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**The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union**

By

Atsushi OGUSHI

A Dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD in Politics

Faculty of Social Science, Department of Politics

University of Glasgow

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyses the process of the disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which is central to the Soviet collapse. The disintegration process also provides a good opportunity to test existing theories of political regime change. In terms of source use, this dissertation makes extensive use of the party archives that became available after the Soviet collapse. This makes possible a very detailed analysis of work of the party apparat.

The importance of the subject and a review of existing theories that offers some hypotheses are discussed in the first chapter. In the second chapter, the reason why the party reform was necessary is considered through analysing the situation within the party before the *perestroika* period. The analysis makes clear that the CPSU faced a dilemma between monolithic unity and monopolistic control before the *perestroika* period, which made party reforms necessary. The third chapter deals with party-state relations under Gorbachev's reform in detail. This chapter discusses the fact that, as a result of the reorganisation of the party apparat that was intended to stop the party's interfering in the state body, the party lost its traditional administrative functions. This, however, led to a 'power vacuum' because no other alternative power centre was established quickly, and complicated further reform attempts. Moreover, the party failed to find a new function as a 'political party', as considered in detail in the fourth chapter. Despite attempts at competitive party elections and the emergence of party platforms, Gorbachev failed to transform the CPSU into a 'parliamentary' rather than a 'vanguard party'. Therefore, the CPSU lost its *raison d'être*, which accelerated a mass exodus of members. The rapid decline in party membership caused a financial crisis, which is considered in the fifth chapter. The financial crisis and the soviets' demands for the nationalisation of party property forced the CPSU to engage in commercial activity. Nonetheless, commercial activity unintentionally caused the fragmentation or dispersal of party property. On the other hand, the 'power vacuum' expanded so much that some emergency measures seemed necessary to some top state leaders. The August attempted coup

is discussed in the sixth chapter in the context of party-military relations. When Russian president Yeltsin suspended its activity, the CPSU had lost its *raison d'être* and its property had been fragmented or dispersed. Thus, the CPSU had no choice but to accept the reality that it was 'dead' *de facto*. The final chapter gives an overview of this pattern of developments, and compares it with the experiences of other communist parties' reforms in East Europe. The theoretical implications are also considered in the final chapter, which argues that existing theories of political regime change are not sufficient and that a further effort of conceptualisation based on the realities considered in the thesis is necessary.

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List of Abbreviations

CC: Central Committee

CCC: Central Control Commission

CP: Communist Party

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

GKChP: State Committee of Emergency Situations

KGB: Committee of State Security

MPA: Main Political Administration

MVD: Ministry of Internal Affairs

PPO: Primary Party Organisation

RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

Note on Transliteration

As to the Russian language, the author basically uses a version of the scheme employed by the journal *Europe-Asia Studies*. However, in some cases when they are established in English (e.g. Yeltsin rather than El'tsin) the standard usages are used.

As to Japanese transliteration, the author uses the widely accepted Hepburn system.

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The remaining faults, of course, remain my own.

Chapter 1 On the Research Subject and Some Theoretical Considerations

I. Introduction

The USSR, which was the first socialist state, one pole of the cold war, and the last empire in the modern world, collapsed in 1991. There is no doubt that it is a challenging subject for all social scientists, including historians, to investigate what the Soviet system was, why and how it collapsed. Many analyses have already been advanced around this subject. The purpose of this dissertation is also to contribute to an understanding of the collapse of the USSR.

The research object here is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which had presided over the state and society in the Soviet Union. Unquestionably, the CPSU was a key in understanding what was the Soviet system. It is clear that the CPSU as the only legal party had monopolistic control over both the state and society. On the one hand, for the state, the fact that it was the only party meant that it was the ultimate organisation to make decisions, to monitor the implementation by the state, and to intervene in state functions. On the other hand, for society, the CPSU was the only route to legitimately express their interests. However, these interests were easily distorted since within the party a unity of interests was assumed and any fractions were not permitted because of the monolithic unity over which the CPSU presided.

Although it was supposed to be the strongest organisation in the Soviet Union, the CPSU, in the event, collapsed quickly. In August 1991, after the attempted coup, Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russian Republic at that time, declared a prohibition on the activity of the CPSU, and it did not resist vigorously. The problem is why it did not. It is natural to speculate that the CPSU was in a disintegrating process well before the attempted coup. After the disintegration of the CPSU, the collapse of the USSR followed in December 1991. It seems that these two processes unfolded side by side. Thus, the analysis of the disintegration of the CPSU can enormously contribute to understanding the collapse of the USSR. In addition, if the extraordinary or exceptional situation reveals the essence of the matter as Carl Schmitt

once argued, Gorbachev's *perestroika* period may be the ideal case for understanding the essence of the Soviet system.¹

The CPSU was a huge organisation. The number of members reached nearly 20 million at its peak. It encompassed almost all elites in the country: political, economic, social elites, intellectuals, sports men and so forth. In general, such a huge organisation necessitates an administrative core. In the CPSU, the core was the party apparat, which is the main research object of this dissertation. Through investigating the work of the party apparat and other related issues in the final years of the CPSU, this dissertation tries to contribute to understanding the Soviet collapse.

II. What the Soviet System Was

1. Basic Characteristics of the Soviet Political System

The Soviet political system or a communist regime in general, the collapse of which is the subject of this dissertation, had prominent characteristics in comparison with other regimes. It is frequently assumed that the party's function was the key in this regime, since the communist party was the only or hegemonic party in communist countries. The communist regime had two characteristics: the monolithic unity of the communist party and the monopolistic control over the state and society. Firstly, the communist party was committed to its own monolithic unity. Based on Marxist and Leninist doctrine, which was the only legitimate ideology, the party was supposed to be the vanguard organisation to lead the countries to communism. It seems that the party's activities were a kind of art of war to change the countries. Just as no one in the military doubts the aim of war during war itself, no party member questioned the aim of the party's activities. Thus, any fraction within the party was strictly forbidden since it could cause a division in the 'war' the party was conducting.² Secondly, the communist party had monopolistic control over both the state and society.³ Although the congruence of the communist party

¹ Karu Shumitto, *Seijiteki na Mono no Gainen* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970). This is a translation of Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*.

² On this analogy to war, see Takayuki Ito, 'Porando ni Okeru Nomenkuratura Ronso: Ichigenteki Shihai no Tasogare (Jo) [Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: The Twilight of Monopolistic Control (I)]', *Kyousanshugi to Kokusaiseiji* [Communism and International Politics], Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982) pp. 58-59.

³ Shiokawa firstly advocated the view that a communist regime consists of triangle of the party, the state, and society instead of traditional view of bilateral relation between the state and society. In his view, the communist party is not a part of society. See Nobuaki Shiokawa, *Shuen no Naka no Sorenshei* [Soviet

and the state was frequently assumed in communist countries, it was not always precise. Rather, the relation between the party and the state is the consistent problem. There was the functional division of labour between the party and the state: on the one hand, the main role of the party was decision-making, mass mobilisation, monitoring and direction; the state, on the other hand, played the role of implementation. As this functional division of labour shows, the communist party had a superior position to the state. Moreover, the party often interfered with this division and substituted (or duplicated) the functions of the state. In addition, in communist countries, it would be natural that we assume a distinction between the party and society. The party as the mobilising organisation confronted society. There was no room for independent associations to play a political role, even if they informally existed. Society was always the object of the party's control and the party had its sections even in the workplace. The party was, therefore, composed of a huge hierarchy from the all-union level (Central Committee) to the work places, schools and others (Primary Party Organisations: PPOs) in the case of the Soviet Union. The parties in other communist countries had a similar hierarchy. In addition, soviets or equivalent organisations of other communist countries could be regarded as an instrument to control society. Candidates in soviet elections were controlled by the party. Moreover, it is well-known that the mobilisation of the party in soviet elections was extensive (99% turnout). It is clear from the discussion above that one of the prominent characteristics in the communist regime was the strict prohibition of other independent organisations. Of course, control could not perfectly be implemented. There was always room not to be controlled. The Catholic Church in Poland was a well-known example. Even the soviets in the Soviet Union functioned as a route to express the interests of society, though they were weak. Nonetheless, severe control was prominent in comparison with other regimes. Although according to Przeworski every dictatorship cannot and does not permit counter-hegemony,⁴ the strictness of the prohibition in the communist regime was so different from the authoritarian regime that the communist regime could be regarded as a distinct type.

History in Perspective] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1993), pp. 23-56; Nobuaki Shiokawa, *Genzonshita Shakaishugi* [*Socialism that Really Existed*] (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1999), pp. 144-149.

⁴ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 54.

It was the *nomenklatura* system that sustained this monolithic unity and monopolistic control over the state and society.⁵ The *nomenklatura* system was a personnel system of the communist regime. This system basically consisted of two lists. One list was of important jobs. Another was the list of persons who were appropriate for the jobs. The Secretariat of the Central Committee in the communist party controlled these lists of the highest echelon of the party, the state and society. One reason that the first (or general) secretary of the communist party became the top person in communist countries was this system. At lower echelons, the relevant party organisations managed these lists. According to Ito, the *nomenklatura* can be analysed from three perspectives.⁶ The first is the method to recruit elites (the *nomenklatura* as a recruitment mechanism). Due to this system, higher-level organisations had the right to appoint appropriate persons to lower organisations within the party. Even outside of the party, the communist party had the right to 'approve' persons to organisations of the state and society. This means that the party could recruit the appropriate elites from society. This leads to the second perspective. This system was also a mechanism to maintain the hierarchy of the party and to control the state and society (the *nomenklatura* as a ruling mechanism). The party could control other organisations through its personnel allocation. This system had Janus-like two functions for the regime. Firstly, it had the positive side of effectively mobilising scarce intellectual resources. Due to this system, the party could appoint qualified persons to important realms, for example industry or the military. Secondly, however, this system entailed patronage. For lower organisations, this system meant that their promotion depended on the level above them. Thus, the lower-level officials had to eagerly demonstrate their loyalty. Moreover, patrons had an incentive to pick loyal clients regardless of their ability. When this patronage system stabilised, the people to be appointed to the *nomenklatura* list became close to a kind of 'new class'. This is the third perspective, that is, the *nomenklatura* as a class. While the first and second perspectives connect with each other, the third perspective is a little different.⁷ The following discussion of this dissertation primarily will concentrate on the first and second perspectives.

⁵ The established work on *nomenklatura* system of the Soviet Union is presented by Harasymiw. See Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1969).

⁶ Ito, 'Porando ni', pp. 56-65; Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control', *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol. 1 (1983), pp. 58-62.

⁷ Shiokawa, *Shuen*, pp. 51-52. Hill and Löwenhardt distinguish the *nomenklatura* as a mechanism from the *nomenklatura* as the 'ruling class'. It seems that the first and second perspectives of Ito overlap the

It seems that the manner of budget formation helped to sustain the monolithic unity of the communist party.⁸ The budget of the party was formed as follows. Firstly, primary party organisations collected membership dues from each member. Secondly, these dues were totally transferred to a regional (*oblast* in the Soviet Union) party organisation. Thirdly, the regional party organisation distributed them to lower (city and district) party organisations. Thus, though it may be possible to argue that regional party organisations were more autonomous in terms of finance, the lower party organisations did not have financial independence, which could contribute to sustain the party hierarchy.

The next question is to review how scholars conceptualise such a system.

2. Conceptualisation of the Soviet System

(a) Totalitarianism

The 'orthodox' conceptualisation has been totalitarianism. Although a popular image of the Soviet system may be that of Orwell's *1984*, a standard academic formulation of the totalitarian regime was advanced by Friedrich and Brzezinski. According to them, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union shared following six characteristics of totalitarianism: 1. An elaborate ideology, 2. A single mass party typically led by one man, the 'dictator', 3. A system of terror, 4. A near-complete monopoly of control of all means of effective mass communication, 5. A near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat, 6. A central control and direction of the entire economy.⁹ Here the party clearly possesses the central position in the system. The dictator leads the party that is dedicated to the ideology and controls mass communication, armed combat, and economy. Although some proponents of totalitarian regime stressed more the role of a dictator, even such an argument did not deny the central role of the party as one of the pillars of totalitarianism.¹⁰ Totalitarianism is, according to the proponents, a modern, dynamic, bureaucratically controlled new type of personal dictatorship.

nomenklatura as a mechanism, and the third fits the 'ruling class'. See Ronald J. Hill and John Löwenhardt, 'Nomenklatura and Perestroika', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 230-231. Thus, the author's argument on the *nomenklatura* primarily focuses on *nomenklatura* as a mechanism.

⁸ The author's knowledge on this issue is limited to the Soviet case. For more detail on the party finance, see Chapter 5.

⁹ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

¹⁰ Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (London: Macmillan Press, 1972).

(b) Modified Totalitarianism

After Stalin's death, some questioned totalitarianism. Particularly, the role of Khrushchev did not seem as crucial as that of Stalin. Juan Linz's standard reference on political regimes does not emphasise the role of dictator. Instead, he indicates three characteristics: 1. A monistic centre of power, 2. An exclusive, autonomous, and elaborate ideology, 3. Active mobilisation through a single party. While he argues that his concept of the totalitarian regime can be applied only to the Stalin era, later changes are considered as a development toward a 'post-totalitarian regime', which is a sub-category of an authoritarian regime.¹¹

Nonetheless, some main features of the system did not seem to change. Many thought the core of the system lay in bureaucracy. Especially the party bureaucracy (the party apparat) developed a huge hierarchical network throughout almost all spheres of the society. Rigby characterised the system as a 'mono-organisational society'. Post-Stalinist development was, according to him, 'mono-organisational society without the personal dictatorship'.¹² Thus, 'mono-organisational society' itself was intact even after Stalin's death. In this conceptualisation, the place of the party is crucial. The party is the core of power in 'mono-organisational society'. Jan Pakulauski's 'partocracy' shares the same characterisation of the Soviet-type political system.¹³

(c) Qualified Pluralism

During the Brezhnev period, such a totalitarian formulation, including modified one, of the system was challenged. Besides the rough identification of the Nazi and the Soviet Union, main criticisms were

¹¹ Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby eds., *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Later the 'post-totalitarian regime' became an independent category rather than sub-category. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

¹² T. H. Rigby, 'Stalinism and the Mono-organisational Society', in T. H. Rigby, *The Changing Soviet System: Mono-organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990): pp. 82-112 (Chap. 4). The phrase 'mono-organisational society without the personal dictatorship' is in p. 107. See also T. H. Rigby, 'Reconceptualising the Soviet System', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman eds., *Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan Press, 1992).

¹³ Jan Pakulauski, 'Bureaucracy and the Soviet System', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1986).

directed to the hierarchal control image of totalitarianism and ideological presumption. Some argued that some groups other than the party (for example, the KGB, the military, a trade union, the Council of Ministers and so on) formed some kind of 'interest groups'. Thus, they argued, party control could not be overestimated. Jerry Hough emphasised that conflicts among specialists (for example, industry, agriculture, education and so forth), between centre and regions, and among regions were everyday matters even within the party apparatus. The full-time party workers were not always ideological fanatics. Thus, Hough tried to replace totalitarianism by his 'institutional pluralism'.¹⁴ The party was, according to these criticisms, not necessarily the centre of power, or the party itself was fragmented by conflicting interests of society.

It seems clear that the place of the party in the system was a crucial element for these conceptualisations. To research the CPSU disintegration, therefore, will provide a good test for them. The strength and weakness of these conceptualisations will be discussed in the final chapter after the detailed analysis.

III. Why the Soviet System Collapsed: Theories of Political Change and the Soviet Collapse

1. International Explanations

Despite being the core of power, the CPSU has not been treated properly in research on the Soviet collapse. Some argue that United States' victory over the USSR in the cold war is a main reason. This can be called the 'international explanation', since it considers that regime change came from outside.¹⁵ There are two variations within this argument. The first one is the military explanation: this school emphasized the priority of the United States to the USSR in the arms race.¹⁶ The USSR, they maintained, could not find a way to overcome SDI. With the end of the USSR, the United States was left as the only power to preserve the world order. Although it appears easy to understand, this argument does not look so

¹⁴ Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

¹⁵ While the 'international explanation' is advanced mainly by researchers on international politics in the context of the end of the cold war rather than collapse of the Soviet Union, the most elaborate study is presented by Brown. See Archie Brown, 'Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2000).

convincing. Firstly, the loss of the arms race cannot necessarily produce a domestic change of regime. Secondly, this ignores the autonomy of Soviet diplomacy. Gorbachev's 'new thinking' diplomacy appeared successful in the late 1980s. In the early stages of the ending of the cold war (around 1987-1990), military explanation was rarely advanced. It is after the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that this explanation gathered support.¹⁷ It seems that this is an example of hindsight since we now know the United States is the only remaining superpower.

The second international explanation regards the power of ideas as the main factor in the victory of the United States.¹⁸ According to this, the form of democracy and the market economy that is typically embodied in the United States became more attractive for the Soviet people than socialism, which caused ideological decay and led to the dissolution of the USSR. It seems that this has some explanatory power. It appeared that the groups who advocated democracy and the market economy had won in the struggle with conservatives thanks to their popular support. Nonetheless, this explanation has certain weaknesses. Firstly, this argument cannot directly explain how such ideas as democracy and the market economy influenced the Soviet people. Secondly, as discussed in later chapters, there is some doubt whether what happened in the Soviet Union was the victory of democrats. Thirdly, the 'international explanations' are very difficult to confirm by empirical evidence. Though to integrate international politics with domestic politics is certainly an attractive research agenda, it seems that we have not had yet been shown a satisfactory research design. Finally, it seems that these 'international explanations', both the military and the ideational one, overestimate international influence on Soviet domestic politics, though it is certainly an important aspect. A regime change of this kind can be explained only through domestic politics except in the case of occupation by a foreign country.

2. Transitology and Civil Society Theory

¹⁶ Although this explanation is accepted mainly by American politicians and commentators, as a scholar's paper, see Richard Pipes, 'Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January/ February 1995).

¹⁷ Kiichi Fujiwara, 'Reisen no owarikata [How the Cold War Ended]', in Tokyou Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyujo ed., *20seiki Shisutemu [The Twentieth Century Global System]*, Vol. 6 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998).

¹⁸ For example, Takuya Sasaki, 'Amerika to Reisen [the United States and the Cold War]', in Chihiro Hosoya and Naoki Maruyama eds., *Posuto Reisenkino Kokusaiseiji [International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era]* (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1993).

Now it is necessary to turn our attention to domestic politics. Works on political change concentrating on domestic politics can be categorised by two axes (see Table 1-1). The first axis distinguishes actor-centred and structural approaches. The second axis distinguishes change from 'above' and from 'below'. Although this typology may be arbitrary, it seems to be useful to explain previous approaches. Some scholars took an 'actor-centred approach' to discuss politics in the perestroika period. Their focus is major political figures and their interaction rather than the CPSU as an organisation: figures such as Gorbachev, Ligachev, Yakovlev, Ryzhkov, Yeltsin and others. Some of these works are well-organised biographies. One successful study considers Gorbachev as the central factor in *perestroika*.¹⁹ This actor-centred approach is theoretically influenced by 'transitology', which generalised the democratic transition in Southern Europe and Latin America (to which Eastern Europe was added later) and emphasized the role of the strategic choices of political elites in regime change.²⁰ Civil society theory can also be regarded as a school within the actor-centred approach, since this emphasizes the strategy of civil

¹⁹ Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

²⁰ Major works on transitology are following. Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1970); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, 'Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts', in John Elster and Rune Slagstad eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988); Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Juan J. Linz, 'Transitions to Democracy', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1990); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 128 (1991).

On the application of transitology to post-communist countries, see Russell Bova, 'Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transitions: A Comparative Perspective', *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1991); Grzegorz Ekiert, 'Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', in Geoffrey Pridham ed., *Transition to Democracy: Comparative Perspective from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, 'The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes', in Gilbert Rozman with Seizaburo Sato and Gerald Segal eds., *Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations* (Washington/ Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Takayuki Ito, 'Minshuka to Koshokodo: Roshia Toou Shokoku no Seijihendo ni Sokushite [Democratisation and Negotiation Behaviour: Based on the political changes in Russia and East European countries]', in Hiroshi Kimura ed., *Kokusaikoshogaku* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1998); Michael McFaul, 'Lessons from Russia's Protracted Transition from Communist Rule', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, No. 1 (1999); Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Although McFaul's works include some critical statements and qualifications of transitology, we can find some influence of it in his works.

society elites rather than structural constraints.²¹ However, the civil society approach is an actor-centred approach ‘from below’ while transitology is an approach ‘from above’. In spite of controversies over the validity of transitology in Eastern Europe, it is not necessary to abandon the attempt at comparison itself and transitology provides useful conceptual tools in analysing political change: for instance, the distinction between liberalisation and democratisation, between civil society and political society, pacts, and others.²² Moreover, it is important to find that opening of political change begins with cracks in an authoritarian regime rather than the rise of civil society. In any case, let us confirm that these actor-centred approaches emphasise the strategic choice.

3. Modernisation Theory

On the other hand, structural approaches emphasise the structural constraint. The classical structural approach is modernisation theory.²³ According to this theory, modernisation, especially economic development, urbanisation and education, produces the conditions for democratisation as following: while economic development and urbanisation leads to the emergence of a middle class, the spread of general education infuses the idea of democracy to this class. The enlightened middle class seeks democracy. Some emphasised more internal dynamics of political institution under modernisation. For

²¹ On civil society theory, see Akira Kawahara, *Chutoouno Minshukano Kozo* [Structure of Democratisation in Central Eastern Europe], (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1993). Fish uses the word ‘movement society’ instead of civil society since civil society in the Soviet Union was premature. M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

²² Controversies over transitology have occurred both the US and Japan. On controversies in the United States, see Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, ‘The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?’ *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring 1994); Valerie Bunce, ‘Should Transitologist Be Grounded?’ *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Spring 1995); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunist?’ *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Winter 1995); Valerie Bunce, ‘Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers’, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Winter 1995). In Japan, see Nobuaki Shiokawa, “‘Taiseitenkan” no mokuteki ha “Seiyouka” ka? [Is the Aim of “Regime Change” “Westernisation”?]’ in *Surabu Yurashia no Hendo: Jutenryouikikenkyu Houkokushu* [Proceedings of a Conference: the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World] (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 1998); Takayuki Ito, ‘Shiokawa hokoku wo chushintosuru comento [Comments on Shiokawa’s Paper]’, in *Ibid.*; Shiokawa, *Genzonshita*, pp. 433-437.

²³ The representative work in modernisation theory is Lipset’s one. See Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1959). More sophisticated works in modernisation theory include the following: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 1973/ First published in 1966).

example, Talcott Parsons advanced 'evolutionary universals'. Society, according to him, develops from a primitive stage, through social stratification and cultural legitimation, toward a bureaucratic organisation, market system, universal norm and a democratic association.²⁴

Such a view had some influence on Soviet studies. Richard Lowenthal, in 1970, argued that communist regimes were bound to face a dilemma between an ideological utopian goal and economic development. After ideological decay, he argued, the communist regime went toward developmental authoritarian dictatorship rather than totalitarian one.²⁵ Later he developed this line of argument. The communist system that had been unable to adopt some element of pluralist democracy would face erosion of legitimacy and, therefore, a political crisis.²⁶

As another example of a modernisation theorist, Thomas Remington can be noted. After the Soviet collapse, he argues that contradictions between industrialisation and urbanisation, for instance environmental problems, and between educational improvement and job structure in Soviet Union, an example of which is that one who had a good education could not have an appropriate job where manual workers were demanded, led people to organise opposition movements.²⁷ These arguments have contributed to understanding the influence of economic and social change on political change.

4. New Institutionalism

While many structural approaches investigate the conditions for regime change from society (below), new institutionalism considers political change comes from the state (above). There are at least two new institutionalisms which have developed with little mutual relation. Nonetheless, some scholars try to find the theoretical core of new institutionalism. According to them, while political institution can be considered as rules constraining actors, the behaviour of actors gradually changes institutions. Political

²⁴ Talcott Parsons, 'Evolutionary Universals in Society', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 1964).

²⁵ Richard Lowenthal, 'Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy', in Chalmers Johnson ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford university Press, 1970).

²⁶ Richard Lowenthal, 'On "Established" Communist Party Regime', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1974). Though this is an abbreviated version of Richard Lowenthal, 'The Ruling Party in a Mature Society', in Mark G. Field ed., *Social Consequences of Modernisation in Communist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), the abbreviated version is more sophisticated.

²⁷ Thomas F. Remington, 'Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case', *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1990). Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, 'Redefining the Political System of the

change can occur as a result of the long-term development of the relation of actors and institution.²⁸ Since this theoretical core is too broadly defined, it seems necessary to introduce each variant of new institutionalism. The first variant is rational choice institutionalism. This school presumes that behaviour of actors is rational within the constraints of institutions. Thus, the preference of actors is the maximisation of personal interests. Moreover, it is based on methodological individualism: it focuses on individual actors rather than collective actors. On the other hand, the second variant, sociological institutionalism, rejects rational choice. This school does not presume actors' preferences *a priori*, since preferences are formed by institutions. In addition, it is not based on methodological atomism. Thus, actors are not individuals but, for instance, social class, parties, and others.

Up to now, some studies that applied new institutionalism to the Soviet case are based on rational choice institutionalism. The common element of these studies is the focus on intra-state (including the party) affairs rather than society. Philip Roeder applies rational choice institutionalism to the explanation of structural cycles and the final collapse of communist regime. He exclusively focused on relations between the top (Politburo) level elites and second (Central Committee) level elites by supposing their relations were reciprocal rather than hierarchical. In order to secure their political position, the top elites had to seek support from the second level, which was bound to lead to a transition from collective leadership to one-man directive leadership. In addition, the directive leadership was bound to be conservative, because it could not betray the interest of second level elites. If betrayed, he was expelled by

USSR: Mass Support for Political Change', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (December 1992) also provides some evidence for modernisation theory.

²⁸ On new (or neo) institutionalism generally, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1996); Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', *Politics and Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998); Rosa Mule, 'New Institutionalism: Distilling some 'Hard Core' Propositions in the Works of Williamson and March and Olsen', *Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 1999). On sociological institutionalism, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 1983). On historical institutionalism, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steimo, 'Historical institutionalism in comparative politics', in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism', *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1998); Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, 'The Potential of Historical Institutionalism: a Response to Hay and Wincott', *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1998). On rational choice institutionalism, see Douglass C. North, 'Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange', James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The

second level elites, as in the case of Khrushchev. Thus, the Soviet system was bound to stagnate. Gorbachev's reforms were attempts to replace the old second level elites with new ones, but he failed to create a new structure.²⁹ Though this is not institutionalism, one study that applied rational choice to the Soviet case can be introduced here. According to Susan Batty and Vesna Danilovic, Gorbachev's strategy of centrism between radical reformers and conservatives was rational in order to make sure their cooperation in the short run. However, such a centralist strategy could not be sustained in a sequential process as polarisation increased. They explained this mechanism by nested game theory.³⁰ In another study, Steven Solnick also utilises rational choice institutionalism to account for the collapse of the Komsomol and other youth organisations. He focuses on the middle level bureaucracy (e. g. regional full-time Komsomol workers). According to him, the middle level bureaucracy tended to be autonomous because of agency problem. Though they were agents of top elites, middle level elites could get more information on their own affairs. Thus, they could hide their real capacity and information from the central elites. The bureaucratic hierarchy was bound to weaken. Gorbachev's reforms delegating authority to the middle level elites enhanced centrifugal fragmentation and caused a hierarchy breakdown.³¹ Although she did not apply rational choice, Bunce's treatment of the collapse of the communist regime is logically similar to Solnick's explanation. Her bird-eye's view explanation emphasises that the formal monopoly of power and resources internationally (within the Soviet bloc) and domestically (within the Soviet Union) caused unbearable high costs for the central organisation. Thus, throughout its history, the Soviet Union informally delegated power to lower organs as well as satellite countries. Gorbachev's reforms accelerated this centrifugal process by the formal power delegation to lower organs. Therefore, the Soviet bloc disintegrated and the Soviet Union also collapsed.³²

author includes historical institutionalism into sociological institutionalism because the crucial distinction in new institutionalisms is in the acceptance of rational choice.

²⁹ Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

³⁰ Susan E. Batty and Vesna Danilovic, 'Gorbachev's Strategy of Political Centrism: A Game-Theoretic Interpretation', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1997).

³¹ Steven L. Solnick, 'The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996); Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

³² Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

It seems that few studies applied sociological institutionalism to the Soviet or Communist case. One study on the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party applies sociological institutionalism, which seems instructive in understanding of the disintegration of the CPSU. According to this, the Hungarian communist party had failed to adequately co-opt the new professionally qualified elites as party workers especially at a regional and local level. Such isolated elites began to form informal reform circle, which, in the end, made it possible to change the party from within.³³

As we have seen, although there are some variations in new institutionalism, the common element is that it focuses on the ruling organisation rather than top elites as in the case of transitology or society as in the case of modernisation theory.

5. Marxist Views

Some Left scholars advanced a somewhat similar view to some new institutionalists on the Soviet 'demise'. David Kotz and Fred Weir argue that Gorbachev's reforms gave a great opportunity to conduct a capitalist revolution to party-state elites. For example, economic reform allowed middle and lower elites to spontaneously privatise state property. Political reform destroyed central control and middle and lower party officials became independent. The Soviet system was, therefore, fragmented by party-state elites themselves. The revolution came 'from above'. A high degree of elite continuity after the collapse, they argue, supports their argument.³⁴

6. Some Hypotheses on Political Change

Here, we can make some hypotheses about why and how the Soviet system collapsed based on these theories.

1. The central factor in the Soviet collapse is the strategy of top elites, for example, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Ligachev and so forth (transitology).

³³ Patrick H. O'Neil, *Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). A condensed version is Patrick H. O'Neil, 'Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transition from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1996).

2. Social and economic change or the failure to legitimate its rule through economic development was the crucial factor in the Soviet collapse (modernisation theory).

3. Intra-state structure accumulated friction within the ruling body that led to the final collapse by the failure of reform (new institutionalism).

4. The Soviet system came to an end by transforming party-state elites into new economic elites (Marxist view).

After investigating the CPSU disintegration in detail, we will return to these hypotheses in the final chapter.

IV. How the Soviet System Collapsed: Temporal Sequences of Political Change

1. Application of Different-Type Concepts

So far, we have seen several theories of the Soviet system and its collapse. In this section, let me clarify some terminology on the temporal sequences of political change, which are used in this dissertation. Although transitology's conceptual tools, that is, liberalisation and democratisation, have been influential in defining the temporal sequences of political change, some concepts that are more appropriate may have been advanced by an older study of the breakdown of *democratic* regimes.³⁵ True, the Soviet system was far from a liberal democracy. Therefore, the application of such concepts may be the dangerous case of 'conceptual stretching'. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the concepts used in the breakdown of democratic regimes are more neutral than those of teleological transitology. Whether or not the application is appropriate should be decided only by the result of such an attempt. Thus, this issue will be considered in the final chapter after the detailed analysis.

³⁴ David Kotz with Fred Weir, *Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System* (London: Routledge, 1997).

2. Crisis

In his *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Linz utilised Karl Dietrich Bracher's concepts of temporal sequences: crisis, loss of power, power vacuum, and takeover of power (a breakdown). In each phase, there is a chance to find a solution (reequilibrium). If a regime fails to secure reequilibrium in the first phase, it reaches the second phase. If it keeps failing, the regime faces breakdown. The first phase is crisis. This is characterised by a situation in which a regime is incapable of resolving problems. Serious problems tend to destroy a consensus of regime-supporting elites, because such serious problems are, by definition, difficult to resolve, therefore, a solution acceptable to the majority cannot be found. Therefore, they are called 'unsolvable problems'. Unsolvable problems accumulate in this phase. Nonetheless, unsolvable problems are usually not the immediate cause of the breakdown. '[I]t is not the technical characteristics of the problems but the political context in which they are placed, the constraining conditions on the regime, and the alternatives offered by the existence of one or more disloyal oppositions that ultimately trigger the process of breakdown'.³⁶

3. Loss of Power and Power Vacuum

In the phase of loss of power, the regime begins to suffer a crisis of legitimacy. The ruling capacity of the regime significantly declines. A tense atmosphere, widespread circulation of rumours, increased mobilisation in the street and so forth may lead regime-supporting elites to take action to strengthen the power of executive, or to make an attempt to incorporate part of the opposition.

Nonetheless, such measures may fail to produce the expected result. In this case, the immobilism of political forces and the process of polarisation continue, and a pre-civil war situation emerges. This is the phase of power vacuum. None rules the country in this phase. There are two options for regime-supporting leadership: to withdraw, turning over its power to the armed forces, or to appeal to the nation and to mobilise organised forces.³⁷

³⁵ Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-55. Citation is p. 55.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-77.

These phases are similar to what Samuel Huntington called 'praetorianism'. The government loses its capacity to satisfy the demands of the people. That is, the level of political participation exceeds that of political institutionalisation, which induces military intervention.³⁸

4. Takeover of Power and a Breakdown

When opposition forces assume power, the process reached the phase of breakdown. This may be a result of a violent confrontation or secret negotiation. In the latter case, the process is carried out by only a small number of individuals.³⁹ Once the opposition assumes power, its rule must be institutionalised. This is the inauguration of a new regime.

To investigate the process of CPSU disintegration, utilising these concepts, is the task of the following chapters. Before starting the task, it is necessary to examine the existing research on the final years of the CPSU.

V. Previous Studies of the CPSU and Features of This Research

1. Categorisation of Existing Studies of the CPSU

Almost without exception, every study of the collapse of the Soviet Union touches the CPSU issue. In fact, it is not possible to discuss the Soviet collapse without including the CPSU. Still it seems impossible to give an overview of all these studies, because of their huge number. It is necessary to limit and categorise the arguments to specifically the CPSU, though, since most of the previous studies on the CPSU are based on firm historical and empirical evidence, it is dangerous to do so. Nonetheless, it seems that there are some differences in focus and crucial issues such as the possibility of reform (see Table 1-2). The first difference lies in the focus of research. While some studies pay more attention to institutional issues, others investigate ideology and the opinion of party members. The second criterion is the possibility of reform of the CPSU, though it is not always clear. Some scholars admit a certain possibility of party reform, which implies that party reform could have led to the successful consequence of total system reform. Other scholars argue that party reform in communist system is impossible, since the party

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order*.

³⁹ Linz, *The Breakdown*, pp. 78-79.

apparat concentrated power in its own hands and any reform would necessarily undermine its power, which must cause an intense reaction from the apparat.

2. Institutional Analysis

The following introduces previous studies along this typology. However, the possibility of party reform is not always clear. Thus, previous studies are introduced by considering their research focus. The first category is institutional analysis. Many studies seem to be included in this category. The most extensive work is Graeme Gill's.⁴⁰ He historically discusses many issues from personnel change to the institutional framework that the CPSU faced by using many published materials, especially newspapers. If forced to mention some problems, firstly, his study is all-inclusive (although it can be also a positive point), therefore, the focus of the discussion is not always clear. This leads to a second problem: why, after all, the CPSU disintegrated is not necessarily clear, though he suggests its disintegration was caused by the failure of adaptation to a changing environment.⁴¹ Related to it, he does not suggest the possibility of party reform. Later scholars should discuss some crucial topics that are not considered in his excellent sketch. Toshihiko Ueno, a Japanese scholar, also analyses many problems of the CPSU. The main foci of his works are institutional change, social composition, the authority of the party in the whole system, and others.⁴² Although he does not refer to the possibility of party reform, it seems that he thinks there was some possibility of this kind at the 28th party congress in 1990. Some works in this category argue that party reform is impossible by investigating resistance from the top-level (Central Committee) party apparat. Though he changed his opinion on this matter, Gordon Hahn's previous view seems typical. According to him, reform of the CPSU was impossible since power was so concentrated in the hands of the CC apparat that any reform undermined its interests, which led to strong resistance. Another feature of his research is the use of party archives. Probably his research is one of the earliest attempts to understand

⁴⁰ Graeme Gill, *The Collapse of a Single Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

⁴² Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosanto no Henka [Changes of the CPSU under Gorbachev]', *Hogaku Kenkyu* [*Studies of Law*], Vol. 63, No. 2 (1990); Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Kaitaikatei no Bunseki [The Analysis of Processes of the Disintegration of the CPSU]', *Kokusaiseiji* [*International Politics*], Vol. 104 (1993); Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kai Taikai womeguru Shomondai [Problems around the Twenty Eighth Congress of the CPSU]', *Hogaku Kenkyu*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1995).

the Soviet collapse through investigating party archives.⁴³ In addition to these works, Cameron Ross discusses the problem of party-state relations.⁴⁴

3. Ideologies and Opinion Analysis

Some scholars analyse ideological issues and the emergence of various groups in the CPSU. Ronald Hill's study is included in this group. The purpose of his discussion is to investigate the strategy of Gorbachev's reform which led to institutional collapse and cracks in the monolith.⁴⁵ He distinguishes these cracks among strands of opinion inside the CPSU. He does not discuss the possibility of reform either. Nobuo Shimotomai, a Japanese scholar, also investigates the divergence of opinion within the party.⁴⁶

Among other scholars, Stephen White should be mentioned. He produced many works on the CPSU from an overview of the disintegrating process to more detailed analysis of the 28th party congress.⁴⁷ Although some of these are beyond the ideology and opinion analysis, for the sake of convenience his works are introduced here. In two works that were written well after the disintegration, he suggests the clear possibility of party reform. Based on opinions of lower level party members that were included in party archives, he states 'there was a real potential for Party renewal in the early 1990s, based upon a commitment to social justice and a far-reaching democratization of the party structure'.⁴⁸ However,

⁴³ Gordon M. Hahn, *Gorbachev versus the CPSU CC Apparatus: The Bureaucratic Politics of Reforming the Party Apparatus, 1988-1991* (PhD Dissertation, Boston University, 1995); Gordon M. Hahn, 'The Politics of the XXVIII CPSU Congress and the Central Committee Open Letter', *Russian History*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1995); Gordon M. Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparatus under Perestroika', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997). His later view that admits the possibility of party reform is presented by Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

⁴⁴ Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations', in Eugene Huskey ed., *Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Politics* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).

⁴⁵ Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU: From Monolith to Pluralist?', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991); Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU: Decline and Collapse', *Irish Slavonic Studies*, Vol. 12 (1991).

⁴⁶ Nobuo Shimotomai, 'Sorenpo Houkai no Nakano Kyosanto [The CPSU in the Collapse of the USSR]', *Kokusaiseiji [International Relations]*, Vol. 99 (1992).

⁴⁷ Stephen White, 'Rethinking the CPSU', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991); Stephen White, 'Background to the XXVIII Congress', in E. A. Rees ed., *The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Stephen White 'The Politics of the XXVII Congress', in *Ibid.*; Stephen White, 'Communists and their Party in the Late Soviet Period', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (October 1994); Stephen White, 'The Failure of CPSU Democratization', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (October 1997); Stephen White and Ian McAllister, 'The CPSU and Its Members: Between Communism and Postcommunism', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1996).

⁴⁸ White, 'Communists and their Party', p. 663.

it is always not clear why this possibility could not be realised. Many reasons may be indicated: the indecision of Gorbachev, the reaction of conservatives and others. His two articles are another early attempt that used party archives.

The analysis of the right wing in the CPSU by Robert W. Orttung shows interesting points. Ideologically right wing in the Communist Party of Russian Republic who sought the unity of the CPSU made the condition of fractionalism by itself because it was one 'fraction' within the CPSU.⁴⁹ On party reform, it seems that he thinks it depended on the attitude of the right wing. If they had accepted pluralism, the party could have renewed itself. He states, 'While the Right was willing to use factionalism in its battle against the democratic reformers, it could not accept pluralism as a permanent state of affairs'.⁵⁰

Concerning Gorbachev's strategy of party reform, there is a study on the discourse of Gorbachev by Neil Robinson.⁵¹ He argues that Gorbachev's reform of the CPSU was not very reformist. Gorbachev, according to Robinson, avoided any change to the place of the party in the whole system. His study suggests Gorbachev's ambiguity on the role of the party. Similarly, a recent book by Jonathan Harris makes an important contribution to understanding Gorbachev's contradictory and ambiguous strategy of reforming the party apparat. His focus is the content of Gorbachev's strategy rather than the institutional framework of the party apparat. According to him, Gorbachev tried to change the role of the party by emphasising the 'political' rather than 'economic-management' role, which destroyed the fundamental function of the party apparat.⁵²

Therefore, the crucial issues in the study of the CPSU are as follows. The first is why party reform was introduced. The second is whether the possibility of party reform existed or not. Thirdly, if there was such a possibility, why was it not realised? Alternatively, if there was no such possibility, what prevented the reform? While some scholars who think the possibility existed tend to attribute the reasons to

⁴⁹ Robert W. Orttung, 'The Russian Right and the Dilemmas of Party Organization', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1992). The author does not give this 'fraction' a formal meaning, since the fraction was prohibited by the end of the CPSU. Only platforms were admitted in the twenty-eighth congress.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 474.

⁵¹ Neil Robinson, "*The Party is Sacred to Me*": *Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-1990*, Discussion Paper Series No. 10 (Essex: Russian & Soviet Studies Centre, University of Essex, June 1991); Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-1991', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1992).

⁵² Jonathan Harris, *Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparatus, 1986-1991* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

indecision of Gorbachev and reaction of conservatives, other scholars who consider party reform was impossible are likely to seek their explanation in the institutional structure of the CPSU.

4. Features of this Research

Compared with the studies mentioned above, this dissertation has the following features. Firstly, the focus is on the institution. Although the author admits that institutional analysis tends to be a dry description, it is necessary to research this issue. After the Second World War, political science sought more dynamic approaches by dismissing an institutional approach. Nonetheless, the old institutional approach has not yet lost its merit. Before turning to a new approach, scholars should think what they can recognise by using such an approach.

Secondly, the author's analysis pays more attention to the party apparat and its work. This seems to be a natural research subject because it is frequently assumed that the party apparat is the key to understanding the Soviet system. However, the study of the party apparat was not easy. Published materials that were available told little about the actual work of the party apparat. Materials that were found by chance (such as the Smolensk archive) provided great opportunities for such research.

Now the situation has changed, and new archival materials become available. This dissertation bases itself mainly on the party archive, which is the third feature of this dissertation. This research utilises party archives of Russian State Archive of Recent History or RGANI (formerly TsKhSD, the Centre for Preservation of Contemporary Documents), fond 89 and Russian State Archive of Social and Political History or RGASPI (formerly RTsKhIDNI, Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History), fond 582, opis' 6 (formerly fond 646, opis' 1).⁵³

These features may not be very new. In fact, this dissertation shares many features with other studies mentioned above. For example, in terms of focus, the institutional analysis is also attempted by many other scholars, including Gill. Nonetheless, this dissertation tries to conduct a deeper institutional analysis of the party apparat. The party apparat, which is the second feature, has been analysed by Hahn and Harris. Still, Harris's work did not utilise the party archives and it researches Gorbachev's (ambiguous) strategy rather than institutions. But, party archives have been utilised by White and Hahn.

This dissertation is, nonetheless, different from White's two articles in terms of focus. While his focus is more on party ranks, the Central Committee (CC) apparatus is this dissertation's main interest. Thus, Hahn's works share many features with this dissertation. The difference will be shown through the whole argument in terms of interpretation.

VI. Structure of This Dissertation

The dissertation consists of seven chapters. In this chapter, the research subject, some theoretical issues, and previous research were considered. In the next chapter, based on mainly existing literature, the situation of the party before *perestroika* will be discussed. This will show the reasons why party reform was necessary. In the third chapter, the reform of party-state relations will be considered. This issue relates to streamlining the party's old functions. The fourth chapter will deal with issues of party elections and the party programme. These issues relate to defining the new function of the party. However, the party failed to achieve the new function desired by Gorbachev. Rather, it was converting itself into other functions: economic and security functions in the final months of the party. These issues will be discussed in the fifth and sixth chapters. Finally, the summarised argument, brief comparison and theoretical consideration will be given in the final chapter.

⁵³ Incidentally, the name 'TsKhSD' rather than 'RGANI' is used in this dissertation, because the author referred to microfilm form documents edited before the renaming.

Table 1-1: Typology of Approaches

	<i>Actor-centred</i>	<i>Structure-centred</i>
From above	Transitology	New institutionalism
From below	Civil Society Theory	Modernisation Theory

Table 1-2: Typology of the Studies on the CPSU

		<i>Focus</i>
		<i>Institution</i> <i>Ideology and Opinions</i>
Possibility of reform	Impossible Possible	

Chapter 2 The Phase of Crisis: The General Problem in the USSR

I. Introduction

The phase of crisis is characterised by the accumulation of 'unsolvable problems'. What were the 'unsolvable problems' in the Soviet system? Some may indicate the nature of the Soviet economic system. Firstly, the command economic system theoretically had fundamental problems as Mises and Hayek argued many years ago. Secondly, the economic system was practically far from efficient. Especially after the oil shock, the lack of efficiency caused a difficult problem in the realm of high technology. Others may indicate a changing nature of society. The emerging civil society, they may say, became less amenable to the party control. My argument, nonetheless, suggests that 'unsolvable problems' were accumulating in the *political* system itself. The basic features of the Soviet political system tended to face a dilemma. Let us, first of all, consider the basic dilemma of communist regimes in general. Then we will move on to the Soviet case.

II. The Tension between Monolithic Unity and Monopolistic Control: a General Problem

As discussed in Chapter 1, the basic characteristics of the communist regime are monolithic unity of the party and the party's monopolistic control over the state and society. However, these two characteristics presented a dilemma. The party tried to monopolistically control the state and society, for which the party had to exercise a whole series of functions. Still, the party had to integrate these functions to maintain its monolithic unity. It was not always a difficult task if the purpose was clearly defined. For instance, in wartime, this system worked rather well since the party could mobilise the state and society for the only aim, to win the war. Or, at the early stage of its development, utopian goal of ideology could mobilise people to build 'communism' to a significant degree.¹

Nonetheless, the more complicated the system became, the more difficult it was for the party to control it. For example, in the realm of economy this problem was clear. Economic development was one of the most important tasks of the regime. At the early stage, rapid industrialisation seemed to lead to

building the utopian communist society. At a later stage, where the legitimization by a utopian ideology faded away, it substituted the function of legitimacy.² However, the party workers were originally revolutionaries, that is, amateurs in economics. They, therefore, had to train experts in economics. Although at the first stage of economic development, they could relatively easily control these experts, the more complicated the economic system became, the harder it was to control them. This problem was reflected in the divergence between so-called 'reds' and 'experts'. While the 'red' was the person who engaged in the party from youth organisations and was educated by the party, experts were raised in the economic spheres. 'Reds', on the one hand, were fully devoted to party activities. For experts, on the other hand, joining the party meant one step in their career promotion. The difficulty of controlling the experts meant that they became influential and independent within the party. Almost the same story was true in other realms. It became increasingly difficult for the central party organisation to monitor regional party organisations since the ruling structure became very complex. In the early stages, the central organisation tried to monitor regional ones by violent methods. Nonetheless, violent methods had the potential to prevent rational ruling due to the arbitrariness of central organisations. Regional ruling elites usually had more professional knowledge on regional matters than central ones. The more stable did the personnel policies become, the more autonomous the local organisations. Thus, the party became an assembly of experts. Ideological decay accelerates this tendency. Monolithic unity faces a crisis of integrity.

Moreover, control over society also might become weak. It is impossible for any forceful organisation to extend its control to such a typical private realm as the family. It is well-known that the Catholic Church was rather independent of the control of the party in Poland. Even organisations founded to control society might become autonomous. Generally, organisations develop their own interests once they have been established. For example, there was a tendency that academic organisations became independent of the party since these organisations had special knowledge and authority. The party could

¹ Shiokawa states that socialist system had effectiveness rather than efficiency at the early stage of development. See Shiokawa, *Genzonshita Shakashugii* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo), p. 127.

² See Takayuki Ito, 'Eastern Europe: Achieving Legitimacy', in Gilbert Rozman with Seizaburo Sato and Gerald Segal eds., *Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations* (Washington/Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 288-294. Ito indicates three legitimating formulas or legitimacy claims in communist countries, which are a revolutionary-millennial formula, the formula of rapid industrialisation, and formula of economic effectiveness. Shiokawa argues that factors that integrated the masses in communist countries were an ideology, economic achievements, and paternalism. See Shiokawa, *Genzonshita*, pp. 184-196.

not force an arbitrary personnel policy upon them. The same tendency was observable in other organisations. Trade unions, for instance, might take some autonomy from the party if the party was not popular with the workers. Thus, monopolistic control over the state and society was gradually undermined.

III. The Soviet Case

Let us turn our attention to how the general problem of a communist regime emerged in the USSR. The communist regime in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had some of the same difficulties discussed above. Nonetheless, it seems that how the difficulty was reflected and how to cope with it had certain differences among the countries. The following sections will specifically look into the Soviet case. Firstly, the structure of CPSU organisations is considered. Secondly, two distinct types of communist party elite will be introduced from raion level to centre. The third task is to discuss centre-regional relations. Finally, why reform of the CPSU was needed will be considered. It will suggest that the reason why the reform in the USSR occurred from the leadership was directly connected with these problems.

1. Hierarchy of the party organisations

Before discussing career patterns from raion to centre, the structure of party organisations should be noted briefly.³ Figure 2-1 shows the hierarchy of the CPSU. The lowest party organisations were primary party organisations (PPOs), which were formed in any organisation if it included more than three party members, and which every party member had to join. The upper organisations of PPOs were *raion* (district) party committees (raikoms) or in the case of cities, city party committees (gorkoms). Let us define this level as 'local'.

The party organisational hierarchy was complicated at its upper levels. On the one hand, in Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan, raikoms and gorkoms were subordinate to *oblast'* or *krai* party committees (obkoms or kraikoms). Some party committees of capital or very huge cities (e.g. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and so forth) had the same status as obkoms. Here we call an *oblast'* level as 'regional'. Except in the Russian republic, obkoms were supervised by republican central committees. On the other hand, the parties of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia,

Turkmenia and Armenia did not have obkoms, therefore, the republican central committee of each republic controlled raikoms and gorkoms in these republics. Then, republican party committees were under the all-union central committee. However, the Russian republic did not have its own central committee until 1990. Thus, obkoms and kraikoms in Russia were directly subordinate to the all-union central committee. This meant that obkoms in Russian republic were as important as (or frequently more important than) other republican central committees for the all-union central committee, since, besides the exceptional importance of the Russian republic, obkoms and kraikoms in Russia outnumbered republican central committees.

At each level, the party committee had full-time party workers. In the all-union central committee, membership of the Secretariat was a full-time job. CC secretaries directed other full-time party workers of Central Committee departments. It is well-known that the General Secretary became the top person of the USSR by holding that position. Though the Politburo was the highest organ of decision-making, membership of the Politburo was not a full-time job, that is, Politburo members had another paid job. For example, members included the General Secretary, chairman of the Council of Ministers, some republican party first secretaries, and others, which were full-time jobs. It seems that the Politburo coordinated the most important interests of various organs of the Soviet system.

At the lower levels, party organisations except for PPOs also had the Secretariats. The equivalents of the Politburo at the lower levels were party bureaux, which included important persons in other organs as well as party officials, for example, the chairman of the soviet executive committee (ispolkom), the director of a huge factory in the region and so forth. PPOs did not have a Secretariat, but had secretaries (PPO secretaries). They were usually, but not always, full-time. The party apparat consisted of this huge hierarchy of full-time party workers from the CC secretaries to the PPO secretaries.

2. *Apparatchiki and Khozyaistvenniki at a Local Level*

How did revolutionaries train economic experts? According to Azrael, Lenin attempted to manage this problem by utilising the bourgeois specialists from the old regime and the red directors, which led to the rise of red directors in the political field. However, Stalin's Great Purge extinguished them. The new

³ On the structure of CPSU organs in more detail, see Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, *The Soviet*

red specialists after the Purge were politically obedient and dependent on leadership through the Stalin and Khrushchev era. Under Brezhnev, a new managerial elite, which was well educated, pragmatic and politically reliable for the regime rather than democratic, consequently emerged.⁴ This well-known story has been discussed by many scholars.⁵ While most of them researched oblast' or upper level elites because of limitations of information, Matsuzato researched the career patterns of raion level elites, by which he distinguishes two different types of elites: *apparatchiki* and *khozyaistvenniki*.⁶ The criteria that are relevant to this distinction are the timing of joining the party, higher education qualifications, higher political education qualifications, and the timing of becoming a full-time party worker.⁷ Now it seems possible to discuss this question from raion to central level. The discussion in this section of the raion is mainly based on Matsuzato's distinction. The relation between *apparatchiki* and *khozyaistvenniki* at the oblast' and central level is discussed in the following sections.

(a) *Khozyaistvenniki*

Khozyaistvennik is a word that derives from *khozyaistvo* '(economy). It literally means an economic manager. This clearly indicates their character. They have a higher education, and pursue their careers in a management body. Joining the party is rather late, and they have only a little political education. Once they become a full-time party worker, their promotion is quick.

Matsuzato introduces five typical cases in Tver' oblast'. One of them is Kozlov in Staritsa raion, who was born in 1945. He entered Leningrad Polytechnic Institute in 1963, joined the party in 1964, and graduated from an institute in 1969. He began to work in a machine factory in Staritsa raion in 1969, and became a new electric factory manager in 1978. In 1985 he became second secretary in the raikom after a

Communist Party, 3rd ed. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1986), esp. chap. 3.

⁴ Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

⁵ An excellent survey of theoretical arguments is presented by Stephen White, 'Communist Systems and the "Iron Law of Pluralism"', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 102-106. His own view is critical of pluralist arguments.

⁶ Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho Shidosha no Kyaria Patan: Toveri shu wo jireini shite [Career patterns of local leaders in Russia: the case of Tver']', in Akihiro Ishikawa, Nobuaki Shiokawa, and Matsuzato Kimitaka eds., *Surabu no shakai [Slavic Society]* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1994). One problem of his studies is how his findings in Tver' oblast' can be generalised. Nonetheless, it seems that his argument is valid as a general tendency.

⁷ A full-time worker of the party and soviet was called an 'exempted' (*osvobozhdennyi*) worker. According to Matsuzato, this terminology has not changed yet. See *Ibid.*, p. 331.

short period of study in a higher party school. Except for his early party membership, Kozlov is a typical *khozyaistvennik*: high technical education, and a latecomer as a full-time party worker, with little political education.⁸ Other figures whom Matsuzato introduces, Sel'vonenko in Torzhok city and Kurbatov in Kalinin raion, have similar careers. His study discovered that technical experience and education was (and 'is' still now) required to be elites at the raion level.

(b) *Apparatchiki*

Matsuzato's usage of the words *apparat* and *apparatchiki* is a little confusing. Usually, apparatus is used as a translation of *apparat* and an *apparatchik* denotes its full-time member. However, his use of these words is more complex. For example, if all full-time workers of the party are *apparatchiki*, even *khozyaistvenniki* are included in the category of *apparatchiki* when they become full-time workers. *Apparatchiki* are, by his definition, people who devote themselves more to the party or executive apparat. They had some common characteristics: they join the party at a relatively early age, become full-time workers early, have lower level technical education,⁹ but a higher political education, and at slow to be promoted. Let me introduce two persons among those whom Matsuzato discusses. The first was born in 1947, and began to work when he was 15 years old. He completed an all-union correspondence (not full-time) industrial technical school in 1971. This education offered him a chance to join the party in 1972. He became a full-time worker (the chairman of a *poselok* (village) ispolkom) early in 1973. In 1974, he moved to the Propaganda and Agitation department of Firosovo raikom and then to the Organisational department in 1975. After a higher political education in Leningrad (1976-1980), which indicates the strong expectations of the party organisation since he was transferred to such a huge city as Leningrad, he returned and was promoted to the deputy chairmanship of the raion ispolkom (raiispolkom) in 1980 and then to the second secretaryship of the raikom in 1983. However, his promotion stagnated here. He remained second secretary until 1990.¹⁰ Another example of an *apparatchik* worked mainly in an ispolkom. He was born in 1937. He completed an agricultural machinery school in 1957. When he was 22,

⁸ Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', pp. 307-310.

⁹ On Soviet education system, we should distinguish lower technical education from higher one though this is not always regarded as important. The latter, on the one hand, indicates education in universities or institutes, while, on the other hand, the former was offered in 'professional technical schools (PTU: professional'no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche)'.

he was recruited as a secretary of a village ispolkom from a kolkhoz worker. He joined the party when he was 24. Then he became a full-time worker of Tver' oblispolkom in 1966 when he was 29. From 1968 to 1970, he studied at Leningrad higher party school. In 1970, he began to work as an instructor in a Tver' obkom. Then, he returned to the ispolkom. He worked in Kalinin gorispolkom (city soviet executive committee). He was promoted to be an assistant of the chairman of the oblispolkom in 1979 when he was 42. Then he became the 'second head' of the oblispolkom in 1982. However, his promotion stagnated here.¹¹ Other *apparatchiki* Matsuzato discusses share more or less this pattern. Then, he concludes that *khozyaistvenniki* had priority over *apparatchiki* in career patterns at the raion level.

Figure 2-2 summarises the career patterns discussed above. This shows economic managers (*khozyaistvenniki*) could be promoted to second secretaryships of raikoms or the chairmanships of raiispolkoms, skipping the lower level party work. Of course, the distinction between *khozyaistvenniki* and *apparatchiki* is not always clear. There are mixed figures. Some, who became a full-time worker of Communist Youth Organisation (*Komsomol*) when they were young, had a higher technical education.¹² Nonetheless, what was discussed above shows the following. Firstly, at least at the raion level, *khozyaistvenniki* stood at a higher point in career terms. Secondly, this priority of *khozyaistvenniki* was a result of meritocracy since this meant that practical managers rather than propagandists were regarded as important. Thirdly, according to Matsuzato, these career patterns were established under Brezhnev during the 1970-80s. These findings are reinforced by statistical evidence. According to 1971 Tver' statistics, 30 people completed a higher education among 33 chairmen of raiispolkoms in the oblast'. Nonetheless, it seems for 19 of them (about three-quarters) higher education meant only that they had graduated from a higher party school. On the other hand, 1989 statistics show that 5 of 30 raiispolkom chairmen (one sixth) completed a higher party school only. During these years (from 1971 to 1989), the priority of *khozyaistvenniki* was established at least in the raions of Tver' oblast'.¹³

3. Apparatchiki and Khozyaistvenniki in Regional and Republican Levels

¹⁰ Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', pp. 317-320.

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 320-321. Matsuzato states he does not understand what was the 'second head'.

¹² Ibid., pp. 321-322.

As shown in figure 2-1, obkoms in the RSFSR were almost equivalent to republican central committees in the structure of the CPSU. Therefore, although the argument of this section includes obkoms in the RSFSR and other republics, the primary concern here is obkoms in the RSFSR.

Since career patterns at the oblast' level have been investigated by many researchers, there is much statistical information that shows that many obkom first secretaries had economic background.¹⁴ Frank studied the profiles of first secretaries of most obkoms and kraikoms (including republican obkoms and kraikoms) based on 1966 data. According to him, 134 of 139 first secretaries had completed a higher education. In addition, according to the other data which takes together all secretaries of party obkoms, kraikoms and central committees of republic parties in January 1967, the figure for higher education indicates a clear increase from the past: the figure in 1947 was 41.3 per cent while the corresponding figure in January 1967 is 97.6%. If our concern is directed to details of higher education of obkom first secretaries as of 1966, the largest group was people who completed only a higher party school (36/134: 26.8 per cent) and the second largest was agricultural-technical (34/134: 25.3 per cent). Nonetheless, if agricultural-technical, industrial-technical (25/134: 18.6 per cent), agricultural-technical and party (7/134: 5.2 per cent), and industrial technical and party (9/134: 6.7 per cent) backgrounds, who were assumed to be *khozyaistvenniki*, are put together, they clearly formed the largest group (75/134: 55.9 per cent).¹⁵ The general tendency of the rise of *khozyaistvenniki* was already clear in 1967 though the higher party school group was still large. It is necessary to investigate this tendency after 1967.

Rigby has researched RSFSR obkoms in the later period. According to his study, the decline of number of obkom first secretaries having only a party education from September 1965 to September 1976 is clear. While in 1965 the group of first secretaries who had completed only a higher party school was 19.4 per cent (14/72), in 1976 this number decreased to 9.7 per cent (7/72). It seems certain that people

¹³ Ibid, p. 330; Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Gyoseifuto toha Nanika [What is the Administrative Party?]', *Surabu kenkyu senta hokoku shirizu* [Slavic Research Center Occasional Paper] No. 56 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1995), pp.26-27.

¹⁴ For example, Peter Frank, 'The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1971); T. H. Rigby, 'The Soviet regional leadership: the Brezhnev generation', in T. H. Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); Joel C. Moses, 'The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional Elite Recruitment', *Soviet Union*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981).

¹⁵ Frank, 'The CPSU Obkom', pp. 182-183.

lacking professional qualifications found it more difficult to become first secretaries.¹⁶ Nonetheless, it should be remembered that people having a professional higher education were appointed first secretaries with a rather long experience of full-time party work. Many obkom first secretaries had been raikom first secretaries, and this number increased from 1965 to 1976.¹⁷ This may reflect the way in which professional qualifications had become necessary at the raion level as discussed above. In addition, the long party experience of obkom first secretaries does not necessarily mean that they identify themselves as *apparatchiki*. Mawdsley and White introduce the case of Viktor Dobrik, an obkom first secretary in Ukraine since 1969. Although he had been a full-time party worker since he was thirty years old, he denied that he was regarded as a party careerist since he thought that he had been promoted because of his professional skill.¹⁸ It seems that the word *apparatchiki* carried a negative image in the USSR. This is suggested in that the word, a full-time worker in the party and ispolkom, was (and is) an 'exempted' worker in Russian. This implied that an ordinary work was more valued than a professional bureaucratic work.¹⁹ Because certainly most obkom first secretaries had long party work experience, it is difficult to insist on the absolute rise of *khozyaistvenniki* in career patterns at the regional level. Nonetheless, it seems that their priority can be admitted even at the regional level to a lesser degree than at the local level.²⁰

4. *Apparatchiki* and *Khozyaistvenniki* in the Centre

At the central level, it seems that there was a division of labour between *apparatchiki* and *khozyaistvenniki*. Nonetheless the distinction of these two types is not always clear at the central level. There were few persons who did not have highly qualified education. It seems better to distinguish central party members in terms of periods of a full-time party work. David Lane and Cameron Ross studied careers of governmental elites (USSR ministers, and similar status executives, e.g. chairs of USSR state committees) from 1984-1991. They distinguished four types of governmental elites, measured by 'party

¹⁶ Rigby, 'The Soviet regional leadership', pp. 237-239.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 242-243.

¹⁸ Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, *The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 210.

¹⁹ Matsuzato, 'Roshia Chiho', p. 331.

²⁰ Matsuzato argues that the priority of *khozyaistvenniki* was weaker at the higher level. See Matsuzato, 'Gyoseifuto', p. 36.

saturation' that was counted by the ranks of party posts and years of full-time party work²¹: i) Governmental elites with no party saturation were 'non-party careerists'. They had no experience of a full-time party work and had a career totally within one ministry or sector of the economy, ii) 'Party careerists' were governmental elites with high party saturation. They had been transferred from the party apparat and had had rather long experience of the high rank party work. And hybrid careerists were divided by iii) 'a low-level party saturation group' who had had only a few years experience in the party apparat, and iv) 'an intermediate group' who had had mixed careers in both governmental and party work.²² This first two are close to Matsuzato's *khozyaistvenniki* and *apparatchiki*, and hybrid careerists are close to the mixed figures introduced in section 3. Lane and Ross assume that the high party saturation represented strong control of the party. They find that party saturation was very low among pre-Gorbachev governmental elites, that is, non-party careerists were predominant. In addition, non-party careerists were the most influential among directing and planning ministers and industrial production and building ministers. Thus, they argue, the party experienced difficulties in asserting hegemony over the USSR Council of Ministers at that time.²³ It means *khozyaistvenniki* were superior in the economic sphere.

The career of Nikolai Ryzhkov is a good example. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1985 to 1991, is a typical *khozyaistvennik*. His career was exclusively in industry. He was born in 1929. Working at a defence industry plant from 21 years old, he completed firstly the Kramatorsk machine construction technical school in 1955, then a higher engineering education (at the Ural Polytechnic Institute) in night school in 1959. He joined the party in 1956. In 1971, he became general director of Uralmash, one of the largest production associations in the world. In 1975 he was appointed first deputy minister of heavy and transport machine building and in 1979 first deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In late 1982, when Ryzhkov was 53, Andropov, General Secretary at that time, coopted him into the Central Committee apparat. In 1985, he became a full member of the Politburo.²⁴ Ryzhkov can be regarded an excellent example of the *khozyaistvennik*: a higher

²¹ Thus, a USSR minister who had been an ex-high rank party official with long party work experience gained a high party saturation number.

²² David Lane and Cameron Ross, *The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 61-65.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

²⁴ On Ryzhkov's career, see Dzhin Vronskaya and Vladimir Chuguev, *Kto est' Kto v Rossii i Byvshem SSSR* (Moskva: Terra, 1994); Tsentr Politicheskoi Informatsii, *Federal'naya i Regional'naya Elita Rossii*:

education, and no political education (there is no evidence to suggest that he went to a higher party school). Though the party admission itself was relatively early as a *khozyaistvennik* (at the age of 27), he had not been a full-time party worker until he became 53.

However, at the central level, *khozyaistvenniki* were not always influential. Brezhnev's career was that of *apparatchik* rather than *khozyaistvennik*, though he had knowledge of technical engineering. He was a full-time party worker since 1938 when he was 32. Chernenko was a devoted *apparatchik*. His education was mainly higher party school and worked in propagandist realm in the party apparat. Gorbachev was also an *apparatchik*. His career was dedicated almost entirely to the party. At the top level of the party apparat, *apparatchiki* seemed predominant. Lane and Ross studied careers of CC secretaries and heads of CC departments from 1981-1991. They found that many of them devoted to full-time party work throughout their careers and did not have experience of governmental work, though they also confirmed that the large portion of other party officials were co-opted from non-governmental sectors (e.g. industrial work, professional work and so forth).²⁵ Such devoted party officials could be regarded as *apparatchiki*. Therefore, it seems that there was a rather clear division of labour between *apparatchiki* and *khozyaistvenniki*. In addition, such division took an institutional form: the party and the government. Combinations of Brezhnev and Kosygin, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov were examples of such a division of labour. While, at the lower level, both *khozyaistvenniki* and *apparatchiki* could be found within the party apparat and *khozyaistvenniki* were more influential in the party apparat, the picture was somewhat different at the central level.

5. Centre-Regional-Local Relations in the Soviet Union

As we have seen, the rise of *khozyaistvenniki* took place especially in lower party organisations during the Brezhnev period. It is difficult to judge if this development led to better performance of the party organisations. On the one hand, there is an opinion that argues that the party stagnated. For example, during *perestroika*, Gorbachev frequently complained that lower party organisations did not work well,

Kto est' Kto v Politike i Ekonomike (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo GNOM i D, 2001); Date Base of Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, URL: <http://src-home.hokudai.ac.jp/politics/rawa/rul.html>; Archie Brown ed., *The Soviet Union: A Biographical Dictionary* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1990), pp. 320-321. See also Lane and Ross, *The Transition*, pp. 212-213; Jerry Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR 1985-1991* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 92-93.

and that they usurped the functions of other organisations, which led to stagnation. Nonetheless, on the other hand, it is obvious that public service and the living standards of ordinary people were best under Brezhnev in Russian history (including Gorbachev and Yeltsin), though, of course, party practices involved a huge waste of resources. Taking into account the fact that local party organisations were much closer to the life of ordinary people, we can point out that the party at least at the local level worked relatively well. In addition, such relatively good performance was related to the establishment of the career patterns. With such career patterns, the party had capable raikom first secretaries who knew the actual work of production.

At the regional and republican levels, it is more difficult to judge how well or badly these structures operated. Firstly, there is a consensus among scholars that regional and republican party organisations became more autonomous from the centre. Brezhnev's policy of 'trust in cadres' provided a good incentive and time to manage their regional problems with first secretaries. According to Blackwell, cadres were highly stabilised during the Brezhnev era at both the central and the lower levels. Let me take the figures of lower levels. In republican party committees, the turnover of republican Politburos (or party bureaux) under Brezhnev decreased by about half in comparison with the Khrushchev era. In the case of republican secretaries, the rate of turnover also declined. In obkoms, the rate was almost half of that of the Khrushchev period.²⁶ John Miller also discussed that the centre did not control regional staffing in a systematic way.²⁷ In other realms, the republican and the regional autonomy at that time has been confirmed by many scholars. For example, Mary McAuley discussed republican autonomy in nationality policy. She studied the national composition of republican party congresses, republican party recruitment, and nationalities of party members of republican parties. Though her argument did not give a definite answer because of lack of information, there was no uniform central policy on nationality matters. Thus, a certain autonomy was confirmed.²⁸ Gill and Pitty also discuss republican autonomy within the party. They argued that a republican party's autonomy increased significantly under Brezhnev. Visits by the central

²⁵ Lane and Ross, *The Transition*, pp. 47-54.

²⁶ Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., 'Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March-April 1979), pp. 33-35.

²⁷ John Miller, 'Nomenklatura: Check on Localism?' in T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983).

leadership became ceremonial and criticism on personnel matters also became moderate.²⁹ One study of Kazakhstan Party personnel by a Japanese student revealed that Dinmukhamed Kunaev, first secretary of the Kazakh party, enjoyed rather a lot of independence from the centre. After 1976 even second secretaries, who usually had Russian nationality and had been regarded as 'watchdogs' of the centre, had worked in Kazakhstan and been promoted within Kazakhstan after graduating from universities, that is, well before becoming second secretaries. Of course, Kunaev's special relationship with Brezhnev would be very useful to enjoy such autonomy.³⁰ In any case, it is certainly possible to recognise the republican and regional autonomy in the party under Brezhnev.

Secondly, we may be able to assume that such regional and republican autonomy was also related to local autonomy. It seems that an oblast' or a republic was too large to monitor all of its cities and raions. It is likely that a relatively good performance by raikoms discussed above led often to their *de facto* autonomy. As mentioned above, most obkom first secretaries had been raikom first secretaries. Many scholars suggested that regionalisation of the all-union Central Committee (the representation of obkom first secretaries in Central Committee) was evidence of regional autonomy. If this suggestion was correct, localisation of obkoms could be considered proof of local autonomy. For example, Gorbachev states in his memoirs that although his transfer from head of department of Stavropol' kraikom to first secretary of Stavropol' gorkom was movement to a lower job in terms of the *nomenklatura* list, he was attracted to *greater independence* of the gorkom first secretaryship.³¹ In addition, one study of Oktyabr' raion party committee in Moscow city shows that the raikom scarcely received any instructions from Moscow gorkom.³² A case study of Kazakhstan mentioned above argues that Kunaev's Kazakhstan was not 'Kunaev's kingdom' but that he coordinated interests of various regions just as the all-union centre did

²⁸ Mary McAuley, 'Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study in Centre-Republican Relationships', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1980).

²⁹ Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

³⁰ Tetsuro Chida, 'Sorenpo Chuo-Kazafusutan Kankei no Hensen (1980-1991): To Erito Jinjidoko wo Sozai toshite [The Central-Republican Relationship and Party Elites in the Soviet Union: Kazakhsatan (1980-1991)]', *Surabukenkyu [Slavic Studies]*, Vol. 50 (2004), pp. 37-39.

³¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 109; Mihairu Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo (Tokyo: Shinshosha, 1996), p. 144. Emphasis added.

³² Itsuro Nakamura, *Soren no Seijiteki Tagenka no Katei [The Process of Political Pluralisation in the USSR]* (Tokyo: Seikeido, 1997).

among regions.³³ Thus, the centre allowed people, who knew their own region better and had professional knowledge, to direct the region. This meant that republican and regional leaders could enjoy rather significant independence in their own republics and regions. Moreover, regional leaders in their turn probably allowed some autonomy to local (raion and city) leaders. If this analysis is the case, it is possible to argue that the relatively better performance of lower party organisations must have been sustained at the expense of the centre. By dismissing strict control, the Soviet system could perform relatively well in the Brezhnev period. John Miller indicates, in his study of regional party personnel, the reason why the centre did not exercise the power to arrange the systematic rotation of officials from place to place 'seem[ed] to lie in the imperatives of rapid economic growth'.³⁴

Given such a situation, a serious task for the central leadership was how to regulate the republican and regional party organisations. In addition, republican and regional leadership faced the same difficulty in their relations with local party organisations. Patronage may provide a clue to understanding this issue. Although patronage has been regarded as evidence of corruption and inefficiency of the Soviet system (and of course this is, to some degree, the case), it may have been a reasonable response to the centre-regional-local problem. When the systematic hierarchical regulation does not work well, a reliable client is a useful or even necessary instrument of central control. It seems to me that this logic was the case at least in the Brezhnev era. When the centre had to allow some autonomy to regional leaders, patronage could be a guarantee that they would not rebel against the centre.

However, patronage would face difficulties when the patron changed. The aging of top leaders might have been a reasonable response in order to escape a destruction of patron-client relations. Still, the time when top leader died was inevitable. A new leader would face considerable difficulty in constructing new centre-regional relations. Some signs of huge turnover of central and regional personnel were there even in the Andropov period.³⁵ Here we can recognise one of reasons why Gorbachev had to attempt a high level of turnover of regional leaders in his early years. The reason lay in patronage and centre-regional relations.

³³ Chida, 'Sorepo Chuo', p. 37.

³⁴ Miller, 'Nomenklatura', p. 90.

³⁵ Stephen White, *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 5.

6. Fragmentation within the Party and Needs of Reform from Above

From what was discussed above, it is clear that the monolithic unity of the CPSU was weakened to some degree. At the local level, raikoms worked relatively well given *de facto* autonomy. Regional leaders also became autonomous. Moreover, the professional background of local and regional party leaders, which were necessary for economic development and public service, made the party an assembly of professionals. Jerry Hough argued that such regional and functional cleavages became a prominent characteristic of the Soviet political system under Brezhnev and that the system was no longer totalitarianism but was moving towards 'institutional pluralism'.³⁶

To some degree, his argument was valid. Regional autonomy and professionalism certainly increased under Brezhnev. The performance of such professional elites was not necessarily bad. Moreover, it seems that his argument assumed that such 'plural' elements contributed to the system's stability. However, he may have underestimated the extent to which such 'plural' elements could be obstacles for the central leadership.

In addition, the Soviet economic system was too centralised and inevitably inefficient. This leads to another reason why we can say that the relatively good performance of the lower party organisations must have been sustained at the expense of the centre. Let us imagine that one raikom, which was asked to produce some kilograms of vegetables valued at 1000 roubles, spent 1100 roubles to produce them. Such inefficiency may have been acceptable at this level. Still if all raions of one oblast' were inefficient to the same degree, the cost would become much higher at the oblast' level. Such inefficiency, then, would become too huge at the centre. And only at the centre this inefficiency in total scale could be recognised.

Thus, the problem may not have been the decline of the economic development rate itself. Even theoretically economic problems do not necessarily cause political problems immediately. In fact, despite several problems in the economy, some keen observers recognised that there was not a clear indication of the Soviet regime collapse. Actually, despite the macro level economic decline, the average living standard of ordinary people was sustained by the relatively good performance of lower level party organisations. The problem was that such good performance could be realised only by *de facto* autonomy

³⁶ Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1977), esp. chap. 1.

of local and regional party organisations and the professionalism of lower elites. In a sense, the party faced a crisis of its integrity not because of economic decline but because of economic development.

That the initiative for reforms came from above in the USSR was, therefore, not a coincidence. So far, an influential explanation is presented by totalitarian theory. According to this, since a regime was firmly controlled by the dictator, only the dictator could have the broader latitude of choice that would undermine his power.³⁷ However, this fails to explain why reform was necessary at all. My argument would suggest a different cause: Only the centre could realise the seriousness of the systemic problems. Regional and local autonomy, professionalism of elites, and patronage became obstacles only for the new top leader. The total scale of systematic economic problems could be visible only at the centre because the performance of lower level was not necessarily bad. Reform came only from the top. If the metaphor of war activity is used, this situation can be explained as follows: While each unit managed their activity relatively well in the front line, at the headquarters the centre could not supervise the activity of each unit because the war line was so extended. Just like 'friction' in a war, the CPSU suffered dysfunction of huge hierarchical bureaucracy. According to Patrick O'Neil, the Hungarian communist party could not work well at the local or regional level. Professionally qualified elites were not co-opted into the local or regional party leadership very much. Thus, reform initiative came from locales within the party.³⁸ The picture was different in the Soviet Union. Local party organisations, by co-opting *khozyaistvenniki*, worked more or less well. In this situation, the initiative for reform could come only from the centre.

Of course, it was the top leaders who judged how acute these problems were. In this term, it was decisive that the Soviet Union had Gorbachev as a leader. It seems clear that he recognised (or began to recognise at some point) these problems as a 'crisis' of the system. Soon after Gorbachev became a leader, the Soviet political system entered the phase of crisis.

IV Conclusion

³⁷ For example, see William E. Odom, 'Soviet politics and After: Old and New Concepts', *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), p. 71.


³⁸ Patrick H. O'Neil, 'Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transition From Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1996); Patrick H. O'Neil, *Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 71-86.

Some of 'unsolvable problems' in the communist regime that divided ruling elites, therefore, lay in the party's dilemma between monolithic unity and monopolistic control. In the Soviet Union, the dilemma led to *de facto* regional and local autonomy, and the rise of *khozyaistvenniki* in lower party organisations at the expense of central control. These problems required reforms, but there was little consensus among ruling elites on what kinds of reforms were necessary. Some thought what was needed was more discipline. Others thought the problems were more acute. Gorbachev was or became one such person who recognised that problems were more serious. The problems became 'unsolvable' under the current system, because of the lack of consensus.

Then, what kinds of reforms were necessary for leaders who recognised the problems acutely? Firstly, the new leader may have thought that the party would have to streamline its functions, because it had become an assembly of various professionals. Thus, it was necessary for the party to remove its burdensome economic functions. Reforms of party-state relations would be required. Probably the institutional form of division of labour between *apparatchiki* (the party) and *khozyaistvenniki* (the Council of Ministers) at the centre would make the leadership feel it easy to decide such a reform. Secondly, central leaders must have fought against 'regionalism'. When, despite a huge turnover of regional leaders, the situation did not improve, the central leaders would attempt competitive party elections, which, they expected, would destroy patronage within the region that had frustrated the implementation of central policies.


In the next two chapters, we will closely look at these reforms. Chapter 3 will investigate party-state relations under the impact of Gorbachev's reforms. In Chapter 4, we will look into party elections.

Figure 2.1: Vertical Structure and Supervisory Functions in the CPSU



Source: John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union: An Introduction*, 4th ed. (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 75.

Figure 2-2: Career Patterns at Raion Level from the 1980s to the Last Period of the CPSU



Source: Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Gyoseifuto toha Nanika [What is the Administrative Party?]', in *Surabu kenkyu senta hokoku shirizu* [Slavic Research Center Occasional Paper] No. 56 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1995), p.25; Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshia chihoshidosha no kyaria patan: Toveri shu wo jireini shite [Career patterns of local leaders in Russia: the case of Tver]', in Akihiro Ishikawa, Nobuaki Shiokawa, and Matsuzato Kimitaka eds., *Surabu no shakai* [Slavic Society] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1994), p.301.

Chapter 3 Streamlining the Party Apparatus: Party-State Relations

I. Introduction

As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the party had to conduct various functions and one of the most burdensome functions was economic management. Therefore the party's relations with the state became a serious concern. In fact, this topic had attracted many scholars before the Gorbachev period.¹ This chapter also considers the party's control over the state.² It is well known that the party controlled state organs. The party had various controlling mechanisms. Firstly the party developed the party apparatus to check the activity of state organs. For example, the CC apparatus had departments that paralleled the central ministerial branches. Secondly, the party controlled the staffing of the state organs through the *nomenklatura* system. For instance, the all-union Central Committee approved the important posts in the military, ministries, and so forth. Thirdly the party had primary party organisations (PPOs) in state organs (and almost

¹ On party-state relations before *perestroika*, see Ronald J. Hill, 'Party-State Relations and Soviet Political Development', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1980); Ronald J. Hill, 'The apparatchiki and Soviet political development', in Peter J. Potichnyj ed., *The Soviet Union: Party and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Ronald J. Hill and Alexander Rahr, 'The General Secretary, the Central Party Secretariat and the Apparatus', in David Lane ed., *Elites and Political Power in the USSR* (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1988). Though the author admits that the word 'state' (and Soviet) has been used to denote both legislative and executive organs, the executive organs (the Council of Ministers and Ispolkoms) are referred to as the 'state' here, partly because to analyse the competitive elections of 'Soviets' (Congress of people's deputies in all-union and Russia and Supreme Soviets and local Soviets in other republics) is such a huge subject that this needs other chapters, and primarily because the party-executive organs relationship has, the author believes, a crucial importance.

² The major existing studies on party-state relations during *perestroika* period are the following. Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations', in Eugene Huskey ed., *Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Politics* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); Gordon M. Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparatus under Perestroika', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997); Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002); Alexander Rahr, 'The CPSU in the 1980s: Changes in the Party Apparatus', *Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1991); Jonathan Harris, *Subverting the System: Gorbachev's Reform of the Party's Apparatus, 1986-1991* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

every organisation in the Soviet Union). The party could monitor the activity of the state through PPOs.

Why did the party need to control the state? To some degree, this was the natural consequence of one-party dominance. The very close relations between party and state can be recognised under an authoritarian regime and under a democratic regime with a predominant party system as in Japan.³ Nonetheless, party control under the communist party regime differed in the following respects. Firstly, in term of the scope, the control of the party reached from the all-union level to the raion, the lowest administrative division. This total control does not happen even in an ordinary authoritarian regime. Secondly, this strong orientation to control the state is, to some extent, a practical requirement of the planned or command economy. Since many of the state organs were responsible for economic management, the party could not release this control. Thirdly, the Soviet administrative system necessitated party control. It is well known that the Soviet system functioned both as a legislative and executive body. In addition, each level soviet was sovereign. Therefore, a 'dual subordination' existed as stated in the Constitution of the USSR, 1977, that 'Executive Committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies shall be directly accountable both to the Soviet that elected them and to the higher executive-administrative body.' This principle could have caused a problem if the decision of the soviet had differed from that of the higher executive body. Such an anarchical principle needed the hierarchic control of the party behind the formal administration system. This 'dual subordination' was, it seems, unique to the Soviet system. An ordinary authoritarian regime does not have such administrative system. Fourthly, the Leninist theory of revolution demanded the seizure of the state by the party. Lenin's *State and Revolution* projected that socialist revolution would take place by replacing an old state bureaucracy with a new 'bureaucracy' controlled by

³ On the concept 'predominant-party system', see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 192-201.

the proletariat.⁴ As the famous distinction between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian one by Linz indicates, the systemic ideology was a prominent feature of the communist party regime. Thus, party control was a theoretical requirement as well as a practical one in economic and administrative terms.

How did party–state relations change under Gorbachev? What happened if party control was removed? To investigate these questions is the task of this chapter. The structure is as follows. Firstly party-state relations up to the 28th Party Congress are discussed. Then, their relations after the 28th Party Congress follow.

II. Reasons for the Reform of Party-State Relations

Before investigating the concrete process of party-state relations, the reasons for this reform should be considered. Gorbachev's initiative on this policy is clear, though it is very likely that he took into account his reformer colleagues' opinions. However, when, as General Secretary, Gorbachev's power base was the party and the party's power derived from its supervision over the state, it did not seem rational for him to release its supervisory power. What made him think the reform was necessary? So far several interpretations have been advanced.

The first one argues that the reform was to resolve the problem of *podmena* (substitution).⁵ The constant problem of relations between party and state was that the party controlled state organs (the Council of Ministers in the centre, Ispolkoms in local areas) so tightly that the state organs could not take any initiatives, which led to economic stagnation. Particularly the party organised departments along the same lines as the structure of state organs,

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Kokka to Kakumei* (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 2001). This is a translation of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

⁵ This is an officially stated reason. Thus, most existing studies suggest this reason. For example, Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosantono Henka [Changes of the CPSU under Gorbachev],' *Hogakukennyu*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (February 1990), p. 167.

by which the party substituted and/or duplicated the work of the state. By dismissing party control, according to this argument, state organs would be able to work independently. Gorbachev himself supports this interpretation in his memoirs.⁶ This argument stresses the connection with economic reform.

The second interpretation emphasizes political struggle within the leadership. According to this, faced by the strengthening authority of Ligachev who was based in the party apparat, Gorbachev advanced the party apparat reorganisation to curb him.⁷

Thirdly, Gorbachev might think that the party and state apparat colluded to frustrate his reforming efforts. Dividing the party and state function, he might have thought, would make it possible to defeat the anti-reform coalition of the party-state apparat.⁸

Fourthly, the reform might be aimed at improving centre-regional relations.⁹ As discussed in the earlier chapter, one problem within the party was that the party function extended so widely that the centre could not devote sufficient attention to supervising regional organisations. In addition, the leadership might think that the party spent so much time and energy on economic activities that it forgot 'political' activities such as propaganda, agitation and so forth. Therefore, streamlining party functions could be one way to reform centre-regional relations and party's 'political' activity. This interpretation implies that it was necessary for the party itself to relinquish party control over the state organs because economic management was,

⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy* Vol. 1 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 410; Mihairu Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku* Jo (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), p. 512; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996), p. 268.

⁷ Jerry F. Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 200. In addition, Hough states as the immediate purpose, 'to begin the process of destroying the central institutions of the Communist Party, including the Politburo.' *Ibid.* However, this interpretation is, it seems, an example of hindsight. It is not persuasive to consider that Gorbachev intended to destroy his own power base in 1988 when the 1989 election of the Congress of the Peoples' Deputy did not take place yet, therefore, he did not have any other power centre than the party.

⁸ Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 184; David Lane and Cameron Ross, *The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 55.

⁹ Graeme Gill and Roger D. Markwick, *Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 55.

according to this, burdensome for the party.

Two points can be suggested in respect of these explanations. Firstly the fourth interpretation (centre-regional relations) is logically consistent with the author's previous argument, which is neglected by many scholars. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the first interpretation tends to regard the party organs as superior to those of the state, while the third one argues that party-state relations were more equal and closer than had been thought. It is instructive that the third and fourth explanations are advanced by scholars relatively closer to the pluralist school. The pluralist school tends not to emphasise party control, but to signify the checks and balances of various interests. We will return these points after discussing the concrete process of party-state relations.

III. The First Reorganisation of the Party Apparatus: from the 19th Party Conference up to the 28th Party Congress

1. The Process of Decision Making on the First Reorganisation

(a) The Reorganisation of the CC Apparatus and the Establishment of the CC Commissions

Many decisions on apparatus reorganisation were taken at the party Conference of 1988 and at CC plenums. The first reorganisation of the party apparatus was set out in the 'Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 19th All-union Party Conference,' which were approved by the CC plenum in May 1988, which stated 'Taking into account the increasing role of the party as a political vanguard, and the division of function of party committees and state's economic organs, [it is necessary to] undertake necessary change in the structure and composition of the party apparatus.'¹⁰ This statement developed into Gorbachev's address on 28 June 1988 to the 19th All-union Party Conference. He proposed to reject organising of the CC

¹⁰ *Pravda*, 27 May 1988, p. 2.

apparat and of lower party organs in parallel with branches of administration, to reconstruct their structure in accordance with the proper function of the party, and to reduce their number.¹¹ The resolution of the 19th conference (1 July 1988) approved a proposal to 'carry out, by the end of this year, the reorganisation of the party apparat' and to 'make the necessary change in its structure.'¹²

The role of directing the reorganised apparat was entrusted to the Politburo members and to the Commission that the conference decided to establish. At the conference Gorbachev referred to the necessity to create Commissions in the CC along the main directions of internal and external policy, in which the CC members would regularly work. The party apparat also was expected to occupy its own appropriate place in the Commissions.¹³ The resolution of the 19th Party Conference 'On Democratisation of Soviet Society and Reform of Political System' provided a basis for the creation of the Commissions from among CC members.¹⁴ Thus, the function of the Secretariat, which had checked the work of the CC apparat, was to be weakened by the participation of CC members.

It took some time to develop a concrete plan of reorganisation. The plan of reorganisation was still not clear at the time of the 19th Conference. The CC plenum took a decision 'On the Basic Directions of the Perestroika of the Party Apparatus (30 July 1988)' which mandated the CC Politburo to examine and establish a new structure of the apparat, and to define new links with the apparat of lower party organs.¹⁵ Then, Gorbachev issued a memorandum 'On the question of the reorganisation of the party apparat' dated 24 August 1988 to the Politburo. In this memorandum, Gorbachev, paying attention to the delay in the apparat reorganisation and referring to the further activation of the CC CPSU through the creation of

¹¹ *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 80.

¹² *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi*, p. 106.

¹³ *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi*, p. 77.

¹⁴ *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi*, p. 126.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, 31 July 1988, p. 2.

Commissions, proposed the function of each CC department. The Department of Party Construction and Cadre 'Policy'¹⁶ should concentrate on internal party work. The Ideology department was to take responsibility for all theoretical, ideological, scientific, and cultural problems. On social-economic matters, Gorbachev proposed that the CC departments surrender this function to governmental organs and to establish a single department of economic and social policy. The Agrarian Department and Defence Production department, which related to economic affairs, were to be kept, though their functions were to be changed. International affairs, which three CC departments had engaged in, were to be under the jurisdiction of a single International department. A new department, which related to the creation of a law-based socialist state, was to be founded. The General Department and Administration of Affairs were to be kept. This reorganisation, as Gorbachev proposed it, entailed a reduction in apparat numbers, amounting to 1940 responsible workers and 1275 support staff at that time. In addition, he proposed greater autonomy for lower party organisations on apparat reorganisations.¹⁷ The Politburo approved Gorbachev's memorandum on 8 September 1988.¹⁸

The discussion at the Politburo meeting shows that every Politburo member admitted the necessity of the reorganisation, though the reasons were not necessarily the same. Let us consider the statements of major Politburo members. The first person who gave his comments on Gorbachev's memorandum was Ligachev. His statement shows that he totally supported the memorandum at that time, though, of course, the possibility that he pretended to support it cannot be denied. In addition, he recognised that Gorbachev intended that the CPSU's original political function rather than its administrative role should be improved, stating, 'I want to emphasise that ... this apparat should engage in political and theoretical questions ...'¹⁹

¹⁶ Gorbachev stated 'Policy' rather than 'Work' in the memorandum. *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 83.

¹⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, pp. 81-86.

¹⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 81.

¹⁹ Tsentral'no-Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 42, delo (d.) 22, page (p.) 1.

Moreover, his argument emphasised the centre-regional relationship, which was one prominent feature of his statement compared with those of other members. He stated, 'The strengthening of the connection with local areas, local organisations, [and] with workers [is necessary], because if any apparat does not closely connect with local affairs, [and] local working collectives, it is not able to help the CC to work out the policy and bring the theoretical and political work for problem-solving.'²⁰ This judgement may derive from his past career as CC secretary responsible for organisational matters. In any case, this statement is important because it shows that centre-regional relations provided the reason for the apparat reorganisation beyond the reform-conservative cleavage in the leadership.

Politburo members from the executive organs were concerned about the consequences of the reorganisation for party-state relations. For example, Ryzhkov's argument was related to the economic sphere, particularly the Social-Economic Department. He opposed the suggestion that this department should have sub-divisions on social policy, economic policy, and science-technology policy, because these jurisdictions were interconnected. His argument was directed to prevent the Social-Economic Department from paralleling the sub-divisions of the Council of Ministers, that is, *podmena*.²¹ He also mentioned the naming of the Defence Production Department and Agrarian Policy.²² Vitalii I. Vorotnikov, the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and a full member of the Politburo, also suggested coordination among the party and economic organisations. He asked not only to reorganise the party apparat, but also to strengthen the cadre of soviet and economic organs.²³ In addition, Gorbachev said, 'It is necessary to strengthen influence. Now we suffer from operational-economic questions, and follow ministries, which pass their own memorandum to us. This distracts us from concentrating

²⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

²¹ Ibid., p. 3.

²² Ibid., pp. 3-4.

²³ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

on the cardinal political questions.²⁴ Thus, the hypothesis, which argues that the purpose of the reorganisation was to prevent *podmena*, has some basis in fact.

What, then, was the party supposed to do? A. Yakovlev mentioned such an ideological problem as the optimal concept of political vanguard, and the interrelationship between the executive and the political apparat. In addition, he argued that the party should concentrate on its political and ideological influence in order to improve the role of the local soviets.²⁵ Though Vadim Medvedev's comment was brief, he also referred to the political function of the party as vanguard.²⁶ Improving its political function in domestic affairs would be one way to be an ordinary party. Anatolii Luk'yanov demanded to precisely demarcate the function of the CC Commissions that would supervise the CC apparat, though his political position seemed more conservative than those of Yakovlev and Medvedev.²⁷ From their statements, we can understand that some Politburo members thought the party should be a 'normal' political party that engaged in political and ideological work.

Together with the reorganisations of the CC apparat, new Commissions were founded. The CC plenum on 30 September 1988 decided to establish six new Commissions.²⁸ Figure 3-1 shows the new Commissions and their chairmen who were CC secretaries. On internal party affairs, Georgii Razumovskii was to lead the Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and Cadre Policy. Nikolai Slyun'kov, a full Politburo member and a close colleague of Ryzhkov, became chairman of the Commission of Socio-Economic Policy. Yakovlev became the chairman of the Commission on International Policy. Chebrikov was to lead the Commission on Legal Policy, and was promoted from KGB chairman to CC secretary. Kryuchkov replaced him as KGB chairman. Medvedev was to be chairman of the Ideology Commission, replacing Ligachev, and, in a remarkable change, Ligachev was moved to

²⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁸ *Pravda*, 1 October 1988, p. 1.

Agrarian work. The hypothesis that attributes the reorganisation to leadership struggles is based on this fact.²⁹

The new composition of the CC apparat mostly corresponded with Gorbachev's proposals. Figure 3-1 shows the new composition. The former 20 departments were reorganised into 9 departments. The most prominent feature of the changes was a huge reduction in economic functions, while the departments on internal party affairs (Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work, General Department, Administration of Affairs) did not face a comparable reorganisation. Though some scholars argue this was a result of these organisations' resistance to reorganisation, it does not necessarily seem to be the case.³⁰ Because Gorbachev's memorandum itself made only a few references to these departments, it seems that he originally intended to reduce the economic function of the party, while keeping its internal cohesion in order to concentrate on the ideological and cadre work that were the party's original function, though the resistance to the reorganisation certainly existed. The resistance can be inferred from the fact that Gorbachev issued an instruction and a memorandum demanding that each department finalised its plans on the structure and staffing on 5 December 1988 when several months had passed since the Politburo's decision in September. In addition, a memorandum on 29 September 1988 from a CC official, K. Mogil'nichenko, suggests that anxiety for their personal fates grew among the members of the party apparat, which might lead to their resistance.³¹ Nonetheless, few changes of the apparat on internal party affairs can be recognised from lower party apparat reorganisation, which suggests the original intention to keep the internal cohesion. Let us consider it in the next section.

(b) The Reorganisation of the Lower-Level Party Apparatus

²⁹ Ligachev himself, of course, supports this argument. See Egor Ligachev, *Zagadka Gorbacheva* (Novosibirsk: Interbuk, 1992), p. 93; Yegor Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 109.

³⁰ Gordon M. Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee *Apparat* under Perestroika,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), p. 284.

³¹ *Istochnik*, 1995, No. 3, pp. 159-160.

Concerning the lower party organisations, the Politburo took a decision 'On the reorganisation of the apparat of local party organisations' on 10 September 1988, which was based on the proposal of the CC Department of Organisational-Party Work³² and Administration of Affairs. According to this, the CCs CPs of union republics, kraikoms and obkoms were to have the following departments: the Department of Organisational-Party Work, Ideological Department, Social-Economic Department, Agrarian Department, State-Law Department, General Department, and Administration of Affairs. At gorkom and raikom level, the apparat was reorganised into Organisational, Ideological, and General Departments. In addition, gorkoms in the huge industrial centres might create a Department of Social-Economic Development, and raikoms in huge agricultural raions might have an Agrarian Department.³³ It is obvious that the departments on internal party affairs (Organisational-Party Work, General, and Administration of Affairs) did not face a large reorganisation. Because this decision charged the CC Department of Organisational-Party Work and Administration of Affairs to examine this proposals from lower party organisations, later (18 October 1988) these two departments issued an information memorandum on the proposals from lower party organisations, which proposed that the reorganisation of the lower-level party apparat should correspond with the previous decisions of the 19th Party Conference, plenums, and the Politburo.³⁴ This argued that the departments on organisational-party, cadre, and ideological work should become stronger, which, it seems, testifies that the first reorganisation was intended to primarily change party-state (esp. economic) relations rather than internal party life.

The implementation of this decision was reported in some places. For example, the October plenum of the Ukrainian Party approved a resolution, 'On the formation of commissions of the CC CP of Ukraine and reorganisation of apparat of party organs of

³² At that time this department was still called the CC Department of Organisational-Party Work.

³³ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 87.

³⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 89.

republic.³⁵ The Moscow obkom case was reported in December. Before the Moscow party conference, V. Mesyats, first secretary of the Moscow obkom, was interviewed by *Pravda*, in which he said that 18 departments in its obkom would be reduced to 9. In addition, according to him, two departments, the Ideological department and Organisational-party and cadre work, would be strengthened.³⁶ Later, the report of the Moscow obkom party conference also mentioned the reorganisation.³⁷ In any case, through these cases we can confirm that these reorganisations were in accordance with the central policy that demarcated party and state and strengthened intra-party cohesion.

2. The Internal Structure of the Party Apparatus after the Reorganisation

(a) The Internal Structure of the CC CPSU Apparatus

Then, what was the internal structure of CC departments after the reorganisation? This can be now understood on the basis of internal party documents. On 29 December 1988, Razumovskii (Party Construction and Cadre Work), Boldin (General), and Kruchina (Administration of Affairs), heads of the CC departments on internal party affairs, presented to the CC CPSU (CC secretaries and Politburo members) a proposal on the structure and staffing of the departments of the CC CPSU and it was approved as a decision of the CC CPSU.³⁸ Various tables 3-2 show the details of the first reorganisation. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that each department had around 100 responsible workers, because Gorbachev stated in his memorandum of August 1988 that the total CC apparatus was 1940 (and 1275 support staff), and that a total of 20 departments existed at that time.³⁹ By comparing this assumed old staff

³⁵ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 12 October 1988, p. 1.

³⁶ *Pravda*, 5 December 1988, p. 2.

³⁷ *Pravda*, 12 December 1988, p. 3.

³⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9.

³⁹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 85. Incidentally, it does not seem useful to count the average number of support staff, because it was likely that the number of support staff differed significantly by the department, which can be inferred from the support staff's number in the first reorganisation plan.

number with the proposed one, we can know the supposed degree of the change.

First of all, it should be noticed that the three departments responsible for internal party affairs did not present their own proposals on the reorganisation, though the reason is not clear. As discussed above, it seems reasonable to think that this was part of Gorbachev's original idea.

The Ideological Department was to have six sub-departments, one consultant group and one secretariat. This department basically integrated three former department functions (Propaganda, Science and Educational Institutions, Culture). The total number of staff was 145 (141 responsible workers and 4 support staff), which was the result of a 61 per cent reduction of all workers of leading composition, instructors, and lecturers.⁴⁰

The largest reorganisation took place in the Social-Economic Department. Eight former departments were considered to be reorganised into this department.⁴¹ This was to have four sub-departments and one consultant group. Despite Ryzhkov's opposition in the Politburo meeting on 8 September 1988 (see III-1 of this chapter), this department had individual sub-departments on social policy, economic policy, and science-technology policy. The function of this new department was the preparation of general proposals, touching all fundamental aspects of social-economic policy. The number of staff was 157 (128 responsible workers and 29 support staff). According to the memorandum, the number of instructors was increased at the expense of consultants.⁴² As a result, it seems obvious that many economic functions were to be removed from the party, though some scholars argue that the CC apparatus violated the proposed division of function between the party and the state because of bureaucratic inertia.⁴³ It is certainly possible to suggest sporadic cases of violation. Nonetheless, it is also clear that this number of staff was not enough to allow it to interfere in daily economic management. To

⁴⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, p. 23.

⁴¹ Ueno, 'Gorubachofu seikenkanioketu,' p. 165.

⁴² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 23.

⁴³ Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', pp. 294-295.

conclude that the party had reduced its economic function is not unreasonable.

The Agrarian Department had eight sectors and one secretariat and total staff was 88 (85 responsible workers and 3 support staff). This number of staff was one third of that of the former CC Department of Rural Economy and Food Production. A reference to the need to avoid the duplication of a state organ (*Gosagropom*) can be found in this memorandum, which may suggest, again, that the main aim of reorganisation was party-state (esp. economic) relations.⁴⁴

The State-Law Department was a successor to the former Administrative Department. As shown in the sub-departmental composition, this department related to armed forces, KGB and so forth. Though this department reduced its number of consultants, it was not a huge reduction. It may be natural that this department did not face massive reductions in the first reorganisation, because the party did not reduce its control over security organs even in the second reorganisation. The demarcation between the party and the state concerned the economic sphere rather than security organs.

The International Department integrated three former Departments (Foreign Cadres, Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, and International). This department had eight sub-departments, one consultant group, one group of 'party technicians', and one secretariat. The total number of staff was 209 (203 responsible workers and 6 support staff), and 20 categories of posts were introduced into the department, which was about twice more than other departments.⁴⁵ Though this was the largest of the departments included in the proposal, the tendency of reduction was clear because this department was to integrate four former departments.

The former Defence Production Department was reorganised into the Defence Department with three sub-departments, one group of consultants, and one secretariat. Total

⁴⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 24.

⁴⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 9, pp.6-8, p. 24.

staff was 62 (54 responsible workers and 8 support staff) which was a reduction of 32.5 per cent compared with the former department. This small number of staff suggests that this department's supervisory power on economic sphere diminished to a large degree.

(b) The Party Apparat Hierarchy after the Reorganisation

The internal structure of the party apparat from the centre to the branches can be inferred from the posts and salary list of party workers. This list, dated 29 July 1989, was presented by Razumovskii, Boldin, and Kruchina and approved by the Politburo on 3 August 1989.⁴⁶ This was demanded because the first reorganisation significantly changed the apparat structure and the full-time party workers' salaries were so low that the party could not recruit appropriately qualified workers. Though this list does not include the posts and salary of the CC Secretary and General Secretary, it covers, it seems, all other party posts. In addition, salary reflected position within the party apparat.⁴⁷ Thus, this list is worth introducing regardless of its length.

Table 3-3-1 shows the CC CPSU job list, which was discussed in detail above. A new finding was that this made it possible to infer the structure of the Administration of Affairs, whose posts were indicated in categories independent of other departments.

Table 3-3-2 indicates posts and salary of republican party officials. Though it is not possible to consider the size and internal structure of the republican CC apparat more precisely than discussed above, it is possible to infer that the internal structure of republican CC departments was similar to that of the CC CPSU because the names of posts corresponded with each other.

Tables 3-3-3 to 3-3-5 show posts and salary from obkom level down to the PPOs.

⁴⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 13.

⁴⁷ Gorbachev states that his transfer from head of department of Stavropol' kraikom to first secretary of Stavropol' gorkom was movement to a lower job in terms of the *nomenklatura* and salary list. Thus, the *nomenklatura* list corresponded with the salary list. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p. 109; Mihairu Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo, p. 144; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 77.

These substantiate the lower-level party structure discussed above, and PPO party officials' low salary was remarkable. The privilege of party workers will be considered in an appendix.

3. Implementation of the Proposal

(a) Some Quantitative Results

To what degree was the proposal of the first reorganisation implemented?⁴⁸ A massive, but slow, reduction of the party apparat can be inferred from some fragmentary and sometimes contradictory quantitative results. Before the reorganisation Gorbachev's memorandum mentioned above identified 1940 responsible workers and 1275 support staff at that time.⁴⁹ In the Politburo meeting on 8 September 1988, Ligachev stated that they would cut about 700-800 thousand people in the whole country and 550 thousand in republic party organisations, obkoms, gorkoms, and raikoms. In addition, when he was asked how the reduction was going by Gorbachev, he answered, 'There is no difficulty at the moment, Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev], no.' He added that it was urgently proceeding and there was a special announcement that it would be completed by 1 January.⁵⁰ Compared with other information that we will see, Ligachev's figures are so huge that the basis of measurement must be different from others. In any case, it is obvious that these far-reaching reductions and time limits were too optimistic and could not be kept.

A memorandum from the CC official K. Mogil'nichenko mentioned above (September 1988) states that some 700 responsible workers, without counting 255 pension-age people, would be subject to replacement.⁵¹ The Central Auditing Commission reported that during the

⁴⁸ There are few studies on the implementation of the apparat reorganisation. Gill's most extensive study on the collapse of the CPSU states, 'There is no real discussion of how this change was carried out.' See Graeme Gill, *The Collapse of a Single Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 74.

⁴⁹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 85.

⁵⁰ *TsKhSD*, f. 89, p. 42, d. 22, p. 2.

⁵¹ *Istochnik*, 1995, No. 3, pp. 159-160.

second half of 1988 about 700 posts of responsible and support staff were cut and that about 7,000 posts were released in lower party organs due to the reorganisation.⁵² These figures of the Central Revision Commission might be exaggerated because the figures that appeared later were more moderate.

In the January 1990 issue of *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (that is, about one year after the Central Revision Commission report), two articles appeared on the apparat reduction. One article, in response to a reader's question, stated that 536 CC CPSU responsible workers had been released. Among them, 224 became pensioners and 312 went to other jobs.⁵³ Another article shows slightly different figures. According to this source, more than 700, including 600 responsible, workers went out. In addition, this article stated that the CC CPSU had 2365 workers and among them 1303 workers were responsible ones.⁵⁴ Because Gorbachev memorandum's figures were 1940 responsible workers and 1275 technical ones (that is 3215 in total), a simple calculation, which excludes new recruitment which might happen during the reorganisation, means that 637 responsible workers and 213 technical ones (in total 850) were cut. In March 1990 Kruchina stated that party organisations had 102,450 responsible and 33,420 support staff in total. In addition, there were 79 responsible workers in one obkom, kraikom, or CC CP of union republic on average and 20 responsible workers in one gorkom or raikom on average. Full-time workers in PPOs amounted to 77,000.⁵⁵ In his report to the 28th Party Congress, Kruchina stated that 8,500 workers had been released at all levels of party committees and that 680 persons had been released in the CC CPSU apparat.⁵⁶ The reduction of 680 was lower than indicated in the previous Central Revision Commission Report. Further figures were presented in the documents prepared for the 28th congress on the activity of the Secretariat.

⁵² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 4, p. 24.

⁵³ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 1, p. 113.

⁵⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 1, pp. 116-117.

⁵⁵ *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 3.

⁵⁶ *XXVIII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuz: Stenograficheskiy Otchet* Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 233.

According to it, during the period from March 1986 to 20 June 1990, 9,756 workers, including 3,097 'party' (technical?) workers, were appointed and 8,266 workers, including 3,380 'party' (technical?), workers were released at all levels of the party organisations.⁵⁷ In addition, between the 27th and 28th congresses the CC Secretariat appointed 824 workers and released 1,494 ones.⁵⁸

It is difficult to evaluate the results of the first reorganisation. Even taking into account the fact that the CC Ethnic Relations department (early 1990) and the department on Work with Social-Political Organisations (April 1990) were founded, the reduction in number of the CC CPSU was massive but moderate in view of the proposed staff numbers. In addition, the time schedule was prolonged because at the beginning Ligachev stated that it would be completed by 1 January 1988 as discussed above. It is understandable that some studies have attributed the result to apparat resistance.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the author inclines to the view that the exercise was not without success. It would have a huge impact, when an organisation that had had about 2000 workers lost some 700 persons within a few years. It seems that the reduction was huge enough to make the CC apparat malfunction especially in the realm of the economy, that is, in relation to the Council of Ministers. To emphasise the resistance too much may distract our attention from the important fact of 'loss of power' and a developing 'power vacuum', which will be discussed later.

(b) Where the released members went

The discussion above makes it clear that party workers were released to a more or less huge degree. Obviously it was not possible to make all pensioners. Where, then, did they go later? The Gorbachev memorandum proposed that the freed full-time party workers of the CC apparat should support central and other organs of administration, scientific establishments,

⁵⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, pp. 22-23. Though it is not clear what the 'party' worker means, it seems to indicate a support staff, because the numbers are close to those given in the previous interview with Kruchina in *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 3 (n. 41).

⁵⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, p. 23.

⁵⁹ For example, Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation.'

institutions of higher education, and the means of mass information.⁶⁰ Though party archival documents are fragmentary and it should be remembered that TsKhSD fond 89 selectively disclosed party documents, it seems to indicate a general tendency of transference from the party apparat to the apparat of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was natural that new officials were required for the supposed new power centre. Anatolii Luk'yanov, first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet at that time, asked the CC CPSU to confirm five persons as heads of department of the Supreme Soviet secretariat on 26 January 1989. Three of them had been CC CPSU apparat officials. In addition, he asked the CC department of Party Construction and Cadre Work to send CC CPSU workers to the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet.⁶¹ On 2 February 1989, Luk'yanov submitted a proposal to confirm an official of the CC VLKSM (Komsomol) as head of department of the Supreme Soviet secretariat.⁶² A further demand was made on 10 February, in which Luk'yanov asked the CC CPSU to transfer 19 CC CPSU workers to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. On the 15th of the same month, the transfer of 8 CC officials to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was requested by Luk'yanov.⁶³ On 21 February 1989, T. N. Menteshashvili⁶⁴ asked the CC CPSU to confirm one CC CPSU official to be an official of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.⁶⁵ Further, Luk'yanov proposed 2 officials' movement to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.⁶⁶ Though these documents certainly show that the party still had the right to check the personnel of the Supreme Soviet because non-CC officials (e.g. a Komsomol official) who were to be heads of the Supreme Soviet Secretariat, were included in these documents, they, it seems, also suggest the general tendency of staff transfers from the party to the Supreme Soviet. In addition, these transfers

⁶⁰ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 85.

⁶¹ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 18, pp. 1-2

⁶² TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 20, pp. 1-3.

⁶³ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 21, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the author could not confirm who he was. Probably, he was a high rank member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

⁶⁵ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 22, p. 1.

⁶⁶ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 21, p. 3.

were not sufficient to make the Supreme Soviet function effectively. While the party was losing control, the alternative power structure was slow to establish itself. Here we can recognise that the Soviet system enter the phase of the loss of power and that it showed the ominous signs of a power vacuum.

(c) How the new institution worked

(i) The CC departments

How these new commissions and departments worked could be understood by the documents presented to the 28th Party Congress. Let us firstly see the CC departments. Table 3-4 shows how many basic issues that were submitted by the CC departments were discussed by the CC Secretariat. Though these 'basic' issues were not all issues raised by the CC departments, this can be regarded as an indicator of activeness of the CC department. Firstly the general tendency of decline of the CC departments' activity is obvious. From a peak of 274 issues in 1987 it reduced to 54 in 1989 and 36 by 20 June.

This stagnation allows a mixed interpretation. On the one hand, it may be because the CC apparat lost some of its functions due to the reorganisation. If this is the case, the CC departments, which had been deprived of their functions, thus *could* not work rather than *did* not work. On the other hand, this may be deliberate prevarication on the part of the CC apparat, intended to suggest that the CC departments had many things to do but intentionally did not respond. Ligachev, it seems, suggests the former interpretation, stating, '[A]fter the creation of the Commissions [that is, the reorganisation of the CC apparat], the meetings of Secretariat ceased simultaneously. The party was deprived of an operating staff of its leader.'⁶⁷ Gorbachev in his memoirs supports the later argument, frequently referring to party officials' 'sabotage'.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Egor K. Ligachev, *Zagadka Gorbacheva*, p. 93; Yegor Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin*, pp. 190-110. It seems that Ligachev uses the word 'Secretariat' in a broader sense including the departments, because 'an operating staff of its leader' must include the CC departments' staff.

⁶⁸ For example, *Gorbachofu*, Jo, p. 497, 567; *Zhizn' i Reformy* Vol. 1, p. 396. *Zhizn' i Reformy* does not have a corresponding paragraph of *Gorbachofu*, p. 567. Incidentally, the word 'sabotage' (*sabotazh*) keeps probably French connotation and, therefore, has a weaker sense in

Though it is difficult to define which is the case, it seems clear that CC officials felt deprived of their traditional function and could not understand what to do in new circumstances. Therefore, they stopped working or did not work. This would be particularly the case for the most significantly reorganised department, the Social-Economic Department.

So, secondly let us see the changes of each department's activity in Table 3-4. Obviously the Social-Economic Department's activity declined, despite the rapid economic recession at that time. In addition, it is remarkable that the Ideology Department, which had been supposed to play a central role in the new environment, could not actively work. Valentin Falin, CC secretary and Politburo member, said about the International Department at a Politburo meeting on 13 September 1990, in which a second reorganisation of the CC apparatus was discussed, that after the changes of the 19th Party Conference, the International Department did not take any responsibility for the selection of cadres directed abroad.⁶⁹ It is reasonable to assume that Gorbachev's new thinking had deprived the International Department of its basic function. On the other hand, two departments, the Department of the Party Construction and Cadre Work and the State-Law Department that supervised the security organs as discussed above, show relative activism. Some arguments emphasise the strength of the Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work and, it is argued, it was able to resist the reorganisation.⁷⁰ Though cadre work was a key concern of the whole party (as Stalin once said 'Cadres decide everything'), it should be noted that the relative strength of the Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work increased as a result of the reorganisation. One report of an official of the department showed this at lower levels, stating 'It is possible to speak of a so-called 'vacuum' in the leadership of people's economy of oblasti and raions, when, in the party, the [economic] branch departments were abolished, but local soviets, particularly at raion level, do not have structural sub-divisions for managing corresponding branches. In these

Russian than in English. The appropriate translation might be 'going slow.'

⁶⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 9.

⁷⁰ See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation' and his *Russia's Revolution from Above*.

conditions, at local level, instead of actual transmission to soviets of efficient functions on the economic questions that had been decided in the branch departments of party committees, the department of organisational-party and cadre work was entrusted with them. That is, everything is examined in the party apparat just as under the notorious command system.⁷¹ Of course, the organisational department's economic work, it seems, was far from excellence. In the end, all these indicate the worst combination: the CPSU was losing its traditional administrative function; but could not become a 'political' party in a Western sense, being inclined toward a security function given the loss of power and the increasing power vacuum.

(ii) The CC Commissions

The 28th Party Congress documents also show the CC Commissions' activity. Table 3-5 gives the basic information on the Commissions. Though it is difficult to understand the activism of the Commissions, they seem inactive because four to six meetings over one and half years cannot be regarded as vigorous activity. At a Politburo meeting mentioned above (13 September 1990), most participants agreed that the Commissions should be strengthened, which suggested that the Commissions had not been working well. For example, Ivan T. Frolov, chief editor of *Pravda* and a Politburo member, said, 'If we want, as we say, to have a working and lively Central Committee, the accent should be on the work of the Commissions. It is necessary to precisely and clearly specify that the centre of all activity of the Central Committee is the Commissions.'⁷²

A more difficult problem is to recognise the relation between CC departments and the CC Commissions. Presumably, the following statement of Frolov was accurate:

'Regarding the departments, these should be the groups to secure the work of the Commissions, not the contrary relationship as we see. Members of the CC should not run to the departments, leading instructions should not come from the departments, but members

⁷¹ M. Sokolov, 'Kakim byt' partiinomu apparatu,' *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1989, No. 19 (October), pp. 23.

⁷² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 7.

of the CC should be masters. For this it is necessary to have not departments but groups under Commissions.’⁷³

This statement suggests that the Commissions, which were supposed to supervise the departments, did not work properly. Rather, the weakened departments’ instructions decided the main direction of the Commissions. Hence the same evaluation as the case of the CC departments: the new system did not function; the CPSU could not become a ‘political’ party.

4. Preliminary Summary

The process of the first party apparat reorganisation has been investigated so far. As a preliminary summary the following points can be indicated. Firstly, the first reorganisation related primarily to party-state (particularly economic organs) relations. While the social-economic department significantly reduced its supervisory power, the CC departments on internal party affairs changed their structure to a far lesser degree. In addition, this was not only the result of their resistance but, presumably, of Gorbachev’s original intention. Secondly, related to the first point, the Council of Ministers received a certain autonomy, though the Council of Ministers itself was losing control over the whole country’s economy. Thus, thirdly, while the party was reorganised, no new power centre could found itself. The party was gradually losing control over the state organs. However, the Supreme Soviet at the centre and local soviets were too weak, ineffective, and/or chaotic to supervise these organs. When hierarchal control from the party was lost, the soviets at each level frequently made contradictory decisions, that is, a local soviet’s decision often contradicted that of a higher soviet. Thus, executive organs could no longer recognise which decisions should be implemented. The contradiction of a ‘dual subordination’ became obvious.⁷⁴ The establishment

⁷³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁷⁴ Shimotomai emphasises the problem of ‘dual subordination’. See Nobuo Shimotomai, *‘Peresutoroika’ wo Koete [Beyond Perestroika]* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1991), p. 299; Nobuo Shimotomai, *Dokuritsu Kokka Kyodotai heno Michi [the Road to the CIS]* (Tokyo: Jiji

of an apparently strong Presidency in March 1990 was a response to this situation, while the party could not become a political party, so remained a kind of an administrative organ. However, a series of 'highest' administrative organs cannot coexist in one country. If it happens, it necessarily leads to immobilism. The phase of the loss of power develops into the next phase: the power vacuum. The only way to escape from this problem is to weaken other administrative organs. This was the case for the Soviet Union. The Soviet system faced immobilism, and Gorbachev went into the second reorganisation of the CC CPSU apparat intending to weaken the administrative function of the party further.

IV. Further Reform of Party-State Relations: the 28th Party Congress and After

1. A Power Vacuum as a Given Factor: Controversy over Party-State Relations at the 28th Party Congress

As discussed above, the loss of power emerged in the process of the first reorganisation of party-state relations. The phase developed into a power vacuum after the establishment of the presidency. It seems this became a structural constraint for making decisions of further reform. This section investigates how political actors recognised the 'power vacuum' from the debates at the 28th Party Congress.

In the opening speech, Gorbachev admitted the difficult situation with regard to reform of party-state relations, stating, 'The process of reform of the political system is going with difficulty. The role and function of the party, state, and soviet organs are being changed. Frankly speaking, this all is taking place abnormally.' Still he insisted that the situation would have been worse, if they had not taken such a course.⁷⁵

A further discussion on party-state relations took place at the section 'Party, Soviet,

Tsushinsha, 1992), pp. 78-80.

⁷⁵ *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, Vol. 1, p. 76.

and Social-Political Organisations and Movements (5 July 1990)'. This section was chaired by Valentin Kuptsov, head of the CC department on Work with Social and Political Organisations, and more than 500 delegates participated.⁷⁶ The two main speakers were Aleksandr Vlasov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and Candidate Member of the Politburo, and Luk'yanov. Both emphasised power vacuum in their speech. Vlasov said, 'Particularly, the questions of political reform, demarcation of functions of party and soviet power should be mentioned. ... The very concepts did not work, the work was conducted unsystematically, structures and functions of soviet organs at local levels did not work ... Absolutely this can be said of the work of executive organs. ... In a word, the party transferred its economic function to ispolkoms, but soviets proved to be unprepared to receive them.'⁷⁷ He went on to state that a similar problem existed in relations between the legislative and executive organs in the soviets, which led to 'bureaucratism' and 'additional friction.'⁷⁸ In addition, when he was asked at what level the lack of preparation to assume new function existed, he replied, 'I think at all levels, from the Council of Ministers to rural soviets.'⁷⁹ Luk'yanov's speech also referred to the same issue, stating, 'half of our misfortune in the centre and branches in the past two years came from, in the author's opinion, the fact that party committees, first of all, had stopped ruling in practice, then soviets ... could not take over the administrative function at all. That is, ... actually power vacuum is arising in real life.'⁸⁰ He also referred to the division of legislative and executive functions in the soviets. According to him, such a division was positive at oblast' and krai level. However, at raion level, 'We remember the Leninist principle not only of division but also of unity of power.'⁸¹ This statement was accepted with applause. This statement, it seems, reflected the recognition that the legislative-executive division had led to stalemate at raion

⁷⁶ Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), fond (f.) 582, opis' (o.) 6. ed. khr. 15, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 20. See also pp. 17-18.

level and to the problem of 'dual subordination'.

Other speakers in the section also referred to the failure of power transfer from the party. For example, Veniamin Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, stated that the party had stopped administering society but the soviets had not fully taken the power into their own hands.⁸² The same statement was presented by E. A. Gershkaron, head of an oil and gas investigation combine in Krasnodar.⁸³

On the other hand, some speakers advanced a different view. That is, the problem was that the party still kept power in its hands. Georgii Popov, head of department at a Donetsk medical institute, argued for the necessity of demarcating the functions of party organisations, soviets and economic organs; while the party should take political responsibility, government and economic organs should take one for their own concrete activity.⁸⁴ Viktor Dyatlov, a reader at Irkutsk state university, said, 'the main task today ---- this is destatification [*razgosudarstvlenie*] of the party. ... Reject the *nomenklatura* system, the right to control the activity of the administration, and an evaluation by the party.'⁸⁵ Anatolii Sobchak, chairman of Leningrad city soviet and a famous radical reformer, stated that it was, first of all, the party that was guilty; the party interfered in the task of state organs and substituted itself still for state power.⁸⁶ Such a view was reflected in the final report of the section meeting on 7 July. Kuptsov mentioned that the party should abandon the command method in relations with the Soviets.⁸⁷

The two arguments mentioned above were different in their evaluation of the chaotic situation. The former one assumed that the failure of power transfer was the reason. The latter, on the other hand, ascribed responsibility to the party's power holding. It seems to the author that the latter argument, which was presented mainly by soviet deputy and/or intellectual people

⁸² Ibid., p. 28.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 35.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 70.

⁸⁷ *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, Vol. 1, p. 583.

(e.g. university teachers), failed to take into account the fact that party officials, for their part, felt they could not control the situation. The Vlasov and Luk'yanov statements clearly reflected such a feeling. A 'power vacuum' certainly existed at least in the leadership's cognition and constrained the decisions of the leadership.

2. The Politburo

As is well known, the Politburo had been the highest organ of decision making of the Soviet Union until the establishment of the state presidency.⁸⁸ The members of the Politburo included not only top party officials but also the top state officials, e.g. the chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of KGB and so forth. The reorganisation of the Politburo at the 28th Party Congress led to reform of party-state relations.

The March CC plenum (1990) approved a draft of the new party Rules, which included a radical change in the highest party decision making organs. The draft projected the abolition of the Politburo and the creation of a Presidium. Its members were to be confirmed by the congress of the CPSU; the chairman (not general secretary) of the CPSU, his deputies and leaders of republican parties were to join the Presidium *ex officio*. The Presidium, in its own name, was to direct the decisions to the party organisations for their implementation; was to bring the decisions on the most important political questions for the confirmation of the CC plenum; and was to report annually on its activity to the CC plenum.⁸⁹ Thus, the *ex officio* Presidium members were supposed to be party officials rather than the whole country's top elite.

However, the new draft Rules that appeared on 28 June 1990 significantly modified this proposition. This draft stated only that the chairman of the CPSU was to lead the working Presidium, and there was no other statement on Presidium membership, that is, the proposal on

⁸⁸ The standard reference on the Politburo is John Löwenhardt, James R. Ozinga, and Erik van Ree, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo* (London: UCL Press, 1992), to which the author owes a lot in this section.

⁸⁹ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), p. 203 (Article 31).

the republican party leaders' membership was eliminated.⁹⁰ In addition, while the chairman of the CPSU, who was to be elected by the party congress, was retained, the CC plenum was to elect the first secretary.⁹¹ Their relation was not clear, which required further revision at the party congress.

The party Rules that were finally approved at the 28th Party Congress were in the event on somewhat traditional lines. Firstly, the General Secretary remained and the post of chairman of the CPSU disappeared, though the post of General Secretary was to be elected by the party congress rather than the CC plenum. At the congress Gorbachev was elected the new General Secretary and was freed from the control of the CC plenum. Secondly, the proposed Presidium was eliminated and the Politburo, to which members were to be elected by the CC plenum, was revived. On these points, Gorbachev stated in the congress that it was because a majority of Communists did not support the new institution and post.⁹² Nonetheless, the General Secretary, his deputy and first secretaries of the republican parties entered the membership of the Politburo.⁹³ As a consequence, the new composition of the Politburo became as in Table 3-6. While only Gorbachev had a state post (USSR President) and other prominent political figures joined the Presidential Council, the Politburo became an assembly of republican party leaders. Thus, in the highest organ, the party was basically deprived of most state ties.

Still, one problem remains. Why did Gorbachev not leave his party post? Rather many people criticised that he occupied both presidential and party posts. On the one hand, some argued that Gorbachev should resign the party post and concentrate on the presidential job. On the other hand, there were some suggestions that he should resign from President and concentrate on the party job. It does not appear very unreasonable to think that he had a chance to leave the party and make the presidency stronger because major political figures had left the

⁹⁰ *Pravda*, 28 June 1990, p. 2 (Article 29).

⁹¹ *Pravda*, 28 June 1990, p. 2 (Article 30).

⁹² *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. 1, p. 100.

⁹³ *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 2 (Article 28).

Politburo and moved to the Presidential Council after the 28th Party Congress. However, it seems to the author this choice was too risky for him given the 'power vacuum'. The party was still a kind of administrative organ. The new presidential system had not been working well up to the party congress and there was no guarantee that a presidential system would work properly. If Gorbachev had concentrated on only his state post, the chaotic situation might have become worse. Thus, it is better to understand not that Gorbachev 'did' not leave the party, but that he 'could' not.⁹⁴

3. The CC Apparatus

(a) The Controversy over Apparatus Reorganisation up to the 28th Party Congress

Compared with the first reorganisation, the second reorganisation of the CC apparatus has attracted little attention from researchers.⁹⁵ In fact, only fragmentary information is available. The turning point toward the second reorganisation was, of course, the 28th Party Congress.

The controversy over the party Programme and new party Rules touched the problem of the CC commissions and party apparatus. Let me consider the process of the approval of the 'Programmatic Declaration' and new party Rules on this point. The February CC plenum approved a 'Platform of the CC CPSU toward the 28th Party Congress' named 'Toward Humane Democratic Socialism.' This included a statement on the party apparatus, to the effect that: 'The party apparatus is necessary. It will make perfect its structure, improve its competence, and eradicate its bureaucratic appearance. It is necessary to create conditions that attract well-prepared, educated and competent party members to its work. The apparatus must be

⁹⁴ This does not deny that Gorbachev had rather strong identity as a party official. Certainly his love of the party would influence his decision.

⁹⁵ A few exceptions are the followings. Cameron Ross, 'Party-State Relations,' Alexander Rahr, 'The CPSU after the Twenty-eighth Party Congress,' *RL/Report on the USSR*, 2-45 (November 9, 1990); Gordon M. Hahn, *Gorbachev versus the CPSU CC Apparatus: The Bureaucratic Politics of Reforming the Party Apparatus, 1988-1991* (PhD Dissertation, Boston University, 1995).

optimised in its number and strictly subordinated to elected organs.⁹⁶ The March 1990 draft of the new party Rules also stated about the apparat, 'Leading elected organs of the party create a subordinate working apparat, which realises basically analytic, prognosis and sociological and consulting service of their activity. The party apparat is formed by electoral organs on the basis of the recommendation of primary party organisations, and the recommendation is discussed at their meetings. Labour law is applied to workers of the party apparat.'⁹⁷ As to the Commissions, 'In the CC CPSU the permanent Commissions are created on the basis of direction of its activity. They are formed in the plenum of the CC CPSU from the members of the CC and also other communists who are confirmed as advisers. The Commissions are headed by CC secretaries who are elected by the CC plenum, and [the Commissions] have right to take decisions within their own competence. Communists working in the CC CPSU and its Commissions on a permanent basis receive a salary from party funds;' 'The CC Secretariat is formed from the leaders of the Commissions. It ... directs the work of the CC apparat.'⁹⁸

Leading up to the 28th Party Congress, the party apparat became one of the main arenas of controversy. For example, the head of the Ideological department of Sasovskii gorkom in Ryazan oblast' proposed the abolition of the distinction between the Organisational and Ideological departments, and the creation of a department of party organisers which would carry out organisational, ideological, political, educational, and economic activity at intermediate level. He also argued for the improvement of cadre work in the party.⁹⁹ There was a proposal to allow PPOs to decide how to form raikom, gorkom and obkom apparats, and it was also proposed to liquidate departments at raikoms.¹⁰⁰ This idea of department liquidation at raion

⁹⁶ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), p. 381.

⁹⁷ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g.*, p. 196 (Article 14).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204 (Article 31).

⁹⁹ V. Sal'nyi, 'Kakoi Byt' Struktura Apparata,' *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1990, No. 3 (February), pp. 34-36.

¹⁰⁰ N. Medvedev, 'Osilila Kabinetnaya Sueta', *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1990, No. 3 (February), pp.

level was repeated by another party worker. He argued for abolishing the departments and creating two 'commands' (organisational and ideological).¹⁰¹ There was also some defence of the function of the apparat. For instance, V. Ryabov, a party official in the CC department, presented a defence of the party apparat, arguing in a *Pravda* article that it was necessary not to eradicate the apparat, but to change its mode of work.¹⁰²

Probably the results in the party congress reflected such a harsh controversy. The 'Programmatic Declaration' approved by the congress did not include any statement on the party apparat.¹⁰³ On the other hand, the June draft of the party Rules and the approved party Rules did not change its article on the party apparat. This may not be surprising because the apparat itself was necessary for any organisation. In any case, the second reorganisation took place on the basis of the new party Rules.

(b) Continuing Controversy after the Party Congress

Some arguments on the second reorganisation were advanced after the 28th congress. At the Secretariat meeting on 28 July Gorbachev stated that the renewal of cadres was necessary in all sections and urged that new, trustworthy and fresh-thinking people should be brought into party work. Then he said, 'All this relates to the CC apparat.'¹⁰⁴ The Secretariat meeting on 7 August thought it necessary to substantially reduce the CC apparat, and to considerably renew it. For this aim, it was decided to carry out the attestation of all CC apparat workers, and to widely disseminate the principle and practice of its formation.¹⁰⁵

The concrete plan of reorganisation of the CC apparat was discussed at the Politburo meeting of 13 September 1990. Oleg Shenin, CC secretary for Organisational Matters, presented a preliminary plan. He stated that there were 1,493 persons in the 'KPK' (Party

66-68.

¹⁰¹ A. Aliev, 'Nuzhny li Otdely?' *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1990, No. 5 (March), p. 38.

¹⁰² *Pravda*, 3 April 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰³ See *Pravda*, 15 July 1990, p. 1, 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Pravda*, 29 July 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *Pravda*, 9 August, p. 2.

Control Committee)¹⁰⁶ and CC at that time and proposed to reduce this to 603 persons (or by 40.4 percent),¹⁰⁷ which was the same figures that had been reported by Aleksandr Dzasokhov, CC secretary for Ideology, before this Politburo meeting.¹⁰⁸ Still, the content of this massive reduction reveals a kind of a façade character. Of the 603 workers, 275 were to go to the CC CP RSFSR. Thus, the real reduction was just 328 workers.¹⁰⁹ The new CC departments were planned to be the following. An Organisational Department was proposed to concentrate wholly on work with party organisations including party organisations in the armed forces, border and interior troops. Here we can understand that the party did not lose its tie with the security organs. On the other hand, work on social organisations, soviets, international relations, and science was proposed to go to other departments. The Ideology Department was, Shenin said, to have two functions: theoretical and ideological. In addition, the Ideology Department was expected to strengthen the Press Centre.¹¹⁰ The Department on 'Work' with Social and Political Organisations had been created before the 28th Party Congress (on 9 April) by the Politburo decision with 28 members including V. I. Mironenko, former first secretary of the CC Komsomol, as first deputy head.¹¹¹ This department was renamed as the Department on 'Relations' with Social-Political Organisations and was to expand its activity. A Department on Legislative Initiatives and Legal Questions was to be formed and the State and Law Department was to be liquidated; the Ethnic Relations Department, which had been established at the beginning of 1990, was to be kept. On the basis of the Social and Economic Department, a

¹⁰⁶ Shenin mistakenly said 'KPK,' because the Central Control Commission, which integrated the functions of KPK and Central Auditing Commission, established itself at the 28th Party Congress.

¹⁰⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990-9, p. 4. In this article he reported the activity of the Secretariat after the 28th party congress. This shows that his statement was made before the confirmation of the Politburo.

¹⁰⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 2.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹¹ This information was stated by Luk'yanov at the 28th Party Congress. RGASPI, f. 582, o. 6. ed. khr. 15, p. 48. The Politburo confirmed its creation on 29 March 1990, and entrusted the Secretariat to submit the proposal on its structure and so forth within two weeks. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 91, p. 1. Thus, its establishment on 9 April perfectly fitted the time-schedule.

Social and Economic 'Policy' Department was to be formed, which was planned to include the work of the Defence department, which was to be liquidated. The Agrarian department was to be reorganised into a Department on Work with Peasants. The International department was to engage in relations with foreign parties and organisations rather than a general foreign policy. The General department and Administration of Affairs were to be kept.¹¹² As represented in the name of Social-economic 'Policy' or 'Work with Peasants,' this reorganisation was, it seems, intended to make the CPSU a political party rather than an administrative organ.

Shenin made proposals also on the CC Commissions, though less detailed ones. He proposed to have two types of Commission: permanent ones and the commissions that were to be formed in accordance with the 28th Party Congress resolutions. This proposal meant that there were more Commissions than CC secretaries.

The responses from Politburo members and other participants to this proposal were very confusing as compared with the discussion of the first reorganisation in which every member had argued more or less from the whole party and country point of view. Not many participants presented their own ideas on the apparat reorganisation, and others complained of the current situation or argued their own interest. For example, Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the CP RSFSR, asked for a larger apparat for his own party.¹¹³ V. Falin, the head of the International Department, complained that staffing levels were too low to work effectively.¹¹⁴ O. Baklanov argued for the necessity to have a Defence Department.¹¹⁵ S. Gurenko, first secretary of the CP Ukraine, supported protecting the apparat.¹¹⁶ A. Mutalibov, first secretary of the CP Azerbaijan, harshly complained of his situation such that he was called a neo-stalinist, which made Gorbachev very angry.¹¹⁷ Some other participants presented new proposals. For example,

¹¹² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, pp. 2-3.

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 5-7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-11.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Frolov mentioned relations between the Commissions and the departments as discussed above. V. Kuptsov put forward some ideas in connection with social organisations.¹¹⁸ N. Nazarbaev, first secretary of the CP Kazakhstan, proposed the renewal of the mode of apparat work and to keep the Agrarian departments.¹¹⁹ G. Semenova, CC secretary for Women Affairs, argued for creating a sub-division for women's affairs.¹²⁰ Overall, there were too many new proposals and demands for Gorbachev to summarise at once. Then they entrusted the Secretariat to work out this problem taking into account the exchange of opinions.¹²¹ The result was reported at the October CC plenum.

(c) Composition of the New Commissions and Departments

The outline of the second reorganisation was reported by Shenin to the October CC plenum.¹²² In the end, thirteen departments and eleven Commissions were established. Figure 3-2 shows the composition of the new departments. The departments were rather significantly changed from the previous proposal to the Politburo meeting. The Ideology Department was to engage in questions of propaganda, mass information and other ideological matters. The Humanitarian Department was to make contact with creative and scientific intellectuals, work out theoretical questions of social development, and prepare party cadres. The Press Centre was retained. Presumably the three departments mentioned above had been under the jurisdiction of the former Ideology Department. The Department on Relations with Social and Political Organisations was to concentrate on social and political relations including workers and youth movements. The Department on Legislative Initiatives and Law Questions replaced the former State and Law Department. The Ethnic Policy Department, which also had been created from the State and Law Department, was renamed as the Ethnic 'Relations' Department. The

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 26.

¹²² *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 8-9 oktyabrya 1990 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 41-47.

Department of Social and Economic 'Policy' was created on the basis of the former Social and Economic Department. The Centre of Information Processing replaced the Defence Department. The Agrarian Department was renamed as the Agrarian 'Policy' Department and was to engage in relations with peasant movements. The International Department was kept but its function was clarified as ties with foreign parties and organisations. The General Department and Administration of Affairs were also kept and the Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work was replaced by the Organisational Department, which was to concentrate on supervision of party organisations including those in the armed forces, border and interior troops, and on renewal of party life. This department was to coordinate the ties of the CC apparatus with lower-level party organisations and organise all-party events. The Organisational Department was to play the central role after this reorganisation.

Compared with the proposal to the Politburo meeting, some differences can be indicated. Firstly, the Agrarian Policy Department, which had been supposed to become the Department on Work with Peasants, survived. This was noticeable because Gorbachev insisted on the name 'Work with Peasants' at the Politburo meeting of 13 September and the agrarian sphere had been under his jurisdiction during the Brezhnev period. If Gorbachev could not implement his intention even in the agrarian sphere, it may suggest he was losing his overall leadership of the CPSU. Secondly, the Defence Department was not liquidated but renamed the Centre of Information Processing. Thirdly, the creation of the Humanitarian Department was not included in the proposal to the Politburo. Overall, the number of the departments was increased.

New Commissions were also reported and approved at the October CC plenum. Figure 3-2 shows the new Commissions. Eleven Commissions in total were formed and there were two different kinds of Commissions as suggested by Shenin's proposal to the Politburo. The first was permanent Commissions created in accordance with paragraph 29 of the party Rules: Ideology, Social and Political, Social and Economic, on Agrarian Policy, on Questions of Women and Family, on Ethnic Policy, on Problems of International Policy, and on Renewal of

the Activities of Primary Party Organisations. The second group was created by the resolutions adopted at the 28th Party Congress: on Science, Education and Culture, on Questions of Youth Policy, on Military Policy. This group of Commissions were to be chaired by Politburo members or CC secretaries.¹²³ Furthermore, a new Commission on Questions of Financial and Economic Activity of the Party was created at the December CC plenum.¹²⁴

The relationship between the departments and the commissions is not clear. While some departments clearly had relations with certain commissions, some commissions had communications with several departments. At the Politburo meeting mentioned above (13 September) Shenin stated, 'For four commissions, which will be, by virtue of their own character, connected with a series of CC departments, a small coordinating apparatus will be created.'¹²⁵ Though it is not clear which were these 'four commissions', it is possible to infer that they were the commissions on Questions of Women and Family Issues, on Military Policy, on Questions of Youth Policy, and on Science, Education and Culture. Still, that the last one (Commission on Science...) supervised the Humanitarian department was made public.¹²⁶ Perhaps, this department had relations with both Ideological commission and the one on Science, Education, and Culture. Thus, it seems that the relations between the departments and the commissions were as in Figure 3-2. To investigate how the decisions on the CC apparatus were implemented and how these new institutions worked is the next task.

(d) Implementation of the Decisions

(i) Some Quantitative Results

As mentioned above (3-(b)), the scale of the CC apparatus was to be significantly reduced. The 40 per cent reduction was referred to by some Secretariat members. Dzasokhov's

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42 (Shenin's report), p. 201 (decision).

¹²⁴ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 10-11 dekabrya 1990 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 5.

¹²⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 29, p. 3.

¹²⁶ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 11, p. 29.

report has already been mentioned.¹²⁷ Just before the October CC plenum (1990) Shenin stated that the CC apparat would be reduced but that the quality of workers and effectiveness of work would be improved.¹²⁸

These published reports, however, did not show the concrete content of the reduction. A document on the wages of party workers, which was prepared by the CC Administration of Affairs on 15 October and circulated to the Secretariat and CCC, shows the contents. Firstly, the mentioned target of 40 per cent reduction denoted only 'responsible workers'. That is, the CC apparat was to reduce its 1493 responsible workers to 890 (in total 603 persons or 40.4 per cent). Then, support staff were to be reduced by 30-35 percent. Secondly, as also mentioned, this reduction had a façade element, because many of the released workers (275 responsible and 150 support staff) went to the CC of CP RSFSR. Thus, the 'real' proposed reduction was 328 responsible workers (21.9 percent).¹²⁹ There was no comprehensive information on how further this reduction was implemented, though it is very likely, inferred from the first reorganisation, that the process was not smooth at all. Still, some fragmentary information on where the released workers went is available, which, it seems, suggests the difficulty in its implementation. Let us consider it further in the next section.

(ii) Where the released members went and Staffing in the CC apparat

It would be natural to assume that the released party workers went to the new presidency after its establishment in March 1990. One surprising fact is, however, that their transfers to the presidential apparat were very slow. Just before the 28th Party Congress (on 28 June 1990) Luk'yanov asked to transfer one CC official in the Ideological Department to the 'Supreme Soviet Secretariat'.¹³⁰ Even after the congress, this tendency continued. On 24 or 25 July a transfer of one CC official to the Supreme Soviet Secretariat was requested by

¹²⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, p. 4.

¹²⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 10, p. 6.

¹²⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 42, p. 1.

¹³⁰ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 30, d. 29, p. 2? Because this delo's numbering was messy, it is impossible to denote the precise page.

Luk'yanov.¹³¹ On 25 July Luk'yanov asked to employ one released CC official as a head of department in the Supreme Soviet Secretariat, though this proposal was not supported by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.¹³² A further transfer of one CC official to the Supreme Soviet Secretariat was requested by Luk'yanov on 2 or 3 October.¹³³ On 17 or 18 October he asked to transfer one CC official again.¹³⁴ On 5 November he made an additional request.¹³⁵ Taking into account that the Presidency was founded in March, these transfers to the Supreme Soviet apparat are a striking fact. In fact, the Presidency did not have its own apparat until December 1990, just before the further extension of presidential power was approved.¹³⁶ According to Valerii Boldin, head of the CC General Department, the leadership had the idea to create the presidential apparat even before the establishment of the presidency, but creating the presidential apparat was complicated by its relationship with the state ministries.¹³⁷ In any case, this was, without doubt, an important reason for the poor implementation of presidential decrees and the 'power vacuum'.

As far as the evidence of fond 89 archive shows, transfers to the presidential apparat took place after December 1990. On 7 December, A. Pavlov, head of the CC 'State and Law Department' (which means this department that the October CC plenum had decided to liquidate still existed at the time), wrote 'in connection with the reorganisation of the CC apparat, it is proposed to release comrade V. N. Putilin from his current posts of deputy head of sector of this

¹³¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 30, d. 41, p. 3? This delo's numbering is also messy. This document gives its date as both 24 and 25 July.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 1-2?

¹³³ Ibid., p. 4? This also states both dates.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 5? This also states both dates.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 6?

¹³⁶ At the Politburo meeting of 16 November 1990, Nursultan Nazarbaev, first secretary of Kazakh party and president of Kazakhstan union republic, strongly recommended Gorbachev to create the presidential apparat. According to Nazarbaev, he established it immediately after he became Kazakh president. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 30, p. 21. See also Stephen White, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 74.

¹³⁷ Valerii I. Boldin, *Krushenie P'edestala: Shtrikhi k Portretu M. S. Gorbacheva* (Moskva: Respublika, 1995), pp. 367-372; Valery Boldin, *Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff* (New York: Basic Book, 1994), p. 249-253.

department.' Then, he added four other officials to be released. They were to work in the Presidential apparat.¹³⁸ The CC Secretariat approved these releases on 13 December.¹³⁹ On 9 January 1991, three officials in the General Department were released and went to the Presidential apparat.¹⁴⁰ Nikolai Kruchina, Administrator of Affairs, made a proposal to transfer one official in his department to a Department on Questions of Defence and State Security under the Presidential apparat on 24 May 1991 and the Secretariat approved the proposal on 30 May.¹⁴¹ An additional thirty CC officials in the 'Defence Department' were transferred to the corresponding department of the Presidential apparat. The Secretariat approved it on 30 May, stating, 'in connection with the reorganisation of the CC apparat'.¹⁴² This means that the Defence Department that was supposed to be abolished in October 1990 still existed until May 1991.

Some officials went to the state ministries, which were supposed to be directly subordinated to the presidency after December 1990. For example, it was approved by the Secretariat on 3 April that one official in the CC department on Legislative and Legal Questions was transferred to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.¹⁴³ On 30 May 1991, the Secretariat approved the transfer of two CC officials in the General Department to the Cabinet of Ministers.¹⁴⁴

Besides the retirement of pensioners,¹⁴⁵ a different type of transfer also took place. On 26 December 1990, the Secretariat approved the release of A. I. Vol'skii, who would play an important role as a representative of 'Civic Union' in the privatisation period under Yeltsin, from 'head of the CC department' because he had been elected president of a

¹³⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 16, p. 2.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 19, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 52, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 54, d. 55, d. 56. See also, f. 89, p. 23, d. 12, p. 6.

¹⁴³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 44, pp. 1-2. This official was named by the Cabinet of Ministers on 16 March 1991, then the department on legislative and legal questions made the proposal later (one day in March, invisible because of bad printing).

¹⁴⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 53, pp. 1-4.

¹⁴⁵ Retirement, of course, took place. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 20, pp. 1-2. Three officials of the General Department retired and were approved by Secretariat on 9 January 1991.

Scientific-Industrial Union.¹⁴⁶ Incidentally, this decision has a strange aspect. According to his official biography in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, Vol'skii was supposed to be the chairman of Committee of special administration of Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast', though he had been head of the Machine Building Department before that.¹⁴⁷ Still, the Machine Building Department was abolished in the first CC apparat reorganisation and there is no evidence that he returned to the CC department. This may be a simple mistake. In any case, such a transfer to newly established economic unions or associations as in Vol'skii's case happened during the apparat reorganisation. On 24 June 1991 the Secretariat approved the transfer of one CC official of the Social and Economic Policy Department to an 'Inter-branch state-cooperative association.'¹⁴⁸

New staffing of the CC apparat has an ominous sign. For example, on 4 December 1990, the Secretariat agreed to employ three persons in the CC Organisational Department, two of whom were to remain as cadres in the USSR armed forces.¹⁴⁹ In addition, on 21 January 1991, that two persons working in the Administration of Affairs should remain each as cadres in the armed forces and as acting reserve of the KGB was approved by the Secretariat.¹⁵⁰

In the end, all these show important points. Firstly the second reorganisation of the party apparat, as the first, prolonged as the fact that 'State and Law Department' and 'Defence Department' that were supposed to be liquidated at the October CC plenum (1990) existed in December 1990 (the State and Law Department) and May 1991 (the Defence Department) indicates. Secondly the preparation of the Presidential apparat was very slow. According to Boldin, it had fewer than 400 staff including support staff by August 1991. Compared with some 1600 managerial and support staff in the Cabinet of Ministers, its relative power was obviously

¹⁴⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 33, d. 10, pp. 1-2. The proposal to approve the release was made by the department of 'Party Construction and Cadre Work' (not the Organisational department) on 6 November 1990. Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 10, p. 44. Vol'skii was a member of the CC CPSU.

¹⁴⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 23, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 14, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 26, pp. 1-2.

smaller, though both were supposed to be directly subordinate to the President.¹⁵¹ In addition, there is no evidence that the Cabinet of Ministers could work well. Here we can see the 'power vacuum' again. Thus, thirdly, the party apparat certainly weakened and lost most of its power of control over the state organs, but tightened its ties with security organs. This may be a natural response given a 'power vacuum'. We can confirm this point from different points of view.

(iii) How the New Institution worked

There is only fragmentary information on the Commissions' and CC departments' activity after the second reorganisation. Table 3-7 shows the number of meetings of the CC Commissions. Firstly, compared with Table 3-5, which shows the activity of the Commissions before the 28th Party Congress, it seems that the Commissions became slightly more active. Secondly, nonetheless, the level of activism differed by Commission. As well as the late established Commission on Questions of Financial and Economic Activity of the Party, the Ideological and Social and Economic Commissions were inactive. On the other hand, the Social and Political, on Agrarian Policy, on Military Policy, and on Renewal of the Activity of Primary Party Organisations were more vigorous. Particularly the last two Commissions' activeness is, it seems, suggestive because Military Policy, by its very name, denotes a connection with the armed forces and the Shenin-led Commission on Renewal of the Activity of PPOs supervised the party organisations including those in the armed forces. This tendency can be confirmed by the departments' activity.

It is, nonetheless, not possible so far to research the entire activity of the CC departments. Let me indicate basic tendencies by collecting the fragmentary information that is available. From April 1991 *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* monthly published articles on the activity of the CC departments. Though this series of articles was interrupted by the attempted coup and, therefore, covered only five departments, they can provide some basic information on the work of the CC departments.

¹⁵¹ Boldin, *Krushenie P'edestala*, p. 372; Boldin, *Ten Years*, p. 253.

The Social and Economic Policy Department had 62 full-time workers (it is not clear if they were only responsible workers or including support staff) and five sectors (Social Policy, Economic Policy, Scientific and Technological Policy, Economy of Defence Complex, on the Connection with Soviet and Social and Economic Organisations). This department's activity was directed to research on the economic situation and preparation for the transition to a market economy.¹⁵² This department's downgrading seems obvious. Compared with the first reorganisation plan (Table 3-2-2), in which its predecessor was planned to have 128 responsible workers and 29 support staff, staffing was reduced by more than half.

The number of staff of the Ethnic Policy Department was not shown. It had three sectors (an Analysis sector, a Propaganda and Information sector, and a sector on Discussion of the permanent CC Commission on Ethnic Policy of the CPSU). This department prepared decisions and information for the plenums, conferences and congresses of the party.¹⁵³ The level of activism of this department cannot be defined. Nonetheless, taking into account the violent situation around ethnic problems at that time, it seems that it could claim its importance.

The Humanitarian Department had 35 responsible workers. Its structure was not clear, though, presumably, it had two sub-divisions (for working out (i) complex problems of the development of science, and (ii) theoretical problems of social development, political analysis and forecasting) and sectors.¹⁵⁴ It seems that this department's activity, by its nature, duplicated one of the Ideological Department. For example, though it was reported that the Humanitarian Department participated in the preparation of the draft of new party Programme, a document of this kind clearly concerned both departments. How cooperative these two departments were cannot be recognised. Still, one can imagine that this duplication sometimes could caused a conflict, because, on the one hand, the Commission on Science, Education and Culture that supervised the Humanitarian department was chaired by Frolov, a Politburo member but not CC

¹⁵² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 4, pp. 78-79.

¹⁵³ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 5, pp. 66-67.

¹⁵⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 6, pp. 90-91.

secretary, and the Politburo became less active after the 28th Party Congress, while, on the other hand, the Ideological Commission was chaired by Dzasokhov, a CC secretary and Politburo member, and the Secretariat became more active after the party congress.

The International Department consisted of 100 responsible workers, though, it was reported, it had about 500 workers in the past. Its structure was composed of groups. Some groups were created on geographical basis (e.g. Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Socialist Countries in Asia and so forth). In addition, there were a group of consultants and a group engaging in studies of huge questions and long-term tendencies of the development of world politics.¹⁵⁵ It is not likely that this department had a significant influence on Gorbachev's foreign policy.

The key of all departments was the Organisational Department, which conducted an organisational and coordinating role within the party: from training and education of cadres, structural unification of the party, to plan making and implementation by party organs. This department had six regional sectors. Furthermore, it had the following sectors: an Armed Forces sector; a border, internal, and railway troops sector; a sector of party organisations in the Soviet foreign establishment; a service commission of the CC CPSU; a consultants' sector; a sector of [party] Rules' questions; a organisational questions sector; an unitary party ticket sector; and a sector of recording and analysis of cadres.¹⁵⁶ Here we can recognise that the party never lost its ties with security organs. In addition, this department had a significant role in composing a new *nomenklatura* list.

Finally, though the work of the Administration of Affairs will fully be analysed in Chapter 5, one important Secretariat decision on 30 July should briefly be mentioned here. By this decision, the Secretariat approved that the Administration of Affairs became an 'independent subdivision' of the CC apparat; it became a 'judicial person' in order to utilise

¹⁵⁵ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, pp. 57-59.

¹⁵⁶ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 8, pp. 85-86.

CPSU property; its activity was to be financed by the party but also from its own productive-financial activities.¹⁵⁷ This decision suggests that the CPSU as an organisation was converting its function into an economic organisation comparable with the Komsomol.

Further activities of the CC departments can be understood by the Secretariat decision 'On the plan of measures for realisation of decisions of July (1991) plenum of the CC CPSU' on 30 July 1991. This plan included preparing the draft of new party Programme, accepting and organising proposals on the party Rules, summoning the extraordinary 29th Party Congress, adopting measures on the election of USSR people's deputies, on the party budget, and so forth. The CC departments were assigned to such tasks and inter-department working groups were organised, but there was no task regarding the state organs. Thus, the party certainly lost its control over the state.¹⁵⁸

Overall, these activities of the CC Commissions and departments show the following tendencies. Firstly, the party lost most of ties with the state except for the security organs. Party control over the state by departmental supervision was over. Secondly, nonetheless, the party faced considerable difficulties in changing its function to 'political party' as shown by the inactivity of the Ideological Commissions and an assumed friction between the Ideological and Humanitarian departments (see also Chapter 4). Then, thirdly, the party began to change its function to an economic organisation to defend itself (see Chapter 5). Finally, given a 'power vacuum', the party had no other reliable force than its ties with security organs (see Chapter 6). These points can also be confirmed by the last *nomenklatura* list. Let us consider it in the next section.

4. The *Nomenklatura* System around the 28th Party Congress and After

(a) Controversy and Decisions

¹⁵⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 64, pp. 1-13.

¹⁵⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 62, pp. 1-17.

The *nomenklatura* system had been a target of harsh controversy. Though it was not always clear what was meant by '*nomenklatura*', it was frequently used to denote party control over the state organs. The February 1990 CC plenum's 'Platform of the CC CPSU toward the 28th Party Congress,' however, did not have any reference to the *nomenklatura*.¹⁵⁹ The Democratic Platform argued for the abolition of the *nomenklatura* system. In the end, the 'Programmatic Declaration' accepted by the 28th Party Congress included a statute indicating 'In the cadre work, the party rejects formalism and a nomenklaturist approach.'¹⁶⁰

Presumably, based on this 'Programmatic Declaration,' the Secretariat meeting on 7 August 1990 planned to fully and finally reject the nomenklaturist stereotype in the near future.¹⁶¹ Later at the end of August, the Secretariat acknowledged it expedient to abolish *nomenklatura* in its existing form. Thus, the CC CPSU was to confirm only party cadres.¹⁶² Shenin commented in the October 1990 issue of *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* that its number of cadre posts examined by the CC CPSU was to be reduced from about 15 thousand to 2 thousand, which identified what was mentioned as party workers and so forth.¹⁶³ Therefore state posts were to be excluded from the *nomenklatura* list.

Still, the implementation of abolition was prolonged. In July 1991 Shenin reported that the party demolished the *nomenklatura* mechanism.¹⁶⁴ Though he did not indicate when they abolished the *nomenklatura* system, the last *nomenklatura* list shows that its implementation was prolonged. The list was presented by the Organisational department on 6 August 1991. It states, 'In accordance with a request (20 September 1990), the proposals on the list of posts ... is submitted...'¹⁶⁵ This prolongation may reflect the resistance of the party apparat or the confusion, ineffectiveness and malfunction in the party apparat. In any case, the problem here is

¹⁵⁹ See, *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g.*, pp. 353-382.

¹⁶⁰ *Pravda*, 15 July 1990, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ *Pravda*, 9 August 1990, p. 2.

¹⁶² *Pravda*, 30 August 1990, p. 2.

¹⁶³ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 10, p. 6.

¹⁶⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, p. 4.

¹⁶⁵ *TsKhSD*, f. 89, p. 20, d. 77, p. 3. Emphasis added.

the content of the *nomenklatura* list.

(b) The *Nomenklatura* List

This list included 7735 posts in total and divided these posts into six groups. The first group consisted of 945 party posts of the CC CPSU, CC CP RSFSR, CCC CPSU, and CCC CP RSFSR. The second group was made up of 1882 posts, including first and second secretaries of union republican parties, secretaries of the RSFSR party, first secretaries of [autonomous] republic party committee,¹⁶⁶ obkoms, kraikoms and some huge cities' (e.g. Moscow) gorkoms. Responsible workers in the CC apparat and some party publishing, academic institutions' leading posts and others were also included. These were party posts. In addition, the second group also included secretaries of all-army party committees, KGB, internal troops of MVD, and railway troops. Though, certainly, they were also 'party' posts and probably the appointments to these posts were to be confirmed *ex post facto*, such armed forces posts were crucial for the party leadership, because this meant that they were as important to the party leadership as first and second secretaries of union republican party organisations or first secretaries of republican parties, kraikoms and obkoms. In total, the CC Secretariat was to confirm 2447 posts. The second group also included posts that were to be confirmed not by the CC secretariat but by the sector of recoding and analysis of cadres in the Organisational department. These were 380 party posts.¹⁶⁷

From the third to fifth group were the posts for which 'the confirmation in the CC CPSU will not be carried out.' It was just for information collecting. The third group consisted of 429 party posts at slightly lower levels including secretaries of union republic parties (excluding first and second secretaries); secretaries of party committees in USSR ministries and branches; foreign Soviet establishments; chairmen of control commissions of union republican parties, republican parties, kraikoms, oblasti and some large cities' party organisations; deputy

¹⁶⁶ At that time, autonomous republics were called just 'republics.'

¹⁶⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 77, pp. 3-4, p. 7. The affixed post list of the first and second group is incomplete.

secretaries of party committees in the army, KGB, internal troops of MVD, and railway troops; secretaries of the party committees of all forms of armed forces, military okrugs, fleets, troops groups and armies and flotillas.¹⁶⁸

The fourth group included 977 non-party posts. For example, vice-president, prime minister, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, ministers, chairmen of state committees; chairmen and their deputies of general confederation of USSR trade union; secretaries of CC Komsomol; leaders of USSR Academy of Science, state bank; chiefs and their deputies of General staff and Main military-political administration in USSR armed forces; commanders-in-chief of armed forces; commanders of troops of military okrugs, groups of troops and fleets, armies, and flotillas, internal troops of MVD and so forth.¹⁶⁹ It is noticeable that many military posts were excluded from the confirmation. Because the armed forces were to be directly subordinated to the President, the party, it seems, had to surrender them.

The fifth group consisted of 341 posts including presidents of union republics, leaders of Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers in union republics and republics; chairmen of krais, oblasti, and some large cities' soviets and their ispolkoms.¹⁷⁰

The sixth group was for 'collection of brief directory-biographical information.' That is, they were not subjects of confirmation. This consisted of 3161 posts of responsible workers of CC of union republican parties, kraikoms, obkoms, also army, state and social organisations, the economy, science, means of mass information, and spheres of public education, culture and foreign apparat.¹⁷¹

From the last *nomenklatura* list, we can confirm that the party lost control over state organs. Nonetheless, it was crucial to the party to retain its control over the party organisations in the armed forces.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 4, pp. 8-22.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 4-5, pp. 23-40.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 5, pp. 41-57.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 5, pp. 58-103.

5. Primary Party Organisations

As far as party-state relations concerned, the controversy over PPOs developed around the organisational principle.¹⁷² Previously PPOs were formed in a workplace (the so-called production principle). However, if the party had to strive for seats in the legislature, that is, if it should be a 'political party,' the principle needed to be changed to a territorial one to struggle in electoral districts, because people's workplace was often different from their electoral district. In addition, this had an implication for party-state relations. State officials' workplace was, of course, state ministries or other state organs. If the party had dropped the principle entirely, the logical consequence would have been that PPOs in state organs were bound to disappear.

The CC platform approved by the CC plenum (February 1990) supported the territorial-productive principle, that is, to keep party organisations in workplaces.¹⁷³ The draft party Rules approved by the March CC plenum also stated that PPOs were created in both working and residential places.¹⁷⁴ Another draft of the party Rules published just before the 28th Party Congress did not change this point.¹⁷⁵

At the congress, Gorbachev took this problem in his opening address. He said, 'Territorial or productive principle. To the question, to be or not to be, the party organisations in production, the answer is self-evident--- to be. ... It is argued that the maintenance of the production principle in the construction of the CPSU should simultaneously strengthen the party organisations' work in residential areas.'¹⁷⁶ This issue was also discussed in the section meeting on 'Renewal of the Party' of the party congress.¹⁷⁷ G. P. Kaz'min, first secretary of Khakass

¹⁷² The debates on PPOs were not limited to this matter. For example, to delegate the financial right to PPOs was one of them, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹⁷³ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g.*, p. 379.

¹⁷⁴ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g.*, p. 197 (article 18).

¹⁷⁵ *Pravda*, 28 June 1990, p.1 (article 16).

¹⁷⁶ *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. 1, p. 97.

¹⁷⁷ On the fullest introduction of the discussion of this section, see Stephen White, 'The Failure

obkom, supported the territorial-productive principle, that is, to keep the production unit.¹⁷⁸ A. S. Podol'skii, a deputy head at the higher military-political school, emphasised the territorial principle, though he did not deny the productive principle.¹⁷⁹ Yu. K. Nepochanov, chief worker of an electric-vacuum factory in Nobosibirsk, proposed to allow the PPO to decide the organisational form by itself.¹⁸⁰ D. M. Sergeev, deputy secretary of the party committee of Ural political institute 'S. M. Kirov,' supported strengthening the territorial principle.¹⁸¹ I. I. Mel'nikov, secretary of the party committee of Moscow State University at that time and later a CC secretary, summarised the arguments as the majority supported territorial-productive principle, but it was necessary to strengthen work in residential areas.¹⁸²

Eventually, the party congress approved the Programmatic Declaration and new party Rules that kept both territorial and productive principles, while emphasising the territorial one.¹⁸³ Thus, in a structural sense, it did not become necessary to dissolve PPOs in the state organs (and the military).¹⁸⁴

Nonetheless, the party faced a strong pressure later. Because, as we have seen, the party lost most of its relations with state organs, it had no power to resist it. So, the party organisations in the state organs began to dissolve themselves.

V. The Disorganisation of Party Organs in the State

The displacement of the party organisations from social, economic, political,

of CPSU Democratization', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 75-4 (October 1997).

¹⁷⁸ RGASPI, f. 582, o. 6. ed. khr. 16, p. 14.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 83. See also his report on the section meeting at the general meeting of the congress on 7 July. *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. 1, p. 566.

¹⁸³ *Pravda*, 15 June 1990, p. 3 (Programmatic Declaration); *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 1 (article 16).

¹⁸⁴ This issue was also related to the party organisations in the military. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.

organisations or 'departyisation' began in universities.¹⁸⁵ To investigate this is beyond the task of this chapter. The 'departyisation' of the state organs was shown in a memorandum written by N. S. Stolyarov, chairman of the CCC CP RSFSR, 'on the attempt of departyisation of administrative organs of RSFSR' (6 May 1991) to Ivashko. This memorandum is worth citing regardless of its length:

'1. Recently in ministries and branches in RSFSR, the policy to departyisation of the administrative apparat and the factual displacement of party organisations beyond a limit is actively carried out. In many cases this is assisted by an uncertain or ambivalent position of top leaders. However, the main course is in systematic pressure on party organisations on the part of the corresponding republican power structure, which is energetically exploiting this departyisation for the achievement of its political aim and full neutralisation of the CPSU. ...

2. Taking into account the situation forming around the party organisations in a series of republican ministries and branches, it is considered expedient (a) to carry out an exchange of opinions on this problem in the CC CPSU with the participation of secretaries of party committees, first secretaries of raikoms of Moscow city and Moscow gorkom, and leaders of the CC Organisational department, the CC CP RSFSR, and the CCC CP RSFSR; (b) to foresee reserve variants of organisational formation of party organisations of republic administrative apparat, taking into account the new reality.'¹⁸⁶

As suggested by the memorandum, the Organisational department made a further report on this problem dated 30 May and Ivashko agreed it on 7 June. It showed a rather serious

¹⁸⁵ See, for example, TsKhSD f. 89, p. 20, d. 51; p. 8, d. 65.

¹⁸⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 91, p. 5.

situation. In the Office of Public Prosecutor of RSFSR, the formation of the apparat was carried out without the participation of communists, and displacement of party committees from the workplace was realised. Minister of Health Care, V. I. Kalinin, displaced the party bureau and the deputy minister called for departyisation of the ministry. In the RSFSR Ministry of Communication, Information, and Space, the party committee was also liquidated. The party organisation in RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was split from the party organisation of the RSFSR Council of Ministers in October 1990, but up to that time it did not register itself under the CP RSFSR. During 1991 (up to May 1991) 305 party members in ministries and state committees and branches left the CPSU and only 33 joined. The report made clear the continuing difficulties. For example, it mentioned the lack of a party Programme, the ideological foundations of its activity, full-time party workers' uncertain feeling about the future, and social defencelessness because of the party apparat reduction. The combination of elected posts with economic [or managerial] work, constant structural change, cadres' 'starving' among secretaries of workshop party organisations, according to this report, all negatively influenced the party's activity. [In Moscow] uncertainty was expressed in connection with the weakening of the influence of central party organs, gorkom and raikoms on the activity of party committees and party bureaux.¹⁸⁷ As shown in these memoranda, the party organisations were disintegrating themselves well before the attempted coup.

A further attack on the party was made by Russian President Yeltsin. A Presidential decree 'On suspending the activity of organisational structures of political parties and mass social movements in state organs and establishments of RSFSR' (20 July 1991) was to prohibit the party organisations in state organs within the territory of Russia.¹⁸⁸ This would certainly accelerate the party disintegration. The party complained of its illegality. Party newspapers published a series of articles arguing that the decree was not legal. The USSR Supreme Soviet

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

¹⁸⁸ *Izvestiya*, 22 July 1990, p. 1.

led by Luk'yanov asked the USSR Committee for Constitutional Compliance to examine the legality of the decree.¹⁸⁹ Still there was nothing more than that. No huge protest demonstration for the party, and no severe battles in the party organs of state bodies took place. The party's control over the state had finished *de facto* before Yeltsin's decree.

VI. Conclusion

The fact that the party lost most of its ties with the state under Gorbachev's reform is not news at all. The aspect that has been little discussed by many researchers is that the implementation of reform of party-state relations led to a 'power vacuum'. It seems that the party's rather strong supremacy over the state is clear here, because if the state had been more independent of the party than usually thought, the 'power vacuum' would not have been created. Therefore, the hypothesis of anti-reform coalition (see section II) is not supported by the circumstantial evidence reviewed in this chapter. In addition, though the hypothesis of the leadership struggle has some evidence in the first reorganisation, this cannot explain the second reorganisation at all. Thus, it seems that two hypotheses, to prevent *podmena* or substitution and to streamline the party's function for improving centre-regional relationship and its 'political' activity, are accurate. In the Soviet Union, the party (and its apparat) was the core of power or power itself.


Under such a political regime, attempts to transform the party were extremely difficult. The new Presidency that was for filling up the 'power vacuum' did not work well. Given such a situation, Gorbachev failed to change the party's function to a 'political party'. It could not surrender its ties with security organs, at least partially because to do so was too risky in a 'power vacuum'. While, on the one hand, the party lost its traditional administrative functions, it

¹⁸⁹ For details see Elizabeth Teague and Julia Wishnevsky, 'El'tsin Bans Organized Political Activity in State Sector', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, 3-33 (August 16, 1991).

failed to find new functions. In the end, the party lost its *raison d'être*.


In this chapter we mainly considered the process whereby the party lost the traditional administrative functions. The failure to transform the party into a 'political party' will be considered more deeply in relations with party elections in the next chapter. What, then, remained with the party? They were huge property asset and ties with the security organs. We need to investigate them further in Chapter 5 and 6.

Figure 3-1: The Organisation of the CC CPSU in 1989



Source: This Figure is applied from Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenpokyosantono Henka [Changes of the CPSU under Gorbachev]', *Hogakukenyu*, 63-2 (February 1990), p. 165 with some modifications. See also on the new Commissions, *Pravda*, 1 October 1988, p. 1; on the new Departments, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, p. 86.

Figure 3-2: The Organisation of the CC CPSU in October 1990-1991



(Three commissions surrounded by dot-lines are not permanent commissions, but decided to establish in the 28th party congress)

*Heads of departments are uncertain. **Falin chaired since 1 February meeting.

Including Inference

Including inference

Table 3-1: The Prospective Number of the CC Departments' Staff¹

Department	Responsible Workers	Support Staff	Total
Ideological Department	141	4	145
Social-economic Department	128	29	157
Agrarian Department	85	3	88
State-Law Department	65	13	78
International Department	203	6	209
Defence Department	54	8	62
Total	676	63	739

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 3-20.

¹ The design of the table is suggested by Gordon Hahn's study. See Gordon Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee *Apparat* under Perestroika', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), p. 285. However, the way to count the staff number is different from him. See Table 2 on the reasons of difference.

Table 3-2: The First Reorganisation of the CC Apparatus in 1989¹

Table 3-2-1. The CC Ideological Department

Head of department: S. Kapto

First deputy head: A. Ya. Degtyarev

Structure

1. Sub-department of basic scientific research: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
5 sectors²
2. Sub-department of party propaganda: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
2 groups and 2 sectors
3. Sub-department of means of mass information: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
4 sectors
4. Sub-department of foreign political information and international connection: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
4 sectors
5. Sub-department of problems of youth teaching and education: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
3 sectors
6. Sub-department of culture and art: Head of sub-department –deputy head of department
4 sectors
7. Group of consultants: Leader of consultants
8. Secretariat

Staffs=145 (141 responsible workers, 4 support staff³)

Responsible Workers

Head of department 1
 First deputy head of department 1
 Deputy heads of department –heads of sub-departments 6
 Leader of consultant group 1
 Heads of sectors 22
 Deputy heads of sectors 4
 Leaders of responsible organisers group 1
 Leaders of lecturer group 1
 Consultants 10
 Responsible organisers 6
 Instructors 78
 Lecturers 10

Support Staff

Head of secretariat 1
 Helper of head of department 1
 Deputy heads of secretariat 2

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 3-5; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), p. 16, on Head and First deputy Head.

¹ Regarding this first reorganisation of the CC apparatus, the first detailed analysis, which utilises party archive, is advanced by Gordon Hahn. See Gordon Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation of the CPSU: Central Committee Apparatus under Perestroika', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997). However, many technical mistakes are found, which are indicated in the later notes. One general point is suggested here. Though Hahn does not count 'helper of head of department' as support staff, it seems appropriate that this is included in the category of support staff, because 'helper' belonged to Secretariat in most CC Departments except for the Defence department.

² Hahn does not mention 'Sector of party scientific and educational institution'. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 292.

³ Hahn miscalculates support staff as '2'. However, they should be 4 (one head of secretariat, two deputy heads of secretariat and one helper of head of department). See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 285.

Table 3-2-2. The CC Social and Economic Department

Head of department: V. I. Shimko

First deputy head: V. P. Moznin, N. A. Stashenkov

Structure

1. Sub-department of Social Policy
4 sectors
Staff=33
2. Sub-department of Economic Policy
5 sectors
Staff=38
3. Sub-department of Foreign Economy
2 sectors
Staff=15
4. Sub-department of Science-Technology Policy
4 sectors
Staff=30
5. Consultant Group
Staff=11

Staffs=157 (128 responsible workers, 29 support staff¹)

Responsible workers

Head of department 1
First deputy heads /head of sub-department 2
Deputy heads of department /head of sub-department 2
Deputy head of department /leader of consultant group 1
Deputy heads of subdepartment 4
Heads of sectors 15
Consultants 40
Instructors 63

Support Staff

Head of secretariat 1
Deputy head of secretariat 1
Helper of head of department 1
Support staff 26

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 6-8; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), p. 28, on Head and First deputy Head.

¹ Hahn fails to count 'helper of head of department' which is included in support staff here. See Hahn 'The First Reorganisation', p. 285, p. 288.

Table 3-2-3. The CC Agrarian Department

Head of Department: I. I. Skiba

First Deputy Head: Yu. I. Mordovintsev

Structure

8 sectors

1 secretariat

Staffs=88 (85 responsible workers, 3 support staff)

Responsible workers

Head of department 1

First deputy head 1

Deputy heads 4

Heads of sectors 8

Deputies 8

Consultants 13

Instructors 50

Support Staff

Head of secretariat 1

Deputy 1

Helper of head of department 1

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 9-11; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), p. 8, on Head and First deputy Head.

Table 3-2-4. The CC State and Law Department

Head of Department: A. S. Pavlov

First deputy head: I. A. Larin, V. E. Sidrov

Structure

1. Sub-department on control for decisions taken on the country's armed forces
2 sectors
2. Sub-department of legal problems
2 sectors
3. Sub-department of inter-ethnic relation
2 sectors
4. Sector on problems of state security
5. Group of consultants on problems of perfection of legislation
6. Helper of head of department
7. Secretariat

Staffs=78 (65 responsible workers, 13 support staff)

Responsible workers

Head of department 1
First deputy heads of department /head of sub-department 2
Deputy head of department /head of sub-department 1
Leader of group of consultants 1
Deputy heads of sub-department 3
Heads of sectors 7
Deputy heads of sectors 7
Consultants 12
Instructors 31

Support Staff

Helper of head of department 1
Head of secretariat 1
Workers of secretariat 11

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 12-13; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), p. 28, on Head and First deputy Head.

Table 3-2-5. The CC International Department

Head of department: V. M. Falin

First deputy head K. N. Brutents, R. P. Fedrov

Structure

1. Consultant group
26 members
2. Sub-department (*Napravlenie*) of New Political Thinking in International Relations
3 groups and 18 members
3. Sub-department of Fundamental Problem of World Economic Relations
2 groups and 11 members
4. Sub-department of International Party and Social Organisations and Movements
4 groups and 1 sector, and 25 members¹
5. Sub-department of Socialist country of Europe and Connections with Communist and Workers' Parties of These Countries
19 members
6. Sub-department of Socialist countries of Asia and Cuba and Connections with Communist and Workers' Parties of These Countries
21 members
7. Sub-department of Connections with Parties and Other Social Forces of Developing Capitalist Countries
21 members
8. Sub-department of Connections with Parties and Other Social Forces of Developing Countries
30 members
9. Sub-Department (*Podtdel*) on Work with Foreign Cadres and Party Organisations Abroad
24 members
10. Group of "Party technician (*Parttekhnik*)"
5 members
11. Secretariat
6 members

Staffs=209 (203 responsible workers and 6 support staff)²**Responsible workers**

- Head of department 1
- First deputy heads of department 2
- Deputy head of department 7
- Leader of consultant group 1
- Head of sub-department 1
- Deputy head of sub-department 1
- Deputy leaders of consultant group 2
- Leaders of group 23
- Heads of sector 3
- Deputy leaders of group 23
- Deputy heads of sector 3
- Instructors 15
- Senior consultants 5
- Consultants 24
- Senior readers 87
- "Parttekhnik" 5

Support Staff

- Head of secretariat 1
- Deputy heads of secretariat 3
- Helper of head of department 1
- Leader of code-group (*Rukovoditel' shifrogruppy*) 1

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, *Perechen' 4*, Delo 9, pp. 14-17; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), pp. 17-18, on Head and First deputy Head.

¹ Hahn miscalculates as 24 members. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 293.

² Hahn miscalculates as 200 responsible workers because he fails to include two first deputy heads and miscalculates 1 member mentioned in the above note. See Hahn, 'The First Reorganisation', p. 293.

Table 3-2-6. The CC Defence Department

Head of Department: O. S. Belyakov

First Deputy Head: N. M. Luzhin

Structure

1. Sub-department of All-embracing problem
2. Sub-department of Special System
3. Sub-department of Information
4. Sectors of Economic analysis
5. Group of Consultants for Negotiation on Arms Reduction
6. Secretariat

Staffs=62 (54 responsible workers, 8 support staff)

Responsible workers

Head of department 1
Helper of head of department 1
First Deputy Head of department /Head of sub-department 1
Deputy heads of Department /Heads of sub-departments 2
Leader of Groups of Consultants 1
Deputy heads of sub-department 3
Head sector 1
Head of secretariat 1
Consultants 13
Instructors 30

Support Staff

Instructors on accounting 2
Helpers of head of secretariat 2
Secretary of head of department 1
Secretaries of deputy head of department 2
Messenger 1

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 4, Delo 9, pp. 18-20; David Wells and John Miller, 'A Directory of Heads and Deputy Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments 1952-1991', *Lorton Paper* 8 (1993), p. 12, on Head and First deputy Head.

Table 3-3 Posts and Salary of the Party Apparatus

Table 3-3-1. Central Committee of the CPSU level

Name of the posts	Salary (rouble)*
Administrator of affairs	1000
Head of departments	1000
First deputy head (in the department led by CC secretaries)	825
First deputy head of Administration of affairs, deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee (PCC)	775-800
Deputy head of departments, deputy administrator of affairs, members of the PCC	750-775
Helper (<i>Pomoshchnik</i>) of CC general secretary	875
Helper of CC secretary	750-800
Reader (<i>referent</i>) of CC general secretary	650-700
Reader of secretary of CC secretary	600-650
Head of sub-department (<i>podotdel</i>), leader of consultant group	700-775
Heads of departments of Administration of Affairs	650-725
Deputy Head of sub-department	625-715
Head of book-keeper (<i>bukhgalter</i>) of Administration of Affairs	650-700
Head of sector, leader of group on direction, lectures' and responsible organisers	625-700
Deputy head of departments of Administrations of Affairs, deputy leader of group of consultants	600-690
Senior consultant	575-670
Consultant, responsible organiser	550-650
Helper of deputy chairman of the PCC, deputy of leader of lecturers' group, helper of heads of departments, deputy head of book-keeper	600-650?
Head of "secretariat"	600-700?
Deputy head of sector, deputy leader of group on direction, responsible inspector (<i>kontroler</i>), leader of code-group (<i>shifrogrupp</i>) of international department	575-6??
Deputy head of 'secretariat'	550-6??
Head of sector of production department of party publisher of Administration of Affairs	560-6??
Instructor, lecturer, senior reader, head of sector of managing department	475-6??
'Secretary' of CC general secretary	500-???
'Secretary' of CC Secretary	500-???
Head of archival preservation (<i>arkhivokhranilishche</i>)	350-???
Reader (General department, department of party construction of cadre work)	315-???
Head of typing sector (<i>mashbyuro</i>)	315-???
Senior 'secretary' of General department	250-???

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 22-23. *The salaries from 'helper of deputy chairman of the PCC' are not complete in the source, which is indicated as '?' in this table.

Table 3-3-2. Central Committee of Republican Party Organisation level

Name of the Posts	Salary (roubles)		
	CC PC of Ukraine	CCs CPs of Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan	CCs CPs of other union republics
First secretary	1100	950	900
Second secretary	950	850	800
Secretary	870	770	730
Helper of first secretary	570-620	520-570	480-530
Helper of secretary	500-550	450-500	430-480
Instructor	570-620	520-570	480-530
Head of department, Administration of Affairs, chairman of commission of party control	650-700	600-650	550-600
First deputy head of department	600-650	550-600	510-560
Head of sector, leader of lecturers' group, member of commission of party control, head of book-keeper	500-550	450-550	430-480
Responsible organiser	480-530	430-480	400-450
Consultant of department, deputy head of book-keeper	430-480	400-450	400-450
Instructor, lecturer	400-450	380-430	350-400

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, p. 21.

Table 3-3-3: Obkom level

Name of the post	Salary (roubles)					
	Moscow gorkom, Leningrad obkom	Moscow obkom, Leningrad gorkom	Out of group	I group	II group	III group
First secretary	950	900	850	800	750	700
Second secretary	850	800	750	700	650	630
Secretary	770	730	700	650	600	580
Helper of first secretary	500-550	480-530				
Helper of secretary	430-480	430-480	480-530	450-500	430-480	420-470
Inspector	500-550	480-530	480-530	450-500	430-480	420-470
Head of department, administrator of affairs, and chairman of commission of party control	580-630	550-600	550-600	530-580	500-550	480-530
First deputy head of department	530-580	510-560	510-560	490-540	470-520	450-500
Deputy head of department	500-550	480-530	480-530	450-500	430-480	420-470
Head of sector. Leader of lecturers' group, member of the commission of party control, (head of book-keeper)	430-480	430-480	430-480	400-450	380-430	370-420
Responsible organiser, consultant of department, (deputy head of book-keeper)	400-450	400-450	380-430	380-430	350-400	350-400
Instructor, lecturer	350-400	350-400	350-400	350-400	330-380	330-380

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 19-20.

Table 3-3-4: Raikom, gorkom level*

Name of the post	Salary (roubles)
First secretary	500-550
Second secretary	450-500
Secretary	420-460
Head of department, chairman of party commission	360-400
Deputy head of department	330-360
Deputy head of department---head of sector (office of political education), head of office work sector	330-360
Instructor, lecturer, consultant	280-330

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, p. 14. *From this to lower level, the structure of the party apparat significantly varied by regions (e.g. by the size of city, industrial or rural area, and so forth). Therefore, this table shows the simplest one of a rural raikom.

Table 3-3-5: Primary Party Organisation level*

Name of the post	Salary (roubles)
Secretary of party committee (party buro) of productive (scientific-productive) association, enterprise (industrial complex, management)	85% of basic salary of main director (chief, manager)
Deputy secretary of party committee (party buro)	85% of basic salary of secretary
Secretary of party committee (party buro) of shop party organisation	85% of basic salary of chief of the shop
Deputy secretary of party committee (party buro) of shop party organisation	85% of basic salary of secretary
Other full time workers of PPOs	
In party committees with rights of raikom	
Chairman of party commission –up to 75% of office salary of secretary of party committee, but not more than	280-300
Head of office of political education –up to 70% of office salary of secretary of party committee, but not more than	250-270
Head of sector of party account, instructor –up to 65% of office salary of secretary of party committee, but not more than	240-260
In party committees (party buro) of party organisations not having the rights of raikom of the party	
Head of office political education –up to 70% of office salary of secretary of party committee (party buro), but not more than	230-250
Instructor of party committee –up to 65% of office salary of secretary of party committee, but not more than	210-230

Source: TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 9, Delo 13, pp. 9-10. *At the PPO level, the structure is varied significantly by the type of organisation (e.g. in an enterprise, railways, a rural place, a scientific establishment and so forth). This table shows the example of the PPO apparatus of enterprises (association), construction and planning organisations of industry, building, transport, connection and other production branches of people's economy.

Table 3-4: Examination, by the CC Secretariat, of the Basic Issues Submitted by the CC Departments

The CC Departments	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990 (20 June)	Total
Party Construction and Cadre Work	24	56	10	12	12	114
Ideology	20	73	17	9	7	126
Social and Economic	26	60	12	10	2	110
Agrarian	18	23	5	1	-	47
International	3	36	4	4	4	51
State and Law	7	18	5	13	5	48
Defence	2	4	2	1	1	10
Ethnic Relation	-	-	-	-	2	2
General	6	1	3	2	2	14
Administration of Affairs	2	3	-	2	1	8
Total	108	274	58	54	36	530

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, p. 23.

Table 3-5: Some Data of the CC Commissions (January 1989-June 1990)

Name of the CC Commission	Number of people of the Commission	Number of meetings	Examined questions
On questions of the party construction and cadre policy	24	4	11
Ideology	25	5	8
On questions of social and economic policy	21	5	9
On question of agrarian policy	23	6	17
On questions of international policy	23	4	14
On questions of lawful policy	20	4	10

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, p. 24.

Table 3-6: the Members of the Politburo in July 1990

Name	Position
M. Gorbachev	General Secretary of the CPSU, USSR President
V. Ivashko	Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU
M. Burokyavichus	First Secretary of CP Lithuania
A. Dzasokhov	CC Secretary for Ideology
I. Frolov	Chief Editor of <i>Pravda</i>
G. Gumbaridze	First Secretary of CP Georgia
S. Gurenko	First Secretary of CP Ukraine
I. Karimov	First Secretary of CP Uzbekistan
P. Luchinskii	First Secretary of CP Moldova
A. Masaliev	First Secretary of CP Kirgizia
K. Makhkamov	First Secretary of CP Tajikistan
V. Movsisyan	First Secretary of CP Armenia
A. Mutalibov	First Secretary of CP Azerbaijan
N. Nazarbaev	First Secretary of Kazakhstan
S. Niyazov	First Secretary of Turkmenistan
I. Polozkov	First Secretary of CP RSFSR
Yu. Prokof'ev	First Secretary of Moscow gorkom
A. Rubiks	First Secretary of CP Litvia
G. Semenova	CC Secretary for Women Affairs
O. Shenin	CC Secretary for Organisational Matter
E. Silliari	First Secretary of CP Estonia
E. Sokolov	First Secretary of CP Belorussia
E. Stroeve	CC Secretary for Agriculture
G. Yanaev	CC Secretary for International Affairs

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, pp. 7-50.

Table 3-7: Activity of the CC Commissions October 90-June 91

The CC Commissions	Number of Meetings
Ideological	2 (14 Nov 90/ 12 Apr 91)
Social and Political	4 (25 Oct 90/ 30 Jan/ 19 Apr/ 30 May 91)
on Ethnic Policy	3 (21 Nov 90/ 1 Feb/ 23 Apr 91)
Social and Economic	2 (4 Dec 90/ 17 May 91)
on Agrarian Policy	4 (8 Dec 90/ 27 Mar/ 16 May/ 5 June 91)
on Problems of International Policy	3 (26 Nov 90/ 1 Feb/ 26 Apr 91)
on Renewal of the Activity of Primary Party Organisations	4 (26 Oct/ 8 Dec 90/ 25 Mar/ 21 June 91)
on Questions of Women and Family Issues	3 (10 Oct 90/ 30 Jan/ 23 Apr 91)
on Science, Education and Culture	3 (26 Oct 90/ 9 Feb/ 20 May 91)
on Military Policy	4 (29-30 Oct/ 8 Dec 90/ 1 Feb/ 26 Apr 91)
on Questions of Youth Policy	3 (14 Nov 90/ 2 Feb/ 23 Apr 91)
on Questions of Financial and Economic Activity of the Party	2 (17 Jan/ 8 Apr 91)

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990 No. 11, pp. 9-10; 1990, No. 12, p. 8; 1991, No. 1, pp. 9-10; 1991, No. 2, pp. 11-12; 1991, No. 4, p. 7; 1991, No. 5, pp. 10-11; 1991, No. 6, pp. 11-12; 1991, No. 7, p. 10; 1991, No. 8, p. 9.

Chapter 4 Failure of Making a ‘Political Party’: Party Elections and Party Unity

I. Introduction

As we have seen in Chapter 2, the hidden power diversity was widening before *perestroika*. In order to manage this problem, Gorbachev tried to streamline the party's functions, and the party lost its traditional administrative functions, as we have seen in Chapter 3. The subject of this chapter is to investigate how the party leadership succeeded or failed to find a new function of the party, that is, to make the communist party a ‘political party’.

One of the most crucial attempts for making a ‘political party’ was to ‘democratise’ the party. A ‘monolithic unity’ has been regarded as a prominent feature of the communist party. It is well known that the party maintained its unity by various methods. Particularly its personnel or *nomenklatura* system has been considered the central mechanism. Still, these methods did not necessarily fit its theoretically democratic principles. What happened if there were attempts to change this practice so as to fit the principle of intra-party democracy? Let us consider four issues related to this: competitive elections of party secretaries, the election of delegates to the 19th Party Conference in 1988, and to the 28th Party Congress in 1990, the emergence of platforms, and controversy around the 28th Party Congress and after. The problem here is the extent to which the controlling mechanisms disintegrated.

II. Mechanisms to Maintain Party Unity

Before discussing party reform, briefly considering the main methods for controlling the party hierarchy is appropriate. These were the *nomenklatura* system, the ban on factions,

and democratic centralism.

1. Intra-Party *Nomenklatura*

The intra-party *nomenklatura* system meant that higher party organs had personnel appointing rights to lower organs. For example, the all-union Central Committee approved a personnel list of republican and regional first secretaries, a republican central committee control its regional secretaries, and so forth.

What then was the problem of the system? Most organisations in the world have such an appointing system. In a private company in the capitalist world, personnel appointing is usually decided from above. The self-management of a factory is hardly successful in any modern society. Nonetheless, this practice of the party did not fit its principle. In theory, personnel appointing was supposed to be decided by election from below. Elections had actually taken place in the party for many years before *perestroika*. However, only one candidate for one post was fixed before the election from above by *nomenklatura* lists. Therefore, the elections had not been competitive and electorates unanimously approved the nominated candidates. To investigate what happened when these elections became competitive is the research subject of this chapter.

2. Ban on Fractions

The second mechanism for sustaining party unity was a ban of fractionalism.¹ Since the 10th Party Congress in 1921, the party had prohibited fractional activity. Though there is no agreement on this measure's interpretation (that is, some argue it was intended as a temporary measure, while others consider that it was to be a permanent feature), it seems sufficient here to confirm that the ban on fractions worked for controlling the party hierarchy. The reason why

¹ The author uses the word 'fraction' rather than 'faction' as a translation of '*fraktsiya*' along with Sartori's terminology. See Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 72-75.

this could be a useful measure is self-evident. Party members could not, at least publicly, organise their opinions independent of the leader, because fractions were prohibited. This does not mean there was no division within the party through party history. Stalin's power struggle, the struggle after Stalin's death, a change from collective leadership to individual rule under Brezhnev and so forth all suggest cleavages within the leadership. In addition, divisions between the centre and regional organisations frequently caused a serious problem as discussed in Chapter 2. However, the point is that even opponents within the leadership or lower organisations could not organise themselves. The appearance of monolithic unity was accordingly maintained.

3. Democratic Centralism

The other mechanism for controlling the party hierarchy was democratic centralism. Usually this has been regarded as a way of decision making, by which party members can discuss freely before the approval of a decision, while, after the approval, the member must implement the decision unconditionally. Obviously, this concept was ambiguous. On the one hand, it was used for creating the democratic façade of the party. On the other hand, it was regarded to mean that lower party organisations had to obey decisions from above. Though this ambiguity became a problem during the *perestroika* period, we confirm for a moment that this principle was one of mechanisms for controlling the party hierarchy. Because before the *perestroika* period, decisions had been made without a truly free discussion, had come only from above, and their implementation had been compulsory.

III. Reasons for the Competitive Election of Party Secretaries

As easily understood, the *nomenklatura* system within the party would not be necessary if party secretaries were elected by competitive and secret elections from below. Thus,

party unity would possibly be destroyed.

Why was competitive party election necessary at all? If the power of General Secretary depended on his control over personnel by the *nomenklatura* system, it would have been irrational for him to destroy its own power base. Some reasons should be indicated. The first reason concerns centre-regional relations. Gill and Pitty argue that the introduction of multi-candidate secret ballot elections was intended to combat 'localism', that is, local cliques who had prevented the smooth implementation of central policies.² They use Mann's concept of weak infrastructural power to describe this situation.³ This concept, infrastructural power, denotes the power to implement policy. While the party-state was strong enough to make decisions independently of social organisations (strong despotic power), the Soviet Union was a weak state in terms of infrastructural power, that is, it could not implement decisions.⁴ As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the party's most serious problems was that its activity expanded so much that the central organisation could not take account regional and local situations. It appeared to the centre that lower organisations distorted sound central policies by forming regional and local cliques. Therefore, party elections were, it seems, aimed at destroying these cliques from below.

² Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, *Power in the Party: The Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 131-133. They use the word 'local' as a general term to denote the lower levels. Thus, their usage is different from the way the author used in Chapter 2, in which the 'local' level denoted raion and city level.

³ Michel Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanism and Results', in John Hall ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

⁴ Gill and Pitty, *Power in the Party*. See also Don Von Atta, 'The USSR as A "Weak State": Agrarian Origins of Resistance to Perestroika', *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989). These concepts, dictatorial power and infrastructural power, are similar to Skocpol's state 'autonomy' and 'capacity'. See Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueshemeyer and Theda Skocpol eds., *Bringing the State Back in* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). McFaul uses Skocpol's concepts to analyse post-Soviet Russia. See Michael McFaul, 'State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia', *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995). Since Skocpol's terminology seems more neutral, her ones might be better for objective analytic purposes.

Secondly, related with the first reason, Gorbachev may have intended to destroy established career patterns by competitive party elections. As discussed in Chapter 2, career patterns in the party under Brezhnev showed the rise of *khozyaistvenniki*. When Gorbachev tried to prevent the party from intervening in economic management and to improve the party's political activity like propaganda, un-ideological or pragmatic, *khozyaistvenniki* were not appropriate. It may have been assumed that competitive elections would improve the party's political activity through their campaign. For Gorbachev, competitive party elections could be a tool to change career patterns. In fact, criticism of technocratic cadres became quite common during the *perestroika* period, as we will see.

While admitting these arguments are persuasive and logically connected with the argument of previous chapters, it may be better to add the leadership's belief as the third reason: 'the more elections, the more democratic, the better performance.'⁵ It seems there was a strong conviction at that time that democracy, if it is authentic, could resolve any problem. The author cannot deny that this policy included something beyond a pure calculation.

Fourthly, the experience of other communist countries, especially Poland and Hungary, would influence the Soviet leadership idea.⁶ It seems that the early stage of *perestroika* followed these two countries' experience of political (Poland) and economic (Hungary) reform. The election of party secretaries had been conducted in Poland inside the deepening crisis of 1981. The Soviet leadership might intend to forestall the difficulty which the party would face by democratising the party.

These four reasons, it seems, are the case to some extent and it would be impossible to identify a single true explanation. In any case, the results of competitive party election were far

⁵ Such a conviction is indicated by Ueno. See Toshihiko Ueno, 'Roshia no Senkyo Minshushugi: Peresutoroikaki niokeru Kyososenkyo no Donyu [Electoral Democracy in Russia: Competitive Elections during the Perestroika Period]' in Shugo Minagawa ed. *Ikoki no Roshia Seiji [Russian Politics in Transition]* (Hiroshima: Keisuisha, 1999), p. 339.

⁶ Werner Hahn, 'Electoral Choice in the Soviet Bloc', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March-April 1987).

from the ones desired by the leadership.

IV. Competitive Election of Party Secretaries before the 19th Party Conference

1. Decisions on the Competitive Party Election

The first address about party election by Gorbachev was made at the Central Committee plenum in January 1987, in which he stated, 'It is necessary to think of a change in the procedure of elections of secretaries of raikoms, okrugkoms, gorkoms, obkoms, kraikoms, the republican CCs. ... With this [change], members of party committees would have the right to bring any number of candidates to the electoral list.'⁷ However, it is reasonable to think that he could not obtain sufficient support on this point because the decision of the plenum, 'On Perestroika and the Cadre Policy of the Party,' mentioned only on the further democratisation of the party but not competitive elections.⁸

2. Early Attempts at Competitive Party Elections

Nonetheless, some competitive party elections took place in lower party organs with a detailed documentation in party press.⁹ For example, the first secretary of the Izhmorskii raion of Kemerovo oblast' in the Russian republic was elected from two candidates in February 1987. This election took place under the supervision of obkom first secretary N. Ermakov. The candidates were Ivan Malkov, chairman of the raiispolkom, and Gennadii Sedykh, director of a sovkhoz 'Izhmorskii'. At the raikom's plenum, both candidates expressed their opinions and participants also made comments on each candidate. After such a discussion, Malkov was

⁷ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 27-28 yanvarya 1987g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1987), p. 31.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-91. The further party democratisation specifically is discussed on p. 79.

⁹ A detailed study on the early attempt of a competitive party election is Toshihiko Ueno, 'Gorubachofu Seikenka niokeru Sorenokyosantono Henka [Changes of the CPSU under Gorbachev]', *Hogakukenkyu*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (February 1990), pp. 148-157.

elected first secretary by secret ballot.¹⁰ Because, as we have seen, it was common that the chairman of the ispolkom was promoted to the first secretaryship at raion level, this was not a surprising result. Rather it seems that this aim was for appealing for support for Gorbachev's policy.

In Ukraine, Oratov raikom in Vinnitsa oblast' had a competitive election for first secretary, which was reported in February 1987. Though the raikom was about to elect A. N. Dvoretz, chairman of the raiispolkom, as first secretary in the traditional way, that is, single candidate way, Vinnitsa obkom interfered in this personnel matter, and determined that the raikom was to have a competitive election. I. P. Dem'yanchuk, chairman of a RAPO (raion agricultural-production combine) council, became another candidate. In terms of experience of party work and knowledge of the raion, Dvoretz had more obvious claims and was expected to win. However, the result of the secret ballot was unexpectedly for Dem'yanchuk. The report attributed the result to new leader's eagerness to seek a new decision, latest science and technology in agricultural work, and his strong leadership.¹¹

The other case, in which two candidates were advanced for the first secretaryship, took place in the Sovetskii raikom of Khanty-Mansii autonomous okrug in Tyumen' oblast', which was reported in March 1987. Though at the beginning the proposal to conduct a competitive election was not welcomed, it was finally accepted. The post was contested for by Gennadii Borin, chairman of the raiispolkom, and Gennadii Zelentsov, raikom second secretary. As in other competitive elections, members of the raikom plenum discussed whether or not each candidate was appropriate as first secretary before the election at the plenum. Though the participants' comments included a personal character of candidates (e.g. arrogance), the critical point was which they should vote for: on the one hand, an economic manager or, on the other, an ideological-theoretical leader, as showed in participants' statements that 'we are to elect not

¹⁰ *Pravda*, 10 February 1987, p. 2; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 10 February 1987, p. 2.

¹¹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26 February 1987, p. 3

an economic leader, but the party's'; 'As an economic manager (*khozyaistvennik*) he [Borin] is not bad, but as the post of first secretary he cannot [be good].' After such a discussion, the candidates spoke of their own ideas. Then, voting took place. Zelentsov, the second secretary, was elected first secretary.¹² This result was not the same as established career patterns, according to which the chairman of the raiispolkom progressed to raikom first secretary. That the central press reported and recommended such a process may have showed the leadership intention to destroy established career patterns.

A plenum of Sakhnovshina raikom in Khar'kov oblast' attempted another competitive election for the first secretaryship, which was reported in March 1987. The post was competed for by two candidates, Nikolai Karnaukh, instructor of the department of agricultural economy and food production of Khar'kov oblast', and Nikolai Semenets, chairman of Sakhnovshino raiispolkom. The organisation of the election was the same as the other cases: an open discussion by plenum members and then a vote. In the end, Karnaykh was elected. This was also a deviation from established career patterns. According to V. Mysnichenko, first secretary of Khar'kov obkom, who supervised the election, the critical point was that the person chosen should pay more attention to social questions and the concerns of ordinary people.¹³

A competitive election of the first secretaryship of the Kol'chugino gorkom was attempted in Vladimir oblast' in May 1987. Six candidates, including the chairman of gorispolkom, appeared in this election. After discussion and voting, N. Mochalov, secretary of the party committee of the non-ferrous metal processing factory 'Ordzhonikidze,' was elected. The report criticised too many candidates in this election.¹⁴ In addition, we can confirm again that this was not in line with established career patterns.

According to an article explaining the party's cadre policy in *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 120

¹² *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1987, No. 5 (March), pp. 32-35.

¹³ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1987, No. 6 (March), pp. 43-46.

¹⁴ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1987, No. 9 (May), pp. 72-73.

(not necessarily first) party secretaries of 909 newly appointed were elected by competitive and secret ballot in 1987.¹⁵ Because this figure was the same as one repeated later, it seems plausible.¹⁶ These early attempts at competitive elections show the following characteristics. Firstly they present some evidence for the hypothesis that the competitive party election was attempted to change the established career patterns, because, as we have seen, the results of these elections frequently deviated from the norm. It seems likely that the party leadership intended to prevent *podmena* (substitution) of the state function by the party. Secondly, while the resistance to competitive elections undoubtedly existed, this may not always be because of a conservative ideology or the reluctance to surrender the appointing or *nomenklatura* power. It is obvious that many raion level elections were directed by a higher party organisation. Thus, these elections did not undermine their appointing power very much. One problem may have been a way of organising the elections. Participants had to openly discuss the quality of candidates, including such personal shortcomings as arrogance in front of the candidates themselves. It seems very likely that such a procedure made for a nervous atmosphere for both candidates and participants, though everyone, including losing candidates and voters, made a positive comment on the attempt to undertake competitive elections. In any case, competitive elections were not compulsory at all (no formal decision on the competitive election at the Central Committee was taken, as mentioned above) and did not reach oblast' level at this time. A further decision was taken at the 19th Party Conference.

V. The 19th Party Conference and Competitive Elections

1. Delegates Election to the 19th Party Conference

¹⁵ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1988, No. 11 (June), p. 15.

¹⁶ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1988, No. 17 (September), p. 11. This is an interview with G. K. Kryuchikov, deputy head of CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work, on the report and election campaign and its instruction.

At the June 1987 CC plenum, Gorbachev, in the name of the Politburo, submitted a proposal to convene the 19th Party Conference in order to begin political reform.¹⁷ The CC duly took a decision 'On Convening the 19th All-Union Party Conference', which included the procedure for the election of delegates. One delegate was to be elected for each 3,780 party members; the elections were to be conducted by secret ballot (but not necessarily on a multi-candidate basis) at the plenums of union republican party organisations, kraikoms, and obkoms or, in the case of delegates election from party organs in military, at the military associations' party conferences; and the elections were to begin between April and May 1988.¹⁸

Nonetheless, the delegates' elections did not take place after Gorbachev's speech at the meeting with leaders of the mass media on 7 May. In his speech, Gorbachev mentioned no quota of delegates and was in favour of the active participation of lower party organisations.¹⁹ Though this was not clear at all as an instruction on electoral procedures, the election became a battle arena between reformers and the party apparat, which is well documented by Aryeh Unger and Baruch Hazan.²⁰ Although there is little to add to their studies, the following points that were mentioned but not emphasised by them should be indicated. Firstly, reformers were far from organised at this time. They did not have a coherent alternative idea of how to conduct the election, nor had they a clear vision of party reform. These matters were alien to the party before the conference, when democratic centralism and the ban on fractions prevailed over the views of party members. Organised opposition began to take place after the conference. Secondly, the apparat's manipulation of delegates was, it seems, not only because of a malicious intention or their reluctance to surrender *nomenklatura* power, but also of an inertia of

¹⁷ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 25-26 iyunya 1987 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1987), p. 37.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82; *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1987, No. 13 (July), p. 47.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, 11 May 1988, p. 2.

²⁰ Aryeh L. Unger, 'The Travails of Intra-Party Democracy in the Soviet Union: The Election to the 19th Conference of the CPSU', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991); Baruch A. Hazan, *Gorbachev's Gamble: The 19th All-Union Party Conference* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 7-20, 69-76.

bureaucratic organs. Any bureaucratic organ has such an inertia that makes it hesitate to change traditional methods. It seems that this was the case for the CPSU as well. Thirdly, there is little evidence that rank and file party members tried to participate actively. Rather, 'the great majority of party members remained "silent".'²¹ Fourthly, in any case, neither the CC plenum decision nor Gorbachev's speech made it clear how to conduct multi-candidate elections. The party apparat had enough excuse just to follow traditional methods.

The result of the election is shown in Table 4-1. Compared with the delegates' composition at the 27th Party Congress, whose electoral process was clearly controlled from above, the result of the 19th Party Conference was not very different from that of the 27th congress. This result had an influence on the future of the party, because, as we will see later, some party members, who were unhappy with the result, began to develop informal clubs within the party. In addition, it is well known that the debate at the conference was very vocal and that the conference approved a resolution on party election, which is considered in the next section.

2. Decisions on Competitive Party Elections around the 19th Conference

In May 1988 the CC plenum approved the 'Theses toward the 19th Party Conference,' which envisaged competitive party elections including higher level ones. That is, 'Communists have the right to propose more candidates than mandates available in the case of elections to all party committees. ... Such a way of promotion, discussion, and election of members of party committees and secretaries may be extended, in the process of the formation of party organs, from raikoms and gorkoms to the CCs of communist parties of union republics and the CC CPSU.'²²

At the conference Gorbachev stated that a majority supported the proposal of

²¹ Unger 'The Travails', p. 349.

²² *Pravda*, 27 May 1990, p. 2.

multi-candidate election at all levels of party organisation.²³ Finally the 19th Party Conference approved a resolution, 'On Some Urgent Measures for the Practical Realisation of Reform of Political System of the Country,' which included a sentence, 'the Conference considers it is necessary to conduct, this year, a report-and-election campaign in party organisations, which is guided by the decisions of the conference on reform of political system, [and] democratisation of party life.'²⁴ The other resolution 'On Democratisation of Soviet Society and Reform of Political System', stated 'In the case of elections of members and secretaries of all party committees --up to the CC CPSU-- ensure a wide discussion of candidates and secret ballot, the possibility to include more number of candidates in the electoral bulletin than mandates available.'²⁵ Thus, the party was to conduct a report-and-election campaign, which would continue until the final days of the party.

VI. Implementation up to the 28th Party Congress

1. The Decision and Instruction on Party Elections

The conference resolutions on party election were a general guideline, but lacked a concrete procedure to embody the resolution that was to be approved by the CC plenum. The July CC plenum (1988) took a decision 'On Reports and Elections in Party Organisations,' by which the party organisations up to the obkom level were to conduct the reports and elections to the end of 1988. This decision also referred to the possibility of including more candidates than mandates. The schedule of implementation followed: PPOs in September to October, raikoms, gorkoms, and okrugkoms in October-November, obkoms and kraikoms in November to

²³ *XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 82.

²⁴ *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 106.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 126. Emphasis added.

December. The Plenum entrusted the Politburo to make a more precise instruction for the report-and-election campaign.²⁶

The Instruction was made and published in the name of the CC CPSU on 12 August 1988. This instruction more concretely prescribed how to conduct party elections, for example how frequently the party organisations should carry out the elections. Small PPOs were to have reports and elections every year; large ones were to do so every two or three years; raikoms, gorkoms, okrugkoms, obkoms, kraikoms and union republic party organisations—every five years. As is clear from the above, the reports and elections were organised by a bottom-up principle. The conferences of lower organisations were to have the right to propose candidates to the composition of higher organisations. This also included the statement of the possibility of including more candidates than mandates.²⁷ Thus, all resolutions and decisions admitted the possibility of a competitive election. Still, it was just possible, but not obligatory. Let us consider how the report-and-election campaign was carried out in the next section.²⁸

2. The Report-and-Election Campaign in 1988

If the reports and elections had been fully free and competitive, the logical consequence would have been the abolition of intra-party *nomenklatura*. In fact, an article, just before the campaign began, mentioned the possibility of ‘making a formal-nomenklaturist approach to cadre [selection] unnecessary.’²⁹ Also at the beginning of the campaign in an interview in *Pravda* Georgii Razumovskii, a candidate member of the Politburo and CC secretary, stated that this electoral experiment would fundamentally changed the concept of the

²⁶ *Pravda*, 31 July 1988, pp. 1-2; *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 29 iyulya 1988 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), pp.43-45.

²⁷ *Partiinaya Zhizn’*, 1988, No. 16 (August), pp. 30-35. A comment on this instruction is *Partiinaya Zhizn’*, 1988, No. 17 (September), pp. 8-14.

²⁸ A contemporaneous study on the report-election campaign in 1988 is Dawn Mann, ‘Results of the 1988 CPSU Report-and-Election Campaign’, *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (February 24, 1989), pp. 4-7.

²⁹ *Pravda*, 3 August 1988, p. 1.

nomenklatura.³⁰ Such a negative statement on the *nomenklatura* was repeated elsewhere in connection with the party election.³¹

The campaign began with workshop party organisations. One article introduced the election of these organisations. Though they were not competitive, the atmosphere can be understood. They discussed practical problems of their own workplaces (e.g. alcoholism), improvement of the authority of party organisations, rush work, and so forth.³² Around the end of August, the election process reached the PPOs. An article asked PPOs and higher party organisations to have competitive elections, and to consider the secretaries' platforms for their own work.³³ In Moscow city one third of shop and primary party organisations conducted competitive elections.³⁴ In September a CC official told the western press that about 10,000 low level party leaders had been replaced in competitive elections.³⁵ According to an article in *Partiinaya Zhizn'* on party elections, more than half the PPOs had competitive elections,³⁶ though a later result showed that this was a little exaggerated (see below and Table 4-2).

The gorkoms and raikoms had elections around October and November. In Moscow city nine raikom party secretaries, including two first secretaries, were elected on an alternative basis.³⁷ An information memorandum of the CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work (3 November 1988) stated that by 1 November (unknown from when) 778 raion and city party conferences had taken place. Though some active participation was reported, according to this memorandum the competitive elections for party secretaries had not been satisfactory. In the end, 174 gorkom and raikom secretaries, including 40 first secretaries were elected on an

³⁰ *Pravda*, 18 August 1988, p. 2.

³¹ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1988, No. 22 (November), p. 10.

³² *Pravda*, 15 August 1988, p. 2.

³³ *Pravda*, 31 August 1988, p. 1.

³⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 3, p. 27.

³⁵ *RL/ Research Bulletin*, 422/88 (September 23, 1988), p. 8. The party official is Georgii Kryuchkov, a deputy head of the CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work and, according to RL, the western press report was in the *New York Times* on 21 September.

³⁶ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1988, No. 22 (November), p. 9.

³⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 3, p. 27.

alternative basis. Nonetheless something new also took place. By secret ballot, 30 to 40 per cent of delegates to the conferences voted against the re-election of raikom and gorkom secretaries. In addition 29 secretaries, including eight first secretaries, did not get the necessary votes and had to leave the elected organs. The memorandum also criticised obkoms for their weak supervision of lower organs, their excessive tolerance toward raikom and gorkom secretaries and poor knowledge of their real authority. Moreover, it was implied that the delegates to the conferences were controlled, by stating that there were no serious critics on the reports of the candidates for the elections.³⁸

Later, the campaign reached the obkom level. However, no competitive election of *first* secretaries was implemented, though eight competitive secretary (not first) elections were carried out. Rather, it may be noticed that party conferences at this level showed how difficult it was to surrender the economic functions of the party. For example, in a Moscow obkom conference, a view that to decide a trivial problem for *khozyaistvenniki* was not a task of the party committees was reported.³⁹

The Politburo decided on 11 February 1989 to publish a detailed report on the 1988 report-and-election campaign. According to this, one third of party groups had competitive election as well as almost half the workshop party organisations and PPOs. Table 4-2 shows the results at PPO level. Moreover, at raikom, gorkom, and okrugkom level, 1117 secretaries and 269 secretaries were elected on an alternative basis. As mentioned above, only eight secretaries of obkoms and kraikoms were elected by competitive elections. Still, the party committees' composition was renewed more radically. Almost 60 per cent of raikoms, gorkoms, obkoms, kraikoms renewed their composition; 66 new secretaries, including three first secretaries, of obkoms and kraikoms, and 1433 secretaries, including 250 first secretaries, of raikoms, gorkoms, and okrugkoms were newly elected (though the methods were not necessarily

³⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 1, pp. 94-98.

³⁹ *Pravda*, 12 December 1988, p. 3.

competitive). It is obvious that higher party organisations did not conduct competitive elections. Thus, this report stated that several party organs had insufficiently conducted alternative elections, and also expressed dissatisfaction with the preparation and discussion of the campaign, and complained that higher party organisations did not recognise the real situation at local level.⁴⁰ We can conclude that, while the report-and-election campaign was relatively active at lower levels, higher party organisations obstructed its full implementation or tended to inertia.

3. The Party Elections in 1989

In February 1989, the CC Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and Cadre Work discussed the results of the 1988 report-and-election campaign. The published documentation of this commission meeting limited itself to positive comment and the empty claim that 'democratisation is important.'⁴¹ Nonetheless, Gorbachev and his reformist colleagues were not happy with the result. Thus, on 18 July 1989 the CC CPSU organised a meeting of first secretaries of union republics, kraikoms, and obkoms, in which Gorbachev argued for applying electoral approaches to cadre appointments rather than formalist *nomenklatura* one.⁴²

Then the Politburo decided to conduct a report-and-election campaign again. Of course, it was obligatory that small PPOs conducted the report-and-election exercise as the 1988 instruction of party election had stated. Still, the Politburo decision 'On the Conduct of Reports and Elections in Party Organisations in 1989 (2 August 1989)' stated that 'it seems expedient at the same time to discuss reports of bureaux of raikoms, gorkoms, okrugkoms, obkoms, kraikoms, and the CC of union republican parties on their activity at the plenum of corresponding committees.' Thus, all party organisations up to the CCs of union republican

⁴⁰ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 3, pp. 12-25.

⁴¹ *Pravda*, 28 February 1989, p. 2.

⁴² *Pravda*, 19 July 1989, p. 3.

parties were to face the campaign again. In addition, this decision urged party organisations to freely discuss current problems *on an alternative basis*.⁴³ This was a reconsideration of democratic centralism *de facto*, at least in its traditional sense.

However, the report on the campaign one month later showed dissatisfaction with the situation: 'an analysis of the reports and elections that have just started shows that, in many party organisations, they are proceeding in the old fashion and in the form established for decades;' 'Reports and elections are intended to help change all orders of internal party relations, to establish, in each party organisation, a situation of friendliness, free and creative exchange of opinions, and presenting and discussing any alternative proposals;' 'With elections, the alternativeness, *glasnost*' [openness], and unconditional consideration of opinions of communists and non-communists should become a rule.'⁴⁴

Under such pressure from above (and probably from below, that is, from rank and file party members), the competitive elections at obkom level finally took place, though it is not clear that these elections were related to the report-and-election campaign. The first attempt was the Chelyabinsk obkom first secretary election on 12 August 1989. N. D. Shvyrev, first secretary of Chelyabinsk obkom, was asked to resign due to harsh criticism. The new first secretary, Aleksei Litovchenko, formerly second secretary of this obkom, was elected from three candidates.⁴⁵ On 7 September, Kaliningrad obkom plenum elected a new first secretary. At the beginning there were more than ten candidates who were discussed in raikoms, gorkoms and the obkom bureau beforehand. The plenum screened them and brought two candidates (the obkom second secretary and the chairman of the oblispolkom) in the electoral list. Finally Yuri

⁴³ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 9, p. 7. Emphasis added.

⁴⁴ *Pravda*, 3 September 1989, p. 1.

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 13 August 1989, p. 2. Note on obkom first secretaries' names. As one can see, Russian newspapers hardly mention a person's full first name, but only his initial. Thus, some persons' names are indicated as full surname with initials of first name and *otchestvo* here. Still, because the elected first secretaries' full names are available in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, the author tried to mention full first names as far as he could check.

Semenov, the second secretary, was elected Kaliningrad obkom first secretary.⁴⁶ Sakhalin obkom held a competitive election on 24 October 1989. Though again at first seventeen people were named as candidates, only four candidates were included in the electoral list. Viktor Zhigailo, a former obkom secretary, was elected obkom first secretary.⁴⁷ On November 30 Kareliya obkom plenum also held a competitive election. Twenty candidates were reduced to two, Nikolai Kir'yanov, an obkom secretary, and Yu. A. Kuznetsov, first secretary of Petrozavodsk gorkom. In the event Kir'yanov was elected obkom first secretary.⁴⁸ As to the first secretary at union republican level, the Ukrainian Central Committee had a competitive election on 28 September 1989, which followed Vladimir Shcherbitsky's retirement. Though at first six candidates were discussed, two candidates (Vladimir Ivashko, second secretary of the Ukrainian party, and Stanislav Gurenko, a Ukrainian party secretary) were brought into the electoral list. Finally Ivashko received a majority of votes and was elected first secretary.⁴⁹ If such a competitive election had been sufficiently implemented, this logical consequence might have been that these elections made a *nomenklatura* system within the party unnecessary. In fact, on 15 October 1989, *Pravda* reported a meeting of the CC Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and Cadre Policy, which admitted the necessity of a renewal of cadres, of a change in cadre promotion practices, further democratisation of the party including elections, and abolition of the *nomenklatura* system.⁵⁰

However, it is clear that, as we have seen, the candidates were rather significantly screened even in competitive elections at higher levels. Thus, in most competitive elections, the final candidates were not surprising figures in view of traditional career patterns (e.g. second

⁴⁶ *Pravda*, 8 September 1989, p. 2; *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 37 (September 15, 1989), p. 35.

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, 25 October 1989, p. 3.

⁴⁸ *Pravda*, 1 December 1989, p. 2.

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, 29 September 1989, p. 2; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 September 1989, p. 2; *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 40 (October 6, 1989), p. 32.

⁵⁰ *Pravda*, 15 October 1989, p. 2. See also *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 43 (October 27, 1989), pp. 25-26.

secretary, chairman of oblispolkom, gorkom first secretary of major city in the oblast' and so forth). In addition, it is very suspicious that, in general, the report-and-election campaign in 1989 was active. Detailed data on the results of the 1989 report-and-election campaign is available only up to PPO level, that is, there are no systematic data on higher level elections. According to Table 4-2, the number of PPOs that conducted reports and elections was small, compared with the previous year. It means that, even at the PPO level, the campaign was not active or that many PPOs might not have thought reports and elections were compulsory because almost all of the PPOs had reports and elections the previous year and, as the 1988 instruction says, only small PPOs originally were to conduct the reports and elections. In addition, some PPOs, it was reported, did not hold reports and elections in the proper way: in a party organisation, participants could know the coming meeting would take place just one day beforehand; some party organisations hindered the attendance of non-communists in the meeting.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the fact that the reports and elections was relatively better conducted at lower levels had some importance. The most vocal delegates were PPO secretaries at the 28th Party Congress.

4. Party Elections in 1990 up to the 28th Party Congress

Under such a situation of inactive reform, the shock to regional level secretaries came from outside the party in early 1990. Elections of the Congress of People's Deputies in Russia, Supreme Soviets in other union republics, and local soviets were to be held in February-March 1990. These elections were to be conducted under a new and difficult situation for the CPSU because of an amendment to article six of the USSR constitution. Party secretaries had to realise that they would lose the elections without turnover of the leadership of each party committee.⁵²

⁵¹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 2, pp. 65-67.

⁵² In addition, these local soviet elections did not necessarily mean secretaries should be 'democrats'. Their struggle for survival in the elections produced a mixed picture in ideological

In addition, many party secretaries, including first secretaries, actually failed to win seats in soviets. Some of the secretaries who failed the election had to resign the post of first secretary. Then the election to the vacant post was sometimes conducted in a competitive way.

Another stimulus to party election was the March CC plenum (1990) decision 'On the Term for Calling of the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Conducting the Report-and-Election Campaign in the Party, the Norms of Representation and the Procedure of Election of Congress Delegates,' which provided for the conduct of reports and elections at obkom and higher levels.⁵³ From the fragmentary records of the Politburo meeting on 7 March, it is possible to infer that the decision to conduct a report-and-election campaign before the 28th Party Congress was controversial.⁵⁴ Thus, before the congress, only higher party organisations were to conduct reports and elections.⁵⁵ However, the timing of reports and elections was, it seems, entrusted to

terms: Some first secretaries became 'democrats', others turned into 'conservatives', and others transformed into 'nationalists'. Though they showed various political standpoints, their logic had the common element: to survive. See Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Roshiano Chihoseido: Daikaikaku kara 1995nen Chihojichihoshiko made, [Regional Institution in Russia: From the Great Reform to Law on Local Autonomy in 1995]', in *Juten Ryouiki Kenkyu Hokoku Shu*, 'Surabu Yurashia no Hendo' [Occasional Papers on 'the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World'] No. 25 (1996), p. 178. McAuley argued that in the process of local soviet elections, Leningrad obkom made the first open rebellion against the centre. See Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective,' *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), p. 60. While this consequence can be partly attributed to the lack of consistent policy of the CPSU leadership, this was a logical consequence of a local election. This also means a democratic way does not necessarily turn out an ideal result.

⁵³ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS*, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 180-183.

⁵⁴ The stenographic record of this meeting on this topic (March CC plenum) is almost completely omitted and shows only top page and the last page. Thus, the author can only infer that it was controversial from Gorbachev's statement in the meeting 'Then, before the congress, to elect only delegates to the congress was proposed and do not conduct reports and elections in the party. So, what about the preparation for the congress? Where is the platform, where is its discussion? Where is the pre-congress discussion, which should show us the opinions of communists and on platform and on [party] Rules.' TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2.

⁵⁵ However, a later report on the report and election campaign states that about one third of workshop and primary party organisations and 40 per cent of raikoms, gorkoms, and okrugkoms conducted meeting and conference before the 28th Party Congress. See *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 5, p. 68. Though the author could not investigate why this happened, perhaps it may be because some meetings for delegate election to the 28th Party Congress also became report and election meetings.

each party organisation. The CC decision stated that the plenums of corresponding party committees defined the procedure of delegate election to the [reports and elections] party conferences (and congresses in union republics). According to Razumovskii at the Politburo meeting on 3 May 1990, 60 per cent of obkoms and kraikoms decided to conduct reports and elections before the 28th Party Congress, with which Gorbachev was not satisfied.⁵⁶ On 13 June 1990 Vadim Medvedev, CC secretary and a Politburo member, reported that 140 oblast' and krai party conferences and 10 union republic party congresses had taken place. Among them 88 conferences and 8 congresses elected their own party committees. It means that, for example, the union republican party congress elected its Central Committee.⁵⁷

So, many party organisations carried out party elections, some of which were competitive. Most widely broadcast was the case of Volgograd obkom. Vladimir Kalashnikov had been first secretary since 1984. His career was that of a typical *khozyaistvennik*. Born in 1929, after graduating from Stavropol' agricultural-economy institute, he became a head of agricultural technician in 1950, then a director of a MTS (Machinery and Tractor Station) of sheep farming sovkhoz in 1955. Though his full-time party work began in 1961 as second secretary of a raikom, he returned to economic managing work after that. Before becoming first secretary of Volgograd obkom, he had been RSFSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Management.⁵⁸ At the beginning he worked well as first secretary. However, he lost his prestige quickly. The obkom faced public demonstrations criticising privileges and corruption. Party members began to think that they needed a political leader rather than a *khozyaistvennik*. On 24 January 1990 the Volgograd obkom held a plenum, at which there were repeated calls for the leader's resignation. On the 30th of the month, the plenum agreed to Kalashnikov's retirement. The new first secretary was elected by competitive election at a report-and-election oblast' party

⁵⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2.

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, 14 June 1990, p. 2.

⁵⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 2, p. 69.

conference in March. Though once the number of candidates grew to 28, three candidates remained after self-resignation. Aleksandr Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd gorkom, was elected first secretary.⁵⁹

Other cases of obkom first secretary competitive elections were briefly reported. Chernigov obkom elected Vasilii Lisovenko as first secretary in competitive and secret election on 22 January 1990.⁶⁰ In the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR the competitive election took place with the transfer of former first secretary, Evgenii Eliseev, to a post in the CC apparat. The post was competed for by two candidates, the chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet and the second secretary of the republican CC. In the event, the second secretary, Valerii Kokov, won.⁶¹ On 27 February Kaluga obkom plenum elected a first secretary from three candidates. Valerii Sudarenkov, working as deputy chairman of the council of ministers of the Uzbek republic and having worked as first secretary of Kaluga gorkom, was elected the new obkom first secretary.⁶² On 24 March the Buryat obkom plenum approved the transfer of its first secretary, Anatolii Beryakov, to the RSFSR State Committee on Ethnic Questions. The plenum recommended that lower party organs discuss suitable successors.⁶³ On 6 April the obkom plenum elected first secretary Leonid Potanov, working as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen republic and formerly a secretary of Buryat obkom.⁶⁴ At Sverdlovsk oblast' party conference eight candidates were advanced for the first secretaryship. Aleksandr Gusev, Asbest gorkom first secretary, was elected on 7 April. On the same day, Ul'yanovsk oblast' party conference elected first secretary Yurii Goryachev, chairman of Ul'yanovsk soviet, from two candidates out of an

⁵⁹ *Pravda*, 28 January 1990, p. 2; *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1990, No. 8 (April), pp. 45-47; Dawn Mann, 'Authority of Regional Party Leaders Crumbling', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (February 23, 1990), pp. 1-6.

⁶⁰ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (February 2, 1990), p. 26.

⁶¹ *RL/ Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, No. 9 (March 2, 1990), pp. 36-37.

⁶² *Pravda*, 28 February 1990, p. 2.

⁶³ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 25 March 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁴ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 7 April 1990, p. 2.

original 20.⁶⁵ On 26 April Tyumen' and Ufa party conferences elected first secretaries on an alternative basis. Also on 26 April Kirovograd obkom plenum elected a new first secretary from three candidates.⁶⁶ Boris Gidasov was re-elected Leningrad city and oblast' party first secretary from five candidates at a joint conference of Leningrad city and oblast' party organisations.⁶⁷ Kemerovo oblast' party conference re-elected Aleksandr Mel'nikov first secretary on an alternative basis and also Vologda and Gorno-Altai oblast' party conferences had competitive first secretary elections.⁶⁸ Magadan, Amur, Smolensk and Voronezh oblast' party conferences also had competitive elections for first secretary.⁶⁹

Thus, many competitive elections for first secretaries took place during this period. However, it is difficult to establish how universal such attempts at competitive elections were. Nonetheless, we can recognise some effects of the competitive process. Firstly, secret and competitive party elections did not necessarily result in the victory of so-called 'democrats'. Gidasov (Leningrad), Mel'nikov (Kemerovo) and others were 'conservative' in a sense. Whether or not this was a result of 'apparatus games' or electoral cheating cannot be determined. Still they could not have won without any support from rank and file party members. In addition, it should be remembered that these figures were different from strongly ideological conservatives like Nina Andreeva. Rather, their claim mainly related to keeping 'law and order' but not necessarily opposing some form of market economy. It is not unreasonable to think that such figures, who advocated restoring public order, could receive some support in a worsening situation. The competitive elections gave a chance of promotion to such new 'law and order' type 'conservatives'. Secondly, once obkom leaders had been elected by competitive elections,

⁶⁵ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 8 April 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁶ *Pravda*, 27 April 1990, p. 3.

⁶⁷ *Pravda*, 29 April 1990, p. 2; *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 18 (May 4, 1990), p. 39. On Leningrad party conference, see also *Pravda*, 26 April 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁸ *Pravda*, 29 April 1990, p. 2.

⁶⁹ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 1 June 1990, p. 5; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 2 June 1990, p. 7; *Pravda*, 2 June 1990, p. 2; *Pravda*, 8 June 1990, p. 2.

they could be independent of the centre. Thus, the General Secretary's *nomenklatura* power must have been eroded. If the party election was considered in order to destroy local cliques, this was an unintended result. Overall, competitive elections accelerated organisational disarray in the party. Thirdly, it seems that the result of these competitive elections made it easy for regional party secretaries to accept the principle of a competitive election in the new party Rules. In the next few sections, the process toward the 28th Party Congress is investigated.

VII. Emerging Fractions and Controversy over Party Renewal

In the run up to the 28th Party Congress, fractions within the party emerged. Let us briefly consider the fractions that tried to influence the delegates' election to the congress. After the Central Committee published its platform as a draft of the new Party Programme, two major 'platforms' emerged around the beginning of 1990: the Democratic Platform and the Marxist Platform.

The February CC plenum discussed and approved the platform 'Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism'. This platform was rather liberal in terms of its perspective for the entire political and economic system, that is, it supported a regulated market economy, a multi-party system, and the establishment of a new federal state. However, it was not very reformist on internal party matters: supporting the concept of vanguard rather than parliamentary party, no reference to the *nomenklatura* system, and keeping, while claiming renewal of their concepts, the ban on fractions and democratic centralism.⁷⁰

The Democratic Platform had its origins in the 'Moscow Party Club', which was formed in April 1989.⁷¹ The Moscow Party Club's immediate goal was to call an extraordinary

⁷⁰ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 353-382.

⁷¹ On the Democratic Platform, the author is heavily indebted to Igor' Chubais, 'The

CPSU congress. Then it developed its aims including reform of the procedure for delegate election to the party congress. At the same time, it began to organise its basic policy, which was crystallised at the all-union conferences of the Democratic Platform in January and April 1990. Their basic policy was to transform the CPSU into a social democratic parliamentary party. In order to do so, they proposed a multi-party system, a federal principle overall, a territorial principle for the PPO, the replacement of democratic centralism, freedom of fraction formation, and abolition of the *nomenklatura*.

The Marxist Platform was rooted in people who left the Moscow Party Club. It held its first conference in April 1990. Their policy was much more moderate than that of the Democratic Platform: it supported a market economy, a party for workers, a guarantee of the rights of minorities and replacement of bureaucratic centralism, still opposing fraction activity and a parliamentary party.⁷²

These were the first organised fractions *de facto* since the 10th Party Congress of 1921. Some proposals of the Democratic Platform in particular had some resonance among the mass media including party journals. For example, some argued for implementation of the electoral principle in cadre work, which would have led to demolition of the *nomenklatura* mechanism.⁷³ There was a suggestion that cadre selection should be open to a variety of people rather than based on a *nomenklatura* list.⁷⁴ It was reported that one raikom in Murmansk city had abolished

Democratic Opposition: An Insider's View,' *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 18 (May 3, 1991); Julia Wishnevsky and Elizabeth Teague, "'Democratic Platform' Created in CPSU', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (February 2, 1990); Vyachelav Shostakovskii, 'Obnovlyaya Kontseptsiiu Partii', *Politicheskoe Obrazovanie*, 1989, No. 18 (December), pp. 5-12; Graeme Gill, *The Collapse*, pp. 122-125. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo meguru Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU]', *Hogakukenyu*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (February 1995), p. 344.

⁷² *Glasnost*, 1990, No. 2, (21 June), pp. 4-5.

⁷³ V. Abramov, 'Iskorenit' Byurokratizm', *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1990, No. 3 (February), pp. 62-66.

⁷⁴ N. Kuz'menkov, 'Ne Po Nomenklaturnoi Lestnitse', *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1990, No. 6 (March), pp. 30-31.

its *nomenklatura* list, which had consisted of 286 posts.⁷⁵ With such views, platforms strived to win the delegate election to the 28th Party Congress, as is investigated in the next section.

VIII. The 28th Party Congress and Competitive Elections

1. Delegate Election to the 28th congress

(a) Decisions on the Electoral Procedure and their Critics

The CC Commission on the Questions of Party Construction and Cadre Policy discussed the procedure for delegate election to the 28th Party Congress. The Commission expressed the view that the procedure should be maximally democratised and supported the direct participation of communists in the process.⁷⁶ The proposal of the Commission was submitted to the February CC plenum (1990). The CC platform that was approved at the CC plenum stated that the election of delegates to the party conference and congress should be conducted with the direct participation of communists on an alternative basis.⁷⁷ Based on it, the CC Commission of Party Construction and Cadre Policy wrote a draft of 'the Procedure of Delegates Election to the 28th CPSU Congress', which envisaged the following points: 1. The candidates would be nominated by primary party organisations. 2. The election should be secret and competitive. 3. The candidates could be investigated at the raion and city party conference. 4. The plenums of obkoms, kraikoms, union republican party could define the procedure of delegate election. 5. A huge primary party organisation could directly elect the delegates with the decision of the plenums of obkoms, kraikoms, and union republican parties. 6. The oblast', krai, union republican party conference could elect delegates. 7. Delegates from the military and

⁷⁵ *Pravda*, 5 May 1990, p. 4.

⁷⁶ *Pravda*, 4 February 1990, p. 2.

⁷⁷ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5-7 fevralya 1990g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), p. 379. See also *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (February 16, 1990), pp. 37-38.

MVD troops would be directly elected from the party conferences of military districts.⁷⁸ This draft after a little modification was approved at the March CC plenum as an attached document of the CC plenum decision, 'On the Term of the 28th CPSU Congress, Conducting of the Report-and-Election Campaign in the Party, the Norms of Representation and the Procedure for Election of Congress Delegates'.⁷⁹

However, there were critics of this procedure. Firstly, though it was decided that delegates were to be elected basically from electoral districts, the party conference could elect delegates in some cases. Some people feared that party conferences could screen candidates who did not suit full-time party workers.⁸⁰ Secondly the delegates from the armed forces were to be elected only from party conferences rather than electoral districts.⁸¹ Thirdly the plenums of obkoms, kraikoms and union republican parties could define the procedure 'taking into account the situation of party organisations and opinions of communists'. But who were to be 'communists' in this context: party ranks or party workers? And how could communists determine 'the situation'?⁸² Fourthly, some argued that, without publishing candidates' affiliation to any platform in the electoral list, communists would not be able to decide whom to vote for.⁸³

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that this procedure was more competitive and appeared better for reformers like the Democratic Platform than the previous procedure. The delegates' election took place under this procedural rules.

(b) The CC Open Letter and the Delegates Election to the 28th Party Congress

As discussed above, one of main aims of the Democratic Platform was to send their

⁷⁸ *Pravda*, 27 February 1990, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁹ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentrali'nogo Komiteta KPSS*, 11, 14, 16 marta 1990 g., pp. 180-188.

⁸⁰ *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, 21 April 1990, p. 4.

⁸¹ *Pravda*, 7 March 1990, p. 3.

⁸² *Moskovskie Novosti*, 1990-10 (11 March), p. 3. This is a comment of Vyacheslav Shostakovskii, rector of Moscow Higher Party School and one of the leaders of Democratic Platform. See also *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, 24 March 1990, p. 3.

⁸³ *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, 12 May 1990, p. 4.

delegates to the forthcoming 28th Party Congress. However, the party leadership was clearly apprehensive about this platform. This became clear with the publication of the CC open letter, 'For Consolidation on a Principled Basis' which appeared on 11 April 1990.⁸⁴

The Politburo decided to write an open letter on 22 March, which was to make clear the party leadership's antagonistic view toward the Democratic Platform. The decision states, 'To consider it is expedient to adhere the direction of ideological and organisational demarcation from the supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and other groups whose activity is directed to the split of the CPSU.' Even if 'other groups' are mentioned, it is obvious that the main target was the Democratic Platform. The Politburo entrusted the Secretariat to prepare the letter and the draft of decision on this matter.⁸⁵ Then, the Politburo on 9 April discussed the content of the prepared letter and whether or not it should be published. As Gorbachev says in his memoirs, he seems to have preferred to send a telegram to party organisations rather than publishing a letter.⁸⁶ Only Yakovlev was very critical of the letter, supported the idea of a telegram, and moderately supported the Democratic Platform though he added that the CC platform was superior theoretically and practically.⁸⁷ However, other reformist Politburo members, for example, Medvedev, Frolov, and Shevardnadze, did not strongly oppose the letter.⁸⁸ Others supported publication of the letter because the CC needed to make its position clear. Without it, they argued, it would cause anxiety and confusion among party members.⁸⁹ It seems that Gorbachev could not help but publish the open letter, though he asked Medvedev to rewrite it.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ *Pravda*, 11 April 1990, p. 1. For details of the politics of the CC open letter, see Gordon Hahn, 'The Politics of the XXVIII CPSU Congress and the Central Committee Open Letter', *Russian History*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1995), to which the author is indebted.

⁸⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 87, p. 1.

⁸⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 2; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), pp. 540-541. Mihaeru Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), pp. 694-695.

⁸⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7 (Medvedev), p. 9 (Shevardnadze), p. 10 (Frolov).

⁸⁹ For example see *ibid*, p. 12 (Prokof'ev).

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 16.

The CC open letter was published, which severely criticised the Democratic Platform: 'Declaring themselves "consistent democrats", ... they attack the ideological and organisational basis of the CPSU ...'; the Democratic Platform tried 'to convert our party to a kind of formless association with full freedom of factions and groupings, that is, to practically ruin it.' This recommended also expelling members of Democratic Platform from the party.⁹¹ This open letter caused some controversy. It certainly seems to have discouraged the Democratic Platform supporters. Some of them thought that the party was impossible to reform itself and left the party. Criticism was also widespread among other organisations or movements. The Komsomol condemned the open letter at its all-union congress.⁹² The Marxist platform also criticised the letter because, they argued, the Central Committee was motivated only by material rather than ideological considerations.⁹³ The meeting of secretaries of republican parties, kraikoms, obkoms, and series of gorkom, and raikoms, which discussed ideological-political work, took place on 25 April, where the open letter was critically mentioned.⁹⁴

Probably the most important effect of the open letter was its influence on the election of delegates to the 28th Party Congress. The Politburo discussed the questions of preparation for the 28th Party Congress and the Russian party conference on 3 May, when the delegate election was just beginning. In his report Razumovskii said that the CC open letter had a big influence on the course of the delegate election and the report-and-election campaign.⁹⁵ Although he mentioned that the letter was, on the whole, perceived as an appeal for the consolidation of healthy party forces while the departure of party members was increasing, it seems that the letter encouraged so-called 'conservatives' to come forward to the forthcoming party congress. In addition, Gorbachev did not hide his critical view of the Democratic Platform, stating, 'What

⁹¹ *Pravda*, 11 April 1990, p. 1.

⁹² *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 17 (April 27, 1990), p. 24. (Central Television, 16 April)

⁹³ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 17 (April 27, 1990), p. 25. (*Pravda*, 16 April)

⁹⁴ *Pravda*, 25 April 1990, p. 2.

⁹⁵ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2.

about the “Democratic Platform”? ... There is no concept, and nothing on the party is well thought out at all. There is only a concept such as ruining the party. That is all.’⁹⁶ As discussed above, one of the original aims of Democratic Platform was to send their delegates to the party congress. The CC open letter discouraged the Democratic Platform members.

On the other hand, Gorbachev’s prime concern about delegates’ election was the social composition of delegates. Probably he presupposed that worker and peasant party members would support his reform and that the party apparat consistently opposed him. Though it is not possible to precisely discern how much effect on the social composition of delegates the letter had, the report on delegate election in progress at the Politburo meeting on 3 May was shocking for Gorbachev. According to Razumovskii, 80 per cent of delegates were to be elected from electoral districts rather than the party conference. The elections were certainly competitive. Up to the date of the meeting 19,800 people had been advanced as candidates for 4,382 mandates. 232 delegates had been already elected at the time. Among them, workers accounted for 12.1 per cent; peasants (kolkhoz workers) for 1.7 per cent; women for 7.3 per cent, and party workers for 24 per cent. Among candidates, the figures were workers 10 per cent, peasants 4 per cent and women 10 per cent. Though the ratio of worker delegates increased in comparison with that of worker candidates, these were shocking figures for Gorbachev. He asked how many workers there were among the 19,800 candidates, but Razmovskii did not answer.⁹⁷ Passivity of workers was also reported by Yurii Manaenkov, CC Secretary and a Russian bureau member. Among the candidates to the Russian party conference (the delegates were to attend the all-union party congress as well), about 13 per cent were workers. He added that administrative pressure should be utilised in order to strengthen the representation of workers. ‘Simply no other way exists.’ Gorbachev was angry with this and said, ‘Then I should speak frankly that our party apparat together with economic managerial leaders is doing this [lowering workers’ representation].’

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

Manaenkov responded, 'Our party apparat is doing this because there are very, very many party workers among delegate candidates. Almost a quarter. Thus, the party apparat is connected with this.'⁹⁸ Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, said that many party secretaries had become candidates and pushed out the working class. Gorbachev responded that the problem was that the workers had not advanced themselves as candidates.⁹⁹ Consequently Gorbachev stressed the importance of electing workers and peasants¹⁰⁰ and the Politburo appealed for electing more workers and peasants to the forthcoming party congress.¹⁰¹

Then, the elections continued. Some reports on the delegates' election began to appear. On 11 May the North Osetiya oblast' party conference elected delegates to the party congress, including Evgenii Primakov, a member of the Presidential Council and a candidate member of the Politburo.¹⁰² The congress of the Turkmen party and seven oblast' party conferences in Kazakhstan elected delegates to the all-union congress on 12 May.¹⁰³ The Georgian party congress elected delegates to the all-union party congress on 16 May.¹⁰⁴ Many delegates were elected also from electoral districts. In Arkhangel'sk, Tula, Smolensk, and Kazan' competitive delegate elections in electoral districts were reported. Delegates elected in Smolensk included Anatolii Luk'yanov, the chairman of Supreme Soviet and a Politburo member. Egor Ligachev, CC secretary and a Politburo member, was elected from an electoral districts of Belgorod oblast', though one report suggested that he had failed to secure election in Moscow.¹⁰⁵ From Moscow city, Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB and a Politburo member, and Yurii Maslyukov, CC secretariat and a Politburo member,

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰¹ *Pravda*, 5 May 1990, p. 1.

¹⁰² *Pravda*, 12 May 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰³ *Pravda*, 13 May 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Pravda*, 17 May 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *Pravda*, 27 May 1990, p. 2; *Argumenty i Fakty*, 1990-21 (26 May-1 June), p. 3; *Ibid.*, 1990-22 (2-8 June), p. 6.

were elected. From Khabarovsk, Dmitrii Yazov, Minister of Defence and candidate member of the Politburo, was elected.¹⁰⁶ The result of delegates' elections of Politburo members, candidate members and CC secretaries were published later (see Table 4-3). The Leningrad, Voronezh, Elista, Tashkent, Kuibyshev, Irkutsk, L'vov, and Kirov cases were also reported.¹⁰⁷ In one electoral district in Moscow city, Viktor Ryabov, a CC official, was elected on 10 May on an alternative basis.¹⁰⁸ In many regions, the results of delegate elections were reviewed in the party conferences.¹⁰⁹ From Table 4-3, we can recognise that delegate elections in party conferences were frequently non-competitive. In addition, it can be inferred from a report of the Red-Flag Northern Fleet party conference that some of the delegate elections of party organisations in armed forces were not conducted on an alternative basis.¹¹⁰

On the process, some complaints on the organisation of the election appeared. In Omsk oblast' 168 candidates had been advanced for 34 mandates. More than one fourth of candidates were party workers who were skilled in political manoeuvring. They could become delegates while pushing out workers.¹¹¹ One worker delegate felt that the election had been organised unfavourably to him and suspected that he had been the victim of an 'apparatus game'.¹¹² An ill-prepared election was also reported in a letter from Kiev city, in which it was announced that the election would take place just one day beforehand. In addition, by not showing the candidates' positions on the platform in the electoral list, they did not have any criterion to judge them.¹¹³ Two weeks before the 28th Party Congress, Vladimir Lysenko, one of leaders of the Democratic Platform and a delegate to the 28th Party Congress, expressed his

¹⁰⁶ *Pravda*, 31 May 1990, p. 2. On Gorbachev's election, see *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 21 (May 25 1990), p. 27.

¹⁰⁷ *Pravda*, 31 May 1990, p. 2; *Ibid.*, 6 June 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 6, p. 155.

¹⁰⁹ *Pravda*, 4 June 1990, p. 2; *Ibid.*, 9 June 1990, p. 2.

¹¹⁰ *Pravda*, 7 June 1990, p. 2. Nonetheless, the Far East Military District Party Conference had a competitive delegates election. See Yazov in Table 3.

¹¹¹ *Pravda*, 19 May 1990, p. 3.

¹¹² *Pravda*, 2 June 1990, p. 3.

¹¹³ *Pravda*, 9 June 1990, p. 3.

concern that 48 per cent of delegates would be full-time party workers, and that less than 7 per cent would be workers and peasants.¹¹⁴

2. The Establishment of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

Before considering the result of the delegates' election, let us trace the process of the establishment of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.¹¹⁵ The idea of a Russian party dates back to September 1989 when the CC plenum on nationality issues took place. This plenum's platform proposed to examine the possibility of the foundation of a Russian 'conference' in which the republican issues would be discussed.¹¹⁶ This led to the idea to revive the Russian bureau that had existed under Khrushchev, which the Politburo decided to propose to the CC plenum on 8 December 1989,¹¹⁷ and the December CC plenum agreed to its foundation.¹¹⁸

Nonetheless, the Russian bureau was not active: Up to the Russian conference, it had only three meetings (15 January, 3 April, 9 June).¹¹⁹ The first meeting was devoted to a consideration of the economic sovereignty of Russia and the matter of republic and local soviet elections.¹²⁰ The March CC plenum decided to hold a Russian party conference, at which the same delegates who were elected for the 28th all-union Party Congress were to participate, and

¹¹⁴ *Moskovskie Novosti*, 1990, No. 24 (17 June), p. 9.

¹¹⁵ For details of this process, see Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo'.

¹¹⁶ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 19-20 sentyabrya 1989 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989), p. 225. The author must use the word 'conference' here because at that time the establishment of the Russian party organisation was uncertain. There was still some possibility that the Russian party 'conference' became a just coordinating place of lower party organs. After the establishment of CP RSFSR was decided, the conference was to become a 'congress'.

¹¹⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 85.

¹¹⁸ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 9 dekabrya 1989 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989), pp. 37-38.

¹¹⁹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 9, p. 24.

¹²⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 28.

the CC plenum entrusted the Russian bureau to form the preparatory committee for the Russian conference.¹²¹ The second meeting of the Russian bureau approved the establishment of a preparatory committee of the Russian party conference, which consisted of 87 members.¹²² Because no Russian bureau meeting was held until 9 June, which was just before the Russian party conference, the real preparatory work was carried out by the preparatory committee rather than the Russian bureau. The preparatory committee pressed the party leadership for the establishment of the Russian Communist Party.

Other movements toward the Russian party became active. On 22-23 April the Committee of the United Front of Workers of Russia, a conservative fraction in the party, held a congress to discuss the formation of a Russian Communist Party. Participants criticised *perestroika* and demanded dismissing the leadership, including Ligachev who was known as a conservative.¹²³ Ligachev himself supported the foundation of a Russian Communist Party, though he added the necessity to keep the CPSU framework and party unity.¹²⁴ Ligachev was, according to Gorbachev, the strongest proponent of its foundation in the central leadership.¹²⁵

Gorbachev states in his memoirs that he was worried that the Russian party might become a base for anti-reform groups to fight against the CC CPSU.¹²⁶ The precise time when Gorbachev finally decided to establish the CP RSFSR was at the Politburo meeting on 3 May. At the beginning of this meeting Gorbachev appeared reluctant to establish the Russian party. He mentioned the possibility that the Russian party would dominate the CPSU, given its

¹²¹ *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: 11, 14, 16, marta 1990g.*, p. 188.

¹²² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 5, pp. 14-19.

¹²³ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 18 (May 4, 1990), p. 28. (TASS, April 22; Independent, April 23)

¹²⁴ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 21 (May 25, 1990), p. 21. (Pravda, May 12)

¹²⁵ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p.531; Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo, p. 684; Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Transworld Publishers, 1996), p. 352.

¹²⁶ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p.531; Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo, p. 684; Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 352.

predominant size.¹²⁷ However, many of the participants supported the establishment. Manaenkov,¹²⁸ Ligachev,¹²⁹ Gumer Usmanov, CC secretary,¹³⁰ Aleksandr Vlasov, chairman of the RSFSR council of ministers and a Politburo member,¹³¹ Egor Stroev, CC secretary and a Politburo member,¹³² Girenko, CC secretary,¹³³ and Yurii Maslyukov, chairman of Gosplan and a Politburo member,¹³⁴ and Primakov,¹³⁵ all basically supported the creation of the Russian party. Medvedev,¹³⁶ Ryzhkov,¹³⁷ and Boris Pugo, chairman of Party Control Committee and a candidate member of the Politburo,¹³⁸ thought there was no choice but to create the Russian party. Vitalii Vorotnikov, chairman of the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the Politburo,¹³⁹ and Lev Zaikov, CC secretary and a Politburo member,¹⁴⁰ were neutral. Yakovlev,¹⁴¹ and Frolov¹⁴² were a little negative. Given such a situation, Gorbachev judged that he could not resist the demand for the creation of the Russian Party.¹⁴³

The last meeting of the Russian bureau (9 June) mainly discussed, firstly, the social composition of the delegates to the Russian conference/congress, secondly, the date-schedule, thirdly, the naming of the Russian party. Gorbachev expressed alarm that the ratio of party workers among delegates had once amounted to 48-50 per cent and that it decreased by 44 per cent by the time of the meeting. Because such high representation of party workers was

¹²⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 10.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 13.

¹³² Ibid., p. 14.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 17.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 22.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 26.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 18. Zaikov neither supported nor criticised the idea of a Russian party itself.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 29.

unacceptable, it was proposed to invite 200 workers and peasants to the Russian party conference and 350 to the all-union party congress.¹⁴⁴ It was also proposed by Usmanov that some guests from other union republican parties be invited.¹⁴⁵ As to the schedule, the conference/congress was to take place in two stages. The problem was whether or not at the first stage the conference/congress would elect the Central Committee of the Russian party. Gorbachev proposed to elect only the first secretary at the first stage, and to elect the CC after the all-union congress, that is, at the second stage.¹⁴⁶ Concerning the naming, it was expressed that communists from the Chechen-Ingush organisations thought the name should be Communist Party of Russian *Federation* or RSFSR rather than Russian Communist Party. Prokof'ev also stated that the name should be the Communist Party of the RSFSR.¹⁴⁷

Finally the day of the Russian party conference arrived.

3. The Social Composition of Delegates to the Russian Conference and the 28th Party Congress

The Russian conference/congress began on 19 June 1990. The number of delegates was 2768 in total. Most of the delegates were elected from single mandate electoral districts (2020 in number or approximately 73 per cent). From multi-mandate districts were elected 257 delegates (9.3 per cent) and from the various party conferences, 491 delegates (17.7 per cent) were elected.¹⁴⁸ Thus, the party conference did not filter the delegates very much, though, as we have seen, some critics of the electoral procedure had been afraid of this. Nonetheless, the social composition of delegates showed a large increase of party secretaries in comparison with the 27th Party Congress and the 19th all-union Party Conference as Table 4-1 shows. In particular,

¹⁴⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 29, p. 4.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 16. See also TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 72.

¹⁴⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 29, p. 22.

¹⁴⁸ *Pravda*, 21 June 1990, p. 3.

the ratio of okrug, raion and city party committees secretaries rose enormously.¹⁴⁹

Why did the election result in such a high level of representation of party workers? Some argue that this was a result of the apparat's mobilisation. Gorbachev states in his memoirs about this result, 'The conference and, of course, the congress [of CP RSFSR] turned into forums of party functionaries of mainly raion and city teams. This was the result of elections in the process of which party apparatchiki organised vigorous pressure to simply make themselves delegates',¹⁵⁰ According to Hahn, the preparatory committee of the Russian conference was the main machine of apparat mobilisation. He says the committee was 'the traditional apparat filter intended to control the delegate election process from Moscow and ensure that party apparatchiki dominated the RCP conference.'¹⁵¹

This argument, however, needs some qualification. If the preparatory committee had been the only filter, the ratio of apparat among delegates would have been much higher in Russia than in other union republics. For comparison, it is necessary to investigate the social composition of delegates to the 28th all-union Party Congress.¹⁵² The 28th congress of the CPSU took place from 2 July to 13 July. The number of delegates was 4683 in total. The social composition of delegates to the congress shows that fewer full-time party workers came from other union republics. Party workers accounted for 40.7 per cent. In the Russian republic the party workers ratio was certainly higher (42.3 per cent) than that of other republics (38.3 per

¹⁴⁹ Incidentally, at the 28th Party Congress, Razumovskii was not elected CC secretary or a Politburo member. In addition, he had not been a member of the Presidential Council. Thus, his political life finished at the 28th Party Congress. It may be partially because of the result of the report and election campaign and the delegate elections to all-union party congress and the Russian conference, with which Gorbachev was obviously dissatisfied.

¹⁵⁰ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p.533; Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu*, Jo, p. 686; Gorbachev, *Memoirs* does not have the corresponding sentences.

¹⁵¹ Gordon Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 137-138.

¹⁵² *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz: stenograficheskii otchet*, Vol. 1, (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 182-184.

cent).¹⁵³ Thus, the mobilisation of the party apparat by preparatory committee of the Russian conference may have taken place.

Nonetheless, what was the apparat's method of mobilisation is not clear. One might expect that the party conference that elected the delegates became a filter because the delegate elections at the conference were, as we have seen in Table 4-3, frequently non-competitive. However, this is not the case. As Table 4-1 shows, at the 28th Party Congress the delegates from single mandate electoral districts were 2968 (63.4 per cent). From multi-mandate districts 497 delegates (10.6 per cent) were elected. From the various party conferences 26 per cent (1218 in number) of delegates were elected. This means that in the union republics except for Russia, more delegates were elected from party conferences and fewer delegates were from single mandate electoral districts, though in these republics the representation of party workers was lower than in Russia. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the party conferences that elected the delegates became the method of filter or mobilisation, even if some critics of the delegate electoral procedure had expected so.

Perhaps, contrary to the critics' expectation, the single mandate electoral district method was more favourable to lower level party workers. As Table 4-3 shows, the delegate electoral district (single mandate) consisted of one or two raions. This might have been better for party workers to exercise their influence. In addition, lower party workers had replaced old party workers in reports and elections since 1988 and had been newly elected. It was natural that such newly elected party workers became delegates.

Moreover, the 38.3 per cent representation of party workers in other union republics than Russia is high enough to assume that the same logic worked everywhere, which helped party workers in general to advance. As discussed above (see VIII-1-(b)), we can add the

¹⁵³ The figure 38.3 per cent was calculated by the following way: {Total party workers to the 28th party congress (1905)-Party workers to the Russian conference (1171)}/{total delegates to the 28th party congress (4683)-total delegates to the Russian conference (2768)}

following points that influenced the delegates' election. Firstly the CC open letter obstructed the Democratic Platform and its potential supporters. This was shown by the fact that the representation of intellectuals, who we may assume were the main component of Democratic Platform supporters, did not increase. Secondly, party workers' manoeuvring or 'apparat games' certainly took place. Thirdly, the workers and peasants were passive in the process. Thus, the elections to the Russian conference/congress and the 28th Party Congress resulted in a high level of representation of party workers.

However, it is a different matter to think that most party workers were conservative, which is assumed by many researchers. To investigate this is the task in the next sections.

4. The Election of First Secretary of the CP RSFSR

On 22 June the election of first secretary of CP RSFSR took place on an alternative basis. Valentin Kuptsov, head of the CC department on Work with Social and Political Organisations, was recommended by Gorbachev.¹⁵⁴ Other major candidates were Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of Krasnodar kraikom, and Oleg Lobov, second secretary of the Armenian CP.¹⁵⁵ At the first election none of the candidates received enough votes. Only 343 delegates voted for Kuptsov and 2278 votes were against him. Votes for Polozkov were 1017 and 1604 votes were against him. Votes for Lobov were 848 and 1773 votes were against him.¹⁵⁶ So a run-off election had to be held between Polozkov and Lobov. The final result was that Polozkov won a majority against Lobov (1396 versus 1066).¹⁵⁷

This was a difficult result for the all-union party leadership and was interpreted as the party apparat's conservative resurgence by many researchers. Nonetheless, the difficulty was not

¹⁵⁴ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p.536; Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu*, Jo, p. 691.

¹⁵⁵ Probably Lobov was one of guests from other union republican parties.

¹⁵⁶ *Uchreditel'nyi s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR: Stenograficheskii Otchet*, Vol. 2 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 169-170.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 187. Incidentally, Gorbachev mistyped votes for Lobov as '1056'. See Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p.538; Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu*, Jo, p. 692.

only because Polozkov was a well-known conservative figure, but also because Kuptsov, the very person recommended by the leadership, lost. He did not go even to the run-off. This was the meaning of a competitive party election. As had already happened at oblast' level, once competitive party elections took place, the centre could not interfere in the process any longer. This very thing happened in the largest and most important union republic. Organisational disarray was accelerated. In a sense, this was the climax of competitive party elections.

Was this, however, a conservative resurgence? To some degree, the answer must be positive. Still Polozkov did not win with an overwhelming majority. If every party worker had been conservative in ideological terms, Polozkov could have won with a first-round majority. The crucial factor appears to have been an anti-centre feeling among communists. It seems that they voted against the party leadership rather than for 'conservatives', that is, they preferred not electing Kuptsov to electing Polozkov. As we have seen, at least at the PPO level report-and-election campaigns had been taking place more or less on an alternative basis since 1988. It is not unlikely that while newly elected PPO secretaries felt responsible to their electorates, they were frustrated by their limited influence on the general party affairs, on the course of events, and on the party leadership. The debate at the 28th Party Congress will show this in the next section.

5. Controversy over Party Renewal at the 28th Party Congress

On 5 July 1990, the 28th Party Congress held section meetings. The largest section was 'Renewal of the Party', which became a place of stormy debates.¹⁵⁸ More than 1230 delegates participated in the section. The main speakers were Polozkov as chairman, Pugo, and Manaenkov.

However, ordinary participants were more vocal than the main speakers. The

¹⁵⁸ For the fullest discussion on this section, see Stephen White, 'The Failure of CPSU Democratization', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (October 1997).

traditional way of chairing did not work any more from the beginning. Many participants tried to shorten the time of Pugo and Manaenkov's speech.¹⁵⁹ In addition, due to participants' pressure, representatives of the mass media were allowed to enter.¹⁶⁰

The main points of debates in the section were the status of PPOs, vanguard or parliamentary party, democratic centralism, fractions within the party, and renewal of the party leadership. Many rather radical proposals were presented by various people. A construction engineer demanded that PPOs decide the structure of raikoms, gorkoms, and obkoms; that PPOs keep 80 per cent of collected membership dues; and that the Central Committee should consist of about 200 people and become a full-time organ. If such proposals were going to be approved, and if the minority's opinion was to be taken into consideration, democratic centralism could be supported.¹⁶¹ According to the head of the military of the North West military border, the crucial problem was the widening gulf between the leadership and party masses.¹⁶² The party secretary of Ivanovo energy institute stated that the CPSU had not become a 'political party' in a real sense to the present day; the party should become a parliamentary, rather than vanguard, party.¹⁶³ The party secretary in the central construction bureau of ocean mechanics in Leningrad said that neither the conference nor the congress but the Central Committee decided the most important questions.¹⁶⁴ An energy worker from Krasnoyarsk krai demanded to examine first secretaries at all levels and to change the name 'democratic centralism' to 'general democratic

¹⁵⁹ Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI) fond (f.) 582, Opis' (O.) 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 16. Hereafter the author intentionally introduces various reformers' speeches without organising the contents, because the author thinks these very assertive but not organised at all views were a main feature in this section meeting. In addition, the author does not mention speaker's name if they are not a high rank person, because it seems to me that it is not important to denote worker or PPO secretaries' names in this context.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp. 21-22. 'Party secretary' hereafter in this section denotes a PPO or workshop party organisation secretary, if not specifically noted.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

centralism'.¹⁶⁵ The head of the military history institute of the Defence Ministry stated that if a party referendum would not act as before, they would face the risk of degeneration into a 'secretaries' party'.¹⁶⁶ The deputy head of the faculty of Novosibirsk higher military political school proposed to elect congress delegates by secret, competitive, and direct ballot; but he denied other platforms and fractions except for the CC platform.¹⁶⁷ The general director of a science-production combine from Moscow called for the renewal of 90 per cent of the party leadership and to change the raikom and gorkom plenum into the council of PPO secretaries.¹⁶⁸ The head of a department of scientific research institute in Moscow said, 'maybe ... the CPSU—this is the PPOs. PPOs are the very party, not its basis;' and he proposed to change the name 'democratic centralism' to 'democratic unity'.¹⁶⁹ The party secretary of a chemical factory asked for the election, from below, from PPO secretaries to the General Secretary on an alternative basis.¹⁷⁰ The party secretary of a trust from Kazakhstan asked to elect the Central Committee from electoral districts.¹⁷¹ The party secretary of a metallurgy production combine proposed to abolish the obkom apparat, leaving the raikom and republican party apparat.¹⁷² The head constructor of a production combine in Khar'kov said, 'millions of communists ... are not attracted because they do not have any influence on party policy making.'¹⁷³ A party veteran of Oktyabr' raion of Moscow city supported the idea of the council of PPO secretaries and shrinking the raikom apparat.¹⁷⁴ The party secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo cotton spinning combine in Moscow oblast' asked that PPOs could retain 80 per cent of collected membership

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 44-45.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 66.

dues.¹⁷⁵ M. A. Mukhametov, first secretary of Sibai gorkom in Bashkir ASSR, proposed to create a horizontal structure in the party.¹⁷⁶ The deputy party secretary of Ural polytechnic institute demanded a series of rights for PPOs: to decide the PPO structure by itself, to summon electoral organs, to stop implementing the central decisions that do not seem appropriate for PPOs, to elect party congress and conference delegates, to call referendums at the raikom level, and to retain 75 per cent of collected membership dues.¹⁷⁷

From these speeches it is obvious that many participants, including PPO secretaries, were reform-oriented. In addition, that their frustration came from their limited influence on the entire party policy, state of affairs, and the leadership is clear too. It should be remembered that the party was not necessarily a citadel of conservatives.

Nonetheless, it is also impressive that they were frustrated individually. That is, though their demands certainly had some common elements, they did not organise them beforehand. For example, some demanded that PPOs could keep at least 50 per cent of membership due, others demanded 75 per cent and others 80 per cent. Thus, the final decisions at the party congress inevitably became the product of compromise.

6. Elections at the 28th Party Congress

Before seeing some congress resolutions, let us consider elections at the party congress. The 28th Party Congress held some elections, including General Secretary, deputy General Secretary, the Central Committee. Although the General Secretary election was certainly competitive, the candidate other than Gorbachev was less well-known, therefore it cannot be said that this election was important (nonetheless it should be remembered that

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 77-78.

Gorbachev received 1116 'against' votes).¹⁷⁸ An important election was that of deputy secretary. The main candidates were Ligachev and Ivashko. The result was a little surprising. Ivashko got 3109 positive votes and 1309 against votes. Ligachev received only 776 positive votes and 3642 delegates voted against him.¹⁷⁹ This was a humiliating defeat for Ligachev. If all party workers had been conservatives, Ligachev, a famous conservative figure, would have won. Here we can recognise again that congress delegates were not necessarily 'conservative' but anti-centre or anti-current leadership. This can be understood from the fact that a radical proposal to directly elect the Politburo and Secretariat from the party congress rather than from the Central Committee was rejected by a very narrow margin of 87 votes (1959 delegates voted for and 2046 were against).¹⁸⁰

The new Central Committee was elected by a rather complicated but not competitive procedure. The General Secretary and his deputy were *ex officio* members. For electing other members, two lists were prepared by the leadership. The first list included 311 members, in which five members were allocated for each union republic and further seats were filled by representatives for each 100,000 of their membership. The second list was a 'central list', which elected 99 members. The second list originally included 85 members but was supplemented at the congress. The congress approved these lists. In the end, the new central committee consisted of 412 members.¹⁸¹ The turnover rate was remarkable. Almost 90 per cent of its members were newcomers. Local and PPO level party officials, intellectuals and workers increased their representations. The younger generation was co-opted. Women's representation increased. More nationalities were represented.¹⁸² Nonetheless, this was not the Central Committee that

¹⁷⁸ *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii*, Vol. 2, p. 295.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

¹⁸¹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990-8, p. 3; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, *The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 203-204.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 198-206.

reformist party members wanted. It had not been elected on a competitive basis. The congress just modified and approved lists that had been prepared beforehand. In addition, the predominant majority had been determined by the first list. The congress could modify and supplement only the second list that included only 85 members originally. As Gorbachev said in his memoirs, 'because the predominant part of future CC members were represented by delegates of union republics, the struggles for these posts had ended before the congress.'¹⁸³ This was a product of compromise like the congress resolutions that we will see in the next section.

7. Decisions on the Competitive Election and Party Renewal

The 28th Party Congress approved the platform which turned into the 'Programmatic Declaration' and the new party Rules. Let me consider some points regarding party election and renewal.

Concerning intra-party *nomenklatura*, the final decisions at the 28th congress called for the abolition of the *nomenklatura* approach.¹⁸⁴ The Programmatic Declaration stated, 'In its cadre work, the party repudiates formalism and a *nomenklatura* approach;' 'The congress favours direct and, as a rule, contested elections of secretaries of party committees and delegates to party forums, with a secret ballot and the unrestricted nomination of candidates.'¹⁸⁵ The new party Rules also stated, 'The party's leadership [and] executive control bodies are elected. They

¹⁸³ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 1, p. 561; Gorbachofu, *Gorbachofu*, Jo, p. 719.

¹⁸⁴ Regarding fractions, territorial base of primary party organisations, and departyisation of military force, the results were ambiguous. Though some of these issues will be treated in the next chapter, for more details see Stephen White, 'Background to the XXVIII Congress' and 'The Politics of the XXVII Congress', both in E. A. Rees ed., *The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo meguru Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU]', *Hogakukienkyu*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (February 1995).

¹⁸⁵ *Pravda*, 15 July 1990, p. 3; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP), Vol. 42, No. 37 (1990), pp. 20-21.

are elected by secret ballot. The ballot includes any number of candidates.’¹⁸⁶ Thus, basically the reformers’ demand were realised on this point. Still, the word ‘favour’ and ‘as a rule’ were ambiguous. Thus, some problems were left.

The Programmatic Declaration rejected ‘democratic centralism in the form it took under the administrative-command system’. And the minority was given the right to uphold its view.¹⁸⁷ However, the new party Rules stated, ‘The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of ideological unity and party comradeship and the principle of democratic centralism’.¹⁸⁸ Again, this depended on one’s interpretation.

As to fractions, to organise ‘platforms’ was allowed by the Programmatic Declaration and the party Rules.¹⁸⁹ However, the creation of fractions was prohibited by the party Rules. No clear distinction between fractions and platforms was made. The ambiguity was not overcome, because these two documents, overall, were the products of compromise. The fact that the congress failed to approve the new party Programme was evidence in itself of its compromise nature.

After the congress, the mass exodus of party members accelerated. Certainly some part of them left the party for pragmatic reasons. When the administrative function of the party was lost, joining the party was not a prerequisite of career promotion any more. It was natural for them to leave the party. Nonetheless, other part left because they were disappointed with the party reform. As we have seen, some delegates, including a number of party workers, were certainly reform-oriented. The compromising nature of the new Central Committee, the new party Rules, and the Programmatic Declaration did not satisfy such reformist party members.

¹⁸⁶ *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 1; *CDSP*, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), p. 15.

¹⁸⁷ *Pravda*, 15 July 1990, p. 3; *CDSP*, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), pp. 20-21.

¹⁸⁸ *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 1; *CDSP*, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), p. 15.

¹⁸⁹ *Pravda*, 15 July 1990, p. 3; *CDSP*, Vol. 42, No. 38 (1990), pp. 21; *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 1; *CDSP*, 42-38 (1990), p. 16.

IX. After the 28th Party Congress

1. Party Elections after the 28th Party Congress

As mentioned above, the Programmatic Declaration and new Rules committed the party to competitive elections. In October 1990, the CC Secretariat published the draft instruction 'On the Procedure of the Elections in the CPSU and Recall from the Composition of the Electoral Organs.'¹⁹⁰ This instruction was revised and approved at the January joint CC and CCC plenum (1991) as part of the 'Normative-Methodological Documents of the CPSU'.¹⁹¹ If these rules had been universally applied, all party elections should have been competitive.

However, these were not universal at all. Though there is no systematic data on party elections after the party congress, it is possible to estimate how vigorous the competitive party elections were. Although in August 1990 two competitive obkom first secretary elections (Krasnodar and Ivanovo) were reported, these were only part of them.¹⁹² This tendency continued until August 1991. In particular, in 1991 competitive party elections became fewer.¹⁹³ Some elections clearly mentioned their non-alternative basis.¹⁹⁴ Thus, it is not possible to argue that competitive party elections entirely replaced appointment from above, despite the Programmatic Declaration and new party Rules.

¹⁹⁰ *Pravda*, 30 October 1990, p. 3.

¹⁹¹ *Materialy ob"edinennogo Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta i Tsentral'noi Kontrol'noi Komissii KPSS, 31 yanvarya 1991 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 113-120; *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 3, pp. 19-22.

¹⁹² See, *Pravda*, 5 August 1990, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 16 August 1990, p. 2.

¹⁹³ Though the author tried to see all obkom level election results in *Pravda*, the author cannot deny that he might have missed some results. Nonetheless, the basic tendency of rare competitive elections can be shown. On competitive party elections, see *Pravda*, 2 September 1990, p. 2; 12 September 1990, p. 2; 18 September 1990, p. 3; 23 September 1990, p. 2; 6 October 1990, p. 2; 12 October 1990, p. 3; 21 October 1990, p. 2; 21 October 1990, p. 1; 27 October 1990, p. 2; 28 October 1990, p. 4; 4 November 1990, p. 2; 25 November 1990, p. 2; 29 November 1990, p. 2; 1 December 1990, p. 4; 2 December 1990, p. 2; 9 December 1990, p. 2; 24 December 1990, p. 2; 21 February 1991, p. 2; 1 May 1991, p. 2; 3 June 1991, p. 2; 4 July 1991, p. 2; 12 August 1991, p. 2; 19 August 1991, p. 2.

¹⁹⁴ For example, see *Pravda*, 28 September 1990, p. 2; 15 August 1991, p. 2.

In addition, from these elections we can understand one more important issue: the reason first secretaries left their posts. The reason 'in order to concentrate on the work of chairman of oblast' soviet' increased enormously.¹⁹⁵ When the party was deprived of its traditional administrative function, the post became less attractive for many first secretaries. Or, they could not understand the new function of the party as a 'political party'.

2. Intra-Party *Nomenklatura*

As inferred from these insufficient electoral attempts, the implementation and interpretation of the abolition of intra-party *nomenklatura* were mixed. The abolition of the *nomenklatura* approach was, it seems, related only to non-party posts. The meeting of the Secretariat of 30 August 1990 stated that the CC CPSU would confirm only leading party workers and also leaders of printing organs, academic establishments and scientific institutions within the jurisdiction of the CC CPSU, while it agreed to abolish *nomenklatura* posts.¹⁹⁶ In October 1990, Oleg Shenin, CC Secretary, reported on the reduction of cadre posts examined by the CC CPSU from about 15 thousand to 2 thousand, which included what was mentioned as party workers and so forth.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, according to their interpretation, the intra-party *nomenklatura* would be retained. This can be recognised by the last *nomenklatura* list that was disclosed later. It was proposed by the CC Organisational department, and included 945 members who were responsible for personnel work (the CC CPSU, CC CP RSFSR, CCC (Central Control Commission) CPSU, and CCC CP RSFSR) as the first group. These posts were entirely subject to the confirmation of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU. In the second group, 1882 posts (first secretary and second secretaries of CC CP of union republic, secretaries of CP RSFSR, first secretaries of republican committees, kraikom, obkoms, gorkoms of Moscow, Kiev,

¹⁹⁵ For example, see *Pravda*, 12 August 1990, p. 2; 25 August 1990, p. 2; 26 August 1990, p. 2; 2 September 1990, p. 2; 28 September 1990, p. 2; 10 April 1991, p. 2; 4 July 1991, p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ *Pravda*, 30 August 1990, p.2.

¹⁹⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 10, p. 6.

and Tashkent, secretaries of all-army party committee, party committees of KGB, MVD internal troops and railway troops, and also workers of apparat of the CC CPSU, leaders of organs of party press, party scientific institutions and the Lenin museum) were included. In this group, 1502 posts were subject to the confirmation to the Secretariat of the CC CPSU, which excluded 42 posts of responsible workers of the CCC CPSU apparat and 338 posts of the apparat of the CC and CCC CP RSFSR from the total of 1882 posts. This excluded part was subject to inspection of the sector of recoding and analysis of cadres of the Organisational Department of the CC CPSU. Therefore, the subjects of the CC's confirmation were 2447 (945+1502), which were a few more than the officially announced figure (about 2 thousand). As a result, this list suggests that, although the subject of the CC's confirmation in the *nomenklatura* list did reduce in size and probably the appointments to these posts were to be confirmed *ex post facto*, many party posts were still under the jurisdiction of the *nomenklatura* list.¹⁹⁸

3. The Attempts to Recover the Organisational Unity

From the above it seems that the party leadership, after the 28th Party Congress, tried to recover the organisational unity that had been lost due in part to the introduction of the electoral mechanism. As we have seen in the last chapter, the party apparat on internal party affairs had not faced such a huge reorganisation. Thus, the party leadership had the potential to

¹⁹⁸ TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen' 20, Delo 77, List 3-4, 7. This Fond 89 list did not have full post list of the second group. Incidentally, Hahn's account of this list includes misleading points. Firstly, he mistyped number of posts of the second group as 1182. Secondly, he does not distinguish Secretariat confirmation from the Organisational department's confirmation. Thirdly, he states 'Still subject to CC departments' "confirmation" --- second secretaries and secretaries of *partkomy* from union republic level down to *obkomy*, of *partkomy* of the army and public organizations, heads of *partkom* departments from union republic down to *okruzhkomy*.' See Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above*, p. 393. However, it is not the case. These were in sixth group in the list, which 'supposes the collection of brief directory-biographical information.' See TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 20, Delo 77, List 5. In addition this sixth group included responsible workers in social organisations, national economy, means of mass information, and so forth, which Hahn does not mention. It is unlikely that the party could claim its control over these organisations in August 1991. The problem of party control over the state was discussed in Chapter 3.

mobilise its power so as to recover party unity. Shenin played the main part in this mobilisation.

On 3 December 1990, the CC Secretariat approved a decision 'On the Orientation of Party Committees on the Questions of Strengthening the Organisational Work for the Stabilisation of Political and Economic Situation in corresponding with the Programmes of CC General Secretary, USSR President'. This decision attached a memorandum complaining of the situation in the party: 'The organisational work and control of implementation are extremely weak and propaganda in local mass media is not widely developed;' 'in several regions, given decisions are practically left without attention.' Thus, 'CC Secretariat notes that ... strict intra-party discipline, timeliness and consistency in implementation of targets acquire exceptional significance.'¹⁹⁹ In the draft of his speech at the meeting of first secretaries of union republican parties, republican parties, kraikoms, and obkoms, Shenin emphasised the interrelation of central and lower party organs. He stated, 'It is necessary to organise the uninterrupted work of party structures at all levels within the limitation of the precisely defined responsibility of each level.'²⁰⁰ The joint plenum of the CC and CCC in January 1990 approved the decision 'On the Organisational and Political Strengthening of Party Organisations'. This decision mentioned 'to reform the system of direct connection between the CC and party organisations.'²⁰¹ In July 1991, Shenin argued for the restoration of vertical relations in cadre work.²⁰² He was undoubtedly eager to recover the vertical structure of the party.

Of course, it is not clear that his attempts were successful. It seems that centre-republic relations never recovered. In particular the Baltic parties increasingly became independent. On the other hand, centre-oblast' relations in Russia would allow a mixed interpretation. Circumstantial evidence like uncompetitive party elections and the *nomenklatura* list seems to

¹⁹⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 13.

²⁰⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 2, p. 22.

²⁰¹ *Materialy ob''edinennogo Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta i Tsentral'noi Komissii KPSS: 31 yanvarya 1991 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 109.

²⁰² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, p. 6.

suggest Shenin's attempts to recover the vertical structure were somewhat successful.

4. Reform Movements toward the 29th Extraordinary Party Congress

While such attempts to recover the vertical structure were activated by the party apparat, reformist elements within the party kept trying to transform the party into a 'political party'. The agendas important to reform from within were the new party Programme, and fractional or platform activity in the party.

The new party Programme had been discussed since the 28th Party Congress. After the CC plenum in July, the draft of the new Programme was published in August. This document was very social democratic or 'democratic socialist' in its language, rather than communist. It accepted some form of market economy, various political parties, plurality of political opinions.²⁰³ The July CC plenum decided to summon an extraordinary party congress in November to December 1991, in which the new party Programme was to be approved.²⁰⁴ Probably Gorbachev intended to split the party with reformist elements at the extraordinary party congress.

Among such reformist groups, the most progressive movement was the Democratic Movement of Communists, which was successor to the Democratic Platform that had fallen apart. It supported social democracy, some sort of market economy, and splitting the party. Though the Marxist platform was more moderate than the Democratic Movement of Communist, they expressed a willingness to cooperate.²⁰⁵

Moreover, the first secretary of CP RSFSR, Polozkov, resigned in August. Kuptsov became the new first secretary. Because Polozkov had been under attack from both reformers and conservatives, his resignation itself did not give an advantage to reformers. Still the new

²⁰³ *Pravda*, 8 August 1991, pp. 3-4.

²⁰⁴ *Pravda*, 27 July 1991, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ For details see Dawn Mann, 'Divisions within the Communist Party Intensify', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 30 (July 26, 1991), pp. 4-5.

first secretary Kuptsov was more reform-oriented.

Under such conditions, it is clear that there was some possibility to reform the CPSU from within. At least, one could recognise that there was a rather clear cleavage over the new party Programme. Still it was too late for Gorbachev to take an initiative. This does not necessarily mean that the August attempted coup put an end to the reform effort. Rather the party had dropped into an unprecedented crisis after the 28th Party Congress. Since 1990 the party had lost 4.2 million members. In the meantime, the party organisations were disintegrating, and the party apparat lost confidence in its activity as we have seen in the last chapter. Furthermore, the party faced a financial crisis and its property was fragmented, as we will see in the next chapter. Probably the ideal chance of reform was the 28th Party Congress. Why did Gorbachev fail? Let us consider it as a conclusion.

X. Conclusion

From our discussion above, it seems possible to understand why the party reform failed at the 28th Party Congress. Firstly conservative resistance to reform unquestionably existed. The election of Polozkov as CP RSFSR first secretary was shocking to the party leadership as well as ordinary party members. The mood created by Polozkov's election led to a grave atmosphere at the beginning of the all-union party congress. The conservative reaction was undoubtedly a partial reason for the failure of party reform.

Secondly, the weakness of the opposition outside the party did not encourage the reform movement within the party. In the Polish case (1980), the 'Solidarity' movement pressed party reformers to organise 'horizontal structures' and competitive party elections. In the Hungarian case (1989) the opposition was weaker than 'Solidarity', but, it seems, stronger than 'Democratic Russia'. At least the opposition parties could seriously challenge the Hungarian Socialist Party, which led to its further reform. It is instructive that in Lithuania the communist

parties split up and more reformist parts survived as a social democratic party (the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party).

Thirdly we can see the weakness of the *organised* reform movement within the party. True, the Democratic Platform emerged. True, as we have seen, many communists, including PPO secretaries, were reform-oriented. Though their importance should be recognised, how well organised they were was far from clear. As we have seen, it is impressive that at the section of 'renewal of the party' at the 28th Party Congress, speakers were very assertive but did not form a united front at all. They offered a multiplicity of criticisms and proposals, but did not present a coherent alternative. In addition, it seems that 'reformers' in the party consisted of various kinds of people. While some were very radical, that is, seemed to try to transform the CPSU into a liberal-right wing party in a Western sense rather than a social democratic party, others were still loyal to 'democratic socialism'. Moreover, such reformers as the Democratic Platform, in my impression, could not get rid of mutual suspicion. It is well known that so-called 'Democrats' at the time in general failed to form a collective identity.²⁰⁶ It seems that this was the case with the Democratic Platform as well. Therefore, the Democratic Platform fell apart quickly. It also lacked a clear leadership. A series of famous figures were certainly included in the Democratic Platform. Still they failed to make a united front. This was one of the reasons why so-called 'Democrats' failed to command a majority at the 28th Party Congress. Probably the only possible way to organise the reformers would have been if Gorbachev had provided the leadership.

However, Gorbachev did not approach the reformers very much. There were two reasons. Firstly Gorbachev was personally very critical of the Democratic Platform, as we have seen (VIII-1-b). Secondly he had to manage the power vacuum. He might have had some chance to organise reformers at the 28th Party Congress. However, if Gorbachev had provided

²⁰⁶ See M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 81-93.

leadership for the reformers, the party would have split up and have lost its ties with the security organs. This was a too risky choice for Gorbachev, given the power vacuum that had been created by reform of the party apparat. As the author had argued in the last chapter, the Soviet political system went into the phase of the 'power vacuum' that was characterised by immobilism at the time of the 28th Party Congress. The Presidency established itself very slowly. Thus he did not have any other alternative power base than the party. If the party had split at the 28th Party Congress, the emerging chaotic situation might have become worse. It seems that this was a really hard decision for Gorbachev. He chose not to split the party, and this accelerated the rapid exodus from the party.

The attempts at party reform created unintended results --- 'unintended' if the hypotheses mentioned above (III) were the case. Thanks to party elections, local cliques became independent. The breakdown of old career patterns did not necessarily promote better 'political' cadres, and more democracy could not always resolve every problem. The party failed to become a political party and suffered organisational disarray.

While, on the one hand, the party lost its traditional administrative functions, it failed to find new functions. In the end, the party lost its *raison d'être*. After the 28th Party Congress, the mass exodus of party members accelerated. The party lost nearly 4.2 million members between 1990 and the middle of 1991. This exodus had a serious impact on the future of the party (see Chapter 5). What, then, remained with the party? They were huge property assets and ties with security organs. We will investigate further the party finance and property in the next chapter and party-military relations in Chapter 6.

Table 4-1: The Social Composition of the Delegates to the 27th Party Congress, 19th Party Conference, Founding Congress of Russian CP, and 28th Party Congress

	27 th congress (25 February-6 March 1986)	19 th conference (28 June-1 July 1988)	Founding congress of Russian CP (19-23 June, 4-6 September 1990)	28 th congress (2-14 July 1990)
The place of election				
Single mandate electoral district			2020 (73%)	2968 (63.4%)
Multi-mandate electoral district			257 (9.3)	497 (10.6)
The party conferences			491 (17.7)	1218 (26)
Ethnic groups	72	72	47	63
Total number of delegates	5,000 (100)	5,000 (100)	2,768 (100)	4683 (100)
New delegates (percentage of renewal)	3,827 (76.5)			3934 (84.0)
Women	1,352 (27.0)	1,258 (25.2)	173 (6.3)	344 (7.3)
Workers	1,705 (34.1)	1,638 (32.8)	264 (9.5) 841 (30.4) ¹	543 (11.6) 1,548 (33.1) ²
People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication	1,375 (27.5)		577 (20.8)	1,005 (21.5)
Workers in agricultural economy	872 (17.4)	866 (17.3)	235 (8.5) 353 (12.8)?	483 (10.3) 738 (15.8)?
Kolkhoz members			118 (4.3)	255 (5.4)
Economic leaders				Approximately 17% (796 in number)
Leaders of productive and scientific-productive combines, enterprises, building, constructive organisations and engineer-technical service	355 (7.1)	354 (7.1)	210 (7.6)	
Directors of sovkhoz	80 (1.6)	74 (1.5)	60 (2.2)	
Chairmen of Kolkhoz	116 (2.3)	108 (2.2)	75 (2.7)	
Scientific and creative Intellectuals		436 (8.7)	245 (8.9)	339 (7.2) ³ 392 (8.4)
Writers, prominent artist, honoured teachers, doctors	156 (3.1)			
Workers of scientific and higher educational establishment	114 (2.3)	175 (3.5)		
Workers of education		93 (1.9)		
Workers of public health		41 (0.8)		
Workers of culture and art		69 (1.4)	129 (4.7)	
Workers of mass information		43 (0.9)	34 (1.2)	53 (1.1)
Party workers	1,074 (21.5) 1,772 (35.44) ⁴		1,171 (42.3)	1905 (40.7)
Party activist in a broad sense		3,153 (63.1)		
Secretaries of the CC CPSU				12 (0.3)
Secretaries of the CCs CPs of republics, kraikoms, obkoms		290 (5.8)		242 (5.2)
Secretaries of kraikoms and obkoms			97 (3.5)	
Secretaries of okrugkoms, gorkoms, raikoms	570 (11.4)	537 (10.7)	421 (15.2)	1075 (22.9)
Secretaries of agrarian raikoms			250 (9.0)	
Secretaries of PPOs, shop party organisations, party groups	698 (14.0)	762 (15.2)		
Secretaries of PPOs			339 (12.2)	486 (10.4)
Heads and deputy heads of departments and instructors of party committees				90 (1.9)
Workers of soviet, trade union, and komsomol organs	682 (13.6)	629 (12.6)	336 (12.1) ⁵	

Workers in soviet			305 (11.0)	
Workers of trade union, komsomol, and other social organisations			31 (1.1)	
Peoples' deputies	3,376 (67.5)	3,119 (62.4)		2,737 (58.4)
Peoples' deputies of the USSR			113 (4.1)	276 (5.9)
Peoples' deputies of the union republics and autonomous republics				516 (11.0)
Peoples' deputies of Russian republic			126 (4.6)	
Peoples' deputies of autonomous republics in Russian republic			102 (3.7)	
Peoples' deputies of locals soviets in Russian republic			1,387 (50.1)	
Armed forces, ministry of internal affairs, KGB				More than 6% (281n)
Armed forces			183 (6.6)	

Sources: The 27th congress, *Pravda*, 28 February 1986, p. 5; *XXVII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz: stenograficheskii otchet*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1986), pp.268-271. The XIX conference, *Pravda*, 30 June 1988, p. 5; *XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz: stenograficheskii otchet* vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), pp, 132-134. The founding congress of Russian CP, *Pravda*, 21 June 1990, p. 3. The 28th congress *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, p. 4; *XXVIII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz: stenograficheskii otchet*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 182-184. The composition of party workers in the 28th congress, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 128. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Dai28kaitaikaiwo meguru Shomondai [Problems of the 28th Congress of the CPSU]', *Hogakukenyu*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 336-337.

¹ This figure is 'Workers' plus 'People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication' calculated by the author.

² This figure is 'Workers' plus 'People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication' calculated by the author.

³ This figure excludes 'workers in mass information' calculated by the author.

⁴ This figure includes 'Secretaries of PPOs, shop party organisations, party groups' calculated by the author.

⁵ This figure is calculated by the author from the sub-categories.

Table 4-2: Results of the Report-and-Election Campaign (1988-1990)

	1988	1989	1990
Number of PPOs	441578		
PPOs which conducted elections	441,531 (99.99%)	158,505	
PPO secretaries elected in the report-election meetings	441,531	163,261**	
PPO secretaries elected from two or more candidates	212,414 (48.81%)	70,004 (42.9%)	
PPOs which conducted election (in territorial party organisations)	398,278 (100%)*		310,133 (100%)
PPOs secretaries elected (in territorial party organisations)	398,575*		384009
PPO secretaries elected from two or more candidates (in territorial party organisations)	193,214 (48.5%)*		136,498 (44.0%)

**Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991-5 states both results of 1988 and 1990 report and election campaign. However, the 1988 result differs from the previously reported one in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989-3. Though it is not clear why this happened, probably the later figures exclude PPOs directly subordinate to the CC CPSU (e.g. PPOs in military organs).

**The number of elected secretaries was not the same as the one of meeting because of the changes of the structures of some party organisations in the course of reports and elections.

Source: 1988: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 3, p. 18; 1989: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 2, p. 67; 1988* and 1990: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 5, p. 70.

Table 4-3: The Results of Delegate Elections of Party Leaders

	Place of the election	Number of Candidates	Number of Voters	Number of Votes 'for' (%)	Number of Votes 'against' (%)
M. S. Gorbachev	Frunze raion, Moscow city (single mandate)	2	2953	1803 (61.3)	1126 (38.1)
L. N. Zaikov	Donsk city, Tula oblast' (single mandate)	3	4621	2833 (61.3)	1777 (38.5)
V. A. Ivashko	Solonyanskii and Tomakovskii raions, Dnepropetrovsk oblast' (single mandate)	2	3834	3681 (96.0)	150 (3.9)
V. A. Kryuchkov	Dzerzhinskii raion, Moscow city (multi-candidate, 12 mandates)	20	38840	30171 (77.7)	8249 (21.2)
E. K. Ligachev	Ivnyanskii and Prokhorovskii raions, Belgorod oblast' (single mandate)	3	3576	2852 (79.8)	708 (19.8)
Yu. D. Maslyukov	Frunze raion, Moscow city (single mandate)	3	3123	2032 (65.0)	1061 (34.0)
V. A. Medvedev*	Dokshitskii Lepel'skii raions, Vitebsk oblast' (single mandate)	1	4448	4005 (90.0)	441 (9.9)
N. I. Ryzhkov	Leningradskii raion, Moscow city (single mandate)	10	2493	1527 (61.3)	898 (36.0)
E. A. Shevardnadze	Kievskii raion, Moscow city (single mandate)	2	2838	2110 (74.4)	693 (24.4)
A. N. Yakovlev	Koroshenskii raion, Moscow city (multi-mandate, 6 mandates)	65	16838	10670 (63.4)	6051 (35.9)
A. P. Biryukova*	The Kyrgyz Party Congress (37 mandates)	37	937	867 (92.5)	70 (7.5)
A. V. Vlasov*	The Rostov Oblast' Party Conference (3 mandates)	3	982	933 (74.6)	249 (25.3)
A. I. Luk'yanov*	Kardymovskii and Smolevskii raions, Smolensk oblast' (single mandate)	1	3579	3438 (96.1)	141 (3.9)
E. M. Primakov*	Severo-Osetinsk Oblast' Party Conference (10 mandates)	10	534	527 (98.7)	7 (1.3)
B. K. Pugo*	The Dushanbe City Party Conference (6 mandates)	6	579	548 (94.6)	30 (5.2)
G. P. Razumovskii	The Latvia Party Congress (16 mandates)	29	404	347 (85.9)	57 (14.1)
D. T. Yazov	The Far East Military District Party Conference (10 mandates)	13	528	496 (93.4)	32 (6.0)
O. D. Baklanov	Science Production Combine 'Yuzhno', Dnepropetrovsk oblast' (single mandate)	2	3565	2855 (80.0)	627 (18.9)
A. N. Girenko	Genichskii raion, Kherson oblast' (single mandate)	2	3473	2997 (86.3)	476 (13.7)
Yu. A. Manaenkov*	Volovskii raion, Lipetsk oblast' (single mandate)	1	3026	2923 (96.6)	103 (3.4)
E. S. Stroeve*	Dolzhangskii, Kollnyanskii, and Maloarkhangel'skii raions, Orlov oblast' (single mandate)	1	3461	3420 (98.8)	41 (1.2)
G. I. Usmanov	Chistopol' city and Novosheshminskii raion, Tatar ASSR (single mandate)	2	2713	2083 (76.8)	619 (22.8)
I. T. Frolov*	The Chirkent Oblast' Party Conference (16 mandate)	16	733	726 (99.0)	7 (1.0)

V. N. Volotnikov and N. N. Slyunikov did not agree to participate in the delegate elections

Source: *Glasnost'*, 1990, No. 2 (21 June), p. 3.

* The person was not elected by a competitive election

Chapter 5 Financial Crisis and Commercial Activities

I. Introduction

After the 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev more or less succeeded in depriving the CPSU of its administrative functions, but failed to transform the party into a 'political party' as we have seen in the previous chapters. Therefore, I have argued that 'the party lost its *raison d'être*.' However, as Ronald Hill argues, the party was not only an administrative organ, but also an economic actor.¹ Its huge property assets and massive incomes from nearly 20 million party members made the party an economic actor distinguished from any other organisation in the Soviet Union. Certainly the party's economic role needs further investigation.

This chapter analyses the disintegration of the CPSU from a budgetary perspective.² Previous chapters have mainly focused on Gorbachev's attempts at party reform, on personnel matters and institutional changes. The budget has been scarcely researched.³ However, in general, the budget is one of the keys to sustaining any organisation. A more detailed investigation is accordingly necessary to understand the disintegration of the CPSU.

The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, the process of budget formation is

¹ See Ronald J. Hill, 'The Communist Party and After', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman eds., *Development in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 70; Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU: Decline and Collapse', *Irish Slavonic Studies*, Vol. 12 (1991), p. 101.

² The argument of this paper is mainly based on my previous article in Japanese. See Atsushi Ogushi, 'Sorenkyosanto Hokaikateito Yoinno Bunseki [The Analysis of the Process and the Cause of the CPSU Disintegration]', *Roshiakenkyu [Russian Studies]*, Vol. 31 (October 2000). However, the earlier article included some misunderstanding. Therefore, I hope that my previous opinion on this topic should be replaced by this dissertation.

³ Some exceptions that mention the financial aspects include Graeme Gill, *The Collapse of a Single Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, *The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. chapter 6; Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

discussed. I move on to consider the budget of the CPSU, then the origins of its financial crisis, and finally, the measures that were taken in an attempt to deal with the crisis.

II. The Process of Budget Formation

The prerequisite to discussing the budget is an examination of its formation, which became an object of controversy in the party's final years.⁴ Because the main income of the party budget was membership dues, let me primarily trace flows that were included. Figure 5-1 indicates these flows. It is clear that the Primary Party Organisations (PPOs) monthly collected membership dues from individual members and transferred the entire sum to a corresponding obkom or an equivalent party committee (e.g. kraikom). Obkoms distributed these funds and their own incomes (e.g. membership dues from PPOs directly supervised by obkoms, profits from regional party newspapers, and so forth) to raikoms and gorkoms within their territory and for their own use.⁵ In the Union republics which did not have oblast' level organisations (e.g. the Baltic states), PPOs directly would transfer collected dues to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC CP) of the Union republic. All of this can be inferred from the draft 'Instruction on the membership dues and financial economic activity of the CPSU' which appeared in *Pravda* on 30 October 1990. Although this document was prepared to change the old way of budget formation, if we compare it with the final version, it seems that the draft followed the old practice. The draft states 'Accepted sums of membership dues are *fully* passed ... to establishments of saving banks ... for their subsequent transfer to special current accounts of *obkoms, kraikoms, autonomous republican committees and CCs CPs of Union republics*

⁴ Unfortunately, my research on this point is limited. The argument in this section includes inferences from fragmented information.

⁵ See the statement of Gennadii Veselkov, chairman of the permanent commission of Central Control Commission (CCC), 'On Control for implementation of the budget of the CPSU and auditing of financial and economic activity' at that time. *Pravda*, 8 January 1991, p. 3.

...'.⁶ There is no reference to raikoms and gorkoms here. This statement was changed in the resolution adopted at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Committee (CCC) in January 1991 as follows: 'Accepted sums of membership dues are passed ... to the establishments of saving banks ... for their subsequent transfer to the special or current accounts ... of *corresponding party committees*.'⁷ Therefore, the flow of money from PPOs to obkoms would be evident from what has been discussed above.⁸

Although it is more obscure at higher levels, it seems that the CCs of Union Republican party organisations deducted some income from obkoms and redistributed it among obkoms. So, it seems, did the CC CPSU, that is, the CC CPSU deducted part of the incomes from the CCs of Union republican party organisations, and in the territory of the RSFSR, from obkoms⁹, since the RSFSR did not have its own party committee until 1990. This is suggested by the fact that Vladimir Ivashko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP at that time, reported to the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian CP that the Ukrainian party had transferred 48 million roubles in 1988 and 51 million roubles in 1989 to the CC CPSU. The amount of transfer, according to Ivashko, depended on the balance of the republican party's budget.¹⁰ It seems that the CC CPSU received more funds from well-developed party organisations like the Ukrainian and redistributed them to weaker party organisations, and so would the CC of Union republican party organisations do to obkoms within their republics. Nikolai Kruchina, Administrator of Affairs of the CC CPSU, stated at the 28th congress in July 1990 that the excess of income over expenditure of obkoms, kraikoms, and CCs CPs of union republics was transferred to the budget

⁶ *Pravda*, 30 October 1990, p. 3 (article I. 11). Emphasis added.

⁷ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 3, p. 48 (article I. 11). Emphasis added.

⁸ However, Alla Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, stated in the 28th Party Congress, 'Some party organisations --- mainly PPOs but also gorkoms and raikoms --- announced their refusal to transfer (fully or partially) the collected party dues to the party committees' accounts.' *Pravda*, 4 July 1990, p. 4; *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuzu: Stenograficheskiy Otchet*, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 220. This may suggest some gorkoms and raikoms collected membership dues. Still, it seems that my argument is basically accurate.

⁹ Hereafter I use the word 'obkom' includes its equivalents.

¹⁰ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26 June 1990, p. 4; FBIS Soviet Union, 1 August 1990, p. 79.

of the CPSU and directed into subsidies for the party organisations which could not cover their expenditure from their own resources.¹¹ A memorandum on the budget of the CPSU prepared for the 28th Congress in the summer of 1990 indicates that some party organisations did not receive enough income to sustain themselves, and that the CC CPSU covered their deficit by a subsidies from its own funds and redistribution.¹²

However, reported budgetary data did not show the redistribution. It was in fact impossible to recognise from the budget figures which party organisations received how much. This is because the CC CPSU compiled the figure of the budget from the sum of the Union republican parties and RSFSR obkoms without indicating redistribution. Let me provide a simplified example. If the CPSU had two Union republican parties, and if one republican party organisation's total income was 100 roubles and expenditure 120 roubles, and another's income 150 roubles and expenditure 130 roubles, then the CPSU's income figure would be 250 (100+150) roubles plus its own income, and expenditure would be 250 (120+130) roubles plus its own expenditure. The CC CPSU might redistribute to cover the deficit of the former Union republican party, but it would not be shown in the budgetary figures. This method can be inferred from the fact that Kruchina presented the budget of Communist Parties of 'Union republics' rather than the CPSU as a whole at the joint plenum of the CC and Central Control Commission (CCC) that took place in January 1991. In addition, he stated that the budget of the CP RSFSR was calculated as the sum of the budgets of republican¹³, krajs, and oblast party organisations together with expenditures to maintain the apparat of the CC and CCC RSFSR.¹⁴ Accordingly, redistribution was not reflected in budget figures and the income of the CPSU was reported as total membership dues plus other incomes. The real figures will help to clarify these calculations.

¹¹ *Pravda*, 5 July 1990, p. 5; *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza* Vol. 1, p. 232.

¹² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 91. An excerpt appeared in *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, 28 July 1990, p. 1.

¹³ At that time, 'autonomous republics' were called just 'republics.'

III An Overview of the Budget of the CPSU in its Final Years

It is possible to investigate the budget of the CPSU in the late period very fully if not completely with sources that are now available. Of course, budget information had been an important topic at party congresses before *perestroika*.¹⁵ Nonetheless, the *perestroika* period was the first time this topic was politicised. In February 1989, *Pravda* published an article on the party budget as a response to readers' letters, which itself indicated that the use of membership dues had become a politically important topic.¹⁶ In March 1990 Kruchina was interviewed on the budget. According to this interview, party income in 1989 was 2,568.9 million roubles and expenditure was 2,386.8 million roubles.¹⁷ Alla Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, presented slightly different figures on the 1989 party budget to the 28th Party Congress, in which income was reported as 2,695.8 million roubles and expenditure was 2,279.2 million roubles.¹⁸ Though the reason this discrepancy occurred is not clear, these two accounts do at least made it clear that the party's 1989 budget was in surplus.

However, the financial situation became worse after that. One party archive document shows that a Politburo meeting held on 22 March 1990 discussed a cut in expenditure.¹⁹ Table 5-1 shows the budget plan of 1990 submitted to the 28th Party Congress.²⁰ According to this, income would be about 2.7 billion roubles and expenditure about 2.1 billion roubles. Nonetheless, in this plan the problem of a deficit was not ignored; it stated that the sharp fall in

¹⁴ *Pravda*, 6 February 1991, p. 4.

¹⁵ Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, *The Soviet Communist Party*, 3rd ed. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 57.

¹⁶ 'Tainaya li kassa?' *Pravda*, 10 February 1989, p. 3.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 3.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, 4 July 1990, p. 4; *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuzu* Vol. 1, p. 219 (income), p. 222 (expenditure).

¹⁹ Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, delo (d.) 88, page (p.) 1.

²⁰ As tables 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5 show, the details of the budget of 1990 were changed several times.

income that had already occurred would lead to a deficit of 1.6 billion roubles.²¹ The problem is whether or not the plan was correctly fulfilled. It is possible to trace the process of implementation through party documents. Table 5-2 shows the implementation for a half-year period.²² This indicates that during the first half of 1990 the plan was fulfilled relatively well, though Kruchina mentioned the decrease in income from membership dues.²³ Taking into account the fact that the mass exodus from the party accelerated after the 28th congress, one might assume that the plan had worked well during its first year. The final implementation is shown in table 5-3. First of all, it is necessary to notice that the plan itself was modified: the income target of 1990 was significantly reduced from about 2.7 billion roubles to 2.36 billion roubles, the main reason for which was the change in expected membership dues. In comparison with the first half year's income (about 1.32 billion roubles), the final income in the year (about 2.28 billion roubles) means that the second half year's income was about 960 million roubles. During this year, in other words, party income had fallen by about 360 million roubles. Secondly, while the first half year's expenditure was about 930 million roubles, final expenditure was about 2 billion roubles without including the apparently unimplemented decision to assist Chernobyl' victims. In other words, in the second half year expenditure increased to almost 1.06 billion roubles (about 140 million roubles more than in the first half of the year).²⁴ This tendency is confirmed in some published comments. For example, in September 1990 Nikolai Kapanets, deputy Administrator of Affairs, indicated that the deficit

²¹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 93. An excerpt in *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta*, 28 July 1990, p. 1.

²² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 43, pp. 1-14. This document was presented on 21 September 1990 to Boris Pugo, Chairman of the Central Control Commission (CCC) of the CPSU, by Kruchina, Administrator of Affairs of the CC CPSU.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

²⁴ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 August 1991, p. 5. *Pravda* shows only total sums. See *Pravda*, 29 July 1991, p. 2. However, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* argued that this total sum included the unimplemented decision of 28th Party Congress to support Chernobyl' victims. Later *Pravda* responded that the financing for victims was implemented. *Pravda*, 12 August 1991, p. 1. The author cannot confirm which was the case.

would be 1.5 billion roubles.²⁵ It is clear from these comments that the party budget worsened considerably after the 28th congress.

In 1991 party finance went into crisis. Kruchina, in a speech at the January 1991 joint plenum of the CC and CCC on the draft 1991 budget of the Union republican party organisations, admitted that the party faced a huge deficit of about 1 billion roubles.²⁶ This budget was approved by the joint plenum.²⁷ The indexes of the budget of the Union republican parties are shown in Table 5-4. Several months later, the 1991 budget plan of the CPSU appeared as a resolution of the plenum of the CC CPSU that was held on 26 July, which projected that income would be 1,394.0 million roubles and expenditure 2,494.0 million roubles, that is, the planned deficit was 1.1 billion roubles.²⁸ Although this resolution did not show the details of these estimates, which were entrusted to the Secretariat of the CC CPSU for elaboration in the process of their implementation, a secret document, disclosed in the non-party press, shows these details (Table 5-5).²⁹ Since the reasons for the financial crisis will be investigated in the following sections, we may for the moment simply confirm that the CPSU was already facing a financial crisis before the attempted coup.

Of course, a financial crisis does not immediately lead to bankruptcy. The CPSU had reserve funds and huge property assets, including buildings which became an object of controversy between soviets and party in the same way in which the property of the communist parties of Eastern Europe had been nationalised during the demise of communist regimes in those countries. At a press conference on 12 December 1990, Ivashko, deputy General Secretary,

²⁵ *Pravda*, 14 September 1990, p. 3.

²⁶ *Pravda*, 5 February 1991, p. 4.

²⁷ *Pravda*, 6 February 1991, p. 6, p. 2. The draft of resolution is TsKhSD f. 89, p. 23, d. 3, pp. 1-3 and this draft was approved in the meeting of Politburo on 30 January 1991. See TsKhSD f. 89, p. 42, d. 31, p. 25.

²⁸ *Pravda*, 29 July 1991, p. 2. During the time between the January joint CC and CCC plenum and July CC plenum, some information on the budget was presented by party journals. See *Glasnost*, 1991, No. 9 (28 February), p. 7; *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1991, No. 7 (April), pp. 37-42.

²⁹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 August 1991, p. 1, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 15 August 1991, pp. 31-34, 16 August 1991, pp.13-16; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 28. Fond 89 shows more detailed items than *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*.

stated that the total property of the party was 4.9 billion roubles and that its reserve funds were 4.4 billion roubles.³⁰ After the attempted coup, the news that CPSU property was about 4 billion roubles in value was publicised.³¹ Although it is clear that the CPSU had enormous property, it was mainly in the form of real estate --- that is, assets rather than current income --- and it cannot be denied that the balance between income and expenditure had deteriorated sharply.

IV. The Reasons for Financial Crisis

1. Decrease of Membership Dues

Why, then, did this financial crisis happen? The first reason was the fall in the number of party members.³² Table 5-6 shows the changes in the number of members, which indicates the rapid fall that took place from 1990 to 1991. This was not because of a natural decline but because members were leaving the party, for reasons including their differences over the policy direction in the party. A massive contraction occurred after the 28th congress, as many party members were disappointed by the compromising character of its proceedings. Secondly, since the locus of power was shifting from party to soviets, deputies did not need to stay in the party. For example, over twenty deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet from L'vov oblast' and city announced that they were resigning from the party in April 1990.³³ In July 1990, Sylenko, a deputy from Khar'kov, reported that all deputies who were members of the Democratic Platform intended to leave the party.³⁴ Thirdly, many studies of career patterns have shown that

³⁰ *Pravda*, 13 December 1990, p. 4; *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 51 (21 December, 1990), p. 36.

³¹ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 36 (6 September 1991), pp. 80-81.

³² On the more detailed study of decrease of party members, see Ueno, 'Sorenpokyousanto'; Gill, *The Collapse*, pp. 153-154; Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, 'Soviet Communist Party Loses Members,' *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 20 (18 May 1990).

³³ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 15 (13 April 1990), p. 36.

³⁴ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 31 (3 August 1990), p. 34. This source does not state Sylenko's first name.

for many people joining the party had been just a necessary condition for appointment and promotion, and had not necessarily been based on a strong commitment to party policy. Therefore, when staying in the party ceased to be a necessary condition, the number of people leaving the party naturally increased.

This decrease of members not only meant its reduction as an organisation, but also influenced the party budget, since well over half of its income, at least apparently, consisted of membership dues.³⁵ Boris Pugo, Chairman of the Central Control Commission (CCC), reported in August 1990 that, during the first half of 1990, 370,000 members had left the party, another 150,000 had not paid their membership dues, and 250,000 had been expelled.³⁶ Oleg Shenin, Secretary of the CC CPSU and a Politburo member, reported in October 1990 that since the beginning of that year 800,000 people had left the party, but only 200,000 had joined, and that the party budget would face more than a 1 billion rouble deficit.³⁷ At the July CC plenum (1991), Gorbachev told that the party had lost 4.2 million members over the previous one and a half years.³⁸

What Pugo said above made clear that even people who stayed in the party did not necessarily pay membership dues. In addition, Pugo reported to a plenum of the CCC CPSU on 10 October 1990 that more than 1 million members were not paying dues, that 10,000 were paying incomplete amounts, and that many party organisations were holding them back for their own purposes.³⁹ Kruchina stated in his speech at the joint plenum mentioned above, 'The party does not receive a part of the income because some PPOs are slow to transfer funds to higher party organisations, refuse to pay for full-time party workers from their own funds, and sometimes spend them selfishly for purposes which do not help party work as a whole. In

³⁵ Some sources insist appropriation from the state budget was quite common. See Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 98-100.

³⁶ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 32 (10 August 1990), pp. 34-35.

³⁷ *Pravda*, 18 October 1990, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 18 October 1990, p. 31; *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 43 (26 October 1990), p. 36.

³⁸ *Pravda*, 26 July 1991, p. 2.

³⁹ *Pravda*, 12 October 1990, p. 3.

addition, the free-rider moods are growing; they keep demanding the increase of subsidies from the centre.⁴⁰ In March 1991 Gennadii Veselkov, deputy chairman of the CCC CPSU, reported that over 1.3 million communists were not paying their dues.⁴¹ The birth of the Communist Party of the Russian Republic made this problem additionally complex. Because the Russian Party was conservative in ideological terms, lower party organisations in the republic faced a problem in that they belonged to it. Some organisations refused to send their funds to the CC CP RSFSR, and considered whether to withhold payment or send their dues directly to the CC CPSU.⁴²

The change in the rate of membership dues also led to a fall in income. This rate change was agreed at the 28th Party Congress and was stated in the new party Rules. As table 5-7 indicates, the new Rules changed the rate from 3 per cent of 'salary' as a maximum to 2 per cent of 'income.' Kapanets explained this concept in an interview in September 1990.⁴³ Afterwards, the definition of 'income' was finally defined by an 'Instruction on the payment of membership dues and financial-economic activity of organisations of the CPSU.'⁴⁴ This 'Instruction,' a document defining the way to pay membership dues, and financial-and-economic activity which will be discussed below, was approved by the January 1991 joint plenum of the CC and CCC as part of the 'normative-methodological documents of the CPSU.' A draft had appeared earlier and after the approval a further explanation appeared in a party journal.⁴⁵ The characteristics of these documents on membership dues were as follows. Firstly, they precisely defined the concept of 'income,' which consisted of salary plus other bonuses, and rewards; that is, instead of a decrease in the rate, the range of membership dues was increased. Secondly, conditions for exemption from payment were strictly denoted. These

⁴⁰ *Pravda*, 5 February 1991, p. 4.

⁴¹ *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44.

⁴² *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 12 September 1990, p. 2.

⁴³ *Pravda*, 14 September 1990, p. 2.

⁴⁴ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 3, pp. 46-55.

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 30 October 1990, p. 3 is on the draft. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1991, No. 13 (July), pp. 22-27 is on the further explanation.

indicated the central organisation's wish to collect membership dues by all possible means.

The new instruction caused confusion in local organisations. One letter on 30 April 1991 from members of the party bureau of a PPO in Orel oblast's statistical administration to the Organisational Department of the CC CPSU explained that they considered some articles of the 'Instruction' were not appropriate to their circumstances. Although their understanding of 'income' excluded state tax and charitable payments, the 'Instruction' appeared to provide for deduction of dues from total income including state tax and charitable payments. This was considered, according to the letter, by rank-and-file communists, who took the view that the party leadership was interested in collecting as much dues as possible and in maintaining the comfortable conditions of full-time party workers; some members left the party because of it. It was necessary, they claimed, to persuade the mass of communists and explain the aims and the amount needed; then 'in a word, we consider this norm of the instruction is not acceptable.'⁴⁶

This antagonistic feeling toward the centre must have been pervasive since the non-payment of membership dues increased very rapidly. Table 5-2 indicates that the income from membership dues was about 800 million roubles in the first half year for 1990 and Table 5-3 shows that the final income from membership dues was about 1.25 billion. That is, the second half year's income from dues in 1990 was only about 450 million roubles, nearly half of the first! Budget plans of 1991 (Table 5-5) were also based on the expectation of a decrease from about 1.3 billion roubles to about 930 million roubles.

2. Decline of Publishing Activity

A decrease in profits from publishing activity as well as membership dues contributed to the financial crisis. Publishing activity suffered in general at that time. This hit party presses as well as others. For example, *Pravda* lost subscribers from 6,870,100 in January 1990 to

⁴⁶ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 11, d. 184. pp. 1-4. See also White, 'Communists and their party in the Late Soviet Period', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (October 1994), p. 658.

504,800 in October.⁴⁷ As Table 5-5 shows, the 1991 budget plan assumed that profits from publishing activity were likely to decrease enormously (its share in total income was expected to fall from 44.2 per cent to 20.6 per cent) and that it would in future need subsidies from the party. The reason for this decline in publishing activity was, firstly, that people were now able to choose from among alternative information sources, and secondly, that the severe economic situation prevented people buying newspapers.⁴⁸ In addition, the economic situation caused a rise in the price of publishing materials, which added to the decline.

V. Reconstruction of the Budget I: Structural Change of Budget Formation

Thus, the party faced a financial crisis and tried to reconstruct the party budget accordingly. The first method to do this was to restrict expenditure. There was a proposal to cut expenditure on 22 March 1990 at a Politburo meeting, though the details of this proposal are not clear.⁴⁹ In addition, it is well known that a mass reduction in the party apparat was attempted by Gorbachev during the *perestroika* period whose purpose was not to cut expenditures as much, but to prevent *podmena* or a substitution of the state function by the party and to concentrate on political activities as I have argued in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, this might be regarded as a helpful step towards reducing expenditure. In fact, one of the major reasons for the arrears of membership dues, as we have seen, was that rank-and-file party members did not want to support full-time workers by their contributions. However, the effect of the apparat reduction was minimal at most or even the opposite. Kruchina reported accordingly in a document of 15 October 1990, which circulated among secretaries of the CC CPSU and the Chairman of the CCC CPSU. According to this, regardless of the massive cut in the number of full-time workers, total expenditure on the maintenance of the CC CPSU and CP RSFSR apparat would increase by 9.15 million roubles or 22.6 per cent over 1990 because of the increase in social insurance,

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, 12 October, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 40 (5 October 1990), pp. 31-32.

⁴⁹ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 9, d. 88, p. 1.

meeting and other costs.⁵⁰ The other document of 15 January 1991 reported an increase in travelling costs to the Baltic countries.⁵¹ These increases in management costs offset the savings that might have been expected to follow the reduction in the full-time central apparat.

The more important method of expenditure reduction was structural change in the formation of party budget, particularly decentralisation of the right of budget formation. Firstly, PPOs were given the right to retain 50 per cent of collected membership dues, though, as noted above, PPOs had had to transfer the total sum of collected dues to obkoms. This proposal was offered by Gorbachev at the plenum of the CC CPSU of March 1990, where he stated 'In the context of democratic reconstruction (*perestroika*) of the CPSU, essential changes in the order of formation and expenditures of the party budget are foreseen by the draft of the party Rules. ... To leave up to 50 per cent from the sum of collected membership dues at their disposal.'⁵² Kruchina also mentioned this proposal in an interview.⁵³ This proposal was approved by the 28th Party Congress and included in the new party Rules.⁵⁴

Secondly, a transition to the self-financing of each party organisation was proposed and approved by the 28th Party Congress.⁵⁵ These new ways of budget formation were defined in detail by a document on the 'Mechanism of formation, implementation and control of the budget of the CPSU,' a decision of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU of 8 March 1991 which prescribed the formation and use of collected revenues.⁵⁶ This demarcated the financial power of central and local party organisations; each Union republican party was supposed to be self-financing in the formation and utilisation of its own budget, which was made up of membership dues, profits from local papers and receipts from production-and-economic

⁵⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 42, pp. 10-16.

⁵¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 10, pp. 1-3.

⁵² *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 2.

⁵³ *Pravda*, 12 March 1990, p. 3.

⁵⁴ For the resolution on the party budget, see *Pravda*, 12 July 1990, p. 1. For new party Rules, see *Pravda*, 13 July 1990, p. 2.

⁵⁵ *Pravda*, 12 July 1990, p.1.

⁵⁶ *Pravda*, 28 June 1991, p.2; *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, pp.17-21. The draft of the 'Mechanism' is in *Pravda*, 17 December 1990, p. 2.

activities. PPOs utilised up to 50 per cent of their incomes; central funds were supposed to consist of profits from the central press, receipts from production-and-economic activities of the Department of Administration of Affairs, the dues of members who were outside territorial party organisations (e. g. the armed forces), and others.

These policies were considered to be one of means of activating PPOs and lower party organisations, and the leadership, it seems, intended that this should be the case. For example, Veselkov, chairman of the permanent commission of Central Control Commission (CCC) 'On Control for implementation of budget of the CPSU and auditing of financial-and-economic activity' at that time, reported such an intention in an interview, in which he responded to letters from communists who hoped that party organisations would be allowed to become independent in the resolution of their financial problems.⁵⁷

However, taking into account the fact that most expenditure was directed to the maintenance of lower level party organisations and PPOs, these policies can be regarded as another form of expenditure restriction. When Table 5-4 (the budget of the Union republican parties) is compared with Table 5-5 (the budget of the CPSU), the total deficit in the former is about 1 billion roubles and that in the latter it is 1.1 billion. Thus, the deficit of the CC CPSU was 100 million roubles. It is evident that most of the deficit derived from lower organisations. There are some references to financial decentralisation as a solution to the financial crisis. For example, the budgetary memorandum for delegates to the 28th Party Congress mentioned it.⁵⁸

How would lower level party organisations and PPOs act, given financial autonomy? Under conditions of a rapid fall in members and arrears of membership dues, each organisation faced a financial crisis. Naturally, they demanded subsidies from the central organisation. Ivashko, First Secretary of Ukrainian CP at the time, reported that only ten oblast' level party organisations in the republic (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Crimea, Lugansk, L'vov,

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, 8 January 1991, p. 3.

⁵⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 93.

Odessa, Khar'kov, and Kiev oblasts and Kiev city) made a surplus.⁵⁹ In October 1990 Shenin, CC Secretary and a Politburo member, observed that all party organisations needed subsidies except for two (Moscow and Leningrad).⁶⁰ In an interview in March 1991 Veselkov complained of the free-rider attitude in which all party organisations asked for money but did not want any interference in how they spent it and indicated that all party organisations would receive subsidies except for Moscow gorkom; for example, he stated that 70-80 per cent of expenditure would be covered by subsidies in the Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen party organisations, and four republics, two krai and six oblast' party organisations in Russia.⁶¹ Some of these demands for subsidies can be seen in the letter from V. Pymashevskii, a secretary of the Latvian CP, on 29 January 1991, which requested subsidies and more allocations from the centre since inflation had been accelerating and the Latvian Council of Ministries had decreed an increase in salaries. Responding to this demand meant an increase in expenditure. While the Department of Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU asked for party workers in state organisations and enterprises to be paid by each organisation, it accepted on 18 February 1991 that full-time party workers should be paid from the party budget.⁶² Since this case was likely to have been more urgent than other requests, how pervasive this response was cannot be clarified. If this case was more general, subsidies must have been correspondingly larger.

⁵⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26 June 1990, p. 4; FBIS Soviet Union, 1 August 1990, p. 79. Graeme Gill's account on this point is misleading. Firstly, he miscounts party organisations as 11. Secondly, he writes as if the '11' party organisations made profits at the all-union level. However, Ivashko was First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP at that time and stated this at the 28th Ukrainian CP congress. Therefore, it is natural to think his report concerned only the Ukrainian republic. See Gill, *The Collapse*, p. 155.

⁶⁰ FBIS Soviet Union, 18 October 1990, p. 31; *RL/Report on the USSR*, 2-43 (26 October 1990), p. 36. Shenin's statement, it seems, excluded oblast' level party organisations in Union republics other than the RSFSR, since his report differed from Ivashko's statement mentioned above too much if it included them. These organisations in republics other than RSFSR would not be within the jurisdiction of the CC CPSU as Figure 5-1 shows. Incidentally, although Shenin did not suggest whether this 'Moscow' meant Moscow city or oblast', it would be reasonable to infer Moscow gorkom from Veselkov's comment. See the next note. In the case of Leningrad, it seems, city and oblast' organisations had been merged. See *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 9 (2 March 1990), p. 39.

⁶¹ *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44.

⁶² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 78, pp. 1-2. Ivashko's agreement was signed in 20 February.

Even so, it seems that subsidies and allocations were not enough, since party organisations began to disappear. The number of PPOs, which had consistently increased, declined in 1991 as Table 5-8 shows. Moreover, some higher party organisations began to dissolve. For example, Tomsk gorkom dissolved itself because of a cut in its apparat and a fall in income, though four raikoms in the city continued to work.⁶³ Even in a relatively well-placed city such as Leningrad the situation was serious. Boris Gidasov, first secretary of the Leningrad obkom and secretary of the CC CPSU, said at a plenum of the obkom that it was necessary to reduce the number of raikoms in order to manage the financial problem.⁶⁴

VI. Reconstruction of the Budget II: Increasing Income

The second way to reconstruct the budget was to raise income. For a start, the pressure to collect membership dues increased. In this period many calls were made for party discipline. For instance, Pugo declared at the plenum of the CCC CPSU in October 1990 that resolute measures to strengthen discipline and to overcome negative tendencies were necessary.⁶⁵ Veselkov mentioned the strengthening of party discipline in his interview of March 1991.⁶⁶ Both decisions on the budget of the CPs of Union republics and the CPSU in 1991 referred to discipline.⁶⁷

Another and more important method was commercial activity. Though this activity has often been considered entirely secret by some researchers, this is not necessarily the case. Many published documents and comments before the collapse plainly mention such activities. The memorandum on the budget of the CPSU prepared for the 28th Party Congress implied the

⁶³ *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 35 (31 August 1990), p. 33.

⁶⁴ FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, p. 95.

⁶⁵ *Pravda*, 12 October 1990, p. 3.

⁶⁶ *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44.

⁶⁷ The 1991 budget of the CPs of Union republics is *Pravda*, 6 February 1991, p. 2; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 236, d. 3. The 1991 budget of the CPSU is *Pravda*, 29 July 1991, p. 2. Though TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23 d. 25 is also on the 1991 budget of the CPSU, it does not refer to discipline.

importance of this, noting ‘more effective use of the existing material and technical base of the party for additional attraction of incomes.’⁶⁸ A resolution of the congress approved the party exercising its rights as a judicial person and rationally using them to strengthen its financial and material resources.⁶⁹ Kapanets made clear in an interview that party committees should actively engage in entrepreneurial activity, utilise their material basis to achieve these aims, and create joint enterprises including participation in foreign partnership and associations.⁷⁰ Gidasov, similarly, mentioned the importance of commercial entrepreneurial activity at a plenum of the Leningrad obkom.⁷¹ Pugo also referred to the need to develop enterprise activity and new sources of income at the plenum of October 1990.⁷² In December 1990, Ivashko reiterated at a press conference that earning money was not prohibited and announced that a special committee on financial and economic activity had been created, though enterprise activity was to be implemented in accordance with laws and party principles.⁷³ Both the ‘Instruction’ and ‘Mechanism’ devoted much attention to financial economic activity. Especially in the ‘Instruction’ there were many changes between the draft and final resolution, which would suggest controversy around this problem.⁷⁴ The resolution on the budget of the CPs of Union republics envisaged greater income from production and economic activity and more effective utilisation of the party’s material resources.⁷⁵ Veselkov insisted on the need to develop production and economic activity though he said that the Department of Administration of Affairs had not yet engaged in this to a significant extent.⁷⁶ The budget plan of the CPSU in 1991 also showed the strong expectation that income would be increased by commercial

⁶⁸ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 93.

⁶⁹ *Pravda*, 12 July, 1990, p. 1.

⁷⁰ *Pravda*, 14 September 1990, p. 3.

⁷¹ FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, pp. 94-95.

⁷² *Pravda*, 12 October 1990, p. 3.

⁷³ *Pravda*, 13 December 1990, p. 4; *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 51 (21 December 1990), p. 36. The statement ‘earning money ...’ was published only in *RL*.

⁷⁴ On the draft ‘Instruction,’ see *Pravda*, 30 October 1990, p. 3. The resolution is published in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 3, pp. 46-55. The ‘Mechanism’ is in *Pravda*, 28 June 1991, p. 2 and *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, pp. 17-20.

⁷⁵ *Pravda*, 6 February 1991, p. 2.

activity.⁷⁷ After the attempted coup, Ivashko observed, 'you know that economic and commercial activity was recently allowed -- strictly within the limits of current legislation -- to party committees.'⁷⁸ From these published accounts, it is apparent that the party did not hide engaging in commercial activity and it is unsatisfactory to represent such activities as evidence of some sort of a scandalous party underground.

However, secret documents also existed. A secret decision of the CC CPSU (21 March 1990) agreed with Kruchina and head of the CC State and Law Department, A. Pavlov's memorandum that under the multi-party system, the party should expect an attack on its property from other parties. So, it recommended, the party should utilise its status as a 'judicial person' in order to protect it.⁷⁹ According to another Kruchina's memorandum of 11 May 1990, the CC CPSU decided to send some party workers to France and Italy in order to look into these countries' financial and economic activity.⁸⁰ The similar decision to visit Austria took place on 12 November 1990.⁸¹ On 23 August 1990, a document, 'On urgent measures for organising commercial and foreign economic activities of the party,' recommended creating an 'invisible' party economy in order to adapt to a new transitional environment based upon the market and multiparty competition.⁸² One document, 'Personal obligation to the CPSU,' suggests that secret commercial activity was carried out by entrusted people who vowed to carry out party tasks in any post and in any situation, not to expose their own status as an entrusted person, to keep financial and material means on behalf of the party, to return them on the party's first

⁷⁶ *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 2 March 1991, p. 2; FBIS Soviet Union, 7 March 1991, p. 44.

⁷⁷ *Pravda*, 29 July 1991, p. 2.

⁷⁸ *Pravda*, 30 September 1991, p. 3; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 43, No. 39 (1991), p. 16.

⁷⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 39, d. 29, pp. 1-9.

⁸⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 6, p. 1.

⁸¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 46, pp. 1-3. In this document, Kruchina asked an approval to send party workers. See Ibid., p. 1. Ivashko's agreement can be found on the same page.

⁸² *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 31 October 1991, p. 1. See also Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz, 'CPSU R.I.P.', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (22 November 1991), p. 5; Hahn, *Russia's*, p. 218.

demand, and to maintain strict confidentiality.⁸³ A meeting of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU on 11 June 1991 agreed the proposal on the development of the production and economic activity of the party.⁸⁴ Though the content of the proposal was not clear, after some modification it was sent to the Politburo. A Politburo decision on 11 July 1991 accordingly proposed production and economic activity to every party committee as a means to cover deficits and achieve a transition to self-financing.⁸⁵

In addition, the party leadership tried to hide the commercial activity. In April 1991, the Administration of Affairs responded a letter from secretary of a workshop party organisation in Omsk that was written in February 1991. In the letter, the party worker asked if or not the party engaged in a banking activity as was stated by a local soviet deputy. Kapanets denied any banking activity of the party and added that the production and economic activity was basically publishing.⁸⁶

There is only fragmentary information on these commercial activities and a full account may be impossible because of Kruchina's suicide.⁸⁷ Rather a lot of examples of the CC's activity are disclosed. The central party organisation leased vacant party buildings and rooms to associations, companies and so forth.⁸⁸ More important cases are the ones that the party invested in or created a commercial company. For example, on 29 August 1990 the CC Secretariat decided that the Administration of Affairs should undertake a joint venture with a West German tourist company.⁸⁹ On 8 October 1990 Kruchina wrote a memorandum asking to create a joint venture on the basis of Institute of Social Sciences under the CC CPSU. This was projected to utilise the property of the Institute (e.g. a dormitory) that had not been used.⁹⁰

⁸³ *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 7 December 1991, p. 1. See also Hahn, *Russia's*, p. 253. However, no completed form of this document was found. *Moscow News*, 20 (16-22 May 2001), p. 5.

⁸⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 7, p. 8.

⁸⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 28, pp. 1-3; *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, 1992, No. 1, pp. 7-8.

⁸⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 22, pp. 1-8.

⁸⁷ Rather a lot of examples are introduced by Handelman, *Comrade Criminal*, esp. chap.6.

⁸⁸ See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 186; p. 8, d. 17-19; p. 23, d. 1; p. 11, d. 8; p. 11, d. 27.

⁸⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 3, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 40, pp. 1-5.

Kruchina's memorandum on 15 October 1990 (circulated to the CC Secretariat) shows that he, taking in account an opinion of a branch of the CC Administration of Affairs, asked permission to establish a joint venture with a state consortium 'Ekoprom,' though the decision of the Secretariat is not clear.⁹¹

Some cases took place in cooperation with local party organisations. The CC CPSU with Leningrad obkom opened a commercial bank 'Rossiya', in which 30 million roubles (15 million roubles each were paid by CC and Leningrad obkom) were accumulated as start-up capital. The bank was registered by USSR State Bank on 27 June 1990.⁹² After its establishment, some negotiation between the CC and the obkom also took place. Although Gidasov, first secretary of Leningrad obkom, requested (on 27 September 1990) 500 million roubles at 3-4 per cent interest for 3 years as a deposit, Kruchina agreed on 22 March 1991 to send 50 million roubles for two years at a rate of 6 per cent interest per year.⁹³ There were more cases of the centre-local cooperation in commercial activity. On 20 August 1990 the Moldavian party organisation sent to the CC Administration of Affairs a memorandum requesting 10 million roubles in total for two years to finance their twelve (including six informal) joint ventures. Kruchina then sought permission to do so, probably from the Secretariat.⁹⁴ The Kazakh party organisation asked the CC Administration of Affairs to invest 100 million roubles in order to managing a commercial bank 'Kompartbank' on 13 February 1991. Kruchina then wrote a proposal to send the money to the 'Kompartbank's account in the condition of annually 10 per cent interest rate, though it is not clear whether or not this proposal was approved by the Secretariat.⁹⁵ On 14 June 1991, the Kyrgyz party organisation requested 7.5 million roubles from the CC Administration of Affairs in order to finance Chui obkom's commercial activity.

⁹¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 18, pp. 1-2.

⁹² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 21, d. 13, pp. 1-2.

⁹³ *Ogonek*, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), p. 4; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 15, p. 1. See also *RL/Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 42 (19 October 1990), p. 48.

⁹⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 19, pp. 1-3. Though it is not clear where Kruchina sent his memo, it is reasonable to think it was sent to the Secretariat, inferred from the style of this document.

⁹⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 84, pp. 1-5.

The Administration of Affairs allocated 4.9 million to the Kyrgyz party.⁹⁶ In Moscow, Yurii Prokof'ev, first secretary of Moscow gorkom, and B. Balashov, first secretary of Moscow obkom, proposed to create a joint-stock company, to which Kruchina agreed on 5 August 1991.⁹⁷

Some regional cases were also reported. In Perm', party officials created a commercial firm and began hotel management and a rent-a-car service.⁹⁸ Zaporozh'e obkom in Ukraine approved a proposal that a party committee in an automobile factory co-founded two small enterprises.⁹⁹ In Tatarstan, a liquor factory was managed by the party headquarters.¹⁰⁰

In addition, after the attempted coup, many cases appeared in the mass media. A joint-stock commercial cooperation received millions before the attempted coup.¹⁰¹ According to *Moscow News*, the topic of party money was featured more than seven thousand times by mass media.¹⁰²

While the first aim of commercial activity was, of course, to cover financial deficits, it had a second implicit purpose, as the secret documents showed, which was to protect party property against the soviets. Party officials knew the experience of East European communist parties in which their property had been nationalised after the regimes collapsed. Yeltsin claimed in his speech at the 28th Party Congress that people would react by nationalising party property if the party did not reform itself. This meant that his word, 'nationalise,' could function as a threat. The Democratic Platform, in fact, proposed to transfer all party property to the soviets.¹⁰³ One memorandum signed by head of the CC Department of Legislative Initiatives and Law Questions, V. Babichev, Deputy Head of the CC Organisational Department, Yu.

⁹⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 33, d. 14, pp. 1-3.

⁹⁷ *Ogonek*, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), pp. 4-5.

⁹⁸ Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', *Soviet Economy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), p. 75.

⁹⁹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 8, pp. 96-98.

¹⁰⁰ Stephen White, *Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 112.

¹⁰¹ *Moscow News*, 37 (15-22 September 1991), p. 7.

¹⁰² *Moscow News*, 38 (22-29 September 1991), p. 7.

Ryzhov, and Kruchina on 12 May 1991 argued strongly that the attempts to nationalise the party property were illegal, which shows that the party leadership was threatened by such attempts.¹⁰⁴ One document on commercial activity mentioned above clearly identifies this aim, stating, '[A]s the lesson of the communist parties of Eastern Europe proved, non-acceptance of timely measures on legalisation of the party property ... inevitably threatened painful consequences.'¹⁰⁵ The proposal from Prokof'ev and Balashov mentioned above also suggests this aim: faced with the threat of nationalisation of party property, 'Moscow gorkom and obkom of the CPSU together with legal experts and specialists conducted a series of conferences and meetings on the questions of securing the normal activity of party organs and preserving party property under the present circumstances. According to the opinion of legal experts, the only right decision is the creation of joint-stock companies of the private type with a change of property and transferring its own share to legitimate capital in the form of fixed funds.'¹⁰⁶ Thus, to protect party property was another important aim of commercial activity. In any case, both purposes of commercial activity can be summarised in simple words: to rescue the party.

VII. The Consequences of the Commercial Activity

The commercial activity, however, led to paradoxical results. Firstly, it caused a functional change in the CPSU from an administrative organisation to a commercial one by strengthening the position of the Administration of Affairs Department within the party. On 30 July 1991, the CC Secretariat took a secret decision, which allowed the Administration of Affairs to become an 'independent subdivision' of the apparat of the CPSU. With this decision, the Administration of Affairs was to be able to engage in commercial activity more vigorously

¹⁰³ *Argumenty i Fakty*, 31, 4-10 August 1990, p2.; FBIS Soviet Union, 14 August 1990, p. 32.

¹⁰⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11. d. 86, pp. 1-3. This memorandum was agreed by Ivashko on 13 May 1991.

¹⁰⁵ *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 31 October 1991, p. 1. See also Hahn, *Russia's*, p. 218.

¹⁰⁶ *Ogonek*, 1991, No. 46 (9-16 November), pp. 4-5.

by using the party property.¹⁰⁷ It seems that this decision shows that the party was becoming a commercial organisation by its attempts to protect its property, while losing its traditional administrative function.

In addition, secondly, these activities paradoxically caused the fragmentation of party property. That is, party property was taken over and 'privatised' by many individual party members, by enterprises including foreign ones, by local party committees and, probably, by foreign Communist parties.¹⁰⁸

On this phenomenon, two explanations have been presented. The first explanation is a 'conspiracy theory' which suggests that the party apparat engaged in commercial activity to enhance their private interests. It seems to me that this explanation attributes the problem to malicious intention too much. It tries to reveal how bad the party apparat was so eagerly that its description becomes more or less scandalous. The second explanation is neo-institutionalism, which is more theoretical and sophisticated. According to this, firstly local party organisations (agents) faced a financial crisis because of the devolution of budgetary rights and began commercial activity by utilising party property, which led to its fragmentation and a hierarchy breakdown (the equivalent of a run on the bank). Then, the central organisation (principal), on the other hand, realised this and tried to protect its property firstly by resorting to power against local organisations, and later by commercial activity. The central organisation, according to this, unintentionally gave local organisations incentives to increase their private interests by institutional change.¹⁰⁹

Although this explanation is at first sight persuasive, the temporal sequence of the neo-institutional explanation is not supported by most of the evidence. It overlooks the fact that it was the central organisation that commanded local organisations to engage in commercial

¹⁰⁷ TsKhSD f. 89, p. 20, d. 64, pp. 1-13.

¹⁰⁸ *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 31 October 1991, pp. 1-3.

¹⁰⁹ Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Solnick states that his argument on the CPSU is not intended to be rigorous. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

activity. Certainly, only a few statements appear to indicate local initiative. For example, in the 28th Party Congress's session 'renewal of the party' V. N. Shbev, second secretary of Lithuania (the CPSU platform) urged to start commercial activity, because of his party's desperate decline in membership.¹¹⁰ At a concluding address of the founding Congress of CP RSFSR, Polozkov stated that the party Rules gave local party organisations full independence in engaging in economic activity.¹¹¹ Gidasov stated at the Leningrad obkom plenum, 'There is no need to wait for some instruction from executive authorities of the CPSU on this matter [commercial activity].'¹¹² However, except for Shbev's statement, these statements can be interpreted as recommendations of commercial activity from the centre to local organisations that had not engaged in it yet. In addition, it was discussed that Gidasov conducted commercial activity in close cooperation with the centre. The 'Mechanism' defined the production-economic activity as relatively centralised.¹¹³ The secret document of July 1991 mentioned above might suggest that commercial activity was not vigorous at local level because, if a 'run on the bank' had happened, the centre would not have recommended commercial activity to local organisations.¹¹⁴ In addition, even such a local case as the Zaporozh'e obkom published in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* suggests that the centre recommended other lower party organisations to follow their way.¹¹⁵

It seems that both existing explanations use the wisdom of hindsight, that is, they speculate about the cause by reasoning backwards from the results. True, commercial activity caused the fragmentation of party property. True, this would entail certain illegal activity. True, many party officials consequently received benefits from commercial activity. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the people who directed and engaged in commercial activity seriously wanted

¹¹⁰ Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), fond (f.) 582, opis' (o.) 6. ed. khr. 16, p. 39.

¹¹¹ *Materialy Uchreditel'nogo s'ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), p. 133.

¹¹² FBIS Soviet Union, 27 September 1990, p. 94.

¹¹³ *Pravda*, 28 June 1991, p. 2; *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 7, pp. 17-20, esp. III, 'Organisation of control for the party budget.'

¹¹⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 28, pp. 1-3; *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, 1992, No. 1, pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁵ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 8, pp. 96-98.

to save the party rather than to make a profit for themselves. The very intention paradoxically caused fragmentation. In order to cover financial deficits and to protect party property against the soviets, they began to engage in commercial activity, and this made it necessary to transfer profits to individual members, enterprises and others for protection since keeping them in one place would leave them vulnerable to confiscation. When Yeltsin gave a final blow to the party, they realised that the entity they sought to protect had been fragmented and that the money had ended up in their own hands. Here we may be able to see the paradox between an intention and a result just as in Weber's account of the emergence of capitalism.¹¹⁶

Hence, Yeltsin's role was not to destroy the party but to fill the vacuum which had been created by the party's self-destruction. The following words of de Tocqueville would be true also for *perestroika* if the words 'July monarchy' are changed to 'party': 'So the July monarchy had fallen, fallen without a struggle, not under the victors' blows, but before they were struck.'¹¹⁷

VIII. Conclusion

Schumpeter once referred to the budget as the essence of the state.¹¹⁸ If so, the budget of the CPSU might be the essence of essences. The CPSU suffered a financial crisis before the attempted coup because of the fall in its membership, an increase in the number of members who did not pay dues in full or at all, and a recession in party publishing. The devolution of budgetary rights to improve the situation caused a rebellion in lower party organisations. Commercial activity that was originally intended to save the party led to the functional change

¹¹⁶ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 1992).

¹¹⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Recollections*, trans. by J. P. Mayer (London: Macdonald, 1970), p. 61.

¹¹⁸ Joseph A. Schumpeter, 'The Crisis of the Tax State', in Richard Swedberg, ed., *Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism* (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 100.

of the CPSU from an administrative into an economic organ, and finally the fragmentation of party property.

A radical change in economic relations frequently involves a huge cost in terms of violence. The apparat's independence as a 'bourgeoisie' made the collapse of the USSR, regardless of its scale, relatively peaceful.

So far we have seen the process that the party lost its traditional administrative function in Chapter 3, that the party failed to find a new function as a 'political party' in Chapter 4, and that the party changed its function into an economic organ, which caused a fragmentation of party property in this Chapter. We should consider the party's last remaining tie with the state organs and the final blow to the party: party-state relations and the August attempted coup in the next chapter.

Figure 5-1: The Flow of Money in the CPSU




Table 5-1: Budget Plan of the CPSU in 1990 (presented at the 28th party congress)

		(Thousand Roubles)
Name of income and expenditure		Approximate percentage (%)
<i>Income</i>		
1. Party membership dues	1,612,860.0	59.65
2. Deduction from profits of party publishing	1,075,840.0	39.8
3. Other receipts	15,000.0	0.55
Total	2,703,700.0	100
<i>Expenditure</i>		
1. Expenditure on maintenance of local party organs and party establishments	1,587,600.0	75.0
2. Expenditure on maintenance of central party establishments	28,700.0	1.4
3. Expenditure on apparatus of the CC CPSU	22,305.0	1.1
4. Expenditure on economic security of activity of the CC CPSU and measures for the acquisition and utilisation of means of office equipments and connections	18,195.0	0.8
5. Expenditure on maintenance of sanatoria and equipment within the jurisdiction of Department of Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU	15,900.0	0.7
6. Expenditure on acquisition of computing technology for party committees and party establishments, and on programming security	24,200.0	1.1
7. Expenditure on construction and repair of buildings of party organs, party publishing, and party establishments	378,800.0	17.9
8. Expenditure on financing of international activity of the CPSU, on the partial participation in publishing of a journal "Problems of peace and socialism"	10,450.0	0.5
9. Expenditure on holding the 28 th Congress of the CPSU	5,600.0	0.3
10. Reserves for covering unforeseen expenditures of local and central party organs	25,000.0	1.2
Total	2,116,750.0	100.0
Excess of incomes over expenditures	586,950.0	

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, p. 95. Percentages of incomes, total incomes and the differences between exceeding incomes and expenditures are added and some details are omitted.

Table 5-2: On the Implementation of the CPSU Budget over the First Half Year of 1990

(Thousand Roubles)

Name of income and expenditure	Approved in 1990	Implemented over the first half year	Implementation in %
<i>Income</i>			
1. Party membership dues	1,612,860.0	798,995.3	49.5
2. Deduction from profits of party publishing	1,075,840.0	512,217.8	47.6
3. Other receipts	15,000.0	10,735.4	71.6
Total	2,703,700.0	1,321,948.5	48.9
<i>Expenditure</i>			
1. Expenditure for the apparatus of the CC CPSU	40,500.0	16,069.9	39.7
2. Expenditure on the maintenance of local party organs and party establishments	1,538,900.0	709,730.6	46.1
3. Expenditure on the maintenance of central party establishments	28,700.0	13,540.8	47.2
4. Expenditure on the maintenance of equipments within the jurisdiction of Administration of affairs department of the CC CPSU	15,900.0	5,829.2	36.7
5. Expenditure on the need of Primary Party Organisations	43,700.0	15,705.7	35.9
6. Expenditure on acquisition of computing technology for party committees and party establishments, elaboration of technical conditions and programming	20,200.0	3,547.5	17.6
7. Expenditure on construction and repair of buildings of party organs, party establishments and party publishing	378,800.0	147,473.8	38.9
8. Special expenditure	25,050.0	12,157.3	48.5
9. Reserve for the party budget	25,000.0	2,568.1	10.3
Total	2,116,750.0	926,622.9	43.8
Excess of incomes over expenditure	586,950.0	395,325.6	67.4

Source: TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 8, Delo 43, p. 5. This document was presented by Kruchina to Pugo on 21 September 1990.

Table 5-3: On the Implementation of the 1990 CPSU Budget

(Thousand Roubles)

Name of income and expenditure	Approved with the consideration of modification	Implemented	Result	
			In thousand roubles	In %
<i>Income</i>				
1. Party membership dues	1,277,000.0*	1,245,835.9	-31,164.1	-2.4
2. Deduction from the profit of party publishing	1,043,360.0	971,019.5	-72,340.5	-6.9
3. Other receipts	40,000.0	67,944.9	+27,944.9	+69.9
Total	2,360,360.0	2,284,800.3	-75,559.7	-3.2
<i>Expenditure</i>				
1. Expenditure on financing the activity of local party organs and party establishments	1,210,340.0	1,197,819.3	-72,520.7	-6.0
2. Expenditure on financing the activity of primary party organisations of Union republics	372,260.0	370,359.8	-1,900.2	-0.5
3. Expenditure on maintenance of central party establishments	28,700.0	27,368.5	-1,331.5	-4.6
4. Expenditure on apparatus of the CC CPSU	22,305.0	18,617.2	-3,687.8	-16.5
5. Expenditure on economic security of the activity of the CC CPSU and holding of all party events	18,195.0	15,984.5	-2,210.5	-12.1
6. Expenditure to maintenance of sanatoria and equipment within the jurisdiction of Department of Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU	12,000.0	11,505.2	-494.8	-4.1
7. Expenditure on acquisition of computing technology, the elaboration of technical conditions, and programming	20,200.0	21,209.0	+1,009.0	+5.0
8. Expenditure to construction and repair of buildings of party organs and party publishing	378,800.0	364,570.4	-14,229.6	-3.8
9. Expenditure on financing organisational measures, conducting sociological research and inter party contracts of the CPSU	18,150.0	14,368.6	-3,781.4	-20.8
10. Reserves	25,000.0	12,267.5	-12,732.5	-50.9
Total	2,105,950.0	1,994,070.0	-111,880.0	-5.3
Excess of incomes over expenditure on financing the activity of party committees and party establishments and development of their material basis	254,410.0	290,760.3	+36,320	14.3
Expenditure on the decision of the 28 th congress of the CPSU				
Transferred from funds of the CPSU to realisation of health measures for children	500,000.0	---	---	---

residing in the accident zone of the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station				
Total on the expenditure part of the budget of the CPSU	2,494.070.0	---	---	---
Exceeding of expenditure over incomes recovered at the expense of insurance funds of the CPSU	-209,269.7	-209,269.7		-9.2

Source: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 August 1991, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union 16 August 1991, pp. 15-16. Although the item of approved membership dues (*) is 1,227,000.0 in the sources, it is a clear misprint and has been corrected.

Table 5-4: Budget Plan of the Communist Parties of Union Republics in 1991

(Thousand Rouble)		
Name of income and expenditure	Planned for 1991	Approximate Percentage (%)
<i>Income</i>		
1. Party membership dues	76,4345.0	84.2
2. Deduction from profits of party publishing	110,755.0	12.2
3. Incomes from production, financial-economic activity and other income	32,840.0	3.6
Total incomes	907,940.0	100
<i>Expenditure</i>		
1. Expenditure to financing activity of party committees and party establishments	981,460.0	49.9
2. Expenditure to financing activity of primary party organisations	482,180.0	24.5
3. Expenditure to construction of building of party organs, accommodation by partial participation, and to repair of housing	195,000.0	9.9
4. Expenditure to construction of object of party publishing	107,000.0	5.4
5. Financing of unprofitable publishing of party organs	9,300.0	0.5
6. Subsidies to publish newspapers of party okrugs, gorkoms, raikoms	193,000.0	9.8
Total	1,967,940.0	100
Resources of insurance funds of the CPSU directed to covering of deficit of the budget of the CP Union republics (Excess of expenditure over income)	1,060,000.0	

Source: *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 5, p. 71. Percentages are added and some details are omitted.

Table 5-5: Budget Plan of the CPSU in 1991

(Thousand Roubles)

Name of income and expenditure	Approved in the Budget of the CPSU in 1990	Foreseen in 1991	Changes from 1990 to 1991 in approx. percentages (1990---1991)
<i>Income</i>			
1. Party membership dues	1,277,000.0	927,200.0	54.1---66.5
2. Deduction from the profit of party publishing	1,043,360.0	286,780.0	44.2---20.6
3. Incomes from production-economic activity and other receipt	40,000.0	180,020.0	1.7---12.9
Total income	2,360,360.0	1,394,000.0	100---100
<i>Expenditure</i>			
1. Expenditure for financing the activity of party committees and party establishments of CP union republics, and development of its material basis	1,515,640.0	1,292,760.0	71.9---51.8
2. Expenditure for financing activity of primary party organisations of CP union republics	372,260.0	482,180.0	17.6---19.3
3. Subsidies for publishing the newspapers of okrugkom, gorkoms, and raikoms of the party	---	193,000.0	Non---7.7
Total expenditure on the budget of the CPs of Union republics	1,887,900.0	1,967,940.0	89.6---78.9
4. Expenditure for financing the activity of party committees and primary party organisations in the USSR Armed Forces	10,883.0	120,525.0	0.5---4.8
5. Expenditure for financing the activity of central party establishments	28,700.0	27,700.0	1.3---1.1
6. Expenditure on apparat of the CC CPSU	22,105.0	32,560.0	1---1.3
7. Expenditure for holding plenums and meetings of the permanent commission of the CC CPSU and other all party events, and economic security of the activity of the CC CPSU apparat	18,395.0	23,800.0	0.9---1
8. Expenditure for maintenance of medical-health establishments and equipment within the jurisdiction of the Department of Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU	12,000.0	26,300.0	0.6---1.1
9. Capital investment to the development and reconstruction of central party publishing material basis, central party establishments, medical-health establishment and equipment within the jurisdiction of the Department of Administration of Affairs of the CC CPSU	75,500.0	133,300.0	3.5---5.3
10. Expenditure on financing organisational measures, conducting sociological research and inter-party contacts of the CPSU	18,150.0	24,000.0	0.8---1
11. Expenditure for acquiring electronic computing technology and new models of office equipment, elaboration of technical conditions and programming	20,200.0	28,000.0	0.9---1.1
12. Expenditure for financing the activity of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU	----	4,300.0	Non---0.2
13. Reserves (for unexpected expenditure in	25,000.0	105,575.0	1---4.2

connection with price increases for material-technical resources communication services and so on)			
Total expenditure	2,105,950.0	2,494,000.0	100---99.9
Resources of CPSU insurance fund directed to cover the deficit of party budget		1,100,000.0	

Source: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 August 1991, p. 5; FBIS Soviet Union, 16 August 1991, pp. 14-15; TsKhSD Fond 89, Perechen' 23, Delo 25, pp. 3-13. Approximate percentages are added. Although Fond 89 shows more details of each item, it does not include expenditure items 2 and 3.

Table 5-6: Changes of Party Members

Year. Mon. Day	Member	Candidate Member	Total
1989. 1.1.	18,975,725	512,097	19,487,822
1990. 1.1.	18,856,113	372,104	19,228,217
1990. 10.1			17,742,638
1991. 1.1			16,516,100

Source: 1989, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 2, p. 138; 1990 1.1, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 4, p.113; 1991, *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1991, No. 11, p.31. The other figure is from Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyousanto Kaitaikateino Bunseki [The Analysis of Disintegrating Processes of the CPSU]', *Kokusaiseiji [International Politics]*, 104 (October 1993), p. 18. See also Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, 'Soviet Communist Party Loses Members', *RL/Report on the USSR*, 2-20 (18 May 1990), p. 2.

Table 5-7: Change of the Rate of the Membership Dues

Old Rule		New Rule	
Monthly salary	Membership dues	Monthly Incomes	Membership dues
Up to 70 roubles	10 kopecks	Up to 70 roubles	10 kopecks
71-100 r	20 kopecks	71-100 r	20 kopecks
101-150r	1.0 % of monthly salary	101-150r	30 kopecks
151-200r	1.5 % of monthly salary	151-250r	1 % of monthly income
201-250r	2.0 % of monthly salary	Above 250	2 % of monthly income
251-300r	2.5 % of monthly salary		
Above 300r	3.0 % of monthly salary		

Source: Old Rule, Graeme Gill, *The Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), p. 250. Translation is modified. New Rule, *Pravda*, 18 July 1990, p. 2.

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Table 5-8: Numbers of Primary Party Organisations

Year. Month. Day.	Number
1989. 1. 1.	441,949
1990. 1. 1.	443,192
1991. 1. 1.	426,226

Sources: 1989, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 2, p. 142; 1990, *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 4, p. 115; 1991, *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1991, No. 11, p. 32. See also Toshihiko Ueno, 'Sorenpokyosanto Kaitaikateino Bunseki [The Analysis of Disintegrating Processes of the CPSU]', *Kokusaiseiji [International Politics]* 104 (October 1993), p. 25.

Chapter 6 Party-Military Relations and the August Attempted Coup

I. Introduction

In previous chapters, we have seen the party had been 'dead' de facto due to the loss of its *raison d'être* and fragmentation of its property. Now we have to look into the final blow to the party. Three days that shook the world, the attempted coup in August 1991, became the final blow. Immediately after the coup failed, the party's activity was suspended by Russian President Yeltsin. There are many mysteries around the attempted coup even now. Firstly, why was the coup attempted? Some argue that it was for reviving the old, that is communist, regime. Others argue that the attempted coup was for maintaining social order. Secondly, what was the main organisation that attempted the coup? While a view that the security organs, especially KGB, played a leading role was advanced by many researchers, others argue that the party led the coup.¹ Thirdly, why did the coup fail? It is too simple to argue that the resurgence of 'civil society' beat conservative forces. Fourthly, what was the relationship between the party and the military under Gorbachev's reforms? All these questions are related to the role of the party in relation to the security organs. This chapter tries to answer these questions by analysing party-military relations during the final years of the *perestroika* period.

In order to consider these issues, it seems expedient to take in account three factors suggested by existing theories of military intervention. The first factor is structural. As Samuel Huntington argues, a military coup takes place when the political participation exceeds the political institutionalisation, which leads to a chaotic social order and 'praetorianism'.² Secondly, the leadership is crucial. According to transitology, a military coup is a failure of

¹ Note on terminology: I denote, by the 'military' or 'security organs', the armed forces, the KGB, some troops (railway, border and so forth), and the police or the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

² Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1968).

regime soft-liners.³ The third factor emphasises the organisational interest and unity of the military establishment.⁴ It is not my intention to decide which theory is better to explain the Soviet case, but to utilise these theories in order to help set research agendas for understanding the attempted August coup. The agendas of research are accordingly defined as follows: Firstly, as suggested by the organisational theory, Gorbachev's reform of party-military relations during *perestroika* should be researched to understand the split within the party-military establishment. Secondly, whether or not the chaotic 'power vacuum' situation led to praetorianism should be researched. Finally the political leadership during the attempted coup will be discussed.

II. Party-Military Relations before *Perestroika*

Before discussing party-military relations under Gorbachev's reforms, let us briefly consider the basic structure of their relations.

1. Theories of Party-Military Relations

When one considers civil-military relations, the relations are usually those of the government and the military. In fact, in formal institutional terms, the armed forces (Ministry of Defence), the KGB and the MVD were under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers (government) also in the Soviet Union. However, it is well known that the primary task of the Council of Ministers was to manage the economy. It seems that the Council of Ministers did not supervise these ministries very much. Therefore, in the Soviet Union, the party's relation with the military was of vital importance. How strong the party control was is a controversial issue.

³ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 24-25.

⁴ In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter add well-placed and professionally respected military officers as a crucial factor. Their presence, which means that the military is divided, makes the coup risky and less successful. See O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, p. 25.

There are three theories of the role of the party in party-military relations.⁵ The first theory emphasised conflicts between the party and military (a conflict theory). According to this theory, as Soviet military professionalism increased, the military required more autonomy from the party, which led to continuous conflicts. This theory is under the influence of the pluralist school in the Soviet and Russian studies. The second one suggested congruence rather than conflict (a congruence theory). This argued that the relationship was characterised as cooperation between the party and the military. Particularly in terms of ideologies, the military's philosophy was congruent with the party's ideology. The third theory (a participation theory) stressed interaction between the two organisations, but the party's priority was accepted. The military was active in bargaining in the military-specific spheres, but not in domestic governing spheres. We can return to these arguments in a concluding section after analysing party-military relations during the *perestroika* period. In any case, it is widely acknowledged that the party had controlling mechanisms over the military. Let me briefly argue the main ones.⁶

2. Controls over Personnel

The first controlling mechanism was the party's staffing (*nomenklatura*) system. The important posts in security organs were included in the Central Committee's *nomenklatura* list.

⁵ My research on this topic is limited. My description is based on the following literature: Timothy J Colton, 'Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union', in Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson eds., *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet military Politics* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1979); William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Condoleezza Rice, 'The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union', *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987); John W. R. Lepingwell, 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992).

⁶ Party control was not limited in the following four measures. For example, the Politburo discussed many internal KGB affairs like the creation of some sectors. See Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, delo (d.) 18; d. 111. In addition, the Secretariat approved the proposal of the KGB to changes in payment of salaries to staffs of the KGB in foreign countries on 16 March 1990. This decision asked the Council of Ministers to work out further elaboration. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 13, d. 48. One can add more concrete examples of other control measures. Still the following four measures seem crucial.

Thus, it was not possible to become a high rank military officer without the party's confirmation. For example, the Politburo approved the release of one general in the army from his post on 11 August 1989.⁷ Moreover, the Secretariat's confirmation of the KGB's personnel changes is recorded on 29 August 1989.⁸ In the armed forces, the party controlled the composition of the military councils of the military districts. The military councils were responsible to the CC CPSU, the government and the Ministry of Defence for the condition and the fighting preparation of the armed forces. The personnel composition of the military councils was confirmed by the CC CPSU. Moreover secretaries of the republican parties, obkoms and kraikoms participated in the military councils.⁹ The actual Secretariat's confirmation of the personnel changes of the some autonomous republican and oblast military councils is recorded in the party archives on 12 April 1990.¹⁰

3. Party Membership

The second measure was party membership. Most or all military officers were required to become party members. As Hough stated in the late 1970s, 'Almost 90 percent of all military personnel are party or Komsomol members. Officers seem to enter the party at a younger age than other college graduates ... and party membership seems to become universal among all officers past their mid-twenties.'¹¹ Once an officer became a party member, of course he had to observe party discipline.

4. Party Organisations in Security Organs

Although party members in any organisation in the Soviet Union, if they were more

⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 17.

⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 7.

⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 73, p. 1. See also Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 492.

¹⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 6.

¹¹ Hough and Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, p. 393.

than three, were supposed to form a primary party organisation (PPO), party organs in the military were somewhat stronger than in other organisations: in addition to ordinary PPOs at lower (up to battalion) level, the party controlled political organs in the military. At the centre the Main Political Administration (MPA) was organised, which supervised lower political organs that were formed down to regiment or sometimes battalion level.¹² Political organs supervised PPOs at lower levels. The MPA had its presence in the party's Central Committee as an equivalent of the CC departments. The political organs controlled line officers, and also were engaged in political education and propaganda work, including publication of books and journals.

5. The Party Apparatus

Finally, the party apparatus monitored the activity of the security organs. The CC Department of Administrative Organs engaged in monitoring. As the author discussed in Chapter 3, the party organised its apparatus so as to parallel state ministries. The CC Department of Administrative Organs mainly supervised the Ministry of Defence (thus Armed forces), of Internal Affairs (police), of Justice, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and the prosecutor's office.

To investigate what happened when Gorbachev's reform attempt changed these control mechanisms is the subject in the following sections.

III. Reform of Party-Military Relations at the Early Stage of *Perestroika*

In the early period of *perestroika*, the party-military relationship was not a primary subject of Gorbachev's reform. Some reform was related to internal military affairs, and foreign

¹² My description of the structure of political organs is based on Colton, *Commissars*, esp. chap. 1. See also Odom, *The Collapse*, p. 36.

policy rather than party-military relations.

1. Reform toward the 'Law-Based State'

The first military related issue was to arrange security organs appropriate to the principle of a 'law-based state'. It is well known that in the Soviet Union some acts of the security organs had exerted power above the law. The principle of 'law-based state' called for a legal restriction or at least a new interpretation of the law. This issue basically concerned the MVD and the KGB rather than Armed Forces, because the basic task of armed forces was not to sustain domestic order but to protect the country from foreign enemies.

For example, in December 1988 A. Pavlov, head of the CC State and Law Department, wrote a memorandum to Politburo members in which he, referring to Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia, asked that a group be formed to discuss the problem of a legal regulatory procedure that was necessary to introduce a provisional special administrative form in the case of emergencies, because there was no such legislative act. Then the Politburo decided to form a discussion group comprising some representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Internal Affairs, the KGB and so forth and entrusted it to work out this problem.¹³

From September to November 1989, a huge corruption case, which was related to former Uzbek first secretary I. B. Usmanhodzhaev, was investigated by the prosecutor's office. Usmanhodzhaev stated that he gave money to top party leaders, including Ligachev,¹⁴ M. Solomentsev, former Politburo member and chairman of the Committee of Party Control,¹⁵ G. Romanov, former CC secretary and a Politburo member,¹⁶ I. Kapitonov, former CC secretary

¹³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 8, pp. 1-8.

¹⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 8; g. 9.

¹⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 10.

¹⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 11.

and a Politburo member,¹⁷ and V. Grishin, first secretary of Moscow gorkom and a Politburo member.¹⁸ Then all of them were investigated and proved innocent. This case allows various interpretations. Firstly, they might have been truly innocent, but prosecutors hoped to present themselves as strong figures fighting against conservative leaders.¹⁹ Secondly, they might have been engaged in illegal activity, but they might have been strong enough to exert influence on the prosecutor's office. In fact Ligachev wrote a memorandum full of anger to a USSR General Prosecutor, A. Ya. Sukharev,²⁰ and Gorbachev.²¹ Romanov also wrote a similar memorandum to the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR prosecutor's office.²² Thirdly, some reformist sections of the party leadership might have tried to humiliate them, especially Ligachev. Though we cannot define which is the case, it is worth noting that such an active top leader as Ligachev was investigated.

As another step toward the law-based state, reform of the military courts can be indicated. On 18 January 1989 Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chairman, made a proposal to establish an autonomous military-judicial educational establishment and to widen the competence of the military courts. The Politburo positively responded to this proposal and sent the proposal to Dmitrii Yazov, Defence Minister, A. Lizichev, head of the MPA, Vadim Bakatin, Minister of Internal Affairs, and others for further elaboration.²³

2. Supports for the Military Control and Reduction

It is very well known that Gorbachev launched a 'new thinking' foreign policy that necessitated arms control and reduction. Early military reform included support for this policy.

¹⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 12.

¹⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 13.

¹⁹ Ligachev supported this argument. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 22. In addition, one party document strongly criticised these prosecutors. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 30, d. 13. This document was written by 'P. Nishanov' without his title.

²⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 22.

²¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 25.

²² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 24, d. 23.

²³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 7, d. 15.

Because this was not always related to party-military relations, a brief mention seems sufficient. The fond 89 party archive shows that the Politburo decided on 12 May 1989 in the name of the CC 'On the measures in connection with the 70th year of the MPA in Soviet army and navy', attached to which was Defence Minister D. Yazov's address. The address asked the MPA to implement the military reform, stating that 'the most important task is practical realisation of new political thinking in the realm of the country's defence ...'²⁴

Nonetheless, this policy caused dissatisfaction within the military. Still, at the early stage, such views were not advanced strongly, probably because the Soviet military had a tradition of not interfering in politics.

3. Renewal of Cadres and the *Nomenklatura* System

Just as in other organisations in the USSR, the renewal of cadres also took place in security organs. For example, in the KGB, one third of leading cadres were renewed and half of the workers in the post of the CC *nomenklatura* lists were appointed for the first time from 1985 to 1988.²⁵ In addition, a small modification of personnel controlling measures over the KGB and Defence Ministry was approved by the Politburo on 6 July 1989. The decision allowed the KGB and Defence Ministry to select cadres without taking into account the party membership, and asked to shorten the CC *nomenklatura* list of the KGB and the Defence Ministry. It was taken in order to improve the KGB and Defence Ministry's conspiratorial activity.²⁶ It seems, nonetheless, that the general picture of party control over military personnel did not change as a result of this decision. For example, though the Politburo, prompted by a memorandum of A. Soshnikov, the deputy head of the CC State and Law Department, decided to delegate the right to appoint the chairmen of the KGB of Union republics to union republican Supreme Soviets on 17 August 1989, chairmen were to be appointed by Supreme Soviets after the confirmation of

²⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 12, d. 23, p. 3.

²⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 51, d. 15, p. 10.

²⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, d. 38.

the CC CPSU and the CC of republican parties.²⁷ Thus, party control over personnel was secured *de facto*. Moreover, the party archives include party control over the personnel of the military councils. For example, on 30 March 1990 the Politburo, in the name of the CC CPSU, confirmed M. Burokyavichyus as first secretary of the Lithuanian party (CPSU platform). Simultaneously it was decided that he become a member of the Baltic military council.²⁸ Moreover, as mentioned above (II-1), the Secretariat confirmed the personnel changes of the military councils of some autonomous republics and oblasti in Russia on 12 April 1990.²⁹ In addition, the Secretariat decided to include the post of head of a newly established institution of the KGB, the Centre of Public Relations, into the CC's *nomenklatura* list and confirmed A. N. Karbainov as head of the Centre on 23 May 1990.³⁰ These documents tell us the party's control over military personnel did not change at the early stage of the *perestroika* period.

4. Reorganisation of the Party Apparatus

Reorganisation of the party apparatus took place in late 1988 as we have seen in Chapter 3. The Administration Department was reorganised into the State and Law Department. However, research into the internal structure of the State and Law Department reveals that no significant change took place in terms of personnel numbers, its jurisdiction and so forth. Thus, we can conclude that, at the early stage of *perestroika*, Gorbachev did not attempt to change party control over the military. More importantly, the party apparatus reorganisation in general created a 'loss of power' and a 'power vacuum' situation. It led to increasing praetorianism, which we will discuss later.

²⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 4, d. 12; f. 89, p. 9, d. 20.

²⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 76.

²⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 2, d. 6.

³⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 122. The establishment of the Centre of Public Relations of the KGB was approved by the Politburo on 10 April 1990. TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 111.

IV. Reform of Party-Military Relations at the Late Stage of *Perestroika*

1. Reform of the Party Organisations in the Military

(a) Decision of the Party Congress

Together with the establishment of the presidency in March 1990, article six of the USSR Constitution was amended in order that the leading role of the party be abolished. Under such conditions, party control over the military became problematic. In particular, the opinion that the military should be 'de-politicised' was advanced by many radical reformers, that is, they supported the abolition of political organs in the military. Most of the workers in the MPA and political organs, of course, opposed such an idea. The 28th Party Congress became a battlefield of the two groups.³¹ It was reported that delegates from military party organisations to the congress who put on their uniform gave a threatening impression. In the end, the result was a compromise. The new party Rules did not state anything on the MPA, which was previously an equivalent of the CC department. In addition, according to the new party Rules, party work in the military was to be carried out by the primary party organisations and elected party organs that were to work in close cooperation with the military councils, commanding officers, military-political organs, and corresponding territorial party organisations; an all-army party conference was to be organised in order to elect the party committee in the armed forces.³² The resolution 'On the basic direction of the military policy of the party in the contemporary period' asked to make precise the function of party organisations and political organs, but 'the Congress opposes the de-politicisation of armed forces'. Political organs should engage in ideological and political education rather than party work, while the party was to create and arrange its own

³¹ For details, see E. A. Rees, 'Party Relations with the Military and the KGB', in E. A. Rees ed., *The Soviet Communist Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Stephen Foye, 'Defense Issues at the Party Congress', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 30 (July 27, 1990); Viktor Yasmann, 'The KGB and the Party Congress', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 31 (August 3, 1990).

³² *Materialy XXVIII s"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 117-118.

mechanism in the military.³³ Therefore, political organs were to survive not as part of the party but as part of the state structure.

(b) Further Decisions

The implementation of 'de-partyisation' of political organs and the establishment of more regular party committees in the military were, however, far from a smooth process. At the end of the party congress, it was announced that Aleksei Ligichev was replaced as head of the MPA and that Nikolai Shlyaga was appointed as a new head. Shlyaga had worked in the CC State and Law Department, that is, he was a party official. This was regarded as a sign that the MPA would not surrender its ties with the party.³⁴ Soon after the party congress (on 23 July 1990), Shlyaga wrote a memorandum to the CC. He argued that forming party organisations in the military should be completed in the course of a report-and-election campaign after the adoption of resolutions 'The Regulation on political organs in the USSR armed forces' (see below) and 'The Instruction on the work of the party organisations in the USSR armed forces' (see below). During the transitional period, he proposed that it was expedient to preserve for political organs the right to select and place cadres, count the party membership dues, and so forth, that is, he argued that political organs should retain control of party-related work in the meantime.³⁵ A. Pavlov, head of the CC State and Law Department, and Yu. Ryzhov, deputy head of the Party Construction and Cadre Work, supported his proposal, adding that a similar idea had been advanced by political organs in the KGB and the MVD, on 26 July 1990.³⁶ Though it is not clear whether or not the Secretariat or the Politburo took any decision on this matter, the process of implementation of the new party structure suggests that Shlyaga's proposal was supported.

A memorandum dated 21 August 1990 (without signature) that was circulated to CC

³³ *Ibid.*, p.188.

³⁴ Stephen Foye, 'Soviet Army's New Political Chief on Reform of Military-Political Organs', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 2, No. 31 (August 3, 1990).

³⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 58, p. 2.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

secretaries showed the dissatisfaction in the MVD with the reform of political organs. According to the memorandum, V. Bakatin, Minister of Internal Affairs, and V. Karpochev, head of political administration of the MVD, submitted a proposal to create a new unified service section on the basis of cadre and political organs after the February CC plenum (1990). Although the CC State and Law Department and the CC Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work, supported the proposal, and submitted a draft of a decision to the CC CPSU for its examination on 16 July 1990, no decision was taken.³⁷ The memorandum indicated many other similar cases.³⁸ It demanded to make clear the precise position of the CC on the place of the party organisations in the system of law-enforcement organs and on the fate of the political department and political apparat of the MVD.³⁹

President Gorbachev, under such circumstances, took a further step toward the 'departyisation' of the military. He issued a presidential decree, 'On the reformation of political organs of the USSR armed forces, KGB troops, internal troops of MVD, and railway troops' on 3 September 1990. It asked the Ministry of Defence, the MPA, the KGB, and MVD to work out the draft of 'the Regulation on the military-political organs' within three months for the policy of the demarcation of the state and party functions.⁴⁰

The presidential decree aggravated party activity in the military. Even the self-liquidation of the party organisations in law-enforcement organs took place. Thus, the Secretariat decision on 16 October 1990, 'Questions of activity of party organisations in law-enforcement organs,' and its attached memorandum 'On the question of de-politicisation of law-enforcement organs' were the response to such a situation. They argued that party activity in the law-enforcement organs be allowed in legal terms, and urged communists in these

³⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 53, p.11.

³⁸ Ibid., pp.9-10.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁰ *Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1990, No. 37 (12 September), p. 908.

organisations to activate their work.⁴¹

The party had to accelerate the formation of the new party organisations in the military. The draft 'Instruction on the work of the party organisations in the USSR armed forces' was published on 25 October 1990, which defined the structure of the military party organisations.⁴² In addition, the Secretariat's decision 'On urgent measures in connection with a strengthening anti-army appearance in a series of regions of the country' (15 November 1990) demanded that the MPA work out measures to strengthen the discipline and unity of military collectives in the course of the forthcoming report and election period, and the formation of the new party structure in the military.⁴³

In legal terms, the reform of political organs and the structure of the new party organisations in the military were completed in January 1991. On 11 January a Presidential decree, 'On approval of General Regulations on military-political organs,' was issued.⁴⁴ With this decree, military-political organs officially became state rather than party organs. On the party side, the January CC plenum (1991) approved an Instruction 'On the work of organisations of the CPSU in the USSR armed forces'. According to this, the structure of party organisations in the military was to be similar to those in other organisations. At the bottom the PPOs were created by the general party meeting, and at higher levels the party committees were to be organised by party conferences. The party committees were to be autonomous and have the right to create their own apparat. The all-army party conference was to become the leading organ of the military party organisations, which was to elect the executive and control commissions, and establish the structure of the executive organs and members of their apparat. Party organisations in the military were to organise political work such as propaganda and

⁴¹ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 11, pp. 20-23.

⁴² *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2; FBIS Soviet Union, 31 October 1990, pp. 51-54. Incidentally, Odom misunderstands this instruction as a final decision. See Odom, *The Collapse*, p. 214.

⁴³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 68, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁴ *Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1991, No. 3 (16 January), pp. 138-140.

education of the party's military policy, theory of Marxism-Leninism and so forth.⁴⁵

(c) Implementation of Decisions

Then, the report-and-election campaign began in the military party organisations. After the plenum (on 5 February 1991), the Secretariat decided to send a letter 'To party organisations, and all communists of the armed forces, troops of the KGB, internal troops of the MVD and railway troops' to all leaders of the security organs and the MPA. The letter asked communists in the military, in the process of the campaign, to pay more attention to the concerns of military collectives, participation in cadre policy, ideological education, and strengthening the party's influence on military officials.⁴⁶

However, it can be recognised from some party documents that demarcation of the MPA and the political organs from the party and the creation of new party organisations were not smooth. In the process of the report and elections in the military party organisations, there was one difficult problem, that is, the position of full-time party workers in the newly formed party organisations in the military. The USSR law 'On Public Associations' allowed an interpretation that the term as full-time party workers in the military could not be counted as a working period in the military. It would affect the payment of pensions, receipt of an award for long continuous service and so forth. For example, on 20 November 1990 N. Nazarov, secretary of the party committee in the KGB, indicated this problem in his memorandum to the CC CPSU 'On the legal status of military service workers of the KGB who are joining full-time party work'.⁴⁷ Dmitrii Yazov and Shlyaga also raised this problem in their memorandum on 3 December 1990.⁴⁸ Three days later Yurii Manaenkov, CC secretary, wrote a similar memorandum to other secretaries. According to him, this problem caused serious concerns among military officers who had become full-time party workers. Then he attached a draft of a presidential instruction

⁴⁵ *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 3, pp. 56-59.

⁴⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 32.

⁴⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 72, pp. 14-16.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

ordering the Council of Ministers to take an appropriate decision.⁴⁹

The similar difficulty in implementing reform of the party organisations in the MVD is shown by a memorandum 'On several issues of party-political work in the system of the MVD' from A. Malofeev, a Belorussian party secretary, to the CC CPSU on 15 January 1991. He argued that 'in our opinion, an unjustified rush toward the abolition of political organs is there.' In addition, reorganisation of the political and cadre service, which had been publicised in the beginning of 1990, was prolonged, and the unified service on the work with staff had not yet been created. All these caused absentmindedness, lack of confidence in their activity, and resignation from their work among the staffs of internal affairs organs. Criticising the central MVD leadership that was removing party organisations from any influence on the staff, Malofeev indicated that the terms spent as full-time party workers in internal affairs organs were not to be counted as periods working in internal affairs organs.⁵⁰ This probably meant the same service continuity problem. On 4 February Boris Pugo, Minister of Internal Affairs, responding to this memorandum, demanded that the government suspend some parts of a related decree, and asked the CC to support his demand.⁵¹ I. Kovyrnin, deputy head of the CC Organisational Department, wrote a memorandum to support the position of Malofeev and Pugo on 7 March 1991.⁵² Though it is not known whether or not the Secretariat or the Politburo took a further decision on this matter, this clearly shows the considerable difficulty in reorganising the party organs in the MVD.

As suggested by the memorandum above, political organs began to disappear, and the party, which was supposed to have no further relations with political organs, showed anxiety. The CC Organisational Department sent a memorandum to the Secretariat, 'On the work of party committees on realisation of the CC Secretariat's recommendation of the strengthening to

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-6.

⁵⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 49, pp. 2-3.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 5-6.

fight against crimes' (without a date). The Secretariat decided to consider the matter and forwarded the memorandum to Luk'yanov on 15 February 1991. This memorandum negatively evaluated the presidential decree 'On the formation of the USSR Committee on coordination of activity of law-enforcement organs under the President' because it led to a campaign of de-politicisation or liquidation of political organs in the MVD. On the other hand, the Secretariat memorandum 'On the question of de-politicisation of the state and law-enforcement organs', according to the Organisational Department's memorandum, made it possible to suspend the atmosphere of liquidation of party organisations in the MVD.⁵³

In addition, even when the party committees in the military were created anew, it seems that the MPA kept some influence on them. For example, on 28 January 1991 a meeting of communists of Kemerovo garrison approved a decision to form a united party committee of Kemerovo garrison that was directly subordinate to the central military party committee apparat. They sent this decision to the CC CPSU, the central military party committee, the MPA and so forth.⁵⁴ Thus, it seems that this implied that the MPA was still related to party affairs.

In any case, the process of the report and elections went on. For example, the Secretariat approved the Organisational Department's proposal to hold a party conference of the Western Military Unit Group on 7 March 1991.⁵⁵ The party conference of railway troops was reported on 13 March.⁵⁶

The all-army party conference was held on 29 and 30 March 1991. Shlyaga, in his address, argued that the conference concluded the process of transformation of the party

⁵³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 9. Incidentally the presidential decree mentioned in the memorandum was issued on 29 January 1991 based on article four of the USSR Supreme Soviet decision 'On the situation of the country' (23 November 1990). See *Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1990, No. 48 (28 November), p.1282; 1991, No. 6 (6 February), p. 242. In addition, the Secretariat memorandum, 'On the question of de-politicisation of the state and law-enforcement organs' mentioned in this memorandum is probably the same as above mentioned 'To the question of de-politicisation of law-enforcement organs' in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 11, pp. 21-23.

⁵⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 2. Emphasis added.

⁵⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 13.

⁵⁶ *Pravda*, 13 March 1991, p. 2.

organisation in the armed forces.⁵⁷ Gorbachev and Yazov also addressed the conference.⁵⁸ The conference elected an all-army party committee and a plenum of the all-army party committee elected Major General Mikhail Surkov secretary of the all-army party committee.⁵⁹ Later he was elected a Politburo member at the April CC and Central Control Commission (CCC) joint plenum (1991).⁶⁰ Officially, by this conference, reform of the military party organisations had been completed. Nonetheless, whether or not party control over security organs was over is problematic, which can be recognised by investigating other controlling measures: the party apparat and personnel control.

2. Reorganisation of the Party Apparatus

As discussed above, after the 28th Party Congress, political organs were not under the jurisdiction of the party, and the party began to organise party committees in the military. Then the CC department that would supervise these party committees was to be reorganised. At the October CC plenum (1990), the second reorganisation of the CC apparatus was reported. The State and Law Department was divided into the Ethnic Relations Department and the Department on Legislative Initiatives and Law Questions. However, these departments were not to supervise party organs in the military. The Organisational Department was to supervise them as we have seen in Chapter 3. It seems that this was related to a change in the mode of party control over the military. We can recognise this change by investigating party control over personnel. Let us see it in the next section.

⁵⁷ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 30 March 1991, p. 1; FBIS Soviet Union, 4 April 1991, p. 47. For details of the all-army party conference, see Stephen Foye, 'Rhetoric from the Past: The First All-Army Party Conference', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 16 (April 19, 1991); Stephen Foye, 'Maintaining the Union: The CPSU and the Soviet Armed Forces', *RL/ Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 23 (June 7, 1991).

⁵⁸ TASS, 31 March 1991; FBIS Soviet Union, 2 April 1991, pp. 51-52 (Gorbachev); *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 April 1991, pp. 1-2; FBIS Soviet Union, 2 April 1991, pp. 52-54 (Yazov).

⁵⁹ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 April 1991, p. 1; FBIS Soviet Union, 3 April 1991, p. 46.

⁶⁰ *Materialy ob'edinennogo Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta i Tsentral'noi Kontrol'noi Komissii KPSS, 24-25 aprelya 1991 g.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 5.

3. Personnel Control

Party control over personnel had not changed very much before the 28th Party Congress, as discussed above. Nonetheless, after the 28th Party Congress, some reform attempts were made in the demarcation between the party and the state. On 11 January 1991 Yu. Ryzhov, deputy head of the Organisational Department, sent a memorandum asking for a reconsideration of the current situation whereby the CC CPSU confirmed the composition of the military council beforehand, and party secretaries participated in the military council.⁶¹

However, it seems that the party tried to change the method of control over the military from direct to indirect control through communists in the military. The party did not lose interest in the education of cadres. Shlyaga sent a memorandum on 28 May 1991 to the CC in order to oppose the abolition of the military science course in the academy of social sciences of the CC CPSU and other social and political institutions of the CPSU.⁶² A. Degtyarev, head of the Ideology Department, wrote a memorandum on 27 June, supporting the opinion of Shlyaga.⁶³ The Secretariat agreed with Degtyarev's memorandum.⁶⁴

In addition, for such indirect control, the personnel of party committees in the military should be stable. On 15 May 1991 the Secretariat accepted a proposal of the all-army party committee to modify the Instruction 'On the work of organisations of the CPSU in the armed forces in the USSR'. The modification was made to give the military party *committee* the right to define the number of subordinate apparat, though previously the party *conference* approved the structure and number of the apparat. Moreover, the terms of election of party committees were to be extended from every two-three years to every five years or more.⁶⁵ Probably this

⁶¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 73, pp. 1-2.

⁶² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 70, pp. 7-8.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 2. This decision does not indicate its date.

⁶⁵ *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, 1991, No. 11 (June), p. 32; *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 8, p. 38; TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 5, d. 19.

modification was intended to stabilise the personnel of the military party apparat.

The *nomenklatura* list that was submitted by the CC Organisational department on 6 August 1991 excluded the posts of command-in-chiefs in the armed forces and other commander posts in KGB and MVD troops. Thus, the direct party control over personnel in the military was to end. However, the *nomenklatura* list included the posts of secretaries of the all-army party committee, of the KGB party committees, and of party committees of MVD troops in the same category as first and second secretaries of union republican parties.⁶⁶ Though probably the appointments to these posts were to be confirmed *ex post facto*, this meant that party posts in security organs were as important to the party leadership as the first and second secretaries of union republican parties. In summary, though a change in party control over personnel certainly took place, the party faced considerable difficulty in entirely relinquishing it.

4. Organisational Disarray in the Military

In addition and more importantly, such reform attempts of party-military relations caused organisational disarray in security organs, as party archives tell us.

Firstly, security organs were losing authority. In many regions an anti-army atmosphere began to appear. The CC Commission on Military Policy made a proposal to the Secretariat 'On urgent measures in connection with a strengthening the anti-army appearance in a series of regions of the country' (without a date), arguing that an anti-army atmosphere was becoming stronger in Baltic, Trans-Caucasus, and Moldavian republics and West-Ukraine. In some of these republics, military officers were deprived of their residential entitlement, which led to a situation where they lost their rights in residential areas to medical treatment, their children's education and so forth. Even physical attacks on military officers were taking place. Prompted by this memorandum, the Secretariat took the decision that had the same title as the proposal

⁶⁶ See Chapter 3 and Atsushi Ogushi, 'Party-State Relations during *Perestroika*', paper presented to the annual conference of the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES), 3 April 2004, p. 21.

(On urgent measures) on 15 November 1990, which asked party organisations in these republics to take urgent measures to protect the military.⁶⁷ Another report of the discussion of the Commission on Military Policy that was written by Oleg Baklanov, CC secretary, on 8 January 1991, complained of a widespread tendency to evade conscription.⁶⁸

Secondly, the relationship between security organs and the party became problematic. On 1 March 1991, Kryuchkov sent a memorandum to the CC. The KGB, he argued, supported the Secretariat decision 'On the work of party committees on the realisation of the CC Secretariat's recommendation of strengthening the fight against crime' (15 February 1991) that advanced an idea to hold an all-union meeting of workers of organs of the Internal Affairs, the KGB, the prosecutor's office, the court, and the judiciary, as well as a zonal meeting-seminar of party secretaries of these organs. However, Kryuchkov asked that the coordinating activity for the preparation of the all-union meeting be entrusted to the KGB. V. Babichev, head of the CC Department on the Legislative Initiative and Law Questions, responded that in a situation where a series of meetings of law-enforcement organs had already taken place, 'Yu. Golik, chairman of the Committee on the coordination of activity of law-enforcement organs under the USSR President, considers it inexpedient to hold the all-union meeting ... until the conclusion of a Union Treaty'. In addition, Babichev argued that the CC Organisational Department carried out the zonal meeting-seminars.⁶⁹ Therefore, it implied that the party rejected any initiative of the KGB on this matter.

Under such circumstances, the party organisations in security organs tried to influence central party affairs. Surkov proposed to invite some secretaries of the military party committees to the CC plenum on 14 May 1991. Ryzhov and G. Orlov, deputy head of the General

⁶⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p.8, d. 68.

⁶⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 2, p.2.

⁶⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 15. Incidentally in this source the date of the Secretariat's decision is noted as 16 February. However, the decision itself shows the date as 15 February. See TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 23, d. 9, pp.1-2; f. 89, p. 20, d. 37, p. 1 (note 55). Thus, the date '16 February' is, it seems, a mistake.

Department, issued a memorandum in support of the proposal on 31 May.⁷⁰ Probably this proposal was supported by the Secretariat or the Politburo because the secretaries of the military party committees actually participated in the July CC plenum.⁷¹ Moreover, a letter dated 21 June 1991 from the deputy secretary of the party committee of a Chernomorskii (Black Sea) fleet to the CC showed concern about the passive position of the CPSU and demanded the summoning of an extraordinary party congress to discuss the new party Programme.⁷² A similar letter from parts and establishments subordinate to the central Air Defence Military (PVO) Unit to the CC was accepted on 22 July. The argument of this letter was not conservative in ideological terms. Criticising both the ways to capitalism and to the totalitarian order, it sought to construct a society based on associational ownership of the means of production. Real democrats and communists, according to this letter, could agree with such an aim, and this was a necessary condition for combining all constructive social forces. Then it demanded an earlier summoning of an extraordinary party congress and more democratic delegates' elections.⁷³

Nonetheless the situation became worse for the party. On 30 April 1991, Ryzhov wrote a memorandum 'On the course of realisation, by party committees, of the CC Secretariat's recommendation on the questions of strengthening the fight against crime', which was circulated to CC secretaries and the CCC chairman.⁷⁴ Ryzhov reported how party organisations were endeavouring to prevent crimes. In order to strengthen the connections among party organisations of law-enforcement organs, a subdivision under the department of Party organisational and cadre work was created in some republics and oblasti. Kemerovo, Pskov, and Sakhalin obkoms created councils of primary organisations' secretaries of law-enforcement organs under obkoms.⁷⁵ Still, the report admitted many difficulties with fighting crime. It is

⁷⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 11, d. 93.

⁷¹ *Pravda*, 26 July 1991, p. 1.

⁷² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 8, d. 3, p. 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

worth citing:

Under the influence of a series of “Democratic” Soviets that are taking the course toward the de-partyisation of law-enforcement organs, several communists took a waiting position, some individual communists left the party, or ... “suspended” their own party membership. Practically party organisations in law-enforcement organs in Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova stopped their activity. The attempts to self-liquidate party organisations in court organs and legal work in RSFSR and Ukraine appeared. And in a series of regions (Leningrad and Zakarpat’e obkoms) they had already stopped existing in these structures. The situation is more complicated in that re-elected party secretaries in most cases cease to be full-time. They do not have working experience in new conditions. Sufficient and qualified methodological help from the sides of individual raikoms is not given. Many party committees consider that at present methodological recommendations are insufficiently published in the central party press.⁷⁶

Then this report proposed to create a party structure in law-enforcement organs, which was, from bottom to the top, similar to the one in the armed forces.⁷⁷ It is not clear whether or not this proposal was accepted. However, even if it was, it seems that there was not enough time to implement such an organisational change. It is more important in our context to note that, despite some party officials’ resistance, the party organisation in the military was disintegrating. Therefore, we can conclude that security organs were gradually becoming more independent of the party, but this did not mean that they could retain their organisational unity. On the contrary, these organs were thrown into disarray.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 6-7

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.8.

V. Increasing Praetorianism

As the author have argued in Chapter 3, reform of the party apparat led to a 'loss of power' and a 'power vacuum'. In Chapter 3 we have seen the leadership's recognition of the power vacuum. Of course, recognition is not necessarily reality. We have to consider the actual situation at that time. A universal phenomenon is a rise in the crime rate when a 'power vacuum' is created. This was the case also in the Soviet Union. Let me consider the situation at the time, which will make clear that these structural factors caused a military intervention.

1. Rise of Crime

The crime record from the late 1980s to 1990 was given in a memorandum of the prosecutor's office dated 11 February 1991 that was circulated to CC secretaries and the CCC chairman. According to this, in 1987 crimes decreased 9.5 per cent and in 1988 they slightly increased (3.8 per cent). But in 1989 the rate increased steeply (31.8 per cent). This tendency continued in 1990. The number of recorded crimes was 2,786,605 (a 13.2 per cent increase), including 422,647 serious ones (a 15.0 per cent increase). Except for Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Tajikistan republic that showed only a moderate increase, this was an all-union tendency. In addition, all kinds of crime showed increase: murder (15.9 per cent), serious injury (12.2 per cent), rape (2.7 per cent), robbery (16.6 per cent), embezzlement (23.8 per cent), speculation (14.6 per cent) and so forth.⁷⁸

In 1991 the MVD reported many dangerous incidents around the country to the CC CPSU. The fond 89 party archives contain some reports around the time of the all-union referendum on the future form of the Union. They include the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (14 March),⁷⁹ demonstrations, movements, and strikes around the country (15 March),⁸⁰ the

⁷⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 16. pp. 4-5. For more detail data, see pp. 4-20.

⁷⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 61.

situation of union republics concerning the referendum (16 March),⁸¹ the process of referendum all over the country (18 March),⁸² and the situation of South Osetia (19 March).⁸³ In general all of these reports emphasised the violent and chaotic situation.

As far as the fond 89 party archive is concerned, further reports of the MVD can be found around the end of July to the beginning of August. The MVD reported on the situation in Latvia and Lithuania (29 July),⁸⁴ Lithuania (31 July),⁸⁵ and of Azerbaijan, Lithuania and Latvia (1 August).⁸⁶ Again, these reports referred to the chaotic situation in these republics.

The memorandum by Ryzhov mentioned above, 'On the course of realisation, by party committees, of the CC Secretariat's recommendation on the questions of the strengthening the fight against crime', noted a rise in the crime rate from January to March 1991 in many places: Estonia (38.9 per cent), Armenia (23.3), Mari (33.5), Chuvash (28.9), Omsk (48.2), Vladimir (40.9), Nizhnii Novgorod (39.5), Kamchatka (39.3), Tver' (37.8), Kaluga (36.8), and Novosibirsk (34.4).⁸⁷

The possibility that these reports overemphasised the danger of the situation in order to demand more security attention cannot be discounted. In addition, the definition of a crime was highly controversial in this period. Nonetheless, it does not seem irrational to argue that the situation was so explosive that some emergency measures were desirable at least for some central leaders. Praetorianism was certainly increasing.

2. Increasing Dissatisfaction within the Military

The security organs came forward in such situation in the late 1980s to 1991. For

⁸⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 62.

⁸¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 63; d. 64.

⁸² TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 65.

⁸³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 66.

⁸⁴ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 34.

⁸⁵ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 35.

⁸⁶ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 28, d. 36.

⁸⁷ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71, p. 7.

example, Kryuchkov proposed to the CC CPSU the creation of an administrative section in the KGB on 4 August 1989, though it is not clear if the CC supported this proposal. The section was intended, the proposal explained, to secure the constitutional order.⁸⁸ Similar proposals were advanced by Kryuchkov several times. For example, on 9 December 1989, he proposed to establish a unit with special tasks in KGB troops and the Politburo agreed on 22 December.⁸⁹ In addition, Kryuchkov asked to create a special military unit in the KGB on 16 February 1990 and the Politburo approved it on 16 March 1990.⁹⁰

Moreover, economic chaos, which was due in part to the party apparat reorganisation, led to economic crimes, though the definition of a crime in this sphere was more difficult than in other spheres. To respond to this situation, I. Skiba, head of the Agrarian Policy Department, and A. Vlasov, head of the Department of Social and Economic Policy, wrote a memorandum, 'On the necessity to strengthen the fight against crime in the sphere of the economy' (18 March 1991). After indicating many incidents related to economic crimes, they asked the party to show support and defence to law enforcement organs. The Secretariat discussed this problem on 22 May⁹¹ and approved a decision on 3 July 1991.⁹² The above-mentioned memorandum 'On the course of realisation, by party committees, of the CC Secretariat's recommendation on the questions of the strengthening the fight against crime' showed serious concern in the party about the chaotic situation.⁹³

Thus, the political arena during 1990 to middle of 1991 was dangerous enough to call for military intervention. The problem was who would provide leadership, which was not resolved until August 1991.

⁸⁸ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 18, d. 127.

⁸⁹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, p. 49.

⁹⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 10, d. 55.

⁹¹ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 20, d. 49.

⁹² *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1991, No. 8, pp. 61-66.

⁹³ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 22, d. 71.

VI. The August Attempted Coup

1. Development of Events

This chapter does not give a detailed account of the August coup.⁹⁴ A very basic chronology follows. Around 5:00 pm on 18 August Gorbachev (who was in Foros on holiday) realised all his phones were cut off. Soon after that, Oleg Baklanov, deputy chairman of the Defence Council, Oleg Shenin, CC Secretary, Valerii Boldin, the president's chief of staff and head of the CC General Department, Valentin Varennikov, deputy minister of defence and commander of the ground force, and Yurii Plekhanov, head of the Secret Service that guarded the president, visited Gorbachev in order to ask him to support the Emergency Committee (GKChP) or to delegate his authority to Gennadii Yanaev, vice president. The GKChP was composed of these eight persons: Yanaev, Baklanov, Valentin Pavlov, prime minister, Kryuchkov, Dmitrii Yazov, defence minister, Boris Pugo, minister of internal affairs, Aleksandr Tizyakov, president of the Association of USSR State Industry, and Vasilii Starodubtsev, chairman of the USSR Union of Peasants. Gorbachev refused both support and delegation. Baklanov and others confined Gorbachev in Foros, and went back to Moscow.

At 6:00 am on 19 August, the GKChP announced that Yanaev was assuming the authority of the president because Gorbachev had become ill. Some troops went into Moscow.

⁹⁴ The following literature gives more detailed analysis of the process of the attempted coup, to which I am heavily indebted. John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 5; John B. Dunlop, 'The August Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003); Odom, *The Collapse*, chap. 14; Jerry F. Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 13; Gordon Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), chap. 9; Brian D. Taylor, 'The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003); Amy Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003); Nobuo Shimotomai, *Dokuritsukokkakyodotai heno Michi [The Road to the CIS]* (Tokyo: Jijitsushin, 1992), chap. 6-7; Nobuaki Shiokawa, "'Kimyona Kudeta" kara "Roshia saigono Kakumeihe" [From a "Strange Coup" to the "Last Russian Revolution"]', *Sekai [The World]*, 1991, No. 11, (November 1991), pp. 55-68.

The KGB failed to arrest Russian president Yeltsin, and he and his team arrived at the 'White House' (the building of the Russian parliament) around 10:00 am. They issued an 'appeal to the Citizens of Russia' that called for the action to fight against the GKChP. Some thousand people gathered to support Yeltsin and his team. The GKChP did not take any action on 19-20 August.

At 3:00 am on 21 August the GKChP finally decided to storm the White House, but, after a small clash that caused three civilian deaths, the troops stopped taking further action. The GKChP members realised that they were failing. Around 2:00 pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Anatolii Luk'yanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Vladimir Ivashko, deputy General Secretary of the CPSU, went to see Gorbachev. Yeltsin sent a Russian government delegation including Aleksandr Rutskoi, the Russian vice president, to capture the plotters. In Foros, the GKChP members were arrested by the Russian delegation.

The greatest mystery is why the coup failed so easily. At the beginning, many analysts emphasised the strength of the opposition of Yeltsin and his team. However, the more convincing explanation is, it seems, the weakness of the GKChP side.⁹⁵ Thus, let us consider the leadership of the coup plotters and the organisational problem, especially the party in the coup, in the following sections.

2. Leadership

It is well known that the coup was ill prepared and that plotters behaved indecisively. There are many episodes which illustrate this matter. For example, after the GKChP members knew that Gorbachev refused to cooperate, Luk'yanov, who visited the GKChP, asked whether or not the GKChP had a plan. Yazov answered that they did not have, though Kryuchkov insisted that they did have one.⁹⁶ Another episode tells that Pavlov was apparently drunk, or

⁹⁵ Among the works cited above, Hough and Shiokawa particularly emphasise the weakness of the GKChP. Hough, *Democratization*, pp. 432-448; Shiokawa, "Kimyona Kudeta", pp. 58-63. Shiokawa stayed in Moscow at the time of the attempted coup.

⁹⁶ Odom, *The Collapse*, p. 312.

suffered a nervous breakdown.⁹⁷ From circumstantial evidence, one may argue that the GKChP members believed that Gorbachev would support the emergency measure. According to Gorbachev, Baklanov said 'We do the dirty work. After that, you can return [to your job].'⁹⁸ Also, it is reported that, when going back from Gorbachev, Baklanov, puzzled by his response, said 'But he thought that was the only solution. What has changed?''⁹⁹ This matter raised the possibility of a conspiracy theory, that is, that Gorbachev implicitly approved the coup.¹⁰⁰ We will probably never know if this was the case. Nevertheless, they should have prepared to implement the plan without Gorbachev's approval. This attempted coup was so ill prepared that it gives us the impression that they might have failed even with Gorbachev's support. Thus, it is reasonable to think something urged them to take sudden action.

The problem is why they attempted such an ill-prepared coup. The background was the chaotic situation as discussed above. However, most scholars agree that the Union Treaty was the most immediate catalyst for the attempt. The Union Treaty was a product of continuous negotiation between Gorbachev and republican leaders, especially Yeltsin, since April. The final version was agreed at a secret meeting of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbaev on 29-30 July. The draft, which would have reduced the powers of the central institutions including security organs, was published on 14 August and was due to be signed on 20 August.¹⁰¹ The plotters had to prevent the treaty being signed. Moreover, Pavlov was showed the draft only on 12 August. Thus, they did not have enough time to prepare a well-organised plan.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev presents another argument. He argues that the KGB bugged the meeting on 29-30 July, in which participants (Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbaev) agreed to

⁹⁷ Hough, *Democratization*, p. 430.

⁹⁸ Mihairu Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Ge (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), p. 647; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 2 (Moskva: Novosti, 1995), p. 559.

⁹⁹ Hough, *Democratization*, p. 436.

¹⁰⁰ Dunlop supports the argument that Gorbachev supported the coup. See Dunlop, 'The August Coup'.

¹⁰¹ This published version was supposed to be agreed on 23 July. However, it included a new agreement on taxation of the 29-30 July meeting. See Hough, *Democratization*, pp. 425-426.

remove Kyuchkov and Pavlov. Therefore, they attempted the coup to save themselves.¹⁰² Again, we cannot find a clear answer on this matter so far. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this argument explains their sudden action.

Still, it seems that there was another reason for the failure of the coup, that is, organisational weakness, which we consider in the next section.

3. The Party in the Coup

As discussed above, the party had controlled various security organs. Therefore, it appears natural to assume that the party played an active role in the coup. In fact, Shenin, CC secretary, and Boldin, head of the General Department, went to Foros to see Gorbachev as representatives of the GKChP. However, the role of the party as an organisation was ambiguous. On 19 August, several (but not all) CC secretaries assembled and decided to send a coded telegram to all union republican party committees, kraikoms, obkoms, stating 'Take measures for the participation of communists in cooperation with the GKChP'. On 20 August the Secretariat sent a second telegram to 'ask to regularly inform the CC CPSU of the situation in regions, the atmosphere of people, the adopted measures for strengthening order and discipline, and the reaction of people to the measures of the GKChP'. Several party committees, including Samara, Lipetsk, Tambov, Saratov, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Tomsk, Altai, Krasnodar, and others, supported the actions of the GKChP. However, most party committees took a 'wait-and-see' position.¹⁰³ Moreover, the GKChP's announcement never mentioned the party or communism. Neither the Politburo nor the Central Committee could decide on its attitude. Ivashko, deputy General Secretary, was in a hospital on the first two days of the coup, and proposed to see Gorbachev on 21 August. Thus, on the one hand, some segment of the party apparat welcomed the coup attempt (though it did not play a major part). On the other hand, reformist segment of

¹⁰² Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Ge, pp. 643-645; Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i Reformy*, Vol. 2, pp. 556-557.

¹⁰³ *Pravda*, 23 October 1991, p. 2.

the party, faced with an unexpected event, showed total confusion. True, the party had not completely lost its ties with security organs as discussed above. Therefore, it was *involved* in, but did not *lead* the coup.

Because the party did not or could not take the initiative of the coup, security organs showed organisational disarray. Hough states, 'the lines of command were never clear.' Troops had been divided among the Ministry of Defence, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹⁰⁴ Without the integrating force, that is, the party, this system could not work well. Organisational disarray was an additional factor in failure of the coup.

This also means that the August attempted coup was not a *communist* but an *ordinary* coup. As mentioned above, the plotters never referred to communism in the coup. Their aim was to restore 'law and order'.

VII. The End of the CPSU

As we have seen in Chapter 3, before the attempted coup, Yeltsin had issued a presidential decree 'On suspending the activity of organisational structures of political parties and mass social movements in state organs and establishments of RSFSR' (20 July 1991), which was to prohibit the party organisations in state organs within the territory of Russia.¹⁰⁵ The failed coup presented him a great chance to give a final blow to the party. Immediately after the attempted coup, Yeltsin issued a presidential decree, 'On suspending the activity of the Communist Party of RSFSR' (23 August 1991).¹⁰⁶ Though Gorbachev once showed the intention to continue party reform after coming back from Foros, soon he realised people's disillusionment with the party. On 24 August Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary and

¹⁰⁴ Hough, *Democratization*, p. 447.

¹⁰⁵ *Izvestiya*, 22 July 1990, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ *Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 1991, No. 35 (29 August), pp. 1426-1427.

called on the CC to dissolve itself.¹⁰⁷ On 25 August Yeltsin issued a presidential decree, 'On property of the CPSU and the Communist Party of RSFSR' to nationalise party property.¹⁰⁸ No strong activity opposing the decree took place. The party had been 'dead' *de facto*. On 6 November the CPSU was banned by Yeltsin's presidential decree, 'On activity of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR'.¹⁰⁹ The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had been the nerve centre controlling the organic body, ended.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, the end of history of the Soviet Union was nearing.

VIII. Conclusion

Despite the resistance from both the party and the military sides to losing ties with each other, the party was gradually losing its control over the security organs. Moreover, this led to organisational disarray in the military. Here the party's superiority over the military is clear. The above discussion makes clear that the party was the only integrator of these security organs. Thus, our findings cannot support the conflict theory. If conflict had been a feature of party-military relations, the military would have welcomed the party's losing control. In addition, the fact that the coup was an ordinary coup contradicts the congruence theory, because, if congruence had taken place, the coup would have been communist.

Probably the control theory was closest to the reality of three theories. This means neither that there was no conflict between the party and the military, nor that in some cases the interests of the party and military became congruent. Nonetheless, we must stress the fact that

¹⁰⁷ *Izvestiya*, 26 August 1991, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ *Vedomosti S''ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 1991, No. 35 (29 August), pp. 1434-1435.

¹⁰⁹ *Vedomosti S''ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, 1991, No. 45 (7 November), pp. 1799-1800.

¹¹⁰ The metaphor 'the nerve centre controlling the organic body' comes from Takayuki Ito, 'Tagenteki Minshushugino Seidoka: Tooshokokuni okeru keiken, 1989-92 [The Institutionalisation of Pluralist Democracy: From Experiences in Eastern Europe, 1982-92]' *Roshiakenkyu [Russian Studies]*, Vol. 16 (April 1993), p. 36.

the military very reluctantly went into the coup despite the very favourable environment. When the military was more or less freed from the party, its leaders realised that the military needed to resort to the final measure independently. The August attempted coup was an example of ordinary military-led praetorianism. However, the military had neither the capacity nor the autonomous decision-making experience to rule the country. In addition, the leadership of the coup was remarkably weak. Thus, the military-led coup failed.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the party had lost its administrative functions but had failed to find a role as a political party. Thus, the party had lost its *raison d'être*. In addition, the party's property had been fragmented before the attempted coup. Faced with the final blow by Yeltsin, the party fell without a struggle. The party, which, based on a self-proclaimed 'universal' ideology, had been proud of its monolithic unity and monopolistic control for more than seven decades, did not have the capacity to fight any more.

Chapter 7 Generalisation and Conclusion

I. Introduction

We have traced the process of the disintegration of the CPSU in previous chapters. The task of this chapter is to generalise our argument. How universal was the experience of the CPSU compared with those of other communist regimes? And what are the theoretical implications of our argument? Before discussing these issues, let me summarise my rather complicated story of the CPSU.

II. Summarising Our Argument

Figure 7-1 shows the course of events of previous chapters. Before Gorbachev's *perestroika* began, the Soviet political system faced a dilemma between monolithic unity and monopolistic control. In order to sustain monopolistic control, the party leadership needed to allow *de facto* autonomy to lower party organisations, which undermined monolithic unity. In addition, if it was to exercise a practical monopoly across the entire society, the party had to exercise a whole series of functions, including economic ones, which led to an increase in the number of *khozyaistvenniki* (economic managers) in the party. The party, therefore, could not concentrate on 'political' activity alone.

Gorbachev's political reform programme was, it seems, aimed at activating the party's 'political' activity through dismissing its economic function. Reforms of party-state relations mostly concerned the economy-related party apparatus. In addition, Gorbachev introduced competitive elections of party secretaries. This policy, at least in part, was intended to destroy established career patterns in the party. In order to improve 'political' activity, party secretaries were now expected to be political leaders who engaged in propaganda, agitation, and so forth, rather than pragmatic *khozyaistvenniki*. Competitive elections would have

improved the political skills of such party leaders. Moreover, competitive elections could have been useful in improving centre-regional relations by destroying regional and local cliques from below.

However, these reforms led to unintended consequences. Firstly, by reorganising the party apparat, especially the economic-related departments, the leadership created a 'loss of power' and a 'power vacuum'. When the party stopped intervening in economic management work, governmental organs that had depended on the party for a long time did not prepare to assume these power and also stopped working. A presidency that was created in order to manage such a situation failed to organise its staff and mechanisms as exemplified in the very late establishment of the presidential apparat in December 1990. This power vacuum influenced many later events. Secondly, competitive party secretary elections made lower organs more autonomous than before. It seems that the establishment of the CP RSFSR marked the climax of this tendency. Thirdly, the CPSU failed to transform itself into a 'political party'. It did not end its ties with the security organs due in part to the 'power vacuum', a self-formulation as a vanguard party rather than a parliamentary party, the production principle for organising PPOs, democratic centralism, and the ban on fractions. Furthermore, it failed to approve a new party programme. Thus, while the party lost its traditional administrative function, it failed to find a new function. The party lost its *raison d'être*, which accelerated a mass exodus of members.

The rapid decline in party membership caused a financial crisis, because the party budget mostly consisted of membership dues. In addition, the soviets demanded the nationalisation of party property. The party needed to protect its property. Commercial activity was a response to such a situation. Nonetheless, commercial activity unintentionally caused the fragmentation of party property.

On the other hand, the 'power vacuum' expanded so much that some emergency measures seemed necessary to, at least, some top state leaders. The situation became increasingly chaotic and even the unity of the country appeared fragile to some of its leaders. 'Praetorianism' was increasing. Thus, the August attempted coup was aimed to restore 'law

and order' rather than 'communist' rule. However, some members of the party apparatus committed to the coup activity because the party did not lose its ties with security organs entirely. Then the party as a whole was involved with the attempted coup when Yeltsin suspended its activity. Because the party had lost its *raison d'être* and its property had been dispersed well before the coup attempt, the party had no choice but to accept the reality that it was 'dead' *de facto*. When the party had completed its history, the end of the Soviet Union was also likely to follow.

Compared with existing studies of the collapse of the CPSU, my study emphasises, firstly, a 'power vacuum' rather than the strength of a conservative party apparatus. Secondly, though the financial crisis of the party has been scarcely discussed by other scholars, it had important consequences for the party. Thirdly, CPSU specialists have not discussed party-military relations in the *perestroika* period very much. On the other hand, though there are many studies of the Soviet military, they are very military-oriented (for instance, the military capacity of the Soviet army) rather than focusing on party-military relations. Thus, this is one of the few studies on this issue. Finally, although my argument supports some possibility of party reform that was dependent on Gorbachev's leadership (see Chapter 4), Gorbachev was structurally constrained by the 'power vacuum' in which he was located.

III. Comparison with Other Communist Cases

1. Case Selection

How universal is the experience of the CPSU? To consider this issue, we have to compare it with those of other countries. Let us limit our analysis to communist regimes. Though to compare the Soviet collapse with, for example, Latin American transitions might be useful for some purposes, only other communist parties' experience seems to have direct comparability for our purpose, because, as far as I know, only the communist regime stabilised itself for several decades, had a party that attempted monopolistic control and was proud of its monolithic unity, and collapsed more or less from within. In ordinary authoritarian regimes, regime control was not as strict as in communist regimes. Though the

Nazi regime in Germany seems to have controlled society to a significant degree, it collapsed within a rather short period, and from outside. The communist regime was more or less unique.

Nonetheless, it does not seem practically possible to take into account all communist regimes. We have to limit ourselves to cases that are appropriate for our purpose, though a case selection frequently entails bias. The criteria for the choice of cases should be made clear. The first and most important criterion is whether or not there was an attempt to reform the communist party within the communist period. Many East European countries changed their regimes without, or with few, party reforms. In many cases, the regime, faced with a huge popular uprising, lost its confidence. The Hungarian case is unique in this sense. The Hungarian communist party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) was successfully transformed into a social democratic party *before* the collapse of communist rule. Although it is well known that ex-communist parties in East Europe returned to a political arena, these parties reformed themselves after regime collapse.¹ In this sense, among the East European cases in 1989, only the Hungarian seems to be comparable with the Soviet case. Another important case is the Polish communist party (the Polish United Workers' Party) in 1980-1. Far-reaching party reforms were attempted at the same time as the crisis of the 'Solidarity' movement. This case seems important also in a sense that a regime (and party) crisis caused military intervention just as in the Soviet Union. In 1988-9, however, the Polish case does not necessarily seem comparable. Though it is well known that the Polish post-communist party transformed itself into a social democratic party (the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, later Democratic Left Alliance) and could become a majority party, these events took

¹ See John Ishiyama, 'The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (June 1997). He states, basing himself on A. Agh, that 'the Hungarian Socialist Party was unique in the communist world in that it emerged before the collapse of state socialism and not after it, unlike all the other renamed and afterwards reformed parties of the post-communist world.' *Ibid.*, p. 321.

place after regime change. Thus, the two cases are to be compared with the Soviet communist party.²

2. The General Problem in the These Countries

As we have seen in Chapter 2, the communist party in general was bound to face a general problem. When the party tried to extend its control over the entire state and society, it had to exercise so many functions that its monolithic unity was undermined. The regime could escape this problem in the early post-revolutionary period or in wartime. But, the more complicated the system became, the more difficult it was for the party to control it. Party control was gradually undermined.

However, there were variations among the communist countries in the way in which they experienced these general problems. As we have seen the Soviet case in Chapter 2, the career patterns of party officials and regional autonomy are keys to understanding these variations.

In Poland, according to Paul Lewis, Edward Gierek, first secretary of the Polish party, tried to appoint well-educated people to provincial party secretariats. Higher education became almost universal among provincial party secretaries (including both first and other secretaries) around 1975 to 1980, which was the same as the Soviet Union. Still, unlike the Soviet case, the predominant qualification was in economics, then industry and agriculture. If we can, as Lewis did, assume that economics qualifications were given by higher party schools, their educational qualifications possibly did not provide them with sufficient competence. In terms of career experience before becoming party secretaries, about a third of provincial first party secretaries had some production-related experience, though other (not first) secretaries had more such experience. The predominant background among provincial first secretaries was governmental and administrative activity. They did not have much

² Nonetheless, the author cannot claim that my study of the Hungarian and Polish cases is empirically rigorous. Rather, my purpose is to illustrate the generality and uniqueness of the Soviet experience. In addition, though the Yugoslav, Hungarian (1956) and Czechoslovakian (1968) cases may be comparable, they are beyond my knowledge.

experience of party work before becoming party secretaries either.³ Thus, we can assume that the rise of economic managers in the party was less significant in Poland than in the USSR.

Concerning regional autonomy, Polish provincial first secretaries, unlike Soviet ones, did not enjoy significant autonomy. Gierek's reform of provincial party organisations in 1975, which increased the number of provincial party committees, strengthened central power vis-à-vis the regions. Moreover, as a result of this reorganisation, lower party organisations were expected to come closer to ordinary people.⁴ In addition, the Polish state body vis-à-vis the party was somewhat stronger than the Soviet one. Demarcation of the party and state functions was frequently claimed, and strengthening 'political' activity was advocated. At the time of deepening economic crisis and volatile public opinion, provincial party secretaries without autonomy found it difficult to carry out their functions. Provincial party committees were placed in a contradictory position. Thus, we can conclude that the 'unsolvable problem' in Poland was not the party's monolithic unity but in its monopolistic control over state and society.

In Hungary, the party had attempted to recruit various intellectuals after 1956 under János Kádár, its first secretary. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily lead to the rise of economic managers within the party apparatus. Firstly, many professionally qualified people were recruited into state bodies rather than the party. Secondly, within the party, well-educated people were primarily placed in the central rather than regional party organisations. This may have been related to the dominance of the capital city (Budapest) in a small country with an imperial legacy. Thirdly, it seems that intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences rather than those with a technocratic background had a rather strong influence in comparison with the Soviet case. Many reformers like Imre Pozsgay had a humanities and social science background. They were still loyal to socialism, but, under the influence of the western New Left, were inclined to a social democratic form of socialism. Thus, the rise of

³ Paul G. Lewis, *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-71.

economic managers within the lower party organisations was less significant also in Hungary.⁵

The degree of regional autonomy in the Hungarian party is not clear. Still, we may be able to assume that lower party organisations were less autonomous in Hungary than in the USSR. Firstly, the capital city was too large. Secondly, the lower party organisations probably did not interfere in economic activity very much compared with other communist countries because of more market-oriented economic policies. Thirdly, many lower level party secretaries were, it is reported, conservative. Thus, although at the central level the party's recruitment policy worked relatively well, at lower levels many intellectuals who joined the party and frequently had humanities and social science backgrounds were isolated from political power. The 'unsolvable problem' in Hungary was that the party apparatus more or less retained its monolithic unity, but it was isolated from intellectual party members. In the Soviet case, the lower party apparatus itself was becoming autonomous, as we have seen.

3. The Reform Process

These different forms of general problems led to different reform processes. Monopolistic control in Poland was originally weaker. In Poland, the weakest point in the regime was the linkage between the party and society. Therefore, the party confronted society. The price increase in July 1980 immediately led to workers' strikes in August. A Gdansk agreement allowed the establishment of 'free trade unions' alongside the leading role of the party. The new trade union 'Solidarity' became a movement and spread into other areas including peasants, university students, academics, journalists and so forth. The 'Solidarity' movement tried to establish a realm independent of the party. This attempt involved a reconsideration of the *nomenklatura* system.⁶

⁵ See Rudolf L. Tökés, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 140-160; Patrick H. O'Neil, *Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 71-86.

⁶ See Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control', *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol. 1 (1983); Takayuki Ito, 'Porando

Pushed by the movement, the party was forced to reform itself. Firstly, the first secretary was changed. Stanisław Kania became the new first secretary. Secondly, within the party, some movements began to construct horizontal relations. Thirdly, there was the free election of party officials, in which most old party officials were replaced. The new Central Committee was almost totally (more than 90 per cent) renewed at the extraordinary party congress in 1981. Nonetheless, this contributed neither to the rise of more competent people nor to recovering the party's political authority. The new Central Committee was occupied by political laymen. In the process of party election, the agendas primarily focused on personnel matters rather than policies or platforms. The new CC members, furthermore, did not have any other ideas on an alternative policy or political system. Moreover, the party faced a rapid membership decline. In addition to 300 thousand members who had left the party before the party congress, 500 thousand members left afterwards. The party lost its ruling capacity.⁷

While, on the one hand, the party could not rule the country, the 'Solidarity' movement, on the other, did not attempt to replace the party in a 'self-limiting revolution'. Therefore, a huge political vacuum was created. The only force capable of filling the vacuum was the armed forces. This led to the rise of Wojciech Jaruzelski, Defence Minister, who became first secretary and who declared martial law in 1981. The Jaruzelski regime shared many characteristics with authoritarian regimes rather than a 'post-totalitarian' regime, which made easier its transition in 1989.⁸

"Rentai" Undo no Kobo [The Rise and Fall of the "Solidarity" Movement in Poland], in Shigeru Kido and Takayuki Ito eds., *Touou Gendaishi* [Contemporary History of Eastern Europe] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987).

⁷ Takayuki Ito, 'Genzon Shakaishugi niokeru Shakaihendo to Seijitaisei: Porando niokeru Tonaisenkyo (1980-81) ni Sokushite [Social Change and Political System under Real Socialism: An Analysis of Party Elections in Poland, 1980-81]', *Srabu Kenkyu* [Slavic Studies], Vol. 31 (1984); Takayuki Ito, 'Nomenklatura and Free Election: A Polish Experiment, 1980-81', *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol. 6 (1988); Jerzy J. Wiatr, 'Poland's Party Politics: The Extraordinary Congress of 1981', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 1981); David S. Mason, 'The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring 1984); Z. Anthony Kruszewski, 'The Communist Party during the 1980-1981: Democratization of Poland', in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice D. Simon eds., *Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 255-292.

In Hungary, party reforms began in 1988. Regardless or because of previous economic reform efforts, the demand for political reform stemmed not from society but from local party intellectuals. They attacked the local party apparatus by which conservative bosses dominated their own areas. Local intellectuals tried to create horizontally based groups, 'reform circles', within the party. These reform circles became influential. Though at the beginning their relationship with the central reformist leaders was ambiguous, Pozsgay and Rezső Nyers, a politburo member, finally supported them. The reform circles demanded an extraordinary party congress, though the somewhat conservative party leader Károly Grósz tried to call a party conference rather than a congress so as to avoid more radical change. But finally Grósz made a concession and an extraordinary party congress was summoned.

The reform circles extended their base and joined a reform alliance with other reform-oriented groups. The reform alliance's platform shows some striking similarities with the Democratic Platform in the CPSU: a clear break with the past (a change of name, of practice from the communist period, and so forth), a transformation from a vanguard into a parliamentary party, abolition of the Workers' Guard (a semi-military organisation supervised by the party), abolition of party cells in workplaces, and nationalisation of party property.

The extraordinary party congress took place in October 1989. The reform alliance could command a majority of congress delegates though they included opportunist reformers. This congress brought to an end the history of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party when they decided to found the Hungarian Socialist Party. Party reform succeeded in Hungary. Nonetheless, some difficult issues, including party cells in the workplace, the Workers' Guard, and party property, could not be resolved at the party congress just as in the case of the CPSU. A referendum organised by opposition parties decided to ban party cells in the workplace, disband the Workers' Guard, and nationalise party property. This well-known referendum included a choice on whether a presidential election should be held in advance of that for parliament. The result very marginally supported a parliamentary election in advance. Though the Socialist Party suffered a humiliating defeat in the parliamentary election, this forced the

party to reform itself further. At the 1994 parliamentary election it could become a majority party.⁹

4. Some Theorems

Comparing the Soviet case with the other two, we can draw some general conclusions. Firstly, there are some prerequisites for successful communist party reform. (i) A strong opposition outside the party is necessary. The 'Solidarity' movement was obviously stronger than any opposition movement in the Soviet Union. Though the Democratic Forum in Hungary was not a very strong organisation, it was strong enough to win a majority in the first democratic parliamentary election. Taking into account the fact that some difficult issues of party reform as party cells or property could be resolved only by pressure from the outside, a strong opposition was necessary. Democratic Russia, which was the largest opposition outside the party, could not hold such a position. (ii) A central leadership is required for successful party reform. Even if a reformist platform is organised from below, its relationship with the centre is important. Gorbachev, as we have seen in Chapter 4, did not ally his leadership with the Democratic Platform. In this sense, Gorbachev failed to play a role of Pozsgay or Nyers who more or less successfully provided leadership through the reform alliance in Hungary.

The second conclusion is that the party is the core of power or power itself in a communist regime. When an opposition is not prepared to assume power, communist party reform creates a power vacuum. Such a vacuum led to introduction of martial law in Poland and an attempted coup in the Soviet Union. In this sense, Gorbachev failed to play the role of Jaruzelski. We may assume that if the August coup had succeeded under the Gorbachev leadership, the new regime would have been closer to the Jaruzelski-type authoritarian regime, which might have made a future democratisation easier.

⁹ O'Neil, *Revolution from Within*, pp. 93-198.

IV. Some Theoretical Implications

Let us move on toward more general theoretical implications of our argument, some of which were discussed in the first chapter. Firstly, theories of a military coup are considered. Then, the issues of what the Soviet system was, how and why the Soviet system changed are discussed.

1. Theories of a Military Coup

We have discussed the August attempted coup in Chapter 6, which seems instructive for theories of a military coup. How to explain military intervention has been a challenging task for political scientists. Many military regimes have been established in Southern Europe, Latin American countries, and Asia (e.g. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Pakistan). In addition, the most troubling matter in the so-called 'third wave' of democratisation in these countries is military intervention. Naturally the task of explaining the reasons for military intervention or its absence has attracted many researchers. Though it may be schematic, let me categorise them into three types.

(a) Structural Factors

The first type is a structure-centred theory. Some stress the importance of the class structure of a corresponding country. 'Bureaucratic authoritarianism' is an example.¹⁰ Influenced by dependency theory, this argues that the class structure of a developing country polarises at some stage of modernisation, which produces a favourable environment for military intervention. Still, class structure *per se* is not the explanation of military intervention. Based on Huntington's political institutionalisation theory, it argues that polarisation leads to greater political demands from the population. The level of participation exceeds that of institutionalisation, which causes praetorianism (military intervention). The problem is not modernisation itself but political de-institutionalisation.¹¹

(b) Leadership

¹⁰ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973).

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT.: Yale

The second theory is actor-centred. A prominent feature of the third wave of democratisation was the absence of military intervention. Thus, the explanation is directed to the reason it did not take place. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that it was the result of 'playing coup poker'. At the beginning of a transition, a regime soft-liner utilises the threat of a coup in order to keep the transition within limit. However, when the opposition is convinced that the threat is a bluff, it makes clear that regime soft-liners will also suffer from the coup, because regime hard-liners will expel not only the opposition but also regime soft-liners with the coup. Thus, both regime and opposition soft-liners tend to make a concession or cooperate. The skill of regime soft-liners is, according to this argument, vital.¹² Thus, the occurrence of a coup may be explained by the lack of political skill of a regime soft-liner or by the greater skill of regime *hard-liners* than soft-liners. In addition, the failure of a coup may be due to the lack of political skill of the regime hard-liners.

(c) Organisational Factors

In addition to large-scale structural or environmental factors like praetorianism and the very situational factor of the individual political leader's skill, it is necessary to mention a factor within the military organisation. In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter add well-placed and professionally respected military officers as a crucial factor. Their presence, which means that the military is divided, makes the coup risky and less successful.¹³ Therefore, the Soviet case, in which a coup took place but failed, may be explained by a divided military. Still the application of this theory to the Soviet case is not easy, because it differed from Latin American military regimes in that the communist party controlled the military. It is necessary to consider the division of party-military relations.

(d) Implications of our Discussion

Our discussion of party-military relations (Chapter 6) may suggest the following points. Firstly, structural or environmental factors may be sufficient to increase the *probability*

University Press, 1968).

¹² Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 24-25.

of a coup. The situation around 1990 and 1991 in the Soviet Union was dangerous enough to call for emergency measures. In fact, Gorbachev's turn to the right can be explained by the chaotic situation rather than pressure from conservative factions. However, secondly, strong leadership and organisational unity in the military are necessary for a *successful* coup, which the Soviet case did not possess. Gorbachev, at least apparently, did not provide leadership. Other coup leaders were too ill-prepared. The organisational unity of security organs was not sustained due in the main part to the reform of relations between the party and security organs. These factors made the coup fail.

2. What the Soviet System was: Theories of the Political Regimes

(a) Controversy over Totalitarianism

As we have seen in Chapter 1, there are controversies over totalitarianism in Soviet and post-Soviet studies and in political science in general.¹⁴ The totalitarian school was challenged by many scholars in the 1970s. However, after the collapse of the Soviet-type political system, the totalitarian school returned to the central place in conceptualisations of such systems. The first reason is that people under the communist system by themselves began to use the totalitarian concept in the late 1980s. Some critics' view that the totalitarian concept was strongly influenced by the cold war, and, therefore, had a too confrontational implication, became difficult to justify. Secondly, qualified pluralism tended to suggest that the system became stable by introducing such 'plural' elements as professionalism and so forth. This was not supported by the course of events. Finally it seems to me that the pluralist school tried to find too much similarity to Western, especially American, society. Hough's thought-provoking work on conceptualisations of the Soviet system is full of comparisons

¹³ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, p. 25.

¹⁴ Apart from literature mentioned in Chapter 1, see Archie H. Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Archie Brown, 'Pluralism, Power and the Soviet Political System: A Comparative Perspective', in Susan Gross Solomon ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1983); Nobuaki Shiokawa, "'Shakaishugi to Zentaishugi" Sairon ["Socialism and Totalitarianism" Revisited]', *Juten Ryouiki Kenkyu Hokoku Shu*, 'Surabu Yurashia no Hendo' [*Occasional Papers on 'the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World'*] No. 14 (1996).

with the American cases and references to Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy*. Though Hough did not clearly say so, such a view gave an impression that Soviet society tended to be more and more liberal democratic. Now we know that Russia's path to liberal democracy is far more troubling.

(b) The Implication of our Discussion

What can our discussion tell us about this conceptual issue? First of all, although the pluralist school does not gather many supporters now, it certainly indicated some tendencies within the Soviet system, as we have seen in Chapter 2. The rise of economic managers and regional autonomy did exist. We should confirm some contribution of this school, even if it is not very fashionable. Still some problems remain. One problem in the pluralist school was that it assumed that such elements contributed to a regime's ruling capacity. However, these elements were obstacles for the central leadership. In addition, the pluralist school underestimated the centrality of the party apparat. In Chapter 3 and the above comparison, it was discussed that the party apparat was the core of power, therefore, its reform led to a power vacuum. Moreover, a conflict theory on party-military relations, which emphasises conflicts between the party and military rather than party control and is closer to the pluralist school, was not supported by our argument in Chapter 6. The contribution of the pluralist school was limited.

Nonetheless, to dismiss the pluralist school does not necessarily mean to approve the totalitarian school. Because this concept has been used in many ways, we should distinguish at least two different ways. The first way is totalitarianism as an ideal type. If totalitarianism is an ideal type, totalitarianism is not reality. We can say that Stalin's Soviet Union was *closest* to totalitarianism in Soviet history, but was not totalitarianism itself. This use can be justified. Even some scholars, who are very critical of totalitarianism, have used this concept as an ideal type.¹⁵

¹⁵ See Nobuaki Shiokawa, *Soren toha Nandattaka [What was the USSR?]* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1994), chap. 3.

The problem takes place when totalitarianism is an essentialist definition. Firstly the totalitarian model cannot explain change from within. For example, modernisation, it implies, can contribute to the perfection of its total control through hierarchical bureaucracy. But it created obstacles, as we have seen in Chapter 2. From the totalitarian perspective, Gorbachev's reform attempts can be considered as something irrational. He did not understand what he tried to do. Secondly, it is not clear that totalitarianism is limited only to the Stalinist period or can extend to the later period. If it is limited to the Stalinist period, it should be explained why totalitarianism had changed and what the later system was. At least the classical definitions presented by Friedrich and Brzezinski do not fit the later period. Classical totalitarianism, to some degree, may have been a product of a mirror image of Western, especially American, society, which later caused a totally opposite attempt to find too much similarity by the pluralist school. If totalitarianism extends to a later period, it should be explained what continued throughout Soviet history and why it changed. Modified totalitarianism may provide some clues to manage these problems. Certainly, Rigby's 'mono-organisational society' has been one of the most sophisticated conceptualisations of the Soviet system. Partocracy also can be a plausible conceptualisation. The party dominated the country and within the party, as Leon Onikov, a former party worker, stated, 'less than 0.3 per cent people of its members [that is, the party apparat] formed the real power in the CPSU'.¹⁶ Nevertheless, modified totalitarianism does not necessarily provide a clue for understanding regime change. This conceptualisation may imply a bureaucratic dysfunction, the role of leadership, and so forth as reasons for the change. However, theories of regime typology and theories of regime change have developed rather separately.¹⁷ Thus, let us consider theories of political change first, and return this issue later.

3. Why and How the Soviet System Collapsed: Theories of Political Change

(a) Modernisation Theory

¹⁶ Leon Onikov, *KPSS: anatomiya raspada* (Moskva: Respublika, 1996), p. 76.

¹⁷ The most important exception is Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic*

The content of modernisation theory was reviewed in Chapter 1. Our hypothesis was:

Social and economic change or the failure to legitimate its rule through economic development was the crucial factor in the Soviet collapse (modernisation theory).

This argument contributed to understanding increasing systemic difficulties in the long term. Our argument in Chapter 2 provides some evidence for this theory.

However, modernisation theory has several weak points besides its euro-centrism. The first is the problem of threshold: it cannot define the critical point at which changes in the quantity of modernisation turn into changes in the quality of a political regime, in other words, what degree of modernisation leads to democratisation is not clear. Moreover, contrary to the hypothesis, the 'unsolvable problem' in the Soviet Union was created by, to some degree, economic development rather than economic decline (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the breakdown of a democratic regime cannot be explained by this approach. Despite modernisation, some democratic regimes broke down in some Southern European, Latin American, and Asian countries. Thirdly, the focus of this approach is 'society'. It concentrates its attention on social movements from below. However, the opening frequently begins with cracks within a regime rather than pressure from below as we have seen. Modernisation theory is not sufficient.

(b) Transitology

The hypothesis of Transitology was:

The central factor in the Soviet collapse is the strategy of top elites, for example, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Ligachev and so forth (transitology).

Certainly political leadership was always an important factor. I have argued in Chapter 2 that it depends on leaders' recognition how acute the problems are, which necessitates reform attempts. Or, as we have seen above, Gorbachev's failures to provide leadership with party reformers at the 28th Party Congress and plotters of the attempted coup were crucial.

Problems in transitology, nonetheless, seem to remain. Firstly, transitology tends to restrict our perspective: researchers are likely to consider only events which concern democratisation. Events outside democratisation cannot be treated by transitology. Secondly, since transitology has strategic implication for democratisation, it is difficult for researchers to maintain their objectivity. Even the excellent biography mentioned above seems to be too generous to Gorbachev.¹⁸ Thirdly and most importantly, although strategies by actors are important, its implication that, if the right strategies were applied, the transition would be successful is not plausible. Political actors do not have a free hand in choosing their strategies, that is, the choices of political actors are constrained by structure. The key problem is not what political actors want to do but what they can do. Transitology is not sufficient either.

(C) New Institutionalisms and Marxist View

Our hypothesis of new institutionalism was:

Intra-state structure accumulated friction within the ruling body that led to the final collapse by the failure of reform (new institutionalism).

This hypothesis may be always true. This reminds us of an old maxim: 'Men makes their history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and

¹⁸ Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

transmitted from the past'.¹⁹ In fact, a sociological institutional study of Hungarian party reform begins with this maxim.²⁰

However, besides such very general hypothesis, individual studies that applied new institutionalism are not without problems. Firstly rational choice institutional accounts cannot be supported. A general problem of rational choice institutionalists is the wisdom of hindsight. We now know results, and who got benefits in the end. Rationalists argue that the results were created by beneficiaries who acted rationally in order to maximise their interests.²¹ The Marxist view as well, it seems, made the same mistake. Still, as we have seen in Chapter 5, real history is full of paradoxes. It is not always convincing that beneficiaries (for example, an ex-party-state elite who could transform themselves into an economic elite) consistently sought to maximise their personal interests. Although rationalists' explanations are usually methodologically and theoretically sophisticated, they are frequently far from reality.

Finally sociological institutionalism has a certain potential to broaden our understanding of communist collapse by integrating a structure-centred theory and an actor-centred theory. Nonetheless, there have been only a few attempts so far to do so. In addition, though it emphasises social changes inside political institutions such as 'reds' and 'experts', sociological analysis does not relate it to a specific feature of a political regime. What we need is to understand the interconnection of the two theories: that of the Soviet-type political regime and that of its collapse. We do not have yet any satisfactory theory to explain what the Soviet system was, and how and why it collapsed.

Therefore, we reach an extremely commonplace conclusion: every theory is the case to some degree and every theory is not the case to some degree. It must be remembered that existing theories of political change, especially 'democratisation', are not sufficient. It is necessary to broaden our perspective. My use of the concepts of the *breakdown* of democracy

¹⁹ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1998), p. 15. A Japanese translation is Karu Marukusu, *Rui Bonaparuto no Buryumeru Juhachinichi* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1954), p. 17.

²⁰ O'Neil, *Revolution from Within*, p. xviii.

²¹ M. Steven Fish states that the rationalist argument is 'deeply functionalist'. See M. Steven Fish, 'Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and

was such an attempt. This dissertation could, it seems, demonstrate that these concepts work better than transitology's liberalisation and democratisation.

Nonetheless, probably, in order to subvert existing theories, we need to conceptualise from reality rather than to borrow existing theoretical theorems. As de Tocqueville once said, '[a] new science of politics is needed for a new world'.²² By basing ourselves on reality, we will be able to integrate regime theory and political change theory.

V. Conclusion

Why have two theories developed separately? The reason, it seems to me, lies in theorists' obsession with universality. If we limit the utility of the theory of political change to a specific regime, the theory, of course, loses its broader validity. If so, it is not a 'theory' in a strictly scientific sense. Theorists, therefore, consistently attempt to broaden the validity of their theories. It turns into a large N syndrome now. Even when small N case studies are conducted, they are only for proving the validity of existing theories.²³ Uniqueness of reality simply tends to be ignored.

Nevertheless, history never satisfies theorists' favourite words '*ceteris paribus*'. Reality is always unique and multi-faceted. Some historically significant issues, for example, the Soviet collapse, need to be considered, however unique they are. The task of social science is not to make abstract models but to understand reality. I deliberately did not use the word 'democratisation' in the context of the Soviet and the CPSU collapse in order to escape from a reliance on existing theories. Moreover, I tried to describe events in detail, though they may be dry and detailed, in order to escape the Procrustean bed. This dissertation was a first step for me in understanding a multi-faced Soviet reality. 'The owl of Minerva begins its

Eurasia', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 797-798.


²² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (London: Everyman's Library, 1994), p.7.

²³ See Paul Kubicek, 'Post-communist political studies: ten years later, twenty years behind?' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2000).

flight only with the onset of dusk.’²⁴ In a sense we are only at the starting point for understanding what the Soviet system was, and why and how it collapsed.

²⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23.

Figure 7-1: Overview



Appendix: On the *Nomenklatura* System and *Nomenklatura* as a Social Class

1. Introduction

The *nomenklatura* system had been regarded as the central mechanism for controlling the party hierarchy, the state and society in communist party regimes by many researchers. Thus, it is necessary to think of this more closely than other controlling mechanisms. Through this personnel appointment mechanism, higher party organs ruled lower ones within the party, and, outside the party, the party tried to control the state and society, which made the communist regime almost one huge organisation or 'mono-organisational society'. Strangely enough, however, less attention was paid to this system to explain the collapse of the regime during the *perestroika* period. The reason could be attributed to the fact that other changes including the creation of a presidential system, the power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, an economic crisis, national or ethnic 'resurgence' and others appeared more important and, of course, these were actually important. These affairs gave an impression that the locus of power had moved from the party. Therefore, *nomenklatura*, the party's personnel system, was lost from sight. In addition, before *perestroika* some scholars had tended to treat *nomenklatura* as a *deus ex machina*, that is, they had made an image that everything had depended on the *nomenklatura*. The anti-*nomenklatura*-oriented policy during *perestroika* could not be explained by such an understanding. Less attention might be a reasonable response to such an exaggerated image.

Nonetheless, many studies that discuss elite continuity and turnover have been advanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some of which use the word *nomenklatura*. Then, some questions take place: firstly, what was and is the *nomenklatura*, since the personnel system itself collapsed together with the Soviet Union? Researchers might use the same word in different ways, which, without clarification, makes for confusion and little progress for understanding reality. Secondly, can we argue continuity and turnover without researching the real disintegrating process of *nomenklatura*? Researchers might argue continuity and turnover by analysing only results, which might lead to wisdom of hindsight. For example, some

continuity arguments might give the impression that elite continuity was the result of the *nomenklatura*'s consistent planning to seek its own private interest. It is necessary to trace the disintegrating process of the *nomenklatura* system during the *perestroika* period.¹

We have treated the party control of state organs in Chapter 3 and the intra-party *nomenklatura* in Chapter 4. In this appendix some remaining aspects of the *nomenklatura* are discussed. That is, the origin and structure of the *nomenklatura* system, party's mobilisation of society, and the *nomenklatura* as a social class are discussed.

2. The Structure and Origin of *Nomenklatura*

The word *nomenklatura* has a Latin origin. Therefore, most European languages have a similar vocabulary, for example nomenclature in English. As shown by this word, *nomenklatura* originally meant a list. In the Soviet Union, the party controlled the lists which included important party, state, and social posts and people who were appropriate for the posts. These lists and people were called the *nomenklatura*. Therefore, the *nomenklatura* could indicate both a staffing system and people, which, it seems, caused some confusion.

These *nomenklatura* lists were managed by party committees from the all-union level to raion. Each party committee had its own jurisdiction, which had been changed several times. Let me explain the early structure. At the Central Committee of the CPSU (all-union) level, there were three types of *nomenklatura* list. *Nomenklatura* no.1, which required to be approved by the Central Committee, included the heads of the party's highest bodies, the states posts (e.g.

¹ The author must admit his formulation of argument includes exaggerations. Some scholars try to clarify the meaning of *nomenklatura* and analyse the actual process of its disintegration. For example, Ronald J. Hill and John Löwenhardt, 'Nomenklatura and Perestroika', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1991); David Lane and Cameron Ross, *The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Olga Kryshchanovskaya and Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 5 (1996). In Japanese, Takeshi Yuasa, "Nomenkuratura" Shintoshihyo niyoru Roshiatochi Eritono Bunseki [An Analysis of Cabinets and Russian Governing Elites through the Nomenklatura Saturation Index], *Roshia Toou Gakkai Nenpo* [Annals of the Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies], Vol. 28 (1999ed./ published in 2000).

Supreme Soviet of People's Economy, VSNKh) and others in 1925. *Nomenklatura* no.2 was conducted with the consent of the CC department of Organisation and Assignment. *Nomenklatura* no.3 was a supplementary list to *nomenklatura* no.1 covering 'elective' posts, that is, 'elective' posts were decided before election.² This all-union level *nomenklatura* supervised oblast' leadership (e.g. first secretaries). At republican level, republican CC managed lower level oblast' leadership and some raion and city level leadership. The obkom's responsibility was some oblast level leadership, raion and city level one. In this way, the *nomenklatura* constituted a huge hierarchy.³

When was the *nomenklatura* system established? According to Rigby, there were three preconditions. Firstly, the party apparat had to subordinate soviets, the state apparat and other organisations. However, the party apparat had not substantially existed up to 1919. The 8th party congress decided on the building of a full-time party officialdom. By 1921 the hierarchy of party secretaries became a principal instrument for subordination. Secondly, the party membership needed to be supervised by the party apparat. This took longer than the first precondition because of the Bolshevik tradition of intra-party democracy. Nonetheless, the resolution 'On Party Unity' at the 10th party congress in 1921 led to a crucial step. Thirdly, it was necessary to assemble administrative resources (staffs, data banks, and so forth). Soon after the 8th congress, the Record and Assignment Department of CC was established. This Department enormously developed during 1920-1921. Meeting these preconditions, the *nomenklatura* system was founded in 12 April 1923 when the Orgbureau issued a resolution on the *nomenklatura* no. 1 and 2. Of course, the full establishment of this system took longer.⁴ It seems that this system consolidated around the end of 1920s with the establishment of the

² Tat'yana Petrovna Korzhikhina and Yurii Yr'evich Figatner, 'Sovetskaya nomenklatura: stanovlenie, mekhanizmy deistviya', *Voprosy Istorii*, 1993, No. 7, pp. 26-27.

³ Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1969): pp. 493-512.

⁴ T. H. Rigby, 'The origins of the nomenklatura system', in his *Political Elites in the USSR: Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), pp. 73-93.

Stalinist regime. In addition, as will be discussed later, the stabilisation of people in *nomenklatura* lists was a product of far later period.

3. Party Control over Society

As we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the higher party organs had controlled the lower ones' staffing, and the party had controlled state organs' staffing. In addition to them, party control reached society. For example, Komsomol workers, factory managers, heads of collective farms, a trade union, scientific associations, and universities, and so forth were subjects of *nomenklatura* lists. There was no formal scope for social organisations independent of the party. Matsuzato argues that the reason the party needed such a huge personnel right was as follows. The first is the lack of a modern bureaucracy. Particularly in rural places, population density is remarkably sparse in Russia. The cost of a modern bureaucracy is very high in such places. If a village had 600 residents, only 200 of whom were old enough to work, it would be financially impossible to pay a policeman. The only way to ensure security would be to organise 'voluntary' social work. In addition, the shortage of intellectual workers influences the underdevelopment of a modern bureaucracy. It is not possible to employ a young graduate from a university in a place where youth begins to work around 17 years old. Such a case is not rare in rural places of Russia. Matsuzato added the underdevelopment of a modern financial system as a condition which requires direct mobilisation from society.⁵

Moreover, it seems that ideological requirements cannot be ignored. Matsuzato's argument is appropriate especially in rural areas and explains very well the reason the mobilisation of society by the administration persists today. Nonetheless, as discussed, the *nomenklatura* was a huge hierarchical system from the centre to local areas. Marxist ideology envisaged the total transformation of society. It is natural that the party, the 'vanguard' of society,

⁵ Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Aparato Demokurashi: Roshia no Chusho Toshigun niokeru Seijito Gyousei [Apparatus Democracy: Politics and Administrations in Russian Counties and Small Cities]', *Suravu Kenkyu* [*Slavic Studies*], Vol. 43 (1996), pp. 97-105.

demanding to control every social organisation.

To discuss what happened when the nomenklaturist control over society was removed is beyond the scope of this appendix. Various forms of independent social organisations emerged during the *perestroika* period, some of which played a role of 'civil society', though it seems to me that they were weak, at least compared with Eastern European cases. It is far from clear whether or not they played an important role in the process of *perestroika*.

4. *Nomenklatura* as a Social Class

As easily understood, people in *nomenklatura* lists were elites. Some argue they were even a ruling class.⁶ If so, their social position must have been secured. In this respect, a ruling class differs from a functional elite. The ruling class is distinguished from the rest of society by its stability, privileges, and a peculiar feeling of solidarity, while the functional elite's character is a non-inheritance of its position, its role or function itself, and lack of solidarity. It would be very likely that the *nomenklatura* was different from functional elites in many respects.⁷ Especially, they had privileges. Nonetheless, how stable it was is a controversial topic. Clearly, the *nomenklatura* was not secure during the Stalin or Khrushchev periods. Under Stalin, the *nomenklatura* was frequently a target of purge, and Khrushchev seriously reorganised the party structure. It is not reasonable to regard the *nomenklatura* as a ruling class for all the Soviet period. Nonetheless, Brezhnev's policy of trust in cadres stabilised *nomenklatura* positions. It seems that it was in the Brezhnev period that the *nomenklatura* became a kind of ruling class. Still, whether or not the word 'class' was appropriate is controversial at least in a Marxist sense.

Then, what was the privilege the *nomenklatura* had? Their salary lists are now

⁶ Alec Nove, 'Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?' *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (October 1975); Alec Nove, 'The Class Nature of the Soviet Union Revisited', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 1983); Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class* (London: Bodley Head, 1984).

⁷ Takayuki Ito, 'Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument for Social Control', *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol. 1 (1983), p. 61.

available. Various tables of 3-3 show the salaries of full-time party workers since 1989. This list was made in order to increase the salary of full-time party officials. The Politburo approved the list on 3 August 1989.⁸ Though, unfortunately, these lists do not include the CC secretary's salary, at the 28th party congress, Alla Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, revealed that a Politburo member earned 1200, candidate member received 1100 and CC secretary earned 1000 roubles.⁹ This statement may contradict the salary list, in which the salary of the first secretary of the Ukraine party was 1100 roubles per month, because the person in this post usually became a Politburo member and should accordingly have received 1200 roubles according to Nizovtseva. There may have been salary increases after approving the salary lists. In any case, the salary of the Ukrainian party first secretary is the highest in the lists. The next highest is one of the head of CC departments (1000 roubles).

The salary lists of state officials are also included in TsKhSD, fond 89.¹⁰ This list was made almost at the same time of the party workers' list. The Politburo approved the state officials' salary list on 20 September 1989. This list, unfortunately again, does not include the highest official, the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Still, it seems that its salary was not different from one of the second highest salary post, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Its salary was 1300 roubles per month.¹¹ Other ministers or chairman of state committees earned 1000-900 roubles, which were almost as much as those of the CC departments' heads. The chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers earned 1100 roubles, which was the same as the Ukrainian party first secretary. Thus, we can understand the salaries of the state officials were almost the same as those of equivalent party posts.

⁸ Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 89, perechen' (p.) 9, delo (d.) 13.

⁹ *XXVIII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuz: Stenograficheskii Otchet*, vol. 2 (Moskva: Politizdat, 1991), p. 78.

¹⁰ TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 9, d. 31, pp. 1-46. Incidentally, these lists include basically all state posts from the central to raion level, which makes clear the structure of a state bureaucracy.

¹¹ One strange thing is that the salary, 1300 roubles per month, was to be higher than that of Politburo members (1200 roubles). The reason is not clear.

It is difficult to argue such high rank *nomenklatura*'s privileges in terms of salary. Certainly their salaries were higher than those of ordinary people (the average income, it was reported, was 201 roubles per month in 1987).¹² Still, it seems to me that 1300 roubles was not too high as one of the most privileged persons in the country. It is reasonable to think that the *nomenklatura*'s privileges were not necessarily its salary. Gorbachev briefly refers to other privileges in the Japanese edition of his memoirs. Though his statements are attempts to justify his policy to open special hospitals and sanatoriums to some children and returned soldiers from Afghanistan and so forth, we can recognise high rank officers did have such privileges. Other privileges included special restaurants, cars, and dachas.¹³ Of course, such privileges were not fair. Still it is difficult to decide whether or not they were too much compared with other countries or the current situation of Russia. Some may be sceptical about the widespread image of highly privileged *nomenklatura*.

The importance of the perspective of *nomenklatura* as a ruling class is, it seems, not in the real composition and process of *nomenklatura* but in its influence on political discourse. Once the free area of speech was widened and criticism of the party was allowed, '*nomenklatura*' became a word to distinguish between 'us' and 'them'. *Nomenklatura* became a target of hatred which would include egalitarian anger about privileges and the anti-elite feelings of mass. For example, from a perspective of the *nomenklatura* as a social class, some dissatisfaction with privilege was published early in 1988.¹⁴ This way of thinking may be still influential in Russia (and the author personally believes that criticisms of privileges are more justified at the present time than in the Soviet period). It seems that the current use of the word '*nomenklatura*' implies 'the revolution betrayed,' that is, the unfairness of elite continuity. To investigate this issue is beyond the task of this appendix.

¹² Rikao Kawabata et al eds., *Roshia Soren wo Shiru Jiten* [Cyclopaedia of Russia and the Soviet Union] revised ed. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1994), p. 279.

¹³ Mihairu Gorubachofu, *Gorubachofu Kaisoroku*, Jo (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), pp. 577-579.

¹⁴ 'Izderzhki "Nomenklatury"' *Kommunist*, 1988, No. 5 (March 1988), p. 42.

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