accepted on each side.[13] In stepping across the divide, as it were, Spender hoped to reveal a more reliable image of Germany. Although conscious of threat, his exercise in empathy led to the engagement of other elements of the ideological self-image. Consideration of recent German history suggested that the analogy of adolescence was appropriate. In such a situation a measure of tolerance was necessary.[14] It would be wrong, it would not be 'playing the game', to keep her down. An empathetic awareness of Germany's perspectives and aspirations characterised the work of Cramb [1914]. A kind of necessity lay at the root of relationships between Britain and Germany. Both states were caught up in an inexorable nexus of things.[15] Dillon [1914] though passionately unsympathetic to Germany's position, with no concessions made to any form of mitigating factor, nevertheless evoked other aspects of the self-image - justice, honour, trust, fair play. It was in

defence of these that Britain was locked in conflict with the forces of evil.[16]

Poems published by Charles Hamilton Sorley and Thomas Hardy in 1914 and 1915 respectively, carried empathetic understanding to a point where the 'Us and Them' polarities disappeared and something approaching a common identity emerged. In Sorley's view the onset of war in 1914 was due to a blindness which affected both Britain and Germany, denying them access to "...each other's truer form...."

"You only saw your future bigly planned,

And we the tapering paths of our own mind,

And in each other's dearest way we stand,

And the blind fight the blind."

When it was all over, the tragic misunderstandings resolved, they would look upon each other "...more loving-kind and warm." For Hardy, "Kinfolk kin tongued" had been deceived into war.[17]

Further clues to the ideological element of the British self-image are to be found in popular fiction plotted on the First World War. Cadogan and Craig [1978], in a review of the fiction of the two world wars, provide the following examples

and commentary[18]. Of a story entitled Twenty Fathoms Deep, published in Nelson Lee, 25 September 1915, they note that the theme was one in which "British decency is contrasted with German ruthlessness..." This decency is in evidence when Lee and his assistant, 'Nipper', pass up the opportunity to kill German agents from a distance. Lee explains: "Of course we could level our revolvers this very minute and drop both the scoundrels where they stand, but that isn't the English way....". A similar episode occurs in Buchan's Mr Standfast. Hannay has the opportunity to shoot the German agent, Moxon Ivery, and thereby subvert a particularly ruthless and damaging scheme, but he lets the chance slip. The problem was that Ivery was clear in his sights, a sitting target, and therefore unprepared. Hannay could not shoot under such circumstances for to do so would have been contrary to the rules of the game.[19] In Christine Chandler's Our Lonely Soldier, published in Little Folks, April 1919, children play an unfortunate and hurtful prank on the kindly hero, Private Horace Smith. Smith is quite taken aback by what he obviously regards as behaviour inconsistent with the upbringing of the children: "Well - I wouldn't have believed as how English children could have acted like that... If you'd been little Huns, now......"[20] Of Mark Sabre, the hero of A.S.M. Hutchinson's If Winter Comes, published in 1921, Cadogan and Craig write that his troubles

arose from "... a habit of giving serious consideration to the other chap's point of view..."[21]

Writing in 1915, A. G. Gardiner [22] was unequivocal in his condemnation of the public policy of Germany. Reports of atrocities in Belgium had "...shocked the conscience of the world and left Germany a criminal at the bar of humanity... Today the wild beast is loose, and Germany has released it from every restraint... The crimes of Louvain, Dinant, Aerchot... The collective punishments... are declarations to the world that Germany knows no law of God or man in the pursuit of her object.... It is as though we are in conflict with a people who live on another plane, move in another realm of morals..."[23] It was all the more remarkable that at such a time[24] Gardiner was prepared to make a very clear distinction between government and people, between public policy and private feeling, and that he recognised a hope for the future in "... that other motif that runs through the German nation counter to the triumphant motif of Bernhardism..."[25]

He was led to this view by an awareness of the way truth and rational discussion could be distorted and silenced in the emergency of war, and by appraisal, implicit and explicit, of the British self-image. Of the impact of war on the critical faculties he wrote: "In the fierce stress of battle we have no

time to discriminate, and we brand the whole German nation with the Scarlet Letter. We know it is false; we know that Burke's great saying about the indictment of a nation is as true of Germany as of any other people: but for the moment we are living under the dominion of a tyrannic passion which repudiates... reason as though it were a traitor."[26] It is possible to piece together Gardiner's perception of the ideological element of the British self-image by examining passages containing implicit references to it and linking them with explicit statements made elsewhere. For example, writing of the difficulty of understanding "... the mental condition of the man who, thinking as Bernhardi thought, sits down to tell all his thoughts to the world..." he concluded:

> "It is this philosophic detachment, coupled with an entire
> lack of the humour and imagination which enable you to
> 'put yourself in his place' and to see the other man's
> point of view, which has puzzled the English mind in the
> conduct of Germany."[27]

The inference is clear. The British were endowed with that humour and imagination which made them capable of empathising with others. At another point Gardiner referred to reports that "... on the battlefield and at sea there have been glimpses that [the Germans] are better than the devilish doctrine that employs

them as its instruments."[28]   The fact that "the English

people have been quickly responsive to such episodes, as in the

case of Captain von Müller of the Emden", is taken as

confirmation that "the healthy mind hates in spasms, but...

lives by its affections." A particular image is being ascribed

to the British people when it is claimed that they "...made much

[of von Müller] who fought without hate and without bitterness,

with chivalry and good temper", and in so doing demonstrated

that "it is possible still to be both a brave man and a

gentleman."[29]   When arguing that "... the God of blood and

iron", who underwrote the public policy of Germany was

"...divorced from all moral considerations, from mercy, from

justice, from pity",[30] Gardiner was assigning such values to

the British.

There were also less oblique references to the traits and values

of the British, as for example:

"......We have not made brute force a national idol....We may

still broadly claim that wherever we have gone we have

carried the spirit of freedom and the authority of the moral

law."[31]

and ".....We shall not answer infamy with infamy."[32]

So perceiving the British self-image, and on guard against that tyrannic passion which repudiates reason, Gardiner determined to be fair to Germany. There was to be no inconsistency between attitudes and values in his case. "do not let us forget to be just", he wrote, and justice called for self-criticism as well as fairness to the German nation. [33]

"In claiming that in this conflict of ideals it is we who have our faces turned towards the light, it is not suggested that we are free from the idolatry of Force...[the] growth of material power... unchecked by an equivalent growth of moral power or social conscience [had resulted in] a certain tyrannous exploitation of self based largely on the possession of material power. The Prussian spirit is not confined to Prussia. It is everywhere... That, and not the German people, is the ultimate enemy." [34]

For Gardiner, there was 'another Germany', quite distinct from that associated with public policy. In Karl Liebknecht and the German Socialists he saw evidence of the spirit which animated this 'other Germany'. "There has been much scornful criticism", he wrote,

"of the docility with which the German Socialists have answered the call of the Prussian drill sergeant. 'See what nonsense this Socialism is', it is said. 'See how it all vanishes into thin air at the sound of the trumpet...' The obedience with which the German Socialists, after marching for generations to the polls against the Prussian Junkers and their military machine, fell into step behind the Junkers at the call of the bugle seems to reduce all their agitations and theories to idle wind. It encourages writers like the enigmatic Dr. Dillon to say, as he says in the Contemporary Review, that there is nothing to choose between the government and the people. But this is to take a shallow view of the facts. The storm fell upon the socialists of Germany as suddenly as upon us... They saw only one thing, as we did, that their country was in danger; and they resolved, as we did, to subordinate everything to the instant duty of saving it from ruin.

We can illustrate the position with a parable. You may quarrel very heartily with your family about the internal economy of your house; but if the house is in flames you will preterminate those quarrels and join forces to put out the flames. You may suspect that the fire is due to the mischievous stove arrangements against which you have waged a vain struggle; but that will not make you less eager to quench the fire."[35]

There was hope for the future in Liebknecht, "the symbol of the Germans with whom we are going to be reconciled." This was because "millions of people in Germany are thinking his thoughts"; thoughts which, according to Gardiner, were crystallised in the conclusion of the speech which Liebknecht submitted in writing to the President of the Reichstag, 2 December 1914:

"Under protest against the war; against those who are responsible for it and have caused it; against the capitalistic purposes for whom it is being waged; against the plans of annexation; against the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg; against the absolute reign of the rights of war; against the social and political violation of their clear duty of which the Government and the ruling classes stand guilty, I shall vote against the war credits asked for."[36]

Here was that other motif that ran through the German nation, counter to the triumphant motif of Bernhardism.

Gardiner made two sympathetic contributions to the debate on Germany. One, summarised above, advanced the view that the

crimes of Germany were the crimes of a system and not of a people. The other took the form of a generous assertion that any weaknesses in the German character were to be explained not by reference to innate dispositions but to the force of circumstances. This brought him, very properly, to consideration of culture and to the problem of differential sharing in culture. His argument, and its inadequacies, will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. What may be said at this point is that those inadequacies suggest that it was not theoretical rigour that brought Gardiner to his conclusions on Germany; it was a psychological need to align his attitudes toward Germany with his perception of the British self-image.

In the significantly titled, A War of Contrasts, Sidney Brooks [1915] set the "...spluttering, insensate hatred of England which is now the common passion of seventy million Germans..."[37] against what he regarded as the more sober, reflective and tolerant attitudes of the British. So far as hate was concerned, the ordinary Englishman was "....very far from reciprocating it. Rightly or wrongly he goes a long way towards exonerating the German people from complicity in bringing on the war. He distinguishes, perhaps somewhat innocently, between Prussia and the Prussians on the one hand, and the rest of the German states on the other. He conceives himself to be at war less with the rank and file of a nation

than with the spirit and leaders of a localised military caste."[38]

A mature sense of proportion, a basic good-heartedness, a readiness to see good in others, are taken by Brooks to be characteristic traits of the British.

> "No nation, perhaps, is so little capable of keeping a grudge alive or of nourishing irrelevant and distracting antagonisms, or so willingly allows the mellowing hand of time the fullest play... It is one of the most palpable contrasts between the Germans and ourselves that they can hate, can find luxury in the emotion, and derive strength from its expression, and that the basic impulse to such displays is lacking in our temperament. Whether it is that we are more impervious to ideas than they are, or less given to visualising them, or that our nerves are under better control, or that our national character is more mature, or that our instinct for the qualities that tell in a crisis is sounder, the fact remains that this particular German characteristic has no counterpart in the British psychology. It is an excess so alien to our own consciousness that we find difficulty in connecting it with grown-up rational beings..."[39]

Fair-play, a jewel in the catalogue of British traits and values was quite incomprehensible to the Germans. To them, "....it seems frivolous or forced, a calculated affront where it is not another proof of our lamentable decadence. They spat from them in contempt the praises we bestowed on the Captain of the Emden as a skilful and gallant commander who played the game... To impute to them or to any of their officers on land or sea the qualities of sportsmanship is to rasp on the feelings of the nation..." [40] Similarly, the British capacity to empathise with others was foreign to the Germans. They "...understand things and facts, but they do not, as we do, understand men. They lack the power of dramatic sympathy to enter into other peoples' feelings and emotions..." [41]

E. C. Bentley [1915] in his analysis of The German State of Mind, made implicit reference to British traits and values when he listed the facets of "...the mental condition into which Germany had got itself after several generations of patting itself on the back and stewing in its own juice. The ignorance, the want of understanding, the monstrous vanity, the moral cowardice, the debility of reasoning, the feverish inconsistency, the total surrender to the basest emotionalism, the general lack of nerve and vicious temper..."

At the same time he disclaimed any intention of making "... a condemnation of all Germans in heaps.... I have been, and still am, a strong admirer of what is admirable in the qualities and achievements of that wonderful people. I know well that millions of Germans never desired the peace to be broken." (42)

Oblique references to the traits and values said to characterise the British are littered throughout the following passage, which concludes with one of his few explicit comments on the way in which Britain and Germany differ. The general theme of the passage is 'German brutality'.

"I do not refer particularly to German methods in warfare. They are only one result of a general leaning towards violence, which has always been present in the soul of the people... Nobody can live for a week in Prussia without feeling the presence of this tendency. It is in everything, from the [official] spluttering about 'hacking through' a particularly defenceless state, to the unembarrassed air with which a sixteen-stone Berliner will crowd a woman out of the corner seat in a train, or the whole-hearted gusto with which a troop of mounted police will charge, laying about them with the flat of the sabre, right through an entirely peaceable assembly... Ruthless employment of superior strength of any kind to one's own

advantage, and a taste for the exercise of force in general, are so much a matter of course to that strange people that little things which make the ordinary British observer's fists tingle are constantly said and done in everyday life without exciting any comment."[43]

Frances Evelyn Warwick [1915] introduced her reflections on Prussia and The Woman with a demonstration of her desire to be fair to the Germans. Her unwillingness to "...bring an indictment against a whole nation..." took the form of a leitmotiv.[44]

"We who have travelled in Germany, not once, but many times, know full well that hardness and cruelty are not associated with the majority. If we admit the simple German of the south is not cruel at heart... rather a dreamer and a sentimentalist, with strong love for domestic pleasures, we find that the policy of 'frightfulness' must be ascribed to the Military Party, consisting for the most part of Prussians with headquarters in Berlin."[45]

Referring to reported outrages against women in German occupied territories, she asserted:

"Undoubtedly these stories, if they could reach the heart of Germany would thrill tens of thousands of honest men with indignation and disgust; I do not believe for a moment that they represent the inclinations of the whole nation."[46]

Of domestic life in general, Warwick was prepared to believe that "in tens of thousands of German homes the wife and daughters are loved and honoured..." In this commitment to fairness and balance Warwick was reflecting an important facet of the British self-image. [She was also, incidentally, congratulating large sections of the German community for accepting traits and values associated with Britain]. And she did so in another way. In looking critically at the connections between public policy and the ascribed role of women in Prussia, she implied that the connections were quite different in Britain.

"The German has forgotten the respect and reverence he owes to his own women folk.... in the rank and file of military circles, even among the men who hold official positions and boast of a certain standing, woman has been dethroned.... No good looking woman is safe in Germany from the ill-bred stares and comments of the men with whom she must travel in train or tram... they are liable to be elbowed into the road if men walking abreast can occupy the whole of the pavement."[47]

Arthur E. P. Brome-Weigall [1915] regarded Germany as a country whose point of view was completely different from that of Britain, and whose actions were governed by a code which did not remotely resemble the British code.[48] The British self-image is made quite explicit, revealed layer by layer in contrast to each damning criticism of the "cancer of German ethics." He went so far as to suggest that the outbreak of the war had been fortunate for "the fair body of mankind", providing as it did an opportunity for timely diagnosis and remedial surgery. The problem with Germany did not reside in militarism, since this was "...an eccentricity apparent to all men, a kind of St Vitus' Dance which could not escape astonished observation." The complaint lay deeper, in the cancer of logic, in

".... the German inability to recognise the paradox upon which life is based, the facing of cold fact, the removal of the veil which makes the vision of existence tolerable, the calling a spade a spade... All the atrocities which the Germans have committed are due to their devotion to apparent fact, and to their belief that fact is the beginning and end of existence; all the protests which the other nations of the earth have uttered are prompted by our knowledge that there is something which lies behind fact... The Germans follow the process of thought to its logical consequence; we shun that conclusion and create

rules of conduct which cannot be justified in logic. The Germans define life and act only upon materialistic reason; we leave life undefined and render tribute to the intangible.... we believe that culture means the ostracising of the crude and bestial element in human life; but the Germans, on the contrary, are of the opinion that culture is the frank recognition of those elements." (49)

It is clear from this that his image of the Germans was that of a people who could not deal with uncertainties, doubts, ambiguities and imponderables - those features of human experience which, if accepted in a rational frame of mind, are the seedcorn of tolerance. Where the Germans, in a competitive situation, would push the logic of competition to its extreme, the British would intrude the notion of fair play, the rules of the game, and so avoid that extreme. The distinction was then reinforced:

"The Germans have no sensitiveness.... the High State of their civilisation has led them to discard sentiment and to face fact in a logical manner; and that paradoxical delicacy which makes life tolerable to us has been abandoned by them as being illogical..." (50)

Brome-Weigall identified this passion for logic in domestic
life, in popular literature, and in the arts, but his prime
target was its expression in German ideas of military discipline
and etiquette.

> "The Teutonic mind, admitting only cold fact and
> discarding ideals, had recognised that the nations of the
> earth are but rapacious packs of animals preying upon one
> another.... The British nation, on the other hand, whose
> civilisation tended towards the ideal rather than to the
> material, blinded itself to so harsh an aspect of life,
> and hoped for the best."[51]

Nature did not hold individual life in high regard. What
justification, then, could there be for treating life as
precious. Individuals were as leaves on a tree, and leaves must
fall. It therefore mattered little if they were shaken off, or
broken off by force. In face of such thinking it was clear that
"any desire [on the part of the British] to limit the horrors of
war seems to them to be the most ridiculous of paradoxes."[52]
War was not a game. The intention was to impose horror on the
enemy, and success in such an enterprise could involve deceit
and cheating. It followed that there was no place for
inhibiting notions such as 'fair play'. It was in contrast to
such "logical deductions of the German mind... the most utter

disregard for the illogical sentiments which sweeten life [that] our methods of thought assume a character altogether more human and inviting."[53] As viewed by the British, civilised life was a paradox; it could not be reduced to a formula. In defence of civilised life, German ethics had to be utterly destroyed. And, of all nations,

"England, impractical, illogical, idealistic, laughing England [was] most fitted to strike with the sword of Righteousness." [54]

The distasteful application of logic to the conduct of war, a practice said to distinguish the Germans from the British, was a theme also treated by J. H. Morgan [1915] in the introduction to his translation of The German War Book.[55]

"Let the reader.... study carefully a dark sentence in that section of The War Book which deals with 'Cunning and Deceit'. There the German officer is instructed that there is nothing in international law against [steht volkerrechtlich nichts entgegen] the exploitation of assassination, incendiarism, robbery and the like, to the disadvantage of the enemy. There is nothing in international law against it! No, indeed, there are many things upon which international law is silent for the

simple reason that it refuses to contemplate their possibility. It assumes that it is dealing not with brutes but with men. International law is the etiquette of international society, and society, as it has been gravely said, is conducted on the assumption that murder will not be committed. We do not carry revolvers in our pockets when we enter our clubs nor finger them when we shake hands with a stranger. Nor, to adopt a very homely illustration, does any hostess think it necessary to put up a notice in her drawing room that guests are not allowed to spit upon the floor. But what should we think of a man who committed this disgusting offence, and then pleaded that there was nothing to show that the hostess had forbidden it? Human society, like political society, advances in proportion as it rests on voluntary morality rather than positive law. In primitive society everything is 'taboo', because the only thing that will restrain the undisciplined passions of men is fear. Can it be that this is why the traveller in Germany finds everything 'Verboten', and that things which in our own country are left to the good sense and good breeding of the citizen have to be officiously forbidden?" [56]

Havelock Ellis [1915] made distinctions between the British and the Germans, but he also made distinctions between German and

German. He had a sympathetic appreciation of the problems facing the various states of the Empire in relation to Prussia, and he held out the hope that Germany was not hermetically sealed in with the values and practices which characterised her recent history. In this analysis criticism was moderated by a desire to avoid categorical condemnation. [57]

It was the misfortune of the nation that "... the spirit of the drill sergeant... the eternal spirit of Prussia... has for the moment dominated the whole of Germany...." [58] It was in subordination to the state that the Germans were so strikingly different from the British:

> "An Englishman.... no more dreams of worshipping the state than of worshipping his own trousers. Both the one and the other he regards as useful.... he would not be without either on any account... but he regards them as alike made for him and to his own measure. The idea that he was made for them and that he must abase himself in the dust before their divine superiority is an idea at which he would smile." [59]

At the same time, Ellis perceived two traditions in German life - individualism and docility - traditions which accounted for what he termed "the strikingly duplex character of the German spirit....."

"The German spirit oscillates between extreme nationalism
and extreme internationalism. The opposing claims for the
dominance of the individual and of the state in Germany,
the cosmopolitanism and the particularism of Germany.....
may well represent varying aspects, from different angles,
of the same national temperament, the obverse and reverse
of the German spirit." [60]

Those opposing claims, pulling Germany in different directions,
could be traced to the profound differences between Prussia on
the one hand and the Rhineland - the west and the south - on the
other. The differences were highlighted by the leading figures
of each region, "... the two supremely representative German men
of modern times....", Bismarck and Goethe. [61] The tensions
inherent in this division meant that 'Germany' had resented,
sometimes even loathed Prussia. It took crisis to bring them
together. "Thus it has come about - although it has not always
been so and doubtless will not always be so - that of late the
spirit of Germany has been the spirit of Prussia." [62]
However, the dislike of Prussia could not be completely removed,
even in a national emergency. Many Germans did not want the
war. If they remained silent it was "out of patriotism in the
moment of crisis.... but they represent a vast number of their
.... fellow countrymen who love peace and home..." [63] In
this, there was hope for the future, for,

"Beyond and above the Germany of Clausewitz and
Scharnhorst, of Bismarck and Moltke, of Treitschke...
There is the great and immortal Germany of Lessing and
Kant, of Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt, of Heine.... It
is a Germany that will be created anew...." [64]

Implicit in articles written by Bertrand Russell [1915,1916]
were the notions that Germany should be treated fairly, that
judgements should not be one-sided, that her situation should be
regarded with sympathetic understanding and tolerance. [65]
Reasoned, impartial analysis indicated that both Britain and
Germany bore responsibility for the conflict. The problem was
that both were "...wholly blind to their own faults, and utterly
fantastic in the crimes which they attribute to the enemy." [66]
Each nation saw itself as peace-loving, and using its power in
pursuit of worthy aims. Each saw the other as perfidious and
jealous, conducting a premeditated conflict. Each believed
that the only possible resolution was in the utter humiliation of
the other. [67]

"The mood in which Germany embarked upon the war was
abominable, but it was a mood fostered by the habitual
mood of England... by our resistance we showed that we
shared their standards...",

and cold pride on the one hand was opposed by hot envy on the other. [68]

Attitudes toward Germany in the prewar period had been characterised by an intolerance stemming from a legalistic insistence on the maintenance of the status quo. Minds had been closed to the reality that "in a world where nations grow and decay, where forces change and populations become cramped, it is not possible or desirable to maintain the status quo forever."[69] Industrial conflict comes about when the wage-earning class desire change in opposition to what they regard as an unfair status quo, and the privileged class defend the status quo in the name of peace. In this way the blame for class warfare is shared. "And in exactly the same way, England shares the responsibility for Germany's war." [70]

A sympathetic understanding of Germany's position would show that since it became a great power "... it has been handicapped by naval inferiority and by the necessity of defending two frontiers. It is these accidents of history and geography, rather than innate wickedness, which have produced German aggressiveness. The aims of German policy are closely similar to those which we have always pursued, but its methods cannot be the unobtrusive methods which we have usually adopted, because such methods in the circumstances, would achieve nothing."[71]

In consequence of rapid development, Germany became more dependent on imports of food and exports of manufactures. Foreign trade had to be safeguarded, and this required a strengthened navy. But a strong German navy frightened Britain and made her hostile. As a result, the German navy, to be effective in face of British hostility, had to be strengthened still further in relative terms. This Britain would not tolerate, and so from the German point of view "... all industrial progress and all colonial expansion [remained] perpetually at England's mercy. If we ask ourselves how we should feel if we were similarly at the mercy of Germany, we shall perhaps understand why the Germans hate us." [72]

A particularly interesting approach to Germany was taken by J. Ellis Barker [1916]. [73] It is an approach which supports the model for classification of attitudes defined in Chapter 2. Barker accepted that the allies were engaged in a "life and death struggle", and that "... the Anglo-Saxon race [was] fighting for its existence." [74] He complained bitterly that those, including himself, "who unceasingly tried to warn the nation.... were treated as alarmists, cranks..."[75] Those attitudes place him at the positive end of the competition continuum. But he was far from being anti-German in the accepted sense of the term. In fact, some of his passages on German institutions and practices were profoundly laudatory, and

he was very discriminating when he came to assign responsibility for the events leading to the war. His criticism of the British way of doing things, as opposed to the German way, may be regarded as an unusual but nonetheless revealing comment on the ideological self-image. His praise of certain German institutions and practices, and his concomitant criticism of related British institutions and practices, is illustrative of the generosity which many saw as part of the self-image - the capacity to be self-critical and see good in others.

His criticisms remarked, implicitly, upon those British traits and values associated with democratic forms - tolerance of wide ranging opinions, respect for divergent points of view. The organisation and efficiency of Prussia was looked on enviously by Barker. The war had revealed the weaknesses of democracy, and the Prussian example "may indicate the cure."[76]

"In democracies party spirit proves only too often more powerful than patriotism. While party interests are promoted those of the nation are disregarded and suffer neglect. Besides, democracies are administered not by men of action but by men of words, by amateurs whose position depends on the popular will and upon the popular whim.... Organisation in time of crisis can be efficient only if the men in power can command, and if those over whom they have

authority are certain to obey. Democracy is government by argument. It does not organise, but it disorganises....." (77)

Barker deplored what he perceived to be the crucial weakness of British democracy; it left the nation without a guide, without a single will to animate the whole administration of the state. In Germany, the whole nation acted "like a single man, and every other consideration [was] subordinated to the national interest." [78] In science, art, and law, efficiency and organised promotion marked the German approach, whereas in Britain "education remained amateurish.... men toyed with science.... the laws are a maze, and justice is sometimes unobtainable because of.... its uncertainty..." [79] British democracy was self-indulgent, depending for action on voluntary methods and persuasion. If the life and death struggle was to be survived, organisation had to be met by organisation, absolutism by absolutism. [80]

When he came to assign responsibility for the war, Barker restricted his focus to the Kaiser. In 1890, Germany dominated the continent of Europe, but this was "willingly borne, because she was believed to be peaceful and contented." [81] However, after Bismarck's fall, and despite the former Chancellor's ongoing criticism of "... the pernicious policy, the incompetent

statesmen, and the dangerous influence which, he feared, would cause Germany's downfall....", William II interfered, picked unnecessary quarrels, created dislike and suspicion. [82] Although Bethmann Hollweg and other colleagues worked to preserve the peace of Europe, they were "overruled by their master", [83] who imparted to Germany's policy "his own nervous restlessness." [84]

In its own idiosyncratic way, The Foundations of Germany adds to the profile of the ideological self-image.

Thomas F. A. Smith [1916] introduced his examination of The Soul of Germany with a commitment to the tenets of the British self-image. He claimed that during his years in Germany he had lived himself into his surroundings and became part of them. This had involved "a great deal of self-conquest.... incessant alertness in looking at things from the other man's point of view.... unlimited patience and inexhaustible sympathy." [85] The extent to which this commitment informed his attitudes to Germany, the relative weight he assigned to it, is a matter for a subsequent chapter; but his reference to such traits and values, and its location in his text, may be seen as an acknowledgement that he was aware of the ideological dispositions of his readers. And there was no disguising the fact that when he identified German traits and values he was

highlighting those of the British in contradistinction.

Smith set himself the task of revealing the "differences between English and German standards of honour, morality, commercial honesty, reverence for womanhood, sympathy for the downfallen, chivalry to the weak, conceptions of right and wrong...." [86] The German was singularly incapable of looking at things from the other man's point of view. It followed that "true sympathy" was a feeling which did not characterise his human relationships. [87] Where the British would place conscience as a guide to action in relation to others, the Germans placed Ehrgefuhl [the 'feeling' of honour]. The distinction was instructive since it defined the respective ground-rules for interaction. Where conscience more often than not led to other-regarding action, Ehrgefuhl led to ".....marked egoism or diseased vanity", and was a measure of "the ease with which a German may be offended." [88] As evidence of the marked sensitivity and active quarrelsomeness of the Germans, Smith referred to the figures for 'insult' cases [distinct from libel in the German Code] published by the Imperial Statistics Office in Berlin:

Year	Persons Charged	Number Sentenced
1907	83,013	60,895
1908	82,011	59,830
1909	82,827	59,673
1910	84,058	60,344
1911	86,573	61,899

For insulting and threatening officials, not included in the above figures:

Year	Persons Charged	Number Sentenced
1907	35,226	27,418
1908	34,453	26,803
1909	32,999	25,677
1910	31,775	24,668
1911	30,466	23,745

(89)

The ideals expressed in the popular phrase 'fair-play' had never penetrated the imagination of the Germans.[90] Whereas the Englishman abhorred the idea of bullying, such behaviour was a recognised feature of German culture.[91] The conclusion which Smith drew from his analysis was that if Germany were victorious in the war, her methods and principles would overthrow all humane ideals. It remained "Britain's mission to prevent that catastrophe and at the same time to vindicate among nations the principle which she first taught to individuals - the traditions of fair play."[92]

The disposition to discriminate, to limit liability, to deal

fairly with the enemy - even at a time of national emergency - is evident in the introduction to Volume 1 of The Gresham History of the Great War [1917]. "It is essential", wrote the General Editor, "to distinguish broadly between Prussia and Germany.... we had no particular quarrel before the war with the German nation as a whole.... regarded as a quiet, domestic race that would have been wholly admirable if left to itself. It was not against this Germany that we drew the sword; it was against the mail-fisted military caste of Prussia." [93]

T. S. Knowlson [1918] wrote a scathing commentary on German traits and values, and in so doing revealed something of the British self-image. The Germans believed that they were so far ahead of all other nations that they were, in a special sense, the custodians of all knowledge and greatness. To the charge that it would be absurd to imagine that a whole nation "could believe such twaddle about itself", Knowlson responded: "True, so far as any nation other than Germany is concerned, but it is just the doctrine that a German can believe; indeed his mentality is of such high suggestibility that he would believe anything if you based it on a system and made it look authoritative." [94] This notion of superiority led to the surrender of individual ethics to state ethics. The mind of the average German was more concerned with "the list of Thou Shalts and Thou Shalt Nots than with freedom, independence, or

individuality." It was not surprising therefore, that from the cradle to the grave, "The Teuton lives for a great scheme; he is a screw, a nut, or a bolt in the machine of a vast state efficiency." This meant "the death of spontaneity... and spontaneity is vital if a nation is to have.... those finer mental forces...." The absence of such finer forces showed up in German education. Were British knowledge put on the scale against German knowledge, the avoirdupois would be on the German side - and this would be the preferred outcome so far as Britain was concerned. Knowledge that was too unwieldy in volume to fulfil its function of refinement was alien to British sensibilities. [95]

However, Knowlson could not bring himself to damn Germany beyond redemption. There had been something of real value there before the nation had been Prussianised. Like Havelock Ellis, he located the hope of Germany in the west and south, and held out the prospect of revival. Having made this concession he yet entertained a doubt;

"What of a new Germany? Will not a better political ideal, a freer existence with a larger scope for personal initiative, result in a more striking intellectual life? When there is less guidance from the overlords and more opportunity for the natural self, may we not expect a

revival of the older German love of Beauty and Truth? It
would be reasonable to answer in the affirmative, for
Germany has a deep intellectual life that could be potent
if properly developed - not by a system but by individual
freedom. And yet there are purgings to be gone through
before such a condition is possible."[96]

The sources so far used for the definition of the
ideological element of the British self-image have been
taken from periods in which Britain and Germany were
mutually involved in international tension or conflict.
It has to be noted that common validation of the traits
and values said to characterise the British did not lead
to common attitudes toward Germany. This was because
attitudes toward Germany depended less on the validation
of the traits and values than on their salience as
operational constructs and on the weight assigned to them
relative to other factors, for example, the pragmatic
aspect of the self-image. In the 1920s when Britain and
Germany were not mutually involved in international
tension, and even in the 1930s when they were, attitudes
to Germany were, in part at least, the consequence of a
conscience-led phase of reflection. In this phase it is
clear that some who had earlier assigned relatively low
weight to the ideological self-image in their assessment

of Germany and how she should be treated, adjusted that weighting in an upward direction.[97]   It may be assumed that in the same phase those who had assigned relatively high weight to the ideological self-image were confirmed and reinforced in that position. As the conscience-led phase of reflection gave way to another period of tension and conflict there was a return to the situation which had prevailed before and during the First World War - common validation of British traits and values, but divergent attitudes toward Germany.

REFERENCES

1. 'Meet Germany', Atlantic Brucke, June 1962. p.118].

2. For general references to the 'ideological' component of the British self-image see:

(i) John Dewey, 'On Understanding The Mind of Germany' [Atlantic Monthly Vol.117, 1916]. Britain is described as being ruled by conscience and constrained by morality: p.253.

(ii) Thomas F. A. Smith, The Soul of Germany [Hutchinson, London, 1916]. Paraphrasing Karl Peters' assessment of typical British behaviour: "Two boys do not pitch on to one, nor a big boy attack a little chap; if in a fight one is knocked down, his opponent waits till he is up again... English boys learn to respect the weaker sex..." p.18.

(iii) M. Ginsberg, 'National Character' [British Journal of Psychology, Vol.32, Part 3, January 1942]. He refers to characteristic British attitudes of "... tolerance and respect for other persons..." and quotes S. de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen Spaniards [1928]:

"I doubt whether any country excels England in the fundamental decency of public discussion, the urbanity and moderation which is shown to opponents and the care which is taken to keep out... imputation of bad motives to those from whom one happens to differ." p.193.

Ginsberg argued that British traits and values could be deduced from behaviour: "... the empirical habit of

mind is seen in all spheres of English life... There is a disinclination to formulate general principles and piece-meal enactments are preferred." He noted a "...dislike ... for rigid principles and ... distrust of abstractions ... in dealing with the practical problems of life the English mind prefers to proceed tentatively, by trial and error... Individualism... can also be readily traced in the various spheres of the national life... it can be seen in the spirit of the English law which is a law of the liberty of the individual subject... and in a very widespread and deeply rooted impatience of compulsion and restraint." pp.191-192. These behaviour patterns were, according to Ginsberg, logically associated with toleration of divergent views, consideration toward opponents, and respect for individual peculiarities.

(iv) G. P. Gooch, <u>Historical Surveys and Portraits</u> [Longmans, 1966]. He referred to the "... innate generosity which distinguished [The British] perhaps more than the people of any other great power." p.115.

(v) John Mander, <u>Our German Cousins</u> [John Murray, 1974]. "it is not, in general, the British tendency to see things in black and white... Indeed it is one of the things for which we like to blame the Germans, and we are apt to contrast our own grey, sensible moderation with the doctrinaire <u>Schwarzweissmalerei</u>..." p.251.

Referring to "... the fluctuation in the Anglo-Saxon estimate of the German character", he concludes: "Perhaps it is that the English are not good haters." p.255.

3. See Dillon, op.cit., for integration of the pragmatic and ideological elements.

4. For limitations to this general statement see page 323 of Chapter 8 where it is argued that left-of-centre positions could be occupied for ideological reasons and right-of-centre positions for pragmatic reasons.

5. Joseph Frankel, National Interest [MacMillan, London 1970] pp.32-33.

6. Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences [Sage 1984] p.19.

7. David Apter, The Politics of Modernisation [University of Chicago Press, 1965] pp.236-237.

8. Kennedy, Tradition of Appeasement, op.cit.p.198.

9. J. W. Eaton, 'The Unchanging Germany' [Queen's Quarterly, Summer 1937] p.210.

10. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics [Macmillan, London, 1975] p.209.

11. For this approach see David Lusted, 'National Fictions' in Geoff Hurd [ed]. British Film Institute, 1984, p.27.

12. Low, 'The German Oedipus': op.cit. p.646.

13. Spender, 'Great Britain and Germany': op.cit. p.395.

14. Spender, ibid p.393.

15. Cramb, Germany and England, op.cit.

16. Dillon, A Scrap of Paper, op.cit.

17. Charles Hamilton Sorley, To Germany, August 1914. Thomas Hardy, The Pity of It, April 1915.

18. Mary Cadogan and Patricia Craig, Women and Children First [Victor Gollancz London, 1978].

19. Ibid. p.81.

20. Ibid. p.65.

21. Ibid. p.101.

22. A. G. Gardiner, The War Lords [J. M. Dent, London, 1915].

23. Ibid.
    "shocked... humanity" p.27.

23. "Today...object" p.29.

"It is....morals" p.238.

24. "The first half of 1915 was a special time of hate in Britain; for in this phase of the war atrocity mongering reached its peak."

Trevor Wilson, 'Lord Bryce's Investigations into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-15'. [Journal of Contemporary History, vol.14, 1979] p.369.

The Publication of the Bryce Commission Report [Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, London 1915] was one of a series of events which "... rendered Germany peculiarly repugnant at this time." Wilson, ibid, p.369. In that series were the use of poison gas, Zeppelin raids on British cities, and the sinking of the Lusitania. The following are examples of depositions taken in evidence and published by the Bryce Commission.

D1 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at Malines].

"Two women, one of whom I took to be the mother of the other, were close to a house, and were together. The German soldier... struck the elder woman in the middle of the back with his bayonet, and I saw the blade coming through her breast as she faced me... I was then about 100 metres from her... The younger woman was a simple peasant, and wore nothing but a skirt, a blouse, and under it a chemise. The soldier immediately pulled off her blouse ... and her breasts were quite naked. I saw him then cut off both the woman's breasts... when this happened I was then about 50 metres away... I immediately shot the soldier."

D26 [Given by a sergeant in the Belgian army, describing and incident at Hofstade].

"... the body of a woman... Both breasts were cut off. There was also the body of a child lying close to the other body. Some of the limbs had been cut off. It was either both arms and both legs or both hands and both feet. I do not remember which."

D36 [Given by a Belgian solider, describing an incident at Hofstade].
"I was in the fight at Malines... On August 25 I went with an artilleryman of our army whose name I did not know, to find his parents who lived in Hofstade. All the houses were burning except the one in which this man's parents lived. [When they unlocked the door they found the parents, and a boy and girl, dead.] Each of them had both feet cut off just above the ankle and both hands just above the wrist."

D85 [Given by a Post-Office official, describing an incident at Weede].
"I saw two little children [girls] three or four years old, standing beside the road with a woman who appeared to be their mother. As the Germans came up, two of them drove their bayonets through the bodies of the two children..."

D88 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at Eppeghem].
"... dead body of a child of about two years of age... A German lance, similar to those used by Uhlans and other German cavalry, was in the child's body, and was stuck into the ground through the body."

D94 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at Boort-Meerbeck].

A German soldier shot at a little girl of from four to six and, "... seeing that he failed to hit the child by firing at her... he ran at her and bayoneted her in the stomach."

D117 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at Capelle-au-Bois].
"I heard a cart coming along the road about 800 metres away. I saw a German officer go forward and stop the cart. We were few in number, so could not go close, the Germans being in greater force. [A boy and a girl shot]. The mother picked up the dead bodies... and drove into the Belgian lines."

D130 [Given by a Belgian plasterer, describing an incident in the vicinity of Malines].
German soldiers broke down the door of a peasant's house. "The peasant came and asked what they were doing. His hands were tied behind his back and he was shot at once without a moments delay. The wife came out with a little sucking child. She put the child down and sprang at the German like a lioness. She clawed their faces. One of the soldiers took his rifle and struck her a tremendous blow with the butt on the head. She fell dead. Another took out his bayonet and fixed it and thrust it through the child. He then put his rifle across his shoulder with the child upon it. Its little arms stretched out once or twice."

25. Gardiner, op.cit, p.30.
26. Gardiner, ibid. p.284.
27. Gardiner, ibid. p.238.
28. Gardiner, ibid. p.287.
29. Gardiner, ibid. p.288.

30. Gardiner, ibid. p.250.

31. Gardiner, ibid. p.248, my italics.

32. Gardiner, ibid. p.282, my italics.

33. Gardiner, ibid. p.238.

34. Gardiner, ibid. p.247.

35. Gardiner, ibid. pp.282-284.

36. Gardiner, ibid. pp.284-286.

37. Sidney Brooks, 'A War of Contrasts' [Fortnightly Review, vol.98, 1915] p.385.

38. Ibid. p.386.

39. Ibid. p.387.

40. Ibid. p.388.

41. Ibid. p.398.

42. E. C. Bentley, 'The German State of Mind' [Fortnightly Review, Vol.97, 1915] p.42.

43. Ibid. p.50.

44. Frances Evelyn Warwick, 'Prussia and the Woman' [Fortnightly Review, Vol.97, 1915]

45. Ibid. p.833.

46. Ibid. p.836.

47. Ibid. pp.834-835.

48. Arthur E. P. Brome Weigall, 'German Logic and Its Results' [Fortnightly Review, vol.98, 1915] p.631.

49. Ibid. pp.632-633.

50. Ibid. p.633.

51. Ibid. p.636.

52. Ibid. p.637.

53. Ibid. p.639.

54. Ibid. p.643.

55. J. H. Morgan [trans], The German War Book: Being The Usages of War on Land, Issued By The Great General Staff of The German Army [John Murray, London, 1915].

56. Ibid. pp.5-6.

57. Havelock Ellis, 'The German Spirit' [Atlantic Monthly Vol.115, 1915].

58. Ibid, pp.551 and 558.

59. Ibid. p.556.

60. Ibid. p.552.

61. Ibid. p.554.

62. Ibid. p.555.

63. Ibid. p.558.

64. Ibid. pp.558-559.

65. Bertrand Russell, [Atlantic Monthly, Vol.116, 1915, pp.127-133].
    Bertrand Russell, 'War As an Institution' [Atlantic Monthly, Vol.117, 1916].

66. Ibid [1915] p.128.

67. Ibid pp.128-129.

68. Ibid [1916] pp.605-606.

69. Ibid. p.603.

70. Ibid. p.606.

71. Ibid. [1915] p.131.

72. Ibid. p.132.

73. J. Ellis Barker, The Foundations of Germany [Smith, Elder, London, 1916].

74. Ibid. p.57.

75. Ibid. pp.59-60.

76. Ibid. p.vii.

77. Ibid. pp.29-30.

78. Ibid. pp.40-41.

79. Ibid. p.55.

80. Ibid. pp.56-57.

81. Ibid. p.175.

82. Ibid. p.149.

83. Ibid. p.187.

84. Ibid. p.175.

85. Thomas F. A. Smith, The Soul of Germany [Hutchinson, London, 1916] pp. vii-viii.
86. Ibid. p.3.
87. Ibid. p.93.
88. Ibid. p.90.
89. Ibid. pp.91-92.
90. Ibid. p.238.
91. Ibid. p.306.
91. Ibid. pp.342-343.
93. Frank A. Mumby [General Editor], The Gresham History of The Great War [London, 1917].
94. T. S. Knowlson, 'Germany's Ruling Idea' [Fortnightly Review Vol. 104, 1918] p.347.
95. Ibid. pp.351-352.
96. Ibid. p.353.
97. Consider, for example, the cases of H.A.L. Fisher, Philip Kerr [Lord Lothian] and Vernon Bartlett.

    (i)   H.A.L. Fisher was a member of the Bryce Commission. In common with his colleagues he was aware that the depositions on alleged atrocities had not been made under oath; that the evidence found in diaries confiscated from German solidiers contradicted the depositions in important respects; that follow-up investigations failed to find corroborating evidence in the field. Further, he was party to the decision not to come face to face with the witnesses making the depositions, or to interrogate the lawyers who had taken them down. Notwithstanding this, Fisher associated himself with the published report.
       See Trevor Wilson, op.cit.
       Wilson considered this to be "an example of the manner in which the pressures of war could affect the

standards of conduct of honourable, enlightened, fastidious Englishmen." Ibid. p.370.

After the war H.A.L. Fisher was a member of the Anglo-German Association.

(ii) There is a clear suggestion that Bartlett had suffered some form of painful psychological problem brought about by temporarily held attitudes which clashed with the declared self-image. He confessed that he "... wrote a book of war sketches so lurid and fervent that whenever I remember it I pause to thank heaven it is out of print."

Vernon Bartlett, Nazi Germany Explained [Gollancz 1933] p.66.

(iii) Philip Kerr had served Lloyd-George in the drafting of sections of the Treaty of Versailles. In an address at Chatham House, March 1936: "My own view is that in the present crisis British public opinion says that Germany has essential justice on her side, that France has the law on her side."

Lord Lothian, Address published in Germany and the Rhineland

[Special Supplement To International Affairs, April 1936] p.50.

CHAPTER 5

THE CONSCIENCE-LED PHASE OF REFLECTION

That there was a period between the wars when attitudes toward Germany appeared to be the result of conscience-led reflection did not escape the highly critical attention of such as A. L. Rowse, L. B. Namier, and Robert Vansittart. Their contribution to the debate will be considered later. By way of introduction it may be noted that Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott [1963], describing British attitudes in the interwar years, used a procession of significant phrases, all of which say something about the British self-image: "Germany lay on many consciences;"[1] "Ashamed of what they had done;"[2] "a sense of disquiet;"[3] "It was wrong to crush her further;" [4] "adopt as fair an attitude as possible."[5]

All the features of the ideological self-image, from empathetic understanding of the sufferings of former enemies to a detestation of double standards, were present in the work of Philip Gibbs [1921].[6] There was also the strain of a troubled conscience; and there was anger, particularly at the apparent ease with which the values associated with the self-image were jettisoned in favour of vengeance. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the war, Gibbs launched what amounted to a psychological assault on his readers; he held a mirror up to British conduct and challenged them to look at themselves. The overall intent of The Hope of Europe was to enter a passionate plea for cooperation between peoples, to lay down the

'scriptures' for a faith capable of "annihilating the folly of the past"; and it was not by chance that the book concluded with ten affirmations denying "....the old baggage of racial and historical hatreds, diplomatic intrigues and sacrifices, military traditions and superstitions."[7] It was in the service of this plea that he made his specific comments on Germany.

Gibbs associated himself with those whose aim was to inspire the peoples of Europe to make "a clean jump across the abyss that opens before them, instead of crawling slowly to it, and falling in." He knew that in doing so he ran the risk, as others did, of being listed with the "impractical visionaries! Dreamers out of touch with reality! Sentimentalists regardless of plain facts! Revolutionists with rose-water...."[8] - and so he was at pains to establish his credentials. As a war-correspondent, all his soul had been with the fighting men, and he had risked his life with them. No one had been more sickened than he by the "tales of horror, and by cruelty undenied and undeniable." He had seen the manner of German destruction, "day by day, year by year, in ruined cities and ravaged fields."[9] It was certain, if anything in history was certain, that nothing would ever reverse the verdict of Guilty against the German Military Caste; they had planned, desired, and made the war.[10] This caste, centred in Prussia, had "brutal qualities" which

resulted in a "degradation of morality", and a kind of "marked defiance of all that is gentle." [11] Endowed with the confidence of such a record, Gibbs aligned himself with what Lord Robert Cecil had termed "the old standards of English justice and honour", standards which called for "moderation towards the beaten enemy.... based on reason rather than passion", and with H. W. Massingham's hatred of cruelty to the weak, the ignorant, the underdog. [12] And never were the old standards more in need of application. In 1918, "The lowest passions of humanity [had been] prodded up by the Press and by politicians", and the people had yielded when appeal was made "to the brute in them." [13]

In passages describing the condition of the civilian population before and at the Armistice, the worsening of that condition with the continuation of the Blockade, and the consequent response of the German people, there is to be found in the words of Gibbs a sense of stricken conscience, a profound distaste for an atypical kick at a 'man who is down', and an almost withering shame in face of what he perceived to be inhumanity and injustice. They are passages dramatically informed by the values of the British self-image.

"The more I see of different peoples up and down the world, the more I understand that they cannot be held

guilty for the acts of their rulers... There is no 'England' when foreign folk say 'England' does this, or does that, thinks this or that. There are millions of English people who do and think differently, or have no share in what is done or thought in particular cases.... So the German housewife, watching her children develop bulbous heads with rickets [what they call 'the English disease'] because of our blockade, had very little to do... with the gas attack at Ypres, and the peasant hustled from his plough to front line trenches...[with] Von Tirpitz and the U-Boat war. 'But they supported their Government', says the logical man. 'They did not rise and overthrow their devilish leaders'. That is true. But English folk decline to be branded because their government has done things which they detest, villainous things, without honour, dirty things which cannot bear the light of day. The clerks, the shopgirls, the farmers' boys, the mechanics, have not overthrown [their] government... They have neither the power nor the knowledge.... Most of them are too busy with their little needs of life to bother about it.....

We do not yet realise - those, at least, who were not in Germany at once after the Armistice - how sharp was the tooth of hunger which bit them, and how it gnawed at

them.... The middle classes indulged in chemical products - 'ersatz food' - which gave them a false sense of satisfaction for a time, but no red corpuscles. They saw their children withering, weakening. In the poorer classes there was real starvation, and the women and children were victims of tuberculosis and every other kind of illness due to lack of milk and fats... working girls would drop asleep... through sheer anaemic weakness. For the children of the cities the last two years of war and the first year of peace were doom years.... They.... were so rickety that they did not grow bones in their bodies, but only gristle."

Against a standard of 3,300 calories per day for a working man of middle weight, German workers were reduced to 1,985 in 1916, to 1,344 in the winter of 1916-17, and to 1,100 in the summer of 1917. In the final year of the war 50,391 children between the ages of one and fifteen years died in Prussia, as against 27,730 in 1913. Deaths from tuberculosis increased during each of the four full years of the war, with steady movement from the 61,000 in 1915 to the 97,000 in 1918. Gibbs, sympathetically considering the experiences of "the clerks, the shopgirls, the farmers' boys, the mechanics", their lack of power and knowledge as he saw it, to offset by action the "villainous things", the "dirty things" perpetrated in their name - addressed the question

inherent in all acts of empathy: 'What would I have done in such a situation?"

"So the German people suffered, and the worst thing that women suffered, and many men, was to see their children weakening and dying, or never gaining in health and strength. No wonder, poor souls, that they wished well to a U-Boat war which should break the blockade and let food in.... To break that net anyhow, by any violence, by any cruelty, was justified in the souls of German men and women besieged through the years of war and watching the blight upon the children they had brought into an evil world. So, if I had been a German father, I should have thought...."

All hope that the Armistice would bring relief from the Blockade proved an illusion. It continued, and defeated hope made the suffering even worse. "The German folk were bitter against us for that", wrote Gibbs, "I think they had a right to be bitter, and that the verdict of history will be against us for that. We had beaten them into absolute surrender. Our force was enough to impose our terms without the need of baby-starving. Nor is it a defence to say that the Germans would have been harsher with us if they had won. Gentlemen do not regulate their conduct by the standard of those whom they condemn as brutes.."[14]

To the contrary point of view, expressed in the words, "Let them die... why should we feed boy-babies who will grow up to be Huns", Gibbs replied that in the cruelty of its logic it was an attitude "new in modern England." [15]

Gibbs was one of the first writers to regard the evidence of the Bryce Commission as suspect. It was to be expected that "the deep tides and currents of war enthusiasm", intensified by hatred of the enemy and love of one's own country, should be "inflamed and kept at fever pitch by atrocity stories", [16] but what was the truth of the matter so far as a cautious mind could ascertain:

"I could never get evidence of any of them. All the evidence I could get myself throughout the war, in the places where they were alleged to happen, was against the truth of them. No living babies had their hands cut off, nor women their breasts. That is certain, in spite of faked photographs. No Canadians were crucified... There were no German 'corpse factories", though our Chief of Intelligence patronised the myth. I myself enquired for atrocities in Lille, Liege, and captured villages in which we rescued civilians who had lived for years in German hands. I could not get any evidence at all. The civilians themselves, while cursing the Germans as a sale race, did not charge them with abominable acts resembling

in any way the atrocity stories of the newspapers. I am
convinced that much of the evidence in the Bryce Report is
utterly untrustworthy." [17]

A sense of fairness is evident in the way Gibbs apportioned
responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. Statesmen of
the Entente powers disclaimed responsibility, "pleaded dove-like
innocence", but they had helped to maintain, defend and
intensify the old conventions of international rivalry.
Imperial aggrandisement and immediate material advantage was
foremost in their minds. There was no real appeal to the
conscience of humanity, no leading voices raised in favour of a
reasonable alternative to slaughter. It was all too easy to say
that humane ideals would have been inappropriate in face of a
Germany occupying the role of "wild beast of Europe, with
devouring instincts"; why had no sustained effort been made to
"tame the wild beast in the heart of Germany"? The statesmen
of Europe, without marked exception, were akin to ape-men,
"peering out of their caves, gibbering and beckoning to friendly
apes, frothing and mouthing to hostile apes." Had Aesop,
Swift, or Lafontaine expressed the European System in parable,
the images of jungle-life and ape-life would have been used. [18]

Gibbs argued that a great opportunity had been missed in 1918.
In defining that opportunity he made implicit reference to the
ideological self-image - to the traits and values of sympathy,

tolerance, justice. He conceded that if the Treaty of Versailles were judged "upon the plane of thought no higher than that of the statesmen who formed it... according to the old ethics", then no better treaty could have been made. The old ethics demanded that each of the victor nations make the best bargain in terms of crude self-interest, immediate advantage, "without much thought to the future." They were like players in a card-school, grabbing the pool which "the German gamblers had lost when their last bluff was called," each willing to quarrel over its distribution. It followed that any criticism of the treaty was futile, if "conducted on the basis of the old philosophy." No one involved had opened their minds to the notion that after the massacres, the destruction of youth, "only mutual helpfulness between one nation and another, former friends and enemies, could bring a chance of recovery...." There had been an opportunity to liberate the German people from bondage to evil ideas, to bring them into "a new era of fellowship", but it had been missed.[19]

On the issue of the traits and values alleged to be characteristic of the Germans, Gibbs' views were constrained by the need to make balanced judgements, the desire to raise, in the interests of fairness and avoidance of hypocrisy, facets of British conduct and practice which required close examination. Of the Germans he wrote:

"....never did I believe in their monstrosity, or their place apart in the human family, as ogre changelings... The German people, as a whole, the peasants and the clerks, and the manufacturing fellows were but victims of a damnable deception and of a still more damnable philosophy, imposed upon them by military minds of a rigid and almost religious caste; and that those Prussian junkers were only rather more logical and very much more efficient, in the fulfilment of their ideas, than certain English militarists whom I had happened to meet along the way of life - an opinion in which I have since been confirmed by certain Generals in Ireland and others like them in cerebral structure of anthropoid type."[20]

There had been cruelties on the German side. If this was down to the unpleasant extremes of human passion, those same extremes were at work in Ireland. If German use of poison-gas was a debit to them, it was no credit to Britain that she had used it too - and it appeared that with the war over experimental establishments in Britain were at work to produce a gas more deadly than any previously used. If callousness, arrogance, and inhumanity had featured in German behaviour,

"Well, we find more cruelty in human nature, outside Germany, than once we cared to believe. In Russia it is

not unknown, though Russians were so good and kind when they were still fighting on our side. Even in England, and in Ireland, there are potentialities of cruelty which are not quite reassuring to our self-complacency.[21]

....If the Prussian believed before the war that he was the noblest type of human being, and that the Empire he had founded had the close support of God, and that his destiny, his very duty was to rule less civilised people, it must be admitted that there have been Englishmen with the same conceit of themselves."[22]

The privations of the German people, and their struggle against odds to regain a significant place in the world, brought out a flood of sympathy which sometimes merged into outright admiration. At the time of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, John Leyland [1923] reported that the Germans did not quail "before this new oppression.... Torn by internal strife, they yet preserve an unbroken front. The very attack that has been delivered upon them has stimulated extraordinary qualities of resistance..."[23] In Leyland's eyes, France was the troublemaker of Europe, kicking Germany when she was down, taking unfair advantage of her difficulties. France had favoured the setting of an impossible sum for reparations precisely because she knew Germany could not meet it. The inevitable defaulting would then, and had, provided her with the

opportunity to invade. In this way the 'hidden agenda' of French policy would be realised - the complete destruction of Germany and the concomitant aggrandisement of France. The Treaty of Versailles was not enough for the French; "in the opinion of most of the jurists of the world they have broken it already, but now they wish to destroy it entirely. It guarantees the frontiers of Germany, but they wish to seek their 'natural frontier' of the Rhine, just as the Government of the French Revolution stretched out their ambitions to the 'national frontier' of the Schelde." [24]

But, in Britain, Germany now had a friend: "It is our interest to develop friendly relations with that country.... The war has long been over, and those who know the German people know well that of all peoples they are nearest to ourselves.... The solid mass of the German people.... are destined yet, whatever tragedies they may go through, to become again a great people, none the worse for having been tried as by fire. The world will do well to regard them as friends and not as enemies. It is not to the interest of anyone that Germany should be disintegrated." [25]

In C. H. Herford's [1927] impressions of the forces at work in post-war Germany there are to be found numerous indications of his commitment to the traits and values of the British self-image. It was his intention to provide his readers with a

revised perspective on Germany, a perspective uncontaminated by the unreason associated with the emergencies of war and by the emotion-charged circumstances of making peace with a defeated enemy. Behind this intention lay a firm belief in justice. It would not be right to ignore the good things that were happening in Germany.[26] When those 'good things' were defined it became clear that Herford's attitude toward Germany was influenced not only by an explicit desire to be just, but also by a belief that the changes being wrought in that country were bringing its basic values into closer alignment with those of Britain. This attitude was reinforced, and the encouraging signs made all the more significant, by sympathetic reflection on the difficulties which Germany had faced.

"Few modern nations have suffered a catastrophe which subjected all the bonds of national cohesion to so terrible a strain as Germany, between November 1918 and June 1919, suffered from the military overthrow, the blockade, the Revolution, and the Dictated Peace."[27]

The war had left "moral wreckage as well as material ruin in its train."[28] In such a situation it was natural that horror and indignation would breed hope and idealism in some, disillusion, despair and relaxation of moral standards in others; it was natural that some would seek solutions at the extremes. The real

challenge in all this was that Germany "found itself thrown back upon its own intellectual, moral and cultural resources....", but the challenge had been successfully confronted, because those resources were immense.[29] They subsumed "...the enduring values and virtues of German civilisation."[30]

The overt signs of regeneration were many. Although some of idealist disposition had their vision "shaped by memory" and looked backward into the past for inspiration, others had their visions "shaped by imagination and hope."[31] Evidence for this departure from old ways was to be found in the likelihood that for half the nation "defeat was a release; and for a large section the humiliation of the army was a triumph..."[32] Important changes were also occurring at the intellectual level. H. S. Chamberlain's, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, had been demolished by Hertz in his Rasse und Kultur, which had torn apart the "... paste-board Jericho of racial superstition", and "sapped the authority of one of the most dangerous of the illusions that lead to war..."[33] There had been a complementary repudiation of "the whole complex of ideas and passions embraced in the 'imperialism' of the fallen Reich: in particular, aggressive nationalism and its accompaniments..." This repudiation did not mean that bitterness and resentment fostered by the treatment of the nation at Versailles had subsided; nor did it mean that Germans would surrender their

desire to win for their country parity among the nations of Europe; but it did mean "...the adoption of international goodwill, of loyalty, not only to 'King and Country' but to humanity...."[34]

Intellectual circles of the post-war period were also providing evidence of a revolt against "those characteristics of modern German mentality which tend to atrophy or sterilise spiritual life... the rigidity.... of theological dogmatism.... the aridity of a scholarship punctillious in the search for 'sources' but scornful of spiritual values... the ego-centric hardness of a capitalism obsessed with the vision of material power..."[35] The Volkshochschulen movement founded in 1918, and the legislation humanising labour relations by giving workers more autonomy and responsibility, were products of this revolt. Now that a start had been made, horizons were being extended and new visions entertained. "What", asked Professor Eugen Rossenstock of Breslau, "if there had to be ordinances designed to do justice not only to the worker as he is, to his actual wants and needs, but to the worker as he is to be? Ordinances which will set free his creative power.."[36]

Such changes of far reaching importance had come about despite rather than because of a naive belief on the part of the Allies that Germany could be compelled to adopt them. In demanding that

Germany, and she alone, disarm, the Allies had made change less rather than more likely, for such obvious unfairness had deeply wounded not only her pride but also her hope of security and sense of justice. Germany would no doubt struggle to redress such wrongs, but not in the old ways. The crushing sufferings of wartime, "culminating in the final debacle which rendered all those sufferings, all the magnificent pretensions which involved them, futile, [had] produced a profound abhorrence of war itself."[37] This much was clear from a study of the writings of Viebig [Das Rote Meer and Tochter der Hekuba], Latzko [Friedensgericht], Frank [Der Mensch 1st Gut], Kaiser [Gas] and Toller [Hinkemann].

Arthur Ponsonby's Falsehood in Wartime [1928] was not simply an exercise in historical revision, nor simply a matter of setting the record straight. It was also a confession that politicians, press, and public in Britain had been party to gross distortion of the truth during the war; it was also, in effect, an act of contrition, a plea of 'guilty' to the charge that the sense of balance, fairness and justice had temporarily deserted many people, from the "deliberate individual liar" to newspaper editors, correspondents, and high officials of State.[38] Ponsonby concluded that there could be "no more discreditable period in the history of journalism than the four years of the Great War."[39] Even allowing for the emergencies of the war

and the claims of expediency, it remained alarming that "prominent people of repute, who would have shrunk from condemning their bitterest personal enemy on the evidence, or rather lack of evidence, they had before them, did not hesitate to lead the way in charging a whole nation with every conceivable brutality and unnatural crime"[40]

Individual liars, initially supported and given wide currency by corporate groups, made significant contributions to the record. Kate Hume, eventually tried in the High Court of Dumfries on a charge of uttering a forged letter, was responsible for the fabrication of a story [1914] in which her sister Grace, allegedly serving as a nurse in Belgium but subsequently found to be safe and well in Huddersfield, was the victim of outrageous brutality at the hands of German soldiers. Grace, so the story ran, had lost both her breasts in a savage bayonet assault, and with her last fading reserves of energy had written a letter describing her torment. The story was taken up and made much of by The Star, The Evening Standard, Pall Mall, The Westminster Gazette, The Globe, and The Times. The latter source, before becoming suspicious, described the evidence as "particularly well authenticated."[41] Letters from Ps.O.W. in Germany were said to contain coded messages instructing those in receipt to remove the postage stamps, whereupon there were revealed comments such as "they have torn out my tongue", and,

"They have cut off both my feet, so that I cannot escape."[42] All this was without grain of truth.

More corporate assaults on the imagination were initiated and carried out by the Press or Official propaganda agencies, aided and abetted by Government spokesmen who evaded searching questions as to their veracity. The 'Corpse Factory' story, purporting to give a scientific account of how glycerine, lubricating oils, and animal foodstuffs were produced from giant vats filled with German war-dead, conveniently mistranslated Kadaververwertungsanstalt so as to obscure the fact that it was the remains of dead horses which were used for this purpose. The deception, later admitted, was successful in portraying the enemy as totally lacking in normal human sensitivity.[43] The Times, in May 1915, reported on the crucifixion of a Canadian solder, "pinned to a wall by bayonets thrust through his hands and feet", and as the story developed, informed its readers that "....written depositions testifying to the fact of the discovery of the body are in possession of British Headquarters Staff." The lie was eventually identified as such by the Canadian authorities.[44] Newspaper reports to the effect that a civilian in Sempst had been forced to witness the rape of his thirteen year old daughter by five or six German soldiers, and then the bayoneting of her and his nine year old son, were later denied in sworn statements by officials of the Belgian commune.

When asked to comment on an atrocity perpetrated on a youth in Ternath, the mayor stated: "....it is impossible that such an occurrence [the chopping off of a boy's hands] should not have been reported to me; it is pure invention."[45]

Historical redress, in the straightforward, well-documented form provided by Ponsonby was a codification built on earlier reservations about the truth of atrocity stories, and it found its way into the bibliographies of many later publications. Its probable influence on those who assigned high weighting to the ideological component of the self-image may be seen in their increasing unwillingness to accept Schwarzweissmalerei judgements on Germany and the Germans. The grosser errors of the past went like lances to the tender conscience. Its wider influence may only be guessed at, but in a period of reflection, distant in ethos from the wilder passions of war-time experience and "the stress of excitement and indignation",[46] it is perhaps reasonable to assume that a number of people now measured the moral legitimacy of their individual behaviour against the adjusted historical record. On both counts Ponsonby's little book could be said to have reinforced the necessary conditions for the reassertion of the ideological self-image.

The publication of Britain and Germany [1928], a symposium of

essays dedicated to the "...ventilation of questions which concern both peoples", [47] was symptomatic, on the British side, of a desire to approach recent history in an empathetic frame of mind. The limitation in the above sentence is more apparent than real and is made for contextual purposes, with no intent to suggest that sympathetic understanding was absent from the contributions of German authors. John Mander [1974] commented that in this "well-meant and once famous book...

"There is plenty of goodwill on the British side. But there is no meeting of minds.... Rather, a stark contrast between a blend of arrogance and self-pity on the German side, and a deal of cooing and fluttering on the British..."[48]

This hardly stands up to close scrutiny. It is possible, on one interpretation, to regard the views expressed by Harold Begbie and Rolf Gardiner [49] as "cooing and fluttering", but the implicit suggestion that the German contributions were marked by "... arrogance and self-pity", and those from the British side by generosity of spirit, cannot be sustained.

Reviewing the collection of essays in the Preface to the English Edition, Gardiner commented, with some justification, that "the

British...not infrequently adopt a haughty, patronising air."
And it would be difficult to regard Alec MacDonald's
contribution on English and German Humour as an example of
"cooing and fluttering." The Englishman had no need to boast or
brag, he concluded, because he was armed with an inner
confidence, his conceit was real "and goes deeper than words."
The German, on the other hand, was assailed by doubt beneath a
superficial confidence:

"Looking at the gilt and stucco remains of the Imperial

glories in Berlin, an Englishman cannot help wondering if

this Titanic boasting were not fundamentally but an

expression of a pathetic doubt whether the Hohenzollerns

were, after all, the highest manifestations of

mankind."[50]

In discussion of British characteristics, 'Diplomaticus'[51]
revealed not only central features of the British self-image - a
sense of emotional balance, tolerance of difference - but also a
suspicion that the absence of such qualities in German society
was a matter for concern. He referred to the pervasive
influence of 'romanticism', involving a "mistrust of... things
generally held to be based on reason".[52] The Jugendbewegung
was a prime example of romanticism at work. It bore "nearly all
the symptoms of a religious movement in its primitive,

revolutionary, fighting stages: a certain amount of intolerance and of prejudice, an amazing energy..."[53] The problem with romanticism was that it could give rise to "generalisation and a riot of associative emotions, leading us right away from the truth."[54] 'Diplomaticus' concluded that the British were not

"Impressed by the conscious aspect of romanticism. To be intensely self-conscious seems to us to mean that we are not sure of ourselves - a kind of inferiority complex. To strive to keep our literature 'pure' of foreign elements, whether Jewish or otherwise, would seem to us to admit that it could not stand on its own merits."[55]

It is true that he rounded off his essay optimistically, and consistent with his declared attachment to balance, by positing the mutual benefits that could accrue to Britain and Germany from a fusion of German enthusiasm and collective energy with the tolerant self-confidence of the British, but again it would be stretching a point beyond the limit to consider his contribution an example of "cooing and fluttering."

The reserve shown by some of the German contributors hardly merits the description of arrogance and self-pity. Von Hertig's assertion that "in the matter of British-German understanding we

are still looking for a suitable building site",[56]   and

Werner Picht's conviction that "..the task of cultivating

sympathetic feelings must be supplemented by the communication

of accurate information...",[57] were cautious and realistic

rather than strident statements. Horst Michael did claim that

in the years before the First World War British obstructionism

"aroused the greatest indignation in Germany",[58] and that his

nation felt compelled to "escape from the danger of being

oppressed and misused by England", but to class this as arrogant

and self-pitying would be a negation of sympathetic

understanding and, in any case, he also argued that <u>both</u>

countries were making "false and inadequate assumptions...<u>both</u>

were thoroughly short-sighted....<u>both</u> lacked a measure of

universal political responsibility and wise

self-limitation."[59]

Gerhard Mueller's essay on <u>The Organisation of German Schools</u>

bore no trace of arrogance. It was, rather, an example of

critical self-examination. Of the products of German schools he

wrote:

   "There was probably no scholar in the world of greater

   probity or steadfastness. But then there was scarcely a

   human being who lived in such seclusion from the world.

   Thoroughness bred onesidedness and led to a deplorable

   narrowness of outlook...."[60]

Erich Obst wrote of the rage of Germany against Versailles, of the hatred felt for those who had "mortified and tormented Germany", but considered that such passions, if intelligible, were quite unhelpful. Intellectually, he appreciated that there was a need for reconciliation, but, instinctively, he held back from "exchanging confidential handshakes with enemies of yesterday as if they were the friends of tomorrow."[61] Reconciliation depended on the restoration of Germany's dignity as a nation. Revisions were necessary in the Treaty of Versailles. Article 231 had to be retracted and the "Hun legend" laid to rest.[62] It was precisely because the British contributors who addressed such issues agreed with the German claim that "...cooperation [was] possible and useful only on a basis of complete rehabilitation..."[63] that a meeting of minds did take place.

Margaret Mackenzie, defining the British way of life and conduct related to it, for her German readers, referred to an "extraordinary tolerance" and sense of balance which grew out of a mixture of "nonconformist conscience and sporting instinct."[64] This mixture was recognisable in the work of G. P. Gooch and Dudley Heathcote. Gooch, in his contribution, informed his analysis with a critical self-awareness that Germany did not stand alone on the issue of responsibility. A sense of balance, a sympathetic understanding of the pressures

bearing on Germany as well as on Britain, characterised his review of events leading to war. He did not see a long tradition of unwary aggressiveness in German history. Had Bismarck's cautious, though ultimately self-regarding, policy been continued, a war between Britain and Germany would have been unlikely. At the same time, it was impossible to ignore the imperatives facing the great powers. Germany, quite naturally, wanted to play a larger role in the wider world. This involved taking risks, some of which were counter-productive and "necessarily alarmed" Britain. He assigned to Germany "the larger part of the responsibility for the lamentable estrangement" between the two countries, and did not feel that he could exaggerate "the folly and short-sightedness of German policy since the fall of Bismarck", but he conceded that British statesmen also committed "serious errors", and deplored the fact that in both countries there were journalists "who seemed to take an unholy delight in sowing suspicion and imputing evil motives."[65] Dudley Heathcote reinforced the image of the British as a people who scorned opportunities to 'kick a man when he is down' when he gave what he called "two striking examples of British forbearance and ... the desire of our authorities not to offend unnecessarily the feelings of a people that had been profoundly humiliated..." On one occasion, notices were to be posted in Cologne instructing German civilians to salute British Officers. Adenauer, the

Oberbürgermeister, requested that the order to post the notices be rescinded, and the occupying authorities agreed. On another occasion a French general was infuriated when a band played 'Deutschland uber alles' outside the Headquarters of the Rhineland Military Commission. The English officer present listened intently and then adjudged that the band was playing 'Rule Britannia'.[66] Heathcote concluded that there was every reason to believe that the "deplorable estrangement" was being replaced by "more amicable feelings..."[67]

To return to John Mander's assessment of the book. It has to be noted that his purpose was to demonstrate that Sir Robert Vansittart was not "overdoing it" when he argued, in Black Record [1940], that the British and Germans lived at opposite poles with "not a main idea in common....no real mental relations..."[68] He was satisfied that the contrast between the essays submitted from each side in the 1928 publication bore out "all that Vansittart has to say on the subject..."[69] To offer Britain and Germany in the service of this view was perhaps to misunderstand, if not misrepresent, the process of empathetic understanding - a process which involves serious consideration of another's point of view, but no necessary surrender of all that goes towards making up one's own position.

The publication of the English translation of Erich Remarque's

Im Westen Nichts Neues [1929] helped to lay the "Hun legend" to rest in the conscience-led period of reflection. Modris Eksteins [1980] wrote that "the great discovery....foreign readers made through 'All Quiet...' was that the German soldier's experience of the war had been in its essentials, no different from that of the soldiers of other nations."[70] The London Mercury [January 1930] complained of ".... the apparent tendency among the British public to sentimentalise over the Germans...", and called upon its readers: "Let us not out of mere sentimentality, concentrate our gaze upon the Germans at the expense of more cultivated peoples."[71] But this had little effect. 'All Quiet...' topped up that well of sympathy which "promoted at a popular level what historical revision was achieving at an academic and political level: the erosion of the idea of a collective German war guilt."[72]

Bartlett [1933] was critical of Nazi Germany. He went so far as to identify the Nazi State as the central problem of international affairs. His response was to argue in favour of conciliation and cooperation, but not at any price. He appreciated that the conciliatory approach could fail, and that total unremitting commitment to it could have disastrous consequences. He was, however, attached to the ideological aspects of the British self-image, and perhaps the most obvious

consequence of this attachment was his willingness to empathise with the German people in their experience of particular historical phenomena. If there was a hint in his work that circumstances did not explain everything there was also a strong suggestion that they accounted for a great deal. In this his point of view was quite distinct from that of writers who tended to regard the events of the Weimar experience as peripheral to what they saw as the crux of the matter – the longstanding characteristics of the German people. In real terms neither position is wholly satisfactory in itself since, on the one hand, individuals do not bring blank cultural or personality records to the situations they encounter and, on the other hand, personalities are not immutable and entirely proof against the exigencies of social circumstances. The distinction in approach is an important one, however, since the capacity to 'stand in someone else's shoes' presupposes that the 'someone else' is part of an historical situation, partaking in particular experiences, subject to particular stresses, faced with particular choices. Empathy demands that due consideration, not passing lip-service, be given to human experiences.

Bartlett confessed that there was a distasteful aspect to his attempt to explain Nazi Germany: "I have... sought for explanations of much that disgusts me and fills me with

despair."[73]   If all people, irrespective of nationality, could be prey to base instincts, "the vein of sadism runs deeper in the German character than in that of most other people."[74] He was deeply concerned about the attitudes toward and on the nature of war being disseminated in Germany, and quoted with revulsion the views of E. Banse:

> "Nobody should be in doubt that war stands between our prevailing need and our coming fortune. But war is no longer a fresh and jolly campaign... it is gas, plague, tank and aircraft horror; it is hunger and poverty, baseness and lies, deprivation and sacrifice. The only nation that can endure it is one whose every member has known for years and is convinced in the depths of his soul that his life belongs to the state and only to the state... Everyone must understand that there is nothing extraordinary or criminal about war, that it is not a sin against humanity."[75]

In face of this, what possible grounds could there be for arguing in favour of conciliation and cooperation? It would be possible, Bartlett wrote, to "take the easier way, and... argue that these Germans are a race apart whose reactions are so different from our own.."; the problem here was that such an approach tended "to range every German behind his Government,

and to turn pacifists into fire-eaters."[76] This would be particularly unfortunate if, as he believed, most Germans were not by inclination supportive of the reprehensible elements of the Nazi movement. He analysed the movement's support as follows:

"There are, as far as one can see, three main tendencies that are making themselves felt... There are, in the first place, the people on the Right, the industrialists.... Then there are their opponents, young men of the middle and working classes who mean the Hitler movement to be a revolution and not a reaction. Thirdly, there are those whose only motive is hate... It is men in this third category whose bullyings and beatings have done so much to discredit the whole movement."[77]

If there were distinctions to be made between sections of support within the movement there was also the matter of the broad mass of the population. Bartlett subscribed to the views of Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm who, in the course of describing the torture of Ebert's son in the Borgemoor bei Papenburg camp, wrote: "I believe that there are very many right-minded Germans who know little or nothing of the....camps; I believe that there are others who do know and heartily disapprove."[78] Where Malcolm referred to "...that large mass of right-minded Germans", Bartlett wrote of "the great majority

of Germans [who] have no idea of these atrocities that have so lowered the reputation of Germany abroad."[79] If conciliation and cooperation were to be viable aims it was important that such people be considered, and nothing done to force them into the arms of the Nazi Government. There was another practical reason for moving carefully. Germany was "...neurasthenic and hysterical, and no doctor attempts to cure neurasthenia or hysteria by clouting the patient over the head.... if one concentrates upon the need for meeting the German point of view it is only because Germany is the pathological case.... She is the patient who must be cured if we are to avoid war."[80]

Fairness [subsuming the notion that self and others should be assessed in terms of the same criteria], justice, and generosity of spirit should figure in attitudes toward Germany. A little sympathetic imagination - that capacity to enter into the situation of others which was an important element in the British self-image - might lead to understanding of what lay behind the neurasthenia, and once the causes had been revealed, it might be possible to remove them.

"I sometimes think our inability to understand the Germans today arises from the fact that we expect them to be so different from ourselves when, in fact, they are so like us."[81]

In the first years of the war, under emergency conditions, prejudice and distortion, hysteria and cruelty, were not unknown in Britain. "It has to be remembered that the state of mind in Germany today is exactly that which was found in all countries during the war... One of the dirtiest things about war is the way in which it so distorts the magnificent passion of patriotism that kindly old English women believe they are doing right in hounding some other equally kindly old woman into an internment camp because she has a German name. We have to go back to all those wartime pettinesses we would rather forget before we can begin to understand the behaviour of many Nazis today."[82]   Since the end of the war there had been virtually no opportunity for the Germans to recover their mental balance. A position of obvious inequality and, related to it, a perception of insecurity, had been compounded by the economic and moral repercussions of the Inflation. In quoting Pierre Vienot's account of the Inflation, Bartlett claimed that it was the best description he had read of the effect of that collapse.

"Let nobody imagine that this purely material fact could lead to material misery, and that then, when exorcised, and when the misery was healed, it left no traces. The effect of such a memory... is never corrected in the course of a lifetime. Inflation made every German experience the

impossible. It destroyed in him the notion of certainty.
If that was possible, anything was possible."[83]

How should the world respond?   Either it should decide that
Germany should endure her inequality, tolerate her feeling of
insecurity and remain in "the bonds we tied round her at
Versailles....or we decide that Germany must be given back her
freedom."[84]   To do the latter certainly involved risk. One
could never be sure beforehand if ".... a bold concession, a
generous attempt to meet the German point of view...." would in
fact rid that nation of ".....her damnable inferiority
complex."[85]   There was, therefore, no guarantee that
conciliation would consolidate peace. On the other hand, to
maintain the status quo so far as Germany was concerned involved
no risk whatsoever; it involved the absolute certainty of war.
If concessions were made, and if instead of calming Germany they
aroused in her a desire to dominate, the moral position of
Britain and the world would be strengthened. An important first
step would be to demonstrate to Germany that "the principle of
equality of rights" animated the thinking of the British and the
French, by showing readiness "...now, or at a definite date not
too remote, to disarm broadly down to Germany's level",[86] were
this not done, then

".....how can Germany be expected not to worry about her security when her neighbours, so much better armed and equipped, talk all the time about theirs! .....It is a paradox, but I believe it to be true, that Germany will be less of a danger to peace when her neighbours are less obviously stronger than she is." [87]

In the 1930s, G. P. Gooch was a consistent advocate of the traits and values subsumed in the ideological self-image. He believed in cooperation, the rational settlement of disputes, and was conscious that fairness and give and take were essential to such an enterprise. "Civilisation is a co-operative achievement", he wrote in 1933, [88] and this achievement involved "a great deal more than mere abstinence from war. It demands mutual aid all along the line, the sharing of our economic resources no less than of our political power." [89] Although he hated the Nazi regime, considering that it overwhelmed the individual body and soul, dwarfed personality and stunted spiritual growth, [90] sympathetic understanding, tolerance, and the claims of justice informed his views on Germany. In 1935 he analysed the events and forces which had led to the establishment of dictatorship in Germany. [91] His conclusions were markedly different from those of many other writers addressing this issue at about the same time, in that he located the causes in the lifetime of those who were part of the

contemporary experience rather than tracing them back into the alleged traditions of German history. The German people had been pummelled by "the combination and interaction of political passions, economic misery, and psychological strain." The dictated peace had added to "the inevitable bitterness of defeat; forced cessions of territory smarted like the amputation of a limb; armies of occupation were an ever present humiliation; military and financial controls.... were a perpetual reminder of a foreign yolk; the attribution of sole guilt for the outbreak of the war to the losing side outraged the feelings of peoples deeply convinced that they had fought for their existence against malevolent foes."[92] He likened the peace settlement and the reparations burdens to a victory war-dance on the prostrate bodies of defeated and impoverished enemies.[93]

All this had happened when the nation was emerging from a life and death struggle, in which compromise had been branded as a crime, heroic virtues exalted, the tenets of the Sermon on the Mount discarded. The cult of violence, the brutalisation of mind and soul could not be set aside easily. The war experience had cultivated a craving for quick results, and it was natural that there should be impatience with the more leisurely processes of peace in which swift action was inhibited by deliberation. "In such an atmosphere of confusion and impatience it was inevitable that millions of distracted people

should cry out for a man", for a solution.[94]   The trauma was deepened by subsequent events, by "a sequence of shocks and humiliations difficult for a proud nation to endure" - French encouragement of separatism in the Rhineland, the use of black troops in the occupied zone, the invasion of the Ruhr, and then the Inflation. And with the collapse of the economy "went the loss of their psychological equilibrium."[95]

Gooch returned to the same theme in 1939.[96] The Treaty of Versailles had fallen on a "hungry, bleeding, distracted nation." Article 231 was "not only a historical blunder but a psychological mistake", for the concept of the Shameful Peace [Schandfriede] "became the symbol of national humiliation" and a "deadly embrace." Britain shared the responsibility for all this with France, but France had not been satisfied. Determined to keep Germany down, not content with having participated in her defeat, France resolved "to keep her poor and weak." All sense of reality had been lost, and dragon's teeth were sown "in the tortured soil of the new Europe."[97]

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The ten affirmations read:

1. "I do not believe in war as a reasonable way of argument.

2. I do not believe that preparation for war is a preventive of war.

3. I do not believe that armed conflict is necessary to the spiritual vigour of mankind.

4. I do not believe that the victory of one nation over another increases the wealth of the victor nation.

5. I do not believe that national egotism is the supreme virtue of the individual and the state.

6. I do not believe that there must be an eternal conflict between those who do the rough work of the world and those who organise the produce of their labour.

7. I do not believe that civilisation reached its highest phase in 1914.

8. I do not believe that cruelty is an essential element of human nature, that selfishness is the highest and strongest motive of individuals and nations, and that the pursuit of spiritual truth and beauty are mere illusions of disordered minds.

9. I do not believe that the political and economic system of Europe, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, was divinely inspired by Heaven-sent

messengers named Wilson, Lloyd-George, and Clemenceau, and therefore unalterable by human effort without grievous sin.

10. I do not believe that men and women are incapable of simple reasoning, and of actions which may preserve them from otherwise certain famine, disease, slaughter, and extermination." pp. 326-327.

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49. Gardiner and Rocholl, op.cit. see chapter 7 reference No.8 For Begbie, and Reference No.9 for Gardiner.

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51. Ibid. The pseudonym of a member of the British Diplomatic Service.

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59. Ibid. p.60. [my italics].

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CHAPTER 6

THE REVITALISATION OF THE DEBATE

By 1936 there was an observable reaction to the conscience-led period of reflection, relatively spasmodic to begin with but then reaching crescendo proportions in the work of Rowse, Namier, Vansittart, and their followers. The significance of the ideological element in the self-image was not repudiated in this reaction - indeed its significance was often confirmed by the criticism levelled against it - and it still served, at least implicitly, as a standard for assessing Germany and the Germans. What set the reaction apart from what had tended to be the characteristic attitudes of the inter-war period up to this point was its revitalisation of the argument based on deeply ingrained weaknesses in the German temperament, with much less emphasis, and sometimes hardly any at all, being placed on the recent past as a source of explanation, and a marked diminution then final rejection of any willingness to make distinctions between Germans. As this trend gathered the momentum of a new orthodoxy it stimulated a dramatic response. There is a sense in which the arguments of the late 1930s and the Second World War years over 'Germans and Nazis', occurring as they did at a time of increasing terror and ultimately in a condition of national emergency, demonstrate the potency of the ideological self-image. That there should be, at such a time, fierce and undiluted condemnation of the potential then actual enemy, lock, stock and barrel, was unremarkable. All hopes of peace were going or had disappeared, all hopes and expectations of

immediate relief, faintly or firmly held, had gone. It was natural that into the gap there should flood resurrected or newly discovered hatred. What was remarkable, however, was the public expression of a point of view which still insisted upon making distinctions between different types of Germans, which apportioned responsibility but not in blanket form, which did not require the suspension of the critical faculties, which - in essence - took the form of a statement rooted in commitment to both elements of the self-image: 'Let us defeat the enemy, with all our force, and as quickly as possible, but do not let us lose ourselves in the process?' This type of debate was not something new. Arguments about the validity of distinctions between people and regime, sometimes taking the form of a dispute over the appropriateness of the notion of 'two Germanies' were, as has been seen, of very long standing. It was the particular nature of the Nazi regime which added a sharp cutting edge to the debate in the late 1930s and during the war years.

Harold Nicolson [1936] allowed that recent circumstances had placed great stress on Germany, but the reader is left with the strong impression that stress alone - however unique in its severity - could not have resurrected the 'German problem' had it not acted upon innate weaknesses.

"The Germans have always been nervous, they have always had a strain of instability in their characters....and I think we must recognise - and this is not meant to be an insult, but a sympathetic comment - that in the German temperament of today there is a strong strain of insanity. We have got to get that into our heads. It was inevitable that this should have occurred. You have an heredity already unstable. You expose the product of that heredity to a strain such as human history has never known. They had to face the war, inflation, the blockade, a series of strains and stresses such as we have never conceived of in our own history. Then at the end comes this revivalist - this ... imaginative, unreliable man, who tells them that all their sorrows were purely due to some strange lack of confidence in himself. If they will put themselves entirely into those firm and tender hands, then the bleeding heart of Germany will again be sound.......

I go back to the problem of the German mentality. I say that under this religious revival, which Hitler has managed to create and evolve, under this mystic Wotanic conception of a Germany marching blindly towards the abyss, under this extraordinary evocation and excitation of all that is most neurotic in the German soul [for I contend that this neurosis has reached a sort of paranoiac stage] Germany has

became, and let us say so with all sympathy, a mental case..."[1]

J. W. Eaton [1937] disclaimed any prejudice against Germany. The dictated peace, the continuation of the blockade, the intolerable difficulties of the inflation, the fearful, jealous and sometimes vindictive actions of France, had stirred in him "a sympathy with a nation which had put up such a gallant fight against long odds."[2] There was much to admire in the new Germany. The Arbeitsdienst, Winterhilfdienst, Mutterheim and Kraft durch Freude organisations appeared worthy, and suggested a collective concern for social co-operation and national welfare. But how had Hitler come to power? Were all the reasons located in the war period and its aftermath? Or were there not, "as with other nations, still more important reasons to be found in her history and in certain traits in the national character...?" Eaton believed that the German people had never had

"....any clear conception of what political and individual freedom means. They [had] not yet shown any capacity to achieve a democratic government nor a willingness to pay the cost. On more than one occasion in the past, when a crisis has arisen, they [had] failed to uncover any political principles which might have given them

confidence and trust in one another.... It [was] now as in

the past to a strong and confident leader that they

[looked] to bind them together and lead them forward....

Their conception of reform [was] still that of something

which comes from regulations and instructions from above,

not through their own persistent efforts and sacrifice."
(3)

A. L. Rowse [1937] considered that ".... the whole of European

history in the past century...." was so much evidence that there

was something wrong with Germany, "something profoundly wrong."
(4)
     He conceded, in a passing reference, that there were

"external factors aiding the process" that brought Hitler to

power, but how could one explain the fact that the German people

had not made "a better stand for the Republic."(5)   The answer

lay in German tradition.

"... no country can show such a tradition of thought that

has so consistently distorted the evidence of common-sense

experience... no country in the world has had such a

tradition of thinkers who believed only in the assertion

of the will as against reason and common sense, in the

supremacy of force, the desirability of war, the State as

the terminus ad quem of all politics, the be-all and

end-all of all social endeavour, the denial of freedom and

international order, the futility and even the immorality of international peace...."[6]

Hitler had succeeded because he was "in all his moods a medium of the German people, a mirror to express their rasping inferiority complex, their envy, their brutality, their unreliability...."[7]

Rowse employed the concepts of his opponents in order to discredit them. He agreed that there were 'two Germanies', two traditions, "...engaged in a struggle for the German soul."[8] But it was an unequal struggle, made too much of by those who sought to establish distinctions between regime and people. One side in this struggle for the German soul was much too strong for the other - which at crucial points tended to show itself ineffective and spineless - and this had been the case for centuries, a futile struggle going on since the confrontation between Arminius and Imperial Rome. His definition of the 'two Germanies' is interesting in itself, for the inequality of the struggle appears to be symbolised in the number of active phrases he assigned to each category. On one side there were two active phrases: "... the forces of reason and culture... the will to cooperate with the rest of Europe..."; on the other side, eight active phrases: "...the forces of barbarism, the denial of reason and culture, the cult of violence and aggression, the

inflamed inferiority complex, the envy, the jealousy, the Schadenfreude, the megalomania..." [9] In relation to those dominant features, Hitler was "the very mirror" of the German soul.

Rowse cast his eye over centuries of German history, pausing at certain points to measure the relative strengths of the forces which competed for possession of the German. In the beginning, there were parts of Germany fortunate enough to come under Roman rule - the Rhineland, Bavaria -

"But there remained the interior depths of the country with its barbarian population of Teutons....unaffected by the influence of civilisation... [and] from that solid core of Teutonic resistance, those interior depths, [had] come a succession of anti-Europeans, leaders whose mission it has been to encourage the Germans to... resist Europe, to assert their own differences, to make a virtue of their barbarism as against reason...." [10]

At the time of the Reformation "... the dichotomy in the German soul" was once more evident, and once more the strength was on the wrong side. On the one hand there was the spirit of Luther",... the apostle of blind unreasoning faith, of thinking with the bowels, of nationalism and force...", and on the other

there was the spirit of Erasmus, "... the protagonist of reason and moderation, of toleration and reform, of peace and a Christian international order." On the one side there was De Servo Arbitro, "..revelling in the insistence upon the necessity for submission....", on the other De Libero Arbitro, preaching freedom of will. Of the triumph of De Servo Arbitro Rowse commented: "How German; how disgusting!" And of Luther he wrote that he had been well described as "the typical German, the man who of all others sums up the character of the German people. Hitler is in the direct line of succession to Luther." (11)

At the time of the Enlightenment there was the same dichotomy and the same outcome. Kant's "pacific cosmopolitanism" was overwhelmed by Frederick's "calculated fraud, treachery and violence." Later, Goethe, "the great European...", was overtaken by the "loathsome German megalomania" of Hegel. And Marx, with his "internationalism pointing to the future" was no match for Bismarck with his "blut und eisen putting back the clock in European politics..." Finally, there was Weimar. Its hopes of "social progress and peaceful international cooperation" had been destroyed by a "relapse into barbarism... deliberate terror and brutality..." (12)

The dichotomy obvious in German society at large also manifested

itself in the individual. And in every case the resolution of the conflict was in favour of the pernicious elements, so that

> "Those who know Germany know that there is something in the German people that... likes kicking a man when he is down. That does not mind torture and brutality, that respects success at all costs, thinks breaking your word is a sign of cleverness, and aggression a sign that you have providence on your side, that rejoices at the thought of being on the side of the big battalions, and does not care who goes to the wall." (13)

It followed that there was no escape from the fact that the Nazi creed and code answered to "something deep down in the German nature... the fact is that the Germans are a singularly credulous and gullible people, without any critical standards...[in] their submissiveness, their readiness to obey, their lust to be led... they are an excessively obedient, docile people." (14) In Rowse's view, Nietzsche had it right: "If only they have a heady wine for the senses they will put up with bad bread. Intoxication means more to them than nourishment." (15)

Tradition had made of the German a homicidal maniac. All the characteristics of the German mind,

"...the inverted sentimentalism the reverse side of which
is their brutality, the unsureness of themselves that
expresses itself in their disgusting exhibitions of
aggressiveness towards others, their persecution of
minorities, their creation of anti-Semitism into a
deliberate policy - a pathological disease, a crime
against civilisation..."[16]

all these things were symptoms of a neurosis that had brought
them to the edge of madness. Rowse returned to the same theme in
a review article in 1941. "All through her history Germany has
displayed a strong undercurrent of resentment, resistance,
jealousy, Schadenfreude against the West..... The mentality of
militant aggression, with the whole complex of doctrines that
goes with it, German superiority... hatred of rationalism... is
not merely the dominant tradition of Germany in the past
century; it is the German tradition par excellence."[17] It
was for this reason that Nazi brutality had gained such a hold
in Germany. It answered to something that lay deep in the
German people.

However much they abominated the Nazi regime as an instrument of
persecution, oppression, and a threat to general liberties,
individuals and groups for whom the ideological self-image had
high salience as an operational construct could not be expected

to swallow blanket condemnations of this kind. But more were to come. Between January 1940 and April 1942 a range of journals carried L. B. Namier's views on Germany. [18] For Namier there was no distinction to be made between government and people in Germany. Taken together, acting together, rulers and ruled were part and parcel of "... a nation singularly brutal and ruthless..." [19] That this had not always been appreciated by policy makers and public at large in Britain was due to a number of things, among them the apparent desire to square attitudes to Germany with perceptions of the ideological self-image. If, as is contended below, Namier's views were so laced with linguistic conjuring tricks and double standards as to make his case aggressively propagandist, this increases rather than reduces the importance of his attitudes, for it provides yet another example of that overstated position from which many in Britain felt the need to retreat, even in the throes of war.

Namier's case against Germany and the Germans was a cultural one. The key was to be found in "the differences between the forms of communal life which nations have developed..." [20] He conceded that a wide variety of social forms were to be found in all nations. but focused attention on what he termed the "dominant patterns which express the national character." Once established, "...these patterns powerfully react on the individual and mould him in turn." [21] Although humane

elements were to be detected in the German tradition, those elements had never occupied a dominant cultural position. He did not deny that "decent, kindly Germans" existed; but they had been "singularly ineffective", and had "failed to impress their pattern on the nation and to 'generalise' their type or creed..."[22] Far from being a force of any real significance in national affairs, the decent, kindly German was a "...charming figure of... romantic legend."[23] It could not be complained that Namier ignored cultural considerations but, like Rowse, he made no attempt to explore the very complex relationships that can exist between 'dominant patterns' and society at large - for example, the differential extent to which norms and values are internalised. Had he done so, he may have arrived at a similar conclusion; on the other hand he may have been forced to hedge his conclusions with reservations. It may be legitimate to speak of national character, insofar as different nations may demonstrate different dominant cultural patterns, but some 'characters' may be more 'national' than others, the base of one dominant cultural pattern may be narrower than another - more subject to challenge than another, and levels of participation in dominant cultures may differ radically - variables being degree of positive participation, degree of prudent participation, degree of acquiescence.

Namier's rather simplistic approach led to the straightforward

assertions that William II and Hitler both truly voiced "... the same elements in Germany's national development and spirit", [24] that Hitler's rise to power was due to him having given expression "... to some of the deepest instincts of the Germans", [25] and that "the achievements and the guilt of Germany are not to be ascribed to one individual, nor even to a Party; they are the work of the German nation." There was no defensible justification for "... dissociating any substantial part of the German nation from the Nazis." It was likely, of course, that after defeat, "... many Germans [would] deprecate and deplore..." Nazi policies, but this would be no more than evidence of the German belief that "Laster ist ein mythologischer Ausdruck für schlechte Geschäfte." [26] In response to the claim that there were "...two fatal extremes in Germany - a too submissive and deferential attitude on the part of the underdog, and the love of power and a ruthless and tyrannical use of it on the part of the top-dog", he wrote

"this view of the Germans... is based on accurate but superficial observation, and in distinguishing sharply between the willing slave and the ruthless bully, establishes a misleading, and potentially dangerous, dichotomy; these are not two mutually exclusive types, but two facets of the German character, closely interconnected, indeed inseparable, complementing and

reinforcing each other; and on their <u>combination</u> is built up the Prussian State and the German nation. In the Prussian State machine everyone is both slave and master... the less personal life and freedom the German enjoys, the more important it is for him to feel a member of the master nation... this is his compensation: even the most submissive and deferential of Germans partakes in the ruthless tyranny exercised by his state and nation at home and abroad... It is the lack of moral courage, self-assurance, and independence in the individual German which makes him seek safety, self-assertion, and superlative power in and through his state and nation, and which makes him glorify them beyond all bounds of sense and reason. Finding in them the desired compensation, he serves them with a patience and devotion such as more individualistic races find it difficult to muster and maintain." (27)

On one level of interpretation the way in which Namier expressed his views is analogous to the performer who creates an illusion by sleight of hand. "Totalitarian systems", he wrote, "have certain marked advantages over freer forms of government." One such advantage was derived from "the unmeasured freely flaunted brutality of... professional thugs, which intimidates and like the boa constrictor fascinates rabbits among the leaders and the

public."[28] In this passage apparently innocent concepts are used to convey a message. It is probably reasonable to suppose that most normal people in civilian situations where they are personally vulnerable will, taking all the options into account, be intimidated by brutality if it is directed against them. Prudence may well dictate that they try to escape the consequences of resistance by avoiding direct confrontation, by disguising their true feelings. This is not a courageous response to the threat of brutal force, but it could be argued that it is an eminently human and intelligent response. But Namier's Germans were not run-of-the-mill normal people in that sense. They were not only intimidated; they were fascinated. In everyday usage one might indeed speak of rabbits being 'fascinated' by a boa constrictor, but the use of the word in Namier's context comes close to suggesting a pleasurable experience on the part of the victims. Undertones of masochism can be detected. It is probably more precise to speak of rabbits being immobilised by fear, just as ordinary people in certain situations may be immobilised by brutality. But Namier's Germans were not ordinary people. And was the use of 'rabbits' entirely innocent? Such creatures may be said to display the characteristics of weakness, timidity and submissiveness.

On the subject of how dominant cultural patterns may be established Namier argued that "A nation can crystallise above or

below the average moral level of the individuals who compose it." (29)   This was by way of preface to the assertion that the dominant cultural pattern of Germany was one that had crystallised below the average, and once established reacted powerfully on individuals, dragging their moral awareness to a still lower level. (30)   The use of a simple mathematical concept appeared to confer authority to the argument. But how is an independently verifiable estimate of the average moral level of a nation arrived at? Are numerous high moral grades counterbalanced by a few depraved elements, or vice-versa? Faced with such an intractable problem it was mere trickery to presuppose that such an average moral level existed in order that there could be assigned to it a particularly low value.

There was some theoretical validity to Namier's claim that dominance and submissiveness may be complementary features of a single personality. But was that hypothesis on dualism in a single personality the sole basis for his rejection of the notion that most Germans occupied the one role of under-dog? There is, of course, enough that is pejorative in that notion. There is something distasteful about ingrained submissiveness and deference. Namier could not leave it at that, however, for to do so opened up the possibility that altered circumstances could make something better of the Germans. Their submissiveness and deference could make them amenable subjects

of a much less ruthless, much more civilised regime. If instructed to act as decent, kindly Germans, they might just have done so. For Namier's purposes they had to occupy the dualistic role, for only in that mix was there little hope of redemption.

In another passage Namier wrote:

> "Whenever the German national character is discussed, someone will invariably remark that he has known such decent, kindly Germans, and will protest against 'generalisations', without perceiving that it is he who is advancing an unwarrantable generalisation in arguing about the character of a nation from that of individuals... it is unsafe to argue from particles to aggregates..."[31]

It is true that generalisations about the German national character were challenged by those who did not subscribe to Namier's views. But to raise questions against a generalisation is not necessarily to fashion yet another, contrary generalisation. What Namier did, almost by stealth, was to insert a conclusion which had not been postulated by his critics, namely, that in aggregate Germans were decent because individual cases of decent Germans could be cited. Quite without justification he accused his challengers of transductive

thinking.

"There are people", wrote Namier, "who treat all evil as
extraneous and adventitious: to them a sick person is a healthy
person plus a disease, not a body in a condition which, whether
temporary or permanent, is its own. A similar 'demonology'
treats the present Germany as a country of normal, decent people
bewitched by Hitler; whereas in reality Hitler's unparallelled
rise is due to the fact that he has given expression to some of
the deepest instincts of the Germans."[32] Statements of this
kind tend to distort reality. Where he confined himself to the
strict medical analogy he was on firm enough ground, but it was
improper to suggest that 'bodies' and 'societies' share similar
organic properties. He appeared to act as a social pathologist,
lay out the corpse of the Weimar Republic, and postulate that
death was due to a disease of the bloodstream or a malfunction
in the central nervous system. Such a process has some merit as
a scaffolding for thought as long as the practitioner remembers
that he is qualified as an historian and not as a physician,
that the corpse is imaginary, that even in imagination it does
not share the organic properties of its model, and that
historical analysis is concerned with relationships between
personalities and environments. To locate the causes of a
complex set of historical circumstances exclusively in
personality is to be ahistorical. Furthermore, there was a neat

twist in the passage quoted above. There is always some prospect of health for a sick person, because that person is not in itself the disease. There was no prospect of health for Germany, for Germany <u>was</u> the disease, and Hitler merely its symptom.

If there was sleight of hand in Namier's work there were also double standards. There is an interesting passage in which he cogently explained certain cultural traits of Jews in relation to the circumstances of their lives, and highlighted the inadequacy of the stereotypes used by gentiles to describe Jewish behaviour. In the quotation below the word 'Jew', used by Namier, has been omitted, and I invite the insertion of the word 'German'. Many historians would see in this passage, so adjusted, a not unreasonable description of the German experience as Germans perceived it, in the first thirty years of the twentieth century. Namier could not make such a concession, even tentatively.

> "What a life, to be continually on trial and under examination! <u>Uncertainty</u> breeds <u>anxiety</u> and anxiety promotes <u>critical attention</u>... most of the peculiarities with which the [   ] is taunted [and sometimes tainted] are the result of a deeper <u>malaise.</u> <u>Harried,</u> he is blamed for being <u>restless;</u> <u>kept out or kept down,</u> he is

described as <u>pushing and assertive</u>; <u>hurt</u>, he searches for compensations and is called <u>vain, blatant or self-indulgent</u>; <u>insecure</u> he yearns for <u>standing, power and wealth</u>; which sometimes protect him, but more often expose him the more to attack."[33]

His very sound objections to racist views did not deter Namier from entering the occasional genetic comment if it had connotations that would support his assertions:

"German faces are marvellously symmetrical.... no other European nation ever attains that square, stolid facial symmetry."[34]

And in terms of his general position on racism, there was something of a contradiction in the claim [addressed particularly to the Germans] that "Everyman has only <u>one method,</u> as he has only one face; <u>he is born with both</u>."[35] Namier treated environmental circumstances with cavalier inconsistency. In the demagogical, militarist and anti-semitic movements in France "... which centred around Boulanger, Deroulede, and Drumont", he saw "almost every theory, delusion or trick in the Nazi repertory..."

"...the same nationalist exasperation and effervescence, a

similar mixture of radicalism and reaction, the same reviling of the Parliamentary Republic, of its sins and 'corruption', the same hysterical adulation of the individual..."

But, in the case of France he referred to internal and external circumstances which counteracted those trends and allowed a generation to grow up "no longer beset by the poignant memories of 1870.."[36] One would have expected him to concede that environmental circumstances, internal and external to Germany, made an important contribution to the ultimate success of Nazism. Those comments he made were, however, marginal, being limited to the remark that the Weimar Republic "received little consideration" from the victorious powers.[37]

The nature of Namier's argument forced him to deny to his study of the Germans one of the techniques essential to the historian - the act of sympathetic imagination. And here we are faced with a contradiction, for Namier fully appreciated the value of an empathetic approach. If gentiles would but use it, he argued, if they were - through an act of imagination - to "find themselves circumstanced as the Jews were at present..." their attitudes towards Jews could not remain as they were.[38]

It has been noted that Namier resented arguments which moved

from the particular to the general. What, then, is one to make
of his claim that

> "It is the lack of moral courage, self-assurance, and
> independence in the individual German which makes <u>him</u> seek
> safety, self-assertion, and superlative power in and
> through <u>his</u> state and nation, and which makes <u>him</u> glorify
> them..."[39]

A search for concrete evidence, rather than assertion and
reassertion, of the dualistic nature of the 'German' personality
[dominant - submissive] reveals <u>one</u> example relating to an
<u>individual</u>:

> "A friend of mine, while gate crashing in the park of a
> German luxury home was <u>rudely accosted</u> [dominance] by a
> gardener who spotted him as an intruder; with admirable
> presence of mind and understanding the German character,
> he <u>sharply</u> replied [dominance]: 'Should anyone ask you
> what I am doing here, you will say that you don't know.'
> '<u>Yes, sir</u>' [submission] answered the German, and walked
> off satisfied..." [40]

One of the most interesting features of Namier's work was his
recognition that the British had a particular image of

themselves. He accepted that "Englishmen hate being unfair or rude."[41] The very literature of the nation revealed its desire to retreat from clear-cut, overstated positions which left no margin for doubt or debate. "English prose", he wrote "however clear and simple, has also to be elliptic; at least the semblance of a free margin must be left for the thoughts of the reader. The Englishman says 'I like apples', the meticulously precise German: 'I like eating apples'."[42] It was not to be expected that his views on the Germans, so cut and dried and, on analysis, so threaded with linguistic tricks and double standards, would recommend themselves to those who hated being unfair and who felt that "at least the semblance of a free margin" should be left to the receiving mind.

One of the chief contributors to the debate on Germany and the Germans, and perhaps the most important in that his extreme Germanophobia stimulated such an interesting response, was Sir Robert Vansittart. He had been a student in Germany in the 1890s and, perceiving himself to be the victim of Anglophobia, "...came to believe that the Germans wanted Britain's destruction."[43] In the early thirties he subscribed to the general feeling that the letter of Versailles was indefensible, but as the decade progressed he became an implacable enemy of the Reich. The debate in which he played a major part centred on questions such as: What form of occupation should be imposed on

Germany when the war ended?; What level of reparations should be demanded?; To what extent should retribution be exacted?; What form of re-education process should be devised? On all of those questions Vansittart took a hard line. In 1940 he advocated that Germany be dismembered, otherwise "...small nations would continue to get their throats cut by this accursed German race...[of which 80% at least were]... the political and moral scum of the earth."[44] In December 1940, he gave seven broadcasts on German history and character for BBC overseas radio. These broadcasts were later published in a best selling pamphlet under the title Black Record: Germans Past and Present [1941]. In the same year he published Roots of the Trouble and, free of government employment wrote letters and articles for newspapers and helped to found and organise groups such as The Never Again Association, dedicated to the prevention of a lenient peace on the conclusion of the war.

The thesis of Black Record was that throughout history the Germans had been and were aggressive, militaristic, untrustworthy, and consistently responsible for war and misfortune. Ingrained in them were the traits of the 'Butcher Bird', whose characteristic behaviour was to spring on smaller, unsuspecting prey.

"It is necessary to discard once and for all what

Sainte-Beuve rightly called the 'vague and lyrical' view of Germany diffused by Madame de Stael, and to keep strictly to the record - the worst ever.... German barbarism first crushed Latin civilisation at the battle of Aodrianople in the year 378, and it has again crushed Latin civilisation in France today....

A fact early and universally recognised was that the Germans were not only very dirty fighters but they never kept a pledge or treaty. Gibbon has commented on this characteristic. It is worth noting that the first German national hero to make himself a name for treachery was Hermann in the year 9.... By the time they got to their famous warmonger, Frederick Barbarossa, in the twelfth century, the only bone of contention was not whether they should remain at peace, but which race should they conquer and dominate.....

The lust of world domination has been working in them for generations... I have seen the idea of the German empire emerging... It has had three elements to work on, all of which are well-known to those with any knowledge of German psychology. The three are Envy, Self-pity and Cruelty....

There is no horror that Germans have not committed; and

the hurricane of cruelty must be succeeded by the wave of indignation. Beware therefore lest another sham reformation is staged. Take nothing for granted. Make sure for yourselves and for your children.

This bird of prey is no sudden apparition. It is a species. Hitler is no accident, he is the natural and continuous product of a breed which from the dawn of history has been predatory, bellicose...."[45]

Vansittart believed that the Germans, as a people, had been impregnated with militarism, imbued with a sense of superiority, and convinced that their mission was to enslave mankind for the good of mankind. They had been persuaded that this great end justified any and every means, however reprehensible those means might appear to others. This process had produced "... a race of hooligans which is the curse of the whole world."[46] Despite this, Vansittart objected to the criticism that he was condemning an entire people. His answer was that he did not hate all Germans, just "... the bloody minded bulk."[47] In an article for the Sunday Times [August 1941], Vansittart said of the Germans: "... cruelty is in their bone and breed", [48] and in Roots of The Trouble he wrote: "...all the miseries of the world's last three generations have issued from the German land and the German soul.... the nature of the German nation is

hideously warped and diseased..."[49]

Except for a group so tiny as to be insignificant in quantitative terms, those who disagreed with Vansittart did not do so because they had any sympathy with the Nazi regime. The vast majority of people agreed with Neville Chamberlain that they would be fighting evil things, "....brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution",[50] and "virtually everyone in Britain agreed that Nazism must be eliminated and Germany disarmed and occupied by Allied military forces."[51] Very few people, if any, believed that re-education could be carried through easily or rapidly. But the Prime Minister probably spoke for a large section of the community when he said that Britain was not fighting the German people but a tyrannical regime which had betrayed them. Vansittart of course had his supporters, some of whom were already committed to similar views, and others who became converts. Harold Nicolson believed that in every German soul there were "...strange pockets of envy and suspicion." Gilbert Murray, the Oxford classicist, asserted that German history was "... an ingenious mixture of all elements calculated to stimulate self-pity, self-worship, desperate pugnacity." Duff Cooper argued that since its creation the German nation had been a menace to the world and that at the end of the war the Allies should make sure that no German nation existed. Beaverbrook asked the British and their

allies to cultivate a "...stern and righteous hatred."[52]
Lillian Doull wrote: "This cant about not being at war with the
German people must cease. If the German people are so
peace-minded, Hitler could never have maintained his
concentration camps or perpetrated atrocities on the enormous
scale that he does."[53] G.R. King reminded his readers that
"The cry at the beginning of the last war was, 'We have no
quarrel with the German people; it is just their government'.
By the end of the war the British and the French had a bitter
hatred of everything German. Consequently the peace terms were
very hard on Germany, though not hard enough to prevent her from
becoming dangerous again. Is this going to happen again this
time? The cry once more is that we have no quarrel with the
German people, but Hitlerism must be destroyed. To ensure peace
after this war there must be no Germany left on the map of
Europe."[54] V. Medus demanded that "'Smash Germany' should be
the order of the day. Utterly destroy them. It's the one and
only way to ensure everlasting peace. 'We fight Hitlerism and
not the German people'...... is piffle."[55]

Apart from the attitudes based on the ideological self-image,
there were tactical reasons for opposing the Vansittart thesis
and making distinctions between the German people and the Nazi
regime. It was thought that such distinctions would help to
drive a wedge between the German masses and their leaders.

When it was perceived in official circles that this might not be the outcome, a tactical adjustment of view took place. It was not so much a question of the non-existence of a valid difference between people and regime as a growing conviction that in practical terms the distinction could not be exploited to advantage.[56] Significantly, the BBC which had previously promoted the distinction in its broadcasts dropped the word 'Nazi' from its news bulletins to Germany. There was a division of opinion within the Foreign Office. On the one side it was held that to speak of good and bad Germans was dangerous in that it could subvert the war effort; on the other side it was argued that the Black Record approach would only "...cement the German people behind their rulers."[57] Frank Owen, editor of the Evening Standard, subscribed to the latter view, and said of Vansittart, "...he brings back to Hitler's side thousands of Germans who were leaving it."[58] It is interesting to note that the Nazi propaganda machine welcomed the views of Vansittart and his supporters. Particularly in the late 1930s the Nazi leaders had felt the need to combat the notion that the people and the regime were in any way distinct. In a speech at Weimar, 7 November 1938, Hitler insisted: "..there are no forces in Germany which turn against the regime. There is only one force. The National Socialist Movement, its leader and his followers in arms"; and three days later, at Munich, he fused people and leaders with the words: "....no one can destroy the

regime without destroying the German people." The Hamburger
Tageblatt of 10 November 1938 proclaimed: "The whole German
people...eighty million strong, was present... in the Burgerbrau
Keller and will always be present wherever the Fuhrer is."[59]
Goebbels was delighted by the claims made in Black Record and
supporting publications:

> "This fellow Vansittart is really worth his weight in gold
> to our propaganda. After the war a monument ought to be
> erected to him somewhere in Germany with the inscription:
> 'To the Englishman who rendered the greatest service to
> the German cause during the war'."[60]

Edward Hulton [1940] in an article entitled Whom are we
Fighting?, was concerned by the shift away from making
distinctions.

> "The attitude of our people at the beginning of the war
> was magnificent. They saw the clear distinction between
> the Nazi Party and the German people. No contest has
> ever begun more free from idiotic jingoism. Of late the
> self-styled realists have raised their ugly heads. Mr
> Duff Cooper tells us that there is something innate in the
> German character which renders the German people liable to
> accept that particular form of bad government which

ultimately leads to war... Sir Herbert Williams, M.P.,
tells us 'it is the German people that are the enemy'.
The Evening News issues 'A Warning to Day Dreamers'. We
are told that we are sentimentalists with a maudlin faith
that the Germans are a gentle people in the clutches of a
gang of blackguards. 'The brutal truth', the Evening News
has discovered, 'is that the German people delight in the
infamies of their leaders'. Our government are now going
back on their former protestations. Mr Winston Churchill
blundered into the use of the term 'Huns'... Even Mr
Chamberlain at the Mansion House, on January 9, declared
that the German people must realise that the
responsibility for the prolongation of this war was
theirs. A few weeks ago only a tiny minority would have
identified the German people with the Nazis. But already
people are wavering... [61]

The most significant response to the argument contained in Black
Record, and by extension to the work of Rowse and Namier, was
that produced by Victor Gollancz [1942]. [62] On one level he
delivered a major assault on Nazi creed and practice; on
another he challenged the style and substance of Vansittart's
case. He stated, without equivocation, that winning the war was
more important than winning the peace. If extremes of hatred
and vengeance were prerequisites for military victory, his voice

would not be raised against the full exercise of such emotions.

Nazi success would mean the imposition of "a way of life totally

incompatible with the moral aspirations of humanity."[63]   In

the struggle with Hitler's regime, "..the gains of two thousand

years and more [were] at stake, and [we] are determined,

whatever the immediate cost in blood and torment and treasure,

that they shall be preserved."[64]   However, in addition to

using material weapons in the fight against Nazism, Britain had

to use spiritual weapons also. He was convinced that the views

expressed by Vansittart, and taken up by others, were fatally

flawed in that they compromised with the spirit of the thing

they were fighting. 'Vansittartism', indeed, impeded victory,

for it robbed the British war-effort of "a dynamic as powerful

for good as the Nazis' is for evil...."[65]   The vulgarity of

the thesis developed in Black Record - its wild generalisations,

its precise and unjustified limitation of responsibility for the

major ills of the world to Germany, its ahistorical undertones,

its intolerance, its incitement to hatred and its demand for

revenge - diminished those who subscribed to it and was

destructive of the ideological component of the British

self-image. 'Vansittartism' was likely to prolong the war; the

outpourings of hatred associated with the position made ordinary

Germans fear what would happen to them if the Allies were

victorious and above all other things, that was "the most potent

factor in the preservation of Hitler's power."   In defence of

the values on behalf of which Britain was fighting, a committed stand had to be made against the claims made in Black Record. It would take some effort to "swim against the stream"; but with all that was good in the British way of life and thinking at stake, the effort had to be made. Were Vansittart to carry the day by default, then the silent voices would bear "The supreme guilt."[66]

Fairness, and the nature of his own attack, compelled Gollancz to reject some of the arguments of those who were on his side in the debate on 'Vansittartism'. He was determined to counter, "tooth and nail", the notion that there was nothing to distinguish the Allies from the Nazis in a war which was mutually imperialistic in origin. He agreed that the war was "unquestionably imperialist...[in that] it arose out of the clash of competing monopoly capitalisms...", but on a number of criteria it was not only possible but right to make distinctions. Britain was on the defensive, Germany on the offensive; Britain had no vision of world conquest, Germany entertained such ambitions; Britain could be said to stand for progress, Germany for reaction and terror; in a British victory there was hope for the world, in a German victory despair.[67] Nevertheless, it was a central part of his argument that "...the drive for profits of competing capitalisms is a general poison which infects the international body..."

The broad causes of the war, whatever immediate distinctions could be made between parties to it, were part of a "general imperialist setting."[68] Inevitably, this raised the issue of responsibility, and how it should be assigned; and in doing that it raised the related issue of how Germany should be treated once the war had been won.

Gollancz attacked Vansittart's position on both of those crucial issues. First, he confirmed Germany's central and deliberate role in events leading up to the Second World War. But he was not prepared, as was Vansittart, to place a definitional stop after this statement, and so imply that all the issues had been covered by it. Were the Allies clear of all blame? Had not the Franco-British policy at Versailles "...laid the first foundations of 1939, and laid them firmly?" Had they not, in the provisions of Versailles, "....deliberately crippled a nation of sixty million souls: as deliberately as Hitler launched the present war?"[69] Had not the French, encouraging German default in order to gain territory, contributed to the Great Inflation by invading the Ruhr - an inflation which was "to leave its mark on the whole German people: bear it in mind when you think of 1933."[70] Second, he argued that when it came to the planning of ground rules for the welfare of the world in post-war years, the particular responsibility carried by individual states - Germany included - had less bearing than

the general responsibility of world capitalism. Preoccupation with special German responsibility would cloud the issue and divert attention from the fact that "the solution of the general world problem [was] the simultaneous condition for the solution of the German problem..."[71] The prevailing economic system, which encouraged greed, "reinforces it, consecrates it, makes it the norm of human behaviour", should be replaced by international socialism.[72]

Since the prospect of fraternity and brotherhood held out by international socialism could only be realised in a world where individual states were treated as equals, it followed that any 'holding down' of Germany would be illogical. It was the aim of international socialism to "...combine the individual productive strands [so that] the richest international garment may be woven... Discrimination against one of the greatest of industrial peoples, for whatever reason it may be undertaken, must necessarily defeat this aim."[73]

In response to Vansittart's claim that on Germany's Black Record were listed the war scares of pre-1914 and culpability in respect of the Great War itself, Gollancz can be seen to call on the principle of cause and effect, and on the premise that, short of international consensus, defence of the status quo is not self-evidently altruistic.

"Every year is, in the nature of things, preceded by another", and it was ahistorical to focus, as Vansittart had done, on events such as the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, without giving due weight to the fact that this followed hard upon negotiations between France and Britain which realised profit to the former in Morocco and to the latter in Egypt.[74] Further, although it was possible to judge the behaviour of states on a plurality of criteria, "...as between a country that is pushing out for power and wealth, and a country that is determined to retain the power and wealth she has got by past exploitation, there is not, in that regard, a ha'porth of moral difference."[75]

The hope that Gollancz entertained was that Germany would regenerate itself from below; that ordinary people would overthrow the forces of reaction. Britain should be pursuing policies which lubricated such processes rather than have them seize up. Everything possible should be done to persuade ordinary Germans "that they have everything to gain, and nothing to fear, from the overthrow of Hitler's tyranny..."[76] Instead, Vansittart and those who publicly subscribed to his views were bringing Germans and Hitler close together. Gollancz saw evidence that the bonds between Hitler and the German people had been "grossly exaggerated and that any real solidarity [was] myth." For every internal opponent who was imprisoned or executed, "there must be very many who would revolt if they

dared, but whose courage stops just short of this..." If, in spite of heavy penalties incurred by civilians tuning in to foreign broadcasts, the BBC maintained "an elaborate round the clock programme" beamed at Germany, then it was reasonable to assume that many were listening.[77] Analysis of comments made by Hitler and Goebbels revealed that all was not well. In December 1941 Hitler had referred to "internal doubters", and in the same month Goebbels had written scathingly of citizens who were more concerned with their own "negligible daily troubles" than with the great issue of the day - the fate of the nation.[78] Vansittart and others denounced reference to such evidence as an attempt to connive with those who wanted Germany to be 'let off lightly'. Why hadn't the German people risen up against the Nazi regime, they asked. If Hitler and the Germans were not as one, why was he still in power? To such questions Gollancz responded with one of his own:

"I should like to ask these heroic ladies and gentlemen who are so shocked because Hitler has not already been overthrown - just how could the German people have done it?"

In their daily lives they had to contend with the Gestapo, "The most awful weapon of espionage, delation, and terror that has ever been forged...", but beyond that there were wider

considerations:

> "Once war has broken out, even potential revolutionaries
> become divided in mind, hesitant, unwilling to precipitate
> defeat - especially [this a thrust at Vansittart] if they
> are led to believe that defeat will mean not freedom but
> annihilation.... I confess that self-righteous indignation
> about the cowardice of the German people, in the situation
> in which they find themselves, makes me feel a little
> sick."[79]

Vansittart had described the Germans as docile, obedient and
acquiescent in relation to the butchery and sadism perpetrated
in their name. Gollancz wondered about the distribution of the
alleged traits of sadism and submission in the German
population, and identified in Vansittart's analysis of national
characteristics a problem already noted by others in the work of
Namier. If, for the sake of argument, one supposed that the
majority of Germans were docile and obedient, but not in
themselves sadistic, then post-war policies of the kind
recommended by Vansittart would be quite inappropriate,

> "For if especially obedient people will follow men who
> lead them to war they will follow men who lead them to
> peace.... We are talking about the great masses of

ordinary, common people: the mother with her baby, the little clerk, the worker at his bench. We all have aggression in us; but do you really believe that, given even a barely tolerable life: given no cunning appeal to the sense of glory or the sense of fear: given an environment that brings out the best instead of the worst: given the possibility of finding an outlet for his aggression in happy, constructive work and ordinary enjoyment; do you really believe that, given these, the average Herr Schmidt of Hamburg will be any more likely to satisfy his aggression by starving and murdering and torturing his fellow men than the average Mr Smith of Clapham?"[80]

Gollancz implored his readers to resist the propaganda of hatred associated with 'Vansittartism'. It clouded judgment and was bad in itself. War was, of course, a dirty business: "We cannot keep our hands clean; we must kill and torment the flesh of our brothers, lest liberty, and the capacity of man to rise above his animal nature, should perish utterly from the earth." But the 'spirit' in which this necessity was met was of crucial significance, for therein would lie the distinction between the contending forces. "We can keep our hearts pure; and by as much as we fail to do so, by as much as we hate, by so much does Hitler win."[81] Where Vansittart encouraged hatred of the

criminal, Gollancz recommended hatred of the crime. He was resolute in his abomination of Nazi practices, and noted with irony that many newspapers - now virulently anti-German - had been aware of those practices in the 1930s and had overlooked or condoned them when the imperatives of war time emergencies had not obtained. In passages at times reminiscent of Socratic principles, Gollancz argued that crimes should be punished, but "punishment should not involve hatred; hatred at best is irrelevant to punishment.... or, at worst and more frequently it perverts the punishment and robs it of any beneficial effect it might otherwise have had."[82] For civilised people, punishment had two main objectives: first, society had to be protected; second, the criminal had to be reformed. The intrusion of vengeance was not only incompatible with those objectives, additionally and reprehensibly it amounted to "seizing a respectable occasion for giving the rein to our own sadistic impulses, or....seeking relief from a tormenting conscience by externalising and trying to annihilate our own guilt."[83] To hate the criminal was, in a sense, to "gratify ourselves, enhance our own sense of power over a fellow creature, give the rein to our own aggressiveness. We use the evil in him as a justification for no longer making the effort to restrain our own..." To hate the criminal was to "increase the amount of self-assertion in the world." To hate the crime, but not the criminal was, on the other hand, to diminish the

expression of self-assertion. Hitler was tempting the world to

worship self-assertion, and the line taken by Vansittart was

making his work easier.   The Nazi doctrine was an invitation to

humanity to loathe itself;   its cult of hatred promoted

"contempt for reason...equal justice and objective truth, and

above all... detestation of pity and mercy and humility and all

the little humanities of decent average men and women."[84]

Gollancz resolved that he would not be beaten in the fortress of

his humanity by Hitler:

> "I refuse to hate him.   And as the Jews are the special
> object of his hatred, as a Jew I doubly refuse."[85]

Wherever Vansittart was successful, whenever a man who had not

previously hated anyone now hated the Nazis, Hitler had claimed

another victim.   Gollancz was aware that <u>Black Record</u> had

anticipated this line of argument, and he responded with:

> "Is all this 'sentimental' and unrealistic...? It is the
>
> haters that are sentimental or emotional, for it is to
>
> their most primitive and stronger emotions that they give
>
> the rein. Those who plead for the restraint of these
>
> emotions, because in abandonment to them they see nothing
>
> but destruction and death: those who insist that we must
>
> look beyond immediate gratification, and must guard

ourselves even now as instruments for giving life to ourselves and others: these are the starkest, and most unsentimental of realists. It is indeed a Nazi triumph that to luxuriate in hatred should be regarded as realistic, and not to do so as sentimental."[86]

Ultimately, the real danger inherent in Vansittart's views was that they were subversive of the long standing traits and values of the British people - reason, balance, fairness, sympathetic understanding and generosity of spirit. It was in defence of the ideological self-image that Gollancz stood against him.

"At a time when objectivity is everywhere menaced by Fascism, the false history and grotesque view of the modern world that Vansittartism presents to the credulous are lamentable enough: but it is in the emotional mood which is induced by its selection of facts and interpretation of events that its greatest peril lies. For, seeming to appeal to reason, it is to two emotions that it in truth appeals - the bad one of hatred and thirst for revenge, and the good but so easily pervertible one of moral indignation... whatever its motives, ... Vansittartism is producing not a reasoned examination of international problems, about which men

may honourably differ, but a mood of savage hatred and blind vindictiveness against the men and women, and even the boys and girls, of Germany. The process had not gone very far. I like to think that the British people are too kindly and decent for that. But who knows where, in the perspective of a long war, this contagion may end."[87]

Vansittart's thesis was also challenged by Thouless [1942]. In response to those who refused to make distinctions between Germans of one kind and another, he argued that clear thinking and a commitment to the principles of rationality demanded that "we must make distinctions where differences exist..";[88] in opposition to those who would not transcend the limits of their own prejudices when making judgments on nations, he claimed that

"each observer has a different frame of reference... if our wish is not to win an argument but to understand reality, there is much to be said for not considering [an] event only from the point of view of the frame of reference that we happen to occupy, but for considering also how it would appear from the point of view of other possible frames of reference."[89]

Vansittart's unwillingness to make distinctions between different Germans placed him perilously close to Hitler. For Hitler there were no good and bad Jews, no kind and unkind Jews, no honest and dishonest Jews: "All of the wide differences between one Jew and another - which are much the same as the differences between different Germans or between different Englishmen - is obliterated in the picture of the one single detestable and invariable figure - the Jew."[90] In Nazi doctrine the reasonable proposition that some Jews were likely to be bad and dishonest had become transformed into the totally false proposition that all Jews could be so described. It was a similar act of transformation in Vansittart's thesis which had "supplied the creed for hostility against... the Germans..." Black Record was, of course, blatantly propagandist, and those with such intentions found rational conclusions "too moderate to be of much service to a general anti-German sentiment."[91] Vansittart's case had to be seen as "a stimulus to action, not as a precise statement of fact." Acceptance or rejection of that case would depend on whether his readers wished to be "stimulated into action by... fictions", or whether they wished to "think clearly even in wartime and even about our enemies."[92]

Thouless laid considerable emphasis on the value of empathy. For the student of clear thinking, "the attempt to look at

things as they appear from other points of view than one's own
[was] not a mere intellectual exercise", but a necessity.[93]
This was not to argue that the point of view of another, say an
opponent in war, would define the situation as it <u>really</u> was,
would describe the <u>truth</u> about a disputed issue. On the other
hand, it was unlikely that a frame of reference defining <u>reality</u>
and describing <u>truth</u> "would be occupied by either of the two
parties to the dispute. <u>The views of both sides are likely to
be unduly influenced by their own situations, so that there is
likely to be gain to both of them if they make the imaginative
effort necessary to consider how the situation would look from
the point of view of the other.</u>"[94] This imaginative effort
involved a systematic determination to escape from the
limitations of one's own frame of reference.

"A person - whether German or British - whose reaction to

air bombardment is expressed in such words as: 'The

brutes, dropping bombs on innocent women and children', is

looking at the situation exclusively from the limits of

his own frame of reference. On the other hand, the

attitude - by no means unknown in Great Britain and

possibly also to be found in Germany - expressed in such

words as: 'Poor fellows, they have to do their jobs just

as our own aviators do', is one that is transcending the

limits of the speaker's own frame of reference."[95]

Douglas-Smith [1942] considered that the British people were firmly resolved "to defeat and smash Hitler and the Nazis", but that the methods by which the victory should be achieved were still "the subject of hopeless indecision."[96] This indecision manifested itself on two levels, strategic and attitudinal. Attitudinally, the problem took the form of a question: 'Is our enemy the German people or the Nazi Party?' Those like Rowse, Namier, and Vansittart, who argued with no more than marginal reservations, if any, that the Germans were all alike, that they were fanatically devoted to Hitler, and that their national characteristics left no scope for 'good Germans', wanted to see Germany and the Germans crushed. There were others who made distinctions between the German people and the Nazis. The question had to be answered, and "the destinies of England and the world depend on the conclusion which is reached."[97]

Douglas-Smith had little sympathy with the case expressed in Black Record. He quoted Heinrich Fraenkel's comments on its author:

> "Sir Robert Vansittart does not know the German people. I
> wonder if, on all his sojourns in Germany, he ever
> travelled on a bus, or in a tram-car, or a third-class
> railway compartment... if ever he spent some time in
> living with a lower middle-class family; if ever he spent

as much as a day and a night in one of the huge tenement
houses of a Berlin working-class district."[98]

And he drew the attention of his readers to the descriptions of
Fascist brutality at the 1934 Olympia Rally provided by Rev.
H.R.L. Sheppard and Sir Terence O'Connor.

"The people who did these things were Englishmen. You can
get hooligans to do these things in all countries. The
case against German inherent cruelty simply falls to the
ground... The case against Germans, as Germans, is a
farce."[99]

If the attitudes subsumed under the general heading of
'Vansittartism' came to govern the minds and actions of the
Allies, then

"...even the wobblers, even the Germans who are only with
Hitler up to a certain point, will rally behind him in the
last great battle of the west. And even Confessional
Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews, the Liberals and
the Social Democrats, before the threat of another
Armistice Blockade and another Treaty of Versailles, may
well decide: Better even Hitler than the foreigner who
comes once more to invade and to oppress."[100]

Barraclough [1946] was representative of that branch of general thinking on what should happen to Germany after defeat that laid the emphasis on co-operation and conciliation. Though his particular expression of the view was not published until after the war, it was the outcome of participation in the lengthy war-time debate on post-war policy options.[101] He concluded that the problem facing Europe in the aftermath of war was "to build a Germany of the German people, representing not the will of a predatory minority, but the sober interests and aspirations of the German speaking millions..."[102] The clue to his attitude and the principles underlying it is to be found in a passage where he quotes from the declaration as the Social Democrats to the Prussian Diet, June 17, 1916:

> "We do not see our wellbeing in the creation of an imperialist Greater Germany, or of a Mitteleuropa, but in mutual political and economic relations between the nations, fostered by the extension of democracy... the common people of no country have willed the war... If the governments of the belligerent countries still refuse to make peace, they act in antagonism to the great masses of the population who long to return to peaceful work. We demand that the German Government, before all governments, should take the first step and should relinquish their plans of conquest."

This, wrote Barraclough, "...was the <u>authentic</u> voice of the German people."[103] To speak of an <u>authentic</u> voice presupposes that there were other voices in Germany representative of other value systems. To admit this distinction, to define value-based opinions as pluralistic, lays on the writer the kind of obligation which Gardiner tended to ignore - namely, to provide some cultural justification for the differences. It calls for analysis of the possible reasons why groups might have participated differentially in the dominant [i.e. power/sanction supported] value system of the society. One other condition has to be observed. The <u>authentic</u> voice, to be so defined, should be one with a history which can be reflected upon. Barraclough met these obligations.

He met the requirement of longevity by tracing the expression of his <u>authentic</u> voice over a period of time. Only a few examples are given below. Of the 1890s he wrote:

> "...the satisfaction which Germany desired <u>was the transformation of imperial autocracy into popular self-government</u> and the destruction of the privileges of the junker class on which the Emperor's power rested..."[104]

The apparent contradiction which arises from the use of the

generic 'Germany' in such a way as to exclude from it a part which was a member of the whole can be resolved by assuming that the word, in this context, was used to mean the <u>authentic</u> voice. The 4,250,000 votes in 1912 which made the Social Democrats the largest single party in the Reichstag were taken as evidence that the voice remained active. Then there was the Zabern Affair of 1913:

"When the commander of the garrison in this petty Alsatian town arrested and imprisoned some of the inhabitants in defiance of the law, <u>his exhibition of military arrogance stirred all Germany</u>."[105]

What we have to assume, with cultural considerations in mind, is that 'all Germany' is an inappropriate phrase, since some section or sections of society, committed to the military/autocratic ethic and willing to defend it publicly in all cases, would have supported the commander's action. We should take Barraclough to mean that the <u>authentic</u> voice, consistent in its expression of liberal values was, on this occasion, joined by another voice [or voices] which, although committed to the military/autocratic ethic was worried either because the ethic was being pushed to an intolerable extreme and/or was being harmed by bad publicity. When the Zabern Affair was discussed in the Reichstag, the vote went 293-54

against Bethmann's defence of the Army. Then, during the Great War, "... in spite of ruthless repression, the anti-war movement gained ground more quickly in Germany than elsewhere."[106] In June 1915 close to 1,000 Social Democrats appended their names to a denunciation of the government's annexationist policy. This was followed by publication of Liebknecht's leaflet, 'The Main Enemy Stands at Home'. The principal demands of the 200,000 industrial workers who came out on strike in Berlin and Leipzig in April 1917 were for "...the introduction of a democratic regime and immediate peace negotiations on the basis of 'no annexations'." The strike of munitions workers in January 1918 was the "... direct reply of the German people to the insolence and intransigence of the German negotiations at Brest-Litovsk...", and the strikes in general "constituted... a clear manifestation of the spirit of the German people, which... sought a peace of reconciliation."[107]

When Hitler became Chancellor on January 30, 1933, "...it was not through the support of, but rather as a result of a conspiracy against the German people."[108] In power, Hitler "...feared the people, as much as the forces of German reaction feared the people, and therefore he stifled every free expression of popular will because.... he recognised the deep cleft between his own objectives and the aspirations of the German people." And, finally, "...by repressing opposition, by

perverting education.... he fastened on Germany <u>a regime hostile
to all the German people had striven after....</u>"[109]

What underlying cultural or sub-cultural variations within
Germany went towards the formation of the <u>authentic</u> voice and
its oppositions? Sociological (class), economic
(occupation, life-opportunities), and confessional factors
militated against a broad sharing of the dominant
(power/sanction supported) values of society. In general, the
lower classes were for change, and so challenged the dominant
values. This challenge was dissipated to some extent by the
fact that one section of the working classes, gradualist in
outlook, worked for change not through overt action but through
a faith in their ability to permeate the system with reform
ideas. For the rest, they were, to varying degrees, reflected
in their responses to particular issues, associated with the
dominant values. The Catholic community, and so to a large
extent the supporters of the Zentrum, were wary of social change
if it took a form "anathematized by church." The junkers and
the industrial and commercial middle classes who could on
occasion be bitterly divided on social goals, subscribed to the
dominant values insofar as reaction was "... a rallying point
for all who had something to lose by popular government..."[110]

Without prejudice to any criticism which might be levelled

against his views, it has to be conceded that Barraclough met the two obligations contingent upon his use of the concept authentic. As he interpreted events, that voice had been consistently raised over a period of time; further, the need to provide some cultural justification for the differences in value-based opinion had not been ignored. But it has to be noted that to meet those two obligations is to do no more than set up the necessary conditions for the definition of an authentic voice. For example, other voices expressing other value-based opinions could claim longevity over the period discussed by Barraclough, and he himself had indicated that those other voices were related to cultural complexities. Why, then, did one of these not constitute the authentic voice? One way or another a sufficient condition had to be found. Barraclough appeared to find it in the British self-image. Why were all the other voices false? They were false because, unlike his authentic voice they did not match with the ideological component of the British self-image. To varying degrees they promoted exclusive rather than popular interests, they perpetuated oppression rather than aiding the development of freedom, justice and fairness; they were selfish rather than other regarding, they supported the military/autocratic ethic in opposition to peace, conciliation, and co-operation. Ultimately, his authentic voice deserved to be so called because it was aligned with central features of the ideological self-image.

In the spring of 1943, Mass Observation polled a representative sample of the British population and returns indicated that 43% of those questioned "...either hated or had no sympathy for the German people."[111]   By February 1945 the figure had increased to 54%. Significant in themselves, the returns also direct attention to the 57% and 46% respectively who did not respond with hatred and lack of sympathy. In some measure this is testimony to the resilience and determination of those who assigned a relatively high operational weight to the ideological self-image. The challenge of 'Vansittartism' had been faced at a time when it was not easy to do so, and large numbers of people had remained unwilling to win the war at the risk, as they perceived it, of 'losing themselves'.

The resilience of the ideological self-image was tested in other ways.   There had been another challenge; less dramatic and perhaps less threatening in the public sense, but no less compelling in respect of the relationship between expressed attitudes and the values from which the attitudes were derived. This challenge came from the way Britain was perceived by others, and in particular by Germany.

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4. A. L. Rowse, 'What is Wrong with The Germans?' [1937], reprinted in The End of An Epoch [Macmillan 1947] p.181.

5. Ibid. p.187.

6. Ibid. pp.187-188.

7. Ibid. p. 191.

8. Ibid. p. 182.

9. Ibid. p. 182.

10. Ibid. p. 183.

11. Ibid. p. 184 [my italics].

12. Ibid. pp.184-185.

13. Ibid. p. 185.

14. Ibid. pp.189-90.

15. Ibid. quoted p.191.

16. Ibid. p.192.

17. Rowse, 'Germany: The Problem of Europe' [1941: Reprinted in End of An Epoch], ibid. pp.194 and 204.

18. Nineteenth Century and After: January, May, November 1940, November 1941: Spectator, February 1941, March 1941, April 1942: Manchester Guardian, January 1, 1941; Time and Tide, May 1941, July 1941 - reprinted in L. B. Namier, Conflicts: Studies in Contemporary History [Macmillan, London 1942].

19. Ibid. p.77.

20. Ibid. p.78.

21. Ibid. p.79.

22. Ibid. p.81.

23. Ibid. p.82.

24. Ibid. p.38.

25. Ibid. p.81.

26. Ibid. p.83, "Vice is a mythological description for unprofitable transactions."

27. Ibid. pp.88-90. Note that Namier was arguing along lines being developed contemporaneously by Gregory Bateson in The United States. See Gregory Bateson, Formulation of End-Linkage, in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux (eds), The Study of Culture at a Distance. [University of Chicago Press 1953].

28. Ibid. p.41.

29. Ibid. p.78.

30. Ibid. p.79.

31. Ibid. p.78.

32. Ibid. p.81.

33. Ibid. p.128 [my italics].

34. Ibid. p.69.

35. Ibid. p.53 [my italics].

36. Ibid. p.22.

37. Ibid. p.31 [my italics].

38. Ibid. p.129.

39. Ibid. p.90 [my italics].

40. Ibid. pp.90-91.

41. Ibid. p.124.

42. Ibid. p.222.

43. Aaron Goldman, 'Germans and Nazis: The Controversy over Vansittartism in Britain During the Second World War'. [Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.14, 1979] p.158. Sir Robert Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1930-38, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government, 1938-1941 and was created a peer.

44. Black Record, quoted ibid. p.160.

45. Black Record, quoted Mander, op.cit., pp.251-253.

46. Black Record, quoted Goldman, op.cit., p.160.

47. Black Record, quoted Gilbert and Gott, op.cit., p.6.

48. Quoted in Goldman, op.cit., p.187.

49. Roots of The Trouble, quoted ibid. 168.

50. Quoted in David Childs, 'The British Communist Party And The War: 1939-41 Old Slogans Revised' [Journal of Contemporary History Vol.12, 1977].

51. Goldman, op.cit., p.157.

52. Ibid. pp.163-164.

53. Picture Post, December 30, 1939.

54. Ibid. December 9, 1939.

55. Ibid.

56. Note Aubrey Douglas Smith, Guilty Germans? [Gollancz 1942] "I possess a copy of a pamphlet dropped over Germany by the R.A.F. in 1939. It contains the sentence, with two words in heavy type: 'Wir haben Keine Feindseligkeit gegen euch, das deutsche Volk'." p.14.

57. Goldman, op.cit., p.162, quoting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Head of The Foreign Office.

58. Ibid. quoting Evening Standard of 24 February 1942.

59. W. G. Knop (ed), Beware of The English [Hamish Hamilton, London 1939] pp.6, 9 and 16.

60. Goldman, op.cit., p.167.

61. Picture Post, January 27, 1940.
    See also, Arthur Calder Marshall, 'Democracy and Mass Observation' [Fortnightly Review, Vol.149, 1941].
    "... an open mind... is essential if the eventual armistice is not to catch the warring peoples unprepared for the work of reconstruction. The emotions which make for good fighting all too often vitiate good peace-keeping; and what should be a far sighted plan to avoid the repetition of similar human catastrophe becomes the vicious reprisal

of an embittered victor. This happened at the end of the
last war, and there are already signs, in for example the
speeches of Sir Robert Vansittart, that a similar spirit of
hostility is obscuring the judgment of certain statesmen."
p.241.

62. Victor Gollancz, <u>Shall our Children Live or Die?</u> [Gollancz
    1942].
63. Ibid. p.13.
64. Ibid. p.58.
65. Ibid. foreword.
66. Ibid. p.6.
67. Ibid. pp.12-13.
68. Ibid. p.21.
69. Ibid. p.75.
70. Ibid. p.78.
71. Ibid. p.23.
72. Ibid. p.24.
73. Ibid. p.25.
74. Ibid. pp.27-28.
75. Ibid. pp.29.
76. Ibid. p.36.
77. Ibid. pp.39-40.
78. Ibid. p.41.
79. Ibid. pp.48-49.
80. Ibid. pp.50-51.
81. Ibid. p.64.
82. Ibid. p.65.
83. Ibid. p.66.
84. Ibid. p.70.
85. Ibid. p.72.
86. Ibid. p.71.
87. Ibid. pp.123-124.

88. Robert H. Thouless, <u>Straight Thinking in Wartime</u> [Hodder and Stoughton, 1942] p.26.

89. Ibid. pp.43-44.

90. Ibid. p.112.

91. Ibid. pp.114-115.

92. Ibid. p.118.

93. Ibid. p.51.

94. Ibid. p.45. [my italics].

95. Ibid. pp.46-47.

96. Aubrey Douglas-Smith, <u>Guilty Germans?</u> [Gollancz 1942] p.9.

97. Ibid. p.14.

98. Ibid. p.209 quoting Heinrich Frankel's pamphlet <u>Vansittart's Gift to Goebbels</u>.

99. Ibid. pp.216-217, referring to Sheppards account in the <u>Daily Telegraph</u> of June 11, 1934, and O'Connor's speech in the House of Commons, June 14, 1934.

100. Ibid. p.11.

101. G. Barraclough, <u>Factors in German History</u> [Basil Blackwell 1946]. See also the 'Peace Aims Pamphlets' published by The National Peace Council:

No.1. <u>What kind of Peace?</u>

No.8. <u>A New Order For Germany.</u>

No.18. <u>When The Fighting Stops.</u>

and in particular, No.19 <u>The Future of Germany</u> [1943] with contributions from H. N. Brailsford, Patrick Gordon-Walker, T. H. Minshall, Herbert G Wood and Henry Carter.

Among the questions addressed were

"What political conditions should govern the treatment of Germany in the <u>immediate</u> after-war period if the basis for a stable peace and a fruitful permanent co-operation with Germany is to be established?"

"Is there any contradiction, in view of the nature of war-making power in the modern world, in the dual policy of

the drastic disarmament of Germany on the one hand and the generous economy treatment of Germany on the other?"

"To what extent are we to hold the German people as a whole responsible for the sins of Nazism?"

"How are the purposes of 'retribution' and reconciliation to be themselves reconciled?" Pamphlet No.19, pp.1-2.

Patrick Gordon-Walker, on the issue of 'good' and 'bad' Germans, took the view that "... it is a question of oscillation between poles... In Germany the poles are rather extremely far apart, and the oscillation between them is rather sharper than in other western countries." The answer was not to destroy Germany, for this could not be done without destroying the whole European economy. The answer was to help the Germans to destroy the reactionary forces within their nation, to strengthen the 'civil pole' in Germany, and to create a world "in which there will be room for Germany." Ibid.p.9.

T. H. Minshall called on the Allies to build up around Germany "an international society in which she can live and exercise her rights as an equal." Ibid. p.16.

Herbert G. Wood claimed that "it is for us to re-imagine the German people... we have to ask ourselves what are the international tasks which will be before us at the end of the war in which we can hope for co-operation with and from the Germans." Ibid. p.30.

102. Barraclough, op.cit., p.153. [my italics].

103. Ibid. p.135. [my italics].

104. Ibid. p.130. [my italics].

105. Ibid. p.131. [my italics].

106. Ibid. p.134.

107. Ibid. p.136.

108. Ibid. p.148. [my italics].

109. Ibid. p.153. [my italics].

110. Ibid. p.137.

111. Goldman, op.cit., p.157.

CHAPTER 7

THE CHALLENGE IN VOICES FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

An ideological self-image is projected outwards, as an instrument for assessing others, in two distinct ways. In one projection it 'fits' the assessed group, which is regarded in a favourable light, with the associated attitudes being complimentary. In the other projection there is a 'mismatch', between the self-image and the traits and values of the assessed group.[1] In this latter case, the light in which the assessed group is regarded is not predetermined by the nature of the 'fit' as it is in the former. The assessed group may indeed be regarded in an unfavourable light, with associated attitudes being pejorative; on the other hand, criticism, stemming from the mismatch may be moderated by understanding, offset to some extent by tolerance and an attempt to be even-handed.

One can identify sources which regarded Germany in a favourable light and gave expression to complimentary attitudes. W. Horsfall Carter [1933] was aware of the differences between the traits and values of Britain and Germany, but he was complimentary in his attitudes, sometimes dramatically so.[2] For Carter, National Socialism was "... a passionate crusade for a regeneration from within..."[3] There followed a passage containing a metaphor which, at one and the same time referred to the creation of new political 'furniture' and the advent of messiahs:

"... the younger generation in Europe, and particularly in
Germany, has become entirely conscious of the essential
modifying factor of our times: namely, that science has
created a world of abundance which is being ignored or
traduced to make a banker's holiday. <u>Today the carpenters
are ready: their names are Franklin Roosevelt and Adolf
Hitler.</u>"[4]

For two or three generations men had been pursuing false gods
and false doctrines; money making and competition. Standards
of material comfort had risen, but spiritual values had been
sacrificed. This was an indictment against capitalism, but also
against socialism, which did not deny the materialist scale of
values so much as advocate a different distribution of wealth.

"...It was in just such a mood of revulsion from the idols
of 'prosperity'.... that able bodied Germans returned from
the trenches. They glimpsed the prospect of a nation
eschewing utilitarian principles and setting the example
of a national life based on fellowship and selfless
service... They found, on the contrary, that in Germany
'big-business' was only intent to try and take up the
threads where they had been snapped in 1914, whatever the
cost to the rest of the community."[5]

Although unable to have official recognition, "... the inarticulate aspirations of the immediate post-war period began to take shape", and came to fruition in a movement set on preserving the nation's individuality through self-help, combined with "... a real and living socialism designed to make the future German body politic a co-operative commonwealth in which there should be no exploitation of class by class or of one section of the community by another section."[6]

Referring to features in Picture Post [1939], a reader's letter complained:

"Your articles about Germany make me sick. Were the purpose not so painfully obvious, I should feel like joining the I.R.A., and setting off a bomb in your premises. After all, you half-baked socialist intellectuals have such a lot to lose by the natural rise of real truth, and real justice; and by that I mean the Fascist People's State. Germany is the only practical socialist country in the world. Liberty, and justice, and freedom are the watchword of every German now that class hatred and class privilege, the brainchild of the democratic hypocrite mentality have vanished."[7]

However favourably Germany was regarded by such sources it

remains true that in the period under study none, with the possible exception of Hamilton Sorley [1914], Thomas Hardy [1915] and Harold Begbie [1928] [8] came close to suggesting that there was a fit between the traits and values of the British and the Germans. This view is confirmed rather than contradicted by the fact that some sources saw hope for the future in a synthesis of British and German values.[9] In classical dialectic it is the quite distinct thesis and antithesis that come together to form the synthesis. Self-image identity between Britain and Germany, where it existed, was almost wholly confined to the pragmatic aspect, as in the work of Maxse and Cramb.

Examples of unfavourable responses and pejorative attitudes to Germany, based on a perceived mismatch between respective traits and values have been given above. Attention has also been given to those sources which, although taking account of the mismatch, demonstrated an empathetic understanding of Germany's predicament at particular points in time, recommended even-handedness, and put an emphasis on justice and fair play. Such sources abjured categorical condemnations, moderated criticism with tolerance, accepted ambiguities, and were not in the business of wholesale acceptance or rejection of Germany in terms of fit between respective traits and values. It is reasonable to assume that for individuals and groups in this

category there was an intellectual and psychological commitment to consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves. Given the very premises on which their position rested they were likely to be troubled by charges of hypocrisy, cant, arrogance, and double standards.

Such charges were made regularly and were difficult to ignore. Kuno Franke [1915] saw double standards at work in Britain's condemnation of Germany's colonial aspirations as "... dangerous and intolerable aggression." The condemnation was coming from a country which had

> "...throttled the independence of the South African Republic, established a Protectorate over Egypt, partitioned Persia... encouraged France to build up an immense colonial empire in Cochin China, Madagascar, Tunis, and Morocco, allowed Italy to conquer Tripoli, and helped Japan to tighten her grip upon China."[10]

Dewey [1916] noted that the image the British had of themselves was not always the image others had of them: "Since their activities, as distinct from their consciousness have been commercial and imperialistic, it is not surprising that the hypocrisy, the unctuous pharasaism of the British have become proverbial...."[11]

J.M. de Beaufort [1917] translated a German pamphlet entitled Eine Fabel, "... very widely distributed, especially in neutral countries." The text and illustrations of the fable depicted a deceitful, devious and dissembling Britain, jealous and envious of an energetic and youthful Germany, hypocritically engaging other nations in quarrels with the newcomer in order to maintain its long unchallenged status. Once upon a time there was a very large forest in which all sorts of animals lived, in peace and harmony. The most important were the Lion [Great Britain], The Great Cock [France], the Bear [Russia], the Double-headed Eagle [Austria-Hungary], and the Little Cock [Belgium]. The Lion was in supreme command, but commitment to his rule was more prudential than conscientious.

One day the Great Cock, looking quite knocked-about, bleeding, and minus some feathers, arrived at the Lion's den. He had been in a fight with a newcomer, a Young Eagle [Germany], and warned the Lion that this stranger was a threat to the ruler's status. From that day on, the Young Eagle seemed to cross the Lion's path - getting to the feeding grounds first, blotting out the sun - never acknowledging the ruler's claim to sovereignty. This added anger to the fear and envy which already filled the Lion's heart and mind. He was enormous in size and strength, but he could not fly! And underneath all his show he was a coward. So he determined to plot against the Young Eagle. He

told the Bear that the Young Eagle was planning to steal his food and the best Bear lairs in the forest. The only solution was to fight; the Bear could count on the support of the Lion and the Great Cock. There was one problem. How could the interloper and usurper be enticed to solid earth. The Lion had the answer: the Bear should attack the Double-headed Eagle. Since that creature was loved by the Young Eagle, he would come to its aid.

"Good!" exclaimed the Bear enthusiastically; but after a few moments reflection he asked: "But what are the other animals of the forest going to think when the three of us fall upon the Young Eagle?"

"Hm, that is true," acquiesced the Lion. "We must try and find some excuse." And, rising, he angrily shook his mane and beat his tail. "I have it," he suddenly growled. "The Big Cock will challenge the Young Eagle. He knows I am going to help him. Well, the Young Eagle cannot reach the Cock without flying over the establishment of the Cockerel. That will give us sufficient excuse to fall upon the Young Eagle."

"How clever, how very clever you are!" growled the Bear. "I shall of course do as you advise."

The Lion left quite satisfied. "One more call," he

reflected," and then I can go to sleep again."   His last visit was to the Cockerel.

"I have just had some dreadful news," he cried out on meeting the Cockerel.   "Before you are many days older, the Young Eagle will try to fly into your little kingdom and take possession of it. You must oppose with all your power this sinful act."

"But how," the little Cock wanted to know, "am I going to stop the flight of an Eagle?"

"I   shall   be   there   to   help   you",   said   the   Lion magnanimously...." (12)

Michael [1928] returned to the theme of double standards when he sketched Britain's traditional view of European and World Politics.   Independence from Europe and a positive, sometimes controlling role in other parts of the world was what best suited Britain.   But the prerequisite for independence from Europe was a stable balance of power on that continent. Despite the fact that it was natural for nation to struggle with nation for predominance in Europe, Britain did all in her power to nullify this process.

In other words, Britain 'wanted it both ways'.[13]   The potency
of criticism in this vein was measured by Begbie [1928]:
"England.... has become extremely sensitive concerning the taunt
of political perfidy..."[14]   Notwithstanding the sensitivity,
it appeared that she still indulged in the attitudes and
behaviour which gave rise to the accusations. Carter [1933]
addressed the issue of moral imperialism:

> "If Germans, by and large... enjoy regimentation, revel in
> drilling, marching and military organisation, and take a
> peculiar delight in work, which, they will tell you, is
> akin to the equally purposeless passion of the English for
> sport - hence the very real popularity of the compulsory
> national labour service - that is their own affair...
> What right have we to affirm that the service of freedom -
> which happens to be our particular pride - is superior in
> the scale of values to the freedom of service?... those
> who complain of the suppression of 'liberty' or
> 'democracy', meaning thereby what Englishmen... understand
> by the terms, seem to be totally oblivious to the moral
> imperialism of which they are guilty in seeking to impose
> their scale of values on a country possessing quite other
> values but of equally respectable tradition."[15]

Eaton [1937] concluded that "England's combination of moral

conviction and business sense may explain quite satisfactorily to herself and her friends the vagaries and vacillations of her foreign policies, but these same elements have been responsible for her past reputation on the continent for hypocrisy and dissimulation."[16]

That such a reputation was current and not a thing of the past was confirmed by the publication in Britain of an anthology of Nazi views on British traits and values.[17] The peremptory headline in Der Alemanne, 12 November 1938, "Silence, Please, You Paragons of Virtue!" is expressive of Nazi scorn for and impatience with the British self-image. Though it is not surprising that German newspaper comment of the Nazi period regarded the relationship between the British self-image and British political behaviour as evidence of cant and hypocrisy, the reaction is an interesting one. It confirms, admittedly through refraction, that the British perceived themselves as being fair, just and tolerant, with all that such traits and values imply in terms of sympathetic even-handedness. It may also provide clues to the psychological disposition of a regime conscious of newly acquired power yet frustrated to some extent in the desired use of it by traditional power. And, for some British sources, the moral challenge implicit in the German reaction to British perceptions of self has to be seen as contributing to the discomfort that comes from the accusation of

inconsistency - notwithstanding Stephen King-Hall's assertion that "... it is difficult to imagine a more mischievous or slanderous account of the English and their ways..."[18]

The following review of the opinions expressed in Beware of the English [1939] is so arranged that the major themes may be identified. Those themes refer to Britain's schoolmasterish behaviour, her self-righteousness, her habit of applying double standards, and her capacity for cant and hypocrisy. Britain was depicted, with irony, as assuming the role of "supreme moral Pope" in world affairs, and referred to as "... this great and divinely appointed controller of the world."[19] At Saarbrucken, 9 October 1938, Hitler declared that "... tutelage of foreign governesses is something that Germany cannot and will not stand," and returned to this theme at Munich, 10 November 1938: "The German regime is a private affair of the German people, and we forbid all schoolmasterish supervision."

Der Alemanne, 12 November 1938, reported: "Once again the English governess is full of indignation. Not, as we might suppose, over the massacres in Palestine, but over the alleged persecution of the Jews in Germany... Authoritative circles in Germany have already made it clear to these incorrigible moral preachers that this continual interference... shows a regrettable lack of tact." On this occasion Britain's double

standards, as perceived by Germany, were highlighted by her claim to act as moral arbiter.[20] The Westfälische Landeszeiturg, 22 November 1938, advised its readers that "The English Press [had] showered a hail of hostile and schoolmasterish criticism on German Jewish decrees...", and the Volkischer Beobachter, 4 December 1938, posed the question: "Who are they exactly, these sanctimonious guardians of the morals and conscience of the whole world?"[21] The Danziger Vorposten, 19 December 1938, describing the experiences of one of its reporters, asserted that "A stay of even a few days in London brings home to one the utter impudence of the 'Governors attitude' adopted by English politicians towards Germany's domestic affairs."[22]

Having recorded how the British appeared to view themselves, the Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 15 January 1939, considered the ideological self-image both unworthy of careful analysis and a pretence to distract attention from deeper motives which were entirely self-regarding: "We cannot and will not enter into a discussion of this philosophy. But it must be remembered that it masks a... policy of self-interest that sticks at nothing. There is never for a single moment the slightest desire for impartiality or objectivity or, indeed, reason."[23] Britain's alleged habit of applying double standards, and the cant and hypocrisy attendant upon this practice, was dealt with at length

in the Nazi press. <u>Der Alemanne</u>, 12 November 1938:

"The English... with typical puritanical hypocrisy [remain] silent on the subject of events in the Holy Land. No words are wasted on the shooting of twenty Arabs in a single day and the passing of death sentences on half a dozen more. But if in Germany some Jewish undesirable is placed in a concentration camp, then everyone is dutifully indignant... So, Silence, Please, you democratic hypocrites... turn your attention to your own doorstep, you paragons of virtue and guardians of the world's morals, and see that too much filth and refuse does not collect there."[24]

British sources, complaining about inhumanity in the conduct of the Nazi regime were roundly chastised by the <u>Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe</u>, 19 November 1938:

"Parliament and Press in England are once more entirely in their element. They use the retaliatory measures of the German Government for the Jewish murder of a young German diplomat as a pretext for an unbridled campaign of atrocity stories and provocation under the cloak of 'humanity and morals'... we ... select one single example from the most immediate past, of which to remind those

lovers of humanity on the other side of the Channel. What
was it like during the Great War, when Great Britain
inflicted a terrible hunger blockade on defenceless women
and children? Then no finger was raised in England... no
cry of protest echoed throughout the lands of world
democracy against the war of extermination which was a
mockery of all rational justice. In those days the
apostles of humanity possessed good nerves... No
democratic hearts were touched by the fact that 700,000
women, children and aged people in Germany pined away in
misery and died of weakness... But the starvation of
Germany during the war was nothing compared with the
inhumanity of continuing the blockade for months after the
Armistice had been signed...

Just as the representatives of world democracy were in no
position in 1919 to speak of guilt and atonement, so to-day
they should be chary of using the words 'humanity' and
'morality'."[25]

The same theme was taken up by the Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 9
December 1938:

"Where was Anglo-Saxon humanity when the devilish hammer
of German oppression was forged at Versailles? Where

were English tears when the blockade was decreed and carried out which was to starve Germany's women and children?... Was it in German starvation camps that women and children were exterminated? Or in English concentration camps during the Boer War?"[26]

Under the headline, 'Distress is Apparently Not Interesting', the Westdeutscher Beobachter, 4 December 1938, contrasted British interest in German domestic affairs with the concern shown for local problems:

"Where are the brave representatives of the British people in Parliament now? Where are these men ... who are always ready with the words 'justice', 'mercy', and 'love of one's fellow men'? It was not this week a question of discussing the distress of the Jews and making accusations about things which are no concern of English members of Parliament. This week there appeared on the order of the day in the House of Commons a matter which should have touched the hearts of the elected representatives of the English people far more deeply – a matter which cast a dark and very ugly shadow on the self-complacency of the House. The problem debated... was that of the English Distressed Areas... as the debate made clear, the extent of these districts is growing... In the

mining districts of Durham the average figure for unemployment is 25 per cent of the population. This figure reaches as much as 44 per cent in several districts in South Wales... What a dreadful picture! But what a subject for parliamentary eloquence; what a chance of exercising justice, mercy, love of one's fellow men; what a golden opportunity to use greatness, might and riches to a practical end! If only, in what concerns England, they would unite in action as they unite in cheap verbiage on other occasions... But just imagine - at times during this debate, this very important and perhaps vitally important debate for the future of England, only 19 [let us say it in words, nineteen] out of a total of 615 members took part.[27]

Der Sturmer, 26 December 1938, used the words of St. Matthew to describe those in Britain who appeared to ignore their own domestic problems, and the culpability of their own nation in international affairs:

"... Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!
    for ye are like whited sepulchres,
    which indeed appear beautiful outward,
    but are within full of dead men's bones,

and of all uncleanness. Even so ye also

outwardly appear righteous men, but within

ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity."[28]

The Hakenkreuzbanner, 21 March 1939, was particularly scathing

in its response to British protests about the occupation of

Czechoslovakia:

"The democracies of the West have no right because of what

has happened in Bohemia and Moravia to stir up against us

their peoples and the rest of the world in so underhand a

fashion. England in particular has every reason to mind

her own business. When she declares that tiny Czechei was

no danger to the great Reich we cannot help asking whether

a rising in Waziristan or in some corner or other in India

is a danger to the security of the mighty Empire. Why does

England repress these risings with knout and sword?"

In this context the writer could find no words other than

"abysmal Phariseeism and immoral double-dealing" to describe

British attitudes. He reminded his readers of "... the days

when Great Britain attacked the tiny Boer states and subdued

them with fire and sword", and how, similarly, "Albion [had]

murdered, plundered and enslaved the Irish people." And it was

"with horror, anger and revulsion" that he called to memory "the

time when England and the democratic West allowed Senegalese
negroes to strike German women and children in the Rhineland and
the Ruhr with rifle butts and riding whips." Where, he
concluded, "was the horror of the democratic world then?"[29]

B.Z. Am Mittag, 22 March 1939, considered British perceptions of
freedom and morality, against what it took to be the historical
record:

> "Does freedom consist in... flogging Arabs... in
> bombarding and blowing up entire villages in Palestine or
> in persecuting the Irish... Has England forgotten that
> concentration camps... were first used in 1900 during the
> Boer War?... It is the same Britain - quite unselfishly,
> of course, and purely on moral grounds - which protected
> her interests in the Far East. She did not omit,
> naturally, by a most justifiable sale of opium, cocaine
> and heroin, to dangle before the poor Chinese, at least in
> his dreams, the illusion of that freedom of which the
> British mercenaries had robbed him for the greater glory
> of the Empire..."[30]

It appeared to the writer that reflection upon the British
experience proved that "...the most moral men are as a rule
those who have had a wild life behind them." There was an old

proverb which held that the worst whores - those who had capitalised on their opportunities - became the most pious of people when past their prime. This was true of nations as of individuals:

"The English are very fond of talking about political morality. They possess everything they need for their natural life. In an age when little was said about political morality, they gathered together a world empire. And now they uphold that empire with moral cliches."[31]

Das Schwarze Korps, 13 April 1939, was also interested in political morality and its applications.

"What is political morality? If political morality concerns not one's own people but all humanity, then the English were immoral to the highest degree when they crushed Ireland, raped a highly civilised nation of 300 million souls in India... bought half a continent in Africa with glass beads and whisky... No commandment of a biblical pan-human moral doctrine exists which allowed the English to conquer, buy or fraudulently acquire a quarter of the globe..."[32]

Die Bewegung, 23 May 1939, made the claim that

"It is... genuinely English to provide the whole world unasked with a moral code whose strict observance by other peoples is demanded, but which at the same time is as elastic as chewing gum and can be unobtrusively stuck under the edge of the table when it might be applied to the situation in England and to English practices."[33]

Broadly speaking, there were three ways in which the charges reviewed above could be countered. First, the witnesses for the prosecution, as it were, could be branded as liars. This was the message conveyed by the words put into the mouth of Ivan, The Russian Engineer, in The Demi-Paradise [1943]

"Much of the world thinks you care only about money. You care much more about cricket, nightingales... a good job well done. Much of the world thinks you are perfidious, hypocritical, but you are warm and kindly. The world thinks these things because you want it to. It pleases that dread sense of humour of yours."[34]

It was also the approach used by Rowse [1937, 1939]. He claimed that Germany was attempting to justify her own rapacious conduct in the 20th century by arguing that the growth of the British Empire had depended on similar tactics. To this he responded that the Empire "largely grew up in consequence of the

trading activities of a maritime and industrial people; and for
the rest, what it acquired in war was mainly acquired as the
result of our wars of successful defence against aggression."
Furthermore, the German ploy was "utterly unhistorical in its
way of judging", since the code of conduct, the standards and
manners of the twentieth century were not those of the
eighteenth. [35]

Behind the distortions and lies of German propaganda lay envy of
Britain's greatness and a malicious pleasure in putting about
falsehoods:

"It is ridiculous to suppose, seriously, that [our] long
record of success has been due to 'English gold', or our
'Machiavellianism', or our diabolical cunning... A real
knowledge of our history, and not merely a superficial
interpretation of it... would have shown how little these
criticisms were justified; and clear thinking would
usually have shown that their strongest root was in
jealousy of our success as a nation, in
Schadenfreude..." [36]

The glory of British foreign policy was that "hypocritical
self-interest" had not been its driving force. It was a
community of interest, embracing Britain and other nations,

which had maintained a balance on the continent:

"Superficial critics on the continent are forever harping

on its 'Machiavellian' character. This is completely

wrong; it so happened that the interests of our own

security co-incided with those of other Powers that wanted

to preserve their own independence." [37]

Alternatively, the case for the defence could be so constructed

that the previous record and practices of the witnesses were

shown to negate their evidence by destroying their credibility.

This, in effect, was the strategy used by Namier and Vansittart,

and it should be noted that in this particular context there is

no intention to infer that the strategy was illegitimate.

However, it was, by definition, an unsatisfactory strategy for

those with an intellectual and psychological commitment to

consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared

values and the values themselves. Their defence, taking

account of the premises on which their position rested, involved

rational self-evaluation, and, in turn, a willingness to

contemplate culpability. One of the most interesting statements

of this position was made by Edward Grigg [1938]. [38]

It is clear that Grigg was conscious of the complications that

could arise from the outward projection of an ideological

self-image. He engaged in a critical re-appraisal, the outcome of which was an insistence that there should be a measure of consistency between self-image and policy. Grigg's reappraisal brought him to the conclusion that Britain should make an attempt to co-operate with Germany, but that co-operation was to be based on strength both moral and material. This is one of the senses in which his rational re-evaluation of the self-image is so important. By no stretch of the imagination could he be regarded as a 'peace crank'.

Grigg made a savage attack on the inadequacy of Britain's security arrangements and general state of preparedness. In the case of Germany, more than any other country, "... the diplomacy of conciliation will be futile unless our organisation for war and our national morale command her genuine respect."[39] It would not be possible for Britain to defend democracy short of war "... unless here and now, while peace is still unbroken... we show a devotion and readiness for service equal to those which inspire peoples under dictatorship."[40] Britain was prey to too many illusions and to a debilitating complacency. First there was the notion that preparation for war would cause war; then there was the belief that foreign policy was a substitute for national reorganisation and rearmament. The motivation needed "to make freedom safe in our time,"[41] was being sapped by "... a passionate and always deepening belief in

the efficacy of the League of Nations."[42]   It was "Useless...
to rely on collective security unless we have done our utmost to
ensure our own security..."[43]   Government and Local
Authorities appeared to lack commitment to the moral and
material strengthening of the nation; the former hesitated and
the latter pottered.[44]   Britain was the only great Power "...
which might conceivably be reduced to surrender by ruthless air
attack, and yet, because of our political divisions we allow
month after month, year after year, to pass in the discussion of
ineffectual and half-hearted plans of organisation..."   This
"... dangerous and damaging exhibition of military folly and
political fear..."[45] was "... allowing a renewed belief in
British decadence to become more prevalent than it ought to
be..."[46]   Drifting was the supreme danger, and Britain seemed
to "... drift in blindness, drift in folly, drift in delusive
calm..."[47]   This was bad enough "... as a spectacle of
political indecision and administrative half-heartedness", but
"... as a moral spectacle"[48] it was even worse. Viewed from
the outside the British were a people "... which would rather be
slack and comfortable than safe and strong."[49]   Grigg
condemned the Peace Pledge Union pamphlet which called upon its
readers "to decline to take part in air-raid precautions..."[50]
and he attacked pacifists who did not face up to the fact that
their ideas, if accepted, would place Britain in the position of
having to agree to every demand made by an aggressor "...

whatever the cost to our freedom and our ideals..."[51]

Grigg argued that "... national organisation is indispensable..." Britain's industries, ports, transport system and civilian population had to be made "... proof against sudden air attack..."[52]   It was foolish to claim that action should be taken only if war broke out. Time was of the essence, and it was necessary to act before the event, so that if the country was forced into war "... all the necessary functions of defence should come into operation smoothly."   The anti-aircraft defence services [artillery, searchlights, balloon barrage] had to be established at all ports and transport centres, at all water, gas and electricity supply points, and trained personnel had to be prepared and ready, for there was "... bound to be confusion if all the men and women required for this wide range of duty..." were not "... classified and allocated in advance"[53] Although the British people had long accepted compulsion in the areas of education, tax paying, etc., they still resisted compulsion directed against persons in relation to service during peacetime. It was clearly not the principle of compulsion that was objected to, "... but only the purpose for which compulsion is used."[54] The people would have to be educated to appreciate that the nation was under threat, a threat which could be dealt with through conciliation but only if conciliation was founded on strength. A Register of Citizens,

classifying the skills and expertise of the entire adult population should be established. "The strongest motive in people like myself ", wrote Grigg, "who are fathers of sons, for advocating national organisation in time of peace is a burning and consuming desire to save our sons from the ordeal through which we ourselves passed."[55]

If national organisation was one of the crucial means whereby Britain could secure herself, conciliation was another. This brought Grigg to his critical reappraisal of the British self-image. Behind his awareness of the need to align that self-image with attitudes towards others, in some sort of consistent relationship, one can detect a tinge of embarrassment which could not have been unrelated to the accusations levelled against the policies and practices of the nation.

Grigg saw a love of justice, fair play, and a commitment to the rule of law residing at the heart of the British self-image. "Justice and the Rule of Law are the constant burden of all our comment on world events, and we are quick to resent any suggestion that our devotion to them is not entirely disinterested."[56] Two immediate problems presented themselves: was the British love of justice and fair-play expressed with impartiality and free of double standards - a definitional requirement - or was it subject to the distortion

of the "one-eyed crusaders?" Were justice, fair-play and law always compatible? Grigg was convinced that the British should take their stand for justice - as they had always done - but should not be content with "a definition of justice which suggests that the democracies are always right and dictatorships always wrong."[57]   Since justice was so much a part of self-image, double standards should be renounced:

> "...we must beware of thinking, speaking and acting as though we had one code of behaviour towards democratic states and another towards dictatorship. Justice and fair play are due to every nation, whatever their systems of government... We shall not preserve the peace and therewith the liberties of Europe by a policy which suggests that what we regarded as unjust to the German people while the Weimar Republic survived is no longer unjust now that the Weimar Republic has collapsed. There must be equal justice and consideration for every state, whether we admire its constitution or not."[58]

This is a classic statement of the definitional logic of the ideological self-image.

Grigg's argument then turned to the relationship, in the international context, between justice and law. Such concepts,

he thought, "... may seem to us synonymous, but others may think them poles apart." He was convinced that "mere legalism" (59) and a "Pharisaic view of international sin and sinners"(60) militated against the impartial expression of justice. For law, read the Covenant of the League of Nations. "The grain of the Covenant", might be "... straight and true for much of its length, but it contains a fatal knot at the very point where the strains upon it were bound to be most fierce. That knot lies in the provisions which guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of every member state and make change almost impossible without a breach of the Covenant itself."(61) There was a danger that the recitation of the credo 'justice and law' would lead to the assertion 'and the greatest of these is law'. The overt signs of this assertion could be recognised in "... the extreme difficulties of persuading large sections of opinion in this country... to show any form of magnanimity to nations which they condemned as Law Breakers."(62) A rigid emphasis on the law could appear to the world as a lack of interest in justice. That emphasis on the law could in fact be construed as an expression of selfish interests. "The map of the world cannot in our time be 'settled' with the finality which seems desirable to nations with a wide command of all they want. As a great World Power we have all the economic opportunity, the range of political influence, the scope for spreading our language, our culture, and our political ideals

that any Power, however great, could possibly desire... and like all rich men we naturally take the view that the present distribution of the world's good things is just. It is therefore easy for us to be on the side of Law in International Affairs."[63]   Grigg quoted the view of Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, that the provisions of the Covenant constituted "... a bar to change and evolution which the forces of Life would inevitably upset."[64]   In Grigg's opinion events had proved Borden a thousand times right.   The text of the Covenant made it inevitable that in the view of some nations law and justice were in conflict.   An effort would have to be made to "... free ourselves from the legalism and rigidity of the Covenant",[65] and find "... a new and less rigid code of policy...", for it had to be recognised that "... no treaty settlement can permanently determine the mutual relations of a large number of nations, large and small, for the unanswerable reason that growth and change are essential conditions of life."[66]

All this led on to the view that Britain should "... admit the faults in our own post-war 'settlement', and particularly the most glaring of these faults, which was to stereotype the division of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire into a constellation of new and sovereign states with inadequate economic resources and, in many cases, indefensible frontiers." Having done that,

Britain should strive "to secure that the process of growth and change proceeds in an orderly manner." Since the situation in Central Europe was "incompatible both with stable peace and with economic recovery", that area should be restructured into "some larger political and economic organisation", and Germany "as the dominant Power in Central Europe should become the head and centre of such an organisation by peaceful means."[67] Safeguards were, of course, essential. Although Germany could not be denied "a sphere of political and economic influence comparable to that enjoyed by the other Great Powers", Britain would have to "ensure that the process by which they acquire such a sphere is peaceable and diplomatic in character, and that the smaller nations which form part of it preserve their essential liberties."[68]

Still more had to be done. One of the causes of tension between Britain and Germany lay in the difference between the respective economic outlooks. Germany pursued an autarkic, nationalist economic policy which inhibited "anti-patriotic economic activities, including the rapid movement of funds from country to country."[69] As 'closed-exchangers' they were in conflict with the 'free-exchangers' such as Britain who pursued an international economic policy. It was held that free exchange was a liberal and co-operative policy, but it could be construed as a means of "masking as international conciliation a movement

which in reality seeks to undermine regimes distasteful to us in other countries..."[70]   Grigg was convinced that "the next stage in human development lies in the organisation of a few strong politically and economically homogeneous groups, and that peace is much more likely to be maintained by accommodation and mutual tolerance between such groups than by any other method."[71]   Britain's policy should be "to live and let live... seeking to enable different systems to co-exist peacefully..."[72]   Germany and Japan, in Central-South East Europe and the Far East, respectively, should have left to them "the gardens they believe essential to their existence."[73] Britain could facilitate such an accommodation by setting aside her 'dog in the manger' attitude towards her 'most-favoured-nation' agreements with other countries. On a number of occasions the desire of states to join together in preferential trading organisations had been frustrated by Britain's insistence on her 'most-favoured-nation' position. "The known attitude of the United Kingdom Government has stood in the way of the realisation of various projected regional arrangements in Europe."[74]   Britain should waive its most favoured nation status, where it existed, in respect of nations which desired to set up a system of mutual preference. Were this to happen, it would demonstrate to the world that she was "no longer determined to insist on maintaining [for herself] a highly protected... system ... without regard for the

comparatively limited economic scope of other Powers."[75]

It has been the purpose of this and preceding chapters to demonstrate that underlying expressed attitudes to Germany and the Germans was a package of traits and values associated with the cultural condition 'being British'. The package was made up of such related items as justice, fairness, tolerance and empathy, and has been referred to as the ideological self-image. Two points have been established: first, Germany and the Germans were so often 'measured' against this British self-image that it became more or less a standard instrument of assessment; second, because of its regular use as a measuring device the resilience of the self-image was reinforced; that is to say, being referred to repeatedly, either implicitly or explicitly, the image took on the character of a self-evident. On the assumption that there is a strain toward consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves, particularly when those values are regarded as central to self-image, important consequences follow from the two points made above. Stated as hypothetical imperatives, descriptive of likely behaviour, they read: [1] if it is believed to be self-evident that the British are just, fair, tolerant and capable of empathy, then consistency demands that such traits and values should not only serve as standards for assessing Germany and the Germans but should also

sympathetically inform the assessments; [2] if such traits and values, serving as standards for assessing Germany and the Germans do not also sympathetically inform the assessments, then one would expect efforts to be made to remove the inconsistency inherent in this unbalanced relationship between attitudes and values.

It is a relatively straightforward matter to demonstrate the strain toward consistency in those writers who made distinctions between different groups of Germans and/or between the German Government and people, for in their case the self-image was invoked as main justification for making the distinctions. These writers who did not make such sympathetic distinctions present more of a problem. And it is a problem that must be resolved, for if consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves is to mean anything, it should apply to both sides in the debate on Germany and the Germans - though not of course in an identical way. To argue otherwise would be to make the untenable suggestion that all those who failed to make distinctions were incapable of acting in accord with the 'norms of reason' as defined by R. S. Peters [1974] [76] This issue is addressed in the following chapter.

APPENDIX

How the British were depicted in cartoons in the Nazi Press

The following examples are from W. G. Knop [ed.], Beware of The English! [Hamish Hamilton, London, 1939]. They have been selected as generally representative of the main charges levelled against British attitudes and policies.

The job applicant in [1] is "an incorrigible moral preacher", quite insolently blind to his own deficiencies. The 'John Bull' figure in [2] has an avuncular and hearty presence, and a smile for the world as he offers a dove of peace. But this is mere outward appearance, the whited sepulchre, masking the true characteristics of intolerance and hypocrisy, and a cruel policy of self-interest. Graphics [3], [5], and [6] point to double standards in the British view of the world and to the sanctimonious, lecturing interest they had in the affairs of other countries, particularly Germany. The Britisches Weltreich might be burning down, social problems at home might demand urgent-attention, and yet the British eye was directed at 'sins' elsewhere. In [4], sentimental affectation and cant go hand in hand with brutality.

ENGLISH HUMANITY IN THE MIRROR

2.   From 12 Uhr Blatt, December 1938.
      Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.45.

HOUSEHOLDERS AT HOME

"Damn it all, look after our own house instead of ever-lastingly peering at the neighbours' pots and pans."

3. From B. Z am Mittag, November 1938.
   Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.40.

"Darling, don't forget to drop a packet of bandages for the poor Arab children with every bomb."

4.   From Kladderadatsch, March 1939.

Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.145.

MRS. BRITANNIA, THE GOVERNESS: "Why do you keep bringing me news from the Empire? When I want to register moral indignation, I need reports from Germany."

MR. WORLD CONTROLLER

THE UNEMPLOYED: "I say, John, you might occasionally keep your eye on England."
(The board over the hutch says: 2,000,000 unemployed in England.)

6.   From N. S. Kurier, January 1939.
      Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.99.

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1. See Irvin L. Child and Leonard W. Doob, 'Factors Determining National Stereotypes': [The Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.17, 1943]. Alternative processes are discussed. For example, a group starts with an unfavourable attitude
   toward a particular country, and an unfavourable attitude toward specific traits; it then projects those traits on to the unfavoured country.

2. W. Horsfall Carter, 'Let Us Understand Germany': [Contemporary Review, Vol.134, 1933]. For his appreciation of the differences, see reference number 15 below.

3. Ibid. p.12.

4. Ibid. p.14 [my italics].

5. Ibid. pp.15-16.

6. Ibid. pp.16-17.

7. Peter O'Donough, Picture Post: 10 June 1939. [my italics].

8. Harold Begbie, 'The Trend of Things': in Rolf Gardiner and Heinz Rocholl (eds), Britain and Germany: [Williams and Norgate, 1928].
   "Examine the plain facts of the European situation as they appear to the eye of reason. Germany and England never crossed swords till 1914. Sprung from the same stock, using a speech that has numerous similarities and showing much the same outlook on the Universe, these two nations were seldom in conflict, often in co-operation... On the other hand, from the early beginnings of English history, the people of France were regarded as England's enemies, and the main relations of the two peoples throughout the long centuries of European civilisation were those of battle. The mental outlook of the two could not have been more dissimilar; the habits of each were a constant provocation to the other.
   Yet it has come to pass that England... finds herself sitting on the same side of the political table with her

hereditary enemy <u>and opposite to the kinsman Power</u>...
What can be the result of such confusion? The English mind
will never be comfortably at home with the French mind...
With the French we feel that we must be always on our best
behaviour; <u>with the Germans that we may sit naturally in
our chair and speak freely what is in our mind.</u> In none of
our relations with the French is it possible to forget
their sensitiveness; <u>in all our relations with the Germans
it is possible to indulge intimately in humour and good
natured banter...</u>" pp.140-142 [my italics].
"I trust my faith in the future of humanity to that Power
whose ends are visibly moral and whose purpose is the
elevation of man's soul. <u>And when I look among the nations
of the earth to see which of them are best fitted to serve
those great ends of the Universe, I feel that the German
and the British nations are marvellously prepared for such
a task, having in them that realistic moral sense which
makes for inward honesty and that quiet devotion to Truth
which paves the way for all lasting conquest.</u>" p.148 [my
italics].

9.   For example, see preface to Rolf Gardiner and Heinz
      Rocholl, ibid. It is suggested that Britain could do with
      Germany's energy, and Germany with Britain's sense of
      proportion. Britain had been contaminated by American
      commercialism; if contact with Germany did not revitalise
      her, then hope might lie in giving British traditions to
      Germany - "... the fertile soil in which we may plant the
      seeds of our experience with the surety of having
      increase." p.19.
      See also, Rolf Gardiner, Meditations On The Future Of
      Northern Europe,   in Gardiner and Rocholl, ibid:
      "The English have now reached a point in their history where
      they must seek a new focus." The old spirit of adventure

had been lost. Britain should "... discard its worn out body and find new life and expression in some new form of combination which will absorb it and nourish it, not do it violence." p.124.

This would mean "... a proper encounter between British and German people. No two nations have more to exchange and share than these." p.128. If tired Britain and ardent Germany could come together, the one bringing maturity, caution, prudence, and the other bringing youth and enthusiasm, "... they might succeed in establishing a new way of life in the countries of the north... for the Germans, the British, the Scandinavians, there might be a common destiny if they choose to make it." pp.130-131.

See also 'Diplomaticus', Romanticism in Germany From An English Viewpoint, in Gardiner and Rochall, ibid:

"England may learn much from the enthusiasm and the collective energy which romanticism helps to produce in Germany – and Germany perhaps something of the quiet, tolerant self-confidence which we have inherited as a result of our older tradition." p.92.

10. Kuno Franke, 'The True Germany': [Atlantic Monthly, Vol.CXVI, 1915] pp.558-559.

11. Dewey, op.cit., p.253.

12. J. M. de Beaufort, Behind The German Veil: [Hutchinson, London 1917] pp.92-98.

13. Horst Michael, A German View, in Gardiner and Rocholl, op.cit., pp.46-66.

14. Harold Begbie, op.cit., p.141.

15. Horsfall Carter, op.cit., pp.11-12.

16. J. W. Eaton, op.cit., p.210.

17. W. G. J. Knop [ed], Beware of The English: German Propaganda Exposes England [Hamish Hamilton, London 1939].

18. Stephen King-Hall, Foreword to W. G. J. Knop, ibid., p.xi.

19. _Westdeutscher Beobachter_, 31 March 1939, in Knop, ibid., p.162.
20. Ibid. pp.17-18.
21. Ibid. p.31 and p.36.
22. Ibid. p.58.
23. Ibid. p.118.
24. Ibid. p.18.
25. Ibid. pp.24-27.
26. Ibid. p.47.
27. Ibid. pp.41-42.
28. Ibid. p.86.
29. Ibid. pp.134-138.
30. Ibid. pp.141-146.
31. _Volkischer Beobachter_, 25 March 1939, ibid., pp.149-156.
32. Ibid. pp.192-193.
33. Ibid. pp.263-264. For graphic examples of Nazi attitudes to Britain see appendix to this chapter.
34. _The Demi-Paradise_ [1943] 114 m bw. Written by Anatole de Grunwald, directed by Anthony Asquith.
35. Rowse, op. cit., p.47.
36. Ibid. p.39.
37. Ibid. pp.27-28.
38. Edward Grigg, _Britain Looks At Germany_ [Nicolson and Watson, 1938].
39. Ibid. p.148.
40. Ibid. p.295.
41. Ibid. p.143.
42. Ibid. p.118.
43. Ibid. p.79.
44. Ibid. p.102.
45. Ibid. p.164.
46. Ibid. pp.283-284.
47. Ibid. p.170.

48. Ibid. p.102.

49. Ibid. p.108.

50. Ibid. p.170.

51. Ibid. pp.286-287.

52. Ibid. p.93.

53. Ibid. p.97.

54. Ibid. p.112.

55. Ibid. p.96.

56. Ibid. p.40.

57. Ibid. p.34.

58. Ibid. pp.51-52.

59. Ibid. p.40.

60. Ibid. p.39.

61. Ibid. p.42.

62. Ibid. p.39

63. Ibid. p.40.

64. Ibid. p.43.

65. Ibid. p.47.

66. Ibid. p.49.

67. Ibid. p.50

68. Ibid. p.51.

69. Ibid. p.56.

70. Ibid. p.57.

71. Ibid. p.61.

72. Ibid. p.58.

73. Ibid. p.59.

74. Ibid. p.64.

75. Ibid. p.67.

76. See R. S. Peters, _Psychology and Ethical Development_ [George Allen & Unwin, 1974].

CHAPTER 8

HANDLING INCONSISTENCY: THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ARISING FROM THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF THE BRITISH SELF-IMAGE.

(i)

Common to the various branches of 'consistency theory' is the notion that a person "... behaves in a way that maximises the internal consistency of his cognitive system."[1] The general principle underlying the work of Heider [1944, 1946, 1958] was that "... an unbalanced set of cognitions is associated with 'tension' and the arousal of forces which tend to restore or to attain states of balance."[2] The contribution generally regarded as most committed to stressing the tendency toward consistency between an individual's belief system and his actual behaviour is that of Festinger [1957, 1964].[3] Aronson [1968] pointed to the essential simplicity of the core notion in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance:

"... dissonance is a negative drive state which occurs whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions [ideas, beliefs, opinions] which are psychologically inconsistent."[4]

Festinger suggested that individuals have cognitions about themselves, those around them, and the world at large. Any two such cognitions may be consonant with each other - that is to say, the relationship between them may be one of consistency. This is a relationship which produces 'psychological comfort'.

On the other hand, any two cognitions may be dissonant with each other - that is to say, the relationship between them may be one of inconsistency. In respect of the latter condition, Festinger wrote: "The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and achieve consonance."[5] Put in another, less technical way, psychological discomfort would be produced if a person believed something to be good but acted as if it were bad.[6] This would be a negative state which the individual would wish to reduce, if he cared at all about presenting to the world a logical and coherent relationship between his attitudes and behaviours. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to argue that "human beings seem to prefer their perceptions to make sense...", and that "when an individual believes in one thing and yet acts contrary to this belief, he is motivated to reduce the conflict."[7] Bramel [1968] and Rokeach [1973] carried the theory forward to issues involving the 'self-concept'.[8] Rokeach argued that the most significant type of dissonance was that which involved the self-conception. He gave as an example the University professor who prided himself on his logic, this perception being an important part of his self-image. The professor then discovered that his students found his lectures incoherent and his conclusions unrelated to his premises. His self-image was violated. Depending upon the importance of the self-image or self-conception, and it is perhaps reasonable to

to suppose that for most people its importance is considerable, inconsistency may well be great and psychological discomfort accentuated when there is "... a discrepancy between how one perceives one's self and the actual performance."[9] A particularly interesting proposition in this context is that "dissatisfaction is felt when the individual does not match up his actions to his own standards and the way he would like to see himself."[10] It has been argued that this type of inconsistency "... has implications for the individual's self-concept, and manifests itself in a guilt reaction."[11]

If there is a tendency to restore or attain states of balance, a motivation to reduce dissonance and conflict between cognitions, a predilection for psychological comfort as against discomfort, there remains the question of how this resolution is achieved. Underlying the following resume of some possible modes of resolving inconsistency dilemmas are the assumptions that "... in a given situation, there is usually more than one way for a person to reduce dissonance",[12] and that if a situation permits several different responses to occur, "... an individual might conceivably use one response to the virtual exclusion of others, or he might use several simultaneously."[13] [see Figure [5].

A number of social psychologists group modes of handling inconsistency dilemmas in two broad categories - AVOIDANCE and

Some Mechanisms For Handling Consistency dilemmas	
Avoidance	Confrontation
'Stopping Thinking'	Effecting change in one or both of the inconsistent cognitions
Denial	
Rationalisation	integration
Compartmentalisation	Transcendence
Derogation	Bolstering
Ritualism	

Figure [5]

CONFRONTATION.[14] If an individual considered an inconsistency to be 'significant', he might, through the use of psychological mechanisms, avoid the implication of the inconsistency "... by perceiving or interpreting the discrepant element in such a way that it no longer [appeared] to be inconsistent with the potentially challenged element."[15] On the other hand, an individual may "actively confront the inconsistency and remove it," by employing mechanisms which bring the inconsistent elements "back into line with each other."[16] It is important to note that in certain circumstances an individual could bridge the categories and handle significant inconsistency by a combination of avoidance and confrontation strategies.

Hardyck and Kardush [1968] consider that for individuals suffering the psychological discomfort of inconsistency, 'stopping thinking' is the preferred mode of escape. When such a mode is not only available but possible - that is, when "passive forgetting... or ... a more active process of suppression" would not of itself create further problems - it is preferred because it involves the least effort. In situations where the above reservation applies, "ceasing to think about one connection between two cognitions can cause no perturbations in whatever cognitive structure exists. It cannot, therefore, introduce new dissonance into the system and, besides, it requires little cognitive work."[17]

The problem is that the reservation may not apply. An individual's self-conception may block off this particular escape route and/or, "reminders from other people of the extreme salience of a connection between two dissonant cognitions may prevent [the individual] from stopping thinking."[18] Denial as a mechanism for the resolution of inconsistency engages the individual at the centre of a potential dilemma in a refusal to entertain "the very existence of the inconsistent element or of the inconsistent relationship between the two elements."[19] Since inconsistent elements and relationships achieve 'existence' from information about them – information which, as it were, gives them life – "the mechanism of denial may operate to prevent or limit the information pertaining to the fact that the individual is, indeed, participating in an activity which is repugnant to him."[20] As in the case of 'stopping thinking', the availability of this mechanism may be restricted by the individual's self-conception and the significance of the information in relation to self-conception. A particular individual may not be able to resolve the problem of inconsistency by 'killing-off' the information which defines it. Aronson argued that experimental work in the field of consistency theory suggested that man is a "rationalising animal – that he attempts to appear rational, both to others and to himself."[21] An individual faced with a potential inconsistency dilemma, arising from the interaction of two of

his values, might resolve the conflict through <u>rationalisation</u>: for example, "... if he has engaged in an action that violates one of his values he may persuade himself that this action was in fact different from what it may appear to have been - that it had a different intent, or a different effect... and that it is, therefore, not really inconsistent..."[22] When an individual engages in the process of rationalisation he is in effect attempting to bring his thoughts and actions into conformity with reason. Although this process can operate culminatively at the various stages of a complex exercise in decision making, it is in common experience, frequently activated at the end of the line, when a decision has actually been made. Experiments conducted by Brehm [1956] produced a classic example of post-decision rationalisation. In most complex exercises in decision making the individual is faced with a number of alternative strategies, each with advantages and disadvantages, each exerting pull. The attractiveness of one alternative over another can often be marginal, and this in itself can give rise to doubts and anxieties. Brehm found that individuals, having made a difficult choice, handled post-decision doubts and anxieties by re-evaluating alternatives in such a way as to <u>make</u> their choices appear reasonable. The positive aspects of the chosen course were emphasised and the negative aspects de-emphasised; at the same time the negative aspects of the non-chosen course were emphasised and the positive aspects

de-emphasised[23]. Anxieties arising from inconsistency can be avoided by the mechanism of Compartmentalisation. Dissonant cognitions can be retained but insulated from each other by erecting a barrier between them. Since incompatibility, even though objectively present, can be 'recognised' only through contact, the placing of discrepant cognitions into "... separate and impermeable mental niches..." so insulates them from each other that they are not brought into "emotionally disturbing juxtaposition."[24] Kelman and Baron suggest that support for this type of separation can be enlisted from "institutionalised patterns that prescribe behaviour... in the context of a particular role."[25] For example, a person acting in the role of committed patriot could use the type of behaviour prescribed by that particular role to insulate the kind of thought and action associated with it from the kind of thought and action associated with other held values. The problems arising from perceived inconsistency can be avoided through derogation and ritualism. Suppose that an individual, participating in discussion or debate, is experiencing an inner struggle caused by tensions between actions based on one value and the pull of another, discrepant value. The tension could be relieved by either derogating the discrepant value or, more likely, by derogating the sources of information associated with it. In either case, the "challenging impact" of the inconsistency is neutralised.[26] Alternatively, a troublesome confrontation

between two inconsistent cognitions may be avoided "by engaging in certain ritual behaviours that hide the inconsistency... Rituals allow him to do what he ought to do - in a highly visible and often dramatic fashion - but, by being routinised and formalised, his actions are drained of their emotional impact."[27] And so the impact of the inconsistency is blunted.

Inconsistency may be 'confronted' and a resolution achieved by effecting a change in one of the discrepant cognitions. The classic example in experimental literature involves the two inconsistent cognitions 'I smoke cigarettes' and 'cigarette smoking can cause cancer'. For the individual unwilling to exclude the first from his cognitive repertoire there remains the possibility of modifying the second. In this particular context the modification often involves the removal of the 'sting', and this can be effected by the use of mechanisms already discussed - derogation and rationalisation. The evidence supporting the problematic cognition may be classed as suspect, or the use of filters may be cited as a means of removing the element of risk. Alternatively, the uncomfortable cognition may be rendered irrelevant, and therefore modified through reduction in significance, by a reappraisal of the self-image. The individual "might actually make a virtue out of smoking by developing a romantic, devil-may-care image of himself",[28] as someone who flaunted danger, who thought nothing of it. It

will be noted that such mechanisms effect relative change in the second cognition [smoking can cause cancer] through the creation of a battery of new cognitions designed to support the first [I smoke cigarettes]. The actual 'structure' of the second cognition does not change, although its significance or relevance changes. There are other, more subtle ways, of effecting change in a cognition. They involve reformulations of the actual structure, and will be discussed in section (iii) of this chapter.

Cognitions which are inherently inconsistent can be brought into line with each other and made to co-exist in more or less comfortable contact through the process known as integration. Through this particular mechanism "... a genuine resolution of conflict is achieved."[29] Such a resolution would require that both cognitions not only retained significance but were also able to engage simultaneously. This might involve the development or highlighting of other cognitions in the form of facilitators. For example, an integration of the inherently inconsistent values of competition [mutually exclusive goals] and co-operation [mutually interdependent goals] could occur in the context of tennis doubles through significance being attached to the facilitating cognition: 'The goal is not more important than the means of attaining it.'[30]

Transcendence as a mechanism for confronting inconsistency

"... involves the introduction of a superordinate principle, which serves as the context for evaluating the inconsistent relationship. The two elements, when viewed in their own terms, remain inconsistent with one another. This very inconsistency, however, is required by a higher principle that transcends the two elements, and it thus becomes acceptable or even desirable. A prime example of this mechanism can be noted in the social legitimisation of otherwise unacceptable behaviour, such as killing in time of war. The soldier may be quite aware of the inconsistency between his action in taking the lives of others and his values regarding the sanctity of human life. This inconsistency, however, is viewed in the context of a transcendent principle, such as that of defending one's country and way of life. When viewed in that context, the inconsistent behaviour is required, acceptable, and even noble. To forego one's scruples, to do 'what has to be done' even though you find it personally objectionable and distasteful - in short, to be inconsistent - is in itself virtuous in this context. Thus, neither the inconsistent elements nor the relationship between them are changed, but they are imbedded in a different context which gives a different meaning to the inconsistent behaviour."[31]

When two cognitions oppose each other in an inconsistent

relationship the individual may handle the situation by lending additional support to one and not the other. The inconsistency remains but is greatly reduced in significance.[32] For obvious reasons this mechanism is referred to as <u>bolstering</u>. In some situations ways may be found to bolster one of the inconsistent cognitions by associating it with statements or behaviour supportive of self-esteem.

It is important to note that the above resume of modes of handling inconsistency is not exhaustive and is set in a context which accommodates psycho-logic as well as formal logic. In formal logic the truth of a proposition may be ascertained without any reference to the desirability of the proposition. Formal logic is a two-valued system involving the concepts 'true' and 'false'. Individuals faced with propositions tend to respond to them with different gradations of assent or rejection rather than treat them as absolutely true or false.[33] People have to compromise the demands of logical and psycho-logical thinking, for their beliefs "must satisfy needs other than correspondence to the objective world of logical consistency."[34] Referring to norms which he saw as "integral to the life of reason..." in that they marked off rationality "... as a level of life distinct from the non-rational, the irrational and the unreasonable", R.S. Peters [1974] wrote:

"There is, first, the influence of the rational individual's concern for consistency and avoidance of contradiction."[35]

At the same time, he was aware of Freud's concept of 'wish' and agreed that 'wishing' could be "... unchecked by logical contradiction and causal association... unhampered by a proper sense of time, space and reality." Peters argued that "... when we talk about wishes we are prepared to withdraw the applicability of a range of categories that go along with the rationality model. Typically," he wrote, "we wish for things like the moon, where realistic questions of taking means to ends do not have to be raised... Freud postulated that this form of cognition still persists in us, after we learn to think and act in accordance with the purposive rule-following model..."[36] What this amounts to is recognition that in certain circumstances an individual may act inconsistently in terms of formal logic but experience no awareness of inconsistency in terms of psycho-logic. "Logical inconsistency... could be readily converted to psycho-logical consistency in that the individual could make sense out of discrepant elements under appropriate circumstances."[37] An example apposite to the discussion in section (iii) of this chapter may be cited. Suppose that the logical inconsistency was between a method for

achieving a goal and the goal itself; that the goal was a world in which nations co-operated with each other in tune with the notion of the brotherhood of man and the principles of fairness, tolerance and sympathy; and that the means of achieving this desired end involved the use of every underhand, savage and unscrupulous trick in the book. In the absence of recognisable attempts to handle inconsistency it would be inadvisable to assert that an individual pursuing such an end by such means experienced the dilemmas contingent upon psycho-logical dissonance. On the other hand, there might be relative security in the proposition: where the observable behaviour of an individual gives cause to assume that (i) he is <u>aware</u> of inconsistency between cognitions and (ii) he is employing mechanisms to handle it, we may infer that he experiences a dilemma in psycho-logic, and that the dilemma could be reinforced by the demands of formal logic.

(ii)

As with most theories which claim to provide an explanation of human behaviour, those which purport to account for it under the general heading of cognitive consistency have been challenged on the grounds that they do not offer satisfactory insights into all instances of observed behaviour and, more damagingly, that they distract attention from more common-sense truths.[38] It has been pointed out that consistency theory, of itself, cannot explain "... individual differences in the behaviour of people placed in identical dissonance-arousing conditions," since each individual inhabits a 'private world' ingress to which depends upon an understanding of personality structures.[39] Different people perceive inconsistencies differently and "... it is likely that differential perception is, in part, a function of the individual's personality structure."[40] One individual will be more susceptible to the experience of dissonance than another; of those who do experience dissonance, some will show more readiness to reduce it than others; of those who show most readiness to reduce it, some will prefer one mode or sets of modes for handling it, and others demonstrate quite different preferences. This, of course, is less a criticism of consistency theory as such than an encouragement for the coming together of consistency and personality theorists in the research enterprise. Nevertheless, in emphasising the

importance of individual personality it forms the basis for a more substantive challenge to the general applicability of consistency theory.

Some critics have attacked the notion that inconsistency, even when perceived, is always bothersome.[41] It is claimed that in some situations inconsistency is not only tolerated but "... sought out, rather than avoided."[42] Advocates of the 'variety' thesis consider that "... novelty, unexpectedness, change, and complexity are pursued because they are inherently satisfying... Life is much too complex to be properly lived and understood through a reliance on easy consistencies... To theorise that the pursuit of consistency is the major directionality of life is to underestimate man."[43] Such advocates tend to agree with Ralph Waldo Emerson's dictum that "consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."[44] Attention has been drawn to the fact that in some areas of human experience "the individual's activity tries to maintain a condition of imbalance. One of the extreme conditions under which this is noticed is the kind of behaviour which we call creative... the perfect balance of a geometrical design [as well as attribution of balance to human relations] is usually considered bad art or not art at all."[45] Experimental studies in exploratory and alternation behaviour have shown that "... variety seems to produce a positive affective response in people", that it is so enjoyable that it is pursued, and in

being enjoyable and pursued "seems necessary to normal functioning and development."[46]

Doubts about the validity of consistency theory have not been confined to those areas of human experience involving the artistic temperament or the exercise of curiosity. 'Ordinary' men, behaving in 'ordinary' ways, pursuing mundane life interests, are brought into the argument. The impact of inconsistency dilemmas on such individuals are not denied, but assigned levels of importance which normally vary from moderate to marginal and only reach critical status in special circumstances. Freedman [1968] is representative of this view:

"... consistency models present us with a very cognitive man who is extremely concerned about and devotes a great deal of energy to maximising cognitive consistency... I think that men do tend to reduce inconsistencies in their lives and among their beliefs... I do not agree, however, that the tendency to strive toward cognitive consistency is as important, ubiquitous, or continuous as these theories seem to be saying... under some circumstances these inconsistency reducing activities are quite important and may even be a major determinant of behaviour... but in my opinion these would be <u>very special circumstances</u>. I think that most of the time tendencies

toward cognitive consistency are of relatively minor importance, are not in fact going on continuously, and consequently have relatively minor consequences for behaviour or even for attitudes and opinions."[47]

In a similar way, Daryl Bem [1970] expressed his reservations about the general applicability of consistency theory insofar as it posits that individuals experience a strain toward cognitive consonance.

"In my view, a vision of inconsistency as a temporary turbulence in an otherwise fastidious pool of cognitive clarity is all too misleading. My own suspicion is that inconsistency is probably our most enduring cognitive commonplace. That is, I suspect that for most of the people most of the time and for all of the people some of the time inconsistency just sits there. I think that we academic psychologists, including the consistency theorists, probably spend too much time with bright college students who are as eager to achieve a respectable overall unity in their cognitions as we, their instructors, are eager to impress them and ourselves with the same admirable coherence of thought... I believe, in short, that there is more inconsistency on earth [and probably in heaven] than is dreamt of in our psychological theories."[48]

It should be noted that the criticism from variety theorists rests more on their desire to see the acceptance of paradox introduced to the explanatory model rather than on a desire to have inconsistency resolution removed from it. Noting that variety theory and consistency theory as _separate_ approaches were incongruent, Maddi effected a plausible synthesis. Of his own feelings when confronted with this problem he wrote:

> "... it is a marvellous and mysterious organism that _includes_ two such opposing tendencies. The excitement and wonder aroused by paradoxes such as this is very close to the kind of thing variety theorists see as the positive affective value of novelty...,"

on the other hand,

> "... the incompatibility is disconcerting, and this is the kind of thing stressed by consistency theorists... everyone has tendencies toward both consistency and variety... the specific conditions, in the personality and the situation... determine when one tendency as opposed to another will be apparent."[49]

Maddi's reference to specific conditions in the personality and the situation is of particular importance. When writers use

expressions such as "very special circumstances" it is difficult to avoid the impression that they mean circumstances which lie outside the norm, and which, in normal lives, have a relatively irregular incidence. It is as well to note that where an individual's self-image in itself, or in relation to particular social roles, is involved in the issue of consistency these so-called special circumstances may be part and parcel of his day to day life experience.

There is every reason to believe that the level of tolerance of inconsistency will be low if it has "important implications for the _self_ or for salient roles."[50] Singer [1968] marked the difference between bothersome and non-bothersome inconsistencies in the extent to which they were ego-involving: "...dissonance... between self-image and the possession of an unfavourable and unwanted characteristic... would be quite bothersome and irritating."[51] Allen, approaching the problem of dissonance from the side of role, argued that "consistency among cognitions, and between behaviour and belief, is role-appropriate behaviour for a socialised person in western society."[52] Berger [1963] had proceeded along similar lines:

"... for normal people [that is, those so recognised by their society] there are strong pressures toward consistency in the various roles they play and the

<u>identities</u> that go with these roles. These pressures are both external and internal. Externally the others with whom one must play one's social games, and on whose recognition one's own parts depend, demand that one present at least a relatively consistent picture to the world... There are also internal pressures towards consistency, possibly based on very profound psychological needs to perceive oneself as a totality."[53]

In development of the views of Allen, Singer and Berger, consider the following model as a starting point:

> x says to y: "Do this!"
>
> y refuses.

The question arises: Why did he refuse? A range of answers might include:

(A) x did not say please;

(B) x did not have authority to give the command;

(C) y was lazy, indolent, and could not be bothered;

(D) y did not like the thought of doing what he was asked to do.

Response (C) is highly idiosyncratic; but note that in a

culture which devalued indolence this response could be regarded
as socially unacceptable behaviour, making engagement in
purposeful activity a <u>cultural imperative</u>. Responses (A), (B)
and (D) are all associated with <u>cultural imperatives;</u> and it
might be said, additionally, of response (D) that it is tied up
with y's self-image or self-justifying consciousness which acts
as a sort of standard [though not <u>always</u> if <u>ever</u> perfect]
against which the appropriateness of personal attitudes and
actions may be judged. In any given situation the effectiveness
of the standard as a means of producing crisp, dilemma-free
judgments could be reduced by a number of factors - including
the problem of ambiguity. It is reasonable to suppose that on
many occasions the situations in which people find themselves
are ambiguous, and that judging between quite different types of
action or quite different attitudes, seen as appropriate in
their own right, would involve a gamble. Having made this
qualification it remains that to act against cultural
imperatives, and in particular to act in a way that denies the
self-image is to lay oneself open to the stress contingent upon
inconsistency. To act consistently is itself a cultural
imperative, since cultures tend to encourage consistent
behaviour. It is evident that this is so when we spend a moment
or two trying to imagine a culture in which inconsistency was
the norm. Consistency principles are themselves internalised
in the form of cultural imperatives, to such an extent that when

inconsistency occurs it is natural to want to reduce it. For inconsistent behaviour carries certain consequences which amount to pains and penalties. To be regarded as inconsistent is to be labelled deviant or at the very least awkward to deal with - is to lose arguments in the perception of others, or, alternatively, to suffer humiliation [ranging from mild to severe, depending on personality] by having to change ground. To the extent that individuals would wish to avoid such consequences, then to something like the same extent would they wish to be regarded as consistent in their behaviour.

Bem's analysis has a certain attraction, for in our individual experiences there may well have been occasions when in response to the internal challenge posed by inconsistency we have answered, 'So what?' But it cannot go unchallenged. As it stands it is unjustifiably elitist. It is no doubt true that the daily strains toward consistency are more obvious in the psychological territory of the university lecturer than in that of less intellectually fastidious and pedantic folk, but this may mean no more than that the university lecturer, because of his particular location and the nature of those with whom he interacts day by day, is forever aware that the pretentions of his self-image are on trial. More ordinary folk may not be laying their pretentions on the line so formally or so regularly, and so the strain toward consistency may not be so

ever pressing for them. But in their own way they will have self-images, and on those occasions, less frequent though they be, when their images are at stake, the strain toward consistency is likely to be severe enough. If we set aside the matter of frequency there is little reason to put the academic at one extreme and the ordinary person at the other. A supplementary point must be added here. Even if it had proved impossible to challenge Bem's suspicion that consistency theory was limited in its applicability to serious students of serious issues, it would have to be said that it is just such people who are in large part the subject of the present thesis.

Secondly, though it may be uncharitable and certainly ironic to say so, Bem's view on the limitations of consistency theory could be regarded as <u>inconsistent</u> with his notion of how self-perception is developed and consolidated. If he was serious in his assertion that

"We have learned to identify many of our internal states only because outside observers first inferred those states from observable external cues and then taught us how to label the internal situation that they assumed was accompanying those cues,"

and that as an ongoing process an individual identifies his own

internal states by partially relying on

> "the same external cues that others use when they infer
> his internal states,"[54]

then he has to accept the presence of a very special form of reciprocity in interpersonal relations that could not exist without a reasonable level of consistency. If Bem's comments on the nature of self-perception are to stand up they must at the very least presuppose a degree of compatibility between the perception of the external cues held by the individual responsible for them and the perception of those cues held by other observers.

Consistency theory, then, appears to say something meaningful about psychological needs and the relationship between those needs and social behaviour. It could also be said to make a successful appeal to common-sense. Its value as a tool for historical analysis, however, is not widely accepted. In a dismissive comment, Mazlish [1968] questioned the validity of the theory in this context:

> "The new theories of group psychology, or at least the
> non-Freudian ones, appear to me to have little
> applicability to history. What is known as the theory of
> Cognitive Dissonance does not help to explain historical
> phenomena."[55]

It is a central proposition of this chapter that Mazlish is wrong.

(iii)

Given the overwhelming evidence to suggest that the British self-image as an entity subsumed a broadly accepted ideological component, and that this component put a premium on fairness, justice, tolerance and sympathetic understanding, consistency theory may well "help to explain historical phenomena;" in that the need to align attitudes with ideological self-image led many to retreat from wholesale condemnations of Germany and the Germans, even at the height of two world wars; contributed to feelings of guilt and consequent acts of compensation during the inter-war period; and, on the other side of the debate, forced most of those who _did_ make wholesale condemnations to engage in manoeuvres, sometimes crude, sometimes subtle, designed to maintain the integrity of the ideological self-image and retain a grip on consistency.

The significance of the ideological self-image as a powerful organising concept did not escape the attention of the anti-Germans, including policy makers, who promoted anti-German attitudes at specific points in time. The inter-related values of that image were often directly appealed to as a standard of assessment against which Germans as a whole were seen to be sadly lacking. Where the appeal was not direct and explicit, that is, where the alleged virtues of the British were not

specifically mentioned, its presence could be detected nonetheless in the way in which inter-related qualities diametrically opposed to the self-image were assigned to the Germans. When the backs of the Germans were being metaphorically beaten, the ideological self-image was too good and heavy a stick to be ignored. Analysis of anti German attitudes throughout the period under examination suggests that most of those who expressed them were so conscious of the uncomfortable logical or psycho-logical consequences of making use of the ideological self-image that they strenuously attempted to achieve a 'compensatory consistency' through the use of mechanisms discussed in section (ii) of this chapter. At specific points in time when the alleged virtues of the British might have undermined political strategies, those virtues were classified as disfunctional. For example, at the point of surrender in 1945 when the civilian population of Germany's ruined cities were experiencing profound hardship and seemed likely to attract the sympathy of British civilians, newsreel commentaries insisted that sympathy would be wasted on such people and so should be withheld. This type of action would have been quite superfluous had it not been based on the perception that the ideological self-image was something to be reckoned with. At specific points in time when the alleged virtues of the British could be used to facilitate political strategies those virtues were seen as having real market value

and were promoted in press, newsreel, and feature film. What could be regarded as a particularly straightforward example of this latter strategy is to be found in Michael Relph's 1947 Ealing Production of 'Frieda'. Robert, a R.A.F. Officer has been assisted in his escape from a P.O.W. camp by a German girl, the Frieda of the title. At the close of the war they marry and Frieda accompanies her husband to England. It has been said of Robert's sister, Nell, that her response to this event was "... in keeping with her Vansittartist philosophy."[56] A conversation between Nell and a family friend runs:

Nell: "It's Robert's happiness I'm thinking about, above
         all. There can be no lasting happiness for him with
         this girl."

Friend: "But you don't know her!"

Nell: "But I know she's a German - That's the point! She's
         a German, that's all that counts. You can't take
         Germans individually... because there's a link - a
         common denominator in every one of them; something
         that twice in our time has set the world ablaze. Call
         it the - essence of Germanism, the German mind. Call
         it what you like. It's common to every German, man,
         woman and child, and we're blind idiots if we believe
         otherwise. It's inborn, in the blood."

Nell's point of view appears to be supported by statements made
to Robert by Frieda's brother, a confirmed Nazi:

"All Germans are one - what you see in me you will see in
her and in her children."

This anti-German flavour is maintained for most of the film,
challenged but not very successfully by those who befriend
Frieda. The character of Nell is so strong and certain that it
appears as though all others are being deceived by Frieda. Then
comes the real point of the film in the form of a dual-purpose
message. The family maid remarks: "We're all different, but
when a German is a bad lot we say - 'That's Germany'." The
implication is plain; it _is_ possible to distinguish one German
from another; it is _not_ true that they are all alike. It will
therefore be possible to work with Germany in the new post-war
Europe. And the one thing that characterises Britain is, above
all, its forgiving spirit - sometimes difficult to reveal, but
always there. This is shown in the last reel conversion of Nell
the Germanophobe: "No matter who they are, no matter what
they've done, you cannot treat human beings as less than human
without becoming less than human yourself." Infinitely more
effort would have been required in this type of propagandist
activity had it not been based on the assumption that the
ideological self-image had a fair measure of resilience.

One way or another, then, the anti-Germans, including policy makers, were highly conscious of and put to either positive or negative use the concept of an ideological self-image. How did they deal with the problem of consistency? Discussion of this question will be assisted if two preliminary points are kept in mind.

First, it has to be conceded that some anti-Germans would not concern themselves unduly with the problem of consistency. Bem cites the suggestion in Abelson [1968] that "an individual's beliefs and attitudes are often composed of encapsulated, isolated, 'opinion molecules'," with each molecule having three components, a belief, an attitude, and a cementing conviction that the belief and the attitude are supported by others. To put it another way, "each opinion molecule contains a fact, a feeling, and a following."[57] Because such 'opinion molecules' are isolated from each other, "... they do not need to have logical interconnections between them, and they are notoriously invulnerable to argument..."[58] Belief systems structured in this way are of course productive of prejudice. Hypothetically, an anti-German might have had buried away among many 'opinion molecules' two which co-existed quite comfortably because, in 'molecular' isolation from each other, they were relieved of the need to be logically aligned:

(a)   I feel that the British are to be congratulated
      (feeling) because, as most people know (following)
      they are sympathetic, fair, just and tolerant (fact).

(b)   Nobody I know has any time for Germans (following) and
      neither do I (feeling). They will destroy us all if
      we give them the chance (fact).

Supposing an individual already had long standing experience of
such a molecular belief system which, amongst other items
included molecule (a) above, the subsequent incorporation of
molecule (b) would not produce the psychological disturbance
associated with inconsistency. It should be noted that this
condition bears some similarity in effect to
compartmentalisation, but is not in any other way like that
mechanism. Compartmentalisation is a way of handling perceived
inconsistency; 'molecular isolation' is a condition which keeps
the individual 'in the dark' about inconsistency. It should
also be appreciated that an individual providing a home for the
isolated cognitions given in the above example could not hope by
any objective standard to convince or enlist the support of
others who respected and acted in accordance with the norms of
reason. To the extent that anti-Germans wanted to carry the day
with the apparent 'reasonableness' of their case, to something
like the same extent they had to accommodate themselves to the

principle of consistency.

Secondly, it has to be remembered that in much the same way as those values of groups and societies which are shared by members are shared differentially, so the notion of an ideological self-image shared by both sides of the debate on Germany and the Germans was shared differentially. It is generally accepted that "... most of us... share many of the same values, and our differences of opinion stem from the relative importance we assign to them."[59] When we say, 'Yes, I agree that x is important and must not be lost sight of - but at this point in time the most important consideration is y, we are assigning weights to values. We are not saying that those weights are necessarily constant in respect of all situations. By weighting (differential sharing) we are bringing values into congruence with the situation as we perceive it.

Material Interests [+]

[B]

A relatively higher
value assigned to
material than to
ideological interests.

[A]

High values assigned
to both, with, theoretically,
more or less equal
concern for ideological
and material interests.

Ideological
Interests
[−]

Ideological
Interests
[+]

[C]

Relatively low values
assigned to both
ideological and
material interests.

[D]

A relatively higher
value assigned to
ideological than to
material interests.

Material Interests [−]

Figure [6]   A VALUE-QUADRANT APPROACH TO DIFFERENCES IN THE
RELATIVE WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO IDEOLOGICAL AND
MATERIAL INTERESTS.

In the clear understanding that a descriptive illustration and not a causal explanation is being offered, this point can be represented [see figure 6] by an adaptation of the 'value quadrants' used by Milton Rokeach [60]. Suppose that what is shared is a dualistic self-image made up of, on the one hand, a concern for tolerance, justice, fairness, empathy [ideological interests], and on the other hand, a concern for power, effectiveness and security [material interests]. Individuals assigning high values to both interests occupy quadrant [A]; those assigning a higher value to material than to ideological interests occupy quadrant [B]; in quadrant [C] are located those who place a relatively low value on both interests; quadrant [D] is occupied by those assigning a higher value to ideological than to material interests. Although intended as no more than a descriptive illustration of the way in which values might be shared differentially, Figure [6] has the capacity to suggest ways in which the discussion might proceed and develop in complexity. For example, in the context of attitudes toward Germany and the Germans it should be possible to show, subject to refinements made below, that:

1. Individuals who assigned relatively high values to both ideological and material interests would, in their attitudes, be likely to express this balanced value position in such a way as to locate them centrally in the

area of congruence of the parallel continuums of competition and co-operation; see Figure [7]. This position could be said to be one of equilibrium or balance between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves. In short, it could be said to be of itself a position which satisfied the strain toward consistency.

2. Individuals who assigned a relatively higher value to material than to ideological interests would, in their attitudes, be likely to express this unbalanced value position in such a way as to locate them to the left of the equilibrium point, either within or outwith the area of congruence. To the extent that ideological interests had contributed to the perception of threat to material interests, [e.g. 'in having no concern for tolerance, justice, fairness, empathy - the Germans threaten us] and/or had served as a standard for assessing Germany and the Germans, this position could be said to be one of imbalance between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the values themselves. Those who occupied this position would be likely to make an attempt to achieve some form of consistency.

3. By definition, individuals who assigned relatively low

[quadrant A]

Point of Balance

(a)   (b)

(+)   (—)

Competition   [quadrant B]   [quadrant D]

(c)

(d)

(—)   (+)

Co-operation

Area of Congruence

note: at the 'point of balance' a b = cd,
indicating that the attitude held is equidistant
from the extremes of competition and co-operation

Figure [7] LINKS BETWEEN THE COMPETITION-CO-OPERATION MODEL
AND THE VALUE-QUADRANT APPROACH.

values to both ideological and material interests did not
participate in the general debate on Germany and the
Germans.

4. Individuals who assigned a relatively higher value to
    ideological than to material interests would, in their
    attitudes, be likely to express this unbalanced value
    position in such a way as to locate them to the right of the
    equilibrium point, either within or outwith the area of
    congruence. To the extent that material interests had been
    called in support of ideological interests [e.g. if we do
    not remain a world power the survival and distribution of
    our values will be in peril], this position could be said
    to be one of imbalance between expressed attitudes derived
    from declared values and the values themselves. Those who
    occupied this position would be likely to make an attempt
    to achieve some form of consistency.

Important theoretical refinements must be made if the link
between the competition - co-operation model and the value -
sharing quadrants is to avoid over simplification. For some
individuals occupying extreme positions outwith the area of
congruence, whether to left or right, questions of inconsistency
resolution would not arise.   'Molecular isolation', for

example, could protect an individual adopting an extreme
anti-German position, even if there existed somewhere in his
cognitive system the notion that tolerance and empathy were
important in themselves. Additionally, an individual located
left of the equilibrium point, with competitive attitudes
increasing and co-operative attitudes diminishing or
disappearing, could occupy that position not because material
interests were regarded as relatively more important but because
the values associated with ideological interests were regarded
as paramount. Such an individual might take the following
stand:

> 'I am not prepared to condemn all individual Germans out
> of hand, but as a collective they must be strenuously
> resisted if our basic values are to be preserved.'

Similarly, an individual located right of the equilibrium point,
with co-operative attitudes increasing and competitive attitudes
diminishing or disappearing, could occupy that position not
because ideological interests were regarded as relatively more
important but because the values associated with material
interests were accorded the higher priority. Such an individual
might take the following stand.

> 'I know that justice, fairness, tolerance, etc., are of

great value, but think of the destruction of human and
material resources that will result if we get involved in
a war with Germany.'

It should not pass unnoticed that such positions represent
attempts to achieve some form of consistency.

With those refinements in mind we can return to the question:
how did those involved in the debate on Germany and the Germans
handle the potential for inconsistency inherent in the dualistic
nature of the British self-image? Although attempting to cover
the whole period under review, and a broad range of mechanisms,
the following discussion has to be selective. And two important
points should be kept in mind: (i) there is an assumption, based
on the content of views outlined in previous chapters that those
involved in the debate were, and remained aware that they faced
inconsistency dilemmas; this means that 'stopping thinking',
and 'denial', as mechanisms, are not considered; (ii) some
individuals were pluralistic in their use of mechanisms for
handling inconsistency dilemmas; this means that they will be
referred to more than once.

As might be expected, derogation was a frequently used
mechanism. It served the purpose of reducing the potential for

inconsistency by raising doubts about the reliability of those who pressed the claims of the discrepant cognition and, in some way similar to the function of bolstering, seemed to consolidate self-esteem. In the context of the debate on Germany and the Germans, derogation, as used by those located left of the point of equilibrium, may be seen as an argument that the case for tolerance, justice, fairness, etc., had been assigned a disproportionate weight and had so tipped the scales that the legitimate material interests of the nation were being neglected. Maxse referred to those who challenged his position as ignorant and invincible optimists, illusion mongers, political deadheads, peace-cranks and simpletons - obscuring the real issues with thoughtless and fatuous sentimentalism, pitiful whines for disarmament, and criminal utterances. Cramb wrote dismissively of the effusive sentiment for peace. Dillon complained of the quietism of the masses and their self-complacent leaders, of croaking prophets conjuring up dangerous mirages. He was committed to the exorcism of the demons of credulity and pacifism. Sidney Brooks used the same mechanism, if in milder fashion, when he referred to decent Englishmen who, somewhat innocently, were prepared to see good in the Germans. Smith agreed that "Freedom of speech is a precious jewel of which Englishmen are justly proud", but he thought it was being abused. The ill-informed wanted to make distinctions between Germans, but "the result of their

ignorance... and open abuse of their right to free speech is this: many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Englishmen must sleep their last sleep on the blood-stained battlefields of Europe... As usual, the charlatans remain in security... while the victims ... are being shot and bayoneted to make good the evil caused by a fatal combination of ignorance and free speech."[61] It was high time that those sympathetic to Germany at such a time of crisis should be "deposed from their pedestals of ignorance."[62]

Brome-Weigall, reflecting on events leading up to the First World War, and the influences being brought to bear on opinion, considered that "The British nation... blinded itself ... and hoped for the best."[63] Rowse wrote of the "liberal illusionism about the Germans and the German mentality", coming from people "who did not know Germany or German history, the German language or German thought."[64] Because of this illusionism, "the English were beginning to sit superfluously in sack-cloth and ashes for a war [1914-18] which they did not begin, had never wanted, and were not prepared for."[65] Of the inter-war period, referred to in this thesis as a conscience-led phase of reflection, Rowse felt "... hard put to find another period comparable to it in folly and disgrace, in corruption of the very source of judgment, in lack of vision and criminal obtuseness."[66] It was implicit in Namier's argument

that a disastrous overweighting of the claims of the ideological self-image had created a surrealistic condition in which "People in this country who abhorred [Hitler's] actions volunteered to shoulder his guilt", so that _we_ and _our_ misdeeds were to blame for his rise." The problem had been that "... in the grey aftermath of the war sensitive consciences cried out for a millennium which alone could have justified ex-post the slaughter of millions."[67] Vansittart wrote bitterly of "ill-informed meddlers" who were "a menace to mankind."[68] The persistent effort "being made to suggest that the German nation is not in this war, and that in reality we are only faced by the Nazi party..." was a lunacy. "Our innocents at home come of the ancient and rechristened stock of Wishful Thinkers. It is held-and-hugged that there are millions of Germans eager to rise up for us."[69] A major contribution to the outbreak of war had been made by "hosts of clever people" in Britain who had "lost themselves in mazes of their own building."[70] Now engaged in war, Britain was in danger of being destroyed by its own deluders - "the ignorant, the biased, the mendacious."[71]

Bolstering was also a frequently used mechanism. If the position held could in some way be justified by adoption of the role of 'suffering servant', ego defences were reinforced. Maxse had sacrificed a great deal of his time and energy attempting to rouse Englishmen from their dangerous torpor, and

Dillon had struggled to awake from slumber his nation's misgivings. Barker numbered himself with those "who unceasingly tried to warn the nation", and "were treated as alarmists, cranks, and anti-Germans."[72] The most striking examples came from Rowse and Vansittart, the latter combining bolstering and derogation in equal measure. Writing after the events, Rowse [1946] cast himself in the role of one of the few 'voices in the wilderness.' For one to occupy such a role, believe and be able later to claim that one was accurate in the assessment of critical events, is ego-boosting and inconsistency reducing. "It was impossible," he wrote, "to make oneself heard in that period of confusion and humbug, of organised cant and hypocrisy: nobody paid any attention: nobody listened."[73]

> "... it was quite impossible - whatever talents or gifts
> of clearheadedness and historical perspicuity one might
> have - to rouse one's countrymen, lulled as they were,
> befuddled and bamboozled..."[74]

Vansittart, so far as one can gather from his written work, perceived himself as the expert par excellence who had not been listened to: "... there can be no writing on the wall when the wall is as dense... as Snout in Midsummer Night's Dream."[75] Of his personal frustrations he wrote, "... everyone must expect his share of knocks in controversy, and no one should resent

being hit below the belt by those who can reach no higher. I
have had my share of them. It is a curious and sinister fact
that nothing has been more unpopular than telling the truth
about a country that for generations has been bent on destroying
you... Even now, if you read certain types of publications
produced in this country you would think that we were some sort
of criminals, <u>instead of men who had simply and accurately
warned their fellows</u>..."[76]

The process of achieving a form of consistency between
discrepant cognitions by emphasising the positive and
de-emphasising the negative aspects of one, and de-emphasising
the positive and emphasising the negative aspects of the other -
a process involving <u>rationalisation</u> - was evident in a number of
sources. The argument was advanced that the pursuit of material
interests was not as antithetical to the values of the
ideological self-image as might be supposed; for the pursuit of
material interests, given the circumstances obtaining, was
really the best way of ensuring the survival of those values.
It was foolish and positively dangerous to inform one's dealings
with Germany with the notion of the brotherhood of man. There
would be no reciprocity. A temporary surrender to hate in
defence of precious traits and values was necessary and in the
nature of a just cause, for Germany's threat could not be
removed by the exercise of sympathy and justice. Bentley

pointed out that "the idea of the brotherhood of man simply does not exist for the prophets of Germanism."[77] Brome-Weigall welcomed the fact that it was being borne in upon "The slow mind of the people of England that this war [1914-18] is being waged against a nation whose point of view is completely different from that of the allies, and whose actions are governed by a code which does not remotely resemble our code."[78] By fighting tooth and claw, without concessions, against this enemy, Britain was "fighting for the heart of the world."[79] Smith argued that the hope, entertained by those committed to the ideological self-image, of co-operation between Britain and Germany "... was destined from the very nature of things to remain a dream."[80] Germany could not be addressed in terms of the 'rules of the game', for she did not recognise them. Whenever attempts were made to act with sympathy and fairness towards Germany, the enemy "played cunningly upon this side of English character..."[81] Britain was faced with "an irreconcilable, uncompromising, arrogant rival,"[82] who had "returned our fair-dealing and friendly overtures with low cunning, brute force and hate."[83] It was precisely for the sake of the values that Britain held dear that she had to act harshly. For, "If Germany is victorious her methods and principles will have overthrown all the humane ideals which Christianity has taken nearly twenty centuries to evolve."[84] Rowse encouraged his readers to accept that "the only way to

meet Machiavellianism is with Machiavellianism."   Co-operation with Germany was not an alternative, "... for it is not even possible, except on their own terms... they do not believe in international order.   Their own will, their own interests, are their only law."   To expect mutual reciprocity of decent sentiments in Anglo-German relations was to pursue a phantom. The Germans were "... the self-declared breakers of agreements..."[85]   The German mentality did not bear trifling with: "... it is no good trying to compromise with it; the only safe thing is to root it out."[86]   There was nothing more dangerous for Britain's future than "... the combination of English good nature and ignorance..."[87]   Vansittart advised that Britain was dealing with a nation "... riddled with aggression... its soul pock-marked with envy..."[88]   It had "traded upon the ingrained British aversion to belief in evil, one of the deepest and most dangerous traits in our composition."[89]

Examples of what could be construed as ritualism are to be found in sources such as Bentley and Smith who, in the expression of generally condemnatory views introduced what amounted to lip-service adherence to the traits and values of the ideological self-image.   Of much more consequence was the manner in which some sources effected a change in one of the inconsistent cognitions.   Employment of this mechanism, designed

to reduce inconsistency by restructuring one of the elements responsible for it, can be detected in the work of de Beaufort and Rowse,[90] but the classic example is to be found in Vansittart. The basis for the use of such a mechanism often resides in the view that there is more than one valid way of interpreting a 'common scripture'. The act of restructuring carried out by Vansittart is of such significance that it deserves a preliminary discussion. By way of analogy, it seems reasonable to argue that

"the central doctrines and beliefs of Christianity would appear to provide basic premises upon which Christians could base racial tolerance, compassion and understanding."[91]

But the findings of Stark and Glock (1968) in their study of the nature of religious commitment in the United States, as reported by Bem (1970), suggest that

"... there are other central beliefs in Christian doctrine which - when interpreted by the layman at least - contribute to racial prejudice rather than diminish it. The most central of these beliefs appears to be a radical version of the freewill conception of man.

The freewill conception of man sees him as a free actor, essentially capable of rising above the circumstances of his environment by virtue of his own efforts, free to choose and thus free to effect his own salvation."[92]

In terms of this particular perspective on, and interpretation of Christian ethics, it appears to be quite consistent "to put the blame for disadvantage upon those who are disadvantaged."[93]   And so, according to the lights of the student, there *is* more than one valid way to interpret 'common scripture'.

Writing on a closely related theme Berger refers to the "... geographical co-incidence between the Black Belt and the Bile Belt" in the American South.

"... roughly the same area that practises the southern racial system in pristine purity, also has the heaviest concentration of ultra-conservative, fundamentalist Protestantism...
Protestant fundamentalism, while it is obsessed with the idea of sin, has a curiously limited concept of its extent. Revivalistic preachers thundering against the wickedness of the world invariably fasten on a rather limited range of moral offences – fornication, drink, dancing, gambling, swearing. Indeed, so

much emphasis is placed on the first of these that, in the lingua franca of Protestant moralism, the term 'sin' itself is almost cognate with the more specific term 'sexual offence'. Whatever one may say otherwise about this catalogue of pernicious acts, they all have in common their essentially private character. Indeed, when a revivalistic preacher mentions public matters at all it is usually in terms of the private corruption of those holding public offices... Now, the limitation to private wrong-doing in one's concept of Christian ethics has obvious functions in a society whose central social arrangements are dubious, to say the least, when confronted with certain teachings of the New Testament and with the egalitarian creed of the nation that considers itself to have roots in the same. Protestant fundamentalism's private concept of morality thus concentrates attention on those areas of conduct that are irrelevant to the maintenance of the system, and diverts attention from those areas where ethical inspection would create tensions for the smooth operation of the system."[94]

Leaving analogy aside and returning to Vansittart. He wrote:

> "Do not always be wondering how to be safely just to her (Germany). Make up your minds that you are going to be just first to Germany's victims, and to Germany after... Both justices are possible, but only if taken in the right

order... The simple Samaritan took good care of the victim. His care for the soul of the aggressor was second and unchronicled. The Modern Levite does not pass by on the other side, he crosses the road to shake hands with the aggressor."[95]

In this fascinating passage Vansittart conceded that justice and sympathy were crucial and valuable elements in the ideological self-image. But he also made a distinction between two forms of justice, the justice of the Levite, that is, technical letter of the law justice, and the justice of the Samaritan, that is, humane spirit of the law justice. The justice of the Samaritan, Vansittarts reconstructed cognition of justice, was the justice of the heart, the justice of true generosity and feeling. Of course, "the simple use of the heart in politics is not always easy; it will even be suspect... Do not fear to be sweeping; else you will lose yourself in refinements."[96]

Transcendance as a mechanism for handling inconsistency dilemmas is recognisable in the work of Maxse, Cramb, Dillon, Harrison, Rowse and Vansittart. The inconsistencies between particular cognitions [material interests and ideological interests] are set in proper context and devalued as matters for concern by a superordinate principle - in some sources the need to face the

challenge of inexorable historical forces, in others the need to resist the 'wild beast' or the smooth-tongued tempter, the political Antichrist. Exceptional circumstances apply and necessitate a re-ordering of priorities. The situation is not dissimilar to that described to Thrasymachus by Socrates in the Republic when the question arose about 'giving a man his due' when the man was in a mentally unstable condition and his due was an axe. Peters refers to the "... process ... of modifying one's ends and rules in the light of circumstances" and argues that

> "Rationality is, for example, evinced in qualifying an absolute disapproval of lying when confronted by a case where exceptional circumstances incline one to think that there are overriding grounds for lying - e.g. the immense amount of suffering likely to be brought about if the literal truth is told on a particular occasion."[97]

Adapting this to the case of the anti-German conscious, in the context of the debate, of the requirement of consistency, we have him qualifying an absolute disapproval of intolerance, unfairness, injustice, etc., when confronted by a case where exceptional circumstances incline him to think that there are overriding grounds for intolerance, unfairness, etc. - e.g. the immense amount of human suffering and material damage likely to

be brought about if Germany and its perceived aims were treated
with tolerance and fairness, to say nothing of empathy.

Integration can be noted in Dillon - material interests and
ideological interests synthesising to produce a dramatic call to
arms in defence of all Britain was and stood for - and in sources
such as Warwick, generally representative of a marriage between
tolerance, sympathy, fairness, and a pragmatism stemming from a
clear perception of material interests. As a mechanism it is
most profoundly evident in the work of Gollancz, particularly in
those passages where the insistence that evil must be combated is
qualified by a conscious decision to exclude large sections of
the enemy population from that category; where a determination
to hate and extirpate the crime stands in conjunction with an
equal determination not to hate the criminal.

Most of those who were involved in the debate on Germany and the
Germans were aware of the dualistic nature of the British
self-image, and of the potential inconsistency dilemmas which
this could throw up. For those who consciously used the traits
and values of the ideological component of the self-image as a
means for assessing the Germans, the potential for inconsistency
was particularly marked. The purpose of this chapter has been to
persuade that consistency theory provides useful tools for the
analysis of how consistency dilemmas were resolved.

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and Leonard Berkowitz, The Motivational Status of Cognitive Consistency Theorising, in Robert P. Abelson, op.cit., p.305:

"... it is unfair to attack cognitive inconsistency research on the grounds that the studies have failed to dispose of every alternative explanation; surely every psychological investigation is open to this accusation."

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"The studies of exploratory behaviour show that when a new element is introduced into the environment, animal and man

alike will approach, contact, and perhaps even play with it. The studies of alternation behaviour show that when an organism's initial response has exposed it to only a part of a larger environment, the next response will be made such that the unexperienced parts of the environment can be experienced."

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80. Thomas F. A. Smith, op.cit., p.94.

81. Ibid. p.306.

82. Ibid. p.326.

83. Ibid. p.341.

84. Ibid. pp.342-343.

85. A. L. Rowse, op.cit., p.59.

86. Ibid. p.192.

87. Ibid. p.207.

88. Lord Vansittart, op.cit., p.30.

89. Ibid. p.19.

90. J. M. de Beaufort, Behind the German Veil, op.cit., "... is it not better to be hard, even unjust, to the enemy than to risk your own countrymen and women?" p.22. A. L. Rowse, op.cit., on sympathising with the Germans and forgetting that Versailles had given liberty to 70 million Slavs: "that was its historical achievement, which we are liable to overlook in sympathising with the [now mythical] sorrows of Germany..." p.45.

91. Daryl Bem, op.cit., p.29.

92. Ibid. p.31.

93. Ibid. p.31.

94. Peter L. Berger, op.cit., pp.131-132.

95. Lord Vansittart, op.cit., p.13.

96. Ibid. pp.13-14.

97. R. S. Peters, op.cit., pp.125-126.

IMAGES OF GERMANY

A theory-based approach to the
classification, analysis, and critique of
British attitudes towards Germany:
1890-1940

VOLUME TWO

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PART 4

NATIONAL CHARACTER:
THE CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER 9

NATIONAL CHARACTER: THE CONCEPT

The purposes of this chapter are threefold: first, to examine the grounds on which it might be reasonable to assert that individual societies are characterised [that is to say, 'marked'] [1] by kinds of configurations or patterns that make them demonstrably different from other societies; second, to consider the important reservations that have to be made about such an assertion, particularly in regard to what may be properly deduced from it; third, to formulate a definition of 'national character' that is consistent with conclusions reached at stages one and two.

[1]

One social group may be distinguished from another in terms of the behaviours of their respective members. Focusing on the individual, we may ask why he acts as he does and what conditions lead him to act as he does. As Krasner and Ullmann [1973] note, "at first these two questions seem similar but the kinds of investigating behaviour that follow from each have very real differences." [2] The what question directs attention to observable regularities, to "... the behaviour patterns of the group as a whole... the nature of its organisation as embodied in its institutions, its collective achievements and its public

policy;" the why question directs attention to what can be inferred from behaviour, to answers that lie, at least in part, within the individual, to "... differences in the distribution of certain traits or perhaps of types in different groups, as when we say that the Germans are more docile than the English... or that the Irish temperamentally dislike regimentation."[3] The differing foci of the what and why questions reflects the "continual struggle" that has gone on in research activity "between those looking for the locus and impetus of behaviour within the individual [for example, in traits] and those seeking the locus of action outside the organism [for example, in situations],"[4] and brings investigators to "... the interface of individual psychology... and the social sciences."[5] Greenstein [1969] saw the competing disciplines [for example, Psychology and Sociology] dividing the field along two axes: "Psychology... deals with the personal system, sociology with the social system... Psychology is concerned with those determinants of behaviour that arise from within individuals, Sociology with the effects of the environment, especially the human environment, on individuals' behaviour."[6] That there should be the prospect of defining some common ground between those two approaches to an understanding of human behaviour is due largely to the fact that the 'space' between polarised statements is occupied by theoretical positions that gradually shade into each other.

Where Freud considered that behaviour was determined by the inner workings of man, by internal forces, Skinner [1971] dismissed the notion of an inner man, rejected "hypothesised internal events", and saw behaviour as determined by environmental forces.[7]   Where Linton [1945][8] argued that the social status [or various status roles] of an individual was a more effective guide to the springs of his behaviour than 'personality', Mackinnon [1951][9] saw various status roles as the contents of an individual's wardrobe. Different suits or dresses were taken out for different status occasions, gave an impression of the body underneath, but in no way constituted the real body - the true contours of which were to be found in an examination of personality.

It is difficult to ignore the situational dimension in the explanation of human behaviour. One of the most potent supports for this view comes from Berger [1963]. In a chapter, significantly titled 'Society in Man', he argued that "society not only determines what we do but also what we are", and it does so by assigning roles to its members:

> "To use the language of the theatre, from which the concept of role is derived, we can say that society provides the script for all the dramatis personae. The individual actors, therefore, need but slip into the roles already assigned to them before the curtain goes up. ...

The role forms, shapes, patterns both action and actor.
It is very difficult to pretend in this world. Normally,
one becomes what one plays at".

In Berger's view it was social forces which conferred and
sustained the individual's identity. Although individuals came
into the world with a genetic heritage, their identities were
conferred "in acts of social recognition" rather than in terms
of biological or physiological 'givens'. And once conferred,
the identity had to be socially sustained.

"One cannot hold on to any particular identity all by
oneself. The self-image of the officer as an officer can
be maintained only in a social context in which others are
willing to recognise him in his identity... Cases of
radical withdrawal of recognition can tell us much about
the social character of identity..."

For Berger, the value of role-theory lay in its perception of
the person as "a repertoire of roles." It followed that "if
one wants to ask who an individual 'really' is in this
kaleidoscope of roles and identities, one can answer only by
enumerating the situations in which he is one thing and those in
which he is another."[10]

It is no less difficult to ignore the _personal_ dimension in the explanation of human behaviour. Greenstein conceded the significance of environmental situations, but also pointed to the importance of personal psychological predispositions.

Behaviour could, on occasions, be "critically dependent upon the personal characteristics of key actors..." He took as an example the nature of Republican politics in the United States in 1964, and while agreeing that "an account of the main determinants of the Republican nomination that year, and of the nature of the subsequent election campaign, would have to include much more than descriptions of the personal characteristics of the party leaders and members", pointed to the impact of such factors as "the willingness of one of the strongest contenders for the nomination to divorce his wife and marry a divorced woman; the indecision of one of the party's elder statesmen; a politically damaging outburst of temper in a news conference... The self-defeating style of the man who received the nomination..."[11]

In response to the claim that 'personality' cannot be said to operate as an important determinant of behaviour since "individuals with varying personality characteristics will tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations", Greenstein outlined "types of situations that actually _encourage_

the expression of personal differences in behaviour" - for example, situations which because of their newness [unfamiliarity], or complexity, or contradictory nature, give rise to ambiguity. Additionally, he held that the expression of personal variations is fostered in situations "in which there are no sanctions attached to the alternative courses of behaviour." Indeed, even when environmental sanctions existed, individuals with "intense dispositions" [excluding the disposition to conform] would tend to ignore the sanctions and "behave consistently with their varying dispositions." Greenstein then made an important distinction between a particular item of behaviour on the one hand, and the degree of conscientious performance and manner of enactment on the other:

"Turning finally to behaviour itself, the kind of behaviour we choose to observe as our dependent variable will affect the likelihood of observing personal variations. For example, variation... is much greater... in the zealousness of performance of actions and the style of performance than in the mere fact that a particular kind of action... is performed. And to the degree that an act is demanding, it is more likely to exhibit personal variability."[12]

Potter [1954] had referred to the recognition of the

complementarity rather than mutual exclusivity of psychology and sociology - as determinants of behaviour - as "one of the epic advances of modern social science."[13] This complementary relationship was underlined by Lazarus [1963]:

"The sources of man's behaviour [his observable action] and his subjective experience [such as thoughts, feelings, and wishes] are twofold: the external stimuli that impinge on him and the internal dispositions that result from the interaction between inherited physiological characteristics and experience with the world. When we focus on the former, we note that a person acts in such-and-such a way because of certain qualities in a situation...

Still, even as we recognise the dependency of behaviour on outside stimuli, we are also aware that it cannot be accounted for on the basis of the external situation alone, but that in fact it must arise partly from personal characteristics."[14]

Where Freud and Skinner had occupied trenches on opposite sides of no-man's-land - the one arguing that personal psychological predispositions determined behaviour and the other that environmental forces were paramount, still others had moved

beyond Berger's <u>identification</u> of social roles with self to a synthetic appreciation of another kind, namely that (1) the social situation was always of significance and (2) at the same time individual psychological configurations, the product of physiological factors <u>and</u> social experience - historically determined - could have an autonomous bearing on behaviour.

In discussing ways in which one society may be said to be distinct from another; in reviewing the problems stemming from inappropriate deductions based on such distinctions; and in formulating a definition of national character - this chapter adheres to the notion that both situation <u>and</u> personality are of crucial significance to an understanding of human behaviour.

Careful observations of any society would reveal what Inkeles and Levinson refer to as "patterned conditions of life."[15] In this context 'patterns' are indications of what Sapir [1927] termed <u>generalised modes of conduct</u>", imputed to society rather than to the individual",[16] and of what Kluckhohn [1941] saw as <u>structural regularities</u> "to which there is some degree of conformance on the part of a number of persons."[17] Phrases such as modes of conduct, structural regularities, and degree of conformance, suggest a measure of commonality in the experience and behaviour of the members of a society. This measure of commonality constitutes the <u>culture</u> of the society. Dealing

only with works published in English, Kroeber and Kluckhohn [1952] listed and analysed 160 definitions of culture in anthropological, sociological, psychological and other social science texts.[18] The concept was introduced and formalised in English by Tylor [1865, 1871] as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[19] Boas [1930] took culture to embrace "all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by these habits."[20] Such definitions were summarised economically by Klineberg [1935] when he described culture as "that whole 'way of life' which is determined by the social environment."[21] The 'sharing' implicit in conforming behaviour, and in modes of conduct that are generalised, was made explicit by Mead [1953] when she defined culture as "... the total, shared, learned behaviour of the members of a group or society..."[22]

How might we approach the culture of a particular society in order to reveal and record those aspects of behaviour that make it distinct from other societies? From the situational perspective, this redirects our attention to the conditions which lead to particular forms of action. Cotgrove [1967]

argued that "the behaviour of actors in a social system will be oriented to their perception of what others expect of them", and so what a person does is likely to be representative of a "consensus on means."[23] As such, there is a high probability that it will be "expected and approved by his peers."[24] When individuals follow behaviour patterns representative of a consensus on means, they are conforming to social or cultural norms, to rules of conduct that "prescribe some means and prohibit others."[25] Cultural norms are regulatory devices. As such they can be identified and described in their observance. They provide a picture of the "set of rules and usages... which define what is considered normal" in the culture being observed.[26] Once identified and described, those regulatory devices can highlight 'deviant' behaviour and call attention to the sanctions employed against such behaviour. All modern societies have sets of rules and usages that establish or reflect a consensus on means. While it would be unreasonable - taking all possible cases of norm-referenced conforming behaviour in modern societies into account - to expect the components of the normative pattern of one society to be totally different from that of another, the differences which will exist are always likely to be of an order which permits cross-cultural distinctions; and in many cases those differences will be profound.

However much we might accept that behaviour is always a function

of both person and situation, there remains the question of the
relative potency of the variables as determinants of particular
forms of behaviour. Where one 'makes a start' in the explanation
of behaviour probably reflects a judgement on the relative
potency of the determinants. For example, when looking at
behaviour primarily related to social norms, the starting point
is the situation; when looking at behaviour as expressed in
traits [see below], the starting point is the person. It may be
assumed that there is also a starting point which assigns more
or less equal potency to person and situation; behaviour
associated with attitudes, values, and goals might be approached
from the intermediate position.

"Attitudes are likes and dislikes. They are our affinities for
and our aversion to situations, objects, persons, groups, or
any other identifiable aspects of our environment, including
abstract ideas and social policies."[27] An attitude defines a
point of view toward something, for example, well-disposed or
ill-disposed, favourable or unfavourable.[28] Values are
desired ends; a value is a "... preference for or a positive
attitude toward certain end-states of existence [like equality,
salvation, self-fulfilment, or freedom] or certain broad modes
of conduct [like courage, honesty, friendship or chastity]."[29]
Whenever two or more people share values,they are party to a
"consensus on ends."[30]   Apter [1965] made the distinction

between instrumental values, what could be regarded as the more immediate, preferred end-states, and consummatory values, the more distant and less accessible end-states associated with particular sets of moralities.[31] For example, instrumental values could cover preferred end-states such as personal security, material wellbeing, physical comfort; consummatory values could cover the whole range of moral positions from which various writers have selected those which best suited their vision of the 'Good Society'.[32] Goals are also end-states; indeed they may be regarded as 'terminal values'. Once a terminal value has been achieved, the precise goal related to it [e.g. getting a good job, a wife, a military commission, etc.] disappears. The pursuit of consummatory values is unlikely to lead to an actual terminus.

Attitudes, values, and goals seem to be so clearly associated with both the social situation and the underlying dispositions of individuals that it is difficult to approach them from anything other than a composite starting point. Bem [1970] probably had this in mind when he asserted that "... our likes and dislikes have roots in our emotions... and in the social influences upon us."[33] Having given lengthy and sympathetic consideration to the part played in this context by 'internal' conditions such as thinking [conscious, non-conscious, unconscious] and feeling, the dynamic organisation of individual psycho-logic "that ties a

man's opinions together" and gives some indication of how beliefs, attitudes and values are interrelated, the "underlying processes by which... feelings, the emotional components of beliefs and attitudes are acquired, transmitted, modified, and eliminated", [34] Bem turned to the influence of situational factors. He suggested that the central beliefs, attitudes, and values held by individuals "lose nearly all their mystery as soon as the dominant social influences in our backgrounds are revealed." He argued that in his own case, "any alert observer of the American scene" could have his opinions "well-pegged" once he learned that he was an urban Jew with liberal parents, a graduate of a 'left-wing' university, and a behavioural scientist at an urban university on the East-Coast of the United States. He concluded that a catologue of the social influences on individuals was more or less equivalent to a catalogue of their major beliefs, values, and attitudes. [35]

Kelman [1961] also brought person and situation together in his discussion on forms of behaviour associated with the processes of compliance, identification, and internalisation. [36] As a point of entry to Kelman's ideas, suppose that an individual makes three statements, one expressing an attitude, one identifying a value, and one defining a goal:-

Attitude: I like 'x'

Value: I believe that 'y' is conducive to the public
             good and should be promoted.

Goal: We should all be aiming for the realisation of
             'z'.

What might bring an individual to acceptance of those positions? How might his behaviour, in coming to those positions, be characterised? Kelman argued that an individual might adopt the propositions "... because he hopes to achieve a favourable reaction... he may be interested in attaining certain specific rewards or in avoiding certain specific punishments... For example, an individual may make a special effort to express only 'correct' opinions in order to gain admission into a particular group or social set, or in order to avoid being fired from his government job." The individual, in such a case, would not adopt the positions because he <u>believes</u> in their 'content', but because they are "instrumental in the production of a satisfying social effect."[37] Positions adopted on such grounds would be associated with an act, or acts of <u>compliance</u>. On the other hand, an individual might adopt positions because he wishes to be <u>identified</u> with another person or group. The act of identification is not carried out because the 'content' of the positions is "intrinsically satisfying", but because the act "is a way of establishing or maintaining the desired relationship to

the other, and the self-definition that is anchored in this relationship."[38] Alternatively, an individual might take up certain positions because they are "congruent with his value system." In this case, the 'content' is intrinsically rewarding and "is congenial to his own orientation." Attitude 'x', value 'y' and goal 'z' are internalised, though not necessarily on rational grounds; "an authoritarian individual may adopt certain racist attitudes because they fit into his paranoid, irrational view of the world."[39] Although individual 'personality' is most obviously at work in the process of internalisation, with attitude, value, and goal positions being adopted because they are congenial with the person's 'orientation' and "congruent with his value system", it is also at work, in company with situation, in respect of behaviour characterised by compliance and identification. Will particular personality 'types' be given to compliance, identification, and internalisation? If an individual's behaviour represents a mixture of all three processes, will his particular personality 'type' determine the form of the mix? The 'satisfaction' derived from a particular social effect will be largely psychological; behaviour which establishes and serves to maintain "self-definition", is likely to have roots in individual personality, insofar as the notion of individual personality subsumes the notion of a unique self-identity.

One culture may be considered distinct from another in respect of the range, distribution, and relative salience of its attitudes, values, and goals. Except under very special circumstances [e.g. a threat to existence so extreme, pervasive, and immediate as to give rise to a profound sense of collective identity] it is unlikely that the attitudes, values, and goals of the individual members of a large and complex society would, if set together, even approximate to consensus. Different groups within society defined, say, in relation to particular roles and status, different sub-cultures defined, say, in relation to geography, or social class, or religion - or some combination of these - would be likely to demonstrate variations in attitudes, values, and goals. Value dissensus could be the product of a number of different social phenomena; for example, as Moore [1969] argued, "pluralism itself may be valued", with the result that "in some aspects of social life, integration rests on tolerance rather than on substantive agreement."[40] Located within the variations there would be, of course, attitudes, values and goals which had particular salience for the future of the society as an enduring entity. These would be the ones which attracted "... at least apathetic compliance on the part of substantial segments... and conscientious compliance at least on the part of those exercising power."[41] Were attitude, value, and goal 'profiles' to be compiled for any one society, they would show range [variation], distribution [from most

widely held to least widely held] and relative salience [social significance in terms of conscientious and apathetic compliance] and would be likely to differ from similarly constructed profiles for another society.

Attitudes, values, and goals are not in themselves observable. As 'mental programmes' [Hofstede, 1984], they have to be inferred or operationalised.

"We need to find observable phenomena from which the construct [i.e. attitude, value, or goal] can be inferred. In some types of research our operationalisation leads to quantitative measures; in other types, to descriptive, non-quantitative measures. Whichever we aim for, any operationalisation of 'mental programmes' has to use forms of behaviour or outcomes of behaviour. The behaviour we use can be either 'provoked' [stimulated by the researcher for the purpose of the research] or 'natural' [taking place or having taken place regardless of the research and the researchers]. Also, the behaviour we use can be verbal [words] or non-verbal [deeds]."[42]

Figure [1] outlines the types of techniques that can be used to provoke behaviour, from which attitudes, values, and goals can be inferred. These can be complemented by examination of

FIGURE [1]

Compiled from the text of S. W. Cook and C. Seilltiz, A Multiple
Indicator Approach to Attitude Measurement [Psychological Bulletin,
Vol. 62, 1964, pp. 36–55].

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1.   MEASURES IN WHICH INFERENCES ARE DRAWN FROM SELF-REPORTS OF BELIEFS, FEELINGS, BEHAVIOURS, ETC.

EXAMPLE OF MEASURE	NATURE OF INFERENCE
An individual is asked to reveal - either in his own words or through acceptance or rejection of standardised items - his beliefs about the attitudinal object, how he feels toward it, how he behaves or would behave toward it, how he believes it should be treated:	It is assumed that the relationship between attitude and expression is a direct one and that the attitude corresponds to the manifest, common-sense implications of the stated belief or feeling. For example, a stated belief that the object has characteristics usually considered to be desirable is taken as reflecting a favourable disposition toward it and vice versa.

2.   MEASURES IN WHICH INFERENCES ARE DRAWN FROM OBSERVATIONS OF OVERT BEHAVIOUR.

EXAMPLE OF MEASURE	NATURE OF INFERENCE
Subjects may be asked (i) to sign a petition on behalf of an instructor about to be discharged for membership in the Communist Party; (ii) to contribute money for the improvement of conditions for migratory workers; (iii) whether they would be willing to have a Negro room-mate. Such devices differ from self-report measures in that in the behavioural measures the subject either actually carries out the behaviour or is led to believe that his agreement to do so will lead to real-life consequences.	All definitions of attitude specify that behaviour can be taken as an indicator of attitude. The usual assumption is that there is a simple correspondence between the nature of the behaviour and the nature of the underlying attitude; for example, that friendly behaviour toward a member of a given class of objects indicates a favourable attitude toward the object-class.

3.   MEASURES IN WHICH INFERENCES ARE DRAWN FROM THE INDIVIDUAL'S REACTION TO OR INTERPRETATION OF PARTIALLY STRUCTURED STIMULI [PROJECTIVE TESTS]

EXAMPLE OF MEASURE	NATURE OF INFERENCE
The subject is not asked to state his own reactions directly; he is ostensibly describing a scene, a character, or the behaviour of a third person. He may be presented with a photograph of a member of the object class [usually a person of a given social group] and asked to describe his characteristics; or he may be presented with a scene and asked to describe it, to tell a story about it, etc.	Asked to provide an explanation or interpretation for which the stimulus presented gives no clear clue, the subject must draw on his own experience or his own dispositions, or his own definitions of what would be probable or appropriate; that asked to attribute behaviour to others, especially under speed conditions, the most readily accessible source of hypothesis is the individual's own response disposition.

4.   MEASURES IN WHICH INFERENCES ARE DRAWN FROM PERFORMANCE OF 'OBJECTIVE' TASKS.

EXAMPLE OF MEASURE	NATURE OF INFERENCE
The respondent is presented with specific tasks to be performed; they are presented as tests of information or ability, or simply as jobs that need to be done. For example, the subject is asked to sort items about the attitudinal object in terms of their position on a scale of favourableness - unfavourableness, ostensibly to help in the construction of a test instrument.	The assumption is that performance may be influenced by attitude, and that a systematic bias in performance reflects the influence of attitude.

5.   MEASURES IN WHICH INFERENCES ARE DRAWN FROM PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIONS [E.G. GSR - GALVANIC SKIN RESPONSE, SALIVATION, PUPILLARY DILATION, ETC] TO THE ATTITUDINAL OBJECT OR REPRESENTATIONS OF IT.

EXAMPLE OF MEASURE	NATURE OF INFERENCE
Rankin and Campbell [1955] compared GSRs obtained when the experimenter was a negro with those obtained when the experimenter was a white Westie and DeFleur [1959] recorded GSR, vascular constriction of finger, amplitude and duration of heart beat and duration of heart cycle, while the subjects were viewing pictures of white and negroes in social situations. Hess and Polt [1960] have photographed pupillary constriction in response to unpleasant stimuli and pupillary dilation in response to pleasant stimuli.	It is assumed that the magnitude of the physiological reaction is directly related to the extent of arousal or the intensity of feeling; thus, the greater the physiological response, the stronger and/or more extreme the attitude is presumed to be.

*R.E. Rankin and D. T. Campbell, Galvanic Skin Response to Negro and White
Experimenters, [Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 51, 1955, pp.30–33];
F. R. Westie and M. L. DeFleur, Autonomic Responses and Their Relationship
to Race Attitudes, [Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 58, 1959, pp.
340–347]; E. H. Hess and J. M. Polt, Pupil Size as Related to Interest
Value of Visual Stimuli [Sci

'natural' behaviour - either through direct observation of social relationships or by study of cultural 'products', what Gorer [1953] termed "symbolic material" [literature, drama, cinema, painting, sculpture, etc.]

"Such symbolic material is susceptible to a variety of analytic techniques: the tendency of the work as a whole - the moral or message - can be deduced and stated; the subjects of crisis or drama can be catalogued; individual characters [in narratives] can be studied to demonstrate what motives are consciously considered to be the sources of what action, what types of behaviour are commended and what disapproved of... where motives are thought to be self-evident, so that the author, writing for his compatriots, feels it unnecessary to explain his character's behaviour, it can be assumed that this presumption is shared by the readers. In popular books, plays, and films what is 'self-evident' to the audience is most revealing to the analyst."[43]

The study of cultural products as a means of highlighting cross-cultural differences has been advanced by such as Bateson [1943] and Kracauer [1947] with regard to film, by McGranahan and Wayne [1948] in respect of popular drama, by Thorner [1945] with regard to language, by Lineva [1943] in relation to

folk-songs, and by Erikson [1950] in respect of political literature.[44] Gorer pointed to the significance of language for cross-cultural studies: "The fact that a person has learned Russian... as his mother tongue means that his thoughts and concepts will be limited and defined by the vocabulary and syntax of the language; in certain important ways he will view and interpret the universe differently to the way he would do if he had been brought up with English, or Chinese or Eskimo as his mother tongue."[45] Friedrich [1974], considering "the tribe's most complex creation, its language," quoted Yehudi Menuhin in support of the view that German attitudes and values were in some way related to its language: "The German language is an abstraction. The language about music - I don't like it. Music is a living thing, but the German terms are always abstract. German has the words for philosophy and for romantic poetry, but not for music. The cultural words are all derived from Latin words... everything civilised comes from Latin roots. And the grammar. When you start a sentence in German, you have to know at the beginning what the end will be. In English, you live the sentence through to its end. Emotion and thought go together. In German, they've divorced. Everything is abstract. That was how they made abstractions of Jews. They didn't kill them as individuals, the way we shot our Indians, but as an abstraction."[46] That the German language may be perceived by some to provide clues to inner dispositions and mental

programmes was confirmed by John Huston's rejection of the suggestion that the mysterious and elusive B. Traven, author of The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, was German by birth or education:

"... I have never felt anything Germanic in the Traven books... The Traven books don't have a Germanic ring to them. There's not that care and precision, there's a kind of Largesse, even wastefulness about them."[47]

Cross cultural differences may be identified in the different ways that similar themes are approached in painting and sculpture. Gorer was interested to discover what "psychological mechanisms... influenced the choice in any given case." He noted that

"in the religious pictures and statues of one country, great emphasis is placed on Jesus as an infant or child, and the Virgin Mary as a young girl; in another on Jesus as a mature and bearded man, and Mary as a mature and maternal woman; in a third on Jesus as tortured and crucified, Mary as an older and grieving woman."[48]

Inferences based on observation of a combination of 'provoked'

and 'natural' behaviours have suggested that cross-cultural differences in attitudes and values can be recognised in parent-child relationships. Bateson [1942] hypothesised that the patterns of parent-child relationship, expressed in complementary behaviours such as succouring-dependence, dominance-submission, and exhibitionism-spectatorship, differed from culture to culture. The English upper- and middle-class system could be represented:

Parents	Children
Dominance	Submission
Succouring	Dependence
Exhibitionism	Spectatorship

On the other hand, the pattern in the United States could be represented:

Parents	Children
Dominance [slight]	Submission [slight]
Succouring	Dependence
Spectatorship	Exhibitionism

Bateson argued that the American pattern of parent-child relationships differed from the English "not only in the reversal of the spectatorship – exhibitionism roles, but also in the context of what is exhibited. The American child is encouraged by his parents to show off his independence."[49] The German pattern was seen as similar to the American, with these important reservations: parental dominance was stronger in Germany, and the child's exhibitionism took a different form. The German boy was "dominated into a sort of heel-clicking exhibitionism which takes the place of overt submissive behaviour."[50] Bateson concluded that "differences of this order... may be expected in all European nations." Following Bateson, Gorer [1943] considered that behaviour learned in the parent-child relationship was likely to transfer to other situations. In his study of parent-child relationships in Japan, Gorer linked family experience and the conduct of international affairs. Gorer's picture of typical Japanese family life was one in which the male child was subservient and deferent toward male elders, but aggressive or commanding toward females, whether siblings or parent.

"Because of this differential treatment received from and allowed toward his two parents, the Japanese boy grows up in a divided universe where he must continuously use careful discrimination. To the male part of the universe

- that is, all males of superior age and status - he must respond obediently, passively, and unquestioningly... In contrast to the male world of dominance and submission, there is the female world... which can be controlled... by aggression or threats..."

Experience of this "divided universe" had ramifications for Japanese symbolism and philosophy. Femininity was associated with concepts such as 'dark' and 'passive', masculinity with 'light' and 'active'; land was male, and sea female. Gorer argued that the dichotomy which split the world of the male child in Japan served as a guide, in adulthood, for categorising other races and societies. Some were worthy of implicit obedience [male]; others could be made to yield to aggression and threats [female]. The masculine virility of the white races, once taken for granted, had been challenged by the defeat of Russia in 1905. The response to the invasion of Manchuria confirmed the female character of the Anglo-Saxons. Then, "on December 7, 1941, this theory was put to the test; and the democracies still held their feminine role."[51]

Moving away from parent-child relationships, but remaining with early life experiences - those of school-days - Joll [1968] suggested similar links with the conduct of international affairs:

"Grey's ... unspoken premises remained the ethical code of a high-principled, slightly priggish Wykehamist, and it is to his school days that we must look for a key to his fundamental attitudes. As he himself wrote later of his boyhood at school at Winchester: '... The ways of the place, its traditions and the country in which it is set were all getting a hold upon my heart...' It is to his education and the education of the class to which he belonged that we must look for the key to much of Grey's later political behaviour; and this suggests that we should in general pay more attention to the links between educational systems and foreign policy, between the values and beliefs inculcated at school and the presuppositions on which politicians act later in life. ... Can we, for example, find out something about French political attitudes by studying the exercises in classical rhetoric to which pupils in French Lycées were subjected? And how far did the Prussian regulations of 1889 which stressed the need for greater attention to recent German history ... condition the attitudes of a whole generation?"[52]

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck [1961] proposed that the attitudes, values, and goals of one culture could be distinguished from those of another by examination of ways in which different

groups dealt with the "limited number of common human problems to which all people at all times must find some solution."[53] Those common problems were embedded in questions such as: What is the character of human nature - evil, perfect, or evil but perfectable? What is the relationship of man with nature - man in subjugation, man and nature in harmony, or man in control? What is the temporal focus of human life - past, present, or future? Mead [1948] adopted such an approach when writing on Anglo-American misunderstandings that had arisen during the Second World War.

> "Another sort of misunderstanding which influenced communication was the difference between the British and the American sense of the real world. The British see the world as something to which man adapts, the American as man-controlled, a vast malleable space on which one builds what one wishes, from blueprints one has drawn, and when dissatisfied simply tears the structure down and starts anew."

Americans were willing to think about the immediate future, but unwilling "to think very far ahead"; the British were willing "to think ten years ahead."[54] In another approach to cross-cultural analysis, Mead showed how there was a marked difference "between the American and the British sense of a

scale of values." When Americans were asked to discriminate between objects, however complex, they tended to do so on a single scale of value, "from best to worst, biggest to smallest, cheapest to most expensive", and so on. A question such as 'what is your favourite colour?', intelligible to an American would, by itself, be meaningless to an Englishman because an answer would depend upon a series of sub-questions such as 'favourite colour for what? - a flower, a tie?' Mead explained the American tendency to reduce complexities to single scales in terms of "the great diversity of value systems which different immigrant groups brought to the American scene; some common denominator was needed, and oversimplification was almost inevitable."[55]

Hofstede [1984] carried out a major study on cross-cultural differences in work-related values. One of the important dimensions of human culture which he identified and measured was uncertainty avoidance.'

"Uncertainty about the future is a basic fact of human life... Extreme uncertainty creates intolerable anxiety, and human society has developed ways to cope with the inherent uncertainty of our living on the brink of an uncertain future. These ways belong to the domains of technology, law, and religion; ... Technology includes all

human artefacts; law, all formal and informal rules that guide social behaviour; religion, all revealed knowledge of the unknown. Technology has helped us to defend ourselves against uncertainties caused by nature; law, to defend against uncertainties in the behaviour of others; religion, to accept the uncertainties we cannot defend ourselves against... Different societies have adapted to uncertainty in different ways... The main underlying dimension is the tolerance for uncertainty [ambiguity] which can be found in individuals and which leads some individuals in the same situation to perceive a greater need for action for overcoming the uncertainty than others."[56]

Hofstede compiled what he called an Uncertainty Avoidance Index [UAI].[57] In cultures with a low Uncertainty Avoidance Index, that is, those which had a greater tolerance for uncertainty, there was a greater readiness to live by the day, less emotional resistance to change, no necessity to view loyalty to an employer as a virtue, and a willingness to break rules if there were good reasons for doing so. In cultures with a High Uncertainty Avoidance Index, that is, those which had a weak tolerance for uncertainty, there was more worry about the future, more emotional resistance to change, pressure to view loyalty to an employer as a virtue, and a belief that rules

should not be broken.[58]   Hofstede concluded:

"Uncertainty avoiding countries will have a greater need for legislation than will less uncertainty avoiding countries. We can, for example, oppose Germany [UA165] to Great Britain [UA135]. Germany has an extensive set of laws even for emergencies that might occur ['Notstandgesetz]; Great Britain does not even have a written constitution."[59]

The cultural "map" of a social system [taking 'system' to be a whole whose parts are interrelated], its 'shape and form', may emerge from study of the web of interrelatinships between its structural elements or sub-systems. [See Figure [2]]. And one social system [say, a national society] may be distinguished from another in terms of the shape and form of the respective maps. Cotgrove considered that it was the major task of sociology "to bring to light the interrelations between the elements in systems" - between the political, economic, educational, kinship, and belief sub-systems of a society.[60] The stated purpose of a 1953 text on Character and Social Structure, was "... to present a systematic statement... in which political, economic, military, religious, and kinship institutions and their historical transformations are connected with the character and personality, with the private as well as

Figure [2] : Inter-relationships between Sub-Systems of the Social System

the public lives, of those living in... society."[61]   Ralf

Dahrendorf's study of Society and Democracy in Germany [1968]

is, on one level, a demonstration of how the various sub-systems

of German society - political, legal, military, administrative,

economic, educational, kinship - had interrelated in the

first-half of the twentieth century to produce a cultural map

with a particular shape and form, one "plagued by a propensity

for absolutes", and as such distinct from those of other

societies which, to varying degrees, were "characterised by the

search for institutional means to control the powerful in order

to keep the political system open for ever new solutions."[62]

Dahrendorf's analysis provides a quite special case of

sub-system interrelatinship. As he perceived German society, it

was not so much a matter of sub-systems touching each other, but

of the harmonisation of procedures, practices, and ideas across

the sub-systems, a harmonisation which gave a particular shape

and form to the cultural map of Germany from the Imperial period

to the defeat of the Nazi regime. Harmonisation of practices,

procedures, and ideas served the search for ultimate solutions

and certainty:

"Many institutions of German society have been... set up

in such a way as to imply that somebody or some group of

people is 'the most objective authority in the world', and

is therefore capable of finding ultimate solutions... in this manner, conflict is not regulated, but 'solved'... The principles by which the inevitable antagonisms of interest were regulated in the various areas of the social structure were dictated without exception by the search for certainty... the settlement of contest was sought everywhere in its abolition rather than in reasonable regulation."[63]

Glock [1965] defined belief systems as symbol systems, superordinate meaning systems, which give 'meaning and coherence' to norms.[64] The ideas which Dahrendorf saw as having superordinate meaning for Germans were those associated with the "German ideology of social harmony..."[65] Individualism, at least in public affairs, ran a poor second to "the community of the whole people."[66] The ideal of Volksgemeinschaft - with its connotations of mutual participation, common interest, communion and partnership, fed the "... nostalgia for a world whose uncomfortable conflicts have been replaced by ultimate solutions."[67] And what more ultimate solution could one imagine than Hegel's negation of the negation which signalled the end of the dialectic process and the end of conflict? The executive component of the political system reinforced those beliefs and translated them into day to day practice. It cultivated an "exaggerated faith in the rule

of law as an institution beyond all conflicts... aversion to discord... evasion of the uncomfortable diversity of uncertainty..."[68]

> "There are certain words that come up time and again in
> connection with economic and social policy in Imperial
> Germany; and whoever cares about the greatest happiness
> of the greatest number, freedom of the individual and his
> rights... liberalism, and competition, must note them ...:
> Nation, state, tight control, the interest of the whole,
> adaptation, and subordination."[69]

While promoting the view that certainty stood at the centre of German affairs, could act as a guide to action, could clarify all issues, the executive component, and in its service the institutions of education, also affirmed that certainty could not be grasped or comprehended by all.[70] Only some could be "... experts of certainty. Authority belongs to them, for they are made for its possession."[71] It was but a short-step from this to acceptance of a "hierarchy of access to truth",[72] and to the flowering of the 'nach vorschrift' mentality — the predisposition to do things according to the instructions.

The acceptance of a "hierarchy of access to truth" sustained the super/subordinate relationships which, in exaggerated form,

seemed to pervade German institutions in general and sub-systems
of the society in particular, and, at the same time, contributed
to 'harmonisation' by immobilising forces which had potential
for disruption. Even after discounting for caricature, it
appeared to Dahrendorf that

"... indigenous and foreign images of the German family
are agreed in their emphasis on the patriarchal home of
the Wilhelminian era, in which the mother is restricted to
Kinder, Kuche, Kirche and the children are held on tight
reins...

The family, like any other institution, may be regarded as
a system of conflict regulation. Occasionally one
encounters the notion that the German father is, or at
least used to be, a combination of judge and state
attorney: presiding over his family, relentlessly
prosecuting every sign of deviance, and settling all
disputes by his supreme authority. There is an element of
caricature in many descriptions of the German father...
[but]... this is not to deny that the caricature does
strike peculiarly German conditions in some respect, as in
the notion, long embodied in the structure of the family,
that the others, the children, the wife, are minors in
every respect. It is no accident that Tönnies, like Hegel

before him and the vulgarised sociology of the Nazis after
him, took the family to be the purest form of
Gemeinschaft". (73)

Super/subordinate relationships pervaded the sub-systems of
German society through the medium of the ubiquitous service
class in education, administration, the law, politics, the
economy and religion. (74) Dahrendorf noted that there was
hardly an institutional order [level or area] in which there
were no Beamte, and even where such a level or area could be
identified, Beamte status and procedures were simulated. (75)
The mentality of the service class had been investigated by
Theodor Geiger [1932]:

"What weighs most heavily from a sociological perspective
is that even for the official who is subordinate in the
last position, the unbuttered bread acquired by a
starvation salary is spread tastily: by that minimal
share which he has in the omnipotence of the state
represented by him as well. It is so easy to explain
psychologically that this tiny share of power means the
more and is demonstrated the more studiously as prestige,
guarded and defended the more jealously, the more
oppressed the position of the individual official is in
terms of level of remuneration and internal function. The

less a person is capable of asserting his position and developing his personality in the occupational sphere of activity, the more he is hampered in his initiative by strict subordination and the more he is subject to the commands of those above him, the more unapproachably does he protect the counterdistance toward a public which has to be 'dispatched', the more he is delighted by shoulder-pieces, swords, and other insignia of an official-impersonal aloofness; the more he is also hurt by the deprivation of these symbols of social recognition."[76]

Within the hierarchical structure of the service class there was scope for competition - but not for the type of competition that created anything new. Nothing was changed by competition for status within the German service-class. The map of society remained the same; all that altered was "the individual's place of residence in it."[77] For Dahrendorf, harmonisation of ideas, procedures and practices across the sub-systems of German society had meant that "... the citizen... the adult church, the child taken seriously, the democratic school... were all long in coming."[78]

Potter [1954] addressed the issue of a 'distinctive American character' through a similar, though less extensive kind of

social systems analysis. Because he was concerned to demonstrate the effects of economic abundance on individual and group behaviour, the sub-system interrelationship which most interested him was that between economy and family:

"Inevitably, the guidelines which the parents inculcate in a child will depend upon the roles which they occupy themselves. For the ordinary man the economy of scarcity has offered one role, as Simon N. Patten observed many years ago, and the economy of abundance has offered another. Abundance offers 'work calling urgently for workmen?'; scarcity found the 'worker seeking humbly any kind of toil?' As a suppliant to his superiors, the worker under scarcity accepted the principle of authority; he accepted his own subordination and the obligation to cultivate the qualities appropriate to his subordination, such as submissiveness, obedience, and deference. Such a man naturally transferred the principle of authority into his own family and through this principle instilled into his children the qualities appropriate to people of their kind - submissiveness, obedience, and deference."[79]

To show how economic abundance had made a profound mark on the American kinship system, Potter invited his readers to consider

the situation of a six-month-old infant. The way in which such an infant was nourished had been revolutionised. Bottle feeding, dependent for its effectiveness on refrigeration, sterilisation, and temperature control technique, had more or less replaced breast-feeding, and this change had "encroached somewhat upon the intimacy of the bond between mother and child", emphasising "the separateness of the infant as an individual", a separateness which "the entire culture reiterates constantly throughout the life of the average American." Economic abundance, reflected in the increased number of houses, and so living space, available for newly married young people, "almost destroyed the extended family as an institution in America and has ordained that the child shall be reared in a 'nuclear' family, so called, where his only intimate associates are his parents and his siblings..." Again, separateness, apartness, were being reinforced. Technology, in the form of central heating, "displaced the woollen undergarment and the vest", removed the need to break the infant to his swaddling clothes "as a horse is broken to the harness", and gave the American infant "physical freedom by giving him physical warmth in cold weather." Mothers, pressured by conditions of scarcity, limited in access to technology, had hastened the fitness of their children to toilet themselves. Modern technology and economic abundance made it "far easier for the mother to indulge the child in a regime under which he will improve his own toilet

controls in his own good time." Conditions of scarcity created
circumstances in which the woman "was economically dependent
upon, and, accordingly, subordinate to, her husband or her
father. Her subordination reinforced the principle of authority
within the home." Abundance extended economic independence to
women and "enabled them to assume the role of partners rather
than of subordinates within the family."[80]

Although his primary focus was on one aspect of sub-systems
analysis, Potter was conscious of the wider web of connections:

> "... the fact is that the authoritarian discipline of the
> child, within the authoritarian family, was but an aspect
> of the authoritarian social system... Such a regime could
> never have been significantly relaxed within the family so
> long as it remained diagnostic in the society. Nor could
> it have remained unmodified within the family, once
> society began to abandon it in other spheres."[81]

Potter was so aware of the importance of ideas with superordinate
meaning that he devoted some space to a comparative analysis of
the connotations that the concept 'equality' would have for
Americans and Europeans.[82] Within the American belief system
a heavy emphasis was placed on mobility:

"In America... status, as fixed differential social position, has long been in disrepute. Ever since the Revolutionary War, it has borne the hateful implications of privilege and subservience... whereas the principle of status affirms that a minor position may be worthy, the principle of mobility, as Americans have construed it, regards such a position both as the penalty for and the proof of personal failure. This view is often pushed to a point where even the least invidious form of subordination comes to be resented as carrying a stigma..."[83]

In arguing that democratic principles owed less to "sheer ideological devotion" than to "the creation of economic conditions in which democracy will grow", Potter was pointing to interrelationships between the political and economic sub-systems of American society.[84] This connection was underlined by the commendatory citing of J. Franklin Jameson's claim that America "came to be marked by political institutions of a democratic type because it had, still earlier, came to be characterised in its economic life by democratic arrangements and practices."[85]

Inkeles and Levinson were well aware of the insights on human behaviour and experience to be gained from the study of

'culture' and 'social structure', and conceded that any distinction between those abstractions and between them and a third, personality, was analytic rather than phenomenal;[86] but they insisted that "beyond the task of studying the regularity with which certain value or patterned behaviour sequences are manifested in any culture, there remains the task of determining the regularity with which certain personality patterns among individual members may be manifested."[87]

Allport, and Adorno et al [1950] pointed to the importance of culture as a causal factor in the formation of personality, but also highlighted the autonomous or 'free standing' nature of personality once formed.[88] Allport took personality to be a function of heredity and environment, with the two causal factors being interrelated as multiplier and multiplicand [personality = F [heredity] x [environment]]. Were either factor zero in quantity, personality would be non-existent.[89] An understanding of the 'social frame' within which an individual stood was essential to an appreciation of that individual's personality, for to some extent, whether he were adaptive or not, his personality would reflect social norms - the prevailing standards. But it would be misleading to suppose that "a mere report on cultural setting and membership" would be sufficient in itself as a means of entry to the personality, "... for no individual mirrors exactly and

exclusively his social environment. Even within a narrow and homogenous cultural circle individuality is amazingly varied in form. Personality is more than 'the subjective side of culture'..."[90] Adorno argued that personality, though unquestionably a product of the social environment of the past [though not of this alone], developed as a structure within the individual, and became "something which is capable of self-initiated action upon the social environment and of selection with respect to varied impinging stimuli..."[91]

In a classic statement Allport listed fifty definitions of the concept 'personality'.[92] In searching for one which would highlight individuality - the quality which he took to be "the outstanding characteristic of men" - he accepted that others, starting from different premises [for example, philosophical, juristic, sociological] could arrive, respectably, at different destinations.[93] For his own part, Allport distinguished between those definitions which gave psychological meaning to the concept and those which did not. Of the psychological definitions, those he found most valuable were the ones which referred to "...organisation of dispositions and sentiments... style of life, ... modes of adaptation to one's surroundings...progressive growth ...development and... distinctiveness."[94] His own definition incorporated those ideas:

"...personality, psychologically considered, is what an individual _is_... Personality is the dynamic organisation within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment." [95]

'Organisation' was an essential component of the definition. Without it there could be no escape "from the sterile enumerations of... omnibus definitions"; and since this organisation within the individual was "constantly evolving and changing", and, by definition, implied "the correlative process of disorganisation", it had to be construed as dynamic; 'psychophysical systems' were involved since personality entailed "the operation of both body and mind, inextricably fused into a personal unity", and comprised "habits, specific and general attitudes, sentiments, and dispositions of other orders..." [96]   Adorno, et al, took a similar line: "... the forces of personality... are primarily needs [drives, wishes, emotional impulses] which vary from one individual to another in their quality, their intensity, their mode of gratification, and the objects of their attachment, and which interact with other needs in harmonious or conflicting patterns. There are primitive emotional needs, there are needs to avoid punishment and to keep the good will of the social group, there are needs to maintain harmony and integration within the self..." [97]

Inkeles and Levinson, reflecting on enduring personality characteristics, listed traits [of particular significance for Allport], modes of dealing with impulses and affects, conceptions of self, and the like. Allport's theory of personality was essentially a trait theory:[98]

"... men experience a desire to represent by name such mental processes or dispositions of their fellows as can be determined by observation or by inference. There is a demand for depicting personality as accurately and as faithfully as possible, for with a suitable term, corresponding to authentic psychological dispositions, the ability to understand and to control one's fellows is greatly enhanced."[99]

Allport discussed a wide range of personality traits - traits of altruism, ascendance, courtesy, extroversion, generosity, gregariousness, honesty, introversion, neuroticism, orderliness, persistence, reclusion, self-assurance, self-deception, solitariness, suggestibility, etc. In response to critics who suggested that traits were not psychological entities but only convenient names given to types of behaviour which had elements in common,[100] Allport argued that an individual was characterised by traits whether or not this was perceived by others. Traits did not depend for their existence on "some kind

FIGURE [3]

A SELECTION OF PERSONALITY TRAITS ASSIGNED TO GERMANS BY SOURCES REVIEWED IN

CHAPTER 2 : A CRITICISM OF THE IDEALIST-REALIST DICHOTOMY AND THE DEFINITION
OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
CHAPTER 4 : 'US AND THEM' : THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT
OF THE BRITISH SELF-IMAGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY
CHAPTER 5 : THE CONSCIENCE-LED PHASE OF REFLECTION
CHAPTER 6 : THE REVITALISATION OF THE DEBATE
CHAPTER 7 : THE CHALLENGE IN VOICES FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

[A]	[B]	[C]	[D]	[E]
Acquisitive	Barbaric	Competitive	Deceitful	Efficient
Adolescent	Bestial	Courageous	Deferential	Egotistical
Aggressive	Brutal	Credulous	Discourteous	Emotional
Ambitious		Crude	Dissembling	Envious
Antagonistic		Cruel	Dishonest	Evil
Apprehensive		Cunning	Dishonourable	
			Docile	
			Domineering	
			Dreamers	

[F]	[G]	[H]	[I]	[J]
Frustrated	Gullible	Hard	Ill-tempered	Jealous
Feverish		Hypocritical	Immature	
		Hysterical	Immoral	
		Humourless	Impolite	
			Impulsive	
			Inconsistent	
			Indignant	
			Inferiority [sense of]	
			Intolerant	
			Insensitive	

[M]	[N]	[O]	[P]	[Q]
Masochistic	Nervous	Obedient	Paranoid	Quarrelsome
Materialistic	Neurasthenic	Obsessive	Patriotic	
Militaristic	Neurotic	Offence [quick to take]	Proud	
		Organised	Purposeful	
			Pugnacious	

[R]	[S]	[T]	[U]	[V]
Rapacious	Sadistic	Taste [lacking]	Uncertain	Virile
Resentful	Satanic	Thoughtless	Unfriendly	Vain
Restless	Savage	Treacherous	Ungallant	
Romantic	Self-aggrandising		Unimaginative	
Ruthless	Self-assertive		Unkind	
	Self-conscious		Unreasoning	
	Self-confidence [lacking]		Unreliable	
	Self-discipline [lacking]		Unstable	
	Self-pitying		Unsure [of selves]	
	Self-worshipping		Unsympathetic	
	Selfish			
	Sensitive [morbidly]			
	Sentimental			
	Submissive			
	Suggestible			
	Suspicious			

It would be an easy matter to pointup apparent contradictions by rearranging the traits into, say, four columns:

Relating to Mental State	Relating to disposition to guile	Relating to lack of personal autonomy	Relating to interpersonal relations or cross - cultural relations
Anxious	Cunning	Credulous	Acquisitive
Apprehensive	Deceitful	Deferential	Aggressive
Nervous	Dissembling, etc.	Gullible, etc.	Competitive
Neurotic			Intolerant
Restless, etc.			Quarrelsome
			Militaristic

This possible reformulation is not intended as a criticism of those who contributed to the list:
"... traits often contradict each other. People may be both ascendant and submissive, perhaps
submissive only towards those individuals bearing traditional symbols of authority and prestige;
and towards everyone else aggressive and domineering." Note also that "in every personality there
are traits of major synificance and traits of minor significance..."
G. W. Allport, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation [Holt, New York, 1937] p.330

of relationship between two people. Did Robinson Crusoe lack traits before the advent of Friday? Will the last man to remain alive on earth abruptly lose his traits when his companions die?"[101] Allport postulated that in every personality there were traits of major significance and traits of minor significance. If a trait was particularly pervasive and outstanding it could be regarded as a cardinal trait; on a descending scale of significance came central traits and secondary traits.[102] The appeal exercised by the concept of trait is demonstrated in Figure [3] which lists a selection of personality traits assigned to Germans by sources reviewed in chapters 2, 4 to 7.

Allport made a distinction between traits which had motivational significance and traits which were merely stylistic. It was not a telephone call or a friend's voice at the other end of the line that led an egotist to monopolise the conversation, "to talk for half an hour about his latest exploits." The response sprung from motivations, from "deep-seated traits of personality."[103] Politeness was not normally regarded as a motivational trait:

"One does not leave the house and seek out other people in order to be polite to them. One may seek out others because one is sociable, and restless without their

company [motivation]; having sought them and being now in their company one may behave toward them in a polite manner [style]... Nor is a man often forceful for the sake of being forceful; rather he employs a forceful style of behaviour wherever he is, for other reasons [motivation] aroused to action."[104]

Allport noted that there were instances where the concepts trait and attitude were interchangeable, where it was "a matter of indifference" whether a certain disposition was called an attitude or a trait. He cited the example of introversion and extroversion, concepts regarded "both as traits of personality and as attitudes toward reality." Yet, there were real distinctions to be made between attitudes and traits; a particular point of view toward frog's legs, arctic exploration, divorce, or Fascism would be classed as an attitude, whereas a "conservative, radical, ascetic, indulgent, reserved, or expansive manner of behaving" would be classed as a trait. If a man is affectionate toward his dog, it could be said that he has a kindly attitude toward it. If thoughtfulness and sympathy toward men and beasts were general characteristics of his behaviour, it could be said that he has a trait of kindliness.[105]

How might one individual be said to differ from another in

personality terms? Adcock [1968] suggested that investigators should "look for the major differences between individuals at the level of drive, trait,... or self-ideal."[106] This mention of drive and self-ideal, and earlier references to "conceptions of self" [to "what the person thinks he is, what he would like to be, and what he expects, eagerly or anxiously, to become]",[107] to "modes of adaptation to one's surroundings", to attempts to "maintain harmony and integration within the self", inevitably calls for comment on Freud's psychoanalytic theories.

In Freud's view, personality was a structure [with conscious and unconscious dimensions] made up of three interrelating elements, id, ego, and super-ego.[108] The dynamic relationships between the elements were productive of anxiety creating conflict, the resolution of which was important for psychic health − which included, among other things, an 'acceptable' notion of self.[109] Much of human behaviour could be explained by inferring the employment of psychological mechanisms to reduce anxiety and achieve emotional stability.[110] This internal effort, in normal circumstances, is part of an unconscious process, but there are circumstances in which the anxiety created by the conflict threatens to break into consciousness. In such situations the psychological mechanisms designed to maintain stability can become seriously maladaptive. Such a

condition is recognised [inferred] from psychopathological symptoms in behaviour.[111]

In Freudian analysis, the id is the depository of biological and instinctual drives - sex, aggression, hunger, thirst, need for warmth, etc. It has been described as "the container of all that is inherited or instinctive or fixed in the constitution of man."[112] Those instincts and drives have energy, and make "imperious... demands" for gratification.[113] The ego is that element in the personality structure which recognises external reality; it is the source of self-consciousness. As such, it is "concerned with adaptation to reality and the avoidance of external dangers."[114] In a sense, the ego represents a psychic security system, operating in "defence of the [self] against others and against the unconscious impulses of the id, which, unrestrained, could endanger the individual's life."[115] External reality, in the shape of the 'standards' of acceptable behaviour, sets limits to the overt expression of basic instincts and drives, limits which cannot be crossed with impunity. Here we touch the role of the super-ego, the

"... internalised representation of... societal requirements as to which objects and behaviours are permissible as [outlets] for instinctual satisfaction, and which are not, and which are 'ideal' as a way of

FIGURE [4]

PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF NEUROTIC AND MORAL ANXIETY

Compiled from E. E. Levitt [1967], Chapter 4, and A. K. Korman [1974], Chapter 2.

MECHANISM	PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS	ADAPTIVE OUTCOMES	MALADAPTIVE OUTCOMES
AVOIDANCE	The stimulus or the circumstances that give rise to it are avoided consciously or unconsciously.	A person avoids cocktail parties because he fears that alcohol will make him quarrelsome and lustful.	A person is so anxious that whole sets of normal every-day situations are avoided; e.g. afraid to leave the house; to meet people.
DENIAL	A thought or feeling that would create anxiety is disavowed.	A person disavows danger in a situation by the 'it cannot happen to me' approach.	A person is so anxious that clear and present dangers to the organism are denied. There is a break with reality.
REPRESSION	An event, feeling, memory, which would evoke anxiety is forgotten.	An unpleasant memory, say, of some unworthy or distasteful personal act is 'put out of the mind' [i.e. pushed into the unconscious].	Extensive use in adult life.
REGRESSION	In times of anxiety a person may 'escape' to an earlier development period - if an adult to infancy, adolescence.	A temporary dependent relationship with another person may be established - resembling that of child and adult.	Poor rate of recovery from such relationships.
SOMATISATION	Anxiety is kept out of consciousness by conversion into physiological symptoms.	Headache, back pain, rashes, fatigue.	When the conversion into physical symptoms leads to severe functional impairment or acute pain.
COMPULSIVITY	A person is anxious to meet the demands of super-ego to, say, be neat, clean, precise, responsible, competent.	A task is sought which requires great precision.	Phobic reactions to dirt - hands washed several dozen times a day - everything must be in its right place.

satisfying the instincts."[116]

In its security system role, the ego has to contend with the id as and when it seeks - "totally without reference to other consequences for the organism" - gratification for instincts and drives.[117] This particular form of interaction between id and ego carries with it the threat that the id will overwhelm the ego, "with consequent acting out of socially unacceptable sexual and aggressive impulses."[118] This type of threat stimulates what Freud termed neurotic anxiety.

The super-ego poses its own problems for 'balance' in the personality. It may become a tyrannical magistrate, threatening "severe punishment, not only for the overt expression of id needs when they are inappropriate, but also for id expression at any time, or even the thought of id-directed behaviour."[119] This threat stimulates what Freud termed moral anxiety. In the interests of the individual's emotional stability, the ego attempts to keep neurotic and moral anxiety from entering the conscious dimension of personality by operating its psychic security system - the defence mechanisms. Figure [4] provides examples of such mechanisms and suggests possible adaptive and maladaptive outcomes.[120]

In addition to mechanisms intended to reduce anxiety evoked by

FIGURE [5]

PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINING A SATISFACTORY SELF-CONCEPT.

Compiled from C. J. Adcock [1968] Chapter 17, and A. K. Korman [1974] Chapter 2.

MECHANISM	EGO SUSTAINING OUTCOMES	PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS
'SOUR GRAPES'	Just as the fox in the fable, unable to reach the grapes, resolved his frustration by regarding them as sour, an individual may reassess an unsuccessfully pursued goal as not worthy of achievement.	
RATIONALISATION	A hoped for success is not achieved, as a candidate being interviewed for a post is not appointed: the self-concept is supported by feelings that 'the cards had been stacked against fairness', that the successful candidate had 'pull'.	Rationalisation carried to extremes can suggest paranoia; over-compensation can turn the coward into a sadistic bully, or lead the individual into a fantasy world; in extreme cases, identification can suggest loss of personal autonomy.
COMPENSATION	The unattainable goal is sacrificed, and in the interests of sustaining the self-concept consolation is gained by achieving satisfaction in other areas. What the individual cannot get is depreciated relative to what he can achieve.	
IDENTIFICATION	The self-concept is bolstered by associating it with a successful group or movement. The victory of the group becomes the individual's victory.	

conflict involving id/ego and id/super-ego, we have to take account of mechanisms designed to maintain ego-strength - mechanisms which could be said to serve, in a very direct way, the interests of the self-concept. Levitt suggested that "in order to maintain a reasonable emotional adjustment, a person must be at least minimally satisfied with himself..."[121] Adcock elaborated:

> "Once his self-reference frame has developed [the person]
> is constantly faced with the problem of achieving an
> actual self commensurate with his level of aspiration...
> when he finds himself slipping in this respect he
> experiences profound dissatisfaction and will resort to
> several methods of lowering his level of self-aspiration
> with the least damage to his self-esteem or will endeavour
> to find some substitute satisfaction. A study of these
> throws important light on ego functioning."[122]

Figure [5] outlines some examples of self-concept sustaining mechanisms.

So far as personality is concerned, one individual may be said to differ from another in terms of traits [particularly in respect of dominant or central traits], in the intensity of either neurotic or moral anxiety, in the capacity to maintain

emotional stability [in the face of such anxiety] through the efforts of the ego, in the nature and intensity of psychopathological symptoms consequent upon damage to the ego's security system, in the 'distance' between self-concept and ideal concept [aspirations], and in the nature and intensity of the psychopathological symptoms evident when the 'distance' is intolerable.

How would such differences be measured? It should be obvious that both individual and 'social frame' analysis is necessary. So far as the latter is concerned, attention would be directed to social norms, to sub-system interrelationships, etc. With regard to the former, Hofstede has summarised 4 approaches capable of many subdivisions. Two of his approaches are concerned with words, and two are concerned with deeds. See Figure [6].[123]

Four available Strategies for Operationalising Constructs

Words	1)	Interviews; Questionnaires; Projective tests;	2)	Content Analysis of speeches, discussions, documents.
Deeds	3)	Laboratory experiments; Field experiments;	4)	Direct observation; Use of available descriptive statistics.

Figure [6]

Each approach is designed to tap features of individual personality, be they attitudes, values, traits, self-concepts, or a combination of these. Interviews could subsume depth analysis; the Adorno et al study employed questionnaires but also a 'clinical' interview during which subjects were encouraged to talk freely about their wishes, fears, childhoods,

relations with parents, etc. This was designed to reach below the surface manifestations of personality. Laboratory experiments have been dealt with earlier. Field experiments could cover 'miniature life-situations', with behaviour being studied in natural day to day terms. Content analysis could subsume study of a wide range of social and personal records. Direct observation could take the form of rating by a number of 'judges'. An appendix to this chapter provides examples of test instruments, and a further example appears in chapter 10. With regard to selection of method, it has been said that "the wise investigator will not place his faith in any one exclusively, but will use several to cover more ground."[124] Hofstede refers to the need to "avoid putting all one's eggs into the one basket."[125]

The line of argument so far developed in this chapter, touching on the analysis of culture and personality as a means of making distinctions between people(s), could be said to be "directly or indirectly oriented to one central type of question: What makes an Englishman an Englishman? An American an American? A Russian a Russian?"[126] There appears to be little doubt that such questions can be answered.[127] Brown [1944] asserted that a nation's history and social structure combined to "develop and encourage certain types of mental outlook... among its individual members."[128] In the opinion of Kluckhohn and

Murray [1949] "the statistical prediction can safely be made that a hundred Americans... will display certain defined characteristics more frequently than will a hundred Englishmen."[129] Demos [1971] advised that "each culture fosters the development of certain dominant... traits or styles."[130] Peters (1974), noting that all individuals are "brought up in an elaborate system of codes and conventions" concluded that their behaviour would differ, cross-culturally, to the extent that it reflected those parts of their respective codes that were "stamped" on them.[131]

For all this, the reservation expressed by Ginsberg [1942] is of crucial significance in respect of the sources covered in chapters 2 to 7 of this thesis:

"... when we turn to the attempts that have been made to subject... characteristics to scientific analysis the results are generally so indefinite as to raise a doubt whether the characteristics in question exist at all."[132]

Section (ii) of this chapter examines some of the problems facing those who would wish to make appropriate generalisations on the basis of cultural and personality analysis, and, by the same token, some of the traps into which the unwary could fall.

[ii]

Effective cross-cultural analysis can be impeded by all manner
of distortions, erroneous inferences, prejudices, confusions,
and inappropriate strategies. There are, for example, the
approaches that see difference and similarity as mutually
exclusive rather than two sides of the same coin. The
consequence is that individuals 'belonging' to different
cultures are seen either as 'birds of a different feather' or as
'brothers under the skin', but never as both.[133] Much more
realistic is the notion that cross-cultural studies may
contribute substantively to our understanding "both of what is
distinctive in single nations and of what is relatively
universal in human society."[134] One of the most interesting
examples of an investigation which picked up similarities when
dealing with differences, and vice-versa, was that carried out
by Milton Mayer [1955].[135] Then there is the frequently
ignored fact that the images drawn of one culture and its
members by the members of another are often related to the
presence or absence of divisive social, political, or economic
issues and are, in the former case, most sharply defined in
brushstroke in periods of tension and conflict. It does not
make for confidence when distinctions can be seen to rest on
special pleading, self-interest, or exigencies of various kinds.
No less threatening to effective analysis is the tendency in

many sources to exaggerate both the permanence and wide diffusion of particular forms of social behaviour or particular personality characteristics in a society[136] — threatening because an unjustifiable sense of uniformity, a quite spurious sense of homogeneity is promoted. So far as sharing in common culture is concerned, individuals do it differentially, and when it comes to the combined forces of heredity and culture shaping personality, "the same fire that melts the butter, hardens the egg."[137] Then there is the danger that behaviour and personality patterns may be viewed as products solely of a national culture whose bounds are narrowly defined by political borders. Such a view neglects the sense in which 'national cultures' are sub-systems, interacting with other sub-systems, of wider cultures. Margaret Mead touched on this point when she suggested that a West European's behaviour could be referred, culturally speaking [and in ascending order from local to international levels] to his individual life history, his membership of a particular class, presence in a geographical locality, a nation, a Greco-Roman tradition, and a technological 'universe' stretching back to prehistoric tool-making.[138] And then, of course, there is the matter of appropriate strategies. To what extent are conclusions based on the use of test instruments or other analytic procedures? What types of instrument and procedure — and how many — were used? To what extent was the issue of validity considered? So far as

cross-cultural analysis is concerned such questions never 'go away'. Ginsberg, reviewing in 1941 the literature which offered distinctions between one culture and another concluded that "the greater part... are livres de circanstonce, written under the influence of particular political situations and with a view to future policy."[139] The images one group has of other complex national or ethnic groups are suspect - even when apparently favourable - if their origins can be traced to the personal motives of their proponents.[140] For example, Klineberg [1944] referred to the image of the negro as a loyal and devoted friend to his 'white-folks', and as endowed-vocally and rhythmically - with musical talent, and suggested that such a stereotype, apparently favourable, had to be judged in terms of the function it was designed to perform.

> "'Loyalty and devotion to white-folks' may represent a favourable judgement, but it helps to keep alive the notion that the Negro's 'place' is that of a servant. 'Superiority in singing and dancing' strengthens the stereotype of the Negro as a performer and to that extent discounts his potential ability as professor or judge. Similarly, in the case of national stereotypes, our constant query must be: to what extent can they be explained by their function? To what extent, for example, do they justify... immigration policies? To what extent

do they give a basis for our alliances and our enmities?
To what extent do they fit in with our economic and
industrial interests."[141]

When Plato assigned the traits of passion and spirit to the
Thraceans and Scythians, love of money to the Phoenicians and
Egyptians, but reserved love of knowledge to the Greeks, what
functions were such stereotypes designed to perform?   Was he
attempting to demonstrate the superiority of the Greeks?
Similarly, propagandist and ethnocentric motivations may be
detected in Aristotle's comparative characterology, based on
climatic conditions, of those who inhabited Northern Europe,
Asia, and the Mediterranean lands.   The Northerners, subject to
cold climate, were "full of spirit" and therefore held on to
their freedom, but had no political organisation, and so were
"incapable of ruling over others."   Those of the East were
"intelligent and inventive", but lacked spirit and so were
"always in a state of subjection and slavery."   In the case of
the Hellenic race, situated between the extremes, intelligence
and spirit were common, and if the people of the area "could be
formed into one state, would be able to rule the world."[142]
All this may be taken as little more than a vehicle for assuming
the superiority of one group over others.   Schrieke [1936] noted
that the trait names assigned to Chinese immigrants by white
Californians in the pre 1870 period, when labour was scarce and

incomers no real economic threat to indigenous workers, were of the order of 'thrifty', 'sober', and 'law-abiding'. The immigrants were held to demonstrate an adaptability beyond praise. Later, when labour competed in a buyers market and incomers from China were regarded as an economic threat, the typical trait names included 'filthy', 'clannish', and 'dangerous.' The immigrants were then seen as being loathsome in habits and morally and mentally inferior.[143] In December 1935 Max Meenes presented 160 students of Howard University with a list of 84 stereotype words and asked them to select appropriate adjectives descriptive of 10 different national/racial groups. Having done that, they were required to go back over their descriptions and select the five words which seemed most aptly to characterise each group. In February 1942 [i.e. shortly after Pearl Harbour] the same procedures were carried out with 137 students at the same university. The results for 1935 and 1942 in respect of Germans and Japanese - listed in rank order - are given below. Trait names which were listed in 1942 but not listed in 1935 are asterisked.[144] [see Figure [7]]

FIGURE [7] A COMPARISON OF TRAIT NAMES ASSIGNED TO GERMANS AND JAPANESE BY AMERICAN COLLEGE STUDENTS – 1935, 1942.

GERMANS

R/O	1935	1942
1	Scientifically minded.	Scientifically minded.
2	Intelligent	Extremely nationalistic
3	Industrious	Intelligent
4	Extremely nationalistic	Aggressive
5	Ambitious	Revengeful *
6	Brilliant	Ambitious
7	Progressive	Cruel *
8	Pugnacious	Methodical
9	Methodical	Industrious
10	Aggressive	Brilliant
11	Alert	Treacherous *
12	Materialistic	Pugnacious

JAPANESE

R/O	1935	1942
1	Intelligent	Sly *
2	Industrious	Treacherous *
3	Tradition loving	Extremely nationalistic
4	Extremely nationalistic	Intelligent
5	Ambitious	Deceitful *
6	Alert	Shrewd
7	Artistic	Tradition loving
8	Progressive	Industrious
9	Scientifically	Imitative
10	Shrewd	Alert
11	Loyal to family ties	Revengeful *
12	Aggressive	Cruel *

Meenes noted that there were similarities as well as differences
between 1935 and 1942 stereotypes. About half the trait names
were common to both years in each case, not particularly
surprising in Meenes' view since the Howard students of 1942
were "quite like those of 1935." He thought it "plausible to
attribute the differences found to changes in world events and
to changes in public attitudes in the intervening years."[145]
of the Meenes study, Klineberg commented:

"... the new situation had altered the stereotypes... and
the inconsistencies challenge the truth of either the
first or the second list, and possibly of both."[146]

A review [1962] of the images of Germany prevalent in the United
States throughout the nineteenth, and into the early years of
the twentieth century, suggests that the American view of
Germany served, in turn, self-justificatory, economic, and
political ends. In the first half of the nineteenth century the
list of trait names given to Germans included calm, moderate,
staid, economical and hardworking. These matched the
self-assigned traits of the early republicans and the pioneers
of the Jacksonian period. There was but one snag; the
autocratic nature of the states in the German Confederation.
The Revolution of 1848, in which the German states appeared to
be steering a middle course between royalty and radicalism made
the political

image altogether more congenial, and "America was carried away by a wave of Germanophile emotions unparallelled ever before or since." The failure of 1848 to live up to its promise gave rise to disillusionment, perhaps related to an American desire to see their virtues reflected in others - a disillusionment echoed in an 1866 comment in The Nation magazine which described Germans as

> "The most learned, patient, industrious, civilised people
> on the face of the Globe, which has attained the highest
> distinction in arts, in science, in arms, in literature,
> in everything, in short, but in politics."

In the second half of the nineteenth century, in spite of her autocratic system, Germany stood high in American esteem: it was the land of Luther when the 'establishment' in America identified with Protestantism; it was pioneering free elementary education; in common with the United States it was engaged in dynamic economic development in challenge to Great Britain. However, the Germany of Wilhelm II came to assume a quite different image in the minds of Americans [with the prime exception, of course, of German-American communities]. The 'good Germans' became the 'bad Germans', ideologically out of tune, as ever, in their pursuit of power rather than freedom, but now also militaristic, and a disturber of the status quo through

its naval and imperial policies. There was little opportunity now for self-justificatory praise of Germany; if anything, self-justification could be gained by condemnation of Germany. And on top of that there were sound political and economic reasons for revising the image.[147]

Disillusionment as a force capable of recasting an image may be noted in the interesting case of Owen Wister.[148] The author of The Virginian, and the creator of Trampas, was a Germanophile before the outbreak of war in 1914. He rhapsodised on those features of the German lifestyle that he took to contrast very favourably with like aspects of his own society. In June 1915, he wrote, "This day, last year, I was in the heart of Germany. The beautiful, peaceful scene is plain yet. It seems as if I never could forget it or cease to love it... And, for the mere curiosity of it I looked in my German diary to find if I had recorded anything."[149] He had recorded a great deal - that each experience of life in Germany made him more and more impressed, that the enlightened attitudes of the people conspired to make the German landscape a constant pleasure to the eye, and constant repose to body and mind. Wherever he looked there was beauty in some form to be seen, "given its chance by the intelligence of man."[150]

All this was in stark contrast to the habitat of the United

States, "littered with rubbish and careless fences... hideous with glaring advertisements... rusty junk lying about... America was ugly and shabby - made so by Americans. Germany was swept and garnished - made so by Germans."[151] All around him in Germany Wister saw evidence of social conscience, of social investment in the future, of efficiency in the service of the people, and he thought of America,

"where so many things look beautiful on paper and so few things work, because nobody keeps to the rules."[152]

A recurring theme in his pro-German treatise was the contentment of the people. He was "struck with the contentment in the German face. Contentment! Among the old and young... this was the dominating note, the great essential possession."[153] Anticipating criticism from those who might question the relative value of contentment in the context of an autocratic regime, he put a case against moral imperialism:

"Until mankind grows uniform, will any form of government be likely to fit the whole world like a glove? So long as mankind continues as various as man's digestion, better to look at government as if it were a sort of diet or treatment. How is the government agreeing with its people? This is the question to ask in each country. And

what is the surest sign? Could any sign be surer than the
general expression, the composite face of the people
themselves?" [154]

Having arrived in Germany from the United States, where the
people "looked driven, unpeaceful, dissatisfied", it was restful
to be in a place "where the spirit of man was in stable
equilibrium." [155]   All in all, "the fair aspect and order of
the country and the cities, the well-being of the people, their
contented faces, their grave adequacies, their kindliness", set
Germany ahead of France and Britain, both in their own ways
"distressing and unenviable." In Germany there was order and
stability; in France confusion and in England disturbance. [156]
And so, he thought,

"Suppose a soul, arrived on earth from another world...
were given its choice after a survey of the nations, which
it should be born in and belong to? In May, June and July
1914, my choice would have been, not France, not England,
not America, but Germany." [157]

Against this background, Wister's conversion to an anti-German
viewpoint was traumatic. Having embraced Germany to the extent
that he harboured doubt on the merits of his own society and its
democratic form of government, he appeared to suffer the shock of

disillusionment with the outbreak of war and subsequent events. He now referred to Germany as "a hospital case, a case for the alienist", in the grip of a mania "analogous to those mental epidemics of the Middle Ages, when fanaticism... sent entire communities into various forms of madness."[158] Criticism was given an edge by disappointment. One can detect a sense of betrayal, the resentment of a man deceived, in the realisation that his pre-war image of Germany had been "... innocent altogether, deeply innocent."[159]

There is nothing untoward about the notion that national cultures are usually 'held together' and to varying degrees sustained as cohesive entities by a combination of elements, interrelationships, patterns, and forces, which include the relative incidence of apathetic and conscientious compliance on the part of the members, the pervasiveness of regularities in behaviour patterns, and the extent to which some form of common purpose informs the interaction between sub-systems and sub-cultures. However, the extent to which cohesion exists or is sustained, the level of conscientious compliance, and the informing force of common purpose can easily be exaggerated. Regional, religious, economic, and all manner of sub-cultural variations - contributing to what Ginsberg called "the great complexity of national groups" - can be evened out, made to disappear, if it is in the observer's interest to suggest a high

degree of homogeneity.[160] When Rocker [1937] warned that it was "very venturesome to speak of a community of national customs and morals" it was not to deny that one national culture could be said to differ from another in terms of norm and value patterns and the distribution of personality traits, but to direct attention to the differences which existed within national cultures.[161] Although norms are recognised in their observance, individual behaviour shows a wide variation around norms;[162] regularities in behaviour are not all of the same order, and the motivations underlying the regularities are sure to differ. The probability of the distribution of personality traits in any modern, complex society being unimodal, that is, taking the form of "a single prevailing personality pattern" is so remote as to be discounted.[163]

The generalisations found in the sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 will be re-examined, in the light of the present discussion, in chapter 10. There are other interesting examples of the inner cohesion of national cultures being exaggerated, and the two now cited could be regarded as representative of the mystical and mechanistic approaches, respectively. Canetti [1962] argued that an investigation of customs, traditions, politics and literature "could be thorough and still not touch the distinctive character of a nation, that which... becomes its faith."[164] In essence, he regarded nations as analogous to

religions, each with its own particular symbols, such as sea,
forest, and corn - subsuming among other things the notion of
cohesion and common rhythm. The German and the Englishman were
dissimilar in that

> "The Englishman likes to imagine himself at sea, the
> German in a forest. It is impossible to express the
> difference of their national feeling more concisely."[165]

The most potent symbol for the Englishman was the sea, and there
was a precise connection between his relationship with it and
his "famous individualism." He saw himself "as a captain on
board a ship with a small group of people, the sea around and
beneath him. He is almost alone; as captain he is in many ways
isolated even from his crew."[166] On the other hand, the
symbol most revealing of the character of the Germans was the
marching forest:

> "The parallel rigidity of the upright trees and their
> density and number fill the heart of the German with a
> deep and mysterious delight... he feels at one with the
> trees."

Unlike trees in tropical forests which grew in all directions
and suggested a certain indiscipline, chaos, and an
"unarticulated mass of growth which effectively precludes any

sensation of order or even of repetition", the trees of the German forest [either in imagination or personified in the shape of the Army] were notable for their "orderly separation", the "stress on the vertical", and "a conspicuous rhythm." In "the rigidity and straightness of trees" lay the clue to the German character.[167]

It could be argued that in the period under study there were areas of German experience which exuded rather than precluded the "sensation of order or even of repetition", and that at a particular point in time, in response to a particular concatenation of historical events, there was a still wider appreciation of the virtues of "conspicuous rhythm", and perhaps even a romantic identification of the routine securities and certainties of everyday life with "the rigidity and straightness of trees;" it is as well, however, that explanations of differences between national cultures have not been confined to mysticism of this kind.

At the heated meetings of the German Historical Association in 1964 when the significance of Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der Weltmacht was discussed, Fritz Stern attacked the prevailing tenor of German historiography - described by Dahrendorf as "a tranquillising instrument of self-interpretation" - which denied that nation's responsibility for upheaval in Europe. Stern pointed to the sequence of 'catastrophes' in recent German history [in

principal, the First World War, the Rise of the Nazis, the Second World War], compared them to a sequence of accidents in an industrial concern and asked "whether such a series could happen anywhere without somebody suspecting that something must be wrong somewhere in the enterprise."[168] Analogies are useful tools but are usually in some degree suspect for they are seldom limited in connotation by the will of their creators. As a device for encouraging German historians to confront rather than retreat from the German contribution to major crises in Europe, Stern's analogy was a useful tool; the problem, however, is that to compare the German nation to an industrial concern is to allow, by analogy, that the degree of inner cohesion of the former was similar to that of the latter. In an industrial concern process and product are defined in terms of objective market criteria, are more often than not related to critical path structures, and are subject to inspection, control, and remediation. None of this would be possible at the required level of performance without a very high degree of inner mechanistic cohesion - an inner cohesion which is in no way a function of what is happening outside the industrial concern. The interior cohesion of, say, process phases and critical path stages can exist in the face of exterior disruption. Further, an industrial concern, a plant, for example, which is experiencing process or product difficulties can be shut down, brought to a dead stop, and faults identified.

In none of these descriptions can a nation be said to resemble an industrial concern.

In 1943, Jacques Barzun asserted that "a people is too numerous, too various, too much an epitome of mankind, to be cited for judgement in a formula."[169] The detail of his assertion had been adumbrated by Sarolea 31 years earlier. Any thoughtful student of international politics, wrote Sarolea, recognised not only the delicacy but also the difficulty of expressing a competent opinion on any great collection of human beings. He considered that the dictum, "all generalisations on national character must be subject to considerable limitations", was especially true with regard to Germany and the Germans.

"In the case of Germany, any sweeping generalisations are manifestly futile and unreal. We have continually to qualify and modify our judgements; we have continually to distinguish between the North and the South, between Catholics and Protestants, between the Government and the people; we must constantly keep in mind, in judging the German people as a whole, that although they have been welded into an empire, they have not really achieved national unity: which is hardly surprising when we consider that the German Empire is composed of many elements heterogeneous in race and religion - and that it

is only forty years since those heterogeneous elements have been politically combined... they continue to present to us at the beginning of the twentieth century a bewildering mixture of spiritual paradoxes and political contradictions."[170]

Karl Dietrich Bracher's analysis of the relationship between electoral support for the N.S.D.A.P. and the "regional, sociological, and confessional differences" in Germany echo Sarolea's reference to "the cleavages between the German catholic South and the protestant North, between the industrial and socialist West and South West and the reactionary and agrarian East and North East."[171] It is against this background that Rainer Baum's literary content analysis of popular fiction published in Die Gartenlaube assumes very real significance. Far from the Germans demonstrating, through sharing in common culture, a high order of cohesion in terms of attitudes, values, and dispositions, Baum found that they were "ethical strangers to each other", and that German society was "... characterised by deep value cleavages, dividing the people into different value communities by region, social class, and urban and rural ways of life."[172]

The informing force of common purpose within a national culture may be exaggerated by a too easy identification of the

'character' of the literature and philosophy which is temporarily dominant and the 'character' of the people at large. Ginsberg disliked "rough generalisations" that exaggerated the diffusion of particular characteristics. He noted that literature and philosophy were often taken "as a basis for the psychology of people", accepted that in the case of dominant groups within a society such a connection might be reasonable, but entered serious reservations to the notion that prevailing orthodoxies in literature and philosophy represented an expression of the character of the general population. He took much the same view with regard to major social and political institutions, arguing that they "may not reflect the character of all the members [of the culture] but perhaps only of powerful sections... It follows that at any one moment of time we cannot safely infer the character of a people from its institutions or public policy."[173]   Sheehan [1981] argued along similar lines:

"... in the political realm, we should be wary of false assumptions about institutional symmetry and cohesion. There almost always is, for instance, a big difference between the order given at the centre and the way it is carried out on the periphery, a difference which does not usually become apparent if we confine our attention to the records of the central administration."[174]

An instruction to the citizens of Münster by General Baron von Bissung, Commander of the 7th Army Corps, in December 1914, could be read as a concrete example of Ginsberg's distinction between public policy and the extent to which such policy finds expression in the behaviour of ordinary people:

"In an order of the day, I recently appealed to the public not to display false and misplaced sentiments of sympathy towards the prisoners of war. You should show more of a German conscience.

... According to the reports which have been submitted to me, all kinds of dainties... have been offered to the prisoners in spite of the prohibitions which have been issued... recourse will be had to exemplary punishment in order to put a stop to this anti-German conduct."[175]

Sheehan, reflecting on the question, 'What is German History?', concluded that the 'single mould' perception of cohesion, which was dissipated with the recognition of multiplicity, was "an often illusory cohesion", and that a richer view of the past emerged with its demise. Taking as a 'text' De Maistre's dictum that it was not difficult to unify a nation on the map, but quite another thing to do it in reality, Sheehan argued:

"We should not... allow the appearance of cartographical

cohesion... to conceal the fact that every state is filled with... structures which, resisting being drawn into the institutional symmetry which states try to impose, form pockets of internal separation..."

Sheehan, interested in "the centrifugal force of regionalism", noted that Tipton [1976] had suggested that German Unification may have "increased the importance of regional differences by accentuating the contrast between industrial and agrarian areas within the Reich." [176]

It has so far been the intention of this brief discussion of the problems inherent in "rough generalisations", which exaggerate the degree of behavioural homogeneity in national cultures, to highlight the importance of the concept of 'differential sharing' - a concept descriptive of the many ways in which different people in the same broad cultural setting may share differentially in what that setting has to offer. Rough generalisations are just as problematical when personality - that which lies behind behaviour - is at issue; and they are just as common. Sarolea noted how difficult it was to "formulate a deliberate opinion on the character of a friend... known for a lifetime"; awareness of the complexity of human nature and of the "infirmity of... judgement", made one pause, hesitate, and ponder. Given the opportunity, however, to pass

judgement on nations, the reticence which guided and reserved
assessment in the case of individuals disappeared:

"... when we are asked to pass judgement, not on one
individual, but on millions of whom we have no direct
knowledge, and about whom we have very little direct
information, we do not seem to feel the slightest
hesitation in expressing a strong and unqualified opinion;
and generally, the less we do know, the stronger that
opinion is likely to be." (177)

The sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 stand as evidence
that it was not unusual in the period under study to attribute
common personality characteristics to Germans en masse. To use
a concept that would have been unfamiliar in this context at the
time, but which precisely defines the approach, the distribution
of personality variants was often seen as unimodal. In
mathematics, the mode of a set of numbers or quantities is that
'value' which occurs with the greatest frequency. It follows
that in a particular context a mode may not exist, or, if it
does exist, may not be unique. For example, there is no mode in
the set 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 19, 27; there is one mode [4] in the
unimodal set 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 9, 11, 19; there are two modes [4
and 9] in the bimodal set 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 9, 9, 11. This simple
illustration provides the basis

FIGURE [8] POSSIBLE SHAPE OF A PERSONALITY PROFILE.

Note: Although personality 'type' 5, 10, and 14 do not
occur with the same frequency, they occur at
mathematical maxima and so may be accepted as
modes.

FREQUENCY

(INCIDENCE IN POPULATION)

for yet another case, that of a multimodal distribution. Following Linton [1945] Inkeles and Levinson argued that in the case of a complex, modern nation, "a multimodal conception of [personality] would seem to be theoretically the most meaningful as well as empirically the most realistic", since it "can accommodate the sub-cultural variations of socioeconomic class, geosocial region, ethnic group, and the like, which appear to exist in all modern nations, and tends somewhat to counteract the inclination toward stereotyping and spurious homogenising in our descriptions of national populations."[178]

Consideration of what a multimodal personality profile might look like should suggest the procedural requirements for its construction and the limitations on the uses to which it could be put. [See Figure 8].

Before we can even refer to the existence of different personality modes we have to determine the frequency with which the different types appear. This, in turn, depends upon a definition of personality variants which establishes clear 'type boundaries'. The fictional multimodal personality profile shown in Figure [8] indicates the frequency with which particular personality types occur in a 'population' [e.g. the adults of a national culture]. As such it would be the end product of a major exercise in the gathering, collation, classification and analysis of raw data. To arrive at a profile

of modes of distribution of personality variants would require "the psychological investigation of adequately large and representative samples of persons studied individually."[179] This highlights the need for careful and extensive testing.

As a modal personality profile of, say, the adults of national culture 'x', there is an extremely high probability that the example in Figure [8] would differ from a similarly constructed profile of the adults of national culture 'y'. The height of the peaks, the depth of the troughs, the general shape or configuration of one profile would be different from those of another. When constructed on a cross-cultural basis, such profiles would serve - for some time at least - as indicators of how one culture differed from another. In themselves, however, modal personality profiles may do no more than this. In itself, a personality profile of a national culture - even if the end product of careful and extensive investigation of a large mass of raw data - may establish little beyond its distinctiveness in relation to others of its kind. The example above indicates that personality types 5, 10 and 14 occur most frequently, and that if horizontal lines are drawn through the distribution they will highlight those types which occur with equal frequency [e.g. 3, 6, 8, 12 and 16]. It is likely that another level of analysis will be required to resolve a range of vital qualitative issues - issues regarding the influence within the

'population' of a particular type, or types, the relative weighting that should be assigned to a type, or types, in respect of, say, the decision making process in domestic and international politics - or apathetic/conscientious compliance in the outcome of that process - the electoral success or otherwise of individual political parties, and so on. Crucial, also, are the relative weights, in determination of behaviour, that should be assigned to personality variants [once defined] and situational factors.

First, then, rigorous procedures are necessary for the definition of the personality profile of the members of a national culture; beyond this, a range of qualitative issues have to be addressed. Failure to address such issues may well lead to the erroneous belief that the definition of a modal personality profile accounts, of itself, for the intra and inter - national policies and behaviours of a national culture.

Situational factors, as determinants of behaviour, are not confined within the boundaries of national cultures. Without, of course, losing sight of the caveat on differential sharing, account has to be taken of wider cultural contexts, of the extent to which particular behaviour patterns are related to the norms and values of a common international culture. To take an example apposite in the present context, the common international

culture of Europe in the pre-1914 period was a competitive one. Its dominant norms and values were competitive. Even allowing for important instances of co-operative and conciliatory relations between states, the general unwillingness of powerful or aspirant nations to sacrifice their existing status or abort their pretentions, in the interests of the international community, suggests an acceptance of competitive norms. And at the beginning of the twentieth century these norms were infused with a powerful new force - "a perfect principle of causality" - Social Darwinism. [180]

Both German and British sources indicate that the application of biological theories to the sociopolitical field "served as a motive power as well as justification for expansionist policies." [181] Walter Bagehot had argued that nations endowed with characteristics which made them "most fit to win in war" were, so far as Nature was concerned, "really the best characters." [182] Lord Milner's Credo legislated:

"... this is the law of human progress, that the competition between nations each seeking its maximum development, is the Divine Order of the world, the Law of Life and progress." [183]

Charles Pearson, in National Life from the Standpoint of

Science, noted that "the path of progress" was "strewn with the wrecks of nations... of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to perfection."[184] Maxse's "illusion mongers", guilty of "fatuous sentimentalism", were those who could not see that inexorable forces were at work.[185] In response to those who argued respect for the status quo, Usher declared that existing conditions were not "... the end and object of the process of evolution."[186] Cramb's "inexorable nexus of things" was little more than the struggle for survival played out between powerful states.[187]

It appeared that every nation was "subject to the natural laws of life and death, growth and decay."[188] Friedrich von Bernhardi asserted that war was never to be seen as accidental; it was a law of nature. The options facing nations in the struggle for supremacy were 'Weltmacht oder Niedergang'.[189] the elder Moltke saw war as "an element of the order of the world established by God, without which the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism."[190] Conrad Hötzendorf, the Austrian Chief of General Staff, reflecting on the relative influence of national and artificial forces on the course of human history concluded that

"Philanthropic religions, moral teachings and philosophic doctrines may certainly sometimes serve to weaken

mankind's struggle for existence in its crudest form, but they will never succeed in removing it as a driving motive in the world... It is in accordance with this great principle that the catastrophe of the war came about inevitably and irresistibly as the result of the motive forces in the lives of states and peoples, like a thunderstorm which must by its nature discharge itself."[191]

Kurt Riezler, Bethmann-Hollweg's aide believed that eternal and absolute enmity was "fundamentally inherent in relations between peoples... not the result of a perversion of human nature but of the essence of the world and the source of life itself. It is not accidental, temporary and removable, but a necessity..."[192]

The major sub-systems of this international culture - sovereign states and their leaders - had similar goals [terminal values] such as security, prestige, improvement of position either diplomatically, economically, or militarily. They addressed such norm referenced considerations as 'how do we gain a better place in the order of things?' - 'how do we prevent others getting ahead of us?' - 'where do we stand in the rank order of power?' Galtung [1964] suggested that nations can be ranked for their comparative status - either 'T' [top-dog] or 'U'

[under-dog] - along a number of scales such as extent of industrialisation, income per capita, military power, level of educational provision, past glory, imperial/colonial possessions, etc. In his terms, the international culture in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century was a multi-dimensional system of stratification, where those who 'had' and those who 'had not', those who 'had more' and those who 'had less' found, were given, or were forced into their positions.[193] In the pre-1914 period there were high levels of rank-disequilibrium and status discrepancy, that is to say, too many states were not rank-concordant, but were high on some scales and low on others.[194] Using Galtung's Top-dog - Under-dog measure of comparative status, a rank-ordering of Britain and Germany on a number of scales in the pre-1914 period produces the following picture:

SCALE	BRITAIN	GERMANY
Colonial territory	T	U
Economic development [subsuming rate of growth]	T [but in relative decline]	T [but in relative ascendancy]
Military Power [land-based]	U	T
Naval Power	T	U

The comparative status of the two nations so far as possession of colonial territory was concerned may be highlighted:-

	Colonial area in sq.miles (M)	No. of Colonial Territories	Ratio of Home Colonial Area
Britain	12-	55	1/96
France	4-	29	1/20
Germany	1-	10	1/5
Belgium			1/82
Netherlands	3	21	1/23
Italy			1/63

(195)

In terms of colonial area, Germany had one-sixteenth of that controlled by Britain and France; she had less than one-eighth of the number of territories owned by those countries. With regard to the ratio of home to colonial area, Germany came right at the bottom of the league, in company with Italy.

Pettman has noted that

> "A rank-discordant state will be continually exposed to
> differential treatment and therefore constantly reminded
> of its disequilibrium position. It will use the resources
> of its top-ranking dimensions in a self-righteous way to
> raise its standing on those dimensions where it has a 'U'
> score." (196)

Why did states concern themselves about their rank-discordance
in the pre-1914 period? Was it a matter, purely and simply, of
personality profiles and intranational cultural patterns? To
answer in the affirmative would be to beg the question of why
two nations moving, without dedicated resistance on either side,
towards conflict might have had two quite different personality
profiles, and to assign to the international culture less
significance than it deserves.

Were ordinary, everyday observers consistently sound in their
assessments; were the 'subjects' of their observations uniformly
'obvious' in that actual behaviour was never ambiguous, and
always matched motivation; were there no hidden depths to
individuals - then Sarolea's cautions on the complexity of human
nature and the "infirmity of judgement" could be dismissed.
None of these situations obtain, however, and so assertions on

cross-cultural distinctions - whether narrow or wide in focus - should, if they are to justify any claim to objective authority, consider similarities as well as differences, resist any charge of special pleading or self-interest, deal cautiously with the issue of intracultural homogeneity, avoid exaggeration of the longevity and diffusion of characteristics, locate the 'systems' being compared in a wider cultural context, and be the product of an investigatory process which has employed a range of sound analytic procedures.

If observation of human behaviour is uninformed by theoretical considerations the chances of making superficial and/or erroneous judgements are greatly increased. Without due attention to the complex of roles occupied by an individual in modern society it would be easier to overlook the fact that in everyday life it is often "necessary to mask the true self, to present to the world an appearance..."[197] And appearances can be deceptive. Fromm [1978] cited the case of the red-faced, shouting man who could be described by an observer, accurately enough on a superficial level, as angry. A deeper probe into the man's system [through, say, a test instrument or an indepth interview] might lead to the conclusion that he was frightened, and a still more rigorous form of analysis might lead to the view that the man was helpless. "All three statements are correct", wrote Fromm. "However, we have a varying degree of relevance, because only the statement 'this

man feels powerless' comes close... As long as I see him as an angry man, I see only a surface phenomenon."[198]

Cook [1984] gives the example of 'Mr Savage', an individual with an aggressive disposition who, in the course of one day, experiences strong urges to punch a neighbour, set the dog on the postman, swear at a fellow driver, run down an employee, and snarl at colleagues - yet he does not implement any of them. Superficial observation of Mr Savage's behaviour might well miss the fact that his socially unacceptable urges were contained not by the internalisation of general social values but by the size of his neighbour [taller and heavier], the fear that an injured postman might refuse to deliver mail to the Savage home, the police uniform worn by the fellow driver, absenteeism on the part of the employee, and in-house customs on interpersonal relations between colleagues.[199]

The dangers of taking an individual's attitudes, values, and beliefs at face-value, as opposed to sizing them up over a period of time and in a variety of situations, have been noted by Rokeach [1960]. The individual may be engaged in a deliberate act of deception or he may be rationalising. Inferences about what an individual really believes should be based on all the things he says and does. Only through such comprehensive observation and analysis can an individual's "total

belief-disbelief system... an organisation of verbal and non-verbal, implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or expectancies" be determined.[200] Bem pointed to the errors of inference which could arise when necessary connections were assumed between evaluative beliefs and/or positive attitudes on the one hand, and values on the other. For example, the evaluative belief - 'power would enable my country to be great again' - and the positive attitude - 'I like uniforms' - could, but need not have a necessary connection with the value, 'it is desirable that inferiors obey superiors.' "To know whether a positive attitude or an evaluative belief is also a value for a particular individual, one must know the functional role it plays in his total belief system."[201] An individual's total belief system is not normally something which is open to superficial observation.

Tajfel [1963] drew attention to the important distinction to be made between the different motives underpinning similar forms of behaviour. For example, two white South Africans could support Apartheid policies - one because he believed that black South Africans were inferior to white South Africans, the other because he saw them as manipulative devices to retain power; two German shopkeepers could have acted to the detriment of Jewish neighbours, one because he considered Jews to be inferior and genuinely subscribed to racist doctrines, the other because

he saw anti-Semitic legislation as a means of getting rid of serious competition.[202]   There is nothing admirable in either position, but the motivation is certainly different. In the case of the German shopkeeper preoccupied with economic motives there is a clear lack of human sympathy and self-interest is dominant. In this sense his behaviour could be said to be supportive of Nazi values; but it could not be said to be based on Nazi values. Motivational distinctions of this kind are safely made only after "a sustained study of a particular individual."[203]

The form of assessment which places an emphasis on norm-referenced behaviour can reveal a great deal about 'overt' consensus on means, but may otherwise be very unreliable. The possibility of there being a distinction between the norm as 'the desired' and the norm as 'the actual' should not be overlooked. In this context, Baum's dictum is relevant:

"Never forget, you could survive in Treblinka only by becoming a tool of destruction."[204]

Bruno Bettelheim's Remarks on the Psychological Appeal of Totalitarianism examined the Hitler salute as an example of a behavioural norm in Nazi Germany. It was given "wherever people encountered each other - at public or private meeting places

such as in restaurants, railroadcars, offices, or factories, and on the street." Why was there such a high degree of conformance? Was it because it was an "expression of self-assertion" eagerly adopted by people who supported the Nazi regime? For some this was no doubt the case. But the salute was also given, when expected, by those who were actively or passively opposed to the regime, for those "who saw that one did not give the Hitler salute might report this, and often enough did," and people hesitated to "make a big fuss - which refusing to give the Hitler salute created - in often repeated everyday situations." Furthermore, there was the effect which deviant behaviour might have on some person met by chance:

> "Refusing to salute was made more troublesome because one not only placed one's own life in danger, but also that of the other person, since he was required to report any failure to give the salute to the authorities... Many times a day the anti-Nazi either had to become a martyr and simultaneously test the courage and convictions of the other person, or lose his self-respect."

Bettelheim was conscious of the pressures which a totalitarian regime could lay on its subjects. Such a regime, he argued, creates a complex of everyday tasks and functions - norms and role expectations - which the individual can ignore only at the

risk of his own destruction.[205]

Comment on personality traits should be as rigorously founded as that on attitudes, values, and general behavioural regularities. Allport considered that any approach which fell short of this would swamp the observer in "considerations of reputation, rumour, gossip, erroneous evaluations..."[206] Apart from the problem of identifying them, so many distinctions have to be made between traits that sustained study is essential. The investigator has to guard against identifying as a relatively enduring personality trait a single-instance disposition "divorced from the usual pattern of circumstances", and "not at all typical of... ordinary behaviour."[207] Then there are the distinctions to be made between real and pseudo traits, stylistic and motivational traits, dominant, central, and secondary traits, between enduring dispositions related to personality and temporary [though not single-instance] dispositions related to a temporary state of affairs - psychological or physical or both. Pseudo traits are often purposeful affectations, making of the individual something he is not. To identify them as real traits is to make the "errors of inference... that come from fixing attention solely upon appearances." Errors of real magnitude can be made when stylistic traits - those "more closely related to external conduct than to root motives" - are confused with motivational

traits.[208] And it is clear that an individual's personality structure could be dramatically misconstrued by an investigator who assigned dominant rather than central or secondary status to a particular trait, or who identified as a relatively enduring facet of personality a disposition which owed its existence less to life-history than to more immediate circumstances.

Of the two broad approaches to the rigorous study of cross-cultural differences which they identified - the close analysis of cultural products and the close study of individuals - Inkeles and Levinson were in no doubt as to where the methodological priorities should lie:

> "... the analysis of collective policies and products... Psychological analysis of these phenomena can contribute significantly to the overall psychological characterisation of a society... however, this should be a supplementary rather than a primary method, the primary one being the large scale study of individuals."[209]

Yet the problems inherent in cross-cultural study are not entirely removed even when assertions are the product of an investigatory process informed by methodological priorities and involving a range of sound analytical procedures. At the end of

an analytical process which may be, to some extent, freely reproducible, and so a corporate possession, there remains the individual and in part imaginative act of interpretation. This problem may be highlighted through brief consideration of one of the most effective strategies for examining cultural products [e.g. public and private documents, literary fiction, film, etc.] - content analysis. Duverger [1964] defined content analysis as

> "... a special simplified form of quantitative semantics... the basic idea of context analysis is to place the parts of a text [words, phrases, paragraphs, etc., depending on the units chosen] in a number of predetermined categories. Content analysis is, from one point of view, the ranging of all these parts in a series of pigeon holes, and describing the text by the number of elements in each pigeon hole."[(210)]

The technique has been widely used. Lerner [1942] analysed the content of articles in German psychological journals. Kracauer [1947] examined the structure, text, and images of German films of the Weimar period. McGranahan and Wayne [1948] employed the principles of content analysis in their study of the 45 most popular stage plays in Germany and the United States in 1927, in order to make a cross-cultural comparison of personality traits. Baum [1981] reached interesting conclusions on the incidence of

particular value clusters at regional level in Germany between 1871 and 1914 by conducting a highly structured content analysis of 31 novels.[211] As an analytical technique for highlighting intracultural configurations and for describing cross-cultural differences, content analysis has much to recommend it. But it does not of itself point to the conclusions which should be drawn and it does not free the student from the need to adjudicate between conflicting interpretations.

The problem of interpretation may be demonstrated by consideration of the election poster produced by the Nazi party for the second Presidential Election of 1932, and published in the Bavarian edition of <u>Völkischer Beobachter</u> 3 March of that year. It is a relatively simple matter to apply the principles of content analysis to this document. It could be argued that its structure and content throw up such obvious points and categories that one man's analysis would be fairly close to that of another; but the interpretations built from common analytical descriptions could be dramatically different.

HITLER   is the password of all who believe in Germany's resurrection.

HITLER   is the last hope of those who were deprived of everything: of farm and home, of savings, employment,

survival; and who have but one possession left: their faith in a just Germany which will once again grant to its citizens honor, freedom, and bread.

HITLER   is the word of deliverance for millions, for they are in despair, and see only in this name a path to new life and creativity.

HITLER   was bequeathed the legacy of the two million dead comrades of the World War, who died not for the present system of the gradual destruction of our nation, but for Germany's future.

HITLER   is the man of the people hated by the enemy because he understands the people and fights for the people.

HITLER   is the furious will of Germany's youth, which, in the midst of a tired generation, is fighting for new forms, and neither can nor will abandon its faith in a better German future. Hence Hitler is the password and the flaming signal of all who wish for a German future.

The document is so structured that the eye is immediately drawn to the word 'Hitler'; there is a strength in the word, derived from its dimensions in relation to other words, from its repetitive appearance, and from the 'distance' established between it and the rest of the text. A dynamic immediacy is created through the recurring 'is'. Absolute identity is established, and appears to extend to a corporate identity that 'swallows' up the individual self: he is; we are. The message is addressed to all who feel that hope is exhausted, to all who feel they are going over the edge, to all in despair, to all who feel that they cannot help themselves. They are offered a lifeline at the beginning and end of the document in the form of a 'password', cementing them, through possession of something precious, in corporate security, and leaving those without 'the knowledge' under threat. There is a 'reckoning' in store for those outside the pale and for those identified as responsible for the suffering of the many - 'Now you are to know us!' Religious images suggest miraculous works and powers, but also death, decay and decomposition. An act of resurrection presupposes miraculous powers, but that act is predicated upon death; deliverance is effected by a prophet but it is from evil; To enter into new-life and creativity is to be 'born again', to enter into a new and sustaining faith, but it also presupposes the shedding of the old, decaying skin.

It is possible to build a number of interpretations on this analysis. Two examples in opposition should be enough to demonstrate that content analysis can take us so far and no further. The first interpretation, which for convenience may be termed the 'psychoanalytic' interpretation, proposes that the essential characteristics of the dominant German personality type are reflected in the document. Hitler is recognised as a strong father figure from whom all others take their identity and to whom they willingly submit. The secular father takes the shape of a spiritual father; there is a strong suggestion of 'come to me, all ye who are heavy laden'; in the notion of 'password' there are echoes of the select body of saints defined in John 3, 16. The masochistic longings peculiar to the Germans attract them towards a complete surrender of independent will. In the catalogue of deprivation there is an appeal to the neurotic anxiety of those who, losing everything else, fear castration. Masochistic pleasure is derived from the images of decay, decomposition and death, and promise of release for sadistic energies is found in contemplation of the misery of those left outside the bond, and of the revenge to be carried out on the enemy. A profound concern about inferiority informs their desire for regeneration. [212]

The second interpretation, which does not exclude psychological considerations, which takes account of anxiety - but the

rational form as well as the neurotic form - and which places more emphasis than the other on situational factors, proposes that the document could have had relatively wide appeal to people who had suffered the cumulative distress of disappointed expectations, of starvation during the blockade, of the physical and psychological scars of inflation, of loss of personal status, and who, at the same time, did not experience the psychological security of belonging to a highly structured and well disciplined political group. For such people the choice might well have been 'Nationalsozialist - oder umsonst waren die Opfer'.

As might be expected, the issue of discrepant interpretations arises in many other areas of cultural and cross-cultural studies. Reference has been made to the emphasis placed by Bateson, Gorer, and Potter on parent-child relationships as indicators of cross-cultural differences in adult personality patterns. That different perspectives on human psychology can lead to different interpretations is evident when we consider Klineberg's challenge to Gorer's thesis that Japanese aggression toward 'weak' peoples was predicated upon the aggression shown by young males toward 'weak' females in the Japanese family. If it were true that such aggression was sanctioned within the family, "might this not," wrote Klineberg, "make it less necessary for him to find other occasions on which to give full

expression to his anger?"[213] Margaret Mead's And Keep Your Powder Dry, focused on the importance of success rather than status in the culture of the United States. She saw the general pattern of parent-child relationships in that culture as one in which the child was stimulated to excel, "prepared very early on for participation in a highly competitive society, in which failure, even though cushioned by a good standard of living [seemed] more terrible than poverty itself would seem in a status country." The individual worth of an American was assessed not by status [position occupied] as such but by the distance which lay between the position occupied and the original point of departure. "Projecting this success drive to his children," the American expected them to "have a different future and an achievement greater than his own." The culture was success oriented; this defined a trend in parent-child relationships, and in their turn those relationships had a product which reinforced the orientation of the culture.[214] Apart from questions relating to the distribution of such characteristics, to the applicability of Mead's conclusions to the population of the United States as a whole, as opposed to, say, a particular social group - questions bearing on intracultural interpretations - there are those which bear on cross-cultural interpretation:

"Miss Mead mentions, as an American characteristic, the

need to bypass your father by choosing another skill than his. Alfred Adler thought this was a pretty widespread phenomenon, particularly if the father was at all successful."[215]

Marked differences in interpretation can arise when behaviour appears to be motivated by anxiety. Is the anxiety rational or is it neurotic? Does the 'anxious' behaviour point to underlying personality <u>traits</u> or is it associated with a temporary and circumstantial <u>state</u>?[216] Further opportunities for the expression of discrepant interpretations are opened up when self-analysis, empathy, and imagination, are regarded as necessary conditions for the effective analysis of others. Bales considered that "to understand a personality or a group is to be able to reproduce in one's own mind relevant parts of what goes on in the minds of others." This is the process of empathetic identification - a process not without pitfalls, for it is "about as likely to lead one to infuse his own characteristics unknowingly into the object, as to internalise the object correctly." If the understanding of another personality, or a group, "implies an understanding of the self," then it is reasonable to suppose that interpretations may differ according to the extent to which the prescription is followed and, since self-understanding is an interpretive, imaginative process in itself and subject to limitations, interpretations

may even differ when the prescription is followed with dedicated intent.[217]

Wherever human judgement - differentiated in terms of experience, imaginative capacity, gifts of perception, objectivity, etc., [218] - is brought to bear on matters of human behaviour - always, and in all forms, susceptible to explanations which may be difficult or impossible to verify - interpretations are likely to be many and different. It has been said that whereas chemists know exactly what they mean by 'copper sulphate', and physicists exactly what they mean by 'light', every psychologist knows exactly what personality means, except that to each psychologist it 'means' something different. This general principle on judgement was sustained experimentally by Estes [1937].[219] A number of 2 minute films were made, each depicting the behaviour of a subject whose personality structure had been intensively studied by a group of 20 psychologists over a twelve month period. The short films were then studied by 37 'judges', all formally trained psychiatric social workers with no less than two years practical work experience. In terms of congruence with the general tenor of the original assessments made by the panel of 20 psychologists, the ten best judges from the group of 37 had a success rate 33% higher than the 10 poorest judges, and the best single judge was 62% ahead of the poorest judge in terms of cross-analyses congruence. Allport

found the conclusion inescapable that "even in a homogeneous and highly trained profession such as psychiatric social work the difference in ability to 'size-up' individuals... is very striking." It was clear to him that "... a gifted judge, applying his skill to certain overt and readily accessible traits in a subject who is himself not deceptive or enigmatic," were preconditions for trustworthy judgement.[220]

The problems identified above are not eased by the fact that a number of projective tests and self-report inventories, designed to reveal aspects of personality, do not lend themselves to objective - freely reproducible - interpretation, or have to contend with all the quirks associated with the test situation in the social sciences - the fact that the subjects are not inanimate, that unlike one molecule of hydrogen which is more or less the same as another molecule of hydrogen, people differ one from another; that they have independent wills, and know that their responses are being noted and measured. It was Duverger's view that assessment of performance on projective instruments such as the Rohrschach Test, the Thematic Apperception Test [TAT], and the Rosenzweig [frustration] Test, was "highly controversial."[221] So far as attitude scales are concerned [for example, the Bogardus, Thurstone, and Lickert scales] 'response-set' is a common problem.[222] Some subjects consistently take the same option when answers are required in a

yes/no form, or always record the extreme response [strongly agree/strongly disagree] or the middle-way [don't know] in a Lickert test. Strategies for dealing with the 'response-set' problem - for example, Criterion-groups Procedure, The Lie Scale, the Forced-Choice Method - have had a mixed reception, with experimental results suggesting that the remedial procedures can introduce "other difficulties of a very serious nature."[223] Knowing what is happening to them, many subjects appear to select or provide the response which they feel would be most acceptable to the tester. This can involve a fair measure of faking. E. J. Webb et al [1966] saw that one way out of this difficulty lay in the use of unobtrusive measures, but these would demand, by definition, that subjects bear witness against themselves without even being aware that they were in a test process. Use of such strategies would raise all manner of ethical issues.[224]

Test instruments are <u>indispensable</u> aids in the study of intra and cross-cultural differences, but they are unlikely ever to escape criticism or debate on their effectiveness and accuracy. This is simply in the nature of things, in the nature of the limitations of those who compile and interpret them, and in the nature of the subjects being assessed. It would be unfortunate if the cautions on the need to recognise similarities as well as differences, on the dangers of special pleading and

self-interest, on the exaggeration of homogeneity and diffusion, on the identification of a wider cultural context, were all met, but immodest claims were made on behalf of investigatory procedures.

[iii]

Geoffrey Gorer [1953] defined national character as that which "isolates and analyses the principal motives or predispositions which can be deduced from the behaviour of the personnel of a society at a given time and place."[224] The term national, as he and other anthropologists used it, referred to a society [i.e., a group "within which the members share the basic elements and conditions of a common life."[225]] possessing a culture in an identified space at an identified time, and not necessarily to a nation-state. It remains true, however, that the greatest impetus to the theoretical refinement of the concept of national character came in the political context of the Second World War and immediately subsequent events when researchers, first acting independently then under the auspices of Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures and a series of successor projects, attempted to identify cultural regularities in the behaviour of members of nation-states.[226]

In the context of the present chapter, with its emphasis on differential sharing and multi-modal distributions, the word national is ambiguous, carrying adequate significance as a discriminator vis-a-vis other nations but inadequate significance as a discriminator at the intracultural level. It is a word which can be taken to suggest that the character it qualifies is a corporate possession; it is a word which tends to have an 'embracing', non-discriminatory effect when applied to members as opposed to non-members. There is, of course, a sense in which the members of a national culture are embraced in or by experiences common to them and not to other people. This does not mean that they are untouched by influences that touch other people, but it does mean that to grow-up and live in one national culture will embrace the individual in a form and content of experience which is not identical to that which embraces the individual in another national culture. There is also a sense in which national identity or national image may, at certain times, come close to being a corporate possession. Dawson and West [1984] argued that the unity of a nation, internally among its own members as well as externally against others, "is... constructed ideologically around a specific 'national identity' which gives substance to 'nationality' and meaning to 'belonging'." For example, British national identity would be "a constructed version of Britain that says this is what Britain stands for, this is what it means to be British,

these are our characteristics."[227] Gorer had earlier referred to this 'unity' as an ideal image, "in the light of which individuals assess and pass judgement upon themselves and their neighbours."[228] Even in this area, however, it has been shown that individuals tended to share differentially in awareness and application of the ideological component of the British self-image, varying in the extent to which they were consistent and to which they experienced cognitive dissonance. Mead recognised the ambiguities and imprecision of the term national character. The research activity of the 1940s and 1950s was, of necessity, interested in nationally originating behaviour, that is, behaviour which was national in the sense that it was being expressed by people acting in the name of, or recognised as acting in the name of the nation as a whole. The national emphasis in the studies was "the exigent one that they were... designed to help national governments to deal with the members of nations who were also behaving nationally, as members of armies, negotiating commissions, and so on."[229] With those issues in mind, and in the context of the present chapter, the writer's preference would be for the replacement of the term national character by the terms 'cultural profile of the nation' and 'personality profile of the nation', so that when, for example, German national character was being discussed reference would be made to the German cultural profile, circa., and the German personality profile, circa. This terminology is, of

course, clumsy; it does not have the neatness or economy of national character. But the selection of the word profile is quite deliberate. In common usage the connotations of the word include ups, downs, peaks, troughs, in short the coming together of a number of different features to produce an overall image. In specialised assessment usage the concept allows for irregularities, for imbalance, for the recording of peaks and troughs; what then emerges is an overall pattern of performance.

On this basis it may be said of the members of any national culture that they have, as individuals, dynamic personality structures involving needs, motivations, traits, attitudes, etc.; that they all share, to varying degrees, in a common culture; additionally, in respect of their membership - normally multimembership - in different groups and socio-economic classifications, they share differentially in separate sub-cultures; that in this multi-layered sharing they conform - at least in terms of observable behaviour, and again differentially - to various sets of norms, and that this conformity makes them appear, whether apathetically or conscientiously, to accept the values that lie behind the norms; that they each occupy and play out a range of roles, and that the style or styles with which they play out their roles will be expressed in traits. It should be possible, as a result of

analysis and investigation, to construct two profiles broadly descriptive of the ways in which the national culture is distinct from others, a personality profile and a cultural profile. Each would take account of situational factors. [e.g., historical circumstances, immediate as well as long term] and of issues relevant to its own field - for example, individual differences as well as similarities in dynamic personality structures as revealed in multimodal distributions; differential sharing in the common culture as well as in separate sub-cultures; the distribution of traits across society as a whole, subsuming the incidence of particular traits in particular groups; the range and relative significance of social roles; norms and the means by which norms and actual behaviour are made to match; the extent to which values are accepted conscientiously, prudentially, or with mere acquiescence. Each profile would have a distinctive overall pattern vis-a-vis profiles constructed along similar lines for other national cultures.

Insofar as its essence as a concept is to direct attention to overall patterns of individual and social experience which make one society in some respects and to some extent distinct from another, national character - to use the historical term - may be defined as the composite picture which emerges when the two profiles are constructed. It is important to emphasise that it

is the overall patterns of its personality and cultural profiles which makes one society distinct from another, for in respect of some, perhaps even many of the various facets which coalesce into unique overall patterns - perhaps even in respect of sub-patterns within the unique overall patterns - one society may be more similar to than distinct from another society.

David Potter, writing in 1954, noted that "theories of the distinctiveness of... various peoples have gained singularly ready and widespread acceptance at the hands of writers in every country and in every age," with the identification of national traits being one means of demonstrating national superiority. In view of the long history of a concept whose origins could be traced as far back as the 5th century B.C., Potter thought that "it might be supposed that... far reaching attention would have been given to the rationale of the subject and that the idea would have been defined and elaborated with rigour and precision." On the contrary, however, he found that outside the field of social psychology those who had "trafficked" in the concept - particularly historians - had produced little more than "striking evidence of the lack of adequate analysis."[230] Many of the sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 of this thesis made statements about German national character. To what extent do they confirm Potter's complaint? To what extent do they take account of the range of issues discussed in the present chapter?

For example, to what extent was 'symbolic material' in cultural products analysed? When traits were discussed were distinctions made between different types? Was attention given to the distribution, variation, and relative salience of attitudes and values? Was serious consideration given to the concept 'authority' and how different people might have regarded it? To what extent was social systems analysis employed? Was the issue of differential sharing in culture considered? Was personality structure regarded as unimodal or multimodal? To what extent was reference made to similarities as well as to differences? Was self-interest and special pleading involved? What significance was assigned to situational factors?

Chapter 10 will address such questions. What must be said at this point is that individual and social psychologists appear to date the emergence of rigour and precision in national character analysis to the pioneer work of the 1940s and 1950s. Mead and Metraux's <u>Study of Culture at a Distance</u> [1953] was, in part, a recommendation to scholars in the social sciences to make use of methods for analysing cultural regularities that had been developed during and immediately following the Second World War. Their bibliography cited 447 titles, 337 of which were dated between 1939 and 1953. Klineberg, writing toward the end of the Second World War, was eager to draw attention to "certain techniques that psychologists <u>might</u> use in giving to national

character a more respectable face in the universe of scientific research."[231] If _specialists_ in the fields of individual and social psychology had not begun to develop a rigorous and coherent body of theory on national character until given an impetus by the outbreak of the Second World War it is hardly appropriate that _non-specialists_ should be criticised for not producing such a body of theory before that date. What could have been expected, however, from sources claiming objectivity, was comment informed by a common sense regard for their own everyday experience. This would have brought some light to their sorties into cross-cultural analysis. Furthermore, although the body of theory on national character awaited development, refinement and articulation, the field was not empty, and there was no lack of useful theory on more general aspects of individual/social psychology and sociology.

That this was so is evident from the fact that many of the sources which provide 'images of Germany' structured their arguments around concepts such as personality, culture, behaviour, and national character. This placed upon them an obligation. Short of an extreme position which would invoke the law of trespass against all non-specialists, the validity of argument so structured rests less on a writer's claim to academic qualification in the disciplines of, say, psychology or social psychology, than on the _discipline_ which he imposes on

himself. A writer who steps into the territory of the psychologist [individual or social] or the sociologist can make his way, however tentatively, only through an effort to familiarise himself not simply with the words on signposts but also with the terrain to which the words refer. If he cannot offer specialist credentials the very least he must do is act in a disciplined manner and, as rigorously as possible, locate concepts in a theoretical framework and then determine, with caution, how appropriate the theory might be as a means of understanding particular historical circumstances. Caution allows space for scepticism. The need to determine how appropriate theory is as a means of understanding particular historical circumstances is of crucial importance. If a theoretical edifice appears impressive it may be worshipped. The impression conveyed by some of the sources in, for example, the use of a concept such as 'neurotic personality', is that they had discovered through the services of a respected magician the key to a problem which had previously appeared insoluble. The problem with magic is that it requires no justification; in fact, it denies it. It is enough that the magician knows.

Judged on these tests, many of the sources which deal with the personality, culture, behaviour, and national character of 'the Germans' lack authority.

APPENDIX

Some examples of paper and pencil test instruments

(i)   Abridged version of a Values Survey Module for

        Cross-Cultural Survey Studies. Geert Hofstede [1984].

(ii)   An interpersonal Rating Procedure.

                                Robert Freed Bales [1970].

(iii)   'F' Scale Clusters.

                                Adorno et al [1950].

(iv)   Sample items from:

            Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale;

            The Affect Adjective Check List;

            Freeman Manifest Anxiety Test;

            The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.

                                E. E. Levitt [1968].

(i) Abridged version of a Values Survey Module for

Cross-Cultural Survey Studies. Gert Hofstede, Culture's

Consequences, pp. 283-285.

<div align="center">

VALUES SURVEY MODULE
FOR
CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEY STUDIES

</div>

Please think of an ideal job - disregarding your present job; in choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to:

1. Have sufficient time left for your personal or family life?

2. Have challenging tasks to do, from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment?

3. Have little tension and stress on the job?

4. Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.)

5. Have a good working relationship with your direct superior?

6. Have security of employment?

7. Have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the job?

8. Work with people who cooperate well with one another.

9. Be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions?

10. Make a real contribution to the success of your company or organisation?

11. Have an opportunity for high earnings?

12. Serve your country?

13. Live in an area desirable to you and your family?

14. Have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs?

15. Have an element of variety and adventure in the job?

16. Work in a prestigious, successful company or organisation?

17. Have an opportunity for helping other people?

18. Work in a well-defined job situation where the requirements are clear?

In response to each item, subjects are asked to indicate its importance on a 5 point scale [of utmost importance, very important, of moderate importance, of little importance, of very little or no importance].

The descriptions below apply to four different types of managers. First, please read through these descriptions.

Manager 1.   Usually makes his/her decisions promptly and communicates them to his/her subordinates clearly and firmly. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without raising difficulties.

Manager 2.   Usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but, before going ahead, tries to explain them fully to his/her subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the decisions and answers whatever questions they may have.

Manager 3.   Usually consults with his/her subordinates before he/she reaches his/her decisions. Listens to their advice, considers it, and then announces his/her decision. He/she then expects all to work loyally to implement it whether or not it is in accordance with the advice they gave.

Manager 4.   Usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates when there is an important decision to be made. Puts the problem before the group and invites discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as the decision.

19. Now, for the above types of manager, please mark the one which you would prefer to work under (circle one answer number only)

    1.   Manager 1
    2.   Manager 2
    3.   Manager 3
    4.   Manager 4
    5.   He/she does not correspond closely to any of them.

21. How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?

    1.   I always feel this way.
    2.   Usually.
    3.   Sometimes.
    4.   Seldom.
    5.   I never feel this way.

22. A company or organisation's rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the organisation's best interests.

23. Most people can be trusted.

24. Quite a few employees have an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if they can.

25. A large corporation is generally a more desirable place to work than a small company.

    In respect of items 22-25 subjects are asked to respond on a five point-scale [strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree, strongly disagree].

26. How frequently, in your work environment, are subordinates afraid to express disagreement with their superiors?

    1.   Very frequently.
    2.   Frequently.
    3.   Sometimes.
    4.   Seldom.
    5.   Very seldom.

27. How long do you think you will continue working for this company or organisation?

    1.   Two years at the most.
    2.   From two to five years.
    3.   More than five years (but I probably will leave before I retire).
    4.   Until I retire.

[ii]   **Abridged version of an interpersonal Rating Procedure.**

Robert Freed Bales, <u>Personality and Interpersonal</u>

<u>Behaviour</u>, pp 6-9, and chapters 9 to 35.

Concentrate your attention on the person you are
rating. Try to recall how he has behaved, what he has
said, what his attitudes seem to be, and how you feel
about him. When you have these memories activated,
read the questions on the form above entitled
Interpersonal ratings, Form A. Try to answer each
question "yes" or "no". If you are unable to give a
clear answer, either because of a lack of information,
or because of some conflict or ambiguity, put down a
question mark, omit that question, and go on to the
next question. Record your answers on a separate
sheet of paper, a yes, no, or a question mark for each
of the twenty-six questions.

Scoring Procedure for Interpersonal Ratings

Immediately following the questions on the
Interpersonal Rating Form you will find a key. After
either a "yes" or a "no" answer on each question you
will find a code of one, two, or three letters that
tell how you are to score the answer. The scoring is
done on a form like that shown in Figure 1.1.

After you learn the procedure you will not need the
full form. All you really need is a vertical list
containing the code letters U, D, P, N, F, B. The
procedure now follows in steps:

1. Go through your answers to all twenty-six
    questions and enter tallies according to the code
    shown on the key, making one tally mark for each
    letter in the code. For example, suppose a "yes"
    answer is followed by the code UPF, enter one
    tally mark after U, one after P, and one after F,
    on the form: three tally marks in all. Some
    codes call for only one tally, as in the case of
    question 1, coded yes = U. Others call for two,
    as in question 2, coded yes = UP. Still others
    call for three, as in question 3, coded yes = UPF.
    The separate letters stand for the names of
    "directions" in the system (explained in step 3),
    and a complete set of one, two, or three such
    component letters is called a "directional
    indicator."

2. After you have entered all tallies, **count the number** of tally marks after each code letter and enter the totals in the boxes marked Find Totals.

3. Next, **compare** the number entered for the direction U with the number entered for D. The letter U stands for the direction called "upward" in the spatial model of this system, and D stands for the one called "downward." It is understood that, as in ordinary three-dimensional physical space, movement upward is the opposite of movement downward. They are opposite directions; movement in either direction cancels movement in the other. The object of the comparison is to find which direction is indicated most frequently, and by how much. To record this result, note the larger total, subtract the smaller from the larger of the pair, and put down the number standing for the difference, followed by the name of the larger (U or D) in the first box titled Subtract and Name. Go through the same steps for P (positive) compared to N (negative) on the assumption that, as in algebraic addition, the directions positive and negative cancel each other. Then do the same for F (forward) compared to B (backward), with the rule that forward and backward cancel each other (see Figure 1.1).

INTERPERSONAL RATINGS, FORM B

1. Is his (or her) rate of participation generally high?
2. Does he seem to assume he will be successful and popular?
3. Does he seem to see himself as a good and kind parent?
4. Is his rate of giving suggestions on group tasks high?
5. Is his rate of receiving disagreement generally high?
6. Does he seem to make others feel he dislikes them?
7. Does he receive a lot of laughter?
8. Does he seem very extroverted?
9. Does he seem able to give a lot of affection?
10. Does he seem friendly in his behaviour?
11. Is his rate of giving agreement generally high?
12. Does he tend mostly to give opinion or analysis when he participates?
13. Does he seem to emphasize moderation, value-determined restraint?
14. Does he seem unfriendly in his behaviour?
15. Does he seem pessimistic about group ideals?
16. Does he seem preoccupied with wishful fantasies?
17. Does he seem to make others feel they are entertaining, warm?
18. Does he seem calm, understanding?
19. Does he seem to be submissively good?
20. Does he seem often to ask for suggestion or for task-leadership?
21. Does he seem to feel anxious, fearful of not conforming?
22. Does he seem only to participate when others ask him for his opinion?
23. Does he seem preoccupied with feelings of dislike for others?
24. Does he show many signs of tension and passive resistance?
25. Does he seem unlikely to arouse dislikes?
26. Does he seem to confine his participation mostly to only giving information when asked?

KEY TO INTERPERSONAL RATING FORMS
(This key is used for Forms A, B, C).

|		
1.	No = D	Yes = U
2.	No = DN	Yes = UP
3.	No = DNB	Yes = UPF
4.	No = DB	Yes = UF
5.	No = DPB	Yes = UNF
6.	No = DP	Yes = UN
7.	No = DPF	Yes = UNB
8.	No = DF	Yes = UB
9.	No = DNF	Yes = UPB
10.	No = N	Yes = P
11.	No = NB	Yes = PF
12.	No = B	Yes = F
13.	No = PB	Yes = NF
14.	No = P	Yes = N
15.	No = PF	Yes = NB
16.	No = F	Yes = B
17.	No = NF	Yes = PB
18.	No = UN	Yes = DP
19.	No = UNB	Yes = DPF
20.	No = UB	Yes = DF
21.	No = UPB	Yes = DNF
22.	No = UP	Yes = DN
23.	No = UPF	Yes = DNB
24.	No = UF	Yes = DB
25.	No = UNF	Yes = DPB
26.	No = U	Yes = D

Figure 1.1 Scoring procedure for interpersonal ratings.

Some examples of personality types [Bales, Part 2, pp. 189-377]

Type U: Toward Material Success and Power

The member located in the upward part of the group space by his fellow members seems active, talkative, and powerful, but not clearly either friendly or unfriendly. He is neither clearly value- or task-oriented, nor is he expressively oriented against the task. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward material success and power. "Our modern industrial and scientific developments are signs of a greater degree of success than that attained by any previous society." "There are no limits to what science may eventually discover." "Let no one say that money is of secondary value - it is the measuring stick of scientific, artistic, moral, and all other values in a society."

Type UP: Toward Social Success

The member located in the upward-positive part of the group space by his fellow members seems to be socially and sexually extroverted, ascendant but at the same time open and friendly. He encourages others to interact to express themselves and give their opinions, but he is neither clearly for the group task nor against it. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward social success and popularity. "The most important thing in any group is to maintain a happy, friendly atmosphere, and let efficiency take care of itself." "Cooperation is far more enjoyable and more desirable than competition." "There are always plenty of people who are eager to extend a helping hand."

TYPE UNF: Toward Autocratic Authority

The member located in the upward-negative-forward part of the group space by his fellow members seems dominating and unfriendly and takes the initiative in the value-or task-oriented direction. He assumes moral superiority over the others in the group and regards himself as the authority and the guardian of the moral and legal order. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward autocratic authority. "In most groups it's better to choose somebody to take charge and run things and then hold him responsible, even if he does some things the members don't like." "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn."

Type P: Toward Equilitarianism

The member located in the positive part of the group space by his fellow members seems friendly, sociable, and informal. He approaches others as equals, neither ascendant nor submissive. He seems interested in them as individual persons with needs and motives of their own, as important as his own. He is not concerned about either their conventionality or their deviance, nor with either their task-relevance nor their status. In the realization of his own values he seems to move toward equilitarianism. "There should be quality for everyone - because we are all human beings."

Type N: Toward Individualistic Isolationism

The member located in the negative part of the group space by his fellow members seems unfriendly and disagreeable, but neither ascendant nor submissive, neither value- and task-oriented, nor against authority as such. He is rather self-concerned and isolated, detached, unsocial, defensively secluded and negativistic. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward individualistic isolation. "In life an individual should for the most part 'go it alone,' assuring himself of privacy, having much time to himself, attempting to control his own life."

Type B: Toward Rejection of Conservative Group Belief

The member located in the backward part of the group space by his fellow members seems heretical and disbelieving. He refuses to admit the validity of nearly all conservative group beliefs and values. He wishes to install another form of society, or perhaps a different mode of existence, a fantasy mode, in another place and time. He is neither clearly unfriendly nor friendly, but ambivalent. He is neither ascendant and expressive, nor submissive and completely inhibited, but tends to be poised, lost in the fantasy of wildly improbable ambitions, unable to decide anything or to actually strive for anything far in the future. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward the rejection of all conservative group belief. "Man can solve all his important problems without help from a Supreme Being." "Heaven and Hell are products of man's imagination, and do not actually exist." "The whole structure of society must be radically changed."

Type PB: Toward Permissive Liberalism

The member located in the positive-backward part of the group space by his fellow members is friendly and receptive to jokes and stories, neither ascendant nor submissive, but equalitarian. He is not task-oriented, but responsive to others as individual persons, appreciative and likable, ready to share and enjoy sociability. He wants everybody to have what he needs, without a lot of complications. He is concerned about persons and their growth. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward permissive liberalism. "Divorce should be subject to fewer old-fashioned restrictions and become more a matter of mutual consent."

Type DP: Toward Trust in the Goodness of Others

The member located in the downward-positive part of the group space by his fellow members seems friendly and nonassertive, calm and ready to admire others. He is neither primarily task-oriented nor expression-oriented, but responsive to others as individual persons. He tends to trust and identify with others. He feels people are good; he likes them in his calm and somewhat submissive way. He tends to emulate and imitate those he likes. In the realization of his own values he seems to be trying to move toward trust in the goodness of others. "People are basically and innately good." "The vast majority of men are truthful and dependable."

(iii) 'F' Scale Clusters

T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J.
Levinson, R. N. Sanford
<u>The Authoritarian Personality</u>, pp.255-257.

F-Scale Clusters: Forms 45 and 40

a. **Conventionalisms:** Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

41. The business man and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.

b. **Authoritarian Submission:** Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

4. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.

8. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

21. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

23. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

42. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

44. Nobody ever learning anything really important except through suffering.

c. **Authoritarian Aggression:** Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.

25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

27 There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

34. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.

37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

d. **Anti-intraception:** Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.

9. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things.

31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.

37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

41. The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.

e. **Superstition and Stereotypy:** The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

4. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.

8. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

16. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places.

26. People can be divided into two distinct classes; the weak and the strong.

29. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.

33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

f. **Power and "Toughness":** Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

2. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power.

13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.

21. It is best to use some prewar authorities in Germany to keep order and prevent chaos.

23. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

26. People can be divided into two distinct classes; the weak and the strong.

38. Most people don't realize how much our lives are

controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

g. **Destructiveness and Cynicism;** Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

6. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.

43. Familiarity breeds contempt.

h. **Projectivity:** The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

18. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.

31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.

33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.

38. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

i **Sex:** Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on".

25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.

39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

(iv) Sample items: Eugene E. Levitt, The <u>Psychology of Anxiety</u>

    (a)   Sample Items from Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale.

         I frequently find myself worrying
about something.   True   False

         I always have enough energy when
faced with difficulty.   True   False

         I am usually calm and not easily upset.   True   False

         I have diarrhoea once a month or more.   True   False

                                                    p.84.

    (b)   The Affect Adjective Check List

<u>Anxiety-plus</u>	<u>Anxiety-minus</u>
Afraid	Calm
Desperate	Cheerful
Fearful	Contented
Frightened	Happy
Nervous	Joyful
Panicky	Loving
Shaky	Pleasant
Tense	Secure
Terrified	Steady
Upset	Thoughtful
Worrying	

                                                 p.42

    (c)   Sample Items from Freeman Manifest Anxiety Text.

         If someone is easily irritated, the reason is he
cannot help himself.   Yes   No

         The successful person:
                 (1)   Takes things as they come.
                 (2)   Worries before each task.

         The average person:
                 (1)   Fears another war taking place.
                 (2)   Fears doing the wrong thing.

                                                 p.95

(d)   Sample Items from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

     I am calm.   1   2   3   4   5

     I feel regretful.   1   2   3   4   5

     I am a steady person.   1   2   3   4   5

     I am overexcited and 'rattled'.   1   2   3   4   5

<div align="right">p.96</div>

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    "... etymologically the word 'character'... is connected
    with making a distinguishing mark. 'Character' comes from
    the field of engraving; hence we talk naturally of the
    delineation of character." Figuratively, the term is used
    to "bring out what is distinctive about people." p.245.

2. Leonard Krasner and Leonard P. Ullman, Behaviour,
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3. Morris Ginsberg, Inaugural Address to the Social
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    April 17, 1941, published under the title 'National
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4. Krasner and Ullmann, op.cit., p.83.

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11. Greenstein, op. cit., pp.168-169.

12. Ibid., pp.179-180.

13. David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character [University of Chicago Press, 1954] p.37.

     Also,

     "Psychology would find in the culture concept a key to the interaction between society and the individual. Anthropology would find in the personality concept a key to the process by which external circumstances are internalised in transmuted form as traits and qualities of the individual. Culture, the medium, and personality, the receptor, were indispensable, each to the other." p.37.

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34. Bem, ibid. See chapters 2 to 5, pp.4-53.

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38. Ibid., pp.153 and 155.

39. Ibid., pp.155-156.

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41. Ibid., p.289. In this context, apathetic compliance

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more akin to identification or even to internalisation as
defined by Kelman.

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55. Ibid., pp.403-404.

56. Hofstede, op.cit., pp.111 and 118.

57. Ibid., for definition of how the UAI was compiled, see p.121.

58. Ibid., see pp. 132 and 133 for fuller treatment.

59. Ibid., p.135.

60. Cotgrove, op.cit., pp.14-15. It should be noted that a sub-system of a social system is, by definition, a system in its own right in relation to its own structural elements. For example, the school is a sub-system of the educational system, which is in turn a sub-system of the whole social system.

The model presented in Figure [2] would be used by the sociologist to demonstrate that, for example: [1] belief systems, or 'superordinate meaning systems', interrelate with (i) kinship systems, to the extent that the values of a society might determine husband and wife relationships, the number of partners to a marriage; for a special case note the Soviet Union in the 1930's [Charles Y. Glock, The

Sociology of Religion, in R. K. Merton, L. Broom, L. S. Cottrell, [eds] <u>Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects</u> [Harper, New York, [1965] pp.156-157]; (ii) <u>educational and economic systems</u> to the extent that a 'superordinate meaning' [say, Communism, Fascism, Democracy] creates a particular ethos, lays down open or closed procedures, limits or expands opportunities; (iii) <u>political</u> systems in that these may prescribe what values will have priorities, or may themselves be influenced in their decision making processes by existing values: [2] <u>educational systems</u> interrelate with (i) <u>economic systems</u> to the extent that they socialise children to perform work roles in the economy and (ii) <u>kinship systems</u> to the extent that family situations influence a child's scholastic performance: [3] <u>political systems</u> interrelate with (i) <u>kinship systems</u> in that family situation can determine voting behaviour, or, in extreme cases, 'the family' can be organised and monitored in such a way that it serves the needs and interests of the political system; (ii) <u>economic systems</u>, through control of prices, expansion of public sector activities, etc., while a man's occupation may influence his political attitudes.

61. Robert K. Merton, Foreword to Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, <u>Character and Social Structure,</u> [Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1953] p.vii.

62. Ralf Dahrendorf, <u>Society and Democracy in Germany</u> [Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1968] pp.13-14. Dahrendorf's analysis will be examined at greater length in chapter 10.

63. Ibid., pp.137 and 387.

64. Glock, op.cit., [see reference 60] p.156.

65. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.131.

66. Ibid., p.83. And see Charles Tower, <u>Germany of Today</u>

[Williams and Norgate, London 1913] pp.214-215: "The German people, as individuals, are characterised by a great degree, not only of sociability, but also of apparently psychological necessity for concerted or combined action in all phases of their social life... there appears to be a certain distaste for the impromptu, and Germans are apt to circumscribe the simplest functions with a fence of rules, regulations, and restrictions, which may appear galling to foreigners, but appear to excite very little vexation amongst the Germans themselves. The taste for combination and the dislike for impromptu and individual action is best seen in the curious development of the verein, association or club.

It was, I think, a German writer who declared that if two Frenchmen, two Englishmen and two Germans were cast away on three different points of a deserted island, the two Frenchmen would, within five minutes, be discussing their respective amours, the Englishmen would have climbed two hills and be waiting for someone to introduce them across the intervening valley, whilst the Germans would have founded a verein for the exploration of the island... In reality this is merely the working out of the inclination for concerted action. For the Singleton the Germans have also a charmingly characteristic word, derived from political life. They say that the isolated individual is "unbekleidet" or unclothed!"

67. Ibid., p.147.
68. Ibid., p.207.
69. Ibid., p.42.
70. Ibid., p.159.
71. Ibid., p.161.
72. Ibid., p.163.
73. Ibid., pp. 51 and 139.

74. See Tower, op.cit.

    (i)   "In the social hierarchy... it may be taken for granted that the officer comes first: he is followed by the civil official in his degree, and even the civil officialdom is given a measure of military prestige: the peaked cap of officialdom greets the visitor to Germany at the first customs-house, and follows him then throughout his visit.

Social caste is determined by the position of the man or woman within the official hierarchy, and inasmuch as the State has taken for its own proper sphere so many departments of public life and activity it is plain that the grades of officialdom are infinite, and the ceremonial observances connected with them are as puzzling to the stranger within the gates as they are oft-times absurd, even in the eyes of Germans themselves. For the German press itself is sarcastic enough about these absurdities... Next to the official castes and classes may be ranged the variety of honorary or semi-official designations, the long range of 'handles' which represent much-coveted distinctions without any corresponding functions in the machinery of the State, or any actual power other than that of prestige... After the titles came the medals and various decorations in their degrees, to be worn upon all occasions when there is the least excuse for their production. In their way medals and decorations also are regarded as lifting the lucky wearer out of the ruck of common folk, and as establishing a measure of social prestige. They appear to be looked upon as an honour conferred by the State for distinguished public service, and thus as establishing the public character of the wearer or

rather his right to be included vaguely in the machinery of government."

(ii) "... the constantly increasing precision of a big manufacturing plant tends to reduce factory labour ever more to the level of that simple obedience to rule, the German 'Vorschrift', which saves the individual German so much trouble...

Partnerships give way to stock companies, and stock companies in turn to syndicates, but the nature of the agreement changes also. The syndicate develops into a public body, its executive becomes a Beamtenschaft, or body of officials in the German mind with all the dignity and privileges of the official caste, and as such not lightly to be subjected to individual criticism. Hence there is a fair field in Germany for the growth of the syndicate as the normal form in economic development." pp. 176-177.

75. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.253.

76. Theodor Geiger, Die Soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes: [Social Stratification of the German People] 1932, p.98, quoted in Dahrendorf, ibid. pp. 95-96.

77. Ibid., p.54.

78. Ibid., p.144.

79. David M Potter, op.cit., p.205. The reference is to Simon Nelson Patten, The New Basis of Civilisation [MacMillan, New York, 1907] pp. 187-88.

80. Ibid., see chapter IX, Abundance and the Formation of Character, pp. 189-208.

81. Ibid., p. 204, [my italics].

82. Ibid., pp. 91-92:

"... the connotations to an American are quite unlike what they might be to a European. A European, advocating equality, might very well mean that all men should occupy positions that are on roughly the same level in wealth, power, or enviability. But the American, with his emphasis upon equality of opportunity, has never conceived of it in this sense. He has traditionally expected to find a gamut ranging from rags to riches, from tramps to millionaires... Thus equality did not mean uniform position on a common level, but it did mean universal opportunity to move through a scale which traversed many levels. At one end of the scale might stand a log cabin, at the other the White House; but equality meant that anyone might run the entire scale."

83. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

84. Ibid., p. 113.

85. Ibid., p.112, quoting J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement [Princeton University Press, 1926] p.41.

86. Inkeles and Levinson, op. cit., p.463: "we have perhaps placed an undue emphasis on the study of individual personality... one may suggest, as Margaret Mead does in some of her writings, that personality and culture are so inextricably bound together, so reciprocally interweaving, that the formal distinction between them need not or cannot be maintained... we agree that personality, culture, and social structure are three abstractions derived for the most part from a single order of phenomena, namely, human behaviour and experience. The distinction between them is thus largely an analytic, not a phenomenal one."

87. Ibid., p. 424.

88. It should be noted that the view taken in this thesis is

that the term 'personality' is neither synonymous with 'character', nor "something more general and amorphous" than character [for the quotation, and the opposite view, see R. S. Peters, op. cit., p. 244, chapter 12]. Peters considered that character was shown "in the sort of things a man can <u>decide</u> to be." [p.245] The concept therefore carried with it a suggestion of "inner effort and decision" [p.247]. This is similar to Roback's definition of character as "an enduring psychophysical disposition to inhibit impulses in accordance with a regulative principle." [A. A. Roback, <u>The Psychology of Character</u> p. 450]. Allport considered that character was "personality evaluated" [G. W. Allport, op.cit., p.52], and this 1927 evaluative element was underlined by Cook [1984]: "In the scientific sense of the word, everyone has a personality, and all personalities are equal. No personality is better or worse than another. The lay person talks of John having 'no personality' and Jill having 'a very bad personality'; the lay person means that John has little or no social presence, and that the way Jill behaves will make her and/or those around her unhappy." Mark Cook, <u>Levels of Personality</u> [Holt, Rinehart, Winston, London 1984] p.2. Allport considered that "when a man shows 'character' by resisting temptation, or when it is said that the aim of education should be the 'development of character', what is really meant is that the man has behaved, or the child should be trained to behave, in ways that are approved by prevailing social and ethical standards. The exercise of 'will' in each case is a phenomenon of personality. <u>Character enters the situation only when this personal effort is judged from the standpoint of some code.</u> If willpower is shown in a man's behaviour, then willpower is <u>in</u> his personality; if constancy, inhibition,

self-respect, the power of 'prolonging the vestibule of desire'... characterises his behaviour, then these traits are important features of his personality. Social standards as well as psychology are brought in when we label such conduct 'character'." Allport, op. cit., p.51.

89. Allport, op. cit., p.106.

90. Ibid., pp. 371-372.

91. T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson & R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality [Harper and Row, New York, 1950] p.6.

92. Gordon W. Allport, op. cit., pp.27-47.

93. "Since there is no such thing as a wrong definition of any term, if it is supported by usage, it is evident that no one, neither the theologian, the philosopher, the jurist, the sociologist, the man in the street, nor the psychologist, can monopolise 'personality'." Ibid., p.47.

94. Ibid., p.47.

95. Ibid., pp. 40 and 48.

96. Ibid., p. 48.

97. T. W. Adorno et al, op. cit., p.5.

98. Inkeles and Levinson, op. cit., p. 426.

99. Gordon W. Allport, op. cit., p. 304.

100. Ibid., p. 287 referring to M. May in Journal of Social Psychology, 1932, 3, p. 133.

101. Ibid., p. 289.

102. "... take the case of Dr. D., always neat about his person and desk, punctilious about lecture notes, outlines, and files; his personal possessions are not only in order but carefully kept under lock and key. Dr. D. is also in charge of the departmental library: in this duty he is careless; he leaves the library door unlocked, and books are lost; it does not bother him that dust accumulates. Does this contradiction in behaviour mean that D. lacks

traits? Not at all. He has two opposed stylistic traits, one of orderliness and one of disorderliness. Pursuing the case further, this duality is explained by the fact that D has <u>one</u> cardinal [motivational] trait from which these contrasting styles proceed. The outstanding fact about his personality is that he is a self-centred egotist who never acts for other people's interests, but always for his own. This cardinal trait of self-centredness... <u>demands</u> orderliness for himself, but not for others." Ibid., p.331.

103. Ibid., p.321.

104. Ibid., p.323. [See also Peters on this issue: "they usually indicate a <u>manner</u> or <u>style</u> of behaving without any definite implication of directedness or aversion -unlike the terms 'motive', 'attitude', and 'sentiment'. R. S. Peters, op. cit., p. 245].

105. Ibid., p. 293.

106. C. J. Adcock, <u>Fundamentals of Psychology</u> [Pelican, 1964] p. 197.

107. Inkeles and Levinson, op. cit., p.450.

108. S. Freud, <u>The Ego and the Id,</u> Trans., J. Riviere [Hogarth Press, London 1927].

109. See Abraham K. Korman, <u>The Psychology of Motivation</u> [Prentice Hall New Jersey, 1974]: "Basically... Freud's model of motivation of behaviour is that of a tension reduction system." p.18.

110. See Eugene E. Levitt, <u>The Psychology of Anxiety</u> [Staples Press, London 1965]: "... the maintenance of emotional stability... is a function of psychological homoeostasis. Psychological homoeostasis refers to the capacity of the human 'psyche', the 'mental apparatus' as Freud called it, to keep the feeling of anxiety from coming into consciousness, or to preclude awareness of thoughts or

impulses that would be anxiety evoking. The 'mental apparatus' maintains homoeostasis through various processes which Freud called defences against anxiety, or <u>defence mechanisms</u>." p.56.

111. For example, "... excessive irritability, withdrawal, depression, or somatic complaints." Levitt, Ibid., p.58.

112. Dorothy W. Seago, in Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds) <u>A Dictionary of the Social Sciences</u> [Tavistock, London 1964] p. 311.

113. Frank E. Hartung, in Gould and Kolb [eds] ibid. p.231.

114. James Strachey, introduction to S. Freud, <u>Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis</u> [Pelican 1974] p.19.

115. Frank E. Hartung, op. cit., p.231.

116. A. K. Korman, op. cit., p.19 [see S. Freud, <u>The Problem of Lay Analysis</u> [Brentano's, New York, 1927] "the super ego is the agent of that phenomenon we call our conscience." p. 125].

117. Levitt, op. cit., p.41.

118. Ibid., p.43.

119. Ibid., p.43. [My italics].

120. Ibid., p. 77: "Employment of defence mechanisms usually involves some distortion of reality. Nevertheless, their functioning is seen as necessary to normal development and functioning. For many of us, the distortions are not serious ones, and are over-compensated by the diminution of psychic pain. However, when the intensity level of anxiety rises sharply, the defences tend to rigidify and to extend their influence over the individual's behavioural repertory. It is at this point that we begin to speak of psychopathology."

121. Levitt, ibid., p.63.

122. Adcock, op. cit., p.248.

123. Hofstede, op. cit., p.17.

124. G. W. Allport, op. cit., p.398.

125. Hofstede, op. cit., p.18.

126. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, <u>Personality in Nature, Society and Culture</u> [A. Knopf, New York 1949] p.xiv.

127. The making of distinctions between people on the basis of social setting and individual 'personality' is an activity with a long tradition.   See Allport, op. cit., chapter 3, for a discussion of the contributions of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Jean de la Bruyere. See also Potter, op. cit., chapter 1.

128. William Brown, <u>British Journal of Psychology</u>, 1944, p. 43.

129. Kluckhohn and Murray [1949] op. cit., p.36.

130. John Demos, 'Developmental Perspectives on the History of Childhood', [in <u>Journal of Interdisciplinary History</u>, Vol. II, No.2, 1971] p. 316.

131. R. S. Peters, op. cit., pp.247-248.

132. M. Ginsberg [1942] op. cit., p.183.

133. Note Hofstede, op.cit., p.34.

"In the process of comparing phenomena, similarities and differences are two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, research designs usually favour either the search for similarities or the search for differences... some studies want to show that different [groups] are in reality 'brothers under the skin'; other studies want to show that superficially similar [groups] are really 'birds of a different feather.'"

134. Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., p.428.

135. Milton Mayer, <u>They thought they were free</u> [University of Chicago Press 1955]. See chapter 10 of this thesis.

136. Ginsberg, op.cit., p.190.

137. G. W. Allport, op.cit., p.325.

138. Mead and Metraux, op.cit., p.17.

139. Ginsberg, op.cit., p.183. For example, from the Anglophobe

side, see L. Schucking, Der englische Volkscharakter [1915] and W. Dibelius, England [1923].

140. See Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., p.427.

141. Otto Klineberg, 'A Science of National Character' [Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.19, 1944, given orginally as the Address of the retiring Chairman of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 11 September 1943], p.149.

142. See Potter, op.cit., p.5, ftn., quoting B. Jowett's translations of The Republic and The Politics.

143. B. Schrieke, Alien Americans [Viking Press, New York, 1936].

144. Max Meenes, 'A Comparison of Racial Stereotypes of 1935 and 1942' [Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.17, 1943]. See also Madorah E. Smith, 'A Comparison of Judgment of Prejudice toward certain racio-national groups before and since the entry of the United States into World War II' [Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.18, 1943].

145. Ibid., p.332.

146. Klineberg, op.cit., p.150.

147. 'Meet Germany' [Atlantik-Brucke, June 1962] pp.118-121].

148. Owen Wister, The Pentecost of Calamity [Macmillan & Co. London 1916].

149. Ibid., pp.4-5.

150. Ibid., p.12.

151. Ibid., p.12.

152. Ibid., pp.14-15.

153. Ibid., p.21.

154. Ibid., pp.21-22.

155. Ibid., p.23.

156. Ibid., pp.45-46.

157. Ibid., p.47.

158. Ibid., pp.63-65.

159. Ibid., p.5.

160. Ginsberg, op.cit., p.185.

161. Rudolph Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, [New York 1937] quoted in Potter, op.cit., p.26. See also Klineberg, op.cit., p.159:- "... nations are not homogeneous... as a consequence we need... studies of various regions within the nation, as well as of economic classes and other sub-groups..." See also Ginsberg, op.cit., p.185:- "Politically complex nations often have sub-nations within them, as is, for example, the case in Great Britain, and the question arises whether there is a national character common to them all. Again, in most European countries there are important local differences both of temperament and character. The Picardian differs from the Gascon, the Norman from the Savoyard, and we cannot be sure that behind these divergencies there is an underlying identity of character."

162. See Hofstede, op.cit., p.91.

163. Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., p.427.

164. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power [Gollancz, London 1962] p.170.

165. Ibid., p.174.

166. Ibid., p.171.

167. Ibid., p.173. The alleged link between German characteristics and forests is also to be found in Chapter 4 of D. H. Lawrence's Fantasia of the Unconscious: "The true German has something of the sap of trees in his veins... and a sort of pristine savageness, like trees, helpless, but most powerful, under his mentality. He is a tree-soul..."; and on page 70 of G. K. Chesterton's The Crimes of England [London, 1915]: "... the one disadvantage of a forest is that one may lose one's way in it. And the one danger is not that one may

meet devils, but that we may worship them... the danger is one always associated... with forests; it is enchantment..."

See M. E. Humble, 'The Breakdown of a Consensus: British Winters and Anglo-German Relations 1900-1920, Journal of European Studies, Vol.7, 1977, pp.52 and 67-68.

168. Dahrendorf, op.cit., pp.18-20.

169. Jacques Barzun in The Nation, April 1943, p.188, quoted in Klineberg op.cit., p.147.

170. Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem [Nelson, London, 1912] pp.69-70.

171. Ibid., p.102. and Karl Dietrich Bracher, Deutschland zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur [Bern, Munich, 1964] p.76.

172. Rainer C. Baum, The Holocaust and The German Elite [Croom Helm, London, 1981] p.67. Baum's Thesis will be examined in Chapter 10.

173. Ginsberg, op.cit., pp.188-190.

174. James J. Sheehan, 'What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography.', Journal of Modern History, 53, March 1981, p.21.

175. Düsseldorfer Tageblatt, 11 December 1914.

176. Sheehan, op.cit., pp.4, 18, 20. The reference is to Frank B. Tipton, Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the Nineteenth Century [Middletown, Conn., 1976].

177. Sarolea, op.cit., p.69.

178. Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., pp.427-428. The reference is to R. Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality [Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1945].

179. Ibid., p.425.

180. H.W. Koch, 'Social Darwinism as a Factor in the 'New

Imperialism'', in H. W. Koch [ed.] The Origins of The First World War. [Macmillan, London 1972], p.336.

181. Ibid., p.337.

182. Quoted ibid., p.340.

183. Quoted in James Joll, op.cit., p.18.

184. Quoted in Koch, op.cit., p.341.

185. National Review, see editorials of September 1905 and April 1909.

186. Roland Usher, op.cit., chapter 2, p.245.

187. Cramb, op.cit., chapter 2, p.3.

188. Koch, op.cit., p.340.

189. Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg, [Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, Stuttgart 1912].

190. Quoted in Koch, op.cit., p.341.

191. Quoted in Joll, op.cit., p.18.

192. Quoted ibid., p.18.

193. Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Aggression,' Journal of Peace Research, Vol.1, 1964, pp.95-119.

194. See Ralph Pettman, op.cit., p.258.

195. D. MacIntyre, The Great War: Causes and Consequences [Blackie, 1979], p.35.

196. Pettman, op.cit., p.258.

197. Allport, op.cit., p.39.

198. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology [Pelican 1978] p.91.

199. Cook, op.cit., pp.38-39.

200. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind [Basic Books, New York 1960], p.32.

201. Bem, op.cit., p.16.

202. H. Tajfel, 'Stereotypes', Race, Vol.5, No.2 1963, pp.3-14.

203. Allport, op.cit., p.314.

204. Baum, op.cit., p.15.

205. Bruno Bettelheim Surviving and other Essays [Thames &

Hudson, London 1979], pp.317-332.

206. Allport, op.cit., pp.42-43.

207. Ibid., p.314.

208. Ibid., p.325.

209. Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., pp.425-426.

210. Maurice Duverger, Introduction to the Social Sciences [George Allen and Unwin, London 1964], pp.105-108. See also E. Dale, The Content of Motion Pictures [New York 1937]; M Wolfenstein and N. C. Leites, Movies: A Psychological Study [Glencoe 1950]; H. D. Lasswell, N. Leites [et al], Language of Politics [New York 1949]; W. Schutz, Theory and Method of Content Analysis [1950], B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research [New York, 1952].

211. See E. Lerner, Journal of Psychology, Vol. 13, 1942, discussed in Klineberg op.cit., pp.154-156; S. Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler [Princeton University Press 1947]; D. V. McGranahan and I. Wayne, 'German and American Traits reflected in popular Drama', Human Relations Vol.1, 1949, pp.429-455; Baum, op.cit., the 31 novels selected were:

Prussia

1.   Fontane, Th. Der Stechlin. Berlin: A. Weichert Verlag (n.d.); first published, 1898; 16th ed., 1907; 36th ed., 1918.

2.   "   Effie Briest. Munchen: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1959; first published, 1895; 5th ed. 1896; 83,000 by 1923.

3.   "   Frau Jenny Treibel. Munchen; Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1959; first published, 1892; 86,000 by 1920.

4.   "   Vor dem Sturm. Munchen; Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung. 1959; first published, 1878; 24th ed. 1920.

5. Viebig, C. <u>Die vor den Toren</u>. Stuttgart; Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1910; 31,000.

6. " <u>Dilettanten des Leben.</u> Berlin; E. Fleischel & Company, 1905; 4th ed.

7. " <u>Das Eisen im Feuer</u>. Stutgart; Deutsche Verlagshandlung, 1925; first published, 1913; 22,000.

8. " <u>Das Schlafende Heer</u>. Berlin: E. Fleischel & Company, 1906; 20th ed.

9. " <u>Die Wacht am Rhein</u>. Berlin: E. Fleischel & Company, 1906; 18th ed.

1, 2, 4, and 8 deal with Prussian aristocrats; 3, 5, and 7 deal with Berlin bourgeoisie; 9 deals with Prussians living in the Rhineland; novels dealing with Prussians and Rhinelanders are listed under both regions.

South and Southwest

1. Ganghofer, L. <u>Das Gottesleben.</u> Stuttgart: Verlag A. Bonz, 1905; 21st ed.

2. " <u>Der Klosterjager.</u> Stuttgart: Verlag A. Bonz, 1905; 31st ed.

3. Rosegger, P. K. <u>Die Schriften des Waldschulmeisters.</u> Wien: Hartlebensverlag, 1894; 14th ed.

4. Auerbach, B. <u>Edelweiss.</u> Boston, Mass: Roberts Brothers, 1869, 4th ed.

5. " <u>Barfussele.</u> Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1871, 3rd ed.; 6th ed.,; 1874.

6. " <u>Joseph im Schnee</u>. Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1871, 3rd ed.; 6th ed., 1874.

7. " <u>Auf der Hohe.</u> Stuttgart; Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1878, 11th ed.

1 to 3 deal with inhabitants of the Deep South, 4 to 7 with those of the Southwest.

West (Rhineland)

1. Viebig, C. <u>Das Weiberdorf</u>. Berlin; E. Fleischel & Company, 1906; 20th ed.

2. "   <u>Rheinlandstochter.</u> Stuttgart; Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1922; 32nd ed.

3. "   <u>Vom Muller Hannes</u>. Stuttgart; Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1925; 43,000.

4.* "   <u>Die Wacht am Rhein</u>. Berlin; E. Fleischel & Company, 1906; 18th ed.

5.* "   <u>Dilettanten des Lebens.</u> Berlin; E. Fleischel & Company, 1905; 4th ed.

6.* "   <u>Das Schlafende Heer.</u> Berlin; E. Fleischel & Company, 1906; 20th ed.

*Already listed under Prussia, these novels portray the confrontation of Rhinelanders and Prussians; 1 and 3 deal with inhabitants of the Eifel mountains, 2, 4, 5, and 6 with inhabitants of the Rhine Valley and the Mosel Valley.

National

Scheffel, J. V., von. <u>Ekkehard</u>. Stuttgart; Verlag A. Bonz, 1877, 22nd ed.; first published, 1855; 240th ed., 1904.

<u>Die Gartenlaube</u> sample:

1. Werner, E. "Am Alter," <u>Die Gartenlaube</u>, 1872, Nos. 1-17.

2. Marlitt, E. "Die zweite Frau," <u>Die Gartenlaube</u>, 1874, Nos. 1-21.

3. Wichert, E. "Ein kleines Bild," <u>Die Gartenlaube</u>, 1875, Nos. 12-20.

4.   Temme, J. D. H. "Auf Waltersburg," Die Gartenlaube,
     1878, Nos. 2-7.

5.   Schmid, H., von "Ledige Kinder," Die Gartenlaube,
     1880, Nos. 1-7.

6.   "   "Trudschens Heirat," Die Garterlaube,
     1885, Nos. 21-32.

7.   Marlitt, E. "Das Eulenhaus," Die Gartenlaube, 1888,
     Nos. 1-14.

8.   Elcho, R. "Weltfluchtige," Die Gartenlaube, 1892, Nos.
     1-9.

9.   Werner, E. "Fata Morgana," Die Gartenlaube, 1896, Nos.
     1-25.

10. Heimburg, W. "Antons Erben," Die Gartenlaube, 1898,
     Nos. 1-26.

11. Robran, P. "Kampf ums Gluck," Die Gartenlaube, 1900,
     Nos. 7-17.

Klineberg considered that Lerner's study was "...
especially interesting as an attempt to derive national
character from the examination of a particular cultural
product," but disputed that the "well-nigh catastrophic
disturbance in self-evaluation" said to characterise German
psychologists under the Nazi regime could be extended with
confidence to the German people as a whole. [p.154]

Inkeles and Levinson, op.cit., commenting on Kracauer's
view that the frequent manifestations of sadism in early
German films reflected a corresponding facet of the German
character noted that

    "... documents such as movies... may be more
    indicative of the personalities of the elite who
    produce them than of the broad consumer

> public... It is, of course, true that if
> such a product is to have wide appeal it
> must to some degree reflect important
> sentiments, values, and fantasies of the
> consuming public. However...
> a popular movie, or type of movie, may
> offend a large segment of the population;
> different groups may enjoy different
> aspects of it, or the same aspects for
> different reasons; and a great variety of
> popular movies may leave unrepresented some
> of the most important psychological
> characteristics of the national
> population." p.458

212. See Henry V. Dicks, 'Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology'. Human Relations, Vol.5, 1950, pp.111-154. Bertram Schaffner, Father Land: A study of Authoritarianism in the German Family [Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y. 1948].

213. Klineberg, op.cit., p.159.

214. Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry [William Morrow, New York, 1942]. The quotations are from Potter, op.cit., pp.48/49.

215. Klineberg, op.cit., p.153.

216. The distinction between rational and neurotic anxiety and its importance in the interpretation of German history will be discussed in Chapter 10.

217. Bales, op.cit., p.24.

218. When arguing that investigators should "read between the lines", and "listen with the 'third ear'..., Fromm was referring to an additional 'sense' with which, of course,

individuals are differentially endowed. Fromm [1978] op.cit., p.213.

219. S. G. Estes, The Judgement of Personality On The Basis of Brief Records of Behaviour [Cambridge, Mass., 1937.]

220. Allport op.cit., pp.507-509.

221. Duverger, op.cit., p.195. See also C. D. Morgan and H. Murray, "... The Thematic Apperception Test," Archives of Neurological Psychiatry, 34, 1935, pp.289-306; B. Murstein, Theory and Research in Projective Techniques [John Wiley, New York, 1963].

222. See A. L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction, [New York, 1957]; L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, The Measurement of Attitudes [Chicago, 1929]; R. Lickert, 'A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes,' Archives of Psychology, 1930.

223. For a discussion on techniques to remediate 'response-set.' see Korman, op.cit., pp.139-142.

224. Geoffrey Gorer, National Character, in Mead and Metraux [eds], op.cit., pp.57-82.

225. L. Wilson and W. L. Kolb, Sociological Analysis [Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1949].

226. For bibliography, details of Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, and list of personnel involved, see Mead and Metraux [eds], op.cit., pp.3-10, 451-474.

227. Graham Dawson and Bob West, "Our Finest Hour? The Popular Memory of World War II and The Struggle over National Identity": in Geoff Hurd (ed). 'National Fictions: World War II in British Films and Television' [British Film Institute, 1984], p.8.

228. Gorer, op.cit., p.57.

229. Mead and Metraux, op.cit., p.4.

230. Potter, op.cit., p.8.

231. Klineberg, op.cit., p.147.

CHAPTER 10

NATIONAL CHARACTER: APPLICATIONS

[i]

It may be said of the bulk of contemporary sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 that they do not constitute a challenge to David Potter's assertion that theories of the distinctiveness of national groups often find singularly ready and widespread acceptance. And, to the extent that many writers who commented on the traits and values of 'the Germans' were retailing, and offering for public consumption, ideas which could contaminate critical capacities if taken without due care, the sources also support his contention that there was a 'traffic' in the concept of national character. Before outlining a theoretical framework for the study of contributions on the characteristics of the Germans, two particular conceptual approaches have to be discussed briefly, then dismissed - the approach which took nations to have "great personalities of their own..."[1], and the approach which invoked the idea of an average personality structure and/or an average behaviour pattern.

Writing in 1915, Geoffrey Faber was cautious in his appraisal of the concept 'individual personality', and well aware that it was not a mere surface phenomenon. The concept still lacked theoretical substance; no satisfactory definition had been framed. In consequence, its nature was "imperfectly, if at all understood." On some issues, however, there was agreement. It

was known that personality was complex and variable, that it was
the product of ages of slow development, that it could be
"broken up", and that there was "more behind than appears on the
surface - immense reservoirs of energy and emotion seldom
dreamed of even by their possessor."[2] When he came to apply
the concept to the life experiences of individual men and to the
characteristics of nations, Faber was much less cautious.   The
complexities and hidden depths of personality and the variations
possible within an _individual's_ personality profile, were
collapsed into three clearly defined stages.   Each stage was
occupied by a particular 'type', identified by a clearly defined
cluster of traits, and each stage was an unfaltering step on the
way to maturity.

> "In the life of the... man of spirit we see three
> stages... First comes the boy... savage, vindictive,
> quarrelsome, cruel, pugnacious; then the young man...
> sensitive to honour, generous, quick to draw upon an enemy
> or to embrace a friend, ardent both in hatred and
> affection; last, the full grown man, growing each year
> more tolerant, more sympathetic, less angry, less
> impulsive. So runs the gamut from cruelty to charity."[3]

This model of personality development was then laid like a
template on national and international experience with the

suggestion that it was possible to trace "an exactly similar
course of development in the personality of nations," the one
difference - of degree rather than kind - being that the
characteristics reappeared in more or less exaggerated form at
national level.[4] The truth of this proposition was to be seen
in virtually "every event in international history."[5] Faber
did not elaborate on this point, but what he seems likely to
have had in mind was that, depending on the stage reached in the
development of the national personality, action on the part of
any one nation would be expressed savagely, vindictively,
cruelly, or with an unpredictability which could embrace
generosity, touchiness, fraternity and hatred, or with
sympathetic understanding. In this way the action of the nation
would resemble that of the boy, or the young man, or the mature
man.

The notion that as personality develops the psychological 'skin'
appropriate to each superseded stage is shed, that, in fact, the
process of development is unilinear, cannot be sustained; nor,
as will be noted below, can the notion that nations have
personalities. This is not to deny the explanatory value of
metaphorical connections between the psychological condition of
individuals and the public actions and reactions of nation
states. It was not uncommon before the First World War for
writers to depict the public actions and reactions of Germany as

expressive of <u>adolescent</u> behaviour. This was metaphorical, and illustrative of how Germany appeared to perceive herself in relation to other states. At its least sympathetic it was concerned with symptoms and had conservative undertones; Germany was being difficult and disruptive; she had the vigour and clumsiness of youth, but had not yet developed sound judgement; the socialisation process was incomplete. At its most sympathetic it was descriptive of an identity crisis, of a party to a set of relationships attempting to terminate the "social moratorium" between youth and adulthood and achieve parity of status.⁽⁶⁾

Faber asserted that "the personality of a nation is just as truly organic as that of a single individual." In an attempt – not entirely without merit – to establish the connections, he succeeded in demonstrating the absurdity of his case. "An organism", he wrote [clearly dealing with the human individual], "is something more than the sum of its parts. The character of... an organism is more affected by a few dominant than by a number of indifferent units." This much is acceptable; one only has to consider the relative significance of brain/central nervous system and limbs for the 'health' of the individual. When he came to consider the personality of nations he noted that <u>official</u> Germany, representative of the nation in international affairs, was "essentially warlike and

aggressive," whereas the <u>majority</u> of Germans were "personally disposed for peace and a quiet life, neither interfering nor interfered with." How was this to be explained? Since the personality of a nation was no less organic than that of an individual, the relative significance of components would again be the determining factor; in other words, it would be "the dominant and strongest personalities which contribute most to the personality of the nation as a whole."[7] Faber's attempt to explain official German conduct by making distinctions between Germans on the grounds of relative significance was an advance on the explanatory devices employed by many of his contemporaries, but the foundations of his particular argument were weak. Nations are not organisms; nor do they have personalities, as opposed to the theoretical possibility that at any given point in time they can provide territorial parameters for the construction of a complex personality profile. It is true that an individual organism is more affected by dominant than by indifferent units, and that the official conduct of a nation state is more likely to be affected by dominant rather than by indifferent forces. But Faber's parallels break down in face of a simple test; destroy the individual's brain/central nervous system and the individual organism dies; destroy the dominant forces responsible for the official conduct of the nation state and others take their places.

The concepts of 'average' personality structure or 'average' behaviour pattern are used in a number of sources. Geoffrey Faber [1915] commented on "the life of the average man...;" Thomas F. A. Smith [1916] asserted that "... the average German will sell his soul for an empty title...;" Paul Barr [1923] referred to "the average German, when you get to the root of him...;" L. B. Namier [1941] considered that "A nation can crystallise above or below the average moral level of the individuals who compose it."[8]

An average is arrived at through a process of redistribution. There are situations in which invoking the concept makes operational sense and others in which it does not. By 'operational' in this context is meant the capacity to actually implement the process of redistribution. If 5 men sitting round a table took all the money out of their pockets, pooled and summed it and then divided the total into 5 equal parts, with one share going to each individual, it could be said that each came to hold an average amount by an act of redistribution. There is operational sense to the exercise. On the other hand there may well be purpose [actuarial, commercial, welfare] but there is no operational sense in calculating the average height or average weight of a population. The calculation is possible, since numerical quantities are involved, but there is no possibility of actual redistribution. In these two examples,

calculation was possible in both cases, but redistribution [and, therefore, operational sense] in only one. Where personalities are concerned, neither calculation nor redistribution is possible.

Take Smith's assertion that "national character is a rough average of all the individual characters which make up the nation..."[9] Setting aside the objection that, even if such a calculation were possible, it would produce one standard national character which would probably fit very few individuals, rather than a national profile with internal variations, there are practical difficulties. How would a gross 'personality' quantity be arrived at? How would redistribution take place? Oddly enough, Smith did not have to invoke the concept of average. Had he dropped the first six words from the following passage on German characteristics and substituted a phrase such as, 'in order to form a picture of the culturally determined behaviour of a national group', he would have retained its essential meaning and at the same time expressed more clearly his obvious interest in behavioural norms and social sanctions and values. In itself the passage points to the importance of studying norm-referenced behaviour in a systematic way. The intrusion of a piece of verbal trickery in the form of 'average' was unnecessary.

"... in order to strike this average, their daily acts in

the counting house, street, and home must be observed. Attention must be paid to those deeds which receive condemnation or praise from the largest number of citizens. In the process of time an image is formed in the observer's mind representing the standard of right and wrong which regulates the doings between these men."[10]

Namier's use of the concept has already been mentioned in chapter 6. One or two comments may be added here. All the reservations made above on calculation and redistribution apply to his notion of an "average moral level." But he used "average moral level" for other purposes - namely to demonstrate the superiority of that level in one nation as against another. This led to logical inconsistency in his argument. Once formed, Namier's national character acted on individuals: "the English national pattern raises individuals above their own average moral level, the German suppresses their human sides."[11] In plain English this must mean that the prevailing norms and values in Britain made many people behave in a way which appeared to enhance their moral potential, whereas the prevailing norms and values in Germany made many people behave in a way which appeared to erode their moral potential. This means that positive, conscientious conformance was not universal in either nation, and that all sorts of motives were at play behind the overt acceptance of norms and values. In short, it presupposes differential

sharing. However, it will be noted below that Namier did not allow the notion of differential sharing - a logical consequence of his particular use of the concept of average - to intrude on his judgement of Germans en masse.

[ii]

Figure [9] represents an attempt to define an analytic framework within which the sources may be studied. With the discussion in chapter 9 in mind, an approach to national character would be considered unimodal, bimodal, or multimodal depending on how the contributor perceived characteristics - personality or behavioural - to be distributed. It is proposed that variance in the type of approach would be accompanied by variance in the nature of related arguments. For example, a unimodal approach would be more likely to exaggerate the degree of cultural or personality trait homogeneity, more likely to regard characteristics as innate, and more likely to recommend cataclysmic remediation than would a multimodal approach. Conversely, a multimodal approach would be more likely to assign some degree of causal autonomy to situational factors, more likely to demonstrate concern for appropriate methods of investigation, and more likely to give objective consideration to the wider cultural context than would a unimodal approach.

Structural Approach to National Character	Degree of homogeneity likely to be assumed.	RELATED ARGUMENTS							
		Degree of differential sharing likely to be assumed.	Likelihood that some degree of causal autonomy will be assigned to situational factors.	Likelihood that a wider cultural context will be objectively considered.	Likelihood of reference to cross-cultural similarities.	Likelihood that cultural considerations if cited will be regarded as complex and variable.	Likelihood that national characteristics are regarded as innate	Likely degree of concern for methods of arriving at conclusions.	Likelihood that cataclysimic remediation will be recommended.
UNIMODAL	greater	lesser	lesser	lesser	lesser	lesser	greater	lesser	greater
BIMODAL									
MULTIMODAL	lesser	greater	greater	greater	greater	greater	lesser	greater	lesser

FIGURE [9] A theoretical framework for the analysis of views on national character.

Application of such an analytic framework is relatively straightforward when dealing with sources which are <u>explicitly</u> unimodal, bimodal, or multimodal in approach to national characteristics. There are, however, one or two slightly odd cases which lie outside its scope, and a larger number of cases where the approach to characteristics is <u>implicit</u> and has to be inferred. In this latter case it is important that the reader is made aware of the interpretive processes used to assign particular modal structures to such sources.

J. A. Cramb [1914], L. J. Maxse [1915] and Paul Barr [1923] fall into the category of odd cases.[12] Maxse and Cramb were less concerned with national character as it has so far been defined than with the great historical currents and fates which in a sense 'selected' powers for greatness and then brought them into confrontation with each other. "The forces which determine the actions of empires and great nations," wrote Cramb, "are deep hidden... They lie beyond the wishes and intentions of the individuals composing those nations. They may even be contrary to those wishes and intentions."[13] In this there is a very definite sense of great events and developments being beyond the control of 'national characteristics' - "<u>La politique, c'est la fatalité</u>"[14] Of course, one may argue that the capacity to recognise and seize upon historical destiny or fate is probably a function of a particular 'type' of people. A lazy,

unimaginative, unambitious people, lacking in initiative, would be unlikely to take up the opportunities or use to the full that potential stored up by "laws more akin to Nature... than to the motives of human action."[15] This paradox is implicit in the work of Maxse and Cramb. On the one hand, individuals cannot be regarded as mere byestanders; Napoleon's belief that "Politics is Destiny" has to be taken in conjunction with his adage, "Everything is in the execution." On the other hand, there were "those darker, obscurer forces shaping the destiny of nations."[16] This paradox may be resolved by reading between the lines of a passage from Cramb's lectures which refers to Germany's spiritual resources, to "the hidden foundations of its strengths," and to the fact that "with nations, as with individuals, it is character that counts; he that wills greatly, conquers greatly."[17] Here Cramb appears to use 'character' in the same way that the concept 'having character' was treated by R. S. Peters - to describe individuals who could exercise self-control, who would not easily give way to self-indulgent desires, who would not take their colour from their company, who would do what their inner voices told them that they should, "even though the heavens fall."[18] Men of this calibre would be able, indeed essential servants in the cause of Destiny. It does not appear far-fetched to consider that Maxse and Cramb would have regarded as being without character the 'peace-cranks', the parliamentarians preoccupied

with 'trivial issues', the public men fascinated and hypnotised
by German blandishments, and all others whose words and deeds
appeared to deflect the energies of Britain from the inevitable
conflict. [19]

But character in this sense is descriptive of "the style and not
the content of a man's rule-following," [20] and as such may say
little or nothing about an individual's substantive or
motivational traits. Maxse and Cramb were more important to the
discussion on the appropriateness of the Idealist-Realist
dichotomy than they are to the discussion on national
characteristics.

Paul Barr's contribution [1923] may be described as 'odd' for a
quite different reason. His argument was markedly multimodal.
He highlighted what he termed natural lines of division and drew
the outline of a very richly patterned cultural profile:

"The south is Catholic and monarchist; the Rhineland is
Catholic but republican; the centre is Protestant and
moderately republican ; Saxony is almost Communist; the
north-east is Protestant but monarchist... There is a
chasm between what one might call the cultural atom of,
say, the Pommeranian and the Bavarian, or the Suabian and
the Westphalian, or the Prussian and the Saxon." [21]

He was aware that in posing the question, 'Is Germany a Nation?', he was running the risk of being labelled as an amiable lunatic or as some blissfully ignorant backwoodsman since,

> "For the last two generations we have had dinned into our ears stories of German thoroughness and craft, intense national ambition, admirable organisation and efficiency. Even before the war... we had grown accustomed to look upon Germany as a homogeneous whole, working with well-oiled bearings..."[22]

But he was convinced that the process of unifying Germany, of "forging it into the single, flawless blade of steel it proved to be in 1914", did <u>not</u> correspond to the genuine instinct in the mind of the German people.[23] The German Empire was not the product of natural, healthy growth. It was an artificial creation, likely in the near future, and as a result of the recent defeat, to revert to "a heterogeneous collection of states, each with its own problems..."[24] The Franco-Belgian seizure of the Ruhr had <u>appeared</u> to rouse national feeling, but resentment had been related to day-to-day economic deprivation – to "absurd prices for bread, butter, meat and the like" – rather than to any emotional commitment to the "sacredness of Germanic soil."[25] The same sort of response, with variation, had

characterised attitudes to the Silesian issue:

"German politicians and journalists went into hysteria about Silesia; it was, they said, like tearing the very heart out of the living body of Germany..."

But then it was discovered by the ordinary German that

"German industry was not dead... and that to its continued welfare it mattered not one row of pins whether Silesia was under the German or the Polish flag. The minute he realised that, he ceased to care about Silesia. It was dead meat to him."[26]

The problem, so far as the analytic framework is concerned, is that Barr did not so much comment on the characteristics profile of a permanent cultural entity known as Germany, as on the characteristics profile of a temporary, artificially created and soon to disappear cultural entity to be found in the geographical area known as Germany.

By way of contrast with contributions which were implicit in their approach to national characteristics, and call for inferential interpretation, [see below], Dillon [1914], Harrison [1918], and De Sales [1942] may be taken as examples of

contributions which were quite explicit on German characteristics.[27] In Dillon's view, Germany had parted company with morality. Warlike tendencies, evil purposes, and savage instincts characterised the people and gave the whole nation the image of the Anti-Christ. He conceded influence to culture, but in the case of Germany this influence was uniform. He did refer specifically to the "virus of the fell Prussian disease," but it would be a mistake to suppose that this was a serious act of discrimination, for Prussia and Germany were interchangeable terms as far as he was concerned, with 'Prussianism' being the creed which animated the nation as a whole. The remedy was to smash German culture. Justice should be retributive. The Devil should be destroyed. Harrison's position was that particularly nasty characteristics were very widely distributed across the German population. Each German had within himself something of "the wild beast." Just as the beast of the forest forever carried its markings, so with the German people; no amount of goodwill or consideration, no amount of time, no normal human circumstance or experience - and here we would have to include historical events, cultural modifications, etc., - could promote a change of character. It is clear that he took the characteristics to be not only homogeneous in distribution but also innate, that he denied any degree of causal autonomy to situational factors, that the wider cultural context was relegated to insignificance, and that

cultural considerations were seen as simple and uniform rather than complex and variable. Further, remediation had to be of the cataclysmic variety. There was a faint chance of re-birth to something less vile, but to be brought to it the German people would have to be broken, brought low, degraded and ruined. For Raol de Roussy De Sales, all Germans were characterised by commitment to a particular form of romanticism. The layer-by-layer development of his argument provided opportunities to limit the distribution of such a characteristic to, say, literary, intellectual, and artistic elites, but the opportunities were ignored. Whereas in other parts of Western Europe romanticism had, in sum, a fairly innocuous effect on political affairs because it remained within the framework of laws and conventions, the situation was different in Germany:

"... across the Rhine romanticism took a very different form... under its Germanic aspect, this exploitation of sentimental emotionalism, of inflated egotism... translated itself into something forceful, aggressive, bloody, racial and barbaric."[28]

Worship of the individual ego within areas of experience not controlled by the State, and in opposition to the rest of the western world, carried with it a threat to all codes of morality, a threat heightened by the fact that "the whole German

people now visualise themselves as the incarnation of the great romantic age." And, of course, it was the "fundamental theme of romanticism that the ego is the extreme law unto itself..."[29] The Germans saw it as their mission to "overthrow the western world, to rid themselves of its moral discipline, of its rationalism, of its concept that there is a law above man."[30] Hitler was indissolubly linked with this aspect of the German character. His Mein Kampf and J. J. Rousseau's Confessions had the same "unregulated intellectual exhibitionism." From a position of exaggerated self-importance both took pleasure in describing how they had suffered, and how harsh and unjust the world had been. In this, Hitler was "the perfect example of the romantic hero."[31] He was the mirror of every German's unconscious, the loudspeaker which magnified the inaudible whispers of the German soul; he was the first man to tell every German what he had been thinking and feeling all along. So that,

"Through Hitler, the Germanic tendency to identify brutality with strength, cruelty with manliness, hardness with determination, has been brought to perfection."[32]

In all this there was no regard for the possibility of differential sharing in cultural norms and values. A wider cultural context was alluded to, but the following passage

suggests that it was brought into play to support his general thesis and to point up paranoid and sado-masochistic tendencies rather than to consider, objectively, if international norms had any bearing on German policy.

"No other nation has tried to justify its quasi-pathological manifestations of brutality, lawlessness, and ferocity on the basis that the whole world was leagued against it in some sort of fabulous plot. No other nation has complained so much of being treated unjustly not only by fate but by every other single nation... No other nation has practised with such consummate skill and persistence the double blackmail of trying to inspire pity as a victim and terror as a bully."[33]

In contrast to Dillon, Harrison, and De Sales, Dent [1928], Gooch [1928, 1935 and 1939] and Eaton [1937] may be regarded as sources whose positions on the modality of German characteristics were implicit and had to be inferred.[34] In a short contribution of 11 pages to the Gardiner and Rocholl Symposium, Edward Dent never quite made it clear where he stood on the modal distribution of the characteristics which he assigned to Germans. The reader is two-thirds of the way through the article before he learns that Dent's purposes are limited

ones. Germany, he argued, was in need of leaders,

"... I do not mean political leaders, <u>for this article is</u>
<u>not concerned with politics,</u> but intellectual and artistic
leaders."[35]

In Germany there appeared to be a "blind devotion" to what was
<u>vorschriftmässig</u> - in accordance with instructions or
prescriptions. The effect of this had been to make "all German
life curiously devoid of artistic unity."[36] <u>Vorschriftmässige</u>
principles covered such concepts as <u>Bildung,</u> which was one of
the most cherished conventional ideas in Germany. <u>Bildung</u> -
form, structure, organisation - explained their "love to have
everything arranged in categories." The Englishman, on the
other hand, did not think in categories; he was synthetic in
his approach to issues and ideas - so that, for example, he
instinctively applied aesthetic principles to ethics "because he
does not know the difference between the two - he has no idea of
<u>Bildung."</u> The German could not possibly apply aesthetic
principles to ethics because he knew that they were "two entirely
separate things."[37] The act of bringing them together would
entail the crossing of category boundaries, and cause confusion.
It was a general insensitivity on the part of the British to
this commitment to <u>Bildung</u> which caused misunderstandings and
recriminations between them and the Germans. Germans, for

example, were frequently accused of being tactless, yet anyone who really knew them understood that they were fundamentally kind. The resolution of this apparent paradox was to be found in the fact that "tact is simply the application of intellect to kindness - and that, of course, is a confusion of categories."[38] Additionally, there was a tendency in Germany to take up " a definite attitude" toward anything and everything - "Mann muss dazu Stellung nehmen." This was a trait quite distinct from the Englishman's preference to "act on reason", to hesitate rather than simply go ahead without the necessary forethought.[39]

To what extent were such characteristics distributed across the German population as a whole? A close sentence by sentence analysis of Dent's contribution suggests that his approach to Germany, nationally, was bimodal to multimodal, but that his approach to the elite groups which were responsible for the definition and codification of 'Good Form' was unimodal. It was in these elite groups that a high degree of homogeneity was present. His references - 6 times in 3 pages - to the average German and the average Englishman appear in his case to be less an erroneous attempt to gross and redistribute personality traits than an ill-choice of synonym for the unimodal - i.e., overwhelmingly predominant - attitudes and behaviours of the socially dominant groups. When assessing German

characteristics the counterpoints in Britain were "large numbers
of people among the educated classes..."   When he strenuously
asserted that his contribution had nothing to do with politics,
and at the same time regretted that "all German life" was
"seriously devoid of artistic unity,"[40] the reader may be
entitled to assume that "all German life" meant all the German
life that he was specifically interested in - artistic and
intellectual circles. It is instructive to consider the status
of the native German sources whom he quoted in support of his
case. They were by no stretch of the imagination statistically
representative of the population as a whole. One was "a
cultivated and much travelled German..."; yet another had means
enough to arrange his European tours according to particular
fancies - Italy for beauty, France for the pleasures of the
body, Germany for the pleasures of the mind, and England for
Geselligkeit; then there were "two students... both sons of
professors and brought up in really cultured homes..."; and
again, "one friend of mine - a man with an amazing knowledge of
art."[41] The 'German' penchant for getting involved in things
immediately and instinctively rather than after a lengthy
period of consideration and preparation, was illustrated by
references to industrialists and businessmen. The way in which
Dent fixed his attention on and devoted his remarks to elite
groups within German society, highlighting what he took to be
their distinctive and uniform traits and attitudes, suggests

that his approach to the nation as a whole was implicitly bi-multimodal.

Three of G. P. Gooch's pre-1940 contributions to the debate on the German Problem [1928, 1935, 1939] make no explicit reference to national characteristics. In spite of this there are strong grounds for inferring that his approach was decidedly multimodal. All three are marked by an appreciation of the complexities and variability of cultural factors; all assign a measure of causal autonomy to situational factors; all give objective consideration to the wider cultural context involving international norms, values, and patterns of behaviour; two [1935, 1939] implicitly avoid exaggeration of homogeneity. In 1964, Gooch wrote postscripts to his 1935 and 1939 contributions which, unlike the originals, explicitly dealt with national characteristics. These postscripts support the inference of multimodality in the earlier work.[42] His afterthought on the Conway Memorial Lecture [1935] referred to the opportunity which the overthrow of the Nazi regime had given for "the re-emergence of the better elements in the German people"; that on the university of London Extra-mural Lecture [1939] raised the question of the extent to which the Nazis represented "the community whom they led into the valley of the shadow of death." He accepted that certain distinctive traits had variable distribution within Germany. It was possible to detect a

"traditional docility", and in part at least, the Germans were "a romantically minded and inflamable people..." That he did not perceive these characteristics as being uniformly distributed is evident from the fact that he used this analysis as the basis for a three-way division on political participation - positive supporters of the Nazi regime, positive opponents, and passive supporters. He believed it was "a delusion to regard Germany as more temperamentally bellicose than other nations." His post-war attitude to Germany was far from being one which favoured cataclysmic remediation; rather was it in line with that expressed by Beveridge. Germany should be treated not as a criminal but as a hospital case; "no offender can be reformed by outlawry."

Gooch's pre-war comments on the Nazi regime are particularly interesting in the context of this analysis since they may be read as descriptive of totalitarian efforts to establish, where it had not previously existed, the unimodal distribution of certain characteristics, traits, values, attitudes and behaviour patterns. The Nazi aim was to fashion a <u>Volksgemeinschaft.</u> Totalitarian uniformity would be expressed through "one party, one pattern, one rhythm, one creed." As the individual lost himself in the life of the whole, an "authorised type" would be produced. To distinguish between a typical pluralist - and so multimodal - democratic system, and the "single pattern of mind

and character" - unimodality - aimed at by the totalitarian system, Gooch used a botanical analogy: "It is the difference between the flower garden and a field of turnips."[43] His multimodal image of Germany before Hitler came to power may also be inferred from his comments that the Nazis were running a steam-roller over the "political and cultural regionalism... of the old Germany,"[44] and attempting by force to reduce to "mechanical unity" an "infinite variety of human types."[45] Situational factors, cultural complexities, and the wider international context were enlisted in explanation of the rise of Hitler and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Material destruction, humiliation, economic misery, had all played their part, and at the end it was "the American blizzard that filled his sails and floated him over the bar."[46] Millions of distracted people were searching for solutions to meet their own particular needs, and Gooch's appreciation of the sociological, regional, sub-cultural, confessional and age differences that gave rise to those particular needs confirmed that his perception of Germany was of a society in which characteristics were distributed multimodally rather than unimodally.

J. W. Eaton's contribution [1937] is less susceptible to confident inference, largely because in his case there are occasions when 'reading between the lines' - normally facilitated by evidence internal to the source - can be carried

out only if <u>external</u> collaboration or clarification is enlisted. And to do this is to run the risk of attributing to the original source very much more than it said, either explicitly or implicitly. To take account of this risk, two possible interpretations of Eaton's contribution will be provided, and the reader invited to make a choice. This particular case draws attention to the fine type of judgement that would sometimes be required to locate a source in the analytic framework.

So far as thought for methods of arriving at conclusions, ascription of some degree of causal autonomy to situational factors, and notice of a wider cultural context are concerned, Eaton's approach has the mark of multimodality. He thought it important to take a balanced view, to set aside any prejudice associated with the past. He believed that injustices had been incorporated in the Peace Settlement. Those could not be ignored as factors contributing to the rise of Hitler; nor could the serious post-war difficulties, internal and external - the prolongation of the blockade, the chronic inflation, the jealous and vindictive policies of France. A perception of sub-cultural differences, and so of differential sharing, can be detected in his view that the <u>Arbeitsdienst</u> could bridge gulfs in society.[47] And yet, he reflected,

"Are <u>all</u> the reasons for present-day Germany to be found

in the events since 1914? Are there not, as with other nations, still more important reasons to be found in her history and in certain traits in the national character..."

He was obviously troubled by the historical record. The Germans had never, to his time of writing, shown any capacity to achieve or bear the costs of a democratic system. They appeared to lack confidence and trust in each other. Reform never seemed to come from "Their own persistent efforts and sacrifice", but from "regulations and instructions from above." They could not bind themselves together by their own efforts; for this they seemed to require "a strong and confident leader."[48]

One way of reading Eaton's contribution would be that his willingness to retreat from a unimodal approach, through consideration of a range of explanatory issues, was ultimately overpowered by his feeling that crucially distinctive and very widely distributed characteristics had a profound influence on German history. This reading would have him fall into the unimodal camp. There is another way of reading his contribution, a reading which throws up a support rather than a counter to his initial willingness to retreat from unimodality. It is a reading which hinges on the view that German culture, nationally, was characterised by value-dissensus; that is to

say, that the Germans were characterised by multimodality so far as evaluative beliefs were concerned.[49] Such a view is not out of line with Eaton's claim that Germans, in their group relationships, did not trust each other, did not have confidence in each other, could not come together of their own volition, and even in crisis situations had to be forced into common purpose. Value-dissensus could account for their apparent submissiveness as expressed in certain kinds of norm-referenced behaviour; they were so different that in the interests of necessary social cohesion and the delivery of instrumental values a high prudential dividend was seen to accrue from obedience to secular authority. Such an explanation assigns to the Germans a rather distinctive fabric of characteristics - a more or less unimodal distribution of prudential attitudes toward what might be termed effective authority, that is, authority able to deliver an instrumental values, and a more or less multimodal distribution of evaluative beliefs. It is an explanation which does not dodge the dangers that lurk within it for a society so described. Would it, however, have recommended itself to J. W. Eaton?

Having dealt with preliminaries on forms of interpretation, the remainder of this section is given to consideration of sources assigned to categories:-

Multimodal		Bimodal		Unimodal	
E. C. Bentley	[1915]	Havelock Ellis	[1915]	A. Brome-Weigall	[1915]
T. S. Knowlson	[1918]	A. G. Gardiner	[1915]	Sidney Brooks	[1915]
Mona Caird	[1918]	G. Barraclough	[1946]		
Philip Gibbs	[1921]	Frances E. Warwick	[1915]		
S. Miles Bouton	[1922]	Thomas F. A. Smith	[1916]		
C. Hamilton	[1931]			Harold Nicolson	[1936/39]
Vernon Bartlett	[1933]	A. L. Rowse	[1937-41]		
Peace Pamphlet 19	[1943]	L. B. Namier	[1941]		
C. H. Herford	[1927]	R. Vansittart	[1941]		

Arthur Brome-Weigall took a very 'singular' view of German culture. In the community of nations, Germany stood out as a clearly defined, single and unique case. In one particular respect German civilisation and that of the rest of the world had "marched along separate lines." This distinctiveness was not difficult to explain. It had been brought about by one cardinal cause - the unimodal distribution of a single dominant Charakterzug which expressed itself behaviourally in an unfailing predilection for applying the principles of logic to human experience. Germans looked the world straight in the face, warts and all. They took it for what it was, with no thought to what it could be. They would have considered

themselves guilty of self-deception had they credited it with any hidden depth or meaning. They confronted the "raw facts of life" with thought processes which denied "the existence of a heart" and were untempered by a "nicer sense" or "the spiritual element."

Brome-Weigall referred on a number of occasions to German disregard of "that paradoxical delicacy which makes life tolerable", to their rejection of values and conduct that could not be "justified in logic." What he called the "cancer of logic" touched all aspects of their behaviour. It was in their habits, their morals, their arts. Slaughter was a daily occurrence in the animal world, and it was clear from experience that Nature was neutral in its regard for life. Man was an animal, and nations were simply rapacious packs of animals preying on each other. To allow sensitivity or squeamishness to influence decision making in such a context was to be a victim of logic. Better to recognise it and observe its rules. To make war – that is, to engage in a brutal enterprise – according to the tenets of an abstract idea such as 'fairplay', derived from an idealised view of mankind, was to be trapped in a non-sequitur. This frank recognition of, and accommodation to the crude and bestial elements in human experience was not limited to international relations; it also influenced their behaviour in the municipal area. In a country where an act of

self-control in constraint of human passions would be regarded as illogical, was it any wonder that there had been 140 murderous assaults in Germany "to every one in England in recent years." The artistic life of Germany was also corrupted by an "abandonment of all spirituality", to the extent that "the subjects chosen for representation are largely those which we object to display." The world was in need of salvation from this "Teutonic disease", behaviour founded on an utter disregard for anything that did not meet the demands of logic. Nothing short of the complete destruction of German ethics would do.

Brome-Weigall's contribution is of particular interest because it raised in an unusual form the common charge that the Germans were unsuitable material for democracy because they could not deal with the uncertainties, doubts, and imponderables that were part of democratic procedures and institutions. The application of logic brought simplicity and certainty into decision making. But the democratic process involved acceptance that individual points of view had worth because they were what they were, rather than because of their status in a two value system; in fact, the democratic process involved acceptance that value positions were many and varied and that no one had easy answers to the difficult questions sometimes faced in the course of human experience.

The argument that the Germans could not deal with the ambiguities inherent in such a process was usually put in terms of psychological disturbance and usually suggested that profound anxiety - normally of the neurotic type - was suffered when they were confronted by uncertainty. To use a term invented by Hofstede, this argument would propose that the Germans would score high on an Uncertainty Avoidance Index. The interesting thing about Brome-Weigall's variation on this theme is that he appears to see the alleged rejection of paradox and ambiguity as a calculated, rational behaviour pattern, designed to provide a justification for self-regarding policies and activities. [50]

Sydney Brooks considered that the Germans were all of a piece. The ordinary Englishman might make distinctions between the Prussians and the rest, between the rank and file of the nation and the military leaders, but he was somewhat innocent to do so. That Brooks saw in "the spluttering insensate hatred of England" which was "the common passion of seventy-million Germans", something beyond a temporary response to a wartime enemy appears clear from his claim that the Germans, as a rule, demonstrated a pathological facility to luxuriate in and derive strength from grudges and antagonisms. As a people they had a number of common traits and dispositions, some so resilient over time and so unamenable to change as to be considered innate; they were gregarious and hard working; they had an instinct for

surrendering their independence; sadistic tendencies - revealed in a streak of brutality and in a lust to dominate and humiliate those who were weaker than they - had their roots "far down in the Teutonic temperament;" they were immature, susceptible to ideas, nervous, and unsound in a crisis.

The German approach to life issues defined by Brome-Weigall as "the cancer of logic", also figured in Brooks' analysis. For example, the application of 'fairplay' and the 'rules of the game' to the practice of warfare were seen as frivolous. In artistic matters, the Germans were not put out by reality, however bizarre or brutal, unlike the British who tended to "squint at facts" and throw "the glamour of a romantic decorum" around anything unpleasant or disagreeable. Although such an approach led to coarseness in behaviour, manners, and morals Brooks viewed it with some sympathy, tracing its origins to historical factors which, had they borne upon Britain, might well have produced the same results. The territory known as 'Germany' had been invaded, partitioned and exploited time and again. The only way to arrest this process was to give precedence to arrangements which would guarantee a united front. And so the Germans "willingly, consciously, intelligently, as a matter of common sense and prudence [sacrificed] a large measure of personal and political liberty."

As was the case with Brome-Weigall, Brooks suggests that it was rational rather than neurotic anxiety which attracted Germans to discipline and order, prudence and calculated self-interest which made regimentation the favoured option.

Whether by subtle design or simply because of confused thinking, Frances Evelyn Warwick swithered between a unimodal and a bimodal interpretation of German characteristics. She made a clear distinction between two types, the Prussian who was cruel and harsh at heart and the "simple German of the South" who did not have these particular innate features and was best described as "a dreamer and a sentimentalist, with strong love for domestic pleasures." This was an explicitly bimodal analysis. The distinction was then largely erased by a statement which at first sight seemed set to reinforce it:

"There are countless Germans who could only be cruel in obedience to orders and, of course, every German will do what he is told..."

The introduction of a unimodally distributed trait of submissiveness reduced the difference between Prussians and the rest to the difference between those who, when ordered to be cruel and harsh, would take pleasure in obeying, and those who, when ordered to be cruel and harsh, would obey - either with

emotional neutrality or distress. There may be substance to the distinction insofar as sado-masochists are likely to inflict pain and suffering without the necessity of command whereas masochists would act only on command, but it could be argued, along the lines taken by Vansittart, that a victim would not make much of it. An element of bimodality was introduced when she considered the role of women in German family life. There were tens of thousands of homes in which wives and daughters were loved and respected but, particularly in Prussian homes where sadism would find expression in male domination and cruelty, and more particularly still in Prussian homes associated with military and bureaucratic circles, women were not honoured and were assigned roles that limited their horizons.[52]

For its time, Thomas F. A. Smith's The Soul of Germany was a remarkable contribution to the debate on German national character. Although his approach was explicitly unimodal and built on the assumption of widely distributed and innate characteristics, he engaged in quite thorough sub-system analysis, with particular emphasis on the relationships that were to interest James Joll - those between educational experiences and political outlook. His stated principles on methodology, as distinct from ways in which, with or without intent, he may have subverted those principles in practice were,

for their time, irreproachable. He indicated that he was aware that behaviour was not always a sure clue to inner motive, and that behavioural patterns could be sustained through reinforcement. The relationship between national characteristics and cultural products was explored. He was not the first to allege that there was a link between value-dissensus within German society and German attitudes to authority, with authority both controlling [in the public sphere] and permitting scope [in the private sphere] to individual predilections - but he was an early entry to the field.

The Spectator, reviewing Smith's book, considered it a scathing indictment against the whole German nation. The Morning Post suggested that the picture drawn might have passed for caricature "if recent events had not attested its fidelity to fact", and in consequence doubted "whether any more searching and scathing indictment of the German people has ever been written."[53] It is certainly true that Smith's description of German characteristics assumed both cross-generational longevity ·and a very high level of cultural homogeneity. Traits such as quarrelsomeness, unbounded vanity, marked sensitiveness, envy, lack of consideration for others, brutal self-assertion, were of long standing rather than recent vintage, and one German was more or less like any other: "Germans are inherently brutal...

German character is the same, whether it is concealed beneath the drab coat of a German Methodist or the gay uniform of a German Officer."[54]

"Beneath the intellectual veneer and imitated manners lies Germany's heart - a heart which has not been changed either by culture or Christianity... Character, both national and individual, has always been of the brutal type in the Fatherland; the success of Treitschke and his school is due to the fact that their teachings were acceptable to the nation - in short, the seed fell upon good ground... it is a ridiculous theory to imagine that the seed 'transformed' the soil."[55]

There was a strong and socially diffuse tendency toward sado-masochism. They acted like invertebrates when dealing with superiors - "es wird gebuckt und geduckt", but all alike possessed the "lust of bullying - die Freude jemand zu erniedringen." From top to bottom they submitted to tyranny throughout their lives, "sustaining themselves with the hope of becoming tyrants too."[56]

Smith was very careful to establish his credentials and outline the methodological principles on which, he claimed, his study was based. The student of national character should always

recognise that no great nation, including his own, was free from moral obliquity. This would help him to control inherent national prejudices and to avoid the all too easy identification of the "worst elements" with the whole. An Englishman would expect the foreign student to work to such general principles; no less could be asked of the Englishman in the course of his studies.[57] But even when so on guard, the observer's focus could be of the narrow, specialised kind, and this would lead - if for different reasons - to similar untenable generalisations. The 'texture' of modern society was so rich and complex that all the pieces making up its distinctive pattern had to be studied and related:

"Each of the Great European States may be compared to an infinite piece of patchwork. There is some sort of jumbled design about it, yet to draw conclusions from one of the small insets and apply them to the whole piece leads only to error. This point refers to authorities who have studied a city or province and ventured to write on seventy million people."[58]

Confronted with students of their culture, Germans often put the question, "Nun, haben Sie sich gut eingelebt?" It was of crucial importance that a sincerely affirmative answer were given. It was categorically imperative that observers should be

fluent in the language and be able to 'feel German'. Smith had spent 12 years working in Germany - mainly in the capacity of lecturer in the University of Erlangen. He had lived himself into his surroundings, had been incessantly alert "in looking at things from the other man's point of view", and had been equipped "with unlimited patience and inexhaustible sympathy." Because of this, Germans were not conscious that they were in the presence of a foreign element, and so remained "truly natural and themselves."[59] He had mixed with every class of German, had "never missed an opportunity to talk with the workman in field or factory", and had been "in close touch with the intellectuals and official circles." His soundings had been representative.[60] For example, his comments on German schools were based upon

"... personal visits to cities and schools too numerous to mention. Between September 10th, 1913, and March 20th, 1914, alone, he lectured in over one hundred German and twenty-five Austrian Secondary State schools... and... spent his vacation... in this way since 1909."[61]

Mention has already been made of Smith's recommendation that behavioural norms, and the rewards and sanctions distinctive to a particular society, were best studied through close observation of day-to-day activities. In itself this was an

incisive methodological insight. To round off, he made two telling concessions which appear to enhance rather than diminish the soundness of his theoretical position: first, "no single writer is able to write with absolute finality upon so complex a mechanism as modern Germany"; second, whatever conclusions emerge from such an exercise, they will be no more than "the observer's opinion of... national character... and ... may be entirely wrong."[62]

Without prejudice to the recommendations themselves, and without denying the importance of his insights or indeed the relevance of some of his conclusions, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Smith's prescriptions were, in part at least, self-justificatory. It was perhaps with an eye to convincing his audience and disarming potential critics that he said all the right things about methodology. When standards are set so high and yet are reached what room is there for argument? When we are told that no single writer is able to pronounce with absolute finality, and that with all his precautions a careful observer could still be wrong, there is a hint of, 'but I can come very close to a certain and accurate judgement.' There was a measure of overkill in the cumulative effect of his claims — familiarity with subject, quality of involvement, closeness of observation, inexhaustible sympathy, limitless patience, and an ability to see things from the German point of view. When set

against this the caveats on absolute finality and the possibility of human error ring a little hollow. If his methodological principles had wholeheartedly informed rather than at times decorated his analysis, it is unlikely that he would have failed to remark upon the fact that the duration of his domicile and his command of the language would not have disguised from the native inhabitants with whom he mixed and was in close touch - intellectuals and officials - that "a foreign element was in their midst." Complimentary Bavarian citizenship was not something conferred upon those assumed to be local. If Germans did indeed look upon England "as their inveterate enemy, and hate her"; [63] if it was indeed a case of "gebuckt und geduckt" when they encountered superiors, and if they observed "slavish forms of politeness" as a means of deception, [64] what, objectively, was the likelihood that they would invariably be "truly natural and themselves" in the company of the English lecturer from the University of Erlangen? There is a certain arrogant confidence as opposed to a commitment to methodological vigour in the claim that "in the whole range of German literature there is no writer who stands out as a supreme lover of humanity," and in the admission that the publication of Norman Angell's Prussianism and its Destruction - a title which implies bimodality, at the very least - was of little interest to him:

"The author has not read Mr Norman Angell's book and has no intention of doing so." [65]

And insights lose some of their potency when they are applied solely in the interests of a particular case. Observation of certain behaviour patterns in German social relations confirmed what Smith must surely have known, in general terms, from personal experience - that outward forms did not always match inner motive. However, not everyone would have identified the norm and been able to make tenable inferences on the culture specific purposes it served. On many occasions he had observed

"The German girl curtsy, the schoolboy obsequiously lower his cap almost to the ground, and the soldier ... salute with wooden rigidity - only to make a grimace in the next instant, or for the expression of profound respect to become a sarcastic snigger when discovery seemed impossible... In the streets of German villages and towns it is possible to observe every few minutes two acquaintances who have stopped to chat, raising and deeply swinging their hats at meeting and leave-taking, several times in as many moments. Neither means anything, possibly they are bitter rivals or even hate each other, yet both will observe these slavish forms of politeness."

Having identified other areas of German social experience where an exaggerated - almost neurotic - emphasis was placed at the concept Ehrgefühl, Smith deduced that this Ehrenzeichen accorded by one individual to another was yet one more example of ritualistic norm-referenced behaviour - not meant in any real sense, but engaged in for its tactical, prudential and deceptive powers or dividends:

"... the sign of respect... is the result of the inevitable 'must', and not a tribute... Ehrenzeichen is a word written in bold characters on the life-path of the German... it is the foundation of that outward punctiliousness which characterises German life, irrespective of the inward motive or sincerity... [the German] uses this weapon to throw dust in the eyes... to curry favour,... to deceive."[66]

The problem with this analysis is not that it is a complete mismatch with reality, or that it fails to say something significant about aspects of German culture at that particular point in time; the problem is that it uses the 'grapeshot' approach. There is no need to consider the difficult question of the incidence of norm conformance because there are no deviants; all engage in this behaviour, and all engage in it for one or perhaps all of a range of self-regarding motives.

Further, the possibility that prudential rather than conscientious motives - given so much importance in this case - could explain other examples of norm referenced behaviour, is conveniently ignored when it would be to the disadvantage of his unimodal approach to consider it.

Smith made an interesting contribution to one of the recurring themes of the period - the 'German' attitude to, and regard for authority. In part, the articulation of his argument has to be inferred, but the clues are not particularly obscure. It was based on what he appeared to see as two interrelating features in German culture: a tendency toward self-assertion on evaluative issues, - what may be termed value-dissensus - and a tendency toward sado-masochism. Value dissensus in German society was noted by Sarolea [1912] when he reflected on why it was that the Germans,

"who a moment ago claimed his absolute liberty of thought... now submits to the most petty regulations... who a moment ago demanded that the last barriers of the moral law shall be taken down... is confronted at every step with the fateful words: Es ist Verboten!"

He came to the conclusion that Germans sought in the sphere of thought and ideas a freedom that was denied to them in the

sphere of politics. Each thinker tried to outbid the others, feeling the need to avenge himself "against the abuses of authority in practical life by glorifying anarchy in philosophy and art."[67] Brooks [1915] had described Germany as "a land of... splenetic envy and back-biting" in which the citizen would obey the State "so long as his private life is as spacious and unfettered as he cares to make it."[68] Price Collier's classic explanation [1913] of why the German countryside was littered with instructions that such and such was _verboten_ or _nicht gestattet_ was essentially a comment on an underlying value-dissensus which could only be controlled by statutory or municipal command.[69] Similar references and conclusions appear in Smith's text. The reader is told that the German State was aware of the intolerance and quarrelsome vindictiveness which characterised its constituent units. The average [!] German respected the rights and susceptibilities of others "just so far as the law, plus the policeman's sword and revolver [compelled] him to do so." He was forever on the _qui vive_ to assert himself, and more often than not collided with another who was out on the same mission.[70] There is explicit enough reference in this to the existence of a potentially injurious competition of ideas and preferences - what Smith referred to as "morbid egoism... diseased vanity" - which had to be kept under strict control.[71]

Smith was not explicit in his explanation of why a people with such dispositions came to be so thoroughly regimented. The arguments based on geopolitics - insecurity and recurring exploitation requiring the establishment of a strong central authority - and on instrumental values - a strong central authority required to ensure basic economic comforts and standards - were touched on but not developed.[72] However, analysis of the various strands in his thinking lead to the inference that Smith brought value dissensus, instrumental issues, and innate characteristics into conjunction. The striking lack of consideration for the rights of others, the self-assertion and morbid egoism which gave rise to value dissensus and made Germany the classic home of "das befreite Ich, das Losgerissene Ich", matched up with the sadistic element in the German character; only a strong power could exercise the control necessary to guarantee instrumental needs; when this power emerged in the region and was in a position to take control, the masochistic element in the German character facilitated submission. Submissive instincts were then nurtured by and through the institutions and procedures which required blind obedience and which encouraged behaviour of the 'gebuckt und geduckt' variety. However, there were compensations [Smith used the words 'solace' and 'indulgence'], providing opportunities for the expression of sadistic instincts. In those areas of activity untouched by the writ of the State, the

individual was "permitted extra-ordinary latitude", was left with "extensive freedom with regard to ethical responsibility towards his fellow men and the entirety of humanity," and could exercise licence "in regard to his moral obligations."[73] This 'personal' area within which the passions - specifically those for brutality and bullying - still had free rein was jealously guarded by an emphasis on Ehrgefühl - the feeling or sense of honour. In that special space where the individual ego was permitted freedom there was a morbid response to anything which could be construed as a wound [Verletzung seines Ehrengefühls]. Distinctions, medals, and titles eagerly sought after - "the average German will sell his soul for an empty title" - not only nourished the individual's Ehrgefühl, but facilitated release of sado-masochistic instincts in that titles and distinctions, in locating the individual, defined those to whom he must defer and those over whom he could wield power.

The philosophies of Treitschke and Nietzsche were natural developments from such a culture and became in turn reinforcing agents. Nietzsche's egoism and "inconsiderate self-assertion"[74] tie in with innate sadism, value dissensus, and the private, personal space; Treitschke's doctrine of submission to the State tied in with innate masochism, took notice of instrumental issues, and defined the public zone. There was a sense, however, in which both came together - for

Treitschke's State with its self-assertive notion of mission was, "in reality, merely a magnified ego." In effect, "both... were apostles of aggression in one of two forms, [Nietzsche] individual, and [Treitschke] collective aggression."[75] And so, the expression of sadistic instinct was not confined to the private zone; through submission to the State there was the opportunity to express sadistic instincts in the public zone, either as an official protected by the laws relating to Beamtenbeleidigung, as a soldier, or simply as a citizen participant in the triumphs of the State.

Although there was no place in Smith's image of German culture for variation in commitment to norm referenced behaviour, no place for differential sharing or for heterogeneity in the public sphere, his analysis of sub-systems was a useful one. It must always be remembered, however, that his case was stated in such a way as to demonstrate the reinforcement of innate characteristics.

In a culture nourishing and nourished by sado-masochistic characteristics it was not to be expected that the humanity and sympathy normally associated with the concept, 'family life', would intrude on the domestic relationships of Germans. Wives were docile and submissive. Their sons treated them like housekeepers. As a result, young men were not made sensitive to

ideas such as "reverence for womanhood." The docile and unassertive role of the German wife was exemplified in the practice whereby no German lady was addressed by her surname, "but always by her husband's title or position... Mrs Doctor, Professor, Architect,... and joy of joys... Mrs Lieutenant."[76] For tenement dwellers there was a daily training in submission, a daily reminder of the sacredness of formal procedures:

"Usually the landlord occupies one of the flats, generally that on the ground floor. On entering... one of the first things which strikes the eye is a placard containing some twenty numbered paragraphs, comprising the Hausordnung - what you must or must not do. A tenant is informed in the house rules when he may play the piano and how he may water the flowers on the window-sills, etc. The landlord is the house policeman, so that even the German better-class homes are not free from barrack-yard discipline."[77]

In German schools, students were drilled in the individual's duty to the State. The aim was to "make machines of human beings."[78] Anything remotely like an independent mind or spirit in relation to public affairs was fiercely discouraged - "Jede Selbsthilfe ist verboten." The Government, whose servants the teachers were, did not wish any of its schools "to teach

self-reliance or independence... In this way educated automata were created."[79]   University lecturers were civil servants, "paid, obedient servants of the State", and so their political activities and influence could only be exercised "in one direction."[80]   The schools and universities of Germany provided the soil on which the poison of Germanism had flourished. Those institutions had served "not only as seed beds, but also as channels through which the baneful ideas of aggression by brute force had been disseminated."[81]   The men who occupied high places, "in diplomacy, in the army and navy, in short, in every branch of public life" – men who ruled Germany's destinies – had been trained in brutality at German universities. Those institutions, through the medium of student Corps, turned young men into swaggering bullies. In the lecture theatres they came under the influence of professors who were no more than State propagandists, and entered an academic world which was saturated with the teachings of Treitschke. Writing in 1916, Smith reckoned that the ideas disseminated by Treitschke forty years previously had percolated "to nearly every educated man in the country."[82]

So far as the testing of probabilities in the analytic framework is concerned, Smith's work is of real interest because of its nuances.   There is no doubt that from his unimodal stance he assumed a high degree of homogeneity and a low level of

differential sharing - at least - in the public zone. Cross cultural similarities were touched on, but marginally; the dominant characteristics of the Germans were, in the main innate. As has been seen, however, he demonstrated - untypically for a unimodal approach - a very high level of concern for methodology. The case made here is that the concern, though possibly sincerely held in principle, was more decorative than real when it came to comment on German characteristics. There is also the question of the complexity and variability of cultural considerations, when cited. Smith was typical of the unimodal approach on the second, but much less so on the first of these two descriptors. Finally, Smith devoted the last one and one half of 343 pages to Britain's punitive function in the war that had been brought about by low cunning, brute force, and hate on the part of Germany. The enemy represented Kultur, a complex system that was antithetical to all that Britain stood for. There was nothing to be gained by efforts to conciliate a sullen, envious, uncompromising enemy, a nation of "highly trained, drilled, human tigers", who could emit fiendish laughter "at the drowning struggles of non-combatant victims." Smith did not specify the fate that should be inflicted upon Germany, but he did claim that hanging in the balance were all the humane ideals that had evolved with Christianity over 2000 years. The catastrophe had to be averted. It may be inferred that a cataclysm for Germany would be required to avoid a cataclysm for the world.

Although he made one or two concessions that would not have been out of place in a multimodal approach, Harold Nicolson's 'German' [1936, 1939] was an easily recognised representative of a long-standing neurotic condition which had reached "a sort of paranoiac stage."[83] He assigned some degree of causal autonomy to situational factors in the development of what he termed "the distinctly German type of mind." It is clear, however, that he made a distinction between distant and more immediate factors, giving independent force to the former - in that they helped to fashion - and secondary, reinforcing significance to the latter - in that they acted upon, innate characteristics. To demonstrate this feature of Nicolson's thinking it is necessary to take his 1939 contribution before that of 1936.

Traditionally, the Germans had lacked sharp geographical, racial, and historical definition or outline. 'Spiritually homeless' they were forever in search of a sense of belonging, and this bred, behind their solid and magnificent virtues, "a layer of nervous uncertainty." They were desperate for focus and eventually found it in a mystic view of the State and in the power which collective submission conferred upon them. Having found a focus for their energies, innate nervousness made them willing to sacrifice anything and everything to retain it, to the point where it could be said that "in every German there is an

element of suicidal mania."[84]   It was with allusion to these particular characteristics - innate nervousness and instability - that Nicolson opened his 1936 contribution. He conceded that situational factors in the twentieth century, for example, The First World War, the blockade, the inflation, had placed on the Germans "a strain such as human history has never known," but this strain was acting on "a heredity already unstable." And so, when the person and techniques of Hitler entered the equation their effect was dramatic, not primarily because they offered release from immediate difficulty but because they were responsible for an "extraordinary evocation and excitation of all that is most neurotic in the German soul." The neurotic condition, stoked up by immediate events, had been fanned into a "strong strain of insanity" by Hitler's revivalism. Germany had become what she had always been in danger of becoming - "a mental case."[85]

By any strict standard, the contributions of Rowse [1937, 1939, 1941], Namier [1940, 1941, 1942], and Vansittart [1941] are bimodal in their approach to German characteristics.[86] This is because they refer in their work to deviation from, as well as conformance to the dominant pattern as they perceived it. Rowse depicted much of modern German history bimodally, in terms of episodic confrontations between progressive and reactionary forces: for example

the ideas of Eramus - versus - the ideas of Luther,

the ideas of Kant - versus - the ideas of Frederick The

Great,

the ideas of Goethe - versus - the ideas of Hegel,

the ideas of Marx - versus - the ideas of Bismarck,

the ideas of Weimar - versus - the ideas of Hitler.

The problem was that the resolution always favoured the reactionary forces. "It is hard", wrote Rowse, "to forgive the total ineffectiveness, the spinelessness... of the liberal elements in Germany."[87] Namier accepted that there were humane elements in Germany, but considered that the "decent, kindly Germans" had failed to impress their pattern on the nation."[88] Vansittart's conviction that 80% of the German nation constituted the moral and political scum of the earth still left hope for some 20% Notwithstanding these references to plurality, the contributions are shown on page [185] to straddle the bimodal and unimodal categories. This is because their references to deviance were patently designed to dramatise the quantitative significance of the dominant pattern. "It is noticeable", wrote Rowse, "how many Germans are happier since 1933."[89] Namier found that he could not dissociate any substantial part of the nation from the Nazis;[90] and Vansittart limited his condemnation to "the bloody minded bulk."[91]

There was some confusion in Rowse's work about how distinctions should be made between the 'good' and the 'bad' elements in the German nation. On the one hand the distinction was made on geographical grounds: the Germans of the Rhine, the northern seaboard, the Catholic south, were more civilised than the rest.[92] On the other hand the distinction was more often a matter internal to the dynamics of individual personality. He defined his concern as being "the problem of the dominant German mind..."[93] At the heart of the German people there was "a real neurosis." They had within themselves at one and the same time an uncertainty and unsureness, and the capacity for aggressive exhibitionism; a sentimental, but also a brutal disposition. Here was evidence of "a pathological disease", all the symptoms of "a dominant neurosis."[94] It was in this context that Rowse flirted with a completely unimodal approach. Interestingly, every time he retreated from such an approach he succeeded in confirming his affection for it. to highlight this, some examples are tabulated:-[95]

Stem	Unimodal	Retreat to bimodal
1. "...the nature of	the German mind,	or at any rate the dominant German mind."
2. "...Hitler is the very mirror of	the German soul,	or the dominant elements of it."
3. "...the brutal emphasis upon macht that appeals to	every German,	or at least the dominant German type."
4. "... clever to lie, to go back on your word.	They like that sort of thing.	or at any rate a certain side of them does, the dominant side.

German characteristics were innate. Hitler was in direct line of succession from Luther; his views "answered to something deep down in the German nature... Before they lapped up the pernicious Nazi rubbish, they lapped up the Hohenzollern claptrap."[96] A search for the deep buried reasons for this, for an explanation of why the Germans were "so unsatisfactory, such bad Europeans", would have to begin with geopolitics. Territorially they had lacked precision; their borders had been ill-defined; they were, in fact, "a frontierless people." This had made them stress their unity "as a volk" and given a 'boundlessness' to their aims and ideas. That they should have

success, they were willing to obey and prepared to be led.[97]

Rowse appeared to show concern for methodology, but in this particular context he was in fact unimpressive. He agreed that there was a difficult problem of diagnosis to be faced when dealing with the question 'What is wrong with the Germans?' In review of A. J. P. Taylor's The Course of German History, he seemed to give some causal autonomy to situational factors in the thought that "Perhaps Mr Taylor does not allow sufficiently for the extreme difficulty and complexity of the German political situation..."[98] He recommended - partly by way of criticism of his opponents - that writers on Germany should have more than a superficial acquaintance with the country; that they should have lived there and become familiar with its language and literature. However, when it came to consideration in his own work of those elements to which Taylor had apparently given insufficient weight - "the extreme difficulty and complexity of the German political situation..." Rowse more or less dismissed them with the assertion "... this is no place to traverse the whole of German history."[99] Yet, in the interests of his own case, Rowse had already traversed the whole of German history. In his search for the origins of the "dominant German mind" he delved back to the barbarian tribes to identify the führer principle, the attraction of Volksgemeinschaft, "the... herd spirit, the primitive love of fighting for its own sake."[100]

He had taken time and space to consider the episodic confrontations between progressive and reactionary forces from the 15th century onwards. When he considered the failure of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler, he wrote,

"I know there were external factors aiding the process..."

And that was precisely as far as he went with regard to such factors. [101]

Any solution to the German problem had to take account of the fact that the nation was in the grip of "a dominant neurosis, verging upon madness." One did not cajole, or compromise with a homicidal maniac. If strong action was not taken to "root it out", the German madness would lead to a European war every twenty-five years "to prove that the last one was wrongly decided against them." [102] There was a promise of retribution in his conviction that the pernicious consequences of the "roots and ganglia of the German outlook" should be "brought home to them properly next time." [103]

Namier made some telling points on methodology. He had clearly addressed the question of how cross-cultural differentiation could be assessed. The respective forms of communal life - norms, institutions - should be carefully examined; then the

extent to which these forms functionally attained, preserved, or negated the practical application of concepts such as individual freedom should be measured.[104] He argued that "some nations develop one or two forms into dominant patterns which express the national character of their communal life," and there is much to be said for his view that the dominant forms in Germany were State, army, subordination of the individual, iron discipline and organisation, and those in Britain Parliament, the team, the rules of the game, and flexibility.[105] An appreciation of cross-cultural differences did not lead him to ignore cross-cultural similarities. "Most types of social groups," he wrote, "can be found, in one form or other, in all nations," and "as members of a group... most people enjoy greater freedom from scruples and inhibitions, and readily do things which they would hesitate to do for their own benefit."[106] He had some valid things to say about the relationship of Hitler to the German people. He could not accept that it was a matter of Hitler and a few cronies on one side and the entire German people on the other. Press and film reports which captioned events with "Hitler sees..., Hitler wants..., Hitler thinks..." were vastly exaggerating the distance between him and the people: "the achievements and the guilt of Germany [were] not to be ascribed to one individual, nor even to a party..."[107] He had some interesting comments to make on how the bonds of a submissive relationship to

authority might come to break. Interesting, because one of the consequences of defining the Germans as unreservedly docile and submissive in face of authority is the need to find an explanation for the fact that a fair number of them did not demonstrate such characteristics during the life of the Weimar Republic. Namier's answer was that submission and deference were accorded to effective authority [largely defined, one supposes, by strength and ability to impose order], and that loss of effectiveness raised in the German mind "doubts concerning the gerents of The German State..."[108]

In Namier's view the Germans had within themselves the "closely interconnected, indeed inseparable elements" associated with sado-masochism; they were willing slaves and also ruthless bullies; they were submissive and deferential to the State because through this they were able to participate in the "ruthless tyranny" exercised by that State at home and abroad.[109] They lacked moral courage, self-assurance, and independence, and this made them seek "safety, self-assertion, and superlative power" in and through the State and nation. Hedged round by organisation, uniformity, and hierarchy, the German was able to find protection from his "moral doubts and fears." His sense of duty - his Pflichtgefühl - was "obsessionist and coloured with anxiety."[110] It was to these deep instincts that Hitler appealed with unparallelled success.

Here, as in other contributions, there is the notion that masochism led to submission; and through submission there was a dividend for sadism.

If Namier was quite impressive in the statement of methodological principles, he was less so in their application. This discrepancy may be inferred from a number of inconsistencies and verbal 'tricks'.[111] For example, he seemed to be unaware that his unimodal approach did for the Germans en masse what he argued the Germans did for the Jews - obliterate all relevant distinctions.

"... there is a vague belief in the Gentile mind that all Jews are marvellously knit together: therefore in some way responsible for every single one among them. If Smith operates in the 'black market', Smith does it; if Cohen, it is the Jew. Whenever some specially unpleasant or provoking incident occurs, Jews, who by no stretch of imagination could be connected with it, murmur: 'I hope to God the fellow is not a Jew.' When Hitler imposed a fantastic fine on an already ruined German Jewry because one young Jew, driven mad by the sufferings inflicted on his parents, had killed a German diplomat, he merely condensed and exhibited in hideous, grotesque exaggeration... an idea deeply ingrained and widely diffused among the Gentiles."[112]

He referred to action derived from group membership, but did not raise the issue of differential sharing; the inference is that the action - in terms of scruples and inhibitions - of a fully integrated member, sharing maximally in the group norms and values, would be the standard action. Then, employing a unimodal approach he nevertheless invited the Germans to disprove his hypothesis by demonstrating multimodality at a time - war emergency - when multimodality would be least likely to characterise any group. The reader is informed that "there is no possibility of effective opposition under dictatorship", and yet it is expected of the German nation under such conditions that it give evidence, in proportion to the ten righteous men asked of Sodom and Gomorrah, of 100,000 men overtly public in their outrage. [113] At one point it is asserted - with suggestions of parity of knowledge, participation, and commitment - that the Germans take "a full-share" in Nazi transactions; at another, the claim is that "hundreds of thousands of men have participated in them, and tens of millions have watched them with approval, or at lease connivance." [114] The inconsistency is obvious enough; the question of syntax and the use of particular words remains. Was it merely use and wont that made him lead with 'approval' and follow with the qualification? Did he intend that the reader should infer a conspiracy of like minds from his use of 'connivance'? In fairness, however, it has to be said that his contention that

the Germans were sado-masochists ties in logically with his thesis that respect for, and deference to State authority, diminished in proportion to the State's inability to impose order.

As with Namier, Vansittart challenged those whose image of the war was of a contest between Britain and the Nazi party. There was too much made of the possible distinctions between party and people. It was not helpful to refer to 'Hitlerite Germany' if that term was intended to reduce the burden of responsibility.[115] These were useful correctives to extravagant views. No less valuable as a corrective was his dismissal of the myths that the Germans en masse had latent democratic virtues, and were "blood-brothers" to the British.[116] Objectively, those challenges were valid because on the one hand they insisted that some sort of sharing took place, and on the other they insisted that sharing was differential. However, it is questionable if Vansittart would have wanted his complaints justified in this way; his general thesis on Germany indicated that he had every interest in non-differential sharing. This may be tested by considering his tendency to criticise the most extravagant and untenable cases in favour of differential sharing, [e.g. - Germany is made up of some 'bad' Nazis and a mass of 'good' Germans - 'Blood Brothers'], in order to dismiss, or perhaps even conceal neglect

of more moderate cases in favour of it. The reader was encouraged to reject - and probably rightly so - the view that "Germany is full of good Germans awaiting us to become good Europeans..."[117] However, there was no mention that differential sharing could have been more modest than this, or that, as a phenomenon, it did not stand or fall according to acceptance or rejection of the statement. Similarly, rejection of the myth of the Germans as "blood-brothers" was not, of itself, justification for the rejection of the notion of "the other Germany."[118]

Vansittart's stance on the innate nature of German characteristics - "thinking with the blood... lust for domination", had been piling up through the ages, and one had to delve into the mists of history to find the genesis of German brutality - allowed him to deny any causal autonomy to situational factors. The Weimar Republic failed because Hitler found the savages ready made to play on.[119] Any difficulties Germany experienced were spiritual, not social or economic.[120] And so, no matter what the Allies had done in 1919, no matter how generous they might have been to Germany, the Weimar Republic "would have failed no less surely and completely."[121]

To some extent the thinking of Ellis [1915] was similar to that of Rowse.[122] Although he was in no doubt that German

characteristics were distributed bimodally, and markedly so,
Ellis - like Rowse - had geographical as well as psychological
explanations. Further, both considered that dichotomous
cognitive and emotional elements were at work within the German
psyche. However, for Ellis - unlike Rowse - the inner struggle
did not take the clearly defined form of sado-masochistic
strivings; and it may be inferred that for Ellis - unlike Rowse
- the outcome of the inner struggle could be socially productive
where the circumstances were favourable.

The two distinct faces of Germany were revealed in the contrast
between the spirit which animated the Rhineland [west and south]
and that which animated Prussia [north and east]. It was the
contrast between the spirit of cosmopolitanism and the spirit of
the drill sergeant. Between them they accounted for "the
strikingly duplex character of the German spirit", and had
produced, in Goethe and Bismarck, "the two supremely
representative German men of modern times."[123] This was a
classic statement of the 'two Germanies' theme: es gibt zwei
Arten Deutsche... Die einen reden immer von Bismarck... Die
anderen immer von Goethe.

There was, however, another sense in which two Germanies
existed, and that was within the individual psyche. Unlike
Rowse, Namier, and Vansittart - for whom the inner struggle was

represented by the play of interconnected sadistic and masochistic instincts, and productive of a particular psychological condition, the sado-masochistic personality - Ellis took account of a number of dichotomies between which, he argued, the German 'spent' oscillated:-

internationalism - nationalism

individualism - authoritarianism

cosmopolitanism - particularism

abject servility - brutal arrogance.

By including in his list the commonly attributed dispositions of "brutal arrogance combined with abject servility", he introduced an element of confusion.[124] Oscillation entails movement from one position or condition to another. It is reasonable to talk of oscillation between commitment to internationalism and nationalism, cosmopolitarism and particularism, individualism and authoritarianism, and between the conditions of abject servility and brutal arrogance. However, where the dispositions of arrogance and servility are combined, there may well be oscillation in behavioural terms - as, for example, between behaviour in face of a superior and behaviour in face of an inferior - but not in psychic terms, since the sado-masochistic personality is a psychological whole. This aside, it is clear that in Ellis' opinion productive as well as unproductive consequences could flow from the struggle for dominion between

the cosmopolitan and the drill sergeant. That the process of oscillation had, by 1915, skewed the scales in favour of the socially unproductive consequences was due to an earlier recognition on the part of non-Prussian Germans that the qualities invested in Prussia - strength, organisation, etc., - were essential to make Germany as a whole "an effective force in the world." And so, since 1870, "the spirit of Germany [had] been the spirit of Prussia."[125] However, it was central to Ellis' thinking that such a situation was temporary. Potential regard for internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism still existed. A Germany free of Prussianism would allow scope to such regard. Sympathetic treatment of the non-Prussian elements in German society was implicit in this vision of the future.

Namier had demanded - in a form of sophistry - that Germans challenge his perception of their unimodal characteristics by demonstrating multimodality in circumstances highly unfavourable to such a demonstration. Ellis, markedly bimodal in his interpretation, was not put out by the apparently united - unimodal - front presented by Germans during the First World War. Although many Germans were peaceloving, they obviously felt compelled, as patriotic citizens, to act in accordance with the norms of the crisis situation.

Bimodality was also obvious in the work of A. G. Gardiner [1915].[126] He made very clear distinctions between Government and people, public policy and private feeling, 'system' and people. He had a concern for appropriate methodology in cross-cultural studies. Political exigencies should not be allowed to colour judgements; the prejudices of wartime had to be set aside. Unpleasant characteristics attributed to Germans could be found in British society. His parable of the family home in flames and the corporate effort needed to save it was a valuable corrective to the not uncommon view that damned sections of the German population [e.g., workers, churchmen] for not rising up against the political and military leaders in 1914. He had a sense of the potency of situational factors. A non-punitive resolution to the German problem was implicit in his comment, "we shall not answer infamy with infamy."[127] Yet, however much his rejection of unimodality was, in principle, more satisfactory - theoretically and empirically - than the views of Rowse, Namier, Vansittart, and many others, Gardiner's thesis was unsoundly based. In a sense he argued the right case for the wrong reasons.

Gardiner made two important statements about Germany. First, the crimes of Germany were the crimes of a 'system' and not of a people; second, any weaknesses in German character were to be explained not by reference to innate dispositions but to the

force of circumstances. The first statement, though very important in itself as an expression of an attitude - all the more remarkable, as has been noted earlier, by the fact that it was made during the public hysteria of 1915 - appeared to ignore the theoretical ramifications of the second. He argued, for example, with more generosity than many others, that "after all, we are what our circumstances make us."[128]

Britain

"... had the good fortune to inherit an island, with the inviolate seas for a defence and the free ocean as a pathway to all the world. Liberalism had a chance on such a soil. The Germans had the bad fortune to be cast in the midst of Europe... They lived with fear and survived by fighting... the doctrine of Force by which they had 'hacked their way through' became their gospel... It ceased to be a means of defence and became the expression of the national spirit... The German people accepted the gospel as a necessity of their existence... Perhaps they might have broken the enchantment if they had not been surrounded by fear."[129]

By defining the respective circumstances that led to differences in the cultural development of Britain and Germany, Gardiner

opened up the issue of national character. But he did not face it squarely. It is valid to argue that in Britain and Germany it was, in part, circumstances beyond the control of peoples which produced particular cultural trends - liberalism in the one case and the doctrine of Force in the other. The problem is that once under way, those cultural trends become the recognisable constants into which new generations are inducted, within which they grow up, and to which they find ways of accommodating themselves. Integral to those cultural trends are values, and the norms which tend to make behaviour consistent with the values. This much Gardiner appeared to accept, for he referred to ways in which the "necessity of their existence" - geopolitically - influenced the nature of German institutions and human relationships within them. But he did not grapple with the consequences of this position. He simply ignored them. In this way he was spared the impossible requirement of providing theoretical foundation for his claim that notwithstanding the constants and the induction process, government/establishment and the public at large in Germany were things totally apart. Differential sharing, in Gardiner's thesis, was a case of all or none. The reader is left with the impression that it was only members of the Establishment who were touched in any positive sense by the values in German society which he regarded as reprehensible. The internal contradictions of an argument which at one turn recognised the

relationship between culture and behaviour and at another appeared to ignore it are evident in his parable of the family house in flames. In this he drew attention to the force of cultural norms. Yet that force was wished out of existence in order to draw a hard and fast line between Government and people.

Gardiner, given his appraisal of the British self-image, could hardly argue that adherence to the ideal which distinguished that country from Germany was differentially shared in such a way as to produce an absolutely bimodal distribution of British Government and Establishment on the one hand and British public at large on the other - but he was prepared to infer such an absolute distribution in the case of Germany. The fact that Britain had a democratic and Germany an absolutist form of government was in itself an inadequate foundation for such an inference. Some section of 'the public at large' is likely to internalise national 'ideals' in the process of socialisation, even though they may have had no say in the political and institutional formulation of those ideals.

Barraclough [1946] pointed to the contribution made by situational factors, and by the norms of the wider international culture, to the shaping of German history after the First World War. The leaders of the Weimar Republic failed to take the

opportunity to "remodel German society and German political life in a new international framework."[130] The action of the victorious powers was not the least of the many reasons that could be adduced in explanation of this 'revolution without a transformation'.

> "... the German people was not left free to reshape German society on democratic lines; instead it was subjected to Allied pressure and, at many important points, to Allied veto, and the creation of an efficient government capable of expressing the will of the German people was subordinated to the national interests of the victorious Entente."[131]

From his bimodal interpretation of German characteristics there emerged the conflicting images of the authentic and non-authentic voices of the German people. In the interests of world peace, the Allies were advised to nourish the authentic voice by establishing a European community in which there was "equality for the German people in its dealings with other nations."[132]

It was in search of the authentic voice of the German people that Barraclough first avoided and then repeated the error that has been detected in Gardiner's analysis. The internal

variability of Barraclough's contribution may be represented:-

Government	
People	People

Bimodality in the
Imperial Regime

Government	
People	People

Bimodality in the
Hitler regime:
1933-1938

Government	People

Bimodality in the
Hitler regime:
1939-1945.

In his analysis of the Imperial regime he avoided the dramatic dichotomy of an 'all or none' distinction between government and people in terms of differential sharing - that is to say, differential sharing was not restricted to members of government in respect of government values and to members of the public at large in terms of non-government values. There were elements of the public at large which supported the authoritarian regime.[133] His analysis of the Hitler regime between 1933 and 1938 produced similar nuances;[134] that for the 1933-1945 period was less profound. In this latter period the assumed dichotomy between government and people was highlighted by the claims that the regime was "hostile to all that the German people had striven after...," and that Hitler himself recognised that there was a "deep cleft between his own objectives and the aspirations of the German people."[135]

Short of the argument that in relation to Hitler's activities after 1938 Barraclough had come to use "the German people" not as an embracing term but as a synonym for its "authentic voice" - an argument which in itself would suggest a certain carelessness - his description of differential sharing in the period 1939-1945 was crude.

Herford [1927] appears to straddle the multi-and-bimodal categories. Although he did not have much to say on methodology, he did point to the dangers of preconceived ideas, recognised the "extreme hazardousness" of attempting to "chart the prevailing currents in the intellectual life of a complex contemporary civilisation", and recommended a balanced approach which took account of all facets of German experience, progressive or otherwise. [136] Situational factors were underlined, particularly those which had affected social cohesion - the blockade, revolution, the Treaty of Versailles. In response to the experiences of 1914-19, extreme solutions were being promoted - informed on the one hand by hope and idealism, on the other by disillusionment and pessimism. At least half of the nation regarded the military defeat as a release, and many saw the humiliation of the army as a triumph for civilisation. This has the appearance of a bimodal approach but, in fact, Herford's Germany was more pluralistic than that. [137] First, it may be inferred that the definition of

extreme positions leaves space for something in between - a third position at the very least. When discussing the communist and right-wing risings in Berlin and Munich in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Herford commented that "all were frustrated by the resisting and resilient power of the solid mass between."[138] Further, although hope and idealism as informing elements stand in direct opposition to disillusionment and pessimism, these generic types may express themselves in a variety of forms. For example, Herford noted that for some the particular form of their hope and idealism was "shaped by memory"; for others, the form was "shaped by imagination."[139]

On one level, E. C. Bentley's approach [1915] could be mistaken for an example of unimodality. He identified the state of mind prevalent in Germany as one associated with traits such as want of understanding, monstrous vanity, and feverish inconsistency. This condition was not confined to government and establishment, nor was it peculiar to Prussia. Prussia's geographical position had forced her to be militaristic. With the creation of the German Empire, the process of Prussianisation had brought the rest to believe that armed violence was a healthy and desirable thing. The "arrogance and folly which made the war" were not exclusively Prussian; "... the Empire was more verpreusselt [in 1914] than it had ever been."[140] He raised the issue of innate characteristics: the

methods employed by Germany in the Great War were "only one
result of a general leaning towards violence which <u>has always</u>
<u>been present</u> in the soul of the people."[141] He made the sort
of odd misinterpretation usually found in unimodal approaches,
and usually designed to bolster a weak case. For example, he
saw in newspaper reports which "volubly [declared] their
unbroken conviction that their country cannot possibly be
anything but victorious", and in the "pathetic perseverance"
with which journals assured their readers "that this, that, or
the other eminent person is completely at ease about the result
of the war", confirmation of the trait of feverish exaggeration
and of "the curious one-sidedness and ... national egoism of the
German mind."[142]

Despite this, Bentley has been located in the multimodal
category. He referred, explicitly and implicitly, to
differential sharing. He conceded that there was a difference
between Prussians - whose characteristics appeared to be
distributed unimodally - and the other groups within the Empire:

> "I readily admit that the Prussian still holds a marked
> pre-eminence over other types of German nationality...
> Ruthless employment of superior strength of any kind to
> one's own advantage, and a taste for the exercise of force
> in general, are so much a matter of course to that strange
> people..."[143]

When he insisted that the commission of atrocities was not unique to the Prussians and that Bavarians were also capable of such activities, there was just a suggestion that where Prussian behaviour in this respect was highly predictable, Bavarian behaviour was less so. His contention that the Empire was more verpreusselt in 1914 than ever before could be taken to mean that a single value system had been established; but it is likely that he was referring to overt conformance to norms at a time of heightened crisis. Further, Prussianisation was a process of accommodation to particular norms and values, and implicit in this is the matter of degree. Different people would accommodate to more than others, and at different rates - in other words, they would share differentially in the process. When Bentley argued that "millions of Germans never desired the peace to be broken", and that "the overwhelming majority of those who now want Germany to rule the earth would rather it were done by a much more intelligently and liberally governed Germany than exists today", he made means and values distinctions between the government and the majority of its supporters, and between the government and its supporters on one side and large numbers of Germans on the other.[144] There was an element of confusion in his presentation when he referred to innate characteristics. A careful reading indicates that the innate characteristics belonged to Prussians. When elaborating on the thesis that a leaning towards violence "had always been

present in the soul of the people", the examples were selected from the streets of Berlin.[145]

There was no suggestion of innate German, as opposed, say, to Prussian characteristics, in T. S. Knowlson's contribution [1918]. His Germany of 1870-1918 occupied what might be described as a cultural parenthesis. In that period the nation had been Prussianised to the extent that a belief in a "quite unapproachable superiority", once a monopoly of those from the north and east, had developed in the people. They considered that their State could do no wrong, that they themselves were custodians of the world's knowledge, and that they had a duty to convert all others. If this latter mission were not well received by those to whom it was directed, "then the world must be taught better manners by war and frightfulness." This Prussianisation had been effected by "two generations of persistent schoolmastering, policing, drilling and supervising."[146] Before 1870, German genius had flourished, located mainly in the west and south. The essential difference between the pre and post 1870 periods was to be found in the "contrast between the old culture of the German States and the new Kultur of modern Germany."[147] After 1918, if Germany could be purged of Prussianism, there would be "a larger scope for personal initiative... and more opportunity for the natural self." Germany had a deep intellectual life "that could be

potent if properly developed."[148]

Knowlson's view of Germany may be interpreted as follows: were an imaginary 'line of development' to be drawn from pre 1870 to post 1918 there would be a consistent latent tendency toward cultural richness and variety [inclusive of Prussian values and goals] as opposed to uniformity. This latent tendency could, of course, be stimulated and encouraged or kept firmly below the social surface, depending on the political and institutional circumstances. This explains why Knowlson is located in the multimodal category. He is there because of the interesting temporal dimension he brought to his contribution, but also because his prognosis on post 1918 possibilities indicated that latent tendencies had not been rooted out. And so it is valid to infer that Germans shared differentially in Prussian values and goals; that only some Germans informed their lives with these values and goals because they were congruent with their own value systems [internalisation]; that other Germans, where they 'accepted' these values and goals did so from motives associated with prudential and pragmatic processes such as identification and compliance. Additionally, the phrase "two generations of persistent schoolmastering, policing, drilling and supervising" presupposes a strenuous, ever vigilant, ever checking process which in itself suggests a need in the face of differential sharing.

Mona Caird's contribution [1918] was brief, but not without substance. Common sense and everyday experience had demonstrated to her that similarities as well as differences could emerge from the study of different national groups. She was profoundly conscious of the dangers inherent in judgements based on non-verifiable assertions. She refused, in the absence of proof, to associate the whole German people with the policies of their rulers. Her predisposition, therefore, was to argue that the degree of homogeneity should not be exaggerated.[149]

Philip Gibbs [1921] set the 'German problem' in the wider context of an _international_ culture with conventions of rivalry and competitive ethics. Before the war the statesmen of Europe, operating within those conventions and in accordance with those ethics had met the errors and miscalculations of Germany with others of their own. After the war, and acting as victors, they had missed opportunities to make a clean break from the old standards; and so they made further mistakes and miscalculations. The _leitmotiv_ of Philip Gibbs', _The Hope of Europe,_ was a plea that the conventions of rivalry and the ethics of competition be replaced by the values and norms of cooperation, enshrined in what has been described earlier as his 'Ten Affirmations'. But although highly critical in principle of the 'Leaders of The Old Tradition', and the 'Men of the Old Gang', he appreciated that he was discussing an international

<u>culture</u>. He conceded that cultural change was more often a question of "gradual taming" than of sudden conversion.[150] Although bitterly opposed to the behavioural consequences of the international culture he considered that it was futile to criticise those consequences if criticism was "conducted on the basis of the old philosophy of international relations in Europe."[151] And he noted, with some understanding of the pressures laid on statesmen as participants in the international culture, that "they were all in the jungle together."[152]

Although he made no formal theoretical statement, it is possible to detect a theoretical stance in his grasp of the significance which a wider international culture had for the nations that participated in it. This point will be elaborated in section [iv] of the present chapter, but it may be said here, to underline the sympathetic understanding Gibbs brought to his analysis, that there was a sense in which states involved in power politics could not ignore the norms, conventions, and values of the international culture. For example, if being in receipt of 'respect', or being accorded 'standing' was a valued condition, and if this value was sustained by norms of behaviour which called for particular types of responses in certain situations [say, to strike back, inflict injury, or in some other tangible and observable way retaliate if humiliated, etc.] then these states were confronted with potent hypothetical

imperatives. In this sense it was unlikely that there would be deviance from the norms of the international culture, like them or not. Differential sharing would, theoretically, be limited to one of two forms: [1] full conformance to norms, accompanied by disclaimers that this was not the preferred or 'civilised' course of action - a position always open to charges of hypocrisy; [153] [2] various levels of deviance from the norms, depending upon how unthreatening to, or unthreatened by other states the potential deviant was.

Gibbs also had concern for methodology, and for the significance of situational factors as behavioural influences. Cross-cultural studies were often blighted by the silly things one group said of the other. Reason, rather than passion, should inform the process of study. Perhaps the most obvious applications of this principle are seen in his reactions to the allegations of atrocities contained in the report of The Bryce Commission, and in his criticism, to be repeated by Robert Thouless during the Second World War, of all embracing, dangerous, and ultimately meaningless phrases such as 'England does this, or that; England thinks this, or that.' He saw a connection between the traumatic experiences of German families during the blockade and their justification - where it occurred - of the U-Boat war. It was a connection which was sufficient in itself; there was no need to go beyond it and seek out innate characteristics of

brutality.

Holding this range of views Gibbs was, of course, multimodal in his approach to German characteristics. If there was an element of bimodal oversimplification in his recommendations that the German military caste should be found guilty and the 'ordinary German' exonerated, that a distinction should be made between rulers and ruled, it was more apparent than real, and was in the nature of a preliminary to the suggestion that support for, or lack of opposition to the actions of one's own government did not necessarily entail non-differential sharing in the values underlying those actions. He pointed to the distinction between what may be called consummatory and instrumental values when he posed the question: to what extent were German housewives, clerks, shopkeepers, peasants, and manufacturing fellows busy with the problems of their own 'little lives', as 'ordinary' people the world over might be - that is, preoccupied with instrumental as opposed to consummatory values?[154]

Thomas F. A. Smith would probably have regarded the views of S. Miles Bouton [1922] and Cicely Hamilton [1931] as anecdotal rather than serious contributions to the debate on German characteristics. But both contributions are interesting because their approach to the modality of German characteristics and attitudes was, in various respects, corroborated by sources such

as Karl Dietrich Bracher [1964], Ralf Dahrendorf [1967], Rainer
C. Baum [1981], and Robert Weldon Whalen [1984].[155]

In an effort to find an answer to the question 'will Germany
revert to monarchy?' Miles Bouton travelled through "all parts
of Germany for many weeks, much of the time afoot, with knapsack
and tourist's stick, the rest of the time in fourth class
railway carriages."[156] His conclusions suggest that there were
many different attitudes in Germany, often determined by
regional, confessional, and sociological differences, and that
sometimes similar attitudes were held for quite different
reasons. In the towns of Württemberg and Baden, Bouton found
that "the people are mild monarchists in principle, but they
have nevertheless accepted the new order of affairs without
visible repugnance." On the other hand, "Among the peasants of
both states... I found many outspoken monarchists."[157] In the
north, socialists had made many gains, but "the natural
conservatism of the farmer is gradually resuming its sway... in
the territory between Frankfurt-on-Oder and Breslau, a district
of small peasants' holdings, I encountered again that hostility
to Socialism and Republicanism which I had found among the same
class everywhere in Germany."[158] Regional and sociological
differences were also behind attitudinal differences in
Thuringia:

"In village after village in Thuringia... I directed the conversation into political channels... If one avoids cities possessing industrial plants, one can wander for days without hearing a Republican sentiment uttered..."[159]

In Bad Blankenburg, Bouton met up with three individuals, each of them dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs, but for different reasons. Leinhoss, a Gasthaus proprietor, had been shot through both lungs in the war and had spent a year in various hospitals. He had rejoiced when the revolution came. In 1922 he commented:

"I was disgusted with my treatment at the hands of some of our officers and with the whole war... and my health had been affected seriously by my wound. But I have had enough Republic. I don't think much of the last Kaiser, but any Kaiser would be better than what we have now."

Meinhard, a wealthy peasant, declaimed:

"You knew our old Germany... What do you think of the Schweinewirtschaft we have now? Things can't go on in this way. The day will come when Germany will have a monarchy again, and then we'll take up the work where we

left off. Look at what we have to-day! No order, no
discipline. Republic! Bah!"[160]

An old peasant remarked:

"Of course, everything wasn't perfect... but now we've got

so many rights that we don't know what to do with them.

There's no use emptying the baby out with the bath water.

I'd like to trade some of what you call rights for some of

the order we used to have."[161]

The views of the two peasants may be said to conflict on a
number of crucial issues, although, of course, there are
similarities. The wealthy peasant's opinion of the Republic was
entirely pejorative.   He looked with nostalgia and reverence to
the past. The old peasant had reservations about the past; he
clearly welcomed some of the individual rights guaranteed by the
Republic; his worry was that the balance was wrong. More order
was needed, and if this meant that some rights had to be
sacrificed, then so be it. Without suggesting that Leinhoss,
the Gasthaus proprietor, was necessarily expressing the
jaundiced view of the Republic held by millions of his fellow
war-victims, his opinions match the war-victim syndrome and
should at least be set in the context of war-victim

disillusionment.

The significance of the war-victim issue in war-time and post-war Germany may be measured by the number of organisations which were established to promote the interests and meet the needs of wounded survivors and the next-of-kin of the dead.[162] In 1918, Evelyn Blücher, who later set down her reminiscences in An English Wife in Berlin [1920] noted that "the country is overrun with invalids with grievances."[163] In search of solutions to these grievances, "bizarre parades took place throughout the country." Leonard Frank's Der Mensch ist Gut [1918] ended "with a terrifying march through Berlin. Train load after train load of the maimed arrive in the city and hobble through the streets."[164] In 1919, Chancellor Scheidemann was informed by a delegate from the Reichsbund der Kriegsbeschadigten und ehemaligen Kriegsteilnehmer that

> "Everywhere in the circles of war invalids and survivors
> there is such bitterness... and when we make inquiries we
> are always told 'we're working on it'."

In April of the same year the Saxon War Minister was drowned after being thrown into the Elbe by irate war-invalids.[165] The National Pension Law of 1920 was designed to solve the problems and quieten the agitation, but it failed because of the

administrative load it had to carry - for example, the mounting backlog of cases in the pension appeal courts - and the political and economic disturbances of the post-war years. And so it was that "five years after the war's end, millions of war victims still did not know what their pensions would be."[166]

This was the broad context within which the Gasthaus proprietor's comments were made. It could suggest that the reasons for his dissatisfaction were different from those of Bouton's other Bad Blankenburg respondents.

Cicely Hamilton who travelled around Germany in the late 1920s and published her reflections in 1931 believed that anyone who went about that country with their eyes and ears open could hardly help noticing that there were constant appeals for unity. The appeals were certainly more frequently made in Germany than anywhere else. She concluded that the appeals for unity were made because unity did not exist.[167] This early commentary on the Nazi interest in Volksgemeinschaft redirects attention to the argument that Germany was a nation characterised by value-dissensus. The title of Hamilton's book was significant: Many Germanies.

It is a relatively straightforward matter to locate Bartlett [1933] in the multimodal category.[168] Although he offered

political reasons for not depicting Germany under the Nazis as a strong-bonded, homogeneous community in terms of traits and values - to do so would have the effect of creating a siege mentality and of bringing regime and people closer together - the real reason for avoiding such a depiction was its basic inaccuracy. Most Germans were 'right-minded', unaware of the atrocities perpetrated by the regime, and not supportive of those reprehensible elements of the Nazi movement which were public knowledge. Within the Nazi movement itself important social and attitudinal distinctions had to be made. Industrialists were there from pragmatic self-interest rather than ideological commitment. There was profit to be made. Most of the young people in the party were there because they were attracted by the vision of a new society - revolutionary rather than reactionary. Then there were the bullies. Bartlett was careful to identify the potential for sadism in all human groups. When he suggested that it ran "deeper in the German character than in that of most other people", this has to be taken to mean, either that it was a personality trait widely distributed across the population - in contradiction of his other comments - or that sadism did not occur in the form of an innate characteristic but appeared with variable cross-cultural incidence in populations as a consequence of dynamic forces within the personality structure of particular individuals. In view of his other comments this latter position has to be

inferred.

He made brief references to appropriate methodology and to the influence of both internal situational factors and the wider international culture on behaviour patterns, attitudes, and psychic 'states'. Under the encouragement of real or imaginary emergencies, any nation might commit atrocities; it was shamefully easy to write lurid accounts of the deficiencies of other people. Post-war Germany was neurasthenic, because it had been unable to recover 'mental balance' after the Great War. She perceived her position in the world to be one of inequality and insecurity. Her neighbours appeared to be better equipped and armed than she was; some of her neighbours appeared threatening. Additionally, she had been beset by harrowing economic problems. It was not to be wondered at that this set of circumstances gave rise to an inferiority complex.

The main question addressed by the contributors to Peace Aims Pamphlet No.19 [1943] could serve as a text for the present discussion:

"To what extent are we to hold the German people as a whole responsible for the sins of Nazism?" [169]

In their different ways, T. H. Minshall, Patrick Gordon Walker,

and H. N. Brailsford rejected the argument from innate characteristics, held that homogeneity should not be exaggerated, pointed to the importance of intra-and-international cultural factors and suggested remedies based on rational, social, political, and economic engineering rather than on vengeance. In all this they located themselves in the multimodal category.

Brailsford [170] was disinclined to "assume a German tendency to aggression." Internal and international pressures had made for "a very perverted environment" in the post 1918 period; the success of the Nazi movement "sprang above all out of want and fear." Hope for the future lay in breaking the hold which conservative forces had on the German economy. German heavy industry should be incorporated with that of Britain and America. Junker estates should be expropriated. An international society should be built up in which Germany could "exercise her rights as an equal." Minshall and Walker detected certain behavioural regularities in German culture which set it apart from other countries. Minshall [171] considered that the centralising tendencies of the post 1871 period had been built upon centuries of severe discipline in Prussia and a tradition of paternalism in other states. The overall effect was that the political capacity of the people had been retarded. In the public, as opposed to the private area

where the free play of individualism could extend to exaggeration of self-significance, "compulsion and obedience [were] widely considered better instruments... than consultation and agreement." Helping to sustain authority in the public area were the teachings of the Lutheran Church and the normal deference and submissiveness of the Catholics to their clergy. These two facets of German life, obedience in the public area and individual freedom in the private, encouraged a tendency to go to extremes since neither familiarised the people with the procedures involved in compromise and negotiation. In all this Minshall was identifying tendencies and so taking account of variation. He wanted to avoid "dangerous generalisations." He knew that opinions differed "as to the proportion of the German masses that are today militarist and aggressive and those that are peaceloving, and as to how far they are only criminally docile and subservient to evil leaders." Although unwilling to come down on one side or the other there were suggestions in his own analysis, in the hearsay evidence that he quoted, and in the solution he offered that there were distinctions to be made. His solution envisaged a German confederation released from "the deadly influence of the Prussian system." Responsible parliaments would be established in each state, with control over finance, education, justice, and the appointment of civil servants. Further, there would be "complete decentralisation of control of all military and police power from Prussia." In

Walker's view, [172] Prussianism had generalised itself in all geographical areas of Germany, but not in all classes or groups. He addressed the question of the 'good' and 'bad' German by focusing on reactions to situational factors. Over a period of time, depending on the situational stimuli, the self-same people could be swept one way and then swept the other. "Socially backward militarist forces were strongly overdeveloped in Germany" because of historical logistics and geopolitical imperatives. An "unfixed and mobile eastern frontier" had led, naturally, to the emergence of "a militant frontier type." The significance of these 'tough elements' had been sustained in Germany by the nation's late arrival as a world power, forcing it "to create its nationalism... when the world was already imperialistic." The late arrival also had an impact on the economy, denying to German industry a laisser-faire period at all comparable to that which had been enjoyed by Britain. It was not surprising that Walker's solution to the German problem included the destruction of the frontier mentality as expressed in the militarist tradition, a liberalisation of the German economy, and the encouragement of democratic institutions. But all this would be futile if the Allies did not create a world "in which there will be room for Germany."

[iii]

Of all the critical comments made in the literature of British attitudes toward Germany, two in particular stand out: first, the Germans, or large numbers of them, had sado-masochistic personality structures; second, the Germans, or large numbers of them, had a deep-rooted respect for authority. These two themes were, of course, often seen as part and parcel of the one syndrome. In many sources the deep-rooted respect for authority was a necessary concomitant of a sado-masochistic personality structure. The purpose of the following discussion is to make a tentative test of the validity of the comments on personality structure and respect for authority by examining the extent to which they may be sustained by more theoretically based presentations - primarily those of Erich Fromm and Milton Rokeach.

The theoretical position constructed by Fromm [1942] to account - with Germany in mind - for "those dynamic factors in the character structure of modern man which make him want to give up freedom",[173] may be summarised as follows: clinical psychoanalytic observation of certain individuals had revealed a dynamic personality structure or condition known as sado-masochism, with symptoms such as feelings of anxiety, aloneness, powerlessness and insecurity, and with behavioural

compensations which took the form of a dualistic search for real or vicarious power and security - either by aligning with and being swallowed up by a greater power [masochism], and/or by exercising mastery over a weaker object, exploiting it and making it suffer;[174] it was feasible to draw conclusions on the group psychology of 'normal' individuals from clinical study of neurotic individuals since there was no qualitative difference between the psychological problems experienced by neurotic and normal individuals; further, an individual's location on the normal-neurotic continuum was culturally defined, so that in social, as opposed to psychological terms, sado-masochists could be normal [i.e., socially adaptive] in one society and neurotic [i.e., socially non-adaptive] in another society;[175] the lower-middle class in Germany, normal in that they were socially adaptive, had such sado-masochistic strivings, characteristics typical of them since the Lutheran Reformation;[176] it was power as such, power because it was power and able to command obedience, that sado-masochists admired and submitted to;[177] and so they found the authority of the Imperial regime [1871-1918] congenial and the 'authority' of the Weimar Republic [1919-1933] unacceptable; ideas lack influence unless they meet deep psychic needs, and so the fusion of the lower-middle class and Hitler was brought about by the fact that the personality characteristics of the leader were replicated in the followers.

Fromm insisted that "the answer to the question why the Nazi ideology was so appealing to the lower-middle class [had] to be sought in the social character of the lower-middle class."[178] How had this social character been formed? Where, in German history, did its foundations lie? As a preliminary he established a general principle, namely that there are circumstances in which freedom can be "... an intolerable burden... identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction." In such circumstances, "powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission."[179] He then applied this general principle to events in German history.

In the medieval period, people were "... rooted in a structuralised whole... which left no place, and no need, for doubt." Unlike modern society, the concept of individual freedom had no real meaning in the Middle Ages, when "everybody was chained to his role in the social order." This created a strong "sense of solidarity" sustained by "the directness and concreteness of human relations." There was no question of the individual being deprived of freedom, since the 'individual' did not yet exist:

"Man was still related to the world by primary ties. He
did not conceive of himself as an individual except

through the medium of his social ... role."[180]

But then the structure of society changed, and with it the personality of man. A new moneyed-class emerged, and with it new economic initiatives which encouraged individualism and competition. Giving the lead to such changes was a relatively small and dynamic group which wanted to break from the traditional way of life and, importantly, had the social and economic resources to survive the break. However, for the masses and the urban lower-middle class - those who did not share the wealth and power - the break with traditional ways was traumatic; they lost "... the security of their former status" without having the capacity to compensate for the loss.[181] Instead of having a fixed and to some extent protected place in the social and economic order, "the individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status." For the masses and the urban lower-middle class "... the increasing role of capital, of the market, and of competition, changed their personal situation into one of insecurity, isolation, and anxiety."[182] Now man was free, but he was threatened on all sides and from all angles, oppressed by a sense of individual worthlessness and helplessness. Such feelings had to be alleviated if the individual was to function in society. They were alleviated by Protestantism which "showed the individual how to cope with his

anxiety... Protestantism was the answer to the human needs of the frightened, uprooted, and isolated individual who had to...relate himself to a new world."[183] Fromm claimed a direct connection between the doctrines of Luther and the psychological condition of all but the rich and powerful. To save himself, man had to submit entirely to God. This involved man's acceptance of his insignificance; it involved denunciation and renunciation of individuality; it involved humiliation. However, for that price he could find certainty and security. Strength was to be gained by "becoming an instrument in the hands of an overwhelmingly strong power outside the individual."[184] This 'contract', Fromm argued, had secular connotations:

"In making the individual feel worthless and insignificant as far as his own merits were concerned, in making him feel like a powerless tool in the hands of God, he deprived men of the self-confidence and of the feeling of human dignity which is the premise for any firm stand against oppressing secular authorities... Once man was ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a God who represented neither justice nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine - and eventually a 'Führer'."[185]

It was not only masochistic tendencies which were encouraged by Luther's teachings. The sadistic tendency was also cultivated. In *De servo arbitrio*, Luther declared that man had no free will "in respect of those who are above him, but in respect only of those beings who are below him."[186]

And so the personality structure of the lower-middle class German was forged. In the Imperial regime this type of individual had derived security and power from identification with the monarchy. He had occupied a particular rung of the social ladder and had a clear perception of those who were above him and those who were below him. For the lower-middle class, the experience of the Weimar Republic "intensified the very traits to which the Nazi ideology had its strong appeal: its craving for submission and its lust for power." Having identified himself "in his subaltern manner" with the institutions of the Imperial period, the lower-middle class German lost his sense of power. His feeling of security disappeared with the monarchy. His stable position in relation to those above and below him was shaken then destroyed by inflation and depression. The ideas of Hitler appealed to him because he was a kindred spirit - a fellow sado-masochist. *Mein Kampf* was littered - on the sadistic side - with references to the author's contempt for the powerless, to his convictions that orators should break the will of an audience, that there is

satisfaction to be gained from domination and - on the masochistic side - with references to the worthlessness of the individual in any situation short of one in which the individual dissolved himself in the whole.[187] Since the "influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the extent to which it appeals to <u>psychic</u> needs in the character structure of those to whom it is addressed", the ardent reception given to Hitler's ideas by the lower strata of the middle class was proof of their sado-masochistic tendencies.[188] It was clear that Hitler's ideology "was addressed to people who, on account of their similar character structure, felt attracted to and excited by these teachings." Through alliance with Hitler, the lower-middle class German gained access to a hierarchy

"... in which everyone [had] somebody above him to submit to and somebody beneath him to feel power over."[189]

There is a generous sweep to Fromm's ideas that invites admiration. His generalisations seem to unpack the constituents of problems and make everything much more intelligible. Sado-masochistic attitudes to power, when set in the historical context of Germany [1871-1945], appear to offer a very plausible explanation for the temporary nature of the Weimar 'parenthesis':

	Imperial Regime	Weimar Republic	Nazi Regime
Functional Characteristics	Powerful in capacity to maintain order and command obedience.	Powerless to impose order and command obedience.	Powerful in capacity to maintain order and command obedience.
How regarded by Sado-masochists.	Admired	Despised	Admired

Setting aside for the moment the crucial issues of incidence and distribution, it would be foolhardy to exclude sado-masochistic strivings from the nexus of causal factors in modern German history. Fromm's reference to dynamic forces in man is to be commended. And one does not have to be a psychologist or a psychoanalyst to appreciate that freedom, in the shape of individual responsibility and opportunity for autonomous decision making, can be burdensome and give rise to doubt, uncertainty, and anxiety. Ordinary everyday experience provides its own verification. This said, there is a sense in which Fromm's whole theoretical construction is a pack of cards.[190]

He started from the sado-masochist as identified by careful clinical observation and then assigned similar dynamic personality structures to the lower strata of the middle class in Germany. The 'gap' between findings derived from the

in-depth study of individuals undergoing psychoanalysis and the characteristics assigned to a large social group was bridged not by appropriate methodological techniques but by intuition and the introduction of three theoretical propositions, each of which, in unqualified form is flawed and of dubious value for the interpretation of modern German history. First, there was the proposition that

"The phenomena which we observe in the neurotic person are in principle not different from those we find in the normal. They are only more accentuated, clear cut, and frequently more accessible to the awareness of the neurotic person then they are in the normal who is not aware of any problem which warrants study."[191]

second, there was the proposition that

"The influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the extent to which it appeals to psychic needs in the character of those to whom it is addressed. Only if the idea answers powerful psychological needs... will it become a potent force in history."[192]

Third, there was the proposition that Hitler's ideas were attractive because they reached out from one sado-masochist to many other sado-masochists.

Inkeles and Levinson took the view that national character referred to "modes of a distribution of individual personality variants", and argued that its study required "the psychological investigation of adequately large and representative samples of persons studied individually." Further, national character could not be equated with societal regularities of behaviour, for "a given behavioural regularity <u>may or may not</u> reflect personality characteristics that are enduring in each individual and common to all individuals who show it."[193] Fromm's methodological approach failed to meet either requirement. There was no examination of adequately large and representative samples studied individually, and so he was forced to deduce characteristics from a behavioural regularity - and from one which was confined to a short space of time - the incidence of electoral support for the Nazi party from lower-middle class voters. It may have been his awareness of this methodological problem that led to the introduction of the three theoretical propositions.

The flaw in the first proposition is that as it stands, without qualification, it is patently unsatisfactory when applied to the interpretation of historical events. Fromm defined the 'normal' or 'healthy' in two ways. In social, as opposed to psychological terms, a person was normal or healthy if he was socially adaptive, that is if he was able to fulfil role

expectations; in psychological terms, a person was normal or healthy if he achieved "the optimum of growth and happiness" as an individual. Both definitions would merge if the adaptive person lived in a society that offered individuals the possibility of achieving optimum psychological health, but in most societies there was "a discrepancy between the aims of smooth functioning... and of the full development of the individual." It followed that the person "who is normal in terms of being well-adapted is often less healthy than the neurotic person in terms of human values. Often he is well adapted only at the expense of having given up his self in order to become more or less the person he believes he is expected to be." Such a person, even though socially adaptive would be crippled in the growth of his personality.[194] In The Crisis of Psychoanalysis [1973], Fromm noted that a person could function well in a sick society precisely because he was sick in human terms. He posed the question: "Was not a sadist quite effective in the Nazi system and a loving person quite unadapted?"[195] Now, bear in mind that unadapted individuals in such a context - that is, those who by definition could not function socially and would be noticed as culturally abnormal - would have gone into exile or been prime candidates for camps and/or liquidation. By implication, adaptive individuals in this context were so because they were crippled in the growth of their personality. But what about the possibility that

sensitive and caring individuals obeyed rules and functioned according to the norms - and so adapted to, and appeared normal in Nazi society - through fear rather than inclination? Further, the sadist who found norm-based opportunities to exercise his inclinations may well have experienced pleasure and, to the extent that personal happiness may be related to culture specific considerations such as the approbation of peers, may well have been happy. For the sensitive, caring person, laden with guilt because of his overt acceptance of norms and feeling that he was in some way diminished, happiness may have been a remote prospect. So far as adapted Germans were concerned, the real suffering and the real unhappiness, the real psychological sickness may have been endured by the sensitive and the caring rather than the sadistic. Adaptation in the Nazi regime and under the Nazi writ did not of necessity presuppose sadistic tendencies, even if the population sample is limited to the lower-middle class. The inmates who serviced the crematoria of Treblinka were adapted in functional terms to their environment. Were they sadists, or were they guilt laden victims of fear?

It has been noted that Fromm did not see the terms normal and abnormal as dichotomous. Rather he considered that they lay on a continuum so that the difference between the "pathology of neuroses and psychoses" and the "pathology of normalcy" was one

of degree, not of kind.[196]   It has to be conceded that there
is a sense in which the 'normal' individual struggles with the
same complexes as the 'abnormal', the difference lying mainly in
the manner in which the complexes are handled. In all
individuals there is conflict when impulses come in contact with
social   reality.   In   non-neurotics   those   impulses   are
"transformed into relatively stable and socially adapted traits
through reaction formation or sublimation";   in the neurotic
there has been a "damming up [repression] of... energy and its
pathological transformation in some symptomatic manifestation",
such as withdrawing into a phantasy life.[197]   The normal or
adaptive individual is not free from inner conflict for the
meeting place of inner drives and social reality is a
battleground. This quantitative distinction between normal and
abnormal, non-neurotic and neurotic - convincing on one level -
is unsatisfactory when applied to the interpretation of history.
Suppose a continuum between the extremes of normal and neurotic.
Between those extremes will lie any amount of individuals in
different states of psychological disequilibrium. Insofar as we
are interested in the roles such people play in historical
events, we have to step beyond quantitative analysis, beyond the
identification of differences of degree, and engage in
qualitative analysis. As historical agents, the individuals are
more than theoretical constructs; they are participants, making
inputs, influencing others, reacting, being influenced by

others. Clearly there is a possibility, and perhaps no more than that, that individuals close to each other on the continuum may input, influence, react, and be influenced in much the same way. But one would expect the inputs, reactions, and influence of individuals at the extremes of the continuum to differ qualitatively, and it appears reasonable to allow the possibility that this would also apply to individuals or groups of individuals located at points relatively distant from each other on the continuum. Once allow the possibility - buttressed by knowledge that the behaviour of historical agents does differ - that individuals who may differ quantitatively in their ability to deal with the common problem of inner conflict may differ qualitatively in form of action, that is, in the making of history, and the claim that it is legitimate to proceed directly to an understanding of history from the study of neurotic individuals becomes dubious, to say the least.

It is no doubt true that ideas lack influence if they do not meet psychic needs, and Hitler's ideas may well have met the particular sado-masochistic psychic needs of some Germans - and not only lower-middle class Germans. But psychic needs are not synonymous with sado-masochistic needs, and can be expressed in the form of non-neurotic anxiety over issues of material self-interest - getting a job, regaining status, etc. While it is true that in-depth analysis of large numbers of individuals

would be necessary to determine what specific psychic needs were
being met for specific individuals by particular ideas, everyday
experience suggests that non-neurotic anxiety, or temporary
neurotic - that is, state rather than trait - anxiety is very
common. Fromm claimed that

> "... the psychology of the leader and that of his
> followers, are, of course, closely linked with each other.
> If the same ideas appeal to them their character structure
> must be similar in important respects."[198]

Had he qualified this statement so that it included the phrase
'may be closely linked with each other', and had he dropped the
categorical 'must', it would stand as a valuable if contingent
analytic aid and no exception could be taken to it. But Fromm
was unable to so qualify the statement because to have done so
would have further reduced its usefulness as a bridge plank
between limited clinical observation and the definition of group
characteristics. The statement is simply not true as it stands.
Perceptions can be vastly different. The relationship between
the ideas of a leader as the leader understands them and the
ideas of a leader as followers understand them is often
convincing proof that the two sides can see things differently,
not only in cognitive but in certain important psychological
respects. Consider Lenin and Luxemburg in relation to Marx;

consider the Girondins and the Jacobins in relation to J. J. Rousseau. Michael Waltzer [1964] suggested that

"Ideas are spectacles which men use to bring the world into focus. They then walk this way and not that because of the particular focus they have chosen."[199]

This is an apposite metaphor. Fromm appears to have overlooked the possibility that spectacle lenses are not identical.

The interesting, if sometimes contradictory things Fromm had to say about the typical sado-masochist's attitude to power might explain why some Germans, acting irrationally, cast their votes for Hitler. The problem is that this attitude, as he defined it, is so irrational that it is difficult to assign it to large groups of Germans who, struggling to keep their heads above water, and probably possessed of some image - modest or otherwise - of the good life, were more likely than not to be concerned with instrumental and consummatory values. The love and admiration, and readiness for submission of Fromm's sado-masochist were "automatically aroused by power - whether of a person or of an institution... not for any value for which [it] might stand but just because it [was] power." The sado-masochist also had a clearly defined attitude to fate. He loved to be subjected to it; "crisis and prosperity [were] not

social phenomena which might be changed by human activity, but the expression of a higher power to which one [had] to submit."[200] This intrinsic as opposed to functional view of power, and submissive accommodation to whatever economic conditions obtained - based on an essentially pessimistic view of the capacity of governments to protect, maintain, and enhance the living conditions of their citizens - might well be uncovered in some individuals in the process of clinical observation, but it is not what one would expect from the great bulk of people, accepting or rejecting power sources in terms of their capacity to carry them toward some tangible material goal and, perhaps more importantly on a day to day basis, to meet their basic economic needs. Even without the benefit of a specially constructed test instrument it might reasonably be argued that _few_ are neutral about the capacity of governments to deliver in terms of short and long term goals. Indeed, Fromm slipped into contradictions on this point when he wrote that a sado-masochist might fight against one set of authorities if disappointed by lack of power, but later on submit to another set of authorities which "through greater power or _promises_" seemed to fulfil his longings.[201] The notion that acceptance or rejection of power may be without regard to values is difficult to sustain outside the psychopathology of sado-masochism. Even the closed-mind thinker - Milton Rokeach's synonym for the authoritarian personality [see below] - related

to 'authorities' which were associated with values, and stood in opposition to 'enemies' identified by the unattractive values of a disbelief system.

That the Weimar Republic was likely to have had the effect of intensifying the anxieties of a sado-masochistic personality is not in question. The problem is that the desire to escape from the "unbearable feeling of aloneness", from the "terror of aloneness" - a desire so characteristic of the psychopathology of sado-masochism - appears to be in direct contradiction to the commonly held view that Germans tended to make an operational distinction between 'public' and 'private' areas. With regard to the latter it is suggested that through a process of withdrawal and detachment they had marked out private mental and emotional 'space' for themselves. This process was eventually to facilitate inner emigration. In this private space, loneliness was not the angst-laden condition experienced by the sado-masochist. Dahrendorf noted that in Peter Hofstatter's investigation of American and German concepts of loneliness the Americans attached sub-concepts such as unloved, insecure, small, weak, sick, empty, sad, bad, and ugly, whereas the Germans attached sub-concepts such as tragic, big, strong, deep, courageous, and healthy. To the extent that the retreat into private space was a widespread phenomena in Germany, and to the extent that the mental and emotional aloneness experienced in

that space was less _angst_ creating than uplifting, then to much the same extent would sado-masochism be limited as a dominant drive motivating behaviour.

"Where public virtues prevail loneliness is necessarily a sign of failure... and therefore experienced with anxiety. Among the private values... loneliness occupies an eminent place. Not everyone can bear it... but whoever can is a hero; he is strong and healthy."[202]

There is a hint of contrivance about Fromm's Thesis. It was too exact and surefooted in its treatment of the distant past and it fitted too snugly with all the stereotypes of more recent history. In the interests of smooth transition from one idea to another the reader is informed that there was no place for doubt in medieval society because everyone was sure of his place. It is true that _knowing_ one's place may remove doubts about the _location_ of one's place, but not necessarily doubts, uncertainties, frustrations, discontent, and insecurities in relation to a wide range of other life issues. In his thesis are found 'definitive' reasons for the aggressiveness and the submissiveness; theoretical confirmation of the abstract of traits on page [45] above; the source of the sense of mission and superiority. It is difficult to avoid the impression that "a great number of apparently insoluble problems" are _made_ to

disappear.[203]   This impression is reinforced by the nature of the 'straw-men' [miserable specimens, even allowing for the time of writing] set up in opposition to the thesis: the notion that the rise of Hitler was due to the madness of a few individuals, that he gained power through nothing but cunning and trickery, that Germans as a whole were willingless objects of betrayal and terror.[204]

Figure [10] is a simplified version of Milton Rokeach's diagrammatic representation of open and closed belief systems.[205] The basic assumption is that amongst every individual's beliefs there are some which are perceived to "emanate from authority." The heavy lines in the closed system - the dogmatic or authoritarian system - suggest that the separate beliefs of such a thinker are isolated from each other, and indeed isolated as a whole from different belief systems held by others. In closed systems the separate beliefs are only in indirect communication with each other, through common contact with "the authority region." In closed systems a change in a belief will take place only by sanction of the individual's authorities, and unless the authorities so ordained it, would have no effect on other beliefs, nor any effect on "beliefs regarding the credence" of the authorities. The closed belief system belongs to the authorities rather than to those who 'hold' the beliefs. By way of example, Rokeach noted

[270]

Belief (d)   Belief (c)

Authorities

Belief (a)   Belief (b)

THE OPEN SYSTEM

belief (d)   belief (c)

Authorities

belief (a)   belief (b)

THE CLOSED SYSTEM

Figure [10]

that

"... Some Communists were observed to change their beliefs
about communist collaboration with the Nazis immediately
following the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact in
1939... However, other beliefs relevant to communism did
not change. The change was an isolated one, a party-line
change restricted to one belief, without altering the
total belief system."

It should be noticed that in the open system the lines which
separate one belief from another, and the system as a whole from
other systems, are light. In open systems, because beliefs are
"intrinsically related to each other as well as to beliefs about
authority", they are "... in high communication with each other
as well as with the authority region. A change anywhere will
spread in all directions and will be seen to have implications
for changing the remaining beliefs, including beliefs about the
credence of authority."

Rokeach placed two groups of volunteers, selected on the basis
of their responses to an assessment instrument designed to
identify open and closed thinking (The Dogmatism Scale), in an
experimental situation where they were faced with a problem
which could only be solved if they came to terms with three new

'beliefs' which, in relation to an ordinary activity, contradicted three everyday beliefs. In the experimental situation no assistance (clues, guidance, etc.,) was given to the volunteers - that is, they were let loose on the problem without access to an authority who knew how to solve it. Each individual, whether 'open' or 'closed' had to "... do his own synthesising of... beliefs without benefit of external authority."[206]

The outcome of this experimental/laboratory exercise led Rokeach to conclude that closed system thinkers experienced greater difficulty than open system thinkers when, "without authority to lean on", they were confronted with a 'world' which could be understood only in terms of beliefs which contradicted those they already held. This difficulty retarded the synthesising process, prevented the break-down of the closed system as a system, and hindered the formation of new systems.[207]

It was part of Rokeach's case that when an authority 'speaks', that is, when a source of authority either actually or metaphorically makes a declaration or statement, gives advice, expresses a command, etc., two types of information are available for evaluation: information about the world on the one hand, and on the other information about the authority and

what it wants the adherent to do or feel about the world. As an example he referred to the statement by a member of the U.S. administration to the effect that the Russians were as stubborn as ever on the issue of disarmament.[208] This statement provided information about the world (in this case Russian attitudes) and the recipient had to decide if it were correct. But information was also provided about the member of the U.S. administration - his beliefs, what he wanted the recipient to believe, what he wanted the recipient to do about it. Rokeach considered that an open-system thinker would evaluate both types of information by looking at them separately and asking questions about their validity. This appears to be a reasonable assertion. It is in fact the sort of procedure adopted by the historian who asks questions both about the sources (authorities) themselves and what those sources actually say. But the open-minded person differs in this respect from the closed minded person (and for closed minded person we can read 'authoritarian personality'):

"... The more open the belief system, the more will the dual character of the communication... be appreciated and responded to with discernment, each piece of information being weighed on its own merits;... the more closed the system, the less cognitive discrimination we will expect between the two sets of information...

There are two aspects to the communication, and in
different people the dual aspects will be differentiated
or fused together, according to the degree to which their
systems are open or closed... Reliance on authority,
yielding conformance and resistance... all may have a
common cognitive basis, namely, the ability (or inability)
to discriminate substantive information from information
about the source, and to assess the two separately."[209]

Each individual has a belief-disbelief system. In his
discussion on the organisation of these systems Rokeach was
eager to demonstrate that an individual's disbelief system was
not merely the mirror image of his belief system, and so
unnecessary as a theoretical construct. He insisted that every
belief - disbelief system was asymmetrical, including "on the
one hand a system of beliefs that one accepts, and, on the
other, a series of systems that one rejects. For example... the
Soviet Marxist accepts one particular system of beliefs and
rejects Trotskyism, several varieties of socialism, Fascism, and
so forth... Thus, our conception of the disbelief system is that
it is far more than the mere opposite of the belief
system."[210] Different individuals, depending on whether they
had open or closed minds would seek information about their
respective disbelief systems in different ways. For example, if
a person's system was completely open "... he would seek

information about a particular disbelief subsystem directly from the adherents or authorities of such a system." An open-minded Stalinist, wishing to learn about Trotskyism would know that the best place to go would be to Trotsky himself. An open minded Baptist, wanting to learn about Catholicism would know that the best place to go would be to Catholic sources. But the more closed a person's system, the more sensitive he would be "to communications, reinforcements, warnings, prohibitions, and promises issuing.. form his own... authorities;" and the more he would be dependent on such authorities for the information he accumulated about a particular disbelief system. Information about disbelief systems, if it was received at all, would "come second hand, spoon-fed by the person's authority. For example, the more closed a particular Stalinist is, the more likely it is that he will come in contact with Trotsky's views only through Stalinist sources."[211]

It is important to note that Rokeach's diagrams represent _ideal_ types. When writers in the 1890-1940 period, picking up bits and pieces from the developing literature of Psychology, referred to the Germans as extravagantly submissive to authority they were, more or less, seeing Germans as representative of the _ideal_ type of closed-minded thinkers. It is clear that short of the _ideal_ types, any one individual's belief-system can be to a greater or lesser extent open or

closed. In other words, the lines in the respective diagrams can be less heavy than in the _ideal_ type of closed system and less light than in the _ideal_ type of open system. With this in mind we can apply the theory to the historical context of the Weimar Republic. Large numbers of those who opposed the Republic, so the argument runs, did so because they had what would now be called authoritarian personalities or closed-belief-systems. Conversely, there is a tendency to assume that open-system thinkers could not have gone towards Hitler as a solution to the social, political and economic problems besetting the Weimar Republic. This argument is, to some extent, of the _post hoc ergo propter hoc_ variety, in that an awareness of the character of the Nazi regime leads back to the assumption that there must have been 'something wrong' with those who positively contributed to its emergence. In an attempt to clarify what lies behind this argument, use is made here of a statement of socio-political theory and of a technique for measuring the extent to which minds are open or closed – both post-dating the Second World War. This may be justified on the grounds that the statement and the measuring technique may lead us toward a clearer expression of what some writers in the 1930's and 1940's were trying to articulate.

Ralf Dahrendorf described "... the constitution of liberty" as "a basic political attitude... characterised by three premises":

first - and notwithstanding firm conviction to the contrary and consistent efforts in persuasion - all men were imperfect in the sense that no one person knew for certain what was good for himself and everyone else; nobody could "establish the binding validity of his convictions except by force:" second, and as a result, there was always a menu of ideas, a "plurality of proposals for short term and, especially, long term solutions to social, and political problems;" in the absence of forcible suppression, all these proposals were competitors: third, political institutions existed to make sure that no single idea would "prevail at the expense of all others;" political institutions were in the business of maintaining the "competition of designs."[212] As a means of reaching a more theoretically based impression of the views expressed by those writers of the 1930's and 1940's who saw support for Hitler residing in the authoritarian, closed-minded national characteristics of the Germans suppose, for the sake of argument that those writers had before them Dahrendorf's statement on the "constitution of liberty" and the measuring instrument devised by Rokeach [see Figure [11] which gives the instructions related to the administration, and sample statements taken from, the Dogmatism Scale].[213] They might well have hypothesised along the following lines: anyone in broad sympathy with the socio-political philosophy expressed by Dahrendorf would (i) have achieved a negative score on the Dogmatism Scale

FIGURE [11]

ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE DOGMATISM SCALE

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE   -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE   -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE

+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH   -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

3.   The principles I have come to believe in are quite different from those believed in by most people.

*14.   I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

24.   I am afraid of people who want to find out what I'm really like for fear they'll be disappointed in me.

*36.   There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

*41.   To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

*47.   A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

*51.   Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

51.   I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the ideas of others.

*11.   Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

*12.   Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

*21.   It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

*25.   While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

*39.   Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

*45.   The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

*48.   There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

*53.   In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

(indicating an aggregated disagreement with the statements) and (ii) not have supported the Nazi movement in its climb to power. Hypothesis (i) is not in dispute but it may be worthwhile to consider hypothesis (ii) with the actual circumstances of the Weimar Republic in mind.

Faced with a social, political and economic environment dislocated by the aftermath of war, the inflation, the weakness of successive governments, the depression, the apparent failure of a range of short term political options - support for the Nazi party (provided it was not extended in the expectation of the terror, the Enabling Act or something similar, and all that followed on from that) was not of itself inconsistent with belief in pluralism, a conviction that in a world populated by competing designs there are no certain solutions. The Nazi alternative was one of the competing designs; support for it in advance of the manipulations consequent on power was not necessarily a denial of the kind of premises listed by Dahrendorf. A pluralist ethic must, by definition, take account of a range of possible options, and in politics those options usually run from left to right. On a theoretical basis no pluralist could object to the Nazi movement simply because it was a movement of the right. At a concrete level it has been argued that the programme of the Nazi party "... was wide ranging and confused enough to let the party appear as less than

a major threat to the existing order."[214]   And pluralism was part of the existing order. Analysis of the 25 points of the Nazi programme suggests that Dahrendorf's premises would not have been violated by the demand for self-determination [1], the desire for an equal place in the community of nations and revision of Versailles and Saint Germain [2], access to colonies [3], the emphasis on "character and ability" rather than corrupt practices in selection for positions [6], state concern for employment prospects [7], equal rights and obligations for citizens [9], the assertion that individual activity should not violate the general interest [10], the 'socialist provisions' [11 to 15 and 17], concern for education [20], health and welfare [21].   Additionally, there was no obvious threat, prior to the spring of 1933, to the independence of the judiciary. Voters, with the marginally possible exception of those who were authoritarian personalities and were motivated by 'sociopathic' tendencies, were hardly likely to have had the vision that under Hitler Germany would experience a time when "... Themis, Goddess of Justice, had the blindfold ripped from her eyes in order that she might determine the precise ethnic origin and political opinion of every party in the dispute over which she presided; ... when a German minister of Justice found it 'lawful' that the Chancellor of Germany should have his political opponents slaughtered... without the slightest semblance of a trial..."[215] To the reader not caught up in the Weimar

predicament, and armed with the benefits of hindsight, [4],
[18], and [24], represent the thin end of a very dangerous
wedge. If citizenship was to be removed from German Jews, if
all criminals, irrespective of race - on the face of it, a
reasonable and equitable provision - were to be severely
punished for acts against the State then it was simply a matter
of time as far as the Holocaust was concerned. And although
religious freedom was to be extended to all denominations there
was the saving clause [24] excluding anyone who endangered the
state or violated moral and ethical feelings. The door was
open. And [23] allowed scope, in unscrupulous hands, for the
destruction of a free press. But the hands would have to be
seen as unscrupulous! If, notwithstanding an appreciation of
the benefits which hindsight confers, it were claimed that no
one subscribing to the kind of premises outlined by Dahrendorf
should have, or indeed could have voted for the Nazi party, the
caution expressed by Robert H Lowie should be considered.
Writing of the "... man in the street longing for delivery from
present evils", he concluded that "He was neither a sceptical
analyst nor a prophet."[216]   It has to be conceded, however,
that anyone subscribing to the principles enshrined in the
'Dahrendorf premises', and who read the Nazi programme in a
careful way, exploring through content analysis the
possibilities inherent in the language of some of the clauses,
and/or who had a similar sound familiarity with Mein Kampf,

would have left himself open to serious cognitive dissonance by voting for Hitler. And yet, in the special conditions of the Weimar Republic such an individual might have resolved the inconsistency to his satisfaction.

Reference was made above to the experiment in which open and closed-system thinkers were let loose, "without benefit of external authority", on a problem involving new beliefs that contradicted certain everyday beliefs."[217] "Without authority to lean on", and confronted with a 'world' which could be understood only in terms of new beliefs inconsistent with those already held, the closed-system thinkers experienced real difficulty in forming the new systems required to 'solve the problem' - a step which, by analogy, could be regarded as the equivalent of dropping traditional and accepting new social conventions as situations changed. This experimental data may provide a clue to certain varieties of actual behaviour in the Weimar Republic, but as an empirical prop on which to rest the general claim that opponents of the Republic were closed-minded authoritarians it appears to have two major and interrelated weaknesses. First: there is a distinction to be made between laboratory situations and the real world. In this experiment those with closed and contextually inappropriate belief systems were isolated from the contextually appropriate information because they were denied access to the authority that possessed

the information. But this isolation was an <u>experimental device.</u>
Bound by the 'old' conventions they were denied, by external
design, access to the 'new' conventions. <u>This is not what</u>
<u>happens in the real world.</u> When, in the real world, social and
political change brings new conventions into being there will be
those for whom the change is congenial. There will also be
those who are more in tune with the old conventions, and, as
always in such circumstances, there will be dissatisfaction and
a certain lack of congruence between how they think the world
should be and how it actually is. <u>But in the real world there</u>
<u>is no experimental device or external design which denies them</u>
<u>access to the new conventions, and this is where it differs from</u>
<u>the laboratory.</u> <u>Second:</u> one can appreciate why the
closed-system thinker in the experiment is, like his open-system
counterpart, deliberately shut off from the new conventions which
provide the solution to the problem. For control purposes <u>both</u>
groups must labour under identical conditions so that if the
open-minded thinkers 'get there first' it will be the nature of
their belief systems rather than something else in the
environment that is responsible. But what if access to
authority with knowledge of the new conventions had not been
proscribed? It seems reasonable to suppose that closed-minded
persons would have been driven to consult the authority –
earlier and more eagerly than the open-minded thinkers – for
their ability to deal <u>independently</u> with the strange new world

was obviously more limited. They might have resented the fact
that they were forced to reveal their limitations, and the
authority with knowledge of the new conventions might not have
been respected. Yet it may be supposed that they would have
consulted it. This scenario, when related to the Weimar
Republic, proposes a situation in which closed-minded thinkers,
finding themselves in an alien environment, might have undergone
a belief system change. That is, wishing to function
effectively in a society with new conventions and choosing to
avoid isolation they might have recognised that the authorities
on which their belief system rested were inadequate and turned
towards other and different authorities. In short, there is
theoretical justification for the hypothesis that not all who
met the Weimar Republic as anti-democratic closed-minded
thinkers necessarily kept their old belief-disbelief systems
intact.

It has to be conceded, however, that the experimental data <u>may</u>
provide a clue to certain varieties of actual behaviour in the
Weimar Republic. One example is behaviour of the type described
by Thomas Mann and Ernst Glaeser.[218] It should be clear from
the argument already developed in this section that individuals
in the Weimar Republic would not be 'isolated' or distanced from
information about the new conventions <u>unless they chose to be.</u>
Such a choice involves some sort of retreat - perhaps more

mental than physical - from what most would regard as the real world into what the individual concerned would regard as a more real world. In Mann's Unordnung und Frühes Leid, set in the period of chronic inflation (1923), Professor Cornelius effected a retreat of this kind into the more congenial and for him more real world of 16th century Spain. In Glaeser's Frieden, published in 1930, the hero had come of army age just as the Armistice was agreed in 1918. The chaos and disintegration which surrounded him led to questions which his mother could not and did not want to deal with. When the father returned from the Front he too avoided discussion of the social and political issues which disturbed his son. He was aided in this avoidance by the fact that his wife had arranged his study exactly as it had been four years previously. The parents were retreating into a world in which the war was forgotten and the environmental upheavals ignored. K. L. Roper wrote:

"In these two figures, Glaeser portrayed a parent generation who wished to escape from any awareness that the world had changed."

It might well be argued that Mann and Glaeser draw attention to individuals who experienced so much difficulty in coming to terms with new conventions that they encapsulated themselves in the old. This sort of behaviour could be said to have

contributed negatively to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. But two troublesome questions remain: how can this type of behaviour be quantified and were such individuals necessarily closed-minded thinkers? The first question is hardly susceptible to answer, except that in very general terms the incidence of this specific behaviour must have been fairly low.[219] Any attempt to answer the second question must, while recognising the irrational element in the behaviour, leave open the possibility that for a number of people - irrespective of belief system - the experiences of war and its immediate aftermath were just too much to bear.

And what of those who distanced themselves from the new conventions and yet participated in the real world. Two groups may be identified. One appeared to hold on overtly to the old belief system and brought it into fierce collision with the new; the other appeared to acquiesce, overtly accepting the new conventions - even using them for their own ends - whilst covertly subscribing to the old. So far as closed-belief system theory is concerned there is a significant distinction to be made between those two types of behaviour. The emotional context in the criminal behaviour of some Freikorps men and members of the derivative Fehme organisations points to individuals acting on the basis of authority which was contextually inappropriate. The way they have been described -

fighters who could not become debrutalised, and men who could never demobilise psychologically - is suggestive of people tied to ways of thinking and acting no longer conventionally appropriate.[220] In this case, however, the retreat from the new was spectacularly violent and defiant, rather than passive. It could be that in this case we _are_ in touch with the neurotic element, with those for whom the need "... to ward off threat and anxiety [was] predominant."[221]

Developing the argument further, we have to allow for the possibility that among the _Freikorps_ and _Fehme_ members - and indeed among those engaging in the type of behaviour described by Mann and Glaeser - there were those for whom the Weimar Republic and its authority, based on democratic principles, was the concrete historical realisation of an invulnerable disbelief system. In such cases, where individuals chose, through one form of isolation or another, not to function effectively in adaptive terms, categorical information about the social and political deficiencies of democracy would have come from their _own_ authorities, and that information would have labelled democracy as undesirable. Although their own authorities were now contextually inappropriate in the sense that they could not be said to reflect the constitutional structure of Germany, or contribute to an understanding of it, these authorities were retained as absolute guides to action. There was therefore no

need, and in theoretical terms no ability, to evaluate the time-specific activities of the Weimar authorities and what these authorities said about the world. For, within the disbelief systems undesirable source and what was said by undesirable source were lumped together. Further, since the Weimar authorities were associated with invulnerable disbelief-systems, these authorities were, by definition, illegitimate. But this still leaves the problem of those who covertly opposed Weimar authority yet overtly played to the 'rules of the game'. Out of tune with the new conventions, participating in the real world but not engaging in criminal activity, the solution lay in temporary and feigned acquiescence. The law was obeyed, the procedures of the State followed and used; but always there was the aim of destroying the new conventions. Such individuals, though opponents of the Republic, do not fit into closed-belief-system theory as defined by Rokeach. We are told that the closed system "... is the authority's system rather than the adherents'," but there is a degree of adherent autonomy in behaviour which overtly conformed to new belief systems - as a matter of pretence - when old belief system authorities, literally predating the introduction of the new systems, could not provide the information needed to do this.

For clarification suppose, first, that the individual lives in a

society which, through the governing bodies, institutionally reflects his belief system (say - autocracy) and _in_ which that part of his disbelief-system which he 'knows' as democracy can be treated as something relatively abstract because, although a competing philosophy, it is non-institutionalised. His belief system is supported by concrete reality and reliance on his authorities is facilitated by the abstract nature of its opposition. There is, in other words, no institutionalised democratic reality to offer a concrete challenge. Suppose, then, that the tables are turned, the competing philosophy is institutionalised, and his belief system is no longer reflected in the laws and civil/political practices of the new social arrangements. Although his own authorities can still spoon-feed him in terms of general anti-democratic principles they cannot give him much help with the time-specific activities of the new governing bodies in response to time-specific circumstances. If he is to overtly support and covertly oppose the democratic regime in anything other than a generalised and abstract manner he has to evaluate its time-specific activities for himself. This involves a degree of personal autonomy inconsistent with the closed-belief system in its ideal form. The application of the theory to a particular historical context opens up the possibility that anti-republicans were not necessarily typical authoritarian personalities.

There is, on the other hand, a measure of agreement from historians that important groups within German society demonstrated what Rokeach termed 'party-line thinking' - a characteristic of authoritarianism. The Weimar Republic had three major political groupings [excluding the Nazis] which might be said to have demonstrated, to varying degrees, party-line thinking - KPD, SPD, and Zentrum.[222]   Since at the level of philosophy, if nothing else, the approach of those groups was relatively humane, it is interesting to contemplate that apart from the obvious example of hard-core Nazi supporters they might represent the authoritarian personalities of the Weimar Republic. Erich Fromm certainly considered that the Weimar socialists displayed significant traits of the authoritarian character structure. He wrote

> "Ideas often are consciously accepted by certain groups,
> which, on account of the peculiarities of their social
> character, are not really touched by them; such ideas
> remain a stock of conscious convictions, but people fail
> to act according to them in a critical hour. An example
> of this is shown in the German Labour movement at the time
> of the victory of Nazism. The vast majority of German
> workers before Hitler's coming to power voted for
> Socialist or Communist parties and believed in the ideas
> of those parties; that is, the range of these ideas among

the working class was extremely wide. the weight of these ideas, however, was in no proportion to their range... A close analysis of the character structure of German workers can show one reason - certainly not the only one - for this phenomenon. A great number of them were of a personality type that has many of the traits of what we have described as the authoritarian character. They had a deep seated respect and longing for established authority. ...Socialism was not what many of these workers rally wanted on the basis of their personality structure."[223]

Before this line of argument is tested against the historical circumstances a few methodological issues have to be addressed. Fromm suggested that the psychological analysis of doctrines can show "... the subjective motivations which make a person aware of certain problems and make him seek for answers in certain directions. Any kind of thought, true or false, if it is more than a superficial conformance with conventional ideas, is motivated by the subjective needs and interests of the person who is thinking."[224] The assumption is that "... ideas have an emotional matrix,"[225] and on this basis it is reasonable to assume that Socialism gained ground in the nineteenth century in much the same way that "... the new religious doctrines were an answer to psychic needs" in the sixteenth century.[226] But Fromm did not concede the similarity. Although he deferred the

explicit introduction of the concepts 'range' and 'weight' until the appendix to The Fear of Freedom, they are implicit in the body of his thesis. It appears that the range or incidence of adherence to ideas is related to the number of individuals who profess belief in them as a potential answer to certain subjective needs and interests, whereas the weight or influence of ideas is related to the strength of these needs and interests and the capacity of the 'answer' to satisfy them. In Fromm's words:

"The influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the extent to which it appeals to psychic needs in the character of those to whom it is addressed. Only if the idea answers powerful psychological needs... will it become a potent force in history."[227]

In arguing that Socialist doctrine was not what many of the professed believers really wanted, on the basis of their personality structures, Fromm was asserting that the doctrine was no answer to their powerful psychological needs. But, if only those doctrines which do answer the powerful psychic needs of their adherents become potent forces in history, we are led inevitably to the conclusion that socialism was not a potent force in modern German history - and this conclusion is untenable.[228] The internal logic of Fromm's thesis appears to

have forced him toward a conclusion at odds with the historical record: <u>Socialism could not be recognised as a potent force in modern Germany because he had defined many of its adherents as individuals with the type of psychic needs and interests which it could not satisfy.</u> To concede potency to Socialism would <u>have negated his premise on how ideas in general came to have weight and influence, and made nonsense of his claim that Socialists were not "really touched" by the ideas they professed to believe in.</u>

Two further methodological points deserved attention. First, the distinction between what people <u>appear</u> to want and what they <u>actually</u> want is a very convenient one to make, because away from the experimental conditions of the clinical environment, and in relation to large groups, it does not have to stand the test of verification. It cannot be used with impunity, however, for it has two cutting edges. Once the claim is made that many Socialists <u>subconsciously</u> desired something other than what was offered by their conscious beliefs, the same sort of argument can be used in relation to the lower middle class in the sixteenth century - and this, <u>without having to stand the test of verification,</u> would subvert Fromm's main thesis on German history. Second, for the sake of argument suppose that 'Socialists' <u>were</u> authoritarian closed-system thinkers - e.g. their relationship with authority was not one of "rational,

tentative reliance..." but one of "arbitrary, absolute reliance..."[229] Because of their personalities and psychic needs they would slavishly derive their views from their 'authorities'. In this context it is hardly legitimate to argue that they did not really hold Socialist views.

Methodological issues aside, it remains true that the unions did not exert their considerable extra-parliamentary potential against the Nazis in 1932/33. They "... still spoke the fighting words, but from mouths that had lost their bite."[230] Historians have attempted to explain this 'failure' in ways that lead, albeit with more respect for the conventions of verification, to much the same conclusion as that provided by Erich Fromm. Snell, [1967] reflecting on (a) the importance in Socialist and Nationalsocialist thought of concepts such as in/out groups, discipline, conflict, exploitation and dictatorship, and (b) their common military vocabulary, drew attention to similarities between "... the characteristic features of the Nazi personality (and) the personality features which German Marxism had helped develop."[231] Friedrich Meinecke pointed to "inherent tendencies" which in strategic (ultimate objective) terms gave Socialism an authoritarian image.[232] Did such similarities between organised Labour and the Nazi movement - a shared conceptual language, a common tactical vocabulary and parallel inherent tendencies bring the Socialist movement "close to paralysis" in 1932/33? How else is

the withdrawal of participation (that is, failure to stop the Nazis) in an "hour of political crisis" to be explained?[233]

The problem with this type of question, referring as it does to alleged indecisiveness and ineffectiveness in face of impending catastrophe, is that post-facto knowledge of the magnitude of the consequences is so shocking that they can hardly be accounted for in terms of rational decision making across a range of options. After-knowledge excludes one of the options (in this case the success of the Nazi movement) and this after-knowledge can so easily be transposed as 'fore-knowledge' to the minds of the historical agents. The effect is to deny to those agents the normal time-specific human activity of checking out the options as they saw them. And with this denial the way is open for a charge of collusion. Respect for the past demands that the options as perceived by the participants be given due consideration.

In July 1932, Chancellor Franz von Papen, on the stated grounds that the Prussian Government was unable to deal with street fighting between Nazis and Communists, dismissed the coalition headed by Otto Braun and Karl Severing. In the same month the Nazis increased their Reichstag representation from 107 to 220. January/February 1933 saw Hitler's accession to power and in March the S.A. launched attacks on union property. Why, in the

face of such warnings and challenges, did union executives and the hierarchy of the SPD not provide the dynamic, militant leadership that might have roused their supporters to violent response? And why, in the absence of such leadership did the rank and file not make violent response on their own behalf? Theories of authoritarian personality provide a deceptively comprehensive answer: <u>in the final analysis what they actually</u> <u>wanted did not coincide with what they publicly believed, and</u> <u>the leaders were in that mode of relationship to their followers</u> <u>in which instructions from above were accepted without question</u> <u>by party-line thinkers.</u> In this scenario no account is taken of the possibility that the behaviour of Socialists in the crisis was, in some respects, closely related to what they publicly believed rather than to what theorists consider they actually wanted. Furthermore, there is a sense in which this form of explanation, although taking account of human experiences in the Weimar Republic assigns to them a mere reinforcing and exacerbating influence on personality structures long entrenched. The experiences have no dramatic and novel conditioning force in their own right; they simply help to <u>reveal</u> the one true established personality.[234] Additionally, in its party-line aspect, it does not allow for the possibility that recommendations from authority were accepted on the grounds that they matched with independent evaluation of the range of available options. Without denying

that the theories of Fromm and Rokeach would cover the experience of some Socialists, and so add a dimension to explanation, it is contended in opposition to a general application of those theories that the traumatic events of the Weimar Republic had a novel conditioning effect which was likely to make many men, earlier prepared to take forceful and risky action (as in response to the Kapp putsch), wary and circumspect; that this in turn probably facilitated careful and critical appraisal of the options open to them; and that their decisions were not necessarily made at the sacrifice of what they publicly believed as defenders of democracy.

Katherine Larson Roper's examination of Weimar novels suggests that primary social ties, disturbed and weakened by the war of 1914-18 were in many cases broken in the aftermath, leaving many young people dissatisfied with existing political groups which appeared unable to remediate present difficulties. Then, with little breathing space large numbers of those embarking on courses with the expectation of professional careers were first victims of the inflation and then competing candidates for employment in a rapidly declining market. Those traumatic experiences were to some extent responsible for their rejection of Socialism, for in its party political form (SPD) it was associated with institutional failure to solve serious social and economic problems. With this rejection, recruitment dried

up and the socialist movement became "... lacking in youth and vigour, defensive in mentality."[235]   It was in this condition that it experienced the Depression in the years from 1928 to Hitler's accession to power, and that experience "... demoralised the labour movement both physically and psychologically."[236]   A contemporary description of the composition and morale of the Socialist paramilitary force, The Iron Front, testifies to the dramatic impact events can have on men:

> "In this vast army, the battalions of strong young men, the daring youngsters with muscles of steel and determined spirit, were only a minority. So many... bore the marks of the long privation of the economic crisis; hunger and cold, the unending search for work, the misery of homelessness... had robbed them of vitality and courage."[237]

Are we dealing here with circumstances that merely reinforce and exacerbate long established personality structures, or circumstances that have a dynamic, personality adjusting capacity in their own right? To comment as one historian has done that "... the movement had lost its elan" - its impetuosity and dash - is to suggest that character was being modified rather than reinforced.[238]

What options were open to workers in the Socialist federations at this time? In response to the von Papen coup in Prussia they could have taken strike action, demonstrated in the streets, resorted ultimately to violence. But rumours were rife that agent provocateurs had infiltrated with the aim of pushing them into that kind of action - and if this were so then sinister forces, in opposition to the movement, could be drawing them into open and bloody confrontation with the Reichswehr. [239] Additionally, there was understandable self-interest in their calculations. There was no shortage of volunteers to take their jobs if they went on strike and were subsequently locked-out. Then there was the matter of the Constitution. They had supported it, had attempted to make it work, had been associated with the political party most constant in the cause of the Republic. And this presented them with a dilemma. While the Supreme Court was adjudicating on the legality of von Papen's actions of July 1932, violent extra-parliamentary action would, unlike their response in 1920, be inconsistent with loyalty to due process. And unless we wish to infer fore-knowledge from after knowledge, respect for due process cannot be excluded from the response to Nazi electoral success or to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor.

Reduced in spirit and confronted by dilemmas, some of them may, as Meinecke suggested, have seen in Hitler's proposed

Volksgemeinschaft a way of "bringing the bourgeoisie and the working class into harmony in regard to the great basic questions of public life."[240] In the end, without fore-knowledge of how socialism would be "denatured and robbed of its best content,"[241] synthesis and survival may have been preferred to negation.

The theories of Freud, Fromm, and Rokeach came together on the issue of neurotic anxiety - a condition often said to have characterised those Germans who opposed the Weimar Republic.[241] Each made a distinction between rational [or realistic] and irrational [or neurotic] anxiety. Freud regarded realistic anxiety as "something very rational and intelligible." He suggested that the occasions on which anxiety would appear, i.e., "in face of what objects and what situations," would depend to a large extent "on the state of a person's knowledge and on his sense of power vis-à-vis the external world."[242] [The theoretical support which this statement gives to Fromm's recognition of anxiety as a central feature of the sado-masochistic personality should be obvious] Irrational or neurotic anxiety was a condition in which objective as opposed to the psychic perception of danger played little part, so that "the connection between anxiety and a threatening danger [was] completely lost to view."[243] Rational or realistic anxiety was a condition which was invariably a reaction to objective

danger. So far as Fromm was concerned, the manifestations of neurotic anxiety resembled "irrational behaviour in a panic." He gave as an example the case of the man trapped in a blazing house; instead of taking the chance to escape downstairs before the building collapsed, he is caught up in panic and irrationally stands at a window calling for help. The distinction between neurotic and rational anxieties corresponded with "an important difference between neurotic and rational activity. In the latter the result corresponds to the motivation of an activity - one acts in order to attain a certain result. In neurotic strivings one acts from a compulsion... to escape an unbearable situation." Unfortunately, "the result is contradictory to what the person wants to obtain; the compulsion to get rid of an unbearable feeling is so strong that the person is unable to choose a line of action that could be a solution in any other but a fictitious sense."[244] For Rokeach, the closed-mind person - the authoritarian personality - was one for whom the need "to ward off threat and anxiety..." is predominant, and this need, although partly brought about by external pressures is also associated with "... irrational internal drives..." Rokeach argued that "... in the extreme, the closed system is nothing more than the total network of psychoanalytic defence mechanisms organised together to form a cognitive system and designed to shield a vulnerable mind." Some of the headings in Rokeach's 'Dogmatism Scale', designed to

measure open and closed systems, are reminiscent of Freud's broad states of neurotic anxiety - e.g.,

"Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation and helplessness of man; Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future; Paranoid outlook on life."[245]

There is no doubt that the irrational does have a part to play in human behaviour and experience, and that the psychological wells of the irrational should be explored by historians. It is also true that many who opposed the Weimar Republic gave every appearance of suffering anxiety and every indication that they perceived themselves as threatened, and although it would be a near impossible task to assess their number it would not be unreasonable to suppose that some of them experienced neurotic anxiety. But it can be argued, from the historical record and the capacity of those examining that record to empathise with those who were part of it, that for many the anxiety was realistic and that the perception of threat was rational. In other words, it can be argued with some justification that the anxiety and perception of threat experienced by many in the Weimar Republic were such as could have been experienced by most normal persons in like circumstances; that their anxiety and perception of threat were not divorced from environmental determinants and were not incomprehensible; that the connection

between anxiety and threatening danger was not "... completely lost to view"; that what the historical record shows is certainly people feeling the need to ward off threat and anxiety, but as likely to be doing so in a realistic and rational sense as in thrall to profound psychic neuroses.

The identification of 'anxiety' as a significant feature was not confined to sources which took an essentially unimodal view of German characteristics; but there was an important difference between unimodal and multimodal approaches in this context. Where multimodal approaches made an implicit distinction between 'trait' and 'state' anxiety - between a lasting and to all intents and purposes constant condition and a condition contingent upon situational factors - and allowed for the existence of both in modern German history, unimodal approaches did not make the distinction and focused attention exclusively on what amounted to a 'trait' version of anxiety. In this, as in other areas, consideration of theory-based approaches to human behaviour can provide what E. H. Carr referred to as a scaffolding for thought.[246] It may illuminate what might otherwise be neglected. It may add substance to more generalised lay approaches. But it may also demonstrate the dangers of generalisation and underscore the philosophical and empirical attraction of a multimodal approach to the definition of group characteristics.

[iv]

Sources which purported to reveal the behavioural and dynamic personality characteristics typical of Germans in the period under study have been criticised on a number of grounds. For example: for inferring personality from behavioural regularities in normal cultural setting and so treating as similar in personality structure a mass of people who would certainly have revealed personality variations if subjected individually to methodologically rigorous investigation; for adopting unimodal/bimodal approaches when multimodality was theoretically and empirically more appropriate; for exaggerating homogeneity, undervaluing the significance of differential sharing, and so representing behavioural regularities as evidence of widespread positive support for underlying values. This criticism was not in the form of a denial that the sources said anything meaningful about German society in the fifty or so years leading into the Second World War. It was the all-embracing, undifferentiated nature of certain approaches that gave rise to criticism. In both of the senses discussed in Chapter 9 there was unquestionably a German national character; only in one, however, can a German national character actually be approached. That there was, in theory, a German personality profile for the period is not in doubt; and given the

knowledge, will, and opportunity it could have been outlined if not fully defined. An _actual_ German personality profile does not exist; where it is claimed it is no more than a construct of the imagination. However, there _were_ some features of German society which, particularly in their interconnections, could be said to give partial and provisional shape to a distinctive _German cultural profile_. It is the purpose of this section to look at some of those features, endorse the claim for distinctiveness, and then argue their partial and provisional status on theoretical and practical grounds.

Without losing sight of the above reservations it may be argued that there is an interesting coherence and a distinctive pattern to the following set of cultural interconnections.

1.   Historically, the people of 'Germany' occupied a geographical area with 'soft' frontiers, open to invasion, constantly under threat. Faced with these geopolitical imperatives one state within the geographical area [Prussia] modelling its political, economic, and social life on the analogy of a "city under siege" [see Milton Mayer], encouraged certain values, institutionalised certain norms and practices, and so survived. The pressure-pot tensions involved in what was essentially a recurring act of survival gave rise, at least in governing elites, to a

'paranoid style in politics' [recognised in many sources, and given some theoretical substance in the work of Richard Hofstadter].

2. The Germans, as a people, were characterised by value dissensus in respect of perceptions of 'the good society'; that is to say, in value terms they were in a condition of disunity to the extent that the most characteristic feature of human relations in Germany was that they were carried out between 'ethical strangers'. [Charles Sarolea, Rainer C. Baum]. Value discensus was exacerbated by the fact that the 'market model' of the good society - said to nourish a respect for differing opinions, compromise, ambiguity and negotiation - was a superordinate value in only one of the four main regions of Germany, that is, Prussia, the Rhineland, the South, and the Southwest [T. B. Bottomore, Ralf Dahrendorf, David E. Apter].

3. In the second half of the nineteenth century Prussia joined with the other German states to form the German Empire. The geopolitical imperatives still held. But now, within the one consolidated state they were rendered profoundly more dangerous by value dissensus. For this reason it was instrumentally advantageous to the other states to pass responsibility for security to Prussia [Sarolea's 'Parable

of Prussia and Germany'], and for the same reason the 'paranoid style in politics' was a feature of governing elites in the Imperial Regime as it had been in Prussia before 1871.

4. To safeguard the new state from external [geopolitical] and internal [value dissensus] threats to its stability it was necessary to 'Prussianise', that is, to generalise the public norms and practices which had been successful in Prussia as a "city under siege." This had an impact on the political, educational, economic, belief, judicial, and kinship sub-systems of the German Empire [various sources, but primarily Ralf Dahrendorf]. Value dissensus remained, but was inactive at <u>public</u> level. For the sound operation of the State all other value systems were, overtly subordinated to the value system of the State. This meant that no non-official value system was able to claim precedence over another. Active value dissensus was confined to the private sphere. However, it still had an influence on public life for it led to "a propensity for amorality in role behaviour" among elites [Baum, Mayer, Dahrendorf].

Reference to the precarious geopolitical position of 'Germany' and its influence on cultural development was a relatively

common feature of the sources consulted. Milton Mayer's analogy of a 'city under siege' and Charles Sarolea's 'Parable of Prussia and Germany' are amongst the most imaginative versions of this interrelationship.[247] With 'soft' frontiers always open to invasion, self-interest led Prussia to turn in upon herself, in a corporatist sense, and became like a city "cut off from the outside world." Under siege, martial law took precedence; with the public interest superseding the individual interest, with the community - figuratively - becoming "an organism, a single body and a single soul, consuming its members...", people surrendered their individuality. Duty became "the central fact of life", and civic pride became the highest pride: "for the end purpose of all one's enormous efforts [was] the preservation of the city." Rather than the city existing for the citizens, the citizens existed for the city. The emergencies - real or imagined - related to geopolitical considerations persisted "for generations and for centuries" and could not fail to inform cultural patterns. There was an emphasis on military standards and virtues, on the merits of service, on corporate consciousness, on obedience and on loyalty.[248]

Before 1871, the distinction between Prussia and the other German states which were to figure in Bismarck's Kleindeutsch resolution of tensions within the German Confederation was markedly

cultural as well as political. It was for this reason that Sarolea set out to explain the "startling paradox" that although there was absolute opposition between the Prussian and 'German' temperaments, Prussian control was accepted. His 'Parable of Prussia and Germany' was an early recognition of the 'value dissensus' which many sources saw as characteristic of German culture. To provide a theoretical framework for the comments of Sarolea, Collier, Brooks, Ginsberg, and Dahrendorf - among others - it is useful to start with Rainer Baum's study of regional cleavages in models of the 'good' and the 'bad' society in Germany.

Using a specially designed 15 item questionnaire, the 'value orientations' of central characters in 31 examples of ethnographic realist German fiction were established by means of content analysis.[249] The central characters in the fiction served "as models of identification and distantiation, telling the reader who he or she is and ought to be, what one ought not to be like, and who some clearly identified others are and how one ought to be like or unlike them."[250] Baum identified four models of 'the good society.' The <u>Market Model</u> placed emphasis on individualism. Institutions existed to serve the needs of individuals. A just society was one "in which the individual pursuit of happiness is given maximum scope." The traditional dilemma of individual needs versus group needs was,

in this model, resolved in favour of the individual. There was a presupposition that people had things to exchange and that competition in ideas was not only useful but healthy. To proponents of the Corporatist Model emphasis on individuality was evidence of selfishness. The good society was one in which there was a "... buckling under to the demands of organisation... rather than individualism." Individual desires had to be sublimated for the sake of the collective whole. The traditional dilemma was therefore resolved by the "clear-cut subordination of the individual." The Gemeinschaft model emphasised interdependence, social harmony, and the satisfaction to be derived from awareness of 'belonging', and so threw a bridge across the divide between individual and group ethics. To those three models, markedly distinct from each other in their own ways, the Communion Model was utopian because its emphasis was on ultimate concerns. In the Communion Model social organisation existed "to transform human and social nature...", and in this enterprise, individuals and groups were "nothing but the instruments of some larger transcendental purpose, secular or sacred."[251]

Baum's findings led him to the conclusion that Germany was a 'nation' "in name only." The value profile as revealed by the ethnographic realistic fiction was that of a country "deeply split into regional subcultures with quite different value

hierarchies."[252] Figures [12] and [13] show, respectively, national and regional adherence to the various models of the good society.

On the basis of those results Baum concluded that "... the German people as a whole shared few if any common values."[253] Comparative analysis showed that Prussia and the Rhineland had quite different value hierarchies. The values that came first and last in the Rhineland occupied different points on the Prussian rank order. Then again, the two regions south of the River Main were distinct from both Prussians and Rhinelanders in that both South and Southwest gave precedence to the Gemeinschaft model; in their turn however they differed on the identification of subordinate values. And so there were "three deep cleavages separating the Prussians from the Rhinelanders and both of them from the people in the Southern part of Germany."[254] Vitally significant though this value dissensus was, and however deeply they were divided in adherence to different beliefs about the nature of the good society, Germans "shared some beliefs on the nature of the bad one. With the exception of the Rhineland, it was German to disdain the Market Model."[255] It is in this context that Bottomore's reference to "the competition model of democracy" and Apter's claim that what he called the "secular-libertarian" model of political relations was analogous to the marketplace - a view shared by

FIGURE [12]

Models of the "Good" and the "Bad" Society in Germany
(Percentage of Societal Values Coded for "Good" and "Bad" Characters).
Abridged version of Baum, p.134.

Societal values	Good	Bad
Market model	19	37
Corporatist model	28	32
Gemeinschaft model	28	20
Communion model	24	11
Number of values coded	(5,820)	(1,080)

FIGURE [13]

Regional Cleavages in Models of the "Good" and the "Bad" Society in Germany (Percentage of Societal Values Coded for "Good" and "Bad" Characters). Abridged version of Baum, p.137.

Societal values	PRUSSIA		RHINELAND		SOUTHWEST		SOUTH	
	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad
Market model	18	38	32	34	20	37	15	38
Corporatist model	36	30	26	27	19	35	27	37
Gemeinschaft model	25	25	23	24	34	17	32	8
Communion model	21	7	19	15	26	10	27	17
Number of Values Coded	(2,040)	(360)	(810)	(180)	(1,230)	(240)	(1,140)	(180)

[313]

Dahrendorf - is of interest.[256]

T. B. Bottomore [1964] pointed to the similarities between economic behaviour in a free-enterprise system and the democratic process in politics, to the "conception of democracy as... competition..."[257] In David Apter's demonstration of similarities between liberal democratic practices and the marketplace, concepts common to economics are conspicuous. There was an acceptance in the secular-libertarian model of divergence in points of view because this led to debate and "competition in ideas." Ideas had to be "tested competitively with other ideas in order to establish truth." In this the libertarian model was

"...essentially an extension of the rationalism of the market place, with the atomistic, competitive, and free play of ideas controlled only by a legal constitutional mechanism that prevents any group from obtaining a monopoly of power... The polity is like a vast marketplace. Government represents the sellers, with incumbents and candidates for political office actively engaged in producing policy or in discussing anticipated policy. Citizens are the buyers... Power and loyalty are exchanged for benefits and privileges... This concept of the polity parallels the pure theory of economic

competition and accepts the same values... Where as money is the measure and expression of wealth in the market, votes are the measures and expressions of power in the polity... There are other similarities between the economy and the political forms of the secular-libertarian model. Information is freely available to voters and officials just as it is to buyers and sellers. On the basis of information, rationality is possible. Hence, political freedom is first a condition of frankness. Knowledge of the product and knowledge of the policy assume an informed public."[258] In Dahrendorf's thesis liberal democratic procedures enabled citizens to "act rationally... to explore the market of life chances..." He defined citizenship rights as "so many chances of participation" through which the individual could "carry his interests to the market of politics as he does his goods to the market of the economy, and his idiosyncrasies to the market of society."[259]

Value dissensus, as such, and the geographical limitation to support for the market model, increased the probability that the inevitable conflicts would not be handled by the give-and-take process of compromise. In such a situation, Baum argued, "you cannot ask the classic question of all bargaining, How much?... you do not bargain about identity.

Where genuine ideal interests clash, it is not a question of
'how much' which structures conflict relations but rather
questions of what and who will carry the day."[260] In other
words, the issue resolves itself to one of power. In Sarolea's
parable the non-Prussian Germans were the heirs of a rich and
beautiful estate. They were clever and gifted but they could
not deal effectively with the problems of management,
protection, and development - serious in their own right -
because "they could not get on together." With the estate on
the verge of bankruptcy they took on a Factor. He was bullying,
unrefined, and overbearing, but he consolidated, kept out
poachers, protected the property against strong neighbours and
exploited weak neighbours. It was to the Factor that 'Germany'
owed "the prosperity of the national estate."[261]

Value dissensus and its ramifications in terms of power relations
within German society was a recurring theme in the period.
Sarolea's Factor had welded the estate into a great and powerful
unit after 1871, but on the eve of the First World War there had
been no diminution in value dissensus. The Germans had political
unity but had not come close to each other in more profound
ways, still presenting "a bewildering mixture of spiritual
paradoxes." Because of this conflict of ideas the unity of the
Empire had to be maintained "artificially by autocracy and
bureaucracy."[262] Collier [1913], in a dramatic

passage listing all the things that Germans did not know what, how, or when to do - expectorate, smoke, walk, stare, laugh, eat, drink, dress, etc., - was highlighting the lack of value consensus. Common standards had to be imposed, and so instructions on behaviour littered the German landscape. Collier effected a nice synthesis of the argument when he wrote:

"The people living upon this ethnographical chess-board have been for centuries rather tribal than national, and are still rather philosophical than political, rather idealistic than practical... To organise this population for self-support and self-defence, to ignore differences...required severe measures.[263]

Ginsberg [1942] quoting R. Müller-Freienfels' view that Prussianism was accepted because without it individualism would have led to anarchy, reflected that lacking some sort of "balance to the forces of individualism, the Germans have only been able to achieve such unity as they have by authoritarian discipline."[264]

McGranahan and Wayne [1948], examining the basic themes in the 45 most popular plays produced for the German stage in 1927, noted that where conflict was a central issue "their level of action is primarily ideological; the basic conflict is between

forces that represent divergent social, political... interests or divergent philosophies of life."[265] Against this background, and without complete subscription to his view, it is clear what Baum meant when he wrote:

"... obedience to state authority was always primarily a matter of expediency."[266]

The potency of value dissensus was in this way controlled but not eliminated. It was redirected into another channel. Many sources refer to the division effected in the life experience of Germans through the creation of two quite distinct areas, "a private zone of freedom and independence and a public zone of deliberate acceptance of restraint." If public space was regimented and characterised by overt submission to authority, private space was "spacious and unfettered" and characterised by individualism.[267]

Leaving aside the question of the extent to which behavioural norms were adhered to because their underlying values had been internalised, there were patterned conditions of life, general modes of conduct, and structured regularities in German society which owed their 'shape' to the developments outlined above. The web of interrelationships between the structural elements of the German social system described a cultural 'map'

on which harmonisation of procedures and practices was the most prominent feature. So far as State interest in the public area was concerned, "the settlement of contest was sought everywhere in its abolition..."[268] In this society the relationship of inferior to superior had to pervade all public spaces. In this 'norm-referenced' culture respect for and deference to military needs and virtues occupied first place in the rank order, for, ohne Armee kein Deutschland. Then, not much further down the list came the bureaucracy which, as an institution, reinforced subordinate-superordinate relationships by defining its members vis-à-vis all others and by programming superiority and inferiority at each of its own levels. Sustaining the members of the bureaucracy, from highest to lowest, and reifying the distinctions between persons in respect of the authority they commanded, were the decorations - satirised in Oberländer's 1894 cartoon, "Der Herr Commercienrath vor und nach seiner Decorierung"; they were devices which, to use Fromm's words, were intended to "insure the adaptation of the individual's character to what is considered 'normal' and 'healthy' within a given social structure."[269] Additionally, there was the protection of Beamtenbeleidigung. There was an "exaggerated faith in the rule of law", supported by the knowledge that the commitment was "on behalf of the victory of the ideal of organisation over the ideal of chaotic individualism."[270] The importance of subordinate-superordinate relationships in society

at large was mirrored to some extent in domestic relationships.
If the family is considered - cross-culturally - as a system of
conflict regulation and if, as Potter argued, authoritarianism
is to be expected in the home when it is "diagnostic in
society", there were signs, even allowing for differential
experience, that Germany over time was more of a 'Father Land'
than other modern states. The affirmative responses, in
percentages, of 1847 Germans faced at the end of the Second
World War by the statement, "The word of the father has to be an
inflexible law in the family", were:

U.S. Zone and American Sector, Berlin [1,470]	73%
American Sector, Berlin [182]	80%
Youth, 17-27 Wurttemberg - Baden [295]	80%

(271)

Schaffner's study [1948] convinced him that there was a
"remarkable parallel" between the rules that governed the
typical German family and "the credos of national, political
life." He found to his satisfaction that the German father was
"omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent", and concerned less
with the welfare of his family than with the "inviolability of
his position as head." Of the 96 subjects whom Schaffner

studied at the Screening Centre of the Information Control Division of the U.S. Military Government, 70% completed the test sentence "A mother who interferes when a father is punishing his son..." to the mother's disadvantage, and all answers to the test question "When a man expresses his political opinion, his wife should..." reflected "the subordination of the German woman to her husband in the home."[272]

It has been suggested that value dissensus and its counterweight - an exaggerated respect for procedural exactitude - contributed in their different ways to degrees of moral indifference in the ranks of German elites. "One can observe certain things in German society of the day before yesterday, yesterday, and even today", wrote Dahrendorf, "which raise the suspicion that they are somehow connected with a mentality that turned doctors and judges and officers into murderers."[273] As early as 1913, Price Collier referred to the special status, legal as well as social, occupied by 'the official' vis-à-vis all others in Germany, and considered it "a fatal incentive to the aggravating exaggeration of his importance, and to the indifference of his behaviour to the private citizen."[274] And in 1916, John Dewey, noting that Kant's Categorical Imperative had, under influences which exalted secular authority, led to an identification of the essence of morality with obedience to the commands of the State, saw in that identification a tendency "to

an implicit acquiescence in whatever laws happen to impinge upon the individual."[275] In such a relationship there was little room for civic courage, for challenge to secular authority in the name of some higher principle. There was, however, considerable scope for indifference to what secular authority did. Baum considered that this long-standing feature of 'German' culture had been raised "to a general principle of conduct..." in Nazi Germany. To demand legitimisation for State action which involved disadvantage to others, to ask on what moral grounds that action was predicated and that disadvantage justified, was not the norm in a culture characterised by value dissensus on the one hand and its counterweight - exaggerated respect for procedures - on the other.

"Given your knowledge that your peers are peers in position only but not peers in convictions, you know that your chances for earning derision or even contempt as a sentimental fool are far larger than the chances of gaining respect for such an endeavour... Value dissensus pushed you towards an abrogation of morally evaluating your role performance. In his official capacity a reasonable man would not try to be also a moral man. His chances for finding a consensual echo for his caring concern about moral values among critical others were too slim."[276]

The paranoid style in politics, as defined by Richard Hofstadter [1966] was "a way of seeing the world and of expressing oneself", one marked by heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy. The paranoid spokesman in politics was not to be confused with the clinical paranoiac, although both would appear "overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose and apocalyptic." The difference between the clinical paranoiac and the spokesman of the paranoid style lay in the fact that the former saw a hostile and conspiratorial world directed specifically against himself, whereas the latter saw it directed against his nation, his culture, and its way of life. In this latter case danger threatened "not himself alone, but millions of others." It was futile to oppose this danger by the "usual methods of political give-and-take" - by "a willingness to compromise" - for the conflict was "between absolute good and absolute evil." What was required was "an all-out crusade... the will to fight things out to a finish."[277] German politics in the period under study - particularly in relation to the outside world - provides what appear to be examples of the paranoid style. A precarious geopolitical position, the natural touchiness and tension inherent in a Kriegstaat, the perpetual fear of Einkreisung, wide ranging ambitions and a sense of greatness offset by a sense of frustration, suggests that here was a State in a permanent condition of emergency. The thesis advanced by

Dollard et al [1939] that frustration causes aggression and that all aggression is the result of frustration is no longer accepted as reliable in a predictive sense. But this is not to argue that aggressive behaviour is never related to frustration, particularly if the person, power, rival, etc., which is responsible for goal-denial already has what the aspiring other wants, was in part responsible for inspiring these wants through its own success, and yet resists that other's pursuit of equality of status. What may be said with some conviction is that contemplation of Britain's colonial and naval power did not of itself discharge or cathart German aggression.[278]

The paranoid style may be detected in the notions that choice was at times limited to Weltmacht oder Niedergang, that great expectations if unrealised must have been denied by some form of conspiracy.[279] It may also be detected as a emotional product of the conjunction between the Kaiser's claim: "Wir sind das Salz der Erde", and Maximilian Harden's cry from the heart: "Uns lebt kein Freund auf der weiten Erde."[280] Reviewing examples of 'literature' couched in the paranoid style, Hofstadter claimed that it usually "starts from certain moral commitments that can be justified to many non-paranoids but also carefully and all but obsessively accumulates evidence." Nazi attitudes to Britain in the late 1930s appear to fit this description.[281]

The elements and interconnections discussed above help to sketch in some features of a 'draft' cultural profile which, in its configurations - its shape - was in all probability distinctive. Once established, institutions, practices, and procedures had their own reinforcing effect and an important bearing on German history. A trait of 'submissiveness' - however various the forms in which it expresses itself - cannot fail to influence political attitudes and behaviours if fairly widely distributed in a population. From his examination of about 1000 German Ps.O.W. Dicks [1950] found "... the trait of submission... to be so widely distributed in the culture that it would fail in its purpose as a discriminating factor."[282] Subordinate-superordinate relationships within the family - a political system in its own right in which one can learn "habits of response ... which can carry over to the larger political system"[283] - were to some extent shaped by the wider culture and in turn made a contribution to its maintenance. Of the 96 Ps.O.W. subjected to intensive examination by Schaffner and his colleagues, the responses of 74 to the test sentence "If a father does not inspire Ehrfurcht..." embodied "the predominant cultural patterns..."[284] K. Larson Roper noted that one of the most frequent family patterns described in Weimar novels was that which portrayed "a subservient mother and a father who cloaks his basic weakness in a strident authoritarianism."[285] It is possible to reserve one's position on the theory that

schoolteachers, policemen, public officials and military personnel were obeyed because, psychologically, they were perceived as surrogate fathers, and yet accept that attitudes to authority within the home were not unrelated to attitudes to authority in the individual's outside world. On the reasonable premise that the exercise of political liberty "forces the individual _into_ the public at the expense of the apolitical dimensions" whereas the individual who puts weight on private values stands apart, and "reserves the choice of retreat" _from_ the social and political process, the forms of withdrawal - described by Mary Fulbrook as "retreat from politics and the public sphere into private spaces in personal life" - were neither creative nor supportive of "The Constitution of Liberty." [286] G. W. Allport _el al_ suggested that these forms of withdrawal ensured that people did not have to "admit disturbing reality" to their "temporary islands of security." [287] In Glaeser's _Frieden_ the mother took refuge in total political withdrawal, explaining that 'Everything the State asks of us entraps us and brings us misery. I want nothing more to do with it'; the father, as was noted above, "retreated into a world in which the war was forgotten and the revolution ignored." [288] It is not to deny significance to other causal factors to suggest that the relative unpopularity of the market model of the 'good society' was likely to limit the attraction of a secular-libertarian system. Schaffner's

study convinced him that "the idea of uniting all Germans in one family-like group had a powerful appeal"; Dahrendorf's review of modern German history led him to the conclusion that "the community of the whole people" had, for some time, been "one of the preferred German ideologies"; and Jeremy Noakes considered that Mittelstand adherents to Corporatist and Gemeinschaft values resented the development of "a modern... capitalist economy, and a more open and mobile society."[289] The serious and very important value cleavages at regional and national levels appeared to be replicated in the regional distributions by social class. For example, abstracting 'best' (a) and 'next best' (b) in each case, the regional cleavages in Mittelstand perceptions of the good society were:

Prussia:	Corporatist (a);	Gemeinschaft (b).
Rhineland:	Market (a);	Corporatist (b).
Southwest:	Gemeinschaft (a);	Communion (b).
South:	Gemeinschaft (a);	Communion (b). (290)

There was a three way division in terms of 'best', and a three way division in terms of 'next best', but it should not escape notice that out of 8 value positions the Corporatist and Gemeinschaft models - models which one way or another constrain the individual - aggregate 5 appearances. The elements and interconnections of the 'draft' profile also appear to increase

the probability that here was a culture in which, comparatively speaking, there was a sharper than usual definition to the necessary conditions for the public expression of sado-masochistic tendencies and the practice of indifference; a culture in which value dissensus contributed to the abrogation of personal moral involvement; a culture in which an emphasis on subordinate-superordinate relationships was to be detected in all sub-systems and institutions; a culture in which there was an emphasis on procedural exactitude, on the credo 'Ordnung muss sein', to such an extent that there was always a danger that Ordnung would become an end in itself.[291] There is, of course, the problem of quantification. For example: How many sado-masochists? Main themes in this and the previous chapter have pointed to the spurious nature of arguments which adopt unimodel or bimodal approaches to such questions. On the other hand, multimodal approaches, however much supported so far as variety in distribution is concerned by theory, everyday experience and the historical record, do not of themselves resolve the problem of measurement. In the discussion which follows it is argued that the 'draft' profile - though providing useful clues to what was peculiar, in terms of mixture and measure of features, to German culture - is partial and provisional. This argument requires that, among other things, the temptation to exaggerate the incidence of sado-masochistic personalities be resisted. It should not and does not require

that the phenomena be regarded as insignificant. Significance in this context does not require that sado-masochistic characteristics were widely distributed in Germany. It should be noted that Hofstede, through an intriguing example, has shown how comparison of _marginal_ phenomena can reveal dramatic cross-cultural differences in the statistical probability that particular forms of behaviour will occur.[292]

The 'draft' discussed above must not be taken as a sharply defined composite picture of all the configurations and features in the German cultural profile _circa_ 1871-1945. It takes little account of multidimensional approaches to legitimacy. It tends to ignore the very real probability that conformity can "conceal a wide variety of inward states and conflicting motives.[293] It can encourage a conveniently loose approach to quantification. Consider the following - multimodal - comment on the responses of Germans to National-Socialism:

> "Among _the million or so_ who ran, or tried to run, away from National-Socialism, there were many who opposed it on principle. Maybe _a million more_ fought it, or tried to fight it, from within. _A few million more_ didn't like it. But _so many Germans liked it_ [and not just some of it, but _all of it_] that it may justly be said to have represented the predominant national character of the time."[294]

The most noticeable feature here is the 'declension' in quantitative precision. Where commitment to the regime and its principles is taken to be non-conscientious there is an attempt to define limits - 'million or so', 'a million more', 'a few million more'. Where commitment is taken to be conscientious, definition becomes fuzzy.

Put too much faith in such a 'draft' and it may come to act as a measure by which any and every type of action by Germans can be defined and explained, to the exclusion of other and perhaps even more reasonable interpretations. Examples of this may be detected in the work of Schaffner. Responses to item 28 on the questionnaire demonstrated a quite marked disinclination to take an active, responsible role in politics in 1945/46. The majority of respondents wanted occupational control to remain indefinitely:

item 28: Germany should be occupied for many years, until
          the German people are able to form a democratic
          government.

U.S. Zone and American Sector, Berlin	American Sector, Berlin	Youths, 17-27 Württemberg - Baden
Yes	69%	79%	69%

Schaffner took this as confirming proof that Germans lacked "the
capacity to handle their own political problems or to reach
solutions without guidance." [295] The responses were made to
fit the theory. Although Baum's version of why people were not
eager to participate in politics at that time should not be
considered as an alternative all-embracing explanation, common
sense demands that it should not be ignored.

> "In 1945, if you stood in Berlin or Hamburg, Dresden or
> Munich, you found yourself amid rubble stretching for
> miles... Such moments in history are not moments of
> reflection. Your worries are biological, where to find
> something to eat, and a place to sleep. If you have
> social worries, these are utterly personal: how to find
> out about the fate of parent, spouse, or child." [296]

It was reported at the time that vast numbers of Germans "wehren
sich auffällig vor jeder Politik", and that young people, in
particular, "fürchtet zunächst Politik wie das gebrannte Kind
Feur." [297] Fulbrook thought that "the prevailing mood of the
time appears - apart from a committed minority - to have been
one of political apathy, or even fear of politics, combined with
a predominant concern for survival." [298]

ITEM	STATEMENT	RESPONSE	U.S. ZONE AND AMERICAN SECTOR, BERLIN	AMERICAN SECTOR, BERLIN	YOUTHS, 17-27 WÜRTTEMBERG - BADEN
2	The 'Right' is better based on justice than on power.	Yes	96%	98%	96%
18	The strength of the nation is weakened by democracy.	No	83%	86%	79%
26	An education encouraging people to have their own opinion is dangerous.	No	84%	76%	75%
56	Only a government with a dictator is able to create a strong nation.	No	75%	65%	65%
83	It is the duty of a citizen to inform himself about his government and to share in the responsibility for its policies.	Yes	81%	84%	83%
87	The most important thing in educating a child is to develop his individual personality [children should be individuals and not educated only for the state].	Yes	80%	81%	75%
98	Children need tenderness and affection from both mother and father.	Yes	92%	95%	82%
101	Obedience to the father should be based on love and understanding and not on absolute power.	Yes	96%	97%	95%

FIGURE [14]   Selected responses from the "Father Land" Questionnaire.   Bertram Schaffner [1948] Appendix 1. Yes signifies agreement and No disagreement with the statements.

It has been noted that more than 70% of the respondents in each of the three groups cited gave affirmative answers to item 3 on Schaffner's questionnaire - "The word of the father has to be an inflexible law in the family." This contributed to his view that there was a "remarkable parallel" between the ethos of the family and the ethos of society at large, yet in Figure [14] the responses, in percentages, of the same three groups to questionnaire items 2, 18, 26, 56, 83, 87, 98, and 101, suggest - in some cases quite dramatically - that Schaffner's view is suspect. Were the 'draft' taken to represent a finished portrait rather than a preliminary, perhaps even shadowy sketch, it would comfortably subsume - without critical consideration of alternatives - J. P. Stern's analysis of the significance and purpose of the ja oder nein? formula in Hitler's rhetorical exchanges with his audiences, whether immediate or wide.(299) Consideration of why use of this formula was such a potent tactic at the time led Stern to conclude that it was aimed at authoritarian personalities who wanted to reduce "complex problems to single black and white issues" as a way of wishing ambiguity, nuance, and subtlety out of existence. That the ja oder nein? formula would probably appeal to authoritarian personalities has theoretical and empirical support, but at the time its appeal was not necessarily limited to this personality type. What if the situational pressures were so great and anxiety so sharp that people, though short of being neurotic,

were more susceptible to simple solutions? Although such susceptibility is clearly a psychological condition, it is not necessarily the case that the condition was of long standing or had characterised people before the particular circumstances obtained. Stern himself conceded that the "temper of the age" was "of most complex and hazardous and exacting speculation..." To say 'no' at such a time might well have been equivalent to "back to the drawing board" - i.e. do nothing as yet to alter the circumstances.

More texture and substance may be given to the German cultural profile circa 1871-1945 by taking a closer look at the various attitudes which may be held of authority, by considering the relative importance of instrumental and consummatory values in different situations, by assessing the predictive reliability of theories which link particular traits with particular forms of behaviour, and by giving due weight to what may be termed the generalised, non-culture specific, non-heroic nature of the human condition in modern societies.

There is evidence to suggest that attitudes which are conveniently labelled 'authoritarian' do not reliably predict authoritarian behaviour. [300] Confirmation of this is found in the work of Schaffner, Dicks, and McGranahan and Wayne. It has been noted above that Dicks was unable to use the trait 'submissiveness' as

a means of discriminating between Nazis and Anti-Nazis, because in his findings the trait was present in both categories. It has also been noted that authoritarian attitudes on father-son relationships and on the role of the mother in family life were not reliable predictors of authoritarian attitudes on other issues. Of the 96 individuals in Schaffner's intensively examined sample, 83 were licensed by the Screening Centre as suitable to work in various branches of the media. Yet on the sentence completion item relating to 'son-father-Ehrfurcht', 74 of the 96 responses embodied the predominant cultural pattern "regardless of the particular political affiliation of the individual." Schaffner concluded that his results demonstrated "the prevalence of traditional German premises even in those individuals who did not succumb to Nazi ideology."[301] The problem of predictive reliability is highlighted by the early family history of one of the Ps.O.W. He was the son of a regular army officer. His father had been particularly strict. Reflecting on his relationship with his father he commented:

"I had only Ehrfurcht for him... I always wanted to say Sie to him... He made me an Einzelgänger... I lived under pressure and fear of his strictures."[302]

The respondent was an Anti-Nazi! During the war 15 American films on various themes were shown to 200-300 Ps.O.W. who were

"selected anti-Nazis." Their responses supported the conclusions of McGranahan and Wayne on traits that were widely distributed in German culture. The anti-Nazi prisoners complained about lack of depth, artificial happy endings, "superficial trash", about the general failure of the American films to penetrate "profound and meaningful sources of human action", about the emphasis on materialistic values, about the exaggeration - in some films - of the importance of the female role and the consequent subordination of the male role.[303] Of all the Germans with authoritarian attitudes in some areas of their life-experience, and with some of the traits normally associated with authoritarianism, it is clear that _some_ became Nazis and _some_ did not. Being 'German' involved conformance to a range of norms which were underpinned by authoritarian values, but conformance did not reliably predict political behaviour.

Baum's review of voting behaviour in Germany between 1871 and 1933 satisfied him that "from a motivational perspective, a vote, like love, is a many splendoured thing."[304] Fulbrook's suggestion that conformity can subsume a wide range of psychological dispositions and conflicting motives is a variation on the same theme. The question, Why do people act as they do, politically? - for example, give or refuse support - was frequently posed by the contemporary sources examined in this thesis. But the problem was that when Germans as a

national group came under the scrutiny of the question, the
answers were seldom based on an analysis of the concept
'authority' and how people might view it both conceptually and
in practice. On the rare occasions when they were so based the
theoretical framework was insubstantial.

Leaving aside the case in which political authority is accepted
for no other reason than that it has the power to coerce, the
properties required of political authority if it is to minimise
the damaging effects of opposition and dissent have been defined
by Apter as the capacity to give expression to, and meet the
needs of _instrumental_ and _consummatory_ values, and by Lipset
[1965] as the capacity to demonstrate _effectiveness_ and confirm
legitimacy. [305] When a political authority acted in
recognition of instrumental values it was encouraging individuals
to maximise benefits by giving support; when it acted in
recognition of the needs people had for "emotional warmth, the
sense of creativity and other 'feelings' and states of mind", it
was attempting to hold support by meeting consummatory values.
[306] Lipset's position was similar. Effectiveness
represented "the capacity of a political system to satisfy...
the expectations of most members of a society..." and was
"primarily instrumental in character." Legitimacy represented
"the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the
belief that existing political institutions are the best that

could possibly be devised", and was "affective and evaluative."
A system would be regarded as legitimate or illegitimate by its
members "according to the way in which its values fit in with
their Weltanschauung."[307] Explicitly or implicitly, these
views on the properties required of authority are
operationalised with regard to Germany in the Allensbach opinion
Polls [1956,1965], and in the work of Verba [1965], Steinert
[1977]. Baum, Kershaw [1983, 1985], and Stephenson [1986].[308]

It is accepted here that modern German history would be 'closed'
to anything but grossly oversimplified explanation if
consummatory values were left out of the discussion. That
history was what it was partly because of dissensus in
consummatory values, and the three discrete regimes of the
period, Imperial authoritarianism, Weimar democracy, and Nazi
dictatorship derived support, in part, from the fact that their
policies and practices matched the perception of the good life
held by some of those who thought of such things. However, since
consummatory values had a much better innings than instrumental
values in the contemporary sources, and since the significance
of instrumental values as factors influencing the "scale of
orientations" to authority was often denied or ignored in these
sources, it is on these instrumental values that attention is
now focused.

It is hardly surprising that Prussia, "more of an authoritarian society than other regions", should forge "ahead of others in withdrawing support from Weimar democracy." It would be convenient to explain this fact in terms of a mismatch between the consummatory values of Prussian society and Weimar democracy. This in turn would lead to the expectation that Prussian votes "should have been the most supportive of the Wilhelmian polity."[309] That this was not the case is demonstrated by Baum's analysis of pro and anti-system political sentiment as reflected in the voting figures for the 13 Reichstag elections from 1871 to 1912.[310] This analysis showed that pro-system votes for the nation as a whole started at 71% and fell to 42%, whereas anti-system votes started at 19% and rose to 47%. Within these national figures, the anti-system vote was consistently greater in Prussia than elsewhere. Although consummatory values were involved - for example, Prussian agrarians perceived legislation which favoured industrialists as promoting that which was anathema to them, 'modern society' - there were strong instrumental forces at work. The building of a costly fleet in order, among other things, to guarantee inexpensive food supplies from abroad was seen to favour the special interests of the industrial classes to the detriment of the conservative landowners. Additionally, the fleet posed a challenge to the traditional supremacy of the army. For such reasons, "The Prussians were the spearhead in

withdrawing support from the imperial polity..."   Throughout
the period 1871-1933 there was to be seen in Prussian voting
figures a "propensity to withdraw support from any form of
government that failed to earn its right to rule" - i.e., failed
to satisfy the material interests of the Prussian
conservatives.[311]

Between 1919 and 1933, instrumental values - defining what the
regime was expected to deliver in terms of material benefits -
were of particular importance to those for whom the Weimar
Republic did not represent a political expression of their
consummatory values. Had it been able to satisfy the
instrumental needs of the Protestant Mittelstand it is likely
that dissent and withdrawal would have been much less
significant, and that reflection on the 'consummatory gap',
where it existed, would have been greatly reduced and, given
time, minimised.

No discussion on the disappointment of instrumental expectations
and aspirations in the Weimar Republic can exclude the Inflation
which peaked in 1923 and the Depression which began in 1928.
The psychological impact on the individual of raging inflation
was explored by Elias Canetti [1962].

   "The millions one always wanted are suddenly there in
   one's hand, but they are no longer millions in fact, but

only in name... What used to be one mark is first called
10,000, then 100,000, then a million. [It] is no longer
fixed and stable, but changes from one moment to the
next...it has no continuity and less and less value. A
man who has been accustomed to rely on it cannot help
feeling its degradation as his own. He had identified
himself with it... and his confidence in it has been like
his confidence in himself... Whatever he is or was, like
the million he always wanted he becomes nothing... The
individual feels depreciated because the unit on which he
relied, and with which he equated himself, starts
sliding... an inflation cancels out distinctions between
men..." (312)

Significantly for the status consciousness of the middle
classes, the inflation did cancel out distinctions between men.
For many middle class folk in Germany the Inflation left a scar
which never healed. For generations they had seen the world in
terms of 'those above us and those below us', and were conscious
of holding a precarious middle position in society. Of course
they wanted to rise up the social scale, but more importantly,
they did not want to drop down the scale. In Mann's Unordnung
und Frühes Leid the professor and his family were described as
members of the 'villa proletariat'. Jarausch [1985] noted that
the Deutscher Richter-Zeitung complained about "the

deterioration of the legal profession through proletarianization..." A survey conducted in Hanover in the early 1920s revealed that 64% of teachers could not support their families on their pay alone. Later, in the Depression period, the term Anwaltsproletariat was coined. Under the so called Notverordnungen legal fees and the salaries of teachers were cut by between 30 and 50%. Additionally, 10% of the teaching profession was compulsorily retired. By 1932, approximately 60 thousand professionals were unemployed.

"The social effects of the crisis varied with age and rank: for the established professionals, secure in their job, pay cuts were a relative deprivation. For the unemployed adults, the Depression was a threat to their very existence. For the recent graduates who were unable to find a job, the 'academic professional plight' was a betrayal of their expectations."[313]

The reference to recently qualified individuals is of particular importance. From surviving records in Hamburg, Halle, East Prussia, and Lower Saxony, Jeremy Noakes [1971] noted that the ranks of the Nazi Party were being filled with young people. At a time when one third of the total electorate voted for the Nazi Party, two thirds of the total student population belonged to Nazi student organisations.[314] Why did the NSDAP

have such an appeal for the young? Erikson [1958] made the interesting comment that young people, standing "between the past and the future both in individual life and in society", have not quite 'found themselves' and so naturally search for identity. In doing this they are especially open to ideological appeals.[315] K. Larson Roper, in her analysis of Weimar fiction, suggested that young people were alienated in their search for identity and meaning because their parents were unwilling to help, could not help, or offered solutions unacceptable to their sons. Some young people, according to the Weimar novels, drifted aimlessly because of lack of guidance in their lives, became apathetic, and withdrew from political life. But others, considering the existing order to be bankrupt, challenged it and looked for something else.[316] Here we have some justification for thinking that Consummatory issues had a bearing on many of the three million Germans who reached voting age in the last years of the Republic.

But instrumental issues were also of crucial significance. The student population rose sharply to 90,000 in 1919, and by 1921 120,000, double the last pre-war figure entered universities. Professional employment opportunities first remained static [a fall in real terms] and then declined sharply. The struggle to complete courses had been bad enough at a time when inflation had wiped out family savings. Then the survivors came out into

a society that could not offer them appropriate employment. That they should lose faith in their environment as then structured is hardly surprising and not without precedent. Reflecting on similar problems of post-qualification employment prospects, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere remarked in 1611 that "Learning without living doth but breed traitors." For many of the young men desperate to make their way in the last years of the Weimar Republic, the Nazi Party offered a vision of a future society, but it also offered employment in an alternative bureaucracy, and status in the form of titles and uniforms - in short, some satisfaction of their material needs. It is the latter offer, recognising the significance of instrumental values that is often missing from the contemporary sources.

Karl Wilhelm Dahm's discussion of the political behaviour of the Protestant clergy during the Weimar Republic takes account of both consummatory and instrumental motivation. On the one hand, "all the calamitous phenomena that they connected with the word 'revolution' rained upon Germany one after the other..." The collapse of the monarchy had robbed the Church of its "institutional representation"; the "conception of authority that had become customary through the centuries seemed to have lost its meaning."[317] On the other hand, very concrete instrumental values were at stake. In the State of Braunschweig in 1922, an unskilled worker earned 12 times as much as a

parson.   In 1926 the <u>Deutsches Pfarrerblatt</u> recorded

"Bitterness in the parsonages is enormous. The church
cannot perform its tasks with a clergy economically ruined
and embittered."[318]

After 1933, and particularly during the war, instrumental values
were important in the formation or adjustment of attitudes.
Dissatisfaction in respect of the political failure to 'deliver'
on instrumental values was probably less significant in the case
of those individuals who had a strong consummatory bond with the
regime than in the case of those for whom the bond was partial,
weak, or non-existent.   Kershaw [1983, 1985] has shown that the
Nazi claim to have created a <u>Volksgemeinschaft</u> was "propaganda
varnish."[319]   Disaffection in consequence of policies and
practices which were not in line with pre-regime expectations
was kept within manageable limits because of the popularity of
Hitler himself - not because of "rational belief in a
coherent... set of ideas or political ideology."[320]   But this
popularity was partly dependent - in the years leading up to the
war - on his assumption of an 'antic-disposition", appearing to
believe in negotiation and peace, and in the early stages of the
war by the success of German arms. When conditions worsened, the
'Hitler Myth' was a poor substitute for the satisfaction of the
instrumental values of those who were not ideologically

committed. As daily life became tiring, frustrating, insecure, and uncertain, obedience became "a matter of sullen resignation rather than... enthusiasm."[321] It appears that under pressure in a material and physical sense, many Germans did engage or re-engage consummatory values, but those of the pre-Nazi period - for example, belief in orthodox religion.[322]

The potency of instrumental values as such may be noted in the immediate post-war experience of Germans and in the way they came to accommodate themselves to the Federal Republic. Kramer [1986] considered that "the post-war state of anomie - the disintegration of social norms [revealed] significant things about the nature of German society. The stereotype of the Germans as immutably law abiding [was] disproved: the disappearance of nation-state authority combined with material need sufficed for most Germans to ignore social norms and existing laws."[323] When asked in the Autumn of 1951 - having experienced without sign of early relief a period of acute material disadvantage - to identify the best and worst times for Germany in the twentieth century, 40% of the respondents selected 1933-38 as the best time [2% said it was the worst time] and 88% said that the post-1945 period was the worst. When the same format was repeated in 1963, in more prosperous times, 63% said that the 'present condition' was the best they had experienced, with the vote for 1933-38 falling to 10%. The

Allensbach Opinion Polls point to judgements made on instrumental grounds.[324]

Mary Fulbrook has offered a "scale of orientations" to authority that "range through a variety of positions between assent and rejection."

1. SUPPORT, in the form of positive assent.

2. PASSIVITY, an orientation carrying little interest in politics.

3. WITHDRAWAL, amounting to "an active retreat."

4. DISSENT, an orientation at variance with official values and practices but not aimed at overthrowing authority.

5. OPPOSITION, dissent aimed at overthrowing authority.

There is a striking degree of multimodality to this approach. In order to consider it in greater detail it is compared in Figure [15] with the findings of Dicks. Although alignment is imperfect, the similarities are obvious. Both tabulations have 5 categories. Both form a 'sandwich', with non-active categories enclosed between positive and negative perceptions of the authority system. In each tabulation categories 1 to 4, although each one is different from the others, may be subsumed under the heading of 'conformity' [i.e. either positive active

(b) An analytical framework for examining a "scale of orientations" to authority. After Fulbrook [1985].

	SUPPORT ACTIVELY/PASSIVELY SUSTAINING	[+]
	PASSIVITY AND WITHDRAWAL	Non-Active
	DISSENT [PASSIVE] [no positive action]	
	OPPOSITION	[-]

(a) Classification of political attitudes derived from a sample of 1000 German Ps.O.W. After Dicks [1950].

1	ACTIVE NAZIS	11%	Active [+]
2	NEAR NAZIS [believers with reservations]	25%	
3	UNPOLITICAL	40%	Non-Active
4	PASSIVE ANTI-NAZIS [no positive action]	15%	
5	ACTIVE ANTI-NAZIS	9%	Active [-]

FIGURE [15] COMPARISON OF AN ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES TO AUTHORITY [DICKS] AND AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES TO AUTHORITY [FULBROOK].

Note: The tabulations are imperfectly aligned because Fulbrook did not differentiate between support and near-support and, unlike Dicks, included passivity as a category separate from passive dissent.

acceptance of, or non-active/reluctant compliance with the authority system]. In this they demonstrate the variety of motives that can be subsumed under that heading. Commitment to consummatory values is a feature of both tabulations, but it should be noted that Dicks also assigned importance to instrumental motives. Those in his 'unpolitical' category were "essentially concerned with private motives such as subsistence and security." His 'passive anti-Nazis', though doubtful about the Movement on consummatory grounds, had originally given support on instrumental grounds. As it became clear that their instrumental values were not being operationalised by the system there was nothing left in that area to compensate for consummatory doubts. Those whom Dicks located in Category 2 - 'Near Nazis, believers with reservations' - are particularly interesting. He claimed that they could be critical of the Nazis, but usually on instrumental rather than on consummatory grounds. This could suggest that they genuinely subscribed to the ideology. But there is another way of looking at them, supported by the fact that they constituted the one unstable grouping in Dicks' analysis. They may have been people who had no great interest in consummatory issues. The 'good life' for them might simply have been one in which their instrumental needs were met. As the war drew to a close and the outcome became more certain, the attitudes of those in categories 1, 3, and 5 remained more-or-less constant, but those who occupied

category 2 began to shift towards category 4.[325]

Fulbrook's analytical framework allows for the existence of an important sub-group in the 'Support' category - that which gives positive support in terms of explicit values and attitudes for reasons which are almost entirely prudential. For such conforming Germans but non-committed Nazis overt adaptation could have a high price. The surrender to prudential motives could be accompanied "by feelings of depression and a bitter consciousness of defeat."[326] One of the most sensitive descriptions of the experiences of such individuals - anticipating comments on the generalised, non-heroic nature of the human condition in modern society - was provided by Bettelheim [1979]. He argued that for such individuals "the system created unmanageable conflicts", and

"In the battle between moral conviction and self-preservation the side... that wanted to live would eventually win out over principle... for safety's sake..."[327]

Some victims of this inner conflict killed themselves, or gave themselves away, but

"the vast majority...gave up the fight and made their peace with the system. Without joining the party, without accepting all of its values... they became convinced that they had to live with and in it... in totalitarian societies opponents live in the continuous anxiety that they may make a slip, that they may reveal their inner feelings and risk total destruction, of themselves and maybe their families. Therefore, opponents have to become perfect actors. But in order to be a perfect actor one not only has to act, but to feel, to live the role... Only by becoming the obedient servant of the totalitarian state can one feel sure that one will be observed obeying all its orders."[328]

Those defined as active Nazis and placed by Dicks in category 1 were described by him as sado-masochistic, paranoid and anxious. Consideration of their personality profile records suggested "maniac denial and regression to magical restitution and vengeance phantasies."[329] This is no doubt an accurate description of some who gave positive support to the Nazi regime. It cannot describe all who were in that category.

In 1934, reflecting on what has been described as "the courageous resistance... confined almost entirely to the

religious sphere" of Niemoller's Confessional Church, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer wrote:

> "What is at stake has long ceased to be what appears to be
> at stake in the ecclesiastical struggle; the lines are
> drawn in quite another place... I see quite clearly that
> this opposition is only a very temporary transitional
> stage to a quite different opposition, and that only very
> few of those who are involved in the preliminary skirmish
> will be found in the second battle."[(330)]

It is the difficulty most ordinary people have in getting ready
for and then actually fighting the 'second battle' that defines
the generalised, non-culture specific and non-heroic nature of
the human condition in modern society. Milton Mayer quoted the
example of the schoolteacher who, having been dismissed from
post in 1933 because there were references to 'liberal'
behaviour on his record, subsequently joined the Nazi Party:

> "If the good had been twice as good and the bad only half
> as bad, I still ought to have seen it... But I didn't want
> to see it, because I would then have had to think about
> the consequences of seeing it, what followed from seeing
> it, what I must do to be decent. I wanted my home and
> family, my job, my career, a place in the community."[(331)]

By posing a number of awkward questions based on hypothetical and actual scenarios, Mayer demonstrated the non-culture specific nature of the human condition:

"The mortal choice which every German had to make - whether or not he knew he was making it - is a choice which we Americans have never had to confront. But personal and professional life confronts us with the same kind of choice, less mortally, to be sure, every day. And the fact that it is a platitude does not keep it from being true that <u>we find it easier, on the whole, to admire Socrates than to envy him; to adore the Cross... then to carry it."</u> (332)

In Th. Th. Heine's cartoon '<u>Michel am Scheidewege</u>', the paths lead <u>zur Demokratie</u> and <u>zur Reaktion</u>. (333) According to some interpretations of modern German history Michel's route was pre-determined. He turned away from democracy because he could not think for himself, was used to following instructions, was blindly obedient and wanted to be led. Large numbers of Germans had so internalised the behavioural requirements of their culture that, in Fromm's terms, they had acquired the kind of character which made them <u>want</u> to act in the way they had to act. They had come to <u>desire</u> what objectively was necessary for

them to do. [334]　　It has been the purpose of this chapter to argue that images of Germany from this frame of reference are unreliable.

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67. Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem. [Nelson, Edinburgh, 1912], pp. 77-79.

68. Sidney Brooks, op.cit., p.397.

69. Price Collier, Germany and the Germans. [Duckworth, London, 1913], p.356: "It pleases the foreigner to laugh and sometimes to jeer at the universal sign of 'verboten' seen all over Germany. They look upon it as the seal of an autocratic and bureaucratic government. It is nothing of the kind. The Army, the Bureaucracy, the autocratic Kaiser at the helm, and the landscape bestrewn with 'Verboten' and 'Nicht gestattet, these are necessities in the case of these people. They do not know instinctively, or by training or experience, where to expectorate and where not to; where to smoke and where not to; what to put their feet on and what not to; where to walk and where not to;

when to stare and when not to; when to be dignified and when to laugh; and, least of all, how to take a joke; how, when, or how much to eat, drink, or bathe, or how to dress properly or appropriately."

70. Smith, op.cit., pp.135-137.
71. Ibid., p.90.
72. Ibid., see pp. 134-137.
73. Ibid., pp.87-88.
74. Ibid., p.149.
75. Ibid., pp.169-170.
76. Ibid., pp. 5-7.
77. Ibid., p.13.
78. Ibid., p.22.
79. Ibid., p.80.
80. Ibid., p.46.
81. Ibid., p.208.
82. Ibid., pp.44-45.
83. Harold Nicolson, Address given at Chatham House, March 18, 1936. Printed in 'Germany and The Rhineland', Special Supplement to International Affairs, April 1936, pp.5-7. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy [Thornton Butterworth, London, 1939].
84. Nicolson, [1939], ibid., pp.144-146.
85. Nicolson, [1936], op.cit., pp. 5-7.
86. A. L. Rowse, (i) What is wrong with the Germans? and (ii) Germany: The Problem of Europe. In A. L. Rowse, The End of An Epoch [Macmillan, London, 1947], pp. 181-216. L. B. Namier, 'After Vienna and Versailles', The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1940; 'The German International', The Nineteenth Century and After, May, 1940; 'Hitler's War', The Nineteenth Century and After, January 1940; 'The Missing Generation', The Spectator, March 21, 1941; 'National Character', The Spectator, February 28, 1941;

'Names and Realities', _Time and Tide,_ May 17, 1941; 'Both Slaves and Masters', _Time and Tide,_ July 5, 1941; 'The Jews', _The Nineteenth Century and After,_ November, 1941; 'English Prose', _The Spectator,_ April 10, 1942. All reprinted in L. B. Namier, _Conflicts: Studies in Contemporary History,_ [Macmillan, London, 1942], pp. 19-61, 73-93, 121-136, and 217-223. R. Vansittart, _Roots of the Trouble,_ [Hutchinson & Co., London, 1941].

87. A. L. Rowse [1947], ibid., p.186.

88. Conflicts [1942], op.cit., pp.78 and 81.

89. A. L. Rowse [1947], op.cit., p.185. [My italics].

90. Conflicts [1942], op.cit., p.83.

91. See Chapter 7.

92. A. L. Rowse, [1942], op.cit., p.186.

93. Ibid., p.187.

94. Ibid., p.192.

95. Ibid., pp. 181-186.

96. Ibid., pp. 189-190.

97. Ibid., pp. 185 and 190.

98. Ibid., p. 215.

99. Ibid., p. 187.

100. Ibid., p. 183.

101. Ibid., p. 187.

102. Ibid., p. 192.

103. Ibid., p. 198.

104. Conflicts [1942], op.cit., p.78.

105. Ibid., p.79.

106. Ibid., pp. 79 and 91.

107. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

108. Ibid., p. 92.

109. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

110. Ibid., p.90.

111. Note discussion of his use of 'average' in this chapter,

and the general discussion in chapter 7.

112. Ibid., p.131. And see Robert H. Thouless, <u>Straight Thinking in Wartime</u> [Hodder and Stoughton, 1942], p.112, quoted in chapter 7.

113. Ibid., pp.40 and 84.

114. Ibid., pp.83 and 81; [my italics].

115. <u>Roots of The Trouble</u>, op.cit., p.11.

116. Ibid., p.14.

117. Ibid., p.11.

118. Ibid., p.14.

119. Ibid., p.31.

120. Ibid., p.29.

121. Ibid., p.9.

122. Havelock Ellis, "The German Spirit", <u>Atlantic Monthly,</u> Vol. 115, 1915, pp.551-559.

123. Ibid., pp. 552 and 554.

124. Ibid., p. 552. [My italics].

125. Ibid., pp. 554-556.

126. A. G. Gardiner, <u>The War Lords</u> [J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1915].

127. Ibid., p.292.

128. Ibid., p.248.

129. Ibid., pp.248-249.

130. G. Barraclough, <u>Factors in German History,</u> [Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1946], p.138.

131. Ibid., p.138.

132. Ibid., p.158.

133. There was, for example, an element which saw the authoritarian regime as "... a rallying point for all who had something to lose by popular government working for the interests of the people"; also, "an element in the labour and trades union movement, observing the indisputable improvement of wages and working conditions under the

stimulus of capitalist expansion, was prepared to compromise with the existing system." Ibid., p.137.

134. There was "the extirpation of working-class leaders, the abolition of rights of assembly and discussion and the suppression of freedom of speech..."; on the other hand, Hitler "promised more than any other party offered... and for a time, from 1933 to 1938, he seemed to keep his promises. He promised work, and in fact he conquered unemployment... He promised peace... and at the same time a righting of the injustices done at Versailles..." then there was "his claim to stand for the interests of the whole German people..." Ibid., pp. 150-152.

135. Ibid., p.153.

136. C. H. Herford, The Post War Mind of Germany... [Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927], p.1.

137. Ibid., see page 4 where he claims that Bavaria had always been "resentful of its subordination to Prussia", and that the Rhineland was "... temperamentally more akin to their French neighbours than to their Prussian fellow-countrymen"; page 6 where he refers to Germany's "...normal looseness of cohesion", and page 7 where he suggests that the post-war mind of Germany was "more clearly than ever a function of many minds." Herford, in fact, argued the case for value dissensus.

138. Ibid., p.10.

139. Ibid., p.29.

140. E. C. Bentley, "The German State of Mind", Fortnightly Review, No.97, 1915, pp.42-53. pp. 42-43.

141. Ibid., p.50 [My italics].

142. Ibid., p.43.

143. Ibid., p.50.

144. Ibid., pp.42 and 48.

145. Ibid., see p.50.

146. T. S. Knowlson, "Germany's Ruling Idea", _Fortnightly_
     Review, Vol.104, 1918, pp.344-353. See pp. 345-346.

147. Ibid., p.350.

148. Ibid., p.353.

149. Mona Caird, "The Greater Community", _Fortnightly Review,_
     Vol.104, 1918, pp.742-755.

150. Philip Gibbs, _The Hope of Europe_ [William Heinemann, London
     1921], p.4.

151. Ibid., p.12.

152. Ibid., p.4.

153. Note that Gibbs took account of this point when he wrote of
     statesmen that "some of them... paid lipservice to...
     ideals..., and with elaborate insincerity, smiling with
     cynicism up their sleeves..." Ibid., p.3.

154. See Robert Weldon Whalen, _Bitter Wounds: The German_
     victims of the Great War [Cornell University Press,
     Ithaca/London, 1984], p.97:
     "By the last year of the war, people had all they could do
     to keep from starving. A local official reported to a
     provincial president in November 1917: 'Public opinion has
     become a stomach question... Interest is devoted almost
     exclusively to obtaining food, and political issues inspire
     little interest. Consequently, participation in the recent
     local elections, and in other public events has been
     extraordinarily small'."

155. S. Miles Bouton, "Which way goes Germany?" _Atlantic_
     Monthly, January 1922, pp.96-105; Cicely Hamilton, _Many_
     Germanies [London, 1931]; Karl Dietrich Bracher,
     Deutschland zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur, [Bern,
     Munich, 1964]; Ralf Dahrendorf, _Society and Democracy in_
     Germany [Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968]; Rainer C.
     Baum, _The Holocaust and the German Elite_ [Croom Helm,
     London, 1981]; Robert Weldon Wahlen, ibid.

156. Bouton, ibid., p.96.

157. Ibid., p.100. [My italics].

158. Ibid., p.101. Note how close this is to the later and very meticulous analysis of K. D. Bracher [1964], op.cit.

159. Ibid., p.98.

160. Ibid., p.96.

161. Ibid., p.97.

162. Bund erblindeter Krieger [1916]. Reichsbund der Kriegsbeschadigten und ehemaligen Kriegsteilnehmer, [1918]. Zentralverband deutscher Kriegsbeschadigten und Kriegshinterbliebener, [1919]. Internationaler Bund der Opfer des Krieges und der Arbeit [1919].
These four appear in a list of seven given by Whalen [1984] op.cit., p.128.

163. Quoted in Whalen, ibid., p.113.

164. Ibid., p.125.

165. Ibid., p.125.

166. Ibid., p.143.

167. Hamilton [1931], op.cit.

168. Vernon Bartlett, Nazi Germany Explained [Gollancz, London, 1933].

169. H.N. Brailsford, P. Gordon Walker, T. H. Minshall, et al, The Future of Germany [National Peace Council, London, 1943], p.1.

170. H.N. Brailsford, ibid., pp.16-22.

171. T.H. Minshall, ibid., pp.10-16.

172. P. G. Walker, ibid., pp.3-10.

173. Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom [Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1942], p.3.

174. Ibid., see pp. 121-124: In some persons there is a tendency "... to give up the independence of one's own individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside oneself in order to acquire the strength which the

individual is lacking... The more distinct forms of this
mechanism are to be found in the striving for submission
and domination... Quite regularly these people show a
marked dependence on powers outside themselves... They tend
not to assert themselves, not to do what they want, but to
submit to the factual or alleged orders of these outside
forces. Often they are quite incapable of experiencing the
feeling "I want" or "I am." Life, as a whole, is felt by
them as something overwhelmingly powerful, which they
cannot master or control... Besides these masochistic
trends, the very opposite of them, namely, sadistic
tendencies, are regularly to be found in the same kind of
characters."

See also p.130: "Both the masochistic and sadistic
strivings tend to help the individual to escape his
unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness."

Also, p.136: "Psychologically... both tendencies are the
outcomes of one basic need, springing from the inability to
bear the isolation and weakness of one's own self... the
sadistic person needs his object just as much as the
masochist needs his. Only instead of seeking security by
being swallowed, he gains it by swallowing somebody else."

175. Ibid., see p.140: whether or not an individual can be
termed neurotic "... depends to a large extent on the
particular tasks people have to fulfil in their social
situations and what patterns of feelings and behaviour are
present in their culture."

176. Ibid., see p.183 where Fromm states that a character
structure founded on "... love of the strong, hatred of the
weak... [was] typical for the lower-middle class..."

177. Ibid., see p.145: "His love, admiration and readiness for
submission are automatically aroused by power, whether of a
person or of an institution. Power fascinates him <u>not for</u>

any values for which a specific power might stand, but just because it is power. Just as his 'love' is automatically aroused by power, so powerless people or institutions automatically arouse his contempt." [My italics].

178. Ibid., p.183.

179. Ibid., pp.29-30.

180. Ibid., pp.34-35.

181. Ibid., p.39.

182. Ibid., p.50, his italics.

183. Ibid., p.87.

184. Ibid., p.86.

185. Ibid., pp.71 and 96.

186. Ibid., pp.64-65.

187. Ibid., see the discussion on pp.191 to 204.

188. Ibid., p.54.

189. Ibid., p.204.

190. Note that Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.378, wrote: "Elegantly, Fromm's nice phrases jump over an abyss of problems..."

191. Fromm, op.cit., p.118.

192. Ibid., pp.54-55.

193. A. Inkeles and D. J. Levinson, National Character: the study of modal personality and sociocultural systems, in Gardner, Lindzey and Elliot, Aronson, [eds.], The Handbook of Social Psychology [Addison-Wesley, Mass., 1954], pp.425-426.

194. Fromm, op.cit., pp.119-120.

195. Erich Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis [Pelican, London, 1973], p.40.

196. Ibid., p.95.

197. Ibid.m pp.181-182.

198. Fromm [1942], op.cit., p.55.

199. Michael Waltzer, "War and Revolution in Puritan Thought", Political Studies, No.2, Vol.XII, June 1964.

200. Fromm [1942], op.cit., pp.145-146.

201. Ibid., p.145.

202. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.304. His reference was to Peter Hofstatter, Gruppendynamik [Hamburg, 1957].

203. Fromm [1942], op.cit., p.117.

204. Ibid., p.2.

205. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, [Harper, New York, 1960], see p.226.

206. Ibid., see pp.225-227.

207. Ibid., see pp.228-229.

208. Ibid., p.58.

209. Ibid., pp.59-60.

210. Ibid., pp.32-33.

211. Ibid., p.61.

212. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.12.

213. Rokeach, op.cit., pp.72-79.

214. Joachim Remak, The Nazi Years [Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1969], p.28.

215. Erich Eyck, A History of The Weimar Republic, Vol.2, [Harvard U.P., 1964], pp.486-487.

216. Robert H. Lowie, Toward Understanding Germany [Chicago, 1954], p.329.

217. Rokeach, op.cit., pp.228-229.

218. Thomas Mann, Unordnung und Frühes Leid [Blackwell, 1971]. For Ernst Glaeser, see Katherine Larsen Roper "Images of German Youth in Weimar Novels", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.13, 1978.

219. Active participation, as measured by voting statistics, was relatively high in the Weimar Republic. See Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.332.

220. See Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism - The Free Corps Movement in Post-War Germany [Harvard U.P., 1952].

221. Rokeach, op.cit., p.68.

222. The Chorus in Brecht's Die Massnahme justifies any action endorsed by the party [KPD] with the words: "... the party is always right and the individual member must subordinate himself to it." When an individual joined the party he became "a name, without a mother, a blank sheet on which the revolution writes its orders." See A. J. Ryder, Twentieth Century Germany [Macmillan, 1973], p.242, quoting from Brecht's Stücke [IV]. For Communist voting behaviour in 'party-line' terms see Erich Eyck, op.cit., p.336: "... their hopeless insistence on Thalmann's candidacy [1.8 million in first ballot and 1.9 million in second ballot] in the 1925 Presidential election effectively meant the victory of Hindenburg [14.6 million in second ballot] over Wilhelm Marx of the Zentrum [13.7 million in second ballot]." For Zentrum, see Ryder, p.281: "As for the Centre Party, its primary loyalty was to the Roman Catholic Church... especially under the leadership of Monsignor Kaas, whose authoritarian sympathies agreed with those of the Vatican" - and quoting Kaas, January 1933: "It is frankly all the same who leads Germany. The important thing is not who he is but what he can do."

223. Fromm, [1942], op.cit., p.241.

224. Ibid., p.54.

225. Ibid., p.240.

226. Ibid., p.89.

227. Ibid., pp.54-55. [My italics].

228. For the significance of the German Labour movement and the SPD in German politics see Ludwig Preller, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik [Dusseldorf, 1978]; Volker Hentschel, Deutsche Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik 1815-1945 [Dusseldorf, 1980]; Albin Gladen, Geschichte der Socialpolitik in Deutschland [Wiesbaden, 1974]; Dick Geary, "The German Labour Movement", European Studies

Review, 3, 1976, pp.279-330; Dick Geary, Radicalism and the German Worker, in Richard J. Evans, (ed.) _Politics and Society in Wilhelmine Germany_ [London, 1978], pp.267-286. Consider the growth of electoral influence of the SPD, its central role in Municipal and Prussian _Land_ Politics during the Republic - in control of the Prussian government from 1919-1932 - and in Labour Law Legislation. Consider the concern with which conservative elements viewed the socialist movement - Weimar regarded as a _Gewerkschaftstaat_ - and the role of the trade unions in the defeat of the Kapp _putsch._

229. Rokeach, op.cit., p.44.

230. John L. Snell, _The Nazi Revolution_ [Heath, Boston, 1967], p.XIII.

231. Ibid., p.XIII. It would have been more appropriate had Snell referred to similarities in norms and behavioural regularities. (a) "the German Socialists taught millions of Germans to hate a group of fellow Germans (capitalists), much as the Nazis would later focus hatred against the Jews. Long before Hitler, the Socialists demanded strict discipline within their movement. It was they who created a vision of the world as a realm of conflict, preached the overthrow of the existing state, and fostered the notion that the German people were objects of manipulation by exploiters (for the Socialists, _German_ capitalists; for the Nazis, _international_ capitalists and the Versailles victor nations). The Socialists, like Nazis later, argued that the group chosen by destiny (the proletariat in Socialist theory; the German _Volk_ in Nazism) could only survive by making itself the manipulator of others. For Socialists, the aim was to create 'a dictatorship of the proletariat'; for Nazis, the rule of _Der Fuhrer_ in Germany and of Germany in Europe."

(b) She calls democratic reforms only 'small stages' (Etappen) in the 'March' (Marsch) of the proletariat to the 'conquest' (Eroberung) of political 'power' (Macht). She demands that the 'warriors' (Kämpfer) against Bethmann-Hollweg... become 'warriors'... for a future social order. She speaks of the alternative prospects of 'victory' (Sieg) or 'defeat' (Niederlage) in a 'campaign' (Kampagne) for voting privileges, in a passionate 'struggle' (Ringen), during which the SPD should powerfully expand its 'Armee' of supporters."

232. "The socialist state that was the goal of the future could be realised only as a state which was to a high degree authoritarian and which organised daily life thoroughly. It remained at first a dream of the future and the thinking of the masses was certainly more concerned with the needs, cares, and desires of daily life than with it. One may suspect, however, that it helped materially to collectivise the masses and to modify deeply their feelings about legal rights; that is, the rights of the individual grew dimmer and the rights of the total state over the individual were allowed to become continually stronger." Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans. Sidney B. Fay [Cambridge, Mass., 1950], quoted in Snell, ibid., p.47.

233. Gerhard Braunthal, "The German Free Trade Unions during the Rise of Nazism" Journal of Central European Affairs, XV, January 1956, pp.339-353, quoted in Snell, op.cit., p.50.

234. "...psychohistorians invariably interpret behaviour in terms of the infantile neuroses... the pervasiveness of ontogenetic propositions in psychoanalysis has constantly directed attention away from the problems of realistic interaction between the individual and society. These propositions also give the impression of an inevitability of action which is belied by the complex nature of the

social world." Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, "The Coming Crisis in Psychohistory", Journal of Modern History, Vol.47, No.2., 1975, pp.202-228: The findings of the University of Frankfurt sociologists in 1930 [see Fromm 1942, op.cit., pp.183-184; M. Horkheimer et al, Autoritaet und Familie Felix Alcon, Paris, 1936; Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, (eds.), Sociology Today, Vol.I Harper, New York, 1959, pp.53-54], led Fromm to argue that the traits of the authoritarian character were present, to varying degrees, in all but a small minority of German workers. Without, as ever, denying explanatory force to Fromm's theory, and simply as a means of containing it within reasonable limits, it is important to note that (i) responses to a questionnaire may reflect time-specific concerns and insecurities rather than long term personality characterisitcs, particularly where immediate life-experiences are traumatic; it is not unreasonable to suppose that in 1930 the immediate life experiences of respondents could have coloured attitudes to questions such as 'Who has the real power in the country?' and 'Who were the greatest persons in German history?':
(ii) even when it is relatively safe to assume that long term characteristics are being revealed, these may be of marginal significance in terms of political beliefs and behaviours; responses to questions such as 'How do you decorate your rooms?' and 'How do you feel about the new styles of short hair and lipstick for women?', may indeed demonstrate conventionalism, but how significant would this be politically? Further, it has been shown - Peter N. Stearns, "National Character and European Labour History", Journal of Social History, Vol. 4, 2, 1970, pp.95-124 - that the image of the German worker as having a zeal for hard work [Arbeitsfreude], a lack of imagination, and a

docility in face of authority, is a grossly distorted one. If the average annual strike rate in Germany was substantially below that of France it was in large part because "the vast majority of German workers changed jobs several times and often changed trades..." as a means of dealing with grievances [Stearns, p.112]. Levenstein's research [1912] indicated that Arbeitsfreude was absent from the majority of textile and metal workers and miners in Germany; the received opinion that German workers had been rendered passive by military service has to be set against a background in which the main categories of workers were not called up at all, and "Large numbers of workers hated their stint in the military" - Adolf Levinstein, Arbeiterfrage [Munich, 1912], quoted in Stearns, ibid.

235. Ryder, op.cit., p.277.

236. Braunthal, quoted in Snell, op.cit., p.57.

237. Ryder, op.cit., p.281, quoting T. Wolff.

238. Braunthal, quoted in Snell, op.cit., p.51.

239. Ibid., p.52.

240. Meinecke, quoted in Snell, ibid., p.48.

241. For the political manifestations of neurotic anxiety, see Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium [London, 1957]: "... Calamities caused by unseen or unknown agencies - plague or famine, gross inflation or mass unemployment [may produce] an emotional disturbance so widespread and acute [that] the only way in which it can find effective relief is through an outburst of paranoia, a sudden collective and fanatical pursuit of the millenium." pp.313-314.

242. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. J. Strachey, [Penguin, London 1974], pp.441-442.

243. Ibid., p.449.

244. Fromm [1942], op.cit., pp.132-133.

245. Rokeach, op.cit., pp.68-76.

246. E. H. Carr, What is History? [Penguin, 1964].

247. Milton Mayer, They Thought They Were Free [Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966 Edition], pp.254-255; Sarolea, op.cit.

248. "From childhood the military virtues of discipline and passive obedience are inculcated in the Prussian citizen." Sarolea, ibid., p.141.

249. Baum, op.cit., see Chapter 9. The 'Coding System for fictional characters' is contained in an appendix titled 'Data and Method of Measurement of German Values', pp.325-352.

250. Baum, ibid., p.121.

251. Ibid., pp.121-128.

252. Ibid., p.157.

253. Ibid., p.135.

254. Ibid., p.138.

255. Ibid., p.138.

256. T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society [C. A. Watts, London, 1964], p.106; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernisation [Univ. of Chicago Press, London, 1969].

257. Bottomore, ibid., p.107.

258. Apter, op.cit., pp.26-30. The secular - libertarian model was distinct from the Sacred - Collectivity model: "... the sacred-collectivity model stresses the unity of the people, not their diversity. It depends less on the free-flow of ideas than on the disciplined concentration upon certain political and economic objectives. It claims a 'higher' form of morality than that of the secular-libertarian model, because social life is directed toward the benefit of the collectivity rather than toward that of the self." p.35.

259. Dahrendorf, op.cit., pp.50, and 67-68.

260. Baum, op.cit., p.139.

261. Sarolea, op.cit., pp.93-95.

262. Ibid., pp.69-70 and 229.

263. Price Collier, op.cit., p.585. Dahrendorf's way of putting this was: "Germany's curse is not that she did not become a nation, but that she did not become a society." op.cit., p.212.

264. M. Ginsberg, "National Character", British Journal of Psychology, Vol.32, 3 January 1942, pp.195-196.

265. Donald V. McGranahan and Ivor Wayne, "German and American Traits Reflected in Popular Drama", Human Relations, Vol.1, 1948, pp.429-455.

266. Baum, op.cit., p.67.

267. See Brooks, op.cit., p.392, Ginsberg, op.cit., p.196, Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.286.

268. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.387.

269. See Ginsberg, op.cit., p.196; Collier, op.cit., p.459; Charles Tower [1913] op.cit.; Theodor Geiger [1932] op.cit.; Talcott Parsons, Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany: Essays in Sociological Theory [Glencoe, 1954]; Fromm, op.cit., p.195; Friedrich Bohne [ed.], Der Deutsche in seiner Karikatur: Hundert Jahre Selbstkritik [Bassermann'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Stuttgart], p.42.


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270. See Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.207; John Dewey, "On understanding the Mind of Germany", <u>Atlantic Monthly</u>,. Vol. CXVII, 1916, pp.251-162.

271. Bertram Schaffner, <u>Father Land</u> [Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1948], Appendix 1.

272. Ibid., pp.4, 15 and 37.

273. Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.346.

274. Collier, op.cit., pp.82-83.

275. Dewey, op.cit., p.258.

276. Baum, op.cit., pp. 5, 301 and 304.

277. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics [Jonathan Cape, London 1966], pp.3-40. As an example of the <u>style</u>, Hofstadter referred to objections to the tightening of federal control over the sale of firearms by mail on the grounds that the legislation was "a further attempt by a subversive power to make us part of one world socialistic government." p.5.

278. J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears, <u>Frustration and Aggression</u> [Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1939]. Note Cramb, op.cit., p.17 where Germany is described as "baulked in mid-career... and now indignant." Note, also, Sarolea, op.cit., p.57 referring to the belief that there was "a malignant and universal conspiracy against the German people." And note Collier, op.cit., p.562: "A new cock in the barn-yard is never received with great cordiality. He must win his place and his power with his beak and his spurs."

279. For the expectations entertained by Germans on the eve of, and during the First World War, see S. Grumbach, <u>Das Annexionistische Deutschland</u> [Payot, Lausanne, 1917], translated [J. Ellis Barker] as <u>Germany's Annexationist Aims</u> [John Murray, London 1917]: The King of Bavaria, June 7, 1915: "The fruit of this war shall be an increase of

Germany's power and an expansion beyond its present frontiers." p.8. Albert Ballin, Director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, October 21, 1915: "we require naval bases both at the entrance and at the exit of the Channel." p.16. Resolution of The Free Conservative Party, December 6, 1915: "The sacrifies made... demand that Germany's power shall be strengthened in every direction, that its territories should be considerably enlarged, that... the occupied territories should be retained." p.18. Bassermann, Leader of the National Liberal Party, December 1914: "We shall know how to retain for all future the lands which have been fertilised with German blood..." p.71. Das Monistische Jahrhundert, December 10, 1914: "We must before all completely overthrow England... and deprive it of its colonies and fleet." p.74. See also Leopold von Vietinghoff, Die Sicherheiten der deutschen Zukunft [Leipzig, 1915]; Arthur Dix, Zwischen Krieg und Frieden [Leipzig, 1914]; Adolf Bar, Die Entwicklung der grossen osteuropaischen und orientalischen Fragen [Weimar, 1915]; Wolfgang Eisenhart, Was Lehrt uns der Krieg? [Naumburg, 1915]. Those expectations were frustrated, and the First World War ended with Germany "more central than ever – doubly encircled, geographically by the partition of Austria-Hungary and the erection of Czechoslovakia and the Corridor, politically by the World Alliance...": Mayer, op.cit., pp.250-251.

280. Zukunft, September 1911.

281. Hofstadter, op.cit., p.36. See W. G. Knop [ed.] Beware of the English! [Hamish Hamilton, London, 1939] quoted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, and also appendix to Chapter 7.

282. Henry V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology", Human Relations, Vol.5, 1950, pp.111-154, p.129.

283. Richard Flacks, Some Psychological Perspectives on

Legitimacy.   In J. O. Whittaker (ed.) Recent Discoveries in Psychology [Saunders, Phil., 1972], p.418.

284. Schaffner, op.cit., p.19.

285. K. Larson Roper, op.cit., p.501.

286. See Dahrendorf, op.cit.m, pp.302 and 309; Mary Fulbrook, "The State and The Transition of Political Legitmacy in East and West Germany Since 1945", Conference Paper, University of London, 1985, p.4.

287. G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, "Personality under Social Catastrophe: Ninety Life Histories of the Nazi Revolution", Character and Personality, Vol.10, 1961, pp.1-22.

288. K. Larson Roper, op.cit., pp.501-502.

289. Schaffner, op.cit., p.73; Dahrendorf, op.cit., p.83; Jeremy Noakes, "Nazi Voters", History Today, Vol.30, August, 1980, p.46.

290. Baum, op.cit., p.142.

291. Schaffner, op.cit., p.53.

292. Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences [Sage, London 1984] pp.31-32: Abridged version of diagrams showing "Ratios between the frequencies in two societies of those exceeding an average and an extreme value of a normally distributed, culturally influenced characteristic."

"... assume a characteristic x (of individuals, institutions, or organisations) which is normally distributed across the nation, but with a cultural difference between society A and society B, so that the two normal distributions do not quite overlap... Such a characteristic at the individual level could be 'aggressiveness'. The percentage of individual's with an aggressiveness level beyond the common average p... would be 30.9 in society A and 69.1 in society B, a ratio between the two societies of 2.2. However, an aggressiveness level beyond an extreme value q ... would occur in 0.14 percent of individuals in society A but in 2.27 percent in society B, a ratio between the two societies of 16.8, or eight times as large as the ratio of those beyond level p. Now if an aggressiveness level beyond q is likely to lead to individually committed criminal offences, such offences are 16.8 times as likely to occur in society B. For collective phenomena, the difference becomes even larger. Suppose that a criminal gang is likely to be created where two persons with an aggressiveness level beyond q meet. This is 16.2^2 = 282 times as likely to occur in society B as in society A."

293. Fulbrook, op.cit., p.9.

294. Mayer, op.cit., p.242.

295. Schaffner, op.cit., pp.66-67.

296. Baum, op.cit., p.290.

297. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 December 1945.

298. Fulbrook, op.cit., p.13.

299. J. P. Stern, Hitler: The Führer and the People. [Collins, 1975], see pp.39-41.

300. See J. J. Ray "Do Authoritarians hold authoritarian attitudes?" Human Relations, No.29, 1976. pp.307-25; see article with same title. Patrick C. L. Heaven, Journal of

Psychology, No.95, 1977, p.169.

301. Schaffner, op.cit., p.19.

302. Ibid., pp.55-56.

303. McGranahan and Wayne, op.cit., p.452.

304. Baum, op.cit.,m p.195.

305. Apter, op.cit. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Sociology, in Robert K Merton, Leonard Broom, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Sociology Today: Problems and Perspectives. [Harper, N.York, 1965].

306. Apter, ibid. p.21.

307. Lipset, op.cit., pp.108-109.

308. E. Noelle and E. P. Neumann, Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung, Vol.1, 1947-1955; Vol.3, 1958-1964. [Allensbach: Verlag fur Demoskopie, 1956, 1965]; S. Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture". In L. Pye and S. Verba [eds.], Political Culture and Poltical Development [Princeton Univ. Press, N.J. 1965]; Marlis G. Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen [Dusseldorf 1970] translated by Thomas de Witt, [Athens, Ohio 1977]; Baum, op.cit.; Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in The Third Reich [Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983]; The Nazi Dictatorship [Edward Arnold, London 1985]; Jill Stephenson, "War and Society: Germany in World War II", German History, No.3., Spring 1986.

309. Baum, op.cit., pp.199 and 239.

310. Ibid., see pages 196-197. Pro-system votes [1871-1912]: Conservatives, National-Liberals, Zentrum; anti-system votes: Left-Liberals and Socialists.

311. Ibid., pp.199 and 239.

312. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power [Gollancz, London, 1962] pp.186-187.

313. Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Crisis of German Professions, 1918-33", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.20, 1985, pp.379-398.

314. Jeremy Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933 London: OUP 1971. See also William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power [Eyre & Spottiswoode: London 1966].

315. Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History [Faber and Faber, London, 1958].

316. K. Larson Roper, op.cit.,

317. Karl-Wilhelm Dahm, "German Protestantism and Politics, 1918-39", Journal of Contemporary History, pp.29-31.

318. Ibid., pp.35-36.

319. Kershaw [1983], op.cit., p.373.

320. Jill Stephenson, 1986, op.cit., p.8.

321. Ibid., p.20.

322. Steinert, Hitler's War and The Germans, op.cit.

323. Alan Kramer, "Law-Abiding Germans? Social disintegration, crime and the reimposition of order in post-war Germany 1945-1949", German History, No.3, Spring 1986, p.61.

324. Fulbrook, op.cit., Noelle and Neumann, op.cit.

325. Dicks, op.cit., pp.117 and 129.

326. G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E.M. Jandorf, op.cit., p.13.

327. Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving and Other Essays, [Thames/Hudson, London 1979], p.320. See also p.323: "... the totalitarian regime finds almost daily tasks which each subject must perform or risk his own destruction. Most opponents of the system, when fulfilling these requirements, start out hating it and themselves. They soon find themselves in severe inner conflicts about whether to act in line with their convictions and run the risks involved, or play it safe and feel like a coward and betrayer of most cherished values."

328. Ibid., pp.327-331.

329. Dicks, op.cit., p.151.

330. Quoted in Dahm, op.cit., pp.47-48. [My italics].

331. Mayer, op.cit., pp.188-201.

332. Ibid., p.94. [My italics].

333. Friedrich Bohne [ed.], op.cit., p.67.

334. Erich Fromm, Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis, in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (eds.) Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture. [New York: Knopf, 1949], p.409.

PART 5

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

British attitudes to Germany as reflected in the sources fell into four broad categories. There were those who made no distinctions between Germans, covering all with blanket condemnation. In national character terms theirs was the Schwarzweissmalerei unimodal approach. Diametrically opposed to this was the approach which made meaningful distinctions between different groups of Germans and was genuinely multimodal. Lying between the unimodal and multimodal approaches were two versions of bimodality, simplistic in their attitudes to Germany and the Germans and to German national character. Some sources in this category made distinctions between the government and the people or between the 'military caste' and the people, along sympathetic 'most Germans are like us' lines; others made distinctions between 'the bloody minded bulk' and an ineffective residue, along unsympathetic 'most Germans are not like us' lines. The commonly validated standard by which Germans were assessed was the ideological component of the British self-image. The self-image as a whole was dualistic. There was a pragmatic component in the form of a perception of what Britain had and held in a competitive world – benefits of trade, security, wealth, possessions, relative status. In these terms any gain by a significant competitor was counted as relative loss to Britain. Then there was an ideological component in the form of a perception of the kind of people the British were. This perception was multifaceted,

representing the British as emphathetic - open to the points of
view of others, willing to consider things from all angles - as
fair - unwilling to make rash or harsh judgements, keen to 'play
the game', self-critical and aware of their own failings - as
tolerant - always prepared to make allowances - and as decent -
having a commitment to justice. Although the Germans were so
often judged in terms of the ideological self image that it took
the form of a commonly validated instrument of assessment, it
was the dualistic nature of the image as a whole and the
relative weights accorded to each component that gave rise to
and fuelled the debate on Germany and the Germans in the fifty
or so years from 1890 - particularly during periods of
threatened or actual crisis when Britain and Germany were in
confrontation. At such times the pragmatic and ideological
elements inevitably came into conflict. Whenever there was
serious and sharp debate about the Germans the tensions inherent
in the self-image as a whole came to the surface. There is a
strain towards consistency between expressed attitudes derived
from declared values and the values themselves, particularly
when the values are central to the perception of self. Where
cognitions are not in 'molecular isolation' from each other
there is a natural desire to reduce the psychological discomfort
of dissonance. Sources which used the ideological self-image as
an instrument of assessment tended to experience cognitive
dissonance if the assessment was not sympathetically informed by

fairness, justice, tolerance, and empathy. The use of mechanisms for the reduction of bothersome inconsistency was detected in a number of sources - particularly mechanisms such as paying ritualistic lip service to the claims of the dissonant cognition [in this context the ideological self-image], derogation of those who held views in opposition to their own, self-justification in the form of the 'suffering servant' syndrome, transcendence of the inconsistency by a superordinate cognition such as the need to combat the Antichrist, and even reinterpretation of the ideological self-image itself.

Tenable cross-cultural distinctions can be made through comparative analysis of symbolic material and collective products, consideration of the behavioural regularities embodied in the respective norms, and study of the functional relationships between the various sub-systems of each culture to determine, for example, the extent to which their procedures, practices and values are harmonised. One culture may be considered distinct from another in terms of the range and/or distribution of the dynamic personality structures of its membership. The range and distribution of personality characteristics have to be inferred since, unlike the behaviour which is said to follow from them, they cannot be directly observed. The extent to which such distinctions - behavioural and personality -deserve to be regarded as objectively valid is

in direct proportion to the observational and inferential rigour employed. The British sources analysed in this thesis, including those which were genuinely multimodal in their approach to the definition of German national characteristics, were deficient when measured against such criteria. What can be said of the genuinely multimodal approaches is that they tended to identify cross-cultural similarities, avoid exaggeration of homogeneity, recognise differential sharing, assign some causal autonomy to situational factors, and consider the wider context of international culture. The analytical framework devised for the comparative study of views on German national character demonstrates that variance in the approaches to modal structure tends to produce variance in the approaches to a range of related issues. For example, unimodal approaches tended to exaggerate the degree of homogeneity, underestimate the significance of differential sharing, ignore cross cultural similarities, neglect the potential influence of a wider cultural context, regard characteristics as innate, pay no more than lip service to methodological rigour, and favour cataclysmic solutions to 'the German problem'. Unimodal approaches, which made no distinctions between Germans, and simplistic bimodal approaches of the kind presented by Rowse and Vansittart shared in the general lack of observational and inferential rigour, were missing the intuitive balance of the multimodal approaches and, typically, failed to address a number

of crucial issues including multidimensional attitudes to legitimacy, the wide range of psychological dispositions and conflicting motivations which may be subsumed under the head of conforming behaviour, the distinction between instrumental and consummatory values and what such a distinction could entail in particular circumstances. Unimodal and simplistic bimodal approaches to German national character were particularly unsafe.

Conclusions on the classification of British attitudes towards Germany have been deferred until now because there is a sense in which the competition - cooperation alternative to the idealist-realist dichotomy brings together all the main themes of the thesis. The idealist-realist dichotomy with respective pro and anti-German sub-sets is unreliable. Idealists could be anti-German, Realists could be ideologically neutral, and a whole range of others equivocal in their attitudes. The area of congruence in the parallel continuums model allows for the recognition and identification of ambiguous positions. The competition - cooperation model is a more reliable means of locating one perception in relation to another [see example below]. It is a more realistic reflection of normal functional relationships between states in the modern world. Unequivocal positions - but more usually that of extreme competition - may be adopted under particular circumstances, but it is an

[386a]

Cramb
Dillon
Maxse
Namier
Rowse
Smith.
Vansittart

(+)
Competition

(—)

Bartlett
Bentley
Brooks
Knowlson
Low

Begbie
Caird
Horsfall-Carter
Gibbs

Gardiner
Gollancz
Gooch
Grigg

(—)

Co-operation

(+)

[387]

ambiguous 'mixture' of competition and cooperation which tends to inform dealings between states. There is also a sense in which the competition-cooperation model brings the main themes of the thesis into coherent relationship. Competition and cooperation though not synonymous with the two main components of the British self-image are concepts readily derived from them. Multimodality in versions of national character, if genuine and not a matter of one overwhelmingly dominant mode dwarfing a number of equally insignificant minor modes, is likely to go with a predilection for cooperation, even if it is in 'future tense'. Gollancz, dedicated to the defeat of the Nazi regime was committed to cooperative goals on conclusion of the peace. And through these relationships the model is linked with consistency theory. Multimodal versions of German national character were less likely to give rise to cognitive dissonance. Unimodal approaches were likely to go with a predilection for competition, and tended to be more productive of bothersome inconsistency.

SELECT BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

G. Barraclough (1908-1984). Educated Bootham and Oriel College, Oxford. Medieval historian who turned to promoting the study of 'Contemporary History'.

J. A. Cramb (1862-1913). Educated at Glasgow and Bonn Universities. Journalist and lecturer. Latterly Professor of Modern History at Queen's College, London.

E. J. Dillon (1854-1933). Educated in Paris and several German and Russian universities. Specialist in oriental languages and philology but then turned to journalism. Daily Telegraph correspondent.

A. G. Gardiner (1865-1946). Journalist, biographer and author. Editor Daily News 1907-19.

Philip Gibbs (1877-1962). Privately educated, he began as a literary journalist but then made his name as a war correspondent during the Great War. As well as journalism, he produced a steady stream of novels and historical studies.

Victor Gollancz (1893-1967). Educated at St. Paul's and New College, Oxford, he was first a schoolmaster before turning to publishing. After working for Benn he set up his own publishing house in 1928. Active on the Left, he took a wide interest in various political and humanitarian 'causes'.

L. J. Maxse (1864-1932). Educated at Harrow and King's College, Cambridge. Editor and proprietor National Review from 1893.

L. B. Namier (1888-1960). Came to England from Polish Russia in 1908 and studied at Balliol College, Oxford and the London School of Economics. Made his name for his approach to the study of eighteenth-century English history, but wrote and reviewed widely on contemporary European political developments.

H. Nicolson (1886-1968). Diplomat, biographer, historian, essayist and diarist who was also a back-bench M.P.

A. L. Rowse (1903-   ) Educated St. Austell and Christ Church, Oxford. Historian, literary scholar and poet who entertained, for a time, left-wing views and political aspirations.

R. Vansittart (1881-1957). Educated at Eton. Entered Diplomatic Service. His career was largely spent in London. Permanent Under-Secretary 1930, but later his influence was by-passed. Subsequently his literary skills were put to use in various polemical books. The view they advanced about Germany earned the title 'Vansittartism'.

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